Vexatious Idiotic Opinions of Judicial Terror in U.S. Courts

CERTIFIED DELIVERY
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR EQUAL COURT ACCESS
7. Again, the Plaintiffs move for equal court access in this electronic Court. For the criminal
purpose of extending and concealing Governmental fraud and extortion scheme O.R. 569/875”,
this Court has obstructed the pro se Plaintiffs’ electronic Court access. Here, electronic court
access is the only practical court access from remote parts of the world where mail is
unavailable.
JUDICIAL CRIMES & OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
8. In Doc. # 338, p. 12, Civil Rights Case # 2:07-cv-228-FtM-JES-SPC, Defendant crooked Judge
John Edwin Steele expressly verbalized his obstruction of justice and prejudice:
“The copy of the Resolution attached to the Third Amended Complaint establishes
that it was signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and plaintiff
will not be allowed to assert otherwise.”
3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED

________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 5, 2009
No. 08-13170
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00228-CV-FTM-29-SPC
JORG BUSSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
KENNETH M. ROESCH, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
versus
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA,

BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
THE LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER,
STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND,
KENNETH M. WILKINSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 5, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jorg Busse, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
third amended complaint in his civil rights action against various state and local
governmental entities and officials in Florida, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985. The district court dismissed Busse’s federal claims because he had either
failed to adequately plead them or had not established federal subject matter
jurisdiction. In the absence of any viable federal claims, the court declined to
retain jurisdiction over Busse’s state law claims. Based on our review of the
record and the parties’ briefs, we AFFIRM the dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
On 10 December 1969, the Board of Commissioners of Lee County, Florida
(“the Board”) adopted a resolution claiming certain lands in the Cayo Costa
subdivision as public lands (“the Resolution”). R10-288 at 9. In the Resolution,
the Board identified the relevant lands by reference to a map of the subdivision
which showed that, along with a number of designated land parcels in the
subdivision, there were also a number of unidentified areas on the eastern and
western edges of the subdivision. Id. The Board laid claim to all of these non-
designated parcels “and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public for
public purposes.” Id.

Busse asserts that he currently owns Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa subdivision
along with all accretions thereto and that the Resolution violates his property rights
under both federal and state law. Id. at 1. To vindicate his rights, he brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against an
array of state and local parties, including the Lee County Board of Commissioners,
the county property appraiser, and the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection.1 Id. In his third amended complaint, Busse made six claims:
unconstitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; unconstitutional temporary
takings; trespass; conspiracy, fraud, and malfeasance regarding the designation of
certain unplatted lots; conspiracy to materially misrepresent and defraud; and
oppression or slander of title. Id. at 3–8. He asserted that an array of statutory and
constitutional provisions supported the exercise of jurisdiction: two civil rights acts
— 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343; Articles Three and Four and the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution; the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33
U.S.C. § 403); the 1862 Homestead Act, the federal common law doctrine of
1
The full list of defendants includes: Lee County, Florida; the Board of Lee County
Commissioners, in their official and private capacities; Kenneth M. Wilkinson, the Lee County
property appraiser, in his official and private capacity; the State of Florida Board of Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida, in their official and private
capacities; the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, the Florida Division of
Recreation and Parks, and the Cayo Costa State Park staff, in their individual and private
capacities; and Jack N. Peterson, Lee County Attorney, in his official and private capacity. Id.
accretion and erosion; the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice, and 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331–3351; and the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201). Id. at 2–3.
The defendants subsequently filed separate motions to dismiss Busse’s third
amended complaint, primarily based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim. R10-285, 291, 303, 304. The district court granted these
motions and dismissed Busse’s third amended complaint. R11-338. In so doing,
the court first found that Busse had made out a valid takings claim but that it had
no jurisdiction over that claim since he had failed to show that he had pursued all
available state remedies before bringing suit. Id. at 7–10. The court then
concluded that Busse had not made out a valid claim under any of his other alleged
federal bases. Id. at 10–15. Given that the court did not have jurisdiction over any
of Busse’s federal claims, it chose to dismiss his state law claims. Id. at 15. Busse
now appeals the dismissal of all of the claims in his third amended complaint.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding subject
matter jurisdiction, including the determinations that a claim is not ripe or that the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. See Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc.,
536 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2008); Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204
(11th Cir. 2006). We also “review a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d
823, 826 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 738 (11th Cir. 2006).
Since Busse is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. See Miller
v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008).
On appeal, Busse argues that the district court erred in dismissing his federal
claims. He asserts that his Takings Clause claim was ripe for review and that he
had properly stated claims involving violations of his procedural due process,
equal protection, and substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.2 Additionally, we read Busse’s brief liberally to argue that the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over his state law claims. We address these arguments in turn.
A. Takings Clause Claims
2
Busse’s brief on appeal does not discuss the other jurisdictional bases cited in his third
amended complaint — Articles Three and Four of the United States Constitution; the 1899
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act; the 1862 Homestead Act; the federal common law
doctrine of accretion and erosion; the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice, and 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331–3351; and the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act. Generally arguments not raised in a brief on appeal are deemed abandoned. See
Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, we agree with the
district court’s analysis of these provisions and find that none of them could serve as a potential
jurisdictional basis for Busse’s claims. See, e.g., Arthur v. Haley, 248 F.3d 1302, 1303 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that appellate courts can and should sua sponte inquire into
subject matter jurisdiction whenever it appears to be lacking).
Busse contends that the Resolution constituted an unconstitutional taking of
his property rights in Lot 15A. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of
private property “for public use, without just compensation” — a condition made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. V;
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001)
(noting that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Takings Clause applicable to the
States). A plaintiff can bring a federal takings claim only if he can show that he
did not receive just compensation in return for the taking of his property. See Eide
v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 720 (11th Cir. 1990). As a result, for a takings
claim to be ripe, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he unsuccessfully “pursued the
available state procedures to obtain just compensation” before bringing his federal
claim. Id. at 721.
In this case, Busse’s claim would not be ripe because he has not shown that
he attempted to obtain or secure relief under established Florida procedures. Since
at least 1990, Florida courts have recognized that an inverse-condemnation remedy
is available for alleged takings violations. See Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d
1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Busse contends that his claim would still be ripe
since that remedy was unavailable in 1969 when the Board of Commissioners
enacted the Resolution. However, our past circuit precedent dictates “that a
Florida property owner must pursue a reverse condemnation remedy in state court
before his federal takings claim will be ripe, even where that remedy was
recognized after the alleged taking occurred.” Id. Accordingly, regardless of
whether Busse has a valid property interest in Lot 15A, because he has not alleged
that he sought and was denied compensation through available state procedures, his
Takings Clause claim would not be ripe for review. We thus conclude that the
district court did not err in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Busse’s Takings Clause claim.
B. Procedural Due Process Claims
Busse asserts that his procedural due process rights were violated since Lee
County had no authority to take his land nor jurisdiction over it and because the
Resolution was improperly executed. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. A plaintiff could make a procedural due
process claim by challenging the procedures by which a regulation was adopted,
including the failure to provide pre-deprivation notice and hearing. See Villas of
Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 615 (11th Cir. 1997); Zipperer
v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995). For such a claim to be
valid, however, the plaintiff would have to allege that state law failed to provide
him with an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378,
382 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).

Based on these standards, we find that Busse has failed to state a valid
procedural due process claim. Florida provides him an adequate post-deprivation
remedy, inverse condemnation, and he makes no argument that this procedure is
inadequate. Even if it was inadequate, though, Busse still would not have a valid
procedural due process claim. The Resolution constituted a legislative act since it
was a general provision that affected a large number of persons and area, 200 acres
in all, rather than being specifically targeted at Busse or his immediate neighbors.
See 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir.
2003). Since alleged problems with the adoption of such acts cannot serve as the
basis for a procedural due process claim, Busse could not cite them as the basis for
his claim. See id. (noting that “if government action is viewed as legislative in
nature, property owners generally are not entitled to procedural due process”).
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in dismissing Busse’s
procedural due process claims.
C. Equal Protection Claims
Busse also argues that his equal protection rights were violated because the
Board, in adopting the Resolution, treated differently privately-owned property and
state-owned property.3 The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from “deny[ing]
3
In his brief on appeal, Busse argues that he experienced different treatment than other
landowners in Lee County. However, we need not address this argument since he did not
mention this in his third amended complaint and we find that none of the exceptions that would
allow us to consider an issue not raised before the district court would apply here. See Narey v.
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. “[T]o properly plead an equal protection claim, a plaintiff need
only allege that through state action, similarly situated persons have been treated
disparately.” Thigpen v. Bibb County, 223 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2000)
abrogated on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002).
Under Florida law, counties can exercise eminent domain over any land that
is not owned by the state or federal government. See Fla. Stat. § 127.01(1)(a)
(2006). Since a state landowner would not be subject to the eminent domain power
but Busse, as a private landowner, would be, Busse could not be similarly situated
to a state landowner. Busse therefore cannot rely on his disparate eminent domain
treatment vis-a-vis state landowners as the basis for an equal protection claim.
Since Busse made no other allegations of disparity in his third amended complaint,
we find that he has failed to plead a valid equal protection claim and that the
district court correctly dismissed this claim.
D. Substantive Due Process Claim
Busse also appears to allege that the Resolution denied him his substantive
due process property rights. Substantive due process protects only those rights that
are “fundamental,” a description that applies only to those rights created by the
Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing the exceptions to this general rule).
United States Constitution. See Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook,
City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Property rights would
not be fundamental rights since they are based on state law. See id. Busse thus
could not bring a viable substantive due process claim based on the alleged denial
of a state-defined property right. See id. Accordingly, we find that the district
court properly dismissed his substantive due process claims.4
E. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Busse also contends that the court abused its discretion in not hearing his
pendent state law claims. “The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
pendent state claims rests within the discretion of the district court.” Raney v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Since the
district court “had dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it
therefore had the discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Busse’s
state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Furthermore, we expressly encourage
district courts to take such action when all federal claims have been dismissed pre-
trial. See Raney, 370 F.3d at 1089. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse
4
The district court, in addressing Busse’s substantive due process claim, mentions that
assertions of irrational and arbitrary government action could not serve as the basis for such a
claim. Even under a liberal reading of Busse’s complaint, though, we do not think he made such
allegations. In the third amended complaint, he discusses takings violations and procedural
problems with the enactment of the Resolution but never questions the rationale for its passage.
Accordingly, we need not address whether he has a valid substantive due process claim based on
arbitrary and capricious government action.
its discretion when it chose not to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Busse’s
state law claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Busse contends that the district court incorrectly dismissed his federal claims
regarding alleged takings and deprivations of property rights. Since Busse’s
takings claim was not ripe because he had not pursued available state remedies and
he failed to adequately plead his other federal claims, the district court correctly
dismissed all of these claims. As a result, despite Busse’s objections to the
contrary, the district court also did not commit an abuse of discretion in not
exercising jurisdiction over his state law claims. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
district court’s dismissal of Busse’s third amended complaint.
AFFIRMED.
David Souter
U.S. Supreme Court Justice
RE: Lee County [FL] O.R.569/875 – An eminent domain scam of giant proportions
Case-fixing in the U.S. Court of Appeals
We are writing to you in the matter of the corruption and case-fixing in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit.
Common intelligence dictates that residents use designated streets to get to their lots.
Unintelligently, the 11th Circuit cannot tell the difference between a designated street and
“unidentified areas”. See Plat Book 3, p. 25 at www.leeclerk.org.
In West Peninsular Title Co.1, corrupt Chief Circuit Judge Edmondson co-wrote:
“And, plaintiffs’ “arbitrary and capricious” due process claim is ripe. Plaintiffs
accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action ..
Plaintiffs’ claim was ripe as soon as the County applied the ordinance … See Eide v.
Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 724 n.13(11th Cir. 1990).”
“But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citing
Murrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33
Acres.”
For Appellees’ bribes, Edmondson now changed his mind and conspired to pervert a platted
designated street into an “unidentified area” in order to fix Appellants’ Cases. Here for bribes,
ripeness vanished, and justice is for sale in the 11th Circuit.
The Appellant(s) also own property in N.H. and wish you the best for your retirement.
/s/ Jennifer Franklin Prescott /s/Dr. Jorg Busse
1
http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/41/41.F3d.1490.93-4449.93-4104.html
Volume 41, The Federal Reporter, 3d Ed. [Nov., 1994 – Jan., 1995]
41 F.3d 1490 Page 1 of 4
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41 F.3d 1490
WEST PENINSULAR TITLE CO., Absolute, Inc., Marion H.
Cooper,
for Estate of Alfred R. Cooper, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
PALM BEACH COUNTY, Carol A. Roberts, Chair of Board of
County Commissioners of Palm Beach County,
Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 93-4104, 93-4449.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Jan. 10, 1995.
Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S. Hackleman, Ft.
Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4104.
Sharon M. Pitts, Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S.
Hackleman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4449.
Jeffrey A. Aman, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Tampa, FL, Joan E. O'Dell, Gregory L.
Williams, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Washington, DC, for appellees in both cases.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, MELTON* , Senior District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
1 After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants
raise several arguments, hoping mainly to void concessions made in district court in
the joint pretrial stipulation. The district court is affirmed.
2 The controversy concerns the ownership of strip parcels (roads and ditches)
offered by Palm Beach Farms for dedication to Palm Beach County in 1912. A 1976
instrument entitled "Notice of Withdrawal of Platted Roads, Streets, and Other
Unexercised Rights" revoked the offer of dedication. In 1986, pursuant to local
Ordinance No. 86-18 (the "Ordinance"), defendant Palm Beach County (the
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:xHNX0cXI3CoJ:bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/4... 4/30/2009
41 F.3d 1490 Page 2 of 4
"County"), began a practice of selling easement and right of way interests in

property originally acquired through dedication. In return for a "privilege fee," the
County issued an abandonment resolution, which, when recorded, transferred
ownership of the parcel to the payor of the fee. This dispute began when the County
attempted to collect fees in exchange for abandonment resolutions for parcels that,
according to plaintiffs, had never been accepted by the County.
3 Plaintiffs, claiming that they were successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms
(and thus owners of the strip parcels), challenged the County's practice as an
unconstitutional taking--under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--of their
property.1 The County conceded that it never expressly accepted the dedication;
but, at trial, the County attempted to show that it had impliedly accepted the
dedication by using the strip parcels. The jury found for plaintiffs, deciding that the
County had not accepted the 1912 offer of dedication within a reasonable time. The
district court entered judgment for plaintiffs: plaintiffs were judged the fee simple
owners of the pertinent strip parcels; defendants were enjoined from applying the
Ordinance to plaintiffs' property; and plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees.
Defendants appeal.
4 The County now contests plaintiffs' standing, arguing that plaintiffs could not
possibly own the strip parcels (and thus have no interest at stake). But given
plaintiffs' allegations and the County's stipulations in the district court, the record
supports both standing and jurisdiction. A "case or controversy" exists in this case
because the parties genuinely disputed ownership of the strip parcels in the district
court. The County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of title, agreeing that plaintiffs were
successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms. The controversy was thus limited to a
decision about whether the offer of dedication was accepted.2 Plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the application of the Ordinance to what they assert is their
property.
5 But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citing
Murrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33
Acres. This decision is not about standing: what the County is really arguing is that
plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. Amicus Boywic Farms agrees, arguing
that it was harmed by the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Because the
district court could only determine who, as between plaintiffs and the County, had
the better claim to the strip parcels, amicus is not bound by the district court's
order. It was no abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to dismiss this
case for failure to join indispensable parties. The County, as movant, had the
burden "to show the nature of the unprotected interests of the absent parties," 5A
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1359; yet, the County's
citation to the record reveals only that it established the existence of adjoining
landowners (not the nature of allegedly unprotected interests).
6 And, plaintiffs' "arbitrary and capricious" due process claim is ripe.3 Plaintiffs
accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action (asserting
ownership to the strip parcels and recording abandonment resolutions which
transferred title) to their property. Plaintiffs' claim was ripe as soon as the County
applied the ordinance and the petition process (including a $400 nonrefundable
application fee) to the undedicated strip parcels. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908
F.2d 716, 724 n. 13 (11th Cir.1990).
7 The County argues that no subject matter jurisdiction exists because plaintiffs'
claims are so frivolous. But the course of litigation and stance of the County in
41 F.3d 1490 Page 3 of 4
district court undercuts its claim of frivolousness. We also note that the pretrial
stipulation plainly reads that "[n]either party contests subject matter ...
jurisdiction."4 If the County actually thought plaintiffs' claims were frivolous, it
should not have so willingly conceded facts giving rise to jurisdiction in the
stipulation. Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
federal claims, the court did not err by including plaintiffs' state claims for
declaratory relief--pendent jurisdiction was proper.
8 The County also argues that the district court erred by interpreting the stipulation
as a "winner-take-all" proposition. That is, the County says it reserved a right to
make several arguments, after the jury's fact finding, by referring to "undisposed of
motions" in the stipulation. We disagree. The parties agreed that the jury's
conclusion would "be outcome determinative of all of the federal and state claims."
The County does not argue that it was unfairly duped into signing the stipulation.
And, we owe great deference to the trial judge's interpretation and enforcement of
pretrial stipulations. See Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 (11th
Cir.1987); Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371, 1373 n. 8 (11th Cir.1982). In the light of the
stipulations, the district court did not err when it refused to entertain the County's
post-verdict motions.
9 Defendants raise other arguments, none of which present grounds for reversal.
The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
Honorable Howell W. Melton, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation
Application of the Ordinance, according to plaintiffs, put a "cloud" on plaintiffs' title

because title to the strip parcels was transferred to the payor of the privilege fee.
Plaintiffs' property was, in other words, not transferable so long as the County continued
to demand fees for the "abandonment" of property it never owned
"[S]tanding cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation." Harris v.
Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n. 4 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). We disagree with the County's
argument that plaintiffs' ownership claim is so obviously frivolous that standing could
not possibly exist, regardless of stipulated facts pointing to standing. In support of this
claim, the County cites the allegedly "remarkably similar" case of United States v.
16.33 Acres of Land, 342 So.2d 476 (Fla.1977), as binding precedent denying plaintiffs'
ownership claim. But 16.33 Acres is distinguishable because in that case the government
expressly accepted the offer of dedication. Id. at 479
Because we conclude that plaintiffs' arbitrary and capricious due process claim was ripe,
we say nothing about whether plaintiffs' additional constitutional claims were ripe. We
do note, however, that plaintiffs were not granted relief pursuant to a specific claim.
Instead, the County stipulated that plaintiffs would be entitled to the remedies requested
if plaintiffs prevailed on any of the disputed fact issues
Parties may not stipulate jurisdiction. Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11th
Cir.1983). And we do not say that jurisdiction was proper because jurisdiction was
stipulated. Instead, we look to the record; we affirm the district court's conclusion that
41 F.3d 1490 Page 4 of 4
the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. For example, the County argues
frivolousness by pointing to purported transfers--by plaintiffs' predecessors in interest--
that the County says are null and void. But the County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of
title; and, the County agreed that it was undisputed that "plaintiffs are the successors in
interest to the Palm Beach Farms Company." The record was set in district court
CC∅ | TRANSFORMED BY PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG
Charlene Edwards Honeywell
FEAR FOR YOUR LIFE
U.S. PUNISHMENT & ‘SANCTIONS’
U.S. COVER-UP OF SCAM O.R. 569/875:
U.S. JUDICIAL CASE FIXING:

DEPRIVE – DEFRAUD – DENY
DISALLOW – DISMISS
U.S. JUDICIAL FRIVOLITY SCAM

FEAR FOR YOUR LIFE
SECRETS OF U.S. JUDICIAL TERROR
SECRET 1: Judicial bribery & corruption are customary and TYPICAL.
SECRET 2: U.S. democracy is DEAD. Don’t be a naïve sheep!
SECRET 3: Any faith in U.S. justice is your foe. There is NONE, so deal with it!
SECRET 4: Facts, law, reason, logic CANNOT possibly stop the judicial case fixing machine.
SECRET 5: Lawyers play along to get along – Don’t waste your money & time!
SECRET 6: The Mafia is cute compared to the U.S. judicial gang. They even wear colors.
SECRET 7: Expect terror & threats as if you were in Nazi Germany. Watch for the smell of gas!
SECRET 8: Trained for terror, only the most corrupt judges succeed on America’s benches.
SECRET 9: NOTHING favorable will ever happen in your case – Face reality & STOP being a fool!
SECRET 10: By agreement, pro se Plaintiffs will NEVER win any important or critical case.
SECRET 11: America is NOT what you have been brain washed to believe: Spell CORRUPTION!
SECRET 12: Do NOT appear in court or party with the Mafia. Plain and short, it could be unhealthy.
SECRET 13: Property, life, and freedom mean LESS in America than in China. Go travel and see!
SECRET 14: Before you disappear, leave lots of information. Someone might read it. Good luck!
God bless America, Anarchy, BP, Corruption, and

Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell.
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
14
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
15
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
DR. JORG BUSSE, JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT,

Plaintiffs,
versus Case # 2:10-CV-0089-FtM-JES-SPC
JOHN EDWIN STEELE; SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL; ROGER ALEJO;

KENNETH M. WILKINSON; JACK N. PETERSON; GERALD BARD TJOFLAT;
RICHARD JESSUP; CIRCUIT JUDGE BIRCH; CIRCUIT JUDGE DUBINA;
RICHARD ALLAN LAZZARA; CHARLIE CRIST; LEE COUNTY VALUE
ADJUSTMENT BOARD; LORI L. RUTLAND; EXECUTIVE TITLE CO.; JOHNSON
ENGINEERING, INC.,
Defendants.
EMERGENCY MOTION
_______________________________________________________________________/
EMERGENCY MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE
AFFIDAVITS & ABSENCE OF ANY CONDEMNATION ON THE RECORD
1. Pursuant to the multiple Affidavits before this Court, the Judicial Officers in this Court
fraudulently alleged “eminent domain” by virtue of Government scam “O.R. 569/875”.
However here, no eminent domain court proceedings ever occurred. No just compensation was
ever paid to the pro se Plaintiffs, and no title ever transferred. Here, Lee County, Florida, never
took any title by virtue of prima facie scam “O.R. 569/875”.
BRIBERY
2. Here, Defendant crooked Judges John Edwin Steele and Sheri Polster Chappell accepted
Defendants’ bribes for the criminal purpose of defrauding and deliberately depriving the
Plaintiffs of their equity. Here, said corrupt Judges and Judicial Officers violated their oath of
office.
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
17
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
UNITED STATES JUDICIAL FRAUD PUBLISHED AT:
http://www.scribd.com/judicial%20fraud
More than 90,000 Readers of
U.S. Governmental Crime Scheme “O.R. 569/875”
19
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
COVER UP OF GOVERNMENT SCAM “O.R. 569/875”
20
TRANSCRIPT OF 11/17/2009 ROGER ALEJO PERJURY
PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS DR. BUSSE & FRANKLIN PRESCOTT:

[VAB RECORD: 1:05:23 – 1:05:33; YOU TUBE: 1:54 - 2:04]
“Is our riparian Gulf-front land parcel, ending on 015A [Parcel # 12-44-20-
01-00015.015A] bounded by the natural boundary of the Gulf of Mexico?
YES or NO?”
Defendant Special Magistrate LORI L. RUTLAND:

[VAB RECORD: 1:05:34 – 1:05:42; YOU TUBE: 2:05 – 2:12]
“Mr. Alejo, does the property have the Gulf of Mexico next to it? Is it right up
next to the Gulf of Mexico?”
Defendant ROGER ALEJO:

“YES, Ma’am.”
ROGER ALEJO’S PERJURY & FRAUD ON YOU TUBE
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYp-Mb242D0
HOW HITLER EXPANDED HIS “EMPIRE” BY CRIMINAL LAND CLAIMS
PARODY BY JOHN E. STEELE
Signed and executed by the Fúhrer in Fort Myers Gas Chambers

FEAR FOR YOUR LIFE
SECRETS OF U.S. JUDICIAL TERROR
SECRET 1: Judicial bribery & corruption are customary and TYPICAL.
SECRET 2: U.S. democracy is DEAD. Don’t be a naïve sheep!
SECRET 3: Any faith in U.S. justice is your foe. There is NONE, so deal with it!
SECRET 4: Facts, law, reason, logic CANNOT possibly stop the judicial case fixing machine.
SECRET 5: Lawyers play along to get along – Don’t waste your money & time!
SECRET 6: The Mafia is cute compared to the U.S. judicial gang. They even wear colors.
SECRET 7: Expect terror & threats as if you were in Nazi Germany. Watch for the smell of gas!
SECRET 8: Trained for terror, only the most corrupt judges succeed on America’s benches.
SECRET 9: NOTHING favorable will ever happen in your case – Face reality & STOP being a fool!
SECRET 10: By agreement, pro se Plaintiffs will NEVER win any important or critical case.
SECRET 11: America is NOT what you have been brain washed to believe: Spell CORRUPTION!
SECRET 12: Do NOT appear in court or party with the Mafia. Plain and short, it could be unhealthy.
SECRET 13: Property, life, and freedom mean LESS in America than in China. Go travel and see!
SECRET 14: Before you disappear, leave lots of information. Someone might read it. Good luck!
God bless America, Anarchy, BP, Corruption, and

Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell.
Charlene Edwards Honeywell
FORT MYERS DIVISION
[“TRANSFERRED” FROM: U.S. D.C., SOUTHERN DISTRICT, W. PALM BEACH DIV.]
JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, DR. JORG BUSSE,

Plaintiffs,
versus Civil Rights Case # 2:09-CV-00791-FtM-CEH-SPC
ROGER ALEJO; KENNETH M. WILKINSON; JACK N. PETERSON; ROGER

DESJARLAIS; LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; LEE COUNTY VALUE ADJUSTMENT
BOARD; LORI L. RUTLAND; STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND; STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; CHAD LACH; CHARLES
“BARRY” STEVENS; REAGAN KATHLEEN RUSSELL; KAREN B. HAWES;
ROGER DESJARLAIS; CHARLIE GREEN; BOB JANES; BRIAN BIGELOW; RAY
JUDAH; TAMMY HALL; FRANK MANN; UNITED STATES ATTORNEY(S);
SEAN P. FLYNN; E. KENNETH STEGEBY; DAVID P. RHODES; A. BRIAN
ALBRITTON; CYNTHIA A. PIVACEK; JOHNSON ENGINEERING, INC.; STEVEN
CARTA; MIKE SCOTT; HUGH D. HAYES; GERALD D. SIEBENS; STATE OF
FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL; WILLIAM M. MARTIN; PETERSON
BERNARD; SKIP QUILLEN; TOM GILBERTSON, NEWS PRESS, R. LENGERICH,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
_______________________________________________________________________/
NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM BAD GOVERNMENTAL JOKE “O.R. 569/875”

AND GOVERNMENTAL FRAUD ON THE COURTS
PRO SE PLAINTIFFS’ PUBLIC NOTICE OF INTENT TO SETTLE
PUBLIC NOTICE OF BAD = CRIMINAL GOVERNMENTAL JOKE:

“O.R. 569/875”
Dear Judge Honeywell:
BAD JOKE
1. “O.R. 569/875” was a BAD Governmental joke [SPELLED: CRIME SCHEME]. We all had a
good laugh. See http://www.scribd.com/Judicial%20Fraud [more than 63,000 Readers world

wide on this one (1) site alone]. But the American people do not think that U.S. Governmental
invasion of private property rights is funny at all. They are not laughing any longer! The
exponential viral spread of VEXATIOUS Governmental lies and crimes exposed corruption and
eminent domain crimes of epic proportions. See record extortion scheme “O.R. 569/875”.
SETTLEMENT
2. Now, let’s settle this criminal matter: Justly, speedily, and inexpensively as required by law. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
BAD JUDGES
3. John Edwin “The Butcher” was a bad man. Let us spell bad: B-A-D. You may ask WHY? Good
question: “The Butcher” criminally invaded private property rights. See, e.g., Doc. # 338; First
Federal Governmental Corruption Case. AGO ## 78-118; 78-125, Attorney General Legal
Opinions. Should you have any better legal authorities and/or “ideas” then the Attorney
General, you should get them out in the sunshine. After all, it’s supposed to be the Sunshine
State. We all came here for sunshine, not for Governmental corruption and concealment of epic
proportions.
OBJECTIONS TO “SLAVERY”
4. Judge Honeywell, you deliberately obstructed our equal electronic filing in this electronic
Court. The people and you can find the conclusive evidence of, e.g., Governmental corruption,
fraud on the Court, and concealment of prima facie scam “O.R. 569/875” at, e.g.:
http://www.scribd.com/Judicial%20Fraud.
Please also see dozens of Google blogs, www.YouTube.com, and dozens of international web
sites that conclusively proved the rampant corruption in this filthy Fort Myers Federal Court.
NO MORE SLAVERY AND CROSS-BURNINGS
5. Slavery was another BAD thing. Here, the pro se Plaintiffs will no longer be denigrated just like
slaves and terrorized by Governmental slave masters, who whip them with vexatious lies and
“O.R. 569/875”, burn down their property, and vexatiously “steal” their beach.
6. Here, property ownership was a MOST FUNDAMENTAL right, and no lawmaker had any right
to usurp judicial adjudication of Plaintiffs’ private property rights. “O.R. 569/875” was a BAD
joke: A CRIMINAL hoax without any named lawmaker; and without any legitimate
Governmental authority. See authorities cited in AGO 78-125; 78-118; on file.
NO MORE HEIL HONEYWELL
7. Slaves no more! Lies no more! “O.R. 569/875” no more! This case is to be STAYED until
anarchy and lawlessness STOP; until Governmental corruption & fraud on the Courts STOP;
until CRIMINAL Judges John Edwin “The Butcher” Steele and Sheri Polster “Punishment”
Chappell are being CRIMINALLY prosecuted for, e.g., bribery and corruption.
ADMIT THE ADMITTED – A JOKE WAS A JOKE
8. Now ADMIT what the Defendants had already ADMITTED for years: “O.R. 569/875” was a
criminal prank to grab land. Here, the Defendant pranksters were bungling Governmental idiots.
See upcoming movie. The American people trust that you treasure ethics & your young career.
9. Here in exchange for bribes, Sheri Polster “PUNISHMENT” Chappell had flushed every last
drop of ethics down her filthy judicial toilet at Plaintiffs’ expense and injury.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff judicial and Governmental corruption and crime victims demand
1. An EMERGENCY Order STAYING the proceedings UNTIL the record crimes and
deliberate deprivations in this Court, and including obstruction of equal electronic court
access, STOP;
2. An EMERGENCY Order enjoining said Defendants’ hate mails/communications by wire,
criminal hate campaigns, and record Nazi-style tactics of terror, retaliation, and oppression
against the pro se Plaintiff street land owners, riparian Accreted Lot 15A, PB 3, Pg 25 (1912);
3. An EMERGENCY Order enjoining the CRIMINAL concealment of Governmental joke “O.R.
569/875”, while the world community has been watching said Nazi-style oppression, terror, hate
“missives”, and retaliation in Lee County, Florida;
4. An EMERGENCY Order enjoining Defendants’ and Judges’ concealment of the forensic
evidence in support of CRIMINAL Governmental SCHEMES “O.R. 569/875”;
5. An EMERGENCY Order enjoining Defendants’ and Judges’ from fraudulently
misrepresenting Governmental SCAM “O.R. 569/875”;
6. An EMERGENCY Order enjoining any and all Defendants from any and all TRESPASS onto
the private undedicated Cayo Costa Subdivision, PB 3, PG 25 (1912); see PRESCOTT, No. 08-
14846, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 8678, 2009 WL 1059631; the Lee County, FL, Real Property
Grantor/Grantee Index; and Florida’s self-enforcing Marketable Record Title Act
[M.R.T.A.].
___________________________________
/S/JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT
Governmental Corruption & Fraud Victim, co-landowner, pro se
P.O. BOX 845, Palm Beach, FL 33480; T: 561-400-3295
____________________________________
/S/JORG BUSSE, M.D., M.M., M.B.A., C.P.M.
Judicial Corruption and Crime Victim; Plaintiff, pro se
State Cert. Res.Appraiser, Licensed Real Estate Broker, Mortgage Broker, Appraisal Instructor;
Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany; c/o Legal and Consular Department
100 N. Biscayne Blvd., Suite # 2200, Miami, FL 33132
EXHIBITS:
GOVERNMENTAL DECEPTION & TRICKERY, VEXATIOUS U.S. SCAM “O.R. 569/875”,
RESOLUTION OF CORRUPTION AND EMINENT DOMAIN FRAUD
RESOLUTION OF CONSPIRACY TO CRIMINALLY DEPRIVE

American Weapons of Mass Deception found in the hands of
Psychopath Jack N. “The Ripper” Peterson

Fort Myers, Nazi Land
Charlene Edwards Honeynotsowell, Government Reporter
National Egregious Enquirer
WEAPONS OF MASS DECEPTION
The Federal Bureau for Insanity (F.B.I.) found weapons of mass deception in the hands of
Psychopath Jack N. Peterson. Peterson had a grisly reputation for ripping pro se Plaintiffs to bloody
pieces. Remains of his lies and victims could be found all over Cayo Costa Island, Nazi Land. In
2006, whistle-blowers had tipped off Florida and Federal authorities. Operation “Frivolous beyond
Insanity” lead F.B.I. psychiatrists to Peterson’s Cayo Costa storage site for toxic Governmental lies.
VEXATIOUS OPPRESSION RULES – MANIFEST OF EVIL: “O.R. 569/875”
When a SWAT team arrested Peterson at the Federal Courthouse on First Street on April 1st,
Peterson’s pants self-combusted. A Manifest of Terror, “Oppression Rules 569/875”, were retrieved
from Peterson’s flaming orange jump suit. Vexatiously, the Manifest violated human rights and
shocked the world. Even so-called legal experts from America’s Supreme Court were puzzled and
shocked. Chief Justice Roberts said that while the American legal system was interchangeably
based on lies and lawyers or lawyers and lies, Peterson just went “psycho”. Eminent domain is
eminent witchcraft, but no witchcraft without judicial proceedings. We hate anarchists and phantom
of the courthouse lawmakers, who usurp judicial witchcraft. Separation of powers, separation of
witchcraft Doctrine, ha, ha, ha.
INSANE INVASION
The Chief Justice continued to compare the invasion of Iraq with Peterson’s vexatious invasion of
private property rights. Weapons of mass destruction – weapons of mass deception. “Insane
invasions”, the Chief Justice grinned, “Vexatious Vatican Rules – Always invade, and best from
behind, while nobody can watch.” “I’m bad, I know I’m bad”, late preeminent jurist and/or
purported singing pedophile in a park.
COMING BEHIND PETERSON – THE VEXATIOUS VATICAN WAY
In a touching call, the Pope personally prayed for forgiveness. Previously, the Pope had come
behind so many other psychopaths, no pun intended. What’s one more the Pope peeped to Peterson.
Then Pope Maledict maliciously went on to advise Peterson’s team of Governmental lawyers on
how to best cover up Peterson’s combustive crimes of corruption. However, Maledict made clear
that he preferred to be an expert on the rape of children rather than the law. But he said the Rules of
sexual Oppression had always worked well. But he said even the Pope could see that the O. Rules
569/875 were never signed and executed. With unusual emotion in his German veins, Maledict
menaced that John Edwin “The Butcher” Steele would not be forgiven: “The sins in Doc. # 338
cannot be forgiven. That Butcher betrayed the American people. We Germans like stamps, and that
stamp was a f….. fake. Charlie “Brown” Green should have done a better job. He’s just such an
amateur.”
PETERSON POSES NATIONAL SECURITY RISK
The Federal Bureau for Insanity declared Peterson dangerous and a national security risk.
Peterson’s lawyers claimed corruption by insanity and blamed fellow terrorist Osama bin Law and
unidentified lawmakers for the vexatious manifest and Rules. After the Bureau sedated Peterson
with psychotropics, Peterson sputtered: “Liar, liar, law on fire.” However, not even traces of any
law could be found.
NO MORE JOKES, PLEASE
Lawless County was unavailable for any additional jokes, but felt relieved. The arrest will put an
end to Peterson’s flaming personality and psychopathological lying, said the Clerk of Forgery,
Charlie “Brown” Green. “Psycho” made me paste and pervert.
As a conspiring combatant, Peterson will be detained at Governmental Bay, Cayo Costa Penal
Colony, where Governmental infernos raged in 2008.
SHERI MISSES THE BRIBES – BUT PLEASURES OF PUNISHMENT WILL GO ON
Sheri Polster “Pain” Chappell, notorious for punishment of pro se Plaintiffs, expressed hope that
one day she may share a jail cell with “Psycho” Peterson: “Psycho played his perverted pranks well,
in particular on pro se Plaintiffs, and the bribes were bloody alright.” I love those Rules of
Oppression: “569 ways of f…… and oppressing the taxpayers in Nazi Land.”
WORLD WIDE PRESS RELEASE:
Jack N. “The Ripper” Peterson Admits Authentic Hoax of Immaterial fact
123PANTS ON FIRE
0fficially Rogue 569/875
RESOLUTION PERTAINING TO PUBLIC CORRUPTION & LAND GRAB

IN PRIVATE UNDEDICATED CAYO COSTA SUBDIVISION
WHEREAS, there appears in the Public Records of Lawless Lee County, Florida, no park
and no Lee County title to any raid lands;
WHEREAS, there appears upon said Plat accreted riparian Gulf-front Lot 15A, 12-44-20-
01-00015.015A, in Plat Book 3 at page 25 the Second Revised Plat of the private undedicated
residential Cayo Costa Subdivision; and
WHEREAS, there appears no eminent domain authority under any law; and
WHEREAS, there appear no names of any lawmaker on this criminal legislative scheme;
WHEREAS, tho Nazi County claims to be corrupt & criminal together with all the its Nazi
Judges.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE GOVERNMENTAL GANG OF
NAMELESS CRIMINALS does by this prima facie forgery claim all of rogue crimes for the deceit
of the public for criminal purposes.
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that these Governmental crimes were idiotic and
shall be criminally prosecuted to the fullest extent.
NEVER DONE AND ADOPTED this first day of hell & terror in Nazi County, Florida.
PASTED IN A HASTE
BY COUNTY CLERK FOR FORGERY
Charlie “Brown” Green
Insane lawmakers not to be named for fear of criminal prosecution and commitment
Execution of vexatious Gov. frauds optional. Signed by John Edwin “The Butcher” Steele
I certify this to be authentic and genuine horseshit in the corrupt State of Florida.
Charlie “Brown” Green, Gang Member, Lee Division of Criminal Conspiracy

merely because state mandated procedures were not followed. First
Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, Fla.,
20 F.3d 419, 422 (11th Cir. 1994). In this regard, some of the
allegations in the Third Amended Complaint are contradicted by the
Resolution which is attached to it. The copy of the Resolution
attached to the Third Amended Complaint establishes that it was
signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and
plaintiff will not be allowed to assert otherwise. The remaining
claimed defects are arguments concerning state law which do not
arise to a constitutional level. Finally, plaintiff fails to state
a procedural due process claim because he has failed to allege that
Florida law provided him with an inadequate post-deprivation
remedy, Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996), and as
discussed above it is clear that Florida does provide adequate
post-deprivation remedies. Therefore, any claim founded on
procedural due process will be dismissed.
D. Equal Protection Claim:
Plaintiff also alleges that the Resolution violated his equal
protection rights. “To properly plead an equal protection claim,
a plaintiff need only allege that through state action, similarly
situated persons have been treated disparately.” Boyd v. Peet, 249
Fed. Appx. 155, 158 (11th Cir. 2007)(citation omitted). See also
Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1552 (11th
Cir. 1991). The Third Amended Complaint does not identify any
similarly situated person with whom plaintiff can be compared. The

-12-
4/24/2010 Statutes & Constitution :Constitution : …
The Florida Constitution

CONSTITUTION
OF THE
STATE OF FLORIDA
AS REVISED IN 1968 AND SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED
The Constitution of the State of Florida as revised in 1968 consisted of certain revised articles as proposed by
three joint resolutions which were adopted during the special session of June 24-July 3, 1968, and ratified by
the electorate on November 5, 1968, together with one article carried forward from the Constitution of 1885, as
amended. The articles proposed in House Joint Resolution 1-2X constituted the entire revised constitution with
the exception of Articles V, VI, and VIII. Senate Joint Resolution 4-2X proposed Article VI, relating to suffrage
and elections. Senate Joint Resolution 5-2X proposed a new Article VIII, relating to local government. Article V,
relating to the judiciary, was carried forward from the Constitution of 1885, as amended.
Sections composing the 1968 revision have no history notes. Subsequent changes are indicated by notes
appended to the affected sections. The indexes appearing at the beginning of each article, notes appearing at
the end of various sections, and section and subsection headings are added editorially and are not to be
considered as part of the constitution.
PREAMBLE
We, the people of the State of Florida, being grateful to Almighty God for our constitutional liberty, in order
to secure its benefits, perfect our government, insure domestic tranquility, maintain public order, and
guarantee equal civil and political rights to all, do ordain and establish this constitution.
ARTICLE I DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
ARTICLE II GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE III LEGISLATURE
ARTICLE IV EXECUTIVE
ARTICLE V JUDICIARY
ARTICLE VI SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS
ARTICLE VII FINANCE AND TAXATION
ARTICLE VIII LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ARTICLE IX EDUCATION
ARTICLE X MISCELLANEOUS
ARTICLE XI AMENDMENTS
www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm… 1/104
(c) The governor shall appoint all commissioned officers of the militia, including an adjutant general who
shall be chief of staff. The appointment of all general officers shall be subject to confirmation by the senate.
(d) The qualifications of personnel and officers of the federally recognized national guard, including the
adjutant general, and the grounds and proceedings for their discipline and removal shall conform to the
appropriate United States army or air force regulations and usages.
SECTION 3. Vacancy in office.--Vacancy in office shall occur upon the creation of an office, upon the death,
removal from office, or resignation of the incumbent or the incumbent's succession to another office,
unexplained absence for sixty consecutive days, or failure to maintain the residence required when elected or
appointed, and upon failure of one elected or appointed to office to qualify within thirty days from the
commencement of the term.
History.--Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary
of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.
SECTION 4. Homestead; exemptions.--
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution
shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the
purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on
the realty, the following property owned by a natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one hundred sixty acres of contiguous
land and improvements thereon, which shall not be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent
inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-half acre of contiguous land,
upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence of the owner or the owner's family;
(2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars.
(b) These exemptions shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner.
(c) The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child, except
the homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse if there be no minor child. The owner of homestead real
estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift and, if married,
may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse. If the owner or spouse is
incompetent, the method of alienation or encumbrance shall be as provided by law.
History.--Am. H.J.R. 4324, 1972; adopted 1972; Am. H.J.R. 40, 1983; adopted 1984; Am. proposed by
Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998;
adopted 1998.
SECTION 5. Coverture and property.--There shall be no distinction between married women and married
men in the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their property, both real and personal; except that
dower or curtesy may be established and regulated by law.
SECTION 6. Eminent domain.--
(a) No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to
each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.
ARTICLE XII SCHEDULE
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
SECTION 1. Political power.
SECTION 2. Basic rights.
SECTION 3. Religious freedom.
SECTION 4. Freedom of speech and press.
SECTION 5. Right to assemble.
SECTION 6. Right to work.
SECTION 7. Military power.
SECTION 8. Right to bear arms.
SECTION 9. Due process.
SECTION 10. Prohibited laws.
SECTION 11. Imprisonment for debt.
SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.
SECTION 13. Habeas corpus.
SECTION 14. Pretrial release and detention.
SECTION 15. Prosecution for crime; offenses committed by children.
SECTION 16. Rights of accused and of victims.
SECTION 17. Excessive punishments.
SECTION 18. Administrative penalties.
SECTION 19. Costs.
SECTION 20. Treason.
SECTION 21. Access to courts.
SECTION 22. Trial by jury.
SECTION 23. Right of privacy.
SECTION 24. Access to public records and meetings.
SECTION 25. Taxpayers' Bill of Rights.
SECTION 26. Claimant's right to fair compensation.
SECTION 27. Marriage defined.
SECTION 1. Political power.--All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation herein of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people.
SECTION 2. Basic rights.--All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have
inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be
rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance,
disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by
law. No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability.
History.--Am. S.J.R. 917, 1974; adopted 1974; Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision
No. 9, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.
SECTION 3. Religious freedom.--There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting
or penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public
morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be
taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid
of any sectarian institution.
SECTION 4. Freedom of speech and press.--Every person may speak, write and publish sentiments on all
subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may be
given in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the party
shall be acquitted or exonerated.
SECTION 5. Right to assemble.--The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble, to instruct their
representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances.
SECTION 6. Right to work.--The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through
a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the
right to strike.
SECTION 7. Military power.--The military power shall be subordinate to the civil.
SECTION 8. Right to bear arms.--
(a) The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the
state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.
(b) There shall be a mandatory period of three days, excluding weekends and legal holidays, between the
purchase and delivery at retail of any handgun. For the purposes of this section, "purchase" means the transfer
of money or other valuable consideration to the retailer, and "handgun" means a firearm capable of being carried
and used by one hand, such as a pistol or revolver. Holders of a concealed weapon permit as prescribed in
Florida law shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.
(c) The legislature shall enact legislation implementing subsection (b) of this section, effective no later than
December 31, 1991, which shall provide that anyone violating the provisions of subsection (b) shall be guilty of a
felony.
(d) This restriction shall not apply to a trade in of another handgun.
History.--Am. C.S. for S.J.R. 43, 1989; adopted 1990.
SECTION 9. Due process.--No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against
oneself.
SECTION 10. Prohibited laws.--No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
SECTION 11. Imprisonment for debt.--No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.
SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.--The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private
communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause,
supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or
things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right
shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be
admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States
Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
History.--Am. H.J.R. 31-H, 1982; adopted 1982.
SECTION 13. Habeas corpus.--The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost.
It shall be returnable without delay, and shall never be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
suspension is essential to the public safety.
SECTION 14. Pretrial release and detention.--Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person
charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on
reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical
harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the
accused may be detained.
Advisory Legal Opinion - Municipalities, vacation of streets and roads Page 1 of 6
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Florida Attorney General

Advisory Legal Opinion
Number: AGO 78-125
Date: October 24, 1978
Subject: Municipalities, vacation of streets and roads
David B. Higginbottom
City Attorney
Frostproof
QUESTION:
Is a municipality authorized by law to require abutting landowners

who request vacation of a public street to prove a revesionary
interest in the property and pay for the proportionate costs of an
appraisal and for the proportionate appraised value of such property
interest as conditions to the vacation?
SUMMARY:
A municipality possesses no authority under the Municipal Home Rule

Powers Act to require property owners whose land abuts a dedicated
public street to 'prove a reversionary interest' or any other
property interest or property right in the streetbed prior to and as
a condition to the vacation of such street. The determination and
adjudication of property rights is a judicial function which may not
be exercised by the legislative branches of government; hence any
such exercise by a municipality does not constitute a lawful exercise
of a municipal governmental power for a municipal purpose. In
addition, while the vacation of streets in the public interest or
when the streets are no longer required for public use is a
legislative function which may be performed by a municipality, a
municipality possesses neither statutory nor constitutional authority
to exact payment for or otherwise interfere with the property rights
of landowners whose property abuts a public street as conditions to
or in exchange for the exercise of its power to vacate streets no
longer required for public use.
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:4-iypP7OQ6MJ:myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/printvie... 4/30/2009
4/24/2010 Advisory Legal Opinion - Counties, roa…

Number: AGO 78-118
Date: September 27, 1978
Subject: Counties, roads and streets, dedication, vacation
Robert Bruce Snow

Hernando County Attorney
Brooksville
QUESTION:
May a county legally divest itself of ownership and control of

certain dedicated streets and roads in a subdivision, and transfer
to a homeowners' association the right to exercise ownership and
control of, and to maintain, the streets and roads?
SUMMARY:
A county is statutorily authorized in the sound discretion of the

board of county commissioners to close and vacate dedicated roads
and streets designated on a recorded subdivision plat. Such
authority must be lawfully exercised in the interest of the general
public welfare and may not invade or violate individual property
rights. The county is not authorized, however, and cannot in any
manner legally convey or transfer the ownership and control of the
vacated roads or streets to a homeowners' association as such, but
upon lawful vacation thereof the abutting fee owners hold the title
in fee simple to the vacated roadways or streets to the center
thereof unburdened and unencumbered by the public's prior easement
to use such roadways or streets for travel. The county would not be
liable to any abutting fee owners as a result of closing or
vacating such roadways or streets unless an abutting owner is
thereby deprived of and suffers a consequent loss of access to his
property. An abutting fee owner would also have a private or
implied easement and cause of action to enforce such easement for
access or egress or travel as against the homeowners' association
or other abutting owners seeking to obstruct such access and use of
and travel upon the vacated, now private, roads and streets.
According to your letter, several miles of platted roads or streets

in a large subdivision in Hernando County were dedicated to the
public and accepted by the county through its approval for
myfloridalegal.com/…/1F43FA7B5F1C0… 1/6
4/24/2010 , Advisory Legal Opinion - Counties, roa… , g
fee owners who presumably could, if they so chose, convey or
transfer a portion of their property to the homeowners' association
(assuming it is so organized and legally capacitated to hold the
legal title thereto) for roadway purposes and control and
maintenance thereof. As a caveat, it should be noted that if the
general public is using the roads and streets in question
(including public service vehicles such as garbage trucks, police,
fire, or emergency vehicles), then the county should not close or
vacate the roads or streets in question if such vacation would be
injurious to the public welfare or violate individual property
rights. It has been noted: '. . . [T]he power to vacate streets
cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner, without regard to the
interest and convenience of the public or individual rights.'
McQuillin Municipal Corporations s. 30.186a. Hence, absent a
determination by the county commission that the general public
welfare would benefit from vacation, it should not be accomplished,
and in any event, the roads or streets can be vacated only in
accordance with the statute as discussed above and title thereto
cannot be legally conveyed or transferred to the homeowners'
association.
You also ask whether the action of the county in closing and
vacating the roads and streets in the subdivision would subject it
to liability in inverse condemnation based upon a loss of access to
the abutting lot owners. As a practical matter, the facts
delineated in your inquiry suggest that the homeowners' association
does not propose to restrict the access of any of the resident or
nonresident abutting fee owners to any of the platted streets or
roads or any property within the subdivision. Therefore, no cause
of action in inverse condemnation could arise in such factual
situation. However, a right of access to one's own property is a
property right. Hence, an abutting fee owner may be entitled to
compensation from a public body when it closes or vacates a public
street for the consequent loss of such access on the theory that a
property right has been taken without compensation. See, e.g.,
Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So.2d 6 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1975).
An abutting owner, it should also be noted, would, upon vacation of

the property, have a cause of action to enforce his right of access
or private easement for roadway purposes as against the homeowners'
association or other abutting owners who may obstruct access or
travel upon any of the vacated roads. Such private (implied)
easement would arise by virtue of conveyances and sales made with
reference to the recorded plat which creates a private right to
have the space marked on the plat as streets and roads remain open
for ingress and egress and the uses indicated by the designation.
As stated by the Florida Supreme Court in City of Miami v. Florida
East Coast Ry. Co., 84 So.2d 726, 729 (Fla. 1920):
The platting of land and the sale of lots pursuant thereto

4/24/2010 p g Advisory Legal Opinion - Counties, roa… p
creates as between the grantor and the purchaser of the lots a
private right to have the space marked upon the plat as
streets, alleys, parks, etc., remain open for ingress and
egress and the uses indicated by the designation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
See also McCorquodale v. Keyton, 63 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1956); Burnham

v. Davis Islands, Inc., 87 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1956); Reiger v. Anchor
Post Products, Inc., 210 So.2d 283 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1968), holding
that the rights of abutting or adjacent purchasers depend upon
principles of law applicable to private property rather than public
dedication since these rights depend upon a 'private easement
implied from sale with reference to a plat showing streets [etc.]'
rather than upon any dedication to the public generally. 87 So.2d
at 100. And see, Monell v. Golfview Road Association, 359 So.2d 2
(4 D.C.A. Fla., 1978), wherein the court held that the rights of
common owners of an easement on and for the purposes of a private
road are limited to the purpose for which the easement was
established and may not be exercised in derogation of the rights of
other common owners. Hence, the court granted an injunction
requiring a homeowners' association to remove speedbumps it had
placed on the roadway which substantially invaded and violated the
right of a particular homeowner to use his easement on the private
road to get to his house and property. Cf., Emerald Equities, Inc.,
supra; 16.33 Acres of Land, supra; and AGO's 078-88 and 078-63.
Prepared by:
Frank A. Vickory
Assistant Attorney General
recording of the subdivision plat and its acceptance of the
dedication of the streets and roads contained thereon. A property
owners' association representing the majority, though not all, of
the residents and property owners of the subdivision has requested
the county to relinquish its control, ownership, and maintenance of
the dedicated streets and roads and turn over this control,
ownership, and maintenance to the association in order that it
might not only maintain such streets and roads but also restrict
access to and within the subdivision to its residents and property
owners. As attorney for the county, you ask whether the board of
county commissioners may legally transfer its ownership and control
of the streets and roads to the association and, if it does so,
whether it will be subject to any liability as a consequence of its
actions.
Initially, it is necessary to consider the elements and effect of a

dedication. A dedication is simply the donating or appropriating of
one's own land for use by the public. That is, the owner of the
dedicated property is precluded from using it in any way
inconsistent with the public's use thereof. There are two essential
requisites to a finding of a dedication of property to the public.
There must first be a clearly manifested intent by the owner of
property to dedicate it to public use. Second, the public, through
its authorized agents or officials, must clearly manifest its
intent to accept the dedication. City of Miami v. Florida East
Coast Railway Co., 84 So. 726 (Fla. 1920); Roe v. Kendrick, 200 So.
394 (Fla. 1941). An offer of dedication to the public an be
accomplished by making and recording a plat and selling lots with
reference thereto, the method apparently employed in the instant
situation. See, e.g., Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. Worley, 38
So. 618 (Fla. 1905); Miami Beach v. Undercliff Realty and
Investment Co., 21 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1945); and see s. 177.081, F. S.
It appears from your letter that the dedication of roads and
streets in the subdivision in question was properly accepted by the
appropriate county officials and I, therefore, assume that a proper
dedication has taken place.
The effect of a dedication does not operate as a grant of the

dedicated property but rather by way of an estoppel in pais. That
is, the legal title to the property remains in the grantor (or his
vendees) while the public takes the beneficial use of the property.
Effectively, then, the fee remains in the grantor (or his grantees)
while the public acquires only a right of easement in trust, so
long as the dedicated land is used for the intended purpose of the
dedication. The grantor (or grantees--abutting lot owners) is
precluded from using the property in any way inconsistent with the
public use. Burkhart v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 156 So.2d 752 (2
D.C.A. Fla., 1963), decision quashed 168 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1964);
Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corporation, 107 So.2d
51 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1959); Robbins v. White, 42 So. 841 (Fla. 1907).
Absent a contrary showing, not made evident here , the legal title
of the grantor-subdivider in properly dedicated property passes to
the grantees of lots sold in reference to a plat, which lots abut
the dedicated streets. Their title extends to the center of the
streets subject to the public easement. Walker v. Pollack, 74 So.2d
886 (Fla. 1954); Smith v. Horn, 70 So. 435 (Fla. 1915); New Fort
Pierce Hotel Co. v. Phoenix Tax Title Corp., 171 So. 525 (Fla.
1936); United States v. 16.33 Acres of Land in County of Dade, 342
So.2d 476, 480 (Fla. 1977); cf., Emerald Equities v. Hutton, 357
So.2d 1071 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1978), wherein the court held that, when
a single owner conveys to the county the title to or an easement in
a roadway which is later abandoned by the county, that owner or his
successors takes back or retains title to all the ababdoned
property unless the owner is a subdivider who has later *4438
conveyed lots (and his interest in the abutting road) which abut
the dedicated roadway to separate owners without specifically
reserving any reversionary interest in the roadway. In such a case,
the general rule prevails that the abutting owners on each side of
the abandoned or vacated road become the fee owners out to the
center line. See also ss. 177.085(2) and 336.12, F. S. These
purchasers acquire their title, however, subject to the easement of
the public in the dedicated property. Smith, supra; New Ft. Pierce
Hotel Co., supra; Gainesville v. Thomas, 54 So. 780 (Fla. 1911).
Your inquiry does not state that the dedicator or subdivider

reserved any reversionary interest or rights in the streets and
roads in the plat in question. I assume, therefore, for the
purposes of this opinion, that no such rights exist in or under the
plat. However, if such plat was made and recorded in the public
records before July 1, 1972, and if no action has since been
brought to establish or enforce any such reversionary rights, they
are now barred and unenforceable by operation of s. 177.085(2), F.
S. See also 16.33 Acres of Land in County of Dade, supra, and
Emerald Equities, supra.
It seems evident that the governing body of Hernando County does

not 'own' the streets and roads in the subject subdivision which
were dedicated for public use. The public has an easement to use
the streets and roads, but there is no legal title to the property
vested in the county which it can convey or transfer to the
homeowners' association. Nevertheless, counties in Florida have the
statutory authority to close and vacate any county streets, roads,
alleyways, or other places used for travel. Section 336.09(1), F.
S., provides:
(1) The commissioners, with respect to property under their

control may in their own discretion, and of their own motion,
or upon the request of any agency of the state, or of the
federal government, or upon petition of any person or persons,
are hereby authorized and empowered to:
(a) Vacate, abandon, discontinue and close any existing public

or private street, alleyway, road, highway , or other place used
for travel, or any portion thereof, other than a state or
federal highway, and to renounce and disclaim any right of the
county and the public in and to any land in connection
therewith;
(b) Renounce and disclaim any right of the county and the
public in and to any land, or interest therein, acquired by
purchase, gift, devise, dedication or prescription for street,
alleyway, road or highway purposes , other than lands acquired
for state and federal highway; and
(c) Renounce and disclaim any right of the county and the
public in and to land, other than land constituting, or
acquired for, a state or federal highway, delineated on any
recorded map or plat as a street, alleyway, road or highway.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Upon termination of the easement acquired by the public in the

dedicated property, s. 336.12, F. S., provides that the title of
the fee owners in the property shall be freed and released
therefrom.
The act of any commissioners in closing or abandoning any such

road, or in renouncing or disclaiming any rights in any land
delineated on any recorded map as a road, shall abrogate the
easement theretofore owned, held, claimed or used by or an
behalf of the public and the title of fee owners shall be freed
and released therefrom . . .. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, upon the lawful, statutorily prescribed vacation of the

public's easement, the title to the fee of the dedicator or of his
successors, or of the abutting lot owners, is freed of and released
from the easement; therefore, those property owners who own land
abutting the street or road would, upon surrender, have
unencumbered fee title to the center of the right-of-way. Cf.,
Emerald Equities, Inc., supra.
Applying the foregoing principles and statutes to the instant case,

I conclude that the board of county commissioners has statutory
authority to close and vacate the dedicated and platted roads and
streets in question in accordance with the statutes, but may not by
conveyance by deed or any other instrument of conveyance transfer
the ownership and control thereof to the association. The title in
fee simple to the vacated road beds or rights-of-way to the center
thereof would remain, unburdened or unencumbered , in the abutting
Your letter advises that the Frostproof City Council has adopted a
'motion' which reads as follows:
[I]n the future a qualified appraiser [shall] be used by the city

to set the value of a street (to become property) when requested
for closure. The person or persons making the request would have
to bear the expense of the appraisal and proof of a reversionary
clause. They would be notified and bills [sic] for the appraised
property value before actual closing of the street could take
place. Payment to be made on date of actual closing.
Section 2(b), Art. VIII, State Const., provides in pertinent part:
Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary

powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform
municipal functions and render municipal services, and may
exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Statutory implementation of the broad grant of home rule is provided

by Ch. 166, F. S., the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act. Section
166.051(1), F. S., of that act states in relevant part that
'municipalities . . . may exercise may power for municipal purposes,
except when expressly prohibited by law.' (Emphasis supplied.) Thus,
it is clear that the only limitation upon the exercise of power by a
municipality is that it must be exercised for a municipal purpose.
State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So.2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 1977).
Although the phrase 'municipal purposes' is not defined by the

constitution, it is defined by s. 166.021(2), F. S., as 'any activity
or power which may be exercised by the state or its political
subdivisions.' But see City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305
So.2d 764, 765-769 (Fla. 1974) (Dekle, J., concurring), in which
Justice Dekle observed:
It is not the definition of municipal purposes found in . . . s.

166.021(2) that grants power to the municipality . . . but rather
the provision of . . . s. 166.021(1) which expressly empowers
municipalities to 'exercise any power for municipal purposes,
except when expressly prohibited by law.'
It is a fundamental principal in this state that the determination

and adjudication of property rights is a judicial function which
cannot be performed by the Legislature. Hillsborough County v.
Kensatt, 144 So. 393 (Fla. 1932); State Plant Board v. Smith, 110
So.2d 401 (Fla. 1959); Daniels v. State Road Dept., 170 So.2d 846
(Fla. 1964). Legislation which constitutes an invasion of the
province of the judiciary is invalid. Thursby v. Stewart, 138 So. 742

(Fla. 1931); Simmons v. State, 36 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1948). Thus, while
the vacation of streets is a legislative function which may be
validly delegated to municipalities (see Sun Oil Company v. Gerstein,
206 So.2d 439, 440 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1968), AGO 075-171), no
legislative body (whether state, county, or municipal) is authorized
to invade private property rights or require abutting property owners
to prove a reversionary or any other interest in real property as a
condition to the vacation of a public street. Accordingly, the action
taken by the Frostproof City Council does not constitute a municipal
purpose; and, therefore, it is outside the scope of municipal home
rule powers possessed by the municipality.
Moreover, under the general rule, the interest acquired in land by a

municipal corporation for street purposes is held in trust for the
benefit of all the public, regardless of whether the corporation owns
the fee or has merely an interest therein. Sun Oil Company v.
Gerstein, supra; 30 Am. Jur.2d Highways Streets and Bridges s. 159. A
municipality is empowered to vacate streets only when the vacation is
in the public interest or when the street is no longer required for
public use and convenience. 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations s. 1668.
Consequently, in AGO 078-118, I noted, as a caveat, with respect to
the vacation of county roads:
[I]f the general public is using the roads and streets in

question (including public service vehicles such as garbage
trucks, police, fire or emergency vehicles), then the county
should not close or vacate the roads or streets in question as
such vacation would be injurious to the public welfare or violate
individual property rights.
Applying these principles to your inquiry, it is clear that the

city council should not undertake to vacate any streets in the
absence of a determination that the general public would benefit
from the vacation or that such streets are no longer required for
the public use and convenience.
As to whether a municipality is authorized to exact charges or

payments from abutting landowners as a condition to or in
exchange for the vacation of a public street, it is necessary to
analyze the property interests possessed by the public and the
abutting or adjoining landowners in public streets.
Recently, in AGO's 078-63, 078-88, and 078-118, I examined the

elements and effect of the dedication of property for public use.
There are two basic requirements to the existence of a valid
dedication to the public. First, there must be a clearly
manifested intention by the owner of the property to dedicate it
to public use. Second, the public, through its authorized agents,
must clearly show its intent to accept the dedication. City of
Miami v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 84 So. 726 (Fla. 1920);
Roe v. Kendrick, 200 So. 394 (Fla. 1941). An offer of dedication
to the public may be accomplished by making and recording a plat
and selling lots with reference thereto. See, e.g., Florida East
Coast Railway Co. v. Worley, 38 So. 618 (Fla. 1905); Miami Beach
v. Undercliff Realty and Investment Co., 21 So.2d 783 (Fla.
1945); and see, s. 177.081, F. S.
However the dedication to the public is accomplished, it is clear

that such dedication does not have the effect of transferring
legal title from the grantor to the public. To the contrary, the
fee remains in the grantor (or his grantees) while the public
acquires only a right of easement in trust, so long as the
dedicated land is used for the intended purpose of the
dedication. Attorney General Opinion 078-118. Unless otherwise
specifically provided in the conveyance, the legal title of the
grantor in the dedicated property passes to the grantees of those
lots sold with reference to a plat, which lots abut the dedicated
streets. Their title extends to the center of the street subject
to the public easement. Walker v. Pollack, 74 So.2d 886 (Fla.
1954); Smith v. Horn, 70 So. 435 (Fla. 1915); New Fort Pierce
Hotel Co. v. Phoenix Tax Title Corp., 171 So. 525 (Fla. 1936);
United States v. 16.33 Acres of Land in County of Dade, 342 So.2d
476, 480 (Fla. 1977); cf. Emerald Equities v. Hutton, 357 So.2d
1071 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1978). Therefore, a street in which the
public has only an easement when properly vacated ceases to be a
street; the abutting landowners continue to hold fee simple title
to the center of the vacated roadbed unencumbered by the
easement. Smith v. Horn, supra; Robbins v. White, 42 So. 841,
843-844 (Fla. 1907); AGO 078-118.
See also s. 177.081(1), F. S., providing that every plat of a

subdivision filed for record must contain a dedication by the
developer; s. 177.081(2), F. S., providing that all streets,
rights-of-way, and public areas shown on plats approved by the
affected local governments shall be deemed dedicated to the
public for the uses and purposes stated in such plat, unless
otherwise stated therein by the dedicator; s. 177.085(1), F. S.,
providing that when any landowner subdivides his land and
dedicates streets or roadways on the plat but reserves unto the
dedicator the reversionary interests in the dedicated streets or
roadways, and thereafter conveys abutting lots, such conveyance
carries with it the reversionary interest in the abutting street
to the center line, unless the landowner clearly provides
otherwise in the conveyance; and s. 177.085(2), F. S., providing
that prior holders of any interest in the reversionary rights in
the streets and roads in recorded plats of subdivided lots, other
than the owners of abutting lots, 'shall have 1 year from July 1,
1972, to institute suit . . . to establish or enforce the right,'
and that, if no such action is instituted within that time, any
right, title, or interest and all right of reversion shall be

barred and unenforceable.
With regard to the instant inquiry, therefore, it is apparent

that the Frostproof City Council does not 'own' streets which
have been dedicated to public use. Cf. AGO 078-118 in which this
office concluded that a county was not authorized to convey or
transfer ownership and control of dedicated streets to a
'homeowners association' since the county possessed no legal
title in the property which it could convey or transfer. Under
such circumstances, there would appear to be no legal basis upon
which the city could require abutting fee owners to pay to secure
property interests which they already possess. See McQuillin
Municipal Corporations s. 30.189, at 123 (3rd rev. ed. 1977),
stating: 'A municipality is not entitled to compensation for loss
of a public easement in streets in which it does not own the
fee.' Accord: Lockwood & Strickland Co. v. City of Chicago, 117
N.E. 81, 82 (Ill. 1917), in which the court held, among other
things:
[I]t would be beyond the power of the city to grant or convey to

a private person or corporation the ground embraced in a vacated
street or alley. Whether a city owns the fee in an alley or
merely an easement, when it is vacated because no longer needed
for public use, the law disposes of the reversionary interest,
and the reversionary rights cannot be granted or conveyed by the
city. . . . Whether the alley was no longer needed for public
use, and whether the public interest would be subserved by its
vacation, could not be made to depend on how much the city could
get for its action. The legislative powers of a city must be
exercised for the public benefit, but that does not authorize a
municipality to sell or bargain legislation as a means of
obtaining revenue.
The State Constitution provides that all natural persons shall have
the inalienable right 'to acquire, possess and protect property . .
..' Section 2, Art. I, State Const. Additionally, s. 9, Art. I, State
Const., provides that no person 'shall be deprived of . . . property
without due process of law . . ..' Section 6, Art. X, State Const.,
states that '[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public
purpose and with full compensation therefor . . ..' Thus, the
acquisition, possession, enjoyment, use, and alienation of property
and property rights are controlled by constitutional law and the
common law. Moreover, the term 'property' for purposes of the above-
cited constitutional provisions includes more than the abutting
landowner's fee simple title. As stated in Seldon v. City of
Jacksonville, 10 So. 457, 459 (Fla. 1891):
There is incident to abutting property, or its ownership, even
where the abutter's fee or title does not extend to the middle of
the street, but only to its boundary, certain property rights
which the public generally do not possess. They are the right of
egress and ingress from and to the lot by the way of the street,
and the right of light and air which the street affords. Viewing
property to be not the mere corporal subject of ownership, but as
being all the rights legally incidental to the ownership of such
subject, which rights are generally said to be those of user,
exclusion, and disposition, or the right to use, possess, and
dispose of, . . . we are satisfied that the rights just mentioned
are within the meaning of the word 'property,' as it is used in
this constitutional provision. [10 So. 457, 459 (1891)
(construing s. 12, Declar. Rts., State Const. 1885, in part a
predecessor of s. 6, Art. X, State Const.).]
See also Lutterloh v. Mayor and Council of Town of Cedar Keys, 15

Fla. 306, 308 (1875); City of Miami v. East Coast Ry. Co. , 84 So.
726, 729 (Fla. 1920); McCorquodale v. Keyton, 63 So.2d 906 (Fla.
1956); Monell v. Golfview Road Association, 359 So.2d 2 (4 D.C.A.
Fla., 1978).
Accordingly, it has been held that the rights of abutting or adjacent

purchasers depend on principles of law applicable to private property
rather than public dedication since these rights depend upon a
'private easement implied from sale with reference to a plat showing
streets [etc.]' rather than upon any dedication to the public
generally. Burnham v. Davis Islands, Inc., 87 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla.
1956). An abutting landowner may be entitled to compensation from a
public body when it vacates a public street for consequent loss of
access to such landowner's property on the theory that a property
right has been taken without compensation. See Pinellas County v.
Austin, 323 So.2d 6, 8 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1975). If follows, then, that
the several property interests of abutting landowners are subject to
constitutional protection. Clearly the attempt by a municipality to
usurp private property rights or property interests or to barter or
sell such property rights as conditions to or in exchange for the
exercise of its legislative power to vacate streets no longer
required for public use, does not constitute a municipal purpose and
is outside the scope of municipal home rule powers.
Prepared by:
Patricia R. Gleason

-12-
HOW HITLER EXPANDED HIS “EMPIRE” BY CRIMINAL LAND CLAIMS
PARODY BY JOHN E. STEELE
Signed and executed by the Fúhrer in Fort Myers Gas Chambers

FORT MYERS DIVISION
JORG BUSSE
Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; KENNETH M.
WILKINSON; LEE COUNTY PROPERTY
APPRAISER’S OFFICE; STATE OF
FLORIDA, BOARD OF [PAST & PRESENT]
TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT
TRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, AND DIVISION OF
RECREATION AND PARKS; LEE COUNTY
ATTORNEY; JACK N. PETERSON,
Defendants.
___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the following motions:
(1) defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and Close File
(Doc. #285), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #302); (2)
defendants State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) and Florida Department of
Environmental Protection’s (DEP) Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Doc.
#291), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #316); (3)
defendant The Lee County Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction (Doc. #303), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.
#317); and (4) defendant Board of Lee County Commissioners’ Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. #304), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.
#318). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are
held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an
attorney and will be liberally construed. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).
I.
On December 10, 1969, the Board of County Commissioners of Lee
County, Florida adopted the “Resolution Pertaining to Public Lands
in Cayo Costa Subdivision”, Book 569, page 875 (the Resolution).
The Resolution stated that the Second Revised Plat of the Cayo
Costa Subdivision contained certain designated lot and block areas
and other undesignated areas. The Resolution further noted that
the plat contained certain un-numbered and unlettered areas lying
East of the Easterly tier of blocks in the subdivision and lying
West of the Westerly tier of blocks in the subdivision. The
Resolution stated that Lee County claimed the lands to the east and
west of the tier of blocks as “public lands together with all
accretions thereto” and “does by this Resolution claim all of said
lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public
for public purposes.” (Doc. #288, p. 9.)
Plaintiff Jorg Busse (plaintiff or Dr. Busse) asserts he is
the current owner of Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa Subdivision and
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accretions thereto. (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 1, 2.) Plaintiff describes Lot
15A as being more than approximately 2.5 acres fronting the Gulf of
Mexico with an estimated fair market value of more than $2 million.
(Id. at ¶6.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution violates his
property rights in Lot 15A, which includes accretions, under both
federal and state law.
Count 1 sets forth a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
alleges that the Resolution deprived him of his riparian rights,
private easements, accreted property and privileges secured by the
United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that
Lee County had no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the
undedicated Cayo Costa Subdivision, and therefore the Resolution
was unenforceable and in violation of the United States
Constitution. (Doc. #288, ¶13.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants
confiscated more than 2.5 acres of his accreted property without
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Id. at
¶14.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants also illegally took more
than 200 acres of private accretions onto Cayo Costa pursuant to
the Resolution, all without compensation. (Id. at ¶15.) Further,
plaintiff asserts that “Defendant State Actors” claimed riparian
rights to Lots 38A and 41A which they denied to plaintiff, thereby
unlawfully discriminating against plaintiff because he is entitled
to equal rights as the State property owner. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 27.)
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Count 2 alleges an unconstitutional temporary taking under
color of the Resolution. Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution was
never signed, executed or acknowledged and did not meet resolution
and recording requirements, and was therefore not entitled to be
recorded and must be stricken from the public record. (Id. at
¶17.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Cayo Costa Subdivision
was outside of Lee County’s home rule powers, and therefore the
State and County had no powers to adopt resolutions or ordinances,
and therefore the Resolution is unenforceable and ineffectual and
the County capriciously grabbed private accreted land and
easements. (Id. at ¶18.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants took
his accretions onto the riparian gulf front Lot 15A without
authority, justification, due process of law, public notice,
hearing, vote count, or compensation, and that this unauthorized
unconstitutional taking injured plaintiff and destroyed his
property value. (Id. at ¶19.)
Count 3 sets forth a state law claim for trespass. Plaintiff
alleges that since the 1969 Resolution the defendants have asserted
that Lee County is the owner of the Cayo Costa accretions and have
induced and caused the public to intrude onto the private beaches
and other areas on Cayo Costa, injuring plaintiff’s property. (Id.
at ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff asserts that the State cannot exercise
power within the Subdivision east of the mean high water mark of
the Gulf of Mexico and west of the mean high water mark of
Charlotte Harbor. (Id. at ¶22.)
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Count 4 alleges a conspiracy to fabricate, fraud and
malfeasance. Plaintiff asserts that the Lee County Property
Appraiser claimed that the Resolution entitled Lee County to
ownership of the accreted property, but the County Appraiser has
admitted that Lee County was not empowered to adopt the Resolution.
(Id. at ¶23.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution on its face
did not meet recording or resolution requirements, and that the
County Appraiser had a professional duty to verify the validity of
the sham Resolution under the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that without evidence
of title, defendants conspired to concoct an un-plated lot, block
and park for the benefit of the State and County. (Id. at ¶24.)
Plaintiff also asserts that defendant denied agricultural
classification to his accreted lot. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that
defendants destroyed most of his property value, deprived him of
private easements without compensation, and denied equal protection
in a land grab scheme. (Id.) Plaintiff describes the agreement as
being to assist the unconstitutional confiscation of the
accretions. (Id. at ¶25.) Plaintiff also asserts that the County
Appraiser made incompetent valuation reports which were
controverted by other comparable sales data and done in violation
of Federal Appraisal Standards, but defendant continued to slander
plaintiff’s perfect title. (Id. at ¶26.) As a result, plaintiff
received purchase offers far below market value and the County
Appraiser has committed malfeasance and abuse of position. (Id.)
-5-
Count 5 alleges a conspiracy to materially misrepresent and
defraud. Plaintiff asserts that Lee County does not hold title to
the accreted property pursuant to the Resolution, and there has
been no proceedings such as eminent domain or adverse possession.
(Id. at ¶29.) Plaintiff asserts that Lee County’s claims of
ownership of the accretions therefore violated the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause, and therefore defendants deprived the public of tax
revenues which could have been received from the private accretions
and easements. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants conspired
to misrepresent the extent of the Army Corps of Engineers’
authority over his lagoon. (Id. at ¶32.)
Count 6 alleges oppression and slander of title by defendant
Peterson for failing to challenge the invalidity of the Resolution
despite his questions about its validity. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-35.)
The Third Amended Complaint asserts the Court has jurisdiction
based on the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), 28 U.S.C. § 1343,
Articles 3 and 4 of the United States Constitution, and Amendments
4 and 5 of the United States Constitution (Doc. #288, ¶7), the 1899
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33 U.S.C. § 403)(id. at ¶8),
the 1862 Homestead Act (id. at ¶9), the federal common law Doctrine
of Accretion and Erosion (id. at ¶10), the Federal Appraisal
Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (12
U.S.C. §§ 3331-3351), and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28
U.S.C. § 2201)(id. at ¶12).
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III.
The Court will first address the federal claims, since these
claims are necessary to provide subject matter jurisdiction. Given
plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court reviews the Third Amended
Complaint liberally.
A. Takings Clause Claims:
A consistent theme which runs through several of plaintiff’s
counts is that the Resolution constitutes an unconstitutional
taking of his property rights in his subdivision Lot 15A on Cayo
Costa island.1 The legal principles are well-settled, and preclude
plaintiff’s takings claim.
Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which states in pertinent part “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 121-23 (1978). The Third Amended
Complaint may also be read to allege a conspiracy to violate the
Takings Clause.
State law defines the parameters of a plaintiff’s property
interest, and whether state law has created a property interest is
a legal question for the court to decide. Morley’s Auto Body, Inc.
1
See Lee County v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
for a description of Cayo Costa island and the Lee County zoning
history of the island since 1978.
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v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 1996). Under Florida law
a riparian or littoral owner owns to the line of the ordinary high
water mark on navigable waters, and the riparian or littoral
property rights include the vested right to receive accretions to
the property. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 1987);
Brannon v. Boldt, 958 So. 2d 367, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). These
rights constitute property, and cannot be taken or destroyed by the
government without just compensation to the owners. Sand Key
Assoc., 512 So. 2d at 936; Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013,
1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). “By now it is beyond question that a
permanent physical occupation of private property by the state
constitutes a taking for which a landowner must be compensated.”
New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th
Cir. 1996)(citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015 (1992) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982)).
Thus while plaintiff has adequately alleged a taking of his
property, “a property owner has not suffered a violation of the
Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures
provided by the State for obtaining such compensation . . .”
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 195 (1972). “Williamson County boils down to the rule
that state courts always have a first shot at adjudicating a
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takings dispute because a federal constitutional claim is not ripe
until the state has denied the would-be plaintiff’s compensation
for a putative taking, including by unfavorable judgment in a state
court proceeding.” Agripost, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla.,
F.3d , 2008 WL 1790434 (11th Cir. 2008). Without having
pursued such available state court remedies, a plaintiff’s Takings
Clause claim is not ripe and therefore a federal district court
lacks jurisdiction to consider it. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at
195; Watson Constr. Co. v. City of Gainsville, 244 Fed. Appx. 274,
277 (11th Cir. 2007); Garbo, Inc. v. City of Key West, Fla., 162
Fed. Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2006). It has been clear since at least
1990 that Florida law provides a remedy of an inverse or reverse
condemnation suit. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp.,
563 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1990); Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d
1533, 1537 n.12 (11th Cir. 1995); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d
1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Additionally, plaintiff could have
pursued an state action for declaratory judgment under FLA . STAT . §
86.011, a suit to quiet title, Trustees of Internal Imp. Fund of
State of Florida v. Toffel, 145 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), or
a suit in ejectment if the matter is viewed as a boundary dispute.
Petryni v. Denton, 807 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
The Third Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiff
pursued any state relief. Indeed, plaintiff has never suggested
that he has taken any action in state court to quiet title or
receive damages under an inverse or reverse condemnation claim.
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Since there is no showing of federal jurisdiction as to the Takings
Clause claim, the Taking Clause claims and any conspiracy to
violate the Takings Clause in any count will be dismissed without
prejudice.
B. Substantive Due Process Claim:
A liberal reading of the Third Amended Complaint might suggest
that plaintiff also frames the alleged taking of his property
rights as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that there is
no independent substantive due process taking cause of action.
Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 612-14
(11th Cir. 1997). Additionally, substantive due process protects
only fundamental rights, that is, those rights which are implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty. Such rights are created by the
Constitution, and do not include property rights. Greenbriar
Village, LLC v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.
2003). Merely asserting that the government’s actions were
arbitrary and irrational does not bring the matter within the
protection of the substantive due process provision. Greenbriar
Village, 345 F.3d at 1263-64. Therefore, those portions of counts
in the Third Amended Complaint which attempt to assert a
substantive due process takings claim or conspiracy will be
dismissed.
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C. Procedural Due Process Claim:
Plaintiff’s counts may also attempt to state a procedural due
process claim. For example, plaintiff asserts that Lee County had
no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the undedicated Cayo Costa
subdivision (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 13, 18, 23), that the Resolution was
and recording requirements (id. at ¶¶ 17, 23), and that the taking
was without authority, justification, due process, public notice,
hearing, vote count, or compensation (id. at ¶19).
“Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to
be heard before any government deprivation of a property interest.”
Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995).
Not all government actions, however, are subject to a procedural
due process claim. The County’s action in passing the Resolution
constituted a legislative act, and therefore plaintiff cannot state
a procedural due process claim. 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade
County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff
asserted that the Resolution effecting the taking of more than 200
acres other than his 2.5 acres. This is sufficient to constitute
a legislative act. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)(noting that it is
impractical to give every one a voice when a legislative act
applies to more than a few people). Additionally, even if not a
legislative act, a procedural due process claims does not exist
-11-

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Third Amended Complaint states that defendants have taken over 200
acres pursuant to the Resolution, far in excess of his 2.5 acres.
The only assertion of disparate treatment is for those lots owned
by government, which plaintiff alleges did not have their rights
taken. However, a private owner such as plaintiff can not be
compared to a public owner such as a government unit. Therefore,
no equal protection claim is stated, and such claims will be
dismissed without prejudice.
E. Other Bases of Federal Jurisdiction:
Having found no federal claim set forth in the Third Amended
Complaint, the Court now examines the other purported bases of
federal jurisdiction.
Article III of the Constitution sets the outer boundaries of
the federal court jurisdiction, but vests Congress with the
discretion to determine whether and to what extent that power may
be exercised by lower federal courts. Therefore, lower federal
courts are empowered to hear only cases for which there has been a
congressional grant of jurisdiction. Morrison v. Allstate
Indemnity Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2000). Therefore
Article III does not provide any additional basis of federal
jurisdiction. Additionally, plaintiff’s reliance on Article IV of
the Constitution is misplaced because Article IV does not address
the jurisdiction of a federal court.
Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 1343 as a basis for federal
jurisdiction. Section 1343 sets forth the jurisdiction of district
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courts for certain civil rights actions, but does not itself create
a private right of action. Albra v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232
Fed. Appx. 885, 892 (11th Cir. 2007). Since none of plaintiff’s
federal civil rights claims are properly before the court, § 1343
is not a basis for jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.
Plaintiff’s reliance on the 1899 Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 is misplaced. Section 403
relates to the creation of an obstruction not authorized by
Congress, and simply not relevant to any of the claims in this
case. The 1862 Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-64, cannot form
basis for jurisdiction because it was repealed in 1976. Assuming
there is a federal common law Doctrine of Accretion and Erosion, it
cannot provide a jurisdictional basis in federal court. The
Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice, 12 U.S.C. § 3331-3351, also do not create
federal jurisdiction. These standards relate to real estate
appraisals utilized in connection with federally related
transactions, 12 U.S.C. § 1331, and no such transaction was
involved in this case. Additionally, in Florida the county
property appraiser is a constitutionally created office whose
appraisals are carried out pursuant to state statute, FLA . STAT . §
193.011 as well as professional appraisal standards established by
the International Association of Assessing Officers and the
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Appraisal Institute. Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.2
(11th Cir. 1996).
Therefore, the Court finds no other basis of federal
jurisdiction has been plead in the Third Amended Complaint.
F. Remaining State Law Claims:
The remaining possible claims in the Third Amended Complaint
are all state law claims. Read liberally, the Third Amended
Complaint may be read to allege a claim to invalidate the
Resolution for alleged state-law procedural defects, a state law
claim of trespass, a state law claim of conspiracy to misrepresent,
a state law claim of fraud, state law claims of malfeasance, a
state law claim of oppression, and a state law claim of slander of
title. Even assuming these are properly pled, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the Court would exercise its discretion and
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
claims. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th
Cir. 2004)(encouraging district courts to dismiss state claims
where all claims which provided original jurisdiction have been
dismissed.) The dismissal of the state claims will be without
prejudice. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
Having found that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, and will not retain supplemental jurisdiction, the
Court need not address the issues raised in the remaining
defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Accordingly, it is now
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ORDERED:
1. Defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. #303) is GRANTED to the
extent set forth in paragraph 5 below.
2. Defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and
Close File (Doc. #285) is DENIED as moot.
3. State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection
and Division of Recreation and Parks, State of Florida, and Board
of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund’s Joint Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a
Cause of Action (Doc. #291) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in
paragraph 5 below.
4. Defendants Lee County, Florida, Board of Lee County
Commissioners, Lee County Attorney, Jack N. Peterson’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. #304) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph
5 below.
5. The Third Amended Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice as to all defendants and all claims. The Clerk shall
enter judgment accordingly, terminate all pending motions as moot,
and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 5th day of
May, 2008.
Copies: Parties of record
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Case 2:09-cv-00791-CEH-SPC Document 159 Filed 04/21/10 Page 6 of 7
Respectfully submitted,
A. Brian Albritton
United States Attorney
By: s/ Jennifer Waugh Corinis

Jennifer Waugh Corinis
Assistant United States Attorney
Fla. Bar No. 49095
400 North Tampa Street, Suite 3200
Tampa, Florida 33602
Telephone: (813) 274-6310
Facsimile: (813) 274-6200
Email: jennifer.corinis@usdoj.gov
6

FORT MYERS DIVISION
JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT,

DR. JORGE BUSSE,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 2:09-cv-791-FtM-36SPC
ROGER ALEJO; KENNETH M. WILKINSON; JACK N. PETERSON; ROGER

DESJARLAIS; LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; LEE COUNTY VALUE
ADJUSTMENT BOARD; LORI L. RUTLAND; STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD
OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND; STATE
OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; CHAD
LACH; CHARLES -BARRY- STEVENS; REAGAN KATHLEEN RUSSELL;
KAREN B. HAWES; ROGER DESJARLAIS; CHARLIE GREEN; BOB JANES;
BRIAN BIGELOW; RAY JUDAH; TAMMY HALL; FRANK MANN; UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY(S); SEAN P. FLYNN; E. KENNETH STEGEBY; DAVID P.
RHODES; A. BRIAN ALBRITTON; CYNTHIA A. PIVACEK; JOHNSON
ENGINEERING, NC.; STEVEN CARTA; MIKE SCOTT; HUGH D. HAYES;
GERALD D. SIEBENS; STATE OF FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL
WILLIAM M. MARTIN; PETERSON BERNARD; SKIP QUILLEN; TOM
GILBERTSON,
__________________________________/
FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The United States of America, by and through the undersigned Assistant United
States Attorney, and on behalf of the named defendants A. Brian Albritton, U.S.
Attorney for the Middle District of Florida, and David P. Rhodes, Sean P. Flynn, and E.
Kenneth Stegeby, Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the Middle District of Florida (the “USAO
Defendants”), submits their Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgement
Against Defendant U.S. Attorneys, Notice of Case Fixing & Corruption on Record and
Conspiracy of Corruption by “Legal Whores” Chappell & Corinis, Notice of Criminal

Concealment of Forged Parcel 12-44-2D-0I-00000.00A0 (“Motion for Summary
Judgment”).
Plaintiffs’ Motion should be denied in all respects. The Plaintiffs has fallen far
short of demonstrating that they are entitled to summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
As it pertains to the USAO Defendants, Plaintiffs’ Complaint includes claims
against the USAO Defendants for fraudulent concealment, material misrepresentation,
conspiracy, and obstruction of justice, based on the USAO Defendants alleged
conspiracy to conceal, and to further, the Lee County defendants’ scheme to deprive
Plaintiffs of their property rights. Busse VII Complaint ¶¶ 222-230. The “evidence” that
Plaintiffs cite to support their concusory allegations of fraud and conspiracy by the
USAO Defendants is that a 1969 Lee County resolution was forged. The only other
pertinent fact appears to be that the USAO Defendants diagree with the Plaintiffs’
position.
In their Motion, the Plaintiffs claim to be entitled to summary judgment against
the USAO Defendants on the issues in their Compalint for two reasons, as described in
their prayer for relief:
An order for Summary Judgment against said Defendant U.S. Attorneys

under FRCP 56, because said forgeries were “no genuine issue as to any
material fact”, and because Defendants never answered and/or defended
against the conclusively proved allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
Motion, p. 29.1
1
The majority of Plaintiffs’ so-called “summary judgment” motion consists of accusations
against Magistrate Judge Chappell of a laundry list of misdeeds, all of which have been
repeated ad nauseam, using scandalous and impertinent language, in Plaintiffs’ filings. These
allegations do not pertain to the USAO Defendants.
2
AVATARS OF FASCISM – ADOLF HITLER …
VEXATIOUSNESS
”The avatar of fascism

posed the century's greatest threat to democracy and
redefined the meaning of evil forever.”
Elie Wiesel
AND AVATAR “A.” BRIAN ALBRITTON

“ADOLF” BRIAN ALBRITTON’S
DISTURBING JOKES ABOUT
O.R. 569/875
DOC. # 159, 04/21/1945

The Fuhrer's sense of humour, which included disturbing jokes about
concentration camp victims, has been revealed in a book called The Last Witness,
published in Britain.
It was written by Rochus Misch, 90, the telephonist in the Berlin Bunker where
Hitler spent his last days before killing himself in April 1945 …
JOHN EDWIN’S DISTURBING JOKES
&
TALES OF TERROR
Produced in cooperation and conspiracy by
“Adolf” Brian Albritton
Sheri Polster Chappell
Jennifer Whore Corinis
Beverly B. Martin
and
John Edwin Steele
HITLER PARODY GOVERNMENTAL PRESS
GAS CHAMBERS, FORT MYERS, FL, AND ATLANTA, GA
UNITED STATES OF ANARCHY
ISBN 0.R.569/875
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ESTABLISH ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY

JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 56
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment makes no effort to comply with the
basic requirements of such a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. To prevail on a motion
for summary judgment, the moving party must establish that “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the burden
of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions, and/or affidavits which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Hickson Corp. v. Northern Crossarm
Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2004). While the court is required to “make
all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment,” it is not
required to make all possible inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Chapman v.
Al Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Whether a fact is material
is dictated by the substantive law underlying the moving party’s claims. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323 (“The substantive law applicable to the claimed causes of action will identify
which facts are material.”)
If a moving party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must “go beyond
the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
3
admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that there are any facts in the record that
are material, let alone that there are undisputed material facts. Conclusory statements
cannot pass for “facts” in a summary judgment motion.
B. Plaintiffs’ Motion Fails to Establish Any Material Facts
The “facts” Plaintiffs’ cite in their brief are not facts at all; rather, the facts consist
of Plaintiffs’ insistence that a 1969 Lee County document is a forgery, and that all
defendants know that it is a forgery:
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, because

Governmental forgeries “D.R. 569/875" and “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0”
were contrary to Florida and Federal law and null and void from the outset.
The fake legal descriptions in said forgeries never existed, Plat Book 3,
Page 25 (1912).
It is not, however, an established fact that the document is forged or invalid. Plaintiffs
make no effort to cite to anything in the record -- other than their own statements -- to
establish any facts, material or otherwise. Thus, the Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden
to establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and summary
judgment must be denied. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
C. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of law
Plaintiffs fail to state any cognizable legal arguments in support of their
conclusory allegations against the USAO Defendants. For example, they fail to plead
even the bare minimum required to state a claim for fraud. Allegations of fraud must
satisfy the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 9(b), which requires that “a party must state with particularity the
4
circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Likewise, Plaintiffs must plead
with particularity that the parties to an alleged conspiracy knew of the conspiracy and
agreed to commit fraud. See Tippens v. Round Island Plantation, L.L. C., No.
09-CV-14036, 2009 WL 2365347, at *5 (S.D.Fla. July 31, 2009). Plaintiffs’ allegations
of misrepresentation and obstruction of justice are stated in conclusory fashion, with
absolutely no support. In addition to their failure to establish the absence of a disputed
genuine issues of material fact (or any fact), Plaintiffs can point to no issue of law on
which they would be entitled to judgment, even if they did produce material facts (which
they have not).
D. Waiver
Finally, the Plaintiffs’ argument that the USAO Defendants somehow “waived”
their defenses against the Plaintiffs’ Complaint is nonsense. The USAO Defendants
timely filed a motion to dismiss premised on absolute immunity, res judicata, and
frivolousness. That motion is pending. There has been no waiver. Plaintiffs’ argument
on this point should be rejected, along with the other arguments Plaintiffs raise in
support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the USAO Defendants submit that this Court should
deny plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment in all respects. Additionally, the USAO
Defendants respectfully renews their request that this Court institute a pre-filing
injunction against Plaintiffs, and dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice, for the
reasons outlined in the USAO Defendants’ pending motions (Dkt. No. 69 and 149).
5
Certificate of Service
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 21, 2010, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of
filing.
I FURTHER HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 21, 2010, I further served the below
listed non-participants in the CM/ECF system by U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid:
JORG BUSSE JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT

P.O. Box 11124 P.O. Box 845
Naples, FL 34101-7561 Palm Beach, FL 33480-0845
Plaintiff Plaintiff
/s/ Jennifer Waugh Corinis

JENNIFER WAUGH CORINIS
Assistant United States Attorney
7
The Florida Constitution

CONSTITUTION
OF THE
STATE OF FLORIDA
AS REVISED IN 1968 AND SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED
The Constitution of the State of Florida as revised in 1968 consisted of certain revised articles as proposed by
three joint resolutions which were adopted during the special session of June 24-July 3, 1968, and ratified by
the electorate on November 5, 1968, together with one article carried forward from the Constitution of 1885, as
amended. The articles proposed in House Joint Resolution 1-2X constituted the entire revised constitution with
the exception of Articles V, VI, and VIII. Senate Joint Resolution 4-2X proposed Article VI, relating to suffrage
and elections. Senate Joint Resolution 5-2X proposed a new Article VIII, relating to local government. Article V,
relating to the judiciary, was carried forward from the Constitution of 1885, as amended.
Sections composing the 1968 revision have no history notes. Subsequent changes are indicated by notes
appended to the affected sections. The indexes appearing at the beginning of each article, notes appearing at
the end of various sections, and section and subsection headings are added editorially and are not to be
considered as part of the constitution.
PREAMBLE
We, the people of the State of Florida, being grateful to Almighty God for our constitutional liberty, in order
to secure its benefits, perfect our government, insure domestic tranquility, maintain public order, and
guarantee equal civil and political rights to all, do ordain and establish this constitution.
ARTICLE I DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
ARTICLE II GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE III LEGISLATURE
ARTICLE IV EXECUTIVE
ARTICLE V JUDICIARY
ARTICLE VI SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS
ARTICLE VII FINANCE AND TAXATION
ARTICLE VIII LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ARTICLE IX EDUCATION
ARTICLE X MISCELLANEOUS
ARTICLE XI AMENDMENTS
(c) The governor shall appoint all commissioned officers of the militia, including an adjutant general who
shall be chief of staff. The appointment of all general officers shall be subject to confirmation by the senate.
(d) The qualifications of personnel and officers of the federally recognized national guard, including the
adjutant general, and the grounds and proceedings for their discipline and removal shall conform to the
appropriate United States army or air force regulations and usages.
SECTION 3. Vacancy in office.--Vacancy in office shall occur upon the creation of an office, upon the death,
removal from office, or resignation of the incumbent or the incumbent's succession to another office,
unexplained absence for sixty consecutive days, or failure to maintain the residence required when elected or
appointed, and upon failure of one elected or appointed to office to qualify within thirty days from the
commencement of the term.
SECTION 4. Homestead; exemptions.--
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution
shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the
purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on
the realty, the following property owned by a natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one hundred sixty acres of contiguous
land and improvements thereon, which shall not be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent
inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-half acre of contiguous land,
upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence of the owner or the owner's family;
(2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars.
(b) These exemptions shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner.
(c) The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child, except
the homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse if there be no minor child. The owner of homestead real
estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift and, if married,
may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse. If the owner or spouse is
incompetent, the method of alienation or encumbrance shall be as provided by law.
History.--Am. H.J.R. 4324, 1972; adopted 1972; Am. H.J.R. 40, 1983; adopted 1984; Am. proposed by
Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998;
adopted 1998.
SECTION 5. Coverture and property.--There shall be no distinction between married women and married
men in the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their property, both real and personal; except that
dower or curtesy may be established and regulated by law.
SECTION 6. Eminent domain.--
(a) No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to
each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.
ARTICLE XII SCHEDULE
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
SECTION 1. Political power.
SECTION 2. Basic rights.
SECTION 3. Religious freedom.
SECTION 4. Freedom of speech and press.
SECTION 5. Right to assemble.
SECTION 6. Right to work.
SECTION 7. Military power.
SECTION 8. Right to bear arms.
SECTION 9. Due process.
SECTION 10. Prohibited laws.
SECTION 11. Imprisonment for debt.
SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.
SECTION 13. Habeas corpus.
SECTION 14. Pretrial release and detention.
SECTION 15. Prosecution for crime; offenses committed by children.
SECTION 16. Rights of accused and of victims.
SECTION 17. Excessive punishments.
SECTION 18. Administrative penalties.
SECTION 19. Costs.
SECTION 20. Treason.
SECTION 21. Access to courts.
SECTION 22. Trial by jury.
SECTION 23. Right of privacy.
SECTION 24. Access to public records and meetings.
SECTION 25. Taxpayers' Bill of Rights.
SECTION 26. Claimant's right to fair compensation.
SECTION 27. Marriage defined.
SECTION 1. Political power.--All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation herein of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people.
SECTION 2. Basic rights.--All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have
inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be
rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance,
disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by
law. No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability.
History.--Am. S.J.R. 917, 1974; adopted 1974; Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision
No. 9, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.
SECTION 3. Religious freedom.--There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting
or penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public
morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be
taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid
of any sectarian institution.
SECTION 4. Freedom of speech and press.--Every person may speak, write and publish sentiments on all
subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may be
given in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the party
shall be acquitted or exonerated.
SECTION 5. Right to assemble.--The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble, to instruct their
representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances.
SECTION 6. Right to work.--The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through
a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the
right to strike.
SECTION 7. Military power.--The military power shall be subordinate to the civil.
SECTION 8. Right to bear arms.--
(a) The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the
state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.
(b) There shall be a mandatory period of three days, excluding weekends and legal holidays, between the
purchase and delivery at retail of any handgun. For the purposes of this section, "purchase" means the transfer
of money or other valuable consideration to the retailer, and "handgun" means a firearm capable of being carried
and used by one hand, such as a pistol or revolver. Holders of a concealed weapon permit as prescribed in
Florida law shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.
(c) The legislature shall enact legislation implementing subsection (b) of this section, effective no later than
December 31, 1991, which shall provide that anyone violating the provisions of subsection (b) shall be guilty of a
felony.
(d) This restriction shall not apply to a trade in of another handgun.
History.--Am. C.S. for S.J.R. 43, 1989; adopted 1990.
SECTION 9. Due process.--No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against
oneself.
SECTION 10. Prohibited laws.--No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
SECTION 11. Imprisonment for debt.--No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.
SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.--The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private
communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause,
supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or
things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right
shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be
admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States
Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
SECTION 13. Habeas corpus.--The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost.
It shall be returnable without delay, and shall never be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
suspension is essential to the public safety.
SECTION 14. Pretrial release and detention.--Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person
charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on
reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical
harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the
accused may be detained.

Number: AGO 78-118
Date: September 27, 1978
Subject: Counties, roads and streets, dedication, vacation
Robert Bruce Snow

Hernando County Attorney
Brooksville
QUESTION:
May a county legally divest itself of ownership and control of

certain dedicated streets and roads in a subdivision, and transfer
to a homeowners' association the right to exercise ownership and
control of, and to maintain, the streets and roads?
SUMMARY:
A county is statutorily authorized in the sound discretion of the

board of county commissioners to close and vacate dedicated roads
and streets designated on a recorded subdivision plat. Such
authority must be lawfully exercised in the interest of the general
public welfare and may not invade or violate individual property
rights. The county is not authorized, however, and cannot in any
manner legally convey or transfer the ownership and control of the
vacated roads or streets to a homeowners' association as such, but
upon lawful vacation thereof the abutting fee owners hold the title
in fee simple to the vacated roadways or streets to the center
thereof unburdened and unencumbered by the public's prior easement
to use such roadways or streets for travel. The county would not be
liable to any abutting fee owners as a result of closing or
vacating such roadways or streets unless an abutting owner is
thereby deprived of and suffers a consequent loss of access to his
property. An abutting fee owner would also have a private or
implied easement and cause of action to enforce such easement for
access or egress or travel as against the homeowners' association
or other abutting owners seeking to obstruct such access and use of
and travel upon the vacated, now private, roads and streets.
According to your letter, several miles of platted roads or streets

in a large subdivision in Hernando County were dedicated to the
public and accepted by the county through its approval for
recording of the subdivision plat and its acceptance of the
dedication of the streets and roads contained thereon. A property
owners' association representing the majority, though not all, of
the residents and property owners of the subdivision has requested
the county to relinquish its control, ownership, and maintenance of
the dedicated streets and roads and turn over this control,
ownership, and maintenance to the association in order that it
might not only maintain such streets and roads but also restrict
access to and within the subdivision to its residents and property
owners. As attorney for the county, you ask whether the board of
county commissioners may legally transfer its ownership and control
of the streets and roads to the association and, if it does so,
whether it will be subject to any liability as a consequence of its
actions.
Initially, it is necessary to consider the elements and effect of a

dedication. A dedication is simply the donating or appropriating of
one's own land for use by the public. That is, the owner of the
dedicated property is precluded from using it in any way
inconsistent with the public's use thereof. There are two essential
requisites to a finding of a dedication of property to the public.
There must first be a clearly manifested intent by the owner of
property to dedicate it to public use. Second, the public, through
its authorized agents or officials, must clearly manifest its
intent to accept the dedication. City of Miami v. Florida East
Coast Railway Co., 84 So. 726 (Fla. 1920); Roe v. Kendrick, 200 So.
394 (Fla. 1941). An offer of dedication to the public an be
accomplished by making and recording a plat and selling lots with
reference thereto, the method apparently employed in the instant
situation. See, e.g., Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. Worley, 38
So. 618 (Fla. 1905); Miami Beach v. Undercliff Realty and
Investment Co., 21 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1945); and see s. 177.081, F. S.
It appears from your letter that the dedication of roads and
streets in the subdivision in question was properly accepted by the
appropriate county officials and I, therefore, assume that a proper
dedication has taken place.
The effect of a dedication does not operate as a grant of the

dedicated property but rather by way of an estoppel in pais. That
is, the legal title to the property remains in the grantor (or his
vendees) while the public takes the beneficial use of the property.
Effectively, then, the fee remains in the grantor (or his grantees)
while the public acquires only a right of easement in trust, so
long as the dedicated land is used for the intended purpose of the
dedication. The grantor (or grantees--abutting lot owners) is
precluded from using the property in any way inconsistent with the
public use. Burkhart v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 156 So.2d 752 (2
D.C.A. Fla., 1963), decision quashed 168 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1964);
Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corporation, 107 So.2d
51 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1959); Robbins v. White, 42 So. 841 (Fla. 1907).
Absent a contrary showing, not made evident here , the legal title
of the grantor-subdivider in properly dedicated property passes to
the grantees of lots sold in reference to a plat, which lots abut
the dedicated streets. Their title extends to the center of the
streets subject to the public easement. Walker v. Pollack, 74 So.2d
886 (Fla. 1954); Smith v. Horn, 70 So. 435 (Fla. 1915); New Fort
Pierce Hotel Co. v. Phoenix Tax Title Corp., 171 So. 525 (Fla.
1936); United States v. 16.33 Acres of Land in County of Dade, 342
So.2d 476, 480 (Fla. 1977); cf., Emerald Equities v. Hutton, 357
So.2d 1071 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1978), wherein the court held that, when
a single owner conveys to the county the title to or an easement in
a roadway which is later abandoned by the county, that owner or his
successors takes back or retains title to all the ababdoned
property unless the owner is a subdivider who has later *4438
conveyed lots (and his interest in the abutting road) which abut
the dedicated roadway to separate owners without specifically
reserving any reversionary interest in the roadway. In such a case,
the general rule prevails that the abutting owners on each side of
the abandoned or vacated road become the fee owners out to the
center line. See also ss. 177.085(2) and 336.12, F. S. These
purchasers acquire their title, however, subject to the easement of
the public in the dedicated property. Smith, supra; New Ft. Pierce
Hotel Co., supra; Gainesville v. Thomas, 54 So. 780 (Fla. 1911).
Your inquiry does not state that the dedicator or subdivider

reserved any reversionary interest or rights in the streets and
roads in the plat in question. I assume, therefore, for the
purposes of this opinion, that no such rights exist in or under the
plat. However, if such plat was made and recorded in the public
records before July 1, 1972, and if no action has since been
brought to establish or enforce any such reversionary rights, they
are now barred and unenforceable by operation of s. 177.085(2), F.
S. See also 16.33 Acres of Land in County of Dade, supra, and
Emerald Equities, supra.
It seems evident that the governing body of Hernando County does

not 'own' the streets and roads in the subject subdivision which
were dedicated for public use. The public has an easement to use
the streets and roads, but there is no legal title to the property
vested in the county which it can convey or transfer to the
homeowners' association. Nevertheless, counties in Florida have the
statutory authority to close and vacate any county streets, roads,
alleyways, or other places used for travel. Section 336.09(1), F.
S., provides:
(1) The commissioners, with respect to property under their

control may in their own discretion, and of their own motion,
or upon the request of any agency of the state, or of the
federal government, or upon petition of any person or persons,
are hereby authorized and empowered to:
(a) Vacate, abandon, discontinue and close any existing public

or private street, alleyway, road, highway , or other place used
for travel, or any portion thereof, other than a state or
federal highway, and to renounce and disclaim any right of the
county and the public in and to any land in connection
therewith;
(b) Renounce and disclaim any right of the county and the
public in and to any land, or interest therein, acquired by
purchase, gift, devise, dedication or prescription for street,
alleyway, road or highway purposes , other than lands acquired
for state and federal highway; and
(c) Renounce and disclaim any right of the county and the
public in and to land, other than land constituting, or
acquired for, a state or federal highway, delineated on any
recorded map or plat as a street, alleyway, road or highway.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Upon termination of the easement acquired by the public in the

dedicated property, s. 336.12, F. S., provides that the title of
the fee owners in the property shall be freed and released
therefrom.
The act of any commissioners in closing or abandoning any such

road, or in renouncing or disclaiming any rights in any land
delineated on any recorded map as a road, shall abrogate the
easement theretofore owned, held, claimed or used by or an
behalf of the public and the title of fee owners shall be freed
and released therefrom . . .. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, upon the lawful, statutorily prescribed vacation of the

public's easement, the title to the fee of the dedicator or of his
successors, or of the abutting lot owners, is freed of and released
from the easement; therefore, those property owners who own land
abutting the street or road would, upon surrender, have
unencumbered fee title to the center of the right-of-way. Cf.,
Emerald Equities, Inc., supra.
Applying the foregoing principles and statutes to the instant case,

I conclude that the board of county commissioners has statutory
authority to close and vacate the dedicated and platted roads and
streets in question in accordance with the statutes, but may not by
conveyance by deed or any other instrument of conveyance transfer
the ownership and control thereof to the association. The title in
fee simple to the vacated road beds or rights-of-way to the center
thereof would remain, unburdened or unencumbered , in the abutting
4/24/2010 , Advisory Legal Opinion - Counties, roa… , g
fee owners who presumably could, if they so chose, convey or
transfer a portion of their property to the homeowners' association
(assuming it is so organized and legally capacitated to hold the
legal title thereto) for roadway purposes and control and
maintenance thereof. As a caveat, it should be noted that if the
general public is using the roads and streets in question
(including public service vehicles such as garbage trucks, police,
fire, or emergency vehicles), then the county should not close or
vacate the roads or streets in question if such vacation would be
injurious to the public welfare or violate individual property
rights. It has been noted: '. . . [T]he power to vacate streets
cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner, without regard to the
interest and convenience of the public or individual rights.'
McQuillin Municipal Corporations s. 30.186a. Hence, absent a
determination by the county commission that the general public
welfare would benefit from vacation, it should not be accomplished,
and in any event, the roads or streets can be vacated only in
accordance with the statute as discussed above and title thereto
cannot be legally conveyed or transferred to the homeowners'
association.
You also ask whether the action of the county in closing and
vacating the roads and streets in the subdivision would subject it
to liability in inverse condemnation based upon a loss of access to
the abutting lot owners. As a practical matter, the facts
delineated in your inquiry suggest that the homeowners' association
does not propose to restrict the access of any of the resident or
nonresident abutting fee owners to any of the platted streets or
roads or any property within the subdivision. Therefore, no cause
of action in inverse condemnation could arise in such factual
situation. However, a right of access to one's own property is a
property right. Hence, an abutting fee owner may be entitled to
compensation from a public body when it closes or vacates a public
street for the consequent loss of such access on the theory that a
property right has been taken without compensation. See, e.g.,
Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So.2d 6 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1975).
An abutting owner, it should also be noted, would, upon vacation of

the property, have a cause of action to enforce his right of access
or private easement for roadway purposes as against the homeowners'
association or other abutting owners who may obstruct access or
travel upon any of the vacated roads. Such private (implied)
easement would arise by virtue of conveyances and sales made with
reference to the recorded plat which creates a private right to
have the space marked on the plat as streets and roads remain open
for ingress and egress and the uses indicated by the designation.
As stated by the Florida Supreme Court in City of Miami v. Florida
East Coast Ry. Co., 84 So.2d 726, 729 (Fla. 1920):
The platting of land and the sale of lots pursuant thereto

4/24/2010 p g Advisory Legal Opinion - Counties, roa… p
creates as between the grantor and the purchaser of the lots a
private right to have the space marked upon the plat as
streets, alleys, parks, etc., remain open for ingress and
egress and the uses indicated by the designation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
See also McCorquodale v. Keyton, 63 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1956); Burnham

v. Davis Islands, Inc., 87 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1956); Reiger v. Anchor
Post Products, Inc., 210 So.2d 283 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1968), holding
that the rights of abutting or adjacent purchasers depend upon
principles of law applicable to private property rather than public
dedication since these rights depend upon a 'private easement
implied from sale with reference to a plat showing streets [etc.]'
rather than upon any dedication to the public generally. 87 So.2d
at 100. And see, Monell v. Golfview Road Association, 359 So.2d 2
(4 D.C.A. Fla., 1978), wherein the court held that the rights of
common owners of an easement on and for the purposes of a private
road are limited to the purpose for which the easement was
established and may not be exercised in derogation of the rights of
other common owners. Hence, the court granted an injunction
requiring a homeowners' association to remove speedbumps it had
placed on the roadway which substantially invaded and violated the
right of a particular homeowner to use his easement on the private
road to get to his house and property. Cf., Emerald Equities, Inc.,
supra; 16.33 Acres of Land, supra; and AGO's 078-88 and 078-63.
Prepared by:
Frank A. Vickory
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Number: AGO 78-125
Date: October 24, 1978
Subject: Municipalities, vacation of streets and roads
David B. Higginbottom
City Attorney
Frostproof
QUESTION:
Is a municipality authorized by law to require abutting landowners

who request vacation of a public street to prove a revesionary
interest in the property and pay for the proportionate costs of an
appraisal and for the proportionate appraised value of such property
interest as conditions to the vacation?
SUMMARY:
A municipality possesses no authority under the Municipal Home Rule

Powers Act to require property owners whose land abuts a dedicated
public street to 'prove a reversionary interest' or any other
property interest or property right in the streetbed prior to and as
a condition to the vacation of such street. The determination and
adjudication of property rights is a judicial function which may not
be exercised by the legislative branches of government; hence any
such exercise by a municipality does not constitute a lawful exercise
of a municipal governmental power for a municipal purpose. In
addition, while the vacation of streets in the public interest or
when the streets are no longer required for public use is a
legislative function which may be performed by a municipality, a
municipality possesses neither statutory nor constitutional authority
to exact payment for or otherwise interfere with the property rights
of landowners whose property abuts a public street as conditions to
or in exchange for the exercise of its power to vacate streets no
longer required for public use.
Your letter advises that the Frostproof City Council has adopted a
'motion' which reads as follows:
[I]n the future a qualified appraiser [shall] be used by the city

to set the value of a street (to become property) when requested
for closure. The person or persons making the request would have
to bear the expense of the appraisal and proof of a reversionary
clause. They would be notified and bills [sic] for the appraised
property value before actual closing of the street could take
place. Payment to be made on date of actual closing.
Section 2(b), Art. VIII, State Const., provides in pertinent part:
Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary

powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform
municipal functions and render municipal services, and may
exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Statutory implementation of the broad grant of home rule is provided

by Ch. 166, F. S., the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act. Section
166.051(1), F. S., of that act states in relevant part that
'municipalities . . . may exercise may power for municipal purposes,
except when expressly prohibited by law.' (Emphasis supplied.) Thus,
it is clear that the only limitation upon the exercise of power by a
municipality is that it must be exercised for a municipal purpose.
State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So.2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 1977).
Although the phrase 'municipal purposes' is not defined by the

constitution, it is defined by s. 166.021(2), F. S., as 'any activity
or power which may be exercised by the state or its political
subdivisions.' But see City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305
So.2d 764, 765-769 (Fla. 1974) (Dekle, J., concurring), in which
Justice Dekle observed:
It is not the definition of municipal purposes found in . . . s.

166.021(2) that grants power to the municipality . . . but rather
the provision of . . . s. 166.021(1) which expressly empowers
municipalities to 'exercise any power for municipal purposes,
except when expressly prohibited by law.'
It is a fundamental principal in this state that the determination

and adjudication of property rights is a judicial function which
cannot be performed by the Legislature. Hillsborough County v.
Kensatt, 144 So. 393 (Fla. 1932); State Plant Board v. Smith, 110
So.2d 401 (Fla. 1959); Daniels v. State Road Dept., 170 So.2d 846
(Fla. 1964). Legislation which constitutes an invasion of the
province of the judiciary is invalid. Thursby v. Stewart, 138 So. 742

(Fla. 1931); Simmons v. State, 36 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1948). Thus, while
the vacation of streets is a legislative function which may be
validly delegated to municipalities (see Sun Oil Company v. Gerstein,
206 So.2d 439, 440 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1968), AGO 075-171), no
legislative body (whether state, county, or municipal) is authorized
to invade private property rights or require abutting property owners
to prove a reversionary or any other interest in real property as a
condition to the vacation of a public street. Accordingly, the action
taken by the Frostproof City Council does not constitute a municipal
purpose; and, therefore, it is outside the scope of municipal home
rule powers possessed by the municipality.
Moreover, under the general rule, the interest acquired in land by a

municipal corporation for street purposes is held in trust for the
benefit of all the public, regardless of whether the corporation owns
the fee or has merely an interest therein. Sun Oil Company v.
Gerstein, supra; 30 Am. Jur.2d Highways Streets and Bridges s. 159. A
municipality is empowered to vacate streets only when the vacation is
in the public interest or when the street is no longer required for
public use and convenience. 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations s. 1668.
Consequently, in AGO 078-118, I noted, as a caveat, with respect to
the vacation of county roads:
[I]f the general public is using the roads and streets in

question (including public service vehicles such as garbage
trucks, police, fire or emergency vehicles), then the county
should not close or vacate the roads or streets in question as
such vacation would be injurious to the public welfare or violate
individual property rights.
Applying these principles to your inquiry, it is clear that the

city council should not undertake to vacate any streets in the
absence of a determination that the general public would benefit
from the vacation or that such streets are no longer required for
the public use and convenience.
As to whether a municipality is authorized to exact charges or

payments from abutting landowners as a condition to or in
exchange for the vacation of a public street, it is necessary to
analyze the property interests possessed by the public and the
abutting or adjoining landowners in public streets.
Recently, in AGO's 078-63, 078-88, and 078-118, I examined the

elements and effect of the dedication of property for public use.
There are two basic requirements to the existence of a valid
dedication to the public. First, there must be a clearly
manifested intention by the owner of the property to dedicate it
to public use. Second, the public, through its authorized agents,
must clearly show its intent to accept the dedication. City of
Miami v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 84 So. 726 (Fla. 1920);
Roe v. Kendrick, 200 So. 394 (Fla. 1941). An offer of dedication
to the public may be accomplished by making and recording a plat
and selling lots with reference thereto. See, e.g., Florida East
Coast Railway Co. v. Worley, 38 So. 618 (Fla. 1905); Miami Beach
v. Undercliff Realty and Investment Co., 21 So.2d 783 (Fla.
1945); and see, s. 177.081, F. S.
However the dedication to the public is accomplished, it is clear

that such dedication does not have the effect of transferring
legal title from the grantor to the public. To the contrary, the
fee remains in the grantor (or his grantees) while the public
acquires only a right of easement in trust, so long as the
dedicated land is used for the intended purpose of the
dedication. Attorney General Opinion 078-118. Unless otherwise
specifically provided in the conveyance, the legal title of the
grantor in the dedicated property passes to the grantees of those
lots sold with reference to a plat, which lots abut the dedicated
streets. Their title extends to the center of the street subject
to the public easement. Walker v. Pollack, 74 So.2d 886 (Fla.
1954); Smith v. Horn, 70 So. 435 (Fla. 1915); New Fort Pierce
Hotel Co. v. Phoenix Tax Title Corp., 171 So. 525 (Fla. 1936);
United States v. 16.33 Acres of Land in County of Dade, 342 So.2d
476, 480 (Fla. 1977); cf. Emerald Equities v. Hutton, 357 So.2d
1071 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1978). Therefore, a street in which the
public has only an easement when properly vacated ceases to be a
street; the abutting landowners continue to hold fee simple title
to the center of the vacated roadbed unencumbered by the
easement. Smith v. Horn, supra; Robbins v. White, 42 So. 841,
843-844 (Fla. 1907); AGO 078-118.
See also s. 177.081(1), F. S., providing that every plat of a

subdivision filed for record must contain a dedication by the
developer; s. 177.081(2), F. S., providing that all streets,
rights-of-way, and public areas shown on plats approved by the
affected local governments shall be deemed dedicated to the
public for the uses and purposes stated in such plat, unless
otherwise stated therein by the dedicator; s. 177.085(1), F. S.,
providing that when any landowner subdivides his land and
dedicates streets or roadways on the plat but reserves unto the
dedicator the reversionary interests in the dedicated streets or
roadways, and thereafter conveys abutting lots, such conveyance
carries with it the reversionary interest in the abutting street
to the center line, unless the landowner clearly provides
otherwise in the conveyance; and s. 177.085(2), F. S., providing
that prior holders of any interest in the reversionary rights in
the streets and roads in recorded plats of subdivided lots, other
than the owners of abutting lots, 'shall have 1 year from July 1,
1972, to institute suit . . . to establish or enforce the right,'
and that, if no such action is instituted within that time, any
right, title, or interest and all right of reversion shall be

barred and unenforceable.
With regard to the instant inquiry, therefore, it is apparent

that the Frostproof City Council does not 'own' streets which
have been dedicated to public use. Cf. AGO 078-118 in which this
office concluded that a county was not authorized to convey or
transfer ownership and control of dedicated streets to a
'homeowners association' since the county possessed no legal
title in the property which it could convey or transfer. Under
such circumstances, there would appear to be no legal basis upon
which the city could require abutting fee owners to pay to secure
property interests which they already possess. See McQuillin
Municipal Corporations s. 30.189, at 123 (3rd rev. ed. 1977),
stating: 'A municipality is not entitled to compensation for loss
of a public easement in streets in which it does not own the
fee.' Accord: Lockwood & Strickland Co. v. City of Chicago, 117
N.E. 81, 82 (Ill. 1917), in which the court held, among other
things:
[I]t would be beyond the power of the city to grant or convey to

a private person or corporation the ground embraced in a vacated
street or alley. Whether a city owns the fee in an alley or
merely an easement, when it is vacated because no longer needed
for public use, the law disposes of the reversionary interest,
and the reversionary rights cannot be granted or conveyed by the
city. . . . Whether the alley was no longer needed for public
use, and whether the public interest would be subserved by its
vacation, could not be made to depend on how much the city could
get for its action. The legislative powers of a city must be
exercised for the public benefit, but that does not authorize a
municipality to sell or bargain legislation as a means of
obtaining revenue.
The State Constitution provides that all natural persons shall have
the inalienable right 'to acquire, possess and protect property . .
..' Section 2, Art. I, State Const. Additionally, s. 9, Art. I, State
Const., provides that no person 'shall be deprived of . . . property
without due process of law . . ..' Section 6, Art. X, State Const.,
states that '[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public
purpose and with full compensation therefor . . ..' Thus, the
acquisition, possession, enjoyment, use, and alienation of property
and property rights are controlled by constitutional law and the
common law. Moreover, the term 'property' for purposes of the above-
cited constitutional provisions includes more than the abutting
landowner's fee simple title. As stated in Seldon v. City of
Jacksonville, 10 So. 457, 459 (Fla. 1891):
There is incident to abutting property, or its ownership, even
where the abutter's fee or title does not extend to the middle of
the street, but only to its boundary, certain property rights
which the public generally do not possess. They are the right of
egress and ingress from and to the lot by the way of the street,
and the right of light and air which the street affords. Viewing
property to be not the mere corporal subject of ownership, but as
being all the rights legally incidental to the ownership of such
subject, which rights are generally said to be those of user,
exclusion, and disposition, or the right to use, possess, and
dispose of, . . . we are satisfied that the rights just mentioned
are within the meaning of the word 'property,' as it is used in
this constitutional provision. [10 So. 457, 459 (1891)
(construing s. 12, Declar. Rts., State Const. 1885, in part a
predecessor of s. 6, Art. X, State Const.).]
See also Lutterloh v. Mayor and Council of Town of Cedar Keys, 15

Fla. 306, 308 (1875); City of Miami v. East Coast Ry. Co. , 84 So.
726, 729 (Fla. 1920); McCorquodale v. Keyton, 63 So.2d 906 (Fla.
1956); Monell v. Golfview Road Association, 359 So.2d 2 (4 D.C.A.
Fla., 1978).
Accordingly, it has been held that the rights of abutting or adjacent

purchasers depend on principles of law applicable to private property
rather than public dedication since these rights depend upon a
'private easement implied from sale with reference to a plat showing
streets [etc.]' rather than upon any dedication to the public
generally. Burnham v. Davis Islands, Inc., 87 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla.
1956). An abutting landowner may be entitled to compensation from a
public body when it vacates a public street for consequent loss of
access to such landowner's property on the theory that a property
right has been taken without compensation. See Pinellas County v.
Austin, 323 So.2d 6, 8 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1975). If follows, then, that
the several property interests of abutting landowners are subject to
constitutional protection. Clearly the attempt by a municipality to
usurp private property rights or property interests or to barter or
sell such property rights as conditions to or in exchange for the
exercise of its legislative power to vacate streets no longer
required for public use, does not constitute a municipal purpose and
is outside the scope of municipal home rule powers.
Prepared by:
Patricia R. Gleason
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JORG BUSSE
Plaintiff,

Defendants.
___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER

1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).
I.
-2-
-3-
-4-
-5-
U.S.C. § 2201)(id. at ¶12).
-6-
III.
Takings Clause.
1
-7-
458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982)).
-8-
-9-
prejudice.
dismissed.
-10-
-11-

-12-
-13-
claims.
-14-
(11th Cir. 1996).
-15-
ORDERED:
paragraph 5 below.
5 below.
and close the case.
May, 2008.
-16-
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JORG BUSSE
Plaintiff,

Defendants.
___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER

1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).
I.
-2-
-3-
-4-
-5-
U.S.C. § 2201)(id. at ¶12).
-6-
III.
Takings Clause.
1
-7-
458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982)).
-8-
-9-
prejudice.
dismissed.
-10-
-11-
-13-
claims.
-14-
(11th Cir. 1996).
-15-
ORDERED:
paragraph 5 below.
5 below.
and close the case.
May, 2008.
-16-
FEAR FOR YOUR LIFE
U.S. PUNISHMENT & ‘SANCTIONS’
U.S. COVER-UP OF SCAM O.R. 569/875:
U.S. JUDICIAL CASE FIXING:

DEPRIVE – DEFRAUD – DENY
DISALLOW – DISMISS
U.S. JUDICIAL FRIVOLITY SCAM

CERTIFIED DELIVERY
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR EQUAL COURT ACCESS
7. Again, the Plaintiffs move for equal court access in this electronic Court. For the criminal
purpose of extending and concealing Governmental fraud and extortion scheme O.R. 569/875”,
this Court has obstructed the pro se Plaintiffs’ electronic Court access. Here, electronic court
access is the only practical court access from remote parts of the world where mail is
unavailable.
JUDICIAL CRIMES & OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
8. In Doc. # 338, p. 12, Civil Rights Case # 2:07-cv-228-FtM-JES-SPC, Defendant crooked Judge
John Edwin Steele expressly verbalized his obstruction of justice and prejudice:
“The copy of the Resolution attached to the Third Amended Complaint establishes
that it was signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and plaintiff
will not be allowed to assert otherwise.”
3
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
14
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
15
FORT MYERS DIVISION
DR. JORG BUSSE, JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT,

Plaintiffs,
versus Case # 2:10-CV-0089-FtM-JES-SPC
JOHN EDWIN STEELE; SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL; ROGER ALEJO;

KENNETH M. WILKINSON; JACK N. PETERSON; GERALD BARD TJOFLAT;
RICHARD JESSUP; CIRCUIT JUDGE BIRCH; CIRCUIT JUDGE DUBINA;
RICHARD ALLAN LAZZARA; CHARLIE CRIST; LEE COUNTY VALUE
ADJUSTMENT BOARD; LORI L. RUTLAND; EXECUTIVE TITLE CO.; JOHNSON
ENGINEERING, INC.,
Defendants.
EMERGENCY MOTION
_______________________________________________________________________/
EMERGENCY MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE
AFFIDAVITS & ABSENCE OF ANY CONDEMNATION ON THE RECORD
1. Pursuant to the multiple Affidavits before this Court, the Judicial Officers in this Court
fraudulently alleged “eminent domain” by virtue of Government scam “O.R. 569/875”.
However here, no eminent domain court proceedings ever occurred. No just compensation was
ever paid to the pro se Plaintiffs, and no title ever transferred. Here, Lee County, Florida, never
took any title by virtue of prima facie scam “O.R. 569/875”.
BRIBERY
2. Here, Defendant crooked Judges John Edwin Steele and Sheri Polster Chappell accepted
Defendants’ bribes for the criminal purpose of defrauding and deliberately depriving the
Plaintiffs of their equity. Here, said corrupt Judges and Judicial Officers violated their oath of
office.
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
17
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
UNITED STATES JUDICIAL FRAUD PUBLISHED AT:
http://www.scribd.com/judicial%20fraud
More than 90,000 Readers of
U.S. Governmental Crime Scheme “O.R. 569/875”
19
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
COVER UP OF GOVERNMENT SCAM “O.R. 569/875”
20
TRANSCRIPT OF 11/17/2009 ROGER ALEJO PERJURY
PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS DR. BUSSE & FRANKLIN PRESCOTT:

[VAB RECORD: 1:05:23 – 1:05:33; YOU TUBE: 1:54 - 2:04]
“Is our riparian Gulf-front land parcel, ending on 015A [Parcel # 12-44-20-
01-00015.015A] bounded by the natural boundary of the Gulf of Mexico?
YES or NO?”
Defendant Special Magistrate LORI L. RUTLAND:

“Mr. Alejo, does the property have the Gulf of Mexico next to it? Is it right up
next to the Gulf of Mexico?”
Defendant ROGER ALEJO:

“YES, Ma’am.”
ROGER ALEJO’S PERJURY & FRAUD ON YOU TUBE
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYp-Mb242D0

Vexatious Idiotic Opinions of Judicial Terror in U.S. Courts

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CERTIFIED DELIVERY

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR EQUAL COURT ACCESS

JUDICIAL CRIMES & OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED

D. C. Docket No. 07-00228-CV-FTM-29-SPC

KENNETH M. ROESCH, JR., et al.,

LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Appeal from the United States District Court

governmental entities and officials in Florida, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and

record and the parties’ briefs, we AFFIRM the dismissal.

On 10 December 1969, the Board of Commissioners of Lee County, Florida

subdivision as public lands (“the Resolution”). R10-288 at 9. In the Resolution,

public purposes.” Id.

the county property appraiser, and the Florida Department of Environmental

unconstitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; unconstitutional temporary

takings; trespass; conspiracy, fraud, and malfeasance regarding the designation of

certain unplatted lots; conspiracy to materially misrepresent and defraud; and

Professional Appraisal Practice, and 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331–3351; and the Federal

Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201). Id. at 2–3.

The defendants subsequently filed separate motions to dismiss Busse’s third

amended complaint, primarily based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and

motions and dismissed Busse’s third amended complaint. R11-338. In so doing,

We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding subject

v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008).

Amendments.2 Additionally, we read Busse’s brief liberally to argue that the

district court abused its discretion in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over his state law claims. We address these arguments in turn.

A. Takings Clause Claims

applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. V;

claim to be ripe, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he unsuccessfully “pursued the

claim. Id. at 721.

he attempted to obtain or secure relief under established Florida procedures. Since

at least 1990, Florida courts have recognized that an inverse-condemnation remedy

recognized after the alleged taking occurred.” Id. Accordingly, regardless of

Busse’s Takings Clause claim.

B. Procedural Due Process Claims

Resolution was improperly executed. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no

process claim by challenging the procedures by which a regulation was adopted,

382 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).

procedural due process claim. Florida provides him an adequate post-deprivation

remedy, inverse condemnation, and he makes no argument that this procedure is

procedural due process claims.

C. Equal Protection Claims

Board, in adopting the Resolution, treated differently privately-owned property and

state-owned property.3 The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from “deny[ing]

101, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002).

district court correctly dismissed this claim.

D. Substantive Due Process Claim

court properly dismissed his substantive due process claims.4

state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Furthermore, we expressly encourage

state law claims.

regarding alleged takings and deprivations of property rights. Since Busse’s

dismissed all of these claims. As a result, despite Busse’s objections to the

district court’s dismissal of Busse’s third amended complaint.

/s/ Jennifer Franklin Prescott /s/Dr. Jorg Busse

This is Google's cache of http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/41/41.F3d.1490.93-

"County"), began a practice of selling easement and right of way interests in

Application of the Ordinance, according to plaintiffs, put a "cloud" on plaintiffs' title

U.S. COVER-UP OF SCAM O.R. 569/875:

U.S. JUDICIAL CASE FIXING:

U.S. JUDICIAL FRIVOLITY SCAM

SECRET 1: Judicial bribery & corruption are customary and TYPICAL.

SECRET 2: U.S. democracy is DEAD. Don’t be a naïve sheep!