DECISION

TINGA, J.:
On 14 August 2000, a team composed of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) operatives and
inspectors of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) conducted a raid on petitioner Roma Drug, a duly
registered sole proprietorship of petitioner Romeo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) operating a drug store located at
San Matias, Guagua, Pampanga. The raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant[1] issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City. The raiding team seized several imported medicines,
including Augmentin (375mg.) tablets, Orbenin (500mg.) capsules, Amoxil (250mg.) capsules and
Ampiclox (500mg.).[2] It appears that Roma Drug is one of six drug stores which were raided on or around
the same time upon the request of SmithKline Beecham Research Limited (SmithKline), a duly registered
corporation which is the local distributor of pharmaceutical products manufactured by its parent Londonbased corporation. The local SmithKline has since merged with Glaxo Wellcome Phil. Inc to form Glaxo
SmithKline, private respondent in this case. The seized medicines, which were manufactured by
SmithKline, were imported directly from abroad and not purchased through the local SmithKline, the
authorized Philippine distributor of these products.
The NBI subsequently filed a complaint against Rodriguez for violation of Section 4 (in relation to Sections
3 and 5) of Republic Act No. 8203, also known as the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD), with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in San Fernando, Pampanga. The section prohibits the sale of counterfeit
drugs, which under Section 3(b)(3), includes an unregistered imported drug product. The term unregistered
signifies the lack of registration with the Bureau of Patent, Trademark and Technology Transfer of a
trademark, tradename or other identification mark of a drug in the name of a natural or juridical person,
the process of which is governed under Part III of the Intellectual Property Code.
In this case, there is no doubt that the subject seized drugs are identical in content with their Philippineregistered counterparts. There is no claim that they were adulterated in any way or mislabeled at least.
Their classification as counterfeit is based solely on the fact that they were imported from abroad and not
purchased from the Philippine-registered owner of the patent or trademark of the drugs. During
preliminary investigation, Rodriguez challenged the constitutionality of the SLCD. However, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Celerina C. Pineda skirted the challenge and issued a Resolution dated 17 August
2001 recommending that Rodriguez be charged with violation of Section 4(a) of the SLCD. The
recommendation was approved by Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang approved the recommendation.
Hence, the present Petition for Prohibition questing the RTC-Guagua Pampanga and the Provincial
Prosecutor to desist from further prosecuting Rodriguez, and that Sections 3(b)(3), 4 and 5 of the SLCD be
declared unconstitutional. In gist, Rodriguez asserts that the challenged provisions contravene three
provisions of the Constitution. The first is the equal protection clause of the Bill of Rights. The two other
provisions are Section 11, Article XIII, which mandates that the State make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at affordable cost; and Section 15, Article II, which states
that it is the policy of the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them. Through its Resolution dated 15 October 2001, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the trial against Rodriguez, and the BFAD, the NBI
and Glaxo Smithkline from prosecuting the petitioners. Glaxo Smithkline and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) have opposed the petition, the latter in behalf of public respondents RTC, Provincial
Prosecutor and Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD). On the constitutional issue, Glaxo Smithkline asserts the
rule that the SLCD is presumed constitutional, arguing that both Section 15, Article II and Section 11,
Article XIII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. It adds that Section 11, Article XIII in particular cannot be work to the oppression and unlawful of
the property rights of the legitimate manufacturers, importers or distributors, who take pains in having
imported drug products registered before the BFAD. Glaxo Smithkline further claims that the SLCD does
not in fact conflict with the aforementioned constitutional provisions and in fact are in accord with
constitutional precepts in favor of the peoples right to health.
The Office of the Solicitor General casts the question as one of policy wisdom of the law that is, beyond the
interference of the judiciary.[5] Again, the presumption of constitutionality of statutes is invoked, and the
assertion is made that there is no clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution presented by the SLCD.
The constitutional aspect of this petition raises obviously interesting questions. However, such questions
have in fact been mooted with the passage in 2008 of Republic Act No. 9502, also known as the Universally
Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008.

Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 9502 amends Section 72 of the Intellectual Property Code in that the later law
unequivocally grants third persons the right to import drugs or medicines whose patent were registered in
the Philippines by the owner of the product
Sec. 7. Section 72 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 72. Limitations of Patent Rights. The owner of a patent has no right to prevent third parties from
performing, without his authorization, the acts referred to in Section 71 hereof in the following
circumstances:
72.1. Using a patented product which has been put on the market in the Philippines by the owner of the
product, or with his express consent, insofar as such use is performed after that product has been so put
on the said market: Provided, That, with regard to drugs and medicines, the limitation on patent rights
shall apply after a drug or medicine has been introduced in the Philippines or anywhere else in the world
by the patent owner, or by any party authorized to use the invention: Provided, further, That the right to
import the drugs and medicines contemplated in this section shall be available to any government agency
or any private third party.
72.2. Where the act is done privately and on a non-commercial scale or for a non-commercial purpose:
Provided, That it does not significantly prejudice the economic interests of the owner of the patent;
72.3. Where the act consists of making or using exclusively for experimental use of the invention for
scientific purposes or educational purposes and such other activities directly related to such scientific or
educational experimental use;
72.4. In the case of drugs and medicines, where the act includes testing, using, making or selling the
invention including any data related thereto, solely for purposes reasonably related to the development
and submission of information and issuance of approvals by government regulatory agencies required
under any law of the Philippines or of another country that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or
sale of any product: Provided, That, in order to protect the data submitted by the original patent holder
from unfair commercial use provided in Article 39.3 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), the Intellectual Property Office, in consultation with the
appropriate government agencies, shall issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary therein not
later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the enactment of this law;
72.5. Where the act consists of the preparation for individual cases, in a pharmacy or by a medical
professional, of a medicine in accordance with a medical shall apply after a drug or medicine has been
introduced in the Philippines or anywhere else in the world by the patent owner, or by any party authorized
to use the invention: Provided, further, That the right to import the drugs and medicines contemplated in
this section shall be available to any government agency or any private third party; xxx[7]
The unqualified right of private third parties such as petitioner to import or possess unregistered imported
drugs in the Philippines is further confirmed by the Implementing Rules to Republic Act No. 9502
promulgated on 4 November 2008.[8] The relevant provisions thereof read: Rule 9. Limitations on Patent
Rights. The owner of a patent has no right to prevent third parties from performing, without his
authorization, the acts referred to in Section 71 of the IP Code as enumerated hereunder:
(i) Introduction in the Philippines or Anywhere Else in the World.
Using a patented product which has been put on the market in the Philippines by the owner of the product,
or with his express consent, insofar as such use is performed after that product has been so put on the
said market: Provided, That, with regard to drugs and medicines, the limitation on patent rights shall apply
after a drug or medicine has been introduced in the Philippines or anywhere else in the world by the patent
owner, or by any party authorized to use the invention: Provided, further, That the right to import the
drugs and medicines contemplated in this section shall be available to any government agency or any
private third party. (72.1)
The drugs and medicines are deemed introduced when they have been sold or offered for sale anywhere
else in the world. (n) It may be that Rep. Act No. 9502 did not expressly repeal any provision of the SLCD.
However, it is clear that the SLCOs classification of unregistered imported drugs as counterfeit drugs, and
of corresponding criminal penalties therefore are irreconcilably in the imposition conflict with Rep. Act No.
9502 since the latter indubitably grants private third persons the unqualified right to import or otherwise
use such drugs. Where a statute of later date, such as Rep. Act No. 9502, clearly reveals an intention on
the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject that intention must be given effect.[9]
When a subsequent enactment covering a field of operation coterminus with a prior statute cannot by any
reasonable construction be given effect while the prior law remains in operative existence because of
irreconcilable conflict between the two acts, the latest legislative expression prevails and the prior law

yields to the extent of the conflict.[10] Irreconcilable inconsistency between two laws embracing the same
subject may exist when the later law nullifies the reason or purpose of the earlier act, so that the latter
loses all meaning and function.[11] Legis posteriors priores contrarias abrogant. For the reasons abovestated, the prosecution of petitioner is no longer warranted and the quested writ of prohibition should
accordingly be issued. Had the Court proceeded to directly confront the constitutionality of the assailed
provisions of the SLCD, it is apparent that it would have at least placed in doubt the validity of the
provisions. As written, the law makes a criminal of any person who imports an unregistered drug
regardless of the purpose, even if the medicine can spell life or death for someone in the Philippines. It
does not accommodate the situation where the drug is out of stock in the Philippines, beyond the reach of
a patient who urgently depends on it. It does not allow husbands, wives, children, siblings, parents to
import the drug in behalf of their loved ones too physically ill to travel and avail of the meager personal
use exemption allotted by the law. It discriminates, at the expense of health, against poor Filipinos without
means to travel abroad to purchase less expensive medicines in favor of their wealthier brethren able to do
so. Less urgently perhaps, but still within the range of constitutionally protected behavior, it deprives
Filipinos to choose a less expensive regime for their health care by denying them a plausible and safe
means of purchasing medicines at a cheaper cost.
The absurd results from this far-reaching ban extends to implications that deny the basic decencies of
humanity. The law would make criminals of doctors from abroad on medical missions of such humanitarian
organizations such as the International Red Cross, the International Red Crescent, Medicin Sans Frontieres,
and other like-minded groups who necessarily bring their own pharmaceutical drugs when they embark on
their missions of mercy. After all, they are disabled from invoking the bare personal use exemption afforded
by the SLCD. Even worse is the fact that the law is not content with simply banning, at civil costs, the
importation of unregistered drugs. It equates the importers of such drugs, many of whom motivated to do
so out of altruism or basic human love, with the malevolents who would alter or counterfeit pharmaceutical
drugs for reasons of profit at the expense of public safety. Note that the SLCD is a special law, and the
traditional treatment of penal provisions of special laws is that of malum prohibitumor punishable
regardless of motive or criminal intent. For a law that is intended to help save lives, the SLCD has revealed
itself as a heartless, soulless legislative piece.
The challenged provisions of the SLCD apparently proscribe a range of constitutionally permissible
behavior. It is laudable that with the passage of Rep. Act No. 9502, the State has reversed course and
allowed for a sensible and compassionate approach with respect to the importation of pharmaceutical
drugs urgently necessary for the peoples constitutionally-recognized right to health.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part. A writ of prohibition is hereby ISSUED commanding
respondents from prosecuting petitioner Romeo Rodriguez for violation of Section 4 or Rep. Act No. 8203.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated 15 October 2001 is hereby made PERMANENT. No pronouncements
as to costs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and the HONG KONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION(HSBC) v. JOSE VERA, Judge
ad interim
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CUUNJIENG (65 Phil 56)November 16, 1937FACTS:The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Manila,with HSBC
intervening in the case as private prosecutor.The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penaltyranging from
four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prison mayor.
(Jan. 8, 1934)Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prison
correccional
to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor butaffirmed the judgments in all other
respects.Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial whichwere all
denied on December 17, 1935. Final judgment was entered on Dec. 18, 1935. He filedfor certiorari to the
Supreme Court but got denied on Nov 1936. The SC subsequently denied Cu
Unjiengs petition for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsider
ation or new trial,then remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of judgment.-

Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of Act4221 of the
defunct Philippine Legislature. He states he is innocent of the crime; he has nocriminal record; and that he
would observe good conduct in the future.CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing for probation on April 5, 1937.HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such hearings and assailed the constitutionalityof the
Probation Act since it violates the equal protection of laws and gives unlawful andimproper delegation to
provincial boards.Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in those provinces wherein theprobationary
officer is granted salary not lower than provincial fiscals by respective provincialboards.The City Fiscal of Manila files a supplementary petition affirming issues raised by HSBC, arguingthat
probation is a form of reprieve, hence Act 4221 bypasses this exclusive power of the Chief Executive.Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.ISSUES:1.
Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings;2.
If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is constitutional based on these three grounds:a.
It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executiveb.
It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powerc.
It denies the equal protection of the lawsHELD/RATIO:1.
Yes. Constitutional questions will not be determined by the courts unless properly raised andpresented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, lis mota.Constitutionality issues may be
raised in prohibition and certiorari proceedings, as they may alsobe raised in mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus proceedings. The general rule states

IMELDA MARCOS, petitioner, vs., The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS; Honorable Judge
GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., the Presiding Judge of Branch 26 of the RTC at Manila; and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
In a petition for review on certiorari filed on November 5, 1996, petitioner Imelda R. Marcos prays this
Court to set aside the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 on
May 23, 1996, as well as its resolution of September 27, 1996 denying her motion for the reconsideration
of the judgment in said case.[1]
Preliminary, her motion for extension of time to file this petition was denied for non-compliance with
Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 19-91 because the affidavit of service, although otherwise
sufficient in form and substance, was not signed by the affiant, and the registry receipt proving service of a
copy of said motion to the Solicitor General was not attached thereto. Hence, the petition subsequently
filed by her was dismissed for having been filed out of time in this Courts resolution of November 27, 1996.
[2]

Petitioner then moved for reconsideration, explaining the cause for the procedural lapses and contending
that, on the merits, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; that no offenses actually
charged or that the facts alleged do not constitute the imputed offenses; and, consequently, that the
court a quo gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to quash.
Considering the number of criminal cases filed against petitioner, relief from which is sought in the petition
at bar and the issues wherein may possibly be raised again in other cases of a similar nature, the Court
resolved on February 24, 1997 to require the Solicitor General to comment thereon, in order that the
adjudication of petitioners plaints may not go off only on procedural points. In due time, such comment
was filed, albeit in abbreviated form, the Solicitor General correctly pointing out that all the substantive
issues now being raised before us had also been extensively argued in and resolved by respondent
appellate court.
Indeed, an overall review of the allegations in the present petition reveals that the same are merely a
rehash of those already submitted to respondent court and that this petition is apparently a reprise of the
certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 filed in the Court of Appeals.
For facility of presentation, therefore, we need merely to reproduce herein the findings in the assailed
decision of respondent appellate court, which are fully sustained by the records, excluding therefrom those
cases pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 (except when involved in the narration of the antecedents of this

case) which was jointly resolved by it but from which no appeals or other recourse was taken by the
petitioners therein.
We accordingly give credit to respondent court and adopt its recital of the antecedents of the instant
petition, to wit:
In CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, petitioner Marcos assails the Order dated June 9, 1994 which denied her Motion
to Quash the eight (8) informations filed against her in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 91-101732 to
91-101739 and the other fourteen (14) informations filed against her, Benedicto and Rivera in the
consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101892, and Order dated August 30, 1994 which denied
her Motion for Reconsideration.
xxx
On October 21, 1983, pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution Nos. 1632 and 1718 dated September 30,
1983 and October 21, 1983, respectively, the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas) issued Circular No. 960. The circular, which consolidated the various rules and regulations
promulgated by the CB concerning foreign exchange non-trade transactions including those on gold and
silver, prohibits in its Section 4 residents, firms, association, or corporations from maintaining foreign
exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the CB or without being permitted by CB
regulations; and requires in Section 10 thereof all residents who habitually earn or receive foreign
exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad to submit reports of such earnings or receipts in prescribed
form with the proper CB department and to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the CB
within 90 days from October 21, 1983. Violation of the provisions of the circular is punishable as a criminal
offense under Section 34 of R.A. No.265, as amended (the Central Bank Act).
On December 20, 1991 or nearly six years after the 1986 EDSA Revolution which toppled the Marcos
regime, Marcos was, for allegedly opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad on various
dates from 1968 to 1991 without prior authorization from the CB or otherwise allowed by CB regulations,
charged with violating Section 4 of CB Circular 960 before the RTC of Manila in eight (8) essentially
identically worded informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101732 to 101739, one of which reads
as follows:
That from 1968 to June 6, 1991, both dates inclusive, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with her
late husband, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while both residing in Malacaang Palace in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously open and maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad, particularly in Swiss Bank
Corporation (SBC) in Geneva, Switzerland, in the name of Maler Establishment, later transformed into
Maler Foundation, which was organized by their dummies, nominees, fronts, agents or duly appointed
administrators among them Jean Louis Sunier who received instructions from the accused and her husband
who signed with their alias JOHN LEWIS in order to maintain two accounts, one of which is Account No.
98929 NY under Maler II with a balance of SF 16,195,258.00, without prior permission from the Central
Bank of the Philippines, and such act of maintaining foreign account abroad was not permitted under
Central Bank regulations.
- (Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No.35719, pp. 45-46)
The wordings of the other seven (7) informations differed only in the dates of commission of the offense
charged, the name/s of the dummy/dummies, the balance of the foreign exchange accounts maintained
abroad and the name/s of the foreign bank/s where such accounts were maintained.
Likewise, for allegedly failing to submit a report of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or to
register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the CB within the period mandated by Section 10 of CB
Circular No. 960, Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera were similarly indicted on December 27, 1991 for violation
of Section 10, CB Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act in five (5) informations
filed with the RTC of Manila which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 91-101883. On the
same date, nine (9) more informations essentially charging the same offense were filed with the RTC of
Manila, but this time only against Marcos and Benedicto, which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91101884 to 91-101892. One of the informations reads:
That from September 21, 1983 up to December 26, 1985, both dates inclusive, and for sometime
thereafter, all accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and with the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residing and/or doing business in Manila, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and assisted by their foreign agent or attorney-in-fact Stephen G. Cattaui, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to submit reports in the prescribed form and/or register with
the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within 90 days from October 21, 1983 as required of
them being residents habitually/customarily earning, acquiring/receiving foreign exchange from whatever

source or from invisibles locally or from abroad, despite the fact that they actually earned interests
regularly for their investment of FIFTEEN MILLION ($15-million) DOLLARS, U.S. Currency, in Philippineissued dollar-denominated treasury notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name of Banque de
Paris et des Pays-Bas (also known as Banque Paribas) in Geneva, Switzerland but which was transferred on
May 17, 1984 to Lombard, Odier et Cie, a bank also in Geneva, for the account of COGES 00777 being
managed by Mr. Stephane Cattaui for the marcoses who also arranged the said investment of $15-million
through respondents Roberto S. Benedicto and Hector T. Rivera by using the Royal Traders Bank in Manila
as the custodian of the said dollar-denominated treasury notes, which earned, acquired or received for the
accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an interest of $13,229.16 for delay (December
16-19, 1995) plus redemption of $15-million which was remitted to Lombard, Odier et Cie through Chicago
International Banking Corporation in New York, United States of America, for the credit of said Account
COGES 00777 of the Marcoses for further investment outside the Philippines without first complying with
the reporting/registering requirements of the Central Bank.
- (Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, pp. 45-46)
On January 3, 1992, eleven (11) more informations for alleged violation of the aforesaid Section 10, CB
Circular 960 were filed against Marcos and Benedicto with the same court which were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969.
xxx
All these thirty-three (33) cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the RTC of Manila presided by
herein public respondent Judge Loja, Sr.
Marcos was arraigned on February 12, 1992 while Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned on February 28,
1994.
During the pendency of these cases, CB Circular No. 1318 (Revised Manual of Rules and Regulations
Governing Non-Trade Foreign Exchange Transactions) dated January 3, 1992 and CB Circular No. 1353
(Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) dated August 24, 1992 were issued by the CB. CB
Circular No. 1318 repeals insofar as inconsistent therewith all existing provisions of CB Circular No. 960,
among other circulars, while CB Circular No. 1353 repeals all the provisions of Chapter X of CB Circular No.
1318 only insofar as they are inconsistent therewith.Both circulars, however, contain a saving clause
excepting from the circular pending criminal actions involving violations of CB Circular No. 960 and CB
Circular No. 1318. (Italics supplied)
Invoking the abovementioned repeal as one of her grounds, Marcos filed a Motion to Quash on May 23,
1994 seeking the dismissal of the cases or the quashal of the informations filed against her in Criminal
Case Nos. 91-101732 to 91-101739 and 91-101879 to 91-101892. Respondent People of the Philippines
opposed the same on June 2, 1994. [3]
Petitioners Marcos aforesaid motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated June 9, 1994 and her
motion for reconsideration was likewise repudiated in an order of August 30, 1994. She then filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals ascribing abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent trial judge. What transpired there is best taken from the account thereof in the following
portion of the impugned decision of respondent appellate court.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, Marcos relied on two grounds in taking respondent court to task, to wit: (1)
respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; and (2) respondent court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Quash.
Anent the first ground, Marcos argues that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the cases as the
informations clearly allege that the acts complained of were committed outside Philippine territory, and
that her constitutional right to equal protection of the laws was violated, the saving clause contained in CB
Circular No. 1318 which repealed CB Circular No. 960 being patently discriminatory as it was purposedly
designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her and her co-accused.
As to the second ground, Marcos argues that the facts alleged in the informations, even if true, do not
constitute offenses and that in any event the offenses charged have disappeared due to repeal.
Marcos asseverates that the saving clause (Section 111, Chapter X) of CB Circular No. 1318 is invalid since
the Monetary Board has no authority to except therefrom pending criminal prosecutions, the power being
purely legislative and is not expressly granted in its charter; that even assuming ad arguendo that the
Monetary Board has the power, the same is still invalid for being an encroachment and an invalid
delegation thereof, the power to declare what constitutes a crime and how it should be punished being
vested solely and exclusively in the legislature; that even further assuming that there is no invalid
delegation of power to incorporate the saving clause, it is still invalid for being ultra vires as it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the Central Bank Act which is to stabilize the monetary system; and

in any event, even if the power is unquestioned, the clause is still invalid for being violative of the equal
protection of (t)he law clause of the constitution, it having been designed solely for the purpose of
preserving the criminal cases against her and her co-accused.
As regards the assertion that the facts alleged in the informations do not constitute an offense, Marcos
contends that since the allegations unequivocally state that foreign foundations or trust, not the Marcoses,
opened and maintained the subject Swiss accounts and earned and received the interest therefrom, she
has no duty to report any earnings and if at all, she was a mere beneficiary of the foreign foundations or
trusts; and that the acts having been committed abroad, they are beyond the jurisdiction of respondent
court.
xxx
Petitioners do not dispute the validity of CB Circular No. 960, the law under which they are being
prosecuted, and of CB Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 which they allege repealed CB Circular No. 960, nor do
they challenge the authority of the Monetary Board to issue them.
Petitioners likewise do not dispute that violation of Section 4 of CB Circular No. 960, as amended, which
provides:
SEC. 4. Foreign exchange retention abroad. No person shall promote, finance, enter into or participate in
any foreign exchange transactions where the foreign exchange involved is paid, retained, delivered or
transferred abroad while the corresponding pesos are paid for or are received in the Philippines, except
when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or otherwise allowed under Central Bank regulations.
Residents, firms, associations, or corporations unless otherwise permitted under CB regulations are
prohibited from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad.
Or of section 10 thereof, the pertinent portions of which provide:
SEC. 10. Reports of foreign exchange earners. All resident persons who habitually/customarily earn,
acquire, or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad, shall submit reports in the
prescribed form of such earnings, acquisition or receipts with the appropriate CB department. Those
required to submit reports under this section shall include, but need not necessarily be limited to the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
Residents, firms or establishments habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or receiving foreign exchange
from sales of merchandise, services or from whatever source shall register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within ninety (90) days from the date of this Circular.
is punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act the pertinent portion of which
provides:
SEC. 34 Proceedings upon violation of laws and regulations. -- Whenever any person or entity wilfully
violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation issued by the Monetary Board, the person or
persons responsible for such violation shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos
and by imprisonment of not more than five years.[4]
In respondent Court of Appeals, however, it was petitioners insistent position that violations of CB Circular
No. 960, specifically Sections 4 and 10 thereof, ceased to be punishable upon the issuance in 1992 of CB
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353, on the theory that the latter circulars completely repealed the former, and
that the reservations made in each of the repealing clauses of the latter circulars are invalid. She now
reiterates the same contentions before us. Respondent appellate court rejected her thesis on this score; we
are sufficiently persuaded to do likewise.
The saving clause in CB Circular No. 1318, which petitioner questions, provides:
SEC. 111. Repealing Clause. All existing provisions of Circulars 363, 960 and 1028, including amendments
thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other
existing Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, however, that
regulations, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be
considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood
that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action
accrued shall govern (Italics ours).
The assailed saving clause in CB Circular No. 1353 is as follows:
SEC. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. All the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318
insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this circular, shall remain in full
force and effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which
has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending

actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or
investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the
regulations existing at the time of the cause of action accrued shall govern (Italics also supplied).
We agree with respondent appellate court that such amendments and saving clauses are valid and were
authorized enactments under a delegated power of the Monetary Board. Section 14 of the Central Bank Act
expressly grants the Monetary Board the power to prepare and issue rules and regulations necessary for
the effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the powers assigned to the Monetary Board
and to the Central Bank under this Act, and to report the same thereafter to the President and Congress. In
fact, this power of subordinate legislation and its validity was admitted by petitioner in the respondent
appellate court.[5]
It cannot be plausibly claimed that there was undue delegation of legislative power in this particular
instance since it was the Central Bank itself which defined the offense and provided the penalty
therefor. As respondent Court of Appeals points out, administrative bodies have the authority to issue
administrative regulations which are penal in nature where the law itself makes the violation of the
administrative regulation punishable and provides for its penalty. [6] This is still the rule on the matter and,
in the instant case, the Central Bank Act defined the offense and its penalty while the questioned circular
merely spelled out the details of the offense. Ironically, petitioner concedes the greater power of the Board
to repeal CB Circular No. 960 through CB Circular No. 1318, yet she inexplicably questions the lesser and
incidental power to provide for saving clauses therein.
Petitioners argument that the saving clauses are not germane to the purposes of the Central Bank Act, and
consequently ultra vires, has been roundly confuted by respondent Court of Appeals. If, as she claims, one
of the objectives of that law is to stabilize the monetary system, that is precisely why Congress punished
as criminal offenses the violations of the issuance of the Monetary Board necessary for the effective
discharged of its responsibilities, and to carry out which the Board deemed it necessary to provide for the
challenged saving clauses. Obviously, these saving clauses were dictated by the need to continue the
prosecution of those who had already committed acts of monetary destabilization. The opposite view
posited by petitioner would result in an absurdity.
Her lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and
her co-accused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures
belied by even the text of the circulars alone.Hence, as respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the
foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioners claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law
was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she may always adduce additional
evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage therefor, and not at their present posture.
Lastly, there is no need for us to tarry on petitioners hypothesis that the acts charged in the questioned
informations were committed by foreign agents or juridical persons outside Philippine territory and that,
she being supposedly a mere beneficiary, this scenario divests the trial court of jurisdiction over her
insofar as the violations resulting from such acts abroad are concerned. This is too simplistic an argument
because it would have the Court assume that she only had a passive participation thereon or, if she is to
be believed, none at all.
That is why respondent Court of Appeals decided to just graciously quote, in refutation of such imposition
on judicial credulity, the perceptively succinct observation of respondent trial judge, to wit:
x x x In no uncertain terms, the corresponding informations clearly state that the accused, in conspiracy
with the late president x x x opened and maintained foreign accounts abroad in the name of foundations
organized by their dummies. The same observation holds true in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879-92 where
the accused and her co-accused are charged (with) violation of section 10, CB Circular 960. As easily
gleaned therefrom, (the) criminal informations are not only sufficient but clear in alleging that the accused
earned foreign exchange without proper reporting therof although camouflaged in the name of
foundations.
xxx
x x x accuseds contention that the acts charged were committed by persons or agents who managed said
foundation outside the country and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this court is misplaced
argument. As already stated and discussed, it is the accused who (was alleged to have)maintained foreign
accounts and earned foreign exchange abroad camouflaged in the name of foreign agents and/or
foundations but neither obtained authority to do so nor reported the earnings to the Central Bank. [7] (Words
in parenthesis supplied).
All the way from the trial court, through the Court of Appeals, and now before this court, petitioner has
insistently repeated the selfsame issues and arguments for the quashal of the charges against her, with

the result that the same have been deep-frozen since 1991. Inevitably, the three-tiered adjudicature to
which they have been subjected has merely resulted in reiterations by the parties of their set issues,
congealed arguments and invariable conclusions.
It is time then to thaw those cases from the frigidity of their present status so that petitioner may have the
opportunity to prove her defenses on the merits, instead of having those cases indefinitely sidelined by
legal strategy contingent on expectancies. For, in the present posture thereof, it does not appear that
respondent Court of Appeals has committed any abuse of discretion, much less of a grave or arbitrary
nature, as would call for the extraordinary writ of certiorari. We accordingly uphold the denial of petitioners
motion to quash so that the interlocutory proceedings may now move on to trial wherein she can present
such evidence as may possibly place her protestations in another light as she claims.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the challenged judgment of respondent Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao
City, respondents.
Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional
Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the
attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder 1 and attempted murder 2 were
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an
Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975,
otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused
from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours).
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, 3 relying on Section 42 of
P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on
our ruling in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan. 5 In his order dated December 14,
1993 6 respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused
shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial was, likewise, denied. 7 Hence, the petition for certiorari andmandamus to set aside the orders of
respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under
the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of
the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days,
considering that while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave
felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until
the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same section mandates that the case, which shall be
subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads:
Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department.
he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which
limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:
Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative
case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining
authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a
presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That

when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent,
the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law
and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the
requirements in
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is
terminated" and the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be
taken together to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive
suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment.
We disagree.
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It
gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave
offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The
suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section
providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or
limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused
be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be
terminated within ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the
Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal 8 or civil
liability. 9 If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his
right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the
court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition
ormandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. 10
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it
refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases,
as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days.
Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all
personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as
the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to
ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently,
that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the
case is terminated.
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in
violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:
Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after
an information was filed against him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices
Act. He had been suspended for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive
suspension. We held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal protection clause" and
shortened his term of office. Thus:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire
until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his

functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been
unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people
are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of
them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either
case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance,
however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were
acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a
case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the
people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In
that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had
outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite
manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal
protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local
Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is
allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In
all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." It
may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government
officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the opinion
of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing
administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation
where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due
hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law." Further: "In the
guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed
without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Clearly
then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In
this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal
protection guarantee. 11
The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who
was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court,
faced with similar factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the
principles of due process and equal protection."
It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused
in Laynoand Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such
that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due
process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal
Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that
his suspension shall last until the case is terminated. The succeeding sentence of the same section
requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse
of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90)
days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the
law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined from
the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 12
Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the
bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is
concerned becomes all the more clear. We quote:
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?" What is this all
about?
REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative, no. Now, if it is charged with a
crime, regular courts.
SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.
REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a
complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law is six years and one day or more, the court shall immediately suspend
the accused from the office until the case is terminated."
REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one day or more.
SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . .?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 Preventive Suspension.
REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case at may baril pa rin at
nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang natatakot iyong mga witnesses.
SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.
REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case." Okay ito but I think we should also
mandate the early termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba "the suspension of the accused from
office until the case is terminated?" Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa ating bansa e.
REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a case can be, as Rene pointed out,
can run to six years bago
ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we should mandate. . .
REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period.
REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?
REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall also be terminated
in one year from the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon.
REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as directory even if you put
it in the law?
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a particular situation.
SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety days.
REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of these, well, looks exactly the same
thing.
SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We are really keen on having it
quick, swift.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.
REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.
REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan, the preventive
suspension is only ninety days. In no case shall it go beyond ninety days which can also be applicable here
because this is a preventive suspension.
SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.
SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case filed against a policeman may be antigraft in nature. . .
SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it?
REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is for criminal cases. I know anti-graft
is a criminal case but here we are talking, let's say, of murder, rape, treason, robbery. That's why it is in
that context that there is a difference between a purely anti-graft case and a criminal case which could be
a serious case since it is six years and one day or more, so it must be already a grave felony.
xxx xxx xxx
REP. ALBANO. . . .

What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the

Veloso case.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am saying. The feeling here is, for
policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal case.
What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is terminated, but
he just wants some administrative balancing to expedite it. So let us study what kind of language could be
done along that line. So just on the National Police Commission . . .
SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.
SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not later than . . ."
whatever we agree.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.
So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police Commission. . . . . . 13
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the
PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and
which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned
is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case
is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus
easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as
the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial
differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of the same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as
violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable
considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither
unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED
227 SCRA 703 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Franking Privilege of
the Judiciary
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking
privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies
to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service
comes from the judiciarys use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal
service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC
issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA
7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary
needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense
allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the
removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if
the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then
they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem

is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all
agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it
for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those
favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is
not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of
the government but still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely relies on the mailing of
court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law
prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but
violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec
35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of
the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason
why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and PATERNO
PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor
Eduardo C. Abaya for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners, five in number, for their release from
imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other crimes, they
would invoke the People v. Hernandez1 doctrine, negating the existence of such an offense, a ruling that
unfortunately for them was not handed down until after their convictions had become final. Nor is this the
first instance, a proceeding of this character was instituted, as in Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons,2 likewise a
petition for habeas corpus, a similar question was presented. The answer given was in the negative.
Petitioners plead for a new look on the matter. They would premise their stand on the denial of equal
protection if their plea would not be granted. Moreover they did invoke the codal provision that judicial
decisions shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines, 3 necessarily resulting in the conclusion that
the Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the
Revised Penal Code as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their application a final
sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the same." 4 These arguments carry considerable
persuasion. Accordingly we find for petitioners, without going so far as to overrule Pomeroy.
Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion
perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.
Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the
same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on December
15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each of
the petitioners has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions. Each of them has
served more than 13 years.5
Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez, 6 as above noted, this Court ruled that the information against the
accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no such complex offense. 7 In the recently-decided case
of People vs. Lava,8 we expressly reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of the
Solicitor General for the abandonment of such doctrine. It is the contention of each of the petitioners that
he has served, in the light of the above, more than the maximum penalty that could have been imposed
upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being illegal. 9

The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas corpus proceeding
prompted petitioners, as had been mentioned, to ask that it be appraised anew and, if necessary,
discarded. We can resolve the present petition without doing so. The plea there made was unconvincing,
there being a failure to invoke the contentions now pressed vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W.
Diokno, as to the existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to raise a serious
jurisdictional question and the retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable to one already
sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code. To repeat, these two grounds carry
weight. We have to grant this petition.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus under the
circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of restraint and detention be
avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes
on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation
of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If there be a
valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any
deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment.
Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights provision" in the
fundamental law.10 Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as "one of the principal safeguards to
personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against
arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered." 12 Burdick
echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important bulwarks of liberty." 13 Fraenkel
made it unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of no avail." 14 Thereby the rule of law is
assured.
A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of liberty coupled with its
limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief Justices Arellano, 15 Avancea, 16 Abad
Santos, 17Paras, 18 Bengzon, 19 and the present Chief Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to
emphasize quite a few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, 21 the
remedy came in handy to challenge the validity of the order of the then respondent Mayor of Manila who,
for the best of reasons but without legal justification, ordered the transportation of more than 150 inmates
of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring to the writ of habeas corpus as having been devised and
existing "as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint" the opinion of
Justice Malcolm continued: "The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 22
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions even if presented in pleadings
on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v. Quilen, 23 where this Court, again through
Justice Malcolm, stated: "As standing alone the petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its
allegations, this court, on its motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case
entitled Thomas Casey, et al. v. George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v.
Rivera, 25 to whom is traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the operation of the writ, that a
disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused if
"restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom." 26
So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall put the matter thus: "The writ of
habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause." Then there is this affirmation from an
1869 decision 28 of the then Chief Justice Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries
esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The passing of the years has only
served to confirm its primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty. Only the other year, Justice Fortas
spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument
for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. ... The scope and flexibility
of the writ its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention its ability to cut through barriers of
form and procedural mazes have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility
essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." 29 Justice Fortas
explicitly made reference to Blackstone, who spoke of it as "the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of
illegal confinement." Implicit in his just estimate of its pre-eminent role is his adoption of Holmes' famous

dissent in Frank v. Mangum: 30 "But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the
structure."
2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained, the
range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. 31 That principle dates back to
1902, 32 when this Court announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the person detained was in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate. This is understandable, as during
the time the Philippines was under American rule, there was necessarily an adherence to authoritative
doctrines of constitutional law there followed.
One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional defect. As summarized by
Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only ground on which this court, or any court,
without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction
and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or
some other matter rendering its proceedings void." 33
There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in mind. Once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction
and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 34
3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection.
According to their petition: "In the case at bar, the petitioners were convicted by Courts of First Instance for
the very same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted. The law under which
they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not
been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can we, in conscience, allow
petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?" 35
They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people similarly situated were
not similarly dealt with. What is required under this required constitutional guarantee is the uniform
operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 36
The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued incarceration after the
twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our controlling
doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal
protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would
happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one
being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would
be made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as noted in the petition before us, after our ruling
in People v. Lava, petitioners who were mere followers would be made to languish in jail for perhaps the
rest of their natural lives when the leaders had been duly considered as having paid their penalty to
society, and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.
4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect. In support of their contention,
petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, 37 U.S. vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v. Almencion, 39 People v. Moran, 40 and People
v. Parel. 41 While reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but to legislative acts,
petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a
case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was previously noted, the Civil Code
provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of
our legal system. Petitioners would even find support in the well-known dictum of Bishop Hoadley:
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first thought or spoke them." It is to be admitted
that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as well as the jurist John Chipman Gray,
were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of the above observations. We do not have to go

that far though. Enough for present purposes that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if
they do not call for, a retroactive application.
It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect petitioners had
served the full term for which they could have been legally committed, is habeas corpus the appropriate
remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as 1910 the prevailing doctrine was announced
in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45Thus: "The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes
punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and
some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the
rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has
served out so much of the sentence as was valid." 46 There is a reiteration of such a principle in Director v.
Director of Prisons 47where it was explicitly announced by this Court "that the only means of giving
retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ of habeas corpus." 48 While
the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the remedy of habeas
corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by the
retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained
the burden of justifying their release.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that petitioners be forthwith set at
liberty

LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco
Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos.
23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary proofs, are as
follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank
robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the AntiBank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the
Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management
Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential AntiCrime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M.
Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually
transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between
the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of
investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate
the incident. This panel later absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly
involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police
operation.[1]
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panels
finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents,
including herein petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman,
except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11)
informations for murder[2] before the Sandiganbayans Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations,[3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion
for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action.[4]
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven
(11) amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an
accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused[6] was
dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. [7] They contend
that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
"principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the
rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the
amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG
27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
dissenting,[9] the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none
of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases
should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction
cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 [10] and No.
1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well
as Senate Bill No. 844[12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others,
to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal
accused in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 [13]. The law is entitled, AN ACT
FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. It took effect on February 25, 1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution[14] denying the motion for
reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996.
On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de
Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the
President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of
the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now
granting, the Special Prosecutors motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxxxxxxxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has
not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued this court has
competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted the
Amended Informations in these cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither
concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases. [16] [Emphasis
supplied]
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of
the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that:

a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was
made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months
the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and
frustrate the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar
circumstances in which petitioners cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as
provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post
facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047 23057 to
procedural due process
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and
7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the
one-title-one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.[17]
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that while Republic Act No. 8249
innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of
Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post
facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before
the Sandiganbayan.[18] They further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right
to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to
the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate pleadings in support of the
constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and
the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file simultaneously within
a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of
whether the subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently alleged
the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic
Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the
required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That
burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which
provides:
SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall
have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provision in Article XI,
Section 4:
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 [21] created
the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were
enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No. 1860,[24] P.D. No. 1861,[25] R.A.
No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No.
8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgment, resolution or orders
of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court
of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with theSandiganbayan. In all cases
elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases
filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers
or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of high rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade 27,
or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxxxxxxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers
or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan
shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word principal before the word accused appearing
in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of
the word principal that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court,
not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the Subject criminal cases since none of
the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent[28] or higher. On
the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent
the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, [29] contends that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a
violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on
ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),
[30]
(d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), [31] or (e) other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the
offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee[32] holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony
punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense
is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office. The phrase
other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one
of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in
paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the
accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A.
8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the
criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection
of the law[33] because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in
the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by
the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by
law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. [34]
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class, [35]
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and
reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected
by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial
had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences.[36] In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter
the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the
constitutional limitations,[37] it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory
provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a
different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that
it shall apply to all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7,
to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover
cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong

Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun
are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as
bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan[38] for their participation in the
passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted
on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is
biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
object of the deletion of the word principal in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the
transitory provision of R.A. 8249.[39] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23
other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House
of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the
committee hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid
law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since
the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of
the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.[40]
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for they are deprived of their right to procedural due
process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A.
7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,[42] an ex
post facto law is one
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. [43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage.[44]
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. [45]
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.[46] R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; [47]or those that define crimes, treat
of their nature, and provide for their punishment.[48] R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by
the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure
by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. [49] Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under
R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already
been rejected by the court several times[50] considering that the right to appeal isnot a natural right but
statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right
of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters
of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post
facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. [52] Moreover,
the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. [53] It has been ruled that adjective statutes
may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. [54]

In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
questions of law.[55] On the removal of the intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court still has the power
of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome. [56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it defines
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to expand its jurisdiction. The expansion in
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated
in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement
that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title [57] is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve.[58] Such rule is severally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249
expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D.
1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. [59] The Congress,
in employing the word define in the title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of
the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of various courts.[60]
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the
retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall now
determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is theSandiganbayan or Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must
appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence
the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information,[61] and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. [62]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender
in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional
requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by public officers and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law. This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it
declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the
office if it (the offense) is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance of his official functions.[65] This intimate relation between the offense charged and
the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information.[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandates:
SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be
stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute
defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis
supplied)
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the
facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal charges is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.[68]
The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v.
Karelsen:[69]
The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense, and second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court of
the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one

should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not
conclusions of law Every crime is made up of certain acts andintent these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.(Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [70]
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for
murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show
the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official
function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations[71] for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP
RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1
OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO
M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO
LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO
SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO
C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of
their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police
and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to
kill and using firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
strengths did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M.
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN,
INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National
Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above
alleged by among others falsely representing that there were no arrests made during
the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila on
or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY TO LAW
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime
of murder in relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused
arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as among
the accessories after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said
accessories concealed the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there
were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque,
Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. The sudden mention of the arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused surprises the reader.There is no indication in the amended
information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the raid. Worse,
the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as

alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by
the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City. How the raid, arrests and
shooting happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation
in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense in relation to office as officers
and members of the (PNP), we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged
and the accuseds official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate
the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say,
not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely
a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense
charged and the discharge of the accuseds official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and
the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information
and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian
commandos consisting of regular policemen and x x x special policemen, appointed and provided by him
with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his
command x x x supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and
detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line
with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and
would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal
motive in committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office
of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not
indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of
the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or
extorting the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their
common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction,
it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the
trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to
public office does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having
been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court,[73] not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to
the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed
to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases.