ACCIDENTS ON FIXED OFFSHORE UNITS ON THE UK CONTINENTAL SHELF 19

In 2000-2006 a total of five R&D projects were defined by the UK Health & Safety Executive-Offshore Safety Divisio
was to obtain complete statistics for accidents having occurred on fixed offshore units engaged in the oil and gas
the period 1980-2005. Fixed units in this project were defined as comprising bottom-fixed platforms (excl. jackups
drilling, accommodation, production and storage. Det Norske Veritas AS (Norway) was contracted the work.

The results from this study would serve as a reference document for data to be used in future Risk Assessments o
furthermore, be a valuable reference document for UK Health & Safety Executive (HSE)/ Offshore Safety Division (
Cases.

To fulfil the objectives of the project, relevant UK and Norwegian databases were interrogated with respect to both
data forming a complete data basis for obtaining comprehensive accident statistics for the listed type of units, geo
period.

The result after having interrogated the databases and removing overlapping records is shown in this spreadshee
7018 events comprising accidents, hazardous situations and near-misses. Note: Best efforts have been made to e
within the free text associated with each incident. However, it is possible that within the 7018 events some anony
In the event that such is found please contact one of the below listed individuals to ensure that corrections are ma

This spreadsheet forms part 2 of the published data. Part 1 is the associated report with accident numbers and fre
report and this spreadsheet may be downloaded from HSE's Internet Home Page www.hse.gov.uk
For each event the following information is given:

Year of event; Type of unit; Operation mode; No. of injuries/fatalities; Chain of events; Event category; Event d
Any queries or comments to this spreadsheet or the project should be communicated to either:

Mr. Espen Funnemark, DNV Industry Norway, Det Norske Veritas AS. Tel: +47 67 57 74 94, Fax: +47 67 57 99 11, E-m
espen.funnemark@dnv.com

Mr. Eoin Young, UK Health & Safety Executive - Offshore Safety Division. Tel: +44 207 717 6926, Fax: +44 207 717 6
eoin.young@hse.gsi.gov.uk

ACCIDENTS ON FIXED OFFSHORE UNITS ON THE UK CONTINENTAL SHELF 1980-2005

Year of
Event
1980

Type of
Unit
PR

Operation
Mode
PR

Injuries/
Fatalities
0

Chain of events--------------------------------------------------------------------------Chain1
Chain2
Chain3
Chain4
Chain5
CN

1980
1980

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CN
OT

I
I

1980

DP

WO

LG

1980

DP

PR

CR

1980

DP

PR

CR

1980

DP

PR

LG

EX

1980
1980
1980
1981

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
DD

0
0
0
1

CR
CN
CN
CR

FA

FA

I
A
A
I

1981

DP

DD

CR

FA

1981
1981

DP
DP

PR
DD

1
1

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1981

DP

DD

CR

FA

1981
1981

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FI
LG

I
I

1981

DP

PR

OT

FA

LG

Event
Category
N

I
I

1981
1981

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

CN
CR

1981
1981

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
2

FA
FA

I
A

1981

DP

PR

LG

1981
1981
1981

DP
DP
PR

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
FI
CR

1981
1981

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
FA

N
N

1981

DP

PR

CR

1981

DP

PR

FA

1981
1981

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
EX

1981
1981

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CN
CN

U
U

1981
1981

DP
CO

PR
PR

0
0

FI
LG

N
I

1981

DP

DD

LG

1981

PR

PR

CN

1981
1981
1981
1981

DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

CN
CN
FI
FI

U
U
I
U

FA

FA
FA

FA

FA

I
N

I
U
N

I
I

1981
1981

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

FI
CR

1981

DP

PR

LG

1981

PR

PR

CR

1981
1981

DP
DR

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

1981
1981
1981

DP
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
LG
CN

FA

N
N
U

1981
1981
1981

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
FI

FA
FA

N
U
U

1981
1981

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
CR

FA

N
N

1981
1981

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
CR

FA

N
U

1981
1981
1981

PR
PR
DP

DD
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
FI
LG

1981
1981
1981

AC
PR
DP

AC
PR
PR

0
0
0

CN
CN
FI

1981
1981

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

U
U
I

FA

U
I
N

FA
FI

N
U
I
U
I
I

FA

N
U

1981

DP

PR

CR

FA

1981

DP

PR

CR

FA

1981

DP

PR

CR

FA

1981

PR

PR

CR

FA

1981

DP

PR

CR

FA

1981

DP

PR

EX

1981

AC

AC

CN

1981

DP

PR

FI

1981
1981

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1981

DP

PR

CR

FA

1981
1981

DR
DP

DR
PR

0
0

CN
CR

FA

U
N

1981

DP

PR

EX

1981

AC

AC

CR

1981

DP

PR

CR

1981

DP

PR

FI

1981

PR

PR

CN

1981

DP

PR

CN

I
FA

1981

DP

DD

FA

1981

DP

PR

CR

1981
1981
1981

PR
PR
CO

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CN
FA

1981
1981

DP
DP

PR
WO

0
0

CR
WP

1981
1981
1981

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
CR
LG

1982

DP

DD

CR

1982
1982

DP
PR

PR
PR

1
1

FA
CR

FA

I
I

1982
1982

CO
DP

PR
PR

1
1

CR
CR

FA

I
I

1982
1982

DP
DP

WO
EV

1
1

WP
CR

BL
FA

A
I

1982

DP

WO

CR

FA

1982

DP

PR

FA

1982

DP

PR

CR

1982
1982

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

U
N
U
I

FA

FA
EX

I
I
U
N
A
I

FA
FA

U
N

1982

DP

PR

LG

FI

1982

DP

PR

CR

1982

DP

PR

CR

1982

DP

PR

CN

1982

DP

DD

CR

FA

1982
1982
1982
1982

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

FI
CR
CR
FI

FA
FA

U
U
N
U

1982
1982
1982

PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
LG

1982
1982

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
FI

N
I

1982

DP

PR

CN

1982
1982

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

I
I

1982
1982

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1982
1982
1982
1982

DP
DP
DR
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

CR
LG
CN
FI

FA

N
U
U
U

I
FA

U
N

FA
FI

U
U
I

1982

DP

PR

FI

1982

DP

PR

CR

1982

DP

PR

CN

1982
1982
1982
1982

DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

FI
FI
FA
CN

I
U
N
U

1982
1982
1982
1982

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
DD
PR

0
0
0
0

CR
LG
WP
CR

1982

PR

PR

LG

1982

DP

PR

WP

1982

DP

PR

CR

1982
1982
1982
1982

DP
DP
DP
PR

DD
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

1982

DP

PR

1982
1982

DP
DP

1982

FA
FI

U
U
I
U

FA

WP
EX
CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I
I
I

CR

FA

PR
PR

0
0

CR
FI

FA

U
A

DP

PR

CR

FA

1982

PR

PR

CN

1982

DP

PR

CR

N
FA

1982

DP

PR

CN

1982
1982

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1982
1982
1982

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
EX
CN

FA

N
A
N

1982

DP

CS

CR

FA

1982

DP

PR

CR

FA

1982
1982

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
CR

FA

I
I

1982

DP

PR

CN

1982

DP

PR

CR

FA

1982

PR

PR

CR

FA

1982

DP

PR

FI

1982

DP

PR

CR

FA

1982

DP

PR

CR

FA

1982
1982

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
N

1982

DP

PR

CN

1982

PR

PR

CR

I
FA

1982

DP

PR

CN

1982
1982
1982
1982
1982

DP
DP
DP
DP
PR

PR
PR
DD
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0

CR
CR
FI
CR
CR

1982
1982

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

1982
1982

PR
PR

PR
PR

1982
1982

DP
AC

1982
1982

U
FA
FA
FA
FA

N
U
I
N
U

WP
LG

FI

I
I

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

U
I

PR
AC

0
0

FI
FI

U
I

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
EX

I
I

1982

CO

PR

FA

1982
1982
1982
1982

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

FI
HE
CR
LG

U
U
I
A

1982
1982

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

EX
FI

U
U

1982
1982
1982

PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FI
FA
FI

A
I
I

1982

DP

PR

FI

FI

1982
1982

DP
DP

PR
CS

0
0

CR
FA

FA
LI

I
A

1982
1983

DP
PR

EV
PR

0
1

WP
CR

FA

I
A

1983

DP

PR

CR

FA

1983

PR

PR

CR

FA

1983
1983
1983

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

1
1
1

FI
FI
LG

I
I
I

1983
1983
1983
1983

DP
DP
DP
DP

DD
PR
PR
PR

1
1
1
1

FA
LG
FA
CR

FA

I
I
A
I

1983
1983

DP
DP

DD
PR

1
8

CR
LG

EX

FI

I
A

1983

DP

DD

13

BL

EX

FI

1983

PR

CS

OT

1983

PR

PR

FA

1983

PR

PR

CR

FA

1983

DP

PR

CN

1983
1983
1983

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
CR
CR

FA
FA

U
I
I

1983

PR

WO

CR

FA

1983
1983

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CN
FA

I
U

1983
1983
1983

PR
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CL
HE
FI

U
U
U

1983

DP

PR

CR

1983
1983
1983

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
FI
CR

FA
FA

I
I
I

1983
1983

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
U

1983

PR

PR

FI

1983

DP

PR

CR

1983

DP

DD

CR

FA

1983
1983

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
CR

FA

I
U

1983

PR

PR

FA

1983

DP

DD

CR

1983

PR

PR

FI

1983
1983

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
FI

A
I

1983
1983

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CN
FI

U
I

1983
1983
1983
1983

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

FI
CR
FI
LG

1983

DP

DD

FA

1983

DP

PR

CR

FA

1983
1983

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1983

DP

PR

FI

1983

DP

PR

CR

1983

PR

PR

FI

1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983

DP
DP
DP
DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

OT
CR
CN
FI
CN
CR
CN

FA
FI

I
U
U
A
I

A
FA

N
I

FA

FA

I
I
I
I
U
U
U

1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983

DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

LG
FA
FA
CR
CR
CR
LG

FA

1983
1983
1983
1983

DP
PR
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
FI
LG
CR

1983

DP

PR

FA

1983
1983

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

A
I

1983
1983

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

U
I

1983
1983

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CN
CR

FA

U
I

1983

DP

PR

CR

FA

1983

PR

PR

CR

FA

1983

DP

WO

CR

FA

1983

DP

PR

CR

FA

FI
FA
FA

FA

A
I
U
I
N
N
I
U
U
I
I

1984

DP

PR

FA

1984

DP

PR

CR

FA

1984
1984

PR
DP

PR
PR

1
1

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1984

DP

PR

CR

FA

1984

PR

PR

CR

FA

1984

DP

PR

CR

FA

1984

DP

DD

LG

FA

1984
1984

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

LG
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1984

PR

PR

LG

1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
DP
PR
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
PR

WO
PR
PR
PR
WO
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

1
1
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

CR
FA
LG
FA
LG
CR
CR
CR
FI
FA

1984

DP

PR

FI

1984

DP

DD

FA

1984

PR

PR

CR

I
FA
FI

FA
FA
FA

FA

A
A
A
I
U
U
A
N
I
U

1984

DP

PR

FA

1984
1984
1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
DD
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0

CR
FA
FI
FI
EX

U
I
I
I
I

1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
PR
DP
WS
PR
WS
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

FI
CR
CR
FI
CR
FA
CN
FA

U
U
U
I
U
U
U
I

1984
1984
1984

WS
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FI
FI
CR

1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984

DP
PR
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
WO
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

EX
CR
CR
FI
CR
CR
CR

1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
CR

FA
FA

1984

DP

PR

LG

FI

FA
FA
FA

I
I
N

FA

I
N
U
U
N
N
U

FA

FA
FA

U
N
I
OT

1984

DP

PR

FA

1984

DP

PR

CR

FA

1984
1984
1984

PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FI
CR
CN

FA

I
I
U

1984

DP

PR

CR

FA

1984
1984

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1984

DP

PR

FA

1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
PR

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0

CR
CR
FA
FI
FA
LG

1984

DP

PR

FI

1984
1984
1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
WS
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0

CR
LG
CR
EX
LG

FA

1984
1984
1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
PR
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0

LG
FI
CR
CN
LG

FI

U
FA
FA

N
N
N
U
N
U
U

FA
FI

FA
FI

N
U
N
A
I
I
U
N
U
I

1984

DP

PR

LG

1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
CR

1984

PR

PR

HE

1984
1984
1984

DP
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CN
CR
CR

1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
CR
LG

1984
1984

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
FI

I
I

1984
1984

DP
CO

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

U
U

1984
1984
1984

WS
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FI
CL
CR

U
U
N

1984

PR

PR

FI

1984

DP

PR

CR

FA

1984
1984
1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
DP
DP
PR

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0

CR
CR
CR
CR
CR

FA
FA
FA
FA

I
I
N
N
U

FA
FA
FA

I
N
I
I
U
N
U

FA

FA
EX

FA

FI

U
I
A

1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
DP

DD
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
LG

FA

U
N
I

1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984

DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

CN
LG
CR
CR
LG
CR
ST

FI
FA
FA
FI
FA

U
I
I
I
I
N
I

1984

DP

PR

ST

1985

DP

PR

CR

FA

1985

PR

PR

CR

FA

1985
1985

PR
DP

PR
DD

1
1

FA
FA

I
I

1985
1985
1985
1985

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
DD
PR
PR

1
1
1
1

FA
FA
FI
FI

I
I
I
I

1985

DP

PR

CR

FA

1985

DP

DD

CR

FA

1985

AC

AC

LG

1985

DP

PR

LG

A
EX

1985

PR

PR

LG

1985

DP

WO

LG

1985

DP

PR

CR

FA

1985
1985
1985
1985

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
FA
FI
CR

FA

FA

I
A
U
I

1985
1985

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
CR

FA

I
N

1985

DP

PR

CR

1985

WS

PR

LG

1985
1985

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FI

U
U

1985
1985
1985
1985

DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
CN
CR
FI

1985
1985
1985
1985
1985

DP
DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
DD

0
0
0
0
0

LG
CR
FI
EX
CR

FI
FA

1985
1985
1985

DP
WS
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
FI
CR

FA

FI
FA

FA

FA

I
U
N
U
A
I
I
I
I
I
U
I

1985

DP

PR

LG

1985
1985

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
LG

FA
EX

N
A

1985
1985

DP
DP

PR
WO

0
0

CN
CR

FA

I
N

1985

DP

PR

FA

1985
1985

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CN

1985
1985
1985

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
LG
CN

I
I
I

1985
1985
1985

DP
DP
DP

DD
DD
PR

0
0
0

WP
WP
CR

I
I
I

1985

DP

PR

FI

1985

PR

PR

CN

1985
1985

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

U
U

1985

DP

DD

CR

FA

1985

DP

DD

LG

FA

1985

DP

PR

FI

1985

DP

PR

CR

I
FA

FA

I
I

U
FA

1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985

DP
DP
DP
DP
PR
PR

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0

LG
CR
CR
CR
CN
LG

1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985

DP
DP
DR
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
DD
PR
WO
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

FI
FI
CR
LG
CR
CR
CR
LG

1985
1985
1985

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

1985
1985

DP
DP

PR
PR

1985
1985
1985

WS
DP
DP

1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985

DP
PR
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP

FA
FI

I
I
I
N
U
A

FA
FI

U
U
I
I
I
I
N
A

FI
CR
CR

FA
FA

I
N
N

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
U

WO
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
CR
LG

FA

I
I
I

DD
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

FI
FI
CN
CN
EX
LG
CR
EX
FI

FA
FA

N
I
U
U
I
I
I
I
U

1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985

DP
DP
DP
DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
DD
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

CR
CR
FI
CR
CN
LG
CR

1985
1985
1985
1985

DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
DD

0
0
0
0

CR
CN
CR
FI

1985
1985
1985

DP
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
FI

1985
1985

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
LG

FI

U
I

1985

DP

DD

CR

FA

1985

DP

DD

LG

FA

1985
1985

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

U
N

1985
1985
1985

DP
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CN
CR
ST

1985

DP

PR

CN

FA

FA

FA

FA
FA

FA

I
U
I
N
I
U
I

U
U
N
U
A
N
I

U
I
I

1985

CO

PR

HE

1986

DP

PR

CR

1986

DP

WO

FA

1986

DP

PR

FA

1986
1986
1986
1986

DP
DP
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

1
1
1
1

LG
FI
FA
FI

1986

DP

DD

FA

1986

DR

PR

CR

FA

1986

PR

PR

LG

FI

1986

PR

PR

LG

1986

DP

PR

FI

1986

DP

PR

LG

1986

DP

PR

CR

FA

EX

FI

A
I
A
I

FA

1986

DP

DD

CR

FA

1986
1986
1986

DP
DP
DR

DD
PR
PR

1
1
2

FA
CR
CR

FA
FA

I
A
A

1986

DP

DD

WP

1986
1986

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
LG

U
U

1986

PR

PR

CN

1986
1986

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

FI
CR

U
U

1986

DP

PR

CR

1986

DP

PR

LG

1986
1986
1986
1986

DP
DP
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

CN
FI
CR
LG

U
U
I
I

1986

DP

PR

FI

1986
1986
1986
1986

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
WO

0
0
0
0

CR
FA
FI
WP

1986

DP

PR

FA

1986

DP

PR

FI

FA

FA

A
FA

I
I
U
I

1986

DP

PR

CR

FA

1986
1986

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
N

1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986

PR
DP
DP
DP
PR
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
CN
CR
LG
CR

1986

DP

PR

CN

1986

DP

PR

FA

1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986

DP
DP
DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
WO
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0

CR
CN
CR
WP
CR
LG

1986

DP

PR

LG

1986

DP

PR

CR

FA

1986

DP

PR

CR

FA

1986

DP

PR

LG

1986
1986
1986

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
LG
LG

FA
FA

FA
FA
FA
FI

U
I
N
U
N
U
I

I
N
N
I
N
A
I

I
FA

I
I
I

1986
1986

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
BL

FA

1986
1986

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

EX
CR

1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986

DP
DP
DP
DP
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR
WO
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0

CR
LG
CR
CR
CR
FI

1986
1986

PR
DP

DD
PR

0
0

WP
LG

FI

I
I

1986

DP

PR

LG

FI

1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986

PR
DP
PR
DP
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
WO

0
0
0
0
0
0

CN
CR
FI
LG
CR
LG

1986

PR

PR

FA

1986
1986

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
EX

1986

PR

PR

CN

1986
1986
1986
1986

DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

FA
CR
LG
CR

FA
FA

FA
FA

FA

FA

N
I
I
N
N
I
U
I
I
I

U
N
U
I
U
I
N

FI
FA

A
A
U

FA
FI
FA

N
N
A
I

1986
1986

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

CR
FA

FA

N
I

1986
1986

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
LG

FA

N
U

1986

DP

PR

LG

1986
1986
1986
1986

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
CR
CR
FA

FA
FA

U
I
I
N

1986

DP

PR

CR

FA

1986
1986

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
CN

FI

I
I

1986

DP

WO

LG

1987
1987

DP
DP

DD
PR

1
1

FA
FI

A
I

1987

DP

PR

FA

1987
1987

DP
DP

DD
PR

1
1

FA
LG

I
I

1987

DP

DD

CR

1987

PR

PR

FA

FA

A
A

1987

DP

PR

FA

1987

DP

WO

FA

1987

DP

DD

CR

FA

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
DD

1
1

FA
CR

FA

A
A

1987

AC

CS

ST

1987

PR

PR

FA

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

I
U

1987
1987

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
CR

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CN
CR

1987

DP

PR

CN

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

EX
CR

FA

I
I

1987

DP

PR

CR

FA

1987

DP

WO

WP

BL

FA

I
I

FA

U
N

1987

DP

PR

CR

FA

1987
1987
1987

PR
DP
DP

WO
PR
PR

0
0
0

WP
CN
CN

I
I
U

1987
1987
1987

DP
DP
DP

DD
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
FI
LG

I
I
I

1987
1987
1987

DP
PR
DP

PR
DD
PR

0
0
0

FA
CR
LG

FA

I
N
I

1987

DP

PR

CR

FA

1987
1987

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

FI

U
I

1987

DP

PR

LG

FI

1987

DP

PR

LG

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1987
1987
1987

DP
DP
DP

WO
DD
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
LG

FA
FA
FI

N
N
A

1987
1987
1987
1987

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

CR
CR
FI
LG

LG
FA

FI

FA

FI

A
N
U
A

1987

DP

PR

CR

FA

1987

DP

WO

FA

1987
1987

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

N
I

1987

DP

PR

CR

FA

1987

DP

PR

FA

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

LG
CR

FA

U
N

1987

DP

PR

CR

FA

1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987

DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
PR

PR
DD
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0

CR
CR
CR
CR
FI
CN

FA
FA

N
N
U
I
I
I

1987
1987
1987

DP
PR
DP

PR
WO
PR

0
0
0

FI
FA
EX

U
I
I

1987
1987
1987
1987

DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
HE
LG
CR

I
U
A
I

1987

DP

PR

CR

FA

1987

DP

PR

LG

FI

FA

FI

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

EX
LG

FI

I
A

1987

DP

PR

CR

FA

1987

DP

PR

CR

FA

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA

N
U

1987

DP

PR

HE

1987
1987
1987

PR
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
FA
CR

FA

U
N
N

1987
1987

PR
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1987

DP

PR

LG

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
FI

FI

I
I

1987

DP

PR

LG

FI

1987

DR

PR

CR

1987
1987
1987

DR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CN
LG
CR

U
I
I

1987
1987

DP
DR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
EX

FA

I
I

1987

DP

PR

CR

FA

FA

1987

DP

PR

FA

1987

DP

PR

CR

1987
1987

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

FA
CN

N
I

1987
1987

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

1987

DR

DD

FI

1987
1987

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

1987
1988
1988
1988

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
DD
PR
DD

0
1
1
1

CR
FA
CR
FI

1988

DP

PR

FA

1988
1988

DR
DP

DD
PR

1
1

LG
FA

U
I

1988
1988

DP
DP

DD
PR

1
1

FA
LG

I
A

1988
1988

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
LG

FA

FA
FA
FA

FI

I
N
N
I
A
I

A
I

1988

DP

PR

FI

1988

PR

PR

CR

1988

DP

PR

FI

1988
1988

DP
DP

PR
PR

167
0

LG
CR

1988

DP

PR

FA

1988

DP

PR

CR

1988

DP

PR

FA

1988

DP

PR

FA

1988

DR

PR

LG

1988

DP

PR

FI

1988
1988
1988

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FI
LG
FA

I
U
I

1988
1988

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

1988

DP

PR

FI

1988

DP

PR

LE

1988

DP

PR

LG

FA

A
A

EX
FA

FI

BL

A
N
I

FA

FI

EX

I
I

1988

DP

PR

LG

FI

1988

DP

DD

FI

1988

DP

DD

LG

1988
1988

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CR
FA

1988
1988

PR
PR

PR
DD

0
0

LG
FI

1988

DP

PR

CR

1988

PR

PR

FA

1988

DP

PR

LG

1988
1988
1988

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FI
FI
LG

FI

I
I
A

1988

DP

PR

CR

FA

1988

DP

PR

CR

FA

1988
1988

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

LG
FA

I
N

1988

DP

PR

LG

1988
1988

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
CR

FA

U
I

1988

DP

DD

CR

FA

FA

N
I
I
I

FA

1988
1988
1988

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FA
FI
WP

FA

N
U
I

1988

DP

PR

CR

FA

1988

DP

DD

CR

FA

1988
1988

DP
IN

PR
PR

0
0

LG
FA

FI

A
N

1988

PR

PR

LG

FI

1988
1988
1988

DP
DP
DP

PR
DD
PR

0
0
0

CR
FI
FI

FA

N
I
I

1988
1988

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

FI
CR

1988

DP

DD

FA

1988

PR

PR

LG

1988
1988

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
LG

FI

U
I

1988

DP

DD

CR

FA

1988
1988

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

FI
FI

A
A

1988

DP

DD

FI

1988

DP

PR

FA

1988

DP

PR

CR

FA

FA

I
I

1988
1988
1988

DP
DP
DP

DD
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
CN
LG

U
U
I

1988

DP

PR

CR

FA

1988

PR

PR

CR

FA

1988

DP

PR

FI

1988
1988

DP
PR

WO
PR

0
0

CR
LG

1988
1988
1988

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
LG
LG

1988

DP

PR

LG

1988

DP

DD

CR

FA

1988

DP

PR

CR

FA

1988

DP

PR

LG

FI

1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988

DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP

DD
PR
PR
DD
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0

CR
LG
LG
CR
LG
CR

FA
FI

FA

N
A
I
N
U
I

1988

DP

PR

LG

FI

1988
1988

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

CR
FA

FA

N
U

I
FA

FI

N
I
U
I
A

FA

1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988

DP
DP
PR
DP
DP
AC
DP

DD
PR
PR
PR
PR
AC
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

EX
CR
CR
LG
ST
FI
CN

1988

PR

PR

LG

1988
1988
1988

DR
PR
PR

DD
PR
PR

0
0
0

FA
CR
CR

1988
1988

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
CR

1988

DP

WO

WP

1988
1988

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

CR
LG

1989

DP

PR

FA

1989

DP

PR

FA

1989

DP

DD

CR

FA

1989
1989

DP
DP

DD
DD

1
1

LG
CR

FA

A
I

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
DD

1
1

FI
CR

FA

I
A

FA
FA

I
N
N
I
U
U
A
I

FA

FA

N
N
N
I
N
I

FA

I
I

1989

DP

DD

CN

1989

DP

DD

FA

1989

DP

DD

CR

1989

DR

DD

LG

1989

DP

DD

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

LG

FA

1989
1989

DP
PR

PR
PR

1
1

FI
CR

FA

I
I

1989

DP

DD

CR

FA

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
DD

1
1

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1989

PR

PR

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

FI

1989

PR

PR

FI

1989

DP

DD

LG

1989

DP

PR

CN

1989
1989

DP
PR

DD
PR

0
0

WP
LG

I
I

FA

A
I

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989
1989
1989

PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
FI
CR

FI

I
U
I

1989

DP

PR

FI

1989

CO

PR

CR

1989

DP

PR

EX

1989
1989
1989

DP
DP
DP

DD
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
LG
FI

I
I
U

1989

DP

PR

CR

1989

DP

PR

CN

1989

DP

PR

CR

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

1989

DP

DD

1989

DP

1989
1989

I
FA

FA

I
I

FA

FI
LG

FI

I
I

CR

FA

PR

CR

FA

DP

DD

CR

FA

DP

PR

FI

1989

DP

DD

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

CR

1989
1989

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
CR

FA

U
I

1989

DP

PR

LG

FI

1989

DR

DD

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

U
N

1989
1989

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
LG

FA

U
I

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DR

DD

LG

1989

PR

PR

FI

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
LG

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

I
U

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989
1989

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FI

FA
FA

N
I

U
U

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

CN

1989

PR

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

WS

PR

LG

BL

1989
1989
1989
1989

DP
DP
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

CR
FI
WP
FI

FA

N
I
I
U

1989

DP

PR

LG

FA

1989

PR

PR

CR

FA

1989

DP

DD

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

LG

FI

1989

PR

PR

LG

1989

DP

DD

CR

1989

DP

PR

FI

FI

I
A

FA

N
U

1989

DP

PR

LG

FI

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
U

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
FI

FA

U
U

1989

PR

PR

CN

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

FI
FA

U
I

1989

DP

DD

CR

1989

DP

DD

FI

1989

PR

PR

CN

1989

DP

PR

LG

FI

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

FI

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
LG

FA

FA

I
I
I

FA
FI

U
A

1989

DP

PR

FI

1989

DP

PR

CR

1989

DP

PR

FI

1989
1989
1989

PR
DP
PR

PR
DD
PR

0
0
0

CR
FA
FI

1989
1989

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

FA
CR

FA

N
N

1989

DP

DD

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

FA

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

LG

FI

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

FA

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

FI

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

N
U

FA

N
N
I

FA

1989

DP

DD

CR

FA

1989
1989
1989

DP
WS
DP

PR
WO
PR

0
0
0

FA
WP
CR

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989
1989
1989
1989
1989

DP
DP
DP
CO
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
DD

0
0
0
0
0

CR
CN
FI
HE
CR

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

DD

FI

1989

DP

DD

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

PR

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

CR

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1989

DP

PR

EX

I
I
U
EX

FA

U
U
U
I
I

FI

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

WO

LG

1989
1989
1989
1989

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

CR
CR
CR
FI

FA

1989

DR

DD

LG

FI

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
CR

FA

I
I

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989
1989

PR
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CR
LG

FA

I
U

1989
1989
1989

PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
LG
CN

I
I
U

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

EX
EX

I
A

1989
1989

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

FI
CR

1989

PR

PR

FI

1989

DP

DD

WP

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CR
FA

U
U

FA

FA

I
U
I
I

U
U

1989

DR

DD

CN

1989

DP

AC

FI

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989
1989
1989
1989

DR
DP
DP
PR

DD
PR
DD
PR

0
0
0
0

CR
FI
CR
CN

FA

I
U
N
I

1989

DP

PR

CR

1989

DP

DD

CR

FA

1989
1989
1989

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
LG

FA
FA

N
I
I

1989

DP

DD

FA

1989
1989

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
CR

FA

I
N

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

1989

DP

PR

CR

1989

PR

PR

CR

1989

PR

PR

FI

1989

DP

PR

CR

FA

U
FA

I
U

FA

1989
1989
1989

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
FI
CR

I
U
I

1989
1989
1989

DP
DP
DP

DD
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
CR
CR

U
I
N

1989

DP

PR

FI

1989

WS

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

PR

OT

1989

DP

PR

LG

1989

DP

DD

WP

1990
1990

DP
DP

WO
PR

1
1

CR
FA

FA

A
A

1990

DP

PR

CR

FA

1990
1990

DP
PR

DD
PR

1
1

CR
CR

FA
FA

A
I

1990

DP

DD

FA

FA

1990

DP

PR

CR

FA

1990

DP

PR

FI

1990
1990

DP
PR

PR
PR

1
1

FA
CR

FA

A
I

1990

DP

WO

CR

FA

1990

DP

DD

FA

1990

DP

DD

CR

1990

DP

WO

LG

1990

DP

PR

LG

1990
1990

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

OT
FI

N
I

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
CO
PR
DP
PR
DP
DP

PR
DD
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

FI
LG
FA
FI
FI
LG
LG
CR

I
U
I
U
I
I
I
N

1990

DP

PR

LG

1990

DP

PR

FA

1990

DP

DD

FA

A
FA

FA

1990
1990
1990

DP
WS
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
CN
LG

1990
1990
1990

PR
DR
DP

PR
DD
DD

0
0
0

CR
FI
CR

FA

1990
1990

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

EX

1990

PR

PR

LG

1990

DP

PR

FI

1990
1990

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
LG

FA
FI

N
I

1990
1990

DP
WS

PR
DD

0
0

LG
CR

FA

I
I

1990

DP

PR

LG

1990
1990
1990

DP
PR
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
FI

FI

A
I
I

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DR
DP
DP

PR
PR
DD
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0

CR
FI
CR
CR
CN

FA

N
I
I
U
U

FA
FI

FA

U
I
A
I
I
I
A
I

FA
FA

1990

DP

DD

CR

FA

1990
1990

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
LG

I
I

1990

PR

PR

LG

1990

DP

PR

LG

1990

DP

DD

LG

1990
1990
1990
1990

DR
DP
DP
PR

DD
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
CR
LG
HE

1990

PR

PR

LG

1990
1990

WS
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
CN

1990
1990

WS
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

1990

DP

PR

EX

1990

DP

DD

WP

1990

DP

PR

LG

FI

1990

DP

PR

LG

FI

1990
1990

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

LG
FI

FA

FA

I
I
I
I
U
I

FA

I
U
I
I

FI

I
I

I
I

1990
1990

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CN
LG

I
I

1990
1990

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
LG

I
I

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP
DP
PR
DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
DD
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
CR
FI
LG
CR
LG
CR

I
I
I
I
U
I
I
U
I

1990

DP

PR

EX

1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

U
I
U

1990

DP

PR

CN

1990

PR

PR

CN

1990

WS

DD

CR

1990
1990

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FI

I
I

1990
1990
1990

PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
CR

I
I
I

FI
FA

FA
FA

FA

FA

1990
1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP
DR

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

CN
FI
CR
CR

FA
FA

U
U
U
I

1990

PR

PR

CR

FA

1990

DP

DD

CR

FA

1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP

PR
DD
DD

0
0
0

CR
FA
CR

FA

I
N
I

1990

DR

DD

CR

1990

DP

PR

CR

1990

DR

DD

LG

1990

DP

PR

CR

1990
1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
DD
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
FA
LG
LG

1990

DR

DD

CR

1990

DP

WO

CR

FA

U
FA

U
U

FA

U
U
I
I

FI

U
FA

LG

1990

PR

PR

LG

FI

1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FI
FI
LG

1990
1990

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990

PR
WS
DP
DP
PR

PR
DD
PR
DD
PR

0
0
0
0
0

FI
CR
CR
LG
LG

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
DD
PR

0
0
0
0
0

LG
LG
FI
CR
CR

FA

I
I
U
U
N

1990

DP

PR

CR

FA

1990

PR

PR

LG

1990

DP

DD

CR

FA

1990
1990
1990

PR
IN
DP

PR
PR
DD

0
0
0

CR
FI
CR

FA

N
I
I

1990

WS

DD

CR

FA

1990

DP

PR

FI

I
I
I
FI

FA
FA

I
U
U
N
N
U
I

1990

DP

PR

CR

FA

1990

PR

PR

FI

1990

DP

PR

CN

1990

DP

PR

LG

1990

WS

PR

LG

1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP

PR
DD
DD

0
0
0

FA
EX
CR

FA

N
I
I

1990
1990

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

U
I

1990
1990

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

CR
CR

I
U

1990

DP

PR

FA

1990

DP

PR

LG

1990

DP

PR

CR

1990
1990

DP
WS

PR
WO

0
0

CR
CR

U
I

1990

PR

PR

CN

1990

PR

PR

CR

FA

I
FA

1990

PR

PR

CN

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP
DP
PR
DP
DR

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
DD
DD

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

LG
LG
CN
FI
CR
FA
CR

U
I
I
U
U
N
I

1990

DP

DD

LG

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0

CR
FI
LG
CR
LG

FA

1990
1990

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
LG

FA

1990

PR

PR

LG

1990

DP

PR

FI

1990
1990
1990

PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FI
LG
CR

U
I
U

1990

DP

PR

LG

1990
1990
1990

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CN
HE

FA

FA

FA

U
I
I
U
U

I
I

N
U
U

1990

PR

PR

LG

1990
1990

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

LG
CR

1990

PR

PR

LG

1990
1990

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
CR

1990
1990

DP
PR

DD
PR

0
0

WP
LG

I
I

1991

DP

PR

CN

1991

PR

PR

CN

1991

PR

PR

CN

1991

PR

PR

CN

1991
1991

DR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CN
CN

U
U

1991
1991

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CN
CN

U
U

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

U
I

FA

U
A

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991

DP

DD

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

PR

PR

CR

FA

1991

PR

PR

CR

FA

1991

DR

PR

CR

1991

PR

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

PR

PR

CR

1991

PR

PR

CR

FA

1991

PR

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

PR

WO

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

I
I

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

DD

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

DD

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

FA

1991

DP

PR

EX

FI

1991

DP

PR

EX

1991

DP

PR

EX

1991

DP

PR

EX

FI

1991

DP

PR

EX

FI

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

PR

PR

FA

1991

PR

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
I

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

WS

PR

FA

LG

1991

RI

PR

FI

1991

RI

PR

FI

1991

DP

PR

FI

1991

PR

PR

FI

1991

DP

PR

FI

1991

PR

PR

FI

1991

PR

PR

FI

1991

PR

PR

FI

1991

DP

PR

FI

1991

DP

PR

FI

1991

DP

PR

FI

1991

DP

PR

FI

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

HE
LE

U
I

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

WS

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

CO

PR

LG

1991

DR

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

FI

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

CR

1991

PR

PR

LG

FI

1991

WS

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

1991

DP

PR

LG

FI

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

DD

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

DP

EV

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

DD

LG

FA

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

DD

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

EX

FI

1991

DP

PR

LG

FI

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

1991

WS

PR

LG

1991

WS

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

OT

1991

DP

PR

OT

1991

DP

PR

OT

1991

DP

WO

WP

1991

DP

DD

WP

FI

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

PR

PR

CR

FA

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

EX
FA

FI

A
A

1991

PR

PR

FA

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
LG

A
U

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

OT

1991

DP

PR

OT

1991

DP

PR

OT

1991

DP

DD

CR

FA

1991
1991

DP
PR

DD
PR

1
1

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

PR

PR

CR

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

CR
CR

FA

I
I

1991

PR

WO

CR

FA

1991

PR

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

DD

CR

FA

1991

WS

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

CO

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991

WS

PR

CR

FA

1991

DP

PR

CR

FA

1991
1991
1991

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

1
1
1

FA
FA
FA

I
I
I

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
FA

I
I

1991

PR

PR

FA

1991

PR

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
FA

I
I

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
FA

I
I

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991

DP

PR

FA

1991
1991

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
FI

I
I

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

PR

PR

LG

FA

1991

DP

PR

LG

1991

DP

PR

CR

1991
1991

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

ST
LG

I
I

1992

PR

PR

CL

1992

AC

PR

CN

1992

PR

PR

CN

1992

PR

PR

CN

1992

DP

PR

CN

1992

DP

PR

CN

1992

PR

PR

CN

1992

WS

PR

CN

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

PR

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992

PR

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992
1992

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

U
N

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992
1992

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992
1992

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992

DP

WO

CR

U
FA
FA

N
N

U
FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

PR

PR

CR

1992

DP

DD

CR

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992

DP

DD

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

DD

CR

1992

DP

DD

CR

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

FA

N
U

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

PR

PR

CR

FA

1992

WS

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

PR

PR

FA

1992

PR

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992
1992

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

LG

FI

N
I
N

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

PR

PR

FI

1992

PR

PR

FI

1992

PR

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

PR

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

PR

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

PR

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992
1992

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

U
I

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

FI

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

CO

PR

LG

1992

CO

PR

LG

1992

CO

PR

LG

1992

CO

PR

LG

1992

DP

WO

LG

FI

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

FI

FI

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992
1992

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992
1992

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1992

DP

PR

LG

FI

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

FI

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992
1992

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

FI

1992

DP

DD

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

DD

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

WS

PR

LG

1992
1992
1992

WS
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

U
I
I

FI

FI

1992

DP

WO

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

WO

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992
1992

DP
CO

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

EX

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

FI

I
FI

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

WS

PR

LG

1992

WS

PR

LG

1992

WS

PR

LG

1992

WS

PR

LG

1992

WS

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

PR

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992
1992

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1992

DP

PR

LG

FI

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

OT

1992

DP

PR

OT

1992

DP

PR

OT

1992

DP

PR

OT

1992

DP

PR

ST

1992

PR

PR

ST

1992

PR

PR

ST

FI

FA

1992

DP

DD

WP

1992

DP

PR

WP

1992

PR

PR

HE

1992
1992

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

CR
CR

FA
FA

A
A

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

CO

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

PR

PR

CR

FA

1992

PR

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992
1992
1992

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

1
1
1

FA
FA
LG

A
A
A

1992

DP

PR

LG

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

PR

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

DD

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992

DP

PR

CR

FA

1992
1992

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

CR
CR

FA

I
I

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992

DP

PR

CR

1992
1992

DP
PR

PR
PR

1
1

CR
FA

I
I

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992
1992

DP
PR

PR
PR

1
1

FA
FA

I
I

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

PR

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992

DP

PR

FA

1992
1992

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
FA

I
I

1992

DP

PR

FI

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

LG

1992

DP

PR

ST

1992

DP

PR

LG

FA

FA

1992

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993
1993

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CL
CN

N
U

1993

PR

PR

CN

1993

RI

PR

CN

1993

PR

PR

CN

1993

PR

PR

CN

1993

DP

PR

CR

1993

WS

WO

CR

FA

1993

WS

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993
1993

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

1993

PR

PR

CR

FA

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

U
N

1993

DP

WO

CR

FA

1993

DP

DD

CR

FA

1993

DP

DD

CR

FA

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

I
I

1993

DP

PR

CR

1993

DP

PR

CR

U
U

U
FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

PR

DD

CR

FA

1993

PR

PR

CR

1993
1993

PR
PR

PR
DD

0
0

CR
CR

LG

1993

PR

DD

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
N

1993

DP

WO

CR

1993

DP

PR

CR

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

FA

U
A

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

N
U

1993

DP

PR

CR

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

PR

PR

CR

FA

1993

PR

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1993

PR

PR

EX

1993

DP

PR

EX

1993

DP

PR

EX

1993

DP

PR

EX

1993

DP

PR

EX

1993

PR

PR

FA

1993

PR

PR

FA

1993

PR

DD

FA

1993

PR

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

PR

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

PR

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

DD

FA

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
U

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

AC

AC

FI

1993

PR

PR

FI

1993

CO

PR

FI

1993

PR

PR

FI

1993

WS

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

PR

PR

FI

1993

PR

PR

FI

1993

PR

PR

FI

1993

PR

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

PR

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

PR

PR

FI

1993

PR

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993
1993
1993

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FI
FI
FI

U
U
U

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993
1993

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

DD

LG

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993
1993

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

FI

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

CO

PR

LG

1993
1993

CO
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

DR

DD

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

U
I

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

DD

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993
1993

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993
1993

WS
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1993

DP

DD

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993
1993
1993
1993

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
LG

I
U
U
U

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

WO

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

WO

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

FI

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

FI

1993

WS

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

LG

1993

WS

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

OT

FI

1993

DP

PR

OT

1993

DP

PR

OT

1993
1993

DP
DP

DD
WO

0
0

WP
WP

LG

I
I

1993

PR

DD

WP

FA

1993

DP

WO

WP

1993

DP

WO

WP

1993

DP

WO

WP

1993

DP

WO

WP

1993

DP

DD

WP

1993

DP

PR

WP

1993

WS

PR

CR

FA

1993

PR

PR

CR

FA

1993

PR

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993
1993

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
FA

U
A

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

CR

1993

DP

PR

CR

1993

PR

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

DD

CR

FA

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

DD

CR

FA

1993

PR

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

WO

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

DD

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

PR

PR

EX

1993

PR

PR

FA

1993

PR

PR

FA

1993
1993

PR
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
FA

U
U

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FA

1993

DP

PR

FI

1993

DP

PR

OT

1993

DP

PR

CR

FA

1993

PR

PR

LG

1993

DP

PR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CL

1994

AC

AC

CN

1994

PR

PR

CN

1994

DP

DD

CN

1994

DP

PR

CN

1994

PR

PR

CN

LG

LG

1994

WS

PR

CN

1994

DP

PR

CN

1994

DP

PR

CN

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CN
CR

FA

U
N

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CR

FA

1994

DR

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

1994

DP

WO

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CR

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

DD

CR

FA

1994

PR

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

EV

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

N
N

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

EV

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994
1994

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994
1994

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

U
I

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

EV

CR

FA

1994

DP

WO

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

PR

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994
1994

DP
DP

DD
EV

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
U

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

WO

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

EX

FI

1994

PR

PR

FA

1994

PR

PR

FA

1994

DP

PR

FA

1994

PR

PR

FA

1994

DP

PR

FA

1994

PR

PR

FA

1994

DP

WO

FA

1994

DP

PR

FA

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1994

DP

PR

FA

1994

DP

PR

FA

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1994

PR

PR

FA

1994

DP

DD

FA

1994

DP

PR

FA

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

CO

PR

FI

1994

PR

PR

FI

1994
1994
1994
1994

DR
DR
DR
DP

DD
DD
DD
PR

0
0
0
0

FI
FI
FI
FI

A
A
A
I

1994

PR

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

PR

PR

FI

1994

PR

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

PR

PR

FI

1994

PR

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

U
I

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

AC

AC

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994

DP
DP
DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
LG
LG
LG

I
I
I
I
I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

FI

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994
1994

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1994

CO

PR

LG

1994

CO

PR

LG

1994

CO

PR

LG

1994

CO

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

DR

DD

LG

1994

DR

DD

LG

1994

DR

DD

LG

1994

WS

PR

LG

FI

1994

WS

PR

LG

FI

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1994

PR

PR

LG

FI

1994

PR

PR

LG

FI

1994

WS

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

WS

PR

LG

1994
1994
1994

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

I
I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1994

DP

WO

LG

1994

DP

WO

LG

1994

DP

WO

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FA

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994
1994

DP
PR
PR

PR
DD
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

U
U
I

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

DP

WO

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

WO

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

DP

WO

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

DP

DD

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
WO

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

DD

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994
1994
1994

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
LG

I
I
I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

FA

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994
1994

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

U
I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

1994

WS

PR

LG

1994

WS

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

EX

1994

PR

PR

LG

FI

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

DD

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

WO

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

WO

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

EX

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

A
U

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1994

DP

DD

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994
1994

DP
DP
WS

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

U
I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

DD

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994
1994
1994

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

FI

U
I
U
I

1994

PR

PR

OT

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

OT
OT

1994

PR

PR

OT

1994

DP

PR

OT

1994

DP

PR

OT

1994

DP

PR

OT

1994

PR

PR

WP

1994

DR

DD

WP

1994
1994

DP
DP

DD
EV

0
0

WP
WP

1994

DP

DD

WP

LG

FI

LG

I
I

I
I

1994

DP

DD

WP

FA

1994

DP

DD

WP

LG

1994

DP

EV

WP

LG

1994

DP

DD

WP

LG

1994

PR

DD

WP

LG

1994

DP

DD

WP

1994

DP

DD

WP

1994

DP

DD

WP

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

I
LG

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

DP

DD

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

CN

1994

DP

WO

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

WS

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

EV

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

DP

WO

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994
1994

PR
DP

PR
EV

1
1

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
N

1994

DP

DD

CR

FA

1994

DP

PR

CR

FA

1994

PR

PR

FA

1994

DP

EV

FA

1994

DP

PR

FA

1994

DP

PR

FA

1994

DP

PR

FA

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
FI

N
I

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

DP

PR

FI

1994

PR

WO

LG

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

DR

DD

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994
1994

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

LG
LG

I
I

FI

FA

1994

PR

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

WO

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

PR

LG

1994

DP

WO

LG

1994

DR

DD

WP

1994
1995

DP
WS

PR
PR

0
0

CL
CL

N
I

1995
1995

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CN
CN

U
N

1995

PR

PR

CN

1995

PR

PR

CN

1995

WS

PR

CN

1995

PR

PR

CN

BL

1995

DP

PR

CN

1995

DP

PR

CN

1995

PR

PR

CN

1995

DP

PR

CN

1995

DP

PR

CN

1995

DP

PR

CN

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995
1995

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

U
N

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995

CO

PR

CR

FA

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

WO

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995

PR

PR

CR

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

WO

CR

FA

1995

DP

WO

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995
1995

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995
1995

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
N

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

WO

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995

PR

DD

CR

FA

1995

WS

PR

CR

FA

1995

PR

WO

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995
1995

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

WO

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

WO

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

PR

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

FI

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

PR

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

DD

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995
1995
1995

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
DD

0
0
0

FA
FA
FA

N
N
N

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

WO

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

PR

PR

FI

1995

CO

PR

FI

1995

CO

PR

FI

1995

CO

PR

FI

1995

CO

PR

FI

1995

CO

PR

FI

1995

PR

PR

FI

1995

PR

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995
1995

DP
WS

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

I
I

1995

WS

PR

FI

1995

DP

DD

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

PR

PR

FI

1995

PR

PR

FI

1995

PR

PR

FI

1995

PR

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

WS

PR

FI

1995

DP

DD

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

PR

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995
1995
1995

PR
PR
PR

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

U
I
A

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

FI

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

CO

PR

LG

1995

CO

PR

LG

1995

CO

PR

LG

1995

CO

PR

LG

1995

CO

PR

LG

1995

CO

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

FI

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

FI

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995
1995
1995
1995

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
LG

I
I
I
I

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995
1995

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995
1995

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995
1995

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995
1995

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

FI

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995
1995

DP
DP

PR
EV

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

DD

LG

FI

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995
1995

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

1995

DP

DD

LG

FI

I
I

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995
1995

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

EX

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

EV

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

FI

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995
1995

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995
1995

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

WO

LG

1995

DP

DD

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

WO

LG

1995
1995

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

PR

PR

OT

1995
1995

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

OT
OT

U
I

1995

DP

PR

OT

1995

PR

PR

OT

1995

DP

PR

OT

1995

DP

PR

OT

1995

DP

PR

OT

1995

DP

PR

OT

1995

DP

PR

ST

1995

DP

PR

ST

1995

PR

PR

WP

1995

DP

DD

WP

1995

DP

DD

WP

1995

PR

PR

WP

LG

I
I

LG

1995

DP

EV

WP

BL

1995

DP

DD

WP

LG

1995

DP

DD

WP

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

FA

1995

PR

PR

FA

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

PR

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

PR

DD

CR

FA

1995

PR

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

PR

WO

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

PR

CR

FA

1995

DP

DD

CR

FA

1995

CO

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FA

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

PR

FI

1995

DP

DD

FI

1995

DP

DD

FI

1995

DP

PR

HE

1995

PR

PR

LG

1995

DP

PR

LG

1995

WS

PR

OT

1995

DP

PR

CL

1995

DP

PR

CL

1996

WS

PR

CN

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CN
CN

N
U

1996

DP

PR

CN

1996
1996

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CN
CN

I
U

1996

PR

PR

CN

1996

DP

PR

CN

1996

WS

PR

CN

1996

DP

PR

CR

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996
1996

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
I

1996
1996
1996

PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
CR

FA
FA
FA

I
N
N

1996
1996
1996

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
DD

0
0
0

CR
CR
CR

FA
FA
FA

N
N
N

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

WS

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

PR

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

PR

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

WO

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

LG

1996

DP

PR

CR

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996
1996

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
N

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

WO

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

PR

PR

CR

FA

1996
1996

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

PR

PR

CR

FA

1996
1996

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

WS

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

WO

CR

FA

1996

WS

PR

CR

FA

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
I

1996

PR

PR

FA

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1996

PR

PR

FA

1996

PR

PR

FA

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1996

DP

PR

FA

1996

DP

WO

FA

1996

DP

PR

FA

1996

DP

PR

FA

1996

DP

PR

FA

1996

WS

PR

FA

1996

DP

PR

FA

1996

DP

PR

FA

1996

AC

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

PR

PR

FI

1996

CO

PR

FI

1996

PR

PR

FI

1996

PR

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

PR

PR

FI

1996

PR

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

DD

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996
1996

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

I
I

1996

PR

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

CO

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

PR

PR

FI

1996

PR

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996

DP

PR

FI

1996
1996

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996
1996

WS
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

CO

PR

LG

1996

CO

PR

LG

1996
1996

CO
CO

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1996
1996

CO
CO

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

FI

1996
1996

WS
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1996
1996
1996
1996

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
LG

I
U
I
I

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

FA

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996
1996
1996

PR
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

I
I
I

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996
1996

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1996

DP

WO

LG

1996

DP

DD

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

DD

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

WO

LG

FI

FI

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

WO

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

WO

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996
1996

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1996
1996

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1996

DP

DD

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

WO

LG

WP

BL

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

PR

WO

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

1996
1996

DP
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

WO

LG

1996

DP

WO

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

WO

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

PR

PR

LG

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

EX

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

A
I

1996

DP

WO

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

WO

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

FI

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

DD

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

LG

FA

1996

DP

WO

LG

1996

WS

PR

LG

1996

DP

PR

OT

1996

DP

PR

OT

1996

PR

PR

ST

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

WO

WP

1996

PR

PR

WP

1996
1996

DP
DP

PR
WO

0
0

WP
WP

I
I

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

EV

WP

1996

DP

AB

WP

1996

PR

PR

WP

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

EV

WP

1996
1996
1996

DP
DP
DP

PR
DD
PR

0
0
0

WP
WP
WP

I
I
I

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

PR

DD

WP

1996

DP

WO

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

EV

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

LG

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

DP

WO

WP

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

DP

WO

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

FA

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996
1996

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

WP
WP

I
I

1996

PR

WO

WP

1996

PR

DD

WP

1996

DP

PR

WP

1996

DP

DD

WP

1996

DP

PR

FA

1996

DP

PR

OT

1996

PR

DD

CR

LG

FA

1996

PR

DD

FA

1996

DP

PR

FA

1996

PR

PR

CN

1996

DP

WO

CR

FA

1996
1996

DP
DP

DD
DD

1
1

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

WO

CR

FA

1996

DP

PR

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DP

DD

CR

FA

1996

DR

DD

FA

1996
1996
1996

WS
DP
DP

PR
DD
PR

1
1
1

FA
FA
LG

I
I
I

1996

DP

WO

LG

1997

PR

PR

CL

1997

PR

PR

CN

1997
1997
1997

PR
WS
PR

DD
PR
PR

0
0
0

CN
CN
CN

U
N
U

1997

DP

PR

CN

1997

DP

PR

CN

1997

DP

PR

CN

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

PR

PR

CR

FA

1997
1997

PR
PR

WO
PR

0
0

CR
CR

1997

WS

PR

CR

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

DD

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

1997
1997
1997

PR
PR
PR

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
CR

FA

I
N
U

FA
FA
FA

N
N
I

1997

PR

DD

CR

FA

1997

PR

PR

CR

1997
1997

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

U
N

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

PR

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

WS

PR

CR

FA

1997

PR

DD

CR

FA

1997

PR

PR

CR

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

DD

CR

FA

1997

DP

WO

CR

FI

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FI

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

PR

PR

CR

1997

PR

PR

CR

FA

1997
1997
1997

WS
PR
DP

PR
PR
DD

0
0
0

CR
CR
CR

FA
FA
FA

N
U
N

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

DD

CR

1997

DP

PR

CR

1997
1997

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

WO

CR

FA

1997

PR

WO

CR

FA

1997

PR

PR

CR

1997

DP

PR

CR

1997

DP

PR

CR

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

PR

PR

CR

1997

DP

PR

EX

1997

DP

PR

EX

CN

N
FI

1997

DP

PR

EX

FI

1997

DP

PR

EX

1997
1997

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

EX
EX

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

DD

FA

1997

CO

PR

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

DD

FA

1997
1997
1997

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
DD

0
0
0

FA
FA
FA

N
N
N

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

FI
FI

I
A

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

DD

FA

1997

DR

DD

FA

1997

DR

DD

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

DD

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

DD

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

WO

FA

1997

AC

AC

FI

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

WS

DD

FI

1997
1997

WS
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

U
U

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997
1997

WS
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

U
U

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

U
I

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

PR

PR

FI

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997

PR

PR

FI

1997

PR

PR

FI

1997
1997

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

U
I

1997

DP

PR

FI

1997
1997
1997

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

FI
FI
FI

U
U
I

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997

WS
WS
WS
WS
WS
PR

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
LG
LG
LG

I
I
U
U
U
I

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997
1997

PR
CO

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1997

CO

PR

LG

1997

CO

PR

LG

1997
1997

WS
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997
1997
1997

WS
WS
WS

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

I
I
U

1997
1997
1997

WS
WS
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

I
I
I

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

OT

FA

I
I

1997

DP

PR

LG

FI

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997
1997

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

WS

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

WO

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

WO

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997
1997

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

FI

1997

DP

PR

LG

FI

1997

DP

PR

LG

FI

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

WS

PR

LG

1997

WS

PR

LG

1997

WS

PR

LG

1997

WS

PR

LG

1997

WS

PR

LG

1997

WS

WO

LG

1997

WS

PR

LG

1997
1997

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
FI

FI

A
I
I

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997
1997
1997

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

I
U
I

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

EV

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

WO

LG

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

EX

FI

A
I

FI

I
I

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

WS

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

FI

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

WS

PR

LG

1997
1997

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

FI

FA

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

FA

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

WO

LG

1997
1997
1997

DP
DP
DP

PR
WO
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

I
I
I

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

WO

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997
1997

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

FA
FI

I
I

1997

DP

PR

LG

FA

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

OT

1997

DP

PR

ST

1997

DP

DD

WP

LG

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

PR

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

PR

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

WO

WP

1997

DP

PR

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

PR

WP

1997

PR

PR

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

PR

DD

WP

LG

1997

DP

WO

WP

1997

DP

WO

WP

1997

DP

WO

WP

1997

DP

WO

WP

1997

DP

PR

WP

1997

DP

PR

WP

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
EV

0
0

WP
WP

I
I

LG

1997

DP

PR

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

LG

1997

DP

DD

WP

LG

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

DP

PR

WP

1997

DP

EV

WP

1997

DP

DD

WP

1997

PR

WO

WP

1997

PR

DD

WP

1997

DP

PR

WP

1997

DP

PR

WP

1997
1997

DP
PR

PR
PR

1
1

FA
CR

FA

A
A

1997

DR

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

DD

CR

FA

1997

WS

DD

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

DD

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1997
1997

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
1

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1997

DP

WO

CR

FA

1997

DP

DD

CR

1997

WS

PR

CR

FA

1997

WS

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

DD

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

PR

WO

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

WO

CR

FA

1997

PR

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

DP

PR

CR

FA

1997

PR

PR

CR

FA

1997
1997

PR
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FA
FA

I
I

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997

WS

PR

FA

1997

PR

DD

FA

1997

DP

PR

FA

1997
1997

DP
WS

PR
PR

1
1

FA
LG

I
I

1997

DP

EV

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

PR

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

LG

FA

1997

DP

PR

LG

1997

DP

PR

OT

1998
1998

WS
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CL
CL

N
N

1998
1998

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CN
CN

1998
1998
1998

WS
DP
PR

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CN
CN
CN

U
I
I

1998

DP

PR

CN

1998

DP

PR

CR

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

WO

CR

FA

LG

I
U

1998

DP

PR

CR

1998
1998

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1998

PR

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998
1998
1998
1998

PR
PR
PR
PR

PR
PR
DD
PR

0
0
0
0

CR
CR
CR
CR

FA
FA
FA
FA

N
N
I
N

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

PR

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

WO

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998
1998

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

LG

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998
1998
1998
1998

DP
DP
DP
DP

DD
WO
WO
DD

0
0
0
0

CR
CR
CR
CR

FA
FA
FA
FA

N
I
N
N

1998

DP

EV

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

WO

CR

FA

1998

DP

CS

CR

FA

1998

DP

CS

CR

1998

DP

CS

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

PR

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

WO

CR

FA

1998

PR

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

PR

PR

CR

1998
1998

WS
DP

PR
DD

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

WO

CR

FA

WP

1998

DP

CS

CR

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

WO

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DR

WO

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

LG

WP

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

WO

CR

FA

1998

PR

EV

CR

FA

1998
1998

WS
WS

PR
WO

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

WP

LG

I
I

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

EX

FI

1998

DP

DD

FA

1998

DP

EV

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998
1998

DP
DP

PR
CS

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1998

PR

PR

FA

1998

DP

DD

FA

1998
1998

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1998
1998

DP
DP

DD
WO

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

CS

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

DD

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

LG

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

PR

PR

FI

1998

DP

DD

FI

1998
1998

WS
PR

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

U
I

1998

DP

DD

FI

1998
1998

WS
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

I
I

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998
1998

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

I
I

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998
1998

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

I
I

1998

PR

PR

FI

1998

PR

PR

FI

1998

PR

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

WS

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

PR

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

DP

DD

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

DP

PR

FI

1998

AC

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998
1998

PR
PR

PR
WO

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998
1998
1998

PR
CO
CO

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

U
U
I

1998
1998

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

FI

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

WO

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

WO

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

FI

1998

PR

PR

LG

FI

1998

PR

PR

LG

FI

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998
1998

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998
1998

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998
1998

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998
1998

DP
DP

PR
DD

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

1998

DP

CS

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

WO

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998
1998

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998
1998

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998
1998

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998
1998

WS
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998
1998

DP
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

WS

DD

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998
1998

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998

PR

PR

LG

FI

FI

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

FI

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998
1998

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

FI

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

DD

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

FI

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998
1998

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

PR

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

WS

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998
1998

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

OT

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998
1998

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
OT

I
I

1998

PR

PR

OT

1998
1998

PR
WS

PR
DD

0
0

ST
WP

LG

I
I

1998

DP

EV

WP

1998

DP

PR

WP

1998

DP

PR

WP

1998

DP

PR

WP

1998
1998

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

WP
WP

N
N

1998

DP

PR

WP

1998

DP

DD

WP

1998

DP

PR

WP

1998

PR

DD

WP

1998

PR

EV

WP

1998

DP

WO

WP

LG

LG

1998

DP

DD

WP

1998

DP

DD

WP

1998

DP

DD

WP

1998

DP

WO

WP

1998

PR

WO

WP

1998

DP

DD

WP

1998

DP

DD

WP

1998

DP

DD

WP

1998

WS

EV

WP

1998

DP

PR

WP

LG

1998

DP

DD

WP

LG

1998

DP

DD

WP

LG

1998

DP

PR

WP

1998

DP

PR

WP

1998

DP

WO

WP

1998

DP

PR

WP

1998

DP

DD

WP

1998

DP

EV

WP

1998
1998

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

WP
WP

I
I

1998

PR

DD

WP

1998

PR

DD

WP

1998

DP

PR

WP

LG

1998

DP

PR

WP

1998

DP

DD

WP

LG

1998
1998
1998

DP
DP
DP

DD
PR
PR

0
0
0

WP
WP
WP

LG

I
I
I

1998

PR

PR

CR

FA

1998

PR

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

PR

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

PR

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

PR

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

CR

FA

1998

DP

EV

CR

FA

1998

DP

DD

FA

1998

DP

DD

FA

1998

PR

PR

FI

1998

DP

CS

OT

1998

DP

CS

OT

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

LG

1998

DP

PR

CL

1999

DP

PR

CL

1999

WS

PR

CL

1999

DP

PR

CL

1999

WS

PR

CN

LG

FI

LG

FA

1999

DP

PR

CN

1999

PR

PR

CN

1999

DP

PR

CN

1999

DP

PR

CN

1999
1999

WS
PR

PR
PR

0
0

CN
CN

N
N

1999

WS

PR

CN

1999

DP

WO

CR

FA

1999

PR

WO

CR

FA

1999
1999

DR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

U
I

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

WO

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

PR

WO

CR

FA

1999

PR

PR

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

PR

PR

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

PR

PR

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

WO

CR

FA

1999

DP

WO

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

PR

PR

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

PR

PR

CR

FA

1999

PR

PR

CR

FA

1999

PR

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

WS

PR

CR

FA

1999

PR

PR

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

WO

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

WO

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

WO

CR

FA

WP

1999

PR

EV

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

WO

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999
1999

PR
WS

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
I

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

EX

FI

1999

AC

AC

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

PR

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

PR

DD

FA

1999

PR

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

DD

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

PR

PR

FA

1999
1999

WS
PR

PR
DD

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1999

PR

PR

FA

1999

PR

PR

FA

1999

PR

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

DD

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

DD

FA

1999

DP

DD

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

DD

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999

DP

DD

FA

1999
1999

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

I
N

1999

DP

PR

FA

1999
1999

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

1999

PR

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999
1999

PR
CO

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

I
I

1999
1999

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

A
I

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

PR

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999
1999

DP
PR

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

I
I

1999

PR

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

DP

DD

FI

1999

PR

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

PR

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

PR

PR

FI

1999

PR

PR

FI

1999

PR

PR

FI

1999

PR

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

WS

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

DP

WO

FI

1999

DP

PR

FI

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

FI

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999
1999

PR
CO

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1999

CO

PR

LG

1999

CO

PR

LG

1999
1999
1999
1999

CO
PR
WS
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
LG

I
I
I
I

1999

DP

PR

LG

FA

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

WO

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999
1999

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999
1999

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1999
1999
1999

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

I
I
I

1999
1999

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
N

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999
1999

PR
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

FI

1999

PR

PR

LG

FA

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

DP

EV

LG

1999
1999

DP
DP

EV
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

FA

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

DD

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

FA

FA

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

WO

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

FA

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

WS

WO

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

FA

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

1999

PR

PR

LG

FI

1999

DP

WO

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

WS

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999
1999

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

1999

DP

PR

OT

1999

DP

PR

OT

1999

WS

PR

OT

1999

WS

PR

OT

1999
1999

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

OT
WP

N
I

1999

DP

PR

WP

1999
1999

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

WP
WP

I
I

1999

DP

EV

WP

1999

DP

DD

WP

1999

DP

DD

WP

LG

1999

DP

DD

WP

LG

1999

DP

WO

WP

LG

1999

PR

DD

WP

1999

PR

EV

WP

LG

1999

DP

DD

WP

LG

1999

DP

DD

WP

LG

1999

DP

DD

WP

LG

1999

DP

PR

WP

1999

DP

WO

WP

1999

DP

WO

WP

1999

PR

DD

WP

1999

PR

EV

WP

1999

WS

DD

WP

1999

DP

PR

WP

1999

DP

DD

WP

LG

1999

DP

DD

WP

1999
1999

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

WP
WP

I
I

1999

DP

EV

WP

1999

DP

DD

WP

1999

DP

PR

WP

1999

PR

DD

WP

1999

PR

DD

WP

1999

DP

DD

WP

1999

DP

DD

WP

1999

DP

WO

WP

1999

PR

EV

WP

1999

PR

EV

WP

1999

PR

WO

WP

1999

PR

DD

WP

1999

PR

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

CR

FA

1999
1999

WS
DP

PR
PR

1
1

FI
LG

FA

A
A

1999

DP

PR

LG

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

PR

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

DD

CR

FA

1999

WS

DD

CR

FA

1999

DP

PR

EX

FI

1999

DP

PR

LG

FA

1999

DP

PR

LG

FA

1999

DP

PR

LG

2000

AC

PR

CL

2000

CO

PR

LG

2000

CO

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

CL

2000

DP

PR

CL

2000

DP

PR

CL

2000

DP

PR

CN

2000

DP

PR

CN

2000

DP

PR

CN

2000

DP

PR

CN

2000

DP

PR

CN

LG

WP

2000

DP

PR

CN

2000

DP

PR

CR

2000

DP

WO

CR

2000

DP

PR

CR

2000

DP

WO

CR

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

2000

DP

WO

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

WO

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

WO

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

LG

LG

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

WO

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

2000

DP

DD

CR

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

WO

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

DD

CR

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

WO

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

2000

DP

DD

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

CR

FA

2000

DP

PR

EX

2000

DP

DD

EX

2000

DP

PR

EX

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

DD

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

DD

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

LG

2000
2000

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

FA
FA

N
I

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

DD

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

DD

FA

2000

DP

DD

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000
2000

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

WO

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

DD

FA

2000

DP

WO

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

DD

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

WO

FA

WP

2000

DP

WO

FA

LG

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

DD

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

EV

FA

2000

DP

PR

FA

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

DD

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

OT

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

FI

2000

DP

PR

LG

FI

2000

DP

PR

LG

FI

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

DD

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

DD

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

WO

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

DD

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

DD

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

FA

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000
2000

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000
2000

DP
DP

DD
DD

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2000
2000

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

DD

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

FI

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

DD

LG

2000

DP

WO

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000
2000

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

OT

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

FI

2000

DP

DD

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

FI

2000

DP

WO

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

WO

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

DD

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

FI

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

EV

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000
2000

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

FI

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

DD

LG

FI

2000

DP

DD

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

DD

LG

2000

DP

PR

OT

2000

DP

PR

OT

FI

2000

DP

PR

OT

2000
2000

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

OT
OT

N
I

2000

DP

PR

OT

2000

DP

PR

OT

2000

DP

PR

OT

2000

DP

PR

OT

2000

DP

PR

OT

2000

DP

PR

OT

LG

2000

DP

PR

ST

2000

DP

PR

ST

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

PR

WP

2000

DP

WO

WP

2000

DP

WO

WP

FA

LG

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

WO

WP

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

WO

WP

2000

DP

WO

WP

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

WO

WP

2000

DP

WO

WP

LG

LG

FA

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

WO

WP

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

WO

WP

2000

DP

EV

WP

2000

DP

DD

WP

2000

DP

WO

WP

2000

DP

DD

WP

FA

2000

DP

WO

WP

2000

PR

PR

CL

2000

PR

PR

CR

FA

2000

PR

WO

CR

FA

2000

PR

PR

CR

FA

2000

PR

DD

CR

FA

2000

PR

DD

CR

FA

2000

PR

PR

CR

FA

2000

PR

DD

CR

FA

2000

PR

WO

CR

FA

2000

PR

WO

CR

FA

2000
2000

PR
PR

PR
DD

0
1

CR
CR

FA

I
A

2000

PR

PR

CR

FA

2000

PR

PR

CR

FA

2000

PR

PR

CR

FA

2000

PR

DD

CR

FA

2000

PR

WO

CR

FA

2000

PR

DD

CR

FA

WP

2000

PR

EV

CR

FA

2000

PR

PR

CR

FA

2000

PR

DD

CR

FA

2000

PR

WO

CR

FA

2000

PR

PR

FA

2000

PR

DD

FA

2000

PR

PR

FA

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

DD

FI

2000

PR

WO

FI

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

PR

FI

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

WO

LG

2000

PR

DD

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000
2000
2000

PR
PR
PR

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

I
I
U

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000
2000

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
U

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000

PR

PR

LG

2000
2000

PR
DP

DD
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

2000

DP

PR

LG

FI

2000

DP

PR

WP

2000

PR

WO

WP

2000

PR

DD

WP

2000

PR

DD

WP

2000

PR

WO

WP

2000

WS

WO

CN

2000

WS

PR

CN

2000

WS

WO

CR

2000

WS

PR

FI

2000

WS

PR

LG

FA

2000
2000
2000
2000

WS
WS
WS
WS

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
LG

I
U
I
I

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

DD

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000
2000

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

DD

LG

2000
2000

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

OT

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

PR

LG

2000

WS

DD

LG

2000
2000

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

OT
WP

U
I

2000

WS

PR

WP

2001

DP

PR

CN

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

LG

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

2001

DP

WO

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

WO

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

FA

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA

U
I

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

WO

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

WO

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

WP

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001
2001
2001

DP
DP
DP

PR
DD
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
CR

FA
FA

I
N
I

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

2001

DP

DD

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

1
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

I
U

2001
2001
2001

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

CR
CR
CR

FA
FA
FA

I
N
I

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
I

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

FA

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
CR

FA
FA

N
N

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

WO

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

FA

2001

DP

WO

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

PR

CR

FA

2001

DP

DD

CR

LG

WP

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

DD

FA

2001

DP

DD

FA

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

FA
FA

N
N

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

LG

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

DD

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

WO

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

DD

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FA

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

DD

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

PR

FI

2001

DP

DD

FI

2001

DP

PR

HE

2001

DP

PR

LG

OT

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

WO

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

A
I

FA

2001

DP

PR

LG

FI

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

WO

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

FI

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

FI

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

WO

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

WO

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

DD

LG

2001

DP

DD

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

FI

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

DD

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

WO

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

FI

U
I

2001

DP

PR

LG

FI

2001
2001

DP
DP

DD
PR

0
0

LG
LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

FI

2001

DP

PR

LG

FI

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

I
U

FA

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

DD

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

FI

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

FI

FI

2001

DP

WO

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001
2001
2001
2001

DP
DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR
PR

0
0
0
0

LG
LG
LG
LG

I
I
I
I

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

PR

LG

2001

DP

WO

LG

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

2001
2001

DP
DP

WO
PR

0
0

LG
OT

I
I

2001

DP

PR

OT

2001
2001

DP
DP

PR
WO

0
0

OT
OT

I
I

2001

DP

WO

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

WO

WP

2001

DP

PR

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

WO

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

PR

WP

FA

BL

I
LG

2001

DP

WO

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

PR

WP

2001

DP

WO

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

DD

WP

2001

DP

WO

WP

2001

PR

PR

CN

2001

PR

PR

CR

FA

2001

PR

PR

CR

FA

2001

PR

PR

CR

FA

2001

PR

PR

CR

FA

2001

PR

DD

CR

FA

2001

PR

WO

CR

FA

2001

PR

WO

CR

2001

PR

PR

CR

FA

2001

PR

WO

CR

FA

LG

2001

PR

PR

CR

FA

2001

PR

PR

CR

FA

2001

PR

PR

CR

FA

2001

PR

PR

CR

FA

2001

PR

PR

CR

FA

2001

PR

WO

CR

FA

2001

PR

PR

FA

2001

PR

PR

FA

2001

PR

PR

FA

2001

PR

PR

FA

2001

PR

PR

FA

2001

PR

PR

FA

2001

PR

DD

FA

2001

PR

PR

FA

2001
2001

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

FI
FI

N
U

2001

PR

PR

FI

2001

PR

PR

FI

2001

PR

PR

FI

2001

PR

PR

FI

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001
2001

PR
PR

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

FI

FI

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

FA

FA

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

FI

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

PR

LG

2001

PR

DD

LG

2001

PR

WO

WP

2001

PR

WO

WP

CR

FA

LG

2001

PR

WO

WP

2001

PR

DD

WP

2001

PR

DD

WP

2001

PR

WO

WP

2001

PR

DD

WP

LG

2001

PR

DD

WP

LG

2001

PR

DD

WP

2001

PR

DD

WP

2001

WS

PR

CN

2001

WS

PR

CR

2001

WS

PR

FI

2001

WS

PR

FI

2001

WS

PR

FI

2001

WS

PR

FI

2001

WS

PR

FI

2001

WS

PR

FI

2001

WS

PR

FI

FA

OT

2001

WS

PR

LG

2001

WS

PR

LG

2001
2001

WS
WS

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
U

2001

WS

PR

LG

2001

WS

WO

LG

2001

WS

PR

LG

2001

WS

PR

LG

2001

WS

PR

LG

2001

WS

PR

LG

2001

WS

PR

LG

2001

WS

PR

LG

2001

WS

PR

WP

2001

WS

WO

WP

2001

WS

WO

WP

2002

DP

DD

FI

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

CL

2002

DP

PR

LG

CR

FI

FA

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

DD

FA

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

PR

WO

LG

2002

PR

PR

CR

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

CR

FA

2002

PR

PR

FI

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

FI

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

CR

FA

2002
2002

PR
PR

WO
PR

0
0

LG
CR

FA

I
I

2002

PR

WO

CR

FA

2002

PR

PR

CR

FA

2002

PR

WO

FA

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

CR

FA

2002

PR

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

DD

CR

FA

2002

DP

DR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002
2002

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

WS

PR

CL

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

WO

WP

2002

DP

PR

OT

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

FI

FA

LG

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

DD

WP

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

FA

2002

DP

WO

FA

2002

DP

WO

WP

2002

DP

WO

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

OT

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002
2002

DP
DP

PR
WO

0
0

LG
FA

I
N

2002

DP

DD

CR

LG

FI

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002
2002

DP
DP

WO
WO

0
0

CR
WP

I
FA

I
FA
LG

I
I

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

DD

CR

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

WO

WP

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

FA

LG

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

EX

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

DD

CR

2002

PR

PR

CR

2002

PR

WO

OT

2002

PR

DD

FA

2002

PR

WO

CR

FA

I
FA

FA

FA

2002

PR

WO

LG

2002

PR

PR

CR

2002

PR

PR

FA

2002

PR

PR

CR

FA

2002

PR

PR

OT

FI

2002

PR

PR

FA

2002

PR

PR

OT

2002

PR

PR

FA

FA

2002

PR

WO

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

DD

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002
2002

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2002

DP

DR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

FA

FA

2002

PR

WO

LG

2002

PR

PR

FI

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

CR

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

WO

LG

2002

PR

WO

FA

FA

2002

PR

PR

FA

2002

PR

PR

CR

FA

2002

PR

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

DD

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

FA

U
FA

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

WP

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

WS

PR

LG

2002

WS

PR

LG

2002

WS

PR

LG

2002

WS

WO

LG

2002

WS

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

OT

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

WO

FA

FA

WP

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

DD

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

FI

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002
2002
2002

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
WO

0
0
0

CR
CR
LG

FA

I
I
U

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

I
FA

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

WO

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

FA

2002

WS

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

FI

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002
2002

WS
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CL
LG

N
I

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

WO

WP

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

OT

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

OT

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

LG

FI

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

CL

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

FI

2002

PR

PR

ST

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

FA

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002
2002

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CR
LG

FA

I
I

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

I
FI

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

FA

WP

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

WS

PR

CR

FA

2002

WS

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

OT

2002

DP

PR

OT

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

DD

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

FI

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CL

2002

DP

WO

OT

FI

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

DD

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

DD

CR

FA

I
FA

FA

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

DD

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

WS

PR

LG

2002

WS

PR

LG

2002

WS

PR

CL

2002

WS

PR

CR

FA

2002

WS

PR

LG

FI

2002

DP

PR

FA

FA

FI

2002

DP

PR

CR

FA

2002

DP

DD

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

DD

FA

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

WO

EX

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

WO

LG

FA

FA

FA

2002
2002

PR
DR

WO
DR

0
0

LG
CN

I
I

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

CN

2002

PR

PR

CN

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

FA

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

WO

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

LG

2002

DP

DD

CR

2002

DP

PR

CL

FA

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

2002

DP

DD

CR

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

EX

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

PR

LG

FA

WP

I
FA

FI

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

PR

FI

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

WO

CR

FA

2002

DP

PR

FA

2002

DP

WO

OT

2002

DP

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

PR

PR

CR

2002

DP

PR

LG

2002

WS

PR

LG

2002

DP

WO

WP

2002

DP

DD

WP

FA

FA

LG

2002

DP

WO

WP

2002

DP

PR

WP

LG

2002

DP

WO

WP

LG

2002

DP

DD

WP

2002

DP

DD

WP

2002
2002

DP
DP

EV
PR

0
0

WP
LG

I
U

2002

DP

PR

WP

2002

DP

WO

WP

2002

DP

DD

WP

2002

DP

DD

WP

2002

DP

DD

WP

2002

DP

DD

WP

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

DP

WO

WP

2002

DP

DD

WP

2002
2002

DP
DP

PR
WO

0
0

LG
WP

I
I

2002

DP

DD

WP

2002

PR

WO

WP

2002

PR

DD

WP

2002

WS

DX

WP

CR

FA

2002

PR

PR

OT

2002

DP

WO

LG

2002

PR

DD

WP

2003

DP

PR

CN

2003

DP

PR

CN

2003

WS

PR

CN

2003

DP

WO

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

DD

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

PR

PR

CR

FA

2003

PR

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

PR

DD

CR

FA

2003

PR

WO

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

WO

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

WO

CR

FA

2003

DP

DD

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

WP

2003

PR

PR

CR

FA

2003

WS

PR

CR

FA

2003

WS

PR

CR

FA

2003

PR

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

WO

CR

FA

2003

DP

DD

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

WS

PR

CR

2003

DP

PR

CR

2003

DP

DD

CR

FA

2003

WS

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

DD

CR

FA

2003

DP

DD

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

DR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

WO

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

WO

CR

FA

2003

DP

WO

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

CR

FA

2003

WS

PR

CR

FA

2003

DP

WO

CR

FA

2003

DP

PR

EX

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

WO

FA

2003

PR

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

WO

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

PR

WO

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

WO

FA

LG

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

PR

PR

FA

2003

PR

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

WO

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

WS

WO

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

WO

FA

2003

WS

WO

FA

2003

WS

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

PR

PR

FA

WP

2003

PR

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FA

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

PR

PR

FI

2003

WS

PR

FI

2003

PR

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

PR

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

OT

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

FI

2003

PR

PR

FI

2003

DP

PR

LG

FI

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

WS

PR

LG

FI

2003

WS

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

FA

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

WS

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003
2003
2003

DP
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

U
U
U

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003
2003

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

U
I

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003
2003

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003
2003

DP
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2003
2003

DP
DP

PR
PR

2
0

LG
LG

A
U

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

FI

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

FI

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

DD

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003
2003

WS
DP

PR
PR

0
0

CL
LG

FA

FI

N
I

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

FI

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

WS

WO

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003
2003
2003

WS
DP
DP

PR
PR
PR

0
0
0

LG
LG
LG

I
I
I

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

FA

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

PR

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

WS

PR

LG

2003

WS

PR

LG

2003

WS

PR

LG

2003

WS

PR

LG

2003

WS

PR

LG

2003
2003

WS
DP

PR
PR

0
0

LG
LG

I
I

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

WS

PR

LG

2003

DP

PR

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

WO

LG

2003

DP

DD

LG

2003

DP

PR

OT

2003

DP

WO

OT

2003

PR

WO

OT

2003

PR

WO

OT

2003

DP

WO

WP

CR

2003

PR

PR

WP

LG

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

DD

WP

2003

DP

EV

WP

2003

DP

DD

WP

FA

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

DD

WP

2003

DP

EV

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

PR

WO

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

DD

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

EV

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

DP

WO

WP

2003

WS

PR

WP

LG

LG

2004

DP

DD

WP

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

WO

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

CO

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004
2004

DP
DP

PR

LG

PR

LG

2004
2004

PR
DP

PR

FI

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

FA

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

LG

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

PR

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

OT

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

FI

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

WO

WP

2004

DP

DD

WP

FA

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

DD

CR

FA

2004
2004

DP
DP

PR

LG

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

RI

PR

FA

FI

2004

DP

DD

WP

LG

2004

DP

DD

LG

2004

DP

DD

LG

2004

DP

DD

LG

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

FA

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

PR

PR

WP

2004

PR

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

CO

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

PR

PR

CN

2004

DP

PR

LG

FA

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

CR

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

FA

2004

CO

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

WS

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DR

PR

FI

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

WO

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004
2004

DP
DP

PR

LG

PR

CR

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

I
FA

FI

2004

DR

WO

CR

FA

2004

DR

DD

CR

FA

2004

CO

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

WO

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

WP

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

WS

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

EX

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

DD

CR

FA

2004

DP

DD

WP

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

CR

FA

FI

I
FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

DD

WP

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

FI

2004

DP

PR

LE

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

WS

DD

WP

2004

DP

DD

FA

2004

DP

DD

CR

FA

2004

DP

DD

CR

FA

2004

CO

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

FI

2004

DP

DD

WP

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

PR

WO

WP

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

FA

2004

WS

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

WS

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

WS

PR

LG

2004

DR

DD

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

PR

PR

CL

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

FI

2004

WS

PR

CR

2004

DP

WO

WP

2004

PR

DD

LG

FA

2004

DP

WO

CR

FA

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

WP

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

DD

CR

FA

2004

DP

WO

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

FI

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

WP

2004

PR

PR

FI

2004

DP

WO

WP

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

CO

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

OT

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

WO

WP

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

WS

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

DD

CR

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DR

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

FA

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004
2004

DP
DP

PR

LG

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

WO

WP

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

FA

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

FA

FA

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

WP

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

PR

PR

FA

2004

DP

DD

WP

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

FA

FI

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

WS

DD

LG

FA

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

FA

2004

PR

PR

FA

2004

PR

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

LG

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

WS

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

WS

PR

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

CR

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

LG

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

FI

2004

DP

PR

CN

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

WP

2004

WS

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

WO

CR

FA

2004

DP

WO

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

WS

WO

CR

FA

2004

DP

WO

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

FI

2004

DP

PR

LG

FI

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

OT

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

WO

CR

FA

2004

PR

PR

OT

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

CN

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

FA

2004

DP

PR

OT

2004

DP

PR

LG

OT

2004

DP

PR

OT

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

CO

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

RI

PR

FA

FI

2004

DP

WO

WP

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FI

2004

DP

DD

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

OT

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

CR

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

DD

CR

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

FA

2004

DP

PR

CR

FA

FA

FA

I
I

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

WS

WO

WP

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

OT

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

WS

WO

CR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

FA

2004

DP

EV

WP

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

PR

DD

WP

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

WS

PR

FA

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

PR

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2004

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

DD

WP

2005

DP

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

AC

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

WO

WP

2005

DP

WO

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

CR

FI

FA

FA

2005

WS

PR

LG

2005

WS

PR

FA

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

FA

2005

WS

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005
2005

DP
PR

PR

LG

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

PR

WO

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

FI

2005

DP

DD

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

CO

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

WP

LG

2005

PR

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

OT

2005

DP

PR

LG

FA

FA

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005
2005

DP
PR

PR

FI

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

OT

2005
2005

DP
DP

PR

CR

PR

LG

I
FA

FA

2005
2005

DP
PR

PR

CR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

FI

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

OT

2005

PR

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

LG

2005

DP

WO

WP

FA

LG

LG

2005

WS

WO

WP

2005

DP

WO

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

CO

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

FA

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

OT

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DR

WO

WP

2005

DR

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

FA

FA

FA

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

FI

2005

DP

PR

FI

OT

2005

PR

PR

FI

2005

PR

WO

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

CR

FA

2005

PR

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

WP

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FI

2005

DP

DD

WP

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

WP

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

FA

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

CN

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

OT

2005

DR

PR

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DR

WO

WP

2005

DP

PR

FI

2005

DP

DD

WP

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

PR

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

FA

2005

DP

WO

WP

LG

FA

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FI

2005

PR

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

DD

WP

2005

DR

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

WO

WP

LG

2005

PR

DD

WP

2005

DP

DD

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FA

FA

2005

DR

DD

WP

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

OT

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

WP

2005

DP

PR

OT

FA

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

CN

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

PR

PR

FI

FA

FA

LG

2005

PR

DD

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DR

DD

WP

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

WP

2005

DP

PR

FA

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

DD

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

FI

2005

DP

PR

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

FI

2005

DP

PR

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CN

2005

DP

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

WP

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

LG

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005
2005

DP
DP

PR

LG

PR

FA

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

DD

WP

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

DD

WP

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

CR

FA

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

DD

WP

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

FA

2005

DR

WO

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

WS

PR

CL

2005

DP

DD

WP

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

FA

FA

2005

PR

DD

WP

2005

WS

DD

CR

2005

DP

PR

OT

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

FA

FA

FA

LG

FA

2005

DP

DD

CR

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

CR

FA

2005

DP

DD

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

DD

WP

2005

CO

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

WS

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

FI

2005

DP

DD

CR

FA

2005

DP

WO

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

CR

FA

2005

CO

PR

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

WS

WO

LG

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

CR

FA

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

WO

WP

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005
2005

DP
DP

PR

LG

PR

LG

FA

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

LG

2005

PR

DD

CR

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DR

PR

FA

2005

DP

DD

WP

FA

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

WS

PR

LG

2005

DP

DD

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

PR

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

FA

FA

2005

WS

WO

LG

2005

DP

WO

CR

FA

2005

DP

WO

CR

FA

2005

WS

PR

LG

2005

RI

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

FA

2005

DP

DD

WP

2005

DP

LG

2005

DP

LG

PR

2005

DP

PR

CR

FA

2005

DP

PR

FI

2005

DP

PR

CR

2005

DP

PR

LG

2005

DP

PR

LG

1980-2005
Event
Description
Diving vessel was reversing up to platform when a psv on the engine functioned and prevented the main drive being used as a braking force. Subsequently the vessel collided with the platform.
M.v. <> discharging cargo on west side of platform. Driven by heavy swell into bumper of leg b4. No damage to rig. Boat bumper severely crushed.
Electrical failure following start-up during initial running of the 13.8 kv main motor of the compressor. A phase to phase short circuit occurred approx. 2 minutes after start-up from unloaded state
when motor was pulling approx. 65 amps. Motor starter circuit breaker tripped immediately by means of both over current and earth fault protective relays. Fault damage confirmed to inter-turn
fault on the starter windings.
Whilst de-pressurising riser, lubricator on rig 34 prior to logging on well p7, the wing valve on gray tool flowtree was left open at same time as the swab valve was open, allowing gas to return to
trip tank and vent to the atmosphere.
West crane in transfer of helium cylinders to vessel. Main cable on crane parted dropping rack of cylinders approx. 4ft. Approx. Weight of cylinders was 8 tons. Damage confined to a discharge
valve sheared off a 1,000 gallon tank of waste lube oil located on skid deck. Leakage of oil stopped and cleaned up. Crane shut down until new main cable installed.
East crane lifting wooden box (approx. 200lbs) from mpipe deck to east `b' module (production level). In order to obtain a better view the crane operator was standing in his cab and had the boom
pedal fully depressed, he failed to notice his angle and the fact that the boom angle limiter had been over-riden. The crane boom was brought up hard against its strops resulting in superficial
damage to boom itself
Water found to be leaking from 10lb chloropac unit base. Shortly afterwards a small explosion occurred blowing sides of unit off and buckling the frame. Flow switch in power supply cabinet
appeared to malfunction causing power to be on whilst water plant was shutdown for maintenance. Probable hydrogen build up had burst a secion of plastic causing a leak to cell cabinet area.
Source water was restarted with ingress of water to cell balance detector box causing ignition source and possibly hydrogen was in sufficient quantities to explode and shatter cell cabinet.
Accident occurred when manoeuvering into place an electric motor, sling slipped and motor struck oxygen analyser of inert-gas plant.
Supply vessel <>'s mooring system failed causing damage to rig's leg C4.
Supply vessel <>'s mooring system failed causing damage to rig's leg C4, 2nd event.
Loading barrels onto barrel rack on skid deck. Barrels lifted by means of slings and crane. Roustabout climbed on to a barrel to guide next one in, this barrel in swinging knocked the stacked
barrels including the one he was standing on and he fell to deck.
Crew were laying down 5 inch drill pipe. Floor hand was taking the joint in the slops when the sling came of the joint of drill pipe going out the v-door. The box end of this single joint of 5 inch
drill pipe fell, hit the floor hand on hard hat and shulder and threw him over into rotary guard.
Vessel ocean inchcape backloading cargo. Whilst rubbish skips being lifted rope snagged and a seaman was crushed whilst attempting to clear the fault.
Assisted by a co-worker the derrickman was pulling on the chain of a chain block attempting to centralise the casing in the hole. The hook came free and whipped back striking his left arm.
Joint of 5" diameter drill pipe was being lifted from racking area up the v-door. On reaching the drill floor the line snagged, when it suddenly freed itself it swung and hit the floorman.
Flash and fire occured when technician moved breaber lever to off posistion on switchboard.
Following mechanical repairs,glycol absorber pump put back into service.5-8 minutes later operator noticed lpg vapour coming from pump location.mechanical isolation of pump
suction,discharge & purge line valves isolated lpg leak.water deluge system operated.high gas alarms resulted in secondary 'b' shutdown.
Fabricating bracket for aligning gear for rig ii. Holding bolt whilst it was being welded. Electric current passed through bolt causing shock.

Vessel on remote joy stick control collided with platform. No damage to platform. Safety net frame surrounding vessel's helideck dented.
Whilst load testing crane, using proof load of 22000lbs & rotation above sea thro 160 degrees at 120ft the boom failed & came to a gentle rest on handrails. Probable cause of failure was hydrolic
pump unit.
The rotating drum on a <> vertical spin dryer failed. Part of the drum broke free and struck the top cover shearing the fixing screws; cover flew off.
Man overboard exercise was being carried out.the rescue craft was unable to start the out-board.it tipped over and a man fell overboard.the standby vessel could not launch her zodiac and then the
lifeboat was launched from the platform to assist but experienced difficulties releasing the falls and was severely jarred injuring two men in the lifeboat.
Gas release occurred from lids of flotcells in module 6 when they were subjected to pressure surge from closed drain system.fire & gas system registered gas release,general alarm sounded &
platform shutdown.escape contained to module & purged.
A wire rope lifting sling attached to a peddlestone crane broke allowing load being lifted to fall from crane onto work area.
Smoke seen coming from roof void in accommodation.ceiling tiles were removed & lagging found smouldering.there was no fire.
When unloading the fast line rope of the crane parted 40' from the hook causing the load to fall to the deck of the vessel. Some indentations were found on the chandelier chain that supports the
overhoist cut out. It is presumed that the overhoist support chain has been drawn up into the cathead by the fast line.
Man drilled through a vent pipe in the 32m level of a leg.oil leaked under pressure.
A section of pipe dropped on to scaffold work causing it to collapse into the sea. A rigger working on the scaffold fell into the sea at the same time and was recovered in four minutes. When the
pipe was falling it hit the top of a cell making a hole in the cap.
4.5 ton load was being moved when the motor of a priestman sealion 6od508 crane dropped to idling speed and the overload alarm actuated although the boom angle was approx 50 deg and
within the safe working load. There was no hydraulic pressure from the hydraulic motor and the drive shaft from the clutch to the splitter box had sheered.
A water injection pump was being tested after maintenance work. It was run up to speed when the spill line ball valve on the pump discharge blew apart and damaged the ball seat retaining
flanges. A stud bolt hit a maintenance technician on the shoulder. He suffered (slight) bruising.
A 1.5 ton cable was being lifted from the <> onto the installation. The sling parted and the drum fell onto the top of the rigging loft damaging the roof.
An explosion occurred in the foghorn panel which was transmitted through the interconnecting nitrogen purge lines & the standby foghorn panel destroying the standby foghorn panel & causing
damage to surrounding equipment. One of the diathane batteries had disintegrated & appears to have caused the explosion.
D.s.v. <> was manoeuvering alongside the platform when waves caused dsv to collide with platform. Slight damage.
Supply boat, mv <>, off-loading cargo on the west side of the platform, collided with no. 3 leg boat bumper. The bottom can of the bumper was indented and the top was displaced.
During cutting operations sparks set fire to timber stacked around the area. A tug was brought alongside and the fire was quickly extinguished.
Gas compression module was on standby duty & pressured up.a-lock fitting on seal oil system failed & caused large leak of seal oil.operation put in hand to blow down compression system to
avoid eventual gas leak from seal system.hydrates formed & blocked blow down line.safely depressurised.personnel went to muster.
While preparing to needle gun on the scapa lift gas manifold a 2" connection assembly blew off the elbolet of an adjacent 4" utility water line. The resultant release of water struck the back of ip's
legs, propelling him towards the manifold. His back struck the protruding valves and he was knocked on to the deck.
Supply vessel mv <> anchor became detached from the seabed causing the vessel to drift astern & to starboard. The vessel struck the starboard stern leg & the port mooring rope parted. Having
retrieved its anchor a steel cable was seen to be attached & it is presumed that the anchor had been attached to the steel cable & not the seabed.
M.v. <> mooring to west side of platform hit a leg. Platform shook but no damage.
Supply vessel was unloading. Stern of vessel came in contact with leg - only superficial damage discovered.
Fire occurred among compressed gas bottles on skid deck. Took 40 minutes to extinguish. Non-essential staff evacuated as precaution.
Explosion occurred which caused slight damage.

Fire occurred in porch module 5. Electrical fire in regeneration module.

Whilst off-loading a drilling tool from <> it was noticed that a cargo-securing chain was still attached to the cradle and sling. However, it was too late to prevent cradle chain from breaking and
tool from falling into sea.
Failure of 6" line from gas compression folwspitter to "a" train second stage separator resulted in an escape of condensate which flashed to gas. Escape picked up by 3 gas heads which initiated
halon release & platform shutdown.
Crane pedestal being changed. A box frame and a jacking frame were being used to lift the crane off its pedestal. 100 ton capacity, 200mm stroke rms model <> jacks were being used. One jack
fell out of its housing owing to a component failure.
Fire and smoke seen coming from top of domestic water heater in accommodation. Fire extinguished within 2 minutes. Electrical fault.
Welder was working in the barge hull using an oxy-acetylene torch.acetylene leaking from hose approx 10' from the torch caught fire which flashed back through the upper deck manway to cause
a second hose fire on deck.the gas bottles were located on the upper deck with hose routed through the access manway into the hull area. Fires were put out quickly.
Pin in lifting shackle unscrewed during lowering operations.compressor fell 30'.
Very small gas leak. Gas escaped while changing clamp on esd valve.
<> was being backloaded with cargo.the electronic engine controls malfunctioned and the vessel went astern colliding with the platform leg. Timber fenders and fender holders were damaged.
Three ton manual chain block used to lift an aron gas generator failed. Load fell 1 metre on to its stand.
Man received glancing blow on head when chicksan line hit him. Cause: misuse of tugger winch.
Fire involving turbine. Fire quickly extinguished. Scaffold boards on top of the exhaust system caught fire. Fire in boards quickly put out. There appeared to be a fire in the lagging (under
cladding) and the turbine shut down followed by a production shutdown.
Scaffold boards caught fire. Boards part of temporary platform on side of turbine exhaust stack. Extinguished quickly.
Whilst offloading 9" casing from supply boat a sling parted causing one of the bundles to drop back on the deck from approx 3'. There was no damage to boat but 4 joints of casing were damaged.
There was no apparent snagging or no overload indication on the crane.
Small fire in a cable on module roof. Welding blanket extinguished it.
North east crane <> was involved in offloading equipment from supply boat <>. The load line whipped & spun on taking up the strain the chandelier with it breaking its supports. Chandelier
ran down line breaking up on striking the operating ball.
Travelling block slowly fell to deck. Wire had de-spooled itself from draw-works. The anchoring dog on the side of the draw-works drum had come off the end of wire.
Outbreak of fire in unoccupied office accommodation. Cause unknown
High level shutdown on b separator. Shutdown activated but common alarm in control room did not indicate because of scanner fault. Oil carried over to flare even though esv on b separator
operated. On east side wind changed direction making the flare blow back over platform and ignited two rubbish skips, tarpaulin and ropes.
Vessels mooring rope and anchor cable broke causing it to strike installation. Damaged rope shock absorber and stairway support to spider deck.
Mv <> collided with ne corner of platform. Indentation was found on the 24" riser pipe panel sheeting. Walkway grating inboard of the riser was also damaged.
Minor explosion in switchgear room produced heavy smoke but no flame. Main 2000 amp power/breaker assembly shorted causing 3 s.c.r. Power breakers to trip and cause 4 generators to trip off
the main busbars.
Failure of lifting stop during lifting of fire pump in conductor column.
During a routine supply boat loading and unloading, the driver of the ad crane picked up a 3 1/2 ton load. When the load was about 12 inches above the boatdeck the whipline broke.

When lifting an accommodation unit onto the installation from a supply vessel the crane driver attempted to boom up. The boom dropped onto its stops and tore off its mountings skewing to port
dropping the load half on and half off the supply boat. It appears the boom hoist parted allowing the load to fall.
During operation to lower empty container onto supply boat,fault occur red in <> manufactured crane,resulting in free spooling.container weighing 1.5-2tns fell 25ft onto guard rail & into sea.
American hoist crawler crane on the sscv <> was being used to pick up one end of gangway between it and the platform at 6m level. The load on the crane was about 5 tons and swl 17 tons.
The hermod derrick rope broke, the jib fell & struck a walkway spanning the module skid beams. The walkway broke & fell into the sea. The jib was extensively damaged *
Whilst lowering a winch unit by crane onto the supply vessel the driver engaged power lowering clutch & slewed load & he found he had uncontrollable descent. The load fell into the sea.
When supply boat <> was unloading 20 lengths of 7 5/8 tubing in four bundles of 5, the crane picked up first bundle and from approx 20 ft above boat as crane started to slew away from the
boat, the load slipped out of two slings onto deck.
An explosion occurred in the exhaust of the gas turbine causing damage to the turbine, exhaust system and control room. Probably caused by a slug of liquid moving through the fuel gas scrubber
and knock-out pots to the burners.
The crane driver asked the master to go astern (close to platform) in order to lift a container off the vessel but the vessel continued astern and hit a bracing on the platform 1 metre above sea level.
The bracing was bent 10-15 cm.
Foam packing around the exhaust of the fire pump house was set on fire by sparks and hot slag from a gas cutting operation in the vicinity. The fire was extinguished by a fire watcher.
3 ton <> chain block failed allowing short free fall of st6 motor base plate. No damage to equipment.
Unloading supply vessel <> using link belt 218 crane. One nitrogen tank (9 tons) had been lifted and a second had been lifted clear of the deck when the boom started to fall. Load fell into the
sea.
12 bottle pack of diving gas was lost overboard during offloading operation between supply boat <> and <>. The cause of the incident was failure of wire lifting strap between crane hook
and four pegged sling.
Trawler <> struck platform and stuck. It bent a 5' section of deck upright.
<> crane being load tested with 3 x 5 ton wts. Testing almost complete and slewing tests were being carried out when crane came to the end of a 90 degree arc driver could not stop slew on his
joy stick control, so stopped crane with the parking brake. The weight cradle kept swinging and 3 weights fell off.
An explosion in the exhaust ducting on a gas turbine caused extensive damage to ducting & adjacent control. Explosion may have been due to liquid carry-over from 2nd stage separator.
Linkbelt 78 crane being used to snatch-lift a container from a supply boat. As load lifted, crane engine revs lost. Whipline dropped but arrested on brake. Boom began to drop but was stopped on
boom ratchet lock.
The crane was being used to lift a valve (1,000lbs) from cellar & main deck. The operator inadvertently left his foot on the lifting pedal while calling the radio room to check if any helicopters
were due. He didn't notice the boom coming up until it stopped at the a frame. The bottom two sections of the boom & the a frame were damaged.
A fire occurred in the no.3 ruston gas turbine in the area of the exhaust manifold & power turbine. It was extinguished using the automatic bcf cylinder & various portable extinguishers.
Whilst manoeuvering beneath east crane and waiting for cargo the supply vessel <> collided into platform leg b3. No visible sign of damage, vessel suffered slight dent to its fender.
Mv <> was preparing to move location. The port forward winch slipped allowing the vessel to drift into the platform. The mast came in contact with the liftboard & damaged the hull of the
lifeboat & the mast was also damaged.

Cat head break outline parted during coming out of hole operations. Line was anchored to drawworks by shackle run through single pulley on break out tongs and laid on to cat head. The break
occurred near cathead causing damaged end to whip across drill floor and strike a man.
Crane was involved in offloading drilling casing from supply boat using the whipline. On snatching load the overshot cut out, twisted, breaking the supporting wire strops, which allowed the cut
out device to run down the crane wire. It broke on striking the operating ball, landing on the deck of the supply boat.
Platform stiff leg crane was being used to retrieve the bow rope of a vessel alongside platform. Boat drifted away putting heavy strain on crane before rope came free.
Rear anchor of <> fouled on sw platform-leg.
<> was using 'hydratight' bolt tensioning equipment which applies hydralic pressure for pre-stretching bolts. With the pressure at 5,000 p.s.i <> was in the process of making an adjustment to
the tensioning collar when the macalloy bolt had shearded causing the collar to recoil and strike mr till on the right side of the head just above the right ear, causing a 2" long deep laceration.
Other small contusions were apparent. The cause of the injury would appear to be the mark of the recoiling collar to the head. The cause of the recoil was the failure of the macalloy bolt to accept
the stress of 5,000 p.s.i pressures.
Casing spool was lifted by winch connected by sling to casing. Latter snagged, sling broke and hit roustabout.
Radioactive tool broke down in the hole & was retrieved. There was no contamination of personnel. The area was thoroughly washed down with sea water until well below acceptable safe levels.
Diesel tank overflowed owing to malfunction of high level shutdown of fuel transfer pump. Diesel sprayed over turbine exhaust and scaffold boards.
Swinging load across deck. Sling parted and load dropped to deck. Safe working load appropriate to task underhand.
Explosion in gas-fired turbine causing damage to turbine exhaust system and other equipment. The accident caused a one-week shutdown. Loss of production estimated at over 2 million dollars
per day.
North crane used to lift casing from storage to rig catwalk.tugger winch then used to pull along catwalk up to v door. Roustabout had to disconnect the hook at the base of joint which was resting
on the catwalk. He walked under casing joint & disconnected the hook,at the same time the joint was lifted onto the v-door. He was dragged along catwalk.
Kelly spinner in use on upper rotary assembly. A 20lb turnbuckle came off and fell 50ft to drill floor striking injured on head/back of neck
Whilst lifting a work-over rig cantilever section into postion with the roto 50 crane a previously positioned cantilever section was snagged and became unhooked from its locating lugs. This
cantilever fell onto the deck striking mr taylor on the left arm.
Crane boom hit stops while booming up, caused some structural damage. Probable that cut out did not operate.
Collapse of crane boom onto helideck during crane maintenance. Removed hydraulic boom hoist motor as part of planned maintenance. Brake failed when motor removed - brake force applied by
spring action, not hydraulics. Crane type - liebher 100 ton pc2.
Trying to set wireline when 2 1/2" nipple blew out of lubricator discharging well bore fluids for 1-2 mins until master valve closed by remote operation, cutting wireline.
Two baskets of completion equipment were being moved. One basket was stacked on bundles of production tubing. On being lowered the other basket dislodged the first which slid down the
bundle, striking roustabout before coming to rest.
A wireline unit was being repositioned by using lifting tackle to take some of the weight of the unit on an air hoist suspended from the hook of the overhead crane. A chain failed, permitting the
unit spreader beam to fall and injure both men.
Whilst 3 men were in the act of disengaging the gangway bridge from platform to the flotel, the semisub <...>. The 50 ton bridge collapsed still in an outstretched position, and men fell 20m into
the sea. The bridge remained attached by tension wires hanging from the side of the platform. One person was recovered dead, two lost presumed drowned.
Crane lifting a light load onto pipe deck from a catwalk. Boom suddenly jerked back on to the boom stops. Minimum range cut-out eventually came in. Boom root section,main chords and cross
members damaged. Solenoid valve in minimum range cut-out system later found to be stuck.
Pipe (30') slipped out of sling during unloading from boat and fell into sea.
During load testing west crane the boom hoist motor suffered catastrophic failure.this causedf boom to free down to hang in a near vertical position.i.p was trapped in the crane cab.

Operator was working on gas system on the turbines. He stood on the seal-oil pipe which broke and sprayed oil onto turbine exhaust which caught fire. Extinguished in ten mins. Paintwork and
electrical cable damaged.
Whipline on west pedestal crane being used to lift gas bottle racks on to lower level at minimum operating radius. Multipart hook became entangled in the boom and damaged two truss members
as boom laid to rest. No further lifts made.
Load testing the <> crane using 23t weight in cradle at maximum radius. The automatic overload detector cut in and the main line started paying out. The weights were dropped into the sea.
Whilst manoeuvering stern first from the ne to line up under the east crane, the supply boat momentarily lost directional control and contact was made between the stern of the vessel and the a5
leg of the platform. This resulted in a 'v' shaped indention and tear on the starboard quarter rubbing band of the vessel 9'long by 5'wide.
Lowering 9 5/8"casing into wellbore. After the joint had been made up caser removed the tongs. As casing was being lowered one of the tongs caught under the elevators causing the tongs to
spring back violently owing to tension being put on the compensating spring. Tongs hit the caser on the left side of his head under his hard hat.
Welding was in progress when a spark caused a small fire in fitters,storage area. Fire extinguished in 5 mintues.
Crane was offloading from supply boat. Whip line parted and dropped load onto supply boat deck. No injuries, superficial damage only.
Crane was booming down to pipe deck when boom went into 3-4 feet free fall.
A plater using burning equipment was cutting a section of the bridge guide. During this operation the wind blew sparks onto a piece of rope which was used for supporting the water & diesel
lines. The rope was impregnated with diesel,caught fire. Superficial damage to both lines.
Crane was swinging over the west side of rig with a tank of artex fuel when boom line failed.
Well slot cover-plate fell from crane onto skid deck. It was being lifted by two lugs instead of four. The bolts failed.
Operator was working on gas detector system on the turbines. He stood on the seal-oil pipe which broke and sprayed oil onto turbine exhaust which caught fire. Extinguished in ten mins.
Paintwork and electrical cable damaged.
Driver was raising a load, put the controls in neutral but hoist did not stop; however, cut-out worked. Load lowered safely.
Diesel generator exciter no.1 was found to be on fire following red alert in the drilling package. Engine was stopped, fire extinguished. Following this there was another fire in no.1 diesel
generator air inlet which was extinguished. It appears that the cause of the second fire was sparks which were drawn into the air inlet during the initial fire.
Dsv was bell diving on east face of platform. When ship's head began to move off to port with thrusters operating in correct direction but not stopping swing. Ships bow scraped leg b4 just before
full dynamic partitioning control returned. Damage: denting to redundant instrument conduit on b4 leg and paint scrape from dsv.
Boom hoist in neutral while lowering stack. Boom hoisted on to back stops passing cut outs. Damage to root section of boom.
The pneumatic control system of an air powered scottish derrick crane had been renewed and was under test. The boom was being raised without a load when it was realised that control had been
lost. The boom's overhoist cut-out failed to operate and mechanic had to isolated power source. By then boom had been pulled beyond the stops buckled and collapsed.
The east crane experinced main line free fall - 8.5 tons load on hook. Load landed on catwalk.no damage.possibly caused by main clutch failure.
Whilst offloading supply vessel <> and lowering main block and reeling in, the whipline limit switch failed. Hook and bail hit sheave, whipline broke. Hook and bail fell to vessel - no damage
no injury
Conductor pipe being off loaded from supply vessel <>. During slewing operations the whipline parted. The load and slings of hook struck stern of vessel and fell into sea.
'Ansul' unit was being relocated when valve assembly which screws into the cylinder neck fractured,causing cylinder contents to be discharged.
Collision of standby vessel with riser guard of platform. No apparent damage to platform riser.
Whilst testing mechanical electrical system and control on a main generator the back panel of incomer circuit breaker removed. Avr switched to stop. During cooldown period avr switched to
'auto'causing flashback across incoming phases damaging busbar.(avr had been fitted with a link to by-pass control panel)

Compressor shutdown started lube oil pump. The resultant pressure surge blew a gasket on main lube pump. Oil fell through turbine base onto exposed exhaust duct where it ignited. Fire spread
to compressor end and burning oil fell on scaffolding and module deck.
Whilst lowering boom into the rest the drivers attention was distracted, and the boom was driven into the cradle. Extensive damage to the two intermediate sections of 50 foot boom.
Owing to stormy weather it was decided to lift bridge between platform and its flotel. Whilst bridge being lifted flotel pitched violently & hit the bridge which damaged one of the portacabins.
Scaffolding boards caught fire near flare boom. Boards ignited by radiation from flare.
Fire in crane engine room, due to blown exhaust. Fire extinguished by driver.
A conductor used for storing produced water failed at splash-zone. 88m length fell through conductor guide to cell tops but caused no damage.
Whilst offloading casing supply boat collided with installation. Severe buckling to lower can boat bumper. Gusset plate between stabbing guide tubular & leg doubler plate torn off. Slight denting
to leg
East crane was backloading an empty container onto a supply boat. Operator lost control owing to a bearing locking ring breaking, thus causing loss of drive.
Working on oily water separator. Spaded off one end but the liquid inside escaped and ignited on the floor. Fire quickly put out, only minor damage.
During final stages of condutor driving at a slot there was a suspected collision with the conductor of the established producing well.
The east crane was working on supply boat. When the crane boomed back there was a loud crack. The root section of boom hit the back stops and bent the root section. This was due to failure of
the cut-out system.
Testing no 2 compressor train. When approx 1830 psi gas pressure was reached, the gasket on the interstage drum discharge side mowbray high level switch flange blew out. Cellar deck was
enveloped in a dense cloud of escaping gas. The production foreman pressed the unit emergency shutdown button and the pressure was vented off.
Header pipe fractured adjacent to a well. Lighter ends escaped causing shut in of all wells. Back in production within 2 hours pressure not known. All safety systems operated sucessfully and well
shut in.
Two supply boats not delivering to <> had permission to use the east crane to transfer a cable drum from one boat to the other. The drum was lifted from the first boat and the other was
approaching when the load went into free fall and fell into the sea. No fault found with crane.
A section of riser was carried away at the +40ft level. Effluents were discharging through a temporary flexible pipe.
On opening an oxygen cylinder forming part of a fixed oxyacetylene burning unit,the regulator exploded rupturing base of casing.
Pin sheared in runway beam trolley when 3/4 ton load was suspended from a chain block attached to the trolley. Swl of beam/trolley/chain block = 2 1/2 ton.
Boat bumper had been removed by sw crane to main deck to faciliate removal of tyres. The top stop slipped and in doing so made contact with the flared end of boat bumper causing stop to break.
The boat bumper fell,pushing out a welded patch by fracturing the weld on 3 sides.
Winds 20 knots seas 4-6 ft. Accommodation vessel's captain called the platform to inform them that re-connection of personnel bridge now possible. When lowering operation almost complete,
the main roller at the barge end of the bridge rested momentarily on the side wall of the trough, then slid over and the bridge dropped 18 roller.
While carrying out transfer of 3 cable drums (weight 1 ton) from pipe deck to db 100 the sling parted and drums fell into the sea.
A fire in exhaust system of gas compressor no c2 located below module e deck in roof of module a. The surge of pressure simultaneously crossed the flange stud bolt on the safety relief valve in
module e filling unit with gas. Instruments & wiring damaged.
Removing stabbing guide from flare boom base,as final cut made and the load came free, one of the two slings securing the load failed. The load slipped from the remaining sling and fell onto
nearby landing
<> collided with the port stern leg of the installation. The boat was anchored at the time; presumably anchor dragged. In clearing installation boat hit the port leg of the production structure.
Damage 4 degrees & boat landing. Further checks being made.
Crane lifting three joints of casing when the whip line went into freefall. Possible clutch failure.

M v <>, a supply vessel,was off-loading cargo and bunkering oil based mud at the same time. Struck boat bumper on leg bi. Slight dent in steel can around tyres about 3ft above sea level.
Crawler crane located on skid pipe deck dropped the test weight for platform crane onto walkway in front of temporary offices.
The diving vessel <> was working alongside the east of the platform which meant that when lifting from helideck to pipedeck the crane jib had to be raised to its minimum radius to avoid the
derrick and platform crane. During this lift the crane hook snagged on the top walkway round the derrick
1 1/2 ton beebe chain hoist failed whilst lifting 5 cwt pipe. Block went into freefall. No damage/injury.
Explosion in gas compression module.deluge of esd activated .emergencygenerator operating.2 lifeboats damaged by blast.no gas detected. 21 people transferred to <>.
Whilst manoevering into position on the east side of platform the bridge port wing of the supply vessel caught on bulk loading hoses,hanging on east side of platform.the ships radio aerial also
impinged on an adjacent overhanging scaffold,causing some damage to the scaffold and the ships aerial.
Platform under construction. American crawlercrane mounted on platform being used to lower piece of exhaust section. Crane was slewing at time, working within limits when it started to tilt
forward. Crane righted itself before driver bailed out. Only damage was a kinked wire.
Equipment: <> (platform east main crane). Loaded with 6 tonne container on the whip line. Damaged sustained: none. Circumstances: the container was being moved from the cellar deck to
the skid deck. Whle slewing the crane boom the hoist lever in the neutral position, the load started to creep downwards. Upwards hoist power was applied to counteract this motion. With the
boom over the skid deck, the lever was returned to neutral and the load slipped 30 ft before being stopped again applying hoist power. The container was then landed without damage.
Welding on 68' level when spark ignited gas escaping from 1/2 trapping point on jump cover on 20' level.
Backloading 5 lengths of 9 5/8" casing from <> to <> when casing snagged on vessel as it fell away in sea. Resulting shock load on slings broke one of them and four lengths of casing fell
into sea.
Vessel,<>,was on the east side of the platform and unloading bulk cement via a 6" hose. Crew noticed that loading hose was becoming taut. In coming astern to release tension, the vessel
collided with platform jacket member. Superfical damage to paintwork and coating of member only.
Lifting piece of 4" id tubular flow line. Pipe nudged leg of flare tower and a weld flange became detached. Flange weighed approx. 25 kg and fell approx. 7 metres. Flange had only been tack
welded onshore and then taped over for the journey. Minor injuries were sustained by <> - bruised left thigh.
A chain block was being used to lift a 24" shut down valve stem and bonnet. The valve was raised approx 1" when the chain block jammed. Two men pulled on the operating chain to try and free
it. The chain parted and the valve dropped back onto its seating.
Burning out work being carried out in module under the generator room.the heat transmitted through the bulkhead,ignited lube oil in the generator room. The lube oil was present as result of a
small leak from generator. Portable extinguishers put fire out. No appreciable damage was done.
Three sections of the east crane boom(85') slid over west side of platform into the sea. The sections had been laid cross the pipedeck whilst being dismantled for a boom change out. No damage to
platform. Boom was scrap so no recovery action.
<> was picking up <>' anchor. Vessel was using 1" wire and 3/4" sling attached to marker buoy. On pulling wire on board sling parted and pelican hook whipped hitting man on right side of
head,causing lacerations to head, and broken collar bone.
Tidying up some chicksan line with aid of chainblocks. A section slipped and caught injured man's leg against structure.
A metal basket was being lowered on to roof deck using the whipline on the platform's east crane. As it was being lowered it ran free for about 5'. Hoist actuator unit replaced later. No damage.
Dsv <> was positioned 15m from platform lef when dynamic positioning failed. Although vessel brought under control manually and taken to safe distance the leg received a dent and an
exhaust vent was crushed. Vessel suffered slight dent to bow plating. No one injured.
Hydraulic hose on national crane failed and load dropped about 2 metres back to the deck of the supply boat. No damage to crane other than to hose. Hose has been repaired, crane checked and
back in service.

The vessel <> was discharging barytes to <> at the platform's north west corner. At 0215hrs the vessel's stern roller made light contact with the diagonal tubular cross member, loading down
from the central column to the north west column. No damage was observed.
1 1/2 ton beebe chain hoist failed whilst lifting 6 2cwt). Block went into freefall. No damage/injury.
Mv <> after unloading 20" casings was about to backload containers when it hit the boat bumper of a4 leg. Bumper sheared as designed to. No serious damage.
Drilling rig,<>,experienced a short circuit on a main breaker in the scr control room. The short occured whilst replacing the breaker for recertification purposes.
Raising boom with no load on crane when boom fell 12-15 feet. Occurred again when a further attempt was made.
When lifting a chimney off a glycol re-boiler,one lifting lug broke at weld, allowing chimney to swing on remaining lugs, which held. Welds had been np1 tested prior to lift. Chimney was a year
old.
Sssv stuck in 'christmas tree'. Personnel evacuated. No injuries
Leaking acetylene cylinder ignited by sparks from grinding operation nearby.fire tackled with 2 bcf extinguishers,but unable to extinguish. Fire hose used to cool cylinders in same quad as
cylinder on fire while adjacent gas bottles cleared. Second attempt successful. Safety officer affected by acetylene gas.
Whilst lifting an a frame section from the supply vessel <> the slings parted allowing the 1 ton unit to fall into the sea. No injury resulted.
Choke spool piece moved from fd to ad platform. Two legged chain sling rigged, choke lifted from fd crane & placed on barrow on bridge. Moved to ad end of bridge. Same two legged chain
sling used to lift load on ad crane.when load 4' above bridge one leg of sling parted. Second leg supported load which swung widely causing damage to operating wheel.
Scaffold boards adjacent to turbine exhaust caught fire. The fire was quickly extinguished - no other damage.
A small fire at the base of micro tower at ne corner on rooflevel. Caused by flame cutting set(having been left with acetylene and oxgyen bottles open and no flash back arrestors)being ignited by
welding operations at top of tower later on in the day.
Fire in engineers compartment, of <> c1 crane. Electric cabling had ignited.
While working supply boat,the crane operator heard what he described as an explosion.after completing the lift it was reported to him that smoke was coming out of the engine compartment. On
investigation he found that electric cabling was on fire.this was extinguished using a dry powder unit.the fuel could have been hydraulic oil.
The top cover of the actuator of a ball valve blew off piercing the adjacent safety fence and falling into the sea. Valve body was depressed to make it safe and hydraulics locked off.
A welder cutting away a section of mezzainine deck flooring , cut through a 3/8 ignited, fire immediately extinguished. No damage.
Sikorsky 61 n helicopter crash-landed on platform helideck. Tail wheel lost in sea but no injuries to passengers.
West crane's slewing mechanism failed leaving crane without means to brake.
Hot work was being carried out on wellhead mezzanine deck. The wellhead was gas checked, covered in asbestos, and a fire extinguisher was to hand. A fire was started by a slight gas leak from a
sealant injection point on 9 5/8 leak stopped and work completed.
On opening oxygen cylinder,forming part of a fixed oxy/acetylene burning unit, the oxygen regulator exploded rupturing the base of the casing.
Fire occurred below generator which at the time was not running. Examination revealed a section of flexible hose carrying diesel in a fill line to the generators had been burnt through. Superficial
damage confined to the paint work of generator container. This incident was probably caused by a stray spark/or splatter from a hot work site.
Fire at top of low pressure vent stack. Lightning ignited the vent stack. It was extinguished within 5 mins by releasing the permanently installed extinguishing system.
Small forklift truck on helideck was blown off and onto pipe deck below. Truck weighed approx. 7cwt. Wind speed 70 knots.
Worker removing the level sight gauge from an emulsifier. An micc cable positioned under his arm fractured and the arcing that occurred before the breaker tripped burned the inside of his arm.
Fuel oil leaked down the accomodation module, and was thought to have been ignited by contact with turbine exhaust. The fire was controlled and extinguished in 15min,and only minimal
damage was reported.the fuel store fed a mobile compressor,the tank outlet was said to have been damaged thus allowing leakage.

Suspected hydraulic failure on crane whilst under load which caused boom and load to drop down to pipe deck damaging boom.
Installation of the 40000 tonne structure halted because several steel piles fell off the structure altering the balance of the structure. The piles were needed to secure it to the seabed. The piles were
discovered 100 yards clear of the platform target location. The oil platform was finally sited on the <...> field.
Well kicked. Small discharge of well fluid. Subsequently brought under control.
The diver was in the basket ready to be lowered from the structure. The basket was lowered from a remote winch using a mixture of hand signals and voice communications. When lowered the
basket caught on the platform tipping it and the diver grabbed the basket upright. As the angle increased the basket slipped away and swung forward partially severing the divers thumb on the
platform. There were communication difficulties due to high ambient noise. The thumb was later amputated.
Tanker loading from the <>. Whilst heaving on hose had to insert chain into snatch block to lead into capstan. During insertion vessel heaved (bad weather) wire became undone & whip lashed
- hit two men. One seriously, other suffered minor injuries.
The diver was dismantling an underwater welding habitat when the section being lifted swung against another section which parted its strop. The diver was pulled to the seabed by the falling
section but bailed out and suffered only slight bruising and a burst ear drum. The sling has been checked and no positive conclusions have been reached.
Whilst cutting into well containing mud tank a flash occurred insulating material in the bulkhead
Production operator had finished blowing down a scrubber in production module in production area. Two men had just disconnected arc-welding cable when ignition occurred.
Chemical aminoethoxy ethanol was released under pressure from a sealed system, through a vent which had not been properly closed. Man had bled off the system in the morning and was in the
process of starting up again (550 psi) it sprayed into his eye.
High pressure drill string test hose ruptured. The long end of the parted hose struck the side of a drillers head.
Man was transferring 30% w/v hydrochloric acid from a tank to drums using a pump. A blow-back occurred and he was sprayed with acid.
Whilst pressurising glycol line to bo7 christmas tree, compression fitting parted allowing pipe work to swing away striking man on the left forearm and breaking it.
During routine maintenance, tempsc was being lowered and raised. On raising the craft, the winch brake apparently failed. The craft went into free fall hitting a leg during descent and smashing
the canopy. The craft has subsequently been recovered.
Pull back wire placed round drill pipe, it became snagged and tightened, catching ip and pulling him against derrick.
Cumulation of hydrocarbon gas in a 'non hazardous area' was ignited creating an explosion which resulted in the deaths of three men and serious injuries to 5 others. Part of the platform's control
room was damaged.
While drilling well #23, drill went through a shallow gas/sand source which released unexpected pressurised gas. Gas escaped into wellhead compartment 3 where an explosion and a subsequent
fire occurred. The fire injured the persons working on the drill floor directly above. The fire burned for 10 hours and the BOP was not yet on. Production, running at <...> bbl/d out of the <...>'s
total of <...> bbl/d, was stopped within 30 secs. The well was plugged by <...>, and the production was resumed <...>. At the time of the accident, the 17 1/2" bit was being pulled out of hole.
There was no BOP stack on the well. The procedure would have been to widen the hole to 24", set the casing and the the BOP. <...> had never encountered gas at shallow gas kicks before. This
well was the <...> production well drilled from the platform. <...> re-assessed its drilling techniques, with particular reference to the timing of fitting the BOP.
<> laying power cable between <> & <> platforms. Cable became snagged as the <> began turning manoeuvre. Damage sustained to roller mechanism on ship along with power cable.
On platform damage to roof beam, roof clamp & cable racks.
Scaffolders removed boards from the production spider deck, stacked them on the working platform for transfer to the drilling platform. Two scaffolders were standing on working platform
stropping boards into bundles when platform failed to an angle of approx 45 deg. The load and one man fell into the sea from a height of about 8m. Rescued uninjured.
Two riggers were lowering a 2 ton cooler when it caught on structure,they then put a puller on, fastening it with scaffolding wire, which broke when pulled. The load knocked one man to ground,
and hit other on head. Not injured.

Supply boat contacted leg of platform while offloading deck cargo. Supply boat was backing into platform to allow crane driver to hook on to food container which was on the forward half of the
boats's deck. Boat kept coming back until it contacted leg j (due to loss of control of port main engine with 30% astern pitch) - bumper ring on leg j bent upwards. Windspeed - 20kts nnw
waveheight - 3.
Whip hoist control hose on east crane (module 24) leaked, and whip drum paid out when driver attended to leakage.
A tank was being lifted from supply boat <> when the lifting bridle parted and tank fell 6' to the deck.
Weight testing crane - water fluid weight. Load parted from crane, struck covered lifeboat which crashed overboard. Boat damaged beyond repair. Davits & other gear damaged. Cause/nature of
failure and failed component unknown.
Lifting wireline lubricator (weight less than 1 ton) with canvas web. Load just clear of deck when it dropped back, caught on a container which damaged the web, which then split and lubricator
fell to deck.
Supply boat <> struck the b3 leg, east side of platform. <> examining leg to establish damage. Sea 8 -10 feet. Winds 35-40 knots.
Motorman checking oxygen cylinders, gauge assembly not standard but made up of 'nadein' fluid filled gauge attached to cylinder fitting and valve. When valve 'cracked' open, gauge was blown
from fittings. Fragment embedded in man's eye.
Collision with boat (500 ton) cargo vessel. No injuries.
Helicopter coming to land on <> when down draft caused another helicopter on <> to slide along deck and collide with windsock mast.
During routine maintenance of the auxiliary generator the diesel drive was run for a short period. Oil impregnated lagging around the exhaust manifold ignited - the subsequent fire was
discovered by the maintenance fitter.
Replacing slew motor bearings. After repair test showed that slew controls connected up in reverse. The hydraulic cylinder was disconnected and the crane slewed uncontrollably and hit non
functional exhaust stacks - bent the boom.
Crane being used to transfer cargo using main hoist. Whipline failed and weight and hook assembly fell into the sea.
Compressor seal oil degasser vent caught fire. Thought to have started from a spark from welding being carried out nearby.
During lift of a gas bottle cage from the upper deck of the cantilever laydown area, the bottle cage snagged on a scaffold pole & swung into a handrail. One bottle was displaced and fell approx
22m onto laydown area.
Slip type elevator/spider in use on casing in elevated position whilst joint made up by power tong operator. Retaining ring fell out which released pin which fell 40'.
After placing 4" plate on top of stools, a sling was double wrapped around one end. The man on the air winch was instructed to lift the plate about one inch. However the man on the winch
accidentally raised it approx 10 inches, causing the plate to slide free & land on bop deck.
Module 221 located on cellar deck of production platform. A reclaimed air transfer pump overheated igniting lubricating oil. Pump had recently been reconditioned with new seals fitted and went
back into service at 15.50 hrs same day. No indication of overheating. Pump damaged.
S.v. <> off loading on south of platform. Crane driver lifting tank off boat when it went out of radius (boat not moored). Captain was requested to reduce radius. As load lifted boat continued to
come astern until stern struck fender on sw boat station.
Workers running 30" casing using special clamping tool. A length of casing was picked off the pipedeck using a crane and swung through the vee door. One man started to unhook the load from
the crane.the other went to vee door and signalled the crane driver to move the crane line.the first man had not yet disconnected the casing which swung and struck him.
Fire in mm1 caused by spark from arc cutting torch igniting a wooden pallet which in turn ignited oil based mud. Put out in 5 minutes using dry powder extinguisher.
Latch opening on elevators broke allowing elevators to open under weight of joint of 2 7/8" drill pipe being lifted from catwalk, one end of pipe resting on catwalk. Other end fell 8ft.
Diesel driven air compressor supplying blast-pot. Blockage in outgoing air hose of compressor caused rubber hose to whip and strike man on head. Helmet took force of blow. Hose slipped off
coupling. No detail of normal pressure or size of hose.

3 ton sling shackled to 500 ton casing elevators being used to pull tubing loading string. Weight of string 2,000lbs. Sling probably failed because although string became hung up it was still being
pulled.
Part of modification, a windwall sheeting was being cut away when molten slag fell onto <> valve on main gas line. Sheet of flame erupted from valve flange. Fire immediately extinguished.
Discovered a gas leak which covered 3 modules. Shutdown platform. Probable failure of subsea and wellhead safety shutdown equipment.
Fabrication in m5 production deck on pipe supports was in progress around gas compressor. A stray spark from the operation appears to have penetrated the deck grating, igniting a small packet
of gas in the open drain, in the module below m5c
Diving vessel <> scraped platform.
In welding habitat, below platform, 24 volt lighting cable connected with ceramic pig tail of a copperheat mat. Pig tail melted insulation, which in turn ignited rubber deck matting. No-one in
habitat at the time.
Fire in ngl plant, associated with the recommissioning of a gas compressor.
West crane involved in 10.4 ton lift from vessel,crane went into freefall and dropped 15ft onto vessel which damaged a silo tank.crane was double reeved at the time_put into rest.
Control valve bonnet prematurely removed from gas compressor whilst welding being done 20' away. Fire started. Quickly extinguished.
Welder working in porch of module 5a when a spark ignited gas escaping from a 3/8" connecting pipe. Prior to this incident a platform shutdown had occurred, opening the normally closed valve.
Pulling out of drill hole when blocks dropped 15 feet and piled up on drill floor. Drilling line spooled off. Believed that rope socket at drum came loose. Driller and his crew managed to slow
down the drop before it hit the floor.
Bundled and slung 5" production tubing being backloaded from lower pipe deck to supply vessel. One sling of joint became caught in the bundle being lifted. When the main load was 8' above
the stack, and being steered towards the side, banksman ordered lift to stop but tubing joint came loose & slid 40' over deck guardrail.
Glycol tank was lifted by crane when it slewed towards stern. Strop parted and tank fell 15-20 feet striking food box and cargo basket.
A valve was being lifted from floor level to a 10' scaffold staging. <> was trying to push the valve clear of the scaffolding weight was too much and his arm was trapped between valve and
pipework.
Fire discovered on top deck in the area of the reboilers which has resulted in damage to the wiring of three out of four of the reboilers. Seems to be some damage to the wiring of the middle deck.
Platform is shut down since the incident. Amoco are investigating. Suspect static from snowstorm.
12 lengths of 5 1/2" pipe were being moved from rig 1 catwalk to the pipedeck. Whipline parted as crane was slewing. Pipe fell on deck causing no injuries or damage. Rope was changed in nov
82.
Fire in a downhole pump supply cable. Pump in well a14 slot 28. The cable at the xmas tree in the well head caught fire but was rapidly extinguished by flapping a glove at it. The electric supply
cable to the downhole pump suffered an insulation failure causing a bang, very small flame, and smoke. Two process operators in the area extinguished the flame immediately. The short was at
point where cable passes through a gland in the tubing bonnet at top of tubing string. Cable is 3 phase, voltage 2100v. Damage to cable only.
Diesel engine being run. Piston seized-con rod broke. Crankcase contained failed parts.
While using 3 ton pull-lift to put more torque on a spanner, the retaining ring pin sheared causing half of the pull lift to separate and its chain to recoil.
<> supply vessel working to <> alongside <> platform. Sudden squall blew up, causing the vessel to collide with <> platform.
Fire in cable tray in area near pig launcher. Put out within short time. Damage to other cables. Evidently fire was at cable splice.
Supply boat hit platform - minor damage.
3/4 ton load suspended from chain block attached to runway beam trolley. A pin sheared in the trolley.
Diving support vessel blown against platform by 30 knot wind. Minor damage but diver taken on board at the same time.

Daniel orifice box on gas line between test separator and flare header. Burning was being carried out on pipe supports, a stray spark ignited a small gas leak from the bleed valve.
A h.p. Pressure test underway.coupling blew off the hose & struck i.p on the jaw.
During welding of pad-eyes, hot slag fell to where flexible hose terminated gas discharging from hose ignited. Quickly extinguished by fire watch.
Container being lifted from marine support vessel to forties bravo. While lifting in progress, leg of bridle broke.
Failure of sling & chain block-spool piece dropped onto spider deck.
Lifting an 18 ton reel fron the <> to the <>.a pad eye on the reel (one of two) failed and the reel of wire fell 3 feet onto the deck of the <>.No further damage noticed.
Hydro test being carried out on a 10' long flowline when compression joint failed. Instead of holding to 20,000psi it failed at 5,000psi. One man sprayed with pressurised water when joint failed.
Oil spillage - minimal pollution
Fire in current transformer in starter motor cabinet for b turbine. Extinguished - no casualties.
After flowing well for approx 8 hrs, small hole discovered in first elbow next to xmas tree. Well flowline closed, top & bottom mastergates shut in. Only liquids leaked out no gas.
Riggers were installing surge tank transfer pump. A tirfor winch was attached to platform bracing with snatch block above the pump. During lifting the tirfor wire separated and electric motor fell.
Snatch block sheave housing damaged.
Operator removed 9 1/2" - 2000 psi wp valve from 10 3/4" x 5 1/2" annulus. Pressure had been bled off from opposite side of wellhead into hydrocarbon open drain system & 1/2" gate valve
opened. When valve was nearly unscrewed, it blew off, the 9 5/8" annulus blowing oil & gas into flange on annulus.
Gas leak at flange joint in 18" riser to platform. (pipelines incident. Information only)
Oil spraying out of connection adjacent to main oil line pump.unit shutdown & leak traced to pressure switch connection. Switch is type <> & on inspection it was found that practicallyt all
fittings on the platform had cracks which would lead to failure.
Small fire in crude booster pump area. Caused by bearing failure. Flashed on shutdown of pump. Extinguished immediately by hand extinguisher.
Welding being carried out. Spark thought to have set fire to oil soaked boards. Fire put out quickly but not until electrical cables supplying drilling rig were burnt out. Cables being reinstated.
Supply boat <> waiting to clear weather side of platform. Came into contact with wooden fenders on legs. Area has been checked, no apparent damage.
Operating east crane with overhoist cut out inoperable. Overhoist cut out on west crane inoperable,and at the time of the incident was being changed out,when completed it was intended to
change the cut out switch on the east crane.during the lift whipline was hoisted beyond chandelier cut outs.headache ball,crane,hook,and pennant sling fell80' to deck.
<> crane was lowering power unit on to the deck of <>'. When the unit (which has a protective frame and a single lifting point) was about 3ft above the load already on deck the lifting
bracket failed completely,allowing the unit to free fall.
Ruston crane on platform being boomed down in preparation for helicopter operations. In booming down main load, line crept round top sheave, tightened, parted and a length of line and hook
fell into the sea.
<> had been hoisted in a riding belt to the top of a <> lubricator, by a certified man riding tugger winch. The belt was hooked onto the tugger winch line using a ramnus (<> hook) he
received two stuffing box segments from the <> engineer who was working from the stabbing board. <> was being lowered towards the drill floor by driller <>. He had a starting box
segment in each hand, his legs were around the lubricator. When he reached the lubricator bop, he was advised by <> (floorman) to push himself clear of the lubricator so that he could be
lowered past the bop. When he did this he fell to the floor, approximatly 13 feet. Investigation showed that the hook had come out of the 'd' rings on the riding belt. It was still correctly fastened
around <>. Some wear was apparent on the hook, it was just possible for the 'd' rings to be tugged through the gap between hook and mouse; 5/16". It is not known whether <> accidentally
unlatched the hook, or the 'd' rings passed through the gap between hook and mouse.
During lifting operations to position a diesel driven air compressor, (complete with lifting frame), the unit was inboard and approx. 8: off its permanent base, when a padeye at one corner of the
frame parted. The unit dropped back onto its base.

Whilst pulling production tubing, the tubing stuck and then came free. A circulating head had been fixed to the tubing via a flexible hose and when the tubing came free the flexible hose hit the
<> on the head.
Rigging crew were removing a crated valve from a container with a sling attached and connected to a crane. One rigger entered container to guide crate outside. Crate toppled and trapped his
right leg.
Lifting section of pipe into position. Pipe rested on 3 order that the sling could be adjusted. Pipe not secured and rolled off onto ips arm.
5 1/2" tubing had been loaded (about 8' high). On top of tubing was a cable tray & spool piece, load slid along tubing. There was a space at the end and the able seaman jumped into this space and
was struck on the back by the load.
3 accomodation modules had been lifted off vessel onto platform. Vessel alongside while crew cleared decks. Vessel rolled and vertical packing timbers fell over striking able seaman.
Section of pipe being transferred to cellar deck when the sling suspending the lift hung up momentarily on the outer edge of the platform then released, catching deck crewman on his leg. Crane
driver unsighted at the time, and being guided by radio.
Air operated winch was being used to remove a pump & riser from 18m level in the minicell.winch wire had been passed through three sheaves to position lift vertically above pump riser.on
lifting the riser & pump,certified wire strop used to secure 1 of standing sheaves to beam clamp failed.load fell 10m into minicell.
<> testing bop stack to 3000 psi. A plug on the intermediate spool had weep hole, casing spool plug was ok so plugs changed over during 2000 psi. At 3000 psi one of the plugs blew out,
striking man in the throat and exited through the top of his head.
Man working on sea water lift pump-pressure testing when compression joint blew and struck him on the chest. He then fell backwards striking another pump.
West side temporary crane lifted old crane chasis on pipe deck - weight 8 tons. East crane lifted chasis to transfer to east side. As load being lifted brakes failed. Landed on container. Weight then
noted as 10 tons.
Testing pressure switch at 130 bar. Pressure dropped to 10 bar and drain valve for condensate opened to the closed drain system. No condensate but the operator heard gas and closed the valve.
Gas alarm sounded.
Pulling deep well pump for inspection, pump became detached pulling electric cable back down hole, catching man's leg forcing it into aperture between outer casing and riser.
Roustabout hit on head by a grating which had fallen fron the monkey board of rig 46.
Fire broke out in utility shaft of platform leg while maintenance work was being carried out. Black smoke was emitted.
Rigger unloading container, when container shifted onto mans foot.
Well undergoing acidisation, vessel moored alongside platform, pumping acid via hose. Forward mooring hawser snapped and hose emergency disconnection device failed to work.
Failure or barnsley hoist (6 tonne) with 3 tonnes load. Load dropped 4ft.
South crane whipline failed. At time of failure, a load of tubulars weighing approx 7 tons was suspended 15 ft above pipedeck level.
Prior to deploying the bell the clump weight was lowered to 40 ft in the water. After a few inches one of the drop weights attached to the bell had fallen off.
Small fire in crane engine room.
Perforating tool made up to be inserted into lubricator using home-made bracket as lifting sub. Lifting sub or bracket failed to support the tool. Fell through production deck into sea.
De-greasing agent being sprayed in preparation for painting to be carried out. Agent flowed along, eventually coming into contact with exhaust support ties. It then ignited on the hot exhaust
causing a small fire.
Drill pipe became stuck in hole. Attempts made to free the pipe when it jumped up . Swivel bail jumped clear of swivel bail hook and drill pipe kelly and swivel fell back into hole.
Whilst carrying out fault diagnosis on crane,boom hoist winch failed allowing the boom to fall uncontrolled back to its rest. National os45 crane.

Steward using 2ft. Long scaffold pole to open container. When finished he threw it onto some scaffold material. It rolled along this, over toeboard and fell 45ft. To modules striking man on neck
as he bent down.
Brake shoe on main platform crane (east side) failed.
Kelly cock sheared. Well has been secured. Spinner male pin had failed at kelly cock. String dropped approx. 8ft.
Condensate/water dump to sea ignited by weld spark while welding on spider deck (despite precautions). Condensate on sea ignited, causing fire around leg c.2.
Small fire on glycol circulation pump. On inspection, damage had occurred inside the pump resulting from equipment failure.
Interior of a mud disposal tank had been shot blasted, and work was commencing on spray painting a primer on the inner surfaces. Workforce was changing over and man entering tank through
open hatch when an explosion occurred and threw him back outside.
Gas inside new process pipework ignited when closing spool tank was being welded.
P & w stores container of 8.75 tons being lifted over sea. Slipped away & fell into the sea. Container recovered and placed on platform.
Supply vessel being backloaded. Scrap bumper beam fell from the deck of the vessel into the sea.
Smoke seen arising from lagging on hot oil line. Lagging was removed and flame appeared which was quickly extinguished.
Platform crane lifting spool piece with sling. Load snagged and sling wrapped round hook which opened latch and load fell.
Lifeboat fell into the sea.
Supply boat <> collided with leg of platform due to a large wave carrying boat.
Following fitting of new falls to no 8 lifeboat, weight was transferred to falls. Brakes failed to function and boat ended up in the sea. Boat was then recovered on winch. Examination of brake
linings showed excess of grease, apparently due to the failure of grease seals.
Fire in construction generator housing in area d2 east. Fire found to be used diesel oil filters burning. Probable cause thought to be welding sparks.
Minor fire. Sparks from welding ignited gas in drainline due to absence of blanking cap.
On lowering container on deck of supply vessel <>, crane operator attempted to lift the load again. The fork end of the whipeline baby became unscrewed. The baby abd the attached pennant
with brothers fell 25ft to the deck of the vessel.
Minor explosion in relief valve workshop.
Crane boom ran away with no load. Boom arrested by emergency mechanism.
West crane whipline failed.
Electric motor driving water injection pump overheated. Smoke was discovered coming from the motor. Co 2 extinguisher injected into motor, smoke then dissipated.
Chain on air hoist failed when lifting 250lbs - chain fell near side.
Wire line failed while removing rigging platform.
While lifting a new bridge from supply boat to platform using a 4 legged sling, one leg failed. The others held, and load was taken aboard safely. Sling rated 10 tons, crane weight 9 tons.
Lifting a basket from supply boat when basket snagged against adjacent tank.
Load suspended by n.crane 20 feet above pipe deck. Driver lost control and load fell.
Tugger winch on drill floor being used to move equipment on bop deck. During recovery of winch wire it snagged, dislodging handrail section which consequently fell and struck a roustabout.
Fuel gas supply tripped and auto switch over to diesel failed. Platform shutdown. Emergency power activated. Three attempts to ignite diesel supply failed. Investigation revealed small fire in
power turbine and exhaust. Extinguished with portable extinguishers. Diesel leak detected.

Three scaffolders working at 20ft level erecting scaffolding. Chain on friction clamp on scaffolding was not tight enough. Structure rotated around scaffold tubular tipping men into the sea. No
injuries to any of the men.
During backloading of helifuel tank using whipline, crane driver noticed main hoist wire rope anchor plate, situated near the jib-head had fractured across the 1/2" plate allowing anchor to come
away. Anchor had apparently snagged in the main hoist block.
Fire in process vessel in gas train, extinguished after 30 minutes. Repairs were being carried out inside vessel.
Bundle of drill pipe being lowered from platform to boat. Crane lost hydraulic power, causing load to drop. Seal failure on hydraulic motor.
Supply boat <> under joystick control, discharging water. Sudden squall blew s.b. Into platform. In order to escape from colliding with platform, two hoses burst while <> changing course.
During offloading of scaffolding equipment from accommodation unit, crane boom started to fall. Driver arrested fall by returning control to neutral, then tried to get load inboard by slewing,
however boom started to fall again, but was halted. Splinney on hoist drive coupling were later found to be sheared.
Offloading supply boat when block dropped. Imposed load caused bend in boom.
Zinc annodes being moved by crane. At the same time another load was being moved by crane. The driver of the second crane could not see the annodes (supported on a pallet) and during
maneouvering the load caught the rope securing the pallet. The rope parted and the annodes fell into the sea and onto the deck.
After controls activated, gangway was seen to lift sufficiently before control was lost. Loss of control, coupled with <>'s rolling movement, caused gangway to slide clear of <> platform. As
gangway descended, accumulators automatically activated. This appeared to reset system which now operates normally.
Joint of 9 5/8" casing dropped due to broken sling.
A camco wireline mast failed during the preparation to move a lift lubricator. The holding down bolts sheared. Air supply disconnected.
Water bag belonging to <> was suspended over west side of platform and being filled with water when it split open.
Flashback fire from acetylene line in fabrication shop. Arrestor on torch failed.
Water bag split as in previous day.
Liquid nitrogen tanks being moved, when the liquid spurted out of valve. It was attempted to close the valve, however this was frozen up. When valve was eventually opened, liquid nitrogen had
boiled over from drip tray and cracked deck plates.
Welder attempted to ignite oxy-acetylene torch but would not light. Checked the bottles - everything in order. Attempted again. Flashback ocurred, with ignition of acetylene gas aound regulator
coupling to the gas bottle. Flame extinguished in 3-4 minutes and bottles cooled for 2 hours. Regulator and f.b. Arrestors on the acetylene bottle were reduced to molten metal by heat of flame.
East crane fast line brake shoe failed when pipe handling.
Storeman checking pressure of nitrogen cylinders with pressure gauge. Mistook oxygen cylinder for nitrogen and when valve opened, gauge blew off.
Lowering emergency generator from upper to lower deck. Slings were attached to casing pad eyes instead of frame of unit. Slings parted from unit and fell 15'.
Gas compressor being vented,purged and drained at the same time.crank case covers along bedplate were blown off due to an explosion.fire extinguished immediately.
Two fitters working on graylock clamp, when pressure trapped between wing valve and choke was suddenly released (approx 4600 kpa), spraying oil, gas and grit into the fitters faces.
After running 'a' fire pump for approx one hour several small fires ignited within enclosure. Appears that diesel fuel from the feed line seeped out and ignited the electrical cable.
Agitator jammed 'c' flotation cell, the friction caused drive belts to overheat and ignite. The fire was put out - no injuries or damage.
Supply vessel loading 14 tonnes container onto platform. Crane was swinging load across when load dropped 12 feet.
Supply boat mv <> collided with platform. Boat bumper damaged.
In knockout pot,one of the elements overheated or shortcircuted.ngl leaked from the pot and ignited.fire spotted immediatley and extinguished.

'A' reciprocating compressor was being started up after maintenance. As gas loading commenced, two perspex windows broke due to pressure build up. Zero vent line to allow de-pressurisation
was not shut.
Nw crane lifting container when slewing pin fell out of crane mechanism. Crane continued slewing, damaging radio tower. Strop snapped on container.
Crane wire on east crane parted, carrying 2 bundles of drillpipe of approx 6 tons. Wire parted 100' from hook, load fell 4'.
During backloading from platform to supply boat <>, a 20 ton half height container with 12 ton load rested on vessal's safety rail. Container tipped at angle, outside lifting eyes sheared,
container slipped and two remaining lifting eyes sheared. The container then slipped overboard.
<> S61n helicopter lifted off from platform with lifting gear slung underneath. When load was 25' from helideck surface, load fell still inside lifting net with strop attached. Load landed on
helideck, causing minimal damage. Subsequent examination showed safety release mechanism on lifting gear had failed.
Diving vessel collided with leg a3. Minor paint scuffs to leg and minor indentation on vessel.
Crane transferring 3 1/2 ton weight across deck. Load fell to deck about 8 ft. No failure of slings or line. Suspected crane failure.
Damaged boom foot section had been changed due to previous damage. New limits were being checked, and during this operation boom section came into contact with boom stops.
Crude oil leak leading to production & gas injection shut down. Wells closed in, module delayed.
S. East crane moving drum carrier. While booming down on main line/crane wire, whip line was inadvertently through the goose neck sheave, severing the whipline.
Fire and explosion on platform. Explosion and subsequent gas ignition caused due to shell rupture of regeneration heater. Confined to gas module and limited area on east side pipe deck, also
blast damage to adjacent utility module. Platform evacuated. Three men injured with superficial burns - no serious injuries. Probable cause of rupture through overheating when contact on heater
element circuit did not fail safe and disconnect heater when gas flow stopped.
Crane booming down and winding up at same time.ball wound into boom head breaking wire.
During burning off electrical control boxes in drilling cement room, a spark went into <> pump north displacement tank causing a flash fire which lasted for 30 seconds.tank was filled
withbrine covered with layer of hydrocarbons,which emanated from bleeding down of lubricator.being used for wireline work. Lubricator on <>.
Fork lift truck on charge. Fire occurred in cable.
Welder replacing floor grating on upper level of manifold area.standby man in attendance.process operator carrying out routine checks & noticed small fire close to pilot gas drum.contacted
control room & extinguished fire using nearby hose reel.no injury or damage.
Wooden boards of scaffolding caught fire due to hot slug from oxy-acetylene flame cutting operation.
Trawler hit platform. Boat fender ripped off n.w leg and trawler dented, otherwise minimal damage.
Crane operation in progress. While loading a boat the hoist on the whipline failed. The load descended striking the boat. Subsequent investigation showed whipline did not fail, the brake failed to
hold it.
Burner working on module crane removing excess material. He downed tools and went to lunch. On his return he found two scaffold boards ablaze. Fire immediately extinguished, damage
confined to scaffolding.
West crane discharging casing from supply boat. A bundle of 5 lengths of casing weighing 5 tonnes was lifted from the deck. Crane slewed, clearing load from the boat when slings parted and
load fell into the sea.
3 ton weight being lowered to seabed. Divers in bell (150 feet away). On lifting load, it snagged on jacket/marine growth and 4 x 1 metre slings parted.
Dsv lifting a 2 ton load. Pile guide stop using 4 ton sling. Sling was reported to have scuffed on riser and then broke. Load approx 17m below surface.
Bop stack lifted with 2 slings. One sling rigged around sharp corner and failed during lift. The other sling held the load and bop lowered in controlled manner.
Whipline on east crane failed, dropping 4.5 ton chemical tank 5' onto supply boat. No chemical spillage.
Whipline being hoisted simultaneously with crane jib being parked. Whipline overhoist cut out and failed to operate.

Driller lost control of elevators hydromatic brake. Elevators hit rotary table and stops on guide rails. No indication of reason for loss of control.
Unloading from <> when bundled casing became trapped. Load fell back to the deck.
3 flow transmitters showing zero readings in control room, and in the process of being blown down. 2 had been done successfully, however when third transmitter blown down, vacuum pump
casing exploded.
Standby vessel <> collided with <> platform. No apparent damage to platform leg. Minor damage to vessel.
Turbine was being checked, and changing from gas to diesel when supply line failed, spilling diesel that consequently ignited.
West crane making lift when boom fell. Crane came to rest with broken boom.
4 people engaged on valve on flow line installing ring joint between flanges. One ton sling parted and chain block fell 20ft hitting one person (suffered no injuries).
Minor fire on pipe deck spark arrestor. Ignited a puddle of diesal. Wire line power pack spark arrestor detached (still hot) and left in 'puddle' and set it alight.
Failure of 6 tonne hoist with 3 tonne load. 1st motion spur gear shed a tooth and load dropped four inches.
During a routine inspection on the platform, a crack was discovered in one of the horizontal braces below 66m depth. The defect is claimed to be isolated, but as a precaution drilling and
workover operations were shut down. Damage took 20 days to repair. Production could continue, but workover and drilling were suspended
Severed bracing member on <...> believed to have been caused by a welding defect. The oil production from the <...> platform was unaffected, but the certification authority has placed certain
limitations on manning of the installation until repairs are completed. A semisub is moored alongside in case that an an evacuation should be necessary.
Man engaged in slinging new section of pipework to worksite below cellar deck. Pipework being lowered past handrails when one flange caught on deck edge - as pipe was released swung
trapping mans hand.
South crane involved in supply boat operations. Man working on telecommunications ariel on crane pedestal access platform. Crane slewed trapping man between base of access ladder and
handrail.
Moving angle iron with crane. Landed angle iron and released strops. Iron fell over onto mans leg.
Man moving 8 1/2" drill collar from drill floor to catwalk using 2 tugger winches when lower tugger took strain and caused collar to swing. Man trapped between collar and handrail.
Air tugger came loose from its mounting and hit man.
13 3/8: casing through v doors swung and hit man on shoulder.
Men were entering rich oil flash tank which had been purged. As covers were being taken off tank vapours from opening were ignited by welders torch some distance away.
Commissioning work was being carried out on the low temperature k.o. Vessel. The k.o. Drum levels were being raised to check that the instrument signals to switch heaters on etc. Were
operating correctly. When all commisioning checks were carried out indicating the control side was satisfactory, the fuses were inserted in each of the 6-440 volt cubicles and the electrical deisolation took place. When the system was then switched on the contactor cubicle aa2 blew out and went to fire causing damage to itself and above and below the cubicle the first ip received
superficial burns, left hand and face, bruised left heel. The second ip received mild back pain. From initail investigations it would seem that ionisation had occurred in the panel resulting in a
short circut across the bus-bars.
Whilst installing a 4 inch diameter spoolpiece 5m long at the 145m level of a colum, the spool was suspended from a chainblock. The spool was being lowered and snagged on two u-bolts.
During contained lowering, the spool slipped off the u-bolts and trapped the ip arm between the spool flange and support steelwork.
Whilst lifting a 4 3/4" drill collar from the cat walk to the drill floor, the lifting sud slid through the closed single elevator. This allowed the drill collar to fall on to the top of the pipe ramp,
striking the ip who was standing on the drill floor near to the v door.
During replacement of nitrogen bottle on five pump after checking for leaks, leak discovered whilst tightening hoses, it broke and valve not closed. Pressure 200 bars, whiplash hit 1 man in the
back other in forehead.
Small explosion occured in oilywater separator tank. Six casualties with superficial burns all taken ashore for treatment.

7 personnel splashed with corrosive inhibitor. Lines were being filled with the inhibitor. When full it overflowed through overflow line -overflow line did not have a sealing weld and so spilled
down outside.
Release of hydrocarbons during workover. Unseated tubing hanger before pulling tubing 2 block - downbolts came out. No fire no injuries. Pocket of gas probably in the annulas. Tubing hanger
put back.
Whilst back loading to sv <...>, wireline unit lifted from pipedeck. Crane ready to, lower unit, whilst manoevering to lowering position, load commenced to free fall. Application of emergency
brake unsuccessful - load and complete crane whipeline ran off crane and into the sea.
Header valve bonnet removed by drilling crew without isolation of supply header (120 psig). This resulted in valve bonnet being blown off valve seating.
Struck by coupling of diesel hose on side of head.
Fallen slag from welding ignited cardboard packing. Fire extinguished - no damage to any equipment.
Crane picked up 40ft container off supply boat with south crane & slewed over helideck with intention of landing on pipedeck.would not slrew to left & continued right.operator stopped short of
derrick.area below cleared for lowering of container.on lowering it struck 20ft container which fell 35ft to production deck.
Hot slag from gouging operation on crane close to gas compressor lube oil tank vents. Ignition of vapour. Fire quickly extingushed.
Fly hoist brake released when crane stopped and line ran out onto back room landing area. Two circlips had broken on actuator end of brake linkage causing pin free movement to dislodge.
Linkage between brake shoe and actuator parted allowing drum to free and line to run out.
Supply boat <...>' being offloaded by west crane. Rapid approach of load towards cab. Boom hit 'stops' at speed causing impact damage to root section of boom. Several bracings bent ane main
structural bracings slightly distorted.
Transfer of corrosion inhibitor from tote tank to produced water inhibitor storage tank, a leak occurred from bonnet joint of non-return valve in relief line from injection pump.transfer ceased &
spillage washed down drains. Later it was reported that diluted inhibitor had blown across sb <...> in spray form.this resulted in crewmembers feeling ill
2" chicksan - 1" hose into the annulus. Chicksan failed striking man - non serious injury.
Welding being carried out next to compressor. Safety procedures carried out and hot work permit issued. Firewatcher on duty noticed small flame coming from relief valve near welder. He
immediately extinguished the fire.
Fire caused by engine oil reservoir seal failing - oil allowed onto hot gland. No substancial damage.
Fouled starboard anchor loire be2 in drilling vessel alongside drifted onto 49/27-c boat landing stage indented at waterline.
While moving chemical tank from pipe deck to skid deck, tank fell 6 foot to deck. No damage to equipment.
Fire in module 4 - houses crude oil separation condensate. Automatic platform shutdown and deluge of module. Fire was on flotation unit which is part of produced water clean up equipment.
Fire extinguished.
Vibration from generator caused exhaust to fracture. Hot gas played a drain. Drain caught fire - quickly extinguished.
Hand spliced sling parted - pump weighing 4 tonnes fell approx 0.5 metre to deck of stirling albion.
Mechanical failure generated heat which ignited compressor fuel.no external damage,but possible internal damage.
On attempting to start centrefugal compressor the auto transormer in the gas compressor control room exploded. Damage limited to transformer in process control panel.
While running 7" liner man failed to raise hinged portion of stabbing board as main block was being lowered. Man`s vision was restricted dolly wheels of block crushed hand rails around stabbing
board. Board fell 5ft. Man left suspended on safety line.
Hp flare line. Ice plug formed and then blew out under pressure. The reaction dislodged the flare line.
Fire in light fitting. Water found inside, believed to have shorted and caught fire.
Man struck by loading hose when lifting collar of hose failed during repositioning of hose into a restricted space.

Readings being taken on dehydrator heaters -<...>. <...> had been completed and work was being carried out on <...> inlet. In attempting to remove a plug, downstream threaded seat retainer
started to come loose causing crude oil to spray out around ball in valve. In attempting to screw the seat retainer blew out.
Pipe from supply vessel to pipe deck. Whipline ran out and emergency brake applied, stopping load on contact with the sea.
Internal explosion on wemco. Produced equipment ninian cenral shut down for approx 8 days. Two welders in the vicinity. Suspect sparks ignited the gas blanket covering the equipment.
Whilst manoeuvering into position to unload cargo alongside the drilling platform, the mv <...> collided with the spider deck.
Sheave to run gyro survey tool rigged up. Shackle attached to end of wire (from this was to hang sheave and safety harness). Lead foreman doubled sling and fed loop through sheave fixed eye.
However he had not attached sling top to shackle. Sheave then raised up derrick when loop pulled out and sheave fell 65 feet.
3 downhole drilling turbines bearings to be returned onshore. Sections were laid across baskets to facilitate slinging. When third section was picked up it bumped section already laid down. This
section slid off basket, through guard rail and into the sea.
Crane boom dropped into crane rest after engine had been turned off. Brake shoe band had failed.
Supply vessel on close standby duties. Mates attention distracted by radio message. Bout drifted into platform. Slight indentation on diagonal cross bracing on north side of waterline.
Damage to drilling derrick. Travelling block hit crown with some damage to support structure.
Small gas leak. Alarm sounded. From lid of wemco unit. Tried to tighten lid - stripped thread. No hot work.
Collision between standby vessel <...> and e2 leg of platform. Boat had taken load of mail and cargo and was manoeuvering south west. In doing so its port quarter struck leg e2.two diagonal
supports for open mesh grid walkway bent. Access ladder to sea at approx 2.5m level damaged.damage to timber fender at +3m level. Damage to pender retaining metal rung
<...> logging tool stuck on well 5-3. Attempted to jar tool. Sheave and polly shattered on top of lubricator. Lateral pull on lubricator bent it.
Pulling out of hole at 1000ft. String parted above lubricator - backflow of fluids from both parted ends. Well closed in and pressure bled off. No damage.
Test weight of 22 tons on crane. Hydraulic feeedline to boom failed. Load fell about 15ft. Crane weight basket struck a samson post before coming down to rest, which pierced the floor of the
basket. Small indentation of the pipedeck.
Crude oil export pump turbine failed to start. Left in normal stopped condition. 10-15 minutes later an alarm indicated on control room panel. Smell of burning - flames seen under hood. Damage
to number of electrical cables.
Vessel collided with platform. Vessel on close standby duties alongside <...>. Tide turned and vessel began to drift into <...>. No evidence of buckling or indentations. Damage limited to bracing
protective coating.
Small fire occurred on water injection pump p36 due to failure of drive.
Small fire in old accomodation (now used as offices). No structural damage - fire quickly extinguished. No effect on installtion safety. Fire started in waste paper bin due to cigarette/cigar butt not
completely extinguished.
Travelling blocks fell 30-40ft onto rig floor. Drilling line pulled from anchor on the drawworks. Due to isolation, by motor man of main supply and back up battery supply to elmago brake system.
Bumper rose from no.1 pump on rig. No.1 completely sheared at safety clamp. Free section of hose lashed into cable tray and escaping fluid covered main dc. Motors and blower motors
Oxy/acetylene cutting torch being used to cut hole from module 4 through module 2 roof. Paint on bulkhead wall in module 2 roof caught fire. Paint burnt on west bulkhead and off adjacent wall
and damage to cable.
Bundle of flat bar lifted using whipline of <...> crane. During lifting a side lacing dropped and fell through jib structure landing on compressor house roof. Buffer ring on engine exhaust stack
near crane shows no evidence of buffer ring/crane jib contact

Gas leak from a block valve. In body of valve 8 out of 16 holding studs snapped. Gas detectors on high gas. Low gas detectors system was shut down.
Faulty brake shoe on east crane. Crane boom slowly running out. Loff brake wiring had become divorced from one brake shoe.
Crane driver carrying out maintenance when he noticed whip line descending. No load. No injuries. Pin retaining brake shoe adjuster sheared.
Linkbelt crane dropped load. Probably caused by ingress of water to brake linings
Supply vessel <...> collided with boat landing stage of platform. No injuries. Supply vessel due to commence unloading. No apparent damage to boat or installation.
Section of pipework removed to be modified. Flushed with water prior to gas cutting. Closed section in value overlooked. Small amount of hydrocarbon condensate spilled on main deck and
ignited. Fire quickly extinguished. No damage sustained.
Fire in accoustic enclosure - quickly put out. Also shut down platform. Enclosure quarrantined because deluge activated checking junction boxes.
In gas compression module using oxyacetylene torch above methanol drum. Spark fell and ignited drum - exploded. Fire quickly extinguished. Electrical cables damaged.
Load being lifted - fuel tank weighing 4 tons. After tank was lifted off boat <...> boom collapsed and load fell into sea. Load not recovered.
Gas leak due to thermowell being blown out of pocket. Machine shut down and all personel evacuated until area cleared of gas.
Failure of chain link on neumatic chain hoist (12 ton hoist lifting 4 ton camco wire line unit) minor damage to both wireline unit & damage on impact.
Slew control lost due to bursting of hydraulic hose. No damage sustained.
Hoist being used to replace heat exchanger tube bundle and hoist being used to support bundle during replacement. 1st motion shaft sheared allowing gear wheel to fall to deck.
Whilst repairing grating on mezz level hot work had to be carried out. Man had just begun to cut grating when sparks from mezz fell to deck and ignited gas leaking from a15 gas to lift line.
Minor fire in module (3) caused by welding. Leak in chicksaw. Welder fought fire manually & brought under control. Only minor damage.
Crane driver had just laid down 45 gallon drum (east crane). Driver sitting when he noticed the boom slowly lowering itself. Put into cradle. Brake lining parted from shoe.
S.v. <...>alongside.picking up container - door came open and a 45 gallon drum of chemicals fell to boat deck. Container was 10 - 12 ft above deck when doors opened. Drum lifted back to deck
and secured.
Brake pin sheared while bringing load to rig from boat.
Crane backloading to supply vessel <...>R110. Load attained excessive speed. Not stopped in time by full application of brakes. Load hit sea and came to rest 15-20ft below surface. Unit
recovered.
Well pressure testing. Valve leaked and went into pump. Pressure relieve pump had not been released therefore build up of pressure.
Using crane near turbine and hot gas - damaged the cable. Crane out of commission. Electric cable on boom and paintwork damaged.
Well head maintenance program being carried out. Testing a well fluid water at 2000 psi. Lower water valve and water injection flow line were closed and well head up to 2000 psi. Screwed
reducer with pressure gauge blew off.
Small fire in lubeoil seal tank - whilst being filled.
Small electrical fire in emergency switchroom. Damage to 110v power supply cabinet's internals. Bank of capacitors has been burnt out and output circuit breakers damaged.
Seismic purpose vessel <...> transferring instrument boxes to rig, collided - no visual damage.
Dsv <...> adjacent to platform using dp system. Dp failure caused vessel to collide with south west corner of platform. Slight damage to navigation lights on platform.
Explosion during recommissioning checks in turbine/exhaust of turbine for main oil line pump. Exhaust split at downstream side of joint
A weld on a drain fitting, associated with safety pressure valve inlet header from crude oil recylce cooler fractured, causing gas release and build up of in gas module 13.
During normal crane operations, slew brake not holding. Found that brake lining had broken up and detached itself from brake shoe.
Minor explosion of a solar turbine generator in the water injection pump,during start up.
Diesel engine run up on test. Smoke seen from exhaust after 3/4 minutes. Then exhaust lagging caught fire - quickly extinguished.

Swab plug well a2 module 01, attempting to remove plug tight when 3 tonne sling wrapped round beam at mezz. Level and parted.
Broken orsa link on 5 leg sling on container.link broke as crane start ed lift.
Internal ignition of gas in <...>. Minor damage to casing.
Backload of drill pipe being lifted to <...>. East crane went into free fall from height of skid deck. Load of 5 1/2 tons dropped to vessel. Damage to handrail of bulkhead.
Supply boat collided with platform (unmanned). Serious damage to cross-members legs a2 and b2 at spider deck level. Also damage to boat.
Accidental discharge of oil via a caisson during unplanned shutdown. Discharge isolated.
After fitting a 'fillup sub' it was necessary to turn the rotary table to line the soupt up with the chicsan line. The chicsan line was then connected to the 'fillup sub' and it was necessary for the readjustment of the slips prior to piking up the drill srting. The driller told them to stand clear as there was torque in the drilling sting. The driller then picked up the drill string and the torque
caused the chicsan to mave in an anti-clockwise direction trapping <...> between the chicsan line and the iron roughneck.
1 ton sling broke whilst supporting a wireline lubricator. Lubricator since been made safe.
Dsv <...> made contact with b4 leg of platform whilst closing with platform to launch a zodiac to transfer personel to the platform. Damage to platform - paint scuffing.
1ton sling used in conjunction with post and 2ton air hoist to hold drill collars straight. Sling failed.
Small fire in one mud pump stuffing box, due to maladjusted gland packing probably generating sufficient heat through fiction to ignite fine oil rust from packing. No damage to plant.
Crane facing north crash heard discovered crane facing south, part overside.
Whilst a crane was off-loading materials from a supply boat, the whipline became loose and fell on the supply boat deck.
Small explosion in battery room. Damage confined to battery charger and battery cells. Result no back up for foghorn but alternative back-up available. No other effects. Minor damage.
Fire involving scaffolding boards directly below ngtg1 exhaust - extinguished. Boards not ablaze - just smouldering.
Oil malfunction caused a small fire at go1b motor bearing. Before fire could be put out it was fed by a spray of crude oil from fractured 1/2" pump drain line due to pump vibration. Fire put out
by dry powder from 350lb unit. No fire damage.
Pulling chicksan line from pipedeck through "v" door to rig florr, using air tugger line with chicksan lift cap attached. Chicksan line hoisted to position just inside "v" door with base joint end still
on pipedeck lift cap weld failed under tension, allowing chicksan line to settle back on pipedeck ramp.
Discharge manifold on a mud pump ruptured and projected metal around the pump room, although one person (name unknown) was in the room , he was not in the immediate vicinity and
suffered no injury.
4 ton travelling hoist lifting seawater lift pump. The angle of use caused the hoist to come off the beam.
<...> 10 ton hoist, first motion shaft sheared when not in use and a section 10 kg in weight fell to ground. Investigation revealed a brittle fracture; pieces of shaft being sent for examination.
Possibly vibration may have caused final severance of shaft.
Dsv <...> spread helideck touched b9 leg after vessel suffered total power failure.
Load from crane dropped. Hit side of platform and fell into sea - raised and put on supply vessel.
During routine subsea inspection by the DSV <...> it was discovered that a clamp at el-41m supporting the seawater lift caisson (no 12) had suffered bolt failures. 22 bolts which were installed in
<...>, had failed. There are reasons to believe that the problem is caused by bolting material. It is also possible that bending and fatigue may have contributed to the failures. New bolts are
installed.
While positioning the jackup <...> it was realized that the rig in fact was too close to the platform, about 50 feet and moving in fast. The jackup's legs were started down to pin the barge and the
thrusters were engaged full forward. Shortly after the rig's stern struck the NW face of the platform. The apparent cause of the casualty was the failure of rig personnel to maintain adequate
manoeuvring control.

The helicopter clipped radio mast during take off and made controlled landing on helideck of platform. <...> people on board, no injuries reported. Damage to rotor blades of the helicopter.
While fitting the last section of riser to the "black start" pump, the support clamp was fitted to allow the lifting bracket to be unbolted from the riser main flange. The utilities crane was unhooked
and the flange unbolted. Up was assissting with the bolt removal and was slackening back the last bolt when the riser slipped through the clamp trapping his hand between the flange and support
clamp. The crane was re-attached to the lifting bracket and the riser main lifted and support clamp was moved to release ip hand. The injured party was sent ashore by helicopter immediately.
The crew were attempting to "free" the oil preventor rams on the wireline b.o.p which were seized. One ram had been removed and as ip was laying it down on the module floor the b.o.p fell over,
landing on his left lower leg. At the time in question the work was adequately supervised, however, the pob was free standing and should have been secured by slinging on chain block from crane.
Relevant work permit was in force and attched.
Whilst moving a handrail at mezzanine level within module c to gain better access to remove bell end from a regenerator/reboiler. The bell end suddenly shifted trapping <...>'s left wrist between
bell end and the rail. This incident caused severe pain and bruising to his left wrist but no breaks or fractures.
Fire and explosion in a module. Fire quickly put under control and extinguished. Some oil and gas escape. Platform shut down.
Main breaker unit removed and modified. System checked. One fuse fitted satisfactorily. Second fuse fitted. Went bang causing burns to i/p.
S.v. <...> discharging general cargo. Bulk hose being connected at boat when vessel surged forward. Hose broke before disconnection and struck injured on the head.
Ip and another electrician were investigating a fault on ngtg4 breaker panel nsb1. (generator fail to load) closing relay b52x was suspect. Electrical checks were being carried out by ip between
line j1 (110v+ dc) and contact l505 to prove integrity of fuse f76 (6amp) and switch 52b. At this point avo meter readings were being taken and the meter lead short cicuited between 110v +andcontacts. Drillpipe blown out of riser.
Manouvering 5' pup joint with wear bushing running tool onto sub-rack. Tool hit side of drill pipe stacked on north side of derrick causing running tool to slide down pup joint hitting mans left
arm.
Operations. Drill floor - manoevering of the riser slips from the rotary table towards the "vee" door using an air winch (tugger) line. Pipedeck - manoevering a drill collar from the pipedeck
through the same "vee" door using the south crane. <...>, the ip, was operating the air winch with his back towards the "vee" door, when he heard a warning shout, as he turned to clear the area,
the drill collar collided with his right ankle forcing it against the air winch rubber exhaust hose.
Working on condensate line - line flashed causing burns to men carrying out work. Platform shut down at time of fire because fire loop ruptured as designed and shut platform in. Platform also
manually shut down.
Fire extinguisher handle broken. Sent to injured man to recharge. Tried to remove top after trying to release extinguisher using broken lever. Used force. Top then blew off and disgorged powder
into his face.
Two electricians had connected a newly overhauled gkn `bullet` welding machine ti the fixed platform electrical supply, 415 volts. The ip then attempted a trial weld but ther was insufficient
power for an arc. The electricians then excited the welding machine three or four times but the machine would not produce enough power for an arc. The ip then produced from his coveralls
pocket a pen sized neon circut tester and placed it across the terminals on the machine. There was an immediate flash and the tester disintegrated leaving the ip with burns to his fingers. The
circut tester was the private property of the welder and as such had not been approved for operational use. The tester was totally destroyed and no substantial part could be found during the
accident investigation.
Opening downhole ball valve - transfer via high pressure connection from water injection header. Bleed valve opened under pressure allowing jet of water to hit man. Knocked off balance and
struck forearm against adjacent steel work.
Accident victim was engaged in hooking on pre-slung (double wrapped) 5 1/2" tubing bundles to crane pennant. On the 27th bundle the forward strop was secure to pennant, then this
strop/pennant looped round a bundle of tubing. The ship's downward movement caused the bundle of tubing to lift and skid towards the after end, colliding with the accident victim.

Driller began to pick up pipe. As soon as string weight came off slips, elevator and hook spun rapidly as the torque was released. Slips were sent spinning and man was hit either by slips or
elevator.
Injured walking through module when a 1/2 off pipe and hit him in the eye.
Scaffolder was riding in scaffold basket when the wire rope parted and basket fell 138' to the deck.
48 ton caisson being raised within jacket when an obstruction occurred. Guides on caisson fouled under guides welded to the jacket. Crane continued to hoist, overloading the slings, which failed.
Caisson slipped 13m into the jacket. Injured and deceased had been near caisson heads until sling broke. Found lying on jacket 13m below module support frame.
Using ldt/cnt gamma ray logging source in well. Tool became stuck at 16255'. Attempts made to fish it out. Source strength: 1 x ldt 1.5 curie caesium 137 source. 1 x cnt 16 curie camariaum 241
neutron source.
Fire involving oxy-acetylene set on the <> platform. Local damage only. Re-injection halted for quarter hour.
<...> diesel pump connected to well via chicksan line for scale inhibitor squeeze job on pipedeck. 3 valves - one on drillfloor, one downstream of filter, one midway between. Man on drillfloor
asked for pump to be started. Drillfloor valve opened. Went to open middle valve - blew apart. No injuries.
Nw <...> platform and at bottom of west underdeck access under stairway metal torn over area 18-24" <...> platform. Metal torn over area 6 sq" access stairway. Consider platform damage due to
bouncing effect of vessels superstructure along platform when rolling in swell.
Oily water separators were not in use. By-passed for repair work. Welder working above. Sparks ignited material inside.
Offloading empty cargo basket from supply vessel. Basket became jammed between containers on boats deck. Boat went down a trough causing basket to be wrenched free, breaking one leg of 4legged 4-ton sling attached to basket.
N.w. Crane lifting drillpipe from a supply vessel when strop being use to hold pipe parted approx. One metre above sv deck. Load lowered on to sv. Load - 2.6 ton. 3 ton swl strop.
Liquid handling pump shut down for maintenance. Standby pump selected for duty. On start up of pump, flange joint on disharge pulsation damper blew off. Caused condensate and vapours to
escape onto bp cellar deck. Deck area quickly awash with condensate. Pump shut down and isolated.
Supply vessels radio mast caught flare boom. Bent the mast but no damage to flare boom.
Two 3ft scaffolding boards set alight by turbine exhaust. Quickly extinguished.
Lifting scaffolding from spider deck. During lift, at early stage, fibre webbing failed. Scaffold fell into the sea. No damage.
Process train maintenance - installing by-pass. Blocked 12" main line with n(2) plug. Replace leaking valve n(2) plug broke down sufficient oil and gas to cause double detector alarm. Eso
activated.
Vent from seal and lubricating oil de-gasser ignited. Mixture of oil vapour, water vapour, hydrocarbon gas ignited by sparks from burning operation above. Small fire - lasted 4 minutes.
Backloading 6 ton load on west crane.load free fell into sea.
Valve cover failure on <...> gas compressor. Studs holding down valve cover failed. Whole valve assembly thrown out into module. Some a ssociated impact damage.
Scaffold boards on scaffolding adjacent to no 5 aron exhaust stack ignited, by radiant heat from stack.
Failure of coiled tubing following acidising of well. Leak detected at surface when tubing at 1000 ft. Sub surface bop and blind rams and slip rams closed. Water pumped down to kill well.
Maintenance work on normally unmanned jacket led to release of (non-statutory) survival capsule. Field standby boat salvaged capsule outside 5-mile radius of <...> - could not make headway
against weather with capsule in tow. Boat sent from port to take over capsule. Standby vessel (last reported position) 7 miles from <...>, within 5 miles of other field platforms.
Small fire under hood of avon generator. Damage to cabling under hood. All safety systems functioned properly - extinguished fire automatically.

Lowering pump onto west laydown area. Duty rigger stopped lowering to get a trolley - load about 4ft above deck. Load 'crept' to deck level. Due to a sheared brake adjusting bolt on whipline
drum brake.
Nw crane-wire parted above headache ball and landed on grating. Ball penetrated and landed on scaffold underneath. 2 gas exhaust lines damaged slightly.
Attempting to lift section of bop riser, weight 5.5 tons, length 35 ft from alongside catwalk onto drill floor using a sling - swl - 8 tonnes sling parted when head of riser rebounded approx 3 metres.
A glyco surge tank overpressured. End plate blown off. Damage other than to surge tank limited to auxillary equipment and section of wind wall.
Pressure testing of riser, wellhead and bop following re-installation of pack-off. Pressure at 1500 psi - a lockdown screw assembly blew out. Threads on assembly are stripped.
Installation shut down due to a fracture in 2" diameter liquid injection pipe coulped to the export line. 36 hours off to allow n.d.t examinations.
Collision between vessel <...> and installation. Minor damage to paintwork on a cross bracing. Vessel thrusters failed due to electrical fault.
Using whipline to lift a 2 ton load. Anchor plate securing dead end of mainline hoist broke away and fell to ground.
Bursting disc in cement circulation system failed. Released byrite into the atmosphere. Diving support vessel covered from stem to stern.
15 ton air hoist involved in rigging arrangement to lift & lower pump motor,direct straight lift believd to have failed when load was within 2ft from deck.hoist motor observed with smoking
issuing from it, control lost on lift motion & then erratic control on descent when load within 2ft from deck.
Dsv <...> setting up dynamic positioning system alongside platform. It drifted and made contact with platform. Minor damage to vessel and superficial damage to platform structure.
Rig was working over slot 53 and at the time involved in fishing for 9 5/8" casing using break out tongs on 8" collar. The wire rope supporting the tongs severed and ip was struck on the right leg
by the falling tongs.
Lifting load with crane. Boom sprung slightly as load came on and struck derrick bending boom latice.
S.v.<...> drifting out of control. Fire and/or engine failure. No immediate danger to installation.
Unloading supply boat using east crane. Lifting 2 tubing cases. Wire parted 30ft from hook. Load was 6ft off boat deck. Wire and load fell to deck. No damage except to wire.
Testing downhole safety valve. After setting, safety valve unlatched itself and crane came into christmas tree and lodged in word valve.
Dead end of drawworks line pulled out. Clamp fixed when line cut and slipped. Load was caught by brake.
Small condensate leak on effluent control system vent pipe near molpump. Construction activities in vacinity including grinding. Small flash fire from ignited condensate. Immediately
extinguished using dry powder extinguisher. Fire watcher was present.
Operator opening flange in gas line, supposed to be depressurized and isolated by one valve. Valve appeared to have leaked - once nuts on flange slackened, gas started leaking under pressure.
Leak and gas dispersed.
South platform crane being used to offload supply boat. Lifting 19 1/2 ton cable drums. First one lifted successfully although safe load indicator showed 25 tons. As lifting second, the main wire
snapped and load fell back onto supply boat - no damage.
While pulling tubing, stabbing board slipped approx. 8ft before automatic brake engaged. During movement of the board, supported by the inertia reel, due to failure of coupling between motor
and gearing.
Unusual sound heard after completion of routine prove.smell of gas. Gas alarm sounded. Leak of gas and oil from failed gas gasket on ball valve fitted to return line from master prover
connection to the metering skid.
2 ton kito chain block handrail and pully parted from chain block and fell 16ft striking operator a glancing blow. Weight of pully approx 3lbs. No sign of split pin found.
Centrifugal compressor k9310 tripped on high level in v9015 first stage suction scrubber. Actuator blew off an 8" ball valve on discharge system causing large gas release.
Failure of actuator on valve on gas compressor unit. Bolts holding actuator in position sheared. Actuator was blown off. Considerable gas release. Plant shut down and area isolated.

Hopper discharge skip suspended on crane when hopper door mechanism allowed door to open. Contents - scaffold fittings - fell to deck.
Removing check valve from annulus under pressure (1400 psi). Extraction tool run into annulus using hydraulic lubricator on six sections of rod (2-tool, 4-extension pieces). On removal of third
extension piece - locking plate failed to hold entire assembly inside. Pressurised lub ricator blew out. No damage.
During start sequence of centrical compressor, auto start transformer ruptured with explosive force. Safety systems operated. Relevant elect rical equipment made safe.
Whilst moving a travelling block on a lifting beam, the block became dislodged and fell approx 4m. A jerk applied to the operating chain in order to release the unit caused it to jump and dislodge
itself from its guides.
1 ton air hoist to lift 0.3 ton pump unit. Hoist failed when attachmen t hook of hoist to lifting beam failed.
Uncontrolled gas release. Gas alarms triggered - red alert and full muster.
During load testing of a 5 tonnes winch a snatch block rated as 8 tonnes failed at less than 5 tonnes.
Wire line unit being moved. When pulled with tugger the unit became stuck in doorway. Tension on tugger wire suddenly released. Bolt on side of the unit ripped the mans ear.
Splitting ad crane to insert a 38ft section when a 5 ton wire sling broke. Failure occurred as boom being lowered to deck. Damage to boom foot.
Electrical fire at mezzanine gas compression module.dc system bulkhead lighting had not been isolated prior to removing a fitting.on removal ,light fitting fell away causing dc cable to contact
approx 2ft length of cable.cable caught fire.fuse blew.
Drilling well - 100% loss of mud. Well shut in. Continued pumping from loss circulation pit. Increase in pressure noticed.
Oil leaked onto hot exhaust and ignited - fire quickly put out. Ignition in seal oil tank - gas compression system. Operator passing; saw flash from flash from flame arrestor and heard a bang in
vessel. System isolated.
Small condensate leak on effluent control system vent pipe near mol pump. Construction activities in the vicinity including grinding. Small flash from grinding ignited condensate. Fire quickly
extinguished.
Offloading cargo. Vessel made minor contact with installation on, or just below, waterline. No damage to platform or vessel.
Just starting to raise stabbing board when sheave pin (6" of sheave) failed. Sheave and wire rope fell. Stabbing board held on emergency device and did not fall.
Hot welding rod thrown over side. Landed on nylon scramble net which caught fire. This was quickly extinguished - no other damage.
Swab valve on live well inadvertantly opened when chicksan line from well to separator had been disconnected. Gas released with chicksan flailing on drill floor.
Crane at maximum radius about to lift load off boat. Sudden jerk on crane so driver shut it down.
Pressure testing completion string on well. Safety valve rutured above rig floor level at 4450 psi. Piece of bottom sub blew out - body of bottom sub broke. Weight of tubing string supported by
rotary slips and valve above slips when it failed.
S.v. Discharging drilling cement into tanks on platform, by air-blowin s.v. Discharging drilling cement into tanks on platform by air blowing a filter bag became detatched and blocked the vent
line. Tghe upper of two inspection hatches was blown across the room.
Welding taking place on porch of module a when gas emitting from a loose valve was ignited. Fire immediately extinguished.
<...> engine shut down for instrumentation problems - corrected. Engine taken through warm-up circle to bring it on line - working okay. Put back on line - engine exploded. Safety valves shut
engines down. Fragments of engine blown around rig.
S v <...> carrying out diving operations. Moored to installation by 2 mooring ropes and 2 anchors. Work completed. Boat slipped port anchor and struck spider deck on installation. No serious
damage.
Water injection flowline stub fitting. 'Weldelet' fractured at weld and projected across module. 320 bar injection pressure in line. No damage.
Block supported on overhead beam was lifting an electric motor. Initial lift successful. Hoist moved down beam. Motor then lowered to deck when failure occurred.
Liquid carry over to flare due to process fault condition. Blew back onto platform causing 2 fires - quickly extinguished. One in area of cab of west crane, other near crown blocks.
While load being lifted,load chain of 1 ton chain block broke allowing load to fall.man was struck a glancing blow on the face resulting in minor injury.

Whilst lowering crane jib onto stand, hoist cable free - fell allowing headache ball to fall to deck.
Freak wave (tail end of hurricane <...>) hit bridge between flotel and jacket. Flotel moved out of operating limits - bridge telescoped more than 3m. Bridge lifted automatically. End of bridge
fouled scaffolding. Platform evacuated. Minor damage.
Whilst lowering radial arm drill using <...> hoist, load chain jumped one link resulting in m/c (drill) falling over and snapping the hoistline chain.
Running up gas turbine for gas compression. Electronics problem worked on by electricians. Run-up again - bang was heard. Platform operator manually shut unit down. Found that seal oil
degasser tank had ruptured along welded seam.
1" gas vent line sheared off from vertical pipe spool leading fronm top of glycol contactor to one of psv's protecting vessel.led to major esc ape ofgas from glycol unit to bop deck
area.maintenance work being carried out on recycle valve on hp gas injection system.machines had been unloaded.loud noise heard in module 4.machine shutdown.severe vibration in vicinity of
glycol system.bypass on system was seen not to be operating properly & was manually opened.shortly after the vent line fractured & a gas escape resulted.
Relief valve blew off on glycol container. Also, a 1 inch stub that was welded to pipework to relief valve broke away.
Whilst lifting cargo from sv mv <...> the <...> suspension chains failed.the cathead sheate and the hoist line failed resulting in basket falling into the sea.crane made safe.
Main hoist on east crane broke while unloading supply boat.load,which weiched 5.7tns,dropped into the sea.hoistline had become fouled by the chandelier suspension chains.
Replacing series 5000 high pressure insertion flowmeter when welded end of flowmeter shaft sheared. Remaining shaft ejected from flowmeter causing shattering of hand wheel which winds
meter up and down.
Section of b.o.p. Stack being lowered to skid deck using whipline of priestman sealion crane. Weight came off hook causing swivel to spin. Castle nut came off and hook parted from line. Locking
pin had sheared.
Whilst removing dampened down insulation, burst into flames. Quickly extinguished. Cause: slight hot oil leak from thermowell ti 5739.
Vessel manoeuvreing closer to platform with bridge in postion. Damage to handrails. Due to weather conditions and sea state, the gap between <...> and platform became greater than preferred.
With bridge still in place (but declared closed by p.a.),treasure finder attempted to winch closer to platform. However, <...> started to go astern rather than come to starboard. Immediate action
was then taken to raise the bridge. While bridge was being raised, damage was done to handrails on treasure finder, and pneumatic hose for bridge control parted at breakaway coupling.
Windspeed 45 kts nne: waveheight - 4m.
Operator doing routine well checks. Noticed water spraying from below mezz level. Found that a plug from casing head spool was missing. Pressure at 2900 psi - depleted after 5 mins. Plug
found 15 yds from tree.
Deceased was working on drill floor pulling out of hole when a piece of equipment fell from derrick and hit him on the head.
An electrician received burns to his hand caused by an electrical flashover when he was carrying out an isolation of electrcal equipment, in preparation for a planned maintenance routine. The
electrical cabinet involved had been switched off but still had live conductors at the bottom of the cabinet. These conductors were protected by a perspex guard. When the main fuses were
removed and placed on the floor of the cabinet, one of the fuses was inadvertantly moved past the guard. The fuse came into contact with a live conductor and earth causing an arc. The primary
cause of the accident would appear to be the inadequacy of of the perspex guard to provide complete protection.
Deceased assisting two mechanics in preparations for the removal of a pump motor. Above pump was a canopy structure. Deceased stood on one of the panels of this structure which gave way.
Deceased fell approx. 18ft to deck. Panel followed and struck him on the head.
Racking pipe monkey board finger flipped over and sheared component, which fell 85ft to drill floor. Struck injured on the arm. Component weight was 5-6lbs.
2 men working at 161m level in leg. Portable alarm indicated h2s. Men donned breathing apparatus to leave leg. One man completed the escape - other man collapsed 2-3 levels up. Rescue team
retrieved man. Was kept under observation.
Shacklepin of <> snatchblock became unscrewed allowing snatchblock to come adrift from the sling to 9 5/8 ing, which was being lowered out the v-door fell, striking the fill-up line and
hitting injured on the head.
Scaffold boards stacked on top of a portacabin. Helicopter down draft blew a board off which then hit injured on the head.

Whilst unloading marine vessel m v <>, a large rogue wave hit vessel on starboard beam causing the cargo to shift thereby trapping the crewman between a cargo basket and container.
Workover crew in process of changing out kelly spinner,utilising rotary table & rig tongs.tongs attached to kelly spinner tool joint & a pull applied to upper tong.at registered pull,lower tong
totally failed at 4ft lever arm & dropped to deck.
While installing flowline on wellhead, it toppled over and crushed <>. Two hoists were fastened to the flow line. Initially these hoists supported the flowline near its centre of gravity but during
the operation they were both moved towards opposite ends of the pipe after one flange had been landed on the xmas tree. In positioning the other flange the flowline lifted off the xmas tree and
toppled over. No lifting equipment failed and no plant or equipment was damaged. The immediate cause of the incident is incorrect positioning of lifting equipment.
Injured crushed between two containers on back of supply vessel. Vessel had rolled causing container to move.
Rig crew were pulling and racking back a stand of 4 3/4" drill collars from well a12. In the process of racking back the stand would have been fouled by the swivel bail as the swivel was stored in
the rat hole. The kelly spinner was used to move the swivel bail but the bail was allowed to return to its prior position before the stand was clear. The bail struck the stand which in turn swungback
and struck the casualty throwing him to the deck.
One of the <...> offshore platforms may have to be cut from the seabed by explosive charges. During piling work severe vibrations caused damage to the jacket. The pile-driving equipment broke
down. A substitute pile-driver proved to be too powerful for the piles needed.
While carrying out a lowering test on davit launched liferaft, the <> quick release hook opened and liferaft fell to water. Man in liferaft fell out 3m above water. Picked up by supply vessel.
Sustained minor injuries (bruising).
Centre crane dropped a load approx. 4ft to deck. Hydraulic motor had gone into a powered descent due to a fault on one of the limit switches
Whilst lifting the coil tubing injector head from the rig floor onto the moving piperack a 1 ton sling, which was part of the rigging being used to prevent the unit swinging, was over stressed and
broke.
20 ton caisson was being manoeuvred by crane and slinging arrangement - chain on a tugger. Chain snapped. Caisson swung and hit some scaffolding.
Offloading s.v. <> of 250lb with two 1 ton swl slings. When cable slack one of slings caught on an adjacent load and at same time boat went into a trough. Shock broke one of slings. No
damage to crane.
Burst valve in 200psi production train causing leakage of gas/oil water into caisson drain system. Caisson overpressurised causing further leakage via caisson valves.
East crane lifting quad of diving gas from back of d.s.v. Along east side of rig. As quad cleared east side of vessel, the fast line failed midway between boom tip and d.s.v. Deck. On the detatched
section of wire, the hook unlatched and fell into the sea.
Supply vessel collided with platform at south west leg. No damage to platform but boat returning to port with two holes above water line.
A joint of 30" conductor (41 feet in length) was being loaded into the transfer trough of a <> pipehandler by the use of the side loading arm. The rear support leg of the side loading arm
gradually gave way causing the conductor to slide backwards out of the arm. The conductor came to rest against the bulkhead of module 26. No cause has as yet been established - investigations
are ongoing. Dept. Of energy inspector, <>, was on the platform at the time of the incident and was informed.
Supply boat on port side of rig, maintaining position using main engine and port bow thruster. Thruster failed, vessel hit north east end of barge fender. Small indentation to barge fender and boat.
Starting avon g 4600 gas turbine. Explosion occurred resulting in exhaust ducting from turbine being moderately damaged.
Work to encase ballast lines in utility shaft. Blocks in basket suspended by air winch. Basket moved sideways at 50m level to get through hatch - rigging failed allowing load to pendulum.
Narrowly missed two men but hit scaffolding and damaged it.
While lifting a pump thrust assembly (weight approx. 125kg) using an air winch, one of the eyebolt links attaching the load to the lifting gear parted. Eyebolts were rated at 500kg swl.
Whilst running 5" ddrill pipe through a bop as part of a work over operation a "mini blowout" was reported. 10 barrels of oil released. Gas alarms did not sound.

4 chain blocks attached to deck freezer. Each block 3 tonnes swl. Load applied. Block at nw corner - chain snapped at anchor point. Was due to operator error - too much load applied.
Failure of nitrogen coil tubing. Tubing snapped as it was being withdrawn from the well. Failure occurred near a weld.
Sv <> collided with platform. Damage to platfrom minor. Vessel evacuated (12 people onboard). Bridge badly damaged.
D.s.v. <> carrying out diving operations. Vessel experienced dynamic positioning failure and hit south west corner of platform. Vessel returning to port. Superficial damage to walkway and
ladder on platform.
Chicksan being pressure tested in well a9. Kill line hydro tested to 5,000psi. Valve in line blew apart. Line did not whip.
Cable fire in utility shaft. Extinguished quickly by safety watchman. Was temporary cabling for lighting work area.
Platform on shutdown. Module 9 (separators) working on line which should have been at atmospheric pressure - was slightly over. Portable gas detector in showed nothing. Welding arc struck and
gas cloud ignited. Flash fire occurred. Auto deluge inhibited, but manual actuated. Fire of short duration.
Hydraulic gangway lifted without warning with 3 men on bridge.jumped clear at about 6-8ft.one received minor bruises.
Drill string parted when pulling out from 848' and jarred-up then jumped off hook. Swivel assembly then fell on rotary table
During field shutdown - level control valve in main oil line blown off during installation of instrumental air supplies to control system on valve. System regulated to work on 20psi. Air supply
appears to have been subjected to 120psi (full platform pressure). Damage to valve diaphragm only.
9 ton load of drill pipe was being lifted from platform onto the deck of <> supply vessel using east crane whip line.once lifted crane driver discovered he had no control over the brakes.load
descended out of control & hit aft starboard side of supply vessel.load fell into sea.
Shutting down gas turbine for maintenance. Leak of lubricating oil from bearing seal onto hot exhaust caused small fire. Rapidly put out - no damage.
Welding operations taking place on grating around external perimeter of platform. Sparks from the welding operation ignited glycol coming out of the glycol vent. The fire was extinguished using
water. There is no sign of any damage.
Long oxy acetylene hose coiled up on hook. Supply valves and torch valves closed with gas trapped in hoses. Gas ignited by spark from grinders from within workshop. Small fire around joint.
Quickly extinguished.
Leak appeared on stub weld of a corrosion probe on gas compressor on line between first stage cooler and first stage discharge scrubber. Gas found to be leaking from horizontal crack in 8 at time
approx. 270 psi.
Redundant ball valve weighing 5cwts suspended on morris 500kg chain block. When valve was being lowered to deck, load chain snapped causing valve to fall to deck.
Working on new well. Preparing to run the tail pipe assembly. Man on the stabbing board felt it move therefore he jumped off. The whole assembly then left the guide rails, from the top first.
Runner wheels splayed out. Hanging on supporting lifting gear.
Lifting a downhole survey tool fom one end of deck to another. Lifting eye broke due to bad rigging. No damage.
Using 3 tonnes overhead gantry hauling a bop from one derrick to the other across skid deck. Hoist wire broke. Not rigged properly - no snatch block.
Fire occurred in m4w avon turbine hall. Initial inspection revealed severe damage to alternator and adjacent cabling at gt4. Machine had been running in stable condition at 4/12 hours at approx.
10 mw load.
Crane driver topping up crane with diesel when diesel tank overflowed. Diesel dripped onto medium pressure turbine exhaust causing fire. Was extinguished quickly.
Drill pipe being offloaded to supply vessel. Approx. 10-15 ft above deck of vessel load was dropped. Hydraulic line failure on hydraulic pump.
Fire in umbilical electrical supplies to drilling rig <> owned by <>. Local damage to insulation.
Pressure test being carried out on gas lift mandrill. 4500psi - hydraulic test on surface. Snap tight 1/4" connector failed. Whiplash caused minor injuries to <> (severe bruising to upper right
arm and lacerations requiring stitches).

Whilst lowering a 3 atch in the b.o.p. Deck down into one of the eggboxes the sling snagged, became detatched and the valve fell approx. 15ft to the deck below striking a glancing blow to the
xmas tree. No damage to tree except broken pressure gauge. Cameron valve shattered.
Failure of coiled tubing equipment. While pressure testing coil tubing unit (<>) at 5,000psi the rotational joint shaft failed. A part of the shaft which failed was forcibly ejected horizontally from
the unit.
While working stuck pipe the drill string parted high. The kelly assembly was released from the hook and fell across the rig floor.
Failure of 5 ton chain block. When taking out daniel orifice box suction line to main oil line pump it gave way. Blocks being used to spring flanges apart so checks could be made for pressence of
lsa scale.
A 25m section of caisson was being removed from splash zone area. Caisson was suspended from main lifting equipment by truneon bar. While lifting the caisson,subsea restraining clamp slipped
slightly. Action of sea produced pendulum movement.caisson was secured by slings & 1.5tne pull lift.action of sea against caisson allowed a shock load on pull lift which eventually burst.
Cargo operations in progress. During lifting operations a piece of metal roller fell to supply vessel deck. Had been held in position by grub screws which had come loose. No damage.
<> crane. Bursting of plastic bowl covering air hoist cut out system lubricator. Maximum test pressure 150 psi - actual working pressure 15 - 20 psi.
Drill pipe was being picked up by elevators from catwalk to run in hole.a failure of the drill pipe elevator latch spring resulted in a joint of drill pipe falling approx.8ft onto rotary table.
During caisson replacement, a 6 ton section was being lowered into position by a rigging arrangement of various components. One clamp slipped resulting in excessive load to tirfar (1 1/2 ton
s.w.l.). Tirfar failed. No other damage.
Lifting a 2 1/2 ton load using a 5 ton elephant super 80 chain block. In middle of lift, slipped through chain block about 2 1/2'.
While preparing to stand back casing, one finger sheared off the monkey board and fell 90ft to floor.
Platform south crane (priestman). Gearbox splinter box failed. Load did not fall and brakes secured it. Recovered boom.
Foreman was directing crane driver to re-secure a 5" transfer hose. The sling connecting the crane hook to the hose separated and the hose fell 30' striking him on shoulder.
Diesel driven compressor threw a connecting rod through its crank case. Flash fire resulted. No damage to any other plant or equipment.
Supply vessel impacted on south west leg and diagonal of structure. Paint programme in progress and leg scaffold took impact and was also damaged. Boat had drifted under stromg current.
Damaged leg had a 3-4 long and 1/2 wide x 3/16" deep gouge.
Scaffold boards found smouldering on turbine exhaust.
Wire lining operation. Pulling a tool when engine failed causing piston to come out of crankcase and debris to fly around.
Two electricians were changing out battery charger cables in battery room. Minor explosion occurred. Four batteries disintegrated and electricians were splashed with acid from batteries.
Gas escape in module 4 above train 2 of lp seperator. Followed immediately by a yellow shutdown. Leak identified and isolated. Gas dispelled by natural ventilation.
Bell 212 helicopter was taking off with maximum load. When 10ft off deck, no. 2 engine failed - ran down under pilot's control. Landed heavily due to reduced engine power.
Fire on shale shaker.
Running tubing. Derrick block being lowered. Hit stabbing board. Travelling block came into contact with the board. The board's top rollers sprung out of the runner tracks. Board held in position
at approx. 20 degrees from horizontal by the 2 ton swl chain hoist.
Chain block failed. 12 ton swl. Block moved into position to lift mol pump. Main hook assy dropped 2ft and stopped. No load supported at time. Static end stopped hook falling by jamming.
Small flash fire. Ignition of drips of condensate during breaking of a flange in north gas line off lp seperator onto flare. Plant in module shut down. Condensate dripped from mezz level to floor
level. Ignition by welding slag. No damage.

Minor explosion in low pressure gas compression module lubricating oiltank. No damage. Flame through dip tube even though purge gas system in operation.
Small fire started on logging of glycol skid generation unit for gas treatment in module. Contained within 5 minutes. No damage other than immediate area. Shutdown initiated for the 20 minutes,
all on board sent to muster stations and stood down after 20 minutes.
Failure of west crane - preparing to lift a tank from the deck of s.v. <> onto the rig. Crane operator took up slack. As vessel went into a trough, simultaneously the overload alarm system
sounded and one of the pendants parted at a coupling. No damage to rig or boat.
Linkbelt pedestal crane power failure - could not stop boom from falling. 6 ton pedestal section being lifted (to relocate on deck of supply vessel). Boom lowered load into water then collapsed
handrails. Boom laid out across deck and over side of installation.
While lifting bundle of casing, east crane jib went into free fall. Connecting pin in brake mechanism failed. Load fell approx. 6ft to deck. No damage.
Rig floor air winch used in conjunction with 1tne chain block to lift clamp into position.clamp was attached to xmas tree.another hoist was being used on another job in same area.operator from
other job operate d hoist attached to clamp.clamp had been bolted to xmas tree & this caused failure of chain block chain.
Whilst unloading freight from helicopter, a wooden crate (approx. 55kg ) placed in safe position. On lift-off, lid and 2 gaskets from the crate came adrift and passed through rotor disc of
helicopter. Visual check revealed no apparent damage.
Process problem resulting in some well fluids being vented from top of vent stack and falling back onto platform. Fluids were a mixture of well water, hydrocarbons and uteg.
<> life capsule dropped into sea from storage position. Work requiring removal of 'd' ring in progress - capsule suspended temporarily for removal. Pad eye on capsule failed.
Picking up tail pipe assembly using 5 1/2" id. Single joint elevator instead of 5" id elevator. Other end of joint supported at v-door by crane. Assembly lifted 20ft above drill floor when it slipped
out of elevator and fell to drill floor. No equipment damage.
Offloading 7@ casing from supply vessel to rig. Load 4 tons. East crane whip line of 5 tons swl being used. While engaged in lift the whip line failed load. Fell into the sea.
Gray tool lubricator was being lowered onto main deck.was suspended from crane by 1tneswl webb sling slung round the main shaft of lubricator line. Sling broke allowing load to fall. Lubricator
damaged ted to come down,the sling broke allowing the load to fall.lubricator was damaged but no injuries or other equipment damaged. But no other injuries or equipment damaged.
High level alarm in wemco unit. Gas noted in accommodation. Gas cleared from accommodation by shutting off power supplies but continuing the ventilation. Cause believed to be due to first
stage separator outlet valve.
Generation module. Hot oil escaped onto turbine. Ignited, probably on hot surface. Extinguished in 30 minutes.
Minor explosion in main workshop area. Loud bang followed by blue flash 3-4ft high, in drain beside worker using a grinder. No evidence of gas or flammable liquid. Worker had been using oxypropane flame during the day. Torch valves checked but were not defective.
Sparks from a portable grinder in main workshop ignited a gas or substance in a drain gulley.minor explosion with single flash occured. Oxy propane torch used nearby-initial conclusion is that a
quantity of propane was accidentally released & collected in drain gulley.
Explosion in freon fitted compressor system of crane - provides ventilation for crane cab. Freon suction and discharge line each fitted with valve, closed in fabrication yard for transit. Found to be
cracked open rather than fully open.
Supply vessel was unloading at platform and had a clutch problem. Wave picked up and boat nudged the platform. No damage.
Temporary flowline between wellhead and separation plant failed. Gas alarms alerted operator and well shut in at surface and downhole. Failure occurred at connection.
Using south crane to lower casing. Fault developed in hydraulic system causing load to free fall on the whip line. After 20 ft an automatic brake engaged. The shock load broke the slings lowering
the casing, and casing fell onto deck of m.v. <>.
Whilst lifting b.o.p. Lifting cradle out of service, there was a serious failure of the lifting pad eye. This resulted in a 20ft load bearing riser falling to deck.
Esd tests carried out.production platform process systems shut down & depressurised.accidental initiation of 3 deluge systems resulted in large quantities of water entering drains system & into
classified open drains tank.explosion occured.
Broken drive chain on crane. Driver unable to hold boom on brake. No load on crane at time of failure.

Injured fell overboard. Was working in bow area wearing a safety harness. Line broke/came undone. Man fell approx. 80ft. Disconnected his safety line and was rescued within 5 mins. Safety line
not recovered.
East crane boom fell across pipe deck resting on sea water surge tank and also l.p. Flare line. Both were dented. There was no gas escape. Had been lifting a mini container when failure occured.
Racking back a stand of 31/8 drill collars on drill floor. Gust of wind moved stand. A 6ft section of a bumper subman drill fell backwards onto rawworks roof.
While cargo was being unloaded from supply vessel, vessel collided with north west corner of platform. Fender damaged and large dent caused in stern of vessel. Unloading was stopped and
vessel returned to port.
The 1" drain line on flowline of well h-18 was found to be leaking. Pipe had fractured just below socket weld. Well shut in for repairs.
Module 4 first stage separator had a dump of oil through system. Level controller allowed a certain amount of oil to escape into the sea. Gas in oil line came back up fire pump drains to module 9.
Level 4 in automatic shutdown. Separator isolated and production restarted.
Undertaking commissioning testing on oil pump motor. On starting motor, there was an explosion in the starter. When the start button was pressed by man a flash fire occurred in the motor
junction box. Man received superficial burns to face and right arm caused by the sudden release of heat through the junction box seal.
Cd linkbelt crane. While rigging up booms the main pendant arm was bent back over the crane and damaged.
Whilst lifting a valve from work platform using an elephant super 80 chain block,the block released,dropping the load.load fell back 1ft to work platform & tipped,snapping the lift chain.as hook
came free,valve fell off the platform to the deck-a distance of 3ft.
Failure of 1 ton chainblock. Block failed to hold load of 679lbs and load fell 30cms. No injuries.
Ip, who was positioned on pipedeck ramp was hit on the ankle by the base joint of chicksan as it settled back on the ramp.
Deceased acting as banksman for setting down/moving container, suspended from platform crane. Container swung and caught deceased on or above shoulder.
Section of support steel work cut from parent structure & hot section discarded.hot slag showered onto deck & fell on a fire blanket covering blunted redundant pipework associated with removed
first stage gas cooler.personnel left site & flashback with residual fire occurred.extinguished immediately.
Pulling drill water pump 'a'. Assembly consisting of 19 sections of pipe 21' x 6" id 2xpup pieces and pump. 70mm electric cable. Having pulled eight sections of pipe and spooled the cable
associated with it onto a cable drum. The pipe parted at the threaded joint between the tenth and eleventh sections. 20 foot cable laid in work area awaiting spooling was pulled violently towards
and down pump caisson. Cable hit <> and knocked him off his feet. Cause: thread between tenth and eleventh section only engaged by 1 1/4" of the 3" thread spread. Sections of pipe pulled
apart, threads did no strip.
Pressure testing subsea tie-in, when 1/4" tubing being used for test pressure fluid parted at 400bar.
4 man team consisting of 2 riggers and 2 pipefitters were removing a valve (approx 750kg) from a vertical pipe. The valve was secured by means of a graylock clamp. (another vlave had been
removed previously and the men had been instructed by their supervisor in the method of operation). Two 1 tonne chain blocks were erected, one immediatley above the valve, the other approx
0.8meters to the side (both chain blocks were approx 4.5meters above the valve). It was the intention to lower the valve using both blocks. The riggers did not secure the valve to the chain block
immediately above. <> undid the bolts on the graylock clamp. On removing the last bolt the valve swung toward the vertical, <>s arm was pinioned between the valve and a guardrail some
460mm distant.
Piece of pipe sprang from elevator and hit injured. Had been moving pipe from pipe rack to v-door. Missed door, elevators unlatched.
The ip was removing a section of lagging from a 2" heating pipe carrying a solution of ethylene glycol in water at a temp of about 85oc & a pressure of 2 bars. A small piece of the pipe wall blew
out and the resulting spray caused scalds to <>'s hands, arms and legs. The affected parts are estimated at about 10 percent of the total skin area.
Half a ton of crown sheave fell on i.p.'s leg (right knee cap).
I.p. Was preparing to weld square section steel buffer to main support beam on a wellhead.as he moved his hands towards workpiece to strike an arc,welding rod accidentally touched a 1/4 t
supplies hydraulic oil to a control valve.resultant arc burnt through tubing & caused a small hole which allowedoil to spray out. This ignited & caused a flash fire.

During preparation for a well pressure test there was a gas escape in the bleed-off line which was ignited by sparks from a grinding operation some 16 feet away. Two persons were injured as there
was a flash-back to the bleed-off line.
Platform crane operator attempting to raise/lower tanker hose onto supply vessel. Crane pendant hook caught on vessel. Due to trough in sea, vessel sank pulling crane off rig. Some impact with
vessel. Crane fell to sea bed with operator still inside cab. One man on the vessel was struck by the falling crane.
Fire in galley at the bottom floor of accommodation. A deep fat fryer burst into flames. The fryer was electrically isolated and the fire was tried put out by use of fire blanket and hand
extinguishers; neither was effective in suppressing the fire. The galley was evacuated due to dense smoke. Fire team used 4 bcf and 7 dry powder hand extinguishers, but they did not manage to
control the fire. The fire was extinguished by use of AFFF hoses and foam branches which were rigged up from production deck. The fixed dry powder extinguisher has been replaced by a foam
system and foam hand extinguishers provided. Because of the unavailability of food preparation and water damaged mess area, the platform was down-manned from 76 to 44.
Series of large explosions resulting in the near total destruction of the installation.165 crew members lost and 2 rescue men lost.
Two spool pipes approx 15ft long were being lifted by crane from pipedeck to west skid deck using 2tne wire slings on each pipe.crane driver could not see landing area.flange on one of spools
was underneath skid rail.as crane pulled,sling overtensioned & snapped.both spool pieces fell approx.10ft to deck.
Whilst removing section of steel cladding near top of drilling deck, securing polypropelene rope was severed when the piece,caught by the wind,swung over an adjacentsharp edge.this allowed
the section to fall free 42m on to skid deck.bounced on to helifuel bund,puncturing a firewater line.
Wire sling parted while a 2 - bottle gas rack was being moved on deck. Frame and one bottle landed on lower deck, other bottle fell into the sea. Sling within examination period but core
corroded. Sling also much heavier than necessary.
Bridge operated telescopically to allow for movement.traffic light system started to work which stopped personnel crossing.movement between units brought into play the limiter which causes
bridge to lift clear. As it did it caught on structure of platform & sheared falling into sea taking lifeboat en route.
Man was working on mooring platform at se corner of installation, there was an opening in the guard rails behind him protected by safety chains. He slipped and fell backwards striking the chains
which failed as the securing links opened out. He fell 70' to 75' into the sea.he was rescued by standby boat using fast rescue craft. Minor injuries.
During a programme of statutory function tests of esv's,a valve on the main gas export line was operated in error allowing gas to escape to atmosphere via an open vent line.source of release was
isolated in 7 minutes.
Welder was working.sparks flew into the corner of the area where he was working & caused a rag to smoulder.was seen by fire watcher & was put out with a fire extinguisher in a few minutes.
Fire detected in no.1 fire pump room.halon discharged.fire automatically extinguished.possible cause overheating of engine cooling system.
Bond SS76 aircraft refuelled and took off. Fuelling airclip still attached. Ran out full length of airclip and broke.
Drive shaft connecting gas compressor seal oil pump to its driver sheared causing the coupling joint to part company with the shaft. Coupling joint hit the protective guard around the shaft&
removed it from its mounting points.no injuries occured.
Major gas release in gas compression module.all personnel mustered at their stations.
A small fire was observed on the lean oil pump motor. The cause of the fire appears to have been a collapsed bearing on the motor, causing oil from the bearing reservoir to ignite on contact with
overheated casing.
During operation involving use of oxyacetalene burner gun on living quarters walkway,operator heard a bang & detected a small flame near base of gun handle.bottles were shut off at regulator
isolator valve & as flame continued,pressure was relieved at torch which extinguished the flame.
Water from cell 13 of condeep storage facility leaked into mini cell while plug was being retrieved from line ws 1107.hydrogen sulphide was detected at 20m level.line was made safe by closing
block valve isolation & the installation of a blank on the line.
Pressure gauge was removed from pipework associated with pre-absorber cooler.gas escaped for approx. 10 secs.gas escape shutdown surface process system.was due to hydrates in an isolating
valve,preventing proper valve closure.

Hot oil fire occured in module 6.fire was automatically detected & extinguished by deluge system.all personnel were mustered & base office mobilised.fire was caused by oil soaked lagging.
During welding conductors in habitat,firewatcher noticed smoke & flame s coming from live cables where they crossed walkway of pipedeck.he immediately switched off welding machine &
extinguished the fire.
During well testing operationsa well was undergoing flow testing through portable test separator to overboard vent.accumulated liquids were collected & manually drained to a
portable,atmospherically vented stock tank.during this process,stock tank over pressured & ruptured.
New 1tn <> chain block was being used to lift load of 60kg from floor to barrow.on initial lowering the load fell.
Rig <> was running drill pipe into open hole after a bit change/bop test. <>,the derrickman was working on the monkey board.he connected the elevators to a stand of drill pipe,and was
holding the stand to prevent whipping,but it whipped more than normal and the elevators struck him.
Discharge of condensate gas escaped from ne vent stack.process shutdown - no fire & no injuries.
No. C turbine tripped causing load shedding of the <> platform. Smoke was observed coming from from top of door of control panel. When door was opened flames were originating from
connectors at bottom left hand side of panel. These were burning vertically through several banks of cables within the panel.
Drill line had been slipped and cut. Taking block to derrick end of line came free. Line slipped on the drum and coiled around making sufficient holding force to hold blocks. Blocks are
suspended at 85' above floor. Arrangements in hand to secure line with clamps.
Winch motor was placed on a 36" x 39" area of 25mm thick grating. While platform fitter was bar turning winch gears the grating gave way. The motor fell into the sea and the man just prevented
himself from falling.
Hydrochloric acid tank sprung a leak round mid point of tank.as no way could be found to stop the leak,the tank was lifted clear of all perso nnel & allowed to discharge into the sea until empty.
Mobile skid mounted air compressor was being used to supply platform's plant air system.unit was seen to be emitting black smoke.unit shutdown & area made safe.
Caller advised that a small fire in the lagging of an electric oil heater located on module roof occured.fire was quickly put out.no injury.
Small fire in power generator - diesel starter compartment. Unit shutdown and halon system actuated. Probable cause seal failure in the turbo charger which allowed lube oil into the unit.
Resulting vibration caused one or more oil pipes to break spraying lube oil onto hot surfaces.
Compressor barrel had been moved 6m by <> chainblock assembly. Block supported on a monorail & operated by air control unit.load was being lowered when two loud bangs were
heard.lowering was stopped & cause investigated.lower block was found to be at an angle.poor load chain feed from storage bin resulted in misalignment of chain with load sprocket.
While raising chicksan assembly, which was attached to standard drill pipe, at a height of 30ft, part of the chicksan line separated, falling to the drill floor. A roughneck was struck as line
rebounded but received minor injuries.
Pressure testing lubricator when flexible hose separated from connection at 3000psi and i.p. Was hit ion the face with high pressure water.
When working with a hydraulic varco kelly spinner,an associated anti-rotation turnbuckle connecting spinner to kelly failed due to excessive loading when making up drill pipe connection.fell out
of derrick onto east skid deck.when spinner started up,one of turnbuckles connected to kelly failed.
Wing valve actuator was isolated & being dismantled for "o" ring replacement. Valve was closed retaining bolts on actuator base & circlip were removed. Prior to removal of actuator bonnet,
piston & springs were ejected into air by actiuon of springs & landed on working platform around actuator.
Small fire occured when welding lead conductor arced to earth causing insulation to ignite.fire extinguished by 09:38.
West crane was swung across east skid deck to backload onto supply vessel. Operator boomed out the crane. Crane went into free-fall - approx . 4m vertically. Pennant hook struck skid deck.
Operator arrested fall . Found faulty boom boost pressure valve.
Driller was preparing to lift rathole to clear bop deck to facilitate rig skidding.sling was placed around rathole & connected to main block .as driller took weight on sling & after rathole had been
raised approx.1ft,the sling snapped.

Operator checking raw water line for fire main.8" <> valve-actuator removed.when spindle turned with a shifter, spindle shot out of hole just missing operators head.
Fire among stored scaffold boards.
Attempting to pull casing from well. Internal casing spear was run down to 83'. Spear set and pressure put to 2000 psi, the blocks exerted pressure but no movement of casing. So spear retrieved
but it was unseated before internal pressure released thus entire unit pushed up holes bending kelly into blocks.
Whilst moving 700kg of scaffolding from helideck level to main deck level,using the platform stiff legged derrick crane,the crane motor tripped.this left load suspended approx.2m above main
deck level.operator left crane to reset motor,load being held by the winch brake.this slipped causing load to falluncontrolled to the deck.
Lifting otis bop & riser section using a tugger located on the bop dec lifting otis bop and riser section using a tugger located on the bop deck. Rigging configurationbetween load load & tugger
was via 4 sheave blocks. Onn lifting the, load one of the 3 tne wire strops securing a sheave to a tubular member, parted.
Fire in pump enclosure-sprinklers set off-no injuries. Fire was probably due to fuel line rupturing at fitting.
The bridge gangway, hydraulic bridge , automatically operated with no warning raising the bridge about 6 feet the control system should operate at 3m heave and automatically operate at 5m. A
loose cable was found on the auto control local junction box
Fire alarm activated by a u.v. Detector in generator cab. Unit immediatly e.s.d.and halon extinguishant activated. Found that a stainless steel fitting on the lube oil system had fractured. Oil spray
contacted adjacent hot surfaces and ignited.
During lifting of a fire pump shaft out of casing a 2 tonne wire strop detached from shackle attached to lifting eye of pump shaft.
Air dryer overheated in drilling module. Fire caused halon to be released.
Minor electrical fire.coupling on rotary convertor for uninterruptable power supply burnt out.platform mustered.smoke in module 68 -halon deployed manually.smoke & heat generation from
faulty coupling on one machine only.
Coupling connecting diesel engine to fire water broke, resulting in sparks and small fire.
Whilst relaying boom hoist wire on drum of west crane,weak link failed allowing wire to fall into sea.remained attached to crane at jib head anchor point.on retrieval of wire,double block was
missing.
An 'i' beam mounted on an 'a' frame above the crown block on drilling derrick had pad eye attached to it by 4 bolts 18 long and 3/4" diamater one bolt worked loose and fell 50m to drill floor. Bolt
had only been secured by single nuts.
36" trunk line being dewatered. Problems during receipt of pigs on platform. Breakdown of seal capacity of pigs resulted in gas being received. Gas dispersed via 12" line. Brief flashover in pump
line region. Second flashover in same area. Water deluge of whole dump line. Third flashover on receipt of final pig.
Fire alarm raised indicating fire in water injection module. Faom used to clear area. Suspect electrical fault in water injection pump.
Leg "a" was at 70m level & there was a leak of water 20m above. Water cascaded down onto light fitting which short circuited & caught fire. Circuit was isolated, leak repaired & the fittinig was
sent ashore for detailed investigation.
Having cut 16" riser were lifting remaining section out by means of a slinging arrangement supported by a 4 ton swl sling over a beam. Load was 2 1/2 tons. When lifted about 12" off deck
supporting sling broke and load fell. Sling had been arranged over sharp corners.
Minor fire on gas turbine exhaust ducting believed to be due to leak of lubricating oil.turbine drives main gas compressor for re-injection.
During routine check on a turbine,the hood door was opened & small flames were noticed around exhaust cowling lagging.flames were extinguished.cause was a faulty 1" dowty seal. New seal
installed on follow up check,small flames were again noticed on exhaust cowling & extinguished.cause was the same as before.
While drilling smoke was seen coming from around the rotary table.drilling operations were stopped & smoke increased & flashed up over rotary table.flames were extinguished & area cooled by
water.
While running in 3/12" drill string driller raised a set of 3 1/2" varco drill pipe elevators to the monkey board and picked up a stand of pipe. As he picked up the stand, a steel pin (3 from the
elevators to the drill floor approx. 100ft below.
Crane lifting load which consisted of bottle rack from supply boat to platform. Slings failed due to catching through the ferrules.

Hydraulic cone blew off releasing high pressure hydraulic oil. Discharged 270 gallons.stopped drilling.
Platform struck by supply vessel,<>- vessel damaged.
Gas release from wellhead in 9 5/8 annulus. 3/8" pressure sensor line. Gas lift well system shut down automatically. 2,500psi rated line. All gas detectors in area registered in excess of 60% lel.
Gas disperced safely. Well was just being brought onto gas lift at the time.
West crane lowering container when engine cut out.crane operator unable to re-start engine.container dragged over stern of supply vessel into sea.operator still unable to start engine.crane slewed
to the left & came to a stop with boom over helideck.
While installing flow line spool piece using chain block of 1.5tns capacity at one end & a pull lift of 1.5tns at the other,pull lift brake failed allowing one end of load to fall 24" striking rigger on
left leg before coming to rest on scaffolded platform.no injury to rigger.
Newly fitted flexible insulating wrap on exhaust expansion bellows on after turbine had been on line for three hours.orange flame visible through small gap in cladding was extinguished a few
seconds after emergency stop button pressed. Turbine driven 'b' train gas compressor caught fire under cladding
Wireline equipment fell.no injuries.
Extensive movement of wellhead tree during heavy seas caused disconnection of of a stainless steel pipeline which connects the "a" annulus on the tree to a gauge mounted on structure.
Disconnection of pipeline caused a gas release which was detected.
Crane about to lift 10 ton load. Crane wire snapped inside the jib. Crane rating was 15 tons.
Gas & ngl leak in cellar deck.grease nipple removed.short duration escape of ngl's.
Incident occured in drilling shaker house whilst platform was shut down while using cutting gear to burn 3" off the baffle plate inside the above the shale shakers.small amount of oil based mud
residue in theextractor hood, above the shale shakers, a small amount of undetectedoil based mud residue went on fire. Fire was extinguished with a dry powder extinguisher by the fire watcher.
No-one was injured and there was no damage sustained.
Attempting to stop minor leak of gas from valve stem & stainless steel port extension piece broke.gas was released through it.module filled with gas.process shutdown to de pressurise system.
On west drilling rig. Drilling drive being instaled in derrick. Snatch block hung from 1 tonne strop to assist with alignment. When tugger took tension, strop failed and block fell to deck.
Webbing strop with swl of 1 ton used to fit 8" ball valve weight 300 lbs). Load was swung over side of platform to load onto lower deck when strop failed and half of strop, including load fell into
the sea.
Small fire. Carry over from lp drain system thrown from lp flare tower and spread on top deck. Superficial damage to structural work and serious damage to fast rescue craft and tropo dishes.
Alert stood down 04:50hrs.
Lifting 30ft section of conductor.as it was being raised the load became detached from clamp.fell 6-7ft onto bell nipple under drill floor.
Hot work ongoing in module to remove heat exchanger bundles from gas cooler.leak on active gas system ignited.minor fire from leaking valve detected.platform closed in on esd.
Whilst pressuring up an air hose connected to maintenance air ring main,the aluminium head of the compressed air filter fractured.
Withdrawing a 24" diameter pile driver through a 25" hole in drill floor. Driller relying on hand signals. Load snagged in hole and 10 ton sling snapped.
During the commissioning of sulphate removal plant,a 2" steel braided hose failed at the crimped coupling connection at a pressure of 26.3 bar g.
Crane boom free fell. West crane was backloading empty container to supply vessel. Whilst boom out over vessel, it began to move of its own accord. Lever put into neutral and load lowered,
using main hoist onto deck.
Hvac system chiller copper pipework for lube oil system opened. System had been vented and flushed to make safe. Where work was continuing, there was a low point in the system. As soldered
joint was heated to release it, a small quantity of oil ignited. Extinguished immediately.
Raising b.o.p. Onto safety hooks. One of hydraulic rams parted at pad eye. B.o.p. Slewed round. Lifted using crown block and draw works and made secure.
While pressure testing a tubing hanger on well b3, the tubing was dislodged. Well is under control.

MInor explosion. Electrical damage to offtake from generator to switchboard.

Failure of <> chain hoist in wellhead area. The 10 ton hoist was being used to lift a blank flange (2-3 cwt). The clutch slipped and flange fell slowly to deck.
Chain attached to test weight failed when weight was lifted out of container.fell back approx. 1ft.
During planned gas injection shutdown released gas into module which activated the deluge system
In separator modules. Blow out panels blew into sea. Guard rails now in place around it.
Fire in helihanger. Extinguished with portable extinguishers. Was caused by welding operation outside.
<> offloading containers.one landed on deck by main hoist; but crane hook could not be raised or lowered as it was too high to be released from container.boat swept by wind and waves against
platform but could not move away because of suspended container.main crude oil export pipe; mast & aerial of boat damaged.
While operating a valve,the cover of redundant limit switch housing on the eim operator blew off striking man in face. (valve = v20,mechanical operator = eim gas driven motor mounted on 20
cameron ball valve)
Pulling drillpipe.one length slipped from drillfloor to bop deck due to error of operator of one of two air winches.
While transferring a section of new pipe into position,a 1tn chain block failed causing end of pipe to drop onto scaffold below.
Helicopter engaged in rotors running crew change.while helicopter was on deck,crane driver operated the crane.jib was raised & slewed across south edge of helideck.safety strop & hook passed
very close to helicopter rotor blades.
Gas leak from instrument tapping from well flowline (downstream of xmas tree).kidney seal blew.no personnel in area at time of incident.
Rig 40 crane lifting container loaded with 6 tons of grit. Whipline on the jaw. Parted. No personnel injuries crane operator reported weight load indicator warning alarm operating and gauge
reading 11900lbs.
Bottom hole assembly & stand of drillpipe run into hole.while pressure testing the casing,drillpipe began to move upward through rotary table dislodging drill pipe slips.pressure bled off & when
top pipe rams opened,drill pipe slipped through the slips & assembly dropped down casing,parting the chicksan line.
Clamp on drill floor in process of being moved.when it was lifted rope broke & clamp,weighing 250lb,fell 20ft damaging a valve handle.
Technician bleeding well through separator.observed gas escape from open manway door on test separator.he went to close it & rig went to yellow status.continued to close & rig went to red
status.door was gas tight & control room was informed.
I.p. Engaged in removing section of catwalk with 2 other workers.slings about to be attached to crane to take weight of catwlk while step wasremoved.i.p.'s tool wrong size & went to change.other
2 workers removed some scaffolding boards.i.p. Returned & commenced to remove step.when bolts released,allowed catwalk to drop striking i.p. On right leg.
Platform was taking diesel from vessel when i.p. Walked aft to inspect suspect hose connection.as vessel moved away,the hose tightened & the ship's weco coupling parted striking i.p on right leg.
Drilling/casing crew running 5 1/2" tubing string.lifting joint of 5 1/2" tubing to drill floor using pipe handling system.whilst transferring tubing to elevators,tubing fouled a 'dolly beam' causing
elevators to release joint of tubing which fell to drill floor,causing leg injuries to i.p.'s. Type of handling system was <...>.
The ip appears to have been overcome by petroleum gas or oil based mud vapour while working on the shale shaker deck.
Derrickman tripping out of hole. Ip unlatched a stand, in order to rack it back. During the process of manoeuvering the stand to the fingers, the stand struck his shoulder. The derrick on both rigs
on the platform are open, with windwalls at the drill floor and monkeyboard areas. The weather conditions were blowing 40/50 knots with gusts. To this end, a dust, caused some unexpected
movement in the stand, causing injury. Reported to department of energy, duty officer.
Electrical short circuit resulting in smoke detection and halon release, after chaffing of incoming supply wire insulation on static invertor.
Whilst picking up joint of 13 3/8" casing using drill floor winch and deck crane, the casing hung up on the bottom of the vee door ramp guide. The subsequent reaction was for the casing to swing
to the edge of the catwalk. The ip tried to avoid the swing by stepping off the catwalk and became trapped between the casing and a pile of casing centralisers.

<...> was preparing for diving operations and was dynamically positioned approx. 35' from platform when bow thruster failed pushing the bow into platform.the dsv's helideck made contact with
navigation light and part of its platform was demolished.a 20 amp fuse had blown on a section board,which supplied control units for bow thrusters
While making up a single joint of drillpipe with a 2" 1502 chicksan swivel on top, using the iron roughneck, the tong sweep swivel joint (lssj), type 50, locked against the elevator ballsand
subsequently backed off the top weco union. The elbow fell 38 feet to the dillfloor and bounced before it hit ip, (roustabout), operating the iron roughneck on the leg.
While moving 2 joints of 9 5/8 47' casing with crane, using 2 wire rope slings, one sling snapped allowing one end of load to fall back on casing on deck. Other sling snapped allowing load to fall
approx. 4ft.
Blowing down dead weight test manifold.drain line was blocked.secondary line operated.again line was blocked.suddenly stainless steel line coupliing parted due to force of pressure. Spun line
hit i.p. Across thighs
Pulling out of hole.trapped torque was not released prior to attching elevators & pulling pipe out of hole.i.p. Bent down to pull out slips & trapped torque was released causing elevators to rotate
at speed & horns of elevators hit i.p. On head knocking him across rig floor.
I.p. backloading <...> from west skid deck.connected hook to main ring of <...>.gave signal to crane operator to take away & was walking away between <...> & 2 others.main ring snagged on
location lug in corner,<...> prematurely lifted & swung towards i.p. Crushing him against 2 others.
Operation involved pulling in lower shear plate on crane pedestal tp align weld joint on top flange of lower deck beam using chain block.both load chain and pulling chain failed simultaneously
underload. Fully tested. I.p. Received slight abrasion & bruising to leg.
Scaffolding was being erected for access to well annulus valve.orifice plate valve tapping on hp water injection flowline adjacent to scaffolding blew out,resulting in fatal injuries to d.p.
Towels inside a tumble dryer in laundry smouldered & burned 30 minutes after being switched off during drying cycle.no injuries but there was fire damage to tumble dryer.
Basket being used to gain access to workover unit.i.p. Standing at north end of basket,giving signals to crane operator.operator boomed up & moved boom to bring basket alongside unit.i.p.'s
forefinger on right hand was crushed between basket & safety rail on workover unit.
Drillpipe being pulled out & laid on pipedeck catwalk.broken out in single joints & put into mousehole.drillpipe lifted using west tugger winch & pushed out through v door & lowered onto
catwalk.single joint of drillpipe became detached from tugger line & fell through v door.hit i.p. Glancing blow causing him to fall.
Crane driver was raising boom, boom fell and landed on boom cradle. Both damaged
Bottom hole assembly in place to commence workover.drill collars had been assembled using elevators & lifting subs.first joint of 2 7/8 ll pipe being picked up by elevators through vdoor.reached height of 15ft above rotary table,pipe slipped through elevators & fell to drill floor striking i.p. On back of shoulder.
About to lift container with crane.operator took up slack.i.p. Walked between container & compressor. Driver lifted container after receiving ok from banksman.lift wasn't centralised properly &
load swung ,trapping i.p. Between container & compressor.suspected fractured sternum.
16" diamter production header had been isolated completely & water jet washed. Previous day, welding had taken place on a joint. Watchman saw flames come out of from the ends of the pipe.
Extinguished with foam
The platform alarm automaticlly activated following detection of smoke in emergency switchgear room.platform halon system discharged and extinguished fire. Fire in ups (uninterrupted power
supply) system.personnel mustered no injuries.
High pressure hose on discharge no 2 mud pump ruptured & failed.oil based mud was sprayed on the surrounding equipment & area.minor damage caused to cables & cable tray located above
rupture point.
Between slack water periods,starboard anchor slipped its position with out warning.vessel slewed to port & port quarter came into contact with platform.some superficialdamage occurred to
divers landing stage.
Perforating gun went off down hole.
Condensate leaked in small quantities from crack in the condensate pump outlet spool.welding cracked.

Hoist sheave on east crane in prcess of being removed from top platform of crane "a" frame. Required use of 1.5 ton pull lift. During operation of pull lift, under load as sheave was being
lowered, chain slipped three feet. Weight of sheave 150lbs
Gas escape from well occurred at the ring type flange joint downstream of choke valve.joint blew.
Piece of wood which was lodged between hot surface of ruston gas turbine (g-555) exhaust ducting & two metal scaffolding boards caught fire. Fire put out immediately.
Clutch failure occurred on west crane diesel engine.consequent sparking by failing metal components set fire to a small oil pool in a temporary saveall under the engine.fire immediately
extinguished by crane operator.crane taken out of service.
Old fabrication shop was being dismantled using acetylene torch when a spark flew across to the cylinder rack & ignited an acetylene bottle (not the one being used for cutting),producing a 3ft
high flame.fire was quickly extinguished by tightening up cylinder outlet using key from adjacent cylinder.
West crane slowly lowering 3 ton food container onto deck near lifeboat. Brake control circuit failed causing load to accelerate from 10ft above landing area. Load collided with lifejacket cover
damaging the top, glanced off its door causing superficial damage.
Rechargeable battery pack ready for use.worker stood over the pack and reached across to switch off the power supply socket, (13 amp outlet 240v 50hz). Before he could switch off the battery
pack exploded in his face. Man was wearing mnsl safety glasses and his hard hat, which saved him from serious injury.
Varco top drive - running in hole.intermediate stop came adrift.thread badly corroded.welded back in place.
Minor gas leak at insulation flange on 10" gas export pipeline. No damage sustained.
During welding for installation of escape ladder from bridge landing platform at lower deck area,small flames were observed coming out of a glycol vent line which was about 2m below the
grating.
<...> riggers were installing a winch monitoring system package to the support frame on the se corner of spider deck.during operation the 3t rated strop on the lead block of retaining winch parted
resulting in the slung monitoring package dropping approx 6ft before coming to rest on a diagonal support member.
Supply vessel was manoeuvring on south side of platform to pass back portable water bunkering hose.operation curtailed due to weather, vessel closed s.e. Leg and contacted with small walkway
at approx. 5m level. Walkway took impact and parted at supports walkway/support connection. Support/leg connections remained intact.
1 ton chain block suspended from beam clamp was test lifting a 5cwt spool piece.load had been lifted 12" when block was unablke to hold load which to the floor. No damage or injuries
Fire on flare tip.minor drop out to base of flare.hydrate in closed drains tank,putting hot oil through system to clear it when carry over occurred.
Electrically driven high pressure water pump in utility leg at 82m level was observed to give off an oil mist.followed by flare of an arc or flame followed by yellow/brown smoke.unit immediately
switched off
An unfired enerjet perforating gun (14ft long, 6 shots per foot) was being removed from well aa-02. The gun was inside the schlumberger lubricator which had been disconnected from the <...>
BOP. Using a tugger wich whose wire rope was connected to a detatchable lifting clamp located on a straight section of the outer surface of the lubricator, the lubricator was lifted approx 2 ft and
moved to one side. At this point the lubricator slipped 6" downwards through the clamp and struck the top of the gun toolstring which broke at its (design) weak point. The gun dropped onto the
rotary table. Damage: the gun strip was bent. Probable cause: lifting clamp incorrectly positioned, and possibly wrong clamp used.
Container weighing 2tne was being lowered by west crane onto supply vessel when it stopped approx 3ft above the deck.at the decks highest point the container fell onto the deck & crane hook &
ball swivel block then fell on top of the container.
Drill collar elevators for 9 1/2" outside diameter drill collars were lifted from racked back position on rig floor to a vertical position over the well,when the stand of collars dropped through rotary
table & onto hole.bit on the bottom split hunting clamp as it passed through riser.
Smoke detected in emergency switchgear room. Oim noticed small fire on filter capacitor bank in 110 ac ups reserve by-pass distribution panel. Flame immediately extinguished & by-pass system
isolated.

Bop supported by lifting frame with bottom flange just above top riser flange.10deg orientation adjustment required to fit kill & choke lines,bop turned by means of tuggers.turning action caused
tortional failure of one of four hydraulic rams on lifting frame & bending of one other. Bop landed on riser flange & made safe.
Crane was used to lift a 1,1/2 ton load off supply vessel.when load was approximately 20ft off the deck the crane shudderd crane driver stopped the lift.he attempted to lower the load nothing
happened.it transpired that the crane whip line had come off the catched sheeve and jamed. A <...> mk35,bd crane was being used,supply vessel <...>.
While commissioning recently installed fiscal meter,leak developed at filter cover.approx. 10bbls oil contained by bund & drained to sea sump.caused by failed 'o' ring.
East crane in use for lifting operations at drilling rig.due to imminent helicopter operations,crane was being manoeuvred into rest/cradle. Approx 50ft above boom rest,jib commenced
uncontrolled descent,despite application of emergency brake.jib fell into rest with some force.
Whilst removing grating from access crane manway & cutting with burning torch,hot metal fell on to fire blanket burning through & damaging propane supply hose igniting propane leak.ga
activated.small fire started which was put out.other leaks suspected from damaged hose.
Whilst a 31ft length of 5" diameter drill pipe was being hoisted from pipe deck through vee door to drill floor,the air winch wire rope parted.drillpipe fell back through the open vee door approx.
20ft & landed on the pipe deck causing no damage.
Whilst installing drilling seawater lift pump using an air hoist,the chain was overlowered & the anchor bolt sheared.load fell 0.5m but chain fell approx. 12m to work site.no injuries to personnel.
Air hoist type was 'profi' 15 ton swl.
Using elephant chain block model super 100 to lower new shale shaker into position when link broke.shater fell about 12 inches.
3 x 45 gallon drums of scale inhibitor were being lowered to skid deck using main platform crane.container net snagged on protrusion from derrick.banks man lost radio contact with crane
operator.both drums fell 20ft to skid deck & split open. (inhibitor core exit 4037. A low toxicitity non flammable chemical.
6.9 ton skip being transferred from platform to supply boat. Load ran through the brake and fell in the sea. Recovered to platform.
A second level gas alarm initiated an installation general alarm & a platform emergency shutdown which included total block & vent of fuel gas system.it was discovered that a pressure switch
had been fitted with non-standard gasket which allowed fuel gas to leak into enclosure type of pressure switch 'amot'.
Routing of well to test separator required change of orifice gas measuring plate.operator activated normal sequence for removing original orifice plate - clamping plate,sealing plate & gasket had
been removed when sudden gas pressure lifted the orifice plate & carrier out of top of fitting.separator isolated manually & blown down sufficiently to allow unit to be sealed.
Gas leak occurred from sight glass in oil test separator.low level gas alarm recorded on detection system.safety & production personnel investigated & found leak in sight glass. Donned breathing
apparatus & isolated sight glass. Vessel depressurised & 'blown down' flare purged with nitrogen.
Fire took place whilst installing new crane.a torch was left on and oxy acetylene was coming out (valve open slightly).grinding was taking place elsewhere.ignited torch which burnt through fabric
ducting used for supplying air to personnel working in crane pedestal.when torch turned off,duct stopped burning.
While west crane was being used to lower bop stack into place in sub base of derrick on skid deck,load slipped or free fell final 6ft on to landing frame.no injuries & no damage.
Hydraulic hose burst in vicinity of port main engine.oil sprayed over hot engine causing thick smoke to from in engine room.fire alarm activated automatically.port main engine stopped resultin in
loss of all thrusters.retreated to 500m safety zone. Aboard supply vessel <...>.
Small fire in motor coupling drive to test separator transfer pump ga2506a.no releases of process hydrocarbons.platform mustered & production shut-in.extinguished in 5 mins.
Supply hose from acetylene cylinder parted downstream of regulator/flash back arrestor.flame blew back & ignited.flame impinged on body of cylinder for approx 2mins before being
extinguished by welder.
After calibrating d.p. Cells, a metering technician put cells back on line.technician heard escaping gas from metering hut above him & immediately re-isolated d.p. Cells.found that plastic line
from dead weight tester to d.p. Cells calibration port had split.
A 60 ton trolley beam was being used to position a hih drill.after load had been removed,one of the ropes continued to play out.no equipment damage.
In attempting to line up riser protection frame on nw corner of jacket, a three ton nylon strop was attached to frame & a pull eastwards using a six ton tugger on vessel was applied.strop failed
whilst under tension in a lateral mode.

Platform annual shutdown.bringing back on-line in area 4a mezzanine. Two 1/2" plugs blew out of a meter run leading to gas release (plant shutdown)
Gas compressory in hood-u v picked up small fire & gas detection panel 1 detector was activated.1 investigated by production operator & found smoke coming from within hood.manually
operated alarm system.platform alarm sounded went to muster stations.firen teamm entered hood extinguished by system
Following plant upset,glycol absorber pump tripped & shutdown.resulted in high levels in vessels which caused gas compression to shutdown.to remove high level from tower,the pump was
started.gas detected in vicinity of pump by fixed detection system initiating secondary shutdown.operator found pump shutdown & lpg blowing from seal cavity leak detection vent pipe.pump
lines isolated & depressurised. Minor explosion in hypocalorite generator. Minor damage contained within the unit.
Vessel engaged in bunkering and offloading cargo on west side near a4 leg. When mat received instructions from rig. Took eye off stern for a moment and vessel made contact with platform. Only
superficial damage to leg.
Compression fitting on 1/2" metering line came apart discharging gas into metering stack.alarms went off.platform shutdown & personnel mustered.after isolation,gas freeing & making safe,the
fitting was found to be improperly made up.
During jetting down operations of separators,plant operator in separator module requested reduction of pressure on jetting system.pressure suddenly increased to over 30 bar.relief valve did not
operate & consequently,pressure gauge blew apart & weld developed a leak.
Meter prover door seal blew during a prover run.not a lot of gas in a very large module but 2 gas heads detected high level gas (coincident detection) and so platform shut-down .personnel to
muster stations. Gas dispersed in minutes.
<...> hand removed plug,then the check valve,out of test port between tubing hanger pack off and tubing hanger neck seal.check valve blew out of wellhead allowing escape of gas from test port.
Wire line operator war rigging up genorator wire line operator.sling a ttached to wire from tugger which parted and wire line unit shot accross the deck.
Seal oil pump motor drive end ignited.the fire & gas shutdown system operated & fire was extinguished.
Sand erosion following clean up operations after sand fracture on well resulted in small cut out in temporary pipework.well immediately closed in.
Hole was being cut through bulkhead for cable transit.firewatch was catching sparks created by burning torch in purpose built box lined with fire resistant material.flame & molten metal falling
onto material caused smouldering.
Routine ppm of a deluge valve.after ppm completed,deluge valve was re-pressurised to five main pressure of approx 150psi.section of cast iron valve blew out & travelled 20-30ft.
While lifting internals from condensate water separation tank, a 5tne beam clamp was used to secure chain pull lift for vertical pull of less than 1tne.when the internals had been lifted 1m & were
being lowered back into position,lift suddenly dropped 1/3m without warning.
Crew taking pipe out of mousehole.length of pipe on air tugger & pushed outwards towards v door & ramp.lower end of pipe at v door when tugger released too early & hook disengaged from
end of pipe. I.p. Sustain ed bruising to right side/lower back region.
Welders working on bridle to a test separator.sparks dropped down & ignited oil & gas below,through grating.producing at time.deluge put on via fire alarm system.all personnel mustered.
Line of chicksans had been made up connecting well annulus to choke assembly in rig floor.choke led to vent system.after successful pressure test,repressuring chicksans with gas through annulus
valve, initial joint of chicksans at annulus parted.threaded section stemmed together but appears that collar rode over some collar wedges,allowing end of chicksan to blow clear of joint.
Drill crew pulling bottom assembly out of hole.on attempting to rack back a stand consisting of 2 non magnetic drill collars with 1 jar on top,the threaded section between jar & upper collar
fractured.jars were left suspended in elevators while drill collars toppled & came to rest on dolly guides of top drive unit.
Fire occurred in electrical panel in mechanical workshop.fire teams were deployed & platform went to muster stations after yellow shutdown. Fire extinguished at 14:37.

3 men installing small platform on gas turbine package.fire blanket placed on deck of area.two flanges on gas turbine found to be loose. Lube oil appears to have leaked from flanges.two
possibilities of cause- lude oil ignited by sparks or welding splatter.or lube oil impregnated blanket which began to smoulder due to sparks/welding slag.deluge systems activated.
Whilst using air winch,air accumulator blockbroke off & fell from over head runway beam on north module deck,50ft below. Block weighed 61lbs & narrowly missed personnel working
there.connection nipple between air hoist motor & accumulator vessel fractured.
Work in progress to increase luffing speed on <...> crane. During trial, operator put control inot neutral and brakes failed. Boom fell on its rest and is damaged.
East crane boom hoist wire slackened when gust of wind blew boom slighty backwards. Boom hoist wire jumped out of sheave ayt "a" frame end and jammed between side of sheave and rope
guard. Subsequent boom operation broke wire rope above sheave. Full avtur tank on hook at time
During removal of section of sea water injection pipework,a chain block being used to transfer load "ran back", allowing load to slip
Painters were using thinners to degrease wall in firepump house.it touched the can against battery terminal of no 2 firepump.spark flashed thinner soaked rag.rag was dropped to floor &
extinguished.
Vessel alongside platform,offloading equipment.using west crane.hook attached to piece of equipment. Skipper lost station.vessel went through 180deg & began drifting north.crew managed to
disconnect hook from load.
Six pairs of cotton gloves placed upon fixed heating unit.gloves began to smoulder,actuating smoke alarm.platform alarm sounded & fire extinguished.
Engine block of diesel engine extensively damaged whilst being run up after major 10,000 hour service. Damage resulted from internal piston fragments egressing externally.no injuries.
Bundle of drillpipe consisting of 8 joints was being dragged into vee door with single sling and vee door air winch and set against stop.one joint picked up by air winch and dragged up to
ramp.one of the others was dislodged and fell down catwalk and collided with backstop.
Five belt pulley drive from 45 kw electric motor to mud centrifuge overheated due to belt slippage,causing belts to ignite.fire detected by module irds platform went to red hazard status and
deluge operated. Finally extinguished by using bcf extinguishers.
Jack up rig was being moved towards installation.started drifting towards installation.tug not quick enough to pull rig away & rig collided with installation.slight damage - indentation on barge
hull plate.
Clamp securing 10" gasline was being welded on a scaffold 12ft above spider deck.splatter carried by wind,ignited gas emitted from mud cuttings caisson.caisson secured to conductor guide by 4
gusset plates which prevent movement due to wave action.failure of gusset plate weld caused crack in caisson wall,allowing gas to escape.
Unloading supply vessel using main crane,crane was 8-10ft off deck when it stopped & started to lower slowly. Driver attempted to raise it again & lifted 3ft before lowering itself again.driver
slewed around to empty area on boat.
Electrical fault occurred in the circuit breaker of the salt water injection pump. This caused a short circuit followed by samll fire, which resulted in the shutdown of the electrical system.
Gas appeared in 3 modules.suspect that gas is coming back into drain system from the mud caissons.severity is such that 7 gas detectors were showing 60% & concentration.production shutdown
& personnel mustered.
Crane hook hit hand rail safety catch ring fell off. Pennant line fell into sea.
East crane carrying out routine lifting duties in sack store area when driver saw crane boom bending backwards against main crane boom stops. Crane was operating at minimum operating
radius.roof section of boom sustained bending damage.boom laid down to rest & crane taken out of service. No injuries.
Gas leak from reciprocating gas compressor discharge valve from flange of bonnet of valve.prior to this, maintenance replaced ring joint on valve & tested to 3000psi.area operator reported leak.
Lowering drill equipment with crane on a 3 ton sling.sling snapped and items fell into the sea.
Welding repair to walkway hand rail was in progress above fuel gas scrubber.falling spark ignited minor gas leak on top of fuel gas scrubber.

Platform shutdown period.welding top of process area. Fire blanket on top of cabling to protect cables. Sparks from welding set fire to blanket.dry powder extinguisher failed to operate.rolled
blanketup to put out fire.extinguished in a few minutes.
Chainblocks being used to hold 30" esd valve in position whilst bolts were inserted in flanges & torqued up.two chainblocks remained in position & under tension to enable pipe support stools to
be positioned & welded.chainblocks remained in position due to weather & industrial problems for fortnight.load chain parted.
Warm air was being blown into a separator via air blower & stainless steel expansion piece. Air was heated as it passed through extension piece. At inlet nozzle of separator, space around pipe
was packed with ceramic wool and carboard which started to smoulder & was quickly extinguished
Lifting gas bottles from platform onto <...> when whipline failed. Load dropped 5' to the deck.
Piece of grating of twin sheet steel was blon down from drill floor.people working on drill floor at time.
Unit on test after extensive repairs.ga alarm sounded.smoke & flames were observed coming from coupling shaft tunnel.esd initiated & casing vented.fire extinguished in 1 min.believed to be oil
soaked lagging in tunnel.
During operation to cement in 13 3/8" casing at the cement head on top of the casing,head blew off at 200psi & fell to drill floor.no damage to equipment or personnel.
Back-up tongs were being positioned on tool joint & as tongs lifted to reach connection,tong hanging wire failed at derrick sheave.tongs fell on rig floor followed by length of wire disconnected
from sheave,approx 150ft.
Y ond fully to electro-magnetic brake retarder & drawworks brake.resulted inblock descending slowly,but unable to be stopped fully.descent continued after slips had been positioned allowing
block to leave guide track,rest on bails & then topple slowly onto drillers console crushing viewing panels.
Washing down deck area using pump & associated high pressure hose.unit was operating at a pressure of 6000psi when a hose coupling parted. The free end of the hose,connected to the
pump,flailed around until it became wedged between bulkhead & adjacent handrail.
While using the platform west crane in the vicinity of the drilling derrick a pneumatic supply hose fitting on the slew pump actuator uncoupled causing loss of slew control resulting in drift
towards the derrick.slew brakes were applied but reaction time allowed the crane boom tip to strike the north west corner of the derrick causing damage to the boom tip extension anchor point and
superficial damage to the derrick s weather protection cladding.
Whilst energising heat tracing on common impulse line,there was an electrical short circuit which ignited gas trapped in lagging & cladding which was leaking from v/v stem on line.fire
immediately extinguished.
Lifting load of tanks,from pipe deck to skid deck.load started to slip (slippage was on drum brake which was required to hold drum when hydraulic drive was stopped).load lowered to skid deck
& crane taken out of service.
Supply boat alongside an westside,pumping drill water.those disconected from vessel & was in process of being hung off at hang off point,when sling(attached to lifting clamp)snapped & hose
fell into water.
Removing a temporary backflow facility from a gas injection well, wing valve, coflexip back flow line were disconected. Work commenced to breakjoint between the other wing valve and tree
itself was a sudden release of gas/liquid under pressure. Release pushed wing valve, rigged to the module gantry crane.wing valve came to rest against an adjacent production well.
On activating heaters in control room,accumulated dust started to smoke.this activated halon system.all alarms & systems functioned properly & all personnel left control room.glass on external
control point blew out.
Bellow expansion joint failed at the inlet to produced water tank in module 6. Tank discharged oil/water to level of 6" in module. Gas alarms activated. Foam blanket used to cover liquid.
Multiple orifice valve to a choke from well suffered serious failure when choke bonnet retaining mechanism failed & the internals of choke were blown out under pressure.platform went to 'red'
hazard status.
Gearbox being transferred by crane from mechanical workshop to shale shaker.slipped from slinging to skid deck which was about 50ft.no one was injured & no damage.there was no equipment
failure.

Drilling equipment consisting of links,elevator,link tilt,link adaptor & torque arrestors broke loose & fell to drill floor (max fall 5ft). Damage to topdrive components.caused by fracture of torque
pins.
Whilst retracting hydraulically operated telescopic gangway for examination, it fell destroying lifeboat on its way down.
Upon opening annulus valve,bottom swivel joint failed at approx 400psi. No damage or injuries sustained.
Crane being prepared for use working supply vessel.operator entered cab & switched on drive motor.aware that a drive had engaged.noticed lifting wires beginning to slacken.tried to stop by
pulling back on lifting lever & then with override button engaged,but both actions had no effect.crane motor switched off.
Whilst re-instatement hydrostatic test was being carried out on new esd 16" valve to riser flange ring type gasket joint. Pipeline sealing plug blew out of riser leaving open end & giving rise to
uncontained release of gas. Followed by explosions in m3w leg c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, & c9, some hours later.
During lifting of a 3 1/2 t0nne mud pump motor, the chain guide roller sheared. The load did not drop and there were no injuries to personnel.
Whilst surveying within 500m zone,vessel lost d.p. Control & collided with structure. Structural damage appears to be superficial.vessel damaged on 'a' frame.
Fire in a junction box either in a cabin or vestibule. Accommodation module evacuated.
<...> 61 helicopter with 15 passengers clipped radio mast during takeoff from installation. Controlled landing back onto installation. Helicopter required repairs.
Rig was running 20" casing in well to tie back pre-drilled well to platform.seven joints had been made up & eighth joint was being made up in rotary table.made up as normal & rotary slips
remopved.connection failed & seven joints fell down through platform & into the sea.
Water injection well.minor leak from 9 5/8 line monitoring pressure.leak on a needle valve into module which gave a spray of dead crude.2 gas alarms went off.plant shutdown manually but
personnel not called to muster.
Bearing in electrical wall heater located in drilling stores office seized.additional heat generated,melted temporary fixing holding heater to the wall.heater fell onto chair which was charred as a
result.
Running 9 5/8" casing. As driller was pulling joint of casing through vee door using blocks and elevators, the leading edge of joint snagged "a" frame at top of v-door opening causing 20ft 3 ton
lifting strop to part. Joint of casing fell across middle of drill floor & bounced out through v-door. Ended up on catwalk/pipdeck.
Failure of lifting equipment. A bundle containing 5 length of rolled steel channel weighing 700kg was being moved from the port to the starboard side using the north west crane. Due to weather
conditions (wind 179d at 26 knts sen 1.5 to 2 meters) the steel channel struck the crash barriers of the vessel causing a shock to the load which parted the lifting strop (swl 1 tonne). The load was
lost over the side of the vessel. No damage to the vessel or injury to anyone on board resulted.
Four tool lifts were being raised on main crane.1 ton wire sling was used to attach tool lift to crane hook.on raising load to landing area, hook on one of tool lifts caught onto lower side of
guardrail surrounding the area.banksman radioed crane to stop but continued to boom upfor short period,resulting in sling becoming over tensioned.four tool lifts fell 2ft to landing area.
Gas leak occurred 2" small bore lagged piping on ngl plant between vessel.leak occurred from a 10mmx4mm hole in the pipe corrosion was sighted in the erea.release was seen as a jet of
condensate & gas by a worker who initiated a shutdown from the control room.all plant shutdown staff mustered to evacuation points
Visiting maintenance crew discovered that a 2ft pipeline had cut-out downstream of the level control valve which lets down produced water from platform production separator.cut-out located at
an elbow & crew found that water with trace condensates was leaking at the elbow.
Routine servicing of jib lights on crane.driver started crane & raised jib 2' for easier access to lights. Controls in neutral,driver leaned out to get a better view & jib descended out of control.
Gas laek on flare line. 2" vent valve in gas compression area "o" ring failure. System shutdown while repair to valve carried out.
Uncontrololed gas release due to diaphragm failure in pressure switch on gas injection compressor.personnel mustered following general platform alarm.area made safe & men stood down.
An <...> turbine exploded during use. Caused by the flame-failure trip being set 50 deg c too low, whilst throttle valve was 'sticky'. When the flame went out the fuel kept flowing and was reignited by the heat in the pipes.

While removing a cover from the prover loop line,2 opeerators were soaked by hydrocarbons from the line.gas & oil escaped & there was some pollution.red alert declared & platform
shutdown.42 non-essential personnel transferred by inter-field chopper to another platform.
Workover circulating to kill well viasurface choke to degasser to slop s tank.oil & mud blown out of derrick vent & showered platform.activated psd & placed on standby for emergency
evacuation.
Backloading pump unit onto supply boat. Unit started to free-fall from crane. Damaged no.2 lifeboat. Crane driver stopped fall - swung load onto platform.
West crane being lowered onto its rest.vertical swing shaft sheared causing driver to lose slew control. Operator was able to manually manoeuvre boom & lower it onto rest.
During operation to deploy dredging spread using support vessel,crane wire parted & dredging spread sunk to sea bottom.
West fire pump had been running for 1hr while survey of wellhead deluge system was being carried out.fire alarm warning sounded in control room for west fire pump enclosure.small fire
discovered on fire pump exhaust pipe lagging.halon system manually operated & pump shutdown.lagging had been contaminated with oil.
2 techniciains investigating fault on level transmitter attached to electrostatic precipatator. They had isolated the level transmitter stand pipe & were draining into plastic bucket. Approx 2-3 litres
of crude had been drained into bucket when contents "flashed". Possibly due to spark of static electricity
Annual maintenance shutdown - removing mainway door from module contactor scrubber. Davit arm and door broke away from vessel due to failure of welds.
Whilst function testing casing stabbing board in downward mode,skyloch brakes engaged automatically causing winch feed wire to go taut.due to contact switch not functioning,cable tension
applied to idler pulley, causing poorlyfabricated weld at pulley shaft end to fail.detached pulley & shaft fell 40ft.
Installing a drive shaft on whip line drum of west side crane.shaft weight was 300kg.were using 5tne tool lift which was secured by 1tne sling.difficulty in locating drive shaft & mechanic asked
for it to be lowered slightly.rigger put trigger on tool lift into lower position.ratchet ran free & load dropped 12".
Nylon strop failed during lifting operations to remove small crane.
High pressure hose on discharge of no 3 pump ruptured and failed.oil based mud was sprayed over surrounding area.no injuries and no damage. Pump was working at approx 4000psi providing
circulation on well.
Crane on start up & commencing to move.drive chain broke between slew motor & slew gear.operator raised boom to avoid collision with platform & vacated cab.
Produced water cooler overpressurised & burst spilling small amount of crude with small release of gas.operator shutdown module after two gas detectors gave low alarm.
Supply vessel struck platform,a light glancing glow on leg 3.only damage,light grazingabove water line possible damage to a ladder. Vessel experienced brief loss of control due to failure of
joystick/speed control mechanism.aft rail on vessel slightly damaged.
Explosion heard on board platform.flames seen coming from vent from slops tank.all personnel at muster stations.
Explosion took place in enclosure of 4700 kw electrical motor on a compressor train.no injuries but extensive damage to enclosure, service li nes, suction line to lp compressor & other ancillary
equipment within module.
Welding set power cable insulation burnt at cable connection caused by overheating. Due to connectors not being correctly assembled.
Diesel hydraulic pedestal crane being used for supply boat operations. Crane boom started to drop of its own accord with load of approx 8tnes on main hook.driver luffed up boom & lowered load
to platform deck.after unhooking load, it was found that boom could not maintain position on brake. Final control gained by use of whip line.
Instrument panel shut down for cleaning.water seeped into cabinet.when power was switched back on,there was a loud bang & small electrical fire.put out with portable extinguishers.
Drilling well.indications of a large influx into well bore.unsuccessful attempts to circulate out due to lack of returns to surface.drilling halted immediately & bop's closed.production shutdown &
downmanning of non essential personnel carried out.
Whilst locating air tugger (25 tons) on the 20' level one of the sheaves of the block shattered.
Bridge was being moved between rig & vessel when it jammed at the ramp it freed itself when the vessel rolled and heaved up past the lifeboat causing a light score mark in the starboard side of
the hull. Mideay between the keel and the gunwalk and the bow and the stern, the bridge was suspended on the vessel crane at the time. The hull was inspected and no further damage found.

Dsv <...> moored to and anchored off west face of installation at 1940 hrs the starboard bow anchor started to drag and at 1945 hrs the vessel had drifted round and made contact with the south
face of the platform. At sea level. Damage - paint scraping to two diagonal members and small indentation.
Painting to be done in airmixing duct in hvac room lower level.fan & heating element switched off,but due tofault in loop,heating element was switched off,causing overheating & smouldering
fire in clipboard located about 10cm above heating element.smoke entered ventillation system & spread to all locations on platform.
Maintainance work to remove orifice plate on gas injection line. After removal of bolts & bar on top of cover plate wasn't possible to remove bolts sheared. Cover plate assembly reinstated with
new "o" ring seal. During operation carrier assembly impinged on orifice plate hampering plates and crushing seal. "o" ring failed to leading to gas escape when injection line wasd back in
service.
A 50ft long transportation basket containing equipment was being lifted from deck of vessel with crane.load just clear of vessel's deck,a heavy duty swivel weighing 500kg fell through mesh base
of basket.
Whilst running into hole,roller wheel became detached from power swivel & fell to rig floor.i.p. Struck on right foot by roller which weighs 25kg.
Arcing of battery terminals.during maintenance on cathode protection system,two terminals came together.subsequently some smouldering was found in the battery room.
Picking up 19th joint of tubing. Properly latched with elevators. As it was picked up through v-door, the joint of tubing fell out of the elevator - ran back down and hit back stop.
Jack up was attempting to position along east side,appeared to go out of control & went under overhang of main deck damaging scaffold staging.tugs regained control & pulled away.on second
attempt, it hit platform boat bumper.cantilever structure hit base of hp vent pushing it & associated lines 9" out of line jack up involved was <...>.
Crane was offloading 2.2 ton container from a supply vessel. Crane working at minimum radius slewing to land container on structure.driver lost control of boom which hit back stop & collapsed
over cab.all sections of crane badly damaged including crane cabin.driver suffered injuries.
Derrickman working on monkey board handling a stand of 9.5 drill collars let it down using a wire from his winch.winch unspooled too quickly wire went slack & then tightened causing wire to
snap.
Lifting 7.8tne load over side.not known whether off loading or not.crane jib went into free fall & was stopped.
Lifting some old anchor off supply boat a 3 ton sling parted
Production technician reported small gas leakon outlet of h.p. Cooler. Reported leak worsening.yellow shutdown activated manually as precaution. Fire team called.leak found to be from
defective weld in thermowell attached to 12" gas outlet pipe. Weld cracked over approx 25-30% of circumference
During breaking out of drill string using tongs,a structural failure occurred when part of the jaw broke & was thrown 12ft accross drill floor hitting i.p. On left thigh causing severe bruising &
lacerations. Tongs were of the bj type db.
Weepage of gas from valve spindle.readings of 150% of l.e.l. Were registered.
Whilst backloading bundles of 5 1/2" tubing onto supply boat the boat heaved & bundle came into contact with adjacent container.one of tubulars was propelled out of bundle across port side
towards port quarter. No personnel in vicinity.wind 25-30knts giving driverproblems laying bundles on boat.
During loading of steel plates into an open transport container equipp ed with downfold tailgate in one end,tailgate suddenly opened & pushed one man backwards.stopped at angle ,caught by
container sling. Caused by locks on both sides of tailgate damaged & could not withstand pressure.
Air driven winch was to be used to lower scaffold materials.when switch operated winch did not lower.switch put in raised position & it raised.into neutral & it stopped.put into lower position &
raised.continued to raise when put into neutral.emergency stop button used to stop it
5m length of 150 x 150 rhs was being lifted into position on underside of new deck extension using platform crane & webbing slings.during this work,sling holding rhs section touched part of
existing structure. Section slipped through webbing sling,fell approx 6ft on to lower scaffolding level & fell into sea.
Fire occurred in extract ducting in laundry drying room during work to create inspection compartment, when fluff in ducting ignited during cutting with a mechanical saw. Fire put out in few
minutes.platform alarm system was initiated.
During backloading operations to supply vessel,a 1tne rack of empty nitrogen bottles was being lifted down to the boat by the west crane.c crane boom collapsed. Rack of gas bottles hit vbessels
portside "a" frame and bulwark before disengaging from thew lifting tackle and falling into the water. No injuries.

Gas leak from fractured line on third stage suction scrubber. Fractured 1 inch weld assembly.
Small fire in vicimity of rushton turbine exhaust-level 1 red alert-fire put out in 5 mins.
Repairs being carried out to discharge pipework using 1/2 ton chain block.pipe attached to block had to be pulled down vertically.at this po int block failed & a chain link was sheared.
Hyraulic hose on annular preventar burst (failed)whilst being tested
South crane failed during lifting operation when weld connecting pennant line to whip line on dead end broke.lifting operations ceased when loose end was observed.
Pulling tube bundle from its shell.when nearly removed,wire rope sling at tube sheet end failed & bundle fell approx 18" onto scaffold which extended external of module wall.prevented falling
further by remaining rigging points,scaffold & some of it was still in shell.
Fire in ne corner level 1.no injurys all personnel mustered.test of standby generator ignited additional scaffold boards after repair of generator.boards put in without authonisationto fill clearance
gap. Fire party deployed & fire extinguished
Attempting to clear partial blockage in sub sea discharge pipeline using 1/2" discharge tubing. Tubing burst when valve opened following release of small amount of gas. Operator shut valve
immediately.
A rupture of a gas vessel on the platform led to an escape of gas in the module, in which the atmosphere quickly rose to 100 % gas, thus avoiding an explosion. No injury reported. Electrical
wiring and pipes in the platform's oil and gas processing unit was damaged. The automatic shutdown system for oil and gas was activated. Independent surveyors claimed before the accident that
a key emergency shut down valve was dangerously close to the module where the leak later occurred. The production resumed at <...>.
50 000 gallons of drilling mud was accidentally spewed into the sea from a supply vessel, rather than into the platform's storage tanks. It is not believed to be any pollution, as any possible
separation of oil would disperse naturally. The cause is to be investigated.
A leak discovered in the flare manifold pipework, caused by corrosion, had the platform shut-in for nearly a month, until repairs on pipework was completed. More than 80 000 tonnes oil
production lost.
Smoke leaking from a reciprocating compressor module caused a significant cut in production of gas and oil. No damage was detected and production was set back to normal after a few days.
Production was halted when a leak at the chemical injection point on the high pressure header oil line was discovered. The cause was corrosion. Extensive examination was accomplished the
following weeks. The <...> field also shut in due to corrosion.
Production was shut down when a "kickback" occurred during drilling of a development well. The well penetrated a high pressure zone and vibrations were caused by high pressure gas blowing
back up the drilling gear. The well would be sealed off for good by pumping cement into it. <...> non-essential personnel were evacuated by helicopter to nearby installations.
While handling divertor equipment with drill floor wireline winches ip caught two fingers of left hand in a snatch block.
Chainblock being used to lift valve from position of rest.before hoist ing, the valve actuator was resting on existing h & v ducting.on lifting valve & actuator assembly it swung around striking i.p.
On shoulder
A <...> was on deck preparing/tying scaffold tubes in preperation to be hauled up to height by another scaffolder. Bundle of tubes separated during hauling manoouvre and fell striking <...>.
Internal working enviroment, pressurised package with artificial lighting.
Ip struck by falling pipe. Fatality-deceased was involved in laying down drill pipe.
Whilst lowering a baker (5000psi) cac actuator weighing approx 150lbs from the bop room to the mezzanine level of the weelhead a distance of some 20/25 feet the actuator slipped form the
nylon endless rope sling being used and fell. As it fell it struck the christmas tree below bouncing sideways and struck <...> knocking him and an adjacent colleague to the floor.
Injured was placing drill pipe slips around drill pipe in the rotary. Brushings. This involved pushing the slips under the break out tong using the handle provided. As he pulled his hand away it
caught between the slip handle and the tong.

Lifting an anode onto platform from <...> using a system of three winches on the platform, and one on the vessel. The tugger winchline on <...> broke and the anode fell and sank to the bottom of
the sea.
Small fire occured under sack room floor.u.v. System activated alarm in control room & deluge was activated by fusible link under floor. At same time witnesses saw smoke coming from under
the floor to the east of sack room.the fire,which was identified as an accumulation of crud which became alight,was put out.
Scaffolders hand trapped between one end of a falling 21inch pole fixed scaffold.
The <...> platform east deck crane was being used to place and 8t drum onto the skid deck, close to the side of the drilling rig. The main block snagged on the rig structure when the load was
almost in place. When the load was slackened off, the main hook securing latch fell, striking ip on the arm.
During laying down 2 7/8" drill pipe from <...> snubbing unit on rig <...>, a pully on a counter balance assembly came off allowing the pipe to fall to the rig floor. As pipe toppled, it struck <...>
on the back of his head. He fell to the deck with the pipe landing across his right leg. On investigation, it was found that no safety pin was fitted through the retaining nut and spindle.
I.p. Was attempting to run drillpipe stand into elevators of top drive. He threw stand into elevators which were only partially open at the time& the stand bounced back trapping his wrist against
the elevator bail arm.
A section of drill pipe being lowered from the drill floor became stuck when trying to position the pipe in a very narrow space. The pipe was not restained and when it came free it knocked the
man down catching his leg causing a fracture.
Following an xmas tree replacement, preparations were in hand to reinstate the well and the flowline had to be reconnected to the tree. A work party, two pipefitters and a rigger, was appointed
and the permit prepared. The flowline had been isolated for about 21 days and was therefore depressurised twice by the oil technician to remove gas which had leaked through the closed manifold
and gantry valves. After each depressurisation the vent was closed. When the work party removed the grayloc coupling holding the blank on the flowline, the blank was ejected with considerable
force, thereby injuring the two persons.
Area of bubbles was seen coming to sea surface and investigations as to the source were carried out. It was revealed that well A15 was the source of the leak. Minor amounts of oil was observed
rising with bubbles. The leak was monitored throughout the kill operation for well A15. Further, the well will be plugged and abandoned.
Possible sabotage. Large metal bolt found in the structure's gas compression chamber. Bolt discovered while engineers were trying to reactivate the compressor.
Oil production was halted when a motor bearing overheated during a routine test of an electrical fire pump. The shut down period was prolonged when subsequently a fault was discovered in one
of the back-up generators.
Fire in diesel engine of diesel fire water pump.
Failure of high pressure hose on mud line.
2nd engineer went overboard due to ships roll, during launch of sea rider rescue launch.
Fire occurred on navaid light.small intense fire inside the explosion proof box.
Welder attempting to ignite torch. Flashed back to hose which caught fire.
Gas leak occurred on north sandfilter cover joint on wellhead tower.
Line pressure 470psi- gas leak
During a demonstration of the invetek descent device, the bolt which was an integral part of the drum/securing strop came adrift allowing the drum and passenger to fall a distance of approx 8ft
6". No injuries were sustained.
Doing a pressure test on cooler which was out of service.diaphragm blew off end of cooler.pressure test designed for 75psi but diaphragm blew off at 60psi and went six feet and blew off habitat.
Two lifting beams stored temporarily on 20ft container on roof of module were knocked off when struck by half height container which was being offloaded from supply vessel. One beam fell
20ft & the other approx 40ft. No damage/injury.
Welded connections failed on hydraulic tong allowing tong to fall to pipe deck out of v-door.

High pressure hose failed on discharge of mud pump.

Standby vessel collided with the platform part of escape ladder fell into sea.
Production operator noticed flames (2' - 3') coming from the sump pile flange. Fire extinguished within 5 minutes using 10lb drypowder extinguisher. Ignition caused by welding slag dropping
from welding operation at higher level. No general alarm no muster. Gas leakage thought to be from defective flange joint.
Trolley & chain block assembly dislodged from runway beam causing glancing blows to two persons using assembly. Both were unhurt.
Flashback occurred when cutting torch was lit. Personnel mustered as precaution -fire extinguished at 10:35 and personnel stood down.
Damage to monkeyboard. Whilst running 13 3/8 casing, the main block struck the monkeyboard causing major damage to the board assembly, the rig super structure and block were undamaged.
Following bang smoke was picked up and shutdown process. No damage to property around area. Oil water separator distorted not ruptured.
During routine start up of oil plant the emergency shutdown valve was opened allowing a slug of condensate and water to move down the condensate return line from the gas scrubber towards the
lp separator. Approx 2 barrels of condensate and water escaped into the module before the line was depressurised. Fire team deployed and foam used on spillage. Platform shutdown automatically.
The casualty was assisting the hydra-tight engineer to carry out nut tightening procedures on a 30inch flange located on the terminal platform.it was not possible for the engineer to maintain visual
contact with all the tool heads being utilised. The casualty was monitoring the unsighted tools for signs of over stroking at the time of the incident a pressure of 15000psi was being applied to the
tool heads when one tool suffered an oil seal failure which allowed high pressure hydraulic oil to be released. Some of which struck the back of the casualtys right hand.
Fire in switchroom fire and gas panel indicated fire in m4 switchroom and release of btm extingishant.inspection showed electrical fire associated with korndorfer transformer - extinguished by
fixed system.no-one in module at time of incident
One of two lifting lugs of a winch broke when winch was about to be lifted by platform crane. Crane load indicator showed 4 ton load at time of fracture.
Butterfly valve in helideck fire monitor failed. Isolation valves did not hold. Water reached into the switchbox. Chlorinator box exploded, blowing door off. Explosion in chlorinator earlier in the
year.
Temporary hose connecting a test positive displacement meter to the test separator meter failed.
A 3tne chain block failed at the hook assembly while assisting a 5tne air operated hoist in positioning the upper block of the wellhead(xmas tree).this caused the lower end of the tree to fall
approx 1ft to wellhead mezzanine deck.
Gas leak occurred in outlet production manifold area.two low level gas alarms sounded followed by high level gas alarms.deluge & high expansion foam operated automatically.high level gas
alarms & deluge operated in adjacent areas.crew mustered & non-essential personnel mustered on flotel.
Minor fire occured in drip pan underneath gas generator compartment. Oil in drip tray ignited.
Sphere launcher had been nitrogen purged.gas escaped from a crack that developed 1" in length on pressure gauge pipe.
Cable connector on 3300 volt supply to water winning pump disintegrated explosively. Two main fuses ruptured. The connector was only partly filled with insulating compound during assembly
by vendor. This allowed ingress of moisture to plug and degredation of insulation.
Portable winch failed in service causing load to free fall. Manual brake applied to stop load.
Crane was found with smoked windows etc.seat had been on fire,thought that heater in cab caused fire.
Failure of lifting gear. 3 stops holding a spoolpiece. One of stops failed. Valves/spoolpiece dropped 15'.
During crane maintenance check boom of link belt raised. Control lever set to neutral when boom about 4ft above rest boom fell onto rest. Minimal damage.
Standby boat <...> collided with platform. No apparent damage to installation. Boat washed into platform by waves after both engines failed.

Single joint of pipe was being picked up by rig floor air tugger.one of loose joints jammed underneath gate to rig floor.when loose joint released it sprung over handrail & down onto skid deck
below.
Fire in power generator expansion joint
Condensate release from behind seal on routine maintenance of export pump. Condensate sprayed out & operator opened a closed drain line to relieve pressure & spray ceased after a few
minutes.
Whilst running condensate export pump for test, a condensate leak was seen on 1/2" compression fitting leading to pressure gauge. Attempting to tighten fitting when it parted & released
condensate.
Uncontrolled release of gas. Gas generator for the turbine driving one of the gas compressors out of service & removed for repair leaving fix ed pipework in module.full isolation carried out but
relief valve was removedon fuel gas vent line but blind flange had not been fitted.
Universal rig hydraulic system under 3000 psi but now not in use. About to skid rig to slot 4. Endcap on hydraulic system blew out and travelled 4 meters and hit bulkhead. No damage, end cap
refitted.
Swagelock fitting on corrosion inhibitor failed - resulted in minor gas leak.
Crane boom fly jib torn off and auxiliary wire parted whilst lifting cargo basket from supply vessel <...>.
Failure of retaining studs on a cylinder cover of booster.small release of gas. High gas alarm , triggered a secondary b automatic shutdown.
The Bell 212 helicopter lifted from helideck with tail door open. Deck crew unloading baggage from tail section at time. Baggage handler fell backwards onto trolley whilst taking avoiding action
as tail slewed towards him. No injuries sustained.
General alarm activated by low level gas detection in condensate pump room. On initial investigation it was discovered that condensate pump chest was full of water/condensate. The bonded area
around the pump was also full and overflowing. The pump was shutdown and isolated. The area was flushed and made safe.
Emergency generator was being tested fault with alternator hydraulic state caused collection tank to balloon too high pressure and blew the lid off
During discharge/backloading operations the m.v. <...> whilst moving astern came into contact with the s.e. Leg b3. Conditions prevailing were; wind 090 degrees 18 knots with waves of height
4m in a confused swell. Damage to both leg and vessel was superficial. No injuries.
Leak of gas from 1/4 inch line activated gas detector in analyser house causing level 2 process shut down.
During water jetting operations on low pressure separator vessel,minor damage was caused to valve components on a 10" produced water line from vessel to water treatment facilities. Damage
limited to leaking flange xcv actuator securing bolts sheared & slight displacement of bulkhead pipe penetration.
A loud bang was heard from south side of platform followed by smoke.on investigation smoke was seen coming from acoustic box above cooler on compressor.water was played into box until no
more smoke came out.
A two (2) ton sling was being used to lift a tubing bonnet (weight 0.25 ton) from well a 45. Unknown to the assistant driller the seal area of the bonnet had come under vacuum and on attempting
to remove the bonnet the sling snapped. Subsequent removal with the rig block indicated a pull of 5 tons was required to break the seal.
Technician was investigating low lube oil pressure problem on gas turbine.the m/c was shutdown whilst he was in attendance.during rundown sequence a flame was sighted at rear of power
turbine casing, adjacent to exhaust ducting.flame self extinguished in a few seconds.
Vapour ignited during sampling from meter skid. Flame quickly extinguished. No earth lead between tap & drum. U v detectors did not pick up flame. Department of transport advised.
Mud hose burst during pressure test.
Two employees had completed work on a safe supply fan located on m8 mezz. An employee removed isolations from cubicle ab8 on r/h side of ps4102 located in m9 emergency switchroom.
Starter panel was "racked in" holding screws tightened and isolator switched to "on" position. An electrical discharge took place within the cubicle. Followed by flame, fumes from heat and
smoke. Manufacturers representative to determine degree of damage to adjacent cubicles. Likely cause would apppear to be within the isolator to bizz bar secton of cubicle ab8. Investigations
continue with company and manufacturers representatives. No definate cause determined as yet.

Standby vessel collided with installation. No major damage to vessel or installation. Installation shutdown automatically due to the vibration set up by impact.
At approx 13:10 hrs esdv 5-1 was opened,for checking of new control system. The surge of gas through the valve lifted the psvs on v95-11 separator.some of the venting gas/liquids escaped via
half inch npt plug hole in a flange.
Failure of a chainblock. Link defect suspected as block has overload protection.
High gas alarm sounded. Gas release due to isolation valve not being closed causing communication from gtg-1 fuel gas supply to g160 venting. A human error caused by non adherence to mnsl
valve isolation and tagging procedures. No damage sustained.
Severe corrosion under lagging on lp vent operating at approx atmospheric pressure. High level alarm sounded & investigation showed liquid running out through 3 or 4 holes.
High gas alert in gas compression module. Gas released from cracked crane valve. Module was shutdown. Personnel mustered. Level switch valve severed.
Fire on lagging of diesel fire pump during weekly test. Caused by oil leak from sheared bolt holding rocker cover.
Using 1 ton chain block to ease a diverter out of a line. Chain failed 6 inches above hook. Probable overload.
During cutting operations of steel plate, hot slag lodged in a fold of welding habitat which caught light.smoke and flames were observed. Extinguished by fire watcher.
High pressure mud line failed.
Link in load chain parted. Section of flowline fell.
Minor diesel leak within hood of 'f' turbine.
East crane came into contact with drilling derrick. Pre-absorber cooler (pac) module (to facilitate shuttling operations) was blown by a gust of wind hitting the s.e. Corner of derrick. No injuries.
Dual fuelled water heater out of service but available to run on diesel fuel. Operations technicians attempting to set up combustion system to fire on gas fuel. An explosion occurred & site was
secured & heater isolated. Furnace front was severely damaged.one person sent ashore with minor injuries.
Leak in fire main. 1 1/2" connection blew out of fire main at twin agent hose reel unit. Unable to isolate fire main so it was shutdown.
Gas release in booster compressor module no plant or equipment failure. Shell claim release caused by breakdown in proceedures
Welder sensed smell of propane gas and traced a leak to the valve group on propane cylinder. As welder closed operating valve in a clockwise directon this caused the whole valve group to
unscrew from the neck of the cylinder in an anti-clockwise direction. This action resulted in the uncontrolled unignited release of approx. 25kg of propane to atmosphere. Damage sustained to
property not person.
Standby vessel touched one of platform legs. Support vessel drifted towards installation under auto pilot when mate noticed situation, he switched to manual power and vessel hit nw leg of
platform in the course of evasive action. Minor damage to vessel, no detectable damage to installation.
Standby vessel request to come up close for scaffolders.as vessel approached platform,captain disengaged gear,underestimated the tide & drifted into platform.damage to top horizontal bracing of
boat landing. Slight damage to cellar deck hand rail.
Carrying out drilling operations, stands of drillpipe racked in vertical position. During racking operation, tugger winch rope parted allowing stand of drillpipe to fall approx 2ft into swivel cup
located in drill floor.
Men laying down a "dyna" drill (weight 4 tons) to be attached to casing. They rested it on pieces of wood (4" by 2"), one of which broke. Drill moved and struck man on leg.
Air circut breaker (acb) 13, was removed from the 415v distibution board to fit a refurbished prrotection module. The protection module was fitted. Acb 13 was then re-installed and racked into
position. A test current of 30a was applied to the module to test trip-actuated by ip. The shunt by application of an insulated screw-driver on the base of the shunt trip. There was a corresponding
flash. Ip sustained superficial buring on the right hand.
Minor gas leak after failure of gasket in fuel line. Platform shutdown. All pob mustered. Leak located and rectified.
Pipework and clamps damaged when high pressure air line parted during bottle charging operations.
Two ton sling failed while lifting an oil and gas separator unit.

<...> reported to have struck the cellar deck support trusses on nw corner and <...> wall platform undamaged.
Anchor winch resistance bank short circuited and insulation caught fire. Minor fire extinguished immediately with 1kg dry powder extinguisher.
The brakes on the e. Crane failed during tests. Weights fell into sea.
When lifting pot water bunkering hose from deck sling came off crane hook and hose fell approx. 100ft, striking handrails on the cellar deck on way down. The diesel hose was then lifted from
the deck of the vessel and hung-off on platform. It was found to be an uncertified sling which was used. The sling was recovered from the end of the pot water hose. It would appear that it had not
been slung properly on the crane hook.
Damage to scaffold. A section of oily water separator outfall pipework was being removed for renewal. A spool piece was being removed from the location when, although still attached to the
lifting equp. It slipped and struck the handrailing of an adjacent access platform. The impact dislodged the scafold causing it ot tile.to tilt. Two valves placed on the platform were lost into the sea.
Weather conditions:- dry, clear, daylight, light wind. No personnel were near the scaffold at the time of impact.
Stripping out of hole with 5" drillpipe alignment string utilising a "c" plate & temporary slip bow in order to secure pipe. Driller pulled last stand through with alignment assembly going too fast.
Crossover too big to go through alignment slot. Lifted c plate & bow snapping 1 securing chain & knocking rotary slips onto temporary working platform where two roughnecks were inserting
slips.
When asst.crane operator actvated the safety catch on the hook it fell off. The 5mm pin had sheared. The hole in the catch showed signs of excessive wear/corrosion.
Power tong desceded 4 feet to drill floor. No injuries or damage. Hydraulic winch failed.
Elevator failed while picking up joint the joint thread caught and the link adaptor on the elevator failed. Releasing the single joint elevator and associated slings, swivel and the link adaptor. The
assembly slid down the pipe to the lower box connection.
Shackle failure. Difficulties being experienced to remove lower half of xmas tree 5000 psi pressure applied below master valve, due to tension of lifting gear tree assembly moved jammed angle.
Crane ops suspended due to increased wind speed. Crane hoisted to approx 80deg to lay down pennant. When lowering boom,driver experienced some free fall. Found riding turns on boom hoist
drum & hydraulic pipe fractured.
A water/glycol mix was found to be escaping from atmospheric vent of cooling water system header tank on weather deck.production shutdown. Suspected that gas was entering water system
from one of the heat exchangers. Confirmed that gas had been entering water system via the export gas cooler attached to compressor.
The chain blocks were being used to lift a section of walkway on to the sulphate removal facility. One side of the walkway snagged causing one of the sling eyes to ride up the hook against the
safety catch. The safety catch failed allowing the sling to come off the hook and drop to one side of the walkway section about eight feet. On investigation it was found that the safety catch was
secured by a 1/8" brass bolt instead of the normal method of rivetting.
Two men sprayed with dead crude oil while underneath main deck during vip visit to platform. Men involved were <...> and <...>..
Packer fell about 10 feet.
Smoke and flame emanating from hood area of gas turbine. Muster and ga sounded. No injuries and no real damage. Lube oil dripping onto hot exhaust.
During a routine test orifice plate required changing. Having changed plate the operator operated the wrong drive spindle and opened the gate allowing an escape of gas. The gas forced the plate
and carrier out of chamber striking i.p. On forehead. I.p. Immediatly closed gate orifice box was islated by other operators. Operator error was the cause of the incident.
Shackle failure. During test of ups north crane pressure passed valve 145 causing shuttle valve 63 to lift during subsequent hoisting operations. Additional hydraulic pressure fed through valve 63
caused valve 147 to pilot and allow flow to hoist free fall.
Pulling out logging tool from well & tool stuck across wellhead & wire line bop valves.tried injecting methanol then closed dhsv.vented off gas above to depressure.tried pulling again & no
movement. Lubricator separated from bop,stuck tool observed & joint remade.broke lubricator at next section - clamped wire.wire parted below clamp & tool dropped down hole through flapper
opening reservoir to atmosphere.blow back of gas out of broken lubricator hit i.p. In face.

Turbine fault alarm,loss of ac power,local control panel shutdown turbine.fire detected in turbine room.fire & gas panel sounded platform fire alarm.turbine room inspection cover opened.small
fire re-ignition. Extinguished with hand held extinguisher. Type 425kw gas turbine/generator 415v.
Smoke from overheated bearing in booster pump. Platform mustered. Helicopters for evacuation in air. Stood down as soon as problem identified.
Overheated fan activated smoke alarm.
Crude oil carry over out of the hp flare sprayed discharging cargo on east face of platform. Immediate investigation had shown that the hp separator xcv had not closed fully, resulting in high level
in the hp separator. It was further established that production well no. 5 hydraulic master valve had not closed properly.
Oil leak in turbine. Flashed on exhaust. Fire extinguished.
Main power shut down due to emergency generator. Platform on batteries for 1.5 hours. Emergency generator had cracked cylinder liner. Gt2 out of commission for 50k hour service. Gt1
developed fuel oil leak and was shut down.
Fire in rubbish drum on platform. Fire put out with dry powder extinguisher. Welding was taking place half way up vent stack. Welding sparks fell into drum about 20 yards.
Picking up lubricator on drilling rig.sling failed - most probably overloaded. Lubricator fell to floor. No injuries.
Failure of 6 ton lifting block which allowed load to drop 2 inches to floor. Suspected that operators were not using block correctly and were trying to lift load at angle.
Pumping completion fluid. When pump switched on, final isolation valve on discharge line was still closed. Resulting pressure caused line to fail at the screw thread.
Mechanical technician removed 3 allen screws from a plate at the top of pig arrival signaller. This resulted in internal mechanism being ejected from body of signaller followed by significant
release of gas. Man suffered minor cuts to face.
Leak of flare blow down header. Platform on yellw alert . Shutdown complete at 11:45.
Gas leak in fuel line due to corrosion under lagging / insulation. Leak occurred in 600 psi 1in. Gas fuel line in module 2. Module shutdown. Isolation and purge system.
Smoke in venting system. No injuries and fires quickly extinguished.
Failure of swivel on lifting appliance. No injury to personnel.
Transferring drilling tools from moving pipe deck using nw main deck crane when sling failed and load descended uncontrolled to deck.slung with double hitch using a 1tn wire rope sling.
Offloading supply vessel when one of the loads snagged on a projection from vessels lead rail.after two attempts to lift load,vessel lurched downward on swell causing shock load on
whipline.hook-block then parted from cable & landed on stern of vessel.
Production operative was draining down vessel at 1200psi to oil skimmer tank.valve to tank was closed and various drain pipes from sling catchers were pressured.although these lines were rated
to 1440psi,due to corrosion there was a leak of condensate at pressure.operative closed valve to stop leak.
Circulating head failure. After rih 9 5/8 packer: circ. Head made up to 5" drill pipe. Made up swivel, lo torque valve and anaconda high pressure hose for connections. S surface lines pressure
tested to 5000psi alright. The drill string was raised 50' above rotary table, slips were set and weight slacked off blocks. Whilst attempting to set 9 5/8" packer by rotating drill string to right, the
circ. Head chicsan connection sheared. Safety chains were attached so nothing fell to drill floor.
Failure of east crane whip line brake to hold load
Small fire around lube oil heater caused when draining oil from pump. Heater in gas comp area 3. Area was shut down and isolated due to other work. Fire put out immediately.
Running blocks hit crane. Returning the travelling blocks to top of derrick driller allowed the blocks to go beyond their normal working height. Realising his mistake he designated draw works
and clutch simultaneously. The pneumatic cylinder also activated, blocks moved up causing collision.
After inspecting & repairing the motor of a hydraulically operated landracker, it failed whilst lowering with no load after five or six successful lifts. Failure caused casing skate to fall into lowered
position.
A voltage transformer was being re-commisioned. Once energised it operated for 30 seconds then failed. Fault cleared by protection circuitry. Residual heat produced smoke which activated fire
protection circuits causing main generation shutdown.

Whilst commissioning bridge between platform & accommodation unit damper assembly on pennant wire failed. During functional tests, bridge was lowered so that load could be transferred
from main hoisting winch to vertical pennant lines. As the loading line was transferred to the right pennant line, the damper failed.
Rig was shutdown mode. During hot works.a hose on an oxyacetyline was seen to be alight. And flames were coming from the oxygen hose. Fire was put out by fire watch. It appears the hose has
been accidently damaged possibly by dropping agrinder.
Whilst manouevring,supply vessel lost control and impacted compressor platform and connecting bridge.no damage to platform but one tubular support on bridge was flattened and 10" fire main
ruptured leading to loss of deluge system in process area.impact set off halon system.16 personnel moved to other platform.
8mm temporary line to a gauge failed on gas compressor 2 which, although shutdown was pressured for test purposes due to faults. Line had been fitted last week by dresser to check for faults.
Gas released into compressor house and platform went to muster with shutdown working.
During function testing of master valve and wing valve,high pressure was released to an open end pipe.this was caused when the upper master valve was opened and then closed releasing pressure
into the xmas tree cavity.
Whilst cleaning inside east crane pedestal, grating previously removed from another deck was dislodged and fell within crane pedestal to deck level some 25' - 30' below.
Explosion. No fire - no casualties. Explosion was not hydrocarbon related.
Wireline crew lifted tool string through v doors. Whilst suspended the string started to lower. It struck drill floor & bounced up. Started to bend & detached itself from tugger line. It then fell
towards v door, struck rig structure & top 2ft of tool string parted & continued to fall down onto catwalk.
Crane blocks ran into cathead due to failure of failsafe devices.
Whilst backloading supply vessel, crane driver landed open sea bin on vessel.before deck crew could unhook load,vessel's bow thruster failed vessel moved away from platform taking load with
it.crane driver paid out crane line to limit.decided to pull load off vessel & into sea.the crane was pulled sideways & boom struck some steelwork on protection frame causing damage to jib.
While using bop cranes in tandem, tandem cable caught on scaffold pole. Junction box shorted out. Rose to limit and caused damage.
Winch activated unexpectedly. Personnel crossed to carry preparatory work on winches prior to carrying out operational check on gangway. When changing controls on west 3 lewing winch from
remote to local, winch started to heave and slewed to west. Safety officer closed bridge.
Spanner fell from west crane boom following maintenance. Crane laid down across pipedeck for a floodlight cable replacement. Crane was hoisted, adjustable wrench fell from the boom, nearly
striking assistant driller, who was walking across deck. No damage or injury occurred.
Minor hydrocarbon leak due to line failure. Pin hole leak from hydrocarbon line (<...>). Line routes from <...>, glycol absorber pre-scrubber module 01 to <...>. Leak detected by two low gas
alarms on the fixed gas detection stsyem. Field shutdown manually under controlled conditions and area locally isolated. Die to valve boundary, lines still contained some five barrels of oil which
leaked onto module floor over period of some <...> hours <...> min and was washed into oper drain system.
Skip had been landed on supply boat near bridge. Crane hook carrying pennant fouled guard rails protecting bridge, causing ring at top of pennant to lift out of hook. Hook was fitted with a bolt
to secure hook latch in closed position. Sleave was missing.
The whip line ball was pulled into the cathead causing superficial damage to the bulldog clips on the whip line
Failure of centre pin bushing on sheave in wireline transfer system. Slant drill rig operating in 30deg mode. Whilst pulling out of hole and racking stands of 5" drillpipe, 8" diameter sheave broke
free and fell approx 70ft to drill floor.
Standby vessel collided with the installation causing denting of a platform-south west leg sea access ladder and severing of 4inch water bunkering hose.vessel has severe damage to central mast.
Fast rescue craft became lodged between cross members of platform jacket, after being caught by a wave. Both boat crew members were thrown into water,but were able to climb back into the
craft.craft started to deflate.the two men then climbed onto crossbearing.both men were brought back to the platform by use of rope ladder and safety harness.both men were checked over by the
medic and sent to hospital for checks.

Standby vessel was close in while scaffolders working in spider deck. Vessel was changing back when caught by swell struck platform a glancing blow. No damage to installation. Vessel sustained
damage to nav aid lights, communications & a crack amidships.
Inlet manifold hose burst on the sulphate removal package.
Oil leak resulting in gas alarm. A pinhole leak in 2" line carrying oily water to second stage low pressure separator.
Supply boat struck north west leg of platform. Damage to 2 fenders and possibly leg coating. Vessel has small dent in stern.
While cutting off a divertor control box with oxy/acet a small fire occurred. Fire extinguisher failed to operate - fire put out with water.
Wire birdcaged - caught up sleave. It is thought that safety chain on overwind device caught up in sheave. Caused whipline to catch up.
Drill top drive fell 60 ft to drill floor. Drill smashed to pieces. No injuries.
Failure of 8mm winch cable at upper eye termination allowed drill floor stabbing board to free fall approx. 5 metres causing damage on impact with lower stop arrestor beam to the stabbing board
platform and the arrestor beam.
Minor gas leak in shale shaker area. Extended to mud pits. Operator attempted to fill gas lift annulus with water from utility water system prior to workover operation. Gas from annulus flowed
back into utility water system & was discharged into shale shaker area.
Lifting harness snagged while loading onto supply vessel. Sv dropped in swell , wire broke and load swung back to installation.
Heat of exhaust gases caused small accumulation of lube oil in exhaust diffuser to ignite. Fire extinguished with hand held bcf.
Gas compressor - 10mm instrument line fractured (pressure differential 50 bar) 60 sec gas release. Gas leak activated at 21 0/0 level. No damage, no injuries.
Lifting spool piece with 1.5 tonne strop using main crane. Spool piece failed structure and broke strop.
Temporary chichsan pipework was connected from the cement manifold on the rig floor to kill the system connection on s44 seawater injection line. Before the final connection was made at the
rig floor a valve connecting it to kill system was opened, resulting in a release of oily water and a small amount of gas at an approximate pressure of 2 bar. The leak caused a fine spray of oily
water which reached the dog house window 15 feet away. A lo-torq valve on the rig floor manifold was closed and stopped the flow. There was no equipment damage, no injury to personnel and
no gas alarm. Probable cause: mis communication between workgroups.
Control of crane lost when gear tooth in drive train failed. Crane boom hit drilling derrick.
During start up of platform after 6 month shutdown, 60% gas alarm in process modules sounded. Automatic shutdown of process & wells. Relief valve was missing from train 1. During start
up,first stage separator of train 2 was open to flare to flush system. Gas fed back down line to train 1 & escaped through open line.
Gas release platform alarm and muster -60 pob runing wire line for closure test on sub surface valve. Cross over valve on 1inch bypass left open.release lasted 1-2min. Shutdown procedure
implemented.
Electrician was resetting hp pump which had failed. Smoke was seen coming from control panel followed by a bang. Probable cause arcing between panel drawer contacts and bus bar.
Low pressure vent stack on <...> ignited by lightning.small fire immedi-ately extinguished by damping with halon.no damage & no injuries.
Chlorine generator explosion, due to mechanical failure. Mechanical failure was of flow switch.
Equipment failure. No damage, no injuries. While carrying out a lifting operation on g4803a (slop oil pump) in mod 2 using winch, one of the 3 supporting eye bolts sheared. Equipment was
lowered to deck.
Gas leak detected coming from xmas tree void space bleed off port. Sssv & flow wing valve had closed.immediate investigation found that 5 1/2 sbms tubing hanger neck seal was leaking.bleed
off port found to be loose. Removed visually inspected & replaced securely.platform was down-manned.
While moving personnel carrier (unmanned) a sling fouled an obstruction and parted.
Vessel scrapped protection barrier - no damage done.
Helicopter was attempting single engine landing on esv when it clipped helideck net. Only minor damage. No passengers on board. Pilot error.

A vessel inspection was carried out on the test separator and included internal examination,to return the vessel to service the manway required resealing blinds swinging etc. To verify the integrity
of renewed gasket/joints the vessel was repressurised in 100psi increments at 500 psi to drain valves blew off level transmitter gas escaped from open end of transmitter
Chicksan line parted during pressure testing of bops.
Failure of riding belt cable. While ascending derrick using riding belt, the counter balance cable parted. The running end of the cable fell on and around the user who sustained no injury. The
counter balace weight fell down striking the roof of the drawworks and the running end of the cable collided with a navigation light fitting on the south west corner of the monkey board,
damaging the fitting. No other damage sustained.
Inspecting orifice plate on condensate metering system. A 2" bore stream was isolated & drained. Other bore was on line.technician was instructed to carry out work on live bore stream. Orifice
plate retaining cover was loosened and condensate and gas were released. Personnel mustered & stream isolated within 3 minutes.
Smoke detected in vicinity of power generator. Traced to gear box where small rug was found to be on fire.
Whilst installing scapa production trunnion, approx 60ft, 18 tons, tugger wire used to cross haul load parted causing load to swing. 3 men received minor injuries. No damage to platform structure
or trunnion.
Sling failed pad eye to which attatched. Bottom hole damaged by movement,
12mm impulse line on gas line failed at a compression fitting, valve was open. Two local gas detectors operated to detect gas release. Esd operated, local deluge operated, no ignition, no injury.
Leak isolated manually by nearby workers. Ga and muster followed.
No. 2 port mooring wire parted after a period of prolonged heavy weather whilst the vessel was in standoff position on the east face of <> platform. The tension on the mooring wire at the time
of failure was noted to be 50 tonnes. Actions taken/
Standby vessel <> collided with West face of platform bow on. All platform personnel were in bed at the time when a massive blow shook the platform. This was followed by three other less
intensive blows. Three personnel proceeded on to m in deck and reported a vessel wallowing at the North West corner of the platform approx. 50 yards off and drifting NE. Platform personnel
were mustered. Damage was: one horizontal bracing was sheared off and one knee joint was also sheared off.
Whilst unloading equipment from standby vessel MV <> to platform. Vessel collided with platform 'X' brace south side. Damage sustained on platform and stern of vessel. Wind - 21 knots @
186 deg. Wave - 1.5 to 2.0m. Visibility - good - 3-4 miles Air temp 16.5deg. Installation shut in after collision.
Supply boat unloading a container onto a satellite platform when it struck the leg of the platform. No visible damage to platform but slight damage to vessel. All usual safety equipment on board
boat and platform. Platform damage undetermined, boat damage - minor dent to stern. Wind: 14 knots 045deg, wave: 1metre, light: daylight, good visibility for task, tide: 0.5 knots ne.
Standby vessel <> imparted a glancing blow to the production platform riser guard, then passed beneath the bridge linking production platform to drilling platform.
The <> was back-loading/discharging containers on the south side of <>. The vessel moved in under the crane to allow the crane operator to place a container up forward on the deck. The
vessel struck cell 3 at the water line, and then m ved back out from the platform.
Supply boat <> made slight contact with port leg of morecambe flame when manoeuvering alongside platform
At 08:02 the vessel <> collided with s1 leg. Platform muster alarm sounded and field supervisor was despatched to the cellar deck.all platform personnel accounted for and stood down from
muster. Oim informed that the vessel was clear of the platform and that there seemed to be no visual major structural damage to the s1 or s2 legs and risers. There were no injuries to personnel. A
vessel with a rov is in field waiting on a weather window to confirm that there is no significant damage
While heaving with tugger 'b' to move clamp d-1 for installation of aec fire water caisson, the strop suspending last of 3 lines parted. The block had a hold back chain which prevented fall of the
gear. Minor damage occurred to the nearby scaffolding.
Following strop failure incident on previous night shift, failed strop was replaced and rigging re-instated. Work was to assist adjustment of d-1 clamp. Tugging was requested with caution, when
a second strop failed rence of incident

East crane was slewing round to 13 roof to land a container, when over 13 roof the operator realised something was wrong as he could not back- check the slew to stop the crane boom movement.
His immediate reaction on seeing the drill crane at the derrick "v" door, was to hoist up the boom and the load. The east crane pennant caught the drill crane boom dragging it east away from the
"v" door before coming to a halt due to the deadman brake automatically coming on due to the low level of hydraulic oil cau ed by a leak
While lowering the block, the suspending wire of the make up tong became trapped in the dolly track. The downward movement of the wire, raised the counterweight smashing the top clamp of
the counterweight guide rails. The wire then parted and the tong f ll tothe floor. The now unsupported counter balance fell to the floor a few seconds later.
During back loading operations to the supply vessel <>, the main hoist lowering speed went out of control falling 20-30 feet before i arrested the motion with the brakes. Statements attached to
file.
<> east and west cranes were hooked onto a rigging system, running through pulleys on main and cellar decks. The system is required for installation of riser protection for 30 inch a-line.
Attached to the system were water bags for load testing the sys em. A similar system for installation of 30 inch b-line protection was tested on <>. When the bags weighed 23 tonnes the crane
driver in the east crane requested permission to adjust the boom from 34foot radius to 30foot radius, permission wa granted. When boomingup, the crane driver noticed an increase in weight, he
thought the water bags had caught on something. As the crane was close to overload conditions. The driver ebgaged the blockline power lower clutch. The load desended slowly at fi st, then
rapidly. As the load descended the weight was transferred to the west crane which was shock loaded by the sudden transfer of weight
The basket No.124 SWL 3000kgm, weight in basket 1000kgm last tested <> was lifted off the main deck by the east crane when it was noticed that one of the basket 'o' rings was in the wrong
place. It was then slewed over the east side of the platform and boomed out until the basket was 30ft away from the platform and directly over the M.V.<>. The power lower on the whip line
was engaged and at that moment one of the basket 'o' rings failed leaving the basket suspended by the other. One pi ce of plate 2ft x 3ft, weight 300lbs fell onto the roof of a container 1189,
portside midships of M.V. <> from the platform main deck level. The basket was then placed back on the 48-29B main deck. Weather at that time was a south-westerly win at 27 knots with a
sea height of 3 metres.
On preparing to swing a 2,000kg load of scaffolding boards inbound of the platform, the crane boom was raised to and subsequently passed its minium operating radius. This action caused the
boom to strike the fixed boom backstop. Damage was sustained to th boom root section by this action. Damage to <> crane was limited to distortion and twisting of the root section. The crane
is removed from service pending root section replacement and load testing weather: wind 5-8 knots sea state : calm full aylight
While working supply boat doing lifts with whip line, the safety pendant on mainblock became detached and fell from top of jib to main deck. A man received minor cuts and abrasions but
returned to work the same day.
While completing lift of pallet of lifting gear from outside the mechanical workshop to the shaker house roof, the pallet collapsed allowing several pieces of equipment to fall to the stair wand
walkway outside the bit shack.
The <> was laying off the rat. The vessels deck crew hooked the cranes pennant to the generator which was sitting adjacent to the nowsco tank. During the course of the lift the generator
caught the nowsco tank causing it to overturn and causing t e two 3 ton brothers to snap. The generator endedup laying on its side on top of the upturned nitrogen tank - which was venting - the
rat crane had its strops replaced and lifted off the generator. The vessel then layed off the <> while the <> crane righted the nitrogen tank. Once in the upright positi9on the venting subsided
- the manual vent was opened - because of signs of damage to the tank frame and the lifting lugs the vessel was returned to aberdeen, with the instruction to hose do n throughout the journey
The elevators were moved from the rig floor to the pipe deck using the north crane connected to the lifting sub. In order to remove the lifting sub from the centre bore of the elevators the
elevators were supported 4 to 5 feet in the air by the north cra e hook connected by a strap to the elevator handling bar. The above bar sheared and the elevators dropped on to the pipe deck.
The north rig 'v' door was lifted approx. 4"using the air winch at rig floor level, the winch wire was fed through two elevated snatch blocks on the drilling derrick and secured to the lower end of
the 'v' door. A roller was inserted under the 'v' door p

Whilst changing out 500 t bails, one bail was being lowered down through the 'v' door when the strop snagged causing the bail to slip through the strop until the strop reached the bail eye. The
shock load caused the strop ferrule to fail causing the bail to fall approx. 40ft out the 'v' door down the ramp and continue for a further 50ft along the catwalk. The bail weight is 1410 lbs. The
strop was a certified swl of one ton. It was double wrapped round the shank of the bail approx 4ft from the eye.
Whilst preparing rig lifting equipment for 6 monthly statutory examination the rig electrican/supp was removing shackle joining a set of power tongs to the wire rope attached to the tong
counterweight to retain the wire rope at rig floor level he attached the hook on the "tie back" rope to the eye of the wire. When the shackle was removed the counterweitht fell within it's guide
assembly and the rope. In poor condition and not rated for the weight. Parted allowing the weight to continue descent. The weig t impacted on the guide assembly base plate causing the plate
and 'h' beam to which it was attached to flex downwards. The guide tubulars came free of the base plate retaining cub and the weight being detached from the assembly fell to the rotary table d
maging a snatch block lying on the floor. <> managed to reach safety before impact being alerted by the noise.
During the removal of a drilling stabiliser using the east crane at the east rig vee door. A lifting cap 4 1/2" weighing 15ins was knocked through a gap in a guardrail. This fell into the rig
substructure. No injuries were sustained, no damage to equipm nt experienced
During normal wireline operations a GS pulling tool was about to be disengaged from the main tool string. Before the tool could be disengaged the BT probe came free of the GS and fell several
feet to the cellar deck. The probe is held in place by a shear in which was found to have failed. The shear had probably weakened during the setting of the DHSV although the operation had been
carried out normally. Although not confirmed, it was thought that the BT probe may have struck a christmas tree but an immedi te visual inspection revealed no damage
Supply vessel <> alongside west side of platform to offload drilling mud. West crane commenced lowering bulk hose to the vessel when the power boom lowering chain snapped. The boom
overun cut out operated immediately and boom was prevented from ree falling. Crane was swung inboard and hose was lowered back into the securing point and the crane boom footbrake
operated to lower the boom into its rest. The cahin was inspected and found that one link had parted. Spare link fitted and chain checked for slackness. Crane brought back into limited use to
offlaod drilling mud and replacement chain called off. The failed link and the chain will be held for subsequent examination.
Luffing hoist hydraulic motor failed while trying to lower the boom into the rest using the brake and the main blick as back up and while lowering lost control and the boom crashed into the rest.
The n.w. crane was being used to discharge cargo from the <> the container bridle caught under a vessel fixture. Subsequent downward motion of the vessel resulted in minor damage to the
crane pendant and failure of the bridle.
A planned change out of an <> Turbine was in progress under the permit to work system. The time was 2100 hours, still air, dry and area well lighted by artifical light. The old turbine had
been removed using a 2 ton Swl <> Travelling Block. As the new turbine was being moved into the cell, one of the sheaves on the block failed, splitting in two through the vertical plane. The
load of 1.75 tons remained on the block and there were no injuries to staff or damage to plant or the load. The are was made safe and secure
The crane boom was reciving the wind at almost right angle. On one saw the incident but it is presumed the wind blew the crane boom off its rest and on until it struck the lifting beam and
exhaust stack. All personnel had been warned to stay indoors due o high winds.
The south crane was being utilised to offload an 11 ton lift from the mv <>. When lifting the load, with 4 fall load line, a second swell brought the boat back into contact with the load, on
continuing to lift the load the crane driver noted a slack f ll of wire and stopped lifting, the boat had moved away. The deck crew went to the lower deck to inspect the block, he saw a loop of
wire hanging beneath the block. The load was lowered and the loop taken up until it seemed to become untangled in the bl ck and the wire snapped. The load remained suspended from the
block.
During proof loan test of a portable boom a pin sheared causing the boom to fall onto platform handrail.
While awaiting investigative action on a reported crane defect, later identified as a broken spring within the luff hoist pump, the pump continued to supply hydraulic power to the luff hydraulic
system causing the boom to creep inward past minimum radius. This overtravel activated the boom protection limit switches which failed to stop the engine. These dual switches appear to have
signaled the engine fuel control valve which failed to operate. The engine continued to run at low speed thus providing hyd aulic power via the broken luff pump. The boom was pulled against
the back stops and suffered structural damage the crane was in stand-by status with no load on the hook and the disel engine at idle speed.

Crane operator was backloading the <> with a 54ft kelly (approx wt: 3000 lb) operator was holding the kelly stationary 10ft above the work boat deck whilst the boat was moving into position.
Then when he moved the control lever to boom down the bo m ran away dropping the delly on the deck of the work boat. The crane operator returned the control lever to the neutral position and
the brake system stopped the boom.
Whilst lifting 22" flange with overhead gantry crane from wellbay to production deck the flange weighting approx. 600 ibs was lifted 25 ft then fell back down 5 ft. On investigation it was found
that the transverse direction control chain had caught in th lifting block. This resulted in the load being transferred to the transverse chain, which subsequently broke. The load then fell back until
the lifting chain became taut, arresting the load.
Whilst lowering bop riser on a51 slot 1 with weight (approx 36t) suspended on 4 hydraulic rams the load dropped approx 8 inches. One set of trolley rollers had come off runway beam leaving
load supported on remaining 3 munck beam trolleys. 3 of the 4 bol s on trolley wheel hub had sheared and support frame splayed allowing trolley to leave runway. The load was retained on
remaining supports.
Fire monitoring control panel of three sides, size 2 off 7' x 4' bridged by panel 4' x 3' to be lifted from the lower central corridor to the pipedeck for backload. The unit was slung by the crane
method and attached to the north crane. As the load reac ed the pipedeck, it was subjected to the prevailing weather conditions (wind 28 kts sw) which turned the load upside down whereby it
fell from the sling to the pipedeck, a distance of some 15'.
Due to mechanical failure of the crane engine the coupling bolts had loosened and sheared. Emergency power pack was used with limited impact as a result it was decided to control the decent
with a combination of the power pack and manual control of the b akes. The wind speed at the time of the incident was gusting 55 knots.
A single joint of 7" tubing was unscrewed from the tubing string and suspended approx. 4ft above the drill floor. The catwalk tugger was attached to the pin end and the joint was pulled out of the
v-door as the elevators were lowered. When the pin end s ruck the catwalk, the elevators unlatched dropping the 40ft joint of 7" 29ib/ft tubing approx. 30ft onto the drill floor. As it fell the
tubing struck the cross beam on the guide tracks of the derrick, then the salvesen tubing tongs, damaging the latch m chanism. The elevators in use were 7" (certification up to date) 150 ton sd
casing elevators make: <>.
The driver in attempting to give extra clearance to personnel was caught unaware when a gust of wind spun his load. The load was in close proximity to the opposite crane and when it spun it
caught the hvac ducting dislodging it and causing it to fall to he ground.
The bop stack had been lifted and moved over the well by the bop lifting frame (swl 30 ton). On attempting to lower the bop stack, the hydraulic jacks on the lifting frame would not function
properly. When attempting to raise the jacks a sharp crack was heard. It was noticed that the weld connecting one of the jacks to its pad-eye was broken (lifting frame has 4 hydraulic jacks). No
damage to any persons or any other equipment was sustained. On further inspection a second jack was found to have a crac in the weld where it joined the pad-eye.
During lifting operations to replace 8.5ton caisson the vertical lift rigging arrangement collapsed inwards when the caisson was being turned to the horizontal. All personnel cleared to safe area.
The load was lowered under control to the deck.
The <> crane was being used to offload the supply vessel <>. During the first lift of a nitrogen tank (11.4 tonnes) control of the boom was lost which resulted in the boom continuing to fall
until it came to rest against secondary structural steelwork on the platform and the nitrogen tank entering the water. Eye witness accounts lead us to believe that no contact between the dropped
load and the installation structure took place. The weather at the time was fine
In attempting to lift a container from the deck of supply vessel. As the crane driver attempted to reel in slack wire & take strain, he heard a bang & the crane auxilliary hoist stopped functioning.
The crane driver stopped operations and made safe. The supply boat crew disconected the container strops, and sailed clear. The failure appears to be due to a seigure of the winch drum/hydraulic
motor drive gear.
In calm conditions, but foggy, crane operator was transferring two small pipe spools from the pipe deck to well deck of mod 15. Whilst leavering the load into the welldeck, as the hoist block
approached some 10-15ft above the deck level the operator noticed the line running out of control. Fortunately he forwarned the banksmen/riggers of the situation, and they vacated the area
rapidly. The rope ran off the drum and the block sropped to the deck, damaging a sea water pipe projecting above deck and trappi ng some welding cables. The wrlding cables were quicly
disconnected and made safe. The platform is currently shut down

Whilst in normal service a small explosion inside the firebox of f5000 flames exited from the front cover gasket. The fire was quickly extinguished by a firehose and the fixed deluge system.
Subsequent inspection showed a possible buckling (+ 20mm) of t e front cover. No other damage was visible interior/exterior. The explosion would appear to have been caused by a build-up of
diesel in the firebox. An in dept investigation by a vendor representative is underway.
The cable connector on the 3.3kv supply to seawater winning pump g4001b split open explosively. The failure appears to have been due to a short circuit within the plug. No personnel were
injured and no other damage was sustained.
Water cutting was taking place externally on module 11 roof. Due to jet reaction the cutting nozzle missed its target weld and penetrated module roof causing water to be sprayed on 480 volt
main incoming supply cubicle. Main cubicle circuit breakers sh rted out causing extensive internal damage, severe heat damage to cubicle panels and smoke damage to switch gear room.
Firefighting equipment was deployed but was not required as no fire occurred.
During the starting of the train 1 gas compressor the <> auto transformer experienced a flash over between 4 pairs of unused tapping studs. This resulted in the destruction of the perspex cover
which in turn initiated a red hazard alert and a main electrical shutdown. Smoke from the transformer was cleared by fans using power from emergency generators. Shortly afterwards the main
electrical supply was reinstated.
Main generator tripped due to governor fault. Loadshed operated and tripped water injection, sub generator tripped under frequency as a result, loss of service waterpressure caused firepumps to
be called for. Firepumps 1 and 2 auostarted. Area technician was requested to shut down firepump no.2. When he attended, he found the room full of smoke. He was instructed to shut the engine
down usingthe emergency fuel shut- off valve, which he did. He reported back that he had stopped the engine and was ventilating the room, before entering to investigate. When the smoke
dissipated, a small flash fire occured on the engine entablature, and this was extinguished. The fire was caused by loss of coolant water hose failure & subseqent overheating. The magnitude of
the fire was insufficient to initiate the rate of temperature rise heat detectors.
Whilst carrying a 21' scaffold tube along the west side w/way in above area the scaffolder slipped on the deck, thus dropping the tube which subsequently fell into the sea. The tube entered the
water adjacent to the b2 leg of the platform where diving op rations were in progess.
Hydraulic pressure relief while the hydlaulic pressure control valve was screwed down and the unit was engaged in wind position. This action caused the wireline and attached tool to be pulled
rapidly up to the sheave where the tool parted from the wireli e and fell to the rig floor.
During scaffold erection on module 232, lower west walkway, a 5' tube slipped out of a coupling and fell a distance of approx. 40 metres to the celler deck. Personnel working in the area were
protected by overhanging structural steelwork. No injuries to p rsons or damage to equipment occurred.
Scaffolder walking along walkway with 2mtr tube when gust of wind blew helmet off. He placed the tube on guardrail whilst retrieving helmet. Tube slipped through gap in guard rail and then
between gap at kennedy grating and kick flats. Tube fell to deck below damaging kennedy grating. No casualties
3" x 7" pin securing the lower end of the racking arm elevating ram to the racking tower some 10ft below monkey board. Split pin sheared allowing pin to come out and fall to rig floor.
Fast line crown sheave roller bar sheared the bolt attaching it to crown structure. The roller fell from height of 147 ft to the rig floor.
The body of the anemometer (wind speed indicator) was found lying on the walkway adjacent to drilling office's upper pipedeck toilet. By the degree of damage to the body of the anemometer
and toilet roof, it is assumed that the body somehow became detache d, fell onto the roof of toilet then finally landing on walkway. A fall of approx. 60ft. Weight of equipment approx. 121bs.
There was no reported sighting of this action, damaged equipment was found by a drilling employee who was passing and subseqently reported finding to logistics supervisor.
During a period of high 90 kt. Winds from a westerly direction. The guy wires appear to have failed causing the stack (approx. 75m x 10m long) to fail at a flanged joint and topple to land on
containers on the skid deck.
After completion of a successful pressure test on instrument pipework upstream of s.d.v. 0923 actuator, a function test of the quick dump valve was required. Whilst pressuring the actuator to 104
bar the front plate of the actuator blew off approximately 12 inches, restrained from further movement by the instrument pipework. The resultant spray of hydraulic oil (p79a) caught the rigger in
the right eye although he was wearing safety glasses. After irrigation of the eye he returned to work. Resulting inv estigation confirmed that the actuator had a working pressure of 80psi (normal)
120psi (maximum) and had been procured and supplied in error.

No 1 generator was started locally from the shelter panel on <> satellite by personnel paying maintenance visit. When the generator came on the distribution board, personnel observed noise as
unusual and investigated. Check showed flames, sparks and smoke being emitted from alternator causing machine shutdown by operation of emergency button, flames sparks, smoke, then ceased
Following modifications to discharge pipework a new 24" blank flange was being fitted. Stress relieving on the flange was being carried out. Fire blanket was caught by the wind, moving supply
cable to heating mat into contact with the flange. The flange a this time was very hot, causing the insulation to break down, creating a small fire. This was contained and put out by a 9lb fire
extinguisher. This happened during daylight hours. Dry environment, no noise, light winds.
Movement of stockpot on galley range caused an un-noticed spill of fat, whcih seaped through range top onto heating elements. Current to stove isolated, trays below stove withdrawn and small
fire put out with damp cloths.
After a failed attempt to start <> gas turbine 'a', temperature readings inside the turbine began rising rapidly even though turbine was shutdown. Platform fire alarm was then initiated by flame
being detected by two uv detectors inside the turbine en losure. Platform fire team were deployed using water hoses to effect cooling of the turbine exhaust stack inside and above the turbine
enclosure. Damage: external to the turbine exhaust stack was minimal. Dent
Starting up the first of the main generators, <> gas turbine gt3, after a period of shutdown, the automatic start control sequence defaulted allowing excess fuel gas to pass unburnt through the
power turbine. The unburnt fuel gas was then ignited in th exhaust trunking resulting in severe damage to the trunking and attachments.
An electrically powered multiway welding set was in use. This was situated remotely from this particular welding site. Several lengths of power and earth leads were employed. All except the last
length were tied up overhead. The final joint was lying on a wet patch and shorted out. Overheating caused lead to fire. The fire was spotted by a pipefitter, who phoned control room immediately
and isolated the power supply. A control room operator extinguished fire with dry powder extinguisher. Control room infor ed OIM who ordered precautionary muster. No platform equipment
was damaged and all other leads were checked out. Situation normal at 19:41 hrs.
Sparks from welding ignited small pool of lub oil below grating at "B" compressor. Firewatch immediately extinguished fire. Platform production was shutdown and vented. Muster alarm was
activated manually from control room as a precautionary measure. Pers nnel stood down after site check.
Smoke detected at 17.18 hrs on the <> scada system and reached other locations by 17.34 hrs. Halon was automatically discharged into affected areas at 17.47 hrs. No fire alarms were
activated during the period. By 21.00 hrs a team from <> platform equipped with ba had inspected the forbes platform and declared it to be safe.
The scaffold was erected below, and in close proximity, to the diesel engine exhaust from p65, fire pump. P65 was run up for its routine test. The heat from the exhaust gases ignited the boards.
Platform alert initiated by mcr due to indications of smoke and heat from 03 fire pump room. Fire team mustered and pump room entered by ba and hose reel. (halon manually discharged prior to
fire team entering). Once smoke had cleared extensive heat dam ge found on fire pump engine (wireing, paint etc). Heat detector found melted. All platform personnel mustered by 0905 and
stood down at 0910.
1458 pump p4a tripped on overload. Gas operator sent to investigate and found smoke venting from exhaust cowl of motor. Local isolation stop button isolated. Control room notified. Fire
alarm activated. Full life boat muster fire teams attended at scene. Electrical isolation of motor at switchgear room. Natural cooling of dump allowed 1525 situation considered under control.
L/boat muster stood down 1540 fire teams stood down.
Two men were repairing/fault finding on humidifier which involved working with electrical power online to check that it was operating satisfactorily. During these tests the unit caught fire. The
men raised the alarm by using the local "mac" (manual alarm all point), isolated the unit and fired 2 bcf extinguishers to put out the fire. All platform personnel mustered and checks carried out in
the area using ba teams to comfirm fire extinguished, area ventilated to clear smoke and platform returned to normal duties.
Employee was loading freight onto a <>'s Tiger helicopter when it took off. Noticed by logistics co-ordinator. Helicopter returned without injuring employee.
Fire main section being recommissioned after hydrant replacement. 1" drain v/v bonnet failed. Workshop area flooded and water accessed essential services switchroom below via hole in deck
penetration cable transit. Water cascaded onto 110v control section of essential svs distribution board causing power failure and platform shutdown. Emergency generation not activated due to its
being fed from essential services switchboard.

Interstage condensate pump 26105a had been disassembled to replace the mechanical seal. On completion of the work preparations were made to restart the pump. This involves introducing gas
from the interstage scrubber at 46 bar via a 1/2" balanceline in o the pump, at this stage the operator involved observed and heard gas escaping. He immediately isolated alll the lines to the pump
and the gas ceased. This release was picked up by the detection system as a low gas alarm by one detector some 40 feet fro the source of the leak. There was a 40 knot wind blowing through the
module. The cause was the failure of a swagelok fitting on the 1/2" balance line which had been cross threaded on reassembly.
Gas leak testing was in progress following repairs carried out on a senior Daniel orifice box on a 10" process gas test line. The leak test was carried out in 25 bar stages, and had reached 100bar
without problem when the failure occurred. The leak occur ed at the corner if the lower flange. The two technicians involved closed the inlet valve and opened the vent valve on the test separator,
before retreating to their muster point.
Sump tank on cellar deck dumped some gasoline into the sea. This gasoline was ignited by sparks dropping down from welding being carried out nearby on the fire pump house. The automatic
deluge system operated and smothered the fire. 3" drain valve was clo ed on the sump tank which shut off fuel source. Paintwork on north end of platform at spider deck level was scorched.
The hydraulic skid on ED satellite is a dual type 3000 and 5000psi. The 3000psi section was bled down for the changeout of a faulty motor driven 3000psi pump. During the removal of the pump,
a pipe fitting which was found to have a loose connection was im acted by a wrench. The pipe fitting blew off due to the above and the 5000psi system being left pressured up.
A leak of hydrocarbon gas was detected by personnel working in the area and was confirmed using a portable gas detector. A leak was identified from the "Manway cover" of the square drum. The
system was isolated and all the work in progress on platform sus ended. The system was de-pressurised and area barriered off.
Recommissioning gas turbine which had been shutdown for maintenance when gas release occurred leading to General Platform Alarm and hydraulic shutdown. Turbine was re-isolated and
preliminary investigation indicated failure to have been in vent line.
The whole complex was in a state of shutdown for the annual shutdown and modifications. All pipelines including sub sea were de-pressured and purged with nitrogen. B.c. (compression) fuel
gas surge drum pressure control valve bonnet was removed for overha l. During removal a small spillage of condensate which at the time was thought to be water occured from the value body,
onto the desk. Later in the day hotwork commence above the site after the necessary gas free checks had been carried out a hot spark f om the hotwork site ignited the spillage which was
extinguished immediately by the firewatcher.
A 1/4" stainless steel pipe adaptor attached to K200 gas compressor high discharge pressure switch sheared off. High pressure gas was released to atmosphere via the adaptor. Two personnel were
in the vicinity of the pressure switch. Upon seeing/hearing th gas leak they quickly isolated the leak by localised valves. Duration of the gas leak was between 30 and 60 seconds. The compressor
was manually ramped down to idle mode whilst the pressure switch was totally replaced. The compressor hall has wide openin s at its ends with the sides partially clad by windwall. At the time
of the incident the wind speed was 30 knots.
Platform brought on line at <>'s request. A leak was detected - wells were isolated but gas was still leaking from well flowline at a 3" elbow going into production header. Therefore ESD was
initiated at 16:05hrs.Platform blowdown @ 16:07hrs. Informed <> and field production supervisor
Turbine exhaust was being pressurised/started. Operator heard sound of gasket failing. Fire hose was immediately run out but oil had leaked onto turbnine exhaust and did ignite. No damage was
sustained, just slight scorching of bellows material.
A packing seal on no.1 cylinder 6.156 gas compressor failed causing a gas leak. Platform sustained a class ii shutdown and went to muster stations upon the sounding of the general platform
alarm. No injuries or damage.
During normal production operations h1 gas alarm registered in area 6a gpa sounded personnel proceed to muster stations and class 2a shutdown initiated. Gas release caused by kidney joint
failure. Transmitter was then isolated and area doors opened to a low gas to disperse. Personnel stood down from muster stations at 20:47hrs.
During normal production operation two 20% lel gas alarms for area annunciated in the ccr. The system worked as per design. A gpa was sounded and a glass 2a shutdown initiated. The muster
was stood down at 20.23 hours. The cause of the release was the nd cover of g156-low pressure no 3 cylinder.

At 07.50 hours a class 2 shutdown initiated when 2 hi-hi gas alarms were activated, gpa sounded platform went to muster. Deluge fired automatically. Gas release identified and isolated which
was caused by instrument blowdown line tied into the kill mani old having blown. Tapping isolated 07.52 hours, deluge reset at 08.14 hrs. The line had been broken earlier in the day to facilitate
the removal of a spool piece from the kill manifold. The spool piece and instrument line had been reconnected and produc ion restarted at 07.00 hrs that day. The tapping blew during pressure
test of reinstated pipeworm in the kill manifold system.
Gpa sounded and fire team assembled at scene to extinguish fire. The cause was due to a diesel spill that occurred earlier at 13:45. After a thorough clean up of this spill, it was decided to leave
gtg1 running and monitor the area. This was done to dr out the lagging.
Whilst venting no.2 to the poor boy gas alarms were activated in the upper mezzanine above the trip tank - a gpa initiated. Due to rate of blowdonw required for this operation the "u" tube seal
was overcome and some hydrocarbon liquid/mud from previous op rations was pushed through to the trip tank, resulting in hydrocarbon mist contracting 4 gas heads. No damage - no injuries.
Preparing to resinstate hydrocarbon water treatment units (v4805 a/d) isolation of tilted plate separator (v4801 a) for water flow through v4805 a and v4801 b units. Lines walked and system
checked that all valves were close/open for correct line-up. Co trol valve opened from ccr for water flow through hydrocyclone unit. Oil spillage was reported and hi hi pressure alarm noted
from tps v4801 a. Valves were tripped supplying water to system. Investigation revealed that a bypass valve was not fully clos d and another valve apparently leaking to v4801 a. Also v4801 a
atmospheric vent valve was closed from previous work on other related equipment.
Whilst backloading crane boom transportation cage (empty) from <> deck to supply vessel a hydraulic oil leak occured due to the failure of two studs which secure whip line low boost filter
housing. The whip brakes were applied automatically and the dri er lost all three motions
Generator while runningon diesel fuel developed a pinhole leak in a flexible diesel supply line. The leaking fuel ignited on contact with hot turbine components. The resultant small fire which
was extinguished. Damage was confined.
During checks of valve closures satellite oim was proceeding down to slot 2 on the platform when he heard a noise which subsequently identified as a gas escape from a pin hole leak at the willis
choke outlet flangeweld on slot 2.(this was the only slot fl wing at the time) the well was immediately shut in and the line de-pressurised.
A portable injection pump was being used to inject methanol into a well flow line. A leak was observed from the pump seals and a decision made to shutdown the pump and effect repairs. The
operator isolated the pump air supply and then proceeded to open he pump bypass valve to bleed off residual pressure. Prior to doing this he should have closed two valves connecting the pump
to the well. His failure to do this resulted in back pressure from the well flowline into the pump header tank forcing methanol ut of a filler hole and spraying him with methanol.
Escape of hydrocarbon liquid from <> unit inpection hatch
To overcome seal draining problems on k9300, both sour seal oil traps onon the hp compressor bundle had been replaced with units taken from the dismantled standby machine k9300. When
compressor was restarted a gasket blew out on the 4th stage seal draintr p inlet flange. At the same time, the labyrinth seals backed up forcing luboil and gas to blow from the seal tell-tale
gooseneck vent. The gas released brought all gas detectors in m4e to high level causing a surface process shutdown. Subsequent investi ation found the drain line joint had been made up with a
new gasket but an old, partly split, gasket had been left stuck on the trap flange. A segment of the old joint had blown out providing the source of most of the leaking oil and gas
During commissioning of reciprocating compressor, a proposed 12 hour monitored test was initiated. Operated normally for 20 minutes when the hand recycle valve was gradually closed in order
to create a minor load across the unit. A yellow gas alert occurr d followed by a red hazard status. The compressor was manually tripped and depressurised. Muster called and all personnel
accounted for.
At 2150 hrs a fire was discovered inside the turbine hood of a1040 sub- main generator by a power technician during a routine inspection toru of module mie. He immediately operated the local
stop button shutting down the machine. With g1040 shutdown its load was shed to g1050 which was unable to accept it and tripped causing a total power shutdown. The technician immediately
started the energy generator g1060, and returned to mie. The bcf fire protection system had not fired by this time, he operated t e manned system and extinguished the fire. This caused the
platform to go to red hazard status at 2145. The ert were called to check the area and the machine. On confirmation that the fire had been extinguished the platform was stood down from red stat
s at 2248 hours

Bang heard by 2 gas techs. Who were in control room, on ivestigation a strong smell of burnt lub oil was detected. The running lub/seal oil pumps were shut down and the oil level checked via
sight glass. The level was below the bottom of the glass and a umber of alarms showing in the gas comp. Control toom, including low level alarm. The compressor sump tank heater was
isolated. Both hp and lp seal oil tanks were full as were the soak oil traps and the flame compressor casing. Lub oil was ejected via he 6" vent line. The vent liner external arrestor gauge and
cowling were also ejected.
During routine plant operations, well was being commissioned in order to top up the <> process plant pressure. The production technician lined up well as per procedure by opening umv and
wing valve. Upon opening the wing valve, the technician observe a flowline surge condition (normal for this operation) followed by a high pitched sound. Investigation of this sound led the
technician to discover a gas leak emanating from a <> flange immediately downstream of flowline choke. The technician immedia ely activated the W.H.T. process shutdown trip and informed
the control room who raised the general alarm. Flow line was immediately isolated and vented in a controlled manner. Well and associated flowline isolated and an ICC raised.
Plate type cooler amnufactured by apv ruptured and caused escape of hydrocarbens approx three barrels of oil lost in spill. Spill totally contained on platform and recovered through drainage
system.
The 'o' ring failed in hp mud service, with ca. 3000 psi in the live, causing the coupling to wash out, and spray a jet of water based mud onto the deck. The system was shutdown, depressured and
flushed. Operation was tranferred to the second hp manifold no personnel were in the are due to its inaccessible/remote location.
Following a planned shut down, oil production was restarted at midnight. Some wells were on line and oil and gas were flowing through the three separators. The separation train was isolated by
closed valves from the gas compression system. At 0133 gas wa detected by first one, then later two more of a group of 3 gas detectors positioned at floor level alongside the tube and seal oil
skid of the lp/ip gas compressor. The control action caused a production system shut down and depressurisation. Two produc ion operators noticed gas coming from the lube oil tank vent and the
lp compressor/gearbox casing. Investigation indicates that gas had passed from the 3 stage separator, through a closed 16" esdv, which must have leaked into the lp compressor; through th shaft
seals. The seal and lube oil systems were shut down at this time, thereby allowings gas to pass through the machine.
Mud wasbeing circulated through two mud lines running underneath rig structure. Driller noticed a pressure loss which was quickly identified as due to a leak on a coupling on one line. Leak
was later found to be due to a failure of ring within the coupl ng and washing of the metal faces. The mud pumps were shut down, the line was isolated, and the standby line put into service. 5
barrels of mud were estimated to have been lost, which escaped through grated decks into the sea.
During normal operations, a gas turbine driven compressor shut down on process trip due to high level in condensate interstage drum. This caused blowdown to vent. Gas alarms registered in gas
turbine hall and <...> enclosure. Automatic ESD activated and evel 4 alarm sounded. All platform personnel mustered and the emergency teams isolated the HP ventto the generator enclosure
situated on the production mezzanine level. The C turbine generator had been removed from service for maintenance. The resultant o en pipework had not been fitted with blank flanges. This and
the failure to isolate the HP vent line left the system vulnerable when HP venting occurred.
Platform was in normal operating mode. A leak developed from a 1/32 x 1/4 inch slit in the valve body of 52-SDV-2047 which is the produced water/methanol shutdown valve from <> inlet
separator to produced water/methanol/condensate header. The eak was minimal and will have no environmental impact
In preparation for running train 1 compressor after a turbine starter motor had been fitted some days earlier the gas fuel system was being re-commissioned. During pressurisation the upstream
flange o ring joint failed adjacent to the fuel gas shut off c ck. The shut off cock had not been included in the starter motor isolation as it played no necessary part. The gas generator cell was not
inhabited at time of release. Upon immediate investigation the enclosure had cleared of gas.
During routine process operations, signs of oil contamination in the water injection supply water was reported. This water is supplied through the service water system. A detailed investigation
was conducted into the possible source through any of the ydrocarbon/serv. Water interfaces on the platform
D-gas compressor had been shut down to replace faulty vibration monitor probe. Three attempts were made to restart. Each failed attempt vented the fuel gas system for the compressor. Gas cloud
built up over module and was ingested by control room pressuri ation vent system.

D gas compressor had been shutdown and vented to atmosphere for maintenance work. During the cooling down cycle, lube oil pump, vent fans continue to run until the control unit automatically
shuts down the auxilliry units. Gas was detected inside "D" tu bine enclosure. The production crew opened the enclosure doors to investigate the problem and in doing so released gas which was
detected by a second gas head which resulted in the automatic alarm being initiated followed by a precautionary muster of the rew. Investigation showed that a flexible vent pipe down stream of
the fuel gas P.S.U. had fractured possibly due to fatigue
A pinehole leak was discovered by production tech during routine plant checks. Leak was caused by external corrosion of the pipe work. The gas was taken off line in a controlled shutdown at
2010 hours.
The ngl plant had been restarted at <> after a maintenance shutdown period. While preparing to put fuel gas to the power generation turbines, gas was blown to a low pressure flare/drain
system. The gas flowed to a draw tank, and pressurised a floor drain loop seal, blowing it onto the module deck. Area was well lit.
A new production flowline had been fabricated and installed on well no. 5-3. The personnel involved with the installation had partially leak tested the pipework with water. This team also had
unsecured a flange further downstream of their leak test. Th s flange was not retensioned or leak tested. When the process department commenced to commission this flowline a small quantity
of crude oil was seen to leak from this flange, this leak also caused a low gas alarm to activate - 20% level.
The incident was caused by the solenoid valve (sv6212) on the fuel gas supply to gt2 failing to close properly or seal. The permited communication between the fuel gas distribution pipework and
the llp flare pipework leading to overpressuring of the flare system. Overpressuring of the llp flare system caused gas to be released to atmosphere from a tundish drain and from the offline ngl
compressor seals. The platform gas detection system correctly followed to identify the source and make safe.
Incident was caused by the solenoid valve on the fuel gas supply to gt2 failing to close properly or seal. This permitted communication between the fuel gas distribution pipework and the lp drain
pipework via (sol 16) bend valve leading to the loss of a ater loop seal due to overpressurisation. This allowed gas to be released to atmosphere from a tundish drain in the deck. The platform
gas detection system correctly indentified the gas escape and procedures were correctly followed to identify the source and make safe.
The operating crew were routinely depressuring the pig launcher via closed vent system to the main cold vent. The weather was almost calm with just a slight northerly air flow. This caused the
gas plume to come back across the installation and gas was ing sted by the ALQ pressurisation fan. Production and power generation were automatically shutdown and power disconnected from
ALQ. All as per cause and effect chart. Total POB of 7 were accounted for with no injuries. Situation made secure and production re tarted at 15:10hrs
A programme to perforate well <> was progressing, no perforation had taken place and the well remained cased with 5" casing, although there was a 1.000' column of + - 100psi on the well
tubing head, following gas lift offloading. When <> were virtually ready to run in the hole the <> engineer phoned the control room to enquire whether it would be possible to get someone
the <> to standby to open the swab valve. The message was misinterpreted by the control room operator, <>, at hat precise time was in the process of screwing the lubricator <> quick
union onto the bop's. He had screwed 1 to 2 turns of the union onto the bop's and a surge was coming out of the union. He called to get the well shut in and <>, proceeded immediately to get
the swab valve closed
At approx 07.28hrs gas alarm annunciated in the control room. Area operator proceeded to module b2 to investigate, on arriving at the scene he noticed condensate escaping from condensate
pressure transmitter, he informed the control room of the situation a production shutdown and general alarm/muster was initiated at 07.28 hrs area operator isolated the feed to the transmitter and
gas dispersion commenced. At 07.36 hrs muster completed all personnel accounted for. At 07.40 hrs react teams, returned to ontrol room and stood down. Following the incident the pressure
transmitter was examined and the exact cause of the leak, was determined to be the centre of a 1/4" crawford patented swagelok 316 blanking cap, which had blown out causing the leak.
Wireline risen connection broken out befor being fully drained. Less than one barrel of oil spilled into well bay activating 4 gas heads. 2 heads went to hi level causing yellow s.down. General
alarm sounded 1000. Pob accounted for 1007. Personnel sto d-down 1009.
Platform producing at full rate. Oil leak reported in m3 deck. Nothing detected on fire and gas system. Yellow shutdown activated. Central alarm sounded. Source of leak as above. Section of
plant containing leak isolated, depressurized and flushed. Escaping oil covered with foam blanket and washed into platform closed hazardous drain system. Personnel at muster stations stood
down.

A pressure safety valve was being removed from a line for testing prior to commissioning of the hydraulic package (<> unit). The line contained residual pressure from commissioning
operation which had taken place in the construction yard although th unit should have been mothbalied prior to module shipment. The psv was screwed into the hydraulic line and it was ejected
from the line with some force when it was backed out to the last thread or so. The technician involved suffered minor bruising to is hand and he and his colleague were sprayed with hydraulic
fluid. The psv suffered minor damage on its threaded nipple when it impacted on the steel deck. No part of the hydraulic unit was in operation at the time.
Gas compressor c1050 was being pressured up during commissioning of the unit. When the seal gas solenoid valve opened, the downstream connection parted causing gas to escape into the
module activating the low gas alarms in the fire and gas panel in the c r. The supply pressure to the seal gas line was 170 psig. The unit was immediately shut down. The leak was stopped by the
dresser commissioning engineer de-energising the solenoid valve. The failure of the connection was found to be caused by a missing eal (olive) in the swagelock.
Removal of blind hub from flowline, four routing valves were closed, two vent valves on top of flowline opened. No indication of pressure in flowline. The graylock clamp was loosened. No
indication of pressure was present, the graylock clamp was remove leaving the blind hub, which was knocked to loosen. It blew off as there was still pressure in flowline.
Whilst testing a 2" choke line from the bjunit down to mod 3 cellar deck up to ss2 rig floor with 3,500 psi the operator noticed a rapid decrease in pressure. After investigation a cap was found to
have blown off a bullplug. This cap was welded on to a " male nipple.
E404 is the fuel gas heat exchanger which warms gas from the fuel gas scrubber prior to use. A 20% lel gas alarm was seen in the module 5 east cellar and an operator sent to check out the cause
of the alarm all hot work permits were withdrawn. The alarm was found to be "good". The leak was located on a large flange on the body of e404. The fuel gas system was isolated and vented.
When changing crude metering stream 1 filter which was isolated, drained down and open to atmosphere, a surge of live crude came from the filter as the filter lid was being replaced. The filter
basket was already in place. As a result a spillage of crud oil occurred resulting in the ccr operator initiating a 2b platform shutdown.
While dismantling at-497 produced water separator, using oxy-accetalene burner, hot metal dropped onto the produced water treater at-498. Gas which had accumulated on top at-498 flashed off
up to a height of 15ft. A gas check had been done on the vessel 0 minutes prior. One isolation valve to at-412 was left open. The vessel had been drained, flushed and filled with clean water.
After the incident the level was found to have dropped 12".
Dischare pressure of k106 rose to approx. 147 bar soon after a44 well was shut in. Psv550/1, the discharge relief valve, lifted and routed gas to flare. The 6" flange gasket blew on the
downstream side of the psv d e to the block valve sp141 being in the closed position. A large gas escape occurred which was detected by platform fire and gas detection system. Due to the extent
of the gas migration within the module a 2b shutdown was initiated. This was followed sh rtley after by a 2a shutdown. To assist in the dissipation/control of the gas, the deluge systems in mods
4 & 5 cellar and production were activated. High gas levels then started to drop after which an investigation team entered the doule to try and det rmine the source of the escape.
Rig floor: all floor personnel behind drawworks for safety. Incident: displacing drill pipe with drilling mud. Upon pressure up of drill string to burst the bressure deck, the hose ruptured, spraying
drilling fluid on the drill floor. /plann
Fuel gas filter v400a developed a seal leak, v400a is isolated by chief operator and pressure bled off. Chief operator returned to control room and notified mechanical foreman that v400b had
developed a leak. Permit was raised to repair v400b. Technicia obtained permit to perform work. Technician mistook chained and locked normally open valves to be chained and locked in
closed position. Subsequent work resulted in gas release. Gas alarm was raised, platform was shut in and personnel were musstered.
Safety valve 11 sv5543 was to be fitted between 'a' gas compressor and the flare system. Ellis interlocked isolation block valves up and dwonstream of safety valve had not been isolated. A
permit to work head not been issued to remove blanks from the lin e. The blanks were removed from both isolation valves; a quantity of gas escaped into the moduel causing a plant shut down.
This in turn allowed large quantities of gas to be vented to the flare system, because the blank had been removed a large volume of gas was discharged into module 11.

While test running fire pump p7003, a 1/4 pressure gauge fitting on a hydraulic oil line at the pump end of the engine blew out, spraying oil over the hot engine and exhaust. The smoke produced
was observed by patrolling platform staff who responded by sh utting down the engine and isolating the gauge fitting. Subsequently flames were seen coming from the exhaust cladding. These
were quickly extinguished by dry powder.
Well F5 choke had been opened from 18 to 19 degrees and the area operator was conducting his checks. Gas detection came up in the main control room for WT-1 which activated the general
platform alarm. The operator was instructed to investigate and the prod uction foreman went to WT-1. A very small leak was seen coming from the upstream flange on F5 choke (dripping water
with entrained gas). The well was shutdown immediately and fully depressured. Personnel were mustered. No one was injured.
Slug catcher was being re-commissioned after a planned inspection. In accordance with the re-commissioning programme the unit was being pressure tested under the supervision of the
Production Foreman. After successful leak tests the pressure was being incr eased slowly to the next test point when a flange on the satellite import line began to leak. This activated two gas
detectors and the general alarm was initiated automatically. Personnel were called to muster stations and were all accounted for. The slug catcher was depressured and personnel were stood down
at 03:35hrs.
Sand separator was on a clean up operation. Problems were encountered with liquid level control. Sand separator was isolated and fully depressured to allow inspection hatch to be opened and
unit to be washed out to remove any sand debris externally. The hatch was opened and remained open. A gas alarm was activated beside the open separator. Gas was being emitted from the open
doorway. The hatch was closed and sealed. The cause of the gas ingress into the separator was later identified as 2 passing valves of the separator.
Wind n.w.e. 10 knots sea 1 metre. Mustered all personnel in emergency shelter after confirming gas/hydrocarbon leak from v-11 sight lglass. Platform shutdown and depressurised via blowout
system. During depressurising platform move all personnel to main deck liferaft/scrambl e net due to gas ingress around the emergency shelter, lifeboat and helideck.
A gas leak was reported by the master of the <> as emanating from the gas riser. The production supervisor was immediately notified and inspected the source of the leak and confirmed the
location as being on the insulating joint on 18" gas export pipeline. Platform was shutdown and all non essential personnel sent to nearby platforms.
Witnesses working in module "b" noticed an area of failure on t8 <> which they reported to production department. <> was isolated at production choke valve as t8 was temporarily shut in
to comply with flare restriction. After isolating tree side of coflexip, an inspection was made of the damaged area, it was found an area about 10' square had sustained failure of stainless steel
outer wrap and external thermoplastic sheath. No leakage of oil and a slight smell of gas soon dissipated.
Water from a leak in the 2" drinking water line from r/o water discharge drained through the bulkhead and down the rear of iv801 electrical inverter panel. The water caused shorting of the
inverter transformer. The resultant smoke from the shortened transf ormer was picked up by the fixed smoke detectors, initiating an automatic release of halon into the inverter/battery room.
Whilst changing out an header valve on slot 32, the ball valve which supplies air to the two isolation valves for the test header, was stuck, the impact causing it to open and heed air to the
isolation valves. This caused the isolation valves to open, releasing oil and gas into module 8.
Air dive 40fsw - 90 min. A section of the diver's laid up umbilical became unlaid.this caused a kink in the air hose which decimated the surface air supply & caused the diver to go on bail-out.the
kink occured 280 feet back from the diver in the umbilical storage net. Diver was recovered without further incident.
Recently we have discovered movement of the <> pipelines on module m4 roof of <>. The precise cause of the movement is not clear and further investigation is continuing. Both
production and test lines have moved 280 - 300 mm.
Prior to radiography commencing, 5 scaffolders had gained access to an area remote from the shot location but nevertheless within the control barriers. A final check of the area had failed to
reveal their presence and the radiography continued to complet on while they were within the barries
A <> 1" coiled tubing unit was rigged up on well <> and had run in hole to approx 6000'. A pull test was being performed 4000lbs was pulled when tubing parted. The blind rams were
closed when trying to close swab valve, it appears that the tubing s across the xmas tree
A riser was being rigged down from the top of the tree. This had been bled down and the top section removed (master valve and swab valve closed). The shear rams were fully closed to allow
them to pass through the hole in the floow. While waiting for the verhead crane and lifting cap to be lowered the shear ram coupling was completely undone. A small leak had occurred into the
bottom section of the lubricator which built up and foreced the ram assembly off the bottom section.

Valves were being removed from the choke manifold for maintenance. Beam clamps and chain blocks were rigged to take the weight and lower the valves. One valve had been successfully
removed. The second valve was was attached to the rigging assembly by a ractice of 'a' assembly hooked into a webbing sling and the valve, and 'b' assembly hooked into 'a' hook. As the bolts
holding the valve were cut and the valve levered free the weight of the valve came onto the rigged lifting assembly. 'B' hook ripped o en the safety catch of 'a' hook and the valve swung supported
on 'a' lifting assembly. At the end of the swing it struck i.p. fracturing it in two locations.
Operator was engaged in launching a line cleaning sphere into the 30" leman bt to bacton pipeline. Whilst pressuring up the sphere launcher prior to launch, the launcher end closure failed. Parts
of the mechanism damaged facilities on the bt top deck incl ding the crane boom (which collapsed). The operator was injured by blast and glass fragments (from shattered crane windows).
In plq. Three explosions, major damage and minor fire damage to se wing of level 3.
I.p. was standing on tubulars waiting to connect the crane hook to slings on the drillex mud motor. The mud motor was stacked on tubulars at a level above where i.p. was standing. The mud
motor rolled off and trapped his right foot. <> who was working with i.p. attatched the slings to crane and instructed the crane driver to lift the motor in order to free i.p.'s foot.
A flowline spool of roughly double 'l' shape was being lowered from the wellbay mezzanine area to main deck level 1 via a short stairway. A chain block was being used to control the descent
down the stairway. Control of the spool was lost just short of ma n deck level 1 when the spool turned and rolled, because of its shape, and trapped ip's foot between second bottom stiar tread and
the spool.
Ip working on drill floor making connection to drill-string when a bolt fell from the top drive safety guard, then bounced off the rig floor striking ip in the face.
While transferring tote tank from bund on m13 roof to m8 chemical tank hose was connected to wrong link thus transferring chemical to tank in m3 which overflowed. Drain link to slop tank
which should have drained away the overflow was blocked resulting i oxygen scavenger ebing blown over diving vessel <>.
Production operator opened inlet valve to pump gm7602a to start a chemical posing operation. The inlet valve to the granduation pot was left open allowing the flow of 'corexit 7679' to discharge
to atmosphere the resulting release splashed onto the opera or affecting his eye/face hands
Pipework was radiographed within the dgl module. The 2 persons, were working within a habitat, distant from, but still within the barriered area, during radiography. Prior to radiography, the 2
persons failed to hear the warning tannoy message. They also escaped detection. The dose rate was calculated by the radiological protection advisor. The estimated does rate each man received is
22.5 microsieverts.
Diver had been diving at a 60' depth (estimated air depth 35'). After surfacing reported he was not feeling well.symptoms indicate a type 11 bend and diver was immediately put into
decompression (table 6). O.m.s. was contacted and advised to continue (tabl e 6). Initial symptoms reported by diver at 0130 hours. Decompression commenced 0226 hours and completed 0711
hours.
Radiographic n.d.t. testing using 2.6 ci iridium 192 source was taking place on 14" firewater line on stairway ucc-lcc. After completing 4 1/2" minute panoramic exposure the radiographer noticed
an employee of cct in an adjacent area to test site approx. - 2 1/2 mtrs from source exposure
While attempting to set slips on running 5" drill pipe in the hole, the front of the slips caught on a recess in the rotary causing the back of the slips to rise. Ip was holding the back handle which
came into contact with the elevators being lowered, ca
During lifting operations to transfer equipment test head from catwalk to drill floor i.p. was struck by swinging load.
Deck grating had been landed by crane alongside a container and were being held back against the container by 2 members of deck crew. While removing the lifting slings used to lower the
bundle the grating fell forwards. Deck crew tried to move clear.
The platform east crane was delivering the portable water bunkering hose to the balblair, with crane hook connected by a sling to the hose end connection. The supply boat deck crew collected
and tied down the hose at the end section. The bridge requested the crane operator to take the weight of the hose but omitted to say that hose was secured at rail. As weight was taken the vessel
fell into through and stretched the hose which parted at the hose end union. Hose snaked, hitting crew member on hand.
I/p was assisting the banksman to lower the harben pump on to the skid deck. During this operation, he trapped his finger between the cargo basket and pump frame. The initial injury seemed
superficial, but over the next few days grew progressively worse resulting in medivac.

After stabbing first section into top of second section crane was signalled to lift. The bottom coupling snagged on steelwork inside storage frame. Ip was guiding load, standing on frame
platform. Banksman indicated to stop laod. As the crane stopped t e snag slipped the load swung and trapped the mans thumb between another section of lubricator stored within the rack.
Ip was usinga pull- lift to alter the position of a heavy door that had been removed from its usual position and slung - up overnight when the pull - lift twisted and momentarily trapped his thumb
between the pull- lift and a platform handrail
I.p. hooked lift ont cranehook, he then walked back 25' from the unit to be lifted. As the crane driver took the weight the lift cleared the deck swinging and hit the aft end of a 25' x 2' cargo
basket. The seaman involved was standing at the fwd end of the basket, 4' away from it. The fwd end slid across the deck hitting the seaman forcing him against another piece of cargo, resulting
in an injury to the groin
The deep gas lift module was being manoeuvred into position using the <> crane and tuggers. During final stages, the chain, of the chain block used for guiding/pulling the module, failed. The
sheared chain struck ip in the face.
Ip on manriding winch to free snagged wire when he was suddenly thrown back and upwards sustaining injury to middle back and minor facial laceration.
In the process of refitting the right hand slew gearbox to the n.e. crane, ip was lifting the brake band (with assistance) and brake cylinder bracket back into place. The bracket then fell trapping
and injuring ip's finger. During the task, ip positione himself towards the rear of the crane in preparation to receive the bracket and bushing when the incident occured. At this point, ip had been
in a bent over attitude and standing on pipework bolted to crane deck.
The work over of well s15 was closed to completion and <> were rigging up a 'polished rod lubricator' to remove a 'h check' tubing hanger plug. While attempting to position a 'cross over' or
adapter on top of the swab valve, the wireline operator all wed it to slip from his grasp. He tried to catch it and it crushed his finger against a lower portion of the wellhead. Good natural light,
sheltered location, but heavy seas may have moved the wellhead a little at a critical moment, contributing to slip top of swab valve is 6ft above deck, an awkward height, and cross over weights
about 40 kilo.
4 1/2" tubulars were being unloaded from supply vessel using main pedestal crane. Ip was steadying load prior to landing the load in pipe bay, when tubulars started to turn, trapping his middle
finger left hand, between load and samson post. Extensive la eration and suspected ligament damage to finger. Atmospheric conditions were clear and dry with top deck illuminated by artificial
light
Whilst pulling out of the hole with drillpipe ip was attemtping to set the slips in the rotary table. They failed to set correctly, with assistance from anothe roustabout, they lifted and turned the
slips. When they were being lowered to the correct posi ion ip slipped and his toes were trapped between the slips and rotary wear bushing. The assistanct driller pulled the pipe up, when he
observed what was happening.
Supply vessel <> was discharging deck cargo at <> platform. Part of the cargo for discharge consisted of crane test weights. These are single point lifts, 6-8 feet long and 1 ft square. Also
on deck was a back loaded generartor. Dur ng discharge one of the weights struck the generators protection flame. This broke the weld at one end, which in turn allowed the metal bar to stand
proud of the unit. During further cargo handling a bright of the crane wire hooked onto this bar. As the , he was sent to north sea medical centre where it was found that the cartilage had seperated
from the rib
Changing out the bottom hole assembly rig tongs were used because there was a stabilizer at the rotary table which has a fish neck of only 1.50' above the blades and it was not possible to use the
"iron roughneck". Also we were working with monel drill co lars which require light hand- ling. When connection was broken the men unlatched each others tongs - the tongs were allowed to
come together, at which point ip's fingers of h is left hand were " caught or nipped" and injured.
Local lightings, scaffold access platform, lifting equipment personal clothing and boots were all good. Gloves were being worn. While removing ventillation ducting from under level 1 in the
centre core a suspended section of ducting snagged on one stud. On pushing with his left hand the load swung free and levelled itself nipping the right hand fingers of i.p.
<> rigging crew, under <> supervision, were removing shackle pins from large fitting assembly (total wt - 150 tons). Assembly was hanging off main crane. The i.p. was removing the
shackle pin nut when the sling trapped his finger. Movement o sling due to roll of barge.

Whilst laying down 9 5/8" casing in V door ( 3 JTS per lift ). <> opened the safety latch on the crane hook to remove sling from hook. As he was removing the sling, the safety latch closed on
the back of his right hand.
Ip was operating the 'v' door non-man riding tugger to lift a tugger from the draw works side. The purpose of this was to remove the tugger from the drill floor. Two of the employee's colleagues
were pushing the tugger to land it at the edge of the 'v' oor so the crane could reach it. The heavy end swung round and trapped ip finger between the tugger and line feeding the drill pipe
spinner.
Whilst dismantling a pre-assembled ESV enclosure which was being supported by the crane, an incident occurred. During the removal of the final bolt the crane driver left the cab to speak to the
OIM. The panel started to spin on the crane hook, knocking I.P. to deck
The crane driver had just landed a lift at the centre of the pipedeck. He jibbed up on receiving the signal from the banksman. Whilst raising the jib in preparation for the nexy lift the pennant hook
struck ip a member of the deck crew, on the side of the face. Ip ip was retrieving a sling from on top of a lift.
I.p. was in the process of moving sections of steel plate into the door of the galley area when the remaining plates fell trapping i.p. beneath them.
I.p. was erecting scaffold in module 2 north pig launcher valve access.
Subject was handling one end of a toolstring to mate it with a perforating gun. The toolstring was raised 5'-6' and was balanced on a riser joint. In the course of mating the string to the gun, the
toolstring dropped of the riser, trapping i.p. finger a it did so.
Whilst carrying out a pump and pipe fitting iperation a length of pipe stowed above the worksite waiting to be fitted, became released from its storage. Falling from height it struck the i.p. at the
worksite below approx. 15-18 feet distance. No materia or structural damage was sustained. Casualty received in juries indicated in section 5.
A crew was engaged in transferring a gas generator from a trolley to it's operating location. In the course of this task, the 3ton hoist was seen to be mal-functioning in that the gypsy wheel was
slipping on the main drive shaft. The task supervisor inst ucted the work group to cease the operation while he sought specialist advice on the problem. In his absence the workmen elected to
proceed with the task. This resulted in the gypsy chain coming off the wheel, causing the casualty to lose his balance, fa l and injure his back
Compact spool was removed from ba26, scaffolding being errected to a seight of 8ft for the operation, the work stage was reduced to two boards, ie 18" wide leaving a large gap between the inner
edge of the stage and the compact spool. Two valves removed rom the old spool were placed on the scaffold. All the valves were landed correctly but were subsequently stood on end. Ip was
attempting to fit one of the valves which was suspended from the bop winch. The work stage wass too high to allow the valve t fit in place so was retracted, placing it on the work stage.
Although the valve was not landed heavily the shock caused one of the other valves to topple. It fell inwards, dropping between the leading edge of the stage and the compact spool. After str
king the spool, it was deflected under the scaffold, where it struck the right foot of ip who was under the scaffold stage. After the incident collegue laid the remaining valves flat on the work
stage. No damage was caused to any materials
Whilst guiding pipe joint through 'v' door on winch, operator was controlling swing with rope wrapped round it. Joint swung forward rope dropped down the pipe, coming to rest over his thumb.
Whilst recovering casing, extended type 'b' rig tongs were being used to break the casing joints. At the time of the incident a joint had just been broken when it was noticed that the connection
had become tight again. The back-up tong was lower on the onnection and the crew ordered to clear the area. The incumbent stood behind some racked drill collars. Toolpusher had just started
to re-break the connection when the back-up tong failed. Part of the tong flew across the rig floor, struck the iron rou hneck, changed direction and hit the incumbent on the right shin.
<> was in the vicinity of the gangway to the flotel when he was struck on the shoulder/neck by a plastic bag containing water which had been thrown from above.
When opening a transport container for the first time since receipt, two cardboard boxes 800 x 400 x400 fell out, and in twisting out of the way injured his back. The top right webbing restraint
fixing was not attached and the boxed fell from this area. The webbing and the location points were serviceable.
Whilst flogging bolts on the manway cover of the coalescer, the hammer sprang off the spanner, glanced off a scaffold pole and back down onto the injured persons foot. The scaffold formed part
of an access staging for the work.
Ip was acting as a firewatch during welding operations. As he changed his postion he came into contact with a length of electrical cable connected to a portable light fitting which was resting on
pipework approximately 5ft above his head. The fitting fe l striking ip on forehead

Ip was working on an instrument box when the lid slammed shut, trapping his thumb. The lid had not been secured whilst the task of removing a labnel from the front of the box was being
carried out.
I.p. was guiding the hp riser through the rotary table, the riser spun and his thumb was caught between the slings as they twisted together.
I.P. was positioned on a certified scaffold below level 1 to assist in guiding the accumulator through the opening. The load was swaying slightly so he tried to steady it and in doing so his thumb
was pinched between the load and a scaffold clip on the ha drail erected on the scaffold platform he was working from.
While moving freon containers: the container moved in its carrier trapping the fingers of <>'s left hand.
Pulling main powe cable for new dgl compressor with colleague fcd cable so far and draped over scaffold structure. Cable unsecured and therefore slipped back falling to deck and striking ip on
the safety helmet. No visible injury, ip was fitted with cervi al coller and will be medivaced to ari for spinal x-ray.
While checking gas lift recorders, on 'a' module west mezzanine level, i.p. fell through an open hole in the grating. A section of grating on the mezzanine level had been removed by <>
wireline crew to enable the rigging of a wireline lubricator on well h-34. Fortunately for i.p. he managed to prevent himself from falling further and possibly into module x1, by hooking his left
arm over a section of wire rope, which was attached to a length of chicsan piping which was in close proximity to the open ho e in the grating, at the time of the accident no barriers were in
position around the hole in the grating, at the menzzanine level or around the open hatch at the production deck level.
An impact wrench was being utilised to tighten nuts on 3" valve (Fill up line on standpipe manifold). A <> Tourpusher was using the wrench off a platform. <> was on the deck of drill floor.
The impact wrench spun off the nut and <> rea hed up to prevent the wrench from falling. His left hand was caught by a split pin used to secure the impact socket on the wrench, the socket
was still turning, and he received cuts to left hand and finger. <> was not wearing gloves.
Ip was in the process of drilling when the work piece spun round catching the middle finger of his left hand. Ip was holding the plate with his left hand while operating the drill advance lever
with his right. The finger was lacerated and may have susta ned tendon/nerve joint damage. Ip person sent ashore to hospital from there sent home for a period pending further examination.
Ip was returning through hatchway down a vertical ladder from the 'a' frame to the engine compartment, following inspection of the 'a' frame and cable drums, when the wind blew closed the
hatchway cover striking him on the head.
Ip installing lifting tackle under mezz deck of mod 11a for pipework erection. He climbed onto scaffold to gain access to beam when the scaffolding gave way and he fell against steelwork.
Scaffold inspected and found to be partially dismantled and unsafe to use. In heavily congested area difficult to jude interface betwwen safe and unsafe scaffolding. Scaffolding should have been
secured even if it had been taken out of use.
Setting up lifting beam and equipment to remove turbine a. Lifting beam was stood on grating, resting against handrail and toppled over falling onto ip foot.
I.p. was carrying out maintenance of 440v isolator. He inadvertently attempted to tighten "live" connections. The screwdriver he was using shorted between the live terminal and the isolator case
to earth. The resultant flash caused the i.p. to receive uperficial flash burns to area around right eye. The breaker systems worked correctly and rendered the circuit safe.
Whilst removing graylock clamp from non return valve of g253 gas compressor discharge line, due to gas trapped downstream on n.r.v. the remaining half of graylock clamp blew off causing gas
in line to release which resulted in injury to face and eyes from projected particles
Whilst preparing burning equipment oxy and acetylene cylinders were opended to check for leaks, whilst pressurised the oxy hose burst with a loud bang adjacent to burning torch. Torch was
held in hand at the time. No iginition.
While alone on the skid deck, ip claims he inhaled some substance which subsequently caused acute respiratory distress with paroxymal spasms of coughing. No possible source of substances,
vapours, or fumes has been determined. From the time the man left the platform it has not been possible to date to obtain further medical information as to the cause of his condition
A high pressure gas release from a pressurised flowline occurred whilst slackening off a 4" clamp ring. This resulted in an uncontrolled breakaway of the clamp, blind plug, seal ring and one stud
bolt into the area. Two men were injured and flown onshore or medical examination. One has no serious injury and has returned to work. The other sustained a perforated ear drum.

While removing some pipework from the crude oil prover loop drain system, two pipefitters inadvertadly removed a valve which permitted an escape of crude oil vapour. The men, who were
working beneath the prover in a restricted position, inhailed some of the vapour and subsequently were taken to the sick bay. Both men were then sent to an onshore hospital for a check-up. The
power loop had been drained and flushed prior to work starting.
Diver assisted clamping operation on horizontal member at 100' clamp loose fit on member and floated by rigging comprising :- double block on 6t web strop anchored at +68' +lt check chain
block) winch wire back to manual pneumatic winch at +20'.
During the storm, the bridge linking the semisub <> and the platform collapsed and one lifeboat was lost.
A full-scale anti pollution operation was launched when oil was found to be leaking from the export riser. 20 barrels of oil had leaked out causing an oil slick about 1.5 miles away from the
platform. The oil was recovered shortly after and hence no environmental damage.
Wind 170 deg at 15 knots, seas 3-4 feet, darkness with good night visibility. Mv <...> conducting survey at position 25 metres north east of leg d3 <...> lost dynamic position power and swung
around beam on to platform. Tried to clear platform by going full astern. Continued going astern but unable to clear <...> platform and went full ahead. Collided with ftp platform in vicinity of
legs c1, b1, a1. Collision impact seemed beam on. Vessel continued going full ahead alongside <...> and collided wit boat bumpers and boat landing on <...>. Running alongside until clearing
north end of 48/29a. No immediate visible damage to either structure apparent. Tidal flow at time of incident 325 degrees at 3.1 knot. Reported damage mv <...>, 4 inch g sh, port hull.
The cimbined standby/supply vessel <...> was located at south side of <...> loading container. During manoeuvre for keeping ship in position the "joy stick" operation of the azimuth motor got
stuck resulting in the vessel bumping into the south
Whilst vessel <...> was moving into position of ad platform to unload containers, the vessel came too close to the ne corner of <...> platform resulting in the rear of the boat colliding with the
jacket leg. Weather conditions - good clear visibil ty, tide - 161 degrees from north 1.5 knots, wind speed - 11 knots at 125 degrees, sea state - calm less than 0.5m
The stand by vessel, <...> collided with the starboard side of the <...> production platform striking the riser platform frame; the vessel continued to move towards the drilling platform making
contact with the boat landing deck, prior to steaming lear the installation visual damage and deflection of the riser protection frame and boat landing deck. Platform and sealine shutdown and
depressured as a safety precaution, possible damage to riser. Department of transport marine investigation branch dea ing directly with <...>, vessel owners, to determine probable cause.
The stand by vessel <...> was positioned to the south of the platform. The vessel lost power to the engines (suspect contaminated fuel) and began to drift towards the platform. It drifted stern
first, to the west face of the plat orm. In doing so it delivered a glancing blow to the west side legs of the platform. Damaged escape ladder, superficial damage to buffers and the protective
coating. The <...> suffered damage to one of the fast rescue crafts. To prevent recurrence of incident
While <....> was coming alongside <....> to offload power was lost and a collision occurred with the <....> platform. Damage was caused to: no 2. Lifeboat including davits, the escape ladder on
the south west leg, diagonal bracings on the jacket (2 off) at the south end cellar deck south walkway and guard rail. Wind was 185 degrees and 22 knots. Sea state was 2.2 metres.
Sbv was on location loading crude oil from rig. Primary position keeping equipment (artemis) failed (distance indicator lock up) and vessel moved forward and made slight contact with fender
ring of rig causing minor distortion of fender and damage to hos section (no spillage of oil occurred).
0030 hrs, clearance given to s/v <...> to enter platform 500m zone to <...>, positioned 200m south of platform. At 0205 hrs vessel collided with platform cellar deck between legs a4 and b4,
causing superficial d mage to 'j' tube dead weight clamp and cross bracing of cellar deck. Master of vessel informed that he had lost joy stick response when engaging control level into both slow
and full astern and could not prevent forward trajectory, and that a decision had been made not to engage thrusters. Damage sustained to vessel was slight and confined to forrard mast.

During offloading operations a tote tank was being lifted from the deck it fouled on an empty compactor, the vessel fell away in the swell and before the crane could lower off the compactor fell to
the deck(8-10ft) the shock of the impact on the deck trip ed the azimuth thruster. The joystick tripped and as the transverse thruster was pushing the stern towards the platform at the time the
swing continued and struck the platform. Superficial damage was caused to the platform. The vessel sustained incidental damage on the starboard quarter
The sanitary water pump was pulled together with the deck wash pump riser from caisson for maintenance. On re-installation, the assembly was being handled into position when the sanitary
water pump assembly parted from the deck wash pump riser while being suspended by the crane. This created a whiplash effect resulting in the sanitary water pump assembly fell across the crane
cab and eventually landed on no 1 separator hitting the relief valve.
The tugger winch wire parted as first module was being lifted from the <...> to platform (tugger was being used to orient module for lift). Minor damage to panel. The cause of wire failure was a
defective winch. The payout speed was insuffi ient compared with boom out speed of crane
While deploying flexible flowlines crew experienced a shuddering of the drum against the friotion rollers. All the activities were stopped. The drum was checked, driving of the drum resumed
another shudder was experienced quickly followed by an uncontroll d pay-out of the conflexis from the reel. All crew cleared the deployment area. The drum continued to rotate in an
uncontrolled manner deploying the flexibles subsea until the termination heads attained a deployment depth at which point the frictional for es on the reel overcame the downward load applied by
the flexibles and the reel stopped.
While recovering a flexible padeye from the seabed, the suspended load had been transferred from the vessels main crane hook. Recovery continued until approx 2-3 metres of the flexible was in
contact with the hud of the reel. At this point a padeye locate on a flanged pulling head on the flexible sheared causing the suspended flexible to fall back to the seabed under its own weight.
Loss of operational control of bop crane whilst operating north bop crane - control was lost over operation - crane traversed indepentdantly - pendant control buttons were not functional - local
electrical isolator was closed in order to stop crane movement
Bundle of scaffold was slung on 8m level then crane hook pulled in to allow removal to cellar deck (17.5m level) lay down area. Slings on load were double wrapped as usual but failed to tighten
up on load when pull was applied by crane. This resulted in approx 25 tubes slipping into sea. Type of sling being used was new to platform ie 20ft/ton swl wire rope sling with a protective
polythene tubing covering 50% of the sling. When tension was applied to load the protective tubing snagged on the eye of the sling thus preventing tightening of load. Normally this type of load
is bulldogged once tension is applied to slings. Not being a vertical lift the deck crew were unable to do this. No injuries or damage.
During the transfer of 20inch casing from the pipe deck to the drill floor via the vee door using the west crane, the crane boom struck the drilling derrick. This incident disclosed the cathead light
and control box causing them to fall to the bop deck. N casualties were sustained
During drill pipe operations. Winch wire broke and fell to the drill floor. On inspection the rig up arrangement was such that the winch wire was firm around a heavy guage hand rail and had
formed a grove through use. This groove had caused the wire to s ag during operation & break.
30" hydril was being pressure tested when a leak developed at the <...> joint near its base. The connection was forced out of alignment and the load of the hydril was therefore taken up on the
main gantry crane using 2x35 ton hoists. These were att ched to the north and south sides of the hydril. In order to align the hydril with its stub in an east-west plane to 6 ton auxiliary hoist was
attached, the intention being to rock the hydril into correct alignment but as the hoist was raised the rope fai ed and the block/hook assembly fell to the floor
Container slipped 20' onto sea when east crane main hoist failed due to grease contamination during off loading <...>.
The crane had been reeved to double fall for a lift expected later that day. The supply vessel arrived with 5 lifts. No backload was planned. Two lifts were taken from the vessel. On lowering the
hook to take a third lift the main rope released itself fro the main drum and the hook assembly fell approximately 3m to the deck of the vessel.

Two production assistants were carrying out routine bunkering of perlite into the hopper which involves attaching a bag of perlite (approx.240kg) to the lifting bar and securing to side pins. The
bag is then hoisted off the deck and manoeuvered over the h pper before being lowered down and secured by means of a ratchet belt. The contents of the bag are then emptied into the
hopper.once the bag is empty it is raised using the ho- ist and positioned over the laydown area. At this stage the empty bag is app. Ft from the deck and would then be lowered to the ground
complet- ing the operation. In this particlar instance when the production assist ants came to lower the empty bag onto the laydown area the chain snapped allowing the lifting bar, chain, hook and
e pty bag to fall to the deck the production assistants reported the incident to the system supervisor (process) who immediately suspended all operations using the hoist pend- ing an investigation.
The new (refurbished) drilling mud tank was being offloaded from the supply vessel to d3ee roof using the s/v 100ft crane. The tank weight was 32 tons with 3 tons lifting bridle. The tank was
positioned on the roof, at an angle, then an attempt was made t reposition the tank. During this attempt, the tank was swinging & appeared to foul/strike on the projecting deck level above the
tank. The padeye sheared off and the tank now only being attached by 3 padeyes canted over at an angle hitting the deck. The /v crane driver then pulled the tank clear hitting the upper flange of
the extreme outboard deck girder and repositioned the load to the s/v deck.
A joint of casing, weight 1 1/2 tons, was being lifted from its predeccesor in the string. The threads snagged and the swivel parted allowing the joint to drop back into the string. A hook load of
only 5000lb was indicated but an overpull in excess of 3 tons cannot be discounted. No injury, no collateral damage.
500 kg cooler being supported by stops fell 4ft when one stop failed. Failed equipment being investigated.
A mechanical specialist was given the task of repairing a pully which was part of the system to lower a hinged walkway from the cellar deck to the spider deck. Whilst it was held up by the winch,
the specialist rigged up the chain block with two three ton slings. This was to allow him to winch off and leave the "stairways" supported by the chain block. He totally underestimated the weight
and the chain block parted at one of the tucks on the main lifting chain. The specialist was on a fixed part of the pla form whilst operating the winch and thus was in no danger.
After replacing boom hoist brakes bands, the crane was in process of being tested. 6.1 tonnes were on the hook at 120ft radius when noise was heard emanating from the drive housing. Shortly
afterwards the boom power lowering facility failed. The operator sed the foot brake to arrest decent, and then lowered the load in a controlled manner. He then put the boom in the rest and shut
the machine down.
West crane power boom lowering chain
Two halon cylinders (full) were lifted from cages on level 1 south west and temporarily stored on west side moving pipe deck-secured to fence awaiting crane transfer to halon room.pkg 7 roof.
During the interim period a boat came alongside to unload. A gu carrier was being landed on the west side of the moving pipe deck. The banksman misjudged the rate of descent of the load as it
crossed over the halon bottles. The corner of the gun carrier struck the tip protective cover of the halon bottle with suffici nt force as to fracture the valve neck. This caused a release of halon(the
contents of the cylinder). The senior deck operator was informed who in turn informed the fos. No persons injured.
Crane mechanic was adjusting clutch linkage on the n.w. crane, which was stopped and plumbed over the west face of the platform. Person bent over to gain access to the linkage his lower back
inadvertantly came into contact with the load line lower. Alth ugh there was no load on the crane the hook and ball slowly descended until it struck the deck on level 1. Several witnesses in the
area saw the ball descent and had time to ensure they were clear of the striking area.
A half height container 20' x 7' x '4 deep which by design has four side access doors, was in transit, being lifted aboard using the north west crane from the main deck of the mv <....>, one of the
access door had not been secured in place.
Drill collar had become plugged with kill pill material during the workover of well 4-1. The collar had been removed from the well and in an attempt to remove the kill pill material, had been
suspended in the vertical position over the moving pipe deck b one hook of a two legged bridal assembly off the northwest crane. When the collar was lowered to the deck, it freed itself from the
hook as the lifting hook was no longer in tension. The collar fell southwards towards the ngl plant, striking some scaff lding as it slid towards a horizontal position on the moving pipe deck.
Only minor damage to scaffolding poles.

The <....> wireline crew commenced rigging down lubricator/bops off well h-36. They were utilizing the "a" frams on the skid deck with a 3 tonne air hoist. The first two sections had been
removed successfully. The lifting cap was transferred to the fina section, hoist attached and bowen quick union released. The crew signalled to one another that it was safe to lift. The <....>
wireline operator on "a" module mezz. Took the weight on the hoist and the hoist body to hook securing bolts failed causing th hoist to drop into "a" module, a distance of -48ft. The load being
lifted at the time the failure occurred was an 8 foot section of 5" lubricator weighing approx. 500 lbs. Subsequent investigations indicated attachment material was not the correct comp nent for
attaching the hoist hang off hook to the hoist body. The hoist was subjected to a six monthly inspection on the <....> which required the hoist to be descaled, painted and swl added. Additionally
the hoist was sent ashore for brake repairs, (brake slipping), on <....>. The hoist was returned to the platform on <....> following repair, complete with certification of test and examination.
After erecting the gin pole the operator observed the hoist cable had parted and was unsafe. The gin pole had been secured by one locking pin out of the two available. The platform crane was
used to make the gin pole safe by de-telescoping the jib and t e gin pole was rigged down from the hydraulic work over unit for inspection and repair. The cable that was fed through the jib
extension had parted at the point where a milled slot had been provided to accept the hoist wire. Through wear, the slot had be ome sharp around its edge and had worn the hoist cable, finally
severing it. The gin pole had previously undergone certification prior to shipment offshore.
Technician was operating hydraulic unit to raise bop stack. During the operation one of the hydraulic rams bearing detached from the pinned clevice. An initial investigation showed partial
corrosion to the clevice thread which caused the ram to collapse shearing the holding pin.
Dynamo pattern eyebolts failed whilst lifting a drains tank pump. Three eyebolts and one safety wire were fitted in total. No damage to perssonnel or equipment sustained. Remaining one
eyebolt and safety wire held the load.
Whilst running 20" conductor, a joint was dropped 4ft onto rig floor. The procedure called for tailing in joints onto the rig floor whilst picking up with the side door elevators by means of the
blocks. The elevators are latched onto the joint on the rig floor. In this instance, the latch was not properly closed. This resulted in the elevator doors opening when load was taken.
As the hook and pennant were lowered to the drill floor there was slight contact with derrick steelwork above the vee door. This caused the top eye of the pennant to be lifted and passed through
the safety catch of the hook. The pennant then dropped app ox. 20' to the drill floor.
While lifting waste skip from landing area on module 7 north the skip lugs caught under a handrail. The handrail section - 20 feet - was lifted clear of the deck sockets and fell into the sea.
While running 13 3/8 csg. On rig 2 a joint of casing was being picked up from 'v' door. It caught up on the 'a' frame roller bar. The joint was approx. 15ft out of the 'v' door and was still resting on
the catwalk when the sling parted. The sling was c nnected between the pick-up elevator and the block hook when it parted.
Whilst picking up 13 5/8" bop with weight suspended on 4 hydraulic rams. After picking up the bop stack approx. 3ft, one threaded piston rod stripped loose from threaded clevs, leaving load
supported on remaining 3 piston.
East pelloby overhead crane was being used to lower a set of 13 3/8 casing slips into the well bay. At the end of its travel the chain passed through the winch. Dropping the load approx 1" and
the chain fell to the deck. Investigation showed that the l mit switch had been removed along with the end stop. This equipment was independently inspected it is not known when the safety
equipment had been removed or the reasons for removal.
North crane being used to lower nitrogen tank to the lower central corridor. Tank was stopped 4' above deck, an attempt was made to use the boom up facility to orientate the tank, boom control
was lost and tank dropped the 4' to deck. Load was unhooked, boom control returned and crane was put in rest.
4 3/4" drill collars were being picked up from piperack. A collar had been latched in the elevators and was in the process of being transferred to the vertical so that the upper end was
approximately 15' above the drill floor. The elevators unlatched & the drill collar fell to the floor. There were no injuries.
Bundle of instrument tubing (10x20x0.5") fell approx 30' from the upper central corridor to the lower central corridor after up ending on handrailing. Incident was the direct result of a radio
failure on the south crane cab. 3 deck crew members each gave erbal radio instructions to "stop" lowering. None were received by south crane driver. Function test proved that an intermittent
fault caused radio failure.

Due to insufficient height it was necessary to transfer the section of pump caisson from the main air hoist to a one ton chain block located at a higher level. Whilst carrying out this operation the
air hoist would appear to have gone block to block resul ing in a chain link on the anchor side failing. The transferring of the load to a one ton chain block is not the normal procedure but due to
the line shaft and enclosing tube couplings being seized it was necessary to lift the caisson pipework clear of th protruding line shaft.
A small half height container was being winched up to the top of the flare stack for the removal of redundant steel and bolts, when the basket was nearing the tope of the flare stack (95m) the
rigger informed the winchman to stop, via the radio. No commu ication was received by the winchman and the basket continued. This resulted in the ferrule being pulled through the sheave to
the block so the 3 tonne webbing strop parted, causing the work basket to fall to the skid deck, causing damage to the nitrogen tanks and workshop.
The cp crane had previously been working the supply vessel <...> and was being slewed to the parking position to prepare for helicopter operations. During the slewing movement, while no load
was on the pennant, the aux line (whipline) pennant beca e disengaged from the aux line hook and fell into the sea. It appears that while the crane was slewing the weight came off the auxiliary
line pennant. This would allow the pennant to rise upwards and part from the auxiliary hook if the safety catch was not fully closed.
Whilst lifting a 6 tonne container over the side of platform, prior to loading on to supply boat <...> deck, the hydraulic hose feeding the left side boom hydraulic ram split, releasing oil and
causing the boom to lower to its limit. The load ame to rest approximately 2 metres above sea level. Atmospheric conditions had no effect.
<...> crane was lifting a 7 (t) mud changing room container when the crane below began to vibrate and engine stalled. After re-start of engine this happened again. On re-start and whilst trying to
land the load safely onto the pipe deck the container made an uncontrolled descent of about 11ft onto the pipe deck.
G1 crane boom collapsed due to boom going past the limit stops and onto the "a" frame and breaking off 1 metre from the end of the boom base. Boom at rest on "a" frame and broken base on
north pipe deck walkway wedged under drill pipes. Also, cab damage aused by boom. No load was being lifted at the time as the boom was being raised into position for lift when incident
occurred. No injury.
Whilst running 9 5/8" casing on well <...>, the pick up elevators were opened before the casing was properly stabbed. The resulted in the joint falling from the stump. The joint impaced the
drillfloor, and then lay back in the derrick. No one was injured
Operations were taking place to backload equipment and containers from <...> a onto the supply vessel mv <...>. Container <...> lowered onto the vessel's deck when, due to sea swell and vessel
movement, the container tipped slightly forward the motor in the container broke free from its seafastening, slid out through the container doors and on to the vessel's deck. The doors of the
container were damaged as a result. No injuries resulted. Container and electric motor were brought back p to <...> pipe deck for examination.
Whip rope fouled on main hoist rope guard at main hoist load watcher sheave. The rope guard became detached and fell from the elevated jib onto the pipe deck walkway below. No one was
injured. The rope guard is designed in such a manner that it is possi le to snag the wip rope on the guard. The guard is not designed to withstand such a load. A three ton test weight was being
raised by the whip hoist at the time.
The compressor building is a recent addition to the complex facilities and is at the latter stages of construction. The internal lighting is of a temporary nature and has been installed on a ringmain
protected by earth leakage circuit breakers. The light ittings are securely mounted from their appropriate steel mounting brackets to secured scaffold poles at the roof of the building by a
minimum of two stainless steel plastic coated 9mm (3/8ins) wide buckle fastening tiewraps. The scaffold tubes form no pa t of a scaffolding structure. The light fitting in question has fallen 15 to
25ft to deck level. The fitting has sustained damage on impact and pulled itself free of its cable glanding whilst falling, the eicb protection worked as designed. No personnel w re in the vicinity
of the falling object at deck level but at least three people were working at the height of the lighting fixtures on an adjacent independent scaffold structure installing water deluge piping. It is not
proven if anyone was on the scaf
Whilst erecting scaffold on 27a compression spider deck two scaffolders were being passed tubes by a third situated on a walkway above them. This involved carrying tubes from a loading
platform to the work site. Whilst going to fetch a different length tu e i.p. lost his balance handling an unsecured tube of the original tubes being passed to the two scaffolders. He fell overboard
from the walkway some seven metres into the sea striking a bracing on the way. His lifejacket inflated on immersion. The wat hman called the standby boat, putford snipe, who sent his fast
rescue craft. The frc arrived on the scene in two minutes to find the man overboard being retrieved by his workmates. I.p. was examined by the platform medic who informed the north sea medic
l centre. On their advice i.p. was kept under observation for four hours before being allowed to return to work

While carrying out routine maintenance on lifeboat 3, the fitter was demonstrating to a colleague the release mechanism for the boat & the locking device, explaining that the lock is secure until
boat is water borne when hydrostatic pressure releases lock fitter then proceeded to lift & pull lever to demonstrate that it was locked, but instead of meeting the solid resistance as expected, the
lever travelled up & across into the release position. The boat was released from the hooks & dropped 6" on to the ang off pennants that are fitted prior to maintenance on lifeboats.
While running 26" riser from drill deck to seabed for well, a joint parted at scid deck level and all pipes fell to sea. No major damage obvious topsides. Rov inspection revealed some damage to
guides and guide support structures some minor.
The utilities shaft cover located in the valley area was raised on scaffold, kick plates arranged & a fine mesh wrapped around the open areas. This was a temporary modification to allow air into
the shaft as the hvac supply fans & ducting were being refur ished during the shutdown. A scaffold on the north walkway at the east end of the valley area was to be dismantled. The work party
were given no toolboxtalk as the scaffold to be dismantled was a simple scaffold. Work commenced at 19:00hrs & the work part chose the route from the worksite to the scaffold rack at the west
side of the valley. The route over the protected hatch was deemed safer than carrying scaffold tubes along a busy main walkway. One man was positioned at either side of the barriers & the
scaffold poles were slid accross the shaft cover. During this operation one pole rolled off the hatch cover at the drilling module site. The gap between the shaft cover & the module +- 6", this
being dictated by a vertical pipe run. The gap on the drillin module side had not been covered completely with netting & the pole slipped through & fell down the shaft.
<...> the survey vessel <...> reported sighting explosives container <....> on the seabed alongside the pipeline. Investigation revealed that container <....> came from <....>. The con -tents were
ast checked on <....> confirming its presence on board at that time. Subsequent investigation assumes that the container was blown overboard during extremely high winds during the night <....>
to <....>. Wind 260 degrees by 85 to 95 gusting 136 knots. No damage was sustained by any part of the platform.
Piece of redundant 6" cable tray weighing 2 kg fell from the flare tower on to the ngl plant without causing injury or mechanical damage. Platform production was shutdown under controlled
conditions, flare risers were isolated, purged and blanked off for lare tower access. Flare tower access gained, further loose cable tray removed and remainder secured
During severe storm conditions a bundle of scaffold boards rigged ready for backloading and stowed on top deck, bogah to break up. The first board spilt allowing a 2nd board to work free of the
lashing. The boards were blown off the top deck and landed on level 2 north walkway approx 6" from galley door which was closed due to storm conditions.
During a severe storm on <....> a <....> heatshield panel on the platform flaredeck weavering approx 1.5m x 1m and weighing 50kg was dislodged from its fastenings and came to rest between the
safety hoops of an access ladder. The damage was not noticed until <....> the platform ops and inspection engineers surveyes the damage from a helicopter. There assessment concluded that the
panels in its current position was unlikely to fall from the flaredeck.
Whilst rigging up to run a wireline plug in well c3 the spring jars fired and the plug dropped from the lubricator. The plug hit the low torque valve on the side outlet from the drilling riser as it
fell. The impact partially fractured the pipe between th valve and the riser causing a leak of treated seawater at about 1bbl/hr from the well. (apart from closing the bop blind rams there was no
way to isolate this leak path from reservoir pressure.) To allow an explosive set "pes" plug to be set in the well he platform had to go into radio silence. As a precaution, production was shut
down before entering radio silence and setting the plug. When the plug had been set the riser was bled down and observed before the damaged stub piece and valve were replaced.
During routine operations on the rig floor a 12" adjustable spanner fell from the upper regions of the rig floor and struck a driller on his helmet. The man was shocked and suffered a stiff neck,
subsequently he returned to work after examination by the latform medic. Some construction personnel were moving about within the derrick and work had been in progress during the preceding
day. However, no one would admit to having had or used an adjustable spanner
Compression washer from the cross bearer on the power swivel, dropped approx. 110'. Struck i/p (grazed neck).
Falling sparks from work on generator exhaust dropped to pud g deck level, igniting paint on pipework and small amount of debris on deck under gratings. Blistering to paintwork and cable. Fire
was extinguished using co2 extinguisher.
Ip was employed fitting insulation to the bulkhead in the internal stairway north west, one flight below accommodation level 1 at the same time that scaffolders were employed erecting a work
platform internal stairwell nw accommodation roof 1w4 as a 5" tu e was laid against the east bulkhead it slipped and fell int the space between the east bulkhead to the stairway. It bounced off the
bulkhead prior to striking ip.

Backloading of drilling materials had been in progress.the crane was stowed due to the arrival of crew change helicopter.due to prevailing wind conditions the flight path of the chopper was over
the skid from east to west.the downdraught from the helicopt r dislouged a scaffold board which was lying on the roof of a container on the south side of the skid deck.the board was propelled
overboard and struck the after deck of the supply vessel.
Main 3 phase supply cables between switchboard bus bars and live side of main isolator in cubicle appear to have 'shorted' to earth. The fire and gas system detected the consequent smoke and
fumes, setting off the halon protection.
Horizontal surge pump was in normal service when motor failed. Immediately before being stopped flame and sparks were emitted from motor casing. These were extinguished using a bsf fire
extinguisher. The motor has seized and has been returned ashore for i vestigation and repair/replacement
At 01.00 i was awoken by a loud bang and a fire and gas alarm. I went into the ccr and reset the uv detector. I talked to ccr, then i woke up the deputy oim. There was a violent storm overhead. I
took a radio and walked out to wap keeping in contact wit my deputy. As i arrived on wap the vent stack beside the contactor tower was hit by lightning, igniting the vent gases. Raised g/alarm,
fire team mustered assessing situation. Tried to extinguish fire with water, little to no effect. After discussion with firemen, p1 plant fire went out. Cooled with water. Stood down fire team after
inspection of the whole installation and after debrief. (03.15 am)
Immediately after a fire alarm and muster, it was noted on <...> control room annunciator that <...> firewater pump had failed to start. It was investigated and control switch was in "auto" mode.
Tried to start pump in manual mode and saw smoke emulating from b ttery box. Immediately switched pump off by switching to "stop" and switched off battery charger locally. Called for
assistance by radio, fire extinguished by use of 9 kg dry powder extinguisher. Batteries look in fair order but damage to insulation on is lation links that connect batteries to starter motor cables.
Smoke alarm (single) altered personnel to compressor house and duty at approx 1910 hrs a smoke alarm came up on fire/gas panel, zone 55 bc compressor no. 1 personnel dispatched to
investigate. It was found that smoke was present in bci compressor house. T is was traced to seal oil pump 'b', "motor end bearing". The pump was stopped, at which time a small flame was noted
issuing from the motorend bearing. This was extinguished by the use of a portable dry powder extinguisher (bc1 compressor esd).
At 0418 hours on <...>, smoke on top of gtg 3 was reported. Area was h osed down gtg 3 shutdown. Investigations showed that the exhaust was not damaged but transit from area 10 is damaged
and this caused debris to be blown on to hot exhaust. No damage o injury.
Cause of smoke in the 11kv switchroom at 0445 hours on <...> traced to burnt out transformer in ndg 130. (110 volt ups) panel. Reason for burn out of the transformer was the use of a heat gun
on the ups socket . These sockets were of the normal type and the person using the heat gun did not realise the difference. The power on socket was not rated high enough for a heat gun.
12" weldolet connection was being installed on the inlet line to c101 to provide a tie-in point. Having installed the weldolet, the internal orifice was cold cut, leaving a lip of metal which had to
be removed by oxy/acetylene burning torch. Some gas was ignited.
Whilst welder was carrying out fabrication work in fab. Shop his fire- watcher noticed sparks and flame coming from the welding unit: the fire- watcher extinguished same using dry powder
agent, subsequent inspection by the electrical foreman revealed that the positive connection on the unit had overheated, causing contact with the chassis frame, which res- ulted in the surrounding
paintwork being burnt: the cause is thought to be due to the positive connector becoming slack (due to vibration).
Module 23 hvac plenum, fan cm3308c overheated bearing, causing smoke to ensue into the general area of module 23/24, thus causing smoke detectors to activate, with a control action of a level
3.1 shutdown.
Whilst applying post weld pre-heat to the weld using a butane burner ring round the weld, insulation material on the underside of the module caught fire. Initial findings of the inspection teams
indicated that the fire was restricted to the mastic coatin on the rockwool insulation bounded by grids 4,5,c & d - an area of approx 120 square metres. No injuries sustained.
Smoke was observed from pipework at air inlet to air cooler of g4500 avon gas turbine. The area technician was informed. He initiated isolation of smoke heads and started to unload the
generator, while a sentry with hand extinguisher monitored the smoke. Fter approx. 5 min the insulation started to glow and ignited. The turbine was shut down and the fire extinguished

At approximately 18.51hrs a smoke detector in the 11kv switch gear room activated the alarm in the ccr; the crt requested one of the ops techs and the fso to investigate. On arrival in the area the
ops tech found smoke and advised the ccr that there was a fire. The crt activated the general alarm 18.53hrs and requested that the fire team attend the scene of the fire. When the fso arrived in
the switch gear room he found smoke and the ops tech who had tackled the fire with a portable extinguisher. He not fied the ccr the fire was in a waste basket and that it was under control.
(18.57hrs) he checked that the fire was out and notified the ccr at approximately 19.00hrs. The emergency muster was allowed to complete and personnel stood down at 19.05hrs.
Diesal generator on weekly load test run with operations in attendance. Exhaust lagging smoked due to absorbtion of oil residues. A small flame appeared for a few seconds. This was extinguished
by operations & the lagging removed. Machine then load-tested okay
Smoke and exhaust fumes were seen issuing from the pump's exhaust. The exhaust cladding was cooled and stripped. Investigation revealed failure of a flange gasket which allowed heat and
flames to permeate and damage the lagging. Atmospheric conditions w re not a factor in this instance. (platform went to muster).
The welder comenced cutting a section of grating away, after approx 1 minute of work the fire watch noted that the atmospheric vent tip had ignited. He informed the welder and both the welder
and his work mate immediately left the flare boom. The observer informed the control room who then informed the safety tec. Who extinruished the small flame
<....> air compressor was being driven by a 150hp electric motor (k07a). At 10.30 hours a high bearing temperature alarm tahh-228 annunciated in the control room and the standby unit put on
line. At 10.31 hours the area operator and a mechan c went to investigate and found the module partially filled with smoke, approx 70% and flames from the motor drive and bearing approx 18
inches high. The area operator pressed the manual stop button and extinguished the fire by use of a hand held dry pow er extinguisher. The fire was out at 10.32 hours no other investigations
ongoing to determine cause of failure.
On investigation of smoke alarm in module 1 switchroom, no sign of fire but switchroom was filled with smoke. Traced to overheating of the resistor banks in drawworks 'c' dynamic brake panel,
causing the resistor insulation to smoulder and burn off. No extinguishing media required
During the reinstatement of the electrical distribution system after an 11kv failure, an 11kv/630v 800kva cast resin transformer feeding a 'squeeze injection' package failed. The switchroom in
module 4 filled with smoke. One electrical technician was in the switchroom at the time of the incident. He was not injured and was unaffected by the smoke. The electrical protection
equipment on the 11kv switchboard operated correctly, disconnecting the supply. No other equipment was damaged. Platform f & g syst m operated correctly
Radiated heat from flare ignited wooden boards above crown block. The boards were wedged into structural 'h' beams as protective packing during the module load out stage. The wood was
external to the radiation shielding, and hence exposed to direct heat from the flare. The wind was blowing the flare across the top of the derrick at the time of the fire.
Work consisted of welded repair to 3" hot water line in hot water circulating system (heating supply to non-accommodation modules). All necessary isolations had been reviewed and correctly
made in accord with company mechanical isolation procedures but se ondary stopper and vent line to classified safe area had not been fitted. Welder successfully welded upper part of line but
when he moved to the lower a small ignition occurred, which he and the firewatcher were able to extinguish with their gloves.
Gas turbine was being run up on diesel fuel after completion of speedtronic calibration. On reaching 1600 rpm machine tripped on overtemperature. Smoke was reported coming from exhaust
stack. Further investigation revealed a fire within exhaust plenum. Boundary cooling was applied to external exhaust enclosures and water spray applied internally to extinguish fire.
Technician blowing down annulus observed flame at line exit. Valve isolated, flame extinguished.
Smoke was seen to be emitting from "a" generator by shift safety officer at the same time. F & g panel indicated fire alarm status on temporary generator "a". On investigating discovered small
fire in generator compartment and that the machine had shutdow on smoke detection. On examination it was found that fitter material was still smouldering and was extinguished using 1 x co2
extinguisher. The alternator windings appeared to have burned out.
Temporary f & g panel in mcr indicated a fire on generator b. This was investigated by the duty safety officer who found smoke to be coming from the generator cabinet. The doors were closed
and the generator had been shutdown. The safety officer used a co extinguisher to secure/extinguish smouldering material.
Scaffolders erecting above the site of the butt involved in the stress relieving, smelt burning. Upon investigation they discovered fire; was extinguished by dry powder extinguisher. Heating bands
& insulation were removed.

Shale shaker extract fan km 8518a motor shaft was rubbing against drive belt guard casing creating excessive heat which transferred along motor shift to drive pulley. Drive belts subsequently
subjected to heat and started to smoke
During the first run of the power generator gas turbine, when ignition was achieved the heat generated in the urbine caused residual oil and grease in the machine to give off smoke. Smoke
detectors in the generator compartment were activated and the contr l room operator initiated a halon release and the gpa was sounded.
Whilst cutting away the sea fastenings on the top drive rogue sparks from the cutting equipment were blown down the rotary hole, igniting oily rags below. The gpa was sounded, leading to a full
muster and evacuation of all non-essential personnel.
Fire alarm in module 11a initiated by heat rise detector. A platform shutdown and deluge release followed due to the compressor running prior to the event large quantities of steam were generated
and area enveloped in dense vapour. Heat rise detector acti ated by turbine a&b exhaust gased which were being blown by prevailing winds directly at 11a
During transfer of methanol from <...> to <...>, vessel reported low discharge pressure and asked platform to check amount received. Amount corresponded with remains in vessel's tanks, and
transfer continued. Production operator carefully watch d the rise in platform tank (v23) and contacted vessel after 10 minutes, when a shortfall was discovered. Transfer was stopped and when
picking up the transfer hose it was observed that it was burst, spilling methanol in to sea.
Wireline operations were being conducted on a well and a gas lift valve had been replaced. The wireline toolstring had been installed in the lubricator and the lubricator re-installed. The driller
was preparing for a pressure test of the tubing string a d opened the surface flowhead master valve. He noted 1000 psi pressure on the wireline lubricator. He proceeded to close the surface
flowhead master valve and bleed off the lubricator pressure to the mud gas separator. The fluid trap on the mud gas sep rator was overcome by the gas pressure/volume and gas escaped to the
triptank area and set off the gas alarms. It appears the surface flowhead master valve was not properly closed and the full tubing string cap was opened to the mud gas separator causing excessive
volume of gas to be released into the system
Mcr operator witnessed gas alarms from c module on jcp 5464 fire/gas panel. On investigation condensate/gas was discovered being emitted into module from the interdtage scrubber sight glass.
Approx. 0410 hrs, having undergone maintenance, a fuel gas start on `a' r/royce was unsuccessfully attempted, allowing gas to enter generator. At approx. 0415 hours start logic was manually
bypassed allowing fuel gas skid operating pressure to be recalibe ated to 18 bar, again allow- ing gas to enter generator, this operation lasting for approx. 30 secs., This coincided with level 4
shutdown.
The unauthorised removal of isolations resulted in the preasuring up of the densitometers, bursting a vent hose attached and causing an emission of oil and gas into module m5 mezz
Horizontal pump was being fitted to replace existing vertical pump. While welding, the old pump was removed and some condensate trapped in the pump seals escaped. The condensate ignited
but was immediately put out by the firewatcher.
During routine pm inspection, operator discovered the pin hole leak. He informed the main control room of the leak on m20 well. The well was shut in and flow line de-pressurised.
During routine well service activities on pb15, gas was inadvertently released from the swab cap vent valve into the wellhead area, causing a platform s.p.s. the status of the well pb15 xmas tree
prior to the incidence was:- sssv umgv and fwgv were closed the swab valve was open three (3) turns and the swab cap vent valve was open with cavity of wellhead open to vent system. The well
service crew were in the process of pressure testing the sssv and umgv via remote control hydraulic lines and removing the wab cap. The incident occurred when the umgv control hydraulic lines
was inadvertently pressured up and opened the umgv, allowing gas to enter the xmas tree cavity and escape via vent system and the swab cap vent valve into the wellhead area.

At 1650 hrs the <...> drilling rig contacted the <...> platform to inform us of a fluid leak from the well head area of the <...>. The <...> was standing off the platform at the time. The platform was
shut in at 1700 hrs from the <...>. At 1800 h s the <...> oim confirmed that the leak had ceased, he also confirmed that the leak was from the area around pb17, he also observed that the well
casing was wet with an oily film. On investigation of the dcs it was noted that the sssv on pb17 had closed on loss of hydraulic pressure. The <...> platform was visited the next day and it was
confirmed that the reported leak was from pb17 control line with the resulting loss of 60 ltrs. Of tellus t15. On the night of the incident there was a 40 knt wind and heavy sea. Casing movement
had pushed the small bore control line against the steelwork and eventually a fitting developed a leak. Complete loss of hydraulic fluid was prevented by the closure of the excess flow valves.
A leak was discovered on a grease nipple on tk valve gw20, inlet to separators from <...>. sealant was injected to try to stop the leak. When the grease gun was removed the leak became worse
and gas started to come from the nipple. I then decided to vent the line between <...>. and the separators, the separators were then isolated from <...>. our first thought was to vent through the test
separator and out of the normal platform vents. However, the wind was directly down the platform towards the accommoda ion and very hazardous. The only safe option was to vent through well
23, by closing the upper master valve on well 23, by closing the upper master valve on well 23 and jacking open the wing valve in order to vent through the wellheads and out of the sate lite
vents. This was successful
Under production conditions v/v gw 822 was leaking water from grease nipple slightly. Production was stopped, separator isolated, vented down grease nipple was removed no non return v/v in
grease chamber could be found. Platform staff fitted a new nrv & n w grease nipple to v/v. Type, t.k. serial no. <...> no damage or injury sustained. Wind 11kts 175 degrees qfe 1020, sea calm.
Platform production facilitation controlled venting executed in preparation of annual shutdown. Complex vent system pipework becomes full of gas as expected. One inch drain pipe from
common vent system header which is used for periodic manual draining of iquids hand operated isolation valve had been left in the open position therefore allowing gas to escape. Platform gas
detection systems did work. There was no one working within the vicinity of the release and the release was isolated expeditiously by th platform incident team
Proir to start up of <...> compression, <...> scrubber 301-1205 was being drained to the closed drain system. The closed drain system was pressurised sufficiently to remove the loop seal (15' head
of water). Which resulted in gas/condensate entering the cellar deck via the open drain system. This led to 60% gas detect and platform gpa.
On the evening of <...> as k200 was about to be shut down a noise was reported in the cellar deck viscinity. No cause could be found and the unit was shutdown. At 0810 0n <...> the unit was
started for production purposes and a further check was ma e to locate the noise. A blind flange was found to have broken off from a commissioning purge valve on the recycle line at the point
where gas re-enters the suction line. The valve was in the open state so allowing gas to escape. The unit was immediately shutdownand vented and investigations commenced.
A noise was heard coming from the ac cellar deck area. One of the compression operators proceeded to the cellar deck and quickly determined that the source of the noise was a gas release from
k400's suction valve differential pressure switch stainless ste l tubing. The compression operator contacted the duty operator via his portable radio and the compressor was immediately esd'd via
the unit control panel. An instrument technician was called to the scene and he discovered that the stainless steel tubing c nnected to the compressor suction pipe work isolation valve had sheared
off at the parker 'a' lok fitting. The fitting was replaced and the tubing reconnected satisfactorily and the compressor was put back on line. Gas release was not detected by the plat orm's f/gas
detection equipment.
Man investigated an unfamiliar noise on the cellar deck. He discovered a natural gas leak from a union on the 3/8" pipe to the dp switch across k100 compressor inlet suction valve. He informed
the control room operator who went to the scene of the leak. T e unit was immediately shutdown and vented. An unexpected esd occurred as the unit was shut down. It is felt that this was not
directly related to the incident and that someone pushed an esd button. This however cannot be confirmed. A pltform safety commi tee investigation team carried out an investigation which
revealed that the stainless steel pipework had fractured at the ferrule. The time between the location of the leak and shutting down the unit was less than five minutes. The pressure in the suction
line was 228psig
At 10.40hrs on the <...> a weld failure occurred on k100's suction boot 1" auto-drain line pipe work which resulted in an uncontrolled release of gas and condensate in the vicinity of the vessel.
The leak was immediately spotted by <...> who was w rking in the area and he reported the facts to the control room operator. The onshift chief operator went to the site and quickly assessed the
situation and the compressor was shutdown and vented at 10.30 hrs. No personal injuries were sustained as a resu t of the incident.

Gas release from previously depressured casing annulus of well a51 (slot a17) during workover. Pressure in annulus was vented through two tie-down screws when the casing was lifted from the
speedhead. All flammable gas detectors in area 4 were activated o 100% lel. In ignition, no injury, gas was vented safely after about 40 minutes.
22.37 hours - two 20% gas readings initiated class 2a s/d and gpa was sounded. Six gas heads around 20% mark (highest 24%) in area 4a. (gas head no. 34-39). 23.02 hours - leak found to be
from a 1/2" vent needle vavle on hp gas injection header in area 4a commenced venting header to flare. At 23.16 hours header pressure was zero. Removed threaded vavle body from 1/2 weldolet
on header and replaced. Tested removed valve and found leak to be via the stern gland packing. Header was subsequently tested and recommissioned
Gas escaped from the vent portof downstream pilot isolation valve. On inspection it was found that the 1/2" npt plug was missing. There was no damage to the threads of the valveor marks on a
nearby girder to indicate the plug had been blown out. The line ad been vented down the previous day for mtce dept. To work on the choke. This was the first time pressure had been reintroduced to system after mtce task.
During mini shutdown to undertake hot work tie-ins of a new glycol regeneration package a spark from welding operations ignited a small quantity of condensate which had gathered on the deck
below. The fire was extinguished immediately on ignition by the w rk groups involved using a dry powder extinguisher. No injuries, no damage.
During routine inspection, operator opened instrument box. This released a very minor quantity of accumulated gas into the meter room. This initiated hi. Hi. Gas alarm, g.p.a. muster and
shutdown of <...> and <...> platforms. Investigation revealed minor leak whithin the meter house that had been constantly monitored
Operator venting down discharge line, small section between auto & manual discharge valves, both valves were closed at this time. During venting, a union joint parted, the operator who was on
the venting valve closed it immediately. Two gas heads register d 20% lel
During a43 choke changeout a cap on the pilot instrumentation pipework was removed to act as a vent point to monitor for any hydrocarbon build up. Upon completion however this cap was not
re-installed after the system was hydro tested. Wells a46 & a32 wer opened to the test separator. Gas leaked passed the test manifold hv on a43 which initiated executive action. Note: operator
had received both written handover & verbal instructions to re-install the cap.
Gpa sounded, emergency team to area 9, personnel to muster stations. Deluge operating. Fire team checking area for gas source 15:59 hours, gas levels drop to 8% lel. Search for gas source
continues, 16:20 hours gas levels drop below 4% lel. No leak source found. Deluge isolated. Personnel stood down from muster. 'A' train isolated production flowing to 'b' train.
Seven gas heads came into alarm. All personnel mustered. Inlet, atmosph- eric and test seperators were vented, gas heads cleared. Deluge sets we- re manually isolated, reset and rearmed.
Investigation of area revealed no damage to vessels, sight glasses p pework or instrumentation. Gas mo- nitors were used and the only potential source appeared to be the dis- charged instument
pipe on the original potential source. Personnel stood down. Normal work resumed.
This incident took place during the annual shutdown. The gas line (along with all gas pipework on the platform) had been purged free of gas with nitrogen. Prior to hot work being done on this
pipe, its contents had been checked as being gas-free. Subseque t investigation showed that a small quantity of liquid condensate had gathered in a strainer (a low point in the line). The heat of the
cutting torch caused this condensate to flash off gas, which was then ignited inside the pipe by the cutting torch flame
Low level gas detection occured in module p02 main deck east. The on duty safety operaor and shift supervisor with gas detection equipment went to investigate and observed vapours eminating
from flotation unit h40ib oil compartment hatch cover. The leak stopped when the shift supervisor tightened the two hatch cover screwed fasteners. Gas detector 04222 indicated high level and
gas detector 04226 went into high level alarm resulting in platform esd2 (coincidental gas detection) the general alarm was act vated and emergency essential personnel instructed to proceed to
muster stations. Module p02 was checked using portable gas detectors and confirmed gas free. Personnel were stood down.
During video/rov survey of well from dsv, gas and crude oil leak observed through the interface between the xmas tree flowline connector and the flowline connecting hub within the completion
guide base, this interface is sealed by a metal vx gasket.

Oncoming shift power tech noticed gas card on panel was indicating a 12% reading. He informed cro & went to investigate the area, approaching from the lower east walkway due to high wind.
On reaching area he smelled crude oil. He continued to area where l oking through to the loading room he could see crude spillage on the floor. He raised the alarm with the cr by phone &
continued round to area. At this time other o/t's summoned by his call for assistance investigated area from the walkway, observed crude spilling from the power loop mezzanine floor & initiated
an sps manually from a callpoint. This raised the platform to red hazard status & thus initiated a full muster. Meanwhile, acting in the emergency response role the technicians successfully isolated
the prover loop & export system after confirming that the process had shut down. The area had last been checked at 06:40hrs. It is estimated that 4bbl of crude oil were spilled, but all the spillage
was contained within the platform drains system & thus the platform drains system and there was no enviromental impact.
Following a <...> gas alarm annunciation on <...> remote scan of the wellhead area indicated hydrocarbon release. Platform shutdown remotely, hydrocarbon release leased.
Z gas release in the gas generator cell of <...> generator caused a control action shutdown of the unit, subsequent investigation reveals that the gas emminated from a crack in the elbow of gas
supply pipe. The elbow has been replaced with a unit of a more rounded nature. The reason for the crack is thought to be through exvessive vibration when it is running up to idle speed during
the start sequence
A <...> generator running on load share at 12 mw, gas was detected by aspirators, gas was confined to g.g enclosing unit shutdown cause of release was found to be a split weld on the gas ring and
also cracked burner elbows on numbers 1-4-6 and 8.
Power generation unit tripped on gas detection in gas generator enc. (fire and gas trip). Leak found to be flexible hose elbow to gas burner leak repaired and unit returned to service.
On the morning of <...> a low level gas alarm was received in the ccr on the f + g panel 29% (99414) investigation revealed that the leak was eminating from a flange on thermal relief valve psv
1902b crude export pump a. The plant was subsequently shutdown pending repair.
Module 17 hvac air supply fan no. Cx4902x drive end bearing collapsed causing smoke from the damaged bearing to be drawn into the hvac ducting of module 17. Investigation of the fan
revealed that the d.e. bearing had failed resulting in high shaft tempera ures and loss of the lubricating grease from the bearing.
Fuel gas ring failed releasing gas into generator compartment. Mechanical failure in normal service. Quick actions taken to offload machine, change to liquid fuel and isolate all gas supplies.
Forced extraction dispersed gas from compartment to open air. O fire or explosion
Operator was closing upstrwam valve on pv 0503 to seat passing valve. An unidentified leakage (of gas) occured which the operators were unable to repeat when undertaking similar operations
on the same valve. Gas smell was evident throughout top level of m dule and 2 gas detectors activated g9101 - low level, g9105 - high level.
A process plant upset led to a high pressure in the test separator.due to incorrect flare valve control settings, the pressure was relieved by the psv's. Gas vented into the module via the tell tale from
the psv bellows.
Whilst working on a injector fault circuit breaker opened causing fuel gas secondary high speed shut off cock to close against fuel gas pressure, gas leaked from gland packing on valve the leak
was detected by the automatic system.
14:47 lo level gar detected. 14:58 co-incident lo level gar level two operated. 15:09 high level gar detected - level three shutdown. All executive actions functioned correctly production shutdown.
Indication of a smoke detector poisoning was identified on the central fire and gas panel. Investigation of the cause followed and a small gas leak was detected at xxv 1543 upstream flange 2nd
stage hot gas by pass valve gas injection machine was shut dow and flange bolts flogged up, 3 in number. This action successfullu prevented further leakage the machine and system was returned
to service and monitored. There was no damage, and no casualties resulted.
Gas release from gland on fuel gas supply to drive unit, valve located in enclosure outboard. Level shutdown executive action. Functioned correctly until shutdown.
Minor gas release from leaking instrument connection to pressure transmittor - detected by aspirated gas detectors. Welding jackets on plstform isolated automatically. - generator shutdown.
During start up of "a" power generator gas was detected within the generator compartment. A level of 50% lel was indicated at the central fire and gas panel in the control room and the machine
tripped on esd. Investigation revealed that a pigtail hose to o12 burner has split. Pressure at hose was approx 1 bar. Further investigation also revealed a leak on the ring manifold which appeared
to have resulted from ignition within the ring.

<...> generator being started for the first time following 20,000 hour overhaul. Within 4 or 5 seconds of propane gas being turned on low level gas alarm followed by high level gas. Propane gas
supply immediately turned off. Investigation revealed gas le ks from base of sight glass propane filter/knockout pot & stem of valve immediately upstream of ko pot.
The drilling department were slowly bleeding off tubing head preasure in order to dissipate a hydrate in ba 28, the contents of which was predominantly sea water. The liquid was being routed
through the drilling choke manifold, the poor boy de-gasser, flo line and shaker house to the cutting ditch. Gas entrapped in the sea water broke out and was detected by a gas head in the shaker
house.
Failure of valve bonnet retention studs causing the valve actuator plus valve bonnet to separate from the valve. This caused the loss of integrity of the valve & subsequent release of system
contents (approx 20 standard cubic feet of hydrocarbon gas). Bei g in an open area no gas detection heads activated & the gas dispersed into the atmosphere.
Rigged up high pressure flexible hose and pressure tested to 500 psi started pumping the hec pill at 2800 psi but the hose started vibrating and broke off a pressure gauge which was connected to
the lubricator. Gas released into wellhead area. Pumping sto ped immediately - needle valve to pressure gauge closed. No damage except for broken connection on pressure gauge.
At 2205 hrs on <...> the recip. compressor (k9320) was started up having been shut down for the day. Within a minute of the suction val ve starting to open a loud bang was heard closely
followed by the sound of escaping gas. After the bang inves igation quickly showed the source of escaping gas to be from instrumentation pipework at the after-scrubbe r. The machine was
immediately shutdown manually and on further investi- gation the instrumentation pipework to the discharge pressure guage for inj ction mode was found to have failed at a swagelock
connection
Platform shutdown for annual maintenance activities. Train 2 had been water flushed as per procedure.all oil wells supplying train 2 had flow line chokes removed and blanks fitted to xmas trees.
Relief valve was being removed from 1st stage separator for e-certific- ation. When studs being removed, small pocket of gas under valve escaped into module, causing gas detector situated
immediately above worksite to go to low then high level.
Platform in full production, 3 trains on line, gas to export. During routine plant watch-keeping the oil technitions noted oil dripping from the relief header at the six o'clock position on the pipe
bend at north end of header. Monitoring indicated that t e leak rate was increasing and production was shutdown in a controlled manner. All systems were depressurised and actual hydrocarbon
release was minimal. Subsequent investigation of the pipe bend revealed corrosion pitting at the leak point.
Platform in production mode with gas & water injection on line. At time of incident 2 avons were running in module m4w. Hazard alarm from module m4w - 2 technicians confirmed fire/smoke
in module & manually released btm bottles. At 09:27 a team entered th module wearing breathing aparatus & confirmed that the fire had been extinguished. The area was inspected & oil found
dribbling from a 3/8" compression fitting on the discharge of the turbine driven lub-oil pump. It was concluded that oil had sprayed ove the hot exhaust & ignited.
At 01:22 the platform status changed to yellow alert, with an indication of low level gas in m3e. 2 technicians were sent to investigate, & reported widespread gas in module m3e. The system
supervisor decided to manually initiate red hazard status. He sta ted sub-main generation & initiated an sps (surface process shutdown). Although widespread, no gas card was seen to indicate
greater than 40% lel. Once shutdown, the process was depressurised. When it was deemed safe to enter the module, the source of the gas was identified as a pin hole leak in the body of the flow
control valve (fcv) of well. Train 3gas re-entry valve had failed to close, & as a result, the logic had prevented the injection manifold from blowing down. Mv9324 was opened manually, & the
flowline isolated. Final depressurisation was achieved by running hoses from bb31 swab & flow wing sides.
Platform went to yellow alert as gas head activated in module. Investigation revealed lean oil pump pressure gauge leaking onto the module deck. The pump was shut down, gauge isolated &
replaced. During the subsequent clean up operations, the oil was swept into the drains gulley & some of the oil went down the storm drains & less than a barrel of oil escaped into the sea.
During mode change, a leak to atmosphere of gas from the valve cover om k9320 occurred activating a gas head & taking platform to yellow alert status. The machine was shut down &
automatically depressurised. Machine status monitored throughout. Hydrocarbo gas released into the module from the leak dispersed through the ventilation system in a controlled manner.

Low level gas alarm triggered by gas release in module m4e. A single head indicated 30% gas. Two other heads indicated 15% & 20%. On investigation, the upstream fitting on the balance line of
rv9310 (4th stage discharge header 8" g452) was found leaking. 9310 immediately shutdown, blowdown & isolated. Stainless line & fittings removed for inspection. New pipework/fittings fitted.
On restablishing fuel gas to g1050 after installation of a new relief valve, a leak developed on the start gas regulator filter separator bowl seal. The pressure regulating valve was pasing & relief
valve had lifted. The leak source was the seal at the dr in port on the filter separator.
At 18:31 hrs the platform went to yellow status due to gas head activation in module um4e. This was very shortly followed by a red hazard status due to coincident gas head initiation. A surface
process shutdown was initiated automatically & the platform p rsonnel mustered. A total of 28 gas heads were initiated in module um4e. The gas compression blowdown system was initiated
manually. Gas technicians observed from the doorway of um4e oil & gas escaping from the pre-absorber separator boot level sight glas . The module was ventilated naturally & access gained &
the sight glass isolated manually by closing the velocity check valves above & below the sight glass. At 19:41hrs the platform was returned to yellow status & at 19:43hrs all gas heads had been
reset & the platform returned to normal green status when the hvac system was started.
It was reported to the production control room that there was a fire in the vicinity of the exhaust stacks. It was found that a 205 litre drum of lub. Oil which was stored on the um4w roof, had
corroded & leaked. The leaking oil from the drum had escaped ia a gap in the south west corner & ran onto exhaust where it flashed off
During platform startup the gas process blowdown was operated. Platform status to yellow alert - indication of llg in u4e annexe. Area technician discovered hydrocarbon gas leaking under
pressure from the downstream flange of mv9088 blowdown valve restric ion orifice (newly installed). Mv9088 was closed and the system depressurised via an alternative route. Investigation
revealed sealing faces of flanges and gaskets to be undamaged, but torque settings were found to be low. 250lbs/ft against 300lbs/ft as s ated on the flange tag. An 8mm wedge was also evident
across flanges at point of gas release.
Apparent <...> tube failure allowing a hydrocarbon mist to be sprayed into the area. Failure of the pressure gauge was noticed by the area technician.
A methanol leak was reported to a member of the production department. The operations engineer and production senior technician went to the scene of the incident. The ccr and oim were
informed. The leak was isolated. Fireteams 1 & 2 were sent to the scene to assist with washing down and to be on scene just in case of any escalation. The control room onshore was kept fully
informed and the platform emergency control room personnel were at their stations. The wind direction was se which blew any fumes and me hanol away from the installation.
A contractor employee was measuring from the mezzanine deck grating to the bleed/blanking plug, in preparation for the installation of a stainless steel chemical injection pipework. He stated
that as he touched the plug he felt it was loose and it suddenl came out with a sudden rush of high pressure gas. Gas pressure at the time of the incident estaimated at 200 bar. He, plus two others
who were working in the wellhead area at the time of the incident, immediately evacuated the area initiating a manual br ak glass alarm. The alarms and platform shutdown system operated
almost instantaneously, drilling and process operations ceased and all personnel on both rig and platform attended their respective assembly points. The gas release is estimated to have laste d for
less than one minute and the gas cloud is said to have dispersed in less than two minutes
During routine operational rounds a production technician discovered a pool of liquid on the floor of pp cellar deck. As this liquid was initially thought to be condensate, platform production was
shut down and a full investigation carried out including line pressure test. The leak was subsequently identified as chemical, coming from a pipe union on a 1/2" stainless steel chemical injection
line
During the testing of pc1 compressor following maintenance work completion, a level sight glass "equip no 53 lg11015" fractured under pressure allowing the release of hydrocarbon gas. Nb:
hydrocarbon gas not detected on platform gas detector heads. Detect d by portable detector in use by personnel engaged on test.
Platform status changed from green, to yellow, then immediately to red status due to high level gas indication. This caused total platform shutdown.

The incident occurred while tripping out of a well, for a change of bit the pipe was pulled wet and mud bucket was in use. After having pulled 15 stands, the mud bucket was tied back to the
stabbing board ladder on the west side of the drill floor using a rope. It was not noticed that the winch wire, with mud bucket attached, had been approx 59 ft above the drill floor. During
lowering of the blocks, the dolly caught the wire and pulled it down over the bracket, thus lifting the mud bucket. Movement of he mud bucket was stopped when it hit the underside of the
bottom cross member of the west dolly track. Due to the inertia of the blocks, the tension of the winch wire increased until it parted at the bracket on the dolly track. The mud bucket and 43 feet
of wire dropped to the drill floor. The tripping operation was immediately suspended for damage assessment and initial investigation. Upon inspection, marks caused by the strands of the wire
rope were clearly visible on the dolly track bracket.
Low level gas detected by 4 gas heads located in the vicinity of interstage gas compressor k2280 located in module m2e, compressor tripped on low pressure. Process shutdown and blowdown
initiated manually as a precaution. Gas release traced to a failed 1/ " instrument needle valve tapping on the second stage suction scrubber. Failed fitting was a screwed connection into a flange
and failed at threadedn union.
Detected gas in exhaust of vacuum pumps of de-airator towers, indicating hydrocarbon gas present in service water system. All precautionary measures taken to monitor and avoid gas levels in
safe areas and diagnostic survey carried out to locate source. Cl sing in cooler resulted in gas levels dropping to zero, indicating this as most likely source.
A pinhole leak (+-1mm) was discovered on a transition spool piece between the wellhead mounted choke and the flowline. The hole was discovered as part of routine operations on the wellhead
platform, there was no specific work ongoing at the time. Gas wa not detected on any of the nearby gas detectors before the flowline was isolated and vented.
A contract turbine maintenance technician was working on a major overhaul of one of <....> mol pump turbines when he observed a spray of water coming from the spindle of a daniel orifice box
in the pipework above p06. He informed a production technician wh in turn informed the production supv. A controlled plant shutdown was instigated and the pipework drained down. It was
found that the packing had failed on the lower plate carrier shaft. This was replaced. No damage of injury sustained.
A smell of gas was traced to a rtj flange on k3001 gas lift kick off compressor pipework system.the machine was being run up to kick off a gas lifted oil production well. System was shutdown and
vented, hot work stopped, permits withdrawn.
During wireline operations gas was detected by visual observation from control line block and bleed manifold part of permanent wellhead/tree installation. Leak was minimised and valve
manifold replaced foreign object - 1/4" dia magnet found inside pipe co nection affecting: a) its security b) operation of n r valve. No emergency declared fso and fire party on standby.
Gas leak was noticed emitting from rjt flange on k-300 gas lift compressor system pipework.the system was being lined up to unload/ kick off newly completed production well.system was
shutdown and depressurised.hot work stopped, permits withdrawn - fire t am and safety officer alerted. No damage sustained or emergency declared.
Gas leak reported to fso who, in turn, requested crt to raise general alarm. Fixed gas detectors in the area registering 0%. Handheld monitor used and also registered 0% lel. On further
investigation smell confirmed to be diesel fumes coming back from th open drains. Source of diesel was identified as an overflow pipe from one of the diesel emergency generator fuel tanks.
(muster).
As part of programme to carry out pressure integrity tests, a chicksan line was rigged for flow purposed under test conditions in segregated well compartments. During testing of this chicksan a
screwed joint leaked as it had not been properly tightened. N damage to plant. One gas detector in area alarmed at low gas level. Spillage and subsequent clean up contained within platform drain
system. Fire team laid precautionary foam blanket to suppress vapourisation of crude estimated at 1 barrel.
A quantity of oil wascarried over from the test separator to the flare system during an operation to pressurise vo3 using well to assist sand displacement. A large percentage of the oil carry over
was collected in the hp knock out drum & this resulted in i-level alarm in the mol control room. The remainder of the oil was carried up the hp flare where not all of it was burned by the mardair,
a small amount falling as oil droplets to the main deck ( report received by control room technician & other oil obs rved as burning on the flare anti-radiation platform deck.
A fuel hose had been fitted to a diesel storage tank. The hose fitted w/2 isolation valves, one ofn the tank piping and the other at the hose end. The last known fuel transfer had been made several
days previously and it is assummed that valve had not be n closed. A leak occurred in the hose near the upstream connection and over a period of a few hours, diesal had leaked onto the deck.
There were several users of this line and it is not known how the leak developed. The spill was mopped up and residues ho ed down with detergent. No raw fuel was discharged into the open
drain system.

Whilst moving a hose connection from the 9 5/8 annulus drain pipework on well 3-3, the treaded connection at the main annulus valve parted. As the well was live oil and gas was discharged into
the eggbox activating 2 low gases and 1 high gas. The main ann lus valve was quickly isolated and the gas disipated immediately. Hot work was withdrawn.
On attempting to restart the well, an escape of gas was apparent from the stem seal of the wing valve.attempt to start the well was abandoned and suspect valve isolated.no gas detectors were
activated.valves since been replaced by vendor and well returned to service.
P1000 had been mothballed and isolated since <....>. During removal of the process pipework namely the recycle line as the pump unit was being removed completely, a small amount
approximatley 1 gallon of oily water was released onto the deck. No gas detecto s were initiated, however, hot work permits were withdrawn as a precautionary measure.
The fuel gas pilot regulator from gas turbine was changed out as part of the maintenance routine. The replacement unit was of new manufactur from stock. Afteer installation the pilot regulator
was being adjusted to the pressure setting recomended. At ab ut 40 psi a gas vapour was observed escaping from behined the manufacturers lable plate. In response to the leakage the gas valve
was shut, the line ventilated and the system isolaed. Examination of the pilot regulator revealed that two of the rivet holes for locating the manufacturers label had been penetrated through the
regulator casing allowing gas escape.
During drilling operations and in the process of bringing the pump on line a rubber bellows spool piece ruptured under pressure and discharge water based mud. Incident brought inder control in
2/3 min. The pump was isolated and cleaning up started. Dri ling operations immediately put on hold to assess damage and then decided to pull out the hole and continue further investigations.
Problems with clearing blocked deck drains from the ngl plant roof area had been encountered on many occasions due to drain line bend configuration. Break couplings were being installed to a
drain line to facilitate access for rodding equipment to clear b ockages. A second pipe was identified as requiring break couplings too as bend design was similar. On cutting the pipe it was
evident that a positive pressure was there. A gas check was taken but no trace of hydrocarbons was found, it was assumed that air had been trapped in the pipe due to blockage. On further
investigation the cut pipe was identified as the process water drain (2'') from the water ko vessel v16 to the production separators.
The complete well compartment was isolated under icc for 4-1 and 4-3 flowline and downcomer replacement. (the design of the new flowline configuration is such that 4-1 flowline now goes to
downcomer slot 4-3 and well 4-3 is directed to downcomer 4-1). Th new downcomer for 4-1 had a blank flanage fitted to sample point prod sup instructed tech to remove and have altered in the
workshop to allow monitoring of pbu at a later stage. Part of the workscope also involved changing over divertor actuator control lines for 4-1 and 4-3. Control tech asked permission of prod
staff to function test the valves in question; and was told to proceed. On opening the 4-1 test divertor, a small quantity of gas escaped from the open ended sample point. A single gas head w nt
to "high gas", by the time crt checked , behind panel, meter had dropped back to normal. No gas detected by fso on arrival.
Production department were preparing separator vessel v02 for maintenance. This separator was out of service and hydro carbon contents had been drained to the process system. During water
flushing/ filling of the vessel the main gas outlet valve was clo ed and the maintenance vent line valve was opened. A small quantity of crude oil was emitted from this vent line and caused a fine
spray/depost of the steel cladding of turbine ko1 exhaust stack
Production team were preparing to transfer top-up oil. No proper valved connected existed, so blank flange split on top of tank to facilitate filling. First indications are that associated gas from
the seal oil was caught by the southerly wind and activ ted adjacent gas heads to "low gas". Reset to zero in 2-3 minutes. Flange resealed, emergency action as per forties emergency procedures.
Without prejudice to the outcome of the investigation, operation of system nitrogen purge is being examined for conf emation of operation
2 uv flame alarms came up on k02 gas compressor. Fire and gas control action activated halon release into k02 hood and shut down ngl plant. Two minutes later 4 gas heads were activated
g112/113/114 and 115. Reading high gas. 3 gas heads reset to 0 with 0 secs. Fso and fire team stood by k02 while halon discharged into turbine hood. No evidence of ignition during the incident
or at the initial investigation. The cause of the control action is under investigation by the platform investigation team.
Low gas alarms were activated by 2 detector heads in the ngl plant. Investigation by a production operator using a portable gas detector confirmed there was a gas release at ko1 gas compressor.
The ngl plant was shut down and all hot work permits withdraw
Low gas alarm (g94) activated in ngl plant, going immediately to high gas alarm. Low gas alarm (g93) in ngl plant activated. Production operator determined gas leak came from seals of ko1 gas
compressor. Ngl plant shutdown manually.
Release of vapour and oily water mixture from separator inlet flange during preparation for maintenance.

During hydrocarbon runs on deep gas lift kick-off compressor k3001, a flange on the inlet pipework to exchanger x-3002 leaked high pressure gas. (approx 160 bar) this activated a low level gas
alarm to 32% lel. After checks by production and safety staf , the leak was found and isolated/depressurised. An accident/incident report is being prepared.
Low gas alarm activated from detector g-3482 which is located on the kick-off compressor. Gas was traced to a leaking flange on the compressor casing drain line. The machine was shut down
and isolated. Nb the machine was on a commissioning run and had b en running for approx 4 hours.
During normal pumping operation a hole developed in the cyclone on the seal oil system on the pump p.03 (test separator booster pump). A production technician reporting for shift entered the
mol area, saw oil spraying from the leak, raised the alarm and i olated the leak, then shut the pump down, they also shut down p.02, the adjacent pump because its motor had been sprayed with
oil.
During normal pumping operations a production technician noticed a fine spray of oil emitting from p03 cyclone pipework. (test separator booster pump). He raised the alarm, with the pump
being shut down and isolated. It was then flushed out prior to furth r investigation
A production technition whilst on routine plant checks noticed drops of oil on the deck. Investigation revealed oil oozing from a weld joint on ths t.s/v relief line for flow line 1-2. The well was
immediatly shut in, the flowline isolated, de pressuris d and water flushed .
The well had just completed a workover and was being deisolated. The following spec blind was to be swung into position. The flowline was double valve isolated, water flushed and
dipressured. When the joint was broken a small amount of residual gas and ater was suddenly released as the line had not been totally depressured. The plant was manually shutdown.
Investigation revealed that one isolation valve was faulty and would not fully close.
Due to operational problems with the fuel gas system there was a loss of platform power and a trip and blow-down of the compressors. The seal oil pumps ran down and the seal oil pressure fell.
At least one seal on each compressor train did not close up as per design. This allowed gas to pass through the seals and vent into m4. Six gas heads were reading above 75%. Natural ventilation
cleared the gas from the module in 27 minutes. At the time of the power loss the sub-main generator was shutdown for mainten
Due to loss of platform power, the <....> compressor shutdown and their associated seal oil pumps shutdown caused by load shed of 440v swithboard. At least one seal on each compressor did not
close as designed allowing gas to pass through the seals and to vent into the module
Whenever a rod packing indicates any mecanical difficulty gas from the packing is carried in the return cooling tank. Gas passing to this tank is vented and gas heads around and above it, warn of
a rod packing problem. The platform went to alert status, the machine was identified by the control tech and stopped. Area checked and gas confirmed at cooling tank. Gas dispersed by hvac,
heads back to zero and platform to green at 12:10.
A technician was carrying out an isolation for planned shutdown work. He was required to open a blowdown valve on the mechanically isolated system and sps'd the platform error. Low gas was
detected in m4 around a <....>. On investigation it was discovere that the seal oil pump control circuit logic supply had been lost, as it was not a maintained supply. Recent, agreed modifications,
had failed to identify this detail
30 minutes after start-up of a <....> booster compressor there was an indication of high level gas detection in m4 around a elliot 3rd stage knock-out pot, followed by an sps. Upon investigation a
needle valve was found open on the drain line from the kno k-out pot instrument bridle.
Test separator was isolated for the technitians to remove & inspect level control valve. Before commencing the job the system was monitored for pressure rises etc., Over a period of 3 hours by
the operations technicians nothing was observed at this time. Est separator outlet line was depressurised & drained down using a 2" drain line near the lcv. After draining, the lcv bonnet joint
was broken & the valve removed for examination. Approx 1 hour later the supervisor & technicians were preparing to refit th valve bonnet when suddenly approx a 1/3 barrel of oil overflowed
from the valve into the module drains system, gas coming from the spillage was picked up by the detection system & indicated in the control room as alow level gas detection. The technicians
informed the cro via the telephone to initiate an immediate sps & blowdown. This was done & the flow ceased forthwith. The lcv was then re-instated.
A failure of the low level control switch lc6504 to shutdown tm650 duty pump resulting in a low level in hazardous drains tank, which reduced the effectiveness of the liquid seal between the
various inputs and the overflow line. Low pressure purge gas fro the cutting chute reverse flowed into tm650 via the overflow line causing a small pocket of gas to enter the open hazardous
drains system which emerged in m5 activating the gas detection system wihtin the module and initiating a surface process shutdown.

During preparations for the start up of the platform following an sps, hydrocarbon gas from the <....> subsea flowline was vented to the flare whilst an unknown excessively high liquid level
existed in the lp drum. This caused entrainment of liquid and ts subsequent expulsion through the flare tip in the form of oil droplets/mist. At the time of the incident the flare was not lit.
Expelled oil was blown by a north westerly wind onto the north end of the platform. Approx. 2 cubic metres is estimated to b discharged to the environment. The high oil level in the lp flare ko
drum was primarily due to backflow from the coalescer to the 3rd stage separator which became overfilled and discharged lliquid to the flare via its pressure control valve. At no time was the
subsea well production valve opened.
Diesel leak from burner ignited on hot engine when machine changed over to diesel from gas. Flame detection shutdown machine, platform went to red status. Halon on manual, technician
extinguished small flame with dry powder portable extinguisher. Platf rm returned to green status
Hydrocarbon leak from the oul cooler plates. Resulted in process shutdown. Approximately 0.5 barrel of oil escaped to sea resulting in a sheen on the water. Estimated size of sheen 0.5km
(dispersing due to wave and wind action).
D.s.v. <....> was preparing for a dive operation when a cloud of gas, now thought to be condensate via the platforms sump drain, affected the vessel. Production operations were shut down and
h.p. gas systems depressurised. At 01.55 deck was considered c ear and diving operations commenced. Wind direction was 093 degrees at 5 knots with an air temperature of 7 degrees c.
0320 hrs o5o gas generator was loaded to min.speed. 0552 hrs general alarm initiated - 1st level smoke in 050 enclosure. Investigation discovered smokey haze in enclosure roof emitting from
power turbine tunnel. 0630 hrs 2nd ga - coincidence smoke in same area. Pesd 2 initiated, deluge released. Areas checked for possible oil leaks - none found. 0650 hrs 050 gas generator re-started
to idle mode. Prior to loading, technician positioned in vicinity to monitor. 0909 hrs 050 loaded to minimum speed. Within 10 mins, smoke seen emitting from enclosure and lube oil level fell by
1/4" - unit immediately shutdown and unit examined. Discovered braided hydraulic hose had ruptured due to chafing on engine servo limiter. Hydraulic fluid had sprayed (aeroshell 560) onto gas
generator
Prior to the incident, the <....> station was exporting gas with 4 units on line and flowing 130 mmscfd. At 0328 hrs a platform general alarm was initiated by the platform f & g detection system.
Upon investigation, it was found to be 1st level gas detection n unit 040 gas generator enclosure which had operated. In order to investigate further, the unit was shut down and the fuel gas
system to it depressurised. The result of further investigation found a cracked fuel gas manifold to the engine burner "pig-tai " pipe. (this was replaced)
0915 hrs general alarm was initiated. The production team were in the process of loading unit 070 gas compressor. Zone 14, k.0. Pot east. Gas head g90 showed a reading of 20%. P1 and p2
checked area with gas monitor. Pcv 331-1 on fuel gas skid "a" was fou d to be leaking via the stem packing.
During commisioning of the generator, fuel gas was introduced to the regulator, which leaked from the body joint of the pilot. The gas was detected by a head situated immediately above the
regulator. As the unit was off line, no enclosure fans were runnin to disperse the gas. On further investigation of the pilot regulator it was found that, although the 'o' ring was intact, the screwed
halves of the body were not fully tight.
Unit 060 shutdown on a vibration trip. For operational reasons, the engine enclosure vent fans were turned off, this was timed at 0935 hrs. At 1008 hrs, a g.a. was initiated by first level gas in 060
enclosure. The supervisor and technician investigated t e incident, no obvious gas leaks could be found. Further investigation required the floor panels and fuel gas mini skid protective panel to
be removed. The leak was traced to a quadrant spindle from the woodward fuel valve.
Installation was not manned at the time of the incident. Bacton terminal which monitors location, received indication of first then second level gas which initiated sps and main platform esd. On
manning the installation the following morning, the outlet s ool of a willis m4 hydraulic actuated choke was found to have two 12.7mm holes cut due to sand erosion.
Unit body bolts (top 2) sheared, allowing loss of approximately 35 gallons of hydraulic oil, total contained within the skid. Unit isolated and removed for investigation.
Well a7 was flowed to the separator. A quantity of oil and gas was lost into the platform well bay. Operators were on site and immediately requested shutdown.
Flash gas compressor started up after being off line. Sour oil trap bypasses not returned to closed position and allowed gas, normally routed to l.p.flare, to enter the de-gasser and escape via
atmospheric vent pipework located outside mod. 14 mezz.

During wireline operations a sudden release of gas struck an employee in the chest knocking him to the floor. No equipment damage. Employee returned to work after examination by the medic.
During routine checks, water was seen to be dripping from 2" bottom stub on the spool downstream of the main suction valve. Reported to central control room and the pump was shut down,
isolated and de-pressured.
Operations technician noticed large pool of oil spreading from test separator densitometer pump. Pump was stopped, suction and discharge valves shut, pump body de-pressured and central
control room informed.
On investigation of gas alarm near to mol booster pump g2001a, gas leak was traced to a flange associated with pressure switch 20pal0017. Switch was isolated and leak stopped immediately.
Gas turbine was running on diesel fuel and within a minute of change over to gas. One gas head, located in the combustion chamber extraction trunking, came into low alarm, followed by
another. The machine was changed back to diesel fuel and the gas leak investigated. The gas leak was traced to the new burners which had been fitted the previous night.
Process train 1 oil/gas/water separator c1001 was being leak tested. One of the battery limit valves can not have been sealing fully. Once the pressure in c1001 had been built up to an interim test
value of 12 bar g with nitrogen, a flow became establish d from c1001 across the closed valve into the hp gas scrubber c1301. C1301 had not been prepared for leak test, and was therefore still
open to the atmospheric maintenance vent, as was the train 1 lp gas scrubber c1302. The nitrogen passing from 1001 thu established a flow through the atmospheric vent header system, which
disturbed the atmospheric vent knockout pot loop seal, and through some open vents on the c1302 system. Pockets of hydrocarbon gas within these systems were carried along by the flow, e
caping to atmosphere, giving rise to low level gas alarms seen in module 3 deck/module 1 deck. Having identified the leaks and the driving force behind them, operations staff then:- 1.
Depressurised c1001. 2. Closed the vents on the c1302 system. 3. Re-es
<....> unit had previously been flushed. It was isolated from operating plant (checked and confirmed during incident) and showed no liquid level or pressure indication. It is thought that the
period of good weather with high temperatures allowed the resi ue in the unit to expand and "gas off" through leaking seals on access hatches.
Seal oil skid had been recommissioned in preparation for start-up of the flash gas compressor. During normal watchkeeping activities it was discovered that the bonnet on 13lv3012 was leaking.
Approximately 100 litres of oil leaked, but were contained wit in the bund and subsequently recovered.
While conducting pre-startup checks on train 1 gas export, the production technician noticed a leak coming from the down stream grease nipple on valve 32xxv0032. He reported the problem and
train 2 gas export was shut down and de-pressured. The non retu n valve and grease nipple were replaced.
Following a shutdown and power failure at <....>, the <....> oil export line high pressure alarm sounded (85 bar). Rapidly followed by an automatic total production shutdown initiated by the high
pressure trip (93 bar). Immediately following the rip, an oil and gas leak was reported in the pig launcher area. General alarm was sounded, personnel sent to muster points and fire team sent to
control the incident. No indications or trips were recorded by the fire and gas system. The leak was traced to a body bleed plug on valve 31hv0033 on the oil export line. The section of line was
depressurised and the leak stopped. Approx 30 litres oil spilled and was covered with foam blanket. Personnel were stood down after 30 minutes. No oil escaped to the sea
Whilst carrying out plant routine inspections, a producton technician noticed a minor oil/gas leak coming from a grease injection nipple on valve 31 hv0060. He contacted the control room and
reported the problem. Production was shutdown via the yellow shu down facility and depressured. The non return valve and grease nipple was replaced.
A gas release was detected and traced to the wireline operations. The gas was issuing from a hose with an open end attached to a tee-piece connected to the non active side arm of well. The hose
had previously been used by personnel to bleed down from abov the bop via the t piece and into the platform closed drain system druing a fishing operation and should have been disconnected
completely at the end of their job.

Instrument pm's were being carried out on 'b' export gas compressor. Part of the routine called for the calibration of the sour seal oil pot/trap level control loop. The method of calibration requires
that the trap level is set up to coincide with that o pots sight glass. In this incident it appears that the level transmitter was set up with the aid of the sight glass. However, unknown the sight glass
on the pot was blocked and a false level was visually indicated, hence the transmitter was set up incor ectly to the true level of the trap. The pot was recommissioned and the level control valve
remained open for some while after the level had emptied in the trap, allowing gas to pass through and escape via the atmospheric vent. Due to the wind conditions at the time, some of the gas
was blown back into the module and activated several gas alarms below their action points. No control action resulted.
Wireline lubricator was set up on well c5 to recover a deepset injection valve. It was tested to 3000 psi. The tool was run, latched and jarring commenced. A leak developed on the 5 1/2 inch by
3 1/2 inch crossover. The bops were immediately closed co taining the leak. On investigation it was discovered that the 'o' ring at the crossover had burst. C5 is a water injection well
This incident occurred while logging well a-1. After the well had been flowing approx 4 hours an intermittent release of gas was observed coming from the 3" connection on the 5 1/2"x3 1/2"
crossover of the lubricator (wireline). The well was then closed in and wireline bops closed. Grease was injecyed between the rams and a seal obtained. Pressure was bled off above the bops and
integrity confirmed.
0.5 bbl of oil based mud,detergent and water went through the drain and overboard whilst cleaning out a mud pit. No damage to personnel or equipment.
A pressure gauge blew off some instrument pipework, striking a man working immediately adjacent and releasing a small amount of gas into the atmosphere. The man suffered a bruised jaw and
bit his tongue, but continued to work after medical attention.
While person was operating newly replaced compactor unit. Actuation of the compactor failed to operate the machine. The operator opened the adjacent air supply valve. The air supply hose
was not connected to the compactor. The resultant blast of air w s directed onto the operators arm resulting in only superficial skin damage.
Whilst repairing leaks on the ssiv hydraulic power unit skid, the psv on the charge pump discharge was assembled incorrectly and adjusted manually without using a psv test rig. Subsequently,
the charge pump was started against a closed discharge valve. He psv popped almost immediately and a few seconds later the charge pump accumulator exploded, damaging hydraulic lines,
structural steel, and severing an electrical cable. The working pressure of the accumulator was 210 bar. The system design pressure i 310 bar. The vendor, a nelson, was inside the skid when this
occurred.
The oil plant was operating steadily, but gas export was being re-established following a trip, when low level gas detection was observed in module 7 (cellar deck). On site investigation by a
production technician confirmed the smell of gas and he was joi ed in the investigation by the fire & safety officer and the production supervisor. Hand held meters confirmed the presence of gas
and the plant was shut down and vented by manual push- button from the central control room as a precautionary measure. The leak was eventually traced to a weld defect in an 8" line connected
to the hp flare manifold upstream of the ko drum.
Gas release from flotation cell. 20% lel gas indication in module 3 vicinity of v1220. Operator with portable gas monitor sent to investigate. Operator confirmed 20% lel near v1220 & started to
investigate possible source. Gas detector nos. 166. 167 & 168 went to 60% lel. Gas alarm sounded on p.a automatically. Control room operator activated platform shutdown from the control
rom on his own authority. Control room operator activated module 3 water deluge from control room. All platform personnel mustered. Headcount commenced. Water deluge turned off. All
gas detectors showing less than 10%lel. Full muster achieved and headcount completed. All gas detectors out of alarm condition. All clear given on oim insturctions. All personnel to normal
duties. Instrument technicians reset module 3 water deluge valve. Gas detector no. 167 went to 60% lel, causing p.a gas alarm. This was due to a small amount of redidual oil in v1220 gassing
off. Oim was standing beside v1220 when this happened. Production was still shutdown and in et to v1220 was still double blocked. Control room operator made p.a. As before, and activated
water deluge. All personnel mustered. Water deluge turned off. Fire hose run out. End hatch of v1220 opened. Operators commenced flushing out vessel with eawater and detergent. Full
Manual operator (handle plus drive shaft) came off block valve on discharge side of caisson pump while valve in open position. Dead crude from the 48" caisson, which was in the discharge
pipework from the pump, backflowed and escaped from the failed valv . Pump was running but had lost suction. Estimate 2bbls oil escaped onto deck and surrounding structure. Oil cleaned up
and flushed into deck drains. Small percentage lost through area of grating near 48" caisson. No significant escape of gas. No ga

Two operators went to investigate a suspected high liquid level in the fuel gas knock out pot in the supply line to the turbine generators. They opened the drain valve on the vessel but no drop in
the level was observed. They then decided to crack open a wagelock union on a tee- piece on the 3/4 inch stainless steel drain line downstream of the valve to check for a blockage in the line.
When they loosened the union it blew off. As the drain valve was in the open position this resulted in an uncontrolled r lease of gas into the turbine hall, activating the low level of gas alarm.
They immediately contacted the control room operator who manually activated the high level gas alarm and operated the level 1 esd pushbutton. Personnel were mustered. The all clear was given
within 2 minutes
Maintenance technicians were installing spades on c5015 gas compressor suction sdv 35021 and bypass valve. The system they were working on had been isolated and de-pressured. Oil
production re-started and 12 minutes later, a discharge of gas and glycol ater occurred at both spaded flanges. The 60% gas alarm activated and production shutdown. Tge leakage of gas
persisted for 30 minutes despite the belts being checked for tightness by personnel in breathing apparatus. The leakage was finally stopped by solating the heating medium. Investigation showed
that a bursting disc had gone on e2720 hc liquid heater. This was caused by the heating medium system being overpressured by gas from v1620 slug catcher as the 16"manual valve from v1602 to
flare had been left in the closed position. This had been closedfor the initial isolations on gas compression but should have been re-opened prior to re-starting arbroath production. As the gas
compression flare system had been isolated, the gas/heating medium mixtur
Gas alarm was activated on east side of m4c at and around the <...> unit. This was followed by a 60% gas alarm in the same area. As a result of the alarm status the control room operator
manually initiated a "2b" shutdown of the process plant. A full mu ter was called and all muster points reported in. Following the investigation into the incident by on board personnel it was
found that gas had been entering the <...> unit (at498) via the low pressure vent system. This was as a consequence of ngl's being carried over to thefuel gas scrubber (v404) from the ngl
stabilisation plant.
A50 well was being brought back on production after a choke change during de-isolation the kill wing valve was not closed properly and the plug not replaced in the blind flange (used for double
block and bleed)- when the master valve was open a small amou t of gas was released activating one gas head to 60%+ and another to 20% - the master valve was wuickly closed and the gas
dissipated rapidly.
Operator noticed strong smell of diesel and fog/smoke issuing from enclosure exhaust vents. Unit was shut down and fire team summoned. Halon discharged manually to enclosure causing fire
alarm to sound. Mustered platform crew. Enclosure entered by two m n in b.a. no fire found. Discovered fuel link cracked weld. Fire team kept on standby until unit returned to ambient
temperature.
Low level gas alarm was raised in enclosure. All work permits were withdrawn and the alarm was checked with a hand meter. The alarm was confirmed. A small crack was found in the fuel ring
on the avon turbine. Unit was taken offline and was isolated.
After a prolonged test run. The unit was s/d and prepared for another start up by operations maintenance depts. The avon was started and a successful lite off obtained. An excessive flow of liquid
fuel was observed coming from the transition piece which i nited due to the heat from the rear of the engine. The unit was immediately s/d and the fire extinguished with a hand held extinguisher.
No damage occurred. Uv and halon systems were bypassed due to presence of personnel in attendance in enclosure during trials
After a period of static pressure the lines were depressurised (a28 being used as the relief well) b j pipework was firstly bled down to a28. 400kph remained within the system. Upon bleeding
back to the bj unit residual gas escaped thus activating the g s alarm located adjacent to the bj unit. No damage resulted. A42 is a water injection well. Two gas detectors are located 6' from the
leak source and are not on a voting system. Both gas detectors alarmed and cleared within one minute.
Whilst under normal operating conditions the main oil shipping pump tripped on high vibration at a journal bearing. The back up shipping pump also tripped on high vibration during start up. To
avoid overfilling the production vessels the main production wells were shut in and the production vessel levels were reduced to the water treatment plant thus allowing time to carry out remedial
work on the shipping pump vibration monitoring system. The increased rate of water flow to the vessel at 498 during this exercise was at a faster rate than the level control valve could cope with
causing the vessel to overflow there by cousing the layer of oil and residual blanket gas to be forced out through the vessel lid and skimmer shaft glands. The emission of fluid an gas first brought
a 20% then 60% gas detection in module 5 cellar. This gas escaper rapidly dispersed and no further gas was detected. At the time of the gas alarm sounding the manual production shut down was
activated even though the gas detection syste had not sensed a serious enough circumstance by the executive alarm zone voting system. The production plant was held in a shut down condition
until a full investigation had taken place. The gas detectors which picked up the hydrocarbons are gd42 and gd3 . Gd38 is 8 meters from the wemco at 30cm from the deck. This was the first to

Earlier in the day while the section was shutdown a low pressure hose was used to clear a high high level in v208 by draining water/condensate to drains outside the module. The opratorrs
concerned then went on to do other things and the hose was not d after this operation. Later an operator on this section witnessed a higher than normal level in v208 and decided to lower this level
by using this hose, however, the section was now opreating at approximately 80 bar. The hose came apart and discharged w remov ter/gas/condensate into the module activating a 20% and a 60%
alarm. Production was manuallly shutdown the valve supplying the hose was closed and the gas levels quickly returned to normal.
During normal two train gas compression operation the sales gas compressor k106 tripped in a spurious failure, to allow time for maintenance the standby compressor k206 was prepared and
started. When the start sequence reached the purge phase a 20% gas a arm activated followed immediately by a 60% gas alarm. The control room operator located the area of the release as
module 5 production and instructed the gas plant operator to stop the compressor. The emergency stop activated and both 20% and 60% alarm cleared very quickly. Upon activation of the 60%
alarm a full platform muster was called and completed in 5 minutes. Initial investigation of the compressor identified a casing drain valve as having raised gas although it was fully wound down.
The com ressor was fully isolated and a full investigation proved the drain valve had failed. This will be replaced and all other valves of this type and service checked.
Precautionary muster. Small leak of crude oil from isolated section of pipe work. During final flushing of feed pipework from mod 03 to the heat exchanger in mod 13, approx 1/4 bbls of crude
oil was displaced on to the mod floor. Resultant high gas dete ted shutdown all platform hydrocarbon systems and initiated the general alarm. All personnel satisfactorily accounted for.
There was a failure of the drive end bearing housing with serious damage to the motor, compressor and drive coupling. The debris from the disintegrating bearing housing and sheared coupling
was thrown distances up to 20 metres in the module, shattering a luorescent light fitting, casing impact deamage to a structural member within the module and puncturing the module wall. The
damage to the compressor allowed gas to leak from the dirve shaft seal. The gas ignited with the damaged light fiting being the li ely souce of ignition. The platform's esd production and gas
supply to the compressor. The module water deluge was activated automatically. In addition, the fire crew entered the module and deployed three hosed on the fire. When the locus of the fire was
etermined, the fire team requested that the compression system be vented to flare to reduce the hydrocarbon inventory that was feeding the fire. The fire was extinguished.
During a planned production shutdown a hydrocarbon leak occured on booster pump recirculation line. Two low gas alarms (fixed detection system) were raised (20% lel). Two fire hoses were
operated to disperse crude oil. Lines valve isolated and system drai ed. Recirc system physically disconnected pending ndt survey and necessary repair.
After routine prover ball change out the prover loop was repressurised. The door vents had been left open by the metering vendor and on repressurisation oil and gas escaped causing a high gas
shut down. Production was restarted 1 hour later. (muster)
Automatic fire detection system activated showing fire indicated in zone 19 (generator room). Fire confirmed, all personnel to emergency stations. Fire extinguished. Fire cause: turbo charger
bearings seized & turbine shaft sheared at exhaust side. Lub oil sprayed onto exhaust & ignited. Incident happened on lay barge, stenna apache (unregistered).
During the initial re-commissioning stages of the glycol absorber pre- scrubber vessel fa1122 hydrocarbon gas from gas compressor gb4001 was being introduced into the vessel, as per the
commissioning procedure. Within minutes of the gas suppy valve being racked open to introduce gas into the vessel mod 11 gas detectors in the visinity of fa1122 went into lo alarm status. The
gas supply was immediatly isolated and the gas source identified and isolated by the plant operators involved in the commissioning. Whilst the operators were locating the leak, one of the five
gas heads which alarmed went to a high alarm status, this initiated a platform alert and a secondary 'b' s.d. six minutes from the initial gas detection the effected gas heads had gone back to ormal
status and pklatform personnel stood down from muster. Investigations confirmed the gas at maximum pressure of 2 bar g escape from an incorrectly made up flange on 11 ls 464.
During leak test at test separator manifold, n2he was released violently when class 1 esd was activated. No apparent injuries were sustained at the time of the incident.however, the following day
the test engineer complained of shock and was transferred onshore
Co-incident smoke detection <...> b generator compartment. This resulted in an automatic shutdown of the generator. Halon was released manually from the control room. Epa was initiated by the
control room there was no evedince of fire within the mach nes compartments. Residual oil was lying in the load gear box compartment in the floor and within the power turbine bell mouth.
Personnel reported to muster stations.

As the main <...> plant was being re-pressured in controlled stages after a major shutdown, a flange occured as a result of incorrect make up. The flange had been previously broken to allow
insertion of a blind. The leak was detected by a nearby wi ness who reported the leak allowing gas to be vented via the vent system before any gas detectors picked up the leak. After correctly
making up the flange the plant was repressured without problem.
Having isolated one of two in-line sand filters and prior to changing the filter element the vent valves on the isolated filter were opened. The vent gas was routed to the <...> vent boom via a 5000
psi wp hose, however, due to entrained sand a steel elbow local to the filter was eroded/ruptured allowing the filter to vent locally to atmosphere.
The <...> clean up system had been shutdown and isolated to allow routine maintenance of the 'a' seperator's liquid control valve. As a routine precaution the filters were to be vented prior to
starting work on the seperator. As the filters were vented to tmosphere(standard procedure) the vented gas was blown to-wards the <...> control shelter and the gas detectors in the hvac inlet
ducting detected the vented gas and instgated a level 4 shutdown as per design. It is estimated that approximately 4 cu ft of as in total was vented as a result of the routine venting. No-body was
injured and no equipment damage was sustained as a result of this incident.
Control room received an alarm indication of low gas levels. The intervention crew of three personnel landed on the platform and one gas head indicating 22%. The area was approached with
caution and a gas/condensate leak found at the pryopant filter on we l ie a "destec" joint on the outlet pipework of the filter. The well was closed in and an isolation set. Wind was approx 4 knots
@ 270degrees.
<...> was manned at 08:21 - helicopter operations ceased at 08:45. As part of arrival checks, the well bays were inspected and a gas leak noted in the north well bay originating from well ra-11
sandfilter inlet pipework. The well was immediately shut in and the filter isolated and vented down. Oim <...> informed.
On <...> during a routine visit to <...> gas was noted to be escaping from the stem packing of well <...> choke valve. <...>. The well wasimmediately shut in and the floe-line de-pressurised. The
flowline was isolated from e ch of the three possible sources of hydrocarbon gas. (i.e. Resevoir, production header and test header) and the stem packing renewed. Leak testing on completion
showed the repair had not been successful; the isolation was left in place. The flow-line pres ure noted to be zero and ther platform de-manned at 19-40 hrs. At 21-14 hrs, <...> <...> control room
received a low-gas alarm at <...> manifold area. In accordance with operating procedures the platform was shut down and top-side pressure monitored continuously. The platform was manned at
22-28 hrs. On arrival on <...> the gas head which had indicated the alarm condition(no 6) was foun to be reading 0% lel. Investigation of the area around this particular head, visually and usin a
portable gas detector, it was revealed that a)rb-13 flow-line was at a pressure of approximately 80 barg and b)rb-13 choke stem seal was allowing a continuous, albeit small, escape of gas. It was
felt that given the prevailing conditiond and the relati e positions of the choke and gas- head no.6, it was likely that this leak had caused the initial alarm. Calibration of gas-head was checked.
During the removal of corroded flange bolts oxy-acetylene burning equipment was being used. All process and mechanical isolations had been correctly applied but in the pipework involved
(approx. 20' of 1.5" pipe) there was a trapped inventory of gas. Th s length of pipework had not been vented down resulting in the release and subsequent ignition of the trapped inventory.
Minor damage was sustained to adjacent trace heating and electrical cables. No injuries were sustained.
At the time of the incident a well services team were carrying out maintenance on the production wing valve, the engineer reports their activities were incidental to the fitting failure, i.e. the
vibration from thier activities may have accelerated the inc ident. The leak had been quickly isolated by a member of the well service team who then reported the incident to the control room. This
was almost simultaneous with a low press alarm received in the control room. No damage sustained.
Low level gas alarm was activated in south end of module 'a'. On checking out the area using gas detector sweep, gland found to be leaking on pcv25 (v5) located in the south side of the module.
Leak was detected by gas head g105 which was checked and fo nd to be in working area.
Low level of gas alarm activated in north end of module 'a' above v3 separator. Leak was detected on srv 25. The internal bellows of the srv was found to be split and gas was released through
the vent port on the srv. Isolation not able to be closed. 3 depressed and hp flare pressure lowered. Valve inserted into bonnet vent and closed.
While lifting pump from disposal pile under blanket gas pressure platform shutdown caused pile to pressurize, releasing gas. Muster police informed. Press release issued. All resolved by 10:30.
After establishing gas lift to ta19 the pressure increased in the a & b an i necessitating blowdown, on opening valves a small emission activated the adjacent gas heads.
Hydrocarbon liquid was sprayed from the atmospheric vent of the knock out pot situated in module 2a and onto the exhaust ductwork of c turbine. This occurred during draining of module 5 gas
compressor casings during start up routine. Platform general al rm was sounded and fire team assembled and laid foam blanket over area affected as a precaution
Gas was detected by remote sensor in module 5 mezzanine level which activated an alarm in the central control room. Site investigation revealed that gas was leaking from the stem seal on
control valve xcv 2615 on the gas export compressor discharge line. Gas compression system was immediately shut down and valve stem seal replaced.

Single gas head registered full scale deflection. Fire and gas detection system initiated general alarm and production shutdown. On investigation no gas found and gas head ok. Calm weather
conditions at the time and it was suspected gas rising from the overboard dump became trapped in a pocket in the mezz. Level above the chemical tanks
Minor gas escape in enclosure. Levels in excess of 25% lel picked up close to gas head sampling points but not detectable elsewhere in enclosure with portable detectors. Leak located in flange
in fuel gas line.
Due to the gas leak from the flange close to the fcv. 3 gas heads in the area detected gas and initiated a partial production shutdown. Gas lift compression shutdown and venting plus 'c' train
shutdown. 50% lel detected on one head and 20% on the other tw heads. Gas leak localised
The gas leak was identified by two gas heads, one of which showed a max. Reading of 50% lel. As a result gas lift compression shutdown as well as 'c' train. 'B' turbine also tripped through lack
of fuel gas. The general alarm was manually activated from the ccr. The lp discharge scrubber vent valve failed to open.
The gas leak activated one gas head 11a/22/kr/5x which sounded a ccr audible alarm; reading 40%. The reading fell away and then rose rapidly. The platform general alarm was activated
manually. Production techs and oss were on their way to the module. Feed ack was of a 'bad gas leak' the glc. Plant was shutdown manually from the ccr. Gas levels in the module decayed
immediately. Noone was injured. A subsequent inspection of the leaking joint revealed uneven tightness of the bolting which could have been a contributing factor.
Electrical fire in 'b' generator enclosure, due to saltwater ingress from ruptured rubber transition piece on cooling water pipe work. Two technicians were about to carry out high voltage phase
rotation tests (4160 volts) between platform electrical supp ies and new diesel generators. Test requires that covers be removed from circuit breaker junction boxes to allow access to the
terminals. The platform power was put on, then the diesel gen. Was started up. The two electrical techs. Were inside to carry out the tests. A jet of water came over the heads of the techs,
directly into the junction box which resulted in an electrical short circuit, flash and arcing before circuit breakers operated. The two techs were shaken but unhurt.
Gas leak on redundant plant being recommissioned. Leak occurred from flange joint on the outlet nozzle of redundant fuel gas cooler in mod 5. The section of line on the fuel gas system for the
power turbines was being slowly pressured up with gas, when a 50psig the joint released containment, thereby activating the gpa
Safety relief flare was replace with one of modified design. On <....> the flare deck was accessed to effect repairs to the heat shield. It was noticed that the gas emmission slot on the flare had
closed considerably. Measurements were taken. There w s a subsequent unplanned production when it was noticed that during plant blowdown there was a 3 bar back pressure on the safety
release system. Further tests were carried out at low production rates and the plant closed down.
One person entered a radiography controlled zone during a controlled exposure of a radiographic source. The man came about 10m from the source which was collinated and directed away from
where the man was stopped by the radiographer. A subsequent trial e posure proved that no significatn exposure took place.
During radiography on the main deck, two mechanical technicians opened a door on the deck above which leads to a platform above the radiography area. The witnesses statements confirm that
about the time this was done the radioactive source was wound in. Evertheless, this does indicate a weakness in the control procedures for radiography.
Radiography was being carried out on cellar deck whilst two painters were working directly underneath from scaffolding. (the radiography was contained within a lead lined enclosure.) Having
discovered this, tests were carried out to repeat the shot and m nitor exposure on scaffold below. Readings were found to be zero.
A plt survey had been completed on<...> and all equipment rigged down. Rig remained parked over <...> waiting on weather before skidding to <...> for another plt survey. Average wind speed at
time of incident was over 29 kts with a maximum gust of 126 k s recorded at 0437. Wind direction from 250 dgs ie. Parallel with the skid beams. A catwalk supporting bracket was fractured but
otherwise no major structural damage is apparent.
During rov operations it was noticed that the bottom three sections of the temprary firewater caisson had become disconnected and the temporary pump/riser assembly was left suspended without
the protection of the caisson. The detached section had fallen n to the conductior support/ guide frame. The pump assembly was installed during the early days of the hook up as a congingency
measure and it has no effect on the operation or performance of the firewater system.
Hurricane winds of 134 knots from the south west ripped off 75% of the pfp covering the north wall of the accomodation. The winds worked under the pfp at the west corner of the module tearing
the pfp away in sheets. The pfp comprised rockwool held in plac with chicken wire and coated in chartek.

While drilling an increase in gas levels in the mud was detected. The well was flow checked and appeared to be flowing. The well was shut in and drill pipe and casing pressures checked. No pit
gain was detected. Production was shut down and esd valves clo ed based on the apparent well flow. Mud was circulated out through the choke and the poor boy de-gasser. The well was opened
up and the weight of mud increased to 12.7dpg.
While drilling ahead at 18255'md (14783'tvd)an increase in return flow was indicated. The annular b.o.p. was closed and the well shut in. No casing or drill pipe pressures were evodent. The well
was circulated through the choke for 20 mins with no gain or loss. The well appeared static and the annular was opened. The well was observed to be flowing and was shut in. Drill pipe pressure
of 180psi and casing 950psi were recorded.
Helicopter <...> on deck with rotors turning disembarking passengers in preparation for refuelling under supervision of landing officer. Helideck assistant approaching front of helicopter with the
fuel sample bottle in his hand to show the pilot. Main rotor blade came in contact with casualty's skull. Weather conditions - good. Wind southerly at 10 knots. Slight drizzle. Dark except for
platform and helideck lighting.
Ip struck by casing bundle, whilst waiting to land it on deck of <...> supply boat.
During replacement of mud outfall pipework a multipoint lifing arrangement was in use. On restarting work after two days suspension due to weather conditions the 3t hoist went into immediate
hoist mode. The rigging supervisor cut the web sling to release he load and was struck a glancing blow on the hand. An accompanying rigger was also struck a glancing blow on the knee.
Investigation indicates steel control button sticking in brass bush.
Whilst installing hp cement valve into cement line on the rig floor between two vertical connections. The valve was lifted into position with a chain lift. It was observed that the pipework was out
of alignment. The chain lift was removed and the valve he d manually in position, chain lift was repositioned torealign the pipework. Whilst pulling, the valve moved and persons assisting were
unable to support the valve. The valve fell 4ft striking employees right foot behind the toe protection of the boot.
<...> (ip) was being assisted by <...> to push the 5" drill pipe over to the racking area. On reaching racking position, assistant driller lowered the drill pipe. The derrick man unlatched the
elevators, the 5" drill pipe bowed, <...> arm got trapped between the 3 1/2" drill pipe in stowage and the 5" drill pipe being positioned.
Whilst preparing lifejacket box to be lifted by crane from the extreme edge of transit container, the box became unbalanced and fell forward towards deck, as injured party was unable to hold the
weight, he stumbled backwarks and received injury to his lef leg. The lifejacket box weighed 200kgs, weather fine, wind 35kts.
During preparations for lifting a waste skip, using the south deck crane, a small section of right-angled unistrut bracket fell from a height - thought to be between 15-20ft - and hit the deck
foreman on the face. It is assumed that the bracket had been l ing loosely on a cable tray or similar ledge and was dislodged by the crane wire.
Following the rigging up of the block the control line was required to be inserted. Man was hoisting up to the block 15' above the drill floor he opened the block to insert the control line. After
opening the block the main sheave fell from the block hous ng striking ip working below.
On rolling the blind over a deck plate seam weld the injured party lost control of the blind and was unable to prevent it falling trapping his left foot.using a valve handle as a leaver they raised the
blind sufficiently to release the i.p foot.
Two instrument technicians were attempting to remove a spring assisted valve actuator. The actuator attachment nuts were being released while the actuator internal spring was under
compression. The actuator was projected towards, and hit, the ip causing minor injury to the face and leg
Whilst ip was sealing a spool end with standard lsa bag and tape, the spool, suddenly dropped onto his left foot - fracture of left foot.
Ip was working in a party fabricating sea-fastenings.a section of pipe fell and struck ip across the back.ip fell across a section of pipe and was pinned by the falling pipe.
The wireline crew went working over slot a5/09. They were bleeding down the lubricator to the closed drain system via a 3/4" reinforced flexible hose. As they were carrying out this operation
the hose burst spraying hydrocarbon liquids and gas in the imm diate area. Some liquid was splashed int the face of an operator near by (but not in the eyes). He returned to work after receiving
treatment from the medic. The hydrocarbon gas activated detectors in the area, giving rise to an automatic platform shutdown
Removing choke valve from a supposedly depressurised line. After clamp bolts had been removed and clamp struck with a hammer to free it, valve was blown off its seating, into the air, by
internal pressure, throwing the clamp sections aside.
While removing 16" flange tester out of 16" pipe on mezz level area 1, it dropped on the wire strop, swung and trapped ip's left hand between the wire strop and the scaffolding damaging his left
thumb.

As a container was about to be landed the ip attempted to steady the container prior to landing in final position. He had a grip of a vertical edge of the container to help stop the movement, whilst
doing this the container moved again trapping his thumb etween the container and an adjacent one.
While lifting bop out of half height on bop deck, the air winch being used on the rig floor for the main lift was resting against a walkway that is designed for rig skidding purposes to fold up. The
ip was standing on this walkway giving directions by rad o. The air winch on the bop deck was being utilised to pull bop clear of half height, with this, the sideways force on the other line folded
up the walkway trapping the man.
During the course of breaking out drill pipe in the derrick to lay out on the pipe deck.the elevator horns struck the monkey board shearing it from its fitting.this threw the operator off the monkey
board leaving him suspended by his safety hareness.whils falling the operator struck his left leg on a protrusion. The casualty was recovered by man riding winch,removed to sick bay, examined
by medic and medivaced to hospital at aberdeen.
The 16" flowline lifted from the header box on the swarf recovery unit, swung over the top of the shakers & struck the floorman in attendance. The floorman received a glancing blow & was
trapped against the railings of the unit by the flowline.
Well bd03 flowline spool pieces required alterations and so had to be removed from m3w to the fabrication shop for hotwork. Two woodgroup rig gers, <...> (injured party ) and <...> (witness)
assembled the rigging gear and proceeded to remove the fi st spool piece. During re- moval the load snagged on a supprt beam. <...> then physically tried to free the load which caused the load to
swing and trap his hand bet- ween the load and an adjacent handrail. The area is well lit & access was reasonable
It was necessary to move a 4" x 4" open container full of scaffold fittings from the se pt cellar deck lay down area to the plq roof. The crane used for this operation is situated above the mezz deck.
On making sure that the lifting strops were secure, th general assistant gave a signal to the crane operator to commence the lift. During the initial stages of the lift, a stropped bundle of scaffold
poles rolled off the side of the second bundle of poles and against the leg of the general assistant. The mom ntum of the poles was stopped when they rested against the container. I.p. Sustained
damaged ligaments and severe bruising to his right knee.
Worker hearing completion on well. The adaptor spool was held by the gantry crane as it was being attached to the tubing head flange. The adaptor spool was hung up leaving a gap of approx. 1
inch, the ip was fitting a nut to the end of the thread of a s ud protruding through the tubing head flange when the adaptor spool slipped down. Ip's finger was crushed between bottom of nut and
part of tubing head.
The incident occured when the lifting operation of removing a 14" valve was almost complete. The valve was over a cradle arrangement in a barrow and <....> was manoeuvring it with his hand to
centralise it over the ba- rrow centre. In this operation murray positioned his hands on the small block valve at the opposite end of the actuator. A combination of the c- hain block being lowered
with his pressure to centralise the valve over the barrow cradle, caused the valve to move and pinch his hand between the a jacent steelwork
A section of the rig floor weighing approx. 2 ton was being removed from its location. This involved a compound lift using chain blocks and a tugger hoist to lift the section and turn to a vertical
position once in this position the weight was transferre on a tandem lift to the north west crane hook to manoevre the lift through the v door. It was at the point of the tandem lift that the load
balance shifted and the load swung trapping the ips finger
Drill pipe was being tripped in the hole. Prior to making up the last stand of pipe a single joint of pipe was picked up. As this joint spun up, the chiksaw swivel fell from the top of the drill pipe
joint on to the pipe spinner, from there it bounced a d struck the roughneck in the face.
Recovering the standby boat fast rescue craft from the sea, the f.r.c. was hooked up to the cable of the davit ready to be raised.while holding the lifting strop clear the boats weight came on to the
strop trapping the subjects right hand against the hand ail that goes around the forward end of the control console of the fast rescue craft.
The drilling deck crew were backloading equipment to the s/v on the south side of the platform. The south crane hook was lowered to the load to be lifted. As the roustabout approached it the
hook "slipped" & hit him in the face.
Two men had been designated the task of unloading bags of grit from a container. The ip was loading a barrow with two bags of grit when one fell off onto the ground. In trying to pick it up he
injured his left arm.
Ip was revolving a slung gas bottle rack to gain entry. The cylinders were not secured, and one fell against his left hand, resulting in a crush injury to his little finger.
Employee was engaged in lifting a diesel circulating pump with air winch he pulled the winch wire to prevent snagging. On doing so, his glove became trapped in the block pulley, pulling his
hand into the mechanism- fractured right 5th finger.

10" scu 160 duplex pipe spool (weighing approx 170kg) was being rigged out of pipework to allow installation of pressure test blind flanges. During rigging operations chargehand rigger trapped
his left hand little finger between the spool and an adjacent scaffold tube when the spool moved unexpectedly. As a result his finger was broken and lacerated.
While dismantling the tool store a section of steel panel was being lowered to the floor, when it slipped trapping ip's foot. After a full examination it was diagnosed as been a soft tissue injury to
the right ankle and abrasion to the shin on r/leg.
Whilst loading a container on the pipedeck of rig 112 ip's finger was trapped between the container and a freezer unit.
Deluge system has 3 distribution rings around the vessel, with bracing installed between the rings. During removal of deluge pipe on inactive glycol contactor v2a, bracing was mistaken for a
support attached to the structure. When cutting the pipe the distribution ring tilted, capsized and hit the ip on the r/elbow.
After experiencing excess water in the utility air system, ip was instructed by <...> chief mechanic to check all drain lines. He proceeded to the after cooler and attempted to close the drain valve.
After assuming it was closed he removed the ball plug w ich blew off, causing subskin injection of grit/air.
While moving blank flange by rolling it along grating, it hit edge of grating toppling onto left ankle of ip.
The ip was about to enter d06 mezz corridor via the north external walkway. A scaffold tube 5' length fell from above the door striking the ip on the left hand. The scaffold tube had lain unnoticed
on a ledge above the door, had become dislodged by the cl sing of the door. The ledge which exists above the door is obscured by a cable tray hence the loose tube being missed during routine
housekeeping inspectons.
Whilst an operator was attempting to ignite the platform flare, at the flare ignition panel, which is a cupboard recessed into the module bulkhead, one of the cupboard doors was caught by the
wind & fell off. The door struck the operator on the chest & wh lst attempting to avoid the blow, the operator struck his back against the adjacent handrail.
Ips had been asked to remove scaffold tubes and fittings from a scaffold on the ne face of p10 - 18m level. While removing the fittings the scaffold collapsed, throwing the men into the sea. They
landed close to leg b5 and swam towards the sea access la der and climbed back on board
Wireline operator was guiding 4" bop for stabbing onto extended riser on well 3-4 caught his left hand between scaffolding pole and bop. His hand was badly bruised and swollen but suffered no
loss of movement and subsequent x-ray revealed no bone damage.
Bop riser had been removed from well on completion of workover. Opening thus left in bop deck hatch had been temporarily covered by by scaffolding boards. Boards started to be removed in
preparation for hatch removal and one was accidentally dropped thro gh opening and struck ip working on tubing hanger. Boards should not have been moved until area below had been cleared.
Whilst walking along the walkway on level 2 p.u.d south ip was proceeding along to the south east corner. An angle bracket fell from above, missing i/p's head but hit his foot.
Ip was working on the main deck level to the north side of the derrick removing a hatch cover to inspect a mud logging pit sensor. Whilst doing so, he was struck on the head and left hand by
objects falling from above.(10" piece scaffold tube and a scaffo d clip). No persons were seen working at this point after the incident. The ip suffered a fracture to the third finger of his left hand.
Back fire while starting gas compressor. Causing exhaust system to split normal class 2 shut down - alarm - muster. No prior indication of gas from detectors. B avon turbine exhaust severely
damaged.
Whilst preparing a piping system for hydro-test the ip was using an 1/2 n.d. screwed pipe plug to vent air from a high point in the system this action released the plug, under pressure, causing the
plug to hit the person in the eye. Ip was given medical a sistance and arrangements made to medevak him to a.r.i. ip claimed that he had been wearing safety spectacles.
Ip turned on tap to fill bucket. The valve assembly came off the valve body and hot water (approximately 80 degrees) sprayed out vertically from the tap, hitting the ip in the face.
Output from the <> and <> fields was suspended because of damage to fire-resistant cladding on the exterior of the living quarters of the <> platform caused by exceptionally high winds.
Production loss is about 80,000 barrels per day.
Gas alarm on the east side of <> at and around the <> unit (at498). Gas had been entering the at498 via the lp vent system due to that ngl's had been carried over to the fuel gas scrubber
(v404) from the ngl stabilisation plant. The high level of ngl's in v404 was a result of a malfunction of pic426 which in turn increased the fuel gas system pressure.

Strong smell of diesel and fog/smoke issuing from the generator "b-m400b" (which was on line) enclosure exhaust vents was discovered. The unit was shut down and halon was discharged
manually to the enclosure. A cracked weld on the fuel link to the turbine was detected.
Vessel on collision course with eider. 33 people on board polatform platform was not evacuated vessel missed by 2 miles.
Dsv <...> was stationed on dp in close proximity to the south face of the f.t.p. Structure. The dsv was (is) engaged in 'a' line riser repair work. At approximately 07:10 the dsv crane was swung
over the starboard side of vessel in readiness of assi ting ongoing saturation diving opeaations. The crane opeator parked the crane with the boom head in what he judged to be a position well
clear of the structure, however due to the prevailing weather conditions-wind:26 knots-2050,sea state: 2-2.5m,visibili y good. The dsv dp footprint enlarged enabling the vessel to close in on the
structure and the crane boom head to strike the cellar deck handrailing. Subsequent interrogation of the crane dp operator and deck banksman indicated a probable lack of vigilanc and
concentration during the crane operation. Both were suitably experienced and should have been monitoring the cranes position and clearance to the structure. Subsequent inspection revealed no
damage to the dsv crane no personal injury was sustained.
At 08:52 while attempting to come alongside the platform the supply ship <...> struck the sw corner leg a glancing blow. Little damage sustained by <...>. But the boat was holed by a "foot plate"
on the leg. Weather calm wind 10 knts. Sea state 2 t de 35/c 1.6 knots
<...> with capt. <...> approached the north side of <...> platform, stern first. The intention was to accept onto the installation diesel using <...> platform bunker hose. The sea state was 0.5m to
1.0m, wind speed 8 knts - wind and tide from the est. The vessel approach was proceeding as normal up to approx. 5m of ar. At this point, the vessel started to slew clockwise, prior to lowering
the bunker hose. The vessel moved slowly eastwards until the bow was approx. 1m off <...> platform. The wave acti n rocked the vessel, causing the starboard stack to strike <...> cellar deck
floor bracing, windfall
The standby boat <...> called up the <...> and said that the conditions were suitable to pick up the mail. The vessel came within the 500 meter zone and the mail was passed down by nylon line.
All mail was received and the lines were being coi ed up, at that moment a part of the vessel struck the spider deck of <...> drilling causing a deflection of approx 6 inches and a dent in a
horizintal 10 inch brace. The conditions at the time were 30 knot winds southerly and an approximate 2 meter sea.
Prior to the collision at 16.15 on <...>. One lift had been made from the supply vessel and one lift backloaded from the platform. While in position to continue cargo handling operations, 3 or 4
consecutive large waves pushed the supply vessel <...> in a northerly direction and it's stern collided with the bracing node at the slash zone/sea of the <...> platform. Weather conditions at 16.15
wind kts at direction 150. Wave height 2.5/4.5 meters. Preliminary inspections of supply vessel and platfor structure indicate only superfical damage. All wellheads and platform cross bridge
connection checked and in order.
The wireline equipment was rigged up on c23 to perform a plt programme. After the riser and bops had been installed, the 3" lubricator was lifted from the v-door by utilising a wire sling (swl 1
ton) that had been choked just below the stuffing box and sh ckled to the utility air tugger on the rig floor. The tool string was made up by the wireline operator and the lubricator made up to the
bops. On completion of the setting of the production sleeve, shutting in of the well and depressurisation of the equ pment, a team began the routine task to disconnect and lift the lubricator in
order to change the tool string. With the logging engineer on the tag line, the driller manning the utility tugger, the winch operator in the wireline unit, the wireline operato backed off the nut on
the bowen connection and lifted the nut to ensure disconnection. The wireline operator instructed the hand on the tag line to keep the lubricator vertical while the tugger operator picked up. He
then instructed the driller to pick up slowly. After lifting the lubricator approx 1/2", the wire sling parted resulting in the tugger line jumping the sheave and snagging on the monkey board
support. The lubricator remained in position but not sealed correctly in the bop female connection
After rigging up wireline lubricator and stabbing into well 4 (b2) the weight was released from the lubricator in readiness for wireline operations. The crane driver was present in the cab but
distracted when it was noticed that the sling supporting the l bricator parted. The cause of the incident was traced to an electrical short in wiring that controlled the hoist. This allowed the hoist to
creep although the controls were not being touched. The lubricator was not pressurised. The bop was shut.
Platform crew doing minor maintenence/function checks on the crane before <...> testing engineer performed full load test on the unit for recertification purposes. Crane jib was in raised position
with electrical motor for hydraulics turned off. Jib luf ing motor (hydraulic) brake mechanism did not hold the weight of the jib which dropped, uncontrolabley on to adjacent hand rails. No
injury to personnel or damage to equipment other than slight bend in hand rail. The task was done under the control of con co permit to work procedure.

A load tersting of the north crane was taking place after routine maintenance on the crane. While the test weight (water bags) were over the sea, the main hoist parted. The main block was lost into
the sea with water bags. There was no other daamge or inj ry. Subsequent access and inspection confirmed that this incident was the result of incorrect reeving of the main hoist rope. The lacing
strut immediately beneath the main block sheeves was seen to be deeply wirecut two thirds of the way through the section
While pulling out of hole, crown block travelled past the limit into the crown block timbers
Rigger had started to take the weight of a sea water coarse filter element (hx 5401b) using a 1 tonne elephant super 100 chain block when a link in the filter element actually lifted. No damage or
injury occurred as the failure happened before the filter lement actually lifted. Rigger estimated the load on the chain block at point of failure to be less than 0.5 tonne. Chain block was last
inspected in <...> when no defects were found.
During static proof testing of one of two dive bell guide wire winches, the winch drum end flange failed, allowing the wire to come off the drum and the test load to drop about one meter. The
winch is one of two used in a compensated mode, and normally p ovides the guide wires for the deployment of the onboard dive bell. Diving operations were not in progress and the equipment
was undergoing maintaenance and testing routines as part of the <...> annual survey. The winch has been removed and is to be replac d with a new unit. The winch used on the other guide wire
is to be inspected and ndted before being operated. The failed winch is to be examined onshore to determine the failure mode
Whilst lifting a wireline lubricator rack from the deck of the supply vessel, one of the top retaining rails fell away from the lift and landed in the sea.
Small spool pipe fell from injection compressor barrel package, whilst being lifted into module 13 (west side) the spool fell onto handrail outside module 13, then onto a container located on the
west landing of the m.s.f
Following completing of wireline work on the drill floor a start was made on rigging down the equipment. The lubricator assembly had been lowered to the drill floor using a 3 tonne sling
suspended off of the bails of the top drive unit but the <...> requested that the load be raised again in order that a thread protector could be fitted. As the lubricator was raised a foot or so off of the
deck it snagged off on the crossover of the 7 5/8 landing string without being noticed. The 3 tonne wire rop sling was therefore subjected to a severe overload which caused its falure. The
lubricator assembly dropped about a foot to the drill floor and then sideways against the v door windwall
The drillcrew were running 7 5/8 ths casing. At 1600hrs the casing pin joint was incorrectly stabbed into the box joint and caused the respective threads to engage whilst misaligned. The driller
attempted to pick up on the single joint to have another go t restabling correctly. Unbeknown to the driller the engagement of the misaligned threads prevented him from picking up the single
casing joint and he was unwittingly at this stage attempting to pick up the weight of the complete casing string. The drille continued to increase the lifting forces to free the casing joint until the
breaking strain of the single joint elevator string assembly was exceeded and the pin in the gunnebo link failed catastrophically. At this point the single joint elevator assembl fell down the entire
40ft length of the casing joint, the slings stricking one of the drillcrew as it came to rest.
Crew were running casing on the drill floor. A joint was miss-stabbed and as the driller attempted to pick up, the joint moved, dropped down and stabbed properly. This imposed a shock load on
the assembly which sheared the link between the swivel and the ard eye for the p/u slings. Slings fell down striking floorman on hand and arm
Whilst backloading a cargo basket weighing 6 tons onto supply vessel <...> the load slipped through the brake from approx 100ft landing on containers on the vessel deck
Sections of drill pipe being off-loaded from the<...> when the crane boom started to shake. The load was lowered onto the deck and investigation revealed that the upper main hoist drum end
flange had fractured down to the outside diameter of the drum. The hoist rope was linked with some wires broken. The crane boom was lowered into the rest without incident.
Broom failure of linkbelt 238 crane whilst lifting 4 tonnes load from vessel <...>. Lift returned to boat.broom hanging by wires stadive providing assistance to remove boom. At the time of the
incident the sea state was <1 metre, the wind was from 355 degrees at 14 knots.
7 inch tubing was being pulled from well bc34 using 450 ton elevators. A set of bj type sp single joint elevators was hanging freely below, approx. 25 feet above the drillfloor. A tapered inset plus
pin and spring assembly from the single joint elevator ell and landed on the drill floor. No injuries were sustained. On examination the 3/8 inch diameter locating pin had fractured allowing the
insert to come out of place. The tapered insert weight is 1.5 lb.

The east crane had been working throughout the morning, at 11:00hrs it was put in the boom rest for approx 2hrs. Shortly after 13:00hrs the driver was called to restart lifting operations. He lifted
the boom, tested the clutches and brakes in a no-load co dition, before slewing around into position on the pipe deck. A compactor weighing 2.75t was hooked on, and when the deck crew were
clear of the lift, the load hoisted to a height of approx 3m. The driver then returned the hoist lever to the neutral posit on which automatically engaged the hoist brake. He was also operating the
slow down brake which slows the motion of the drive train. It was at this point that the load dropped or slipped throught he brake. The compactor landed onto the pipe deck, the impa t causing a
small penetration in a deck plate, which allowed some standing water to drain into the drilling workshop.
Whilst running in the hole and the cement plug was tagged at 2734m. The driller pulled off the bottom to prepare to make ip the top drive. The slips were set and the drainwork parking brake
engaged. After noting the previous operations the driller releas d the parking brake but did not engage the hand brake simultaneously, causing the block to travel approx 10ft bending 2 joints of
drillpipe. 6 5/8".
The puq north crane was under maintenance, as part of routine maintenance recharging of the gross overmovement protection system was carried out at this time but not test run. On trying to
operate the crane the control system pressure only registered 5 t 10 barg normally 60 barg. System checks were then carried out. During the checks, the crane mechanic went to check the (gopu)
and reset the valves for start up, he returned to the crane engine bay to ionform mechanic supervisor that the low control pre sure problem had been resolved and proceded on the test gauge and
attempted to slacken off the adjusting valve. During this operation the crane mechanic increased the engine revs. Mechanic supervisor noticed the increase in pressure and moved to the eng ne
compartment door to get the mechanic to stop the engine. As the mechanic reacted to mechanic supervisors call the hydraulic oil accumulator exploded.
On inspection of draw works drillers found 3 brake caliper pivot pins broken and 1 cracked. 15% of breaking had been lost.awaiting new set of pivot pins. No damage.
On the drawworks a caliper support pin on the disc brake system failed this caused a piston to be pushed out of its cylinder and resulted in hydraulic fliud loss aditionnaly the hyrdraulic fluid
contaminated the the disc and impared the braking ability w th the small amount of fluid present. The traveling block and top drive assembly collided with the drill string.
Partial 50% failure of draw works braking system causing pipe in situe hydrulic coupling on draw-works braying system became disconnected and resulted in loss of pressure to 50% of the drawworks system. Brake failure resulted in slippage of the travellin block and top drive assembly. Top drive rested on stand of drill pipe which caused deformation of an accelerator sub assembly.
A 45 gallon drum of oil was being lifted from the west side of pipedeck to the porch of mod6 when it slipped from the barrel clamp. The drum dropped approx 25ft no persons were injured and
damage was restricted to the drum itself. Weather conditions dry a d clear.
The power boom lowering chain parted while operating the crane under light load conditions,(1 tonne)auto brake activated preventing boom falling.crane returned to rest.
Rig mechanic was carrying out a monthly planned maintenance procedure on the casing stabbing board, part of which was to check the sky climber operation and controls. Whilst lowering the
board downwards (approx halt way down its travel) the hoist/lower w re parted, resulting in the board dropping approx 10ft onto the guide rail stops. The safety locking mechanism on the hoist
appears only to have engaged after the board bounced up off the stops. The rig mechanic was left suspended in mid-air on his safety harness.
Wireline operations on going on well <...> wireline lubricator was suspended from bop crane swl 18t. The lubricator lifting clamp was attached by a bow shackle and pin swl 3t. Difficulty was
encountered while pulling the lubricator free from the riser u ing the bop crane. The lifting clamped failed and on inspection was found to be sheared and the pin in the shackle was bent and
deformed this indicates that forces above the swl of 3t. Had been exerted.
During reinstatement of x01 tuve bundle, vertical loops was held on a 3t chain block and horizontal pull being achieved via the 1.5 tonne chain lift. Bundle was installed some months ago, this
operation was concluded only by pulling in the last 6" or so rior to fitting the vessel end cover. During this operation, the 1.5 tonne chain lift failed on the hook length. No other damage was
sustained and no one was injured.
During routine crane operations a piece of kennedy grating (approx 3' x 2') fell approximately 40 mts, from the crane boom walkway narrowly missing a crew member by 8'. Damage was
confined to the section of grating.

When laying out joint of conductor, night shift, joint tailed out with platform crane, running tool held in elevators. 2 off tuggers attached to running tool lifting shackle. After lowering joint to
allow second crane hook to be attached, conductor move towards v-door. Because the elevator and bails were facing the opposite way, the link tilt was limited. The bail arms contacted upon the
bail pins/rollers. Three out of four pins failed and fell to the drill floor.
<...> deck crew and crane driver using <...> south crane to effect a lift from <...> main deck. In doing so the hook arrangement made contact with the handrailing on the walkway on the side of
the drilling package. The handrail was dislodged nd fell approx. 40 feet to land on the <...> main deck. The banksman took cover and was not injured. There was no other damage indicated.
On investigation it was found that no safety securing bolts were fitted to secure the handrail in the platform sockets. Weather at the time was dry, warm and sunny.
The overhead crane was being used to lower a clamp to the cellar deck when the end of the chain passed through the machine and dropped through the hatchway a
On offloading cargo from the <...> using the west crane of the <...> platform the limit switch hoisting gear warning lamp began to flicker on and off. The hoisting of the cargo stopped and the
limit switch hoisting gear warning lamp showed continuo sly. The crane operator then gently lowered the load at which point the limit switch hoisting gear warning light was extinguished and
the hoist motion immediately restored. The offloading of cargo was then aborted and an inspection of the crane effected. It was found that one of the chains holding the limit switch striker plate
support had broken. This chain was then replaced with certified slings, a short piece of chain had to be utilised to enable the striker plate to remain level.
At approximately 1430hrs on <...> the east crane of the <...> platform was being used to move light loads on the main deck for construction materials storage purposes. The crane being banked by
a qualified banksman member of the pl tform contsruction deck crew and driven by competence assessed driver <...> crane specialist on long term hire to <...>, the <...> pltform operator
designate). The load manoeuvred out of site of the driver behind the drilling derrick sub structure by the banksman using dedicated vhf radio communication with the driver. On instructions from
the banksman the driver lowered his boom to extend reach and in so doing the boom foot section of the crane boom came into contact with a temporary cra e boom rest on the deck immediately
in front of the crane. This caused buckling and crush damage to a lower boom chord and resulted in damage to the main boom lower (right from cab) member at the root area of the all welded
joint between chord and main me ber. A detailed incident investigation is underway on the platform under the leadership of the enterprise oil senior offshore representative at the request of the
hook up and commissioning oim. A full technical evaluation of the damage and repair/replace ent options is also underway using structural and metallurgical specialists. There were no personnel
A 12 foot spool had been rigged by day shift riggers in preparation for night shift to lift. Night shift comenced lift, when spool reached a height of approx. 5 ft. It fell back to the deck together
with block, tackle and sling. No injuries occurred. In estigation concludes that no failure of rigging equipment occured. Incident was caused by one of two eyes of the upper sling not being
passed fully over hook of block and tackle, and therefore not being retained by sping loaded clip.
Whilst the north crane was working over the pipedeck, an 8" spacer bar, at the four fold block (weighing approx 8 1/2 lbs) became detatched and fell to the pipedeck. No injury or damage was
sustained.
Two 45 gallon drums of lube oil being transported in a wire cargo net by the north crane <...>. Cargo net snagged on a protruding light fitting approx 20 feet below the roof level of mod 38 (east
side). This area is out of site of the crane operators posi ion, two banksmen were engaged in directing the transfer. Banksman <...> was initially directing the crane by radio, but his partner <...>
realised the radio was not transmitting. <...> then attempted to stop the crane using his own radio, agai this message was not received. By this time the crane operator had realised something
was wrong and had stopped booming down, however the net had already snagged on the light fitting. The two drums began to slip from the net and then fell approx 60 fee onto mod 30 roof
landing area causing one to burst on impact. Causes:- 1. <...>'s radio found to be damaged. 2. <...> radio rendered useless by transmission "black spot" 3. Poor positioning of banksmen relative
to crane operators position. Wind south west 9 knots, conditions favourable.
During mechanical investigation and repair to brake system the crane driver raised the boom. On returning the control lever to the neutral position, the brake did not come on, thus allowing the
boom to run away. The paul ratchet did not stop the boom and subsequently broke off before the driver pressed the emergency stop. This action stopped the boom immediately.
Platform crane was lifting pipe spools from the lower central corridor to module 43. The spools ( two x 12" diameter x 2 1/2') snagged on a beam. The wire lifting strop snapped and both spools
fell approx 25' back to the lower central corridor deck. The trop was rated at 1 ton. The spools weight - 1/4 ton. No damage other than to the strop was incurred.

At approximately 13.30hrs <...> rigging personnel were installaing the motor for the l.p. Flare pump. The motor was lifted from a trolley on to its mountings, a lift of approximately 4ft once on its
mountings the weight was taken off the lifting gear, bu left in place to await the electricians who along with the riggers would complete final alignment and installation. At 13:55 the gpa
sounded. On returning to the site the cahin blocks were found lying on the deck. <...> who was responding to the goa, h ard a lod crack by the flare k.o. Drum and on looking across and up he
saw the chain blocks falling to the deck. No personnel were injured and no equipment was damaged.
The pin on which the 2 top luffing sheaves rotate had to be replaced. In order to do this the sheaves had to be supported by a rigging arrangement - in this case the sheave was supported by a
webbing sling .when the pin was removed the weight of the sheav was taken up by the sling, the sheave moved to the side and fell out of the sling, striking the luffing wire and the crane boom
before coming to rest on a cablea tray some 50ft below.
While transferring material to the new 20 feet stores container the <...> crane whip line control failed. The whipline went into freefall. It fell approx 10 feet until the whip line ball and hook fell
into the store container access scaffold.
The sea crane was being used to back load containers to the supply vessel <...>. During this operation the penant line detached from the whip line hook ( no load suspended at the time of
incident). No injury or damage sustained. Wind speed 20 knot . Direction 040deg. Visibility 18 miles. Barometer 10 mb. Air temp 27 deg c. Sea state 8-9.
Unwanted material was being cleared from the monkey board area (90'el) and transferred to the frill floor using materials basket esa 1542. When loading of the basket was complete it was lifted
off the west fingers and lowered between the east and west fin ers. When the load was approx 30ft from the drill floor (at 114' el) the floorman operated the monobeam, moving it to the north to
ensure that the load would not come into contact with the top drive. The monobeam moved in a jerky fashion and at that poi t the basket and contents fell to the drill floor. The winch wire
whipped upwards and the weight of the line on the opposite side pulled the socket end up to the block at the crown. The slack wire landed heavily by the winch.
Deck cre were involved moving steelwork from pipedeck to skid deck racks they had three previous lifts of tubular steelwork. At the time of the incident they had prepared a lift of 6 pieces of
80mm angle iron. The angle was stowed heel to heel and 100kg swl endless canvas slings were used to lift the load. Stell slings had been tried but were slipping so canvas slings were used
instead. A tag line was attached to the load to control it. The wind speed at the time was 33kts. Weather was clear and sunny the load was being transferred from the north side to the south side.
As the load was passing the south crane rest the wind caught the load and started spinning the angle. The operator holding the tag line could not control the load and it came into c ntact with the
crane rest. This unbalanced the load causing the angle to drop to the skid deck. One section of angle fell outwith the handrails and struck a section of walkway, 20m below. It ruptured the
grating and went into the sea.
Deck crew were moving an isert mandrel (length 4m dia 6" weight 80 kgs) from the helideck to the skid deck using g4 crane. The deck roustabout was sent to the helideck to sling the mandrel
using two wire slings. Both slings were of correct type and clour code. The roustabout was advised by the crane driver to double wrap the sling and put one eye through the other to secure a bite
on the mandrel. The load was subsiquently lifted on the roustabouts order and all appered to be correct. The crane operator started to lower the load to the skid deck when the load slipped from
the slings and fell to the deck from a hight of 20 ft. Narrowly missing a painter who was crossing the skid deck at the time.
Whilst lifting rack of argon cylinders from <...> deck with <...> east crane, rack caught on protruding steel member of adjacent winch bumper gaurd. Although the banksman, sited on safe
britannia, gave immediate instructions to the crane operat r to cease hoisting, the accommodation vessel rolled in the swell. This increased pressure on the slings and 3 of the 4 legs of the lifting
slings parted. The cylinder rack was lowered to the deck using the undamaged leg where the top of the rack was obse ved to be damaged and possible damage to four cylinder neck valves was
noted.
3 metal beam sections (approx 1m long) were bundled together using web type straps. They were lifted by west crane in order to relocate them to n/e of mod 2. During lifting and while 40ft above
the deck level the bundle touched part of the structure and t e beams dislodged from the straps falling to deck below. No injury to personnel and only minor structural damage substained. NB:
web staps used no round turn used

During installation of sea water lift pump a into its caisson, the pump motor and riser assembly (8.4 tonnes) were suspended by pneumatic chain hoist, the 3 inch motor cable was being fed into
the caisson and banded to each lengh of raiser at the flanged nds. The assembly had been lowered, the cable banded, and personnel were preparing to fit the next 3m lenth of raiser. The
installation clamp 9to hold the assembly) had been positioned. The assembly was lifted approx 70mm to allow fitting of the flange bo ts when one link of the hoist chain failed causing assembly
to fall onto the clamp. N.b hoistswl 15 tonne. This incident had a high potential for serious injury since, had the chain parted when the clamp was not positioned, the assembly would have fallen
nto the caisson taking with it the cable from the adjacent cable drum and the hoist chain, the hoist was being operated correctly and experienced riggers.
Make up tong line was caught in travelling, block and it swung over and crashed into 'doghouse'.
While moving the divertor annular from the south side of bop arae onto the divertor spool the tugger handle on the upper bop tugger sheared pulling the annular assy across the bop area
uncontrolably. With there being no fitted isolation valves at the tugg r the driller was unable to stop the air supply to the tugger this resulted in the assy continuing across the area onits own
because the tugger was sheared in the pulling position and it went all the way to the 13 3/8 bop before it came to a halt and the ir supply was isolated by the driller at the rig floor which is the
nearest isolation point. During the travel of the annular originally and rigged up on the south side of the lifting frame via a sheave and 2 ton sling secured to the back of the v door, c me tight and
snapped the 2 ton sling. A 5 ton chain hoist being utilised on the lifting frame also snapped the operating cahin while the bop was on the annular assy to tilt prior to it comingto a halt against the
13 3/8 stack.
Well c6 mudline safety valve left its lockout location and moved into the wellhead. This occurred during the routine testing of the mlsv as part of a 3 monthly test. The mlsv was closed. The
flowline was being depressured by flowing into production when t e wellhead pressure reached 400 psig. A loud bang was heard in the xmas tree, and c6 was closed in at the wellhead control
panel immediately.
3/8"s.s. Swagelock fitting failed whilst two men were fitting tarpaulins over the <...> hydraulic unit in module 02. The fitting has not been made up to the manufacturers specification when
installed. The pipework was accidently moved causing the pipe to blow out of fitting. No injuries were substained.
After several attempts to start machine a further attempt was made on diesel but after 56 seconds no flame was observed and the machine was manually stopped.large explosion occurred rupturing
the expansion bellows
Prioe to the explosion their had been 3 attempts to start the turbine, each time it failed on ignition failure. Following this the engine was cranked for five minutes to disperse any accumulation of
fuel in the combustion chamber. A 4th start was attempted on the turbine, this is when the explosion took place. Damage was restricted to the air inlet ducing, filter bank and plenum doors. It is
suspected that a build up of fuel in the combustion chamber was responsible for the explosion. Investigation ongoi g on fuel systems
Gas compression in process of being commissioned and were at the stage of doing on-line running commissioning checks with vendors in attendance. Vendors associated with these tests were :2 x <...> (gas compressor) 2 x <...> (compressor driver) 1 x <...>. (comp. Anti-surge control) plant running with two gas compression trains running in parallel with no problems encountered from
1700hrs on previous day <...>. Tests that had been carried out on the compressors were load sharing of both compressors t 120bar discharge pressure. <...> vendor was satisified with duration
of run and now wanted to progress to next stage. This was to increase discharge pressure of the compressors to normal operating pressure of 163 bar. Presuure increase is achieved b control
valve pv 0311 (on p&id ac et fe 00209 01) and this was started at 0835hs 31st may. Pressure was increased in 5 bar increments over a 30min. Period from 120 bar to 160 bar which is the set
point of pepic0311 controlled at the dcs in c.c.r. At ap rox 0920am a loud bang was heard by the witness in compressor start up room. They proceeded to investigate the noise which had first
some had thought was the result of crane operations. As can be seen from the witnesses statements their observations wer passed on to c.c.r. Operator who passed information on to colin twiss
A hydrostatic body leak test of a coiled tubing shear seal bop on well n11 xmas tree was being performed. The test medium was water/glycol and the final leak test pressure was 5000psi. The
thread protector cap on top of the bop was not removed and repla ed by a pressure rated test cap with a vent valve as per the written procedure. Neither was air venting undertaken prior to
pressuring up the bop. At approximately 40 bar the top of the thread protector uniformly parted from its body and was projected ve tically to a height of 80ft before landing on the naa pipedeck
(diameter of cap 10.5" and weight 6lb). There were no injuries and no other equipment damage
While pulling out of the hole, a brass bushing fell from the derrick onto the rig floor. After investigation it was established that the bushing had come from the monkey board hinge pin.
Bumper guard used to protect top drive hydraulic hoses and electrical control cables dropped off and fell approx 40 feet onto the drill floor the gaurd weighs appox 20kg and inspection revealed t
were inadequate for the purpose hat the welds failed. The welds were only 'tack welds' and

13ft 6in free standing scaffold structure completed <...>. Rq no <...>, tag no <...>. Structure blown over in one piece on <...> during high winds. Damage cause included deformed scaffolding
tubulars, 2 x broken floodlight fittings in control boxes. Wind speeds of up to 75 knots gusting to 90 knots were experiencing at sea level on the previous morning. Wind speed immediately after
incident was measured at 37 knots.
During the erection of a scaffold outboard mod02 roof level, a 7 ft scaffold tube fell from the scaffold to mod 56 deck east side some 120 ft below, where it glanced off a handrail and into the sea
below.
At 0230 hrs a scaffold board fell from a height in the void between modules 02/03 although thought to have seen secured by the dayshift scaffold squad before end of shift, one of there 13'
scaffolders " working boards had worked free from its securing the e and fell some 40' below, coming to rest on a completed scaffold, no damage was sustained but the board was seen by a
member of a three man work party to land approximatley 10' from them. The weather at the time was 35/40 knots n/w
Two mechanics were re-orientating a valve in a vertical 2'' line. They removed the raimaining bolts from both flanges so as to be able to swing it round on the r.t.j. 'S. On removal of the last bolt
the pipework sprung open causing the valve (weight 185 k ) to fall 12 feet to deck level. On falling the valve hit a cross member which deflected it, and it landed between the blast wall and the
cross bracing. The passive fire protection on the bracing sustained slight damage. Lighting in the modulegood. Noise level was low. Weather at the time good.
A fault was identified on the cable supply power to the helicopter warning light on the east crane. An electrical technician was authorised to carry out investigation and repair. The repair required
removal of the hatch cover to install a new junction box within the stanchion. Before he could complete the work the crane was requied for operational reasons. The technician made safe,
replaced the cover and removed himself and tools from the worksite. After the cran operation was complete and crane parked, cr ne driver moved to the west crane. Approximately 15 minutes
later the hatch cover became detached and fell approximately 60 metres onto the deck of the <...>. The hatch cover dimensions are as follows: 600mmx 130mm, weight 3200 grammes.
At some time on either <...> or early on <...> a section of the <...> compressor turbine exhaust ducting weighing approx. 2 tonnes and about 10m long appears to have dropped from its support
support mounting directly in to the sea. Ther were no witnesses to the incident. A short section of loose ducting remains stuck in the support frame. The ducting appears to have failed at a
flange(the ducting is made up of short sections bolted to-gether). Detailed inspection has not been possible a yet due to access difficulties. The compressor was shutdown as the end of the
remaining section of ducting possibly infringes the hazardous area envelope. Whilst the machine was on line at the time of the failure there have been no recent operations or a tivities on-going in
the vicinity of the exhaust ducts. The weather over the period that the incident occured was calm with 10-16 knot south easterly winds ans 0.5-1 metre seas.
It was noted that an area of passive fire protection while remaining intact had loosened from the face of the plq south wall. The surrounding area was immediately barriered off and steps taken to
inform all personnel of the possibility of the caoting fall ng from the wall. The matter was discussed with dept, heads, onshore management and <...> safety reps. The ca were informed of the
matter in writing on <...> when the weather improved a protective scaffold was erected and an access scaffold b ilt. Following a forecast of severe adverse weather, the valley area was placed out
of bounds. Further warnings were broadcast to personnel regarding this matter. The <...> reps. Were advised of this and the actions the oim would take if the passive fire protection failed. The
platform processes were shutdown and all risers closed, onshore staff advised as were the coastguard, the latter were advised at 05:00hrs that the platform was secure. The area remained out of
bounds and non essential personnel were confined to the plq in case other falls occurred.
On <...> the platform was subjected to rough weather. During the storm all non-operations personnel were confined to the living quarters and operations personnel to internal areas of the
production facility. Weather data from the computerised weather s stem indicated park wind speeds of 93 knots, with a wind direction of 320 defrees and a significant wave height of 7.5 meters in
the <...> area at around 1700 hours on <...> On <...> during a tour of the well head jacket platform engineer, the wel head jacket lifting frame was discovered to have been lost to the sea.
Discussions with platform staff established that the 'a' frame was probably lost during the storm of <...> A number of personnel including safety representatives were aware of a c ange to the jacket
following the storm, but had not grasped the significance until platform engineers tour. The handrails at the east and west corners of the south end of the wellhead jacket upper level were found to
be damaged. The area was barriered off and sub-surface safety valves on wells at the well head jacket were closed in, in case of sub-sea damage to the stucture.n.b. The lifting frame could only be
seen from limited areas on the platform, and not from the lower level of the jacket were the rama nder of the jacket facilities are situated. Initial investigations have established the following
Following a loud bang being heard in the accommodation, investigation found the source to be the disintegration of hvac condenser fan a rotor. As the fan had peeled off its rotor, the debris had
punctured the side of the enclosure. The force of the impact caused parts of the fan blades off and project through the damaged guard, landing up to 20 feet away.

Deck operator was lowering a turbine hood to the deck. He stopped lowering by releasing the lowering lever. However the load continued to lower, slowly approximately two feet to the deck.
No one was injured and no damage was done. The job was immediat ly stopped
During high wind conditions (60-70kts) doors, which give access to install main hoist wire spool, fell to skid deck. Hinge pins had seized in sovkets and with constant buffeting by winds pins
sheared off.
Failure of split pin caused the kellycock actuating finger to drop 90 feet on to the rig floor.
A drill pipe protector cap approx. 1lb fell from the pipedeck onto a walkway between m3 and m5 20 metres below. A few moments earlier a scaffolder had used this walkway and heard a noise
behind him. Investigation discovered the cap lying on the walkway.
A crane rope deflector plate fell off the apex of the v door and landed on the pipedeck. The securing plates similarly fell and landed on the edge of the drill floor. The deflector plate weighs
approx. 75kgs and fell about 15 metres in total. No operat ons were ongoing through the v door at the time and neither had there been for several hours. No personnel were in the immediate
vicinity of the v door. The drilling operations were very steady with little or no vibration in the derrick structure. The late and bolted assembly had been installed circa 2 hours prior to it
breaking free. The weather was sunny and dry with light winds of approx. 5 knots from variable directions.
During routine tripping operations, pulling out of hole, a pin from the hydraulic cylinder on the pipe handler at the monkey board fell off, landing on the rig floor between the racking mats. The
pin weighed 0.3kg and fell approx. 85ft. The upper retain ng circlip on the pin dislodged allowing the pin to fall.
During operation of north crane one of the boom walkway retaining clamps weight 6 lbs approx - fell from the boom cathead section onto the pipedeck, approx. 60 mtr fall
During an independent inpsection of <...> derrick an inspector was using a chipping hammer to check integrity of steelwork. A plate weighing 11lbs dislodged and fell 26 metres to the rig floor. A
wireline operator was laying out tools on the rig floor a the time and the falling plate cam to rest 5.7 metres from him. The plate appears to have been tack welded on to the structure and with
subsequent corrosion failed.
Plate fell from the dolly track beam to drill floor 50ft below. The two holding bolts had loosened, allowing the plate to fall.
Diesel-oil was bunkered and hose was racked at 11:15. At 13:00 the hose parted at the swedged connection and fell into the sea - a distance of approximately 61m . No injury or further damage
occured.
The forklift was being used to move a stack of seven empty pallets from a position adjacent to the outboard handrail at the 42m elevation. When the stack was picked up the top two pallets fell
overboard directly into the sea. They were recovered immediate by by the standby vessel.
During drying of clothes in tumble dryer no 1, smoke was observed coming from the dryer. The dryer was stopped, door opened and clothes removed. The smoke came from the heating element.
Reason - the filter element was not put right in place so shag came n contact with the heating element
The<...> is a normally unmanned platform, and at the time of the incident was producing gas under scada control from <...>. Following a shutdown to the platform gas turbine driven generator,
caused by loss of fuel gas pressure, a fire started insid the turbine's inlet air plenum, within an acoustic enclosure. The consequent temperature rise, tripped heat activated devices, releasing the
halon flood system and a platform esd. Fire damage was limited to the turbine inlet air plenum and trunking, and lectrical wiring adjacent
At 17:40 hrs, smoke observed in area of k400 power turbine bearing support. Note, smoke smelt of hot metal/paint rather than oil. During investigation flame was observed and the unit manually
shutdown at 17:52 as an additional precaution the platform was sd'd manually at 17:54. The flame extinguished as the unit shutdown without the use of a fire extinguisher
Compressor k104 was started at 03:18 at 03:55 unit esd and halon discharge automatically on uv detection on inspection power turbine transition lagging ties appear to have smouldered and set
off unit uvs. K104 has completed 150hrs since installation of re lacement zero rated hour engine and lagging material. Note no flames evident at time of incident.
Lp vent was ignited by a lightning strike. All lp vent systems were manually shutdown and the vent was extinguished using the halon vent snuffing package. Wind speed
direction : 025 degrees cloud
: 5/8 450 feet visibility : cables , heavy rain, lightning

: 5 knots wind

Cardboard boxes containing light bulbs ignited (they were stored on top of the dc cabinet in <...> engine room and were in contact with a hot air exhaust). The motor man and welder who were in
the motor room had been investigated a burning smell which as thought to be new lagging drying out. They extinguised the fire with 2 halon and 2 dry power extinguisers. In the process of
extinguishing the fire the motor man recieved stinging to his eyes and the welder had breathing ploblems due to inhalation of e tinguisher medium. Both personnel were sent to the medic the
motor man returned to work, the welder was stood down for 24 hours and leter returned to work. All offending articles were removed and the area checked for further damage (none found)
At 0740hrs smoke was seen to be coming from no 2 tumble drier. The smoke detection which is in the void above the ceiling had not operated. The gpa in the laundry was operated bring the
platform to hazard status. The isolation switch was operated for the achine and the door opened and coveralls were removed. As they were removed flames were observed in the machine and a
holon extinguisher was used to extinguish them. It was observed at the time that the drier elements were glowing red. The machine was kep under observation until the elements cooled down.
Smoke detectors activated and resulted in an automatic deluge release in module o6. (gas compression) no flame detected by uvs. Plant shut down. Fire teams mustered and area investigated.
Drive end bearing on seal oil pump was cause of smoke. Note- compre sor not running at the time. Platform normal at 03:05.
During normal production operations smoke was detected by one detector in mod 05 mcc room. This was followed by activation of two smoke detectors (co-incident detection) in module 03 lcr.
The co-incident detection of smoke in module 03 lcr caused the auto atic release of halon into that area and a total production shut down. A thorough check of modules 03 05 and the hvac supply
system revealed no evidence of smoke.
At 02.06 coicident smoke detection (2 x smoke detectors) caused the automatic initiation of the deluge system covering module 16. Invest revealed that non drive end bearing on the motor of c
seal oil pump had collapsed and over heated thus generating suff cient smoke to cause detection and extinguishant release
Production systems shutdown, depressurisation of the gas injection manifold was underway to complete this activity xxv 1364 was opened- coincident with this occuring. Smoke detectors local to
the valve activated and initiated automatic deluge/foam of the odule and level three shutdown. Precautionary g.p.a. Called p.o.b. Accounted for area checked out, no evidence of smoke source
found. Xxv 1364 removed stem damaged packing defective
Scaffolder working under deck reported that there were scaffold boards smouldering by lifeboat no 6 on investigation it was found that a scaffold had been built under deck in close proximity (+/12'') to the diesel fire pump exhaust. The pump was running t the time as part of the weekly checks. As the area technician switched off the fire pump, a smoke head in d3ww detected smoke and
put the platform on to red hazard status. At the time the alarm was raised, the diesel fire pump had been running for 19 mi utes. The hot exhaust playing on the scaffold boards had charred the
boards. Once the fire pump stopped running, the charred boards burst into flames over a small area. Immediate action was taken, deploying a fire hose andbranch to extinguish the flames a d cool
the area. The emergency response team arrived shortly after to find the situation fully under control. The platform returned to normal green status at 1349 hrs some 10 minutes after the first alarm
Tecnician observed smoke coming from exhaust chamber of the power turbine of a roll turbine generator. The operator raised the alarm and production were shut down . The emergencey responce
team attended the incident but were not required. The fire self ex ingusied as the machine shut down. Precautionary muster carried out.
The north fire pump was running to provide cooling water to the s.e. Flare which was in use to clean up pw27 following acidisation. At 1103 hrs <...> contacted the control room (cr) and reported
a burning smell adjacent to the mechanical workshop. No alarms. The cro <...> contacted <...>, briefed him and told him to check the north fire pump, that being the most likely source. <...>
found the pump room to be full of smoke and advised the cro. The cro stopped the fire pump with the rem te in the cr at 11:06 hrs and then contacted and briefed the operations supervisor <...>.
No alarms. The os. Instructed the cro to contact messrs <...> and have them pick up b.a. Sets and meet him at the n fire pump. Cro. Did so. A single flame sensor initiated led at 11:10 hrs. Cro
advised os. Os. Instructed cro. To put on zone lockout. Cro actioned. Co-incident flame initiated led at 11:14 hrs. The cro. Advised os then contacted the oim who instructed the gpa to be
activated. Gpa activat d. With the ert onsite the fire was extinguished and the electrical supplies isolated. Module was then ventilated and photographs taken of the fire damage. The source of the
fire appears to be the jacket water system heater which overheated as aresult of oss of cooling medium when the heater discharge pipe fractured. The heat build up tracked up a lifting trolley

During welding operations external to a non-pressurised 6" vent line, a minor "pop" and flamewas observed by the welder across the adjacent, open end of the vent pipe. The flame selfextinguished but a hand held extinguisher was discharged as a precaution no alarms were initiated. At the time of the incident the entire installation was detpressurised, shut-down and nitrogen
purged for routine maintenance. The vent line and associated system had been spaded off from the hp knock out drum, with additional v lve isolations performed along the length of the system.
Prior to cmmencement of welding operations, the system had been purged with nitrogen and pressurised to 10 bar. This was repeated on three occasions prior to the vent system being left
depressurised and open to atmosphere. The incident was thought to have been caused by a small amount of residual condensate vapour, drawn through the system by thermally induced
ventilation, being ignited by the heat from the welding activity.
A group of 3 persons (1 welder and 2 platers) had been working from a scaffold on the 17.00m level of leg a3 (south west) of the platform carrying out welding and burning operations.
Immediately prior to the incident, <...> (platers were working on the scaffold and <...> (welder) was acting as safety watch. A query was raised about subsequent work so the equipment was
isolated and the three persons proceeded to visit the supervisor. It appears that hot slag had fallen onto a poly ropylene mooring rope adjacent to the scaffold and caused it to ignite. The burning
rope subsequently set fire to the scaffolding boards. After a period of about 11 minutes (from the time the 3 left the site) a fire on the sw leg scaffold was reported t the <...> control room. The
platform muster alarm was sounded - all persons accounted for and the fire extinguished using water and hoses from the attendant jack-up vessel <...>. Report from <...>, platform safety officer,
suggested that "th fire developed quite quickly due to the mooring rope material involved acting as an accelerant." Notification of incident event log from the platform oim reads:- 11:36 fire
reported to control room dppa 11:41 complex muster alarms sounded due to fire e calation (rope had ignited scaffolding boards around leg). 11:46 firepumps on 11:50 all pob accounted for
Smoke alarm activiated in lv switch room. Humidifier cubicle overheated causing damage to the contractors and internal fittings. The switchboard was isolated. Damaged cubicle being
investigated by the switchboard vendor.
Fire pump 'a' was undergoing weekly function test run. Following pre- start checks, operator commenced auto-start test run at 13.45 hrs. Establishing all running conditions as 'normal'. After
period of approx. 30 mins in attendance, operator left site to attend to other duties, leaving engine in 'running' condition. At 14.50 hrs a platform 'red' alert sd2 condition was initiated, caused by
'fire detection' within fire pump 'a' module. Auto deluge was initiated which extinguished fire condition. Subsequent investigation into cause of fire directed towards turbo-charger where
significant amount of paintwork scorching and blackening was evident. Following clean-up, engine was test run under controlled conditions in attempt to locate cause. Test run was aborted after
approx. 2 mins following lifting of crankcase relief valve due to sump over-pressurisation. Fault finding investigations are proceeding with assistance of manufacturers vendor rep. Turbo-charger
at drive end of engine removed. Exhaust manifold gaske found broken. It is considered the passage of hot exhaust gasses across the flange via. The failed gasket ignited paintwork in the
immediate vicinity, thereby causing the fire. Sump pressurisation problem is still being addressed. Platform hydrocarbon pr cess remains shutdown in accordance with firewater pumping
A section of the main oil line export riser pipework was being replaced. The site of the incident was at the open end of the existing 20" riser export bend which was being prepared for a "golden"
butt weld, the weld profile was being ground onto the pipe utt when sparks from the operation ignited hydrocarbons inside the bend near the closed export esdv, a small flame was contained
within the pipe which was extinguished by use of an extinguisher and firehose branch. The work was stopped and permit withdra n and an investigation commenced. No plant damage occurred.
No personal injury occurred. Atmospheric conditions dry and windy. The platform wa shutdown at the time for major maintenance and construciton activities and the export pipeline had been
flus ed prior to the work using an apprroved procedure.
During a routine operation to "top up" the lubricating oil sump level on k02 a strong smell of smoke was identified by the operator from the area of the exhaust diffuser and the gearbox. At this
time there was no indication of an actual fire. To assist urther investigation the turbine was shutdown. During investigation by the fire and safety officer to locate the source of the smoke a
section of exhaust lagging around the diffuser was disturbed and at this point the fumes caught fire. The fire was imm diately extinguished by the fso using a hand held type extinguisher
Repairs were being carried out on the guide vanes which involved welding in place the replacement vanes. A hot work naked flame permit was in force and a void entry certificate as part of the
permit allowed the welder internal access to the trunking. He had welded in place three vanes when it was noticed through the trunking access panel that a small fire and smoke was coming from
the lagging behind the steel cladding. This was immediately extinguished using a bcf extinguisher and the effected lagging w s removed from behind the steel cladding and doused with water.
There was no detection on the platform fire and gas system, a strong draft quickly dissipated the smoke.

The <...> hot oil flush line was perforated by the action of an angle grinder. A hot work naked flame permit was in force for replacement of structuaal stelworkafter the installation of a manifold
spool. The associated scaffolding obstructed the refit f a section of steel beam. To allow access, it was decided by the workmen on site to cut the obstructing scaffold tubes. The oil line was cut
by a grinder used for this purpose when it was mistaken for a scaffold tube, a number of tubes had already been ut by the time the oil line was perforated. Oil escaped the line under static head
pressure. Work immediately ceased and all hot work permits withdrawn. The line was isolated by a shift production personnel, a foam blanket was laid over the spill.no ga leakes indicated on
the platform fire and gas system. The platform was in a shutdown condition prior to the incident and general shutdown activities were underway.
During routine n2 lift operations, contract crew had to vent pumps for liquid pumping duty. They vented with no warning tannoy. This type of unit vents n2 at the engine exhaust point. Due to the
shuttered location of the unit, the n2 entrained exhaust fum s and dispersion was slow. Member of crew saw and smelled what he thought was smoke and correctly raised the alarm. Full
emergency procedures were activated and production shut-down until we had confirmation there was no fire.
A fuel change over from diesel to gas was attempted on gt2 but the turbine resisted the change over and tripped, the turbine was reset and restarted on gas. The machine was manually shutdown
about 15 seconds later after abnormal speeds and temperature we e observed. High temperatures were noted on the exhaust stack and when checked, flames were seen to be emitting from the
stack. The general alarm was sounded and fire parties sent to the seen.
A mechanical failure of the shaft on an hxac (ventilation impellor) resulted in fan belt friction/smoke production into the utility air ducting. Two smoke detectors were set-off in the switch gear
room. This resulted in a yellow prodution shutdown and fo r no by 75kg halon cylinders to auto-release into the switch gear room (halon 1310) a p;atform general alarm, muster and bop
confirmation was conducted as a routine precaution. A physical inspection on the platform rooms/ modules was conducted, no fire p esent. Muster was stood down.
Plant running under normal conditions with no2 gas generator supplying power requirements. A power shutdown occurred and within 10 seconds coincident smoke detection in the generator
room initiated the general platform alarm. The automatic surface process shutdown was also activated. This made safe the gas process and associated dehydration packages. The standby vessel
<...> and <...> control were notified of the alarm, two members of the emergency response team were dispatched to the scene to in estigate the cause of the alarm. They safely ascertained that
smoke was evident in the operator room but that there was no indication of an accompanying fire. The room was clear for entry within 5-10 minutes and it was evident that the problem had been
co fined to smoke production from the generator windings
After an automatic sps (surface process shutdown) initiation, the platform main generation failed on attempted change over to liquid fuel operation. Two machines were on line at this time, g8210
& g8230 - both of which tripped on suspecxted flame failure
At 14.55 hrs on <...>, mr <...> cutting a redundant condensate line above the betis actuator, inlet to fws v570, encountered a condensate pocket which he was unaware of. The line in question had
been previously water washed thoroughly, followed by nitrogen purge cycle with sampling at various tapping points. Permit to work was in force. <...> was designated picws and firewatcher,
<...> was designated nrp. A ladder outside the working perimeter gave access to <...> and <...> who were preparing a butt for welding. On ignition, the flames ignited the ladder which trapped
messrs evans and foster above, who both managed to slide down a chain block suspended between the test separator v510 and west windwall. <...> activated a dry p wder extinguisher, <...>
arrived on the scene and attempted to stop the flow with his welders gauntlet. The combination of attempting to stop the flow and the dry powder extinguished the fire immediately.
At 21:30 hours a production tech working nights reported to the oim that there was liquid on the floor of the dc-nb room around the main station batteries. The electrical rpe was asked to go with
the production tech to investigate the liquid. They reporte back to the oim that it was battery fluid that had bubbled up after a discharge test earlier in the day. The rpe plus one other member of
the crew were asked to go over and clean up the liquid. Whilst cleaning up the liquid some ran down the battery case and made contact with the base frame shorting the battery to earth causing
arcs, sparks and a smallfire between the batteries. The rpe was asked to isolate and disconnect the batteries while members of the base crew extinguished the fire. After using 4 co extinguishers,
the situation was under control, the fire was out and batteries disconnected. The area was then cleaned down and made safe by 02:15 hrs.

The 'b' fire pump was run up for commissioning checks. The engine exhaust pipe work was supported part way along its length by two chain blocks and slings, this rig up was hidden from deck
level by scaffolding one set of rigging utilised a canvas sling, he other used a steel sling which had cardboard packing in place to protect the stainless steel exhaust. After running the engine for
25 mins, the heat of the exhaust ignited the cardboard causing some minor damage to one instrument cable (not live), and elted the canvas sling. The person discovering the fire attempted to
extinguish, using a dry powder unit, which failed to work. Another dry powder also failed. The fire eventually burnt itself out. No persons were injured, and the fire only lasted for a short period
Fire in switch room. Constant voltage transformer supply smooth 415v to ups system. Probable overheating of capacitors leading to over- heating of adjacent cables. Smoke and occasional
flame. Knocked down with halon portable.
Lagging on crude oil dehydrator heater seen to be smouldering with possible flame at main deck level.muster called whilst investigation started.fire main water used to dowse lagging.esd
initiated.muster stood down 22:35.
The control room registered one smoke alarm in the locker room and contacted a production tech. To investigate. On entering the locker room he smelled smoke, then saw a small fire in a metal
waste bin on the floor. The fire was extinguished using an adja ent hosereel.
Due to inclement weather, rubbish was being stored temporarily in the west end of the corridor on level 1 accomm. One cardboard box was noticed to be alight. Immediately the alarm was raised
and the fire extinguished using adjacent hose reel. Personnel were accounted for at a muster
The general platform alarm gpa was filsely initiated at 1453 hrs on <...> platform suring an instrument loop check. A low level pressure switch pll66045 was being loop checked from the central
control room ccr by an instrument technician. All but the loo including the gpa from <...> emergency response centre had been inhibited on the fire and gas panel in the ccr for the commissioning
work. The installed loop (under external walkways) however was not as expected from the design ( and the other input points being checked) and the lopp bypassed the inhibit key. Coincidentally,
fire pump was being run for the first time during a commissioningtrial. At the same moment as the gpa sounded smoke was observed from the turbo blower by commissioning pers nnel as a result
of paint on the turbo blower heating up and flashing off. Mustering took place in accordance with the emergency reponse procedures and was completed in 15 minutes. The visual evidence of
smoke coincidental with the alarm gave cause to bel ve that the smoke had caused the alarm.
Coolant hose from the overtemperature switch to the radiator leaked. The engine overheated along with air compressor. The air compressor unloader valves seized in the load position, allowing
air to be continually compressed and discharged, creating furth r localised overheating of the air compressor cylinderhead and discharged pipework. This heat resulted in in embrittlement of the
air discharge hose. On hearing a "bang" from the engine compartment, the crane driver investigated immediatley. On discover ng a small fire, he isolated the air supply, which inturn stops the
engine. He then proceeded to extinguish the fire using 1 x dry powder extinguisher.
Smoke was observed filtering from a vent on the <...> roof. Investigation by emergency teams established that combustable material was smouldering /burning in the deck drain within the <...>
locker room. This was extinguished using a hose reel. The drain is partially covered by lockers and combustable debris had accumulated. The source of ignition is suspected to be a carelessly
discarded smoking material, this area is a designated smoking area.
After turbine trip on platform, plant reinstatement was in progress. Turbine "b" was started at 0030 hours. At this time, a smoke alarm indicated trouble within module 09. Investigation showed
smoke within the module with water injection pump "b" runnin . Attempts to stop the pump locally failed. The pump suffrered severe vibration problems causing major failure of drive couplings
Nightshift steward removed some dishcloths from the drier in the laundry and placed some on top of a metal workbench, then left. Later two smoke detectors situated in the laundry extraction
duct initiated, causing the gpa to sound. All personnel were full mustered. The smouldering materials were extinguished by hand held water extinguishers.
1 control room logged small power failure at 00:23 hours. 2 various areas subjected to a 'dip' in power. 3 elect. Technicians checked e.c.p recitfier. Fault lights were annunciating, these were
accepted. 4 elect. Technicians then went to emergency switch oom. This was found to be full of smoke. The source of smoke was cubicle 4a 10a which was isolated and removed. 5 the switch
room was monitored to ensure no fire developed. 6 control fuses blown, 8 contactors burnt out. 2 cubicles burnt out from u.p.s system
The nightshift cook/baker removed a tray of cooked sausages from the oven and placed it on a workbench nearby. When he turned around to close the oven door he noticed that a quantity of fat
had spilt from the tray onto the oven door and ignited. He shut t e oven door and switched the oven off. The fire was extinguished using a portable co2 extinguishe at 05:11 the smoke detector in
the galley initiated a g.p.a at 05:13 the incident was established as being under control and personnel stood down.

Gpa was initiated at 13:23 on smoke detection from the drill floor sub-structure electrical switchroom. This resulted in a full muster. On investigation, it was determined that a problem had
occured on 3k854ob wher the fanbelt was slipping and the guard w s loose. The friction had caused the fanbelt to smoke and this activated alarms in the trunking. The fan shut down on high
vibrations.
Naked flame hotwork was ongoing on module "b" mezzanine level, adjacent to (and just above) t15 choke. During the welding of a pipe support, <...> noticed a flame around the collar of t15
choke valve. He immediately extinguished the small "gas ring ype" flame with a fireblanket and then informed the control room via nearby telephone. An emergency muster was initiated and the
area then checked out all clear by the emergency teams
Thew drilling inspector wanted a small inspection hatch cutting in the ducting of the mud pump room hvac system. This was to enable him to carry out a minor modification to an air sampling
line. The hatch was approx 12" square and was cut using a hand h ld grinder, approx. 15 min after the work site had been cleared away and the permit signed off, smoke was detected by the
electrician who was by this time in the driling switch room. A subsiquent investigation showd that slag from the grinding operation ad become embedded in the polythene coating of the acoustic
muffler, starting a small smouldering fire. The fire was reported as officially out by the fire team, having been extinguished by means of a dry powder extinguisher
The exchanger overheated decomposing water/glycol and discharging considerable amounts of smoke/steam under and around cellar deck incident contained by isolation of affected unit. Infield
and coastguard sar launched but not required later precautionery d wnmanning of non-essential personnel to <...> and <...> took place due to continuing power outage (no safety implications personnel comfort only) main generation restored just after 1800 hrs all production systems returned to normal by 2400 hrs weather as follows: wind sw at 15 knots, visibility +13 miles, wave
<.5m
Joint in welding cable, which had been left live, was arcing to the deck plate, in a pool of water, causing sparks and the insulation caught fire
A pipe support was being welded below deck and due to the heat transfer through the metal, a small cable drum, directly above, on the roof, caught fire.
<...> diesel powered generator (no.2229) suffered failure in alternator causing smoke to be produced which indicated a halon release. (15kg. Halon 1301) nb. 1 of 4 units currently used to produce
platform power.
At approx 09:40 on <...> an electrical short circuit occured on the essential utilities switch board. This is the normal feed to the well head area turbulating fan which is rated at 75kw and fitted
with 250a fuses. Ip heard the cubicle buzzing abnormally and decided to attempt to rectify the situation by first opening the fuse switch and then closing it again. It was during the reclosing of the
swittch that a large flash occurred. This flash caused the injuries noted in form and irreparable damage to the cubicle. Adjacent cubicles were not damaged.
Cubicle l303 had been isolated since <...>. Ip was detaild to prove the cubicle indication back to the vdu on prismic, via dats squeezer outstation 4a. Ip opened the door with the key from the
keysafe and pulled out the chassis replaced the control cir uit fuse and link fuse and closed the cabinet. It was at this point that a large flash occured on investigation it was ascertained that a
bundle of 3 fuses occured on the isolation of <...>. Had rolled toward the live terminals at the rear of the cabi et due to the replacing of the cubicle one or more of these fuses bridged the live
terminals at the rear of the cabinet which gave rise to the flash which severely damaged the cubicle and inflicted the minor injury to ip noted on form.
Mechanical testing of motor feeder pump on entergising there was a flash over on terminal box at the yellow phase. Smoke set of f & g system and stopped main generator . No one was in the
area at the time. When the cabinet was opened it was discovered tha the red phase surge arrestor had blown out. No fire. No injuries. Investigation started with vendors reps etc,
During normal running of the compressor a heat alarm inside the enclosure triggered a halon discharge. The unit shutdown automaticallt (2 x 42 kg cylinders tined) during the cylinder
replacement, another one was discharged in error ( 1 x 41kg)
O wind, gas leak discovered during inspection by hse. Grease plug left not fully tightened after injection of sealing compound.
Well c14 willis choke valve on crude oil manifold. 2" split developed on downstream spool side of choke valve assembly discharging crude oil/ water and gas into b module. One gas detector
alarmed. Manual shutdown initiated by area operator.

Well c14 willis choke valve on crude oil manifold in b module developed a 2" type split on downstream spool side of choke valve assembly resulting in gas/oil and water being discharged into the
atmosphere in b module. This valve had been removed from c04 anifold valve slot after failure of that valve in the same circumstances - valve has been washed with sand from produced fluids
within 5 hours of being put back in service, area operator initiated manual shutdown, three low level and one high level gas al rms activated.
After making a connection wilst drilling 12.25" hole the driller started to bring his mud pumps up to the drilling rate. He then received an instruction by telephone from the derrickman to
shutdown the pumps, which was done immediately. The psv assembly h d sheared at the threaded joint on no. 1 mud pump which was then isolated, allowing the well to be circulated with no.2
pump.
Location and details of leak are as per attached diver inspection report (3 pages). Depth of water at this location is approximately 3608.
At approximately 16:50 hours engineering personnel and production operators were to begin the oil decommissioning of the 10" <...> pipeline. When the pressure behind the pig in the launcher
equalled the pressure in the pipeline (100 psi), valve hov 5074 w s opened to allow the pig to be pumped down the 10" pipeline. As the valve opened, there was gas break out from the pipeline
back through the 4" hose and fill pump, causing gas to pass through the break tank to atmosphere. 2 gas detectors were activated a d initiated a general alarm. No injuries or other damage
occurred.
Gas, at 2070 psi, escaped from inner annulus. Initial investigations confirmed gas leak to be in the area of m22. Several valves were closed but leak continued. Men with specific wireline skills
located leak and closed a 1/2" needle valve, stopping the leak
Glycol bubbler was being loosened from its position at the top inside of a fire and gas panel in control room. The bubbler came apart due to incorrect dismantling procedure and glycol leaked out
cascading down onto the live fire and gas panel cards. The glycol caused short circut to occur in the card pannel.
<...> was manned at 1900 hrs on <...> to reset esd 301. Helicopter <...> rotors ran until 1925 hrs when it was decided to release the helicopter as remedial work was going to take longer than
planned. Whilst recommencing <...> flow at 1949 hrs, well b2 (slot 4) was opened in error, resulting in the flowline being pressurised to 207 barg and hence tripping the well on flowline pahh.
Simultaneously, a lound bang was heard, followed by the sound of venting gas. At the time of the incident, all three pob were in the control room approximately 10 seconds after the inital noise,
various gas heads in the process area came in to alarm and the production shutdown on a level 301 due to coincidence ga detection in the process area. Initial investigation found la ge clouds of
gas coming from the process area, wind direction blowing the gas towards the control room and life-boat. It was decided that the safest place for all personnel was inside the control room. The
stanby vessel, <...> was contacted at this poi t in time and requested to come in on close standby and the vessel skipper responded by saying that he would do his best but was experiencing
problems with the rough seas and high winds. The process operator at <...> base was also contacted and inf rmed of the situation and told to pass detail of the situation on to <...> (production
During routine utilities check the production technician observed what appeared to be a small liquid fire in the base of the main fire of no. 1 glycol regenerator. The unit was shutdown and the
fuel gas isolated. The small fire continued burning, confirmi g the source was due to glycol entering the fire tubes. The fire was extinguished with a dry powder fire extinguisher.
As the operators commenced bringing well a9 to flow, the manual choke on the gas inlet to the seperator was opened quicker than the flow contorl valve on the seperator outlet. The contorl room
operator seeing the pressure increasing instructed the process operator to back-off the manual choke. It was at this time 02:10 hrs the p.s.v. On seperator no.7 lifted for approximately 5 seconds.
The process operator immediately closed the manual choke. As the operator closed the choke he noticed a strong smell of g s and the control room received a 20% gas alarm. On investigation the
cause of the leak an area of corrosion and hole was discovered in the vent line downstraem of the p.s.v. The gas detector which alarmed was 6 feet from the leak.
Suspected rupture of <...> export riser below water
An 8" check valve was being changed out for a serviced unit. On opening up the flowline to remove the check valve, vapours were released under atmospheric pressure which were detected by
the gas detector located within 3 feet of the check valve. The wind at the time was light and variable.
Platform <...> was in production with both glycol skids in service. Glycol was seen coming from the top of gas/glycol exchanger e 502a. The leak appeared to be coming from a pipe to vessel
weld. Wind 19 knots, wave 2mts.
Psv 615 relief line back to condensate pump suction was being cut by electric powered cutting disc to facilitate removal of pipework section for modification. A flance on the line above the point
to be cut had been broken prior to work being commenced. Wh n the pipewall was penetrated there was a small release of condensate.

<...> liquid handling pump (306-1501) was found spraying condensate from the centre ram area. The equipment was isolated and on investigation the middle ram was found to have seized in the
gland box. This resulted in the gland box bolts shearing causing he packing and produced liquids to spray out. Approx 5 barrels of condensate/produced water/methanol was spilled into the
bund. No gas detection was alarmed.
During the night of <...> it appears that the solenoid valve located in the fuel line to the day tank on the emergency generator failed in the open position, diesel fuel overflowed into the generator
enclosure, through a drain hole, on to the pla form deck and into the sea. "approx 22 tonnes". The incident came to the notice of platform personnel during routine dipping of diesel tank at 0600
hours on <...>.
Upon investigation of bc2 compressor vent system pipework icing up indication of discharge valve passing ) it was discovered that the process gas discharge non-return valve downstream flange
had a small leak. Production operations personnel then checked t e compressor discharge valve (borsig ball valve ) to ensure it was in fact fully closed. Hand pump operation of the valve
managed to close the valve a few degrees and this stopped the gasket leak. Operations group then took steps to isolate and depressure the system to allow remedial action. Weather conditions at
the time were strong north east wind (46 knots) blowing through the open mezzanine area, driving rain , sea state 5 metre swell with good light conditions.
At 21:52hrs on <...> <...>, operator 1 was on duty in the <...> cellar deck when detected a very minor gas weep from a stainless steel union on the feed to k4000's suction valve from the ledeen
operator (outside of the cabinet). <...> attempted to n p the union up with an adjustable spanner and whilst doing so the tubing came adrift from the union.<...> immediately isolated the supply to
the ledeen operator and contacted the control room chief operator <...> who initiated an emergency sh tdown of the unit via the ucp esd p/button. The incident was over in less than a minute. The
1/2" stainless steel tubing was pressurised to 220 psig and the release was stopped in less than one minute. The leak was so small it was not detected by local ar a gas detection devices in the
area. Further investigation indicated that the tubing union had been over tightened and the tube firced through the ferrule
The leak was discovered by instrument technician whilst looking for a spanner dropped from the deck above.
Normal platform operations. Reboiler tube failure resulted in golycol leaking into tube flame enclosure which was ignited by normal heating flame. Glycol formed a small pool below the fire box
approximately four feet in diameter, i.e, a pool fire. This wa extinguished with dry powder followed by operation of reboiler halon system and deluge of area the fire now contained to inside the
reboiler was extinghished with dry powder. Damage appears to be limited to the reboiler tube and paint burnt off the fire ox. Conditions at that time wind 5 knots at 30 deg sea state, waves 0.5 1 metre night time therefore dark.
Half inch stainless pipework from suction header to k104 suction valve differential pressure switch parted at a compression fitting. No damage, fittting replaced. Wind speed 26 knots gusting 39
knots direction 26 deg. During past construction work the pip brackets supporting the half inch stainless steel line had been cut. The line was then bent away to clear the ongoing work. Cutting
the brackets also allowed the horizontal section of the unsupported line to drop with the whole load supported by the fail d fitting. When construction work was finished the pipe brackets were rewelded in their new position. The current failure occured during work to repair the pipe brackets and restore the stainless steel line to its correct position. The fitting failed whe the pipe brackets
were cut free prior to being re-positioned.
The installation was restarted after shutdown work the condensate pumps were started. A leak was then reported on the condensate line to the duty operator. Duty operator shutdown condensate
system. On investigation a split in the pipework was found on a b acket on the bridge between the <...> and <...> platform. The pipework was manually isolated. The condensate leaked into the
sea. The pipe is a 3" line
While isolating psh-f-150 to recalibrate pressure switch the isolation valve developed a stem seal leak on being closed. The valve was opened and the leak stopped. The platform was shut in, the
production header was isolated, depressured and the valve was changed. Loss of production was 85 minutes.
Whilst attempting to recharge the nitrogen accumulators on the m254 hydraulic package it was necessary to bleed off the hydraulic pressure on the accumultors. Whilst doing this the drain valves
were opened too quickly and releasing 200 bar of hydraulic oi into rervoir which caused the filler cap to pop off and cause a slight crack on the lower seam.
At 13:24 gpa sounded caused by 2 x 20% gas detection in area a. Deluge fired. Personnel to muster stations. Investigation revealed 0.5" impulse line from tubing port on tree to pressure
transmitted in area 4. No injuries or damage. This minor gas release approx 4m3) led to detection at two closely spaced detector heads- one at 22% lel and one at 30%lel. On <...> platforms logic
has been modified to provide platform wide alarm and executive action whenever two detectors reach 20% lel

During work to isolate the pig launcher for pigging operations, a minor leak was detected from the top of the bonnet on valve mov 5004. (nb detection was by personnel gas detection equipment
did not show any release). After examination, it was found that as was escaping through three adjacent stud bolts on the bonnet. (nb : the leak occurred on the top of unmanned structure which is
freely ventilated and allows maximum dispersion in an area)
Well bo4 was shut at 2245 hours for a plt logging programme to be carried out. A recompletion had been completed on this well on <...> and well had been producing from that date. <...> well
services completed a drift run at 0625 hours and had pulled ut of hole.they requested the well shut and lubricator vented down. The operator closed the swab valve to ensure they were out of the
hole. He then cracked open the swab valve the lubricator pressure via the tubing kill v/v to the aux flare. He heard a no se like an air hose blowing off. He observed gas escaping from between
the production wing v/v and the christmas tree. He ran back to the tree an closed the hand master valve. He informed ccr of the leak. No gas alarms activated in ccr. He the depressuris d the tree
to the south east aux. Flare depressurisation of tree and lubricator took approx 5 minutes. Three hand tight bolts were found when flange was checked.
During compressor recommissioning after annual shutdown, gas release 2 x 20 lel occurred in module 4. Class 2 shutdown, automatic releases at deluge and gpa were atomatically activated.
Muster stations stood down at 21.33. It is known that multiple gas he ds on three seperate circuits activated the highest level detected being 47% lel (actual head unknown) 4 heads - 59 d.j.k.
Were reported at 20%. Nb the <...> feild has the most sensitive fire & gas detection system in the north sea, ie gpa, muster and shu down occur at 2 x 20% lel. The above level of detection would
not have caused a gpa/muster at <...> previous gas detection action points of 2 x 60%.
Flight<...> overflew oil slick at coordinates <...> north and <...> east. Weather 30 kas 264. As a result, subsea wells in the vicinity were subsequently shut-in. Established leak originating from
flowline p1 <...> which runs from well s bsea 38 to platform. Also oil spill finger print sample taken which confirmed within 24 hours that pipeline was subsea 38. Nb: pipeline fluid was 80%
water, 20% oil.
Hot work was being conducted at the void between n4/n2 45.5 m level. The site had been sheeted in with fire blankets and a firewatcher was in position. However, some sparks were able to
descend to n1 level 3/2a where an <...> generator is sited. The w tness, whilst passing the generator noticed a small flame aprrox 6 feet above the deck level on a unistrut support of a cable tray.
This flame was approx 2" high. As he approached the generator, he noticed two other flames at deck level approx 6" high. He immediately raised the alarm and then extingished the flames using
a locally situated co2 extinguisher.
Pv 5007a process flare valve on the gas test separator dismantled to investigate reason for jamming. The gas test separator was drained and purged. A 16 valve downstream of the pv was used to
isolate it from the flare header. When well n11 was brought on tream a back pressure was created in the flare system through c101 the first stage oil separator back pressure was sufficient to
cause isolating valve to pass. Gas escaped from dismantled pv. Pv was immediately secured and bolted up. Six fixed gas dectect r heads were activated during the leak
During live annuls checks wellhead operator <...> heard gas venting from a tie-down bolt on n11, he raised the alarm to <...> technical room then made an unsuccessful attempt to re-seal the
leaking tie-down bolt using an ajustable spanner. On arrival of ell team leader and well supervisor a 1/22" hp hose was connected to the 9 5/8" annulus outlet to vent the annulus pressure . The
leak reate began to increase and further tie-down bolt started leaking. The platform was already in a shutdown condition due to an unrelated trip. The panic button was operated by well heads
personnel to ensure all dhsvs were closed. A chicksan was rigged between the 9 5/8" annulus and the n11 kill wing valve. The preasure was then bled down to the production header stopping th
gas leak. N11 was futher secured by brine and a wireline plug.
Hand valve ci802 had been removed to allow the topsides to be nitrogen purged prior to hot work. Due to a down hole valve passing the purge could not be carried until rectification of the down
hole valve passing problem. The valve ci802 was installed back into the pipework until the purge could be achieved. Due to nomination requirements the installation was recommissioned for
production and at some point in a two period started to leak methanol from one of the valve flanges.
Whilst stroking esdv 2203( the riser valve from the new subsea completion) there was an hydrocarbon/nitrogen gas release and the area was evacuated, the lock ceased after approx. 30 secs. Both
fixed and portable gas detection operated, registering 47% to 120% l.e.l. All personnel were mustered and accounted for. On investigation, it was found that the valve body plug had been removed
during nitrogen purging of the pipeline 7 days previous and had not been re-instated. Prior to venting the pipeline was at 5 bar
When stroking the hydraulic master valve of well <...>, there was a leak of hydrocarbon gas from the telltale on the side of valve body, indicating the failure of the lower stem seal. The dhsv was
already closed. The manual master was closed and the pip work vented to zero from the flowline drain and swab connections

The <...> high pressure pumps were being used to bullhead kill well <...>. Prior to killing at approximatley 1000psi., All lines were tested to 5000spi.. The pumping medium was 480pptf nacl
brine. At the end of the programme killing procedure, he bleed valve was opened to the barrel tanks to confirm zero pressure, as shown on the guage. A small amount of gas percolated up the
line at low pressure and escaped from the barrel tanks setting off an alarm via the nearby gas detection head. The gas v ry quickly dispersed and no injuries or damage were sustained. All relevent
safety systems ativated as designed.
During normal operations, gas was detected by an operator in the area detailed above. A leak was traced on the fuel gas line up to c turbine which runs through the module. The turbine was
changed over to operate on diesel and the line was isolated.
Small pin hole leak discovered in test seperatorpump recycle line. Pump not in service at time. Line pressurised via tie-in to main inlet conection ie main inlet to test seperator. Test seperator in
use in normal flow mode. Soillage predominatly format on water with normal amount of oil and perhaps some gas. Spillage contained in test sep. Bund no more than actillon in volume.
Following bullhead tip of well in an attempt to explode blockage of lobe pump, 40 gallons of seawater habing been injected a residual pressure of 250psi remained. This was then vented down
into the trip tank. A gas detector above the trip tank was activ ted at high level during this operation.
Weather conditions at the time of the incident were sry and clear. The equipment in use was a diesel driven air compressor. No persons injured. At 2024 a fire was discovered on the platfor,
involving a temporary installed, diesel driven, air compressor. The general alarm was initiated and the fire extinguished swiftly by personnel using extinguishers and hose lines. Damage was
contained to the air compressor.
Hydrocarbon leak observed from hazardous drains return line at production manifold tie-in point, leak consisted of oil, water and gas mist. Open module therefore gas dispersed, liquids
contained within bunded area. Note:- equipment not in use at time of ncident. Three wells producing to production manifold.
Gas leak from flange on annulis. Helicopters mobilised, coast guard and police informed. Crew mustered but not evacuated. Bolts tightened under pressure.
Ti probe no0354 blew out its thermowell causing a gas release into module 03. The termowell was located on the down streamside of ex 0103a j.t. After cooler the resulting gas release was
detected by numerous gas heads in the module going a level 3 shutdow .co-incident smoke detectors brought in by the gas could effected a dulge of the module and gave an esd fire output.
The process was in a shut down condition. Approximately one barrel of crude oil was released into production module 03. Two operators were trying to prove a mechanical isolation to a control
valve in preperation for maintenence. The upstream and downstrea block valves were closed and the drain valve cracked open when suddenly what appeared to be a blockage in the drain cleared
and crude oil was discharged into the module. The drain was quickly closed. Several gas detection heads were activated and picked p by the ccr fire and gas panel. All hot work on the platform
was stopped and a foam blanket applied to the spill. It was subsequently found that the down stream block valve was damaged internally and the valve was not fully closed. This valve is now bein
changed out.
Gas injection compressor <...> running up after maintenance a leak occured on the greylock clamp on psv 2612. The release of gas caused 2 x smoke detectors to alarm and initiate a level 3 shut
down condition. (fire area 101 smoke dtectors sm 9400 sm9 02) investigation found that the pipework was misaligned causing distoration at the invet clamp on psv 2612
The two gas detectors, situated in the fuel gas wing, came into low alarm. The gas leak was traced to a spindle gland on the secondary high speed shut off cock.
A ti probe no 0354 blew out of its thermowell causing a gas release into module 03 the thermowell was located on the down streamside of ex01 0 3a jt after cooler the resulting gas release was
detected by numerous gas heads in the module giving a level 3 shutodwn. Co-incident smopke detectors brought in by the gas cloud erected a deluge of the module and cave an esd fire out put.
During removal of suction strainer, a release of of condensate and gas 0ccured when the strainer lid sprang open under pressure trapped in the line. The metering stream had been isolated and
drained down but slight pressure remained in the line due to the master drain valve being closed

15% hcl was being transferred from one tank to another, on the skid deck when the air driven pump was started up, the discarge hose leading in through a top hatch of the receiving tank back fed
itself through a tie line which was holding it in position. A a consequence of the pump stroking - the acid solution was splashing off the top of the hatch and over onto the skid deck - it is
estimated that between 5 to 10 gallons was discharged. The spillage was neutralised with soda ash and flushed with copious a ounts of fire water. No injuries or damage sunstained. Weather was
clear with light e.n.e. Breeze.
The produced water line had been drained, flushed with water, drained again and isolated. Prior to commencing to cut the pipe with a cutting disc a gas check was carried out at the open end of
the pipe. This was 2-3 mtrs from the point of cut and showed 0 lel. The jobs copmmenced but as the cut approached the top of the pipe gas was encountered and ignited the flame was rapidly
extinguished by the pipe fitter who smouthered it with the gloved hands. There was no injury to personnel, or damage to equipment
Following water washing of the rb211 gas compression engine minor maintenance had been undertaken on the third stage discharge valve (xxv 1364) pilot valves. After starting the
engine/compressor xxv 1364 was stroke checked in order to ensure satisfactory pening and closing. During this operation gas was detected coming from the gland area of the valve, this being
observed visually and detected on the fixed gas detection systems.
Whilst shutting down power generator ax 5401c after maintenance checks two gas heads came into alarm, one showing 22% lel and the other 19% within five minutes both were showing zero on
the panel in the central control room. On investigation it was found that the secondary high speed shut off cock (ov6303c) was leaking from the gland packing whilst going from the open to
closed position.
The release of gas & condensate occured as a result of trapped pressure between a discharge valve and non return valve. Leak occured whilst operator specificaly checked for trapped pressure
when isolating the pump for maintenance. One detector alarmed in ire area 03:01 low level gas.
Gas generator on b power gen. Was being changed over from diesel fuel to fuel gas when coincident gas detection within its enclosure caused a level 3 shutdown of the machine.
Preparations were taking place for the start-up of b compressor train. This involving pressurisation of the system. During the operation the low level gas alarm activated and the train was
depressurised from the central control room. On examination it was found that a blanking plug on flow transmitter ft 1430 was not fully tightened
Production was stable. The 'a' injection train was on line with 'b' shut down for maint pmr. One gas head g9576 went into low alarm, then high alarm with g9580 going into high alarm some two
minutes later. G8914 and g9572 went into low alarm at the same t me. Procuction operators <...> and <...> had gone to module 16 to investigate the first alarm - they reported a strong smell of
gas at the lower mezz level increasing towards the stairs leading to the upper mezz. The operators vacuated the module a the platform sustained a level 3 shutdown as a result of coincident gas
detection. The shutdown initiated the de-pressurising of 'a' comp train and all gas heads returned to normal levels within 10 minutes. The module was inspected but no obvious source f leakage
was found and it was decided that leak testing should be undertaken using nitrogen.
Operations personnel had just commenced pressurisation of the gas skid and had reached a pressure of approx 3 bar when a gas alarm was initiated in the analyser house. Investigation revealed
the source of the leak to be an open ended section of 1/2 instru ent piping. The open end was present due to construction personnel. Some 12 days ealier, having removed for repair the vacuum
pump to which it would normally have been connected.
As above.followed by vessel was being depressurised for further maitainance when seals failed at 50 bar, followed by controlled blow- down of vessel with platform brought to hazard status.
Work had been completed in changing the fuel gas system on g-850 from gas to liquid fuel. Initial commissioning had been carried out under the supervision of the service engineer. Earilier
starting problems had been caused by blockage of the fuel filters nd the machine was on its second start attempt within an hour. During this start attempt 24ird10 activated and subsequently reset
whereon 24ird12 activated. The control room contacted the power technician after the first detector had activated, who upon c ecking inside the enclosure noticed smoke and flame within the
transition piece between the gas generator and the power turbine. After checking that the enclosure doors were closed, the halon was released manually from the local control room. This caused
he platform to go to hazard status. The executive actions were then confirmed i.e. Fuel supply isolated and air supply damper closed. No fire could be observed looking through the enclosure
window but checking the rest of the unit revealed that the fire w s still burning within the power turbine exhaust ducting. The unit exhaust and inlet dampers were then manually closed.
Meanwhile the emergency support team laid a foam blanket under the machine prior to extinguishing the fire using halon extinguishers an water cooling
Following maintenance work on recip compressor the machine was started up in injection mode. While still bringing the machine up to full operating pressure, a low level gas alert was activated
in module u4e. The compressor was shutdown manually and automa ic blowdown initiated but 2 gas heads detected high level gas and initiated a full surface process shutdown (inc esdv closure).
The module was clear of gas 10 mins after the leak was found to be from a suction valve cover on cyl no 5

Following maintenance work on recip. Compressor the machine was started up in the injection mode. While still bringing the machine up to full operating pressure, a low level gas alert was
activated in module. The compressor was shut down manually and auto atic blowdown initiated but 2 gas heads detected high level gas and initiated a full surface process shutdown (inc esdv
closure). The module was clear of gas 10 mins after the first alert and the leak was found to be from a suction valve cover on cylinder
Following a train shutdown two technicians injecting grease into a newly installed gas entry block valve partially unscrewed a grease fitting which suddenly blew out releasing gas into the
wellhead module. Pressure on the separator side of the valve was 8 bar, the upstream valve was closed. After the initial burst of gas the flow stopped. The platform shutdown automatically on
high level gas detected by sensors sited near the valve
As part of the operations agreement, all main block valves on the prover loop have to be leak tested.this is a routine task carried out by the oil export technician. To test the valves, they are closed
and the cavity between the seals is bled down and a v sual check for leakage is carried out. The export technician had completed this check on stream 2 main stream valve but had failed to fully
close the drain valve. When the main stream valve was returned to service, hydrocarbons were released into the modu e through the slightly open drain valve. The platform went to alert and then
hazard status. The drain valve was closed. The gas head indication decreased and the platform was left on alert status until the small hydrocarbon releasewas cleaned up. The plat orm was then
returned to normal green status
Minor gas release from valve over joint on compressor.yellow alert - red alert onto blowdown returned to normal 10:55 <...> at 1040 hours the installation went to yellow alert status due to llg in
um4e approx 1 minute later hlg alert was activated whi h put platform on red hazard status. Investigation by area technicians found a gas leak from valve no 8 cover joint to cylinder no 6 of
k9320 recip compressor. The machine was manually shutdown and auto blowout and isolation initiated the f&g panel was mo itored during the incident with 1 gas card rising to + 80% lel and 3
gas cards rising to +40% lel as soon as the machine was blowndown the gas levels quickly dropped to zero the platform was returned to green normal status at 1055 hours weather at time wa 130
degrees at 22 knots, air temp 8 degrees
Gas release emanated from k9310 4th stage discharge pressure gauge impulse line. Machine manually shut down and impulse line root valves were isolated by the area technician. Witin 4 minutes
of incident all affected gas heads had dropped below 25% lel.
K9320 was being brought into service after the platforms annual maintenance shutdown. On 2 previous start attempts the suctin valve had failed to open. The fault was corrected and the machine
started at 0608 hrs. It tripped at 0610 hours on a faulty low s ction pressure trip and began auto blowdown. At 0612 hours the cylinder no 1 head gasket developed a leak. Low level gas alarm was
triggered (yellow alert) followed by red hazard status on high level gas.coincident high level gas produces an sps,as design five gas heads in the area registered > 75% lel. A further 20 heads in
the connecting modules indicated between 25% and 75% lel. 2 gas heads in column 3 indicated between 25 and 75 % lel.hvac remained on and the compressor continued to blow down until th
area was clear of gas and platform returned to normal green status at 0639 hours. The gasket was replaced no evidence of cause was found. It had not been disturbed during the maintenance
shutdown. During the red hazard status a full muster was held.
K9320 had been running since 2200 hrs on <...> following an earlier joint replacement. High cylinder temperatures were detected in cylinder no 1. The machine was shutdown at 1842 hrs after
checking all other cylinders in order to change out identified f ulty discharge valves on cylinder no 1 as per design the machine began to blowdown within its boundary isolation. At 1842 hrs low
level gas was detected in that module and the adjacent inter connected module. At 1854 hrs high level gas was detected an sp and red hazard status were automatically triggered. Gas compression
auto blow down activated,as per design ny 108 the gas had dissipated sufficiently to clear the red hazard status and the platform was stood down to yellow alert status.at 1920 hrs with a l gas
heads clear nirmal green status resumed. A full muster was called at 1854 all personnel accounted for at 1908.
Failure of lean pump p9415 mecahnical seal caused a release of hydrocarbons resulting in an sps of the platform. All auto systems operated correctly and the module ventilation cleared all
hydrocarbon gas released. Checks were carried out in other modules o ensure no migration of gas the lean oil pumps shutdown and automatically isolated. The failure of the seal is subject to
further investigation.

High vibrations from p4030 seawater supply pump indicated in alarm. 0649 hours vibratins peaking above trip point. 0650 hours smoke head s878 activated in column 3 and platform went to red
hazard status. Platform personnel being mustered. 0651 hours repo t of buring oil smell (appeared as smoke/vapour cloud in column 3). 0703 hours 2 technicians entered column 3 to investigate.
0707 hours report from technicians that area around p4030 safe and some oil/water mix found around pump bedplate. Bearing housing was hot. 0709 all personnel accounted for and platform
returned to normal green status. Inspection of pump p4030 found that the pump bearing failed due to ingress of cooling water from leaking bearing housing cooling coil, causing oil to emulsify.
Subsequ nt oil viscosity loss lowered ability to lubricate bearings and therefore led to overheating of bearing causing hot oil vapour/mist to be emitted activating smoke head s878.
A well was being flowed through the test seperator bc-v-3150; the lcv by-pass line failed, downstream of the by-pass valve 3p2008, releasing oil and gas into the module. Cd8/9/10 low level gas
detection operated followed by high level gas detection about a minute later. This resulted in an automatic surface process shutdown. The test sepearator was depressurised via the control room,
hvac remained on and cleared the gas. There is normally no flow in the by-pass line. Preliminary i examination indicate corrosion as the cause.
Worked over in <...> it was decided to disconnect the flowline,when the train was shutdown the tree was disconnected from the process by re- moval of the choke and fitting blanks to the tree and
flowline.the choke was removed and a blank was fitted to he tree.before the technicians fitted a blank to the flowline a quantity of water was ejected from the open end of the flowline.this
quickly stopped and was followed by a smal release of gas
Stem seal on xcv-2136, train 3-1st stage gas blowby valve,failed in service releasing oil and gas into the module.sps initiated by area technician on discovery of the leak. Oil trains immediately
depressurised from the production control room on confirmat on of the leak.low level gas was then detected in the extract ducting by two heads g771/g772, very quickly reducing to around
5%lel. Extract duct situated directly above the valve. The gas was dispersed by hvac initially and then assisted by natural venti ation. The oil spillage was contained in the module and cleaned up.
Platform raised to hazard status on detection of hlg from the crude oil cooler enclosure on m1w roof. Upon investigation a pressurised oil leak was reported to be spraying from the oil inlet pipe
to crude oil cooler. The leak coming from the sealing comp und at the deck penetration. The process was immediatel;y shut down and de-pressurised. The leak wa scaused by external corrosion
of the pipe with a hole approximately 50mm
The platform was raised to red hazard status by high level gas detection in m3e and d3e. Gas was seen to be escaping from bd31 swab cap bleed nipple. The bleed valve was in the open position
and the release occured when the upper master gate valve was ope ed. The instance of release was observed by the technician in the wellhead who straight away instructed (by radio) his colleague
at the hydraulic skid to re-close the upper master gate valve. This instruction was immediately actioned and the leak was stop ed. The action to isolate the release was taken before the gas
detectors raised the platform to hazard status.
1/2'' swagelok, deisolation of lean oil system. Technician noted leak, this did not actuate any sensors. Isolated by technician.
Work was ongoing in d1cs to decommission the existing d2c deluge valve set and replace with new spools and valves. During the course of removing a section of 6" deluge pipe spool it came into
contact with a 1/4" oil sample test point that was in close pro imity to the deluge set. This caused damage to the tapping point which in turn allowed loss of containment and prompted a manual
shutdown of train 2. Approximately 4 gallons of 50% oil/water mixture was released into d1cs at a pressure of 0.5 barg
Power technician, whilst carrying out checks on the fuel gas system in d2e noticed a hydrocarbon drip from a flange on an adjacent system he immediately informed the system supervisor process.
The ssp identified the leak as being on the hihi drains return from gas compression to 2nd stage separator (normal pressure 20bar) the train was manually shutdown. Upon inspection it was found
that a 6" 150 gasket had been fitted in a 300 class system. In addition the gasket was not concentric with the flange.
Oim,ops, supervisor and ssp whilst on a process module inspection observed a water leak from a pipespool. The leak proved to be hydrocarbon contaminated water from an 8" to 6" reducing
spool on line <...> directly upstream of lcv2231 (train 3 2nd stage) the control room was contacted and instructed to shutdown and blowdown train 3.all other process interfaces with train 3 were
checked and confirmed isolated

Train 3 trip and alarm testing was in progress. The first stage high level kdg switch required resetting. An instrument technician, a member of the test team, electrically isolated the switch and
proceeded to d2c to make the adjustments. The kdg cap is sc ewed and while the technician was unscrewing it the whole assembly unscrewed (appx 15 degrees) the kdg switch assembly is
screwed into a flange and is sealed by a joint. This joint began leaking. The technician immediately re-tightened the switch which re uced the leak but did not stop it. An area technician, one of
two in the module contacted the control room and the shift supervisor process (ssp). The ssp went immediately to the module while the two technicians monitored the leak (gas detection did not d
tect any rise in gas level on any detector in d2c). On arrival in the module the ssp assessed the situation and instructed the control room operator to shut down and blowdown train 3 isolations
from the remaining process were checked and confirmed
Well <...> - hydraulic oil with traces of crude was discovered weeping from the connection between the wellhead and adaptor spool above. In addition a small amount of gas accompanied the
leak. This indicated a loss of integrity requiring investigative nd remedial work. The well was closed in and being the oinly produvtive available, all production was shutdown.
While commissing the platform fuel gas distribution system gas was released from a nitrogen leak test injection point which had not been blanked on completion of the leak test. The majority of
gas released was nitrogen but hydrocarbon was present in suf icient quantity to activate gas heads in the area.
Whilst carrying out the task of drainin down an ethanol distribution line a spillage occured. Hot work in the area had been suspended to allow draining of the ethonal system. On completion of
drain down the hotwork was re-instated. At this point a mino spillage occured almost immediately caused by a hot welding spelter falling from above. The fire was extinguished using a dry
powder extinguisher.
Two gas detectors, zones 32e (12) 32e (24) indicated presence of hydrocarbon gas in above area. Area thoroughly checked but nothing found. By this time, detectors had reset. General alarm
initiated muster procedured and recall for construction personnel
Gas condensate escaped from a drill line an a condensate line between hp seperator and lp seperator. Pressure in the line was 12bar. Valve on drain line was fitted with a blank which was trapped
and fitted with a swagelock nipple and adaptor. The drain was used as an access point during recent leak testing and this was the first time this train had been livened up. The swaglock nipple
appears to have been covered with a plastic cap and the valve was passing pressure build up behind the cap blew it off, and condensate escaped.
A 3/4" plug blew out of the seawater side of the lube oil cooler 8 to 10 barg. Due to use of dissimilar metals.
The seal at the freasehead on an <...> wireline lubricator failed causing loss of containment and subsequent release of hydrocarbons, the system failed due to an obstruction in the choke valve on
the grease supply line. The incident happened on a further three occasions as the tool string was being pulled from the well. On each occasion the b.o.p's were closed the lubricator vented and
the check valve removed stripped and cleaned
A flow controler on a dew point analyser had failed and gas was escaping through a bleed hole on the body of the regulator. Smell of gas detected by someone passing the location and subsequent
search found the cause.
Leak was observed from impulse pipework conected to a pressure switch on the oil export system. Leak was traced to npt fitting that was only hand tight. Instrument isolatedand have
elimminatted when fitting tightened properly
Gas detectors in the wellbay area acivated by a minor leak from a vent valve on a pressure gauge tapping the gauge was connected to the non active side arm cap on the area the xmas tree of the
well. An operator was in the area and isolated the leak quickl . The deposit dispenced and caused valve to leak.
A pressure guage on a riser attached to wellhead, blew off whilst a routine pressure test was underway, to prove integrity of riser & lubricator seals. At the time of the incident, the swab valve was
closed and the hydraulic master and sssv were open. The riser was being pressurised by a gas supply from the service wing valve. The pressure above the swab valve had reached 303.5 bar. At the
time of release, and above the sssv it was at 315 bar. Gas pressure blew the guage to the underside of the main deck w llslot temporary tread boards. The wireline supervisor, <...>, quickly shut
off the supply gas needle valve to the riser. He then contacted me,informed me of the situation and proceeded to close the master and sssvs on well-slot 8. He then return d to the mezzanine level
to close the needle valve on the supply manifold to the guage connection. Whilst this was ongoing, my action was to monitor the gas level being sensed by gas detector g.d.1103 situated on the
east side(high route) of the platform. The incident occured at 14:15 hrs approx. At 14:17 the % lel had reached 27.4% and by 14:18 hrs this had decayed to 5.9% lel. G.d. 1103 was the only
detector to show an increase in gas levels. The situation was monitored closely throughout its duration an i had the option of shutting down production had conditions dictated

Walking past flowline from wellslot 10, i heard a 'different' noise which turned out to be a gas leak coming from a 'graylock' type flange coupling situated on the flowline from wellhead slot 10
immediately downstream of the wing valve. My immediate actio was to inform <...> control room & asked them to shut in wellslot 10. I then closed the wellslot upper master valve and all the
associated manual isolating valves on that particular wellslot. I depessured the pipework via the vent header and atte pted to tighten the coupling bolts, after which i re-pressured the pipework for
test purposes. The leak persisted and i again had <...> shut in the wellslot wing valve. I closed the upper master valve once more and shut in the header isolation val es, informing <...> control
room and my immediate supervisor
Gas vented and a plug blew out of a flange fitted to the vent header (p101). Drilling work ceased, the 49/27a rig oim was informed and the deluge system activated. No gas alarms operated as it
was very windy when the blow down was complete and all the gas vented, the platform was left vented and depressured.
Incorrect flow indication from pw-09 well flow transmitter fi-0500. Suspect liquids or hydrate. Gas lock-out for pw east well bay for depressurising flow transmitter. The isolation and vent valves
situated on instrument control block were operated by clos ng high and low pressure supplies and opening both vents. One isolation valve stiff to operate. Exercised several times to close.
Opening vents on control block. Small discharge of gas. This being normal, operator called to relieve desk control operator f r short period. Gas lock-out removed for protection. 15:10 hrs low
level single head gas alarm indicated from east well bay followed 5 minutes later by low level coincidence gas alarm same area causing g.p.a. Investigated area, small discharge of gas from pw09 control block vent. Closed valve which had been stiff a further 3 turns stopping any gas release.
A pinhole leak occured from the weidolet chemical injection stub on the flowline. Well fluid was seen running down the flowline by an operator whilst carrying out routine wellhead readings.
Well was immediately shutdown manually at local panel. There were no injuries
Normal process operations, with no untoward alterations were ongoing. Condensate pump "c" was the single duty pump. A mechanical working in the area noticed a spray of condensate coming
from under the ram box cover. He informed operations and the area ope ator shutdown the pump, isolated the system and vented the residual to drain. On investigation it was found to have been
caused by a pinhole leak from the outer radius of a 6mm dia s/s tube which is part of the condensate throat bush flushing system ram packings.
A condensate leak was discovered on the lubricating system of condensate pump "c". This was similar to a previous incident when the pipework had been replaced. It appears that the replacement
pipework had been used before and suffered a common mode failur producing a similar leak. The pump was s/d and drained.
Routine operations ongoing operator tasked with lining up <...> separator liquid outlet to the surge drum header. On arrival he saw a liquid release from the water/methanol lcv bypass valve, the
main control room was informed and a controlled shut own initiated and the offending pipespool isolated and depressured. Wind speed 20 kts, direction 180 c.
2 x 20% gas detectors initiated on pp cellar deck, on arrival, condensate release was seen to be coming from condensate pump 'c', control room informed and pump stopped and isolated.
During a planned shutdown liquids were being removed from the production systems using residual pressure. After pumping out the condensate surge drum to its minimum level it was decided to
utilise the closed drain system to fully drain the vessel. The ope ator, having operated the appropriate valves heard a change in noise level and upon investigation saw a slight mist on the
mezzanine level below and immediately isolated the line. Simultaniously the control room operator reported a single 20% lel detectio in the same area. On investigation sand was evident on the
cellar deck floor and the hole in the process line identified.
Gas generator for compressor no 3 was shutdown to investigate a fault in the fuel gas supply to the starter. The fuel gas supply was isolated and depressurised. When the inlet strainer flange was
split, gas was released and activated the gas detectors in he enclosure hood. Subsequent investigation showed that no valves were "passing" and that the cause of gas being present was most
likely due to insufficient time being taken during depressurisation. After the one time release, no further action was necess ry to make safe the area. There was no continuous release. The
isolations and depressurisation was safe before work recommenced.
A 20% gas alarm brought the release to the control room operators. Attention. He immediately contacted an operator who went to investigate. He discovered a leak on the lubricating system of
condensate pump a. (partially contained and deflected by the pump ram cover), stopped the pump and shut the discharge value which reduced the discharge. A second operator arrived and
together they closed the suction valve and depressured the pump. The total time of discharge was 5 minutes.

At 0300 hours on <...> during normal production operations, a 20% l.e.l gas alarm from pp cellar deck (zone 1 hazardous area) fixed detection unit came up on the control room operators panel.
A mobile operator in the vicinity of pp cellar deck was i mediately asked to investigate. This confirmed a jet spray leak from the <...> produced water lcv. Bypass line. Prompt communication
resulted in immediate tripping & venting of both <...> & condensate systems plus a general platform alarm. This led to a muster. The separator 'produced water/methanol' outlet shutdown valve &
closed. The leak virtually ceased at this point. Further manual isolations secured the site. On examination, the principle damage was sustained by the 1 1/2" by pass val e which exhibited a 1/4"
hole in the body. The immediate vicinity was covered with sand, indicating liquids contamination. The area was well illuminated. External weather conditions- wind 12 knots dir 042 c temp 11 c.
Rainy
At 1439 hours the platform status changed to red, indicating fire at p4250 turbine. 2 technicians sent to investigate. P4250 confirmed by technicians, had shut down and flames could be seen
inside hood of turbine. Technician operated btm system by removin pin from bottle and striking. After discharging btm the emergency response team arrived to continued investigation. Fire
confirmed as out after btm had been released. Cause of fire was hydraulic oil being sprayed onto hot exhaust casing under turbine hoo . Source of oil was from the hydraulic start pump which had
been suffered an o ring failure. 2 of the 4 hydraulic pump holding down bolts were found to be slightly slack.
At approx 1825 hours 2 gas technicians entered module m2e to check k2280 and located a gas leak on a .5 inch needle valve on the third stage discharge bottle. After making an initial assessment
of the leak they both decided the machine required to be shu down. They informed the control room of their decision and stopped k2280 and depressurised it. The leak was detected by smell,
the fixed gas detectors did not register any gas level.
An ives 1/2" npt stainless steel gauge coupling connecting 6" diameter stainless steel gauge (0-160 bar) to 6" fuel gas line failed with a resultant gas release into module. Platform automatic shut
down system operated with deluge release into module as er design. Fittings and gauge damaged - no other damage or injuries sustained.
A gas leak occured on the production separator v4201 when the pressure indicator pi42705 blew off from a 12mm dia. Compression fitting. Cause unknown.
Leak occurred in the oil process line from oil cooler to third stage separator <...> train 1 (operating at 2 bar). Immediately spotted by worker close by, who raised alarm. Train manually isolated
and pipe work depressurised. Pin hole leak found to be a 6 oclock posistion on weld. Leaking hydro carbons (85% bs+w) retained within module. No indication of gas from either fixed or
portable gas detection monitor
The cement untit was being used on well e2 'a' annulus in order to complete a prelimary 3,000 psi pressure test on same. The rig up to allow this task included a third party rental hose run accross
mod 21 rig fllor which connected the hp cement line to th rig choke manifold. The rig up allows pressure to be applied to the annulus and bleed off back to the cement unit. During the course of
the pressure test, the hose failed at 2,800 psi causing the release of the pressurised test medium, (seawater) to be s rayed into the rig floor area.
During the approach of a helicopter to land on <...> helideck the south firewater/foam monitor started to discharge uninitiated by the attendant fireman. Before full discharge could take place the
fireman averted the monitor away from the deck and man ally isolated the appropriate valve.
Following leak testing of the m.o.l. And oil metreing skid pipework, personnel were instructed to remove a valve. This involved removing grayloc clamps. The test medium was nitrogen. During
the removal of one of the clamps, a small explosion was experienc d accompanied by the noise of high pressure release. Subseyent investigation identified the line between the valve to be
removed, which had been in the closed position, and the downstream spade, in position as phased isolation, had not been de-pressurised due to an oversight. This resulted in the release of n2
pressure of possibly 120 bar. Conditions: good lighting, cramped worksite due to location, oil free.
A quantity of crude oil was carried over from the production separator (vo2) to the flare system via the production scrubbers vo4/v05. Production from the sattelite platform fe was being
established at the accident, a large slug of liquid was received fro the fe production line, which tripped the separator. However, liquid was carried out through the separator gas off take into the
flare system. Some of the oil was not burned in the hp flare and fell as droplets on the main deck (west). No injury to pe sonnel. No damage to plant.
During normal operations flowing well fluids from <...> to <...> via the 12" flowline a small leak was observed on a 12" nrv in the <...> reception area on <...>. The leak was immediately
reported to the ops supv who then shut down <...>. A foam blanket was put down o the deck under the leak as a precaution and a fire tam was in attendance as the then isolated pipe section
depressurised. Eventually the liquid (oil and water) leak subsided and then small 'puffs' of gas were observed coming from the leakage area for se eral minutes until the isolated system fully
depressurised. Any evolved gas was being carried out of the adjacent module door duw to the prevailing air currents.

Pin hole leak detected on 18" l.p. Manifold at point of entry of 1" demulsifier injection line. Lp manifold shutdown and prepares for repair - during this period production plant shutdown for other
reasons. Decision taken to leave plant down for duration of repair to ensure security of isolation. On achieving gas free status, offending pip nipple cold cut off revealing wastage of 18" dia
manifold local to point of attachment - cleaned back to sound metal - including ultrasonic inspection and 1 1/2" sockol t fitting welded in place. (oversize to original to compensate for metal loss
at attachment). - note originated as "weep".
A contract electrician was passing the main export pump and noticed a small quantity of oil leaking onto the deck. He reported this to the adjacent control room and an operations technician was
called to investigate. The leak has developed into a spray y the time the technician arrived at the pump. He immediately returned to the control room and pressed the manual plant shutdown.
Aux generator (dg 6) had been running for almost one hour as part of normal sunday runs. (machine is normally stopped, but on standby). On checking machine from outside the enclosure,the
technician on duty noticed lube oil on and around the machine and i mediatly pressed the local stop button, shutting down the machine. On entering the machine enclosre he noticed a small a
small fire under the exhaust manifold heat sheild. He extinguished the fire with a hand bcf extinguisherand informed the central con rol room
The corrosion inhibitor injection line was to be tied omtp the modified p13/14 pump discharge line. The line is 1/2" ss tubing. The pump end of the line was valve isolated and the pumps
isolated. When the cap was removed at the delivery end of the line to check the line was free of fluids a minor oil and gas release took place. Opertion staff were on scene and the fso and fire
team were called to support if required. No fire and gas annunciation or action took place and a muster was not required. The ource of the oil was not readily found so the operations supervisor
shutdown the plant on a controlled mol sequence 2. The line was re-plugged and the source found at an old collector header tie-in point. The tie-in to the chemical line in question was ifficult to
see or fine amongst pipework and cable trays. The line was being proved free of fluids in order that an icc could be applied to the line for maintaenance staff to tie it back into the oil line at the
booster pump discharge line.
Small fire reported inside hood of gt2, precautonary muster of platform personnel. Fire extinguished using dry powder. Personnel stood down. Preperations had been in hand towards end of night
shift for man entry into diesel day tank t05 north for major i spection. To avoid draining off residual deisel into lp closed drain tank, which is pumped out to the producton seperators and impacts
on water quality in the effluent disposal system, an unapproved method of draining down was utilised. The main drain he der from the diesel tanks was plugged with the intention of draining the
residual diesel into drums. A transfer of diesel from the storage leg to the south tank was then undertaken which resulted in he south tank being over filled, diesel from the tank o er - flow had no
drainage rout. Diesel backed up bthe booster pump 1" bund drain which overflowed, indications are that a small quantity of diesel migrated back up the small bore drain to the power bearing
housing assembly and dripped onto the exhaust
The auxillary generator dg7 had been started for its weekly test runs at 21:35hrs and all was satisfactory. At 22:28hrs the smell of diesal alerted an operations tech to investigate the generator. He
discovered diesel leaking from the fuel supply sytem t the machine. The operator shut the machine down and isolated the diesal supply. The failure occurred in the fuel oil reservoir (a small pot
designed to ensure no air is entrained in the diesal supply). The securing bolt which holds the fuel oil resovo r together had sheared at the neck above the threads the incident was discovered
quickly and consequently. Relatively little diesal was spilled approx 7 litres.
<...> had been found to be passing, preventing access to the <...> receiver for pig removal and inspection. Furminite were bought out to inject sealant into the valve to enable isolation. Sealent
was injected on the west side of the top seal of the valve. On attempting to access the injection nipple on the east side, a small leakage of oil under low pressure occured from the nipple threads.
Cautios attempts to tighten the nipple did not stem the leak. <...> were asked to shut down in a controlled manner. A foam brqnch was laid out and an lp fire hose used to wash the spillage to
closed drains. Welding feeders were tripped fd esdv 21561 on fc was closed and <...> a fully isolated and depress- ured/drained. On attempting to remove the nipple the threaded sec ion
fractured. It was evident that the threaded section had been prevously partially fractured. The <...> sealine and <...> infield production header was in operation at the time at a pressure of arround
55 bar. The incident occured in package 3- pig rece ver area, a module with louvred east face, open door to east face of platform and passage and to mol package 2. The wind was light, from the
north-no gas heads in the area were activated by the leak
Pinhole leak discovered by operator in well 2-2 flowline on a short section. Leak was discovered by a production technician recording nightly well annulus pressures. The well was immediately
shut in and the flowline depressurised. On inspection the lea was caused by internal corrosion. The inside of the flowline had a scale coating approximately 3mm thick, at the point where the
pinhole leak developed the scale coating had flaked off. It is suspected that the scale was of a barium sulphate compositio , a sample has been taken for analysis

An oil leak was spotted by production personnel who alerted the shift supervisor and fire and safety officer. Immediate investigation revealed an oil leak from the pipe work. The platform was
shutdown immediately ceasing oil production and the live work was isolated and depressurised, the oil leak turned into a small low pressure gas release that was contained manually. There was
no detection of gas registered on the fire and gas protection system. There was no pollution, the oil being contained in the drain system. No personnel injuries were sustained.
An instrument technician was working near the gas lift feed pipework when he noticed a small vapour release and icing on cover joint/valve stem of a 1' nominal ball valve. No gas heads were
activated due to the combination of leak size and exposed wind ocation
During normal production operations the duty operator observed a small crude leak from the valve bonnet and on the recycle valve on po5. The stand-by machine was started and po5 shutdown in
a controlled manner to inverstigate and rectify the fault.
A diesel day tank was filled beyond its capacity. The overspill was routed to the process open drain tank, t-71. This resulted in a displacement of crude oil/diesel from the open drain loop seals
onto the floor of the mol pump area in front of p-o5. A roduction shutdown was manually initiated as a precaution.
Painter, noted a smell of gas when working in the roof space of package 5, seperaror module. Ops. Supv. And oim notified. Small leak found on spindle end cap of 12" nrv. (detected visually
only by leak test solution) on off gas line to ngl compressor s ction.
Low then high gas alarm, gas head g11, activated in wellhead area eggbox 3. Upon investigation, gas was found to be coming from the 1/4" npt vent port (actual aperture 4mm diameter) of a
"block and bleed" valve assembly located just off the non-active win valve on the gas injection side of well 3-3. Block and bleed assembly was isolated and depressured. Gas injection pressure is
monitored by local pressure guage via this assembly which was under 90 bar pressure at the time. The normal condition for the ve t port is needle valve (integral to the assembly) closed and the
vent port plugged
All instrumentation on the dgl skid was being checked for gas leaks following notification by <...> of a gas leak on their ft 3205 earlier in the week. Inspection of psl 3222 on <...> revealed a
minor gas leak from the body joint just abov the screwed tapping. Psl 3222 manufactured by <...>.
Following ngl plant trip at 1535 and loss of dgl, a routine plant start up was underway at around 1915 just prior to a dgl start-up. P97 was stopped as condensate make was low. Operations team
shutdown p97. High pressure vapour then began to leak from th gland on the suction valve. Platform put to muster as a precautionary measure at 1922. Successful isolation reported at 1927. Gas
leak under control 1934 hours stand down at 1949 hours after oim site inspection. Wind 10 knots,220,daylight. Visibility 10n+ bar pressure 1014 mb. I424:i425'
During the annual internal igloo inspection of the gas pipework & valves within the gannet igloo by the dsv subsea mayo. A minor gas leak was observed coming from the 20" neles ball valve
fv10, at body plug (part 159.1) reference attached drawings. To g ve an indication of the leak rate, it took 81 minutes to fill a one gallon container.
A fine oil spray was noted by the assistant operator coming from a flow line. He identified the leak to be coming from well <...> flow line. He immediately shut the well in and contacted the
control room. The flow line was then depressured to the well clea tank. Flow line pressure at time of incident was +/- 185 psi.
Prior to the incident, fault finding was on going to determine why the turbine would not run on fuel gas. Mechanical checks were exhausted and instrument tests continued within the turbine
enclosure. Two electricians and one instrument technician were i attendance. Solenoid valves and pressure switches were removed from fuel gas supply lines and bench tested, then refitted. The
turbine was run up but failed on the same fault. The junction box for the solenoid valves power supply was opened up. An inst ument technician placed a fluke d.v.m. Over the contacts of a
pressure switch to monitor for any change when the turbine was running up. When the turbine was running up the technician dislodged an adjacent crimped lead and this touched the side of the
ju ction box creating a spark. The spark ignited fuel gas and there was a ball of flame approximately one foot in diameter, this quickly reduced to about six inches then was extingiushed after
approximately twenty five seconds by a hand held co2 fire exting isher. The heat singed the hair on the forearm of the technician. There was no damage or scorching marks on the equipment.
Initial checks for gas leaks following the incident failed to highlight any fuel leaks, the unit has been kept off line to test th integrity of the fuel gas system. A general work permit number 39036

The leak was identified by the area assistant operator at 16:35 hours, he had been in the area 5 minutes previous and there was nothing untoward. The leak wasw from the threads on a 1/2" npt
test port on the tubing bonnet. It was a vapour (gas and hydra lic fluid) spraying upwards approximately 4 feet. With assistance from the area operator he closed the sub surface and surface
safety valves on both the tubing ans 7" annulus. It appears that the leak was being fed from the 7" annulus via the tubing han er seals, the annulus preesure was 1400 psi. The annulus was then
operned up to the flare system. The leak continued but was surging rather than a continuous flow, but still approximately 3 to 4 feet. It was dispersing very quickly due to the module bei g partly
opened to the elements (25 knots winds 345 degree). There was no build up of gas in the module or alarms activated, the nearest gas head was directly above the xmas tree approximately 10 feet.
The leak gradually reduced as the 7" annulus was
The fire was reported at 06.35 hours by a workman in the area. The flames were approximately 1 foot high with a spread of 2 to 3 feet. It lasted less than 2 minutes and burnt itself out when the
hydraulic oil was prevented from falling on to the exhaust. Personnel stood byo
The assistant operator was draining down prover loop to closed drain system, on completion he opened the drain valve to tundish to make sure it was completely drained down after the pressure
gauge showed zero. The tundish suddenly overflowed causing crude oil to flow onto the floor under the skid and between two beams. The concentration of crude caused the annunciation of gas
heads within this confined area which initiated an sd/.
Whilst demonstrating pressurisation loss alarms in the generator room, to the certifying authority, a general alarm was initiated (1st level gas in generator room). Susequent investigation identified
a broken pipe clamp on the fuel gas line to the generat r carburettor, causing a minor gas leak sufficient to give a single head 1st level gas alarm
During watchkeeping duties the area technician observed a small gas leak the shipt supervisor was called and initiated a manual shutdown of the gas system and a manual blowdown.
Following routine emergency shutdown function testing, the platform was being re-installed in accordance with "blackstart" procedure. The fire and gas panel was activated when carbon dioxide
was erroneously released. The building was evacuated, all person el were accounted for and the areas effected were ventilated
During normal operation of bk unit 040 avon gas generator/cb compressor the general platform alarm sounded due to low level gas detection in zone 2 (u040 gg enclosure). There are 3 gas
detector heads within the enclosure but only 1 was indicating low leve gas at 20% lel. The unit was immediately reduced to auto/idle speed and the gas level reduced to 85 lel. On investigation a
small gas leak was found on a 1" valve flange the unit was immediately shutdown (manually) and the unit fuel gas was blocked and t e 1" valve, which is on the unit fuel gas knock out pot liquid
drain line, was removed and examined. The neopene flange seals were inspected and the downstream seal was found to have hardened with age. The seal was replaced and the unit fuel gas system
pr ssure tested. During the pressure test another small gas leak was found on a 1/2" tube fitting to a pressure gauge. The tube fitting was replaced and pressure tested. No damage sustained. The
unit was returned to service at 1700 hours.
<...> supervisor <...> was preparing to vent down well fo6 via the kill manifold. He had closed fo7 kill wing valve and fo7 2 in. Kill manifold valve. He had opened fo6 kill wing and fo6 2 in. Kill
manifold ready to vent fo6. He was then awa e that gas was escaping from the kerotest bleed valve which was open. <...> then closed fo6 kill wing valve & opened fo7 kill wing valve with the
intention to vent fo7 gas away from the valve that was open. He then proceeded to vent from the kill skid at this stage the alarm sounded and he proceeded to the muster station. The area quickly
ventilated and the platform returned to normal status.
The platform is currently in a construction/commisioning phase. A major leak testing programme of all hydrocarbon pipework/systems is ongoing using nitrogen/helium. A 69 barg test was
ongoing on part of "train 2" gas compressor pipework. 3 leaks were ide tified, so the nitrogen/helium was transferred across to the equivalent pipework on "train 1". (transfer of the nitrogen
would result in +/- 34 barg in train 1 pipework, although it was planned to increase the pressure of the 69 barg.) The boundaries for the 69 barg systems were clearly defined, using marked up
p&id's, and agreed upon by <...> and contractors(s) engineers. Whilst transferring the nitrogen from train 2 to train 1, a 2" valve which had been defined as part of the boundary, was observed to b
partially open, and the glycol skid was pressured to +/- 10 barg (normal pressure 3.5 barg).
An insulator was refitting an insulated box over a flowline pressure transmitter liquid knock out pot when an instrument pipe fitting on the drain valve parted at the union, releasing hydrocarbon
gas into the area no injury was sustained by the insulator. The leak was detected by local gas detection but the leak was isolated by production personnel before co-incident alarms were activated.
A proccess shutdown was initiated manually as soon as the release was visually confirmed. The platform is in the co missioning/post hook up phase and all instrument pipework had been
pressure tested. On inspection of the fitting the ferrules has slid off the pipe, however, indications were that the ferrules had gripped the pipe.

Concurrent events were taking place: 1. Maintenance on the drains caisson pump, and 2. Working process vessels18s, attempting to resolve level control problems. The drains caisson pump had
been removed under permit and isolation control. The pump was fou d to be defective, and the job suspended overnight. The caisson top was left off. Throughout the day problems has existed
with level control in the separators. The vessels had been manually dumped when neccessary, which eventually filled the closed drai sump tank with water. To dump the water from the closed
drain sump tank, a manual valve was opened, allowing water to dump into the caisson. The manual valve was left open from 0930 until the time of the gas escape. A few minutes prior to the gas
rele se, a gas compressor was shut down. During the shut down the compressor vents-off to the flare header during this venting off, gas back flowed to the closed drains sump tank and the open
manual valve to the (open top) caisson.
A 60% gas alarm was initiated in x7001a generator turbine enclosure shutting the unit down. On investigation the source of the gas release was found to be from a rupture in a temporary length of
nylon pipe fitted for the purpose of fault finding on the fu l gas system
Prior to a flash gas train 2 start up, it was discovered by personnel in the vicinity that gas was leaking from the body bleed plug on 23 pcv0013 bypass valve.
The casing of the cleanout pump in module 8 split. The pump was not in service at the time. A production technician in the module witnessed what had happened acitvated the platform esd and
telephoned the control room. At the same time gas was detected n sufficient quantity to automatically release the alarm. Both these actions automatically shutdown, isolated and depressurised
the production facilities, manual isolation was effected within minutes of the initial leak. Platform personnel were brought t muster stations and a foam blanket was laid in the module by the fire
team. When the gas concentration was detected initiallly to a safe level the module fans were started to disperse the resdual. Platform personnel were stood down. Investigation in o the
incident was started immediately.
A pinhole leak was discovered on the motor coolant return line of a condensate pump. (on this type of motor, cooling is via the condensate) the leak was relatively minor (ie frequent drips at
worst). The pump was isolated and a section of pipe removed. S a precaution hot work in adjacent module was stopped on discovery. No injury. No other damage, no spill since small quantity
evaporated quickly. Leak was at weld on weld neck flange of one inch line.
When commissioning the train (1) gas plant after the total production shutdown due to <...> shutting the magnus riser valve, <...> a slight smell of gas in the area of the discharger drum was
noticed by one of the production technicians. On investig ting, the lower vessel sight glass top vent valve body joint was found to be leaking slightly.
Oil was noticed on the surface of the sea, coming towards the platform from the south. The weather was misty and the source of the slick could not been seen. The standby vessel was informed
and asked to try to identify the source. The leak was identifi d as starting from above d8 subsea wellheas approximately 4km south of the platform. This well had been shut in in <...> as unable
to produce oil to the platform and was planned to be worked over and turned round to water injection next year.
A slight oil and gas leak from e2001, train 2 interstage oil cooler thermowell 20 tw008 oil inlet pipework occurred when an instrument technician unscrewed the protective cap from the
thermowell to carry out a temperature survey. Re-tightening the cap fa led to completely stop the leak. No fire and gas systems detected the hydro carbon release. All hot work permits were
cleared withdrawn and non essential personnel were cleared from the area, on duty fire team in attendance. The by pass was opened, then the inlet an outlet block valves on e2001 were closed,
vessel depressured to closed drain system. No injuries to personnel occurred. Total volume of oil spilled approximately 10 litres, contained at site.
A1 choke valve stem leaked small amount of gas while using flowline to depressurise wireline lubricator.
Survey vessel, <...> reported a noise in the <...> of d7 water injection flowline. Further chocks by the vessel confirmed there was a leak.
A small pin hole leak was observed coming from pipe spool . The section of pipework was isolated and drained after the associated oil prodution train had been shutdown.
During routine plant inspection in module 5 deck, an operations technician discovered an oil/water spillage. On investigation the leak was traced to the pump seals on gm1503b oil launder pump.
The pump was shutdown which stopped the leak, approximately 5ltrs had spilled onto the deck. Spillage was cleaned up.
An operations technician was performing routine plant checks when he observed a small pool of oil (<0.1kg) from under well b1 chemical injection line. Close inspection revealed a pin-hole leak
(split weld) from a welded joint at the first weld under the rvc (non return valve). Knowing that the chemical injection line was not in use the operator isolated it. Oil was coming back from the
well via the nrv which was passing. The most probable cause being due to fatigue because of excessive movement/vibration

Operations were in progress to bring well a7 on line both upper master and wing valves were opened gas was detected as the jet of gas deflected off the choke body directly to a gas detector. A7
choke was closed immediately stopping the leak on detecting t e leak the fire team was in attendance as a precautionary measure. At 02:52 the incident was under control.
An oil slick was observed, so the produced water treatment package was checked. This was immediately shut down and investigation showed that the train 1 low pressure seporator produced
water level control valve was sticking approximately 40% open
A slick was sighted on <...> which circumstantial evidence was believed to be coming from d6 flowline. The recommendation of the accident report <...> was to carry out a sub sea investigation
to confurm this. On <...> the <...> was brought into the field and the pipeline re pressured to 30 bar, at 11:40 hrs. In the initial search area no defects were found by rov or traces of oil the
surface. Line pressure was then increased to 100 bar at 13:30 hrs. The dsv reported a smal leak - estimated at 1 pint every 2 mins at kp5.108 and a second leak at kp6.314. The first leak was
reported at 00:55 hrs and the second at 03:50 hrs.
On pulling out of hole with a parted perforating cable, a limited gas release occured from the wireline lubricator greasehead. The flow check valve in the greasehead failed to operate and the
xmas tree upper master valve and lubricator stuffing box had t be closed when the integrity of the grease was lost. The possibility of the flow check valve not operating when the broken wire
was pulled through had been anticipated and precautions were in place to ensure that any gas release was limited. A low pres ure line wiper rubber hose at the top of the lubricator was pulled off
it's fitting at the time of release but no other damage was sustained. The duration of the gas venting was circa 1 minute.
Two infra-red detectors indicated 'confirmed fire' in turbine enclosure of peak lopper generator. Fire and gas system automatically stopped generator and released halon. Two production
technicians and the on shift fire and safety officer were sent to in estigate. No obvious signs of fire - no damage or smoke in the enclosure - but oil/diesal vapours were rising from hot turbine
surface. On further investigation a diesal leak was found at a loose connection to no 8 burner, therefore in all probability t e fire indication was genuine.
Gas leak at nrv's on gas regeneration system. Leak detected by platform fire and gas system. (4 low level gas alarms, highest reading 46% lel). Fso and production techs monitored locally and
found leaks at 3 joins for double nrv's. Plant depressured, i olated and gaskets replaced.
Main oil line pump p3600 in operation. Pipeline esdv closed due to instrumentation fault. P36000 shut down on high pressure trip, but gasket blew in flanged joint in common discharge header.
(gasket blew in flanged joint downstream of p3610 discharge b ock valve - p3610 not on line). Fine oil spray from hole. Oil fell through grating into the sea. Witnessed visually. Level 3 s/d on
manual activiation.
Oil leaking from pump casing joint was vapourising on contact with hot surface of pump casing. Witnessed visually:- pump shut down under control operating conditions.
Test was to test run condensate booster pumps on diesel, then condensate pipeline pumps via condensate metering. Valve line-up was as per attatched p&id and was checked against the p&id.
Booster pumps had been run in recycle the previous day; to provide suction to pipeline pumps. Personnel remained at the skid to observe for leaks for approx 10 minutes. Having observed no
leaks, they proceeded to the pipeline pumps to bleed the casings. Some minutes later they were informed that there was a diesel leak from the meter prever door. The leak was isolated, hot work
suspended, and the area washed down. Diesel was found to have flowed into the prover loop via the drain valve. No injuries. Subsequent investigation showed: 1. The planning of the job, with
ma ked up p&ids etc., Was to a high standard. 2. The task had been double checked. 3. The drain valves were awkwardly sighted, and painted black. 4. The drawings show only one connection to
each block valve, when in reality, there are only two. 5. The exte
The process operators were in the process of bringing well t9 (slot 16) back to production. Operation of the wing and master valve, via the dcs system in the process control room resulted in a gas
alarm and subsequent automatic platform shutdown (plx). He emergency response team on arriving at the scene effected an esd to close all sssv's and manually closed the manifold valves from
all wells. The source of the leak was traced to the valve stem on slot 16 choke valve. The indication was that the valve stem sealing had failed. (this will be confirmed by stripping the valve and
investigation)

The production operators had observed a 'wisp' coming from the monitor port on the <...> tubing adaptor and had monitored it before seeking the advice of the <...> engineer on board. (the <...>
engineer was on board to check the integrity of all seals on the w ll head tubing hangers). The chief operator requested the <...> engineer to investigate and advise; being familar with the
probable cause he asked for the well to be shut in following his visit to the wellbay. Two <...> employees had indicated the source f the leak to the <...> engineer. They indicated that there was
only a very faint smell of gas noticable and likened the escape to a kettle boiling. The leak had obviously increased although insufficint to set off any automatic gas detection. The master v lve
and wing valve were shut, followed by the ssv. The tubing was then bled down to zero via the test header to flare.
Wireline bop's being lowered into place onto the wireline riser. The <...> tool was already in place inside the riser. The manual master valve on the tree was in closed position. The swab valve
was opened before the bop's were secured. This resu ted in the release of gas at approx 2,200psi which had been trapped between the manual master and swab valves, and in turn displaced
approx 15 gals of methanol which had previously loaded into the riser. Three personnel were in the process of positioning he bop's onto the riser and were caught in the resulting methanol spray.
All three showered immediately after the incident and were examined by the <...> medic. Only one, <...> required treatment to his eyes, of a minor nature.
While on routine platform inspection the on shift operator discovered a small leak of gas escaping from a 1" npt plug fitted at the bottom of a 12" non return valve fitted in the <...> export line.
During production start-up it was noticed by operators that psv 02008b on hp separator was passing. The standby psv's were brought into duty by means of diverter valve, xv-02008, and the plant
brought on line. The flare islolation valve for the passing ps was closed as the plant was being pressurised. The closed port of the diverter valve must have been passing allowing gas pressure in
the 'dead leg' to come up to hp separator pressure of 60 bar. The upstream flange on the flare isolation valve failed a lowing escape of trapped pressure. A production shutdown was manually
initiated by operator arriving at the scene after hearing a loud bang. Insulation and cladding were blown clear during the escape. The night was clear with wind
The seal on the oil prover loop door failed. This allowed oil and gas to pass to atmosphere. The leak was noticed by a worker in the area and noted by the ccr operator via the fire and gas panel.
The ccr operator manually shut down platform just before receiving a call from the onsite worker. The manual shut down was percautionery and was before the set levels that would have
automatically shut the platform down. All personnel were mustered as a precautionery measure. The leak was isolated by the ope ating crew.
A gas leak occurred in the gas compression module. The 60% gas alarm was sounded and personnel were sent to muster stations. Personnel were all mustered by 1410hrs and at that time the
leak had been identified and the gas was clearing from the module. T e leak originated from a drain valve just downstream of the sdv208-2. The valve is on a low section of the line that feeds gas
to the sales gas compressors from the main train compressors and dehydration plant. It appears that a plug sealing this drain v lve blew out/unscrewed and the valve itself was not shut. An
operator in the area heard the vent of gas and contacted the control room who had already noted several gas detectors tegistering above 20% lel and were in the process of initiating a 2b (proce s)
shutdown. Other operators in the area also initiated manually the 2b shutdown using the emergency stations outside the module. The ccr followed the 2b with a 2a(blowdown) this was effected
befor the automatic system received enough input (voting) to nitiate. The system would have shutdown the plant, however, if the operators had not have done so first. This was established from
examining the panel and relays, etc, after the event. The operator who initially heard the venting shut the drain valve a d the gas cleared quickly. The drain valve in question is not used al all in
At 1500hrs a rapid pipeline depressuration on pl147 was noted in the control room causing a level 2c shutdown of the platform. All safety equipment functioned as designed. Contact was made
to confirm they were aware of the pressure drop. A helicopter w s sent to search for a leak. A leak was detected in the area where pl147 connects to the western leg of the <...> pipline system.
Subsequently diving operations confirmed pl147 had parted approximately 40 m from the intersection of these two lines in a m chanical connector.
The reda esp. In the production caisson failed. The pump is suspended in the caisson viathe 10" drain ex v425 by a 3" flexihose, with securiy cable attached from pump discharge to caisson top
cover. A permit was isssued, and work commenced on pulling the pump. After approx 10 minutes the technicians reported seeing and smelling an escape of gas. No platform alarms indicated
any escape and further investigation failed to detect any gas escape/presence. The work was restarted and monit0red fully until the pump was removed and blank fitted, no gas was deteced during
this operation. The blank was removed to run in a new pump. The technicians reported to the production operators and safty officer a cloud of gas escaping from the caisson. During the investig
tion, after the escape had ceased, more gas began to flow from the caisson, this was associated with a well surging into the separators where pressure control equipment released to flare. An
assumption made by the production dept. That this was associated with the gas escape resulted in the 10" valve ex v425 being shut. The final gas escape brought three level gas detections, on
gd25, gd28, gd29 and a 60 per cent lel gas detection on gd31. The gas levels indicated immediately began to reduce when v425 10" ine bv was shut.

During plug and abandonment operations on well a-37, the rig was displacing hole contents with sea water and 5bbls oil base mud with gas carried over bell nipple spilling down riser skid deck
and bop deck, 6 gas heads fired and 60% gas alarm sounded. The well was shut in and monitored. No pressure observed during shut in. After approval from hse operations resumed circulating
via choke and gas buster with no evidence of hydrocarbons remaining in the system. Pumped 50bbls hi viscosity sweep and displace with 160bbls seawater. All fluids were contained on board
by drain system.
Following a plant shutdown due to a main power outrage the plant was being brought back on line. As water fed to the igf unit <...> a 60% gas alarm was seen. This alarm cleared within one
minute. Gas source was inpection hatches on <...> Unusally ca m conditions winds 10kts from nw did not allow natural dispersion as usual. Muster was called and completed as drill when
alarm cleared quickly.
8" riser r10 was being pressure tested. A pressure of 250 bar had been attained when all pressure was lost from the system. There was no damage to topside facilities but subsequent subsea
investigation revealed a significant leak from the vertical secti n of the riser at the 25 to 35m level
The line concerned is a crossover line between the main separators which allows production to be routed via one of them if the other is shut down. The line is normally isolated by valves but
contains dead crude. It is thought that a valve had been passin causing the line to pressurise. A contract company employee noticed a small pool of oil accumulating on the floor of the lower
central corridor and traced the source to this line which lies between the grating in the upper central corridor.
During the warm up cycle, hot water is fed via the water injection system via the <...> production and test pipeline system to the test separator and on to the lp seperator via transfer pump (ga
2582a) where it is eventually disposed of through clean up f cilities. However during this warm up cycle, an upset was experienced which resulted in the test separator (fa-0708) water level rising
to the high trip condition. This resulted in an increase in pressure on the pipeline and topside pipework which caused a number of minor leaks and damage to certain instruments.
During routine wireline operations a small escape of hydrocarbons occurred due to loss of pack off around the wire. A fine spray of hydrocarbons resulted which was blown over the skid deck
and slops tank area. The escape was contained within approximate y 2 minutes by increasing the grease pressure within the grease injection tree.
A fire was reported on the turbine exhaust at 1406hrs on <...>. The turbine (<...> frame 5) was running on gas at the time with a load of 18mw. The platform alert was initiated from the mcr and
personnel mustered at emergency duty stations. The ire was extinguished within 1 minute of being obsreved, by the helideck firemen using an fb 10 foam hose reel. On arrival at the scene the
fire team applied additional cooling via the helideck foam cannon and the turbine was shut down. Personnel were sto d down at 1426hrs. Inspection of the site confirmed at was a surface fire and
further investigation indicates that oil from a half height which had been placed on the landing area above, had migrated during cleanup/washdown operations to a channel section of the turbine
exhaust. It had lain there against a collection of rust debris until conditions were right for ignition to take place. No damage to equipment occurred, but the turbine remained shutdown until
inspections by the platfrom, <...> were completed. Weather: wind 40 kts/300 deg, sea 3.9m, temp 2.5deg c.
Whilst on turbine log keeping routine an operator was using a hand operated pumping unit to remove lub oil which was leaking from no2 bearing and created a pool below, containing some half a
gallon of lube oil. Some splashed onto hot steelwork (frame/cas ng) the temperature of the steelwork being sufficient to ignite the oil. He collected the nearest extinguisher just outside the
compartment, this was a bcf, this failed to extinguish the flames. He secured the next nearest some 10' away which was a dry owder type and successfully extinguished the flames with this. He
then alerted the mcr. No executive action was required.
Worker heard hiss from pinhole leak on a weld on a 3" gas line to a turbine. Detectors didn't pick it up-very open windy area. Isolated line and now running on diesel. Will remove spool with
view to finding cause and then repair/replace gas escape at p nhole leak on fuel spool reported to main control room. Plant supervisor investigated and instructed operator to put turbine over to
diesel. Leak isolated, production shut in and spool removed, for weld repair. Blanks fitted and production back on line. Further production shut down lead to reinstate repaired spool. System
de-isolated and production reinstated to normal. Line checked for leaks and turbine put back on gas.
During a platform esd lpg systems had fully depressurised. Whilst the module operator was carrying out pre-start up checks he observed lpg esccaping into the atmosphere from stream one and
two plently filter door seals.

After completion of "a" turbine major overhaul/upgrade, there were five start-up attempts. All of these were unsuccessful due to various control faults. At the fifth attempt to start the turbine, the
unit fired and reached 2900 rpm. At this point, it w s realised that a fire had developed in the exhaust plenum. The fire was caused by diesel in the exhaust space which was ignited by the hot
gases of combustion. A full scale investigation has been conducted and it has been found that a valve in the exhau t plenum was closed, thus not allowing any unburnt fuel to drain away.
Gas lift to the <...> test riser was opened up using 11 xcv 8071. The hp and lp vent trappings on the orifice carrier 11 fe 8018 were still in the open position and gas was released into the module.
The module operator heard gas escaping and isolated th upstream and downstream block valves. Low gas then one high gas was indicated on the fire and gas pannel on the mcc. All hot work on
the platform was immediately stopped and the immediate area cleared. High gas alarm cleared straight away.
At approximately 02:00 hrs <...> a general assistant was walking by the west side of module m4 (wellhead module) and smelt gas. It was reported to the control room and immediately
investigated. A positive indication of leak showed on meter coming from agging on the fuel gas header. The west system was isolated and the fuel gas users, 2 hp water injection turbines were
shutdown. The gas header was manually blowndown and purged with nitrogen.
Whilst carrying out normal duties a technician noticed a leak from the candelabra on oil well. The leak was seen to be coming from a pinhole in a dead end section of the candelabra. The leak
was immediately reported to the pss who isolated the well flow ine and depressurised the line via the test separator.
At 23:52 hrs low level gas alarm in mod 5 separation.full muster called cause was a one and half times half hole in the test sep 6 inch gas spike line to 2nd stage b separator with release of
crude.platform shut- down.approx 1m/3.possible cause-localised orrosion. Inspectors <...>,<...> and <...> aboard at time of incident. Preliminary details obtained. 1.o.i.m. Factual statement
2.site inspection 3.examination of corrosion records
A drain plug brew out of the "c" <...> cooler with subsequent water spray deluging 2 smoke detectors in the compartment, poisoning the same this activated the gpa and halon discharge. All
personnel proceeded to muster stations
At approximately 03:48 personnel were involved in preparing for a nitrogen/helium leak test on system <...> pig receiver. The operation was to replace a spade in the 2" blowdown line to the lp
flare with an orifice plate. The spade was isolated f om the live process (lp flare) by a 2" ball valve, the handle of which indicated that it was in the 'closed' position. After all the bolts on the 8
bolt flange had been slackened, the top four were removed. As the spade was being removed, gas was relea ed and detected by two gas detectors which were at a distance of seven metres and ten
metres north of the flange. The spade was reinstated and the flange bolted up and approximate pressure in line one p.s.i. The gpa sounded and all personnel mustered. A l personnel were stood
down at 04:05.
At 23:24hrs a call was recieved in the control room and radio room reporting that the <...> exhaust was on fire. The onduty safety operator and on shift fire team leader went to the area and
reported that flames were coming from a <...> gas turb ne exhaust at an installation manway and also at the expansion joint. The generator was shutdown locally. The gpa was sounded at 23:28
and all personnel mustered. The fire was extinguised as a result of the machine shutdown and co2 applied to the exhaust xternally.
Hydrocarbon gas was introduced to the dehydration inlet gas knock out drum for the first time on <...>. The objective was to pass gas through the dehydration skid and thence through the ngl
system in order to dry the pipework prior to chilling down th system in order to commission it. The gas exits the k.o drum via <...>. Shutdown valve (sdv) 3721/1 is positioned on this line and
isolates the k.o drum from the fitter separator which lies immediately downstream. The system pressure had bee brought up to 29 bar accross a period of approximately 2 hours. At 23:33, the gpa
annunciated and the process shutdown as a result of two gas heads detecting gas at a level of 25% lec. On examination of the valve it was conformed that the bleed screw on his valve was not
fully sealed.
Whilst putting an orifice plate into a carrier, the gas operator opened up the flow transmitter valves which lead into the analyser house. The metering technician had left open small vents on his
transmitter causing the gas alarm.
An instrument technician was investigating a process esd caused by level switch low low 3721 bridle on the dehydration inlet gas knock out drum - to blow the bridle down (to see if switch reset)
the bridle isolation valves were closed, the closed drain is lation valve opened followed by the bridle drain valve. At this time (04:05) gas escaped from a check valve due to the blanking end plug
being missing. The line was immediately isolated by closing the bridle drain valve but a gpa had been initiated due to gas detector being activated, this also caused a class 1 esd.

Hydrocarbon leak from 1" <...> clamp on slot 16 (b5) manifold. After completion of leak testing a permit was issued to loop check, calibrate and commission all instrumentation associated with
slot 16 (b5) and when the valve was opened oil was released from the <...> fitting. Further investigations show that the oil come back from the test manifold - which was at 9.8 bar operating
pressure via mov 1416 which was open.
The ice metering specialist was requested by the control room to investigate/recalibrate one of the two h2s analysers (at 3422-a) as its reading varied a great deal from that of the b analyser. In the
gas analyser room he isolated the supply gas to at 342 -a and removed the side mounted access cover. On doing this he noted that the lead acetate tape was discoloured on both the 'feed' & 'takeup' spools, indicating that the tape was contaminated prior to it passing through the gas stream. He informed the ontrol room who acknowledged and also advised him that they had 2x10% gas
indicated. The lid was immediately replaced and the gas analyser room door opened. At 16:07 hrs the gpa sounded due to 2x25% gas indication. All personnel went to muster. Checks ere made
to ensure no leakage of gas was present.
Prior to starting of pressurisation, the system limits had been established as per the p&ids, the flanges taped by the technician, and hoses run out to the connection points, but not connected. The
permit was raised at 1715 hours and preparatory work was ommenced in the fitting of the hoses to the injection and the blowdown points vc 3207 and vl 32185. At 1915 hours the comtec pump
unit was started and the pressure applied - this was monitored. At 1950 hours, witness was within the barricaded area and clo e to the hose which exploded. He ran to the area of the pump skid
and isolated a small valve on the pressure indicator 4022 c1 and informed the pump operator to stop pumping.
Generator p8001b was started at 11.10 for overspeed checks to be witness ed by lloyds. No problems were found after pre-start, external and internal checks were carried out. After lunch, the jb
engineer noticed smoke in the g.c.r and started to check each of the generators in turn. At this point, all four generators were running. When he entered b generator accessory compartment, an oil
leak was discovered at the vitaulic joint on the coupling guard feed/drain line. The turbine compartment was then checked and this was found to be the source of the smoke. The engineer
returned to the g.c.r where the density of the smoke had noticeably increased shutdown the generator and opened the g.c.r doors to try and dispute the smoke. At this time the gpa was initiate
upon hearing this he closed the g.c.r. Doors and proceeded to his muster station. All personnel were stood down at 13:53.
At 21:48 hours the platform shutdown on an esdi initiated by the 16" gas export pipeline hihi pressur switch pshh 3411. Approximately three minutes later the gpa was activated by 2 x 10% lel gas
detectors indicating gas on compression level 2 mezzanine, i the vicinity of the gas analyser housing. The process systems were shutdown and blowdown was initiated by the executive action of
the esd1. The source of the leak was traced to the downstream flange on psv 1700a. The system pressure was decreasing as a r sult of the automatic blowdown. The valve was isolated and the
leak stopped. The platform returned to normal status at 22:18 hours.
During normal operations the 2" elbow downstream of lcv 55022 on <...> developed a leak resulting in a release of liquid (water with 1000ppm methanol) two crew members working on adjacent
filter package heard the leak occuring, identified th source and isolated the length of pipework. In addition a welding operation on going on the deck above was stopped and permit returned to
control room.
The non return valve downstream of production seperator 'a' was being removed to check for internal damage. The valve bolts had been slackened, some removed and the jacks had been installed
with the flange parted. While preparing to remove the check val e by means of chain blocks, gas escaped form the non return valve flange joints and activat- ed the platform gas detector, and
subsequently the platform general alarm. The leak was not at full pressure or of a large volume. Blowdown occured in a controll d manner. Cause at present suspected as demister pad from the
slugcatcher coming loose and lodging behind the check valve. The mesh compacted with sand giving a gas tight seal and false isolation indication. During removal of the valve the demister was
isturbed allowing gas to escape. Passing valves in the plant allowed the gas build up to be maintained behind the demister pad.
<...> was operating in normal production mode and was unmanned. Plant pressure was 90 barg. At 1900hrs <...> the main platform control room received indications of <...> gas detectors above
20% lel. These continued to fluctuate until 2230 when <...> shutd wn automatically on confirmed gas detection. This requires 2 x 60% lel detections. Wells were shutdown and export pipeline
esdu closed. Wind speed had been falling and was only 5 knots when shutdown occured. Overnight windspeed picked up and turned fr m ne to sse becoming 25 knots. Raining throughout. At
1000 hrs <...>, the witnesses led by satellite oim <...>, visited by helicopter. Plant pressure had fallen to 80 bar g. Leak difficult to locate by sound with no background noise. A grease ipple on
2" plug valve attached to sand separator a was found failed. Lagging box was intact and iced up. Local isolations applied and new nipple fitted. Leak path was 1/8" diam internal pipe.

11:28 <...> crd. Accepted a low gas alarm from <...> platform. Gas detector was sited in south well bat, platform was immediately shut in. No fall in "locked in" pressure was detected.
Investigation team to <...>. Landed at 14:02. Small leak which was diff cult to detect was traced to the second destec joint on the active side of well <...>. Well was fully isolated and
depressurised.
<...> is a n.n.m.i and was unmanned at the time of the incident.at 03.15hrs a single low gas alarm activated. The <...> carried out the laid down procedure,part of which was to shut down the
platform process.this was done at 03.26 h s.at 08.35 hrs a team of three persons visited the platform to investigate the cause.a dester flange was found to have been leaking on a <...> flowline (the
first <...> flange on the flowline downstream from the wing valve). Wind speed was approximately 0 knts.
At 22:06 hrs <...> control room received a low gas alarm from <...> manifold area, gas head no 5. An investigation party of 5 persons arrived on rb at 23:29 hrs. <...> had commenced a shutdown
at 22:20 hrs and this was complete. On arrival the g s head was in alarm state but was reading zero % lel. Numerous tests were carried out using a portable gas detector and a positive leak was
found on a 1/2" isolation valve flange leading to <...>. This joint was inspected tightened and proven gas t ght at approx 0120 hrs. <...> was de-manned at 01:34 hrs.
An instrument tubing on the turbine lube oil system (turbine running, lube oil system at 9.5 barg) failed. This released into the alternative enclosure. Man detected the alarm in the turbine control
room, investigated then stopped the machine.
During commissioning activities on the gas treatment dehydration package, on inlet pipe gasket failed resulting in a gas release from the temporary gas sweetering vessel. The gas release although
significant resulted in no damage or injuries to persons in the vicinity other than a large gas cloud eminating outboard from the flange. The fixed gas detectors activated and shutdown the plant
automatically initiated gpa.
Upon reistatement of the oil production plant after a 24 hour shutdown a small hydrocarbon release was observed from the 2'' line to psv-03120. The leak was not significant and did not cause
damage or injury line isolated immediately and production ceased
During gas compression commissioning activities hydrocarbon gas was being introduced into the suction (27 bar) of the hp compressor via the inlet coolers and suction drum. The leak was not
significant and no injury or damage sustained after the leakage of gas vapour. The line was immediately depressured and isolated
A hydrocarbon oil leak was observed eminating from a 3/4'' drain line associated until the main 14'' oil export line. The leak itself was not significant and did not cause damage or injury. The line
was isolated and depressured immediately
A crude oil leak observed from a 3/4" drain line associated with main 14" oil export line.the leak was approximatley 25 litres in volume and did not cause damage or injury.the oil export was
shutdown immediatley ie level 2 from the central control room ma ually.the line was isolated and drained/depressured immediatley.the platform emergency response team was mustered as a
precaution,then stood down.
A .5" flange tapping severed, releasing hydrocarbons (live crude) into the area. Gas detectors immediatly detected the leak and tripped the process. Esdv valves closed, isolating the point of
leakage from the rest of the oil production train. A foam blank t was put down on the leaked oil. The oil was then washed down into the platform hazardous area open-drain systems. A smaller
leak had occured minutes previously from an instrument connection on the junction to the adjacent 'b' mol pump (it was not runnin at the time). In this case a pipe had sprung from a compression
fitting severed into a two-valve manifold.
Upstream of the gas sweetening vessel (v 1201) exists a flange system on the 12" process gas line and immediately upsteam of these flanges is a methanol injection point into this 12" line, which
is also flanged.under gas export conditions these flanges pa sed gas to the adjacent atmos- phere and activated the installation g.p.a. With 2 gas heads at low level going to alarm. The necessary
executive actions were automatically initiated by the f+g/esd console
Crude oil leak from c mul pump whilst on normal export rate;circa 190000 b.o.p.d.leak was noticed immediately and pump system shutdown in response (po 301 c).cause of leak appears to be a
hairline fracture of a weld on an impulse line on discharge of said pump.this impulse line serves pressure shutdown intrumentation.mode of failure of weld has not been positivley estabished
Flotation unit was out of service for maintenance, and the current process workpack for d22 requires that the minimum gas detection in the immediate vicinity be isolated due to the possibility of
small amounts of residential gas being evident. This was n t done and the subsequent gas muster the result.

Sales gas stream 1 located in mod b was onstream, when a gas alarm was indicated in the main control room. An area check was instigated, however, prior to any feedback, a second gas detector
activated and a a manual platform shutdown and muster was initia ed. The partial blowdown of plant followed. Production foreman reports source of gas leak to be sales gas stream1
densitometer. This infomation was relayed to the emegency teams via the safty supervisor. Wind speed 37 knots, direction 210 digrees, visi ility 3 miles seas 3m. A
On start up of turbine, passing s.o.v. Allowed small quantity of gas to permeate through turbine. Hood mounted detector registered prior to rapid dispersal via forced draught ventilation. On
arrival all traces of gas dispersed by forced draught ventilation
Minor gas release during maintenance activity on produced water gas flotation unit d22. The unit has been isolated and nitrogen purged in line with written procedures and the aerator lid raised
to enable internal seal repair. Continued purging with nitr gen caused residual hydrocarbon gas to escape and register on 9 local gas detectors with the closest one reaching alarm level of 20%
lel. All work on the platform was stopped and the module cleared of non-essential personnel. The lid was closed and the essel further purged to vent.
Gas detectors in process module b were activated at 0254. Three heads indicated showed 30%- 18%- 10%. Ir gas detector registered 100%. In keeping with platform emergency philosophy full
muster of all personnel took place. Process module b was checked out y team personnel with ba. Within 5 minutes of initial alarm gas levels had reduced on detectors. Further gas sweeps were
carried out without any trace of gas leakages found. No process work was carried out which could have damaged detectors. On completion of the muster further tests proved negative.
Srv 87a on e12 fueol gas lifted. This displayed a plug from the body of the valve exposing an approx 1/4" orifice to the atmosphere. The resulting gas leak initiated a single low level (20% lel)
gas alarm resulting in stoppage of work until the srv was isolated
Export gas stream 1 orifice plated inspected by metering department. On completion a pressure test was applied and a small leak was discovered on top cover plate. System was isolated and
depressured. The metering technician replaced the top cover 'o'ring seal. Prior to opening orifice carrier both sunp drain valves were opened to check for pressure/liquids. Leak testing system
was carried out by the area operator after hot work in the module was completed. The system was pressured with hydrocarbons to 00 psi when an audible sound of gas escaping was heard by the
area operator. He quickly ascertained where the leak was and isolated the two drain valves. Two i.r.gas detectors and one pellistor type gas head picked up the gas release causing an automati
plant shutdown yodels to sound.
B2 riser was hydrocarbon free and isolated for maintenance. A 1" drain valve on the annulus was routed to an open drain sump via a 1" hose for flushing prior to re-instatement of downhole pump
p-802. The flow of water to the drain sump disturbed stagnant as, which initiated h2s detector tg-13 to alarm (10ppm). The detector was sited immediately adjacent to the drain sump. A full
muster was called. The h2s level returned to zero within 10 minutes.
1/2" stainless steel closed drain line fractured, releasing low pressure oil and gas froim the closed drain. The fracture was due to "work hardining" of the line to vibration.
Low level gas alarm activated upon single head at 20%lel. All platform hot work stopped and module cleared of personnel. Area checked by production operator, who discovered leak on valve
cv46 gland. Valve located on compressor c-2a hot gas bypass line. Immediate action taken to tighten the gland packing which stopped thew leak.
Gas found to be present in module d laboratory and in module h drain sump. Plant running steady at the time. T14 well being depressurised to closed drain for removal of f2 conductor. Source
of gas emission assumed to be caused by the coorosion of pipew rk in v-29 below water level , allowing gas to return to modules d and h through open/safe area pipework.
Oil operator found high pressure produced water leak from corroded 3/4" nipple above drain valve on lt12 (seperator v3 water level trol). As he was isolating this, a high level gas alarm was
initiated from a gas head in the extract ducting local to the eak. One other head indicated 10 o/o lel. A muster was initiated. Operator completed isolation of level trol, emergency teams
checked area, all clear at 17:38 hrs.

The witnesses were in the process of changing out the orifice in fe 8010 prior to routing ps16 to v3 for a well test. Due to the current isolation philosophy and the fact that a good seal could not be
guaranteed on the orifice carrier, the procedure that as to depressure v3 to the lp flare which is at zero pressure, close the upstream and downstream isolation valves for the orificecarrier and vent
the orifice carrier down to the closed drain system via a 1/4" stainless steel line. The top plate was then r moved and the orifice plate changed out. The orifice plate was refitted with a new gasket.
Because of the possibility of a gas pocket lyiong in the top cover, the executive (shutdown) action of the adjacent gas heads was inhibited prior to opening the car ier. The detection was still and
would have given identification in the control room if a problem had arisen. This procedure was followed and the plate was replaced with no gas indicated on the adjacent gas heads. The carrier
was then slowly pressuried up via the hp flare and there were no leaks at 60psi. When the pressure was increased to 100psi a leak was noted coming from the top cover gasket, which was the
cause of the gas head 102 in the north extract ducting, indicating a level above the low level ga alarm (40%lel). 102 is an ir detector and extremely sensitive to gas detection. The gas head
Metal worker in module "e" reported smell of gas at south end. Control room stoppe hot work. No indication on fixed detection system. Leak traced with portable gas detector to gland of 2"
isolation valve on v11 bridle. Gland packing adjusted and leak ured. Still being monitored. ( the leaking valve normaly contains ngl. Due to partial gas plant shutdown, v11 was empty of ngl
held only gas at approx.. 500 psi.)
Team leader detected smell of gas in v3 seperator. Hotwork suspended until source of gas identified and cured. (no indication on fixed detection system). V3 seperator depressured and pcv15
gland packing adjusted. Subsiquently leak tested ok. To 300 psi
De-tagging of t201 process isolations was in progress in module b but with no associated valve movement. This activity was in preparation for planned nitrogen testing of the dga plant. The open
ended conneciton on the closed drain piping adjacent to t-2 1 referred to above had been noted (in accordance with the relevant isolation certificate). Operators were collecting tools to close the
connection. The air supply to ecv 8009 in module 'e' was recommissioned and the ecv left in its normal open operating osition. The upstream isolation ball valve <...> was then moved to the
open position with no significant audible indication of gas movement, or opening resistance reported by the operator. This unexpected ease of opening and lack of gas noise in icative of a low
pressure differential across the valve could not be explained. Approximately 1 to 2 minutes after opening the valve, the platform yodels activated, at which point the gas oprerator locally tripped
the ecv. In parellel to this incident, wo process operators in module b identified the source of the gas release which was from an open ended 1/2" stainless steel drain adjacent to t201. Assuming
this to be nitrogen, the operators reconnected the line and left the module for muster stations. Full platform muster was initiated and emergency response teams responded at the scene as per the
During annual inspection, slick noticed over position of <...> template, subsequent investigation showed leak from chemical umbilical at termination plate on the lower frame level of the template
During the annual pipeline inspection a diver discovered a leak on the two flexible 4@ lines terminating at the "t" piece connected to the 8" water injection pipeline. The leaks were discovered to
be emminating from the graylock connections. As soon as the leak was discovered, water injection to the field was stopped.
Well <...> was being prepared for production, using lift gas. High gas alarm in module b. Control room responded by calling gas muster. Fire and gas shutdown systems(psd1) and process
operations shutdown. Using emergency teams with scba and portable ga monitors, the source of the leak was found to be from field panel 1, hydraulic reservoir in module b. Well <...>
hydraulic supply to subsea safety valve (sssv) was isolated and the gas levels was seen to reduce. <...> was identified as the porbable sourc due to sssv tests being carried out joust prior to the
incident.
During normal production operations a 1/2" drain line separated from the main 16" crude line to/from the crude oil storage tanks. A cleaner working within the module immediately evacuated to
inform operations techs of the incident. The resultant gas rele se activated the platform esd loop. The resultant cause and effects of these 2 actions led to a full and successful platform shutdown.
The oim ordered the muster alarm to be sounded and subsequently, the evacuation of non-essential personnel from the pla form. This dully occurred in a calm, controlled and efficient manner,
all persons being evacuated to the <...>. The responding fire teams, wearing compressed air ba, re-entered the module to lay a foam blanket, whilst members of the operations team also wearing
ba, entered to conduct further manual isolations of the associated pipework. The leak was plugged and gas levels within the module were monitored. Approx 9 tonnes of crude oil were leaked
over a period of 20 mins. When gas levels were below 10% lel, remaining personnel were withdrawn from the module, the hvac vents opened and the fans turned on. The area was subsequently
monitored and declared safe. There were no accidents or injuries during this incident. All personnel conducted their d ties in a responsible and efficient way.
At 1330 hours the casing of the cleanout pump, in module 8, split, the pump was not in service at the time. A production technician in the module witnessed what had happened, activated the
platform esd and telephoned the control room. At the same time gas was detected in sufficient quantity to automatically release the halon. Both these actions automatically shutdown, isolated and
depresurised the production facilities. Manual isolation was effected within minutes of the initial leak. Platform personnel we e brought to muster stations, and a foam blanket was laid in the
module by the fire team. When the gas concentration had decayed naturallly to a safe level the module fans were started to disperse the residual. Platform personnel were stood down at 1426 h
urs. Investigation into the incident was started immediately. There were no injuries to personnel.

A gas alarm, one head at 20% lel, registered for mod 11a in the ccr. Control operator immediately informed safety and operations out on the plant, who responded to investigate. Upon arrival onsite a gas leak was evident. The glc was shutdown from the cc r and the general alarm sounded. The leak was traced to the cracked impulse line to the hp compressor pi 2898.
A gas head alarmed in the ccr (reaching 100% lel). The first senior prod. Tech. On the scene confirmed the gas leak to the ccr. The general alarm was sounded. The <...> compressor was already
shut down. Upon investigation it was discovered that the syst m had not depressurised as the vent valve, xcv 2846, had not opened. The boundary valves were isolated and xcv 2846 was jacked
open to depressurise the system and stop the leak.
Reported by prod tech while on his plant inspection of a gas leak from the glc hp compressor discharge cooler. No fixed gas heads in the mod picked any trace of the leak. At the time there was a
good air flow through the module. Operating pressure of t e cooler 2400psi plant condition stable. No persons injured. The leak was from the floating head face joint on the tube shell type
exchanger. Incident reported to the supvr who investigated then instructed the ccr to shut down the hp gas compressor. T e suction line isolation block valve was also closed reported to the oim
that the situation was under control.
A weld fractured on the nitrogen injection line on the compressor suction header pipework resulting in the gas release
An xmas tree had been installed on <...> well <...> foldwing completion <...> was testing the scsssv and control line utilising a tree connection. Simultaneously tests were being carried out on the
5 1/2 bore of the xmas tree holding open the mast r gate valve and 3/8 hydraulic oil line fitted to the altuator manifold. The actuator was pressuriesed and the hand pump removed. <...>
completed his tests and removed his equipment from the tree, he turned away to leave the area when the needle valv assembly blew off of the actuator manifold and struck him on the back of his
upper back and head were sprayed with hydraulic oil but he was otherwise uninjured. Investigation showed that the swagelok connector joining the assembly to the actuator had bee made up
onshore before despatch but was only finger tight, another connection of the same design on another tree tree not yet installed, was also found finger tight.
Whilst commissioning the heating medium system and waste heat recovery units some heating medium fluid trapped within the heat transfer coil of 'c' heat exchanger was heated by the hot
exhaust gases of the on line generator. The oil expanded and was eject d from a 3/8 vent line on a pressure indicator which had been left in the open position. This oil contaminated the
adjacentinsulated pipework on contact woth a hot unlagged flange the oil reached ignition temperature the small fire was rapidly extinguishe by an engineer working on adjacent equipent using
one 12kg dry powder extinguisher. Investigation showed that the fluid should not have been present within 'c' recovery unit pipework as commissioning was confined to the off-line generator and
system. Thi oil had been accidentally trapped between blockvalves by commisioning errors.
Nitrogen from the n2 utility generator/system was being used to purge/ dry the fuel gas make up line/from export manifold a hose had been used to connect unility take off to the pipework. Due to
a shutdown of the nitrogen generator back pressure from l.p. Flare allowed gas to back flow into the n2 header as there was no non-return valve at the hose/ utility point. This header also supplies
the n2 purge to the chiller. Hence gas migrated to this enclosure and was detected at the outlet lourves.
On arrival at not normally manned satellite <...>, a gas leak was observed during the standard pre-checks. It was from the flange connecting the actuator to the body of pressure control valve pd1c
on the outlet of the test separator. No auto dete tion was activated. The valve was manually isolated and the section of line was depressurised. Gas released, dispersed readily beneath the windfall
@ 1-2 away.
Sd 500 is a switch gear set located in the emergency generator room. This switch gear is normally powered via another board from the main generators. In times of main generator failure the
back-up (emergency) generators power this board to allow various ystems needed for maintenance of platform or emergency duties to receive power. It is believed that snow was blown into the
cabinet due to the squalls and unusual wind direction, this melted and when a diesel transfer pump was energised the water caused a short circuit of the breaker to this pump set. There was no
fire as a smell of burning was noticed by staff who were in the area. They immediately shutdown the system. A fire alarm was manually raised but personnel were stood down when it was
realised hat the situation was controlled. Work permits cancelled when the muster was called were not re-issued pending investigation of the incident. The platform was not in production as
production had been shut in at 2300 hrs <...> due to a diesel fuel shor age. Power to platform was still being supplied by the main generator, this unit tripped at 0730 hrs. The cause of this was
was later ascertained to be the run down of the 24 volt battery which supplies control circuits. We were not able to effect a re ower of the system from the main generators, due to the isolation of

As part of the offshore testing programme for the subsea facilitie, the 10'' water injection pipeline from platform to the east water injection manifold was subject to hydrotest. The limits of the test
were the topside piping of uq and the flowbase valves on the various subsea wellheads. Include the test therefore were the manifold and 5'' flexible jumpers which tie back each wellhead to the
manifold. At 2345 on <...> the hydrotest crew onboard the platform noticed a sudden loss of pressure from 519.7 barg (test pressure) to zero a call was made to the diving support vessel <...> to
investigate. At 0438 on <...> the <...> arrived on location and an rov inspection revealed that the 5'' flexible jumper connecting the manifold to wellhead ' h' had ruptured an investigation by rov
and divers revealed that in addition to the ruptured 5'' jumper, the impact arising from rapid depressurisation of the jumper had caused damage to the manifold and the wellhead flowbase.
A 2 flexable air supply hose parted at the coupling whilst being used to supply air pressurised to 21 bar to the 10 gas line pig launcher. Two compressors were sited on the module roof and two
supply hoses suspended vertically over a 35-40 metre section. He hose had been previously tested to 40 bar and were secured to adjacent steelwork and handrailing at regular intervals and
secured together. All equipment was shut down and the launch valves closed. Investigation showed minor damage to handrails and the hose damaged beyond repair at the coupling there were no
injuries to personnel.
During plt logging on b18 the production master and swab valve were closed in error - 15,00ft of wire and a radioactive source were trapped downhole.
Drilling department were doing a through tubing workover in <...>, an oil well which had not been flowing since <...>. A pes straddle packer had been set in the 5.5 tubing from 4376 ft to 4428 in
an attempt to straddle a leak in the 5.5 tubing at 4403 ft identified by running a plt log in <...>. To test the straddle assembly the 'a' annulus had been lubricated twice by bleeding off pressure to
the test separator then pumping inhibited sea water into the annulus. This operation was being monitored by rilling personnel in the wellhead when a loud popping noise (similar to an air hose
blowing off a connection under pressure) was heard and a plume of mist/gas was seen coming from the vicinity of the gauge panel on bb-25-xmas tree. The hazard alarm was ac ivated within 2 to
3 seconds and all processes shutdown automatically drilling personnel vacated the area, reporting to the control room. An operations technician went to investigate, identified the leak source, and
closed the 'a' annulus pressure gauge r ot valve. Forced ventilation quickly cleared the gas (all gas heads below 25% lel 12 mins after initial release) and oil production resumed at 0023hrs
subsequant investigation revealed that a swagelok coupling had failed under pressure and further examina ion indicates that the pipe had not been fully entered into the ferrule and the nut had not
Casing had just been installed to a shoe depth of 4144m and the casing was suspended at well head. Preparations were then made to cement the casing in place. During the cementing operation
the casing suddenly sliped and the cement head manifold and surfac lines were sheared off. The casing slipped a total of 24m from the rotary table to 1m below the wellhead.
Well e2 wireline work in progress. Wireline crew running in hole with armed perforating gun. At approx. 200' gas began to leak from within the brainded wire into the module until the well was
isolated at the sub surface safety valve and successfully dep essurised. Unable to pull out due to wire becoming stuck in the lubricator grease tubes due to freezing associated with the gas release.
After stopping the gas release, wire eventually freed off. Once temperture returned to ambient, toolstring recovered nd perforation gun disarmed
Routine workover on well <...> (oil produciton) replacing tubing/ subsurface safety valve. Circulating undiluted water when a 'kick' occured. Well shut down platform went into red alert
coastguard informed later pin gas circulated and platform status no green
At the time of the incident coiled tubing was pulled from well 2 - 3 where it had been used for a gas lift trial. From a depth of 1300ft bsv tubing was pulled to 917ft bsv when the operator heard
nitrogen escaping from the tubing in the vicinity of the i jector gooseneck. The operator stopped pulling out of the well and closed the bops, pipe rams then followed procedure contacting the
central control room and well service supervisor. The nirtogen bled off completely over 5 minutes. The double check valv s on the bottom hole assembly prevented any back flow up the coiled
tubing. The well was shut in at the time and not capable of flowing naturally. Inspection revealed a fracture approx 1/3 circumference of the tubing at the mid point of the injector goo eneck. The
coiled tubing was subsequently cut and spliced and recovered to surface.
While running out of the hole (t5) with coil tubing, the coil tubing tools pulled off the tubing in the stuffing box. This resulted in a release of nitrogen from the well and the coil tubing at surface,
as a result the well was closed in. A
Having drilled to td of the resevior section. The drill string was being puuled out of hole for logging. When pulled to 2673m it was observed that the hole had taken inadequate fluid. Flow
checks showed well to be static. The drill string was run back to bottom and the well circulated to remove any influx thru choke manifold. Gas in the returns activated the platform gas detection
heads and confirmed there had been an influx.

The <...> sub sea well had been shut in during spudding operations by <...>.at 2220 hrs gas lift was introduced to commence bringing on <...> well after being informed that spudding ops
completed by <...>. Gas lift flow dropped off to s bsea well and gas lift changed to kick off gas. Small amount of gas detected at vacuum breaker caisson was manually vented to lp flare. No other
damage sustained no injury
Wind: light visibility: good site supervisor: <...>. A ball valve of aprox. 3 tons was being moved on <...> main deck using the aw crane. An attempt was being made to re-orientate the valve
through 90 degrees <...> who was not involved in this work but was crossing the area was crushed against a cargo container. He was taken by stretcher to the sick bay and a medivac flight
requested. A helicopter which was in the area was diverted to thames and <...> and an attedant were flown directly to <...> hospital. On examination <...> was found to have a fractured pelvis and
was detained in hospital
West crane lifting unit (2.5tns) from small external platform on the drilling derrick to lower to the weather derrick. Ip on platform to connect up lifting gear on unit onto crane and guide driver.
Ip instructed crane driver to lift. During the lift th load swung ti tge left trapping and injuring the ip whose escape was obsrtucted by an empty drum and scaffold tubes.
Injured person was stacking some heavy steel plate on the pipedeck and stacked two bundles in a vertical position against a sampson post. A third bundle wa being lifted in by the crane. The ip
was guiding this in with a tag line and he was about to stack this bundle against the other two. During the operation, the two stacked bundles fell foward and hit the ip on the right side of his
body. He sustained injury to his face, neck, shoulder and arm. Ip was transferred to <...> by helideck
<...> south crane hook was disengaged from cargo, landed on mv <...> deck. The banksman signalled for the crane operator to lift his wire. As this took place, the hook was snatched from an
<...>'s hands, and a bight in the crane wire hit an adjacent deck h nd in the face.
3 1/2 length of drill pipe slipped from bungle the end of whichf fell between sampson post. With the result of hitting injured parties left foot.
Heavy wall pipe spool for new riser instillation delivered to platform in half height containers. Spools removed and temporarily stored on scid deckprior to sorting and moving to job sites.
Injured man was looking amongst spools for some pipe supports wh n one of the spools approx. 4 1/2m in length moved and hit his left leg. Spool 4 1/2m x 8'' dia x 804 kg.
Electrical technician was reinstating a motor control cubicle following modifications into the drilling switch board. The busbar shutter mechanism impinged upon the internal conductors resulting
in a severe arc. This arc caused considerable damage to the ubicle and truck in addition to inflicting injuries
Whilst removing actuator from valve bonnet, loosened slings to turn actuator through 90 degrees to disengage. Actuator dropped and crushed ring finger ting gear on unit onto crane and guide
crane driver. Ip instructed crane driver to lift. During the lift (approx. 2ft off the platform) the load swung to the left trapping and injuring the ip whose escape was obstructed by an empty drum
and scaffold tube
The ip and a colleague were lifting, by crane, bundles of angle iron from a 40' basket. The ip caught the crane safety pennant with his left hand with the intention of latching the crane hook to a
bundle of angle iron. The pennant was swinging and he ar ested the swing of the pennant this placed a strain on his left arm and elboe. He sustained fluid and torn muscles to his left elbow.
On completion of lifting a seawater riser from the horizontal to vertical position on the weather deck with the platform crane, the riser swung and knocked over one of the deck assistants who was
positioned to steady riser. The ip fell and the riser crush d the ips left leg against a scaffold rack. The riser then swung backwards and the other member of the work party went to the ips
assistance. Lighting and wing conditions satisfactory
The drilling crew were preparing a29 well for a drilling operation, the job in work was nippling up a bottom riser section on the skid deck. The riser section of pipework had been lowered into
position and an instruction was given by the driller to <...> (lead floorman) to remove the pennant lines that had been used to lower the riser section into position. <...> susbsequently positioned
himself on top of the riser section and started to undo the shakles securing the pennants. While <...> was arrying out this operation the driller and fllorman proceeded to lower a bx-137 seal ring
on a soft line down from the drill floor above the skid deck. The seal ring was placed over the top of the guide string prior to lowering. As the seal ring was being lowered from the drill floor the
soft line rubbed against the guide string and snapped. The seal ring which weighs approx. 15lbs fell approx 15ft stricking <...> on his back and left arm. At this stage the tool- pusher was informed
and the platform med c called to render assistance.<...> was subsequently medivaced from the installation and after medical examination was found to have substained severe bruising to his back
and left arm.

Due to oversight, elevators were in wrong position to clear chicksaw line. As elevators were lowered they hung up on the chicksaw momentarily and then came free. This caused <...> to trap his
finger between the elevators and chicksaw.
Whilst backloading containers ip was struck on the face by the crane wire. The wire had been caught under part of a skip, as ip proceeded to unhook the container the wire sprung free due to the
vessel movement.
Drill crew were laying a 15 inch pup joint of drill pipe out of the v door. The injured person was assisting to push the pup joint over to the north side of the v door in order to land it in a clear area
as the pup joint swung over the injured persons fi ger was trapped between the pup joint and the v door guard rail.
The drilling floormen were transporting cement from the chemicals store to the top deck. Whilse trying to fit lifting forks into a pallet loaded with sacks of cement, the trolley supporting the
pallet rolled towards one of the floormen, trapping his left foot. He rapidly pulled his foot out of his boot. Because the trolley had bent up the toe cap of his boot, when he pulled his foot out.
The inner edge of the protective toe cap scraped across his toes and damaged his big left toe nail. No equipment was damaged and the atmospheric condition were not relevant.
Three technicians were removing the front cover plate of p302 electrical supply terminal box. Unknown to them at this satge, the backplate is fitted in two parts. The cable entry side of which is
not secured to either the pump motor casing or sideplate, ( o reference in manufacturer manual either). The bolts were removed from around the front cover plate by the technicians who were
positioned at either end and in the centre of the terminal box. As the cover plate was prised from the backplate/ motor causin , the cable entry half of the backplate detached from the cover plate
(backplate was held on briefly by the mastic type rubber compound used to ensure seal) and fell stricking a technicians right foot lacerating upper of safety boot and causing severe bru sing and
suspected broken toe.
A 1" drain hose had been lowered from the rig floor to the wellheads during the rig up for wireline work on slot 13. Subsequently the hose was secured at the rig floor. The hose was made up of
2 lenghts connected by a h.p.'walter' coupling. During the ecuring of the hose the coupling snagged on the rotary table causing the quick connect sleeve to disengage. The lower hose fell to the
impact deck (approx 40 - 45 ft) and struck a scaffolder , who was erecting an access platform on the impact deck, on th back of the left hand.
A bundle of 8" long scaffold tubes was being lifted from a half height container using the platform crane. Ip had positioned himself inside the container and was acting as banksman for the lift, as
the bundle was lifted the load swung towards his midrift, to fend it off he raised his foot, in so doing he incurred injury to his foot.
While running a <...> pack-off running tool on drillpipe from the drill floor to the wellhead,the threaded retaining ring 9upper-part of the pack-off assembly)fell off 25ft above the casing head.the
item struck and bounced off the wellhead and hit a <...> service enginneer on the right shoulder and upper chest. Some slight movement of the running tool was observed while a connection was
made. The threaded ring has an internal j slot profile,the ring was made up onto the running tool by the <...> engin eer on the rig floor
I.p. Was involved with moving pipework from fabrication area to constru- ction work site. The type of pipework being transfered was cunifer which is easily damaged. The pipework was slung
with two wire slings shackled through the backing ring on the pip work(see the attached sket- ch). As the pipework was being lifted, the riggers attempted to steady the load and prevent it
striking other objects in the area. As the weight was taken by the crane, the pipework shifted slightly. In order to prevent it s riking nearby objects the i.p. Took hold of the top of the pipework.
As he did this the backing ring came into contact with the flange if the pipework, trapping his right thumb. The load was immediatly lowered and his thumb could then be released. Pipe ork was
20" in dia. The load was lifted to a hight of approx. 3-4"
Ip was working on the pipedeck catwalk. This involved laying out tubing onto dunnage, using single joint elevators connected to the rig floor tugger. Once three joints had been laid out. They
were bundled up and set aside using the crain. As the single jo nt elevators were removed from the joint on the catwalk the ip was looking towards the crane hooks prior to slinging the tubing.
Joint at the north end of the catwalk rolled off the dunnage onto <...>'s right foot.
Ip was preparing to move a high pressure pump unit from the after deck into the test container adjacent to the work station. The vessel shipped a light sea over the stern which displaced the pup
unit, causing it to strike ip in the lower leg. This resulte in a 21/2" laceration as ip was unable to move away due to the presence of another pump blocking his exit route. The wound required 5
sutures and 2 steri strips before sterile dressing was applied.

The air supply to the blast pot compressor had been shut off and depressured so that an investigation could be made to determine the fault on the grit blasting equipment. The <...> line was
uncoupled at the base of the pot, and although all pressure safety relief valves were open the pot did not depressure. Consequently when <...> uncoupled the the ogar line high pressure air and
grit was released hitting him on the back of the left hand. Upon further investigation a blockage in the nozzle was found to be caused by a small stone. The equipment has been returned to shore
for a full investigation.
When erecting a scaffold. A ledger tube slipped out of the hands of the scaffolder. As it came out of the fitting the tube fell vertically approx. 15' before rebounding off pipework and deck and
finally striking ip on the back of the neck. The ip was work ng approx. 18' horizontally from the base of the scaffolding. Light in the module was satisfactory and since module is enclosed wind
conditions are not considered a contributory factor.
The ip was returning argon gas cylinders to a transportation rack.as he turned his back to the rack a cylinder toppled over, the valve body of the cylinder striking him on the back of the right leg
just below knee level. On subsequent inspection the base late of the rack was found to be distorted.
Completed welding job, removed screen and was immediately hit on head by a piece of wood 9" x 9", which had fallen from above.
During commissioning work on the platform lifeboat no 1, some adjustments were made to the fall wires - this was under permit control including an isolation certificate against power to the
winch, so as to allow the wire falls to be adjusted using the man al operating handle. The watercraft represenative requested the power to be re- instated so as to check the wires were lying
correctly when operated,and also to check the davit limit switches were correctly set. The winch motor was "inched" whilst starti g the checking of the wires. The manual operating handle had not
been removed. As soon as the motor turned, the handle rotated at high speed, it made contact with a fixed part of the frame and the handle snapped. The broken section "flew" some 20 feet, and
hit ip on the shoulder.
The ip was standing next to a drilling mill which was standing on its pin after recovery from down hole. The tool pusher drilling supervisor and service hand were examining the mill, the mill
overbalanced and fell onto ip's foot landing above the protecti
Transportation of pipe spools was taking place on a barrow/trolly to a suitable location for radiography inspection. In order to negotiate a path through the module it was required to swivel the
spool on the trolly to pass an obstruction. The spool slip ed and fell to the deck trapping <...>'s finger.
During the rebuilding of a <...> pump the fluid end was being attached to the air motor by means of three stud bolts. The fluid end weighs approximately 25lbs. The fluid end had been listed into
position and one of the three nuts installed. The mechanic reached over to lift the second nut when the fluid end fell to the deck. As it fell over it trapped the mechanics left hand between the
fluid end and the bund that surrounds the pump assembly.
Employee was assisting in racking bundles of scaffold tubes. During the processof unloading a bull dog clip, wich restricted the wire slings from slipping, the bundle shifted and traped the
injureds foot. He sustained a broken right middle toe.
During the investigation of the incident frie hoses were run out on the south side of the cellar deck. As one length of hose was pressurised the female instantaneous hose coupling connected to a
jet/spray brnach shattered. This allowed the branch to bre k free, and resulting jet reaction thrust the end of the hose and remaining part of the coupling into the ribs of ip.. On seeing the incidetn
occur the hydrant operator immediately shut of the water supply to the hose. The leader of emergency team 2 and other team members went to the aid of ip, and the medic and first aid team were
summoned to the cellar deck to treat ip.
Manual unloading of 1" coil tubing from a 40' open basket on the pipedeck had just commenced. The contents of the basket also included 4.5" tubing. A man was positioned at each end of the
basket to remove the 1" tubing. As the first 1" tube was being r moved, the tubing slipped longitudinally, trapping ip's right index finger against the end of of the basket. Ip went to see the
platform medic for treatment to lacerations and contusions.
Whilst turning the isolator handle of the switchboard feeder to condensate booster pump p1202b to the off position, a fault occured within the cubicle, which created an electrical 'flash' that came
back onto the operators hand. Caused burns to left hand
Thirty-three personnel were evacuated from the platform when power was lost due to a generator failure. Power was restored later the same day. No damage or injuries.

Two workers, employed by <>, were told to go up in the "cherry-picker" to grease equipment on the derrick. It was observed that the "cherry-picker" was moving too quickly, and shortly after
the hydraulic crane (which is assumed to be located on the platform) collapsed and the basket plunged 17 feet on to the deck of the support ship <>. One of workers died after receiving serious
head and chest injuries. The other suffered broken ribs and neck and shoulder injuries. An inquiry was set up in order to investigate the circumstances around the accident.
Pollution, mixture of sheen and solids, being one mile long and 4-5 ft wide was spotted close to the platform and running se. All production shut down. Source of pollution is probably the pipeline
between the platform and the <> platform. It is planned for an internal pipeline check and pressure test.
At 1500 hrs a worker (scaffolder) fell off the west face of the platform and 30 m down into the sea. He was in the water for 2 mins before being rescued by a fast-response boat from the nearby
stand-by vessel <>. Medical assistance arrived from shore, but after a short while they declared him dead. It was later revealed that the scaffolder was struggling to get from the scaffolding on
to a walkway because his safety line had become snagged, and hence his colleagues unclipped his safety harness, disentangled the line and passed it back down to him, a 10 sec. Manouevre that
was common practice. Before the safety line reached him, he started shaking violently and breathing heavily and fell to the sea.
At 0743hrs on the <...> the mv <...> propulsion failed. A precautionary level 3 emergency shutdown trip (esd3) was initiated by the <...>. This shut the <...> platform production and export
facilities down. The loading hose was also re eased as a result of the esd3 and a small oil spil of less than <...> entered the sea. The loss of the tanker propulsion system resulted from the
emergency stop button being operated when the engine went full ahead in an uncontrolled manner a full invest gation of the underlying causes in underway by a joint <...> team. Results of this
will be provided when available.
Weather: wind 070o 30 knots, sea state 2.9m max wave 4.1m supply vessel <...> unloaded cargooon qp position south side of <...>. When ship lost power on the starboard propeller the port
quarter touched the sw leg(a1)on the ship some paint was stri ped off. On the south side of the leg a1. 1m above the water minor damage to the coating was observed.
<...> advised <...> that the <...>,one of its <...> field standby vessels,had suffered damage to its bridge after being struck by a large wave and was disabled. Dropped anchor at <...>. The <...>,an
<...> standby vess l advised <...> that the <...> was dragging her anchor and was drifting towards the <...> platform.all <...> manned platforms were advised of the situation. <...>,<...> duty
manager was advised. <...> was advised that the <...> was 450 m tres from <...>. <...> was already shutdown. <...> was esd'd and vented.vessel missed by a few yards and continued drifting
sse.advised by coastguard that under current wind and sea conditions the <...> would miss the two <...> platforms by 2 3 miles.advised that the supply vessel <...> was due infield eta 1400 to
assist in towing. Advised the dawn warbler had slipped anchor at <...>. <...> passed <...> platforms comfortably. Weather conditions: wind 300 degs 40 knot
Psv <...> was offloading portable water and oil base mud at north side of platform when she struck shaft 5 just above sea level. Subsequently, in pulling away from platform the vessel took two
loading hoses, breaking them and dislodging the hard pipe lines at the loading station away from the platform structure. Wind speed : 30/36 knots:wind direction = 210 degrees sea state = sig
4.7m max 7m, period 7.14 seconds
The <...> had been alongside <...>, on the east side since 0900 hrs, on <...> between 1315 and 1400hrs the platform cranes were in their rests because of helicopter operations. The vessel
remained alongside during this time. A approximately 1420 hrs whilst awaiting the final lift of backload and the accompanying manifest, part of the vessel's deck fittings or deck cargo on the
starboard quarter of the vessel became hooked up on the bights of the platforms bulk mud and portable water bunkering hoses which were hanging in their normal stowage posistion. As a result of
the vessel manoevering to extricate itself, damage was sustained to brent bravo as follows: 1 scaffold walkway external to m2e badly twisted. 2 both bulk mud and po table water hoses were
broken. 3 both hard piped loading lines were bent, and manifold valves were considerably displaced, to the extent that one mud line approximately 50 feet away from the manifold was fractured.
There were no injuries to any personnel,
<...> was standing close by <...> platform discharging cargo. A collision occured when the distance between the vessel and the no. 1 lifeboat station was misjudged. The prevaillling conditions
were as follows: wind: wsw 25 knots current: from west t 1 knot sea: 1.5 metres 3 seconds swell: light. The vessels navigational lampstand was damaged. Damage to no.1 lifeboat is in the
processs of being evaluated.

After picking up a line from the <...> the tug <...> allowed himself to turn and take the tide on the beam. The vessel was then carried into the installation <...>. The tug mast came into contact
with the sw corner navigation light station. The t g hull buffers made light contact with <...> west leg. Damage: 1. Structural damage to the sw corner <...> nav light station north and south side
support steel/cable tray. 2. Damage to lighting stanchion - south side of nav station. 3. Damage to mast of <...>.
The <...> was manoevreing on the north face of the platform when the mate who was in charge of the controls failed to maintain the vessel on station.conseqently it contacted the platform leg and
bent a ladder on the leg (part of the tertiary struct re).the vessel suffered a minor dent.
Standby vessel was called up by radio officer on the installation to come close to platform for close standby duties as men were working overside on west side of the platform. Standby vessel was
at that time approximately 0.5 miles from the platform. Th master manoeuvred the vessel until the vessel was heading 000deg on auto pilot with the port main engine engaged and 25/30% pitch
on bridge control proceeding to a point - 0.1 n miles from the nw platform leg. The master who at this time was doing some w rk at the chart table found the vessel drifting underneath the
installation overhang and before he could do any manoevring the nw structural support member came into contact with the starboard rader mast and main navigaiton mast the the vessel. Damage
to the vessel was confined to starboard railings around the monkey island, rader scanner and navigation which were both demolished. No damage has been found the the structural member (n
west) of the platform. The vessel then drifted off the installation.
Ne corner of platform struck a damaging blow sbv - damage to bow and railing platform paint scratched.
While tripping out of the hole on well no. <...> inwind speeds around 50 knots, the magnetic sensor, which was attached to the travelling block to activate the kinetic energy monitor, hit an
obstuction which sheared off the securing bolts. Subsequently, th magnet fell to the drill floor, llanding on the reserve side set back area
While picking up a joint of 5 1/2 inch tubing, a roughneck incorrectly latched the pick up elevators. (did not ensure the latch was in correct positio or instal the safety pin). The pipe was lifted
from the mouse hole to the 'v' door. When the base of t e pipe hit the v door ramp the top came free from the elevators. The pipe sliped down the v door and on to the pipedeck. No injuries were
sustained. Weather conditions were fine10 knt winds.
After picking up load from pipe deck the driver slowed the crane in a s.w. Direction towards the supply boat the boat was discharging water and diessel to the platform as the load cleared the
platform's s.w. Corner and was over the sea it began to free fa l the load fell 30ft before the cranes system brought it to a halt
Oil density probe weight approx 2 lwt being lifted by west crane from load bay. Load was double reeved and choked with3mtr 1 tonne wire strop strop parted at mid point whilst over sea loosing
probe.
Weather; wind 110 @ 18 knots, sea state: 4-5 feet, visibility: 10 mile plus, conditions : fine. Crane driver, <...> using platform east crane (manitowoc s.c. 70) to backload nowsco diesel pump
unit (weight 12.2 t) onto deck of supply vessel <...>. Load being positioned over deck of vessel involving simultaneous lowering and booming down of crane boom. On reaching the appropriate
position, the crane driver returned the boom lever to the neutral position. The boom continued to travel down ards and the load descended approximately 25 ft onto the deck of the vessel. The
vessel successfully manouvered to disconnect the load and pull away from the platform. Subsequently, the crane " was found to be damaged no personal injuries sustained
On the morning of <...> at approx. 0840 i called in the <...> to commence back-loading all the coiled tubing drilling equipment. This back-loading included lifts in excess of 10t but initially with
wind speeds of 30 knots and a sea state of 1.5 metr s we completed several small lifts to see how the boat handled the tide/wind. We back loaded an empty n2 tank at 6t with no problems followed
by several smaller lifts. I consulted with the boat and crane driver and also observed the situation myself. All elt that there were no problems with the n2 tanks. The boat was happily holding
station close to the platform when required. I took up position outside the accomodation door south to observe the first lift going down. I observed the lift being slewed out o be positioned over
the boat. The driver appeared to lower the load but it juddered down approx. 1 foot. At this time i heard an alarm that i assumed was the mipeg. The driver then stopped and the boom went up and
the lift was stabilised. Once the lift w s stable again the driver commenced lowering and the load appeared to just pay out until it hit the side of the boat and the tank up-ended itself to finish pright
on the aft end. There was no indication of n2 leaking but the crane headache ball lodged its lf in the tank structure. The boat crew managed to free the crane hook and after discussion departed for
The crane driver <...> was lifting the <...> crane boom out of the rest. At about 4ft up the boom stopped rising, he looked at the weigh load indicator and found that the whip line had hooked up.
He was about to lower the boom when the hook ca e free causing the pennant to come off the hook and the whip line ball to hook on the cat head access handrail. The jaws of the whip line hook
had opened allowing the pennant to jump off into the sea. The crane was lowered into the rest and taken out of s rvice pending an inspection.
Lifted load off production deck. Weight of load 2 tonnes. Getting clear of deck turn, taking load over the side to put down on boat, when clear of the platform and lowering to the boat the
headache ball came adrift from the line dropping the load onto the boat. Wind speed 180/10 knots wave height 3ft visibility 2-3 miles

An empty container was being transferred from the helideck to the galley landing area using the whip line of the south crane. During the lift the "whip line limits" were activated and the load
payed out striking a helidack light and damaged a cable pressu e reducing valve on the valve on the whip line limits hydraulic circuit it payed out quickly (faster) instead of inching out under
control (slowly). On inspection it was found that the pressure reducing valve had scored a seal. Weather at the time of the ncident was: wind direction 250 speed 17 knots. Visibility 8 miles
general conditions rain/mist
Whilest lifting a half ton collection tank in a direct lift with two one ton slings one sling failed on the eye attached to the five ton shakle which was attached to a one ton chain block.the load fell
approximately six inches striking a fire hydrant and ending the valve spindle
Whilst backloading container approx 2 tons, crane operator posistioned load over mv <...> and applied slew break. Having lowered the load about 20ft he disengaged slew break and engaged slew
lever intending to slew left. At this point the crane sl wed right, operator successfully landed the load. Investigations showed shearing of the slew drive shaft. Having no other means of arresting
the slewing motion once the slew drive shaft had sheared,the crane responded as a weather vane in the wind.
Deck crew had been asked to transport two items into the utility leg, and land them at the 124m level. The items were an electric pum and a reel of electric cable. The pump was rigged with two
shackles and 2 x two ton wire strops. The shackles being secured to padeyes on the pump body. The deck crew fastened a wire strop around the cable reel in a noose formation. Both items were
then attached to the crane lifting hook by the strop eyes, and the lift was commenced. At the 124m level in the utility leg it was decided to land the electric motor first then the cable reel. A
member of the deck crew and a rigger then proceeded to pull the motor inboard,over the handrail, and the crane banksman gave the order to lower away. (all comms between banksman and crane
being handled via vhf hand held radio). In the process of of landing the motor its position on the gratings had to be adjusted and several instructions were passed to the crane without any
problems. The motor was landed on the 124m level and on of the shackles was removed. The second was still under tnsion. Crane stop was then asked to lower away, to slacken off the tension on
the shackle which it did.it was then asked to stop. There was no response to this instruction and the crane continued to lower the load. Comms between crane & banksman was lost for several
At around 1330 hrs on <...> the east crane was backloading bundles of 7" tubing from the platform pepe deck to the deck of the supply boat <...>. During the lowering of the fifth bundle of
tubing, the load was stopped about 30' above the d ck of the vessel. When the brake was released to re commence lowering the load fell to the deck of the vessel. The load landed across the beam
of the vessel. A cargo container on the port side of the vessel was damaged and the guard/crash barriers on the tarboard side of the vessel was damaged. No injuries no wind sea was flat calm
there were no witnesses to the incident on the <...> other than the crane driver.
At approx 16:30 hours <...> and during east crane routines the boom hoist rope was to be changed out. Whilst lifting the new rope drum into posistion on the east landing platform below the east
crane, the crane boom was at a minimum radius of 13 metre .after lowering and releasing the lift the crane operator proceeded to boom out, but due to a failure of the boom hoist clutch exhaust
valve to function correctly. The boom hoist drum went into the hoist motion and the boom went past the minimum radius c t out limit causing compression damage to the east crane backstops.
Well operations were centred around bc08 (a water well), with preparations in hand to prepare for a coil tubing circulation to brine. Weather conditions; 50 knot wind, gusting from the south. The
coil tubing bops were installed and the injector head (5ft was being lifted into position when the top drive torque tube parted at a bolted flange connection. The sheared fastenings and one dowel
fell from the joint onto the drill floor. A nut struck a <...> operator, resulted in a minor first aid injury. Th torque tube parted at the third joint, allowing 15m of tube to rotate, pivoting about the
lower attachment assembly and impacting with the derrick structure. A damaged cross-member and bracing resulted. The upper section of the torque tube remaining su pended from it's linkages.
During the course of normal crane operations the nightshift crane operator was repositioning a 45 ft completion basket from one area to another on the pipedeck. He lifted the basket and
positioned over another basket in order to laydown. While slewing t e load to the left in order to position, he attempted to stop the load by returning the joystick to the neutral position, the crane
continued to motion to the left. He tried to compensate by manoeuvering the joystick to the right, this operation was to n avail as the crane continued to travel to the left, hitting heavy duty
handrails on the pipedeck which then fell onto the skid deck area below. The crane operator informed the pipedeck foreman to move himself and his team away from load as the crane con inued
to travel left until the crane driver switched the on/off key to the off position and the crane came to a complete halt.
Failure of the emergency/parking brake actuators causing the brake to come on. At the time the block was travelling upwards empty.

A 16 inch cunifer spool had been replaced on a cooling water cooler, using a number of 1 ton chain blocks to position the spool and hold/lift the adjacent pipework. After fitting the spool was
filled with water and leak tested. The foot supporting the s ool was short so a packing piece had to be fabricated. A welder was tasked with this job. In order for him to take a dimension to maje
the packing piece he decided to raise the spool a few millimeters using one of the one ton chain blocks still attached o the pipework. The block was operated and when it was still possible to get
movement on the hand chain, a link in the lifting chain parted just inside the block leaving approx 2 foot of chain still attached to the fabric sling. No damage was done to the ipework, no-one
was injured.
During bulk loading operations a bulk loading hose was being returned to the bulk loading station when the 2 tonne sling holding the hose parted allowing the loading hose to fall approx. 30
meters to a production deck walkway.
During routine crane operations a container was to be backloaded onto the <...> from the m5 mezz laydown area on <...>. The north crane was in useat the time. When lowering down to attach to
the container the 20ft pendant on the crane was allowed lay across the top of the container at which point it released itself from the main hook and fell into the sea. The pendant fell directly into
the sea. On investigation the safety catch retaining bolt was found to be sheared this allowed the pendant to come free when the weight was taken off by lying across the container.
A seawater lift pump was being installed on <...> cellar deck using an air operated hoist. The hoist failed to react to signals from the control unit and the pump descended onto a 2" pipeline
causing a weld fracture. The hoist was isolated by turning off the main air supply.
Responding to an emergency call from the standby vessel <...>. It was decided to transfer the medic from installation to vessel by lowering him in a lifeboat to sea level and reshipping in the
vessels fast rescue craft. The lifeboat was low red ten feet above sea level and as the medic was attempting to transfer he fell into the sea. He was not immersed for more than 5 seconds. The two
crewmen of the frc acted quickly and professionally to retrieve him. Wind speed 33.77 knts direction 259.5 sea state 2 metres
Lowering canopy to normal position using tirfor as supplied for the job by vendor. After lowering the hood to past the halfway point, the tirfor wire failed allowing the canopy to freefall to rest
position. The wire snapped at 2/3" from the tirfor and rec iled in the direction of the boat. The canopy damaged the boat slightly as follows:- -1" hole at rright hand side of door. -dents at door
base. -deluge pipe bent.
During the unloading of drilling risers to the <...> one riser (approx 8 tonnes) rigged at both ends (approx 25ft long) with webbing strops fell at one end onto the deck when one of the webbing
strops parted. The distance of the fall was between 3 a d 6ft. The load was then lowered back onto the deck. Proper slings were passed to the boat and the transfer completed. The webbing strops
have been held for examination.
Whilst pulling out of hole, the bumper bar which protects the top drive drive hoses from snagging on the dolley track splice bolts and beam on the west side, became dislodged by the
extending/retracting hydraulic umbilical and fell approx. 16m. And landed 3m from 2 flooormen standing at the rotary table. At the time of the incident weather was clear with a westerly wind at
30-35 knots.
During operations to recover the production completion from well <...>,a padeye support beam failed at the monkey board level in the drilling derrick.the padeye support beam with sheave
connected fell approx 80ft to drillfloor.the casing tong weighing 1.3 tonnes that was supported at the time fell approx 3ft on to the rotary table.six personnel were work- ing on the drillfloor at the
time,none were injured although the power tong operator was at the closest point of risk.the only damage sustained was to th padeye support.
Crane operations of the west crane took place for about an hour,lifting backload on to supply vessel <...> then the east crane was used for some 20 minutes to move loads from the east skid deck
to the pipedek this included a pumping unit weighing 10 5 tonnes.subsequently operatio- ns of the west crane continued for again about an hour with lifting of equipment from the <...> onto the
platform.at the end of the oper- ation the 10.5 tonnes pumping unit had to be lifted off the platform and backlo ded onto the supply vessel. This operation took place within the capacity of the <...>
crane using a single part hoist line.when the load was at the level of the d-deck,it could no longer be controlled by the brake and fell into the sea. The p mping unit was drained of sea water and
with the brake holding ag- ain was put on the platform deck.
Lighting good: air temp 50f: wind 15 knots 025 lowering bundle of scaffold tubes to module 56 mezz lay down area when load struck an overhanging scaffold structure. This resulted in one
scaffold tube ejecting from the bundle and landing on deck below, app ox 20 feet distance. No damage sustained, no personnel injured. Incident investigated by platform safety department and
report, complete with recommended remedial actions submitted to management.

Chicksan pipework was being temporarily supported by a 1 tonne sling connected to the west winch 3.0 tonnes swl at the v door. The chicksan was used for topping up casing during running in.
The kelly was tied back towards the sw corner of the drill floo during casing runs. During dumping operation via the kelly one of the kelly hoses stiffined under pressure and pushed against the
winch operating handle, causing the winch to reel in. This resulted in the chicksan being lifted up to full extension and u timately in the 1 tonne sling parting.
At 23.25 hrs on <...> whilst lifting cargo from the <...> the cargo snagged on the starboard safety hatch, protecting bars. This caused one of the slings to part. No damage was caused to the vessel
and there was no personal injury. The ships crew eleased the load and re-stropped the lift.
A drill pipe drift, approx 2lb in weight was connected to a line on the travelling block to be sent up to the monkey board. On reaching the monkey board the spliced 1/2" rope parting resulted in
the drift falling to the rig floor below. No one was injured in the incident and as personnel always stood clear of the drill floor when a drift is run no one was put in immediate danger from the
dropped object.
A wireline unit belonging to <...> was being transferred from the <...> to the <...>, whilst landing the unit on the deck the access door opened and was caught on another container. This resulted in
the door being forced off of he wireline unit and dropping onto the top of the container, the unit was landed safely and no injuries occurred.
The deck operators were removing a choke body from the wellbay mezzanine level to the west firepump room where it was to be stripped down for oie inspection. The choke body was
manouvered into position where it could be lifted by the platform crane. The position was wellbay mezzanine level, south side. One of the deck operators was putting a wire sling around the
choke body, in doing so he stepped around the choke body onto another section of the grating. The grating gave way falling into the sea 92' b low. The deck operators feet went with grating. He
saved himself falling any further by grabbing hold of the choke body. He then hauled himself up into a safe position. After doing so he reported the incident to the oim. The deck operators only
visibl injury was a graze to his left shin. This was recorded as a minor injury. The other deck operator involved in the task went to the west firepump room to receive the choke.
The <...> was on station at the <...> platform and was being worked by the <...> crane. The whipline hook was being used to backload a watertight container.as the container was being
positioned,it glanced off an adjacent container. The boom was manoeu red to enable the container to be positioned correctly.the banksman located on the <...> main deck then caught sight of the
main hook pendent travelling down the whipline towards the boat deck. The banksman shouted a warning to the supply boatdeck crew via h s channel 6 radio. The deck crew took evasive action.
The main block pendent landed on top of the backloaded container and subsequently fell to the boat deck. No persons were injured and the pendent was recovered from the boat for inspection.
After running 9 5/8 casing to the 13 3/8 window at 1078m a change of handling equipment to the varco 500tn power elevators and slips was made before entering the open hole. 30 joints were
run when there was a sudden loud noise heard while picking up the eight of the string. Fortunately, the slips had not released and the casing load was still held. On examination it was
discovered that one possibly two of the operating pistons had sheared.
Rigger was attaching a chain block to a 1 ton beam trolley situated on a lifting beam when the trolley fell 10ft onto deck.
Lifting equipment was being inspected and found to be defective. The bottom hook split collar retaining ring assembly was found to be loose further investigation found that only half of the main
load bearing split ring was fitted.
During crane operations a 10mt pendant was attached to the crane hook to assist in the operations. A container had been lowered down to a laydown area, when it was on the deck, the crane driver
lowered off to allow the container to be disconnected. Howeve , the crane hook snagged against part of the structure releasing the safety catch and allowing the pendant to fall approx 40'. As the
pendant fell, part of the rope struck one of the men working the container a glancing blow to the arm. There was no injur to the man or damage to equipment.
At the time of the incident the 7" completion string was being pulled. During this operation <...> ssd 7" 200 ton side door elevators were being used. The elevators had been latched on to the next
joint to come out and the string was picked up. The slips ere set and the joint broken out. The roughnecks then proceeded to push the free end of the joint out through the "v" doors, at this point
the elevators unlatched releasing the other end of the joint which fell approx. 20' to the drill floor, bounced and hot out the door and down onto the catwalk . No personnel were injured and no
damage occured as a result of this incident.

The mwd tool failed and the decision to pooh was actioned, the string was pulled back to the shoe, and a heavyweight mud was applied. Tripping operation commenced, 3 stands were pulled and
when pipejoints were broken the in rush of air indicated that the ipe was dry. When the 4 stand was broken, oil based mud issued from the joint splashing 2 of the floormen this stand was then
racked back to the derrick. The driller decided to attempt to chase the slug by raising the next stand. As the string passed the onkey board level the derrickman engaged the pipehandler racking
arm to the drillpipe, the elevators inpacted with the racking arm.
While rigging up the pressure control lubricator on a well in preparation for a routine logging run, the tugger hook became disconnected from the lifting shackle causing the lubricator to fall
across the deck at an angle lodging against the overhead deckb ams. The bottom of end of the lubricator was restrained from falling by the logging tools which were inserted into the lower riser.
The tools were severely bent.
When lifting a xmas tree from the stern of the supply vessel the crew noticed objects falling from the transit frame. These were later established to be spare tree lifting accessories. The incident
was not immediately reported, by the time it was the ve sel had left. Further investigation suggested that this equipment had been secured to the lifting frame by two strps of metal banding. This
had worked loose allowing the equpiment to fall onto the deck. No-one was in the immediate vicinity and no damag occured to the vessel.
Equipment was being moved around the impact deck. After setting down the second lift the crane was travelling south when the cable catenary guide bracket weighing approx 5 kilos fell from it
mounting a total distance of 6 meters onto the impact deck.
During routine tripping operations a bolt from the drill pipe racking arm fell approx 90' to the rig floor narrowly missing personnel working on the rig floor. (weight of bolt 0.8kg)
Part of guide dolly wheel bearing for the top drive fell 90' from monkey board level to the drill floor. The bearing part weighed approx 250 grams. No one was injured as a result of this dropped
object.
Wireline equipment was being rigged up on the drill floor in order for <...> to set a bridge plug. During rigging up the running tool got snagged up. This created strain to be applied to the wire.
The wire parted at the weak point thus allowing the tool to fall to the drill floor.
After backloading 7 containers to the <...> a 20' basket was landed on the vessel. After detachment the crane operator boomed back and slewed to the right at about 30' from the deck of the
supply vessel the 8 ton swl single penant fell from the hip line hook and landed on the deck of the supply vessel. Wind speed 35 knts, vessel pitching 20 to 25 degrees. Equipment in use, <...>
hydraulic offshore mounted crane with <...> automatic safe load indicator. Swl at radii 31' to 129' 6.7 ton
South crane sustained damage to cathead and main block during a lifting operation over magellan deck. Debris (sheave guard) fell from crane on to magellan deck. Upper hoist limits did not
prevent this occurrence due to limits not being reset when falls ha been previously changed from single to three fall. Weather :- 10kt westerly breeze, bright clear conditions, visibility 10 nm.
When lifting the riser a slight misalignment of the two hatches forces the riser to move off centre through the hatches. As the first collar on the riser came through the main deck hatch it caught
one side of access hole. This caused this side to lift pproximately six inches. The other side of then moved toward the centre causing it to come off its supports at the corner of the hatch. The
hatch cover then fell through the hatch and rattled down the riser to the intermediate deck. The operator saw the over falling and moved back to avoid injury. His ability to clear the area was
restricted by the scaffold safety barrier erected around the riser. He moved to the corner of the barrier which gave him sufficient room to escape. The purpose of the safety barrier was to prevent
uninvolved personnel from access to a hatch on the intermediate deck which at times is opern without the riser in place, after the incidetn the area was made safey by laying the riser down on the
main deck and replacing both hatch c vers. Work was then suspended pending incident investigation.
While moving containers about the deck the after crane whip line sheave check plate came into light contact with the flare tower. The dsv was positioned parallel to the east face on a heading of
033 degrees(t) with the centre section of the dsv positione under the flare tower, the closest point of approach to the riser legs was 15 metres between the hull and the east legs. The dsv was in dp
at the time with diving operations in progress. The wind was sly 15-20knots, waves 2.5meters, visibility good, pit h & roll 1 degree heave 1 metre. Dp positioning port stbd within 1.5m fore and
aft within 1m, heading within 1.5degrees. Damage sustained to <...> aft crane:- bent and buckled check plate (non-structural). Damage to flare tower:- possible paint da age and slight dent to the
bottom of an internal diagonal cross brace at +40m elevation.

The caisson terminates at minus 41 metres and the procedure called for 3 off lenghts of approximately 10 metres to be cut off and removed. The first length was secured for the a2 caisson. The
caisson was cut 1.5metres above the minus 33 metre guide and h d been partially lowered when one of the chain pulls released and allowed the section to fall to the sea bed. The divers were
above the seciton and therefore there was no injuries. The dropped section was then located on the sea bed and its line of dece t plotted, this was inspected by rov for impact damage and two
areas were identified where it has brushed off members and one are of impact which only removed some marine growth. No other areas of impact were found. The operation proceeded without
furthe incident with a revised rigging arrangement using a tugger operated from the spider deck.
A container had just been back loaded onto the <...>. As the crane operator moved the hook with pennant down to the deck for the deck crew to gain access to unhook the container, the pennant
came free from the main block hook and fell 8 - 10 feet to he deck. The hook and safety latch was inspected by deck crew and appeared to be operating satisfactorily. After consultation between
the crane operator and the vessel skipper it was agreed to fit another pennant and to back load another container, afte which the other pennant could be retrieved. There was re-occurrence of the
first incident during the operation to drop the hook for access.
Elevators on top drive lowered onto toe board of monkey board whilst lowering 5 tubulars into mousehole.
While recovering the <...> rov to surface on its umbilical the unit was latched on to its dockking device attached to the recovery crane. This consists of a sheave wheel and and docking tube with
3 latching dogs. The umbilical passes over the sheav wheel, throught the docking tube and down to connect with the rov. The docking termination locates in the docking tube and is latched on to
the docking dogs by means of an anular shoulder. As the rov was swung inboard, following docking, the rov disengag d from the docking device falling approx. One foot (damaging the handrail).
The load was transferred to the umbilical winch. Visual inspection of the docking mechanism and dogs showed no damage, however an exess of grease was identified around the docking device
which is concluded to have prevented one of the three dogs latching resulting in the incident.
5" x 3/4" steelbar (latch indicator) fell off <...> 5 1/2" elevators whilst at top of derrick. Bar fell 90ft and just caught roughneck on the drill floor. Elevators removed, photographed and
quarantined. Ip assessed by a medic as fit for work on the next hift. <...> believe a weld has failed but item is not normally load bearing. <...> have issued an 'alert' to their other crews. The
compant propose an onshore investigation by the manufacturer.
During backload operations, a scaffold plank approximately 4m long was observed by the second officer as it fell into the sea approximately 5m from the ship's side. He could not ascertain from
which level the plank had fallen as it was only sighted on im act with the sea. Weather - slight/moderate sea, low swell wind - wsw 5/6
A 7" 29lb/ft x 42' joint of casing was brought onto the drill floor from the catwalk. (the catwalk is horizontal to drill floor) a tugger lowered joint into 7" sided door elevators. The latch was
closed and checked by a floorman. The joint was picked up with the blocks. When the elvator was approx 20' above drill floor the elevators opened and the joint fell out. As one end of the joint
was still on the rigfloor it toppled across landing on the tool room roof. Damage to equipment was to the box end of he joint of 7" casing.
A set of three ton test weights were being transferred from module 03 to module 05 via the lower central corridor. On lifting the second set of weights from the mezzanine level, they were lowered
to within 6 inches from the deck when the chain block faile . The chain block was a <...>, 2 ton s.w.l. Identification no. <...>
The final joint of 5 1/2" vam tubing was being made up to the completion string on well <...>. A circulating head and chicksan swivel union were made up on top of the joint to tubing whilst it
was lying in the 'v' door. The joint was latched in the eleva ors and stabbed onto the completion string. As the joint was made up with the "speedmaster tongs", the chicksan swivel union caught
the elevator rails. As the joint rotated to the right the chicksan hammer union unscrewed, causing the sivel union to fal 45ft to the drill floor. The assistant driller was watching the top of the joint
as it was being made up and shouted a warning just before the swivel union fell.
On completion of wireline operations on <...>, the bop were being rigged to take them from the wellheads to the drill floor via the bop deck. The bop was laid down on movable cover plates to rerig. As the bop was picked up, it swung round and caught the co er plate on which ip was standing. Cover plate moved causing ip to fall 10ft onto the christmas tree below. He was not wearing a
safety harness. This fall resulted in ip receiving a slight injury to his right knee (bruising). After seeing the platform med c he went back to work.

Service engineer was working in the wellheads pouring oil on top of the tubing hanger of well n-28. Prior to commencing this job he checked that the covers over the moonpool above his head
were in place. At the same time, christmas tree for n-28 was pic off its side into upright position. This operation commenced after an announcement had been made that a heavy lift was in
progress in the wellheads. Whilst the christmas was being picked up it came in contact with the "c" plate covers over the moonpool, lifting half of the plate over the lip and moving it
approximately 8 inches. This movement allowed the 2 foot diameter circular top cover in the centre of the "c" plate to fall approximately 15 feet to the wellhead deck below, after striking
metalwork on the way down. The cover weighing approximately 64lbs struck the service engineer a glancing blow, knocking off his hard hat and knocking him down. After medical attention the
engineer returned to work.
After bulldogging 3 drilling shock subs weighing approx 470lbs, they were lowered to the deck. Not being satisfied with the position of the subs, they were raised approx 18" to 2'. The
banksman then instructed the east crane driver to lower the load, bu as the subs were lowered the banksmans left foot caught a deck pad eye, causing him to stumble. Unfortunately at this time
the subs hit and slid down the angled side of the of the pad eye trapping the banksmans leg between the subs and a 10' cargo basket resulting in a crush injury to his left leg.
A 100ft section of 1 1/2" drilling blockline had been cut as normal and was to be transported to waste skip for disposal.the line was picked up by the crane via a nylon sling attached to a point 15ft
from one end.as the crane swung the lift round to the s ip,the line slowly started to slip through the nylon sling and fell to the deck striking the roust- about pusher.the blow to his helmet caused a
small laceration which nee- ded 2 stitches.his ankle became painful the following day and he was se- nt to hos ital for x-ray on 6/6/94 where results showed only soft tissue bruising.
Whilst working the <...> the south crane pennant was unhooked from a load that had just been landed on the vessels deck by its crew at approx. 22:45 hrs. The crane operator then boomed up
with no load prior to slewing the load back in towards th platform. When it reached pipe deck level (approx.) A considerable swinging motion was noticed on the the line by the crane operator.
Upon starting to slew the load inboard, the pennant line, complete with master link, disengaged itself from the crane ho k and fell off, striking a container in the aft section of the vessels deck
before falling into the sea.
During pressure testing operations involving the top drive unit on the rig floor, the t.d. Unit became energised. The rotation of the unit's assembly wound up a 3" hp hose connecting the unit to a
manifold on the rig floor. This caused the failure of rigg ng which supported a saddle for the hose some 25' up in the derrick. The hose and saddle assembly fell to the floor. A floorman involved
with the pressure test operation was trapped between the hose and manifold until the support rigging failed, suffering minor injury
The <...> launched its frc in order to collect mail and newspa- pers from the <...> platform.at around 10:09,a crewman was struck by the crane hook which swung across the frc.at the time the
crewman had just untied a mailbag from the hook.the mov ment of the hook and the movement of the frc relative to it (in the opposite direction)delivered a strong blow to the crewmans left arm.
At the time the sea was choppy and a fresh breeze was blowing.conditions were as follows:wind 350 17knots,sea 2.4m 7.1 sec period,temp 8.1c.
The drill string had been pulled to change over the drill bit. The floor crew had commenced running in hole with 3.5" drill pipe and had run in approximately 9 stands of pipe. The crew were 8
hours into their shift. The attached diagram shows the layou of the pipestands during this operation. Stands are removed from the rack in the numerical order shown. Environmental conditions
on the rig floor were normal. Wind speed was approximately 30kts. Two roughnecks had taken up position at what they thought was the last stand of drillpipe in the row they had been working.
As the stand was being lifted they noticed that they were positioned at the wrong pipe stand and they moved to the area shown to work the actual stand being lifted. This is approximatley ten feet
from where they had been standing. As a result of having to make this last minute adjustment of position they were unable to control the motion of the stand being lifted. As a result of trying to
control the drillpipe ip inadvertently placed his hand between the pipe and the point of impact with the make up tongs, sustaining crush injuries to his hand. As soon as it became obvious there
had been an accident the operations on the drill floor were stopped. Ip was told to report to the medic. He was accompanied on his way to sick bay to report the accident. It was first thought that
Incident on rig floor, pipe spinner line tangled in main travelling block due to wind. Pipe spinner body (400 lbs) lifted 10 feet. Support frame sheared. Body fell to rig floor.
While unloading an 18tn coil tubing unit from the supply boat,shortly after the load was lifted a large wave caused the boat to fall then rise the load was hit by the side of the boat sending it
towards the deck where it was struck on one corner by the bo t on its way up.the load was put down and on the second try recovered to the platform.it was found that the lifting frame had been
damaged, the weld on one lifting frame pad eye had sheared and the frame had been distorted.
While backloading a skip from the n.e. Face of the platform the cargo runner on the crane whipline parted leaving the skip upended between a compactor and a coiled tubing unit. On
investigation it was found that the crane rope had become trapped between t e skip and adjacent cargo resulting in severe damage. The following lift caused the rope to part as the load was
applied.

While trying to remove wireline equipment stuck down hole at 100> ft using 3/16" braided wire a 2400lb bind was held for one hour. This was followed by releasing the bind and pulling 1800lb
on a power jar, after the jar fired the sheave side plates fractu ed and it fell to the rig floor. The area was barriered off and no injury sustained. The sheave was rated at 2 1/2 us tons, and on
inspection was found to have gouge marks from the wire on the inside of the side plates.
During cementing operations a rotating/cementing head was being racked back into the fingers. The rotating head has a sidearm and lo-torque valve attached to a 2" nipple which protruded
approximately 2 feet from the strand of drill pipe. The elevators wer unlatched and the stand pulled in towards the fingers by a tugger. When the driller thought it was indicated to him that the
stand was fully racked back and consequently clear. He sealed off on the blocks. The top drive unit came into contact with the si earm and lo-torque valve assembly shearing it from the rotating
head and allowing it to fall to the drill floor 60-70 feet below. No one on the drill floor suffered any injury.
A wire strop was required to lift a corrision inhabitor pump off the additional roof space. A strop was located nearby attached to a rigged down length of lubricator. Whilst moving the lubricator it
rolled up against a second section of tubular, trapping he injured party's rh ring finger the injuries overleaf were sustained.
Drill crew were breaking out the internal bop in the top drive unit, the driller left his console to assist in the operation and failed to apply the parking break. The drill line was spooled off of the
drum allowing the travelling block and hook which we e attached to the top drive unit to fold over coming to rest against the racked drill pipe in the derrick the top drive did not move as it was
holding drill pipe secured by slips at the rotary table and located within the guides. When the block came to r st there were 5 turns of cable still on the drawworks drum. No damage was
identified to any of the hoisting/drilling system. The travelling block was not in immediate danger of falling to the rig floor due to rate of descent and connection to other components
At the time of the incident we had just completed pulling out of the hole with the 7" liner clean out assy. The next operation was to pull the wear bushing rom the wellhead to allow us to set the
test plug for testing the blowout preventors. To pull the the wear brushing we had to change the drill pipe elevators from 3.1/2" to 5". The tugger was used to change out the elevators. The
tugger was put back in it's normal stowage position on top of the tong snubbing post and tensioned up to take any slack o t of the line. It would appear at this point that the line from the crown to
the air winch was snagged up on the top drive. The tugger operator looked up to check the line but failed to see it was caught up. The driller proceeded to pick up the blocks w th the intention of
picking up a stand of pipe from the derrick. The tugger line tightened up pulling excess tension on the air winch causing the line to part approx 50ft up from the winch. When the tugger line
tensioned up it distorted the top drive mu hose causing it to split the outer sheath and armour. The tugger line and mud hose have since been removed from service.
During flaring gas from production an apparent flashback in the lp flare system occurred due to the absence of purge gas. No gas compression running at time. On inspection of pipework and
flanges no damage was found.
When erecting scaffolding on the nw corner of the ba helideck, a 2i' tube was laid on the top of the accommodation whilst the scaffolder secured other materials, the tube, which was pre cariously
placed with a portion of its length (6') overhanging the ac ommodation, was then subject to vibration from a helicopter landing which caused it to "walk" off the roof and fall 30' to the ba main
deck.
Freight for use on <...> satellite <...> was placed outside the helishack on the open grating walkway (for weighing and manifesting to freight 'jd'). One item (tin of grease wt approx 2kg) fell to the
level below (12'-15'). It had fallen between a gap betwe n the steel kick plate and the guard rail. No person witnessed the tin drop, the wind at the time was approx. 40 knot gusting 44-46 knots.
Actions taken/planned to
After unbolting the valve and lifting it from the wellhead, the <...> crew were attempting to re-sling the valve in order to get into a posistion that would allow it to be lifted through the wellbay
hatch. During this operation the full weight of the wing v lve (approx 1.3 tons ) was placed on the scaffold. The scaffold then partially collapsed
Tower scaffold had been erected to inspect/repair main hoist limit switch on ap crane. Crane boom was across the deck of the ap roof. Crane boom had been removed earlier in the day thus
leaving the tower exposed. Winds increased throughout the day prevent ng the dismantling of the scaffold. Tower toppled on to handrail. No ip's, 1 light fitting damaged, no damage to scaffold or
lamp standard
During a routine function check a technician attempted to operate a chain operated firemain valve. As he did so the wheel-handle attached to the valve gearbox parted and fell 30 feet to deck.
The technician was standing to one side when operating chain nd was not injured. The wheel-handle which was manufactured from pressed steel was found to have corroded through.

Whilst erecting scaffolding on cp spider deck <...> was working in the centre of the middle bay between grid lines c & d. He was working under the horizontal diagonal brace running from ne to
sw in middle bay. The <...> wire came tight as he stood as he wire was running underside of the brace. <...> went back under the brace, detached his inertia to run wire over the top of the bracing.
At this point he over balanced and fell 5' into the waster. The lifejacket worn at the time inflated on contact wi h the water.
Coil lifting operations were taking place on well c-2 through the drill floor. A 2 7/8" motor and under reamer assembly was made up and lowered through the mousehole to function test the unit.
At that piont the coil tubing bop shear rams were activated losed, severing the assembly at the top connector allowing it to fall approx. 25ft to the bop deck below no injuries to pesonnel were
sustained and no plant damage incurred.
As helicopter departed helideck a wooden crate lid was blown from the helideck run off area down onto the pipedeck area. The wooden crate was situated within a half height and had previously
contained hoses which had been removed 2 days earlier. A
During a period of high wind cladding detached from the drilling derrick and landed aprox 70' away adjacent to m15 offices.
Formed steel protector from derrick main door fell 20 metres and landed on roof of hvac unit. Object weighed about 2o kg. Appears to be a vibration problem, however bolts securing object also
appear undersized. Both undid itself.
As helicopter approched the the down draft from the roter blades blew a section of the cable tray divider off the main cable tray and down to the cellar deck below narrowly missing persons on the
way down.
A bus stop type fire extinguisher sign fell from its mounting which consisted of a length of unistrut secured to the handrail extending to a height of approx 1.1 metre above this rail.
During a routine photography inspection of the flare tip it was discovered that the trumpet part of the flare tip was missing.
On retrieving a rope tag line under the stairs on the <...> unit on the <...> pipedeck (elevation 52.2m) a section of samson post stored vertically in the same location toppled over the kick plate and
fell into the 2 metre gap between the drilling and accommodation modules. The post deflected off the turbine exhaust and dropped 20 meters towards the west side and landed on a scaffold
platform on the production deck (elevation 31.4). Note: 1. 1. The location of impact was i meter from the firemain. . A samson post is a turbular steel section approximately 0.7m high, 0.15m in
diameter, weighing approximately 20kg.
As the witness (<...>) was ascending the glycol tower he heard a loud bang. He turned round and saw that the temporary loading trestle had collapsed. As far as he could see no one was in the
immediate vacinity. He climbed down the tower to look at hat had happened and found the trestle & scaffolding bundles on ther deck.
Whilst carrying out replacement of air cylinder at finger board a tool- bag full of instrument technicians tools fell from the monkeyboard level to the drillfloor narrowly missing the personnel
working on the drillfl- oor (estimated 6 ft).the clip holding the handle opened out and toolbag fell through the slots to the drillfloor.
During hot bolting of the production produced & ballast water flame arrester situated 100ft up the flare tower on the north face, a nut was dropped. The nut rolled across the grating and fell down
the gap by the vertical ladder, it then dropped down the lare tower, hitting the flare deck some 20ft to the south. The nut then bounced off hitting ip on the ankle
Repairs to the 'a' <...> compressor exhaust ducting insulation had recently been undertaken. Shortly after 'a' <...> had been on full load an area of the exhaust started to smoke. This worsened over
a 15 minute period, at which point some small flames became evident. At this point, the unit was stopped and the fire extinguished with hand held extinguishers. The area was then monitored for
a further 3 hours.
After platform power outage, drilling personnel re-instating power to boards noticed smoke coming from panel km0011b. Returned to generator cubicle and opened breaker to kill power then
discharged 5.5kg bcf extinguisher into panel which successfully extin uished the fire. Damage to all internal components in cubicle km0011b and slight heat damage to adjacent cubicle km0012b
Whilst an employee was burning away redundant bolts at the front of the filter house. A hot piece of metal dropped through the grated walkway and ignited the gas emitting from the 2 inch
overboard vent some 7ft below. The fire watch on location immediatel snubbed the fire by the deployment of the dry powder extinguisher. It is estimated the flame was present for 10-15 seconds.
The job was holted and the incident reported to the duty operator in the platform control room.

The surrounding area of the flame box was not damaged. No marks were found. On removing the outer cover there were no marks on the flame arrester. The flame arrester looked in good
condition. Photographs were taken of the surrounding area and flame arrest r.wind speed at the time was 50 knots with gusts to 65 knots easterly.
Small vent stack fire ignited by snow squall at 07:52. Fire extinguished at 07:58 by use of fixed co2 extinguisher system. 1 bottle used.
Small vent stack fire ignited by snow/sleet squall at 14:40.pm. Fire extinguished at 14:48 by use of fixed co2 extinguisher system- 1 bottle used.
Small vent stack fire ignited by sleet squall at 21-45hrs. Fire extinguished at 21-53 hrs by use of fixed co2 extinguisher system, 1/2 bottle used.
Smoke reported in level 1 plant room by teleephone to ccr. Fire team located the hvac supply fan hm6303b as the alarm source. It was already stopped & shutdown by two members of the
electrical dept upon their arrival. Using dry powder the fire was extingu shed & contained & area made safe. This set off the smoke detectors & gave indication in the ccr of the event. This input
initiated gpa as required. Initially, site of local stop button for hm6303b could not be safely reached
Several systems tripped at the final stages of bringing the plant back, on line after a shut down at 17.45 hrs on <...>. The resultant flaring operations resulted in initiating two small fires on the nw
side of the p04/05 weather deck. One fire was con ained in a waste skip and the other developed opn a pile of wooden sleepers. Damage occurred to two protective trolley covers ond plastic safety
signs. Fires were extinguished and the plant depressurised in a controlled manner. The flare was finally shut own at 17.00 hrs on <...>.
At 01:48 the central control room recieved a message from a production operator that there was a fire in the hazardous hvac room on fan motor cm3201b. The fire was caused by a bearing
collapse on the motor, this ignited grease at the bearing side of the motor.
Whilst running in normal operating mode a thrust bearing on high pressure pump at the reverse osmosis unit (portable water maker) overheated. Smoke from lubricant on the faulty bearing
caused activation of a smoke detector and initiation of the local modu e alarm. The alarm was investigated by production personnel who immediately diagnosed the problem and shut down the
offending pump. Following discussion with safety the arae was then ventilated to allow clearance of smoke.
A team of platers were working at three sites preparing m3ee roof beams for reinforcement at the root of the lifting padyes. Unwanted steel from a beam flange at the ne site was being washed out
using an oxy-aceylene gouging nozzle which generates a consi erable amount of glowing slag. (far more than a cutting nozzle). Some of the slag sprayed out through a gap in the fire blanket site
enclosure. Bounced off pipework below into an open deck drain and ignited the seal pot contents. A yellow flame 1.5m high ad reduced to 0.5m minutes later when extinguished by deluge. Uv
fire detection was inhibited for the hot work. A materials controller passing through the module say the fire and hit a gpa break glass. He exited the nearest door released the deluge manual y and
raised the alarm. This resulted in simultaneous release of the linked east wellhead deluges riser esdv closure and evacuation of the platform workforce to the barge.
During oxy acetylene burning within a habitat at the flare tower base a flashback into the acetylene supply hose occurred. The hose ruptured at two points releasing burning acetylene into the
habitat. Prompt action was taken by the firewatcher and plater n isolating the gas bottles and extinguishing the flames with a dry powder extingusher. The pss in observing the fire radioed the ro
with instruction to initiate a red hazard status
At 14:50 smoke alarm from overloaded earth cable in drilling module s.c. R. Led to muster.s/d equipment and secured.went back to routine and dec- ided to start up gas turbine which had been
down for maintenance.on start up at 15:35 smoke alarm from under ood.determined due to oily contamination and stood down muster.back to normality 15:45.are working on earth cable
overload.oir9a for both alarms will be submitted.
Umc invertor ca-l-2341 was unserviceable and fault finding to repair was in progress.after an interchange of components,as part of the fault dia- gnosis the unit was put on test.ten seconds after
the energising,the el- ectrical maintenance technitian saw moke issuing from on of the unit cooling fan outlets he immediately switched off the power supply,but re- sidual smoke activated an
adjacent smoke detector.futher investigation by the vendor has been organised.
On <...> a 2" meg line mc581908e2 was prepared for hot work. Both meg injection pumps were isolated using a double block and bleed arrangement. A drain valve was opened on the cellar deck
and the line flushed from its highest point for two hours. A gas t st was carried out with a 0% lel result. At 22.43hrs a hot work permit was issued. A 5" section of the pipe was removed by cold
cutting. A "t" piece was tack welded into the line. One butt was root welded and the second butt 50% complete when the welder f lt heat on his hand. He stopped work and observed a flame
emanating from the "t" piece. The length of the flame was approximately 18". The fire was quickly extinguished with a dry chemical fire extinguisher.

During grinding to prepare an 8-in. Decommisioned natural gas line for flange connection to a new 8-in. Spool, there was ignition of condensate resulting in a flame from the open end of the new
spool. The flame lasted only a few seconds and self extinguis ed. There were no injuries or equipment damage and no impact on production operations.
Fuel gas heater is built with two units in series (ex1601a and ex1601b) each bank heats the gas using electrical power. Prior to the incident flow control problems with fuel gas required the system
to be shut down and depressurised per design. Ex1601b fun tioned correctly. Ex1601a protection did not function due to incorrect wiring. Electrical power to the exchanger was maintained, and
with no flow to cool, the <...> over- heating caused the insulation to smoulder. The smoke was seen and the alarm raised. Roduction was shut in, a full muster called. And the emergency
response team went to the incident. The electrical power was isolated, the insulation removed and the exchanger colled. There were no injuries. Exchanger has been removed for recertification.
At 0139 hours on <...> the 'b' compressor seal oil pumps were electrically deisolated for a function test. Approximately ten (10) seconds after starting one of the pumps, a loud bang was heard in
the switchroom followed by loss of lighting and a plant hutdown. On investigation, a large volume of smoke was seen coming out of the switchroom and a gpa was initiated. Once ventilated,
smoke levels were reduced. No fires were observed. All personnel were accounted for, no injuries reported.
When the lab tech was flushing fluids through an enclosed sample loop into a waste container the top of the waste container flashed. He quickly contacted the ccr to explain the cause of the
subsequent deluge and gpa.
Investigation and test runs into failure of turbine to change from gas to liquid fuel supply on ko2. A final test run on liquid fuel (diessel) was attempted. During this start sequence a loud bang was
heard and a flash seen at exhaust outlet. The mahcine ripped on high exhaust temperature. Immediate presence at the turbine saw flames coming from enclosure the fire was extinguished by an
operator using a co2 fire extinguisher. All process plant was shutdown and made safe. Weather - dark, dry, wind - 14 kt at 102o, temp - 9oc visibility 10 miles, sea - 2/3 mtrs.
Mechanical deterioration of an air suuply fan shaft bearing resulted in fan belt break-up and smoke generation into the transformer room air ducting. Two smoke detectors were set off in the
transformer room. This resulted in an automatic production shutdo n and halon 1301 discharge to the transformer room. Work permits were suspended until confirmation that the situation was
under control; as a precaution.
Unit 060 compressor set whilst being commissioned after major shutdown experienced a minor fire in the cladding around the turbine exhaust. The unit was being visually monitored at the time
and immediate shutdown and vent was initiated. Initially smoke wa noticed. On full investigation a minor fire was observed and extinguished within 3 minutes. No damage occured. The general
alarm was initiated manually and all personnel were mustered as a precaution.
The production operator was doing his 15:00 hrs rounds on power generation. Four gas turbine generator sets were on line at the time the fifth was under maintenance. During his checks on the
turbine hall roof he noticed whisps of smoke coming out of the b ttom of the cladded insulation on the exhaust of gas turbine 31-007
A diesel driven air compressor was in use to supply service air during repairs to the permanent air compressors. During normal running conditions between periodic checks by the operator a fire
occurred which caused damage to +/- 10% of the acoustic cladd ng inside the enclosure. Investigations have established there was no diesel or lube oil leaks on the unit; the source of ignition
appears to have been the exhaust heat transmitted to the cladding. Vendor states cladding is fire retardant.
Hvac ran, tag no. magellan, developed a bearing fault during duty operation. Heat from the bearing caused smoke to be produced inside the inlet hvac ducting to the production conrtrol room.
Smoke was detected in the pct by the fire & gas system , which in turn initiated an automatic shutdown/blowdown of everest and riser production facilities and halon extinguishent release in the
production control room. Power to hvac fan also tripped automatically at this time
The plant conditions on the above date was of a single main train/cold plant bypass operation with t102 being fuelled by diesel. No alarm conditions were known within the operation at that time.
Two maintenance personnel with the assistance of two opera ors in attendance were investigating vibration faults on k102/103 in the start up room situated on module 5 mezzanine. A smell of
smoke became apparent to all present. The two operators investigated checking out the immediate and surrounding area of the module. The other two maintenance personnel present checked
belts on the hvac system for signs of deterioration/burning. When the door at the gear box end of the t102 enclosure was opened by the operators to check inside, evidence of smoke was seen by
th personnel on the mezzanine above. Access was gained into the enclosure and investigations found evidence of a fire emanating from the area at the base of the power turbine casing/gear box
transition shaft. The fire alarm and production shutdown were ma ually activated. The fire was extinguished by manual activation of the halon unit system. No major damage was apparent
during early investigations but this will be verified by vendor rep inspection.

Main train to compressor driver had just been restarted after a number of false starts and adjustments to the fuel system. The engine had just entered the "warm up" stage when indication of a fire
was received in the compressor start up room and the engi e shutdown. The situation was quickly checked and flames were seen to emanate from the transition piece between the engine and
power turbine. The extinguishant was released local to the engine and the fire quickly extinguished. The after burning downstre m of the engine was caused by unburned fuel from previous starts
accumulating at the back of the engine.
A start sequence had been initiated to t102 engine, where the warm up speed had been reached. Personnel on the scene saw lagging covering the transition piece of the engine to power turbine
ignite. A manual activation of the halon discharge was initiat d immediately by those present. After initially appearing to be extinguished the lagging was seen to re-ignite. The fire was
eventually extinguished by the fire team using a foam branch after which damaged lagging was removed from the enclosure and washed down
On <...> at 1420 hrs a fire was discovered in the heavy tool store of the drilling sub-structure on the <...> platform. The alarm was raised in the following manner: a)the welding foreman informed
<...> control room by radio. B)a ma ual alarm call point was activated adjacent to the fire. C)a telephone call to the <...> control room was initiated by a person adjacent to the fire. The platform
gas and fire detection system did not pick up the fire as the fire zone had been inhibited o allow the hot work to be carried out the fire was quickly extinguished by the welding foreman using his
glovs no persons were injured and damage to the plant and equipment was very slight (restricted to a three inch burnt section of welding cable.)once he control room received confirmation of a
fire,a general platform ala- rm was initiated and all personnel at their respective muster stations.
Fan belts on k8502a became twisted in 'v' groove, causing belt to rub on pulley guard. Resultant smoke detected and area halon activated. Gp initiated.
At approximately 20:40 smoke was observed coming from the ventillation discharge duct of 'a' <...> gas turbine load gearbox compartment by witness. On investigation, he observed smoke
coming from the area of no 2 bearing and informed the main contr l room. Another employee was sent to assist, and on further investigation, flames were observed in the region of no 2 bearing.
On this report, another employee was sent to the machine and asked to stop it - this he did, as directed by reducing the load on the machine and applying the emergency stop. The flames were
extinguished using a portable co2 extinguisher. After the machine had been stopped and allowed to cool down, the area was inspected. The bearing area was found to be in good order and leak
free
'C' water inspection tails pump bearing / mechanical seal over heated and its lub oil ignited. The fire was noticed by two platform personnel as it started and was extinguished with a portable fire
extinguisher, the alarm was raised and the pump shutdown.
During normal operation an operator smelled a gas leak which was confirm -ed by a mini gas detector. The operator informed the control room isolated the gasband rerouted the vent line. The
flange had been openeda couple of days before in connection with b inding work/ <...>. The gasket may have been re-used when closing the flange.
The pig launcher, m3, was pressurised to 125 barg. Aftre a successful leak testing the operator started to decompress by opening manually the two block valves to a 2" vent line. Shortly after a gas
leak was seen by the operator who immediately iscolated t e leak from the m3 by closing the valves. After having assessed the situation, was slowly and controlled decompressed through2" vent
line. During this phase the leak was closely monitered and it was ensured that no ignition sources were present. The leak as on the upper level with no ceiling i.e. Good ventilation.
A 2.5 litre aceton bottle exploded/fractured in locker used for storage (in the laboratory) of chemical solvents, methanol, ethanol, chlorform, etc. This resulted in a chemical spill in the laboratory.
The central control room was notified of incident and the extraction fans were immediately set to full speed. The spill was cleaned and the room was subsequently vented. After half an hour no
vapours from the spill could be detected.
Gas detection on a jbgt air intake ducting on fuel gas passing gcv through the unit via combustion chamber and percolating through to the air intake ducting. In still air conditions, gpa initiated
resulting in full muster. No injuries or damage occurred.
Seal failure alarm was indicated on interstage condensate pump 2g105a. In iscolating the pump to investgate the problem, condensate was drained into the closed drain. Due to a suspect hydrate
blockage, back pressure affected the pump seal arrangement lea ing to joint failure. The volume of line drained was circa 6 litres.

On the evening of the <...>, 'a' gas compressor in c module was operating normally. At 17:45 a gas leak occured within the accoustic housing of the <...> engine of 'a' compressor train. The gas
ignited and the subsequent over pressure damaged th accoustic panelling and frame work. The modules halon and deluge systems were activated aut0 matically. The fuel gas continued to burn
within the compressor housing for a period of approv 17 minutes causing damage to pipework and cabling within the housi g. The gas suppl was isolated and the residual gas allowed to burn off
while the emergency response teams used fire hoses to cool the surrounding equipment. All non essential platform personnel werw assembled in their muster stations on the <...> 20;07 and were
stood down until 20:37. The gangway remained closed until the platform returned to normal status at 21:43. No one was injured.
Pinhole leak found in gas compressor first stage knock out pot drain line return to separators. Approx. 20 gallons of fluid mainly produced water with small amount of condensate/crude oil
discharged into the module. Production train immediately shut dow for isolation, removal and repair of pipework.
Pipeline pump g1002b was started up at 07:32 in order to resume oil export. At 07:45 it was reported to m13 that there was a leak on the pipeline pump. The operators were alerted and sent to
the area. At 07:55 pipeline pump was stopped then isolated an depressured.
On starting the b oil export pump the mechanical seal failed allowing produced fluids oil/water to escape into module. The incident was reported to the main control room immediately by the
local operator and a contractor working in the area. The pump wa shut down and isolated
A routine observation was made around the pump and it was discovered that oil was weeping from a repaired weld. The pump was shutdown and a procedure formulated to affect a repair.
Level in third stage separator passed through closed interface level control valve, during produced water flow checks. The xv which closes on lo lo level failed to close. Investigation revealed that
the lo lo level flow swithch failed to activate due to b ild up of sand in switch. Level indication of the interface remained steady but reloder also found faulty. Once the false level was identified
the xv valve was closed but level was dropped sufficiently to allow small amount of oil through.
Pipeline pump was being brought on line. Pre start checks carried out and pump started followed by esd valve being opened up. Immediate gas detection and investigation revealed nde
mechanical seal on pump had failed and oil was discharing into module the ump was immediately shutdown.
A malfunction on the oil production trainresulted in oil contamination of the <...> units. The only evidence of this was discolouration of the sea at the overboard caisson as nothing unuasal was
evident on the production train instrumentation in order to onfirm the problem each wemco unit was checked in turn by opening a hatchto view the level oil was found in the 'a' unit and the level
adjusted to skim the oil over weir whilst inspecting the 'b' unit a gas release occured resulting in a sd3.
During normal start sequence on the gas compressor on reaching gas gen lit, a loud bang was heard. On investigation some distortion was found on the exhaust trunking. An expansion joint was
found to be badly damaged also a flange appeared to have spread on the pipework. An internal inspection was carried out an accessable parts and apart from the distortion nothing was found.
Water/gas release developed from a corroded grease/sealent injection nipple on the lipstream divert valve to the lp production <...> of m15 production well.
The unit level controller setpoint was adjusted in an effort to improve overboard water quality. The level overflowed releasing produced water and gas to the module.
Gas release from produced water separator units.
Hydrocarbon release from produced water separator units.
Samll volume of gas released from depressurisation of flowline after pressure test.
Pump had been running approx 3 hours after a process shutdown. A vapour haze was noticed by the module operator and identified as caused by crude oil leakage from a pinhole on the balance
line at the drive end of the pump. The pump was immediately shutdow . The leakage was estimated at approx 2 gallons.
A gas release occured from the gas lift pressurisation line. The flange is between 15-xv-1102 and the oirfire plate. The area requires ear protection and the weather condition was windy. The
module is not pressurised and is open

Two technicians were carrying out a calibration of the oil metering master prover. Verification that the master prover was full of water and that the vent valves were not passing could only be
achieved by breaking a union on the line from the vents into t e hp flare header, and doing a visual check of the flow or no flow. During the period where this union was broken open. The lab tech
was involved in sampling adjacent to this area. His task involved purging gas into the hp vent header. This gas was releas d out of the open union causing twin gas detection and platform
shutdown.
During routine operation of the test loop facility, it was necessary to vent the loop down to atmospheric px. At approx 7 bar the door seal on the sand trap began to leak causing the two adjacent
gas detection heads to go into alarm, causing a g.a. And mu ter. The test loop was allowed to continue venting down under supervised condition until safe.
During a routine utilities check a production technician observed via the inspection window that in addition to the normal burner flame picture, a substance was burning in the bottom of the
firetube, and also a flame was present at around the 2 o'clock po ition on the fire tube wall . The unit was shutdown and fuel gas isolated. The small fire continued burning, suggesting that fire was
fuelled by the ingress of glycol. The fire was immediately extinguished using an adjacent dry powder extinguisher
The platform has been off production and depressurised for the past two weeks, to allow drilling and process modifications to take place. On the day of the incident it was noted that pressure had
built up in the isolated production header. This required t e production header to be manually vented. During this operation gas escaped from the h.p. Vent adjacent to no.3 contactor, activating
the platform gas detection and shutdown systems. The manual vent immediately shut preventing further release of gas.
The <...> wing valve actuator developed a leak approximately 2 hrs after it was operated. The production operator, while on an inspection tour, heard the leaking gas as he entered the area. The
noise was caused by the 200psi power gas passing through 1/4" bo e stainless steel pipe fitting connected to the underside of the actuator (the normal actuator vent\0. The gas supply to the
actuator was closed & leak stopped. The supply was then isolated until the actuator can be repaired. The <...> wellbay area is an op n deck grated area with wind wall covering 2/3 of the height
on the north, esast and west sides. Wind at the time of the incident was 14 knots at 240 degrees. Approximately 15 minutes before the leak and noticed, grit blasting was taking place about 3 met
es from the wing valve. A portable gas detector was being utilised and no gas was detected. None of the fixed gas monitors in the area detected a leak.
During normal operations leak observed coming from weld on the drain valve assembly on condensate pipework by opertor monitoring the area. The section of pipework involved was the victor
condensate export line downstream of the export pumps. The pumps and liquid metering. The line was operating at a pressure of approx 1300psi. The control room operator was called to the
scene and immediately stopped the duty export pump which reduced the leak. The operations supervisor was also called to the scene and ass sted isolation and de - pressurisation of the system.
The total leakage into the celler deck was approx. One gallon maximum of a water/condensate mixture.
<...> satellite was brought into production at 19:40 hrs by opening the wing valves on <...> cellar deck at approx 20:40hrs. The operator, while doing his rounds & routine checks noticed the noise
of gas escaping from <...> wing valve. He immediately shut the win valve in and isolated the power gas. The <...> wellbay area is an open deck grated area with wind wall covering 2/3 of the
height on the north, east and west sides.
During normal routine rounds the section leader became aware of escaping gas from actuator on valve 303-sdv-6. This gas appeared to be escaping past the piston 'o' ring seal inside the actuator.
Valve 303-sdv-6 is the shut down valve on 2" liquid dump lin from bc2 wellheads seperator and is located at the south end of bp cellar deck. The fire & gas system was operational - however due
to the small quantity of gas - did not alarm. The bp cellar deck is an enclosed area, with forced air ventilation on four corners
While construction supervisor was reviewing forthcoming annual shutdown workscopes in the area, he discovered the gas leak - he called the area operator to investigate who, witha n instrument
special, isolated the gas supply. Weather: wind 18-20 knots, 0 0 degrees, sea state 1.5/2.0m
During routine operations, metering technician heard gas escaping. On investigation, found body bleed plug on inlet valve to victor metering stream no.2. No equipment in use and no damage
sustained. The weather at the time of the incident was overcast wit heavy rain. Wind speed 24 kts at 050 degrees
No discharge pressure was evident on the <...> methanol pump discharge on the <...> platform. After proving the operation of the pump and the associated equipment, it was established that the
loss of pressure was likely to be due to a leak on the 2" p peline from <...> to the ed satellite. The dive support vessel <...> investigated and found the line parted some 1180 metres from the ed
jacket. It appears that the 2" methanol line was snagged by a trawl board from a fishing vessel an dragged away from the 12 inch gas pipeline until a point was reached where it could no longer
move, at which point it 'necked' and failed.

Following a planned platform shutdown during which the process system was vented, upon re-pressuring, a leak occurred at the base of the damper where the "c" ring meets the body. Weather
conditions at the time were clear with 10.20 kt winds @ 300 deg.
While completing post shutdown tests, and prior to starting avon gas generator, bci compressor was undergoing a purge and pressurisation cycle. During this activity the operator noted some
operational inconsistencies. Prior to shutting the unit down a mix ure of hydrocarbon gas and seal oil was released into <...> compressor house from the seal oil reservoir tank (dipstick oriface).
This caused three gas detectors to alarm on the fire and gas panel in the <...> control room. Weather conditions at time: heavy ra n, wind at 24 knots, north, 3 metre seas.
While attempting to take a produced water sample from be2 wellhead seperator, the sampling valve failed, i.e. The stem packing assembly sheared allowing the release of a mixture of process
liquid. At the time local manually operated isolation proved unsat sfacty. <...> production shutdown was initiated one hour later allowing the isolation of the liquid handling system. During this
time approximately 40 gallons of mainly water was put into the open drain system. No gas was released from this incident. No gnition sources present in area.
Reboiler tube failure in module 4.
Diesel fuel was leaking from the transfer pump on the diesel generator engine. The cause of the leak was worn shaft seal which eventually failed. The diesel oil ran onto the steel floor and ran
down a nearby drain into the sea. The area of dispersion was bout 1 sq.metre in the generator room. The platform was unmanned prior to the leak. The standby vessel had any discharge from
<...>
A slight smell of condensate/gas was noted to be coming from the vicinity of the manway doors on inlet scrubbers v152/153. The vessels were pressurised to 230 psi at the time of the incident but
the platform was shut down). The vessels were depressurised nd the doors were flogged up. The vessels were pressurised to 480 psi and leak checks revealed no further problems.
A condensate/gas smell was detected above fuel gas skid on <...> cellar deck by <...> electricians working on scaffold removing/replacing cable trays.msa detector reading of 0-1% lel in this area.
It appeared the wind blowing through the module was carrying the gas from around k/100 k/200 suction/discharge pipework. Gas tests in area of k100 discharge header psvs resulted in readings
of 0-40% lel. Escape eventually identified, after removing lagging, as coming from a 1/4 npt nipple between the relief valve ilot valve and bleed down valve on psv 309 k100 discharge header.
Unit k100 was cool stopped (normal stop including 10 min. Cool down timer) to effect repairs. Investigation revealed that the nipple was craked around approximately 230o of its circumferenc
an attempt was made to remove the nipple but it sheared in the body of the pilot valve. A replacement pilot valve was fitted to the psv, leak and pressure tested and the unit put back on line.
On the <...> 11.48 hrs, an esd and blow down occurred. The activity on the platform at the time was the completion of the pre annual shut down checks. The complex was pressured in a ready to
run state with the exception that the main <...> generators ituated on the <...> had been shut down and power was being supplied by a temporary diesel unit on the <...> platform. During the
blow down a quantity of condensate was vented in the gas stream from the <...> stacks. This condensate spilled to the sea but a pr portion also fell down onto the <...> control room/generator
roof, no escalation of the incident occured, further more no hot work was going on as all staff were on <...> (lunch). On the esd the ga sounded, a muster was progressed and the emergency
respons team called into acton. Once the venting ceased the inspection revealed the reason for the esd was the activation of the signal from a loss of <...> power timer running full term.
<...>, a <...> scaffolder working on the <...> expansion project, was preparing to pass some scaffold tubes up to a colleague who was positioned on a hanging scaffold located approx 4 mts above
the ac end of the <...> lower bridge. The sca fold was built under an overboard scaffold work permit and was complete except for some handrails. Performing authority <...> requested an inboard
scaffold work permit at 07:00hrs on <...> to erect/dismantle inboard scaffold including the ne previously mentioned. <...> left the confines of the platform to pass poles and stood on the 1" drain
valve to obtain purchase and in doing so broke the valve of its screw female connection.

Whilst at work dismantling scaffold which had been used for access to paint the well flow lines, a scaffolders tool belt snagged the 1/4" stainless steel pipe fron the low flow line pressure sensing
tap off point. This resulted in the pipe being pulled ou of its compression fitting and gas released into well head area. This activated the gas detection system to 17% lel. The low gas alarm
sounded in both main control room and radio room. The scaffolder immediately reported the incident to the radio room. T e platform crew were already responding to the gas alarm received in the
control room. Duration of gas release approx. 2 minutes. Isolation made by platform crew. Pressure in the flowline 1100 psi and platform was off-line, not flowing. Wind direction 250 wind
speed 15 knots, air temp 59 degrees f.
During a routine venting operation to depressure <...> via <...> discharge header vent v/v xv-10-7. After approx. Two minutes of venting the outside operator noticed a small gas leak from the top
of the hp vent boot sight glass. The venting was stopped and th leak reported. The fire and gas systems were armed and no detection annunciated. Inspection revealed the top nipple had sheared.
The sight glass was removed and plugged for repair by the mechanical technician. No persons were working in the vicinity and he station off-line.
All process operations were shutdown prior to incident. Daylight hours, wind 200o at 15 knots. At 19:27 cold work was in progress on the main deck of <...> (production) in the area of the
redundant separator/ contractor towers, this involved the swinging o a blind in a " cross- over " line between main flow lines on the platform side of the esdv's. <...> was cleaning the threads in
the area of no.2 contactor separator towers. He moved around to the east side of the towers and became aware of the ound of escaping gas on air. He was unable to locate the location of the leak
but decided that it was gas due to the smell. He immediately informed his supervisor who was working in the immediate area. <...> and his supervisor, <...>, searched or the location of the leak
and found it to be a " pin hole " on the outer diameter of a 2 " pipe bend. <...> contacted the <...> control room by telephone and reported the gas leak.
K104 compressor while on test run was being cheked over by inst tech and in doing so detected a small gas leak, upon further investigation the leak was found to be at a weld where the gas
balance line joins the compressor drive end. It was decided to shut the unit down in a controlled manner to save further disturbing the pipework. Actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of
incident
K103 while on line (compression). A small fire in power turbine enclosure was detected by internal uv detectors setting off halon system and shutting down compressor. Leak found to emanate
from rtdi fitting on power turbine bearing oil had gradually satur ted lagging and as power turbine extremely hot ignition had occurred. Oil found to have seeped rather than sprayed down conduit
and then onto lagging. No damage found to equipment as fire extinguished rapidly by halon system.
While checking for trapped air to pressure switch 1w 143 psl 206f, employee slackened off the union nut approx one eighth of a turn. The pipe blew out of the olive and nut discharging the
hydraulic oil from 2600 psig to zero psig. The system was installed during the <...> esdv modifications and has been in service since. No-one was injured and the pipe was the only item damaged.
The wind was from the south east estimated at 20 knots, light was good, mild condition and no noise.
Wells f6 and f9 were brought on stream. The production operator detected a gas leak, identified the source, shut the wells in and isolated the power gas to the two well esd valve bettis operators. A
further gas check was carried out and the area was clear the production operator detected a gas leak coming out of the vent from the bettis actuators on the outlet header for wells f6 and f9. The
wells were immediately shut in and the power gas to the valves were isolated. Further gas checks were carried out a d no further leaks were found. The gas was leaking for approximately one
minute. The volume was very small. The gas was not detected by gas heads however, the valves are positioned in open deck.
While carrying out gas tests during hot work preparation procedure, a small gas leak was detected at the stem seal on well f6 top master on well f6 xmas tree. The well mudline safety valve was
closed and the well vented from the mlsv to the flowline vent n the production platform. The top and bottom masters and the wing valves were closed. A further gas check was carried out and the
area was found to be clear
At 16:26 start sequencewas initiated on k1602. At 17:06 unit fully on-line and running normally. At 17:45 black smoke was noted coming from exhaust exit and emergency stop initiated. Smoke
continued tom exit exhaust. Inspection inside turbine enclosure fo lowed. All non essential personnel were told to leave the area. Heat from the internal exhaust fire caused the flexible bellows
above the enclosure to ignite and small fire followed. Fire was detected automatically & g.a. Sounded. Fire team put the fire o t while all others mustered. The fire was extinguished immediately
and hoses played on the exhaust until cooled. The source of fire traced to oil in exhaust base.
Small fire ignited on the outside of the first stage exhaust bellows. Source was oil being blown through from the turbine. Faulty/worn compressor drive end seal. Fire extiguished with a hose reel
within compressor module.

A technician was checking the valve positions on the line from bc35 thp tapping point, to the <...> transducer and local gauge. As he checked the first valve in line from the tree, the stem blew out
of the valve body releasing oil and gas into the module. E immediately had the well closed in. The fixed gas detection in the area operated, raising the platform through yellow alert to red hazard
status. An auto sps occurred and bc35 xmas tree depressurised via the valve body in question.
During the annual inspection of pl43/43a a small leak was detected in the 6" nb coflexip oil production pipeline. A tear, approx 4" long, was visible in the outer sheathing of the pipeline approx
100m from the wellhead. Small amounts of gas with possibl traces of oil were visible. Approximate measurements of the leak suggests leak rates of 50ml every 30 minutes.
On recomissioning, sea water lift system, utilising g119a to commission utilities, a very small amount of gas was released from a sea water line at 2" valve in the rig shaker area. Gas dissipated to
atmosphere. The gas was not detectable at distances grea er than 20" from the pipe. None of the fixed gas detectors in the area were activated. No damage and no injury.
Cause of release was a leak from a flange fitted with a blank. The flange was on the line ao5 to the backflow system. At the time of the leak the pressure within the line was increasing due to
increased flow in ao5. No damage or injury sustained. Internal module
Gpa and muster called when gland leak occurred on fuel gas controller pv333.7,2 gas detectors momentarily read 20% automatically initiating a class 2 shutdown. One minute later readings fell
to 10-11% and six minutes on read between 4% and 6%. The gas det ctors were situated in the extract ducting and upon shutdown immediately started to fall. Nb the <...> field has the most
sensitive fire and gas detection system in the north sea, ie th gpa and muster shutdown occur at 2 x 20% lel.
During annual shutdown preparation for replacing isolator valve on the kill manifold,residual annular gas leaked across valve and vented via sample point in area 6b.
During work to isolate the pig launcher for pigging operations, a minor leak was detected from the top of the bonnet on valve mov 5004, (nb detection was by personnel,gas detection equipment
did not show any release). After examination, it was found that as was escaping through three adjacent stud bolts on the bonnet. (nb the leak occurred on the top of unmanned structure which is
freely ventilated and allows maximum dispersion in an area.
During a class ii shutdown the esdv xv-001 apparently failed to close as a result of the telemetry trip. Initial investigation revealed the valve position indicator to be displaying incorrectly.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the valve was also assing. The pipeline was then isolated and depressurised to allow access to the compnents within the valve for maintenance.
Fuel gas to 'b' generator flanged joints were insufficiently tightened which resulted in class 3 shutdown.
During routine purging of mp compressor following annual platform s/d the compressor belly drains were left open longer than normal when removing any condensate . Gas was blown through
the belly drains and into the atmospheric vent header. Gas pressure ba ked up in the open drains system and was released through the drains into the void below the mud pits. The drain line from
the mud pit room(maintained at a negative pressure) was open, this combined with gas was sucked from the void below the mud pits. Ga was sucked from the void up into the pit room
Sparks from welding of pipe supports above k201s overhead seal oil tank c212s ignited small gas leak emanating from lagging around c212s sight glass isolation valves and pipeworks. Two
"small blue flames" (eye witness description) <2-3" long were immediat ly extinguished by fire watcher using one 9kg dry powder fire extinguisher. There were no injuries. Personnel were not
called to muster stations. One uv detector was activated - no plant shutdown or deluge which requires two detectors to be activated. Fol owing the incident the lagging was removed and a minor
gasleak was detected local to the isolation valve stem.
Coincidental heat detection inside gas export compressor k201a shut the unit down and discharged 50kg of halon into the unit enclosure. During investigation as to the cause of the shutdown
momentary re-ignition occurred and a further 50kg of halon was dis harged manually . Seal oil leaking past labyrinth seal ignited on contact with hot engine component. No fire damage occurred
only slight discolouration of a small section of pipe lagging in close proximity to drive shaft.
Methanol injection to the <...> subsea well was recommenced at 10:30 following a planned shutdown during b2 drilling ops. The platform oim & mech tech were present and pumping methanol
to equalise sssv/reduce the possibility of hydrate formation durin b1 start up. At approx 14:00 the mech tech observed a small leak of methanol from the instrument pipework the oim was
informed & shutdown the methanol pump from the control room workstation. Approx 2 litres of methanol had been released by the time the s id depressured. On visual examination the pipework
was observed to have parted adjacent to a parker a-lok 316 ss swage ferrule connection.

At o540 hours it was observed that there was a leak of hydrocarbons between v8010 (test separator) and the west bulkhead, as it was too difficult to determine where exactly the leak was coming
from, due to the fine spray forming a cloud and partly due to he light at the time of day, a level 3 shutdown was initiated by phoning the <...> control room. It then became obvious that the half
inch chemical injection line going to well t15 had parted at the elbow fitting, this was immediately isolated. On in estigation into the problem it was apparent that the half inch olive threaded
connection, attached to the right angled elbow and the pipework, that passed through the bulkhead to the wellhead area, had parted. Further investigation discovered that the n.r v. On the
pipework prior to the injection point on t15's flowline had been installed in the wrong direction allowing backflow of hydrocarbons along the injection line. The 1/2" elbow and connections were
replaced and the n.r.v. reinstated.
Slot 4 xmas tree wing valve was operated remotely by <...> main control room to bring slot 4 into production. After operation a small gas leak was detected through the 'tell tale' on the wing valve
body. The well was then shut in. Wing and master alves were both closed and the slot ws isolated at the hydraulic control panel.
Gas alarm indication on ccr fire and gas panel fire area 101 module 13. Investigation revealed crack in pipework downstream of fcv 2602b on gas injection compressor intercooler.
Blockage in pump seal drain line caused a small gas leak from the export pump seal. This was detected by the gas detection system which initiated a level 2 plant shutdown.
A <...> clamp on the recycle line failed on the joint between valve fc2602b and the injection compressor intercooler. The clamp failed at an operating pressure of 352 bar during normal running
conditions. The mode of failure was that both bolts on one s de of the clamp sheared. A significant gas release occured within the module, a full gpa emergency actions taken and platform made
safe by depressurisation. The incident was declared safe and personnel stood down at 08.28.
Seal leak at pump drive end resulted in a small discharge of crude oil leak discovered by senior operator after approx 5 minutes duration. Pump was shut down from tdc in control room and
isolated on suction + discharge valaves. Oil spillage continued to h zardous drains and area cleaned.
A discharge of condensate from <...> pipeline pig receiver outlet block valve, grease/sealant port occurred when nipple was removed to replace with new.
2 x low level gas alarms registered on the f&g panel in the ccr. The ccr contacted the area operator who immediately investigated and found oil/gas emmitting from a swagelock connection on
export pump b (impulse line) the machine was immediately shut dow
Pse-1448 (cooler ex0205b shell side relief to lp flare) had been removed by maintenance for renewal of bursting disc element, isolation from the flare header having been made at a swing check
valve. Whilst the pse was removed gas discharged from the lp fl re side causing high level gas detection within the module and subsequent level 3 shutdown. Cause of gas release subsequently
identified as flapper of the swing check valve being manually held off its seat allowing gas from the lp flare to flow into the m dule. Due to high level of gas in module 16 the gpa initiated and
personnel mustered at altenative muster points.
Following a previous level 2 shutdown caused by high pressure in the inlet gas scrubber the plant was being restarted when a local module alarm was activated from the fire & gas panel, this
being caused by a low gas alarm (g.9115). An operator went to in estigate and reported 2 or possibilty 3 of the psv's opn the igs had lifted, one of which (pvv 0156) was leaking gas into the
moduke from its tell tale. An attempt was made to put the "off line" psv into commission and take off the faulty psv (0156) but t is was not achieved quickly enough and two gas heads went into
"high level" alarm. A level 3 shutdown then occured. It is suspected that the psv's had lifted on the previous ( level 2) shutdown and had not fully reseated.
At 20.34 a gas head in module 16 came into low and then high alarm. Upon investigation the operator found the gas to be coming from a drain gulley but whilst re-establishing a water seal a
second head went into high alarm causing a process plant shut-down the water seal was resorted and gas heads returned to normal by 20.42. At 20.44 a gas head came into low alarm in module
04. The source was not readily apparent but was pinpointed, using a portable gas detector, as coming from a lute drain seal. This was topped up and the gas heads returned to normal by 21.13
hours. (a total of three gas heads went into low alarm at various times during the investigation to pinpoint the source of the leak in module 04). Following these releases, all drains in process area
were checked and topped up as appropriate. Checks were also made on the open drain caisson. Permission to re-start production was given by the oim at 23.oo hours.
<...> engine no.ax7401h was being given a routine test run. At 10.56 when the engine had been running for approx 25 minutes, co-incident u/v detection occured (3 off u/vs) and extinguishant
was released automatically into the generator room which is protected by a halon system. On attendance by the safety officer and drilling personnel water was applied to the exhaust insulation
adjacent to the engine's turbo charges as the lagging was smoking and very hot. Removal of the insulation that were were two small holes in the flexible section of the exhaust. Oil had
contaiminated the mineral wool insulation which had ultimately ignited.

A very slight leak was detected by the gas detectors 9922/9921 when the fuel gas wing enclosure ventilation fans were shutdown for maintence to be carried out, on 'c' power generator ax-5401c.
The 'c' injection machine was being put back into service following replacement of the fuel gas throttle valve when two gas detectors within the gas generator enclosure went into alarm. The
caused a level 3 shgutdown of 'c' injector and closure of fuel ga supply which shutdown the adjacent 'd' machine. On investigation it was found that the fuel throttle valave had been supplied with
the valve position indicator missing form its base. Gas had therefore been able to escape from the valve via the open "trap ed hole in the base of the valve.
Whilst the gas turbine logic was carrying out pre-start sequence checks two gas detectors within the fuel gas wing of the turbine enclosure went into alarm. On investigation it was found that a
fitting on the fuel gas line between the throttle valve and t e high speed shut off-cock was leaking, whilst the fitting had not been disconnected for the throttle valve removel/replacement it may
have been disturbed resulting in the subsequent gas leak.
Gas leak was extremely minor. No gas detection initially but when hvac fans were stopped for work by instrument department gas heads were activated.
Work was being undetaken on the logic power supply of 'c' power generator - this resulted in the shutdown of the vent fans in the fuel gas wing of the gas generator. Two gas detectors within the
fuel gas wing compartment went into 'low alarm and on invest gation it was found that there was a minor leak on the secondary high speed shut-off cock.
Leak was from blind flange fitted to fuel gas outlet line from fuel gas k.o. Pot. (line had been removed to allow engine removal)
Two gas detectors were activated (at low gas alarm) when a release of gas occured which, on investigation, was found to be coming from the flow transmitter (fth 0002) on injection well b10.
Flow transmitter was isolated pending change-out for another unit leaking unit to be sent ashore for investigation.
Whilst pulling out of hole with wireline equipment on well b21 a gas release occured due to leak of the grease seal in the lubricator. This was due to a fault in one of the pumps supplying grease
to the lubricator. Whilst the gas release was detected by a single gas head and an alarm indicated in the central control room, the leak had been noticed by <...> operatives who undertook
immediate corrective action.
Whilst running in hole with wireline (perforating gun) a minor gas leak occured at the lubricator. This was noticed by the <...> operative on the drill floor but also caused the activation of one of
the gas detector (g9874) in low larm. The problem was diagnosed as being due to the lubricator pump failing to maintain prerssure. Back-up pump was started and the lubricator seal reinstated.
Suspect pump was checked and the problem found to be to be due to a regular adjustment
Whilst running in hole for perforation, gas leaked from the lubricaor on the wireline equipment causing the activation ( in low alarm) of one gas detector. The leak appears to have been caused by
the two duty pumps on one of the elmar skids having stalled and thus the grease pressure in the lubricator dropping to a level where gas was allowed to pass.
At 14:52 on<...>, alram in the ccr indicated pressence of a low level of gas in the cooling medium header tank, fire area 16-08.
During a restart of the production facilities following a pipeline shutdown, high pressure occurred in the igs and psv 0157 lifted. This resulted in the failure of the bellows on the psv and gas was
released into the module via the bellows tell-tale. Gas as detected on five heads ( 1 in high the others in low alarm) and a level 2 shutdown initiated.
Instrument technician and production operator blowing down flow transmitter impulse line to clear liquids. Small amount of gas drifted into analyser house setting two gas detectors into alarm.
During routine operator checks a very slight leak had been detected in 'a' inj secondary h.s.s.o.c. The machine was shutdown, the gland tightned and the system depressurised without problems.
Whilst carrying out pre-start activities on the inj. M/c the tw gas heads in the wing cell came into low alarm. Investigations with a portable gas detector and snoop were carried out on all fuel gas
connections and glands in the wing cell. Nothing could be found. The two gas heads returned to zero after about 30 seco ds. Lower alarm is set at 10% l.e.l.
Draining down (via a valve) was taking place in order to permit the removal of psv 0783. The block valve forming the upstream isolation was passing and thus the quantity of gas condensate
vented caused the activation of a local gas detector and module lo al alarm. Venting ceased immediately.
A production operator was tasked to blow-down well b18 tubing head pressure which had approx. 280 bar in the line, the correct isolation procedure had been carried out. As the operator opened
the vent valve, liquid started to drip from the drain line and the impulse line blew out from the swagelock 't' piece causing a very minor injury to the operators elbow. No alarms activated in the
area.

During start up b gas injection compressor a low alarm came in on f&g (g9575). The production operator checked the area and found a very minor leak on 3rd stage recycle valve gland packing,
the machine was shutdown from ccr and depressurised, maintenance tightened the gland and compressor started up with production monitoring for further leaks. No leaks detected.
One gas detector went into alarm. Area was checked and it was found that a nylon seal ring on the pilot pipework assembly to psv had failed. On identification of fault psv was isolated and
depressurised.
Multi-discipline planned maintenance work had been completed on b fire pump and it was given a test run with production and maintenance personnel in attendance. Having run for some ten
minutes oil leaked from the vicinity of the turbo-charger and ignited. He engine was shut down and the fire was shut down and the fire quickly extinguished using portable dry powder fire
extinguishers. The cause of the lub.oil leak and susequent fire was traced to a pipe connection on which the compression fitting 'olive' ha been incorrectly fitted on original installation.
Vx 5401a fuel gas k.o. Pot:leak detected attop of union on fuel gas k.o. Pot sight glass,detected during deisolation following maintenance work o.v. 6103a secondary high speed shut off cock:very
slight gland leak detected during deisolation operation foll wing maintenance work. Both of the above leaks were detected by the platform fixed fire and gas detection system.
At 1010 on <...> an oil/gas leak in module m2e was reported to the control room by the shift supervisor process. As a result the platform was put on hazard status from the control room, and a
shutdown and blowdown of oil train 2 was initiated from the p ocess control panel the fire and gas system was checked, but there was no indication of a gas release. Oil train 2 was then isolated
from all sources of hydrocarbons. A full muster was achieved on the platform in 23 minutes the cause of the leak was found to be a pinhole leak on a "10" x "2" stub weld downstream of lcv 2121
block valve on train 2 oil outlet pipework from the first stage. The pipework had been inspected on <...> by <...> and <...> testing, and no defect found.
Examination of the valve concluded that the locking nut holding the stem thread in the valve body was loose, causing the stem to unscrew when the valve was operated. It is not possible to
determine how or when the lock nut became loose
K9320 developed an imbalance of interstage pressure. Cylinder 2,4,6 side was 250 bar while 1,3,5 side was 195 bar. The head end discharge pipework was also considerably hotter than the other
five cylinders (100 degc), it was deduced that there was a probl m with a valve on cylinder no 1. The machine was shutdown and started auto-blowdown at 0402, at 0416 low level gas indication
in um4ee followed by high level gas and surface process shutdown at 0418, subsequant investigation revealed a leak from the cylin er head joint on no 1 cylinder.
At 15:15 hours on <...> the platfrom went to red status accompanied by a gas compression shuttdown. Personnel to muster stations. Production investigated and found a genuine gas release within
module m3ee. During this time process shutdown and closure o the esd valves occurred at 1523 hrs. Production personnel found the source of the leak to be from the differential pressure
transmitter tag number pdzt 49917. This was duly isolated and the gas heads monitored. When the gas indication dropped below 25% l l the oim instructed the control operator to put the platform
on yellow alert status.
Due to a previous incident of bcf release, under the hood of g-4700, two supervisors entered the avon enclosure to try and visually identify any hot air leaks. Once inside the enclosure the
machine was subject to increased load from its original idling co dition. As the load increased a leak from no.2 burner pig tail was immediately apparent. At this point the avon was manually
shutdown.
Oil technician was changing out the pressure gauge. A hoke 3 port isolation valve was installed upstream of the gauge between the hoke valve and the main oil export was a 3/4" plug valve seized
in the open position. The technician was aware the 3/4" plug alve was seized. Isolation using the hoke valve (proven single valve) is acceptable. The technician could not get a reading on the
gauge so he changed the gauge for a second time still no reading. The hoke valve was closed and the technician was checking he ports of the hoke valve when it detached allowing a hydrocarbon
escape. This activated the hlg and subsequent sps. The platform shutdown and blewdown automatically. The technician assisted by 2 others isolated the section of line and as the pressure de ayed
plugged the open tapping

Oil mist leak discovered coming from the valve stem of 006/23 (lkv2214) 1st stage oil outlet block valve on train 1. It was reported to the control room operator who immediately shutdown and
blew down the train. The oil mist was not detected by the fixed etector system and therefore there was no change of platform status. This was due to the relative significance of this leak and the
effectiveness of the adjacent hvac extract.
Oil technicians were preparing to open bd38 to open for the first time following a prolonged platform shutdown, as the oil flow wing valve fwv commenced opening, a leak occurred from a
flowline coupling joint releasing gas into the wellhead module. All oi and gas production was shutdown and depressurised. The gas in the module was dispersed naturally. There was no personal
injury or significant equipment damage. Two technicians were involved in bringing on the well. One positioned at the tree in module d3 and the other was situated in m2w at the hydraulic skid.
Immediately prior to instructing his colleague in m2w to pump open the fwv, the technician at the tree 'cracked' open the choke. As the fwv commenced to open,a surge of gas was heard entering
the f owline and almost immediately a loud bang was also heard by the operator at the tree. He then observed a gas cloud forming above him in m3e and quickly reclosed the choke, contacted the
control room to shutdown the trains and vacated the module.
The isolation of the fuel gas knock out pot v3820 and inhibition of the halon system were applied for and carried out by <...> ops tech. After discussion it was decided to leave to halon on auto
release mode. The logic for this that the work could be carr ed out from outside the avon hood with door open. Upon loosening the bolts on the regulator a gas release occurred. Re tightening the
bolts did not stop the leak as the sealing 0 rings were dislodged. The platform went from green to yellow to red status. Ps technician arrived at scene and checked the isolation of xev3820 (fuel
gas auto isolation valve) he ascertained this valve was closed and that the pressure was locked between in the downstream line to the regulator.he proceeded to the fg purge line and vented
pressure from the line. During this time hl coincident gas was initiated in the avon hood and the halon release was initiated as per platform f&g logic
A technician had refitted the pigtail pipes to the gas fuel burners following cleaning of the latter. The specified tool for this procedure is a 6" spanner. All the pigtails were refitted according to
procedure. The generator was synchronised and on the bars at 12mw when platform status changed from green to yellow due to an indication of low level gas on the avon alarm annuncator panel.
The machine was immediately shut down. Later inspection showed the source of the leak as being at one of the pigtail connections
When carrying out pigging operations on <...> to <...> pipeline a small amount of residual oil spilled out.
The rotary table kelly hose failed at 1m below the goose neck conection actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
A leak at one of the pin retainers on non return valve at the inlet manifold to the hp seperator was reported. The leak stopped at 17:00 when the pressure in the system was dropped after isolating
the a train.
One high and 2 low level gas alarms were activated in the enclosure of the c export compressor which was isolated for maintenance. Single valve isolation had been used against the flare system
and one valve had passed a small quantity of gas when the pre sure in the flare system had increased when the b export compressors fuel gas had blown down. Double valve isolation was
immediately put in place and the system tested for gas. Work was stopped. Examination of the isolation conformation certificate rev aled that the comment 'not required' was written next to the
blow down valves that were not closed, although the drawing accompanying the icc had these valves marked for closure. The double valve isolation established at the time of the incident was
achi ved by closing these valves. The method used was to take an air supply to the valve actuators bypassing the fail open control system of the valve.
Hydrocarbon leak at a retaining plug on a non-return valve next to xxv 10900, on the flowline of well slot c5 at the <...> manifold. This was at the north end of the platform in an open area. The
prevailing wind was at 190 degrees,8 knots which disperse the gas away from the platform. This was a minor leak and was observed, the platform fire and gas system did not detect it.
Gas metering technician was carrying out a densitometer vacuum test and was in the process of putting the densitometer back into service. He had disconnected the common vacuum/vent header
from the vacuum pump (for protection) and placed a blank cap at the end of the line. Upstream and downstream isolation valves (located in the analyser house) were opened. On returning to the
analyser house technician noticed gas issuing from the end of the vacuum/vent header. The leak was isolated immediately and the plat orm central control informed. Technician noticed that the
common vacuum/vent header isolation valve was not closed and the blank cap was not tightened sufficiently. 3 gas heads which are located in the analyser house went into alarm no one was
injured and no plant damaged. No control action initiated as gas heads in the area were inhibited for an adjacent de-spading task.

Condensate leak from flange on maintenance valve on main oil riser . The flange is located on the valve body and is connected to the lp flare system to allow depressurising of the valve cavity for
leakage checks. Normal production activities were in opera ion at the time of the incident including liquid export
The wire line lubricator had been attached to the sweab on slot 6 and was ready for pressurisation. This is done by equalising around the swab valve from the service wing valve through a needle
valve to the swab flange. The service wing was open six turns and the instrument tubing pressurised upto the needle valve. When the needle valve was opened the pressure dissipated. The
personell didn't have time to assess the loss because pressure returned suddenly and the 1/2" instrument tubing flewu out of its com ression fitting at the service wing valve. The operator
immediately closed the service wing valve followed shortly after by the hydraulic master valve closing, initiated by personnel at the wire line well control unit.
During pressurisation of pt-v-2520 sphere launcher, sphere launcher vent valves vpx2502-01 and vpx2502-02 were closed, pipeline blowdown valve vpx2506-02 and 3" choke vpx2506-01 were
closed and valves vpx2504-03 and vpx2504-01 on pressurising line to spoo cavity between launching valves hv-2502 and hv-2504 were opened. Valve vpx2503-01 on pressurising line from t/l
was opened. Valve vpx2503-02 was slowly opened to pressurise line from 3" choke to the launching valves cavity. At 0716 hrs the plant tech was informed by the control room operator that there
was low level gas indication zone 229 relief valve area mezz deck. Plant tech immediately closed pressurising valve vpx2503-02. At 0717 hrs the gas level went to coincident low level and
initiated a gpa. Th tech proceeded to the relief valve area and found the 3" choke leaking gas from its stem. At the time was 20 bar. The choke valve opened to vent and the leak stopped.
Attempts were being made to unblock lcv 2402 by stoking the valve from 0-100% open to closed from the control room. On the 3rd attempt the blockage cleared followed by a high pressure (70
bar) produced liquid/gas from a hole eroded in the bottom of the va ve body. The ops supervisor and plant technician were standing next to the control valve and were able to isolate it
immediately before any alarms or detection was activated.
<...> were carrying out a coiled tubing plt survey in well pw21. All pre-running checks had been carried out and they were running coiled tubing down-hole when they stood up at the sssv. It was
during retrieval of the coiled tubing he incident occured. Pulling coiled tubing to surface in well pw21, a small gas leak started at the injector head, the operator on the tower was brought dwon
and the coiled tubing was pulled up further. At this point (0530 hrs( <...> the gas blew out t the stripper. The well was closed in at the swab valve, this stopped the gas leak. The top master gate
on the well was closed and the well opened to vent via the kell skid. The swab valve was re-opened to vent the remaining n2 from the coiled tubing eel. The gas leak lasted for 4 minutes, the
well was contained and the wellhead secured in a total of 10 minutes. The swab valve was closed in preference to the master gate to ensure that tools were not stuck across tree.
At 14:00 hrs on <...>, train 1 turbine was being run up after maintenance to the fuel gas system. At 14:10 hrs the general alarm sounded with indication of gas detection in the turbine enclosure.
All personnel were mustered and confirmation given that ow level coincidence of gas detection had resulted in shutdown and depressurisation of the pc/pm platforms. On investigation it was
found that the leak was from a 3/8" stainless steel compression fitting disturbed during maintenance on the fuel gas system the leak was of a very minor nature and detectable only by the nature
of the air flow in the enclosure and the positioning of three detectors in the mouth of the extract duct, set at 20% l.e.l.
Slot 14 was recommisioned following wireline work and it was noticed by a wireline ops. Tech in the vicinity that gas was leaking from the service valve connection on the gas string. The well
was closed in immediately by operations. The gas flowline was isolated and depressurised. No persons were injured. No plant damage occurred. Weather conditions were dry and windy.
Painters had been issued with a permit and an entry certificate to clean /paint the intervals of the skirt supporting the hp suction scrubber. They noticed a weep from the drain line just after the
elbow.they reported this to the outside senior operator w o told them to stop work and come out of the skirt until he investigated.he confirmed the leak and reported to the central control room.the
ccr operator shut down the gas compression system manually.
During recommisioning of pc2 compression train, as part of the procedure manual juction block valve (10 hcv 12081) was to be opened. Prior to this all pressure across the valve had been
equalised. On commencement of opening of this manual valve j.reed det cted a small emission of gas from the face between the valve bonnet and body, on the east side of the valve.

Whilst preparing to carry out a leakage test on esdv 3026 (<...> export valve), the methanol system was shutdown from the main control room pushbutton. The action of the pushbutton is to close
all the methanol system sdv's (including methanol pipeline sdv' ). The methanol system was shutdown at 0555 hrs. At approx 0855 hrs, a platform electrician alerted the main control room of a
methanol from a 6" blind flange in the area of the <...> methanol pumps (p.p cellar deck s.e. Corner). Two operators checked ou the leak.informed the main control room of the exact nature of
the leak. The control room operator checked the pressure in the system and opened the audrey methanol pressure controller, the system pressure was 83 barg at this time, at which time the leak
subsided. The pcv was closed again and the cro noticed the pressure increasing again. At this time he checked the gdt screen and noticed that sdv 9807 ( <...> methanol export sdv) was indicating
"in transit".
Day shift operations had loaded sphere launcher. Night shift operations staff were re-pressuring the launcher to make it available for use. A short time after pipeline pressure had been reached (79
barg) the door seal failed causing the release of the (is lated) inventory - a total of 7m3. Operators were on the scene. The release was reported immediately and followed by a gpa + shutdown.
Dispersing gas entered air intakes of <...> generator turbine, detected by sensors, halon discharged and generators shu down. Wind wsw 250 degrees, 10-15 knots. Illumination good. Temp.
Approx. 11 degrees c atmosphere.
On the nightshift of the <...> was on low nominations was no compression required. The 5 man operations shift were given a few isolations to carry out for next day. At 03:30 hrs i left the control
room with <...> and <...>, the two tside operators, we went to the pp celar deck for checking of an isolation. After checking the isolation i decided to go on a routine plant inspection at 03:45hrs
whilst checking the area around the chemical injection pumps i became aware of a hissing no se from the area of the bypass manifold which was about 2 1/2 metres away. I then shouted to <...>
and <...> to join me at the compressor bypass valve pg 316 which i had identified as leaking from the bonnet. I assessed the leak and instructed the control oom operator via radio to stop
production from the two fields which had no facility to flow via the bypass manifold. I then instructed <...> to go to the control room and bring back a portable gas monitor. On <...>'s return i left
the cellar deck and went t the main control room and phoned both the oim and production supervisor. I then returned to the valve and was joined by the oim by which time all production had
been switched to the bypass manifold. We then decided to close the valve to try to isolate th bonnet by using the valves' ball seals. After the valve was closed the leak dissipated considerably. The
Whilst production operator was touring the production facilities during routine operations he heard an unusual noise. On investigation he discovered that <...> separator production water outlet
lcv bypass valve was spraying liquid from its body. The cont ol room was informed and <...> process was shutdown, vented and then isolation.
The kca assistant driller was attempting to relieve pressure trapped (approx 800 psi) within the cement pump discharge piping whilst preparig to carry out a formation integrity test. To facilitate
the release of pressure the assistant driiller had first r lieved the cement unit piping back to the pump header tank and was pr- oceding to back off a 2" weco union connecting the cement pump
discharge to a high presuure flexible hose. An amount of hydrocarbons gas which had been released from piping into the pu p header tank migrated to a gas head situated directly above cau- sing
a change of platform status.
Solar generator g1040 was being restarted after tripping. During start sequence the machine shut down automatically on fire detection.it was discovered the turbine ultra violet detectors caused
alarm. Power tech noticed smoke inside the turbine hall. The urbine btm system was prepared for immediate release and co2 extinguishers taken to scene a hood access door was opened and a
small fire discovered in area above titan starter turbine exhaust unit. Fire successfully extinguished and co2 was used to cool t e area and avoid reignition.after ventilating the area inspection
revealed a blanking cap on a small bore fitting on the hydraulic start pump return had detatched. No damage was caused to the turbine package.
The compressor was being repressurised with process gas after having be- en deisolated following a maintenance repairs to the valves on no.2 cyl- inder.shortly after starting repressuring the
machine a gas leak was de- tected by the fixed gas detection sy tem and the operation shutdown aut- omatically.all safety systems functioned correctly.the investigation found no evidence of poor
maintenance.it has been concluded that the op- erating procedure needs to be revised to have more personnel present du- ring this type of operation to monitor the machine during the repressursing operation.
Plant on line, intercooler in service at 97barg. Operator detected noise within g10ft and then smell when moved in closer. Operator located leak on joint area by feel, called for supervision.
Supervisor inspected leak and unit was shutdown and blowdown
A release of oil occured on <...> at 04.35 hours on m3 roof area of cpc. The release was from an incorrectly fitted blank flange on a 3/4" valve on the hot oil system cpc. The system contains
santotherm 60. The blank flange had been used to provide the bleed of a db&b isolation to facilitate the recertification of a p.s.v. On re-instatement of the p.s.v. The oil was circulated through an
off-line w.h.r.u. The system appeared to be intact. However, when the oil was circulated through an on-line w.h.r.u. He flange developed a leak through which a total of 50 gallons of oil was lost.

A pinhole leak developed in a branch leading from a production riser carrying crude oil/gas and produced water at approx. 25 bar pressure. It is estimated that 0.6 tonne of fluids leaked before the
pipeline could be isolated and depressurised. Wind; 15 k ots, 360 degrees. Sea: 2m waves, 6.3s period. No photographs or samples were taken.
Normal production of <...> crude to storage was in progress.during our routine twice daily leg checks a pin hole leak was found in line p065 oil to storage at first weld on the line immeediately
upstream of the of the import manifold connecting flange.se arated crude in the form of a fine spray was emanting from the leak.there was insufficient gas to - activate the fixed low level gas
alarms. The platform was shutdown to isolate the leak and effect a repair.
Normal production of crude was in rpogress.during normal watch keeping duties the area technician found a leak on the outlet spol on train 1 1- stage separator down stream of the lcv line no.p059-3106y. Approx 10 litres of produced fluid was released(bs w 77%). The platform was manually shutdown and depressurised ,personnel were mustered as a precautionary measure.train 1 was
isolated to enable repa- irs to commence.
The normal production of <...> crude was in progress.during normal wat- chkeeping duties the area tech found a small leak on the outlet spool of e2610 crude oil cooler on train 1. Approx. 100lt
of produced fluid was released.train 1 was manually shutd- o n and drained prior to repairs being carried out.
During platform tour,seepage was noted on the affected pipework.on rubbing the pain a pinhole leak occurred.the leak was immediately reported to the pcr and the train shutdown and
depressurised for isolation of the crude oil cooler,in order for replacemen to be carried out
During area technicians watchkeeping duties a pin hole leak was found to be causing a hydrocarbon loss of containment.the equipment was locally isolated and de-pressurised.as a precautionary
measure the platform was placed on alert status by a manual init ation.. No shutdown,blowdown or muster caused.
At 14.25 on <...> a low level gas alarm was indicated within module 02. Exceeding 20 l.e.l. This initiated a local area alarm. Subsequent investigation identified the source of the gas emission as
a 3/4 blled of ve-03-2003. The bleed had previously bee opened as part of a blowdown exercise when repairing a graylock joint on ve-2001. The source of the gas emitting from the 3/4 bleed has
been idenfified as originating from the h.p. Flare, backflowing through p.v. 1944 into the glycol contractor, on to th injection compressor suction manifold and venting at the bleed valve. Upon
discovery of the above, all the necessary isolation were made, and at 15.03 gas levels commenced dropping.
During procedures to shutdown the glycol contractor, pressure control valve pv 0354 could not handle the required gas volume at 100% open, because of hydrate formation. Pressure started
increasing and was not detected by hshh 0360. Psv 0381 lifted to reli ve the pressure. As the plant did not immediately trip, an extended relief period took place. Chattering of the psv caused the
bellows to fatigue releasing gas down the bellows reference line. A gas detector local to the discharge point of the reference l nes alarted operators to the problem and appropriate actions taken.
Pshh 0360 did not detect the high pressure for two reasons: pshh 0360 had drifted to 80 barg (1 barg above set point) transmitter replaced as it would not hold set point on recalibration. 3 way
valve marked incorrectly to piping configuration, therefore pshh 0360 was isolated. A programme to check all 3 way valves of sililiar arrangement was immediately put in place.
During gas inspection operations a p.t.f.e. Sealing 'o' ring failed between the adaptor flange and manifold on flow transmitter fih 0002 well e1 causing a gas release. The flow transmitter isolation
valves were closed. The discharge valve was closed on 'c gas injection compressor. The compressor was placed on recycle. The injection manifold and e1 flowline were depressurised. Weather
40k 168 6m wave.
Gas was seen to be emitted from a flange between a n.r.v. And block valve downstream of vent vx 0215 e/f. When this was observed the 'c' injection train was manually shut down. Prior to this
incident this system has been n2 tested to 312 barg successfully with no apparent leaks. Subsequent examination of the system identified no backing off of falnge nuts and bolts.
A crack occurred in a 1" branch connection on unit 12-p-024033. This 12" line carries gas from the 1st stage aftercooler (ex0215c) to 2nd stage suction scrubber (vx0212c) on injection
compressor train 'c'. Gas was released into the module. The smell was n ticed by a start-up engineer and the source of release was found using a hand held gas detector.
A leak from ex0104b, m.o.l. Suction coller plate exchanger caused a discharge of condensate into the surrounding area and the initiation of two gas detectors.
Whilst preparing to run a wireline set bridge plug in well e7 the viscous seal of the atlas grease head was lost. This resulted in a small gas release into module 01 through the return hose to the
grease injection skid, and the initiation of 2 low level ixed gas detectors. The cause was determined to be the incorrect connection of gease injection hoses.

Light - good. Wind from the north. At 1920 hours <...> platform production was automatically shut down as a result of a level 3 initiated by extra high level within the slop oil vessel. Following
the shutdown the level continued to build within the slop oil vessel subsequently discharging a small amount of oily water on the platform deck and helideck, via the slop oil vent located at the
end of the flare boom. Investigations identified the primary cause of the slop oil vessel inventory build up to be def ctive valves on 2nd stage seperator drain system. On identifying passing valves,
the level 3 was "reset" and the 2nd stage separator inventory was passed forward to the 3rd stage separator followed by depressurisation. Slop oil vessel level control was re nstated shortly after.
Cap on the drain sump had not been fitted correctly and the seal not flooded. This allowed gas blow back from the open drain system. Gas was detected by the fixed platform system.
Pressure in 1st stage seperator at time of incident. 5 bar minor gas leak observed at p.v. 0150 gland packing for the stem. Leak also detected on fixed detection system.
Condensate was seen to be leaking from mol suction cooler ex0104b. It was apparent to personnel in the area that a seal had failed and steps were taken immediately to isolate in the area that a
seal had failed and steps were taken immediately to isolate a d drain down the exchanger. Gas evolving from condenser was detected by fixed detection and local alarm initiated automatically.
Once the exchanger was isolated, the leak stopped.
Gas release near 3rd stage flow transmitter on c compressor was detected and isolated at 1437 hours <...>. The compressor was shut-down and transmitter removed. No fault could be found at
that time. Spare transmitter was fitted and equipment recommision d. Gas release near a similiar transmitter on compressor. A occured 1442 hours <...>. Transmitter was isolated, but the machine
was kept on-line in full re- cycle while the investigation proceeded. At 1536 hours <...> a gas leak occured. Operator on site informed the ccr who initiated a shutdown and a general platform
alarm (g.p.a.). The compressor was depressurised on shutdown to stop the gas release. Personnel sttod down at 1603 hours.
Operational mode: full production and gas injection. Gas detector in module 02 comparession arae indicated low level alarm at 20% for a few seconds then reduced to 1-3% lel. Sebsequent
investigation identified leak on compressor 'a' blowdown valve (xx1314 cavity vent. Vent port was repaired.
Gas was detected at 20% lel by a single detector. Problem traced to bellows vent of psv 942 ( relief psv on teg contractor ). Gas detector is positioned near rear for early warning of bellow failure.
Psv iscolated using interlocked valves after standby ps 1943 was made oper- ational
During a compressor shutdown for maintenence, gas was detected by a fixed detector coming from a valve actuator body. The valve was in the closed position. On investiagtion, the gas leaking
from the valve stem seals. Wind 28k - 169 weather good, lighting good
Gas released from psv tell-tale pipe during a process shutdown was detected by the platform fixed detection system. Personnel in the area did not notice any gas, therefore, conclusion was a
minor gas release.
During cementing operations a weld failed on the cement head top cap allowing high pressure mud to escape vertically inside the derrick. The union/bull plug came to rest on the east side of the
drill floor
After breaking the joints prior to removal of a valve, a small amount of residual vapour leaked from it. This caused two detectors to register for a few seconds. The system had been isolated,
depressurised and checked for residual pressure before breaki g the joints.
During controlled venting to depressurise trapped gas between isolation valve and nrv, gas head went to low level alarm.
Leak developed to well e5 flowline nrv seal ring during production. The flowline has been in service for 6 months.
Two gas heads came into low alarm when gas leaked from gland on fv 1400 b injection compressor. Leak stopped by tightening gland follower.
An operations technician was performing maintenance on south 1 lifeboat when he observed through the grating what he described as "a whisp of steam" emitting from the vicinity of the 12" fe
riser. He went to the 66' level for a closer view and concluded there was a small leak from the riser. He immediately informed the mechanical supervisor and operations supervisor via the crt.
This was at 1330hrs. The oim and ooe wee also called to the scene. A fine gaseous light spray was observed at the time emitt ng from the riser about 10' - 20' above sea level.
During removal of de-commissioned gas detector local to condensate pump 75, the support bracket bolting had to be hacksawed. While cutting the last stud, the lp impulse line to pdi was
"nicked", resulting in a 2 litre leak of condensate.

A leak occurred in a 1" diesel supply hose used to fuel well service equipment.the hose had a local isolation valve located immediately upstream of the fuel dispensing nozzle.this valve was in the
closed position.the leak occurred in a section of the hose just upstream of the local isolation leak.
Oil drops noticed by electrical supervisor onto module floor. Leak source immediately identified, isolated and depressurised. Oil weep seen at above weld.
At 0325 hours a fire and gas logic action, high gas reading at detector g5221, automatically caused a platform yellow shutdown. All hot work was ceased. Manual checks conductedin the area did
not find any gas present. Instru checks on g5221 confirmed that there was no detector malfunction. Ongoing operations - prior to the event normal production operations were in progress.
Approximately one minute prior to the high gas reading a routine shutdown on mol export pump p05 had occurred. No equipment or pipewo k anomaly was found; at po5, the production scruber
pumps on the open drain tank and associated pumps (t71 area). The gas detector is stiuated adjacent to produciton scrubber pumps and open drain area. The reason for the high gas reading is
therefore inconclusive
Platform was in normal oil/gas production. An oil leak on the pig launcher door was reported. The platform productions was immediately shutdown and general alram sounded. All personnel
with exception of the emergency teams were sent to their appropriat muster stations. The pig launcher was isolated and area cleaned up.
Whislt carrying out routine monitoring of plant, operations technician noticed a smell of gas. It was subsequently traced to a pinhole leak on a weld on hydrocarbon condensate line from vessel
v16 to v18. Supervisor was informed, plant was depressurised a d shut down. Note: v17 - low temperature separator which separates "second stage" chilled condensate. V18 - flash separator
which mixes two condensate streams at 25oc prior to pumping to the main oil line. The light ends flash off to flare and fuel gas.
Well 3-2 flowline developed a pinhole leak at the weld of the promat fitting which is used for the injection of the scale inhibitor. At the time the leak started two <...> hands were in well
compartment 3 conducting routine wellheas maintena ce. They noticed a fine spray of fluid and reported it immediately to central control. The well shut in by the operations tech within 3 mins.
No gas was detected . The leak was predominantly water (well water cut 67%) - a minimal amount of oil (> 2 lit es) was spilled. Initial investigations shown there to be some metal loss at the
promat to flowline weld - possible associated with chemical attack.
During previous shift, p14 had undergone a seal oil cyclone inspection, necessitating dismantling of pipework. After re-installtion the system was leak tested with water to 16 barg and then test
run for approximately 5 minutes at 2110hours. Pump was the shutdown and placed on standby. At 2222 hours the pump was placed on line, using local start facility. After reporting the pump
on line to the mil control room, the technician returned and noticed a leak of crude oil from a 1/2" flange. Pump was immed ately shutdown, isolated and depressurised. It is estimated that the
leak lasted a total of 2 minutes.
Whilst carrying out routine checks around compressor k02 a technician smelt diesel vapours. On closer examination through the turbine hood windows, he saw liquid on the diesel pump drip tray.
On closer investigation having gained access to the hood he saw that the pump casing was shut down the machine using the emergency stop button.
Operating problems on the pipelines system had resulted in the field and the third party pipeline system shutdown. This resulted in the <...> pipeline shutting down with 159 bar after line packing
up to the riser. In due course <...> operational control c ntre for fps requested the <...> to equalise the <...> riser to the <...> export system via the <...> pig trap. To do this it was necessary to
reduce the system pressure by carrying out the <...> riser start up pressure equalisation procedure. It was during the nitial steps of this procedure that the incorrect valve sequence was selected
and fluid pressure was bled into the pig trap without a vent path open to the platform export system. The resulting pressure rise caused the door seal to fail and a small quant ty of water and oil
escaped to the platform drains and to the sea.
Platform was operating main oil export on one pump, the other units being under turbine maintainance. An operator smelled diesal and saw a spreading pool at the rear of the machine. The
machine was shutdown and the leak stopped. Repairs were carried ou and the platform restarted after notification to the hse duty officer.
Low and high gas alarms from well compartment 3 were received in the central control room. The control room technician informed the mol control room, operated the yellow shutdown system
and operated the general alarm. At about the same time the ops tech in the mol heard a bang and received indications of low pressure and shut in from well 3- 4. In view of this and having
received reports of high gas from the ccr they also elected to operate the yellow shutdown. The ops supv, fso, ops team and fire te m went immediately to well comp 3 where it was observed that
the swab isolation valve bonnet of xmas tree 3-4 had completely been blown off. A large hole was observed in the south wall of the compartment and other superficial damage was apparent. The
well had been safely shut in and no further loss of hydrocarbons was taking place. There was no fire or explosion.
P06 diesel fuel block valve sprayed fuel inside the hood. No fire and gas action and no ignition. P06 shutdown and platform shutdown as p05 is not available due to major repairs.

Crude oil sprayed from mol pump (po5) casing drain l ine. Po5 is located in package 2 level 1. Louvred module.
Gas leaked from a non return valve flapper hinge retaining plug on 12" class 150 swing - check co angle valve. Louvred module. Wind 30kts @ 288 degrees.
A <...> gas turbine had been changed out and was in the process of being commissioned. Earlier in the day it had been running with 8 mw load. After a short stop it was run up to 8mw and, with
the cell doors open a final check carried out for gas leaks. Wh n satisfied the machine was gas tight the area technician and vendor rep. Exited the cell and closed the door. The platform
immediately went to red hazards status with 3 cell gas heads in high level alarm. The machine shutdown automatically and on subsequ nt inspection a fitting on the fuel gas rail was torqued up a
further 1/4 - 1/2 turn with a 'c' spanner and mallet ie the joint was not slack.
Rov detected gas coming from seabed on <...> during routine survey. Pipeline already shut doun due to maintenance work on <...> topsides. Following excavation rov discovered small flange
leak on <...>. System remains shut down.
Gas turbine had been changed out and during re-commissioning it was deemed necessary to inspect/repair the pilot regulator and axial flow control valves. After re-installation of the valves the
fuel gas supply was deisolated, very shortly afterwards the latform went to hazard status, the manual block valve was immediately closed. Three gas heads in the exhaust ducting were indicating
100% lel. The leak was traced to a flared fitting on the sensing line for the axial control valve, some tightening of th s fitting was achieved, but further leak testing revealed there was still a leak
path. The fitting was then replaced by a compression fitting and was tested gas tight.
A limited fuel gas release from (probably) failed bellows on rv8064 initiated a high level gas alarm within generator g8010. This in turn activated the halon protection and shut the machine down,
bringing the platform to a hazard status. No damage was sustained
At 17:30, fd 6568 (power turbine acoustic hood) indicated in the control room(ccr). The area technician was sent to investigate. He reported back via radio to the ccr that there was a fire in the
power turbine(pt) acoustic hood. He was told to clear the a ea and halon 1301 was manually released from the ccr which shutdown the generator g8010 and put the platform on hazard status.
Subsequent investigation, after the halon had been cleared, revealed that the area of the fire was confined to a small area of t e pt shield adjacent to the pt pedestal at around 210 deg. Somehow,
oil or oil mist had been entering the space between the inner volute lagging and the lagging heat shield. At high load the pt exhaust temperature and hence the inner volute, was was above the
flash point of the lub. Oil, and the resultant oil vapour ignited as it vented from the lagging heat shield jointing
The problem was originally identified during the annual rov survey on <...>, carried out by the support vessel. Initially it was assumed that the gas bubbles were as a result of the rv on the
coflexip connection relieving pressure in the carrier pipe. However, review of the video on <...> would suggest that the escaping gas is coming from an "araldite" injection port, at the 5 o'clock
position.
The gas leak was detected by the production operator carrying out his routine duties. Heard a noise, and on investigation detected that the leak was from a 4" <...> orifice box, tag no<...>. He had
to move his hand to within 12" of the leak to detect its exact location which was from the cover plate for orifice removal. The systems operating pressure was 1820 psi. It was shut down manually
and depressurised. On strip down and inspection the cover plate 'o' ring was found to be damaged. There was insuffici nt gas release to activate a gas detection head which was 12 feet above the
orifice box.
A fracture had occured on a 3/8" stainless steel line to pilot valve on psv-029a which was the on line psv on the 1st stage discharge of gas compressor kt-03. This fracture caused a gas leak into
module c1 which was detected in the control room by gas mon tor gse-1194, showing 20% lel. This gradually increased to 60%. During this period the cause was being investigated by the area
operator who quickly identified the source of the leak and isolated psv-029a.
The leak was not visable when the turbine was shutdown, it was ran up to 60% speed and the leak was detected at a joint between two halves of a ring mainfold. Following strip down and
inspection, the gasket was found to be brittle and parts of it had brok n up. System pressure was 180 psi. The gasket was replaced with one of different specification and the turbine was
subsequently run and tested satisfactory. The turbine had only recently been installed and had 250 running hours.
The hot work being carried out was a deck penetration (4" diameter hole) in module x1 at cellar deck level. Only acetylene burning equipment was being used. Below deck level scaffolding with
fire blanket had been erected to contain the sparks, a fire watc with extinguisher was present. During the burning sparks escaped the blacket and ignited a small gas leak approximately 10ft
below deck. The gas leak was from the top of a 10" plenty filter which is connected to the atmospheric vent system. The flames es imated approxmatelty 2" around 2" of circumference and were
extinguished by use of a hand held extinguisher.

Problems were being experienced with the production seperator level control, of both water and condensate. Visit had occured on <...> to solve these problems. On leaving the platform it
appeared that level control had been established and no condensate as being discharged. On <...> although water and condensate appeared to be controlling (based on remote control indication)
there was a report of condensate discharge - slick observed from helicopter. Nt
On arrival at <...>, not normally manned installation, personnel were conducting routine arrival checks. During these checks a condensate leak was discovered in the 1" condensate outlet line
from the production separator. The leaking condensate did no activate the platform gas detection systems due to the pin hole size of the leak. The <...> and <...> platforms were shut down. The
<...> wells and esd valves were shut and the platform vented down. Weather: wind 333 degrees at 28 knots; sea 5 metres
The oil leak was found to be a small drip from a transition casing. This drip accumulated underneath the compressor. A drain hole was found to be blocked. This would normally drain any drips to
a cool and safe position the incident occurred after a unit s utdown when on restart the natural temperature rise flashed off the pool of oil. The volume was estimated at half a pint. The fire
detectors picked up the flame and triggered a general alarm. The fire was extinguished by dry powder extinguishers within ap roximately 3 minutes. The unit was shutdown and vented to
investigate the oil leak and subsequent blocked drain point. All other similar units were checked for similar problems.
Whilst loading the compressors prior to coming on line, unit ak-k-040 indicated high gas generator vibration. At this stage the discharge pressure from the machine was in excess of 600 psig and a
surging of some description was experienced in the control oom. Unit ak-k-040 shutdown on high gas generator vibration. During the investigation into the shutdown, it was noticed that some
fuel gas pressure was still indicated on the 3 way valve pressure guage and that the newly installed automatic vent valve wa half open. Fuel gas block and vent valve operated manually by the
technicians. Exhaust stack fire indicated in the control room. Fire extinguished by manual operation of co2 snuffing system.
Gas generator g600 was operational and onload. At 1148 2nd level gas detection was annunciated by the fire and gas detection system. Subsequently a ga and muster was initiated along with the
automatic shutdown of the unit. The fire and gas system detect on also initiated the block and vent of the fuel gas system to the unit. All persons were accounted for at muster. When deemed
safe to do so the unit was investigated to identify the cause of the loss of containment. It was found that a fuel gas pressur switch diaphragm had ruptured thus releasing hydrocarbons into the
enclosure. The normal operating pressure of the fuel gas system is 8 barg.
During normal pumping operations it was brought to the attention of one of the production technicians that liquid was escaping under pressure from a pipe on the ak to ap bridge. On further
investigation it was found that a jet of condensate was escaping rom a hole in a 90 degree bend on the ak to ap condensate discharge pipework. The discharge pressure from the pump was 120
psi. The location of the leak was on the north end of the bridge and 2 feet below the walkway. Approximate discharge to sea 10 ga lon max. Sea state wave height 3.7m, wind 33 knots.
Preliminary investigation indicates corrosion being the underlying cause , to be confirmed once access scaffold in place.
Diaphragh on pressure switch failed allowing minor leak of condensate into module the pump was stopped preasure switch isolated, system drained and repressured.
Turbo expander was being started up following a planned s/d to test export riser. Riser of the plug was immediately noticed by production tech's on the scene who shut the expander down.
A compression fitting on the platform well a6 annulas drain parted releasing a small quantity of oil and gas to module. No work was being carried out on this equipment. The release was first
spotted by the lab technician who was carrying out sampling from another well at the other side of the module.
Technician spotted small leak in train 2 oil pipework, contacted control room and isolated the section. Plant was tripped and fire team despatched and information tannoy made. The line was
depressured to the closed drain.
Simultaneous operations were in progress, drilling and well services, when seawater contaminated by traces of oil based mud overflowed a cutting discharge chute, due to swarf debris, onto a
impact deck below, including a metal handling pole. No injuries ccurred to personnel working in the area. The wellservice operations were suspended, drilling operations continued
During an rov survey, a large hole (circumference app i metre) was observed in the sea bed around d3 flowline. The rov camers picked up a jet flow from d3 flowline directed at the seabed. The
rov survey was to ascertain the depth of the hole due to turb lence from the leak. The well was shut in at 06:55 hrs <...>. After discussion with <...> and hse, a flow test was performed against the
shut in tree valves, which indicated that app 3 mbd was leaking from the hole in the flowline. Wind: varib e 7 knots, sea; slight; swell: 45o 8 sec, 1.5 m.

Following overhaul the gas turbine was started up with an operator in attendance to check for gas leaks in joints which can not be leak tested prior to re-commissioning. A leak was found on no.8
can and subsequently 8 low level gas alarms were annunciated in the ccr. The machine was then shut down by the operator on site.
During routine watchkeeping operations a tech noticed a pin hole leak in the reference line from flow orifice to 10 ft booster pumps total flow internal weather not significant. Controlled
shutdown of train 1 plant initiated.
At approx 03:30 hrs ops. Prod. Tech. Saw crude oil leak from recovered oil system. No gas detected. Leak isolated, fire teams mobilised and blanketed with foam & washed down. Suspect cause
corrosion. Production on 1 of 2 trains continues. 1/2 bbl lost.
The train (1) plate pack separator, y1501, became overloaded resulting in the psv lifting allowing oil into the drainage relief header and down into the sea. At the time, produced water was on line
from both lp separators, both flash drums, train (1) plat pack and down to train (1) wemco. 10-lcv-0013a on separator c1002 was found to be stuck open 50% although the controller in the ccr
was indicating fully closed. At the same time, there was a considerable problem with well b7 in the test separator sluggin . This caused severe water level variations in the lp separator
downstream of the test separator. The low level trip in the separator was not activated (no fault found when tested). This has led to an assertion that sand build up in the lp separator caus d a
vortex at the water outlet, through which crude was carried under to the produced water system.
Following a plant shutdown the plant was being brought on line. An operations technician, carrying out routine final checks, noticed smoke issuing from the drive end seal of the booster pump
(g1001b). He warned the ccr, stopped the pump locally at which t me seal oil started to leak subsequently igniting. He informed ccr, production was immediately shutdown and vented, fire team
summoned. Another ops tech extinguished the flame using a 9kg d.p. Extinguisher. Damage- shaft was scored, stationary seal ring s lit when it was removed
At approx 18:30 production operator observed smoke in the south east corner of the lower deck. When he got closer to the scene he found that the seal had blown on hot oil pump 67-089. Hot oil
(castrol perfected) was seen to be running into the drip tray b neath the pump and dripping from there onto the floor below. Flames appeared to be on the surface of the pump bowl to which dry
powder from an extiguisher was applied the pump was shutdown by production operator who then osolated the suction & discharge v lves and drained the pump. He slipped on the oily surface
injuring the back of his right shoulder. (first aid only)
Low gas detected by f&g system. Gas card 40106 in alarm followed by gc40114 and gc40105 low gas detected by f&g system. Gas card 40106 in alarm followed by gc40114 and gc401005
During plant restart a small leak of condensate occurred on the bonnet of a level control valve from the hp gas scrubber. Combustible gas was detected by 2 gas heads in the vicinity and plant was
automatically shutdown and depressurised. The source of the leak was a flanged joint on the body of the valve. The section of the line was valve isolated and drained
The defect identified by the <...>: position 12 o'clock depth 24% wall thickness (approx 5.5mm) axial length 37mm circumferential width 58mm the rov confirmed damage at fj 19550 to the
field joint bitumen at the pipe crown with evidence of exposed pip steel which corroborates the <...> data. The rov was not able to establish the dimensions of the defect, although judgement is
that it is of the order reported by bg. Adjacent to this location there was also minor weight coat damage. Structural/pressu e integrity of the pipe is not compromised. Defect analysis has been
carried out using the defect information given above to confirm this.
Hose being used for flush slot 13 flowline was subjected to a pressure of approx 70 bar it subsequently failed allowing a release of gas to atmosphere. This gas release was detected by the f&g
system which resulted in a process shutdown. A gneral alarm an muster of personnel
While bleeding down the wireline riser to the "poor boy" degasser vent, 2 high gas alarms annunciated in the roof space of the shale shaker area in the rig substructure. This resulted in an
automatic production shutdown and the general alarm being sounded those immediately on the scene in the shale shaker area could detect no gas in the vicinity with hand held metres, indicating
that the volume of gas involved was small. The most likely source of gas was identified as the liquid seal loop on the deganer d um which dumps into the shaker chute. Following the general
alarm a muster was completed as a matter of routine before those not on duty were stood down. No damage was sustained nor personnel injured.

Actuated 4" wing valve had just been replaced, and leak test carried out on wellhead using nitrogen. Nitrogen injection point was through tapped hole in blind flange in 2" wing valve. Tapped
hole not plugged on completion of leak test. Master valve ope ed to bring well back on production. 2" wing valave in open position and gas released through hole in blind flange. Operator
immediately closed master valve. Two gas heads alarmed. Production s/d automatically. Full muster carried out.
A small flash fire was discovered by a gas operator on routine operations. The compression unit c5010 was running and the fire was identified as coming from the drive coupling between the
power turbine and compressor. The uv sensors at the time were ove ridden to allow hot work to be carried out in adjacent areas. The fire was knocked down and extinguished using a dry powder
extinguisher. The fire was caused by a release of power turbine-compressor mineral lube oil coming into contact with the hot surfa e of the power turbine exhaust cowling. The leak was from a
leaking oil seal on a cable gland on the side of the coupling between the power turbine and the compressor the braded armour cable passing through the leaking gland carries the signals for the p
wer turbine vibration monitoring insturments.
High gas larm caused by deliberate venting of sight gas local to sensor head. A local panel alarm indicated a high liquid level in the fuel gas knock-out pot on p3610 gas fired mol oil export pump.
In normal circumstances liquid level control is via a sw tch which activates a solenoid controlled dump valve to drain the vessel to the drains sump tank. In this instance the oil operator to
investigate why there was a high level in the vessel. With the vessel sight glass isolated from the vessel, he removed the sight glass drain plug and drained a small amount of hydrocarbon liquid
from the sight glass. The hydrocarbon was drained through the grating into the sea. The operator then cracked the lower level isolation valve between the sight glass and vessel nd confirmed
there was liquid in the vessel up to this level. The operator at this point was joined by the chief operator. The operator at this stage went to collect a bucket in case the knock-out pot needed to be
drained. Whilst the operator was away the chief operator cracked open the top level isolation valve between the sight glass and vessel to confirm there was liquid in the vessel to the top of the
sight glass. Some of the liquid hydrocarbon spilled on to the beam below the knock-out pot. Gas wa released and activated the gas heas supported on this beam approximately 18 inches below
Whilst running into well a7 with an electric wireline toolstring through the lubricator, rigged up on the drill floor, a gas detector on the bop deck below recorded above 60% of lel of methane.
The platform alarm sounded and the platform was mustered. W reline operations were suspended. A 2 man investigation team in full ba gear confirmed a gas release in the bop room. Gas
alarms returned to normal within 17 minutes. The incident investigation team concluded that: prior to running wireline, and during wireline lubricator rig up and testing, a a small volume of gas
from the well trapped in the lubricator, later passing into the lubricator bleed-off line when the lo-torque valve on this line was opened to ensure no pressure had built-up in the lubricator when
the tree was opened up to run wireline into the well, the rise in pressure forced gas through the bleed-off valve in the bleed-off line above the trip tank in the bop room, causing gas to escape into
the bop room. The bleed-off valve at this time as providing single valve isolation to the lubricator and well.
On opening the door to oil pig receiver v1600 some gas (approx 1m3) was released to atmosphere and caused a 60% alarm condition on gas head no 14 which is located +1 metre from the point
of release. No other alarms were activated. Production to both tra ns was automatically shut down. The alarm condition cleared immediately after the door was reclosed. The system is presently
being operated under permit to work (using a written procedure) until a suitable replacement interlock system has been evaluated. Alternative systems are presently installed on v1610 gas pig
receiver and on <...> vessels. Subsequent operation of v1600 to remove the pig passed without incident. Conclusions: the atmospheric vent valves were not opened as per procedure, thereby leav
ng a quantity of gas in the pig receiver after draining of the oil. The test point on the door and the local indicators showed no pressure was present prior to the door being opened so it was
wrongly assumed that all hydrocarbons had been drained.
On restarting production following a shutdown, caused by a turbine trip, the suction line for shipping pump p3410 was pressured up to normal working pressure (120-130 psi). The operator on
checking round the pump area found the seal on the lid of the suc ion filter to be spraying a fine oil mist. The pump was isolated; all hot and electrical work suspended and production shut down
manually. No platform alarms were activated and there was no damage other than oil on surrounding areas. The oil contaminati n was cleaned up, an air purge of the pump motor enclosure
carried out as a precaution, and all electrical junction boxes checked for contamination (none found). The cover was removed from the suction filter housing and all surfaces and seals were
inspect d, no damage or contamination was found. The sealing 'o' ring was renewed and the lid replaced. After obtaining hse consent the production process was opened up and oil export resumed.
There was no sign of any leakage at any point.

An operator was reducing a high water level in the electrical crude oil dehydratror vessel v-1040 on the <...> production train by opening up a vlave on the water leg. The water leg from the
dehydrator feeds into the <...> flotation oily water separat r vessel v-1200. As a result a small surge of water entered the flotation vessel. The surge of water resulted in a small leak of gas via the
seal from under one of the flotation cell hatches out of the vessel. The gas leak was picked up by gas detector g-169 attached to the body of the flotation cell on the north east side. A 20% of lel
gas level was initiated. The production control room observed the gas head registering a gas level. Two operators with a gas detector were dispatched to module 3. The gas alarm climbed above
the 60% lel level inititating an automatic level 3 esd of the production plant. The operators at the scene confirmed a gas leak from one of the flotation cell hatches. They tightened the hatchg and
the gas release stopped.
On closing esdv1511 on 14" oil export pipeline, pressure surges displaced 'o' ring seal on pump p3410 suction filter. Apporx 5 bbls crude oil spilled on deck, approx 50% spilled to sea. Leak was
observed by operator and system shutdown took place automa ically. Gas levels cleared rapidly due to open module ventilation. There were no other persons in the area or on the spider deck
below. Slick on sea was dispersed by standby vessel. Similar 6" hayward duplex filter on adjacent pump was not affected.
Level control valve lv1021 stuck in 40% position. Allowing crude oil to flow from train 1 dehydrator to train 1 flotation cell v1200. Gas escaped from train 1 flotation cell hatch cover activating
gas head adjacent to hatch.
Gas escape from flotation cell v1200. Seal on hatch cover leaking, gas head located on side of vessel, approximately 2 feet from hatch. Only one gas head activated. No damage done. Gas
dispersed quickly following production shutdown. No ignition. No injury. Faulty level control valve lv102 from train 1 dehydrator caused influx of oil into flotation cell.
Additional indepth report to follow. Note: <...> rig is physically located on the <...> platform. (no report received).
Generator a had been running on line with no problems. It was shut down for approx 10 minutes in order to change two vibration monitors in its control panel. These monitors are external to
enclosure (in generator start-up room). On start up, with gas fue , (as per normal) the unit was run up and then synchronised onto the board. Approx one minute later the low level gas alarm
(25%lel) initiated on the fire and gas panel in the control room showing gas present inside the enclosure. With the unit still run ing, two men inhibited the halon, opened the enclosure and
checked for gas with a detector. A level of 4% lel was sensed, at the same time the general alarm sounded ( due to detectors registering 25%lel). The unit was then shut down automatically (the l
cal emergency stop button was also pushed at that time). On investigation xv51271, diesel manifold drain valve was found to be passing to the drain tank. This had allowed the gas fuel, which
purges the diesel burners during gas fired operation, to flow i to the drain tank and exhaust into the generator enclosure via the tank vent.
Following a 'prx' shutdown on the gas compression at 1810, 'b' and 'c' generators both automatically switched from fuel gas to diesel fuel supply to burners. At 1845 whilst approaching the glycol
skid on the main deck to re-establish the process, the oper tor detected excessive fumes from 'c' generator enclosure exhaust. He reported this to the pcr. Further investigation by other operators
found diesel being discharged in a fine spray, towards the floor of the enclosure, from a screwed manifold connection on the diesel distribution block. The oeprator took immediate action and
stopped the machine at the emergency stop button. Approximately 2 gallons of liquid were recovered from clean up of enclosure floor.
60% lel gas alarm was activated by gas detector gd22 which is immediately above the <...> unit. The unit was not in use at the time. Gas was detected escaping from the wemco lid by the chief
operator. A manual valve was used to isolate the vessel from th suspected gas source, the lp vent system, and hoses used to dissipate the gas. It was suspected that psv580 (diaphragm low
pressure type) had failed and gas from the lp vent system backflowed into the <...> unit. No production shutdown occurred as only ne detector activated.
At 17:30 hrs during a power failure the fuel gas filter pots were isolated to main generation and opened up for inspection. On completion of inspection they were reinstated. At 20:26 hrs after
compression start up there was a gas release from the on lin filter, supplying gas to main generation, in module 3 cellar. The gas detection system picked up the gas release and a production
shutdown was initiated immediately from the control room. This was followed shortly by a master blowdown and activation of module 3c deluge. Within a period of 6 minutes the gas was
dispersed and the gas detection system was reading zero.
Train 2 gas compressor had just shutdown on a high condensate level in the dehydrator. Simutaneously the drain plug on the bottom of the condensate level transmitter lt41-2 came out which
resulted in a gas release. All production was shutdown and the le el transmitter isolated, no damage or injury was sustained

At approximately 06:06 hours a 20% gas alarm was activated on the fire and gas panel from a gas detector located in mm2 mud pit room. Personnel were dispatched with portable gas detectors to
investigate the cause of the alarm. At the same time a platform announcement was made warning all personnel and for all hot and electrical work in the area to cease. Personnel dispatched to the
area with portable gas detection equipment confirmed presence of gas in the mezzainine of the mud module but were unable to f nd a source. Before the source of the gas could be identified, a
60% gas alarm was activated. All platform personnel mustered as per station bill. As a slow build up of gas was indicated by other fixed detection systems, a 28 shutdown was initiated manu lly
from the ccr. Initial investigations carried out by the personnel at the scene of the gas alarm found that the hvac and vent fans within the mud pit room had been isolated for maintenance
purposes. After ensuring that it was safe to do so, the hvac nd vent fan systems were reinstated to assist with the sidpersal of accumulated gas. No source of gas could be found in the vicinity of
the mud pit room. Investigations into the source of the gas leak continued after the gas lel had dropped below 20%. Th investigations found gas building up from a drain in the cp room which
During backflow operation of <...> gas line, gas condensate from h.p. Flare k.o. Drum spilled into flare tip platform and ignited
During pressure testing no. 5 flowline a plug blew out.the test specifi- cation was 333 bar for six hours.the failure occured three hours into the test. Subsequent investigations identified an
incorrect specification of plug was installed.it was a "fusabl loop" type plug,which is normally used to trigger deluge system,of pressure rating 7 bar.
Pump p1030 m.o.l. Started up and pipe vibration was identified by perso- nnel in the area.p1030 was shutdown manually from the ccr under instruc- tions from the plant supervisor.at that point
oil was noted leaking from insulation near 3/4in stub on the re ycle line low point above m.o.l. P1030. On removal of the insulation,a crack was identified around the 4 3/4in stub.approx 5 litres
of hydrocarbons had spilled on the deck.
Minor gas leak on <...> during commissioning run of gas compressor at 6 bar. Dry seals on gas supply pipework at drive end of compressor. Auto-surface process shutdown initiated. Alarms and
muster. Leak path identified and muster stood down.
At 13:41 a single gas head in fire zone 02 was activated.this was follo- wed at 13:45 by co-incident gas detection to 40% lel with ensuing gpa and production shutdown.at the time draining
operations of condensate from 2nd stage discharge scrubber,was bein carried out by commissioning the operation stopped upon activation of the initial gas alarm.gas from the condensate had
vented to atmosphere from the vessel activating the detectors.the operations being carried out were considered to be normal commisioni g operations and the vessel level monitored as 60%
full.there was no liquid spillage at anytime from the vent.gas detection fell below 20% lel at 13:55 and was clear at 14:05.
Closed drains flash drain v6000 overflowed whilst draining,hydrocarbon oil from main line pump p1032 to allow removal of suction filter.this resulted in oil and gas being emmited to atmosphere
and sea (less than four gallons of oil to sea) via v6000 atmos heric ventline.due to the wind direction gas was blown back toward gas detectors,which initiated an insatllation surface process
shutdown and general platform alarm. A breakdown in communication/procedure was the root cause of this incid- ent.
At approx 16:25 on <...> during commisioning of the gas compressor a leak was witnessed coming from the body of rv 20019 this caused an init- ial estimate of 1m3 gas condensate to be released
to atmosphere .rv20019 is fitted on the discharge line of the condensate pumps. The gas process was going through the start sequence when it was noticed that there was a 60% condensate level
in the first stage suction scrubbr .it was decided to lower the level using one of the condensate pumps which transfers conden ate from the 1st stage suction scrubber to the oil export metering
skid. Approx 5 mins after the condensate pump was started the control room op- erator started to experience an increasing level in the lp flare ko drum at that time the two events were ide tified as
being related.afetr apprx another 5min's a witness reported to the control room that gas condenste was spraying from the body of the releif valve.it was at this stage that the control room operator
shutdown the condensate pump then later depressurised.
Tests were carried out on main oil line export pump p-1030,to fully ide- ntify the source of heavy piping vibration at a recycle valve posistion. Results indicated a region of high vibration at the
pump discharge recy- cle line when the recycle valve was pprox 50% open.outside this region no adverse effect on the pumps performance was identified. During the early hours of <...> the
third (of three) mol export pumps p-1030 was started to test the integrity of instrument repair work,with it's recycle valv fcv 10005 set fully open on manual control. To accommodate the
increased pumping capacity fcv 10003 on mol pump p- 1030 moved under automatic control to approx 50% open and ran in this c condition,heavy piping vibration ,for 20 mins. During this time
a f ilure of a small bore drain connection weld was ob- served,oil was witnessed leaking from the failure under pressure3,approx 10litres. Mol p-1030 pump set was immediately shut down and
isolated.a slight leak was then observed on the identical drain line o mol p-1031 pump set:th- is was also immediately shut down and isolated.

A single infra red detector within <...> gas turbine enclosure (generator package g8003) alarmed in central room. An operator was dispatched to investigate locally, obsrved a small flame from
burner no. 7 area, requested control room operator to manually shut down unit. The flame was subsequently put out due to fuel starvation. Subsequent investigations identified the alluminium
washer used to provide a seal between the burner and supply diesel fuel line was found to be damaged. This allowed pre surised diesel fuel to spray onto hot surface of gas turbine, resulting in a
small flame at the point of loss of containment. Note: automatic shutdown of unit and activation of co2 system requires 2 coincident ir detectors. The flame was small hence onl one detector
saw flame.
A single infra red detector within <...> gas turbine enclosure (generator package g8003) alarmed in central control room. An operator was dispatched to investigate to investigate locally,
observed a small flame from burner no. 6 area, requsted control oom operator to shut down unit and activate co2 fire extinguishing system. The flame was subsequently put out. Subsequqnt
investigations indicated the co2 system did not operate, cause attributed to operator unfamiliarity with manual operation. Hence fl me was put out due to fuel starvation. The alliminium washer
used to provide a seal between the burner and supply diesel fuel line was found to be damaged. This allowed pressurised diesel fuel to spray onto hot surface of gas turbine, resulting in a smal
flame at the point of loss of containment. Note.automatic shutdown of unit and activation of co2 system requires 2 coincident ir detectors.the flame was small hence only one detector saw flame.
Confirmed gas was detected at the hvac duct which supplies the local co- ntrol room for gas compressor system. This resulted in automatic surfac- e process shutdown and blowdown of
production and gas comporession syst- ems, and power to the local control oom, and initiating of gpa. The area was tested for traces of gas, but none recored. Initiall observations identified
vapours emitting from lube oil system vents in this area (system part of gas compressor) and heading for hvac. It was initially assesse this was the potential source. However, subsequent
investigations identified a further potential source of gas release. Just before the gas was detected, the gas compressor had changed over from fuel gas to a process surge. As part of the nor- mal
oper tion of the fuel gas system pcv 20264 cloces <...> and xy 2013 opens to vent surplus locked-in fuel gas via an atmospheric vent which terminates in the same area as above. Its was noted
that pcv 2026, by virtue of design, wa not a positive means of isolation and could have continued to allow a small quantity of gas to pass until the system was depressurised. Furthermore, the
enviromem- ental conditions may have contributed, by not adequately scouring the gas away from this
At 16:06 g8 001 was in the process of being changed over from diesel to fuel gas when there was an indication of h1 gas from the gas detection system in the turbine enclosure vent exhaust
ducting. Three gas detectors were in alarm condition from fire zone 30,one reach- ing 27% this caused the machine to shutdown,the fuel gas to be isolated and a platform gpa.when the machine
shutdown the gas detectors quickly returned to a healthy status. G8001 automatically shutdown on seeing hi gas and isolated the fuel as from the machine.the shutdown does not initiate a
process sps on seeing hi gas,this being due to the turbine being self-contained and protected by co2 extinguishant system. The platform went to muster stations and remained there until the gas
release w s investigated.the incident co-ordinator attended the scene and investigated the gas release.on opening the enclosure,the area was checked out with a portable gas detector where no gas
was found.
3 gas heads indicated high.machine logic shut it down but no esd.plat- form went to muster.fire team investigated inside enclosure but can find no faults. Platform now running.investigation going
on.oir9a to be sent.
Confirmed gas release was detected in hvac duct to local control room for gas compressor. This resulted in an automatic surface process shutdown and gpa initiation. Gas detectors immediately
reset themselves. Subsequent investigations identified fuel inle valves had not been iscolated. This allowed gas to pass through vent line which terminates at the gas processor module roof. Due to
enviromental air conditions at the time, gas was not effectively diluted/dispersed resulting in ingestion into hvac inlet
Platform personnel were sent to muster stations when a release of hydro- carbon gas in c2 well bay area,activated the gas detection system.using a portable gas detector the source of release was
found to be the hazar- dous drains. Subsequently gas levels n the area returned to safe levels.the muster was stood down. Subsequent investigation found that gas had migrated through the open
hazardous drains pipework into the well bay area,due to draining down operations on mol pump p1031 (this was terminated whe the gpa/muster initiated).the gas was able to escape from the
drains into the area,due to a missing drain seal cover.
Crane driver observed smoke coming from engine compartment. On investigation he saw hydraulic oil leaking from a pipe coupling and onto the engine exhaust. He shutdown the engine and
extinguished the fire using a dry powder extinguisher.
During incident investigation in module 01, gas was seen emitting from an open 2" flange on top of the redundant glycol reboiler column. The 2" atmospheric vent line had been removed and the
flange not blanked. At this time it is not known when or by who the vent line was removed. A blank flange has been fitted.

Two mechanics were investigating an air leak on the lpg prover in module 30 during the removal of a component on the actuator piston, the lpg in the prover body was vented to atmosphere. Two
gas heads were activated giving a low gas alarm. The release wa stopped by a plant operator opening the flare blowdown line. No injury was sustained by any personnel.
Fuel gas controllers on scada wre lined up so as gas from module 38 could be used. As the pressure increased in the system, safety relief valve/valves were heard to lift in mod 03. This resulted in
two low gas alarms followed by one high being indicated n the main control room. On investigation of the control system it was found that a pressure indicator controller pic 8639b had failed
open.
During preparations to start @a@ export compressor and commence production from a <...> well, the hp compressor tripped resulting in all the offgas from hp separator being routed to the hp
flare via the hp flare knockout drum. An operator in module 06 control room heard the gas and liquid coming from the area of the hp flare knockout drum. He found a pinhole leak on the
instrument bridle of one of the level switches (lsh-06-247). He notified the main control room then isolated the bridle.
The <...> production was shutdown but pipeline at pressure of approx 85 bar g. Problems experienced wtih choke valve 25hvc 8016. On examination it was found that the actuator to vlave
spindle nut was loose, also thread damage. It was decided to remov the actuator form the valve body for inspection/repair. The actuator was pre-rigged. A mechanic started to remove the
actuator. Once the actuator was pre-rigged. A mechanic started to remove the actuator. Once the actuator securing clamp was removed the vlave spindle blew out, and released gas. An operator
in the area isolated and depressurised the pipework.
Failure of 'o' ring seal that seals product from atmosphere between sleeve and shaft on none drive end of lpg export pump ga304a allowed hydrocarbon to be released into the module. Pump had
only just been run up and was shutdown immediately by operator in attendance. Seal damaged on assembly.
Low gas levels were detected in several modules by fixed detection systems. It was traced to a breakthrough of gas at the seal pots on the surface drain gulleys. Lp flare purge gas was reduced and
gas levels continued to fall to normal conditions. However the low levels of gas reoccurred the following day, by which time it had been established that the most likely cause was a primary seal
failure in the oily water caisson.the systematic checking of plant revealed that the glycol reboiler vent water seal ha been lost allowing gas/steam to enter and pressurise the drain system.
Low level gas was detected in several modules by fixed detection systems. It was traced to a breakthrough of gas at the seal pots on the surface drain gulleys. All hotwork suspended. General pa
announcements were made to inform platform residents.
A score mark was discovered on a 1" socket weld. The line was isolated and ndt showed depth to be 2mm of a 4-5mm wall thickness. The score mark was not new. Risk assessment concluded that
sufficient wall thickness remains to contain highest possible press res. Pipeline returned to service.
During well testing operation, an operator technician discovered produced water leaking from a small hole on the oil level instrument bridle.
Heard and smelt gas when walking along the pipedeck adjacent to 02/03 void. Traced leak to 1" condensate line running between the turbine knock out pot and the flare knock out drum. Hot
work and vessel entry permit in adjacent area suspended. Turbine switched to diesel and gas line isolated and flushed out.
The vessel <...> was discharching oil base mud via the platforms east side hose handling station. The vessel was lying stern to a moderate sea and swell heading 060t, wind was swly 20-25 knots,
occasionally 30 knots in wintery showers. At 0348hr a cloud of the product was blown over the deck of the vessel from the platform manifold area. Pump was stopped immediately and platform
informed. At 0418hrs marine control were informed by the vessel of the events. It was agreed that the vessel's deck should be washed down thoroughly before any cargo operations could be
safely resumed. The hose had split approx 4' from the manifold. Approx 1m cube was lost, mostly onto the vessel's deck.
During installation of replacement pipe work for 1" hf 060036b1a turbine knockout pot drain line to hp flare knockout drum, a pin hole leak was found by the construction supervisor in the
existing pipework at an elbow over the side at n25 nearby closed dr in sump tank. The turbine was switched to diesel, the line isolated and depressurised. New line is being installed, prior to
turbine being operated on gas.
Gas compression facilities in export at circa 7000 scm/hr when vendor representative noticed a shimmer from hp aftercooler cn-e-3114 outlet flange. As no smell was evident he informed the area
technician, who on confirming the leak to be from gas pipework contacted the shift supervisor. On arrival at module 6 and observing the leak the supervisor ordered an immediate shutdown and
blowdown of the process.

The gpa activated at 1757 hrs. By coincidental high-high gas alarms in the drilling hazardous hvac room (hhhr) the presence of gas was confirmed by the emrgency responce team deployed to
investigate the alarm. The gas alarm cleared and the platform f&g pa el was reset manually after approx. 20 mins the ert could not identify the source of the gas. The platform returned to normal
status after approx 40 mins. Approx 5 mins after the all clear, a 10% reading was deducted in the drilling sub-structure. This wa investigated , but again the source of the gas leak could not be
found.
Venting down operations were taking place on c3720. Five gas alarms came up in sequence - the two alarms nearest c3720 registered 25%, the others 10%. Gpa initiated. Two sweeps of the area
immediately afterwards indicated no gas present.
Whilst a pipefitter was installing a spool piece into the high pressure flare system, he heard a rumbling noise from the pipe and he immediately left the area by means of a vertical ladder. When he
was halfway down the ladder his left side was covered in black liquid which had started to discharge from the open end of the flare header. This caused him to jump from the ladder and land on
the deck below: a distance of + 4ft. This action resulted in minor back pain, but he has not required to be absent from work. The initial discharge was followed by a series of bangs and rumbles in
the hp flare system, culminating with a further discharge of vapours. Production was shutdown and a precautionary evacuation of non-essential personnel was instigated.
Having experienced operating difficulty at low flow rates, a new condensate spike pump minimum flow control valve has been fitted. Consequently, it was decided to test run the pumps. System
operators were instructed to closely observe the pumps and pump s als and to initiate a stopif any abnormalities were observed. At 06:10 hrs. Mcr recieved indication of 2 low low level (10%)
gas alarms in the area by "b" pump. The pump was trapped by mcr and the operator called by radio to investigate. This was followed by one 25% lel gas alarm. At 06:12 hrs. A second 25% lel
alarm indicated - gpa initiated.
A leak of amine from plate type heat exchanger e3550 was discovered by the production operator. The unit was shutdown, the area barriered off and the spillage hosed away.
Release of gas when the repacking of a gland involved the removal of the top part of valve assembly from body on kv 3742 - b.
Platform shut in 11:27 <...> . Platform manned <...> for routine maintenance . Production operator found leak on <...> flowline 1st active side. All non essential personnel mustered in safe area
platform staff isolated well & flowline & vented <...>.
Bleed screw worked loose on instrument pressure tansmitter manifold at pt2652 on oil export line <...> resulting in a fine spray of crude oil escaping into the mezzanine deck (n.e. Corner). The
leak caused two gas detectors in the area to activate - one at hi-hi level, the other at hi level. Upon investigation and confirmation of the leak, a class 1 esd was initiated by the control room.
The wellbay kill system was to be used for the pressure testing of the well j1 annulus,and prior to commencing the pressure test a flushing programme was initiated using the drilling package
cement pump (high pressure unit). Whilst flushing out the kill l ne to be used for the pressure test a quantity of hydrocarbon oil/gas was released from the split flange, resulting in amist cloud
engulfing the east side of the wellbay area. This resulted in two coincident high level gas detectors activating and initiat ng a gpa level 3 shutdown.
H.c. Gas leak from 3/4" weld-o-flange on h.p. Flare line from p.s.v 15068a
The exchanger e-6 had recently been ressembled agter replacement of a failed tube bungle. Prior to being returned to service it had been successfully nitrogen tested to 1800 psi. On completion
of testing it had been on line for a period of five days bef re the leak occurred. Just prior to the incident the platform suffered a <...> shutdown and the gas plant was put into recycle mode of
operation. A low level gas alarm was picked up by the gas detection head in the vicinity of v-9.r.oswald, gas plant o erator, entered module "e" to investigate the situation and discovered a bisible
and audible gas leak from e-6 bell end-cover. At the same time as this investigation was being carried out, two other heads came into low level alarm. <...> determined hat the leak required
immediate action and consequently the control room operators shut down c1, c2 and c3. On leaving the module <...> activated the manual call point to alert the platform to the incident and
reported in to the control room to advise.
During recommisioning of well <...> following planned shutdown, t10y was being made ready to flow. The sub-surfacer valve, lower master and upper master valves had been opened in that
order. The choke was closed and the flowline wing valve closed. Durin opening of flowing valve (which progressively pressures the flowline up to choke) a rupture occured in the flexible
flowline (coflexip) som 3 feet from it's connection with <...> xmas tree. The gas cloud generated by this release moved north ward to a di tance of approx 30 feet activating three gas detection
heads. The well was immediately closed in and the area made safe. Module force ventilation removed gas within approx 2 minutes.

The plant had been shutdown on an sps prior to this incident.the blow- down valve xzv-2230ont he hp suction scrubber and barrel did not open fully.this resulted in pressure remaining in the
system,afetr the overh- ead seal oil reservoir had been depleted. Ithout seal oil,the pressure in the barrel caused gas to leak across the seal and into the module via the atmospheric vent on the seal
housing. Two gas heads detected the low level gas and initiated a yellow alert.as a precautionary measure the platform w s manually taken to red hazard status at the request of the oim.
A small gas leak was reported to the ccr form a pin hole in a redundant test burner line, ref no <...> the test burner line is a spur off <...> this is the oil outlet line (header) from the clean up
separator, which at this time was not in service, but condensate returns from the fuel gas system tie into the same line via <...> and was routed to a train 2ndstage. Wind speed 15 knots, wind
direction 10 degrees. No immediate isolation method was available, c turbine was swi ched to diesel fuel and fuel gas and lp compressor were shutdown. Fuel gas system depressurised then
isolations carried out. The pipeline was banded for immediate containment, whilst the line was depressurised.
Following an unsuccessful attempt at flowing slot 43 for a period of 24hrs the choke was shut back to 5 degrees then to 2 degrees to try and establish the problem. The tubing head pressure
slowly raised to approx 450# over a period of an hour. The oil s de of the tree and flowline were covered in a thick coating of frost. At 01:00 hrs the oil manual wing valve and gas choke were
shut as the problem was thought to posibbly be a hydrate in the oil string. The oil tubing head pressure started to rise towa ds the gas tubing head pressure of 2400# over a period of 20 mins. A
decision was made to de-pressure the gas string to flare with the intention of dislodging the hydrate backwards. At this time a leak was observed at one of the tubing hanger packer ins ection
ports.
Local f&g system indicated leak in hydrocarbon system.announced in central control room.technician investigated.on finding genuine fault telephoned ccr who immediately sounded gpa (muster)
and shut down process plant.personnel stood to muster for 58 minut s whilst isolation took place.breach support emergency response team assembled at <...>. Coastguard supported with aircraft.
(later stood down).failed section of plant:6" 150 rated shed. 80 carbon steel line used to route an oil- water-chemical 'cocktail' f om the drains system to the process plant (for further treatment)
N gas turbine generator was started up at approx 12:10 hrs following commissioning checks and run at idle speed. The unit was loaded up to 5kw and final checks were in progress flames were
noticed in the vicinity of the free turbine output shaft coupling area. The unit was shutdown on emergency stop and the ccr informed. The general alarm was sounded, all personnel went to
muster and emergency teams and and fireteam responding to the incident. The fire was extinguished using a dry powder extinguisher, he fireteam remaining on site to secure the area. B turbine
was isolated from source or fuel. No personnel were injured. The extent of damage to this unit is currently under investigation however the cause is considered to be ignition or lub oil mist.
<...> at 1700 hrs a swagelock fitting on nlgp gas inport system in module 5a failed allowing high pressure gas to escape. The fitting which failed was associated with pressure switch dpsh 2936.
The mode of failure was the instrument pipe w s pushed out of the fitting by gas pressure. Two <...> technicians, <...> and <...> were working in close proscrimity at the time of the failure fitting
hert shields for valve solenoids. The technicians were unhurt by the gas escape. They infor ed the ccr who set off the general alarm. <...> incident and met j<...>(production technician) and
agreed to shutdown the platform on an esd. The high velocity gas escape was isolated by teh fire/production team and subsided very quickly.
The a cost tank was being emptied by displacing the oil with water from the low pressure seawater lift system. The system pressure is maintained by a seawater dump valve fcv 3203. This valve
was leaking & so the manual block valve upstream had been almost closed to ensure sufficient water was flowing to remove the oil. Five water injection pumps were running. The c turbine, which
drives one of the three power generators, tripped automatically following smoke detection in the area of module 21 immediatly outside the turbine enclosure. It is likely this smoke came from oil
residue on the engine casing following maintenance as the machine had only running for 10 minutes since start up. Smoke had been detected a few minutes earlier but the dectectors had cleared
themselves without any operator action. The general alarm sounded & the crew went to muster. Loss of power resulted in automatic load shedding of water injection & the 5 pumpsran down to a
halt. The low pressure system then had no forward flow to the de-aerator towers & the lack of cooling in the gas lift system caused temperatures to increase. To prevent shutdoun of system due to
high temperatures, a process operator was despatched to open the manual block valve on fcv3202. Once this was done temperatures in the gas lift plant returned to normal. Five minutes passed
Following a previous power outare and prior to recommending oil production to 'c' 1st stage seperator a leak of water vapour (gas was spotted), the release was found to be from the test seperator
hp flare vent line. The alarm was raised by the ots via a 3 3 (emergency call line) call to the ccr, the platform then went to general alarm status. With the aid of ba, isolations were made and the
hole covered. The maximum level of gas recorded was 6% lel.

Two people were carrying out tubing head pressure checks on <...> well heads using equipment set up as per the attached stetch. The checks nelessitated the removal of the tubing head pressure
impulse line from the pressure monitor production block on th tree and the fitting of the calibrated test guage mentioned earlier as equipment. The checks on three wells had been
successfullycompleted and the reading taken on the fourth (a4) as the compression fitting attsching the assembled equipment to the block as being slackened off to bleed the pressure from the
test equipment the tube, stil connected to the guage assembly, came out of the compression fitting with some force. The pressure at the time in the line was approximately 180box. The fitting had
as on he previous well heads been made up hand tight and then nipped with a spanner.
During steady state production, a failure occured at the connection point between a 2" and a 16" gas live. This resulted in a total disconnection and gas release . A level 3b e.s.d. Was initiated and
the plout was blown down (executive action).
During nornal production it was noticed the 8 no vlaves and blank flanges had been left open to atmosphere. Three of thses vent lines were releasing gas under pressure of one bar for
approximately one hour. The system had been left in this condition contr ry to the companys safety standards and procedures. Instruction and training.
At 1627 the fire and gas system caused the platform to go to yellow alert status following detection of the low level gas in module 1 level3 gas compression area. The leak was traced to the
pressure tapping at the flanged connection downstream of the bloc valve (approx line pressure 140bow). A production shutdown was initiated and the compressor blow down valve opened from
the control room. Access to the pressure guage line was provided and the upstream block valve isolated. The leak was coming from the t ead of where the 5/5 1" pipe is tapped into the mild steel
flange fitting.
During a start up sequence of the "a" <...> and associated compressors, a production tech was standing by at mil5 mezz @ the export compressor psv's to monitor the same. It was suspected that
certain psvs may be lifting early. It was during onitoring, at a time when the export compressor was up to 90.6(140barg) that it was noticed the psv 36200c was iced up. Further investigation
showed up a minor gas leak at a 1" stub on the downstream line. The production tech contacted the lead production tech contacted the lead production teach who gave the instruction to shut
down and blowdown the "a" compressor.
A grease nipple on the discharge side of the main oil line pump was leaking oil onto the floor of the module.
A high pressure lube oil hose was leaking and the high temperature inside the enclosure ignited the vapour.
The crude oil cooler was seen to be leaking oil onto the deck of the module. The plant was shutdown and the seals were removed.
During normal operations of the gas compression tank it was necessary to close the gas export control valve to prevent off specification product entering the pipeline. During this action the
export compressor discharge pressure continued to rise resultin in the pressure relief valve, which is of a bellows construction, activating. Failure of the bellows resulted in gas being released via
the psv vent port to atmosphere.
Production operator discovered a pin hole leak on hydrocarbon pipework from chiller liquid flash drum to peed-peed exchanger. Position of leak being on weld at point of attachment of pipe
support to an elbow.
The fire and gas system detected high level gas in the pgt10 turbine enclosure resulting in an esd 3 shutdown accompanied by the initiation of a red hazard status and personnel being called to
muster stations.
The night safety officer noticed a minor gas escape from a loose blank on module 1 level 4. The vent downstream of a psv was open and the blank flange not fully secured. Lp gas at low level
was escaping. Operations personnel isolated the ball valve and tightened flange
A psv sited on the discharge pipework of the c crude booster pump discharged crude oil to the module from the bellows port on the upper section of the relief valve. The pump was shut down and
the psv isolated. At the time of the incident the pressure in the final seperator was less than 1 barg and as such the crude had a relatively low vapour pressure. No automatic gas pressure
occurred.
High gas alarm, coupled with visual report of slick alongside platform. The manifold was shutdown effecting a shutdown of all riser platform's entrants. Since the leak appeared to continue a full
system shutdown was initiated. The platform and system wa monitored from the docc and the helicopter until it was judged safe to land on the platform at 1532. It was then discovered that the
leak had come from the pig receiver door. Approximately 1 barrel of crude oil spilled to the sea. Wind in excess of 30k ots, easterly wave height in excess of 4metres. Air and sea temperature
approximately 2 degrees celcius.

During decompression of a pressure vessel on <...> liquid entered the ventline. Some hours later the psv on the same vessel lifted and a high flow of gas accellerated the liquid in a 16" ventpipe
between <...> and <...>. The slug hit a bend and caused substa tial movement of the pipe. After inspection of all parts of the line a crack was found in the weld of an 8" branchline.
The diver's hose (air diving) formed a 'kink' which totally stopped his air supply.he went on bail out and was brought back to the surface in the dive basket. No injury.
During pigging operations, pigs stuck in the line between the trap and the inlet valve. To remove the pigs, the spool piece between the trap and valve had to be removed. Reinstatement of the
spool required a pressure test to confirm pipeline integrity. D ring this operation, the inlet valve failed the pressure test and started leaking at 20 bar.
During visual inspection of riser corrosion detected emerging from under neoprene coating. Critical engineering assessment proved riser's fitness for purpose with defect insitu. Defect ground to a
smooth profile with no cracks or pitting detected.
The fire and gas system indicated fire in fire areas fa-01, fa01-02, fa 56-03, fa 56-13. The platform general alarm was sounded by the ccr operator. All personnel mustered at their primary muster
points. The fire and gas system indicated fire due to low a r pressure at a deluge control station. The cause of the low air pressure was due to pcv 2907 failing to control the air pressure. All areas
were checked by the emergency response teams who confirmed there was no fire.
At 23.11 hours the g.p.a. Was sounded due to an emergency call being recieved by east brae central control room. An announcement was broad cast informing of fire on the skid deck. The
attendant vessel. Safe britannia also went to muster. The duty emergenc response team mobilised to the skid and confirmed no fire. The alarm appeared to have been raised by a man who had
mistaken the venting of nitrogen with the refection of the flare in the background as fire. Production and drilling operations were shutdow as a precautionary measure. H.m.c.g. And shorebase
were kept informed of the muster.
On <...> at 19:56hrs generator 'c' was running at 10-11 megawatt load, when the machine automatically tripped on indication of low lubrication oil flow. As no other generator was running this
caused a total power failure with the engine compartment cool ng fans and generator dampens also tripping the temperature within the compartment rose sharply from the engine surface temp and
the rate of rise heat detector within the arae actuated the general platform alarm via fire and gas control panel and halon 13 1 (82kg) was released as executive action. The emergency generator cut
in immediately but fans and dampers are not connected to essential services supplies.
During routine maintenance of the wellhead of b7 it is required to vent the gas down to zero psi above the sssv. The flowline was open to atmosphere via the vent header. The wing valve was
open, top master opened 5 turns to depressure above mlsv. It was d ring this operation that a loud thud was heard, suggesting the sssv had become dislodged and moved up the tree. The bottom
master was closed approx. 6 turns to hold the valve from slipping back. The work permit was withdrawn and the area made safe.
After platform esd at 17:40 on <...> <...> sssv's were repressured with the exception of wells d1 and d5 (long term isolations are in place on well d1 wing valve/xmas tree). Insufficient time was
available to pressure up well d5 sssv. Well d5 s sv was isolated at the hydraulic annulus wing valve in order to make the well safe overnight. The platform was then demanned. <...> - at 11:50 well
d5 hydraulic annulus wing valve was de-isolated amd attempts were made to pressure up the hydraulic annul s with no success. On further investigation at the xmas tree it was found that both the
upper master and lower master valves were obstructed and only able to be closed by 1 1/2 turns. It was then assumed thast the sssv had become dislodged from the sssv n pple and was now sitting
in the xmas tree across both the upper and lower master valves. The status of the well was then discussed and isolations implemented.
Drilling circulating bottoms up after cement squeeze above b19 perforations. A small pocket of gas was picked up resulting in the above
While displacing b34 of mud and pumping sea water based clean up pills (in preparation for completion operations), gas entrained in the sea water system broke out at the shakers. The driller
noticed a positive flow on the flow indicator, shut in at the hy rill and personnel attended muster stations. With the well secure at the bop and the muster complete all personnel were stood down
at 053s. The stabilised shut in pressures were sidpp200 psi, sicp 300, psi. The well was circulated to 9.5 completion fluid, flow check and found to be losing fluid to the reservoir at a low rate.
Weather details - wind 010' speed 30 knots sea 2m visibility unlimited generally good
Choke(slot25)was opened to flow well, a small valve stem leak was noticed. To remedy this the choke valve was opened and closed several times to improve condition. This operation worsened
the condition of the leak and the well was closed in. There was o plant damage or persons injured and leaking oil was contained.

The bop test string was installed in the wellhead with a test plug to seal off against the wellhead.the bop annulus was pressurised above the plug using the <...> pump.as the test pressure of
3000psi was appr- oached the test string was pumped out of the well until restrained by the pipe rams.due to the upwards movement also being restrained by the top drive unit the pipe buckled
severely forming u-shape and protruding through the v door. Note that the well was cased off with cemented liner and mud in the hole
Circulating bottoms up prior to begining coring operations when gas reading were detected by gas heads in module 21 drilling derrick substructure. This initially caused a local module alarm and
eleven minutes later a level 3 platform shutdown. The well e7 was shut in on the annular just prior to the level 3 shutdown. No pressure bulid up under the annular.
At the time of the incident a check trip was being carried out to condition the 6" hole section prior to running the pre-packed screens. The drillstring had been run to 11450 and the well was being
circulted clean. A bottoms up was reached, trip gas level recorded at the shale shakers by the hrh gas detectors increased rapidly. At the same time, seven of the platform gas detectors in the
shaker deck tripped, causing the platform to go to red hazard status and initiate a process shutdown. Within three minu es of the platform going to hazard status, operations techs carrying out gas
checks in the shaker deck could find no gas present. After communication between the platform control room and the drill floor the well was closed in at the bop's. After monitori g the well and
establishing zero surface pressence circulation was recommended going across thr choke minifold, and through the mid gas seperator. After 20 minutes, circulation was stopped and the well
checked for pressure and flow. Both checks were neg
The pump was lined up to well <...> 5/8" casing which had been filled with sea water, however some oil had percolated through to surface. The chp was 100 psi. The casing valves were opened
and the pump man was instructed to start the pump and increase th casing pressure to 300 psi. The pump man closed the bleed valve which returns flow to the feed tank and opened up the
discharge line to the 9 5/8" casing. At this time oil/water back flowed into the feed tank. The pump man checked the pump valves anf fou d the 2" x 1" bleed valve was not fully closed. He closed
the valve and noted that there had been an increase of 1 1/2 barrels in the feed tank of which 1/2 bbl was crude oil, there was also a very strong smell of gas. Gas head gse-1145 which was 1 metre
bove and 3 metres to the side registered 30% lel in the control room.
Gas levels being experienced in well was at low level initially but slug of gas came up well,resulting in red alert.closed in well to conta- in gas.situation under control. N.b. Caller confirmed
above stating all systems operated in accordance with proced res.platform returned to normal.
While making up the top drive system to the stand of drill pipe the a.d was pulling out of the slips when a 'bang' was heard. The rig superintendent and the a.d went to investigate, and discovered
the connecting link to the counterbalance had sheared.
During well preparation t16 the <...> packer set had to be recovered at 11000ft with fishing operations due to mechanical problems. The hurricane plug lower body was milled over to a size of 4
3/4" to enable recovery with a 4 3/4" grapple. Theis ethod does no allow ciculation below the packer. Drill crew were briefed on what "swabbing" effects have on a well whilst pulling out
packer. Caution was exercised while pulling out of the hole (1) monitor hole fill up, while pulling pipe. (2) slow pip pulling until indications of the packer rubber elements being dislodged from
the tool. Packer was recovered at 05.00 hole fill up was correct, no indication of formation fluids to the well bore. A clean out assembly was run in the hole to 11,200ft to ci culate out any debris
left in the well from fishing operations. Displacement returns were monitored while running pipe in the hole no discrepencies were noted. The driller was further advised of the possibility of
increase in flow returns while circulat ng bottoms/up from 11,200ft, circulation started at 13:30. The driller noticed an increase in flow and moved the drill string into position for closing the
b.o.p. The rapid near surface expansion of the gas caused the expulsion of well bore contents. D iller then sutdown rig pumps and closed the annualr preventor to secure the well. Gas monitors
As in 2) followed by implemenation of "kick" procedure. Platform production process shut down and vented in order to extinguish platform flare as a precaution. Well contents occurred
conditioned as per procedures/control measures. No gasrecieved to surfa e and integrity of well secured without incident.
Laybarge being backloaded along side platform. 2 bundles of pipes landed on deck by crane. Sea swell 2m with bigger swell now and again. The ip had to step into the gap between the two
bundles to unhook his wire. At this point the ship rolled and one o the pipe bundles rolled onto his right ankle/leg. The ip fell with the bundle across his leg. #he crane driver noticed this and
immediately lowered off the crane slings instructing the deck hand to re hook the pipe, he then lifted it clear of the ip.
The west crane was taking a lift from the <...> crane boom went into free descent and a deck crew rigger received a leg injury. The boom collapsed over the side of the platform and damaged
lifeboat no. 6.

Ip went up to the derrick to relieve his assistant during pulling 6.5/8" drillpipe out of the hole. After a few minutes of him working, the blocks were lowered and accidentally hit the top of the
drillpipe stand. This caused the drillpipe stand to bow and spring out hitting the ip in the chest. The impact winded him and caused him to lose his balance and slump in the safety harness. The
assistant derrickman, who was still in the derrick, checked his condition and helped him to regain his composure. After a period of approx 10 minutes he confirmed his condition was satisfactory
enough to decend from the monkey board unassisted. The assistant derrickman continued with the tripping operation. In the morning ip went to see the medic, complaining he had not slep well as
a result of pain in his right chest area. He was checked, treated with pain killers and told to rest for the next shift. After a period of 10 days into his field break, on <...> he notified the <...> office
that his doctor diagnosed a crac ed rib and was therefore not available for work.
Two pieces of support steel framework were being lowered into position by the nw crane for use outside the ccr (central control room). As the two pieces were finally being positioned the ip's
arm was between the two pieces and became trapped in a scissor type movement between the 2 sections
An <...> diesel driven hydraulic power pack was starte up by a technician to enable platform oie to caryy out a 28 day bp200 check on the unit. A technician was in attendance observing the test.
The diesel engine had been running approx 15-20 seconds wh n a centre cone sealing unit of a hydraulic coupling (situated on the hoses manifold) blew out striking injured person on the right
knee cap. Note:- this hydraulic power pack was being run as a selfcontained unit the unit should not be started up unitl hy raulic hoses are connected between the power pack and wire line unit.
Operating instructions posted on the power pack were not correctly followed.
Train 1 <...> fuel gas system was being flushed through with natural gas using a temporary connection into the lp vent line. This operation being part of an approved commissioning procedure
controlled via permitry. During the removal of a fuel gas regulato on train ii. The gas supply to the regulator had been blanked off and a pair of 1/2 inch instrument tubing lines had been
disconnected but inadvertently left uncapped leaving 2 openings at the cab end of the lp vent line. The flushing operation on train fuel gas created sufficient back pressure in the common lp vent
system to cause a small release of gas through the open ended vent pipe in train 2 <...> cab. As the avon cab ventilation was shut down ast the time the amount of gas was sufficient to activa e the
gas detectors in train ii cab only which was picked up in bd control room by the fire and gas event logger.
On the drill floor syandpipe manifold chicksaw connection for dog house pressure gauge-the pressure sensor unit had failed giving no pressure reading.the sensor unit was removed and a
crossover and bull-plug were fitted in order to repair the pressure sen or. When the mudpumps were started and the pump pressure reached 2500psi the thread half bull plug blew out of the wing
half of the crossover.there was no damage to equipment or personnel. However oil based mud was sprayed over the area and one person suf ered oil based mud in eyes whilst wearing safety
protective specs. Oil based mud in both eyes.washed ouy with local eyewash.examined by medic,againwashed with sterile water and given drops and cream to apply.
When pressurising the fuel gas system for g8020 generator a leak devel- oped on the fisher 310 gas pressure control valve pcv - 2211. The generator had been running on gas fuel one hour before
the incident with no indication of gas leakage from the fuel g s cabinet. The machine had been changed to diesel firing during gas exort commisio- ning trials and was being returned to gas firing
at the time of the in- ident.no ancillary equipment was in use and atphospheric conditions were not a factor.
The vessel was coming along side the platform to discahrge cargo on the west side. Whilst manoeuvering into position the vessel collided with the structure casuing damage to mb21 and mb41
bracings. The damage was minimal. The wind was wnw 21kn swell, 3 , light was from the vessel and platform.
Due to long tool string length a spade had to be inserted into the wire line string at a pre-determined point to allow the breaking of the string into more managable lengths. Afterinserting spade
while tool string was being lowered the tools appeared to h ng up. The injured party shook the tool string with his hands on the spade when suddenly the string dropped, trapping his thumb
between spadeand top of bop.
The ip was assisting in locating materials and equipment for the dive programme. A compressor was being lowered by crane onto the laydown area adjacent to the dive skid - the ip was trying to
guide it by hand as it was in close proximity to another piece of equipment. The moving load swung and trapped his hand between the compressor and the adjacent stationary piece of equipment.
A diver returning to the bell and stage was pulling in diver 2 umbilical the bell and stage dropped sharply several feet. The bell struck the diver on the right side of his back. The bell and stage
heaved up and struck the diver again, impacting the ribs n his left hand side. Weather force 6/7.

Whilst running 31/2 completion tubing the stand being drawn into the drill floor by the hustler and balis snagged at the pin end projector on the hustler. The floorman moved position to signal to
the driller to stop the bales being raised. The floorman wa ked in front of the tubing which became free, at the pin end the protector allowing the tubing to continue in an inwards into the rig fllor.
The shoulder end of the tubing struck the floorman in the lumber region of his back, knocking him to the drill floor
Ip had been using a 12.5 gantry hoist to lower equipment down to the scaffold. The last load had been lowered and he proceeded to secure the hoist chain to the scaffold hand rails. As he did so,
he was struck in the back by the chain stopper from the hois which had become detached from the chain some sixty feet above ip. The chain stopper was made of metal in a rubber compound
coating and weighing 2.4 kg. The stopper had become detached due to the failure of the steel pin that secured the stopper to the c ain. The blow winded him and he collapsed to the floor of the
scaffold. His workmates contacted the radio room, and the medic, emergency response team and stretcher party were mobilised and sent to the scene. Ip was carefully examined by the medic. The
me ic then deemed it acceptable to move ip and he was placed onto scoop stretcher, and transported to a nearby permanent walkway. In the meantime, the doctor on the <...> had also been
mobilised and was on his way to the scene by helicopter. After exam nation by the doctor ip was transported by stretcher to the adjacent flotel and from there by helicopter to the <...>. After tests
and a night under observation, ip was pronounced fit to return to work at 0900 hrs the next morning
A party of four riggers were removing redundant flowlines. Valves and other equipment from m3e. A 6" non return valve (nrv) needed to be removed from underneath an elevated walkway on to a
trolley to be transported out of the module close to the valves lo ation, a one tonne chain block had been secured to a beam by a beam clamp. The clamp and chain block had been installed some
days earlier, and had been used to remove flowlines from the vicinity of the walkway. The beam was designed as a load bearing beam and had until quite recently supported flowline <...> via a
constant load support. The flowline had been removed but the constant load support was still attached to the beam. The load bearing beam ran east to west and was secured to two beams running
nort to south, by an arrangement of lindaptor clamps the chain block was secured to the valve by a strop. The valve was some 11ft (one foot) south of the beam centre line. One of the work party
took up the slcak in the strop, and ip ducked underneath the elev ted walkway to assist in landing the valve on the trolley. At that moment the load bearing beam fell without warning. It hit the
handrail on the elevated walkway, then glanced off the right hand side of injured person's hard hat. There are clear marks on he supporting beams and pipework in the vicinity showing the path of
Whilst removing a 2 mt 20",90 degree bend from the c1 void the load was initially supported by three chain blocks.as the load was being trans- ferred from the north 1 to north 2 the north end of
the load was tempor- arily landed on the steel deck in order to disconnect the north 1 chain- block. As the employee was about to raise the end of the load off the deck usi- ng chain block north
2,the load rotated on the sling,with the lower end slipping approx 10" west across the deck trapping his ankle against an adjacent pipe section.
The wireline cap had just been removed from the xmas tree on well fb 4-2 using a rig floor tugger and the hook then pulled back to the rig floor to collect a 41/2 " drill pipe lifting cap. The cap
was to be lowered to the bop deck to pick up the xmas tree lifting sub. Once the hook was attached to the lifting cap on the rig floor, the slack line was manually pulled to drag the lifting cap on
the rig table. As the hook went over the rotary table void, the now detached lifting cap fell, glancing off tehshoul er of the assistant driller who was waiting on the bop deck below to receive it.
Weight of cap - 11 lbs. Approximate distance cap fell - 40 feet.
A 9-5/8" casing cutting and pulling operation was underway. The platform cranes were weathered down, this meant it was decided to leave the casing cutter assembly on the rig floor after it had
been used. It was positioned so that the bottom of the "v" d or ramp would be clear for laying out 9-5/8" casing. The next operation was to pick up the 9-5/8" casing spear assembly which was
racked in the derrrick. As the stand was picked up the injured party and two others restrained the lower part of the assemb y. The assembly started to move towards the rotary table came into
contact with the casing cutter assembly lying on the deck. The cutter assembly was pushed towards the rotary table and caught the right foot of the injured party between the cutter and r tary table
raised plinth.
Whilst breaking out connection with the rig tongs the floorman pulled breakout tong back to allow others to pull slips. As the driller picked up the string the breakout line reeled in pulling the
tong and ip towards the drawworks. The snub line tightene and limited the travel of the tongs but the floorman continued backwards and struck the drawworks casing. Subsequent mechanical
and function checks found no system defects. It is suspected that the clutch lever must have been inadvertently operated by he driller's arm while carrying out other operations.
Bj type single joint elevators were in operation for running 9 5/8 casi- ng.the elevators were used to raise casing to the vertical posistion and lower to engage and be made up with previous
joint.prior to torqeing up, the split pin was pulled free from t e elevators latching mechanism and the elevators unlatched.the link-tilt was operated to clear the elevator from the string,as the string
was lowered the link-tilt was returned to vertical and contact was made between the elevators and casing section, res lting in the retaining chain being severed and the split pin to fall approx 14ft
to the drill floor. Damage to the chain may have been sustained during pick-up from the dril floor(the chain becoming trapped between the elevators and casing collar ),but th final parting of the
chain resulting in the dropped object occured as described above. The retaining chain was inspected after every five casing joints and te- sted for freedom prior to each lift.

No pad-eyes on line slings wrapped around.caught or jammed on deck.sling parted.(2 deck crew on deck.area cleared.no injuries)photos to be taken.
Four joints of 51/2 tubing were slung between two three tonne wire slin- gs (single wrapped) to move the tubing from the pipe deck to the catwalk ,whilst running the completion.this involved
lifting the tubing approx 10ft over the deck posts. As the bundl was lifted from the deck at a height of approx one foot, one of the slings failed (parted) and the other partly failed (several strnds
parted).one end of the tubing bundle then fell onto the deck.the total weight of the bundle was 2.2 tonnes.no-one was injured.
Various drilling string tools were being reposistioned on the east side of the pipe deck on the dp platform.witness was driving west crane and the lifting operation was being directed by banksman
with other witness assisting. The equipment was being lifte on a set of brothers attached to a hook on the overhaul ball of the crane. The stabaliser had just been reposistioned close to the east
crane pede- stal after being transfered from one of the bays and had been unhooked. As the roustabouts cleared the are the crane operator hoisted the ball and boomed up to clear the area.during
this operation the overhaul ball arrangement banged against an obstruction,belived possibly to be one of the east crane hand rails or a samson post,the jolt was sufficient to caus the safety latch
on the hook to open and allow the master link on the brothers to pass through the gap,the arrangement fell to the deck narrowly missing witness who was carrying the hooks on the brothers at the
time. The master link fell from a height of between 2.5 to 3.0 metres.
Whilst lifting a 4 tonne half height from deck of platform during supply boat operations, when 6' into air, the auxilliary hoist began to spool off out of control dropping 4 tonne load onto the
pipedeck.the failure is believed to be due to a failed hydrau ic hose. No personnel were injured and no damage sustained by plant or equipment. Weather conditions were, at the time , calm, dry
and clear in twilight conditions. Sea state 1.5m.
<...> was cleaning up on pc platform when he heard a section of windwall flapping in the wind. He went to investgate and make safe when a gust of wind pulled the section of wall off the steel
work, hitting <...> in the ribs.
Scaffold was being erected for a ne crane slew ring change out. Some tubes were standing unsupported against the side of an adjacent container. A pneumatic windy gun was being used on the
crane for the slew ring change which appeared to cause some struc ural vibrations. The tube slid down the side of the container and struck the passing steward a glancing blow on his safety
helmet
When backing off the thread protector on the end of the lubricator it became detached from the bottom of the <...> bop. The <...> tool inside the bop dropped approximately 4" causing an impact
shock to ip's fingers as it struck the thread protector in ip s hands. Conditions on the bop deck were good at the time being well lit and protected from the weather.
The scaffolder was lowering down a 20' ladder to the deck below. One of the rings caught a protruding pole and caused the ladder to spin out of his hands. The ladder began to fall towards
technicians who were working in the area. He leaned over the sca fold rack tail to try and catch the ladder and toppled head first over the rail. He fell approx 12/15 feet striking his head on the
way down and landed on his feet.
While erecting scaffold in the ngl one scaffolder was passing tubes up to his colleague, who was in the process of levelling a section of the scaffold. A tube was dislodged which fell and glanced
off a vessel and struck ip on the chin and left shoulder.
Heildeck windsock blew away in high winds. Metal tubing frame broke away and fell to deck below. Wind conditions at the time were in excess of 50 knots in the gusts
Crude oil which was being drained into an open top metal container ignited. The operator holding the now burning container moved it to an adjacent walkway. Another operator attacked the fire
with a 5kg co2 extinguisher and the fire was extinguished just b fore the automatic deluge began to operate. No-one was injured and the fire was confined to some electrical cable and a pressure
switch
P27a maintenance was carried out. This involved changing out the thrust bearing gland packing. Following this, the pump was test run for approximately 20mins by a maintenance technician.
The test run proved satisfactory. As part of normal daily routin checks, the pump thrust bearing lub oil level was checked on the morning of <...> and reported to be satisfactory. On <...> at
1400hrs as stated above, p27a was run up to test fire main pressures etc. Approximatey 20mins later a smoke head activation ame up on the control room annunciator panel. This was
immediately investigated by a uilities team leader. On his arrival at the fire pimp enclosure the area was full of white vapour. As he was exiting the area, the enclosure halon system activated aut
maitcally at which point, the platform responded to a full muster as per the <...> staion bil. Following the incident, the pump bearing housing assembly was stripped down and it was found that
no lubrication oil was present and that the bearing had suff red catastophic heat damage. The bearing has been returned jto the manufacturer for a through investigation and a report on findings
and recommendations will follow.

Welding was being carried out on module g blast wall from a scaffold at a height of about 12 feet and separated horizontally from p6b oil export pump by about 6 feet. P6b was running on load at
the time of the incident. Lube oil had accumulated in the save ll underneath p6b. This oil was ignited by a stray welding spark from work ongoing at mod g blast wall causing a small fire which
was restricted by the saveall. Two welders working at the blast wall tackled and extinguished the fire using portable extingu sher and the firewatcher contacted the control room. There was a delay
in raising the alarm due to a breakdown in communications. The firewatcher said he informed the control room of the fire but the control room say no mention of fire was made in the ini ial call.
A second call was made to the control room by one of the welders asking why no response had been made to the reported fire. The fire was reported extinguished at this point and the area was
investigated by a utilities team leader.
A well clean up package was being installed on the top of the <...> platform in preparation for a well clean up task. At the time of the incident work was taking place to prepare for a pressure test
on this equipment. As part of the requirements for this work, isolations had been installed on the xmas tree of the well to be tested. A technician involved in this preparation removed what he
thought was a plain nipple from the armpit valve of the xmas tree in preparation to install a pressure detector, the t ee being isolated and the cavity vented down via this route. However, the plain
nipple was in fact a grease nipple with an integral check valve that had stopped the cavity pressure being released. This situation had not been identified when the initial is lation had been applied
to the tree. On removal of the nipple the pressure was released and a stream of gaseous fluid at pressure struck the technician on his forearm and to lesser extent his knee. Because of the limited
volume, the release quickly subsid d. The technician was wearing overalls but the force of the straem caused bruising, and there were concerns that due to the pressure of gas or fluid, some may
have been forced into the tissue.
At 20:10 a g.a. Sounded. Uv indication on the <...> drilling platform sequence panel showed detection on top deck production reboiler area. A team was sent to investigate the area. They reported
a pool fire adjacent to rebolier no.3. The fire was tackled by members of the fire team, extinguishingthe pool fire in 7 mins from general alarm then tackling the fire contained within the reboiler.
Fire extingiushed 36 mins after initial g.a. During the fire fighting, <...> was overcome by smoke/fumes and was subsequently medicared to <...> hospital. He was released shortly after arrival.
Ecr procedures were adopted, but were not required.
While taking sand sample from the filter pot on which the pressure gauge read 10-15 psi, the drain point appears to have been 'sand plugged'. This plug gave, and the blast caught the wrist of <...>
causing some cuts and abrasions. The equipment, except the filter pot, from the christmas tree swab and top master valves to the overboard vent was depressured to zero. The sand filter bypass
line was open and the filter pot isolated but not completely depressured.
As part of the re-instatement of pl147 gas import line dewatering was about to commence, as the gel pig was being loaded into v307 launcher and removed from it's can it was blown back out of
the launcher and struck the attendant operative in his right low r chest region. This man in question was removed to sick bay, inspected by the medic and shortly after by the in-field doctor. He
was subsequently moved to <...> hospital for further observation and tests. He was later discharged
During <...> start-up operations, the composition of fluid entering the lpg export pumps was subject to change, causing an increase in density and subsequent increase in discharge pressure of the
pump. The high pressure pump trip had been overridden as the system operating parameters were being assessed at the time). On starting export pump ga 3004s, the area operator observed a
leak from the lpg metering package. He immediately shut down the pump and investigated the source of the leak. On investig tion, it was found that an instrument compression fitting on the
manual vent line from the on skid densitometer had parted. The vent valve was in the closed position. Due to resrticted access and fixed lagging it was initially difficult to ascertain the xact
source of the leak. Sections of lagging had to be removed to allow full operation of isolation valves. During the process of isolation, it became obvious that the leak had been in the reverse
direction of normal flow in the vent line and was now (a proximately 15 minutes after the pump shut down) observed as a slight vapour escaping from the parted fitting. Approximately 2 feet from
the leak, the instrument line ties into a 1" lpg manifold leading to a 2" lpg flare header. There are no isolation va ves on the manifold. Adjacent on the manifold is a 1" tee from the metering
Apparent heat exchanger failure. Relieving pressure through relief valves. Spade in relief/blowdown line did not allow inventory to be released. Cooling water discharge from ea 3805a
developed a flange leak, allowing pressure in line to escape. Atmosph ric conditions: wind 35 mph, direction 270 note: subsequent investigation confirmed that the heat exchanger had not failed.
Source of gas was from the module c38 fuel gas make up supply which was routed to flare via an open lcv on the ko drum. Closure of this lcv prevented gas escape to flare due to 16" spade
remaining in the main flare route. <...>
Ga-0701-g discharge check valve, type <...> mission, style <...>, on water injection low pressure header, was discovered to be issuing out water. System isolated and investigation revealed that a
plug which retains a guide pin within the checked valve bo y was missing. The check valve was then removed and replaced.
Pinhole gas leak from redundant 2" drain line (closed drain) from heat exchanger. Small leak, no alarms. Production shutdown and line isolated.
Small gas leak from hatch cover on da 1101x glycol absorber. System isolated, swept with n2 and repair carried out. System pressure tested prior to returning to service.

The produced water outlet from the hydroclones was being re-configured for disposal in the sea sump. One of the 14" spools was found to be mis- aligned. And a section was cut out from the
pipe. The spool pieces were then joined by a <...> coupling to all w completion of the reconfigurat -ion. 7 hours after process startup one of the cut sections of the spool eased apart from <...>
coupling due to the axl stress on the spool. This resulted in a release of produced water with some entrained gas. The releas of water broke a deluge trigger line frangible bulb causing a red alert
and deluge release. The gas present activated some gas heads . The process shutdown and blewdown automatically, thus stopping the leak. The gas dispersed naturallyand the platform re urned to
normal status after 1 hour 9 minutes.
Two electrical technicians and one operator were removing a plug from a <...> access fitting in order to insert an extension probe. When the plug was removed, gas started escaping. The three
men immediately left the area. The gas detection system operat d the gpa and platform esd system. Actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
A report was filed by the power ops that p27a was spraying seawater which had travelled up the shaft, through the gland packing and out of the head assembly. A work permit was raised and work
commenced at 19:45 on the same day. The work consisted of rep cking the gland, cleaning of the packing follower, re-bedding and lubrication. The pump test run for approximately 15/20
minutes and returned to service. The lubrication sight glass was checked and found to be normal before and after the test run, it wa also checked on the morning of the seventh as part of the daily
routine checks, the level was found to be normal and the oil appeared uncontaminated. Category one maintenance was carried out on the pump during week 4, records of which are held by <...>
maintenance department. A request was received by the rp to issue a verbal permit to <...> techs to run p27a fire pump in order to carry out flow and pressure checks on the platfrom fire hydrant
system. The pump was brought into service at 14:00 a per normal operating procedures and ran for approximatley 20 minutes when a single smoke head in the pump enclosure was activated and
investigated. It was enclosed with white vapour. He switched the pump off manually and made to leave the enclosure, as he left the halon release alarm sounded, the halon system operated at
P6 recycle control pcv80818 had been imperative for 30 days. As a result p6 recycle was being iperated manually. During highlander unstable operations, surges occurred and the p6 suction flow
became unstable this caused p6 to trip on low suction pressure. Simultaneous operations were taking place in preparation for opening b3 and highlander restart. At 1130, prior to the incident the
first half of the crew were stood down for lunch. At 1150 p6 was restarted. One man had been sent to monitor v6 level, and informed the control room that level in v6 was 25 ins. & rising, also
that lcv26 was closed. The man was was instructed by the relief team leader via the control room opertor to open the by-pass around lcv26. This system has 3 valves. The first of these is
permanently open & has no valve handle. The centre valve which would normally be closed was opened fully by operator. The third he "cracked" open by 2n turns.the operator stood by for a
further 3 minutes (approx.) Before going to module 'g' where he handed over to oncoming operator & proceeded to lunch. During handover, situation on v6 was discussed. While starting up p6 a
second operator had been detailed to monitor pcv8010. At approximately 12.40 he was instructed by the control room to go to module "a" & close lcv26 by-pass. While shutting down the by-pass
Work was in progress to remove p801 from its caisson (b3 riser). The tubing hanger was connected to the drawworks block via 7" vam casing. As the weight was taken the hanger moved
upwards, and as its 'o' rings cleared the riser topgas was released. This was detected by various gas detectors. (infra-red and catalytic), all in close proximity to the riser. One detector (g162)
went to 100% lel, and another (g167) went to 25% lel. Within a short period (5-7 mins) the highest reading on any detector in the area was 10% which continued to delay. N.b. Prior to the issue
of a work permit, b3 riser had been purged with nitogen and sampled until a reading of 0% was obtained.
'A' turbine was running normally on gas fuel when smoke was indicated in the ccr in the turbine alternator and main area of the module. The turbine was shutdown and halon was released
(automatically) into the gas generator enclosure. The platform genera alarm was activated manually from the ccr. Safety advisor and the fire team immediately responded and although smoke
was in evidence, no signs of fire were obvious. Neither is there any damage to the free turbine evident at this stage.
During planned reduction of production from 62000 bopd - 25000 bopd, the choke on <...> well <...> was reduced from 50/64 - 35/64 and after stabilising fully closed to further and reduction the
wells tiffany. A1 and a3 were reduced from 120/64 - 80/64 and 50/ 4 respectively. At this time a leak occured on the hi-lo pilot box on <...>. The plant was manually blown down via a psd 2 push
button and the leak depressurised by manual blowdown of both test and production manifolds. At this time the ball valve beeat the hi-lo box was closed and the leak isolated.
It was reported to the ccr that the flare appeared to be burning abnormally. Aninitial investigation was carried out and the oim informed. On inspection the oim found the flare to be burning with
an additional plume which was impinging on the upper flar boom structure. The oim took the decision to shut down the process and a psd 2 was initiated from the central control room.
When a hydraulic coated line valve was opened, the piework failed at a connection and there was an escape of fluid @ 400

At 2233hrs on <...> two gas detectors in fire zone 46 detected high level gas,this caused the platform to go to sps/gpa.the source was assu- med to be from the fuel gas vent line on the gas
compressor roof,as in a previous incident. At 0120hrs on <...> the gas compressor was restarted whilst monitoring the same gas detectors.at 0219hrs as the compressor was entering load stage
the detectors were observed to be rising as before,the gas compre- ssor was manually shutdown.the production supervisor again i vestigated the leak, but was unable to identify the source,
however he did confirm that the leak was not relatede to the fuel gas vent line. When the compressor was shutdown the area was cleared of gas, and remained shutdown for investigations to be
carri d out. At approximately 0830 hrs. Investigations found that the dry gas seal filter packages for the 3rd stage of the compressor was leaking gas, though the compressor was shutdown, the leak
areas were identified and the dry seal filters isolated.
Vessel was providing saturation diving support on the field subsea facilities. A routine ndt survey of the pipeline and manifold revealed two small gas leaks - both identified by visual
examination. Divers reported the leaks to be at the joint between va ve bonnet and body on vo22 and vo23 (2" isolation valves on 2" instrumentation branches off gas export pipeline (pl823),
within the manifold). A video record of the leaks was taken. No attempt was made to repair the failure. Gas export pressure was norm l at approx. 170 bar.
At 1550 hrs, pressure began to build up in well no. 4 and gas started leaking. The pressure build-up was detected by sensors in the annulus. The trouble arose during wireline operations when a
ball valve became blocked. Since this well is an old well, corrosion could have caused the valve failure. 130 non-essential personnel were transferred to adjacent installations in the field, while 39
remained onboard to bullhead the well, i.e. fill it with mud. The 10-hour operation was started the next morning. By the evening the well was killed successfully and crew returned to the platform,
and the platform was back in full production some days later.
Drilling vibration caused downhole equipment failure during drilling of the 11 template wells on the <...> field. Drill bits, mwd tools and drillstring were particularly affected. The problem is
estimated to have a cost about <...> million us dollars in lost rig time alone. No further information available.
A wellhead marker buoy were reported drifting and position being monitored by rig <...>.
The <...> vessel <...> was fishing when it collided with the <...> satellite at 14:20 hrs on the <...>. The weather conditions were wind ssw, 10-12 knots, sea 3-4 metres, visibility poor (fog). The
satellite was unmanned at the time and the only visible damage is paint scraped off approximately 5 sq feet of leg b2. The occurrence was reported to <...> on the <...>y at 13:30 hrs and the v<...>
was dispatched to investigate. The <...> standby vessel reported the visible damag and confirmed that all navaids were working correctly. The vessel has been reported to have incurred damage to
its hull but was able to make port under its own power. There were no personnel injured. The vessels report states that it was fishing in the f g, near the platform, relying on autopilot, radar
navigation with a human lookout. Much attention was being paid to sonar and locating fish.
Collision of platform lifeboat with jacket brace during lifeboat sea trials.
M.v.<...> was approaching <...> platform to assess if weather conditions were safe to work cargo. Approx. 100m east of <...>. platform two items were washed overboard by a larger than normal
wave/swell. Items lost are 1 x 2,700 litre helifuel tank (full) and one other container, possibly a waste skip. Weather conditions: wind 330 35kt tide 145 1.5kt sea state 2.5-3m swell.
The incident involved the supply vessel <...>. When lowering an empty container onto the deck of the boat, the skipper of the vessel informed us that he had come into contact with the <...>
spider deck. Wind was approx. 30 - 35 knots, sea state approx. 2m, which was within normal crane operating parameters.
Standby vessel <...> was approaching production platform from north easterly direction at approx 5 knots and appeared to be on a collision course. Contacted vesel on channel 8 no response.
With about 50 metres to go vessel steered course away f om platform (heading approx n.e.). Stern of vessel 'brushed' riser protection guard and went clear of the platform. Radio contact was then
established and the vessel reponded that he had lost all steerage and had now regained it. Sea state was calm, no wi d. Weather: fair and sunny. Please see attached vessel report.
While the supply vessel <...> was being unloaded the vessel sustained a mechanical failure. As a result the vessel drifted into the south east leg. Upon inspection only slight abrasions to the outer
coating on the leg were found.
Standby vessel apparently lost control and drifted backwards between <...> platforms striking the connecting bridge. Standby vessel sustained minor damage to aerials. No damage to bridge
evident. Vessel was manoeuvring into position on the east side of ad to enable diesel oil to be discharged.

Mv <...> came into contactwith east platform central structure whilst positioning to commence discharge of cargo wind speed 25 knots from 010 degrees sea state 3.4 mtrs mean wave periods 8.3
seconds
The <...> was manoeuvring to take up a position alongside the north face of the platform for routine cargo transfer when the starboard quarter swung toward the platform and at low speed struck a
glancing blow to the nw leg protection fender. Woode protection fender suffered some splinter damage and the <...> has a small area of impact damage. Weather conditions at the time were good.
Wind 8 kg wsw, sea 1m with 1-2m swell, visibility 10nm
0020 hrs <...> platform receive <...> loading buoy trip initiated by the <...>shuttle tanker <...>. 0024 hrs <...> reports to standby vessel mv <...> and <...> control room she has failure of main
engine and power and has bro en away from the <...>. 0025 hrs standby vessel dispatched to attend <...>, <...> adviseo potential collision course with platform,until direction of drift could be
confirmed. 0026 hrs control initiate red hazard staus and precautionary muster and inform oim and oic.
Whilst the supply vessel <...> was positioned alongside the <...> platform south east corner main structural leg. (leg 11 b2). Causing the removal of surface coats of paint in two areas. One
above sea level and one below. The wind speed was 25-30 knotts gusting 35 knotts. The wind direction was 320o abd the sea height was 4 meters with a sea swell of 4 to 6 meters. There were
snow showers at the time of the incident reducing visibility considerably. It was also dark.
The mv <...> was positioned at ne corner of platform, carrying out an rov survey using 2 rovs. The vessel was utilinsing its dp facility. A sudden squall developed. Weather conditions were
recorded as wind speed 38-40knots, sea state 3-3.5 m tres with a westerly direction. The decision was made to recover both rovs but it became apparent that one rov had become entangled in
scaffold debris on the seabed, so they relaunched the recovered rov to assist witht he recovery. The dp system failed ausing the vessel to move astern, at which point manual control was regained
by the master. The decision was made to cut the trapped rov's umbilical and abandon it. The other rov was retrieved and as the vessel moved astern to clear the platform, it's m st aerials came
into contact with the metal cladding under platform lifeboats 7 & 8. No damage to the lifeboats is evident after inpsection. The vessel has been re-called to <...> to repair the damaged aerials.
Standby vessel was 0.65 m distant from platform in a stand off position mate on watch was attending to some administrative duties during which period the vessel drifted toward platform. When
in close proximity the mate attempted to take avoiding action b t failed - the vessel collided with n e leg of platform. No damage to platform structure. Minor damage to vessel.
Whip hook with "weight ball" lanaded on top of a container on supply boat deck as a large wave lifted the boat. This resulted in the whip hook opened and the safety pendant wire came off the
hook and fell down on deck. Note the link on the pendant wire a parently pushes the spring loaded latch upwrds,see enclosure
The elevator was overloaded during loading of washing machine an truck. Door was open.the elevator sank 1.5.m,stopped by the emergegy brakes.no personnel injured.
When picking up a 1/4" tubing joint using the air tugger and a pick-up elevator,the tubing coupling slliped through the elevator as the bottom of the joint was about to reach therig floor,and
bounced off the rotary hand slips and slid back out the v door. he pick-up elevator remained fully latched.no-one was injured
While offloading <...> equipment from m/v <...> an equipment rack containing high prssure riser hung on an adjacent container causing a welded plate utilised as a retainer for the riser to break
off allowing one joint of riser to fall @ 5 ft to he deck of the boat and one joint to partially come out of the rack. After the rack was loaded on the rig the rack was inspected and it appeared that
the weld on the retaining plate had been cracked prior to this incident. This assumption being made due t very little 'gray metal' being seen on the broken weld. Soa state @ 2 meters. Wind speed
so knots.
23ac <...> roof python swing jib crane suffered wind damage causing the jib assembly to partially pull out of the bearing located on top of the main stanchion. Area roped off and warning signs
posted. Wind speed 45 - 55 knots 315 deg nw.
On arrival to <...> the drilling crane boom was found to have been moved presumably by recent high winds. The boom had been moved in a north easterly direction knocking over the boom rest
and damaging two light fittings, 1 - 110 volt socket, a.j.b. frame an associated cable tray. All these items are located across the north end of the drilling platform. Wind speed on day of manning:
35 knots direction: 240 deg significant wave: 1.8 to 2.4 m
Well ci conductor tube sheared at screwed joint approx. 1m above holding cup located at spider deck level. Break located aprox. 19ft above lta. Wind speed - 31 knots wind direction 245 deg
significant wave height - 1.8m
During lifting operations with the centre crane, a load fell approx. 6-8 feet into the container into which they were being loaded. The nylon strop having severed through

While cross hauling a wellhead recepticle, the master link on rigging broke. 3 lift bags surfaced, clear of <...>. The load (wr12) was left hanging on a drill string (previously used for lifting). 2
divers involved, neither injured. No damage caused. Only 2 bags were inflated, 1 of 5 tonne and 1 of 1 tonne. 1 of 1 tonne was empty. Lift bag inverters failed, the cord breaking. Master link
was 10 tonne swl. The <...> frc recovered all 3 lift bags.
While rigging down chicksans from coil tubing operations the crane was hooked on to a length of chicksans running from the west side of the skid deck to the pipe deck. When the crane began to
hoist the line a chicksan caught below the skid beam, causing t e 1 ton wire sling to part. The chicksans line moved east and landed against the derrick causing minor damage to a light fitting. The
load was made safe and the light fitting isolated.
As the joint was being lifted from the catwalk, the nubbin at the top of the joint struck the roller at the top of the vee door. Continued hoisting against the obstruction caused the 2 x 3t slings to
fail. The joint fell approx 25` to the loor and struc and damaged the joint in the table. All personnel were standing clear at the time.
The i beam ref 016-05 was to be fitted as the end stopper of i beams 016-04. The i beam 016-05 was tapped along channel of i beams 016-03 and 04 as it neared its final position beam 016-05
toppled forward off beams 016-03 and 04 onto scaffold jarring the eam and the scaffold. This caused the retaining sling to come free off the chain block hook. The beam then fell into the sea
complete with the sling attached. Weather - winds variable 5-10knots. Visibility clear, job site well lit. Equipment 1 ton sling, ton chain block, 2 ton sling and beam clamp, to restrain beam
whilst it was being trapped along. No significant damage to scaffold - paint marks/scratches on a couple of tubes.
The incident took place in the hours of darkness, wind speeeds 20 - 30 knots with squalls / showers. The operation in progress was working a supply vessel. The crane at the time had no load
attached to the line. With operations temporarily suspended whils a squall passed. Following the squall the unloaded main hoist line was raised. The hoist line having no load had been pushed to
the right of the boom and caught under the roller retaining plate, because it was dark the crane operator did not notice this vent. This caused the hoist line to build up on one side of the hoist
drum as the line continued to be hoisted. The line then forced its way past the brake cover plate, eventually damaging the rope. The crane was made safe, taken out of service and left u til a
specialist engineer was brought on board to assess the damage and make recommendations to prevent reccurance.
During unloading operations on the <...>, a load being removed from the supply vessel snagged betweena half height container and a ring bolt that is welded to the ships side. As the load was
taken by the crane the supply vessel dropped 4 - 6 metr s due to a large swell. Two of the lifting lugs failed as the load released springing into the air. A further lug failed and the load came to rest
in the adjacent half height container. The seastate at the time if the incident was 4 - 6 metres swell, 10 t 15 deg roll with 20 knot winds, east southerly direction.
On completion of the wireline operation the gamma ray correlation tool string was being pulled out of the hole.due to the failure of the depth monitoring equipment the tool came out to fast and
struck the upper wir- eline sheave at the top of the derrick. he tool fell from the derrick but following a search was unable to be located.it is likely it fell in- to the sea. There were no injuries.
A wireline job involved rigging up a toolstring on the drill floor. While the jars were being made up, they slipped into the kelly bushing drive pin hole. At the bottom of the hole there was a
makeshift debris catcher welded across the hole to prevent ob ects fallling through. The jars broke through this plate and fell 20 metres vertically. The jars impacted onto bb165 xmas tree,
leaving a clear stamp mark on the tree body. During the fall the jars passed through an open deck hatch, removed to allow th lubricator to pass through. There were three people working within
2 metres of the wellhead at the time of the incident.
3.5 mtr long x 14" dia, 344 kg, cunifer spool had been rigged with a 1 tonne polyester sling in readiness for lift, the spool was then lifted into a vertical position, with the spool approx 1 metre off
the deck (the sling was attached in a double wrap cho e rigging arrangement). At this point the sling failed mid lead end attached to hook approx 350mm from eye. The spool fell and sustained
damage to flanged end of spool. Actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
Whilst the temporary grove crane was extending the boom up to near maximum, the offside hydraulic cylinder which controls this action, failed. The seal retaining disc was forced up and out of
position. This offside cylinder safety lockout system operate immobilising the crane. The safety lockout system on the nearside hydraulic cylinder also operated as per design.

Deck crew requested to relocate a valve for backload from laydown area to skid deck. Informed that estimated weight was 1 tonne swl wire rope sling sourced for lift (sling was one of a new
batch received on board <...> and had been previously used onl once for lifting a 400 kg drum. Sling double wrapped and choked round one end of valve body behind flange. Lift hooked onto
crane, slewed round and stopped about 20 metres above skid deck to align with intended landing area. At this point the ling par ed and the valve dropped to the deck striking and damaging a
bumper bar and staircase on the east face of the mud package.
A section of steel round bar (3/4" diameter x 3' 6" long), fell approx. 30 ft from east crane cab area piercing scaffold boards erected above walkway on the exterior of m2e
A 9 1/2" drill collar (weight 6,500lbs) was lifted into the drill floor, suspended at one end by a platform crane, and by a rig floor tugger attached to a 5" lifting sub at the other, so it was approx.
Horizontal. The 5" lifting sub was latched into the 6 5/8" elevators. When the driller started to lift the collar into the vertical position it slipped out of the elevators and fell approx 6' to the rig
floor striking a stabiliser joint in the rotary table as it fell. The elevators that should have been used are 5"are 5"
The primary drawworks brake failed to hold the string when attempting to clean and dress the top of the 5 1/2" x 7" liner top pbr. The string fell 10' or so, coming to halt with the string sat on top
of the pbr. No one was injured and any signs of damage ere not immediately apparent. On investigation the drawworks brake adjust mechanism was found to have failed, owing to thread damage
disabling one brack band. Replacement parts were fitted and a full check of the drawworks completed to ensure it fit for p rpose. Detailed operational checks/test were carried out prior to
continuation of the drilling operations.
While running 5" drill pipe out of the hole, stand 90 was in the process of being racked back in the derrick. The derrick had attached the pull back tugger wire to the stand and had pulled the stand
into position ready to unlatch the elevators. The drille lowered the blocks until the stand was set back by the drill crew. The driller turned to look at his tv monitor to observe the derrickman
unlatch the elevators. He continued to lower the blocks but was unaware that the elevators had not swung free from t e pipe. The updrive came in contact with the monkeyboard and fingers
causing damage to all three. The derrickman jumped clear and suffered no injury.
During function checking of the drop down fire panels, as they were lowered, the door in bay 15 went into free fall crashing to the deck. The wire rope, which is normally attached to the drive
mechanism, which hoists the panels up as well as controls thei descent, had failed approx 7-8 feet from the attachment point on the bottom panel. Only damage was to the wire rope and the panel
limit stops. The doors were left in the lowered position and the power to the electromagnetic latch mechanisms was isolated nd locked. A three man platform investigation team (including a
safety rep) was set up.
During modification of gas compression unit, the compressor end cover was being removed for back loading onshore for modification. A runway beam and 16 tonne air hoist were being used for
removal of the cover in a vertical position. When clear of the comp essor skid, the procedures require the cover to be reorientated to a clear horizontal position for re-slinging and backload. Two
5000kg polyester slings had been attached to the crane and it was during the reorientation that the sling parted allowing the load to swing, causing superficial damage.
The easet crane was being used to unload and backload the supply vessel after recovering and stowing the oil based mud hose. The operator attempted to boom down in order to resume
unloading. The boom could not be lowered. He slewed the crane down-wind and applied the parking breaks the crane mechanic was called to investigate the fault. Meanwhile cargo unloading
was completed using the west crane. Investigation revealed that the power room lower drive chain had broken, and the boom drum overspeed brake had y overhead.he was casevaced on <...>
actuated, preventing boom free fall.
Whilst breaking out joint of 5 1/2" tubing driller was picking up blocks with single joint elevators on pipe. Elevators parted at swivel connection and fell down the pipe, landing on top of the
casing power tongs.
Removing sections of casing. The casing section was being lifted clear by means of a single joint elevator. The swivel failed due to overloading.
Whilst rotary drilling on <...>,a retaining pin weighing 3 kgs,fell to the drillfloor,landing 3 metres from a floorman who was clearing a drain at the time.he was the only man in the area and the
driller and the ass- isstant driller were in the doghouse. he retaining pin is one of four which secure the travelling block tothe dolly which runs on the vertical track of the derrick. Drilling had
been steady for 28 hours prior to this.operations were sus- pended whilst an investigation was carried out.it was a certained that the split pin which holds the retaining pin in place had sheared and
the latter had worked itself loose. The pin was replaced with a new split pin and the other 3 split pins we- re also renewed.as the cause had been determined and remidial ctions carried out,the
oim allowed drilling to resume after consulting the pla- tform manager onshore. Weather conditions were good with light winds. No damage was susteined. <...> will follow up recommendations
to fit restraining chains or similar to the p ns and also to determine whether there is a better method of securing the split pins.

While running a liner,a broken segment of the elevators setting weighing 1.2kg,fell 45 feet onto the rig floor between the iron rough neck and the drillers doghouse.the elevators were being
lowered over the liner collar in the open posistion and the setti g ring touched the collar.a retaining screw sheared and the setting ring broke in half.one half fell to the rig floor.the screw and
setting ring may have been previously cracked as they did not sustain a heavy knock.the sheared screw did not fall as it wa wired in place through it's head. The elevators had been inspected in
<...> and had only been used for nine hours since that date. There were personnel on the floor at the time of the incident but they were not hit by the falling object.
While raising an over size 7" liner in single joint elevator that was attached to the hoisting block assembly with a 3 ton sling and lift elevator assembly, the box end of the 7" joint came into
contact with the v-door bumper bar assembly. This caused an xcessive overpull on the sling causing it to part. The length of the sling was too long which caused the 7" joint to foul on the
underside of the bumper bar assesmbly the joint fell to the rig floor and then travelled down the v-door and onto the pipe dec . In his haste to escape from the actual area of the incident, the
floorman tripped over an obstruction and hurt his knee. However the injury did not result in a 'lost time' accident.
A lifting operation was underway using the s.e. crane to transfer a 45 gallon lub oil drum from the drum store outside package 7 to the east end if the bop deck. The crane had lifted the single
barrel using a barrel chain sling and had sjued the load anti clockwise over the bop deck east end. The barrel fell from the sling moments after the load was being lowered and after the sling had
been completed. It fell, hittign the east top bop handrail, onto the bop crane runway beams and onto the bop deck, a dist nce of approximately 60ft.
The <...> crew were performing wireline operations on well <...>. The lubricator was being lifted from the riser using the overhead bop crane (18 tonne swl). The lubricator is lifted by means of a
lifting clamp and two short (1 foot) 2 tonne swl wire slings. prior to making the lift the crew released the collar on the bottom of the lubricator crossover from the riser connection to ensure the
threads were disengaged. In spite of this action, the lubricator hung up on the riser during the lift, possibly due to hread re-engagement or the seal face of the bowen threaded connection 'binding'
inside the riser. This in turn resulted in one of the short slings parting under excessive load.
During recovery of the scab casing string 10 " varco/bj 150 ton type slx side door elevators were being used to lay out a joint of casing after breakout from the string. The elevators were rigging
up with the latch mechanism facing the doghouse to allo the driller to confirm proper latching. As the joint was being lowered and tailed towards the v door with a tugger it was noticed that the
tugger tailed end was not being lowered quickly enough. When the driller stopped lowering the blocks to redress the situation the elevators opened releasing the casing joint. ( it is unclear whether
or not the elevators contacted the stabbing board immediately prior to release). The casing was prevented from falling to the drill floor by hanging up in pipework. To the ide of the stabbing board
and the tugger supporting the lower end. No injuries occured. As a routine operation, no formal risk assessment had been carried out.
<...> 'cargo box' <...> was lifted off supply boat <...> at 09:45. Because of the 3 metre swell, it was a snatch lift. When the box was in mid air one of the lifting slings was seen to be loose. Once
landed on the platform deck on of the four l fting lugs was seen to have broken off. No other damage occured, no one was hurt. The box was weighed and total weight (with contents as lifted off
the boat) was approx 1 tonne. Max permitted gross weight of the box is 4 tonne. It was last certified on <...>. For further details see attached report from <...> oie.
The drilling facility on <...> had been undergoing a major up-grade and one of the operations in hand was replacement of the rig floor tuggers. Therefore the ropes had been disconnected from the
tuggers and left hanging in the derrick, but tied off. On the night of 20th it was required to rotate the kelly swivel while it was hanging in the derrick, and one of the disconnected tugger ropes was
used for this task. From below, one end of a tugger rope was flicked round a kelly bail ear and pulled by hand to ma e the kelly turn. Once this had been achieved, the rope was released. However,
shortly after this it was noticed that the released end was rising in the derrick. It continued up the derrick, and as it was the plain end, it went through the sheave at the t p and fell to the rig floor.
Once the end was observed to be rising, the rig floor was cleared, long before the end finally fell down. It is thought that the end that went through the sheave was only tied off with a piece of
rope, and that either the knot undid when the wire was shaken, or the rope broke. No no one was hurt and nothing was damaged. Atmospheric conditions were not a factor.

Wind wsw 24->28 knots. Waves 2 metres. Roll 0.2m pitch 01/m. During transfer of 10 personnel from <...> to <...> by personnel basket, the basket fouled the main hook (see sketch) and
became entangled and tilted. Basket then fell 6"-12" before ecoming free. It was then lowered to installation weather deck with no injuries occuring. Vessel had been laid off from installation
for heavy weather. Conditions were not improved enough to deploy bridge but s/by vessel master wqas confident he could l unch rescue boat. Personnel had been lifted previous evening to attend
to generators but vessel had since moved closer to bridge position. Vessel was not in retrospect in ideal position and boom elevation was lower than normal. Crane driver misjudged a ignments.
Following completion of a wireline tag run on w380 prior to a static survey, the lubricator was de-pressurised and preparations to rig down commenced. A wireline operator attached the lifting
strop to the crane main block and turned away to replace a ladd r. The crane operator, without receiving a signal to do so, raised the main block to take the weight of the lubricator. As the strop
moved upwards, it fouled a plug on the lubricator. The crane operator, unaware of the snag and concentrating on the positi n of the block in relation to the luricator, continued to lift. The strop
failed at the point of snagging causing the block to swing into contact with the stuffing box pulley shearing it off. The pulley ran down the slack wire, hitting the deck and the da aged support
bracket dropped to deck level. No personnel were in the immediate vicnity of the falling objects. The whipline block, the normal lifting method was not available for use due to re-certification of
components underway onshore.
<...> had run in hole to carry out a cement bonding log on well <...> (slot 4) using 0.46 inch o.d. braided wireline. A problem was discovered with the logging tool and whilst pulling out of the
hole the wireline caught on the line wiper, located on he rotary table. The line wiper (approx weight 6lbs) was raised along with the wire and made contact with the top sheave. This caused the
wireline to part with both ends falling to the drill floor (90 ft below) and the line wiper to the pipe racks at the monkey board (5ft below)
Whilst pulling out of the hole (<...>) to make a connection at the rig floor and lowering the blocks in a retract position the elevator hinge pin came loose and fell to the rig floor.
During routine tripping operations part of the latch trigger mechanism the latch pin, approximate weight 0.5kg - broke off and fell approximately 22 metres to the rig floor below narrowly missing
, by 1.8 metres, a santa fe floorman who was working on the rig floor. On inspection an area of impact was evident on the latch pin and a lack of both penetration and fusion at the weld point was
discovered.
Incident occurred when backloading a <...> iron basket (no <...>) onto the stbd side of the supply vessel <...>. The vessel was steady on position on the north side of the platform but side on to
the swell and rolling. The basket weight was appprox 4.5t and contained miscellaneous crossover pipes and low torque valves. Items within the basket are secured by means of removeable
vertical post either side of the basket which locate into pegs at the top and bottom of the frame. These had been secured in this position by threading a wire rope through the holes at the top of the
post in a continuous loop. The basket was lifted onto deck ofthe <...> adjacent to the nitrogen pump & mixing tank. When the lift landed it was not sitting on the deck correctly & so the crane
operator eased the lift up in order to position it correctly. At this point the vessel rolled away from the platfrom &the basket "snatched" up approx 5 feet while at the same time the aforementioned
retaining wire appeared to catch on the mixing tank. The crane operator saw two pieces of equipment fall onto the deck of the vessel. These were later identified as lo torque valves weighing
18kg each. The vessel then dropped away so the crane operator picked up the lift. At this time the lift was over the sea and the crane operator observed another unidentified object fall into the sea.
A section of wireline stem bar (iron bar 1.25" od approx 30lbs 5ft in length) was propped against the side of the wireline doghouse. The base of the bar was resting on the wooden board covering
open grating. The bar became dislodged from the side of the d ghouse and went through the grating of the production deck and landed 40ft below on the cellar deck passing through the cellar
deck mezz grating. The bar landed approx 20ft from two persons working on a small gantry to the side. The position of this gantr was not in line with the bars path of descent.
During a rotation of drillpipe with the lower jaws of the torque wrench still engaged the elevator and pipe handler swung violently into a stand of 5 1/2" automatic elevator and pipe handling
system.pieces of the ele- vator (3*1-4lb in weight) dropped app ox 20ft to the drillfloor. On investigation it was found that a modification had been made by the drilling mechanic to the torque
wrench which caused the lower jaws of the wrench to have hydraulic pressure locked in and being engaged when normally they wo ld have been disengaged.this was not seen by the drill- er due
to the jaws being hidden from view.
While tripping out of the hole for changeout of a failed mwd(dir/ logging tool) a 6 5/8" stand of drill pipe (approx 90ft) had been backed out of the sting ready for racking back into the derrick. At
this point the upper racker arm was connected to the s and still being supported by the elevators/top drive. With the drillpipe as above, the driller with the parking brake off, removed his hand
from the manual brake allowing the top drive to move down sufficient distance to contact the top of the stand of pi e causing damage to the stand, topdrive and upper racker arm head. On futher
inspection of the upper racker arm assembly, it was found that a section of the racker assembly, approx 10lb in weight, ahd fallen approx 86ft to the drillfloor. This was though to have occurred
when the topdrive and drillpipe contacted. No persons injured.

Wind 250deg, 24knots, sea state 3m, vis 3nm, temp 10.2c, dull/cloudy a bundle of 5' scaffold tubes were landed on a gantry on the north side of rig 81 at teh 35' level. Once the bundle had been
landed on the gantry walkway, the banksman attempted to retri ve the lifting strops by coming up slowly with the whipline on pull the strops from under the bundle of tubes. Whilst pulling free,
on of the strops caught a scaffold tube and dislodged it from the bundle, the tubes rolled off the edge of the gantry and f ll to the drill floor. The scaffold tube landed vertically in the centre of the
make-up longs which were not in use at the time, the tube then bounced out of the tongs to land and come to rest near the north side wall of the drill derrick. Drilling were p lling out of the hole at
the time and three roughnecks were working on the drill floor approx 8 to 10 feet away from where the tube landed. 3 men were in the doghouse. There was no injuries to personnel and no
damage to property or equipment.
<...> xmas tree was being removed using the <...> crane. As the weight of the load was being taken up the chain parted at the top of the air hoist fixing point and the chain fell through the well
slot in module 'b'.
The activity had been ongoing for approx 4 hours.the drill pipe was att- ached to the drillfloor winch by the lifting cap.as the drillpipe was being winched up the v door to the drill floor.the lifitng
arm fractured resulting in the drillpipe sliding appr x 5 feet back down the v door and coming to rest on the catwalk approx 5 feet from the bottom of the v door.no damage sustained,other than the
failure. Investigation showed that the lifting caps specifically for this job were correctly manifested and had omplete lifting equipment certificat- ion.the failed lifting cap,and two similar
caps,were neither manifested nor certificated.it is considered that they came out of the platform al- ready screwed into the drillpipe,possibly having previously been used as end protectors.
The wireline shooting nipple/lubricator assembly was to be picked up 2 feet to confirm that it was above the bop shear rams. The upper pipe rams that were closed aroung the shooting nipple had
to be opened to allow the shooting nipple to be picked up. T e driller operator the rams from the remote bop control panel on the rig floor. Although the green light on the control panl indicated
that the rams were open, the rams were in fact prevented from opending by the locking screws which the driller had forgo ten were engaged. As the shooting nipple was still anchored in the bop,
when the driller attempted to pick it up with the draw-works, an over pull was put on the ligting chains causing them to part. One link on each chain parted and felll to the rig flo
A new 75' x 3 1/2" standard rotary hose was being transferred from the pipedeck (m4roof) to a temporary storage area in the void between the drilling mud module (m4) and the drilling derrick
(m5). The crane rigging for this operation was single fall with a 15'/8 ton safety pennant and swivel hook. The rotary hose was laid out diagonally across the casing on the pipedeck from the nw
corner to the se corner. A 30'/3 ton sling was attached to the nw end of the hose and the hose picked up until it rested in the vertical at the se corner of the pipedeck. The hose was the positioned
over the w end of the void and under the direction of the banksman (<...> deck foreman) slowly lowered. The <...> deck foreman, with the assistance of a roustabout, walked the free end of the
hose as far as possible along the void the e before instructing the crane operator to slack off the remainder. The 30' sling was removed from the w end of the hose and re-attached to the e end.
The crane was repositioned to the e of the catwalk and the pennant lowered to allow the eye of the 30' sling to be coupled up. This was done &the crane picked up and took the load. The <...>
deck foreman determined that further use of the crane was of no advantage and requested the crane operator to, onc e again, slack off. The e end of the hose had been landed but when slacking
The fastline 'kite' is an assembly suspended within the derrick and designed to dampen the oscillation of the drilling fastline as it spools on and off of the drawworks drum, this is effected by
passing the line through a series of rollers (8) arranged on 4 sides and applying side restraint via wires or springs. The drill crew were pulling out of well a7 with the 7" cement clean out assembly
whilst 'running down' the empty travelling blocks a roller (approx 1kg) fell to the rig floor from the kite (30 fee ). Investigation showed the the roller bearings had disintegrated allowing the roller
to wear and snap the retaining pin. The assembly wires and rollers are maintenance free, checked weekly and were changed out 3 weeks ago.
The sea state was very calm, the wind about 3 knots. Little noise, full daylight and the temperature at sea level was about 20c approximately. In <...> scaffold was erected to examine the state of
the clamp holding the riser to the structure. The scaffold was erected during low tide to fit as low as possible on the structure. Just above the minimum sea level. Before the scaffold could be
removed the weather changed, making it impossible to remove. It was decided to leave until better weather in <...>. It was left fitted during summer because it was known that there was work to
do on the production spider deck before the end of the year. On <...> whilst welders/burners were available it was decided to remove the redundant scaffold. <...> (scaffold foreman) raided a
p.t.w.,called in the standby boat <...>, donned a life jacket and harness and proceeded to the spider deck. The <...> launched the fast rescue craft 335. <...> descended onto the scaffold but noticed
that part of it was loose so withdrew to a safe part of the scaffold. He attached his safety whip line to a secure part of the scaffold. Some of the scaffold clamps had to be burnt off because they had
seized after a long spell in the water & being battered by heavy seas. He had decided to work from one end & dismantle as much of the scaffold as poss before dismantling the rest from a safe
During construction of blast walls, the welder was welding up the seal plated at the top of the new blast wall when welding spatter fell through a 3mm gap and ingnited the insulation tape behind
the blast wall

All scaffolding equipment stowed at m3ww storage area requires removal and dismantling as it forms part of the blow-out path from the west wellbays. During the course of the nightshift up to
eleven scaffolders had been involved in the systematic removal f tubes etc. At 0430 hrs, two electrical technicians entered d3ww on route to work area. Both men heard the noise of something
falling from above on of the men looked up and saw a scaffold tube fall and land in between them. No one was apparently worki g above them at the time. The two metre long scaffold tube
falling in uncertain circumstance. No injuries were sustained by the men.
While working to remove scaffolding from the crown block of the derrick it was noticed that there was some wood secured to a beam which had the purpose of protecting the beam from rope
chaffing. It was decided to remove the wood and the abseiler did this lying down passing the wood behind him to a scaffolder who stacked it against the kick plate. The abseiler had removed four
pieces of wood and was holding the fifth and last piece when a loud bang was heard from a falling object hitting the derrick. The bseiler and scaffolder secured the last piece of wood and
descended. On later inspection, there were only four pieces left on the crown block, and it is thought that the abseiler inadvertently managed to kick one piece over the kick plate.
Whilst the deck foreman was cleaning up on the top of the red shack in orderto gain access to the dc motor stored there, bits of pipework and a set of bales were removed. In the process of
moving the bales with his boot, one of the bales twisted around, s ipped through the bottom gap of the of the handrail and landed some 30ft down on the valley deck, thereby denting the canopy
above the door to the bulk silo module and the deck-plate of the valley deck. At that moment there was no body in the vicinity. Ha ing ensured tha area on top of the red shack was safe and secure
and observing no ip and minimal damage, the foreman lifted the bale with the crane back to the pipedeck after that he informed the night pusher of the incident.
During high winds 2 stop chocks 450mm x 160mm x 90mm weight 12 kilograms fell from the top of the main generator (a) exhaust onto the weatherdeck and level 4 (58.1m) walkway and to sea.
Nuts/bolts had backed off due to weather/vibration. High winds for se eral days prior to incident.
Routine inspection revealed sections of lagging had fallen off po4 and po5 turbine exhausts. Recent bad weather is thought to have been a contributory cause, along with possible interference of
skirt on top of exhaust stack and lagging s.s. cladding when tack contracts.
A section of flat bar was found on walkway on the south west corner of level 2 at the flare base. It was curled into a semi-circle and burned by extreme heat. A check on dimensions confirmed that
it was most of a deflector vane from llp flare. A visual in pection was carried out from the platform and from helicopter of flare by binocular and a video was taken. No loose debris sighted on
flare top.
Following completion of the escape to sea project works, the access scaffolding below the south truss accomodation was being dismantled. Whilst dismantling the final section a hanger unseated
from the overhead support beam resulting in a partial collapse. the scaffolder conducting the work was suspended by safety awareness and inertia reel.
During the installation of north mousehold scabbard it was necessary to lift a hinged hatch on the substructive walkway. The operator lifted the hatch, believing that the grating and support plate
underneath were attached. This was not the case the steel late (17" x 28" weighing 66 lbs) subsequently fell the bop deck below. There were no injuries and no plant damage occurred.
A section of unistrut 6 metres long was being removed from a temporary scaffold rack. The length slipped from the persons grasp and fell down to the level below. It landed on west 1 lifeboat
punching a hole 4" square through the roof.
Whilst returning scaffolding boards into the storage rack, siuated at the edge of top deck north side, one of boards fell through the rack landing on the deck below.
Bolt attaching support strut to the rest platform loosened off and fell to the ground during severe weather.
During the initial stages of rig skidding, the rathole was being raised to the rig floor. An object dropped to the bop deck and on investigation was found to be retaining t-bar. The procedures for rig
skidding prohibit personnel access to the bop deck and therefore no injuries were incurred. The t-bar function is to retain the rathole in the positioning pivots during drilling operations. It appears
that the rathole was landed on top of the t-bar instead of in the pivot seat.
A pipe clamp weighing approximately 5 kg fell from the po6 recycle line onto the walkway in front of pump po6. The recycle line is approx. 25ft above the walkway. The bolt for the clamp was
found lying 2ft from the clamp. The clamp was discovered by an ops tech carrying out a routine tour.
A piece of angle iron approx 18" long fell from a scaffold narrowly missing scaffolder. The angle iron was discovered accidentaly by a colleague who was pulling on a 110v extension cable.

The vacuum breaker on the seawater outfall from g4403 fire pump fell approx. 2 metres on to the firepump causing damage to the blower pipework. The failure was the 3" cuni line supporting the
vacuum breaker fracturing
On <...> at approx. 0800hours simops (drilling and wireling) was taking place. The wireline crew were working on the impact deck within the footprint of the drill derrick when a 10" shifting
spanner fell approx. 30' narrowly missing personne working in the area. An investigation team was set up by the oim to try and ascertain where the spanner fell from . After the investigation the
conclusion was that the spanner could not have dropped through the drill derrick approx. 50' above the impact deck but that it had been left on either a support or gantry crane beam approx. 30'
above the impact deck.
Wire mesh cover from gas turbime exhaust stack (approx 4'6" dia) became detached during high winds (gusting 75 knots).falling approx 20 metres onto the external walkway outside the drilling
module switchroom on the east side of the platform.
Follwoing high work activity, vessel inspections, relief valve recertification, an individual was ontop of the brent high pressure separator <...>. This is a grated walkway some 20-25` above deck
level with handrails and kickplates. As he approached his work area 9to flog up top manway hatch) he displaced a 12" dia 2" thick blank weighing 30lbs approx which was laid on the walkway.
The displacement caused the blank to pass between the bottom of the kick plate and the grated deck. It then fell to the dec below, breaking a scaffold board enroute.
During a severe storm a section of grating (approx 3' x 2'6") plated with 1/8" steel was dislodged by the wind. Section fell approx 30' landing on a lower access platform causing dam- age to the
platform grating. Actual fall object was not witnessed.fallen object was discovered some time after the event. Winds:- 70kts gust, 55kts mean seas:- 11-12m.
During removal of scaffold platform from crown, a scaffold clamp was dropped through the perspex roof of the rig floor drillers dog house. While the scaffold crew were transferring scaffold
clamps the bag in which they were contained burst. This resulted n one of the clamps dropping approx 100ft from the monkey board area onto the roof of the rig floor drillers dog house. The rig
floor had been barriered off and cleared of personnel.
<...> personnel were trying to restore electrical supplies,derived from cpp 13.8kv switchboard after supply breakers had been tripped.the <...> feeder oil circuit breaker had been closed,but the
voltages at <...> were unstable,preventing the closure of <...> 440v incomer breaker b. Consequently, the feeder oil circuit breaker tripped. When electrical personnel tried to resolve the problem
by operating the closing switch on cubicle 13 of the 13.8kv switchboard, whcih was extinguished by fixed halon system. The oi circuit breaker yellow phase moving contact assembly had come
adrift from the associated operating mechanism by a mechanical by a mechanical failure of it's security bolts. A gpa was sounded, and a full muster held. Personel were stood down at 21:40
During routine daily flame failure/hot spot checks <...> & <...> observed a small hot spot/internal fire within reboiler no 3. Unit had been shutdown at time of inspection and oim was called prior
to removing inspection port and extinguishing with a small quantity of dry powder foam 12 kg extinguisher. Fire and liquids had been contained within furnace tube and no smoke was visible
from stack until fire was extinguished. Teg from furnace section was then drained into surge/storage vessel and hse duty officers r beverage and <...> were informed and permission requested to
remove no 3 reboiler tube no 25.
A fire broke out on <...> behind a welding machine. Fire was coming from an extinguisher cover (orange plastic) which was wrapped behind the welding plant. Several riggers were on site at the
time, one of whom pulled the cover from behind the welding plant the others extinguished the fire using dry powder. The fire was out in seconds. Nobody was injured. No significant damage
occurred. An investigation ensued and the duty production hse was contacted. Note:platform is totally depressured with boundary isolations in place.
At 15:00 hrs on <...> a small localised fire was noticed on some welding leads laying on the cellar deck (s.e. corner) of <...> by three scaffolders working above the deck. They promptly
extinguished the fire using a portable hand held dry powder extingu sher and reported the incident to the <...> control room. Subsequent investigation showed that there had been an electrical
short circuit of the welding lead at the connector, which was laying on top of the earthing lead. This caused the earthing lead insu ation to ignite. The welding lead connector appeared to have
"broken down" allowing the short circuit. <...> is currently undergoing major construction work. The platform is shutdown, depressured and nitrogen purged. There were no combustible materials
in the vicinity.
Small fire caused by sponge cleaning a diffuser.

On <...> commissioning test runs of k400 were being carried out after the machine had been out of service for 7 months due to construction activity. During the afternoon some smoke had been
noticed from the power turbine area but this was not co sidered particularly unusual since the machine had been down for several months. The machine tripped and on run down some oil was
noticed running out of the cab drains adjacent to power turbine. The oil leak was investigated and after discussion some furt er tests were carried out showing the leak being caused by a vent
problem. The unit was successfully run and cool stopped at 22:32. Staff remained observing the unit following shutdown and then returned to the control room. The mechanical tech. Noticed sm
ke coming from power turbine end at 22:45 and called for assistance and with the aid of co2 and dry powder put out the small fire by 23:10 hrs. No muster took place - all personnel were
informed of the incident. Hse were informed on morning of <...>.
On <...> at 1945 k400 was being prepared for commissioning checks. The pre-start checks were carried out without incident. At 2058 the unit was fired up ok and was run in idle for 30 mins
without incident. 2127hrs k400 was brought to minimum peed again without incident for approx 5 - 10 mins. Smoke was then seen to come from power turbine exhaust diffuser. The unit was left
on line for a further 10 minutes to see if the smoke would abate. It did not so k400 was shutdown at 2150 hrs. Operation staff observing took a closer look at exhaust diffuser and noted a small
fire in a similar position to previous one <...>. It was extinguished using 3 short blasts of dry powder extinguisher. No muster took place. Hse were on board at time of incident and were informed.
At 10:18 hours <...> the platform general alarm was raised to alert all staff of two vent stack fires caused by a severe snow storm. The fixed fire fighting systems were used, instantly snuffing the
<...> platform fire but there were three attempts to ext nguish the fire on the <...> platform vent stack. This used 75% of the fixed fire fighting system stock. Upon confirmation of the fires being
extinguished, the fire fighting systems were returned to operational readiness and normal production commenced. Due o the protracted nature of the incident the <...> emergency response
process was activated and the <...> ecr manned.
At 03:43 hrs on <...> the <...> platform <...> shut down on an esd which is believed to have been instigated by a failure of the communications system known as serck. This shut the main gas line
esd valve, the mud line safety valves, the well wing valves and the diesel tank esd valve. The number 2 generator which was on line then failed to stop causing a large amount black smoke to
accumulate around the top deck of the production platform. Once daylight allowed the stand by boat to observe the smoking conditions the main <...> platform <...> contacted the duty production
person <...> and other key players to the potential of a fire condition. These key asset members then attended the <...> main control room with the telemetry specialist at that point a further esd
signal was sent to <...> via the backup known as meteor. Shortly after a satops crew assembled at the <...> heliport along with <...> (satops team leader) and <...> (satops oim). A helicopter was
scrambled en route to the <...> field where the <...> oim was acting as emergency control centre co-ordinator, whilst en-route the helicopter made a fly past <...> to allow the team to make a close
inspection of the incident at this time there was observed a clear indication of smoke coming from the exhaust pipes of the number 2 generator only. The helicopter landed on <...> to clarify the
D117 vessel had been opened up and steam cleaned as part of '95 shutdown. Fumes and smoke were observed comming from vessel and responding fire team saw "a glow and flames" withing
vessel interior fire was contained within the vessel and subsquently put out.
Motor on seawater injection pump g117d short circuit on start up. Flash a phut! No fire, smoke or injuries.
During a test run on generator `b' after a faulty automatic voltage regulator had been replaced, a small 2" flame was observed emitting from a metal cable conduit which contained wiring
connecting the generator control panel and the alternator. <...> group incident report <...> refers to above.
During the presence of three personnel discussing arrangements to install an additional battery cubicle, arcing was heard and seen coming from ventilation areas of both ch7 and ch8 subsea
control power modules after isolating both modules, further investi ation revealed a build up of conductive dirt had contributed to a breakdown of insulation,allowing d.c. voltage in the paxolin
control board to track across the area of a small capacitor. From the evidence as noted it would seem possible that it was the b ild up within the capacitors that discharged to earth which caused
the arcing.
During water pumping operations to displace well a18, pump no. 2 on cement unit failed, creating smoke which was sensed by two smoke heads and subsequently triggered a production
shutdown. It is thought that the pump clutch unit may be the cause.
During start-up of the hp compressor pipework exceeded normal operating temperatures due to failure of a cooling medium vlave to reset, resulted in the activation of 2 smoke detectors prior to
compressor being shut down.
Multiple head smoke detection in module 05 (utility module) resulted in a platfrom shutdown. A precautionary muster was undertaken to account for personnel. No one was injured, and all were
accounted for. Module was ventilated and soource of smoke was f und to be "b" air compressor motor which had failed.
A small fire was observed in the power turbine enclosure near the pt front bearing. When visually confirmed the fire was extinguished by manual activation of the halon system.

V belts on portable water maker drive pump overheated causing smoke logging in module which subsequently cause automatic deluge release. On removing the pump crank dase it was found that
the power end crank has been sheared across the stalling of the driv belts which excessive heat was a consequence of the power end crank shaft failure.
At 1745 hrs 2 x infra red detectors indicated confirmed fire in fire area 31e . A firepump room. The fso was alerted to investigated and the general platform alarm sounded. The deluge system
activated automatically in response to the f & g signal. Fire eams attended and isolated fuel to pump, ba team entered enclosure to ascertain that the deluge had extinguished all fires.sytem fully
isolated and made secure by 1809hours. Initial inspection revealed that the gear box had seized and the clutch had burn out.
The lifting of a psv on the gas compression system caused and increase in flare rate. The increase in temperature on the weather deck activated at least 2 heat detectors (probable rate of
temperature rise as opposed to reaching max temp). The 'confirmed fire' signal mitiated on automatic esd and the firewater deluge releae in that fire area.
G.p.a.'s sounded on confirmed smoke detection in <...> battery room. On investigation it was visually confirmed as a fire and the fire team was asked for. When the fire team investigated
internally using breathing apparatus, the room was full of smoke, but n flames were detected. This was because the smoke detection had stopped the hvac and closed the dampers and thus starved
it of oxygen. The room was then ventilated so a detailed examintaion could take place which revealed several batteries had exploded. D ring the day a discharge test had been carried out for
the<...>, the chargers had been re-established some 3 hours earlier to the incident happening.
At approx 23:00 hrs the tumble driers restarted to finish off drying towels which were still damp.they were put onto a 20 minute drying cycle a few minutes later the stewardess left the laundry
area to do other du- ties. At approx 23:10 hrs a fire was det cted by the oim when he heard a squ- eaking noise from the laundry and smelt smoke.oim observed smoke follow- ed by flame coming
from the north east tumble drier.he killed the laun- dry power using the emegency shutdown button,activated gpa from local cal point and fist aid fire fighting commenced. At 23:13 hrs smoke
detected by fixed fire detection system and sprinkl- er system operated. At 23:20 hrs emergency response team with breathing apparatus on scene and took over fire fighting.all other personne
mustered and accounted for. At 23:30 hrs fire confirmed as extinguished though smoke logging of lau- ndry and immediate surrounding area persisted. At 00:18 platform returned to normal status
and all personnel stood down from muster stations. Fire damage confined to the tumble drier itself,no surrounding area aff- ected except superficial damage caused by fire water.
The essential sservices switchboard had been isolated earlier in the day to prepare for removal of temporary feeder and pulling/terminating permanent feeder from dd. This later work was to be
done with boarad lie live since this board had ups feeders-ups atteries would sustain loads for only two hours. Wrap round insulation was added to bus-bars connectors and a rubber curtain was
installed in front of the bus within the cubicle to be terminated later. The board was then e re-energised after various check . All work had been thoroughly discussed and carried out under a
detailed procedure. Too-box talks were held and recorded. Approx 50 minutes after re-enegerisation an electrician smelt and saw smoke coming from the cubicle. He alerted control room. Platfo
m ga was initiated. Smoke detectors alarmed two minutes later. Time 1910 hrs. Fire team entered with ba and manual c02 extinguishers. Difficulty in gaining access into board for co2. No d fixed
fine system in area. After isolating all power to board fire inally secured at 2050 hrs. Non essential personnel were relocated tos support barge <...>. Temporary supplies were re-established by
0200 hrs <...>. The rubber matscreen and cable insulation had burned causing large smoke evoluton and considerable heat damage. Offshore personnel including a safety representative and
Derrickman no 2 was in the mudpit area when he witnessed a large bang and some sparks coming from the agitator at pit no1. After pressing the stop button, he contacted the <...> nightshift
electrician who, on arrival, detected a high temperature on the ag tator motor. He immediately proceeded to package 1 switchroom to investigate. When approaching mcc6 observed smoke
belching from some cubicles. He then isolated the feeder to d1-o3 agitator and contacted ccr on ext 555. The crt initiated emergency initiat d emergency procedures. The fire was extinguished any
supple isolate. During investigation and testing, the motor and cubicle serving the agitator, was found to be damaged as follows. A) d1-o3 motor had insulation failure. B) cubicle mcc 6 c1 was
electriclly burnt out.
At approx 0940 hrs a scaffolder was proceeding through module c1 when he noticed flames at the engine exhaust at the west bulkhead of gas compressor kt-03. He proceeded with the assisstance
of two workers to extinguish the fire and raise the alarm. On e iting the module it was noticed a fire was burning at the exhaust location external to the module which was the source of the flames
that were noticed internally. Again they tackled the fire using fire extinguishers and extinguished the fire which subsequ ntly re-ignited. <...> operators and safety technicians arrived at the scene
and prepared to extinguish the external fire and cool area down. The platform was shutdown at approx 0950 hrs and general alarm activated at approx 0955 hrs. All personnel mu tered and
necessary authorities notified. The fire was reported extinguished and everything under control at 10.00 hrs. All personnel stood down at 10.11 hrs and necessary authorities informed. The fire
resulted in damage to 8 small cables which run in close proximity to the exhaust, additionally external wall cladding was damaged by fire. It would appear at this stage that the fire was caused by
heat from the exhaust igniting the cables. Investigations are currently ongoing to determine if the exhaust is holed and hot gasses are escaping through the exhaust lagging.
Fire pump failed to start during routine weekly inspection. Rpe was checking for an open cct across start solenoid with a multimeter when engine started. It is assumed that the start solenoid stuck
in as the associated wiring burst into flame. The rpe rai ed the alarm, put out the small fire with a dry powder extinguisher and then disconnected the batteries.

Post weld heat treatment was taking place at b1 leg 8" riser. During the course of this activity a heating element became dislodeed and came into contact with riser insulation, this material melted
and the heating element continued to slip and rested upon adjacent scaffold board which burnt and a tarpaulin erected to shelter the worksite was set alight. The fire alarm was raised and dry
power fire extinguishers were used to control the fire. A fire hose was directed at the worksite to cool the area. The fi e team took control at the site and ensured all hotpoints were cooled and
ember extinguished. Power to heating elements was cut off when alarm raised. Hydrocarbons had not been introduced into the riser.
At 20:15 hrs the <...> helideck monitors were checked. The <...> diesel fire pump was called to run on demand. A nightshift production technician went into the firepump room at approx 20:30
hrs. He noted that the engine temperature was still showing cold. the engine was left to warm up and complete a 1 hour weekly test run. Just prior to 21:00hrs <...>,a crane driver,contacted the
radio room on a channel 6 radio. He informed the platform staff that smoke was coming from the ak diesel fire pump room. A fire team was sent out, they confirmed that there was a fire inside the
ak fire pump room. The platform general alarm was raised. The fire pump fuel isolations were closed and boundary cooling was applied. Supporting fire fighting teams were despatched. T e fire
was known to be extinguished at 21:17 hrs. Boundary cooling continued. Initial investigations indicate that the fan belts were slipping, they frayed and came adrift of the pulleys. The water pump
stopped and as a result the engine over heated, poss bly seizing or having internal damage. The sump presure blew engine oil from the rocker box and was sprayed onto the engine exhaust and
ignited. Later inspections indicated that the diesel engine electrics were damaged. The fan belts were frayed, and that the engine may be seized. Inspection of the fire pump enclosure indicates no
Whilst <...> welder/plater was burning off hand rails on north side of p2300 (gas m.o.l. export pump), sparks ignited the fuel gas vent line 10 feet below cellar grating. P3600 was not on line
when incdent occurred. Wind was approx 20 knots southerly wave height was 1.5 meteres max. Firewatcher <...> noticed flame, informed <...> and <...>, and while <...> informed the control
room <...> and <...> extinguished the flame.
During change over of fuel from gas to diesel on power generator g-8004 a single flame detector alarmed in the control room.on investigation a flame was witnessed at a burner coupling inside
the generator enclosure. A controlled manual shutdown of the generator was carried out.
After a wet test on the deluge system in module 05 (as per lloyds requirement) water ingressed into transformer tr05/4c causing a malfunction initiated from the hv cable box. Damage was
sustained to electrical cable and hv cable box cover plate.
Plant operator was requested to check fault alarm on auxillary seawater pump, (annunciated in main control room). On arrival he observed smoke and flame at pump. He informed main control
room of the situation. Operator then proceeded to shut machine dow , and extinguished fire with local hand held dry power extingisher.
Work was being carried out installing steelwork. This involved preheating steel prior to welding. Worker had been using preheat equipment. On completion he put equipment down clear of his
worksite, and commenced welding. After approx 5 minutes he heard a boom' and became aware of a source of heat in the immediate vicinity. He looked round to see a ball of flame being fed
open ended propanee hose, his firewatcher attempted to extinguish the fire using a dry powder fire extinguisher. Welder left the site to isolate the propane cylinder. A hagen activated a mcp and
informed the ccr of the incident. On site investigation revealed that the hose had become detached from the nozzle and the welding work in the vicinity had ignited the gas pocket.
Arc air welding had been ongoing in mod. C north void from 22.35 hours with breaks until the time of the incident. Nightshift chemist <...> had been taking samples in mod c. <...> was leaving
mod c north door when he noticed flames coming from the cab es attached to the welding machine adjacent to the module door. He covered the flames with a tarpaulin and contacted the ccr to
inform them of a fire external to mod g. Alarm was raised by the ccr and platform went to muster. The area was checked out by t e emergency team and fire was confirmed as extinguished on their
arrival. The cable immediately adjacent to the welding machine had suffered burning to the sheathing and the short tail piece at the machine was completely burnt through. Damage had also bee
caused tot he machine shell by the burning cable.
The production supervisor had earlier advised me of the need to test run <...> crude oil booster pump and if this proved successful to run up <...> mol pump, as both these units had not been run
since they were handed back from maintenance. The rodcution technician checked the pumps over prior to the ccr starting the crude booster pump. When he reported back that the line ups were
correct the booster pump was started on full recycle with a flow of 175m3/hour. The oil operator stood by whilst t e pump was started and all appeared satisfactory. At about 1015 i decided to
check the condition of the pump prior to us starting the mol pump. As i approached the pump i noticed that the nde collar was glowing red. I advised the control room operator v a the radio to
stop the pump as a precaution i located a fire extinguisher as the pump rotation stopped a small circle of flame appeared around the nde seal, this was immediately extinguished with the dry
powder entinguisher. On investigation it was found that the "keyway tab" of the bearing retaining nut tab washer had broken allowing the shaft to float. This caused excessive force to be exerted
on the seal assembly causing it to overheat. It would appear that the tab washer had been re-used following a previous rebuild due to a lack of the component at the time. This may have
A very small gas leak was detected on the body of a hydraulic 26" valve (valve hu m 281).the leak came from a 2" plug in the body of the valve. The leak came from a 2" plug in the body of the
valve.the leak was manually detected by an operator who discovered a small lump of ice on the valve.

A gas detector on <...> was activated and upon checking of the area,a gas leak from bolts on bonnet of esdv m3.1 was found.leakage confirmed with portable gas detector and "snoopy". Platfrom
side of esdvm3.1 decompressed(from 60 bar) and leak stopped. Seali g compound injected.total duration of leak 62 minutes,estimated quantity:1m 3.the area is open to wind,the wind speed at the
time:17.20 m/s,direction 210 degrees
Following a report of loss of pressure in the template wi system an investigation was carried out by rov deployed from the <...>. Damage to an 8" pipeline spool was found as set out in the letter
may/ingram of <...> attached. This oir 9a as been raised at the request of the pieplines inspectorate.
Prepartations were being made to load a pig into the main oil line (mol). A class 1 f&g platform shutdown occurred when the pig launcher was opened, due to coincident gas detection at 25% lel
at 2 gas detectors adjacent to the pig launcher in b module. he launcher had been isolated and depressured, and contained residual gas only. Wind conditions were particularly calm at the time.
An audible leak was heard in the wellhead area, no work was in progress in the area. The leak was traced to a body joint on well 1 choke and the well and flowline were immediately isolated. The
well pipework was depressured and an isolation permit raised. the incident was reported and arrangements made to investigate further on a future visit.
Weather: wind nw 15-20 kts, 6 c. Daylight well c5 process flowing 60mm via contactor v4 therefore noise levels very high. Passing e.side of v4 i noticed a condensate smell.assistance in locating
the source was given by <...> and <...> and traced to x701/4. Gas was found to be leaking from the transmitter end of the instrument due to failure of the internal thermowell. C5 process was
taken offline, depressured and isolated to allow further inspection / removal and eventual replacement of the thermow ll with a solid plug. Failure had occured adjacent to the threaded section of
the thermowell.
08:45 production technician reported a water leak on v201. 08:45 <...> control room informed. 08:47 vented separator v201. 08:52 separator v201 to 0psi.
Overflow of condensate from glycol storage caller quoted l100 gallons as quantity. Some entered sea.
09:14 general alarm sounded, <...> on <...>, broken by <...>. electrician who reported smoke and flames on <...>. 09:15 i initiated p-o shutdown from the central control room. 2222 to initiate
<...> ecr. <...>placed on standby. 09:17 fire team espatched wap, muster completed, mustered personnel instructed to put on survival suits, advised of situation and of possible evacuation. 09:19
fire team leader confirms smoke and small flames at 'a' skid reboiler thief hatch. Tackling situation with fire hose. Mustered personnel informed, <...> ecr informed. 09:21 contacted <...> log-co
via hot line. Helicopter evacuation of non essential personnel. Radioactive source brought to south helideck stairway. <...> updated. 09:23 fire extinguish d, boundary cooling taking place.
Mustered personnel informed. <...> ecr informed. 09:26 informed <...> log-co of situation. 09:30 mustered personnel instructed to proceed to accommodation lounges 09:32 radioactive isotope
returned to safe location 09:45 <...> ecr informed that situation was safe, boundary cooling continuing. <...> informed of situation. 10:00 permanent boundary cooling in place. Fire team returned
to contro room. Dimlington ecr updated. 10:15 all personnel involved, nstructed to write a report, on their part in the incident. Reports written in isolation of all personnel. 11:00 all personnel
Water (entrained condensate) leaking from a pin hole leak in pipework from separator. This was the water dump line from no 1 separator and was at separator pressure- 510 psi. Separator was
isolated and vented. Production shutdown. Informed <...>. Snr oim on <...>. And snr oim on <...>.
Production operator noticed frosting around actuator of 355-sdv-6 upon investigation it was found that the gas was leaking up through the stem seal, the line was depressured and isolated. A full
isolation was put upon the system and the valve changes out, ventilation was good no fixed gas detection was activated and a portable gas detector only showed 20% level from 2 feet away from
actuator
Bc2 gas compressor had its vent valve 351-sdv-3 overhauled i.e. new gate and seats fitted plus a bonnet seal was fitted on the <...> On the <...> the machine was required for service and was
started at 15:00 on checks made after the machi e had been running a short while the operator noticed a slight leak from the vent valve bonnet joint, this was monitored and was found to be
deteriorating the leak was escalating to the size of a small plume approx 24" long and 10-12" in diameter. The pro uction supervisor was shown the leak who then initiated a normal shutdown
procedure for the gas compressor. The wind speed was 6 knots eastly which depleted the gas from the vent valve which is located high and outside of the module from normal walk ways.

An operator was depressurising a short section of 12" pipework isolated between <...> satellite import riser esd valve and wing valve using an 1/2" valve with outlet piped below the open grating
in preparation for change out of corrosion coupon in the lin . The wellhead area is open on 3 sides and the floor open grating. There was a light westerly wind blowing. The enclosed volume of
gas at the start of depressurising was 0.2m3 at 150 psi approximately. The operator under estimated the conditions prevaili g and depressured the line too quickly causing gas dispersion which was
sensed by two gas detectors in the area causing a platform esd and blowdown. Extra gas detectors of the i.r. type have been recently fitted in the area. The incident team checked the rea within
minutes and found the gas detectors reading zero l.e.c. incident occured on the 1800-0600 shift at 21:27 hours on <...>.
At 03:00 hrs the night operator went to vent down some pressure in the <...> liquid handling drum 306-1203. On opening the vent valve on the drum the operator noticed that the venting was
louder than normal. The operator shut off the vent valve and the n ise stopped. The operator then cracked open the vent valve and felt down the pipework, at the deck level pipe support, a hole in
the vent pipework was noticed. The operator shut off the vent valve and reported the condition to the duty section leader, the operation supervisor and platform o.i.m. were subsequently informed
(hole caused by corrosion). A temporary wooden patch was fitted over the holed pipework to minimise any gas release from the pipework in case of automatic platform venting and during the
lanned platform depressurisation. Platform production systems were selectively shut-in to reduce platform gas inventory and controlled venting was commenced @ 04:20 hrs. The platform was
fully depressured at 11:00 hrs. Wind 12kts, @ 20 c.
During the initial start up sequence on k300 the rb211 enclosure gas detectors (nos 2 & 3) indicated an 8% lel reading quickly followed by an increase to above 50% lel which caused the unit to
esd and the halon extinguisher to discharge into the enclosure at the same time it was noted that k200 & k400 compressors dropped in speed and gas was heard to be venting up the ac vent stack.
Investigations revealed that the k300 fuel gas block valve (ces tag no 20 fic) had not closed which allowed fuel gas from th running units k200 & k400 to vent. The soleniod was found to be
sticking and once tapped the block valve closed and the fuel gas supply to k200 & k400 returned to normal pressure of 600 psig.
As part of the construction activity on the platform, a 2" valve on the condensate header system required to be removed. Prior to the valve removal work taking place the system had been nitrogen
foam inerted. After removing 6 bolts from the flanges by use of a burning torch, a gas check was initiated. Once this was completed satisfactorily the job recommenced to burn through the last
remaining bolts. During this process flames were seen to emanate from between the flange faces. The job was immediately stop ed with the fire quickly extinguished by using a combination of
fire hose and dry powder. No injury to personnel or damage to equipment ensued. Subsequent investigation concluded that a trapped pocket of gas was probably ignited in the process to release
he flanges. Hse were informed at 00:42 hrs.
Power gas was being restored to its normal operating pressure of 420-480 psi. The gasket on the door of the power gas reservoir failed. The failed gasket was detected by an operator who was
carrying out checks following reinstatement of gas on 23at. The g s detectors had not picked up the gas release because of the direction of the release, ie directly through the grating and off the
confines of the platform (6ft). There was also a following wind of 30 knots. The system was depressurised and the gasket rep aced. There were no persons working in the immediate vicinity. Hse
were informed following preliminary investigation.
Fuel gas system was pressured up with gas. A pressure sensor line from k200 fuel gas orifice plate parted at the parker fitting at the bulkhead between the cellar deck and main deck. Gas escaped
for 3 mins before being isolated by the operations staff. Al personnel were mustered by manually setting of the g.a. hse were informed.
K200 was being prepared for compression tests. Machine was pressurised and at the end of this sequence a start was initiated. The machine was ramped up to idle, during this process an operator
and an instrument technician did rounds to check that all equi ment was satisfactory. The gas leak from a 1/2" stainless steel fitting was discovered. It is estimated this lasted 10 mins. Before the
pipework was isolated. The gas detectors were live but did not pick up the escape, though this may have been due to the 30-35kn wind in the compression hall. Hse was informed. An investigation
team has been set up to review what happened.
At approximately 2300 hrs the platform esd'd. On blowdown some liquids which contained condensate were vented along with the gas landing on the accommodation platform. All people
mustered and were accounted for. Crews were sent out to wash down surfaces o aq with water. The hse were called at 0145 hrs following an investigation by the platform team. A full
investigation team from onshore will follow to prepare a full review of the incident and recommend preventative measures as appropriate.
Noise reported coming from contactor no 1 glycol/gas exchanger. On investigation it was found that gas was escaping from the lower area of the glycol/gas exchanger. Contactor no 1 isolated and
blown down. Noise reduced as pressure dropped, confirming location of leak.

It was noticed shortly after first manning this nnmi, that the teg pump 1a had failed permitting teg to spill into the sea. It was noticed at that time the packing flange studs had both sheared, this
permitting the pump pressure to push the packing out pe mitting a release of teg.
Whilst a painter was removing paint from a redundant 3'' vent line (still tied into main vent system) a trickle of liquid was observed from beneath the line. Work stopped on the line and the paint
supervisor was informed. He checked the liquid and thought it to be water. The incident was reported to the duty chief operator in the <...> control room who visited the site with the paint
supervisor. No liquid was running from the pipe, but the lower surface was wet with what appeared to be water. The paint supe visor's hot work permit was withdrawn and the oim was made
aware. In consultation between the duty chief operator and the oim it was decided to leave the <...> pressured up, primarily due to the wind direction of 210 deg @ 35 knots. This could cause
vented gas from <...> to pass across <...> or <...> plus lack of light to properly investigate the pipe and its redundant nature. It was considered safer to draw up plans for a controlled venting of
<...> and <...> with the necessary personnel to act as watch in the area of the 3'' pipe. During daylight hours of <...> the area of the leak was cleaned using hand tools. Corrosion failure of approx.
5% of the weld at a 90 deg elbow was found. Isolations were put in place and a controlled venting of <...> and <...> was undertaken
Immediately after pig launching operations were carried out on the <...> platform the normal process of isolating and then depressuring the 36''/30'' section of launcher pipework was in process of
being carried out. During this operation a slight smell of as was discovered emanating from a piece of pipework close to the launcher. No obvious pipe damage could be found and the vent
process continued until vessel totally depressured. The area of pipework was noted and a subsequent ndt survey later the same mo ning revealed a pinhole type penetration as the cause of the leak.
The vessel then being taken out of service until repairs could be undertaken.
At 10:00 hrs the turbine enclosure gas detection system alarmed with an 8% lel indication. The fuel gas system was immediately shut in and the cause investigated. The gas leak was found to be
coming from the covers of 2 psv's in the gas turbine enclosure. the covers were re-tightened and checked for leaks and found to be satisfactory.
During normal operations the operations staff could smell gas in the <...> turbine hall near to k101. Although no gas heads had picked up any signal the chief operator made a thorough
investigation of the area and found gas escaping from an instrument take off on the interstage discharge of compressor k101. The compressor was shutdown and vented. The whole plant was then
shutdown and k101 isolated and spaded off. Prior to this, the hse duty inspector was informed who allowed the site to be disturbed and repairsto progress. A suitable repair procedure was agreed
with the certifying authority.
During routine checks at 0320 hrs a smell of gas was detected by the duty operator who immediately returned to the control room informing the control room operator of the situation and
returning to the site with a portable gas detector. Starting at the ex t dampers of the gg enclosure for k104, ac main operating deck, enclosure gas detection system linked to the fire and gas system
was not in alarm. The gas leak was traced to a partly fractured weld on the fuel gas supply to the avon after the woodward gov rnor. The gas generator unit k104 was then taken off line and shut
down in a controlled manner and isolated for inspection.
Gas release occurred during normal platform operations. Px0102b pump was being primed after a 720 day planned maintenance routine. Whilst pressurising up the pump casing, the operator
noticed a leak from the dart union adjacent to the n.d.e cyclone sepe ator. He immediately closed the valves to the pump and started depressurising. Two low and one high gas detector, in close
proximity to the pump alarmed on the central f&g panel in the ccr. These reset quickly.
Mech fitter passed along the walkway between k104 oil cooler and exhaust stack and detected a smell of gas and heard a hissing noise. He moved to where the noise was coming from and found
that a union fitting on the <...> to <...> suction line pressure switch h d sheared and gas was escaping. He closed the adjacent valve and reported the leak to the operators in the ac control room.
Upon further investigation it was found that a parker a-lok pipe fitting attached to pipeline gp-4001-b (36") had fractured and she red into two parts across the thread. Atttached to the other side
of the pipe fitting was a sor-europe pressure switch. The atmospheric conditions were upon release 40 knot wind, heavy rain, cloudy, good light and very noisey due to compressor usage.
On the evening of <...>, operator <...> was carrying out routine rb211 gas turbine water washing operations with the assistance of technician/operator <...>. During the engine crank cycle <...> (as
control room operator) not d 10% gas detection on the gas detectors situated in the unit cab around the rb211. The crank wash cycle was immediately aborted. Individual gas levels dropped to
zero within 15 seconds. No personnel were in the immediate area of the gas leak and no other work was in progress in that work location at that time. The <...> control room operator was notified
and the oim <...>, maintenance foremen <...> and chief operator <...> advised of the incident. <...> notified the hse y telephone of the incident. Mechanical technician <...> investigated and
identified the source of the leak as the joint section on the starter motor exhaust to the associated vent pipework. As there was no defect of the mechanical components of the ssembly on
inspection of the joints and gaskets was carried out. Although there was no obvious defect with the joints and gaskets these components were replaced with new. The equipment was tested and
proven gas tight after which the unit was considered avalable for service.

Low level gas alarm received in main control room. Maximum indication of 10% lel on gd 517/1 inside solar no3 power generator cab. Investigation with portable meter confirmed 10% lel in
area of stainless steel (1/4") supplying ignition gas to ignitor of e gine. Unit given manual shutdown and fuel gas system isolated at manual block valves. Complex oim informed of occurence and
unit deemed unavailable until further investigation was allowed. Power generator set no3 is housed within a force ventilated cab wi h automatic shutdown system on gas detection - alarm at 10%
lel and shutdown at 50% lel. 1/4" stainless line found to have sheared - line to be sent for analysis to discover reason for shear.
At 22:12 hrs <...> solar generator shut down and simultaneously indicated a 30% gas presence within the cab. This was investigated by the process operator and instrument technician who
discovered a 1/4" control line sheared. This was isolated and all g s escape stopped. The unit was then left pending an internal investigation and formal notification to hse (out of office hours
number 23:00 hrs <...>). The line was replaced and all similar connections checked visually and with a gas detector. No other faults found.
During a routine operation to bunker diesel fuel from the supply vessel, a diesel leak occurred from a screw connection between two sections of flexible hose. An estimated 20 gallons of fuel was
discharged to the sea. Weather overcast with good visibility 13 knot wind gusting 27 @ 210 deg. Significant wave height 1.2 metres -period 4 secs.
The test separator had previously been isolated and depressured to allow modification of the outlet gas metering runs and repairs to be made to a defect discovered during an internal inspection.
The de-isolation of the vessel had been started but then st pped as the correct bolts were not available to complete the manway securing. The main gas inlet and outlets were still fitted with
spectacle blinds. The vessel was open to the h.p. vent system.psv 301 on the <...> production separator, lifted spuriously at 93 barg, set presssure is 129 barg. This caused a release of gas to the
h.p. vent system. This caused a back pressure in the vent system. This back pressure was less than 1.6 barg as an alarm at this setting did not activate. Gas then escaped from an o en drain
connection on the test separator.
During normal stop of k1602 compressor, which is powered by a <...> turbine, a fuel gas relief valve lifted and due to a split in the flexible vent connection, gas escaped into the enclosure.
Detectors inside the enclosure picked up the high level of gas and initiated an automatic shutdown and vent of the compressor. The forced ventilation in the enclosure quickly dispersed the gas to
atmosphere.
At 06:37 hrs on <...> 19% lel was detected on fire and gas panel from k1602 turbine enclosure. At 06:43 unit was shut down manually as lel had risen to 22%. On investigation it was found that
the flexible fuel gas line to burner had developed a leak.
At 0707 hrs on <...> the platform was called to muster station because of co-incident gas alarms in the extract ducting within area 2. The gas heads within the ducting showed 40% lel and 30% lel
before quickly declining to 5% and 6%1/2. At 0623 hours t e gas heads had declined to beneath 2% lel and at 0625 the platform stood down from muster stations. At no time during the incident
did any of the general area gas detection pick up any indication of gas within the area it was confined to the gas detectio within the ventilation extraction system. The investigation established that
a draining operation had been taking place within an adjacent area of the platform (area 4b) and the dissolved gas had migrated through the open drains system into area 2. Both xtract ducting are
within 10 feet of the open drain pots.
At 2023 hrs on <...> the platform was called to muster station because of co-incident gas alarms within area 5. The gas heads in the area initially read 20% before declining to beneath 10% at
2100. No leak was found. The system was re-pressurised a 2115. At 2200 the system was up to operating pressure. No leaks were found at 2225. The source of the leak was found to be the "tell
tale" on psv 320.2 on the 10 bar gas header system. Further investigation found the initial seals on the psv to be passing.
Small amount of lazy gas released from open flowline shutdown valve opened was located just below gas head. 2 gas heads reached 20% and 22% lel then immediately dropped to 3% and 9% lel
flowline had been flushed and vented for 4 days prior to incident.
All gas alarms activated in area 6a. Alarms subsequently activated in area 6a. Emergency response team determined leak to be from a flange on the hp injection header. Upon depressurisation
the flange appeared to re seat. An estimated 100m3 of gas was released. No injuries. No damage.
During routine water injection into well 9/13a ss32 it was reported that an increased amount of water was being pumped along the pipeline. It is suspected that the pipeline has developed a leak.
A pinhole leak was reported in a 2" weldolet branch line below the deck on the 6" water injection riser to the subsea injection manifold. The leakage was caused by corrosion/erosion in approx.
Top third of the weld in the redundant branch line which led to the pinhole leak
To enable sw1 to run during shutdown, a temporary hose was fitted to the deaerator vent and routed into module 5. When deaerator inlet valve was cracked open, blanket gas was displaced
through hose. Due to still weather conditions this was picked up by the gas heads. No damage resulted.

During a period of still atmospheric conditions fluctuating gas levels were detected on two gas detectors during increased flare loadings. Gas levels disappeared at low flare loadings. After
exhaustive searching, local corrosion was detected at a penetration of the low pressure flare line.
Background: the plant was already shutdown and depressured for essential work on lp flare relief line. Equipment and pipework were opened as part of preparations for the repair of the work. A
small amount of residual lazy gas discharged into module. Tw gas heads very closeto the work site activated the gpa and deluge. Gas heads reset within one minute(indicating a very small
release)
Installing additional instrument pipework. Present pipework had been isolated and vented off downstream sides of pipework. Pipework tested from primary isolation valve at the carrier to
isolation at transmitter for any pressure and pressure found on one side. Whilst tightening valve at the carrier a top section of valve parted causing a release of gas.
Escape of gas from floatation unit h401a,north west hatch cover causedb by back pressure from the llp flare syatem following loss of level control on first stage separator resulted in activation of
several gas detectors.an esd2 was manually activated from nab ccr. All personnel were called to muster as a precaution and the fireteam muster in breathing apparatus.modules p02 and p01 were
checked with portable gas detectors immediately following emergency stations alarm with negative results,the small gas release having dissipated rapidly. The fireteam remianed on standby until a
full muster was acheived and all personnel stood down.
Approx one barrel of hydrocarbons was released from a 5mm hole caused by severe metal corrosion on a section of the 10" oill outlet pipework from the oil test seperator. The quantity and
concentration of gas released was insufficient to activate the gas detector alarms. 00
Incident occurred while platform was unmanned. When platfrom was manned the next day the generator room floor was found awash with lube oil. An immediate clean up operation was
organised and an investigation as to the cause of the incident. During the oil clean-up a stainless steel pin was found close to the "a" gen skid, this pin had fallen out of the fuel lift pump rocker
arm rendering the pump incapable of maintaining fuel to the injector pump whilst allowing engine oil to leak out of the engine crank c se. Fitted a replacememt pump of a different type and
checked the same pump on the "b" gen engine.
During wellhead operations it became necessary to bunker a portable diesel air compressor on the main deck of the platform from a bulk tank (about 6 tons). The operation involved the use of a
3/4" id line. The platform was de-manned at 1740 hrs and re-man ed at 0755 the following morning. On arrival offshore a sheen was noticed on the sea and its source traced back to the bunkering
line to the compressor which had remained open over night. This resulted in about 5 tonnes diesel being spilled to the sea. Sea state 2m swell. Weather generally fair.
During normal running with no work ongoing or recently completed, a pool fire occurred in gt 3 turbine enclosure, sequence of events are as follows: itds in gt3 initiated red hazard status and
platform shutdown in accordance with cause and effect matrix ( ps). Power tech and sett were dispatched from ccr to investigate if alert was genuine, on approaching the turbine a pool fire was
noticed by the techs and extinguished using a hand held portable dry powder extinguisher. The ccr was informed.
During normal operations the returned oil tank (rot) collects oily water and drained gas condensate from the various operating processes, with liquid hydrocarbons pumped back into the separator
and flash off gas venting to the flare header. The ppd vessel which is currently not used, has an over flow line which also discharges into the rot vessel. This overflow line has a lute seal to prevent
vent gas in the rot from entering the ppd vessel. At approx 02:20 hours an operations tech discovered that gas was escaping from the ppd vessel vent line, which discharges over the side, to the
north of the <...> platform. Suspecting the lute seal from the rot tank may have a low liquid level, he attempted to re-establish the seal by filling with water via the tungdish. owever, before he
could effect a seal, sufficient gas was being vented from the vessel to initiate the gas detectors adjacent to the ppd tank. At 02.25 hours, two gas detectors initiated the fire and gas executive action
and shut down the process plant an wells. This automatically sounded the general alarm and the emergency response teams were mustered the general crew were not called to muster, since within
5 minutes of the alarms sounding the gas had dispersed and the situation under control. At 02.35 a Announcement was made that the situation was under control and all personnel to stand down.
Whilst carrying out a routine check around the test separator in module 231 upper the operator named in section 4 discovered a fine spray of liquid emanating from a pin hole in the recycle line
pipework. The operator contacted the control room and the te t separator was shutdown and depressurised. The test separator was flushed, purged and isolated.
During routine checks of the area, production operator discovered a leak from the diesel coalescer package. Investigation showed the leak was due to a ruptured sight glass. Approximately 0.5
tonnes of diesel spilled into the bund and onto the deck. There as no spillage to sea. The coalescer was isolated and drained.

A production and gas compression shutdown had occurred at 0500 on <...>. On the shutdown of gas compression c turbine automatically fuel changes from gas to diesel. At 08:20 on <...>
maintenance technician <...>was in the area (<...> celler eck 222) he heard and smelt gas. Upon investigation gas was found to be escaping from a small hole in the base of c turbine fuel gas
solenoid block valve. He informed the control room, the main monval fuel gas isolation v/vto c turbine was closed and the ine was depressured. The pressure in the system at the time of the gas
release was 3 bar approximately. No injuries or damage was sustained to personnel or equipment.
Small gland leak after start up which put gas head gs9408 into high alarm.
Two gas heads, 9432 and 9433 (located at the pump seals) went into high alarm causing controlled action shutdown of "c" export pump.
Two gas heads went into low alarm. On investigation it was found that the diesel supply hose had separated from the diesel inlet supply nozzle causing minor gas release.
4000 hr pmr completed on this unit less than 1000 hrs ago. Low gas detect alarmed but no gas could be found. On shutting down the unit very slight leak was detected using "snoop" at- 1. No.8
burner unit (union may not have been torqued up correctly) 2. anifold (fretting could have occurred in 1000hrs running period if bracket was not secure)
Gas was detected by the early warning aspirated detectors located on mol pump seals px0102b. The pump was in the standby mode. The source of gas was back-pressure in the closed drains
leaking through the secondary seal.
During plant start up the blowdown ring securing plug on psv 19030 un- screwed releasing crude.vapours were detected at high level by 1 gas detector and 2 at low.plant was immediately shutin.plant started once psv 19030 was isolated and standby psv broug t on line.
The platform was shutdown for a programme of work depressured. As a result of trapped pressure, gas was released to the module whena line was opened to remove an isolation. The release
occurred from a 3 12" flange on a 15m length of pipework. The volume f gas released was approx 4m3 with the potential for a localised event only.
After changing out the high speed shut off cock on 'b' power generator set, there was a slight leak of gas from one of the joints. This was detected by two gas heads at low level.
While running up the compressor after a shutdown the lp non-drive end barrel leaked gas, due to a seal failure. Compressor shut down and depressured. Leak detected by the platform fire and gas
system bringing into low alarm three gas detectors.
Gas injection compressor a.x. 0201 d. Small leak developed from 3rd stafe discharge pressure transmitter impulse line cap. Leak detected from blank fitted a t the end of drain blowdown line.
At 0205, 40 minutes after start up, a minor gland leak occurred at the 3rd stage recycle valve on ax0201c gas compressor. This gas leak was detected by g.9272 detector.
The central control operators were alerted to a problem in module 16 when a gas detector went into alarm condition. Investigation took place immediately and it was found that the gland follower
holding down nuts on the 'a' injection train third stage rec cle valve had worked loose thus allowing a gas leak from the gland. It is believed that the nuts worked loose due to vibration.
Following a level 5 shutdown and with no hvac, a minor leak from the upstream swagelok union to lp flare activated a gas alarm at "low" inside the 'b' injection compressor gas wing.
Injection compressor c had been isolated with no hvac in preparation for a two yearly maintenance routine. A minor gas leak build-up inside the enclosure activated two gas alarms at low level.
Gas detectos picked up low gas in module 16 gas injection. On investigation it was found to be coming from the hazardous open drains.
During start up after a production shutdwon the f & g system detected gas in the turbine enclosure ax5401c. The engine had previously been removed and there was no hvac on/in the enclosure
due to maintenance. On investigation the leak was traced to a joi t on the lp flare side of a psv. Psv downstream block valved was closed and leak stopped.
Plant was in full production handling approx 616 km3 p.hr of gas through the contactor. Leak was detected at/from the body of the cavity relief valve xxv 1940, by sound and smell. A platform
level 2 shutdown was initiated in order to effect repairs.
During re-commissioning of 'b' power generator gas leaks were detected by g.9907 and g.9908. These were traced to 0/v 6203 a/b, fuel gas p/sh 55oc and p.t. 6213/2 fuel gas p.t.
Whilst pressurising the metering stream after completion of pmr work on the pressure transmitter, the 'o' ring on the kidney flange inlet failed, causing minor gas release activating two gas
detectors (g9060 - g9061). On investigation it was concluded th t the 'o' ring was damaged during the original installation.

Upon pressurising the test separator presence of hl gas detected throughout l4, time 21.51. Platform to hazard status and all personnel to muster. Precautionary downman of installation
commenced. Module doors opened to clear gas after suspending gas x-ove blowdown due to concerns over size of flare. Downman of installation halted of reaching llg l4. Platform to alert status,
time 23.20. Upon clearing gas, platform to normal status, time 23.20.
On the night in question it was planned to despade v200 1st stage separator to allow train 1 to be recommissioned after installation of a replacement level transmitter. In order to effect the
necessary isolation to allow despading, it was necessary to cease gas backflow and depressurise the gas injection header shortly thereafter. In the days leading to the incident well services had
been carrying out wireline work on ba12. Work on the well was carried out under <...>. The well was correctly isolated from the process by double block and bleed using the fwv, the gas flowline
block valve and an 0.5" draine connection in u5w. Isolation was recorded on <...>. Well services informed operations that they wished to carry out a leak off test on ba 12 sssv. A de-isolation for
test (dft) no. 05424 was completed by well services to accompany request. The dft stated only that reconnection of fwv hydraulics would be required. The ssp discussed requirements with well
services & modified the [lan for the evening to depressurise above ba 12 sssv at the same time as depressurising the injection header. This plan was discussed individually with the control room
operator, who was also acting as nightshift permit coordinator, & the area technician. The hydraulics on ba12 were then reconnected in accordance with the dft certifivate. After lunch, gas
A single smokehead alarm from m2e was activated on the fire and gas panel in the production control room.two production techs investigated and reported that m2e module was full of
hydrocarbon mist. The platform psl's were still on normal green status. The production control operator took immediate action by; a) manually closing down and de-pressurising train2. B)
manually acivating the "red" hazard status. C) manually closing down and de-pressurising trains 1 and 3. D) manually closing down and de-pressuri ing the gas compression process m2e module
was freely ventilated to allow gas dispersal by opening both the east side doors. Non-essential personnel were downmanned to the <...>. When the gas had vented from the module and personnel
were allowed to enter, it was discovered that the cause of the leak was erosion damage to train 2, stage 2,1/2" stainless steel. This was caused by hydrocarbons containing sand content, flowing
through this line. Well on test for sand content was bd42.
Crude oil cooler (coc) e2630 had been islolated to strip down and clean coc plates. Upon completion of work, the cooler was de-isolated by the dayshift operations team. The nightshift
operations team were then required to de-isolate train 1 and the test separator, and bring train 1 back into production. Having successfully de-isolated train 1 and test separator, the test separator
(acting as 1st stage separator), and the 2nd, 3rd & 4th stages of train 1 were brought on-line by opening up a well (bd16)to the test separator. The well was only "cracked open" in order to
introduce some gas pressure into the separators and push through a volume of water which was in the 2nd stage separator after flushing operations, as part of the initial isolation. At this point the
2nd stage separator was 60% full of water and all separator stages were at zero pressure. The test separator was allowed to pressurise to 1st stage pressure (94 bar). The water in the 2nd stage was
pushed through to the 3rd stage and the pressure in each stage allowed to build up. At the point of the incident, the vessel pressures were 94 bar, 7 bar, 0.8 bar & 0 bar respectively. A low level gas
(llg) indication came up on the fire & gas panel in the control room, indicating llg at m1w roof cocs. ( no change to platform status, single gas head only). The ssp instructed the oil tech to closeDuring lean oil system shutdown, the pas boot bypass valves were required to be operated to reduce the condensate level in the vessel. Drain valve p/5/37 failed due to excessive internal erosion
as a result of the pressure drop created across the valve wh n draining the vessel. The erosion of the valve body has probably occured over a period of many years. The first indicatin of the valve
failure was when the platform went to alert status (low level gas indicated in u4ee), whereupon 2 technicians were dis atched to u4ee to endeavour to ascertain the cause. The technicians
discovered the leak was in the pas boot area in u4e and reported the information to the process control room. The platform alert status changed to hazard status on high level gas detecti n after a
period of 5 minutes. The techniciams went directly from u4e to gas comp control room where initiated "gas comp blowdown and isolate", followed by "gas comp dlowdown open". As a result of
more that 1 gas head initiating hazard status, the platfo m then went automatically into surface process shutdown (sps) mode. Entry into modules u4e and u4ee was then prohibited until blowdown
was complete and the gas dispersed. The failed valve has been removed for investigation, and has been replaced.
In order to unload sand from <...> this well was being flowed via a temporary chicksan flowline and choke manifold, located in m3w, to the test separator in d2c. A hazop had been conducted for
this arrangement and monitoring points for erosion established. In terms of the choke manifold and chicksn installed between the xmas tree and the test separator manifold this functioned as
expected with eroision being confined to those areas. The platform monitored pipework (bends and welds) up and down stream of he test separator suffered no detectable material loss which was
also expected to be the case. Installed in the failed straight section spool piece is a 'flow straightener', debris was found on the upstream side which is thought to have caused a localise change of
direction and velocity of the highly erosive fluid into the pipewall resulting in erosion to the point of a small hole appearing in the pipework. This aallowed the oil/gas under pressure to be
released into d2c and the migrate through and open door (a hose had been run into the module through the door)into d2w. Note: this 'flow straightener' is not identified on our drawings or those
onshore used for the hazop.

A mechanical technician carrying out micro-log vibratrion monitoring on pump p.9413, noticed drops of oil falling down around work area, upon checking, he suspected a leak from the lean oil
pump discharge header pipework around the 1" stub piece. At the initial stage, the leak was only a slight drip. The technician immediately contacted the gas technicians and reported the leak.
All three made their way to u4e, and when they reached the site, the leak had intensified to a constant stream of oil being sp ayed out under pressure. One of the gas technicians shutdown the lean
oil system in a controlled manner, whilst the other contacted the process control rollm by telephone. One gas head directly above the leak (gd-323) did not respond to the leak as it b came grossly
contaminated by oil as the leak developed - no other gas heads came into alarm and there was no change in platform status. The failure was investigated by the ssm who reported a crack around
the weld of a 1" stub piece on the discharge header downstream of the stub piece hand valve. An isolation was them instigated until such time as repairs to the lean system could be effected.
Whilst investigating water injection well <...> annulus the annulus was lined up to the cement pump unit to enable fluid pumped and returned to be recorded. The operator observed a pressure at
the pump unit and thinking it was water pressure opened two valves resulting in hydrocarbons being released via a vent line into the module. On observing the hydrocarbon release the operator
immediately shut the isolation valves. The platform was brought to hazard status by the automatic activation of the gas detection system.
Whilst preparing all the platform processes for annual s/d work an 8mm hole was discovered/created on the gas injection header blowdown pipe- work in u4ee. The loss of hydrocarbon
containment which resulted in a llg alert (yellow) occurred during manua de-pressurisation of <...> above the sssv via the injection header blowdown valve. The leak was discovered almost
immediately and the area technician closed the blowdown valve which reduced the leak to a small backfeed of gas from the platform flare syst m. All processes were s/d at this time, however depressurisation was ongoing in various areas. The hole is situated on the first 90 deg bend on the blowdown line and 100 v 470. It is approx. 250mm downstream of cv9324. The hole is attributed
to sand erosion.
A hydrocarbon gas release occured in the north east corner of the u4ee while swinging a spectacle blind form the closed to the open position during gas compression reinstatement following
shutdown. There is nothing else invovled in the task of any significance. The spec blind concerned was isolating the gas injection manifold blowdown tailpipe form the high pressure relief header
(flare system). Isolation were in place and were double block and bleed with the o exception of the flare header entry valve 011/07 which was a single block valve. It was not possible to leake test
this valve using an established bleed point as non esists between the non-return valve and the block valve. In order to comply with operating standard 1.026 the procedure adopted, in
consideration of the low pressure invloved (2.5 inches water gauge),m was to crack the spec blind flange and confirm asatisfactory isolation prior to the opening the flange fully.. This allowed the
option to re-tighten the flange if the isolation was not confirmed. The possiblity of joint failure during opening was precluded by the low system pressure. The flange of the spc blind was cracked
open and the isolation confirmed to be good. On testing the crowcon triple meter. No gas was detected. The spec blind was removed for turning and a further gas check carried out with negative
At 0335hours the gas injection compressor tripped causing all train first stage pressures to rise at approx. 132 bar. Whilst the gas technicians were investigating this platform status change to
"yellow" at 0342hrs followed by "red" status at 0344hrs. T e activated an automatic s.p.s. confirmation was recieved from the technicians that there was a gas relaese from the pre-absorber
seperator v9060. All oil and gas process systems were shutdown and blown down as required. The hydrocarbon gas release was c ntained in modules:u4e lower and u4ee. The areas were
ventilated by natural, controlled dispersion.
While preparing meter stream for maint (depressuring). It was noted that one of the pressure gauges from the isolation valve cavity was still indicating 120 bar, the gauge was isolated and the gas
heads in fire area 32a inhibited to depressure the gauge when the gauge was depressured the gas released was sucked into a turbulator fan containing two gas heads, both heads went into high
alarm and a yellow shutdown was initiated automatic. The gas head in the turbulator fan were on a different fire area f om the main area 32a. If they had been inhibited no shutdown would have
occurred.
Condensate leak at mokveld control valve. Leak was found by <...> of <...> on an initial walk around the platform for mechanical survey. The leak found was at <...> valve, condensate was seen
to be dripping from the lagging box round the valve. L.c.v. 0221 (condensate from test separator). A1 well was shut in and condensate line isolated. The test separator was then vented. On
removal of lagging the leak was found on the valve body relief valve.
On arrival on the platform for an intervention visit the platform which was in a level 1 esd condition. Two people carried out a safety inspection and found that the generator room was flooded
with diesel. The visit was aborted until daylight due to safe y reasons. On return to the platform an investigation was fully carried out to find the source of the diesel fuel leakage and it was found
to have come from the glass bowl on the primary pump sediment trap on generator no.1. The engine had shutdown probab y due to air in the fuel system as well as generators no.2 and no.3. The
platform shutdown on esd level 1 which closed diesel esd valve, but the fuel continued to spill into the generator room due to the bypass valve not being fully closed. The generator oom was
bailed out then washed out with jizer bio to dilute as much fuel as possible to stop it vaporising.

During diesel bunkering operations the high level audible alarm failed leading to an overflow of the diesel tank. This overflow flowed via the closed drain system to the closed drain holding tank.
This tank apparently already full, overflowed into the sea causing the diesel and heavier oils already contained within the holding tank to form a slick. Because of the small outlet on this overflow,
this leak carried on to some extent for the period of approx 90 mins.
Low level coincidence gas detection during unit start up. Safety systems operated, unit and platform shut down and depressurised, all personnel mustered. Leak traced to small bore tubing left
disconnected after maintenance.
During start up of gas lift on well <...> a small gas leak was observed emitting from the 1" flange ring joint on the gas lift flowline corrosion inhibitor quill. (the start foloowed normal
procedures). The flowline was isolated and depressurised. Inspec ion of the flange did not reveal any faults with the ring joint or flange faces. However, the technician indicated that although no
loose bolting was found, he could tighten the nuts by another 1/2 - 2/3 turns.
Pinhole leak on weld of slot 18 connection to hp manifold was first noticed by noise of escaping gas and oil which vapourised into the air. The cause of the leak was due to errosion/corrosion in
the stub off the manifold.
Inspection of the gas metering oriface plate on gas stream 2 was taking place. Removal of the oriface plate had commenced when a gas release occurred, due to the isolated section of line
containing the oriface plate, still containing some pressure. Isolat on procedures to allow removal of the oriface plate had not been complied with. The performing authority also failed to comply
with permit conditions and had started to remove the oriface plate without the operations senior technician being on site. A ris assessment had been done during <...>, which had been superceded
by a procedure developed in <...>. The metering skid is in a well ventilated module which is partially open to the elements. This incident was not notified to platform management until 2 days
later
<...> fuel gas system was isolated to allow inspection of a fuel gas regulator the system specialist who had been assigned to the task of investigation into the fault began by removing the regualtors
top cover after two bolts had been taken out, a release o hydrocarbon gas occurred above the lowest action point. Leading to the activation of the platform gpa. No damage to plant or equipment
occurred, and there was no injury to persons caused on investigate of the fuel gas system a vent valve from the regulat r was found to have failed to operate. This failure resulted in gas pressure
being trapped in a 1/2 " stainless steel line approximately 1 metre long.
The compressor was de-isolated 4 days prior to the incident in readiness for n2 pressure testing. At this time all locks and chains were removed from the machine, no valves were moved. After the
testing was complete the compressor was prepared for service but the starter turbine exhaust to vent valve was left closed. When the gas was fed to the starter the exhaust line over pressured,
causing the securing clamp to fail. Gas was released into the enclosure and all six gas detectors alarmed and registered 1 0%. This activated an immediated train s/d and general platform alarm.
We are unclear as to whether the enclosure door blew open or was left open, but this caused gas detection within the compressor house and at the fin fan level above(all raised 20% alar s). After 9
minutes the platform muster headcount was correct and gas detection levels had reduced to below 20% level. All emergency systems functioned correctly. Wind ne 8-10 knots.
Commissioning the <...> injection to the gas metering and separator inlet for bringing the jupiter system on line. A leak was seen in the <...> module and reported to operations. The methanol
system was shutdown and depressured. On inspection the fitting was found to be only finger tight. Atmospheric conditions wind 300 degrees 20-25 knots - light good. - wave height 4 metres
noise low. - air temperature 10.5c.
At 17:00 hrs a smell of gas in the location of hcv 9850/b was identified as a leak from a steam seal on the valve.this leak was stopped by depre- ssurising the downstream pipework from the valve
to carry out an effect- ive repair on the stem xcv7356 was c osed and hcv 9805/b was to be open- ed,thereby depressurising the section of the line 16" g1738 - 9106v. While opening hcv9850/b
there was a release of hydrocarbon gas from the lower body joint of the valve.
Hot work was ongoing in um4ww which is now a construction area. After lighting the propane torch, the work party noticed a brief flame in the adjacent drain. The drain was well covered with
fire blanket and the flame self-extingusihed after a second. Th drain covers where not disturbed and there was no other visible of ignition. The hot work was stopped and the drains flushed with
water. Following a detailed examination, it was found that the open non-hazardous drains in um4ww were connected by a line ot shown on the platform p&ids to the open hazardous drains in
um4ww.
Plate heat exchanger had been subject to lomited leakage. Leakage rapidly deteriorated until decision was taken to shut down the skid for investigation and dismantling of exchanger.

Instrument line provides pressure differential indication across a filter on the produced water outlet from the production 3-phase separator. Instrument line parted from pipe fitting on pdi gauge
manifold. Leak was heard and reported to <...> control room rom which a platform alarm and muster was initiated. Incident management team convened, isolated the drilling platform and blew
down the platform inventory. Guage and instrument line has been isolated and capped to allow guage, fittings and pipework to be removed for further onshore investigation.
During routine blowdown of train 1 compressor pipework a gas leak was reported which emanated from a spectacle blind flange on the upstream side of isolation valve v562135 on the blowdown
line <...>. The gas release was terminated within a few inutes by stopping the blowdown. The back pressure in the system would have been of the order 5 barg maximum. M5 is an open module
with good natural ventilation. No gas detection registered on the fixed monitoring equipment.
On initiation of a full topsides blowdown, a gas leak was observed to be emanating from the vicinity of gas dehydration tower a. The blowdown was aborted within one minute and the leak
stopped. The leak was subsequently traced to an instrument line on the tower blowdown outlet pressure control valve (pv-62119-2) control cabinet. The line had not been reconnected following
planned maintenance.
During a platform topsides blowdown, the hose was subjected to normal hp vent back pressure, the compression train being shutdown at the time. A gas leak occurred from the joint filling the
turbine enclosure. Gas detection alarmed in the control room and the blowdown was aborted. The exhaust has been isolated pending investigation of the joint/gasket.
The subsea umbilical termination unit (<...>) is adjacent to ellon wells <...> and <...>, 43m and 28m apart respectively. During inspection of <...> no. Methonal lines identified as leaking
methanol and gas. Methonal also identified as leaking from interst ces of umbilical at bulkhead termination for armouring. Leaks reported as minor.
04:22 red hazard status - m4w fire 04:27 fire confirmed in m4w by operations personnel. The on-load generating set g4400 developed a lub oil leak on the line to the <...> lub oil was ignited,
either by the hot p2 air line which runs directly below the lub il line or the hot exhaust transition pieces above and slightly west of the leak. The effect was to cause a lub oild system pressure fed
fire, which ignited the engine sump below the avon gas generator skid. The platform was brought to red hazard status w th fire indication in m4w and shutdown both avon generator sets and
process. Operations area technicians confirmed there was a fire and attemped to extinguish the fire using local fire fighting equipment but had to withdraw due to the acrid smoke coming rom
the oil fire and the electric cabling that was affected by the heat generated from the sump fire and direct flame impingement. The support team and response teams tackled the fire using portable
fire fighting extingushers (c02 and dry powder) and a fo m branch from a local fixed foam unit. The fire was extinguished and the area cooled/monitored to ensure no re- ignition occurred. The
resultant damage was local. Electric cabling in the immediate area and the engine sump. There was also localised damage to the structural coating.
Hydrocarbons leaking from joint 1 gas detector activated at its lowest level. Pipework isolated and depressurised.
During a perforating programme on well e4 power failure caused loss of air to the grease pumps maintaining a seal on the lubricator grease head, resulting in gas passing through seals activating
two low alarm gas heads.
High seastate conditions caused back pressure variations from the sea sump to drain vessel (t71). Backpressure changes to the platform drain system resulted in the loss of the water seal in a drain
loop. The loss of water from the drain loop seal allowed minor volume of gas from the 80 millibar purge gas system to be evolved. Gas head 5238 registered high lel gas and executed an
automatic yellow production shutdown. No ignition took place and the gas evolved was quickly dissipated. The loop seal was imme iately topped up with water to regain water seal integrity the
production plant was reset and production recommenced.
The ngl plant was shutdown and depressured, preparatory work for p98 despading was then carried out. A hp hose was being used to depressure and drain parts of the system. The hose was being
moved from one location to another. On disconnection the hose end was plugged and then unplugged on reaching the new location. When the hose was unplugged a minute amount of condensate
dripped from the hose end. This activted a high gas alarm and resulted in a production shutdown.
Diesel fuelling hose had been put into the void space between the ngl plant and moving pipe deck and not isolated. Nozzle broke free from the hose and the diesel flowed from the open end. The
hose has not been isolated following the previous fuelling op ration.
Whilst pressure testing the 2" discharge hose from dowell unit to 3000psi prior to a cement job, the hose ruptured resulting in the contents ( biozan spacer ) approx 1/10 barrel discharging over
the area. A roustabout in the area received minor splashes o material to the eyes but after washing and examination by the medic returned to work.

An automatic yellow shutdown occurred when high gas level was detected briefly by detector g5238 at the east end of vo2. The source of gas is believed to have originated from the adjacent
tundish drain to t71. This tundish drain had been topped up at the tart of the dayshift. The gas detection / yellow shutdown occured about 20 minutes after t71 had been routinely pumped out. T71
had received cold fluids ex helideck just prior to t71 being pumped out.
Prodeuction seperator v01 was taken offline and was being drained to close drain v45. Gas detectors g118 and g119 indicated low gas in the v45 module. On investigation a small leak was found
in a 2" drain line immediately outside v45 module leading from v 1. V01 draining was stopped and leakage abated. A temporary clamp was fitted to the 8mm diameter hole to prevent further
leakage and allow for controlled shutdown of the plant and isolation for repair.
Ccr reported low gas in v45 area (gas head g119) first indications the gas detected was coming from p119 leaking seal. Pump was isolated, gas reading in ccr continued up to 30 lel. Further
checks in the area were carried out and a hole was found in an el ow on the 2" drain line to v45 leaking gas. A temporary patch and sealant were fitted.
Following an 18 day shutdown to carry out major planned maintenance, the oil plant was being brought back on line. 12 minutes after commencing export, the platform shutdown due to gas
detection. Checks were carried out and local tundish loop seals topped p then the plant was restarted under controlled conditions. Gas was again detected and the platform shutdown. The release
was from open drain valves on the test separator pump.
Informed by <...> that diesel bunkers would be taken in the early hours. At 02:10 the <...> arrived. On checking the diesel log book the s/e leg had 433 tons in and we were to recieve 252 tons
from the <...>. The bunkers system was pumped out prior o starting. Bunkers started at approximately 02:40. At approx 04:10 an interface was reached. The captain of the <...> was called to stop
bunkers, on a marine band radio. The time between stopping the bunkers pump on the <...> and the flow to stop resulted in an amount of diesel overflowing into the sea sump. The <...> had given
us 122 tons. The s/e leg holds 750 tons. The log was not correct resulting in a discharge to the sea sump.
Normal operating conditions. Operator on patrol of area noticed leak from under lagging on 2" water offtake from v16 gas separator to v01/v02 leaked onto deck. Had only just occured as
quantity of liquid on deck was minimal. Leak isolated immediately and vessel depressurised to affect repair.
The loop seals are topped up on a regular basis, this was a hot day, and evaporation of this seal occured causing vapour from t71 to escape back into pkg 5, where an adjacent gas head detected it,
and a yellow shutdown followed. Diesel bunkering was in pr gress at the same time. This may have had an effect on t71, but further investigations on a similar nature failed to replay the event. We
will do this again with millibar gauge on t71. Closed drain vessel.
The ngl plant had tripped and shutdown following selected well shut down in the oil plant. The plant had been re-started with compressor ko2 on diesel fuel. After approx. 2 hours the ccr reported
an oil mist alarm to ngl control. On investigation, the tec nician smelled diesel and noticed a leak/spray in the turbine hood. The machine was immediately shut down manually. The leak stopped
and further isolation was made outside the hood. The fire team attended. After a period to allow the machine to cool, the doors were opened, the engine checked and the spillage cleaned up.
Subsequently a hairline crack was found in the bourbon tube of the diesel burner pressure gauge.
Failure of swagelock adaptor on the suction/pressure gauge of p99 condensate pump. Resulting in the release of condensate into the atmosphere.
Operations techs noticed main oil line pump po4 turbine exhaust smoking at the bellows section. Po4 shutdown, lagging dampened down. When removing some lagging it ignited and burned for
some 15 seconds before being extinguished. The central control room ( cr) was notified of the flare at 2154 and sounded the general alarm. Within the minute the ccr was informed that the fire
was out and the situation made safe. The pob muster continued and established correct @ 2202 personnel were stood down at 2206. On in estigation it was found that a small quantity of lube oil
had dripped onto the lagging from the ngl compressor turbine air inlet ducts drains which had inadvertently been left open.
The drill crew circulating through the standpipe manifold in order to jet the wellhead and bop clear of cement debris prior to pressure testing the bop. During this initial phase a section of chiksan
line complete with a lo-torque valve was blown from its connection on the drain line of the standpipe manifold. A quantity of mud was expelled over the rig floor and drilling equipment. The
pressure at the time of failure was approx 2900 psi. Investigations revealed that a 2" hammer lock 1502 fitting on the ch cksan had been incorrectly fitted to a 2" male 1002 fitting on the standpipe
drain. A 1502 2"thread is a very slack fit on a 1002 2" weco thread.

Work on production seperator vo1 was planned in order to prepare for forthcoming maintenance and modification work. The seperator had previously been removed from production service and
was isolated by valves. The scope of work included draining the vesse of hydrocarbons, water flushing and purging. This was to lead onto a full isolation by the application of blanks. The work
had previously been the subject of a risk assessment and was subject to procedural control. During the latter part of the shift a p rmit was obtained for blanking off the gas outlet. At about 1655
hrs low gas alarms were received in a central control room. These were followed shortly afterwords by a high gas alarm which initiated a full production shutdown. In accordance with standing
instructions from the control roomtechnician operated the general alarm and put all personnel to emergency muster stations. The site was checked by the operations supervisor, the fso and the
duty fire team leader. The site was declared safe. Production remained shutdown for a further eleven hours. An investigation team was appointed by the platform oim.
An instrument technician was dispatched to the ngl area to investigate a fault on p98 condensate pump. A differential pressure switch was being inspected by the technician. The switch was
isolated and a bleed plug was removed. A small volume of condensate drained from the dp switch. An i/r point beam gas detector is located directly below the switch. The release initiated a high
gas alarm (a low gas alarm was also recorded on an adjacent detector). The production shutdown on this f&g action. The general al rm was sounded and fd emergency procedures were initiated.
The site was checked by the operations supervisor with fso and duty fire team leader in attendance. The gas quickly dissipated and the site was declared safe. An investigation team was appointed
b the oim.
The platform was shutdown but had not been reset for start up pending final inspections and notifications of incident in ngl earlier in morning. The downhole safety valve control lines were
therefore not pressurised. The control line pressure dissipated t rough time allowing hydrocarbons to migrate up the line from a production string into the return storage tank of the hpu. Gas began
venting from a gas vent line just below level 1. Two gas heads are located either side of this vent. One high gas alarm was recorded at 0700 hrs. The second high gas alarm came in at 0704hrs.
With the platform already in shutdown status, the central control room technician activated the general alarm. All personnel went to muster stations and fd emergency procedures were initi ted.
The site was checked by the operations supervisor with fso and duty fire team in attendance. The control lines were isolated in the eggboxes at the oliver panel. The gas quickly dissipated and the
site was declared safe. An investigation team was appointed by the oim.
The report of oil leaking was given to the mol control room staff by a construction crew member. An operations technician checked the report and found oil weeping from a tapping point on the
daniel irifice box the operations supervisor and oim were infor ed. The decision was made to shutdown the plant to allow further investigation. A yellow shutdown was initiated. The line was
then isolated and flushed. Investigation revealed a crack in an a6 screwed nipple at a 1/2" tapping point on the daniel orific box. The crack is suspected to have been caused by experiencing a
force and then enlarged through time by corrosion. Further force may have contributed to the failure.
A pinhole leak in a sample point 2" weldneck flange on oil export pipework on pl 10009 was discovered by operations technician. The process was shutdown and pipe isolated,drained and flushed
with service water followed by nitrogen.
Worker reported a leak from ga 02 to the control room, on, investigation condensate was spraying out of a fine crack in a weld on the tapping point . The area was cleared and the condensate
injection changed over to ga 07. Ga 02 flowline was depressurised isolated and removed for shore repair.
Gas export had tripped due to high level in compressor suction scrubber. A report was received in the control room of a gas leak in c5. On investigation the leak was observed to be form a
corrosion probe installation on the gas export line. We were not xporting and the line pressure was 118bar. Gas export esd valve closed, line depressurised. Provbe tightened half a turn. Pressure
containment cap installed. Line service reinstatement pressure tested.
Whilst calibration work on pza 2063 hh was ongoing, an isolation applied in order to facilitate maintenance to the instrument failed, resulting in a gas release of some 2std, m3 which was detected
by the fixed fire and gas detection system surface, proces shutdown then automatically occurred and the leak was isolated.
Gas leak from aluminium plate fin cooler on 2/3 stage of flash gas compressor. Gas detector into low level alarm. Operator checking area noted leak from cooler e2030 fire protection enclosure.
Manual shut- down of flash gas compressor initiated. Cooler isolated and depressurised.
During nitrogen purging operations of v1210 (d 1st stage separator), an instrument plug was removed from a level, instrument bridle on the depressurised vessel causing a minor gas release. Due
to proximity of fixed gas detectors and calam weather condit ons, the platform was raised to alert then hazards status with sps and blowdown. Gas quickly dispersed naturally. On release of the
gas, the nowsco technician left the scene to report the situation to a shell techniciean, who replaced the plug but due to the prevailing conditions, the rlease was detected and executive action
initiated. The vessel was fully depressurised and was being prepared for nitrogen purging at the time of the incident.

When the alarm activated the area operator investigated but could not detect any leak. He continued to search with the aid of a portable gas detector and traced the leak to a gas heater element.
Gas was escaping past one of the element sealing arrangement which is compression fitting. The system was manually shut down and depressurised it requires two 60% alarm for an alarm for an
automatic shutdown. Normal operating pressure is 1850 psi. Gse 1182 is approx 7ft from the leak.
Gas compressor kt-02 was being re-started after having been taken off-line to carry out an engine wash. At 28% gas producer speed the engine ignition system was activated. At that moment a
loud bang was heard and the compressor skid enclosure doors blew o en. The engine start sequence aborted and the machine shut down automatically. On investigation the exhaust collector in the
enclosure had broken a weld on it's hotizontal plane, leaving an opening of 30" across and a gap of 1". There was no sign of any o her damage to the exhaust or surrounding area. The cause would
appear to be excessive fuel gas delivered to the combuster.
A pin hole defect was detected during a routine general inspection. The weep was initially very small and did not start to leak any significant amount until the paint/surface of the pipe was
disturbed by rubbing. The plant was manually shut down and depre surised.
While filling piping in fiscal metering package venting noise altered personnel to leak. Leak occured at a drain valve which had a blind flange partially loose in outlet; valve was in open position
w locking pin in place. A small amount of oil approx 2 ga , escaped before valve could be closed valve was inaccessible being underneath metering skid. Spill was washed to open drain system
and contained.
Whilst conducting a rov survey of the subsea connection a minor gas leak was discovered on a recently installed 24" flange connecting the 20" gas export line to the <...> pipeline at <...>. This
flange connection had passed the required leak test (1.1 x mao ) after installation. (the pipeline tee is <...> km from the platform).
Failure of instrument of pipe fitting on gas metering skid resulting in gas release.
During routine start-up of bk 070 compression unit, gas was detected in the turbine module after gas starter initiated. The start sequence was aborted. Investigation found that 1/4" tubing to a
gauge fitted to show the starter gas pressure had sheared at a reducing fitting due to the unsupported weight of the gauge
A night shift technician <...> smelt condensate/gas in phase 1 knock out pot room on leman bk. He investigated but failed to find the source. This information was passed to the day shift who
further investigated. At 0900 hrs a crack was found in the 90 degrees elbow attached to nozzle "j" of the boot section of vessel bk-v-100. The gas leak rate was very small and too low to quantify.
A portable gas detector placed on the crack measured 6% l.e.l. n.b. the elbow is situated in free space under the module floor. Thus the crack was in the open air outside the module.
<...> terminal reported a low level gas alarm on <...>, a not normally manned installation, during mid afternoon on <...>. An intervention team of 5 men arrived by helicopter at 17:41. Gas was
discovered leaking from a sheared nipple connecting w345 ellhead to its associated pressure indicator/transmitter. The top and bottom master gate valves were shut manually and the pressure
remaining in the wellhead vented to atmosphere via the kill system - this reduced the leak to a very low level. Due to the navailability of materials to effect a permanent repair, the source of the
leak was plugged, the sssv shut and isolated and the well withdrawn from service pending permanent repair at the next planned visit on <...>.
The hydrocarbon release was from t3 wing valve bonnet cavity check valve. Five gas heads detected the release instantaneously, one at 25% lel and the other four at 20% lel. At the time of the
incident the plant was being brought back on production after process shut down (prx). The plant was shut down manually via a prx button on the cellar deck by the chief operator on his way to
the scene to investigate. The leak ceased immediately on shutdown. No damage or injuries were sustained. The weather was wa m, sea calm with negligable wind. The duration of the leak was
approx 2 mins.
The gas leak was spotted by inspection engineer while carrying out module inspection. No alarms had been given, detectors not giving any reading. Leak was traced to a ring type joint. The
section of plant (export gas compressor) was immediately shutdown.
Escape of hydrocarbon gas from flange y 2501, plate separator, during routine draining of vessel. This was picked up by one gas head (gd 9100) in mod 5 mezz. Flanges on top of y2501 were
secured with 2 bolts, (8 bolt flange), this had been done due to the frequency of requiring to adjust oil collar weirs. (approx) once per shift. The situation was exacerbated by prod. H2o from the
test separator on manual control without correct level indication.

An oil leak was seen at the base of train 2 low pressure outlet valve production technician was called on arrival he witnessed the plug fall blowing out releasing more oil and gas. He initiated a
yellow shutdown locally and radiod the control room requesting that the fire team attend a foam blanket was laid down. Plug was found to be badly corroded, with virtually no thread remaining.
Watch-keeping duties revealed a pinhole leak at the base of weld connecting the 1" chemical injection line to the flowline <...>. Salt had previously crystallised concealing the defect, and when
rubbed off a small amount of oil/gas was emitted, the flow was stopped with a rag pad, until the well was shut in and the flowline depressured, in a matter of a few minutes.
During removal of cladding for pipe inspection, employee heard a hissing sound when he removed an eigth" self tapping screw from the cladding. He replaced the screw immediately and
informed the production department. On investigation the screw was found to have penetrated a 1" closed drain line. The cladding on this pipework has never been removed since being
commissioned in <...>.
New well b2 has just been brought on line at 07:25hrs. It was gas lifted between 08:55 and 11:30 to assist the well to flow. At the time of the incident preparations were being made to shut in the
well and rig up for a perforating rum. During this oper tion, personnel in the area were alerted tot he release of gas by the noise it created. They immediately traced and isolated the leak.
Investigation revealed that a 1/2" nominal bore instrument tube swaged fitting had failed on b2 well
Production plant being restarted following an earlier unrelated shutdown gas detected in m3 upper mezzanine level by fixed f&g equipment. Plant automatically shutdown and de-pressurised as
designed. Platform general alarm initiated from general control ro m. Personnel mustered - all accounted for. Sourse of leak found to be failure of top joint gasket of pcv 5137.
Gas escape from leaking hatch cover seal on v1200. One gas head activated 60% gas alarm. Two other gas heads activated 20% local alarm in control room but did not exceed 25% lel. Gas
dispersed almost immediately. Escape due to slugging action of water level control valves on main and test separators. No ignition. No injuries.
The <...> production train (train 2) had been closed down and isolated all day for remedial work on the water and oil level control valves. During re-start of production on train 2, after operating
pressures and levels had been achieved, the manual bl ck valve on the 1st stage separator water leg was open - allowing produced water to move forward to the flotation cell. Approx 2 minutes
after starting to operate the block valve, the production operator became aware of a problem in the area of the flota ion cell, and informed the ccr via the radio, whilst closing in the block valve shortly after reporting to the ccr, the 60% gas alarm sounded automatically.
At 16:20 hrs on <...>, during the day to day activities of personnel on the cats riser, a slight sound of leaking gas was detected, on investigation a slight leak was discovered from the north side of
the check valve adjacent to the lower two plugs, he plugs being the sealing plugs of the check valve spindle ends. (the leak was detectable by ear due to the riser`s low noise when operation os
stable). The individual immediately contacted the pcr via phone. The duty chief opertator contacted the oim and the production foreman. It was observed to be a leak adjacent to the bottom of
the two plugs on the valve north face due to paint etc. Determining the cause - either the casting fault or the plug thread couldn`t be agreed to. Immediately the decision as made to shutdown and
depressure the cats riser. At the time the weather conditions were dry, sunny, wind 20/25 knots @ 182o.
At approximately 21:45 hrs on the <...> a gas release was detected by a 20% gas alarm (single head) at the channel end cover of exchanger e106b located in module 5 cellar deck. As a result of
this alarm steps were taken to immediately shut down and depressurise this train (train 1) to allow investigations and appropriate maintenance work to proceed. Subsequent investigations
highlighted that the channel end cover gasket was damaged around the 9 o`clock position. The gasket was replaced with a new one drawn from stores and the vessel reassembled after ensuring
that all mating surfaces were clean and free from debris. `hitorc` stud torquing procedures and equipment was utilised duriing therebuilding of the unit. Upon reassembly, the vessel was
pressure/leak tested using nitrogen in stages up to a final test pressure of 60 bar. Snoop leak detection fluid was used at each stage to assist with the monitoring of any possible leaks. <...> on
completion of all other associated maintenance tasks, the vessel was handed back to productiondepartment who then commenced with the recommissioning of the equipment. During the
recommissioing phase, the gas pressure was gradually increase and suitable leak detection monitoring equipment was employed to monitor for any possible leaks. The equipment reached its
Routine preventative maintenance was scheduled for m400a turbine, this included inspection of the fuel gas filter inside the enclosure. Process and electrical isolations were applied during the
nightshift of <...>. The permit was issued and accepte by the performing authority at 0640 hrs <...>. At approx 0730 hrs he noted a small pressure reading on the filter pressure gauge and began
to open the vent valve to prove the system safe prior to removing the filter housing. With the gas head in very lose proximity to the release site and the ventilation fans isolated, teh 60% gas alarm
was activated immediately he began to open the vent valve.

After engine change and some modification work the fuel systems were being prepared for commissioning. As the fuel gas was being commissioned gas escaped into the engine enclosure
activating a platform 60% lel gas alarm. The system was immediately isolated and depressured.
At 02:44 hrs on <...> single detector <...> in fire zone 46 det- ected high level gas production operator sent to investigate. At 02:47 hrs on <...> single gas detector <...> in fire zone 44 detected
low level gas. Operator found flange on outlet of rcb dry gas seal filter (s-2015) lea- ing.control room informed,gas compressor shut down and depressurised. Filter taken off line.
Following change over from fuel gas to diesel fuel a fire was detected in the turbine enclosure of g8004 generator by two infra red flame dete- ctors.there was automatic discharge of co2
extinguishing media into the enclosure.on investigation,it was found that a small section of pipe la- gging was charred. The diesel leak was identified on the main liquid fuel line at burner no.6.
Whilst an instrument technician was taking readings of condition monito- ring equipment in g-8000 turbine enclosure he was alerted by cro that a low level gas indication was identified at the
equipment.the technician left the enclosure and closed the door the fire and gas system then ind- icated high gas levels (20% lel) in the enclosure vent intake resulting in a total platform shutdown
(gpa and muster).following the incident no unusual conditions could be identified and no elevated gas concentration were found.
At 17:50 hrs a loud noise was heard by <...> wireline personnel coming from gas lift manifold area. They contacted the control room. Operators and production supervisor immediately went to
the wellbay and located the noise which was due to a gas leak from the flow transmitter fitted on n15 well isolated, drained and vented. The transmitter was removed and disassembled to identify
cause of leak. The graphite gask, between manifold and transmitter, had a segment blown out.
During restart of the gas compressor gas was noted escaping from the body tell-tale port of rv-20007. The compressor restart was suspended. Initial investigations concluded that the gas was
escaping from the ltlp flare via a defective internal seal within the valve body. The leakage was controlled by isolating the ltlp flare header from the source of pressure (lp flare header). The leak
was detected by smell and then portable gas detection. The fixed detection indicated a slight increase on detectors close to release. The weather conditions were 11 knots 230o.
Routine patrol by plant technician observed liquid falling from mezzanine level north side of module c38. Leak was found to be a flange joint on 11/2" <...> methanol distribution line. All
methanol injection points were isolated and the topside ethanol pump stopped and line depressurised.
Pin hole leak on 2" drain line from cp-17 production manifold, resulting in a discharge of 0.5bbls well fluids. The leak was observed to occur by an area plant technician who instigated a local
isolation of the flow line and production manifold. The line was de-pressurised to the closed drain sytem.
At 2030 hrs on <...>, an instrument assembly connected to a double block and bleed valve on cp52's 9 5/8" casing was blown off. This instrument assembly landed some 20-25 feet north of cp52
and oil was ejected to a height of 30 feet app oximately. This was all heard and then observed by a person working in the next connecting module. He left the modules to find a telephone at a safe
location to report the incident. Simultaneously the fixed gas detection system operated at its low alarm s t point of 20% lel. One head went into high level, 60% lel for a short period of time. The
control room operator dispatched the module operator to investigate. On his arrival he observed oil blowing upwards under pressure from cp52 and proceeded to isolat the leak by closing the
main block valve from off the 9 5/8" casing. Standard platform procedures were implemented, eg suspension of hot work on the platform, pa's etc. As soon as practible the "dublok" valve outlet
with the broken off part of the instru ent fitting still in it, was removed and replaced, and a pressure reading obtained. This showed 147 bar in the 9 5/8" annulus. The 13 3/8" annulus space was
then checked and it revealed zero pressue. The well was not shut in at this time due to risk of co pounding the problem. On examination of the failed instrument component, it revealed that the
During a routine inspection of module 11, the plant supervisor noticed a background smell of gas in the vicinity of gas compressor <...>. On close inspection he noticed a small gas escape of gas
coming from a suction pipe connecting on skid scrubber to suction pulsation damper. The failure of the pipe appeared to be a longitudinal crack at the 6 o'clock position on a right hand elbow.
The release of gas noticeable in the immediate vicinity but was not sufficient to initiate a low level gas alarm. The nearest detectors are approximately 4m distant. The <...> was shutdown and
isolated. Apart form the apparent fialure of the pipe, no damage to property or equipment occurred. There was no injury to personnel. There was no impact on the environment.

Whilst the gas compression operator was carrying out his normal duties he observed gas escaping from <...>. This was immediately reported to the plant supervisor and the entire gas
compression facilities were manually shutdown. The vess l was immediately isolated and vented to flare via the blowdown facility and the condensate inventory pumped forward to the mol. At no
time during the incident did the gas level rise above 5% lel. Within 10 mins there was no visible leakage. It was estab ished that the leakage had developed form the valve packing and was
escaping from a telltale plug in the actuator spacer sleeve. After a further 5 mins the area was gas tested, no trace was detected and normal access was reinstated.
Whilst carrying out a 3 monthly ppm on sp39 the chemical injection flange on the well flowline developed a leak resulting in a mixture of gas/oil/water discharging from the flange. The well hmv
and sssv were closed immediately and the flowline was depres urised. The leak was contained using a washdown hose, mechanical isolation was put in place and the flange removed for
inspection. Upon investigation the rjt ring was found to be corroded, also the flange face cut out.
At 0255hrs an alarm on the main control room fire and gas panel indicated low gas detected in module 03 near the lpg pumps. Area operator informed who proceeded to the location. He
reported back to the mcr that he was unable at that time to locate the s urce of the gas escape. The plant supervisor and an operator proceeded to the area with another portable gas monitor and on
arriving in module 03 met the area operator who had found the leak on the discharge flow meter lp impulse line of lpg pump ga-0392.the pump was shut down and the impulse line isolated at the
flow element. The module was vented and gas free at 0308hrs.
Plant supervisor was carrying out routine checks around gas compressor <...>. He noticed a slight smell of gas around the suction supply (8") to the compressor. Close examination revealed what
was suspected as a pinhole leak near a weldo flange. The nit was shutdown manually and isolated. Ndt (dyepen) inspection revealed an 85mm crack longitudinal below the weldo flange area.
The spool piece was removed from system and returned to <...> for specialist analysis of possible cause of failure.
At approx 0015 hrs on <...> gas head 03g 35 indicated low then high gasin the module. At the same time lpg pump 0392a tripped. Investigation revealed module 03 was partially contaminated
with smoke. (later sourced from pump lub oil system). The pump was removed from service and mechanically and electrically isolated from platform systems.
At 2025hrs a low gas alarm in module 03 was activated. Investigations revealed a small leak had occurred on the suction pipework drain line to <...> booster pump. The pump was immedialtey
shutdown and isolated mechanically from the oil systems in he module. Only one gas head had actioned and this was local to the leak. Controlled de-pressurisation of pipe was monitored by
plant operations personnel.
While performing routine operations in module 01 wellheads area, an operating technician shut in the <...> water injection well <...>. Having closed the choke, he was on his way to the baker
pannel to close the master valve. Hearing a `bang` he turned and saw the instrument piping assembly for the well pilot and tubing pressure transmitter had blown off the kill wing of the xmas tree.
High pressure water was venting from the kill wing into the module. He shut the kill valve immediately, stopping the leak. inspection of the piping assembly revealed that it had been connected to
the tree using a 12mm male compression fitiing screwed into an incompatible 1/2" npt thread hole in the blank fitted to the kill valve.
Water injection to the <...> wells w2 & w4 being carried out when an incr- ease in injection waterflow rate was observed via monitoring on capo. Print out shows a drop in pressure from 180.8 to
133.8 bar.both w2 & w4 were closed in and pipeline pressures mo itored.a detailed test procedu- re was carried out and the leak positively identified as being on the injection water flow line to w4
between the pfv904 and the umg valve 902 the pipework between the pfv and umg is some 3 km long,made up of 2.7 km of stee pipe with 150 m of coflexip at each end.
Platform had been flooded by activation of deluge systems durin work on oily water separator.
During a routine plant inspection tour, a production operator observed a high pressure fluid leak from the base of lcv 53107. This lcv controls liquid levels in production separator a <...>. A p
&id of production separator a and associate piping is attached. Subsequent inspection revealed that the base plate of the lcv had suffered internal erosion damage resulting in the formation of a
small "through thickness" hole.
An operator on routine patrol and cheking on condensate level controller heard an escape from the downstream side of the condensate level control valve bypass. The leak was increasing and was
immediately isolated by operator. Inspection of the pipework revealed sand erosion.

At 0704 hours 25% lel alarm indicated in <...> control room, on <...> panel <...> was in normal not manned situation. The alarm drifted in and out. Standby vessel was sent to check and
reported a high noise level. Wind speed 25 knots. An auto atic shutdown followed. The platform was left to depressure until a helicopter was available to take a work party over. The stainless
steel impulse/support line to the pressure gauge on wel d11 was found to have fatigued. The wellhead was moving more th n others. Inspection found that theconductor guides at 8m level were
missing - only 1 of 4 in place. Pipeline renewed and platform put back on-line. Note: only manual blowdown is possible on these satellites.
Oim arrived on <...> at 0737, and commenced walk around. He noticed a gas escape noise from laging box around d11 hi-lo pressure pilot. The well had shut itself down on lo-pilot as the result
of the leak and hence very small invento y was involved - no oir12 has been raised. Upon investigation the impulse/support line which is a short npt stud fitting had fatigue failed. Cause
excessive wellhead movement as a result of missing stabiliser in conductor guide. This incident is very si ilar to that reported on oir9a & oir12 for gas escape on <...>.
At <...> on <...> was in production and operating in the unmanned mode. The platform had been last visited on <...>. At 14:34 on <...> a low gas alarm was indicated in the manifold area on
<...>. The alarm was received in the <...> control room. The <...> oim was informed by the control room operator and the <...> platform was shutdown remotely. A high gas alarm was received
at 17:38 and the <...> platform was subsequently blown down remotely at 17:45. <...> was visited by an 8 man team on <...>. Investigations found one gas head in alarm. Further investigation
revealed 2 separate gas leaks originating from flowline to choke joints on wells <...> and <...>.
At <...> on <...> was in production and operating in the unmanned mode. The platform had been last visited on <...>. At 12:22 on <...> a low gas alarm was indicated in the manifold area on <...>
The alarm was received in the <...> control room. The <...> oim was informed by the control room operator and the rb platform was shutdown remotely. A 5 man team visited <...> at 17:50 on
<...>. Investigations found one gas head in alarm. Further investigation revealed a gas leak origin ting from the flowline to choke outlet destec joint on well <...>.
2 offsmall bore connections were cut of main oil line pipework as part of a modification. Pipework had been left full of water to remove heat during grinding of wall of tapping through
partialthickness with final cut being completed using cold cut techniq es. Once tappings were cut off water began draining as expected after a short period of ime oil began to drain instead of
water. Residual oil had been trapped at high poin in pipework and flushing operations had not moved it. Hence, when pipework draine approx 1 barrel of oil was split. A gas head below the
grating was covered with the spill and operated at its lowest action point.
12:55 requested to bring w6 on line. (w6 status - sssv shut, tree and flow line depressurised) 13:00 shut w6 flowline vent and opened flowline block. 13:02 commenced pressuring up well 6 from
well 5 via kill skid. W5 sssv, lmg,ung kill-open fw,swab,shut. 6 kill, umg, lmg.open,sssv,fw,swab shut. 13:06 commenced opening w6 fw to pressurise flow line. 13:07 audible gas leak from w6
xmas tree. 13:08 shut w6 umg w5 kill valve. 13:10 g.a. caused by coincidental low level gas 13:14 kill skid to vent manual va ve opened. 13:15 audible leak stopped. 13:16 g.a. reset. Icing
observed w6 fw grease injector.
The pe, oil op, and <...> op proceeded to t11 in module 'b' and the oil op removed the isolation tags from the kill wing and upper master valves. The oil op then re-connected the air supply line to
the upper master valves. All three personnel then proceeded to fpi (t11 well control module) and the oil op looked for a further isolation in the field panel on the well control module. There was
no further isolation in place and he then moved the upper master valve to the open position. A loss of containment was hen evident from t11 swab valve connected to bleed. The oil op
immediately closed the upper master valve and then proceeded with the dga op to t11 tree and closed the swab valve and o/b vent. Three gas heads in module 'b' went into high level alarm and th
platform was immediately put into a confirmed alarm condition. The dga op went to his muster point at his lifeboat station, as did the pe. The oil op went to the control room and reported to the
etl that the gas leak was from the job he was working on. H told the etl that he had closed the upper master valve, the swab valve and o/b vent. The etl then sent the oil op back into module 'b' to
close the choke valves. On investigating the area the emergency ba team saw the oil op in module 'b' and he informed them that the leak was from t11 and the relevant valves had been closed. Ba
Gas compression was shut down in preparation for e6 isolation. Import gas was on-line and selected production wells were flowing. Initiating alarm, activated in section c of the gas alarm panel at
low level then more or less instantaneously rose to high l vel. During this time two technicians local to the incident attempted to intervene manually to shut off gas escape. These personnel
identified the source of escape as the impulse line of pic 156 (later identified as a parted swagelok fitting). Platform st tus lights were illuminated esdi was initiated automatically and personnel
were called to muster stations. This was followed by rapid deterioration of situation indicated by 8 gas heads moving to full scale in module e. Deluge and blowdown systems were ma ually
activated and power was manually shutdown. Emergency teams were quickly on-scene awaiting deluge isolation prior to entering module. A 4-man ba team entered the module with two men
detailed to isolate the impulse line and two men to provide back-up. whilst the team was in module e indications of gas migration were confirmed by high level alarms in modules a and b and gas
detection in module f. This was followed by low level gas indication in emerg gen room which was immediately checked and found to b clear. On completion, of pic 156 isolation full module

Gilycol was being injected trough a tapped flange with threaded connection. The fitting started to leak and gas escaped into the module. The gas was detected by gas heads, the platform went to
alert status. Technicians checked the area isolated the flan e and reported the area safe.
On start up of p1211 and p1201 oil booster and main line export pumps, the area technician observed an oil leak on 1"pl1025,rv line on downste- am side of crude oil cooler e1201.this operates at
13 bar and 65 c.after shutting down the pumps and isolating he lines the stainless steel lag- ging was removed uncovering t 1/8" diameter hole.this was probably cau- sed by underlagging
corrosion.
Wind - 30 knots from n/w. A valve froming a block in a double block and bleed passed slightly. This was not apparant when the isolation was applied as the whole system had been depressurised
and it is thought that the bleed valve was blocked. 8 hours afte prssure was applied to the passing valve it escaped through the bleed into the module. Once the block valve seated properly the
leak stopped. The gas dispersed naturally.
During start up after a process trip, the liquid level increased in the gfu and tripped the inlet valve. The level then buil up in the tps which overflowed, releasing oil/water and gas. The liquid and
gas spread through the module. The north easterly w nd caused the gas to spread s/w. Towards m3 mezz and to the air intake of g8000 generator. The genertor shutdown automatically. The gas
compressor and oil process were then shut down manually. Gas detectors in p1 also indicated gas released from a small amount of oil which spilled over the bund of the tps/gfu and onto the deck
of p1 below. Technicians then hosed down m2 deck and cleared the module of gas. All oil/water was flushed down the drains.
During commissioning or b train 1st stage separator after de sanding operations a small condensate leak was observed from the bonnet of a 2" n.r.v condensate line to b 2nd stage.
A temporary hose split causing a leak of oily water to sea. The leak was caused by a pump pulsating causing the hose to rub against the deck gratings. The pump was not running at the time the
leak was detected, but oil was being exported from crude oil st rage tank putting the hose under pressure of approx 100 psi max. A task risk assessment was carried out prior to use.
Process fluids were being introduced into a seperator which had been aligned to the glc suction flare line. At 07.50 hrs it was reported that rv 5202 had lifted. On investigation the presence of gas
was confirmed within module 7. One local detector regist red 20-25% lel. The source of the gas release was identified as being a parallel screwed fitting in the body of the relief valve which had
partially unscrewed from the body. The plug locking device, a locking wire and small screw, which would have prevent d this was found to be sheared off the glc suction header flare line was
isolated & therefore " dead headed with no means of forward flow and as a result the rv lifted.
Turbine a running on load fuelled via this fuel gas system. Enclosure gas heads detected low level gas (approx 10% lel), after initial investigation turbine was selected to run on diesel fuel. Further
investigation found crack on one of the gas manifold f el lines. Turbine was shutdown and gas line replaced. Crack in fuel line was found to be approx 60m/m long & estimated time of release
was 10 minutes.
On activation of one gas head at 20% lel, in the ccr. The production senior technician was sent to investigate. On arriving at the scene and identifying the location of the leak, he informed the ccr
who shut down and de-pressurised the h.p. compressor.
During routine inspection & plant checks the production senior technician deteceted a smell of gas. On investigation he found a flange on the h.p. discharge cooler weeping gas. He advised the
c.c.r. of his findings who shut down the compressor to effect remedial repairs.
During coiled tubing retrieval frim slot 11 the coiled tubing was damaged by inadvertently closing the manual master valve upon it. A small amount of gas was observed at the sturring box while
recovering the coiled tubing at which time the operator closed the rams on his equipment until a safe method of recovery was determined.
After completing a pressure test to 1000psi and bleeding off sea water test medium, gas was observed in the <...> unit after venting +/- 2bbls into displacement tank. Valves at <...> unit were
manually closed in to prevent further release. The <...> unit displacement tank is open topped resulting in gas being released to module, fixed gas detection system indicated 38% & 35% lel
respectively on 2 deck head detectors.
While bleeding down the `a` annulus of well <...> via the choke manifold to the poor boy degasser using the auto choke, the choke was being slowly opened and the indicator climbed from 1/8
open to 1/2 open, a slug of gas carried over the degasser and s t off the gas alarm. The manual valve was immediately closed and the well shut in within seconds of the alarm sounding.

During normal operations an operator on his routine tour of the worksite noticed a grease nipple on a valve leaking. The offending valve was closed and the leak stopped. The valve in question
was off the header to b train from slot 2. Consequently the slo had to be closed in until a replacement nipple was installed. Approx 3 ltrs crude (97% water) released.
During workover of slot 45 approximately 2 barrels of crude oil were spilled as the tubing hanger was being picked up. A gas bubble came to the surface and overflowed the bell nipple. An
investigation team was formed and an investigation was carried out to determine the cause of this overflow; procedures were ammended accordingly.
During start up of a turbine a gas alarm was initiated in the main area by a gas release from "a" turbine gas pipework.
A plug was found on the floor of a deluge cabinet after a production tech. Had investigated the flood of water from below the door. The threads on the plug were seen to be worn and it is assumed
that it blew out of the spool piece between two supply wate isolation valves on the firewater ring main. A new plug has been fitted.
The process plant was operationally steady and exporting approximately 73000/bbl/day of oil and 65 mmscfd of gas. The b compressor train (pgt10 turbine, high pressure compressor) had been
shut down for some days due to a problem with the lub, oil system of the turbine. It had been decided to perform and engine strip down to effect repairs. Additionally the opportunity was taken
to replace the rotating element of the export compressor due to a known under performance of the unit. The compressor train was isolated to effect these repairs. The export compressor had been
purged with nitrogen and subsequently tested as hydrocarbon free. The oim was was making a routine visit/inspection on the plant wishing also to assess in particular the progress of work on the
compressor train. While standing at the non drive end, west, of the "b" export compressor he perceived a very slight smell of hydrocarbon and initially believed it to be residual vapours from
ancillary pipe work which had been removed as part of the work scope. On moving to the south side of the compressor the odour of hydrocarbons disappeared. In reviewing the status of the work
he noticed that a dry gas seal leakage atometer, a "rotameter type device", was missing from the exportcompressor unit and an "open" 1" flange was evident. It was immeditately realised, because
At 07:39 a small fire was discovered at the top of the still column of the glycol accumulator which emanated from the lagging surrounding the column and associated pipe work. On the <...> the
oim had been on a routine inspection of the platform he met ith the production supervisor and lead mechanical tech to review certain work activities.during this period attention was drawn to a
sma- ll amount of vapour emanating from the lagging where the subsequent incident occured. The situation was discussed tak ng into consideration that no leak had been observed by those
present since the work order tag had been placed at the location.the cladding was opened slightly to ascertain if any li- quids could be seen,which was negative,no gas could be discerned and th
system operated under near atmospheric pressure.it was also noted that the leak appeared following a charge of fresh glycol.in view of the pre- vailing circumstances it was assessed that a
monitoring exercise would be instigated with further analysis onc the liquid level had stabilised and/or the situation changed with regard to the leak ceasing or deterio- rating.
Whilst starting up the plant following a production shutdown caused by a faulty low level transmitter in the inlet separator, a hydorcarbon leak occurred at the crude oil cooler (plate exchanger) at
the inlet to the final separator. Personnel were standi g by during start up and initiated a manual shut down immediately. Investigation showed that a plate gasket on the cooler had failed. The
supposed cause is that when shutdown occurs an esd valve at the crude oil exit from the inlet separator closes and he inlet separator to crude cooler line depresurises. On start up the esdv opens
quickly allowing a rapid build up of pressure to 16 bar. This entered the cooler and exploited a weakness in the plate gasket.
Site inspection for evaluation of esdm3.1 repair.fire protection coating removed by use of chisel in a small area.should remove steel intension h mesh/operator used air power chisel for tihis
purpose.hit riser wall with chisel hammer with small sharp dent with a depth of 1 - 3 mm as a result
Deg loading hose got caught under the stern of the supply vessel <...>.
During construction activities on the subsea manifold, the 6" gas lift pipeline from the platform was slightly damaged. A tool basket was lowered from the diving vessel to the work site. As the
diver manouvered the basket into position, it became caught on the bolts on the valve at the end of the gas lift pipeline manifold. Due to the rolling motion of the vessel, the pipework was then
pulled vertically approx. 1.5 metres. No leakage was visible following the incident.
At approximately 08:25 there was a loss of all electrical power on the platform. This was reinstated within 1 hour. At approximately 10:30 there was another full electrical isolation. This was
reinstated. Unfortunately, due to complete loss of power, a l printers, pc`s and ic`s screens were shutdown. This left platform with no history to the trip. Investigation is still ongoing.
Flare performance tests were being carried out to check the performance of a newly fitted high pressure flare tip and to compare actual back pressure readings with calculated values. During the
test at a higher than normal flow rate,the flare burning prof le changed suddenly,due to the loss of the coanda effect over the flare tulip.this lead to higher than normal levels of heat radiation on
the platform. Production was automatically shutdown and no damage was sustained.the test was conducted under controll d conditions with additional data recordings made.essential personnel
only were in the area and the fire team was on standby at the location.

Drain line from coupling was not fitted, mechanical technician was instructed to fit the line, at the same time electrical/instrument technician was requested to make the pump available to
circulate lube, prior to mechanical technician completing his work he was called to another job. Electrical technician unlocked the switchboard and turned on the power preventing the motor
from running by forcing the logic (soft ware) in the compressor control panel. The platform subsequently was shutdown on a blue leve shutdown (loss of electrical power). This removed power
from the compressor control panel. On re-instatement of power the logic focing was returned to normal putting a start command to the lube oil pump, resulting in the pump starting to circulate.
Drian was disconnected so oil drained down to deck.
During survey of mod 05 by ois it was picked up that the flowlines from <...> and <...> were rubbing together causing substandard erosion to both lines. It was established after closer inspection
that erosion to <...> precluded us from flowing the well unti a repair has been effected. <...> was found to be fit for purpose and is now back on line, however repairs will be required.
On the <...> at 03:37 hours the msv commenced laying the flexible flowline from the manifold towards the plem in a north east direction. At 15:41 hours after approximately 1200 metres of
flowline had been laid the dgps signal failed and the back up systems failed to operate. At 15:58 hours the vessel was brought under manual control until the dgps and back up systems were
restored at 16:08 hours. During this period an excursion of the vessel occured resulting in the flowline being laid 11.0 metres out of line for a distance of 100 metres.
During overboard of the first flowline connection, a cp. Braclet anode came into contact withthe lip of the lay shoot and was dislodged by approx 6.0 metres, snapping the earthing strops and
slightly scarring the outer sheathing of the flowline. Inspecti n of the flowline and anode was subsequently carried out. The anode was left in its new position and new earth strops installed, no
damage to the flowline occured.
During a severe storm on the morning of <...>, the platform was struck by a very large wave which caused significant damage to underdeck and external walkways, scaffolds and cable racking etc.
The esdv underdeck failed closed as a result.
Amage sustained to brace is currently subject to investigation by specialist support. Initial report from chevron cptc san ramon has indicated to immediate problem with sructural integrity of
jacket.
An intervention visit was requested to <...> to carry out checks to try to ascertain if the sssv had travelled up the well into the xmas tree. The checks requested were to close the top and bottom
master valves and it was found that niether of these valves ould be closed indicating the possibility of the sssv in the xmas tree. The well operations department were informed and a visit report to
the satops co-ordinator.
During preparatory work on well b27, the well was lined up to pump seawater down the tubing and returns to the production train via the annulus kill line. The driller saw pressure on the system
and inadvertently bled off the to the drilling trip tank som gas from the line was detected by the shaker area gas heads and set off platform gpa.
Whilst drilling, within the reservior section of the pilot hole an 80 bbls influx was taken and the well closed in on the annular preventer. At a depth of 13911' an increase in flow rate was observed,
the well was closed in and zero pressure recorded on b th drill pipe and annulus. The well was opened and circulated for 30 minutes with background gas levels of 2-3%. Drilling continued to
13918' whereupon a further increase in flowrate was suspected and the well shut in with zero pressure on both drill pipe and annulus. The well was opened up and flow checked with no flow.
Bottoms up was circulated and a bubble of gas arrived at the rig floor, the well was closed in with zero pressure on both annulus and drill pipe. The well was flow checked by opening the a nular
and connecting to the trip tank. However, inadvertantly the well was not connected to the trip tank and was left flowing to the mud pits, where an 80 bbls influx was detected. The well was closed
in with zero pressure on the drill pipe and 325psi on the annulus . Approx 80bbls of crude oil and gas cut mud was circulated out and a heavy 10.7 ppg mud prepared and circulated into the well.
Well <...> run of perforating guns from the pob deck -electrical cable broken while pulling out after survey part left of the cable (around 645m) winched to surface -when cable end came out
from lubricator, lubricator safety check valve did not seal proper y resulting in a gas leak -<...> wisa valve immediately closed by operator -xmas tree umv immediately closed by <...> operator
-leak stopped when gas in lubricator was fully bled down

The completion tubing was being recovered form well <...>. At the time of the incident 4,450 feet of tubing had been laid down, when a backflow of calcium chloride/bromide brine occurred,
causing a flow from the top of the tubing. The tubing at the time as in the slips, the top being approx 4 feet above the drill floor. Normal actions were taken to control the situation. Firstly, an
attempt was made to fit the crossover and kelly cock, in order to stop the flow. However, the x-over cross-threaded and ilst attempting to remedy this, a sudden flow increase occurrred. When
the crossover was released, the splashing took place, contacting the men. The <...> and <...> were contacted and immediately proceeded to the drill floor. On observing the seriousnes of the
flow, and being informed that it had not been possible to stab the kelly cock, the owe contacted the oim. The oim having been norified of the initial problem, raised the platform to yellow alert
status, making an annnouncement that a problem exis ed on the drill floor, and the medic was required, this was followed shortly by a red hazard status, again raised by the oim, production
shutdown and a call for alll pob to muster stations. Whislt asseessing the situation and cause of the flow, the drill r was instructed to prepare to drop the tubing and close the bop. It was whilst
Well 5-4 connected with a chicksan kill line to the mud pumps for bullheading operations. On opening up this kill line to the pumps hydrocarbons backflowed up the kill line and lifted the prv on
mud pump 2 which vented into the mud pits. This release of h drocarbons activated the fire and gas system. No injuries were sustained and no plant damage occurred.
During drilling the <...> formation at 13248ft. The driller noticed a mus volume gain of 3 bbl. Influx confirmed, followed by implementation of "kick" procedures - platform production process
shutdoen. Flare vented, purged (n2) and extinguish as a precaution - well contents circulated and conditioned as per procedures control measures. No gas received to surface and integrity
secured without incident.
While working the supply vessel <...> a gas sample bottle rack, being lowered from <...> platform to the vessel, became enmeshed with the side of a 30ft cargo basket. The boat rolled and the
snagged bottle rack lifted the cargo ba ket, causing it to swing inboard crushing a member of the deck crew against an adjacent container. The deck crew member was fatally injured.
At approx. 02:15 on<...> ip was sent from the drill floor to the stabbing board to releive the derrickman, by the night shift driller, prior to sending ip to the stabbing board, the driller confirmed
with ip that he was familiar with the requirements for the stabbing 13.3/8 casing. The derrickman then instructed ip on the mechanical operation of the stabbing board (controls), after observing
ip stab one joint of casing without problem, he left the drill floor for his tea break. Ip continued with the duties of stabber for the next five joints. At joint 96 he latched the elevator to the casing
joint and gave the appropriate hand signal to the driller to confirm the elevators were correctly latched. On receiving this signal, the driller picked up the casing string out of the slips & began to
run the string into the hole. Whilst lowering the string, the driller was observing the weight indicator, watching the casing through the table, and looking up into the derrick, after running approx.
28ft. Of casing the driller heard a shout to 'stop' from the rig floor and immediately applied the brake. On looking up at the stabbing board, he observed ip in a postition trapped between the
stabbing board hand rail and the crash guard of the tds. He immediately picked up the casing string to release ip and sent a member of the drill floor crew to the stabbing board to assist ip. The
Two drilling centrifuges weighing 3 tonnes each were to be lifted from the frame on skid deck to the pipe deck. During the second lift the load shifted as it was being picked up trapping left foot
or roustabout beneath it fracturing same. There was a ca le boom above the lift. The banksman was aware the load would shift as tension was taken up and placed the roustabout in a position to
steady the load. The load moved faster and in a direction not anticipated trapping the roustabouts foot
A pressure test was being carried out on the drill floor stand-pipe manifold to test on the valves. The manifold was displaced to seawater using the test pump until returns were identified from the
topdrive, the vent was closed and pressure testing commenced. It became clear that the valves were leaking as no pressure increase was obtained and returns were seen from the topdrive. In order
to eliminate the number of possible leak paths an attempt was made to test the second stand pipe valves via the testpump hooked up to another <...> connection. When the blank cap was removed
from the <...> connection debris was seen to have settled out blocking the line. As it was likely that more debris was present the manifold was bled down through the bleed-off line. All valves
were overhauled, cleaned and reinstated ready for a second test. The manifold was re-filled with seawater and when returns were seen from the topdrive testing re-commenced. Again the valves
leaked with returns seen form the top drive and a drip from the weco connection. This was beld off through the bell-nipple and the line left open. Work commenced on the stand pipe valve to
remove the valve bonnet & assembly, with all the nuts (complete with studs) holding the valve bonnet removed completely as the assembly remained stuck in the housing the assistant driller and
Whilst surveying an electric motor with air mover attached for possible slinging methods the rigger pulled the equipment off it's mounting onto his leg.the equipment had been partially dismantled
however it was repo- rted to have been lift in a secure/saf manner by leaving two retaining bolts in place.it is therefore unclear as to how this equipment became unsecure.
Lifting a spoolpiece of approx. One ton with m8 crane from z11cd to z23ll.rails on top of inhibitor tanks platfrom hit by hookball,one end of the rail got loose and swung down.hit marine operator
on leg.marine was not in position to see crane operator.con act by vhf radio,good communication,calm weather.

Ip was assisting in th removal of a stinger from 9 5/8" offside caasing v/v on well c01.after assessing the existing rigging on the stinger,he altered it slightly before re-running the wire strop
through the walkway grating overhead and securing it to a c ain block,in order to acheive a vertical lift instead of an angular pull.as the bolts and the graylock clamp were removed the tool came
free.the ip was holding the back end of the tool which swung upwards,trapping his finger between the tool and the walkway overhead.he was casevaced on <...>.
Having released the elevators from a long stand of drill pipe the ip was in the process of stacking same when the bottom block of the power swivel came in contact with the top of the drill stand
propelling the stand backwards striking the ip on the forehe d. The driller witnessed the ip being thrown backwards on the drill master cabin cctv monitor and alerted 2 drill crew members who
went to the monkey board to assist the ip. Following assessment by the medic the ip was lowered in a stretcher on the man ri ing winch to drill floor level the stretchered to the sick bay for
treatment prior to going ashore by helicopter for further medical treatment.
During the removal of a dummy test joint of pipe from inside the bop, a seal ring was dislodged and gell 16 feet hitting an engineer working on a scaffold platfrom below. The injured person was
hit on the ankle by a metal ring gasket weighing approximately 7lbs.
During racking back a stand of 3 1/2" drill pipe, when the derrickman pulled back the stand to tack it, the base of the pipe rotated off the timber and dropped into the gutter. The stand was put
back into the elevators and lifted to replace it on the tim er. The roustabouts thumb was crushed when the stand banged against the tong post.
Because of the weather conditions it had been decided to down man the platform in line with the adverse weather working policy. Three men were waiting for the lift to descend to the 101 metre
level in the utility leg in order to leave their worksite and r port back to the <...>, as they had been instructed. Whilst the lift was on its way down from d1cs, the men heard a "crack", followed by
the sound of a falling object bouncing of steel work on its way down. One of the men called out to his mates o take cover, and he himself went underneath the stairs. The object then fell and
grazed the face of ip before striking his right forearm then falling to the gratings. The falling object was seen to be a guide wheel from the cab of the lift
Under work pack no. <...>, disc brake retrofit, the old "k" type draw works braking system was being destructed. The main draw works shaft had been removed and positioned over the rotary
table. The gears and bearings were them removed using hot work. Att mpts were then made to remove rims from the shaft using jacks and hammers. No movement was seen. The rim was them
cut half was through with a oxy/acetylene torch, and another atteempt made to manually remove the rim. Wood had been placed under the rim o stop it from falling over. Again, no movement.
On making the final cut the rim "sprang" up and fell over, striking ip on the left forearm.
A fan was being manoeuvered through the external windwall. A section of which had been removed to facillitate this operation. The opening was made as large as possible. The fan was
suspended on 3 chain blocks front, centre and rear. A tubular brace run ing across the corner of the opening was causing the base of the fan to snag. As the base of the fan cleared the tubular
bracing one corner snagged causing the fan to move to one side. In doing so the fan trapped the employers finger against windwall sup ort beam. As a result the employers sustained a crush
injury to left hand ring finger later diagnosed as a fracture.
Mech fitter and injured party were tasked with removal of redundant hvac ducting in mod cd.7 rigging equipment (chain blocks), were employed to undertake this task by injured employee. Two
chain blocks were used, one in the vertical with the second offse . These were attached to the ducting at roof level and some 3ft off deck level respectively. The mech fitter, then released bolts
holding the ducting together at roof level and supports at deck level, he lowered the ducting section using top chain block o the level of scaffold staging erected for access, when it became
jammed. At this point, the mech fitter, requested a scaffolder to remove scaffold boards causing jam, and hauled up on the top chain block. During removal of boards it was apparent that the
ducting flange bolt had snagged on the edge of a board, the scaffolder released this by twisting the board over, at which point the ducting droped, causing a shock loading on strop affixed to top of
ducting & attached to chain block. As a result, the chain block attached by a strop to lower section of ducting (under tension in "off" vertical plane), pulled the ducting outwards & towards anchor
point of chain block. The combination of shock loading & tension applied by the chain blocks imparting unequal forces on the ducting, resulted in the ducting failing at its weakest point, (hvac
Whilst attempting to put the casing power tongs onto the 18 5/8" casing the injured person was holding onto the tongs door handle. The tongs which were suspended on a winch wire swung
toward the casing and crushed the ip's left hand between the casing and the tongs.

Wind direction - westerly / visibilty - 10 nautical miles / wind speed 25-3- knots / temperature - 6 degress celsius / sea state 2-2 1/2 metre swell. * information as provided by siby vessel <...>t and
platform meteorological equipment. Normal car o backload operations were taking place. The lift being returned was 1 of 4 similar lifts also backloaded, standard practice and lifting slings were
used and in good order. In addition to the ip 3 other personnel witnessed the incident. The ip was visibly in pain immediately, which was instantly noticed by platform deck crew. Crane of radioed
vessel master who stopped work and pulled vessel of loc to investigate condition of i.p. medical treatment was then administered and transfer to <...> hospital
While making a connection - torquing up the kelly to the joint in the rotary table, the ip was operating the back up tongs. The break out line went tight before the snub line due to the break out
line being jammed at the cathead (a fact that was not known at the time). The breakout line came free and the load went onto the snub line. The resultant shock was transmitted through the tong
handle causing injury. The ip was pushed up against the rig tong by the breakout line at this stage.
Whilst picking up 5" drill pipe from the mouse hole by means of drill pipe elevations, one of the two bail hooks which position the elevators around the drill pipe prior to latching the elevator
closed, failed due to incorrect positioning of the hook.
The replacement windscreen was packaged in a plywood box for transit offshore inside a shipping container. As part of the <...> work routine the lid was removed from the front cab window
transit box, the window condition checked and the polystyrene to packing removed. The lid was however not replaced on the transit box. This took place on the west laydown area m3 roof
adjacent to the containers in a wind protected area. The <...> crew requested the deck foreman to move the box to the scaffold st ging at the east crane. The deck crew rigged the box in the
correct method for using two wire strops. The crane operator was requested to raise the load to tighten the strops the load was replaced on the floor and the operator adjusted the strops. He requ
sted the load to be raised approximately 3 metres and again checked the strops for security. The load was considered to be safe and the crane operator was instructed to lift the load, was under
control for the first 7 metres, as the load traversed over th drilling package hvac vent fans the wind caught the load, raising the flt lift to a vertical position. The load started to rotate and the glass
panel became dislodged falling from a height of approximately 8 metres. The crane operator at the same time ttempted to lower the load to a safe landing position on the pipe deck on the safe
2 7/8 tubing being laid out on double - wrapped and choked sling and tugger. 3rd party vendor attempts to cross catwalk with tool trolly. Sees danger to himself so leaves trolley on catwalk
beneath joint to be laid out and walks long way round to retrieve trolley from other side. Meanwhile, ip attempts to move trolley and manouvre pipe around it, during this the weight came off the
joint, the sling sprung open and when the joint moved it slipped through the sling and down the catwalk trapping the ip's foot against the edge of the catwalk guide.
Whilst moving the bop set from the drill floor through the 'v' door, the bop set toppled over and landed on the left foot of <...>. The bop set was veing dragged by the catwalk winch at the time of
the incodent. Atmospheric conditions - good - no wind.
Whilst landing bundle of drill collars on pipedeck, the bundle opened up when weight came off the sling and trapped the injured`s right foot under one of the collars causing a crush injury.
Temporary rigging consisting of 2 x 1 ton slings were used to secure air tugger line to bell nipple and housing. Due to the rigging arrangement and angle of pull undue strain was applied to slings
causing them to weaken & part. Ip who was controlling the ork was standing adjacent to the worksite and was struck in passing by one of the parted slings.
Whilst pulling out of hole (s53) using top drive, a tugger line became snagged on the stabbing board. This in turn trapped the kelly hose causing to part at the top drive end. The longer end of the
kelly hose subsequently fell to the drill floor bouncing up and hitting the injured person. Weather conditions - wind gusting 50+ knots and light rain.
The wireline operator failed to secure the lower wireline sheave prior to rigging up the tool string suspended from the wirline. This caused weight to be brought onto the sheave which eventually
pulled off a snagging point. The operators hand was caught b the sheave as it propelled off the drill floor.
The inp and another banksman were carrying out material handling operations in conjunction with the south crane. The banksman had radio contact with the crane driver. During lifting of a short
drill collar, the ip stood in front of the collar. As the c ane lifted it, the collar began to swing in a southerly direction, towards the ip. He attempted to avoid the swinging load, but caught his foot
between the drill collar and a joint of riser.

An <...> pump unit at level 1,east laydown area previously posistioned, was loaded onto a 3000kg pallet truck.the pump unit and truck was to be lifted to level 2 east laydown for use by comtec.a
priority had been stated for the lift so other operations we e suspended to allow it to be instigated. The crane operation was carried out in full sight of the crane operator ,another witness,who was
observing the operation from level 2,where he was waiting to receive the units. The following sequence of events too place: 1.the ip hooked the pump unit onto the crane pendant hook and had
lifted and placed slightly to one side of the pallet truck. 2.a sling was then run through the triangular handle of the pallet truck and the eyes placed over the crane pendant hook o that both items
where now attached and ready for lifting. 3.he then instructed the crane operator to lift the load.the pump unit cleared the deck first but as the crane head block was plumbed over the pump unit
when the pallet truck lifted it it swung n towards it.at this point the ip stepped forward to control the swing and either pinch- ed his finger between wire truck or the truck and pump frame causing
the injuries to his finger.
A loose retaining clip fell approximetly 25m from its resting position on part of the floor boom or crane rest structure. The wire rope or overhaul ball of the deck crane dislodged the clip during
operations to relocate a gas quad. The clip fell and str ck a member of the deck crew on the right foot, resulting in bruising which required treatment with an ice-pack.
The task entailed rigging down a 2 inch circulation hose from the top of tubing. The floorman was in a riding belt, being winched up the tubing that was run in the hole. He shouted to the
winchman to stop lifting as the winch line has snagged. He grabb d the tubing ans instructed the winchman to lower off a little (about 12"). He freed the line, took the weight off the belt, and
then kicked off towards the kelly hose, the winchman was signalled to re-commence hoisting and then suddenly the floorman was seen to lurch up into the air and drop back to the previous
position, the floorman appeared to be injured and he was lowered to the drill floor. The riding belt was connected to the winch wire by a length of chain, which featured a swivel at the end conne
ting with the winch wire. A shackle was used to connect the the swivel/chain to the winch wire, it is believed that the shackle pin fouled the guard fitted to the top dirve motor guard. The guard
consists of a plate perforated by holes of approx 3" diam ter. It is considered that the shackle fouled one of the holes in the guard, was freed by the floorman, and almost immediately snagged
again without his knowledge.
Messrs. <...> and <...> were working on scaffold access on <...> mezzanine deck preparing a 4" butt on a 5ft length of pipe that penetrated the redundant helideck above. <...> was positioned
below the pipe squaring it for welding while <...> wa standing by the pipe aiding in the process. From the witnesses accounts it appears the movement of a cable drum above collided with the
pipe being released from an alignment clamp (at helideck level) and the pipe falling through the penetration hitting <...> on the chest. <...> was sent for medical attention (bruising) and
subequently went straight back to work. An investigation took place following the site being cordoned off.
Ip was struck on his left shoulder by a dropped scaffolding tube. 3 five foot tubes were dropped in all 2 fell into the sea and one hit ip the tubes fell from a scaffold being erected approx. 30' above
and to one side of ip.
Ip was kneeling to operate a valve on the blast kettle, when two sheets of plywood standing against the habitat fell against his lower back. Upon standing he felt pain in his lower back, but thought
this would go and did not report the incident, by mid af ernoon the pain had increased and visited the medic. He was given treatment and stood down for the remander of the shift. The ip was
medivaced on <...> and told to see his own g.p
Gas compression was being restarted following platform shutdown. After two unsuccessful attempts, elec. Dept. Were requested to check relevant trips in switchroom. They identified and reset a
timer trip and stood by to observe next attempted start. They s w breaker close, immediely followed by discharge of pitch insulation form top of breaker, with associated arcing and flames. Smoke
detection then activated halon release in the area which extinguished the fire. Ip was at the scene of the incident with a f re extinguisher when the halon discharged, which resulted in the ip being
hit in the face causing him a cut lip and his upper right tooth being chipped. He returned to work immediately.
The equipment involved was in a cubicle associated with the emergency power distribution board.a 400a ccomtractor was being replaced.the cubicle was isolated but bus connection at the base
of the isolator remained live.during the task an electrical short resulted in an arc which enveloped a technician causing serious burns.after examining many of the items left around the worksite
and their possible involvement with the incident,the electrical equipment in the cubicle was systematically dismantled.part o the plain washer,similar to those used in the bolting of the contactor
connections,was found on the floor of the cubicle.a heat affected zone,on the rear panel,indicated that something had shorted between the red phase and the cubicle.this escalated to a three phase
short and the devopment of a high energy arc. The investigation concluded that the washer had fallen down the gap between the equipment backplat and the panel and on to the live bus bar. This
was shown to be possible by simulating with a similar plain washer.
Drilling operations had suffered two power failureson <...> at 09:45 and 12:07. Efforts were being made to restablish this supply. Investigations centred on the breaker in the switchroom. The
<...> electrician, supported by the toolpusher were standi g in front of the breaker cabinet, with the door open, when a flash occured

Drilling operations had suffered two power failureson <...> at 09:45 and 12:07. Efforts were being made to restablish this supply. Investigations centred on the breaker in the switchroom. The
<...> electrician, supported by the toolpusher were standi g in front of the breaker cabinet, with the door open, when a flash occured
Si61 <...>, call sign <...> with 14 passangers and 2 crew onboard, were on final landing routine when the aircraft suffered control difficulties which resulted in severe mechanical damage to the
tail rotor blades. Aircraft landed with no personal inj ry being sustained to any passangers. However, the co-pilot was treated for shock and lower back pain.
Following repairs and rebuild of b.p. sump pump the system was de-isolated for test running and return to service. On initial start up the sump contents issued from an open vent/priming line. The
attendant trademan's upper body and face were contaminated. this outlet is protected by a hand operated valve which was open.
As part of the procedure, a function test was carried out on the lower master valve to verify the pressure integrity of the valve. This was carried out to verify the operation and pressure integrity of
the valve. The function test failed, as the valve co ld not operate more than 3.5 turns, whilst a total of 27 turns is required to fully open or close the valve. Believing the valve to be open, an
attempt was then made to drift the well with wireline prior to running the plugs neccessary to make the well s fe for christmas tree maintenance. The wireloine tool sting failed to pass through the
tree indicating that the lower master valve was not in a fully open position. The <...> technicians were instructed to cycle the valve in order to open it ful y. In the process of operating the valve, a
safety pin(designed to prevent damage to the valve internals) was sheared. As the cap to the final thread(s) it blew off due to the fact that the gland securing the seal on the valve stem had also
come free. T is resulted in an uncontrolled gas escape from the lower master valve stem commencing at approx 13:30 hrs. One of the <...> received a blow to the knee as the incident occurred
and sustained a lost time injury due to severe bruising.
Whilst investigating an overheating problem on 'b' generator a mechanical technician shut down the generator, waited approximately 20 minutes for cool down and cracked open the radiator cap.
A small jet of hot fluid hit the left side of his face and neck nd his left hand causing burns. He was using a cloth to cover the cap while opening it. The cap was a pressure relief device
incorporated in it which will be checked for correct operation. The overheating was caused by a leak between the oil and water in he oil cooler allowing oil into the cooling system. See attached 2
engine information sheets.
At 0640 hrs the m stern-trawling fish factory <...> lost machinery cooling water during adverse weather conditions and started to drift some 6 miles west of the platform. Due to the threat of the
drifting vessel, 104 platform crew members were airlifted to the <...> platform leaving only 39 persons onboard. At 0840 hrs the tug/supply vessel <...> got a towline onboard the vessel. At that
time the vessel was approx. 1.9 miles away from the platform. From 1100 hrs the remanning of the platform commenced.
A 100m 5000ton barge was under tow to <...> by tug <...> when it broke free in bad weather . Downmanning started from the <...> platform to semisub <...>. The barge was under control some
hours later just 12 km from the platform. The <...> platform was put on standby for evacuation as it lay in the drift path of the barge, but the 50 onboard were stood down once the rogue had been
retrieved.
The rig had commenced off load of supply vessel mv <...> when he appeared to drift in towards the rig. After requesting he pull clear the vessel swung into the starboard aft column he was
conected to the rig by the portable water hose this burst as he pulled clear
<...> lost power 200m off the south side of the platform windspeed:25 knots wind direction:se wave height: 4m
Vessel <...> was in close standby at <...> platform positioned close to the north east corner. Nitrogen/glycol transfer to platform was in progress. At 1206 the vessels stern thruster failed to 100%
pitch to port. Vessel control was switched to manu l and thruster stopped but vessel port quarter touched the platform north east leg. Vessel pulled away to safe location after discontinuing
nitrogen/ glycol transfer. Visual inspection from platform and from vessel indicated no significant damage apart fr m paint scuff marks. Weather at time was good. Wind speed 15knots from 180200 deg wave height 1.5 metres, visibility 10 miles.
While alongside platform, discharging deck cargo, the automatic position control system on the sv <...> failed and the vessel struck the platform. Minor damage to vessel and d2 leg of platform.
Remedial actions: examine damage and repair vessel rect fy poscon defect vessel trialed off <...> <...> new joystick fitted. Software adjustments made to system, resulting in improved reaction
times to command instruction. Azimuthing thruster reaction increased to match transverse thruster time so bot act in tandem and not against each other. Other adjustments made to overall
system balance. Engineer sailed to field and joystick performance fully tested. Vessel worked in similar conditions to incident without heading or position loss. Master satisf ed with
performance. Vessel owners preparing full report for <...>. <...> man to sail on vessel to make complete evaluation.
Probs assoc with <...> wellhead were reported. A dive vessel in the field was sent to inv and has reported 2 small leaks and movement of the roof panels.
Vessel damage = bent fender and split weld. No threat to safety. Installation bent boat fneder. Visible divers to investigate.

The <...> hit the a2 leg on the <...> platform. This sprung 3 bolts on the (redundant) 8" glycol riser approx 12' above l.a.t. investigation in progress. The vessel was apparently in full working
order.
Vessel on standby duties for <...> platform position 2nm north west of platform. Weather south east 45/50kts. Sea 6/7 metres. At approx 1800 hours large sea breaks over bulwark, hitting and
breaking bridge windows. Vessel oses electrical power, steering, communications and navigation systems. No personnel injured. Emergency services alerted via mayday and hand held radio call
to maureen platform. At a approx 19:30 vessel restores propultion and steering control. Process to <...>. Escorted by stand-by vessel and then tug. <...> stand-by covcer provided by vessel
<...>, until full cover resumed at approx noon <...> by replacement vessel.
At 10:15 hrs the vessel <...> entered on request the prd 500 metre zone and shortly after successfully completed one lift to the installation. While positioning herself to receive a backload at
approx 10:30 hrs from the installation the vessel skip er reported to the crane driver he would reposition the vessel head into wind. In the process of carrying out the manoeuvre the vessel collided
with the b1 leg.
The incident occurred when the <...> derrick was being operated on the <...> west flare. It had been used several times previously in the same location without any problem. At the time of the
incident the jib was in the raised position attempting to m noeuvre a load of about 0.75 tonnes, the wind was about 20 knts and the rigging crew found that the jib would not slew. At the time, the
attention of the crew would have been primarily with the load end. When the jib is raised near to its limit the link p n comes within the radius of the pad eyes on the crown. When the jib is slewed,
the bottom sleeve will turn and this turning moment will be transferred via the slew balance tube to the top sleeve, to which the bottom of the link pin is attached. As the li k pin was up against a
pad eye the top sleeve could not turn and the force applied to the job and bottom sleeve would have forced and eventually damaged the pad eye. Once the problem had been analysed a clamp
arrangement was installed to rectify the damag caused. The incident will be discussed with all relevant staff to ensure they are aware of the need to identify any hazards associated with work they
are involved in. Nb: we reported this incident when it occurred, based on the information we had at that time. However, the final analysis proved that it was not a failure of a load bearing part of
A drilling sub was being removed from the pipedeck into the v door of the drill floor using the crane. When the sub was laid on the drill floor the crane hook was released, the crane operator
started to pick up the crane hook and the headache ball caught n a beam above the v door.a one meter section of the beam broke away and fell to the rig floor. No injuries were sustained. The rest
of the redundant framework from the top of the v door has been removed. The cross member, which has been left, has been in pected to ensure that it is securely welded.
During drilling casing cutting and removal operations from the drill floor to the pipe deck using the drilling (central) crane, the crane was boomed up with the over-ride switch operated resulting
in the crane boom being driven against it's stops which resulted in damage to the lower section of the boom.
Dropped stones from <...> west crane. No injuries
Equip was being moved to a worksite on a cellar deck from main deck via a lifted deck hatch using the platform crane. A banksman was located on main deck. No personnel were within cellar
deck vertically below hatch. Equip items were being lowered in their wooden packing crates as supplied from onshore, using cert webbing sling several such lifts had been successfully completed
whilst lowering a hydraulic pump inside its packing crate, the crate disintegrated causing pump to fall c 6 ft to cellar deck below and be rendered inoperable.
Chain block failure whilst attempting to life a <...> electric generator from the solar room.
During operations aloungside the southside of the platform. A nut fell from the platform striking an a.t.k (jet fuel) bowser narrowly missing two deck hands. No damage or injury
Deck crew were moving electric motor from south end of level 3 on agm to pipedeck when motor slipped from lifting strops and fell approx 10 m onto deck - no injuries - damage to motor and
handrail/stairway
Whilst pulling out of hole with gyro survay tool, winch drum on wireline whinch overturned. Wind direction s.e 10 knots. General conditions good sdc wireline winch
Whilst discharging vessel the crane overheated. When checking this problem load started to pay out very very slowly. No incident. The breaks adjusted and load tested.
Whilst clearing up piepdeck. Weather conditions good. Test weight was fitted with shackles and weight taken on north crane. Lifting point on test weight failed. No injuries no damage.
Equipment.
When lifting a piece of drilling equipment (shooting nipple) from the mv <...> to <...> platform, the vessel was pulling away from the platform as the item was being lifted by the east crane. The
pincher nipple was snagged on the ships rail ca sing a 3 ton wire sling to part. No injury to personnel occurred. Wind 20-25kts wave 1.3 metres light - darkness mipeg printout shows peak load
of 3.4 tonnes, swl was 3 tonnes.

Started working boat <...> at 09:00 hrs. 4 lifts had already been taken (6 1/2 t, 2 1/2 t, 1 1/2 t, 7 1/2 t) and a fifth lift of 7 1/2 t had been taken off the boat and was being placed on the deck when a
hose, on the right hand side boom ram, unctured resulting in the boom lowering through loss of oil pressure, down to its minimum position on the ram. Approx. 50 litres of hydraulic oil leaked
out on to the crane pedestal and main deck.
The east side crane was back loading onto the mv <...>. The container being lowered snagged on another container on the loading deck of the supply boat and tipped at a slight angle. It was
raised again to the upright position and placed on tubi g/drill pipe on the supply boats deck. The door of the container opened and part of heavy equipment fell to the deck. The weather
conditions/sea state were good during this operation. Personnel on the supply boat replaced the equipment. (mud pump module) weighing 4 cwt unit into the container.
Ad west crane - right hand boom pendant line. Thimble has become detached from the hard eye splice at the tip end of the boom. The thimble slid down the pendant leaving the splice exposed.
The bare splice does not appear to be capable of carrying the req ired loadings. The crane has been isolated and will remain out of service until new pendants are fitted. The offending pendants are
1 year into a 2 year certified life. Test cert <...>.
The only equipment involved was the west crane. The operator went to lift the boom out of the rest ready for use. On lifting boom approx 6" from the rest to dry out the clutch and brake with the
pawl engaged. He heard a loud bang from the boom the winch after checking out the brake and clutch and finding nothing he assumed the noise had come from the rope jumping. He went back
into the cab engaged the clutch to lift the boom and take out the pawl the crane boom went into free fall. The boom fell appr x 18" into the crane rest causing crush damage to the main chords at a
point where the cathead section crosses the boom rest.
Manriding winch failed to hold 3-man dive basket carrying 3 men when control lever placed in neutral. Basket ran away for a distance of approximately 1.8m before being arrested by its own
braking system. The 'fault' could not be replicated.
The derrick was in the process of being destructed with the use of an air powered saw operated by abseilers. Equipment was being hauled to the top of the derrick using a gin pole and tugger
winch. A 25 metre barriered exclusion zone had been set up arou d the base of the derrick. Safety signs were erected and two men patrolled the barriers to prevent unauthorised entry to the area.
An air powered saw was fastened to the hauling wire using 8mm polypropylene rope lanyard and the operator started to lift i up the driirck. When the load was part of the way up the derrick, it
became entangled in the derrick stell work. Before the operator could stop the winch the lanyard snapped and the saw fell to the ground. Because of the safety precautions in place there were no
persons in the vicinity.
South crane with an empty basket hooked on was booming up in order to load in a specific location. Boom continued to travel upwards until it came into contact with stops at which point
emergency stop was activated. 2 safety devices had failed to slow and top boom during its upward travel.
During the routine removal of a spool section of a flowline, prior to xmas tree removal, a wire sling being used to lift the spool piece broke. The sling that parted had a safe operating limit of 1
tonne and had been rated to 2 tonnes as part of a batch t st. The approximate weight of the spool piece is half a tonne. Although having suffered catastrophic failure. The sling showed no undue
signs of defect.
During wireline operations, a drift run was being performed. When pulling out of the hole the wireline operator noticed an increase in weight, eventually being unable to move the tool. Whilst
investigatiing the wire parted. As a consequence the pressure i the lubricator forced the wire out through the lubricator stuffing box, resulting in a release of gas. The lubricator stuffing box was
fitted with a "blow out plug" which failed to operate properly. Gas release was limited due to the hmv closure securing the well & the bop and swab valves were also closed. A senior production
operator in the area was alerted and he routed most of the lubricator contents via the flowline to the closed drains. No gas detection was activated as a result of this release.
Activities in progress - attempting to conduct 2 surveys for the mwd and observe perameters for the smith whipstock tool run. The toolpusher picked up the drill string to conduct a second survey,
100 feet higher than the first unsuccessful attempt. Whilst using the "rigserv-crown-saver" warning lights (emergency braking system) as an indication of elevator height, the travelling block
made contact with the crown block assembly. At this stage the brake was applied and the toolpusher was unaware that contact had been made. The travelling block was lowered and brake
released. Investigations were commenced, but the full scenario did not become evident until closer inspection in daylight. An investigation team was set up and the certifying authority and bis
inspection asked to assist.

The east crane was lowering a container of chemicals through the hatch on the roof of mod 6 into the sackstore below, when the crane ceased to lower. The crane mechanic found that the retarder
pump drive spline had failed, causing the crane to stop in a f il safe mode. The load was transferred to the west crane and safely lowered. A new pump was fitted to lower boom into the rest for
further investigation.
A 3te adjustable beam trolley and chain block was attached to the east crane 4te swl maintenance davit. Whilst the davit was being rotated into position, the trolley started to move along the beam
due to wind conditions and davit motion. It was presumed t e end stops would prevent the trolley from falling off, but they did not. The beam trolley and chain block fell to the skid deck, striking
the expamet protective cover to the manway hatch of a transportable chemical tank. (containing tross scaletreat). Da age was limited to the expamet, none to the tank, and the portable lifting
equipment.
While unloading an interstage cooler from a mini container it was being supported 15cm from the ground prior to being lifted into position on the plant. The webbing strop failed and the
interstage cooler toppled over causing minor damage to the pipedeck. he cooler was known to weigh 1 tonne and was being supported by a strop with a 2 tonne rating. The strop had been
examined prior to use and judged t be in good condition.
The left hand threaded coupling at the top of kelly backed out allowing the kelly to free fall through the rotary table and carry on through the bop area removing the cover plate and to pierce the
cover plate on the skid deck. It was stopped from travelli g futher by the top of the kelly coming to rest on the rotary table, the bottom of the kelly was then projecting approx 5 ft into wellhead
area.
During an electric line plt the wire line units power pack was switched off and the park brake failed causing 1000 ft of wire to be spooled uncontrolled into the well.
The <...> slim line (bop) wire line unit is shipped with its long axis parrel to the deck, it has to be upended so that it can be transferred to the bop deck between the support structure beams. This
operation was being carried out by changing the our point bridle onto the top lifting lugs. The crane was being banked by radio. As the load became upended and just "floating" on the deck it
went out of control slid westward and struck a section of handrail which was forced from the deck support socket . It then fell to bop deck below. The area immediately below the rail in the bop
deck was barriered off and no-one was inside the barrier. However one operator was out of sight beneath the overhang, the handrail landed beside him.
Whilst putting the newly supplied quick erect type scaffold onto its storage location at east end of top deck central walkway by means of the ne crane an adjustable leg slipped out of its housing
and fell approx 5 m narrowly missing the snr deck operator ho was banking the load. The screw adjustable leg is held in place with an interal seg- mented plastic collar which is opened [release]
end closed [locked] by a rotating circ collar on the main frame. The plastic collar in the locked position grips the th ead of the adjustable leg and holds it in place. It is not readily noticeable
whether the lock is in position or not and with no weight on the ext led the locking collar is quite free to move. Weather played no part in this accident, at the time the weather was calm.
Lifting an elec motor onto a pump mounted in the vertical position, using chain block and tackle. No single lifting point was available to fit the motor in the vertical position so 3 lifting slings
were rigged around the drive and flange mounting on the m tor frame. The motor needed to be sited slightly off centre of the lifting beam point, this being accommodated by a 2nd chain block
used for pulling the unit on centre. During the unnecessary re-rigging employed to get the correct motor orientation, afte initial placement of the unit, the motor toppled when the weight was
taken on the chain block and the momentum of the toppling motor put undue strain on the chain causing it to part and subsequent falling of the motor 5 ft onto the deck.
Drill ops on well 1-2. Pulling out of hole driller heard something drop beside him in the driller's consol. Drill line spooler safety sling shackle found on rig floor. Shackle pin found also on rig
floor. Shackle pin retaining split pin not found. Split p n had snapped, been incorrect ly fitted or potentially had not been fitted allowing the shackle pin retaining nut to work loose and the shackle
to therefore fall off.
Whilst moving the wireline power pack using the bop crane a scaffolding clip fell from above and landed on the deck 2-3 ft from one of the personnel inv in the op. No work was in progress
above and it is believed the clip had been left either on the crane chassis or on one of the beams above the crane. The superstructure above the bop deck was subsequently checked and reported
clear of further foreign objects.
Trainee crane op driving the crane at the time. Backloaded lift tilted at a sharp angle and loosely stowed fittings fell out the container and fell approx 12 feet onto deck. No one injured

The north west crane was unloading the supply vessel <...>. As the crane driver commenced lifting a drum of cable it rolled off the carrying frame and dropped approximately four feet onto the
deck of the supply vessel. No further attempts were mad to offload the cable drum. The supply boat returned the equipment to <...> for inspection. No report that the skid caught or impacted
other equipment during straight lift. Verbal report of skid damage after the incident.
The <...> crew were rigging down from <...> on completion of a scale squeeze. Whilst retrieving the speed-head(hammer union/chicksan crossover) the 1 ton sling parted due to application of
excess load. The immediate cause of the excess load was re-engagemen of the hammer union and tree cap threads when the union slipped during the lift. Equipment being used was the bop crane
6 ton auxiliary hoist. The <...> operative working the hoist didn't hear the warning given by the operator positioned in the egg box.
The load was initially lowered from the top deck level over the water to a point above the supply boat prior to slewing the load over the deck of landing. The crane was then jibbed down to
position the load over the landing area just above the deck prior o attempting to box the load up to the previously positioned backload. It was at this stage of the op that the crane operator saw the
boat drop away and to one side of the load. When the boat rose on the swell it did not resume its orig posi- tion having oved location by approx 4 ft causing on the riser the sus- pended half
height to strike its inboard edge on the chemical tank the load was intended to be boxed up against.this caused the suspended half height to tilt sufficiently to induce movement of the contents
against the half height of the door thereby causing the door to open, dropping some of the contents onto the boat's deck from a height of approx 8 ft.
Wind 6 kts, direction 250 deg, sig wave 0.7 mtr, max wave 1.4 mtr tide dir 338 deg, tide speed 1.5 kts (predicted only) vessel hdg 145 deg the standby vessel <...> was being used to complete an
inter- field transfer from the <...> platform. This involved the offloading of 2 lifts and the backloading of 2 lifts. The <...> entered the <...> platform 500 mtr zone after gaining authorisation to do
so. The vessel took up station on the south side of the <...> and lifting operations commenced. The first two lifting operations were completed without incident. The crane hook was then attached
to a watertight container and was being prepared to be lifted. As this occurred the bow of the vessel started to drift to the portside (towards the direction of the a<...>) the vessel master was
requested to come back on station and attempted to do so utilising his bow thruster. The master was unable to maintain station and commenced to pull away from the jackets as he was concerned
that the tide would take him onto the <...>. As the vessel attempted to avoid a collision the crane operator followed the stern of the vessel with his boom and was at the same time paying out the
rope. As the vessel turned north the crane boom was prevented from following it due to the <...> vent stack support suructure.as a result of the angle of the vessel and the boom the crane jib began
Whilst unloading scaffold material from supply vessel a clipbasket suffered damage with one of four lifting points fractured.
<...> fire pump string being lifted at time of incident. No injuries. Level 3 investigation being carried out by oim. Winch has been quarrantined for 3rd party inspection by amec. No other winches
on board.
Running-in-hole.the blocks were being run up for a stand of drill pipe when the tong fell to the drill floor.the hanging line was observed bet- ween frame and air blower hose.the tong started to lift
and witnesses on drill floor and monkey board shouted a warning.the line parted and tong fell approx 2 metres to deck.investigation suggests that the tong trave- lled up due to tension on the
wire,straightening 4 tonne shackle.tong then whipped upwards.when released by retainer chain,draw works stopped, so no onger tension on wire.tongs fell back and momentum was sufficient to
part wire when it contacted sharp edge of flange securing air blower hose.
Rigger had fitted a 1 ton beam trolley to beam to lift equip up to next level - approx 5 ft. He was running the beam trolley to site above the load when a screw and spacer fell. He took the trolley
back to ascertain prob and one wheel fell off. No injury to personnel occurred.
A container <...> taken off the<...> <...>, which contained 10 off 205 ltr drums of oil/chemical. There were all removed with the use of barrell clamps. <...> at approx 1840 this container was to
be backloaded onto the <...>. During this procedure the container was in collision with several others whilst attempting to position on deck of the ship. Finally in position crane op noticed that
the door was now lying on the deck of the ship. It was no longer attached to the container. A investigation by the ships captain concluded that the safety retaining pins fro the door hinges had
been dislodged or not securely fitted. There were no injuries/damage to equipment. Door fell approx 2 metres. Container certification was in date. Corr ctive actions: all container door hinges
must be checked for locking pins prior to shipping. Deck personnel must check all doors retaining pins are in places and in good condition before containers are moved about the deck or
backloaded. To ensure all per onnel are aware of this responsibility a "poster" will be sited on notice boards and message on cctv. <...> materials controller to raise service improvements
document [sid] to <...>, highlighting the above occurrance and need for intervention

Two hydraulic arms parted and frame dropped 2 feet onto bop site made safe. No injuries. The aim of the activity was to lift the bop from the riser using the bop lifting equipment and to traverse it
north to its stowage position, a normal drilling activit . During preparations to lift the bop from the riser the bop stack clamps and turnbuckles retraining the bop were removed and the weight of
the stack was taken by the two lifting rams and frame to support the bop prior to moving. On taking the weight, the bop (weight 53 tons) was lifted approx 1-2 inches off the riser when the two
rams fractured and parted at the connection to the lifting frame. The bop dropped back onto the riser causing the riser to be pushed down approx 0.75 inches. The bop was immediat ly secured by
the turnbuckle restraints and and securing clamps at the riser connection. An investigation team was set up by the oim to investigation the immediate and underlying causes. After dicussion with
the hse the rams and clevis pins were removed a d sent onshore for metallurgical analysis to established mode of failure.
During pulling and racking of 5 1/2" drill pipe after running liner on n20 well, on racking back a stand, a roughneck on the drill floor heard somthing ratle down the drill pipe. On investigation it
was found that a guide block and bolts had fallen from t e racker head assembly 90ft to the drill floor. The block weighed approx 0.5kg. The block was secured by two bolts, it is suspected the
bottom bolt vibrated loose and dropped and the top bolt sheared, the block and bolts could not be located after they dropped.
During top hole drilling 2 x 1 1/2 bolts dropped 90 ft from the hydraulic (bj) elevators to the drill floor. On inspection the bolts had been checked approximately 30 minutes previously as part of
operational checks. The bolts had been secured with lockin wire. The cause of the bolts dropping is thought to be the excessive vibration on the elevators during this top hole drilling phase. An
increase frequency for checks was implemented and the hydraulic elevator was replaced by manual elevator.
During pulling out of the hole with the drill string after drilling in 12 1/4" hole section the derrick man was racking back a stand of 5 1/2" drill pipe in the derrick finger with th derrick upper
racker arm system as the drilled cont'd to pull the drill string out of the hole for the racking back of the next stand, the top drive link tilt hydraulic hose protection bar contacted the upper racker
arm head, shearing the 4 pro- tection bar retaining bolts. The protection bar, approx weight 4 lbs, then fall a prox 86 ft to the drill floor the original design of this system includes an audible alarm
to commun- icate potential collision between top drive/link tilt and the upper racker arm. This did not operate in this instance. A recent mod to the top drive link tilt system did not include a mod
to this audible alarm sector sensor flag.
During drilling operations, when pulling pipe out of the hole on well np30, the main block over-ran the crown-o-matic safety device and continued on to impact with the crown. Severe damage to
the travelling block, crown sheaves and adjacent structural st elwork was sustained. No injuries to personnel occurred and no damage to the drill floor was sustained. At this time drilling
operations have been suspended until repairs can be effected. Also well left in a safe condition.
Failure of 3.1 tonne swl elephant chain block during maintenance operations on sea sump pump load on block at time estimated at 0.5 tonne was estimated ay 0.5 tonne was in the process of
beiong lowered when chain anchored end ran off the chain block. Load fell 6-8 feet untill the load chain locked in the hook pulley. This allowed the load to be retieved another block.
Drill floor trigger winch (hydraulic) allowed suspended load to desend under gravity after power was switched off
Using tugs and a dsv, the caisson was floated into a position where it was to be hooked up to platform lifting equipment, to allow lifting into its final position. After it had been pulled into its final
'sea' position and before it could be lifted, wave otion caused the caisson to heave considerably more than had been anticapated. This excess heaveapplied repeated shock loads to the rigging and
these loads were transmitted via the lifting wire 'a' to sheave no 5 as a result the side plates of sheave no distorted and allowed wire a to come free.
The drilling drawworks was in operation pulling pipe out of the hole. Whilst pulling up in casing, in high/high gear the drilling line spooler lost tension allowing the wire to oscillate. The
toolpusher who was operating the drawworks responded by easing ff the throttle. As he did so the spooler assembly dropped 15 ft down the wire stopping short of drawworks drum. Investigation
revealed that the support line had failed as a result of running through a shackle rather than a sheave block. A retaining wire lso parted as the spooler mechanism lost support.
Sbv was delivered interfield transfer cargo to platform, the 3rd and final lift had been hooked onto platform crane when vessel's stern thruster failed. Vessel could not hold station and despite
efforts to payout line whilst following her movements the cr ne operator determined he would need to activate the auto line payout and vacate the cab in line with procedures this he did. Shortly
thereafter he noticed that the 3.5 ton container had fallen off rear rail and insufficient tension having been generated o trigger the line release mech. Crane operator saw the container floating and
so returned to his cab to effect its retrieval.

Whilst lowering a heavy lift (load 26.2 tones - coiled tubing reel). To a boat, the crane experienced main hoist hydraulic hose fitting failure. The crane fail safe systems operated as designed, the
weight was then lowered to the boat using the emergency system. After a quick repair the crane was then re-tested and the load was then re-positioned. (repair time 2 hours)
A memory valve on the crane hydraulic locking system failed due to a cable becoming damaged. This caused the crane elec systems to shutdown. The crane systems failed safe. No load was on
the hook at the time of the inc. Boat unloading op was in progress a this time but the vessel was not placed by risk when the crane came to a halt.
Druing change out of the bottom hole assembly to coninue drilling ahead on a8 the last joint of bha had been picked up from the catwalk and landed on the drill floor. The 'e' tugger hook was
then secured to the breakout samson post and the line tensioned by pulling on the tugger. It is suspected that unknown to the person operting the tugger that the line had blown across the dolly
track and became snagged on a joining plate prior to tensioning. As a result when the top drive was raised the tugger wire ecame entangled in the blocks and was stressed beyond breaking point.
The wire parted approx 30ft above the drill floor, allowing approx 275 feet of wire to fall to the drill floor 150' below the top tugger sheave.
Well a5 was being prepared for well access operations. Hoses were required to be run from the halliburton pumping unit to the well bay. In order to minimise the routing on the skid deck area it
was decided to provide access via well a2 skid deck hatch. he well access hatches are 1.0 m square, approx., And secured to the skid deck with countersunk screws. Prior to lifting the hatch a
scaffold barrier was erected around the hatch location to provide personnel protection following removal of the hatch cove . A two leg wire sling was attached to the hatch cover lifting points
with the master ring inserted into the lifting hook of the west crane. On attempting to remove the hatch cover the work party noticed that only one side of the hatch cover was raising ollowed by
the failure of one leg of the sling. The cause of the accident was due to the fact that one of the countersunk retaining screws had not been removed and thus the hatch cover was still partially
attached to the skid deck.
The drill crew were changing elevators 3 3/8" to 2 7/8" on the top drive unit. Using the east tugger the 3 3/8" elevators were removed. As per procedure the end of the tugger line was fastened to
the adjacent securing post, the slack line reeled in and a visual inspection carried to ensure the line was taut and not snagged. Two persons were satisfied that the line was freee and one signalled
the drill (who is unsighted at the console) the 2 7/8" elevators were fitted manually and a few minutes later the op unit was moved upward in the 'dolly track'. Somehow the tugger line was
picked up by the top drive in in motion, strain applied in excess of the design, and the line parted approx 50 feet above the winch on the 'standing' fall. Being released the wir unravelled over the
top sheave and fell to the rig floor. No injuries.
Maint being carried out on deck crane to calibrate load indicator. Boom was being lifted to min radius to check boom marks with the radius indicator. At min radius the fitting on the supply hose
to the hydraulic rams failed causing loss of hydraulic flui to main deck. Boom lowered to max radius on the rams with partial control by hydraulic check visits. Crane operator pressed the engine
stop butto actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
Whilst re-instating main hatch cover handrail fell through open hatch to wellhead area below.
Whilst erecting a scaffold in the accommodation at level 03 the scaffolder placed a tubular on the walkway, as he turned round the rubular rolled over the edge under the guard rail falling approx
25'.
Technician carrying lengths of 6m instrument tubing around walking on the north side of puq platform. Rested tubing at a corner on handrails. When he went to pick up the tubing it overbalanced
slipped from his grasp and fell to the next level landing at the access area for the interplatform bridge.
During routine testing the no 3 bay panels dropped down in an uncontrollled manner following the supporting wire breaking
A stainless steel shheting protective cover, approx 4' x 4', fell from the south bop crane approx 30' onto bop deck. Unknown numberr of cover secruing devices - pop rivets had been removed
and the cover re-secured by plastic tie wraps. It is deduced th t to gain access to the crane drive motor for maintenance, the pop rivets had been removed to allow the sheet to be folded back for
access and re-secured with tie wraps. The folding would have caused deformation to the sheeting causing the sheet to foul t e underside of the rig support beams, which, when currently fitted,
clears the support beam by 1". The sheet fouling the beam caused the remaining rivets to shear and the edge of the stainless sheet to cut through the tie-wraps, causing the sheeting to fa l, being
unsecured to the frame. Upon inspection it was found that the cover of the north bop crane was in a similar condition.

A scaffold was being erected on the north face of the drill derrick to allow access to replace, repair and secure the monkey board windfall. Whilst lowering a 20' tube into place using a securing
rope it caught on a check fitting slackening the knot (clov hitch) the pole fell hitting a handrail on the west side of the derrick and falling to the bop deck. All areas had been barriered off and
tannoys made prior to the work commencing, the pole fell into an area that was restricted to all personnel.
Repairs were being carried out to the <...> crane walkway, this involved cutting away old deck plate prior to installing new sections. Whilst waiting on scaffolding to be built under the walkway,
the work was progressed by "part" cutting the open sections of walkway, the open sections were then covered to allow persons to walk on the surface. It would appear that a section was "part" cut
too far leaving insuffcie- nt metal to metal contact to keep it in place. It then fell off when it was covered up or as result of vibration due to persons walking on the walkway. The piece of metal
was found some 5hrs 15mins after the was completed for that day, therefore the time that the piece of metal became loose and fell is unknown. The piece of metal is 430mm long, mm thick and
tapers from 50mm at on end to a sharp point at the other, it weighs 1lb and fell 20mts
<...> broucher capsule semi released 15' down causing significant damage to capsule rendering it unuseable. Being made safe by intervention crew. Platform not manned at time.
Platform personnel were removing 6" blowdown line whilst working from a crane work basket. Basket was resting against blow down line, when the last bolt was removed the blowdown line
moved. This allowed the rtu ring gasket to fall to the platform weather deck. This work was observe by the platform mech. Fitter who immediately vacated personnel from the area below prior to
the incident.
Production operator proceeding to lower separation area when dropped object hit deck approx 7' - 8' away. Object retrieved and found to be the backplate half of a scaffolding band and plate
fitting. Upon investigation found sacffolding section being remo ed at upper deck level, but had gailed to barrier off area below.
Rigging up on well for coiled tubing work. It was necessary to modify the rig up to accomodate local pipework. Whilst manually handling the spm check valve (approximately 80lbs weight) it
slipped from the two operators hands from waist height and droppe approximately 13 feet via a deck penetration (for flowline) to the lower wellbay area. The wellbay on both levels barriered off
for the task in hand. Likely causes: failure to recognise options to eliminate manual handling. Failure to re-assess manaua handling techniques in light of new heavier/bulkier check valve. Lack
of awareness in relation to two man lifting techniques. Fatigue and personal circumstances may have been factors. Personnel involved contacted safety department. Full investigation instigated.
During routine deck operations a deck operator found a small metal plate (200mm x 125mm) lying on the laydown area on the roof of module 1. The plate (weight 400gms) was later established
to be the identification plate from one of the <...> burners on the flare tip. Distance fallen 94.5metres. Wind speeds in the area for the preceding 48hrs was 30-42knots, measured at sea level.
Scaffolders were positioning scaffolde materials on module 6 sub sstructure in preparation for erecting a work platform. Transoms and ledgers were being stacked on a grating walkway several at
a time, in a near vertical manner, leaning against a handrail during this operation a 2.5 metre length of culpeck quick fit scaffold tube slipped across the walkway and fell through a 280mm gap
underneath the handrail on the landing on the impact deck of module 5, approx. 12.5metres below. Personnel were working o the imp[act deck at the time the nearest one apprx. 16 metres from
where the tube landed.
Personnel preparing to commence work. Rolled out a section of 'fire blanket' which, unknown to them, contained a section of 'chartek' flame retardent cotaing approx. 9" * 4". The section
dropped from the scaffold working area to the deck 35' below. Per onnel descended from the scaffold, confirmed no damage to plant, personnel or equipment and resumed work. The incident has
been brought to the attention of all offshore staff, including ways of preventing recurrence.
Personnel were on safety induction tour of facility, walking along cellar deck when a scaffold fitting fell from above narrowly missing one person. Work in prog was dismantling of over the side
scaffold. Area below was not barriered as it was not envisage that any dropped objects could land on platform the work area being well out board.
This was a failur of rigging equipment of unknown origin on the telford caisson diving platform installation. In addition incorrect rigging practices which could have led to personal injury and
damage.
An unsecured offcut of module cladding material (est 8 to 10 ft long x 1ft wide) blown overboard from the scafolding outside f module and landed on the supply vessel <...> that was alongside
working cargo. No injuries or property damage were sustained.
During the evening coffee break the juice machine short-circuited, a small fire erupted in the machine which was discovered by the personnel present in the shop. The electrical plug was pulled
and the fire in the machine died out by itself.

There were two events running one after the other to be discussed. 1. Two <...> techs were completing planned maintenance on the air compressor starter located in switchboard ps 4007 itself
located in m8 deck. Part of the pmr is to function test various electrical items with the starter withdrawn. To function test these items a "test supply" is required. This test supply was fond to be
deenergised and during fault finding for this supply the fuse suppling the relay marshalling board was removed by mist ke resulting in all closed circuit breakers on ps 4007 opening. This stopped
the main hvac fans resulting in a production shutdown. The two <...> techs immediately informed m13 control room of the cause of the production shutdown. 2. On restart of the ain hvac fans,
safety supply fan b non drive end bearing overheated and collapsed. The resulting smoke was drawn through the supply ducting via the other safe supply fans causing smoke detection to be
activated in m9 and m17, resulting in the gpas sounding and a platform muster.
Fire on temporary generator. Quoted to be a hot surface. Engine block was red hot fire extinguished at 06:55 hours muster on <...> + <...> at 06:55. No injuries: investigation team mobilised:
relevant hse inspector notified 10:30 <...>.
Due to a problem with the main gas generator the diesel generator was started and put on load at 11:42 hrs on <...>. At 11:57 hrs the generator room u/v detectors alarmed and personnel mustered.
<...> and <...> who were in the control room. On the production platform extinguished the fire within two minutes of the fire being detected using a co2 extinguisher. The engine was water
cooled for a short time using a hose.
At 14:40 hrs the general alarm sounded with subsequent platform esd. While racking in the solar 3 breaker an explosion occurred within the cubicle, throwing the electrical tech backwards and
producing smoke and sparks. All personnel were evacuated from th building and a platform muster carried out. Fire team investigated the incident scene, checked the area and pronounced it
clear. During this time we also had a comms failure to <...>, and a partial closing of 27e esdv 2024.
Whilst starting up generator no 2 which was noisy and running eratically, upon opening enclosure doors a small fire was found coming from vent of alternator. The unit's emergency stop was
pushed and the fire extinguished using dry powder. Total duration of fire was one minute.
The <...> hlv was located on the west side of the platform having completed the lift of the cdm. <...> construction were cutting away the lifting frame, when a gauge attached to an acetylene
cylinder. The firewatcher in attendance extinguished the f re with the assistance of the plant supervisor, by isolating the cylinder. No fire extinguisher was utilised. The above events were
witnessed by osd operations inspectors <...>.
Normal production operations were ongoing when a heat detector activated indicating excessive rise in temperature in a turbine enclosure. On investigation an operator discovered a fire and
activated a co2 fixed system which also initiated a shutdown of t e turbine driven compressor. A general alarm was sounded on the platform and emergency personnel attended to the incident. The
scene was secured until the hse were informed and full internal investigation in accordance with company safety management systems initiated.
Following shutdown of the machine for maintenance, the run up sequence was in progress when a small quantity of lube oil ignited. The lube oil was located under the machine in a skid base. The
fire was extinguished by the fixed co2 system manually activat d by operations personnel on scene at the time. Full platform emergency procedures were followed including a muster and
notification of hm coastguard. Investigations into the cause are ongoing.
During normal operating conditions with turbines on-load, a small fire occurred in gt3 turbine enclosure. Ird's in gt3 initiated red hazard status and platform shutdown in accordance with the
cuase and effect matrix (sps). Two technicians were dispatched from the ccr to investigate and determine if the indication was genuine. The power technician was also sent to the area. On
approaching gt3, a small fire was seen within the turbine enclosure, which was easily extinguished with a hand-held dry powder ext nguisher. The site of the fire was on the top cover of the lub oil
sump. The ccr was informed and personnel stood-by the site to ensure that re-ignition did not occurr whilst the machine cooled. Further examination of the sump tank top revealed only a thin
coating of lub oil.
A small fire occurred on the bed of the turbine under the bifurcated ducting, this was due to the accumulation of oil seeping into the lagging on the ducting and heat generated by the hot exhaust
ingnited the oil. The fire was immediately detected by the ird fire detectors, shutting down the turbine and process. Two technicians went to investigate the fire. A small fire was extinguished
with a dry powder extinguisher. Large amounts of smoke were released when the doors were opened, and detected by the s oke detection in the turbine hall, the emergency support team
monitored the area and used a co2 extinguisher to cool the area.

Employees observed a higher than normal volume of 'steam' emanating from the tumble drier located in the smokers tea shack. The door of the unit was opened to investigate and the contents of
the machine (overalls) burst into flames. The door of the unit was immediately closed and the alarm was raised initially by telephoning the control room. At the same time the heat detector above
the tumble drier activated the fire and gas system and put the platform nto red hazard status. Attempts were made by the e ployees to extinguish the fire with a co2 extinguisher, but this was not
successful. With the smoke levels increasing the shack was evacuated by the personnel who then proceeded to their muster points. A drilling support team of four persons was sent to the scene
with b.a. equipment and two of the team entered the area with two co2, one dry powder extinguishers and b.a. sets to attempt to extinguish the fire. At this point the sprinkler head at the side of
the machine operated. The two extinguishers we e operated but they did not extinguish the fire. The b.a. team then withdrew to their b.a control point. At this time the platform support team
arrived on the scene and took over firefighting duties. All power to the shack was isolated and confirmation of this was received by the team leader. A three man team then entered the area with a
The assignments to both motors were adjusted in different combinations balance could not be achieved. The rig mechanic was called to rig floor for assistance, his first reaction was to check the
engine room. There was nothing abnormal and he returned to he drill floor leaving the motorman in the engine room. There was nothing abnormal and he returned to the drill floor leaving the
motorman in the engine room. The motorman in the engine noticed smoke coming form the vents/mud pumps and rotary table, he o ened the door saw fire and set off the gpa then returned to the
panel to extinguish the fire using a dry power extinguisher. The rig mechanic who had made his was to the engine room from the rig floor to his muster point, arrived and isolated the stop bu tons
on each of the generatos preventing the driller from assigning any dc.
Fire on <...>. A number of scaffold boards on a scaffold above the avon generator caught fire - possibly as a result of exhaust fumes. Fire spotted early and put out by emergency team within 5
minutes. There was a muster and platform was shutdown no injuries no2 damage.
As part of a major refurbistment/enhancement of avon generator sets, a part de-isolation of g1010, to allow a 'dry-crank' test run, was in progress. A part constructed service water system was
pressurised against a closed valve. The system pressure over ame a relief valve (set at 4.7 bar) and discharged through an open ended line into cd17 switch room. The area technician realised the
relief valve had lifted and closed the supply valve. However, a quantity of water breached 6.6kv cubicles bcg 1020 and b k 9310 causing a flash-over which resulted in damage to circuit breakers
and bus bars.
Fire in sample skid in wellhead module. Extinguished. Platform shutdown. All accounted for situation under control. No report of explotion. Not a major fire.
Smoke was noticed to be issuing from door into the north fire pump module on pt platform. Reported to the icc who raised a ga and dispatched personnel to inv. The cause was identified as
smoke/steam issuing from diesel engine jacket water heater due to a ailure of con- trol thermostat.
Whilst transfering oil drums, the crane's boom developed a small fire halfway along the boom. Fire was caused by overheating of hydrolic and pneumatic hoses, which were close to the <...>
compression turbine exhaust stacks also situated on m6 roof
Turbine po4 was being test run by the <...> engineers, and the machine had been running for approximately 30 minutes. The engineers were engaged in visual surveillance of the turbine and
observed a small flame beneath the exhaust coupling and immedi tely reported this to the mol control room. Po4 was immediately shut down and a production tech responded to the scene with a
portable halon extinguisher, assessed the extent fo the fire, estimated to be approx 0.1 sq metres with a 15mm flame height. The ent fans were shut down, hood door opened and the halon
directed at the flames with immediate effect. The turbine hood was resealed and the ops supervisor notified.
Supply cables flashed in terminal supply box to k10 air compressor. A flame and smoke alarm were activated. Compressor motor tripped immediately on earth leakage protection. No fire
present on emergency team's arrival on site, only some residual smoke rom the box. No fire or smoke damage to motor. Motor was an industrial unit and not ex rated. All fire and gas equipment
and control actions took place as per design.
2 maintenance technicians noticed a small flame on sp221 coalescer transformer on m3 roof east. The flame was on the north high voltage terminal chamber and an area glowing red was
observed on top of the expansion bellows. The cause of the incident was he failure of the high voltage, up to 22kv, flexible connection between the transformer insulatior and the vessel high
voltage bushing. The flexible connection which is designed to absorb therminal deflection served at about the centre. This produced a park plug effect melting the copper from the transformer
connection end. Eventually the gap was wide enough for the arc to transfer to erath. The control room was notified and a surface platfrom intitiated.
Fire in a waste container within the stairwell of the accommodation module. This resulting ain smoke logging of 2 stairwell levels and required a precautionary general alarm. The area was
internal. The area is used for domestic activities.. No persons were injured.

During the morning of the <...> the south east navigation warning light equipment caught fire. This caused extensive damage to the batteries and wiring. <...> is not a normally manned
installation and the damage was discovered during a day tri to <...> on <...> where part of the work scope was to investigate a navigation aid common alarm which had been activated on the <...>
incident being investigated the relevant parties (<...> board and <...>) have been informed.
Hotwork was ongoing at the east side of the skid deck, which involved burning sections of 1" beam. The work was controlled by the permit to work system, uv's were inhibited, fireblanket placed
over the deck drains and a firewatcher nominated. Gas checks had been carried out and a portable gas detector was in use at the worksite. During the burning operation, some gas migrated up the
drains to the skid deck, and was ignited. The control room operator received two messages, one by radio and one by teleph ne that the drains were on fire. Control room operator initiated the fire
alarm. The platform went muster stations and the fire team responded. The people carrying out the hotwork and the roustabout took the initiative to run out a fire hose. Within t o minutes of the
alarm being initiated, the fire team leader was at the scene, and reported in that he could see no evidence of fire on the skid deck. Weather conditions was 25 knots (nw), however, the area on the
skid deck was very sheltered and was tot lly protected from the wind. The work was progressing adjacent to deck drains. The drains had been covered with fire blanket, but no bung had been
inserted into the actual drain. The production operators had drained down instrumentation on process vesse s during the lunch break. No repeat gas check was carried out prior to restarting work
While welding out beam extensions on the south side of the platform, main deck, a small fire occured in the habitat in which the welder was working. The welder reported that he heard a bang,
saw flames and flet heat. He alerted his firewatch who was at th upper level, and also heard the bang. He descended from the middle to the lower levle of three levle habitat and extinguished the
flames. There was no injury to personnel and no damage to equipment. Causes:- inspection of the havitat and work site after he incident showed one small charred area on the white tarpaulin and
two burnt areas on the blue tarpaulin neither larger than two feet in the habitat. Blue and white are used for simplicity of decription and also to indicate that two different materials ere used. Two
checks for presence of hydrocarbons by different operations staff were negative. Bottles containing gases used for cutting and burning were stored on the main deck adjacent to the habitat and
were shut at main valves. Burn tests were done o samples of the two tarpaulins under workshop conditions and both burned when a naked flame was applied, but neither exhibited the intensity of
flame described by the welder. Flame from the white tarpaulin was very weak while that from the blue tarpaulin as much stronger. The cause of the fire was not firmly established but is assumed
Normal production conditions. All platform electrical load was being transferred onto generator 'a' at 11:34 by personnel. A loud & unfamilliar noise was heard closely followed by shutdown on
voted flame detected in the enclosure. Platform general alarm was activated automatically. Control room operator observed 'extinguishant released indication' on f&f panel for generator enclosure
'a'. Interior of enclosure was inspected through viewing windows, observing halon mist. No fire/flame evident. Further examination revealed that an igniter plug port blanking plate had burnt
through this would allow hot combustion gases/flames to exit the engine casing, which in turn activate the fire detection system. On close inspection/strip down it was found that part of the
blanking support liner shank and cap had been burnt away. 2 associated gaskets had also been burnt through. Signs of a hot gas flow path was evident on the engine casing, but no other damage
could be seen. No damage to internal parts was visible through the engine casing port. The engine vendors <...> were contacted for advice and guidance. <...> advised that they had seen this
problem before but not oftem. Various precautionary measure were discussed as a safeguard before returning the unit to operation. The remaining blanking plugs [3] have been examined, no
During fault finding on diesel engine of <...> wireline unit, diesel fuel filters were taken off and disposed of in a compactor bag stored on the pipedeck. Shortly thereafter a flash fire occurred in
the void space between the living quarters and t e drilling module. The fire was effectively extinguished using a high pressure washdown jet. A fire hose was later deployed to provide further
cooling
Waste oil (probably lube oil) was disposed of in a compactor bag on the pipedeck. A small amount of oil leaked out of the bag and dripped into the void space and onto a hot exhaust stack
resulting in a flash fire which was extinguished using a portable dry powder extinguisher.
Electrical isolator in the off position for <...>. Dry conditio elect. Enclosure destroyed by fire, b.b.c. type g.h.g. 263 enclosure probable elect. Short circuit due to moisture ingress. Picked up by
one flame detect. Operator checked and confir ed portable dp extinguisher used same time second flame detect. Picked up and operated fixed system (deluge) prod. S/d mustered until confirmed
elect. Isolation.
The platform alert was sounded indicating a fire in the plq laundry. Upon arrival found smoke emitting from the door leading into the laundry two stewards were in the laundry prior to the alarm
sound. The smoke was quite heavy. A two man team wearing ba entered the laundry to find no 2 tumble drier with flames inside the drum. The flames were extinguished and smoke dispersed.

Following the running of turbine z3150 for some 30 mins, the unit tripped the unit had been under observation following start-up having earlier had the skid cleaned of lube oil. As a precaution
against exhaust lagging ignition a charged fire hose had been run out and operations personnel advised to be extra vigalent at the unit, in addition to which personnel were position to observe the
exhaust stack for non-standing emmissions. Within one minute of tripping the operator observed a small fire at the botto of the power turbine in the area of rock wool insulation, the control room
was informed and the decision was taken to open the turbine hood door and extinguish the fire with the pre-charged hose. The extinguishing of insulating material took less than 5 econds. The
insulation was then removed to ensure no deep seated fire existed and that the fire was not burning within the casing.
A metal 5 gallon drum containing mixed rigidon 503 (coating system). A paint roller used to apply rigidon p21 rolling aid, two rags soaked in rigidon t2 (actone) and a 1 litre plastic container with
an unknown quantity of rigidon catalyst c3 was thrown in o a general rubbish skip. Shortly after it was deposited in the skip the contents of the drum self ignited. It was susequently confirmed by
the supplier that c3 catalyst will ignite if it comes into contact with metals in sunlight conditions. Weather at the time was sunny
During restart ops after a production shutdown heater was found to be on high temperature. The heater was annunciating tripped and could not be reset. There was still a supply to the heater
element. This supply was then isolated. The heater tube instru entation and pipework were all subject to overheating.
As the main drive start on the gas lift compressor lp was initiated, it caused the bus zone 2 trip on the right hand side of the 13.8kv switchboard to activiate causing loss of power generation and
platform blackout.
A stove hotplate in the galley was operating at approx 300 degrees (f) although no cooking was taking place. A jug of oil placed on the workbench opposite was knocked over and onto the
hotplate. The event was noticed by members of the catering staff who isolated the stove and placed a fireblanket over the hotplate. Smoke from the blanket activated the smoke alarms in the
galley and the platform placed on red hazard status. The drip tray beneath the hotplate contained oil that had steeped down and with he residual heat this ignited. A further fireblanket was placed
over the hotplate and water used to extinguish and cool.
Hydrocarbon gas release minor leakage around bolts
At 1440 hours, 'b' <...> gas compressor shut down due to a high level in the interstage condensate drum. During the restart sequence,the condensate drum was pressurised to 85 psi. Condensate
was being drained from level bridles on the interstage dr m to the closeed drain system when a leak developed at a swagelock fitting between the level bridle and the drain. Low gas levels were
detected by 3 low mounted gas detectors. The area operator and operations supervisor, who were carrying out the draining operation, were unable to immediately identify the source of the leak.
The operations supervisor instructed the main control room operator to shut down and depressure the unit. The leakage reduced, and the source was identified and isolated. When the are was
being washed down, the residual condensate was flushed towards the gas detectors, causing 2 of them to register high levels, resulting in a class 1 shutdown and a gpa. Approximately 2 litres of
hydrocarbons were released. The operation itself was saf and had been controlled. The basic cause of the release was poor fabrication and installation of a compression fitting and associated
tubing. The tubing is 2" longer than required and had been forced into position causing the nut to cross thread on the f tting. The drain system was checked for any similar fittings before restarting
Red hot work to remove internal baffle sections was being carried out in a separator vessel (2010a) in b module number 1 baffle was being removed using air gouging techniques, to gain access to
the vessel shell areas in preparation for repair. This was th last of atotal of 8 sections to be removed. As the welder was cutting into the section in question, a small fire started which was quickly
extinguished by the actions of the air jet from the air gouging torch. He recommensed the gouging when a further fi e occurred which immeadiatley spread up the the inclined fins of the baffle,
involving around 5 layers of the baffle fins. The firewatcher and the welder attempted to extinguish the fire using dry chemical extinguishers on site but were unsuccesful. They acated the vessel
and raised the alarm inthe permit office. <...> alarm was initiated and all the personnel were fully mustered and accounted for within 11 mins. 2 ert teams extinguished the fire, the gpa was
isolated and instruction for all personnel to tand down from the muster. An additional job safety analysis was held to discuss the remaining job workscope job particularly that involving red hot
work. Further thorough cleaning of the vessel and blasting of the remaining baffles was carried out. A cut ing disc was used to remove the last baffle section. The baffles were kept wept and a
This incident occurred when commissioning the b <...> gas compressor. The suction cooler tube bundle had been removed for repair onshore and had subsequently been returned and installed in
the cooler shell. As part of the isolation for the removal of the tube bundle, the source water supply and return lines were isolated and drained during the commissioning, it was noted that the level
in the suction scrubber 2-c104b had risen, possibly indicating that there was a leak in the tube bundle allowing water to pass into the scrubber via the shell of the cooler. To confirm this, the unbit
was started in order to put gas pressure into the cooler shell; gas pressure being higher than water pressure, the gas would leak into the water side if there was tube or tube plate communication.
This proved to be the case, and it was confirmed that communication existed between the water and gas sides of the cooler. The unit was shut down, the compressor depressurised and the water
supply and return shut off to the cooler. Ten minutes later, gas detectors in the vicinity of b dresser rand scrubber/cooler skid sensed gas concentration greater than 25% lel and generated a class 1
esd. Investigations showed that the drain valve in the cooling water supply 'y' piece was not fully closed and had allowed first water and then gas to be discharged to atmosphere from the leaking
Inservice failure on weld at elbow down stream of 10 tcv 1215 (oil outlet line from ist stage separator, by passing coolers)

During normal prod ops the area operator for module 4 [sep module] noticed a leak of water from a section of pipe which formed the level bridle for c1002 the 2nd stage separator. This leak
occurred due to internal corrosion o as weld. Due to the water lev l in the vessel and the leak occuring on the bottom leg of the bridle only produced water was being ejected untilthe bridle was
isolated. The level bridle also contain approx 3 ltrs of condensate floating on top of the water which was also ejected under p essure during depressurisation of the pipework, which was delayed
several mins due to a blocked drain valve system operating pressure = 11.5 bar
Normal ops were in progress. The area operator was on a general insp on his return to the module cr and approx 10 mins after passing the same area he noticed the leak. He at once isolated the
leak changed over lcv and informed the main cr. New spools are lready on order to replace the ones in position. The contents of the fluid was mainly water and oil with some entrapped gas.
<...> engines are in full operation to supply power during drilling operation for well. The diesel supply line to no2 cat. Sprung a leak at a point where it was clamped to the engine. This caused
diesel to spray across the top of the engine (hot) ausing ignition. The leak and fire were immediately spotted by the electrician and motorman in attendance. The fuel supply was switched off and
the fire was extinguished with a portable bcf ext.
Gas leak in process area of normally unmanned installation detected at bacton onshore terminal. Platform auto shutdown on high level detection initial pressure 123 bar. Leak from pressure
transmitter gaskelt [btwn transmitter and valve mani- fold].
Well pb 08 'o' ring failure on xmas tree loss of 100 litres of hydraulic fluid into sea from sssv circuit - sssv closed due to failure.
The a annulus pressure was 44 bar - over next 4 days the pressure fell to zero - initially this was believed to be a faulty p transmitter - the well was shut in and the annulus p remained at zero - ops
were carried out to check the p transmitter - tubing/ nnulus cross over valve was opened and immed annulus p equilibrated with flowline pressure - with the annulus master valve closed there was
no fall off in pressure - as soon as the annulus master valve was opened the pressure fell to zero.
<...> was shut i at the <...>. Pressure decline was observed in the subsea flowline and pinpointed by the the observation of bubbles by the standby vessel on <...>. Hse were informed but oir report
held back pending rov survey. Rov survey on <...> identified the exact flange within the subsea cage that was leaking natural gas.
A fractured occurred on a positive displacement condensate pumps lubri- cation system pipework the pipework was 1/4". A jet of condensate was released at a max of 40 psig to a height of 4 ft
veritcally into air. There was no gas entrained in the condensat . The failure was discovered by a passing worker who informed the prod dept. The pump was shutdown and isolated. Failure was
due to fatigue as the pipework had been inservice for numer- ous years. 1st failure of this type. Pipework on this and a similar p mp is to be renewed.
During leak testing of an esdv valve pipework on platform side of esd valve was vented to allow a leak test against sealine pressure to be carried out - whilst pipework was being vented liquid was
seen to be coming from platform hp vent - venting was stop ed and a small amount of liquid was observed running down vent stack.
Fuel gas leak on start up of gas turbine. Part of fuel pipes had been removed. On start up system automatically shut down. Fuel gas at 7psi leaked for 10 secs. No gas detection. No muster.
Jet of condensate coming from psv. Chief operator isolated psv, stopping the leak.
Gas was escaping from stem seal of valve - at this time flowline press- ure was approx 600 psi. Flowline was isolated and depressured and it was noted that the leak appeared to stop at around 300
psi. As the platform flowing pressure is normally around th s level this would account for the fact that this leak had not been noted earlier.
Rupture in pl 631, a 2" teg line between <...> and <...>.
Platform shutdown at 07:02 caused by a processing upset. In the procedure to restore the platform flow it was necessary to equalise the pressure across the platform esd valve. The venting lasted 4
minutes. During the first minute the gas condensate mix ej cted from the top of the vent stack into the sea.
Platform was shut down and de pressurised - <...> freeflow line was flushed with water to remove check valve - during bolt removal with hand grinder the flange cracked open - a small amount of
liquid mainly water with some condensate spilled onto boards and ignited - immed extuing- uished with dry power - no injuries
Whilst conducting platform checks it was disc gas leaking from well b12 wing valve greasing point. Tightening fitting failed to stop leak. An isolation cert was raised and well b12 was shut in.
Minimal escape of hydrocarbon
Generator no 1 injector spill line had worked itself loose and parted. Diesel fuel spill due to system being under pressure.

Gas from production equipment pressurised the open drains system and escaped at various drain points around the deck.
At 1825 hrs on <...> a hole formed in 2" water discharge pipe from no 1 contacttor on <...> - mix of water, condensate and hydrocarbon gas was found escaping from hole - well a1 flowing to
contactor was immed shut in and the contactor isolated and vented
Gas detection activated initiating gpa and platform shutdown - small gas release from d114 gas outlet flange observed by area operator.
Ccr received report that crude oil droplets were being discharged from the main flare prevailing wind carried some oil droplets across the riser access tower, shutdown work activity ongoing and
announcement made to clear the area.
After removal for repair of the waste oil recvery line on d101 a water/ oil emulsion escaped from an open end into area 9.
During routine testing of well a44 tubing to annulus communication in excess of <...> acceptable criteria was identified. A leaking gas lift valve is suspected to be the cause. A forward
programme for remedial action will be developed
Operator was venting via hard piping, a very small amount of gas migrated to g156/g157 casing causing 2b shutdown.
Crack identified in shell of separator. Actual leakage approx 200ml crude oil. No gas head activated. Leaks self sealed at pressure in separator.
During gas backflow operations from well b22 a weld-o-let failed at the point where the 2" psv bypass line joins the 6" flare relief line.
During normal produc when pinhole leak observed in inlet separator inv by area operator & prod supervisor initiated de-pressurised class 2 shut down. Total estimated volume of leak 330ml. Nb.
No f&g detection activated no muster no gpa.
During normal production, when 'pinhole' leak ovserved in inlet separator d3401. Investigated by area operator and production supervisor. Initiated a de-pressurised class 2 s/d. Total estimated
volume of leak approx. 300ml. No f&g detection activated, no muster no gpa.
Oil observed coming from crude pump discharge line - loss of containment occurred during ndt prog to identify under insulation corrosion oil released amounted to 3-4 gallons
The well was lined up to circulate out crude oil via choke manifold and mud gas separator to test and clean up separator. No flow was detected so circulation was stopped and well shut in to
check line up and drain mud gas separator via shale shakers. Wh le draining mud gas separator correct line up was affected allowing test separator to de-pressurise via shale shaker.
While attemptng to restore production following a train trip to coil in the waste heate recovery unit was overheated causing release of steam via local pressure release valves and gaskets of the a
& b coalescer heaters and dump cooler. A full internal investigation is being carried out.
Discharge pipework from heating medium distribution pumps burst, releasing system contents to atmosphere. (glycol treated potable water at 110 deg c. Heating medium is circulated in a closed
loop system providing a controlled source of heat for the coale cer heaters. Coalescer assist in removal of produced water from produced oil.
As part of a planned gas shutdown, the gas plant was depressurised to allow the removal of a section of pipework situated downstream of a normally closed isolation valve sited downstream of
esv 5129. In addition the 4" isolation valve downstream of esv 5 29 was being replaced as part of the same task. At approx. 18:50 while the new 4" plug valve was being bolted up (4 bolts in
place) gas was released from the open end of the valve and from the flange being tightened. The technicians quickly bolted up the flange and afterwards closed the valve to control the leak.
During this operation the central control room was informed of the gas release. The gas plant was restarted despite no permits for the job being returned and signed off as complete. Incorrect
ssumptions by production personnel about the status of work were made.
The dangerous occurence happened during the de-isolation of gas compressor k102a after the summer shutdown while the gas plant was in operation. The compressor was isolated on the
discharge side by the valve esv4965a and a spade. Valve integrity was prove when the compressor was originally isolated prior to the summer shutdown with the gas plant in operation. The 10"
joint was broken and checked for pressure build up behind the spade. When the spacer ring was being installed the plant back pressure increa ed and the esv started to pass a small quantity of gas.
To allow work to continue in a safe manner, the live system was depressurised downstream of the valve. The total quantity of gas released was estimatd at half a cubic metre. Safe operating
procedures for isolations were reviewed offshore and a section relating to the use of plug valves (using sealant) was incorporated. This has to be reviewed by onshore.

A work permit was issued to carry out boroscope inspection of one of the two air receivers (kc6202a) of the diesel generators pneumatic starting system on the naa platform. After depressurisation of the system, the 'a' receiver to be inspected was discon ected from the air header. This one was re-orientated and blanked in order to bring back 'b' receiver into service. The header
was leak tested by pressurising the 'b' receiver with air at 20 bars. No leak was identified. The 'b' receiver was being brought up to the usual operating pressure of 30 bars, when at approximately
25 bars one coupling failed, resulting in one 1" valve/blank assembly being blown off against the module wall located at a distance of approx. 2 metres. Three production personnel were p esent in
the room at the time of the dangerous occurrence, away from the missile trajectory. A cause tree analysis was carried out offshore. The following actions were decided:- - review the design and
installation procedures of the type of coupling invol ed and their suitability. - review training requirement for personnel involved in pipe fitting. - review the existing safe operating procedure for
pressure test/leak test.
On disconnection of a greasing unit from a nipple, the cap of the nipple disengaged from the valve body due to being backed off too many turns prior to start of greasing operation. This allowed a
small gas release which was quickly stopped by isolation using the wellhead valves
Oil spill (<0.1 tonnes) observed on south side of <...> platform after draining of an oil metering line.
Tied back 20" & 13 3/8" casing. Observed gas bubbling between 20" & 13 3/8". This is on well <...>.
Prod ops had been shut down for approx 1 hr. Ops tech was carrying out plant insp around process area when he heard what he thought was a leak instrument air. On inv he discovered an oil gas
escape from the vicinity of a 3/4" stub situated at the top of t e inlet pipe pool to the hp separator. The operator activated the yellow shutdown system and requested activation of ga. Ga and muster
initiated. Pressure in hp separator reduced to zero by automatic blowdown.
Following a prod shutdown, a bursting disc on the inlet to the mol pumps failed. In normal circ the result of this would have been hydro- carbon depressurisation in a safe manner. However in this
instance a mono block vent in the pipework downstream of th failed bursting disc had not been fitted with a plug. The result was a low pressure crude oil leak onto the adj deck of approx 4 litres.
The leak was quickly spotted by an operator and isolated. The spillage was contained. Before recommencing oil prod re son for bursting disc failure is being inv and all other mono blocks are
being inspected that they have plugs fitted.
Installing new flowline - pressure cap blew off. Two men sprayed with hydrocarbon. Small release. No injuries. No gas alarm. No muster. Permit to work failure?
Normal prod ops were in progress at time of inc. The night shift tech was int he process of insp his area of plant when he spotted a hydro- carbon leak consisting of oil and vapours from the flow
line area of well on inv he identified the area of release o be assoc with a flange on the pipeline side of the flowline pressure sensing device. The tech immed informed the cr tech who closed the
well in.
As part of final commissioning for the desanding/dewatering skid a sand slurry injection programme ws initiated to verify solids removal/ detection probe performance (level) and accumulator
flush efficiency. This exercise had been in progress for approx 18 hours flowing this when it was stopped on the evening of <...> to enable personnel to vacate the platform. Upon re-diverting
flow through the desanding facilities on the morning <...> a release was heard by the person manually operating the valves. He imme iately closed the valves and the release stopped. Upon
inspection at the skid it became apparent that a leak was evident around the water lcv 3907. This was immediately isolated upstream and the leak stopped. It appears that the sand probe failed to
ala m allowing solids in to the discharge water line which drops pressure from operating circa 60 bars to atmosphere before dumping produced fluids. Sand/water solution was released only-no
hydrocarbons detected.
When carrying out op trials on descending system level in the separator was lowered below the lolo trip point manually in an attempt to drain the level bridle to lsll.
At 0602hrs 20% lel coincidence gas alarm was activated in the process cellar deck crude oil pump area and a platform gas alarm, muster ensued. 0608hrs 60% lel coincidence gas was reached,
effecting a level 2 fire & gas shutdown. 0609hrs fast response team reports an oil leak from the mechhanical seal on p8107 main crude oil line pump. 0610 hrs gas levels were noticeably falling
and area was reported secure 0612 hrs all personnel were confined to muster stations until the clean up operation was complete. 06 0 hrs personnel were informed that normal duties may
continue. Note: platform production was suspended until all relevant parties had been notified and permission to commence normal operations was given. The leak was not particularly high in
volume, estim ted in the region of one barrel or less. Addition points: weather conditions: wind 8 knots, 340o. Calm hanging conditions with no breeze factor. No permits had been issued as
personnel were only beginning their shift cycle.
Satellite installation feeds into logs complex 09:15 approach by helicopter observed "haze" 30-35 knot-wind. No gas detection. Shut down vessel approached. Gas escape course unknown

During routine operational checks the operations technician and senior operations technician observed a pin hole leak and discharge of produced water from the 6 o clock position on a weld in the
bravo pigging tee dead leg. This was immediately reported to the ccr and the bravo platform was shutdown and the <...> platform pipeline depressurised and flushed with sea water.
The <...> engine installed in the 'b' generator was being recommissioned after a full overhaul onshore. A fire was detected by the uvs and the unit shutdown. Cause of the fire is attributed to an
internal lube oil leak within the engine.
During start up of gas injection train ax0201d. Two gas detectors went into low alarm. The gas release was traced to a boom joint leak on ov7656b (secondary high speed shut off cock vent
valve) on the gas turbine driver fuel gas system. The machine was shutdown and fuel system isolated and the release dispersed naturally.
During test run of 'c' power generator after rb211 engine installed, two gas heads g9922/9921 came up in low alarm.
During start up of lp/mp compressor train ax-0207b, two gas detectors came into low alarm. The gas release was traced to a swagelock fitting leak on psll-1063 on the lp compressor discharge cx0201b. The machine was shudown and the psll 1063 was isolated on inspection the fitting was found to have stripped threads. The fitting was replaced and the compressor out back in service.
The wireline crew were in the process of recovering damaged wireline from gas in section well no. B5. The wire was being pulled in a controlled manner through the grease head the wire then
parted either in or at the grease head. Gas then started to escap through the grease head. The well was shut in and depressurisation carried out in accordance with procedures. The ccr were kept
informed at all times of the status of work and were aware of the gas release before the gas panel (3 gas heads in high alarm nd 2 in low). The executive action on the fire and gas panel then
isolated the electrical supply to module 22. The operation of the grease head ball check valve is being invesitgated.
Well kill operations to b22 had been completed, xmas tree assembly removed and drilling personnel opened 'a' annulus valve to check for leakage during b.o.p. test. The annulus valve was opened
to atmosphere and allowed well kill fluids with entrained hydr carbon into the module (01), and initiated alarms on fire and gas detection system. Persons involved failed to communicate to the
ccr staff action and potential of local minor gas release. Actions: bother persons involved cautioned about the lack of awar ness and communication breakdown.
During routine diesel transfer operations, manual isolation valves were set in the incorrect position. This resulted in diesel being discharged from an atmospheric vent above hot turbine exhausts.
On contact with the turbine exhausts the diesel ignited nd a flame was seen and extinguished by personnel in the area. A precautionery muster and fire team attendance had been initiated. A
reviw of the diesel system design and operational procedures is being carried out in order to prevent a re-occurrence.
Following a <...> shutdown, the pipeline pressure to the <...> increased and the platform was manually shut down. Shortly after, two gas heads in module 01 went into high alarm as a result of an
impulse line on a differential pressure transmittor on the main oil export line, failing at a swagelock connection. This resulted in gas/condensate spraying from the failed connection. The gpa was
sounded and the emergency response team affected an isolation of the damaged impulse line by closing a 3/4" isolatio valve. Action taken: instrumentation inspected - incorrect make up
suspected - to be confirmed by onshore analysis. All other connections of similar make up checked prior to recommencing production.
In preparation to performing bullheading operation, configuration of chicksan lines was checked, valves to "a" annulus opened in error. This allowed hydrocarbons from the annulus back to the
pump and as the fluid ends is not designed to with hold has at annulus pressure, gas vented through pump to atmosphere.
K 9320 was in injection mode at 330 bar discharge when hydrocarbon gas release occured from hcv 9320 recycle valve. Two technicians in module pressed the emergancy stop for the operational
package and subseqeuant coincidental high level gas caused sps and auto blowdown of gas compression. K9320 was then isolated and then made safe. On investigation of hcv 9320 it was found
that the chevron packings failed the packings were replaced and the platform was satisfied that it was safe to return k9320 to service, a full inv was carried out.
It is suspected that the hydrocarbon release was due to the parted coil being pulled out of the stripper rubber and not on failure of the stripping rubber on running the coil tubing back into the hole.
The stripper rubber was able to seal around the coil again and control regained.

Choke on well <...> shut in and depressurised then isolated during preceding nighshift. Tree pressure had built up again through the umgv and lmgv. Dayshift greased and recycled both valves
again to achieve tight seal, during depressurisation through blowdown hose gas was released from hose connection that had been left slack. Gas detected initiated shutdown and blowdown of
process. Hose was isolated by closing swab valve at the tree.
G4600 was started and run up on no-load without apparent incident. Upon placing a 5mw load on the machine, fixed safety systems in the hood detected a gas escape and the platform status
changed to yellow alert status. Onshift power tech and ssp immediate y converged on g4600 to investigate. First impressions were that gas was escaping from a loose fuel gas pigtail coupling,
causing the alert. A more thorough investigation revealed that a further 3 fuel gas pigtails were loose, specialist contractor pmd ar to be instructed to introduce a checklist system to ensure all
hydrocarbon systems are correctly reinstated following maint work.
The redundant rich oil line had been purged and water flushed. A permit was raised to remove a spool piece as part platform process isolations. An area technician was in attendance with a
portible gas monitor the line was drained as far as posible using t e drain points designed in to the pipework. The fitters then proceded to split the flanges. A small amount of water drained from
the flange and the area was cheaked and tested with the portible gas monitor. No gas was detected. The job proceded with the g s monitor in constant use, and showing no hydrocarbons.after a few
minutes, the platform went to yellow then to red status when two gas heads at the other end of the module were activated.
The process tripped as the result of fire and gas systems testing. Two minutes later a gas realese was eported and confirmed from the gas rigging platform. The release was isolated by closing
manual valve 49pxy001 on the gas export cross-over manual blo down line. The point release was the tapping point fort.p49901 from which a fitting had blown out. After the blowdown there
was a loss of power, a rigger working undertneith the pigging platform was alarmed. He lost his balance and fell from the struct re. He was saved from falling by his hareness and interia reel
Gas release in module um4ee, detection system operated resulting in process shutdown. Process blowdown initiated and full muster complete. At 15:17 gas had dispatched, platform returned to
yellow status. Source of release is believed to be a sight glass n a compressor knockout vessel. <...> is connected to flotel.
Flowline reconfigured and modified. Bd28 worked over, flowline was new. Hydrotest ok, leak on gas test. Examined the graylock, no obvious fault. 2 gas heads hlg, 3llg.(5 total). Process
shutdown manually on report. Veited hydrotest by breaking graylock.
The well in question had been flowed for approximately 7 hours prior to pulling out with coiled tubing. The fluid flowing from the well was mostly water, but with a small quantity of
hydrocarbons. Water cut was estimated to be 95-97%. After the coiled tubing was pulled to the surface, the <...> operator <...> closed the well in at the xmas tree master valve using the
hydraulic <...> pump located on the <...> rig cantilever deck. Closed in thp was 1100 psi. <...> and the <...> night shift supervisor <...> briefly consulted each other regarding the bleeding off of
the pressure above the xmas tree. During the interchange <...> was under the impression that <...> considered it to be acceptable to bleed down the pressure on the rig floor using a bleed line on
the nowsco bop. However, after the interchange <...> immediately headed for the wellhead area to bleed off the pressure above the xmas tree via the closed drains. He assumed that <...> would
wait for a call on the radio to confirm thatpressure had been bled off before opening the valve on the rig floor. <...> then began to make his way down to the lower wellhead area (d3e). On the
rig floor <...> instructed one of his crew <...> to bleed off the trapped pressure above the xmas tree. <...> thought that as the well had only been flowing water, bleeding off at the bop was an
Hydrocarbon release from process plant (1"drain line from pre absorber seporator boot - pin hole leak). Shut down and muster - gas release dispersed naturally - plant isolated - back in
production
Gas
leak intest
module
u4ee caused
pinhole
the cap
drainusing
bypass
pre-absorber
seperator
Muster
05:00 leak
isolated .lines
Mentostood
downtree kill wing valve, exposing it to the void
A
pressure
was carried
out onbywell
<...>leak
xmasintree
the around
cementthe
pump.
The cement
pump .was
connected
via chickson
the xmas
above the upper master gate valve, after the test, pressure was bled back to the cement pump, causing gas to be released into the cement pump area. Sensors in the area detected low gas level and
itiated.
A minor hydrocarbon release occurred during a flushing operation. The flushing operations were ongoing prior to completing an isolation to allow maintenance to change the position of some
incorrectly installed nrv's in the test separator flowlines of bd 7 and bd29. The service water hose which had been connected to the kill wing valve of bd40 for flushing operations had ruptured
causing a release if hydrocarbons into the module.
Diesel bunkering operations were commenced between the <...> and the platform. Pumps were started and the hose slowly filled. Both deck crew (platform) and officer on watch on the <...>
noticed discolouration of the sea (due to diesel) and pumps w re immediately stopped. The estimate of spillage was a maximum of 20 litres. This confirmed by the <...>.

When trying to bring gas lift back on after shutdown a gas leak was detected by an operator. He could detect the gas approx 6-8 ft away from the leak, but this was not recognised by the fire & gas
detection system. Duration of leak was estimated at 90 sec . The estimated quantity of gas release to air was 2kg. The valve stem grease nipple had not been used prior to start-up. For gas to be
present, the stem seal must also have passed.
Minor gas leak on 3" valve

Top manifold isolation valve 13 was found to be leaking hydrocarbon through a grease nipple.
During wireline ops at 0800 hrs while pulling out of the well with 5/16" braided cable, the weight indicator showed an increase. The cable was slackened off and a single strand of wire unwound
from the cable. The wire could not be moved in or out as it ha 'bird rested' due to the broken strand a flow path through grease injection was created. If it was not poss to pump enough grease to
seal the leak,
Weather
conditions:
resultingwind
in a 35/40
mix ofknots
oil and
direction
grease 100
escaping.
deg temp
The deg
wirec was
sea state
cut and
3-3.5
themtree
visibility
valves 10
closed
mls.inAnn
making
condensate
the w llmetering
safe. lcv 2023 failed in service discovered during routine operational
checks
3 employees on pr esd deck heard what was assumed to be a pressure release - on inv it was found that a liquid sample bomb on jupiter condensate metering skid was leaking from inlet [lower]
flange. Cr was contacted by radio to initiate a psd while a manua isolation of the bomb was carried out. Approx 3 kg of condensate had escaped, and was contained on the module deck [leak last
approx 2 mins] the condensate was flushed into the closed drain system and the deck cleaned
Nature of failure - fractured weld on tube base. <...> vibra gauge. Gauge in service approx 8 months. Instrument tech heard noise, found leak and isolated manually.
Whilst carrying out con monitoring of <...> generator a, an amec employee detectd a smell of gas. He traced the source to the fuel gas slam shut valve the machine was shut down and the fuel gas
line depressured. Further inv revealed that a fibre washer h d been installed as opposed to the dowty seal recommended by the manufacturers literature
Gas leak
During normal prod activities, the night shift operator was carrying out a plant tour when he observed a leaking 3/8" stainless fitting. The fitting was on a methanol injection pump. Discharge
gauge assembly the pump was operating at 180 barg. The oversid op then radioed the cr and the pump was stopped remotely. Once this had been done the gauge pipework was isolated and
removed. The tappings were then plugged. 5 litres of methanol was released over an area of 6 sq metres around the pump.
On the <...> small florets of oil at a rate of three per minute were observed surfacing to the east of <...> and during tidal changes to the north and west of the platform. The mv <...> (rov vessel)
was mobilised to locate the leak source which was subse uently traced to the outboard sub sea tie in flange of the pipeline on <...>. The observed leak rate at a p/l pressure of 30 barg was three 2
mm bubbles escaping from between the flanges faces every 40 seconds. The p/l pressure was reduced to 15 barg a ter which the obsereved leak rate was one 2mm bubble every 3 to 4 minutes.
Calculation based on a 5 mm oil sphere every 3 minutes equates to leak rate of 0.1 liter/day. Although the top half of the flange protection cover had been displaced some 3 meters owards ca and
minor damage to the p/l weight coating 2 meters towards da inspection of the flange components and bolts showed no sign of any impact damage. Its likely that a flotel mooring displaced the
flange protector and damaged the concrete earlier this year.
Between <...> and <...> a programme of installation and control system logic modification had been completed on the dual fuel system of the avon turbine driving p3070 main oil line pump. All
logic changes completed,d the machine was started on liquid fuel, automatically changed to gas fuel and then some 27 minutes later the platform status changed to hazard status, confirmed fire
indication. Investigation proved that a fire was indeed burning around the external transition duct of p3 70 avon power turbine, action was taken to manually initiate the btm system which
positively extinguished the fire, although the fire teams were mustered at the scene as a precaution. No obvious damage was evident but a team from pmd were mobilised to ins ect the engine
mechanically whilst a check of electrical cables inside and external to the hood were also identified for inspection. The underlying cause was detailed to be a blocked drain line on a fuel drain on
the underside of the power turbine transit on duct which directs excess fuel to a float trap prior to directing the liquids to the drains system. Remedial actions to prevent recurrence were essentially
to ensure that overfueling on start up was not occurring, drain systems were operational and mai tenance routines raised to ensure continued operation and consideration of improved fuel isolation

During norm production h2s(toxic) gas alarm activated from within stripping gas compressor 'a' enclosure. Ga activated on first detection. Second detection instigated local shutdown. Personnel
mustered and oim initiated blowdown. Flammable gas detectors s owed 7-10% lel. Full ba team entered enclosure and nitrogen used to leak test. A 2" closed drain line was found to be cracked
circumferentially on the threaded section into the compressor discharge line. 'B' compressor was examined and showed signs of cra king. Production shutdown until repairs complete. Further
investigation in metallurgy,etc will follow.
Leak detected by standby vessel. 5km from dougals rov survey indicates possibly the gas reinjection line. But this needs confirmation. Line shut in. Dsv mobilised. When line identity confirmed.
Line will be vented and nitrogen purged
While depressurising a well (d8) to the burner boom a hydrocarbon leak developed at a loose weco connection. The leak was detected by the gas detectors in the area and automatically a plant
shutdown/ blowdown initiated and a platform g.p.a. from alarm to leak stopped - estimated 3 mins.
<...> subsea well on production. At 1430hrs report from fishing vessel near ellon buoys that a patch of seawater is a different colour (100ft2). Survey by helicopter at 1530 hrs. Gas escape from
<...>. Well shut-in and flowline depressurised. Supply vesse sent for observation (<...>). After one hour leak ceased and thin film of hydrocarbon on surface disappeared (confirmed by helicopter
survey at 1600hrs and supply boat. Video film available. Subsequent rov inspection shows four sheared bolts [out of 8] on flange connection at subsea choke manifold. Bolts replaced and pressure
tested ok. Production restarted <...>. Bolt failure being investigated.
A total esd system failure caused all safeguarding actions to fail safe. This initiated a rapid blowdown of the <...> and <...> process. This is abnormal the processes are normally blown down
sequentially in order to limit flare radiation and damage to he flare tip during the blowdown crude oil carried over the flare system and was discharged from the flare tip. It was carried by the
southerly wind back over the other side of the platform into the sea. The quantity discharged was not measured but is est mated to be upto 2o tonnes with 80% going into the sea. During incident
installation was placed on hazard status.
The <...> oil process was on line direct to export whilst the <...> oil process remained shutdown to continue the hydrocyclone enginerring upgrade work including drains system re-configuration.
To enable the <...> process to operate whilst the dunlin shthe defective parts are being returned to <...> for inspection and shutdown work continued a number of interfaces between the <...>
process were isolated to enable physical segregation. A section of the closed drain system which included the drains from the export prover loop <...> pig receivers & the <...> pig launcher was
isolated under ptw isolation which indicated physiccal segregation from the above pressure sources and the de-gasser vessel by spade installation and identified on both the ptw isolation
cetificate and pcf schematic. An oil leak was identified on the thistle receiver by outlet spade at a failed closed drains joint indicating pressure in the isolated closed drian system, the <...>
process/export was manually shutdown to allow a full investigation into the source of the pressure in the drains system and the oil leak was contained to the pig receiver area external to <...>.
Further investigation identified that the pressurre had emanated from an export prover loop which although identified as being spaded off was found not to have the spade installed but only
Following a esd valve closure on <...> oil export was shutdown. 30 sec's after shutdown of the export booster pumps, the shutdown logic initiated a sps process shutdown during 30 sec delay
levels in 2nd and 3rd stage <...> production eparatoirs increased to high levels. Once the pipeline to <...> was open again <...> process was started up. On the <...> process the esd system was
reset to allow start up. On initiating the reset train 1/2 xcv's on the liquid outlets opened caus ng high pressure oil to flow into the 2nd stage sparator which already had a high level in it. As a
result oil carried over into the gas offtake into the flare system. Not all of the oil was collected at the flare ko drum but was carried over and sprayed ut of the flare tip. The spray of oil lasted 4-5
mins then stopped. Shortly following this the platform went to red hazard status due to high level in the flare ko drum but no oil coming from the flare
Pin hole leak on 2" equalisation spool on the <...> prod riser. Resulted in a loss of containment and spillage of hydrocarbon fluids
A condensate/gas leak occurred at the top of the sight glass on the test separator. The plant was depressurised, the test separator made safe. Following inspection, it was found that a cushion seal
had extruded from the top section glass.
<...> maintenance team were carrying out reinstatement of the shale shakers, which have been recently refurbished. These items are driven by a hydraulic system powered from a hydraulic power
pack on the level below. The hydraulic power pack was set to deliver a pressure of 172 bar, and the two men were working on a shale shaker when they heard a loud'crack' from the level below.
They rushed to a position where they could see a spray of hydraulic oil being discharged from the vicinity of the hydraulic hose couplings and immediately proceeded to the level below and
switched off the hydraulic system. The crack was parallel with the axis of the fitting and extended from the outer edge of the screwed part of the fitting down past the threaded section to the region
of the internal support for the integral valve sealing spring. The hydraulic power pack was built by <...>, though this unit was not directly involved in the incident, other than supplying the
hydraulic pressure. The fitting has no discernible markings to indicate its origins or pressure rating, though it is believed to be rated for 345 barg working pressure as there are identical fittings on
other parts of the system which can be used at this pressure, when skidding the rig, for example. The environmental conditions are an exposed location but this and similar fittings have only a very

Pressure test of a annulus was required. B annulus was to be open so no pressure was to be transmitted to it during a pressure test should there be cross comm. Drilling personnel were requested
to open the b annulus. B annulus gauge was checked and indica ed 7 bar, gauge was bled down but it still showed 7 bar. Annulus valve was opened slowly to bleed down the pressure personnel
were unaware that the pressure was due to gas, though it was stale air. The gas activated the gas heads in the egg box and a cont ol action from the fire&gas was activated and the platform
shutdown. No muster was called as the gas head indicated a drop in the reading by the attendant <...> and ops supervisor.
Platform was in normal prod ops. P98 condensate pump had a known defect- ive seal which was valve isolated for a pending change-out. The seal was charged with seal oil pressure and locked in
but the seal pump was not on. The seal oil pressure decayed ther was a small amount of condensate in the pump which leeched past the seal the high integ astra gas head alongside the seal
activated from low gas to high gas in 17 secs and the plant shutdown on an auto yellow shutdown. The platform personnel were immed c lled to muster. Shuttling was suspended and the <...>
returned to <...> to refuel in prep for evacuation. Oim <...> took on role of onscene commander.
The orig inc was the pin hole leak in the 2" discharge pipework at a weld connection of an lp condensate pump, operating under normal cons. Detected by a low level gas alarm in the central cr.
Prod staff were on scene within mins. The pump was shutdown an the sec of line isolated locally by closing valves.
Biocide was being decanted from top deck to pump suction line in prep for a seawater system biocide treatment. The flexible hose from the portable holding tank was connected up to the suction
line in the bunded area and the valve from the tank, on the har suction pipe was opened. The tech then proceeded to a lower deck to open the valve at the pump suction. A salt water flushing line
is connected into the hard piped suction line, uswed to flush residual chemicals out of the line on completion of the job. he valve on the salt water supply line is tied into the hard pipe in between
the 2 said valves on the chemical supply line. This valve had been left in the open position. By the time the tech had gone down the one level to open the pump suction valve the ater from the
flushing line had filled up the ullage in the chemical supply tank and chemical was seen escaping from the tank vent connection the valve on the tank outlet was immed isolated on the techs return
to the tank. Immediate area washed down with sea water.
Chemical decant ops were taking place involv surflo a biocide containing gluteraldehyde. This op involves the connection a chemical transit tank situated on the top deck to a fixed pump suction
line for the chemical treatment of seawater for water injecti n. The fixed pipework runs from the transit tanks on top deck down the west side of the platform through the decking of level 2
external walkway then continues directly under this decking to reach chem injection pumps situated directly opposite west 2 lif boat. From the injection pumps the chem is then passed into water
holding tanks[2]. The decanting op commenced at approx 1250 hrs at approx 1257 hrs the senior deck operator who was working on the west side of level one external walkway, adjacent to the m
thanol skid observed liquid falling onto the deck. Invs foundthat the liquid was discharging under hydrostatic pressure from the biocide line directly under level 2 walkway. At this time it is not
poss to ascertain the precise cause of this leak due to th location of the pipework. The area was immed barriered off and the area was washed down with a port- able monitor from the fire main.
The decant skid was isolated and the pipework flushed out with water from an inlet adjacent to skid. The area of spillag was washed down continuously until all the pipework was fully flushed
A low gas alarm annunciated. On investigation leak found to be eminating from a 2 to 3mm dia. Hole in a 2" dia drain line which was lagged and clad. Removal of lagging and cladding material
was required to identify exact location of leak.
Normal operations were ongoing. The plotting of a surge curve on the gas turbine prime mover (recently overhauled) of a gas compressor, was nearing completion. The ngl plant tripped on a
process upset. This was almost immediately followed by a full proces plant yellow shutdown. The yellow shutdown closes down all production operations and de-pressures the plant. In this case
it was triggered by the fire & gas system detecting a high concentration of hydrocarbon gas in the separator area. Investigation cre s in b.a. found gas leaking from a port in a non-return valve. The
valve being on the outlet of main gas scrubber v05. The pin, which acts as the flapper pivot and is normally screwed into this port, was found on the floor directly beneath.
An ops tech disc diesel backflowing from a closed rain tun dish onto the floor of the module. The diesel was being collected by other closed drain points, though some was escaping to sea via a
manway hatch. On inv it was found that the auto drain on the d esel oil filter had mal- fuctioned and was continually draining diesel to the closed drains. It is suspected that the drains were
restricted and hence could not cope with the full flow.
During routine test of the fire pump a technician opened the water supply valve to the fire monitor and the head (complete monitor) was blown off its support swivel. The water pressure at the
time was approximately 12.5bar and three other monitors were open.

A <...> prog for a flowing pressure gradient survey was underway on well <...>. The flow survey had been completed and the next major step in the prog was to rig down the lubricator. The <...>
crew requested the well closed in and they closed the lmv umv and th swab valve while the ops closed the well from the process plant. The cdp crew commenced draining the lubricator to v45
drain vessel. When depressurised they broke open the lubricator to remove the logging tools, a few mins after this oils began to flow f om the top of the open riser. The cdp crew immed checked
their isolations and stabbed on the lubricator to the riser thus stopping the flow. The prod ops checked and closed the actuated wing valve. The oil flow spilled on the bop deck and into the egg
box and was contained by the use of absorbent material.
During production condensate/leak from 2"dia pump recycle line - plant shutdown
While carrying out plant routines, production technician became aware of diesel fumes around export pump po4 area. He traced the fumes to inside po4 hood. Adjacent export pump - po5 was
started and put on load. Po4 was shutdown manually and allowed to co l. The leak was repaired and the douty seal was replaced on the diesel burner. 3 litres of diesel were reported leaked into
the drain system. Environmental conditions: wind speed - 13.6 knots wind direction - 285 degrees wave height - 0.8 - 1.3m tempera ure - 11.6c bar. Press - 1013.2mbar visibility - 10+nautical
miles to prevent recurrence: 1. Mechanical engineer to check suitability of douty seal for this kind of service. 2. Other <...> platforms to be advised of this incident.
Normal production operations were in progress, wind speed 9.3 knots: direction due east. Visibility 10 nmiles; temp 13.4 degrees c. Barometric pressure 1010.1 mbar. Wave height 0.7 metres.
There was a gas leak from the gland packing of block valve gp 46 as it was being closed to isolate pcv 8182b for maintenance. The ngl plant was manually shut down and systems isolated.
There was no fire and gas action. The valve was replaced. The cause of failure of gland packing is to be investigated by score. Fu ther actions will be decided when the report is received.
Normal procedure ops were in progress. A tech detected a strong smell of diesel during a routine watchkeeping check of k02 turbine. This was inv further and the bund surrounding the diesel
pump was found to contain diesel. The crt reported an oil mist det ctor had been activated. The turbine was shut down. Subsequent inv revealed that the diesel pump seal was leaking.
Gas condensate was detected leaking from v45 production drain header pipework located under the east end of v02 separator. Header pipework id.dp 511-a6 size 2" pressure in pipework approx
0.5 bar. Leak emanated from a pinhole size hole possibly caused b mechanical damage due to vibration on adjacent steelwork. The integrity of all the pipework will be checked by ndt. The
plant will be surveyed to ascertain if similar conditions exist at other points.
Whilst bringing on an esp after wireline work, it was reported that liquid was coming out of the closed drain vents on the se corner of the top deck. On checking out the system a 3/4" drain v/v
was found open, this was immed isolated and at the same time he vessel level was pumped down. Approx 2 litres of crude came out fo the vent and was carried over into the sea.
Newly fitted pressure rated flexible hose on discharge of temporary bs & w pump failed. This resulted in a realise of hydracarbon oil into module m4. Module is plated with buliding and an oil
realised to sea.
The platform was operating normally with well g1 + g2 on flow at a combined rate of 70 mmscfd. The weather at the time was bad with winds over 50 knots from the north east and rough seas.
The incident occurred immediately following violent movement of th platform due to a large wave or wind gust. All 4 personnel on board were in the equipment room engaged in a shift handover
when a lound noise of escaping air or gas was heard, followed by an immediate esd level 1. The wellbay area was checked from the e uipment room doorway and a large cloud of escaping vapour
was observed around the wellheads. The immediate action was to initiate an esd level 1 from the push button on the scs matrix panel and operate the blowdown valve after informing the <...>
radio room. All personnel remained in the equipment room until the process was fully depressured.
The platform went into a level o emerg shutdown, and auto blowdown due to 20% gas being detected at the equip room intakes. <...> cr received notification via the scada system as the
installation is normally unattended. An intervention crew arrived on th installation to inv the cause of gas alarm and emergency shutdown. They discovered a leaking flange connect- ion on a
pressure differential trasmitter. The transmitter is located approx 4 ft away from equip room air intakes. The op pressure of the unit a the time of the failure was 200 barg. The leak was due to
loose bolts and damaged o ring seals on the flange connection where the impulse lines block and bleed assembly connects to the transmitter.

G820 was running on full load, on diesel fuel, due to a problem with g8010 which was shut down. Platform went to hazard status and g8020 shutdown on a confirmed fire indication in turbine
enclosure. This was followed by confirmed high level gas (2 detect rs). The halon system was automatically released as per design (108kg). All automatic systems protecting the generator worked
as per design. Containing the incident and preventing escalation. Inspection of the turbine enclosure showed light smoke damage o the upper part of the rurbine combustion casing and fuel lines.
Some of the plastic fittings in the enclosure areas had melted. A visual check of the fuel lines showed no damage. However at the 5 o'clock position looking south towards the air intakes there
was a wet area on the combustion casing. The floor area showed no signs of fire. Mechanical checks revealed that 5 of the gas burner braided connections were loose. One of the braided
connection in close proximity to the wettted area was discolou ed throughout its length (symptom of overheating. Several of the braided connections were marked over 50% of their length. The
gas manifold was discoloured over 75% of its circumference 2 to 11 o'clock position
During fab activities on 13 3/8 annulus vent line in immed vicinity of furmanite clamp vent outlet - while striking in an arc to tack weld a pipe spool in situ, a minor vol gas flow from 13 3/8 x 20"
annulus was ignited - fire blanket on location was depl yed over naked flame which was immed extinguished
Phoned <...> 1930. Confirmed facts as above. On start up, monitoring on site immediately identified fire which was immediately extinguished using dry powder extinguisher. System shut down
to investigate and make safe. A small lube oil fire occurred at g2oa exhaust collector area. A lube oil return line joint had been repaired at the power turbine end of the power turbine to gearbox
coupling. Although the oil was cleaned up it would appear that a small amount of oil seeped between the exhaust colle tor and insulation jacket. When the machine was ran up this residual oil
ignited. The fire was quickly noted as the area was visually inspected to confirm lube oil leak had been arrested, the area operator immediately extinguished the fire and the machine was shutdown manually.
Gas leak caused by fracture of 3/8" stainless steel fitting on kto2 first stage psv23b pilot line. Psv23b isolated and leak stopped by 1556 hrs
Raf <...> notified coastguard of gas bubbling in sea at <...> location. <...> production shut down and dive vessel mobilised to investigate. Problem identified as incorrect sealing ring used in
flange (mild steel instead of stainless steel). Sealin ring changed and corresponding flange also changed as a precaution
The oil metering prover system had been depressurised and isolated to enable removal of a ball. The lid of the ball receiver chamber had been opened annd the ball was where expected. When the
ball was removed to to comence lifting it from the receiver, tr pprd pressure underneath it caused approx 20 gallons of oil a9well fluid) to be discharged over the surronding process and over the
operator.
Lost communications with <...> subsea well from the <...> & <...> causing subsea shutdown. Hydralic oil back to return tank, attempted to circulate hyd.oil returns to filtration reservoir without
success. Area operator sent to hpu to investigate the valv status, encountered hydrocarbons escaping from the returns reservoir psv. <...> subsea blue was activated, all hotwork stoped on both
<...> & <...> ongoing investigations co-ordinated by <...> office,in liason with the vendor
While on routine rounds an operator discovered oil leaking from a pressure gauge conenction on the inlet to the oil export coolers. The inclation valve beneath the gauge was closed (double
block 2 bleed <...> type) and the leak stopped. It is estimat d that it had been leaking for 10 - 15 minutes. On removal of the gauge, a crack was discovered in the threaded section of the
<...>swivadapt fitting which is fitted between the pressure gauge and the adjacent valve. It would appear that t e internal collet was not fully hand tightened, therby allowing the gauge to vibrate.
This vibration has led to fatigue in the threads adjacent to the loose collet and ultimate failure.
Flange on iniet to 41-6701 began to leak gas. This was picked up by local gas detection which shutdown process. Area operator investigated isolated and repaired the leaking joint. Machine put
back on line, production restarted, and full surbey of all flanges in fuel gas system being carreid out by mech techs.
After making upa jumper hose form p-9 to p-12 and testing same in order to equalize the pressure across the bottom ssr isolation tree plug prior to retrieving same the wireline supervisor
instructed the wireline operator to open the hydraulic intervention valve (hiv). The control panel for the hiv is located on the weatherdeck. The operator proceeded to the control panel as
instructed and turned on the air to the hydraulic pump. The operator then went to have his lunch assuming the regulator was set for 3500psi. The wireline supervisor had observed the hiv
opening. He then proceeded to p-9 and opened up the jumper line to start equalizing. The wireline helper was positioned to the left of the hiv to control the gas flow into the lubricator. The
wireline supervisor was ascending up the ladder to the scaffolding platform when (2) bangs in short succession occurred the wireline helper observed the hiv actuator going through the
scaffolding handrail. Upon investigation the (2) bangs, the hiv actuator was found laying on the grating next to the wellhead. It was also noted that no hydraulic oil was coming out the actuator
and the hydraulic hose was still connected. The jumper hose was immediately isolated and bleed off. The wireline supervisor then proceeded to the weatherdeck and found the control panel
A wireline logging run in well p9 had just been completed with gauges retrieved to the lubricator. The downhole safety valve was closed and pressure being relieved by venting to the platform
vent system. From a well shut-in pressure of 5600psi, the pres ure had reduced to approx 2000psi when a significant gas leak to atmosphere occurred at a clamped joint below the wireline
intervention valve.

Burners were being changed around to fine temperature in the interduct; this was being undertaken by the <...> rep. On completion of the work, the machine was being brought back on line for
test. The <...> rep, and the power tech were observing the run - up rocess through the viewing port in the acoustic hood. A small flicker of flame was observed; this initiated red hazard status via
the fire and gas panel. The machine shut down automatically. The flame self extiguished when the acoustic hood door was op ned to extiguish the flame (dry powder extighuishers were on site).
The halon system was on manual as per cebntral field unit policy. The platform returned to normal green status two minutes after the initial change in status.
After the pilot valve on 060 starter gas system had been overhauled, the unit was de-isolated and an attempt to run the starter motor up, to test the speed settings was made. Soon after the start
button was pressed (approx. 30 secs) the general alarm soun ed and high level gas was detected in the enclosure. This initiated a esd level 2, blocking the platform and venting the units.
When starting <...> unit after one failed start the 2nd start gave a very heavy light off. After approx 30 secs running at auto idle one heat rise detector went into alarm and unit shutdown. On inv
condensate had entered fuel gas system into gas generator an ignited in power turbine
A low gas alarm voted for generator `c` was received at 20:17 hrs; automatically initiating a platform g.a. initial inspection of enclosure could detect no gas present. East door of cab was opened
to facilitate this with cab fan overrides applied. West d or was opened and fuel filtration system inspected with no gas detected. Decsion was made to start another generator and obtain technical
assistance to investigate fault on `c` generator. As this plan was being actioned `c` shutdown on `high gas voted` nd platform plx resulted.
Production personnel were working on a level control valve when they noticed crude oil spraying onto the adjacent bulkhead. The leak was traced to impulse line on train 2 mol booster pump
discharge minimum flow pipework. Train 2 oil plant manually shutd wn and leak isolated. It was a pinhole leak with less than a litre lost, none to sea. No fire or gas alarms actuated. Fire team
called as precaution. Cause: a stress fracture of the butt weld on the impulse line connection to the orifice carrier. Contrib tary factor: additional vibration caused by flow through the adjacent
level control by-pass valve. Environmental conditions: wind 15kts @ 30 degrees. Qnh 1013.snow showers.
Prod ops were preparing the test separator for maintenance, it was iso- lated fromthe wells and oil displaced by flushing with water. This was being depressured. When pressure was approx 4 bar
the sandwash down comer developed a leak at the bend under the separator allowing sand water and some gas to escape into the module setting of a low gas alarm. The operators depressured the
separator to the flare.
Gas was detected in mod 14 deck which was picked up by the gas detection system and resulted in a full production shutdown. The source of the gas leak was from the glycol skid seal pot. This
is designed to allow glycol to be discharged into the drain sy tem in the event of high level in the seal pit or over pressure in the glycol stripping/ reboiler unit. It is assumed a rise in pressure in
the llp flare system caused back pressure in the glycol unit. This resulted in a mixture of glycol and gas being ischarged from the vent to open drain. A small quantity of gas from the discharge
was sensed by the gas detectors. Problems had been experienced by the night shift with the seal in the line to the open drain system from the llp ko pot. Blockages were cle red twice. This is not
an unusual occurrence. It is assumed the blockages are caused by rust and scale with sludge from the pot and pipework.
Coil tubing operations - run into production well - before entering xmas tree tip of tube caught bop. Resulted in crimp in tubing which resulted in withdrawal of tube. Tube fractured - some of
fluid escaped from fractured line. When displaced to sea water was some hydrocarbon release. Closed rams on bop - make well safe cut tubing. Closed tree valve stub of tubing in rig up now
recovered.
At approximately 1330 hours on <...> gas turbine 3 (<...> turbo generator) received a signal from its control system to execute an emergency shutdown. The cause for this signal is under
investigation. During the rundown two infra red etectors indicated a fire within the turbine enclosure. This triggered the automatic release of halon within the enclosure. Normally this would also
have triggered the general alarm. This did not happen as the general alarm had been inhibited for fire and gas system testing in a different module. On seeing the fire alarm and halon discharge the
control room technicians dispatched fire and safety officer<...> and production technician <...> to investigate. They verified that any fire origin lly present had been extinguished . Subsequent
investigation has revealed that the fire was a result of lube oil leaking onto the hot turbine exhaust. Analysis is ongoing to determine the source for the lube oil and effect a remedy.

Transformer house no 2 fire dampers were being tested, fire and gas panel over-rider keys had been used as per standard procedures. Over-rider keys do not inhibit fire pump-start. North fire
pump was duty pump. It had started and run for short periods during previous tests. Pumps had been started by damper test, and had been running for 20-25 mins when the heat head in the pump
house went into alarm. The fire and gas over-rides were removed and a fire alarm was broadcast over the alarm system. <...> operator) was proceeding towards the north fire pump via the cellar
deck west walkway to shut the pump down manually. The fire alarm had gone off and he could see smoke coming out of the fire pump house. He radioed the control room, informed them that
the team were quickly on the scene and commenced boundary cooling. The fuel supply to the engine was isolated externally. The engine stopped after a slight delay. The first team entered the
fire pump house with foam hoses and extinguished flames on top of the engine. Light fittings and cabling were charred and melted by the heat. The inner lining of the ceiling was blackened by
smoke. The cause of the fire was the leakage of lubeoil vapour from a rubber breather hose to a cylinder head cover. The hose routed close to hot pipework and the engine turbo-charger. The
During start up of c5010 gas compressor the commission eng and production operator were checking out unit locally. The engineer tapped interstage nrv, on 3rd stage suction seal gas, to ensure it
had seated properly. The pipework parted at the swage lock connection, causing a gas release. The prod enginner operator initiated manual shutdown locally, the gas heads in the area also
detected 60% gas and automatically shut production down. The platform personnel mustered and the fast response team along wit two members of the fire team donned b.a. sets and rectified the
leak.
After maintenance work on the gas engine driven main oil pump, p3610, the fuel gas system was de-isolated, and the unit prepared for a test run. Maintenance work had been carried out on the
fuel and ignition systems. The unit was started, but it tripped out on "low fuel gas pressure". The gas head at the air intake to the engine detected hydrocarbon gas and initiated a 60% gas
alarm/shutdown production. The detected gas was as a result of the engine mis-firing due to the ongoing ignition problems. The roduction and maintenance personnel working on the machine
were unaware that gas was present until the alarm sounded, and it very quickly dispersed. The <...> engine was firing on one bank of pistons, but the 2nd bank had no ignition at all, leading it to
misfire/backfire.
The following events took place whilst the plant was being put back on the production after an extedned maintenance shutdown period. P3610 mol pump (main oil line crude export pump) was
put on line. The production operator observed the drive end seal to be overheating. In accordance with written procedures, the pump was shutdown, and the seal assembly was pressure flushed.
On completion of flushing, the pump was put on stand by. No test was carried out. + / - 2 hours later, p3610 was required for duty and was put on line by a different production operator. After
starting the pump, the operator did not standby the unit to check the earlier flushing process had been successful, in fact he was unaware that the pump had a problem. 15 minutes later the fi e
alarm sounded automatically, and the deluge started. The seal assembly had overheated to such a degree that it failed, overheated and lube oil ignited.
The platform was coming back into production after a process trip. During the start up hight levels were encounted in the first stage separator [train 1]. Also the flare knock out drum. The levels
contributed to crude oil "carry over" into the flare line hat resulted in a high flame buring. The actions that resulted were:- * the platform was manually shutdown. * personnel were called to
muster. * onshore duty production staff informed. * coastguard informed. A full investigation has been carried out, the esults of which will be used to deinge the remedial actions required to
prevent such an incident re-occuring. We aim to have a clear degifinition of the remedial actions and an action plan to address them by <...>.
Normal production conditions existed at the time of incident. The gas compressors were exporting and reinjecting gas to the reservoir at a pressure of approx 179 bar. Whilst carrying out routine
duties on the adjacent compression train, an operator obse ved a gas leak at the seal gas skid on train 1. A small gas cloud was visible in an area of 1 metre (approx) around the seal gas duplex
filter. The operator contacted the process control room and a manual controlled shutdown of the unit was effected. T e gas release, in an area open to the elements and no apparent wind had not
initiated any gas alarm. The leak source was traced to a flanged joint on the filter body, four bolts on which were able to be tightened 1 to 2 flats on the nuts. This equipment h s been in
continuous duty, for approx 2 weeks, following the commissioning of the new reinjection gas compression facility. The identical equipment on the adjacent train ( in operation for approx 6
weeks) was inspected following the incident. This was f und to be tight. The duplex filter was part of the package which had been supplied by <...>, the compressor manufacturer. The root cause
is deemed to be qc at the filter manufacturer.

Normal production conditions existed at the time of the incident. The gas compressors were exporting and reinjecting gas to the reservoir at a pressure of approx 179 bar. At approx 0750, a
painter was about to commence preparatory and painting work on t e recently commissioned train 1 reinjection compression facility. He could smell, hear and feel gas on his face. A small gas
cloud was evident around a blank flange on the compressor discharge piping. This was reported to the pcr by telephone. An oper tor sent to investigate, advised the pcr to shut the compression
train down. A manual controlled shutdown was initiated the gas release, in an area open to the elements and no apparent wind, had not initiated any gas alarm. The leak source was traced to 1/2"
2500 blind flange which was drilled and tapped for an instrument tapping. A bullnose plug has been fitted. The source of the leak was from the screwed connection. Following depressuring, the
flange was removed, thread cleaned, new plug fitted and eal welded. The flange will be replaced as soon as one can be dispatched from onshore. The identical flange on train 2 was inspected
and miniscule trace of gas was evident. The same action was taken. The evidence points to incorrect make up of screwed onnection. This incident will be a subject covered at tool box talks and
07:54 - gas alarm was indicated in the drilling module mm1. The alarm activated is located approx 15ft above deck level over the east open drain, within the cuttings processing room. The chief
operator and fire and gas tech reached the module and noticed a strong smell of gas. A portable gas detector recorded 10%. The fire and gas tech headed towards gd298 and recorded 25%lel at his
point. 07:56 - a second detector was activated at 20%. This detector is located in mms in a similar location, over the west pen drain in the cp room. The hazardous area fans were switched on in
the mud pit rooms [on the upper mezz level] to help desperse the gas. 08:00 - gd298 reached 60% and a platform gas alarm was annunciated. Personnel mustered hoses were run out to fill the
drains in the cp rooms to suppress the passage of gas up the drains. 08:05 - gas levels dropped to 25% lel at gd298. 08:06 - gas detector gd237 located on a mezz level above gd299 recorded 30%
lel. Gd237 is approx 50ft from gd299. 08:14 - gas levels dropped below 10% lel at all detectors. A high level in the atmoshpheric vent pot was noted in the ccr [alarm panel] and attempts were
made to drain the vessel. However, no flow was seen from the end of the water seal despite the manual valve being in the open position. The manual valve was closed and the water seal spool was
The utilities supervisor discussed the isolation eith the oim who arrived on the platform at 1200 hrs. The decision was made by the oim that the fuel gas relief valve line to the lp flare drum was to
be spaded off on the inlet side. At approx 1605 hrs the utilities supervisor tannoyed the technician who answered the call from a telephone outside the platform co-ordinators ffice. The utilities
supervisor stated that verbally instructed the mechanical technician stated that he was informed to fit a spade on he outlet flange of the relief valve and questioned the utilities supervisor on this
subject. He stated that the utilities supervisor confirmed the spade was to be fitted to the outlet flange of the valve. The tecnician collected a blank extension of mech nical isolations fro the
platform co-ordinator and failed to inform tha platform co-ordinator of the details of additional isolation. He proceeded to the generator enclosure and comenced to break the line on the outlet
flange. He immediately tightend the lange bolts to seal the escape caused a co-incident high level outside the module in which the generator enclosure is located, this resulted in total platform
shutdown and full muster
On start up and change over of gas compressor from diesel to fuel gas all 3 gas detectors in ventilation outlet registered greater than 20% lel. This initiated a general platform alarm and platform
personnel were mustered. The control room operator manual y shut down the compressor and gas detection indication fell to zero. Subsequent initial investigation revealed the source of gas to be
a failed fuel feed pipe. All executive action from the f & g system were as design. The intertrip to psd 05 (unit shutd wn) was overriden as part of the override for the start up sequence.
Four gas detectors located on east side of wellbay came into alarm. Three indicated low level alarm and one greater than 40% lel high level alarm. On investigation gas was found coming from
the cuttings caisson vent on the eastside of the esdv deck. Altho gh gas levels at the wellbay east side detectors dropped away, local portable detection continued to monitor gas levels local to the
caisson vent. Gas compression was manually shutdown - as the only source of hydrocarbons in the system. For the duration o the incident the weather was calm. Further extensive investigation
found a tube end plate failure of gas cooler.
After commencing gas export, high levelgas was detected, a further six gas detectors registered low levels of gas on the production mezz deck. The production supervisor realised that this was
indicative of a large gas leak and initiated a manual sps and a to blowdown to reduce the hydrocarbon gas inventory and minimise the loss of containment. When the gas levels has dissipated the
production supervisor instruted two operators to check for the source of leakage. On inspection of the area it was found that he hydrocarbon gas release had been caused by an open bleed valve,
on a block and bleed facility this pressure gauge registers the export cooler
A pipeline shutdown was initiated by the control room due to export pipeline constraints. During power generation fuel change to diesel, generators 8001 & 8003 tripped. Four minutes later
confirmed smoke & gas detection was indicated in 8003 enclosure & t e co2 system fired off the platform alarm sounded all personnel mustered the fire team and incident controller made the area
secure & carried out a controlled opening of the enclosure doors. It was apparent that a lube oil leak had ignited on high temper ture engine casing casing lagging which was imediately
extinguished by the fire team using portable fire equipment stand by continued until the unit had cooled down. Fire and gas detction was reinstated and the unit isolated. The engine has been
removed a d sent to the vendor egt/gec to determine the cause of the fire. When the cause is determined appropriate prevention measures will be implemented

An operator making his rounds dicovered an oil leak from weldolet for dv-10060 on mol pump p1032 recycle line. The spill was confirmed to area by bunding and the operator isolated the line
either side of the leak. The mol pump was not on line at this time but was subsequently isolated & drained down. The fire team had been mobilised and continued to seep oil from the drip ring
into a drip tray until the pump was drained down. No product went over the side at any time during the inc.
During an inspection in the enclosure of power turbine an indication of gas in the enclosure vent caused the machine to shutdown and a platform gpa/tps. On investifation it was found that the
machine had minor gas leaks inside the enclosure from the burne assembly ignitor socket. When the enclousre was opened to carry out an inspection the reduction in ventilation pressure caused
gas to migrate up the inlet vent to the gas detectors inside the inlet vent hood. This was verified during testing.
Simultaneous drilling, production, pil and gas export hydrocarbon fluids involved. Person noticed hydrocarbon fluids weeping from pinhole in weld on 1/2" tapping point (for pressure transmitter
pto 1407) on process pipework down stream of oil choke well <...>. Control room advised who shutdown and secured wellhead. Other wellheads eyeballed for similar fault, none found. Ndt to
be carried out on welds on other wellheads depending on metallurgical analysis of defective well. Well 17 flowing down s ream of choke incorporated tapping point to be replaced.
Following a process shutdown on change over of sea water lift pumps, block/vent fuel gas valve xv20450 failed to fully close and permitted gas to be vented through xy20013 blowdown vent.
Due to the proximity of the rb211 gas compressor exhaust outlet to t e vent point in combination with the wind direction gas was able to migrate through the exhaust ductwork to the compressor
enclosure the dampers do not shut in normal stop. Gas levels rose above 10% lel but remained below the high level 20% lel and imedia ely dispersed on isolation of the gas supply. Block/vet fuel
gas valve xv20450 has been exercised in demonstrate its operability and a specific operating procedure put in place to isolate gas in a recurring situation. A full function test will be carried ut on
the valve at the next shutdown.
Prior to calibration of sub sea pressure gauges on the <...> manifold the procedure called for calibration of utilty gauge pi-50010. The methanol/utilities crossover valves were lined up to prove
gauge using methanol pump ga3003. Pressure was increa ed in 50 bar increments and whilst being raised from 150 bar to 200 bar the 10mm instrument fitting on 25 pdm se71b failed. The leak
(water) was noticed by the area operator and the line was isolated. Pressure calibration operations were suspended. Initia indications are that the fitting had been over torqued during make up,
however, the whole system had been pressure tested satisfactorily to 400 bar during commissioning.
Normal production. Natural ventilated module. Crude oil escape, approx 20 lts. Elbow on manifold developed pin hole leak which increased to approx. 1/8th.inch. Detected by area operator
who shut well in and drained manifold to make safe. Duration unk own, have used 15mins. As probable exposure length. Elbow for onshore inspection and investigation to determine reason for
failure also reason for failure to detect on u/t survey.
Lined up to receive pig on pig trap. Exterior area subject to strong southerly wind. Crude oil. Pig trap door seal failed in service slick and smell of gas by people lead to detection fixed detection
did not detect.
Water leak was indentified by plant operator. The vessel was immediately isolated from hydrocarbon service, depressurised and drained down. Detection within module did not operate.
Spoolpiece was changed and vessel returned to service.
Gb 0601 gas compressor feeding fuel gas into fuel gas header. Internal modules. Release of hydrocarbon gas. Gb 0601 sour gas compressor of the srew type. Instrument compression fitting
parted, releasing oil/gas around the base of the machine due to pressu e transmitter fault (line iced up) and intervention by control operator, fuel gas header over- pressured lifting relief valves
with the failure of one bellows result in another gas release which was detected on the fixed gas detection system bringing one inute prior to the relief valve re-seating.
A pinhole leak was detected by a <...> painter who was walking in the vicinity. He reported the leak to the m.c.r. the line was supplying gas from the fuel gas separator fa-5120. The leak is
above the weld.

At 2155 hrs on <...> a low gas alarm for midule 11, gas compression activated on the fire and gas pannel in the main control room. The mcr operator <...> checked the scada display and
determined that head g27 in the west hvac ducting was th one affected. A standard `low gas` announcement was made over the public address system and the gas compression operators, <...> and
<...> were informed of the location of the affected gas head. On entering module 11 from the local control roo they smelled gas, and started checking the area for a leak. Gas was found to be
escaping from a cracked small bore pipe on gb1101a 13.5" discharge pipework, namely <...>, the line leading to the safety release 11sv5281 and 11sv5543. The smal bore pipe is used as an
instrument pressure tapping, in conjunction with a double block and bleed valve assembly. Gb1101a was shut down, isolated and depressurised immediately.
At 0115 hrs a crude oil leak was observed at a small bore pipe weld on the prod header no 1. Prod was immed shut down. As plant operators pre- pared for draining the header, the leakage
increased for a short term which activated the hi gas automatic shutd wn and platform alert.
Operation on progress - production environmental conditions wind 270 deg t 35-40 knots. Gas found to be leaking from ea 4002 2nd stage suction cooler tube sheet flange joint. The compressor
was immediately shutdown and system depressurised.
Whilst carrying out an inspection of gb1101a gas compressor following report of a strong smell of gas, it was noticed that there was a small fracture of the 3/8" monel instrument tubing from 13
1/2" discharge cylinder tapping point for: 11pshh5173-11psll5 72. The machine was shutdown immediately and repair effected. The damaged tubing and associated fittings were found to be of
the corect type and installation on further inspection another leak was located on the small bore pipework for level switch 11ls h2005 off suction scrubber fa1128.
While investigating an indication of a gas leak in mod 5 mezz. Level (due to a pre-alert initiated by one gas head) it was seen that the north prover door seal had failed and crude oil was leaking
into the module. The platform was raised to red hazard sta us at 21:42. The process was shutdown and the prover loop depressurised, drained and isolated. On subsequent opening of the door it
was seen that an section of the seal, approx 10mm long was missing at the one o'clock position. The process conditions had een steady at the time of the incident and the door seal had been
changed under job card <...>, a yearly routine, in <...>. The crude oil leakage was estimated at 0.5m3 and was confined locally within the module and drain system.
Technician on routine watchkeeping duties observed localised gas mist from the vicinity of <...> manifold connection, informed supervisor who initiated manual process shutdonw and blowdown.
Placed platform to red hazard status as per platform local proced res. No automatic detection due to localised leak from dead leg section of manifold.
23150 gas compressor was isolated by nightshift ops to remove and replace the ip suction stainer (witches hat) to faclitate breathing operations n2 purging was carried out across the ip barrel by
dayshift ops via gauge tapping points pl 1065 and pl 1168 t e system was proven hc free and the hoses removed, tapping points being left open for venting purposes. On completion of suction
stainer cleanout all pipework was reinstated. Nighyshift ops carried out deisolation of z3150 gas compressor and proceeded to urge the compressor using 2nd stg gas via hi-1306 pushing n2 from
gas sweeting vesselthrough ip barrel gas escape was immediately apparent to the operations crew in the vicnity for start up and blowdonn initiated in the local cr gas leakage was quickly tr ced to
the n2 purge points which had remained open. Valves isolated & capped status identified.
During initial pre commissioning checks on the 5th water injection pumps final insps were made on the turbine hood internal pipework to ensure no blockage or failed solenoid valve. 4 small bore
pipe fittings were dis- connected and the pipe blown through ith air b the <...> [vendor] engin- eer. This uncovered the fact that a diverter valve was orientated in the wrong position. Only 3
fittings were re-connected and the 4th inadvert- ently forgotten by the egt engineer. When the fuel gas was introduced to the turbine gas discharged from the 3/8" od pipe. This was recognised
quickly when no pressure was indicated on the local pressure gauge and a loud gas hissing sound was evident from within the turbine hood. The local emergency stop button was immed pressed a
d shortly after 2 gas detectors in the ventilation outlet duct indicated low level gas, causing a yellow alert status on the platform. Due to the fact that the platform has h2s areas, it is common
practice when detecting low level gas to manually initiated platform hazard [red] status and muster all personnel.

The gpa was automatically initiated as a result of 2 high gas alarms being activated from the gas analyser room on level 3 - a full muster ensued. The gas release was contained within the housing
of the gas analyser room. Investigations revealed that the vac to the room had been inadvertently stopped at some time before the alarm. When the pipework was checked a very small leak was
found on an elbow of the kenmac manifold ft3405b1. A guard has since been fitted over the hvac stop button to protect it agai st accidental knocks. A verification check of the hvac alarm to the
pcs has been carried out, and a visual indication of the air flow from the hvac has been fitted at the outlet. This small leak would have never been found or noticed if the hvac had not b en shut
down, therefore a procedure is being drawn up for the metco technician to periodically shut down the hvac and check the system for gas leaks by using snoop on the joints and with a portable gas
detector.
During normal water wash operations on the b compressor, operator noted steam coming from lagging on 2nd stage hot gas bypass valve. On investigation it was found to be a leaking flange.
Compressor was shut down in the normal manner and de pressurised. no gas alarms were initiated to prevent recurrance, plans in place to systematically remove lagging boxes and replace with
other form of protection. In the short term, all valves with lagging boxes were checked.
On completion of bridge link from ssv <...> to newly installed installation - an initial safety insp revealed that a leak had occurred on diesel fuel system within enc of no 1 generator. The diesel
storage system of the installation was empty. Gener tor enc was fuel of diesel fuel to door sill level and the generator had shut down on loss of fuel estimated that 3.0 m3 of diesel fuel had spilled
into the environment on or bout 6 july 96.
During routine diesel bunkering a leak was observed at rigid platform pipework flexible hose connection. No isolation valve is installed at this position and it was decided to displace pipe content
approx 1/2 ton into storage tank to avoid spillage into sea.
During start up of the high pressure water injection system, excessive vibration occured. The vibration damaged instrumentation disloged fittings and fractured a weld on an ancillary cleared
injection line. Preliminary findings suggest a design problem. T e plant in question has been shutdown pending further inv.
Maintenance work had been completed on the 'b' generator turbine. During start up, fuel gas leaked into the enclosure and activated a gas detector initiating a gpa. The fuel gas line was pressure
tested with nitrogen at 40 bar but no leak could be found. on restart it was discovered that a back-pressure in a sight glass in-line off the throttle valve was created. The back pressure was
sufficient to pass seals and allow gas to escape. The back pressure was created by purging fuel gas to the vent line. Th practise was stopped and the turbine ran normally.
High pressure chemical discharged from instrument piping on discharge of temporary chemical injectin pumps. Lab tech was checking pump rate when his lower body was sprayed with chemical.
The chemical in use was 'blacksmith' wm 180 asphaltine inhibitor. Th pump in use was a checkpoint air driven pump. The air driven pump was pumping against closed valve sub sea following a
<...> production trip. The pump dicharge had stabilised at psv setting of 345 bar 6. The pump had stalled but the instrument fitting lew when the lab tech was in the area.
Small leak occurred around a valve stem of an instrument manifold on instrument. Leak was so small that it was not noticed by the tech check- ing the instrument approx 1 hr before. Metering hut
is approx 6 ftx10ft with no vent and its estimated that appro 20 cubic ft of gas collected in top of hut bringing up 1st stage gas alarm initiating a ga.
A gas leak in module b from a flexible hose on the <...> riser (<...> gas lift psdl 8159b). Personnel in the module reported the leak to the ccr and gas was detected by fixed heads. Platform muster
initiated and process operations and power supplies s utdown ( platform blowdown in operation). Emergency teams investigated, identified and isolated the leak when fixed gas heads indicated a
reduced level of gas. The area was secured and ventilated and adjacent modules checked and found all clear. Ventilati n was achieved by opening module doors as hvac system was inoperative
due to power loss.
Internals of spool piece not checked for hydrocarbons prior to work. Presence of hydrocarbons caused flash fire when welding attempted. Flash fire disappeared up pipe and extinguished itself.
At 14:25 on <...> smoke was seen in the module 'd' void area, a manual alarm was activated in the control room. A muster was initiated and everyone accounted for. Investigation by emergency
response teams confirmed smoke but no fire emanating from mg-2 exhaust lagging. Mg-2 was shutdown and the area damped down. The situation was secured and the muster stood down at
15:52. Investigation confirmed that mg-2 exhaust insulation has been impregnated with lube oil from a leak on a flange joint on a mg-1 lub oil line running above the exhaust. No injuries were
sustained, minor property damage occurred.

Whilst wireline operations were being undertaken on well <...>, a low level gas alarm activated in that area. On leaving the module a wireline operator observed gas escaping from a low torque
valve. He closed the valve which isolated the leak. On investig tion a grease nipple was found to be missing having sheared off.
Gas turbine tripped due to the activation of the infrared flame detectors within the enclosure of the machine. At approximately the same time a bang was heard and the doors were observed to fly
open. No personnel were near to the machine which is not loca ed in common thoroughfare. A small fire on on the insulation of the enclosur was extinguished. On examination of turbine machine
it was discovered that the fuel gas distribution manifold was ruptured by internal over pressure between dual fuel burners fou and five. Also the gas hose feeding burner six had broken off and
showed signs of heat damage.
Methonol had been injected into the <...> gas lift line the system was isolated and being de-pressurised via the spillback pvc to the methabol tank. Shortly after opening the pcv to the relieve the
pressure a change of platform status occurred due to coi cident low level gas module 1. The pcv was closed immediately. The gas levels cleared and the platform was returned to normal status.
Investigations revealed that the nrv at the methanol injection point was passing opening the pcv permitting gas to pass f om the methanol injection header into the storage tank on to common
chemical al tank e vent header and to the external vent outside module 1. The nrv was replaced and inspected. A damaged 'o' ring seal was found and identified as the cause of the gas in the
methonol header.
During routine oil sampling from oil export line, oil/mist found to be emitting from a flexible sampling line from ta-14. The area technician quickly identifed this emission and isolated the
offfending leaking line as the occurrence from sampling start to finding leaking flexible line was estimated as 15 mins, leakage was estimated as 1 litre of oil escape
Incident occurred during platform annual shutdown. The activity was replacement of pl-226 1 1/2" kicker line by pass valve for a-1301 oil pig launcher the valve flanges are 4 bolt 1 1/2" mounted
in the vertical plane. At the start of the task, it was foun that all bolts on the upper and lower flanges were heavily corroded and impossible to loosen off. The fitter sawed through two bolts on the
upper and lower flanges. The flanges did not open, and no relaese occurred. A third bolt on each flange was cut an the valve was moved to separate the flange faces on the two remaining bolts a
small amount of gas was emitted from the top flange which is conected to the pig launcher. Oil/water emulsion and gas was emitting from the lower flange which is connected to t e oil export line.
After draining to a bucket for 15 mins it was decided that the fitter would reinstate the valve, and that the line would be thoroughly drained via the pig launcher prior to futher work on valve
replacement. The valve was realigned betwe n tha flanges and two new studs fitted in each of the upper and lower flanges the fitter decided to cut out and replace the two remaining corroded
bolts. Immediately the remaining corroded bolt in the lower flange was cut, the flanges sprung apart allowi g a release of oil/water emulsion and gas. The fitter managed to remove the corroded
Coiled tubing operation, while opening sliding slide door on ta-14 upper lateral. At 6716 feet, with cithp of 740 psi. As the ssd opened the cithp built up from 740 to 1080 psi in 5 minutes. The
injector head stuffing box was at that point set 1000 psi. A the cithp rose above 1000 psi, the driller observed gas passing the stuffing box. He informed the coil tubing operator and in turn the
coil tubing operator applied more pressure on to the injector head stuffing box to contain the gas leak. This operation took 10-20 secs.
Leak off test was being carried out, the wll was lined up to the test separator for bleeding down. The actuated well valves opened up (choke in manual partially open) allowing crude oil at 50 barg
to pass through pipework. The pipeline high pressure trip perated to close in the well and test separator inlet valve xzv-1001. The test separator inlet xzv-1001 did not close quickly enough to
stop a pressure surge into the test separator. This resulted in pipe hamer, which caused a flanged joint to spring resulting in a gas leak into the module.
On a liquid to fuel gas change over co-incident high level gas indicated inside turbine enc automatically shutting down the unit. On inv a fuel gas supply hose to dual fuel burner no 8 had burst.
During normal production operations a gas leak was detected on the gas lift header. The gas lift compressor was shutdown, the header depressurised. When the pipe lagging was removed the leak
was determined to have come from a flange. The gas leak took pla e in a partially open module, the wend speed being 52 knots at 126 deg.
During routine operations an operator noticed a leak on the produced water tank. Further investigation revealed the source of the leak to be a pin hole leak at the base of the tank. The produced
water tank is situated in an enclosed module with forced ventilation.
C turbine fuel was changed from gas to diesel then diesel to gas as a regular routine operation. <...> was walking past module 13 on the outside walkway when he saw smoke/mist coming out of
the vent system of c turbine. He contacted <...> who nv the situation by looking inside the enclosure and saw diesel spraying out of the burner purge hose. The smoke/mist was caused by high
pressure disel vapourising. <...> contacted myself in control room to say that he was going to shut down the turbin using the emergency stop. Water injection was automatically load shed via the
prismic to bring the load to an acceptable limit for the remaining turbine.

During routine ops the gas import tripped on lo lo temp. On inv a flange was found to be leaking gas [the gas was venting onto the temp switch which actioned the automatic shutdown]
During diesel loading from vessel to platform a small amount of fuel was lost to deck, when auxilliary generator fuel tank overflowed. (two litres). The vessel was changing suction to his pumps,
switching from tank to tank and a pocket of air was pushed t rough the system resulting in this occurrence
During routine checks of module, a member of the production team could smell gas in the vicinity of the high pressure gas compressor. The operator informed the ccr, who checked the gas
detection for any indications in that area, none were found and syste s were proved. A small leak was located from further investigations on the instrument tubing pipework. A valve isolation
stopped the leak. The compressor was then shutdown to allow the pipework to be replaced.
A small slick was observed (brown discolouration in sea) from the platform on the south east face and centrally beneath the platform. The operations team began an immediate investigation into
locating source which was found to be from the drains caisson to sea in module. There was already an operations team member in the module who had been responding to a hi-level alarm on the
skimmed oil tank, both of the skimmed oil tank pumps were running but the tank level was not falling at the expected rate. The tank level had been higher and overflow to the caisson had taken
place which resulted in the spillage to sea, operations checked the line from the module through its flow path to 'a' second stage seperstor, all appeared fine with no closed valves or leaks, the
caisson pump was in operation pumping out to the closed drain tank, after a shore period the levels dropped to a normal operating state and the caisson was cleared of residual oil. Further
investigations were carried out which indicated that the skimmed oil discharge was unable to deliver at full rate because it comingles with don fluids prior to entering b2nd stage the don has slug
flow characteristics and at the time of this incident had been flowing at a high rate typically at peak fow 25000-30000bbl first stage to be routed via the test sep oil outlet line a a2nd stage. This
During routine production gas lift operations, gas head detection system in ccr alarmed at 30% lel quickly rising to 60% lel simultaneously another head rose to 20% lel, this automatically
initiated a local equipment shutdown. As this was happening two m re gas heads rose to 20% level, this level of gas quckly subsided as the compressor shut down and vented. On identifying the
location of the first gas head to alarm, an operator discovered a fractured impulse line. Gas lift operations suspended until re tification of failed component. Investigation report raised. Personnel
made aware of incident.
A leak of approximately 1-3 gallons per minute was observed from the lower section of crude oil cooler 200 hb-01. As the temperature range was within acceptable limits a decision was made to
bypass and isolate the cooler. The bypass was opened and the i let valve to the cooler closed. During the closing of the outlet valve a significant amount of water and crude was emitted from the
north edge of the cooler. The ccr was instructed to initiate a psd2 and manual blowdown of separation, they were further r quested to initiate a mnaual red hazard status. The cooler was fully
isolated and with the aid of the emergency response team area cleaned and made safe prior to returning the installation to normal green status.
During the reaming of a liner, the driller increased the rate of no1 mud pump from 2400 to 3400psi to attain the required pressure. After a short time a bang was heard followed by a release of
mud onto the drill floor, the driller re-acted stopping the m d pump in order to investigate the cause. It was discovered that a <...> wing half of a union, complete with anadrill transducer had
blown off the stand pipe manifold leaving the thread half of the union in place. The wing half and transducer came to rest approximately 10' from the n.e. corner of the iron roughneck some 15'
from its original location on the manifold. Two men were working on the drill floor at the time of the inicident neither of them sustaining an injury. Investigation of the thr ad half of the inion
attached to the manifold revealed it to be a <...> this was replaced by a <...> and a "<...> bull plug fitted. The new arrangement was leak tested prior to resuming work.
The i.p. compressor tripped following a high level in the suction k.o vessel. A few minutes later a gas head in m1 l4 came into alarm followed by others raising the platform to yellow alert status.
On investigation a leak was discovered coming from the head joint of the i.p suction cooler. All sources of pressure feeding the i.p. compressor were checked and isolated and a unit blowdown
initiated. Shortly afterwards the oibserved gas levels had dripped to zero. The platform was returned to normal gree status. Because a higher than normal pressure was observed in the suction
side of the m/c, esdv 36/38 refrigerent feed tp i.p. compressor isolation v/v) was suspect. The valve was tested and found to be operating normally, more detailed testing reveale a fault with the
solen old valve in the air supply line
Platform was in normal production. During routine site visit production supervisor observed curde oil issuing from a grease nipple of the oil pig launcher mnaual block valve. It is estimated that
approx 20l. Oil leaked from the orifice. Plant shutdown ffected to remove and repair/ plug.

During wire line activities on well a9 (retrieving bridge plug) a leak developed by the wire line mast stuffing nbox - (+1 - j - 10l.oil). The operation was halted and the well pressure reduced to +/16 bar. The stuffing box was adjusted and the operation re-commenced without incident viz. Pulled out of hole. The next phase of well access work being completed with a different mast. The
stuffing box in question being subsequently subject to maintenance.
Gas detected on satellite from <...>. Platform shutdown from <...>. Topsides depressurised and vented to atmosphere. Sbv detected gas at 500 metres and moved away. Depressuring pipeline
between <...> and <...>, pressure dropped from 18 bar to 8 ar in 2 hours. <...> facility on <...> also shutdown.
While rigging down shear seal bops from the <...> xmas tree on well <...> st it was decided to conduct ppms on the xmas tree since the well was already shut in. During the ppms the following
valves failed to test: production string - lower maste valve and flow wing valve gas injection string - flow wing valve
The production department were in the process of starting up water injection system. Exessive flow was acheived across a hand indicated control valve resulting in cavitation and vibration of
pipework. The vave positioner fitted to the hic valve, failed ca sing the hic valve to fail the closed position. Rapid closing of the valve caused hydraulic shock to the system, resulting in damaged
pipework, instruments and other fittings. A level 2 shutdown was initiated by the production supervisor. The system has r mained shut down since the incident.
Adverse weather/sea conditions had caused extensive damage at 8m level walkways underdeck of both the production and drilling platforms. Main areas of damage on both platforms were, east
side, se and nw hand rails (mainly all along east side) were bent in oard at about 45 deg. Damage would appear to have been the result of large waves. Access to all emergency escape routes has
been made available
A 20mm separation found between the pin and box of a 20" conductor connection. Pressure integrity of the well is not lost as the 13 3/8" and 9 5/8" casing integrities were confirmed. The
wellhead integrity was confirmed. The well was shut in pending the outcome of stress analysis. Repair options are being evaluated.
<...> is the well currently being worked on the platform. The ongoing operation at the time of incident was perforation of the well prior to completion. Wireline was rigged up to perforate with a
shooting nipple (length of pipe in the blow out preventors to slow bops to be closed with wireline in the hole). This is a routine precaution against higher than predicted pressures. The well was
also lined up to inject (pump into formation) with heavy brine if necessary. Before firing the guns the annualar bo was closed around the shooting nipple and the pressure monitored. After firing,
pressure in the well rose to 120 psi indicating an underbalance. Preparations were made to inject into the well. Precautions were taken to ensure that the shooting nipple as in the correct position
in the bops. Two chain blocks were also attached to help restrain movement. The drill floor was cleared and barriers erected prior to commencing pumping. Injecting was commenced and
pressure in the well rose slowly to 1100psi at that point the shooting nipple moved up approximately 6" and shouldered out under the bops. This movement caused one of the chain blocks to
part. The ip had been crossing the drillfloor after erecting barriers as the chain block parted. The chain struck him on the forearm,
During replacement of esdv 2401 - sealine valve - a line plug in the sealine was released whilst there still a differential pressure of approx 28 psi across it. Caused the plug to suddenly be forced a
further 400 mm into the sealine a 1 ton steel wire ret ieval line attached to the plug assembly parted
Found tubing to annulus communication on routine test of well. Well shut in,awaiting repair prog
In order to c/o tree stradle across sssv was pulled to allow down hole plugs to be set. When attempting to pull stradle on wireline pooh with part of control line clamp. Ran 4.2 drift- hung up at
696'. Ran lib showed impression of control line so tubing c early badly damaged or parted . On checking back records mnsl found no evidance of tbg- annululus communication. Well is water
injector and will not flow with sw in well mnsl intended to keep on injecting untill rig free to workover
Well b31 was routinely tested for tubing to annulus communication - the leak rate was found to be outwith mnsl specification. The leak is below the asv. The well remains on production.
Forward plan/remedial activities will be developed
Well b30 was routinely being tested for tubing to annulus communication the leak was found to be outwith mnsl specification byt below the trdhsv the well remains on injection. Found plans
activities will be developed in due course.

While drilling the 12 1/4" hole section the wellpath of the subject well knowingly came within 18.5ft of an injection well <...>. The total survey error for the two wells was 50.28ft, which meant
that the wells could have collied. The mwd error was n t detected until a gyro survey was run in the 9 5/8" casing. The gyro indicated that the well was displaced 422 ft further left than the mwd
surveys showed. The incident occured due to magnetic survey errors in the mwd readings. Two errors were made, as f llows: error one:- the wrong number was input into the survey computer for
grid conbergence this resulted in a 1.3o azimuthatl error. The pre-run configuration sheet was reviewed and approved on the rig. The grid convergence was accurately noted on this f rm, but as
this a an off-line form the engineer was still able to input the wrong value into the computer. Error two:- the drillstring magnetic interference correction programme was applied without adequate
quality control procedures. These programmes ar not universally applicable, and the software in this case wrongly applied a correction factor. This resulted in an addition 2o azimuthal error on
the mwd surveus at section td.
Pre-packed screens were run in the 81/2" horizontal section on well <...>. After an open hole cleanup the well was losing 300 bph. Postflush was pumped down the drill string and the well was
noted to be still losing at 300 bph. However, on pooh flow as observed on the drillpipe and the well shut in with 200 psi sidpp, o psi sicp 10.4 ppg brine was bullheaded down the drillpipe to reestablish 300 bph losses, on pulling the inner washpipe above the knockout isolation valve the losses stopped. After po h to 11,100 ft hydrocarbons were observed on the drillpipe. The well was
shut in with o psi sidpp and o psi sicp. The well was circulated with 10.4 ppg brine and flowchecked static prior to continuing pooh.
During the abandonment of well <...> the completion packer was unsealed. No circulation was possible due to the packer rubbers being extruded. Before pulling the tubing a flowcheck showed
the well to be flowing. The annular bop was closed and maximum of 22 psi sicp noted. The tubing had zero pressure. The casing pressure was bled down using volumetric control and
subsequent flow check showed the well to be static. The completion tubing was then pulled with the well static throughout.
960 psi recorded on a and b annuli, indicating packer leak (already known) and annulus to annulus communication. 9 3/8" pack off to be tested and well repaired. (water injection well)
During routine well integrity tests on birch production wells <...>, <...> and <...> the trssv's were found to be passing the leakage rate is outwith api recommendations. A risk assessment has been
conducted and additional controls put in place. Furture p anning is to confirm that the leakage rate is due to scale build up. Acid washes will be programmed asap and trssv's re-tested. The <...> is
currently performing drilling operations over the birch cluster and the oim has been informed of the addition l temporary controls.
After tripping out of the hole at 19:00hrs on <...>, a kick occurred. A pit gain on <2bbls was detected. Pipe was stripped into the hole to 2,833' and brine was circulated. Pipe was then staged in
the hole to 12,306' and stripped to 14,558'. Brine was ci culated and weighted up from 10.0ppg to 10.5ppg to kill the well.
While pulling out of hole, drilling bops were closed to verify well ballooning. No influx from the resvoir in the wellbore and no drill pipe or annular pressures recorded. Well monitored over trip
tank before pulling out of hole cont'd
While pooh noticed improper fill - circ well ok while rih noticed improper displacement closed in well with 15 bbl gain and 725 psi sicp circ well constant ww of 680 pptf was obtained rih
circulating as required barite sag thought to be cause of problem
Whilst running in hole 7" completion string in well <...> (bottom of string at 670ft) the well started to flow. The 13-3/82 hydril gl bag type preventer was closed in. After approx 1 hour the
pressure on tubing and caseing stabalised at 120 psi. The build up of gas cap was circulated out under controled conditions. Although a subsequent inflow test initially showed no flow. The well
started to flow again and the hydrill again was closed. Currently awaiting 680+pptf brine to replace the 670+ brine in hole
Routine leak-off test being carried out on <...> safety valves. Ssv failed to close. Lmgv failed leak-off test.
Action taken: well closed in and killed programme being scheduled to take place before the end of <...>.
Well closed in from <...>-<...> noticed high pressure in a annulus plugging at this time would increase risk to personnel pressures not rising above maasp well to be monitored and plugged after
ltfd mods
While pooh with packer swabbed well in losses could not immed be cured so welll shut in until mud tanks full again well finally bulkheaded to 635 pptf water based mud - well stable cont'd
pooh
No gains or losses during the circulation period. Trip volume was 8 bbls, which is correct for 12 stands of drill pipe. No gains or losses during circulation. No measurement pit gain prior to shut
in. Plan formulated. Relevant gas heads isolated

A pes plug was set to a remedy leak between the tubing and the a annulus the ung was opened to check the thp. The thp was found to be 118 bar with an annulus pressure of 138 bar, these
readings suggest that the pes plug is leaking.
During a routine operation a well flow occured. This happened whilst the pumps were shut down to add to a drill pipe to the drill string. A well control programme was immediately instigated
Whist drilling the well was observed to be flowing and shut in using the annular bop at 05:45. The drill string was rotated periodically as a precaution against the drill dtring becoming stuck
during the well control operation. The annular bop was obese ved to be leaking the ram bop's. Once primary well control had been re-established an additional barrier of a retrevable packer was
installed in the wellbore and the annular bop sealing was replaced.
After the well was flowing for approx. 5 minutes, it was noted that the h2s in the gas export stream was steadily rising. Prior to depressuring the flowline, an oil sample was taken and it indicated
a reading of 450 ppm in the gas phase. The well had no previous record of high h2s levels.
<...> was completed and brought on stream in <...> from the outset abnormally high annulus pressures were recorded (120) the influx was investigated and the result showed it to be brine from an
over pressured zone leaking through the liner lap. The well is subsequently produced and operated under dispensation. Pressure on the a annulus is normally 100 bar and can be bled to zero. The
influx continues to be brine with a flowrate of 3.5 litres per minute. (last recorded dec 95) at the same time a 2000 psi pressure test on the a annulus was good. Recent fishing operations on this
well have been abandoned, leaving approximatley 6000' of wire and tool strings. The accessible along hole depth is 13000. It was reported that on<...> the a annulus pressur had reduced to zero
(and was sucking). At the same time there was also a drop in b annulus pressure from a steady 49 bar to 26 bar. The change of status occured over a period of less than 12 hours. It is suspected
there is a leak between tubing and a annulus.
While drilling at 3303m with a mud weight of 1.50sg, the well was suspected to be flowing following a 1.7m3 gain. The pumps were shut off and a flow check confirmed a flow of +/- 10m3/hr.
The bop was closed and a sicp of 460psi was observed. A circulation was carried out to homogenise the mud, then a wait and weight method kill with a mud weight of 1.61sg was carried out. The
mud weight was subsequently raised to 1.64sg due to persistent instability/background gas. The well is now stable.
Formation fluid influx while pulling tubing during workover on well <...> to recover the old completion string of well <...>, an overshot was run on 5-1/2" tubing to engage the 7" tubing at 247'.
The tubing was then drifted to 9148' with a 3.85" drift and to 2305" with a 4.60" drift whilst the well was closed in a chemical cut was made above the previous hold up depth at 2292' the
completion fluid in the annuls was then circulated out and displaced to 580 pptf kill brine. Thereafter the 7" and 5-1/2" tubin and sssv landing nipple were recovered along with the control line.
Drilling pulling the 7" tubing the well started to flow at 2bpm into trip tank. A total gain of 26bbl was observed. The well was closed in by stabbing a circulating head on top of the tu ing and
closing the annular preventor. Pressures on the annulus and tubing both stabalised at 60psi. String depth was 1690@. The well was imediately bullheaded at 1 bpm with 70 bbl brine to squeeze
the influx back into the formation. It took 1.5 hours to kill the well and reduce well pressures to zero. As the well was bullheaded no hydrocarbons were brought to the surface. A further 140bbls
brine were bullheaded to increase overbalance. Normal operations were resumed. The remainder of the 7" tubing was pu led out of the hole. An overshot was run to recover the 5-1/2 and 5"
Failure to install and test the 9 5/8" casing hanger seal assembly. Attempt to recover the seal assembly failed and the lower part of the seal assembly was left in the cavity around the hanger neck.
After obtaining the required approvals and establishing hat the flow from the well (due to ballooning) had decreased to an acceptable rate (less than 1bbl/hr and decreasing for exposed
hydrocarbon bearing reservoirs in the cased 12 1/4" section). It was decided to lift the bop stack. The remains of the seal s ack were recovered and replaced by new seals and also tested to the
required pressure, before the bop stack was re-instated the same day.
On <...> the well was accidentally perforated (on depth) using pressure acivated top guns. This was the result of an apparent failure of a pes check valve during final pressure testing on the
completion tubing. Brine was lost from the tubing and sea ater was used to re-establish a fluid column back to surface. The well was initially full with 590 pptf brine. On <...> after conducting
an injectivity test the completion was pulled back to expose circulating ports. The well was then circulated to 5 0 pptf brine from above the packer back to surface. The well was observed for
three hours and was seen to be dead. No flow from the annulus or drill pipe was observed. The completion tubing was therefore pulled out of hole without incident. On <...> a 9.5/8" dlt packer
was run in hole on 5" drill pipe losses of /-1 barrel per hour were observed. The well had remained static for 6 hours between operations. The packer was set at 1400 and function pressure tested
to 1000 psi during the test the drill ipe remained open at surface and the level was observed to be dropping slowly. The top drive was used to keep the drill pipe full. Tripping in hole
recommenced in a controlled manner slight back flow was observed from the drill pipe between connections ut diminished to nothing by the time the next stand was picked up. The well was still
While drilling 8 3/8 hole at 13550` md (12286` tvd) a kick occurred. A pit grain of 8 bbls was detected and a flow check performed. The well was shut in and sidp and sicp were recorded. The
mud weight was increased from 11 ppg to 12 ppg and the kick cir ulated out. Circulation continued, increasing the mw to 13.5 ppg drilling operations resumed at 22:30hrs, <...>. The well was
845'tvd above the <...> reservoir. Produciton was shutdown unitl control was achieved.

Routine 6 monthly xmas tree maintenance being carried out on well this well is a 7" water injector. Both the umv and the wing valve failed the <...> asset well integrity manual leak rate criteria
for xmas trees. The lmv was successfully pressure tested nd the dhsv is in place and was successfully tested on<...>. Workover planned for well in <...> when the xmas tree will be changed out.
Well gos on suction when water injection is shutdown. Well is currently on water injection under dispensation
On completion of a workover gas injection pressure was applied to the lower a annulus to return the well to prod. This action resulted in the b annulus pressure inc to the b annulus shutdown
pressure of 50 bar. The well was plugged and invs have now been onducted to establish the presence of a leak from the low a annulus to the b annulus via the 7 5/8" scab casing. The gas lift
completion has now been reconfigured to place dummy gas lift valves in the lower mandrels allowing gas lift only to occur from t e upper most mandrel. The new gas lift configur- ation was tried
by injecting nitrogen gas and resulted in no b annulus press build up being observed. This was conducted across the expected in service gas injection pressure range with the well plugged and
later unplugged. The well will be returned to product for a trial period of one month after which time a review will be conducted to ensure that the reconfig and monitoring procedures put in
place can ensure that no pressure is trans to the b annulus, ou with the <...> asset well integrity manual guidelines.
<...> is <...> welll with a tubing retrievable dhsv installed on the gas injection side. During the last closure test gas was seen to migrate up the control line when the valve was closed and the
control line was depressurised. A seal failure is suspected and we intend to lock out the valve and install an insert wireline retrievable valve. This work will be undertaken in the next few days, on
the completion of the current op.
Monitoring of well t1 annulus pressurising revealed communication from the tubing into a and b annuli. As a precaution the platform manning was reduced to a minimum. Measures were taken
to reduce the annulus pressures by bleeding off to the closed drain and flare. Tubing pressure was minimised by keeping the well on production. The sub surface safety valve was closed and this
premitted the pressure to be bled down on the tubing and annuli. Preparations are being made to repair or plug this well. An nvestigation into the causes is under way. No personnel were
injured. A detailed internal investigation report will be made available in due course.
Well <...> is a naturally flowing oil productin well on the platform. This well was taken offline for routine wellhead and downhole safety valve integrity testing. The surface actuated valves were
successfully integrity tested against a wellhead closed in ressure of 68 barge. Three unsuccessful attempts to close and integrity test the otis dkd downhole safety valve were made. An ongoing
intervention in another well precluded immediate valve changeout. A risk assessment of the situation was made. The res lt was that the well was returned to production with additional safeguards
being taken to minimise any risk of damage to the wellhead. The well was re-entered and the downhole safety valve was recovered. Primliminary investigations howed that the ball h d seized in
the half open position due to barium sulphate scale deposition. An <...> (flapper type) downhole safety valve was successfully installed and tested. The well was returned to production service.
Drilling well through reservoir section. Meter observed drilling break flow checked well [positive] shut in well to observing drill pipe and casing pressure killed well as per bp well control policy
by weighting up mud
Drilling 6" hole on well through reservoir section. At 3148metres observed gas increase from 0.64% to 22.5% lel and flow rate increase. Shut well in and observed drillpipe and casing pressure.
Killed well as per well control policy by weighting up mud f om 1.39sg to 1.49sg.
The allowable leakage rate for the valve is 0.0025bpm and the actual leakage leakage rate was 98.9 bar over 5 minutes which equate to 0.83bp. This would be the volume rate passing the injection
valve to pressurise up the flowline to wellhead pressure. Al the tree valves were also tested and held pressure within the acceptable criteria.
During wireline ops remove control of upper master valve overpressured valve actuator shearing retaining bolts - prior to running in hole with wireline lubricator had been pressurised to 3000 psi
as per procedures and bled down before opening upper master gate valve to enter well - valve was opened using platform air and transferred to bank of compress air bottles - reg failed to control
output pressure - overpressure in actuator sheared retaining bolts - relief valve in line from reg had had not been fitt d - excessive force sheared 5 bolts actuator came off end of valve spindle
and landed on scaffolding some 12" below
While logging with <...> on <...> the connection to the needle valve on the bleed off line to the downhole safety valve parted. This caused a loss of pressure to the downhole valve which shut and
cut the shlumberger wire. The <...> tool string and 11,000 feet of wire were lost in the well.
Drilling 8 1/2" hole section, encountered reservior section higher than anticipated drilled to 16586` md-9285`tvd, the driller noted an increase in returns flow. He spaced out the drill pipe & shut
the well in on the hydrill (bop). Shut in drill pipe pr ssure was 280 psi total kick gain = 3 bbls. Mud weight 12.4 ppg @ the time maximum anticipated = 12.5 (ppg) kill weight fluid = 13.0 ppg.
Kill well with weight & weight method. Closed in injection wells n18 & n17 in case these were provising injection upport.

Took a 5 bbl influx while drilling the upper reservoir on well. Sidp = 225psi sicp = 575psi mud weight = 13.1ppg kill weight required @9324' tvd (rkb) = 13.6ppg attempted to circulate out kick
using drillers method, gas cut mud coming back. Check pressur s - 510p 225psi. Wt up and displace to 13.6ppg mud. Shut in well with 13.6ppg mud circulated around sidp=300psi bled off
10bls sidp=0 sicp=250psi cont to circulate 13.6ppg through choke. Bleed off annulus pressure. Open hydril well static.
Well incident
The well started flowing on a trip during fishing operations at 10287'. A back-off had been made with a string shot inside 2 - 7/8" tbg at 9245' , and btms up were circ w/11.3 ppg brine. The well
was static. Pipe was pooh to 7808', incorrect fill ups we e noted, and well shut in after a 4 bbl gain. Sidp was 70psi. We stripped back in the hole down to top of fish and circ'd out influx using
"drillers method". Sicp=sidp= 0 psi at this time, however the well still flowed slightly. The btm hole pressure ad been slowly increasing during the workover due to injection support (which has
since been shut in). For this reason, the well was circ'd to 12.5 brine.
<...> water injector during the workover of <...> all the preparations had been made for recovering the completion. Plugs had been set and pressure tested and an inflow test had been performed.
A 7" tubing spear was run and engaged in the hanger profile ready to pull the completion. The tie down bolts were retracted and the hanger was unseated from the wellhead. The hanger was
raised 30ft which meant that the outer housing of the eltsr was now approximately 10ft above the top of the slick joint. The maximum martin decker reading was 305000lbs which decreased to
280000lbs. A flow check was performed and the well was seen to be flowing so the annular bop was closed around the drillpipe. The sidpp and sicp both stabilised around 1100 psi. After a
discussion betwen the <...> senior toolpusher it was felt that the most likely cause of the increase in pressures could be attributed to the upper completion packer having been disturbed allowing
reservoir pressure to pressure up the annulus. This in turn by-passed the packoff on the 7" spear and caused the sidpp to rise with the annulus pressure. A conference call was then held with the
onshore support team and it was agreed that the safest plan of action was to attempt to land off the tubing hanger again and attempt to obtain a pressure test on the hanger seals so that the situation
Whilst pumping operation in progress to circulate to s.w on <...> well <...> (secured/abandoned well i.e. cement plug in position across perforation, pressure/inflow tested.) Low level gas (20%
lel) detected in area of rig floor sub base, bringing platform automatically to yellow status. This was followed immediately by cro bringing platform to red status manually - as per platform
standing instructions. Gas increased to max of 60% lel during a period of 3 to 4 minutes during which time well was made secure. The hydrocarbon gases encountered during operation were
residual hc's in the inhibited sea water completion fluid (this did not constitute a well control situation). Following incident well fluids circulated via a closed system to the process. Gas lev ls
were dissipated by natural ventilation in a matter of minutes (20knt wind from the east) confirmed by both fixed and portable monitors.
During routine 6 monthly integrity testing of a downhole safety valve, installed in <...> well <...> the down hole safety valve failed to test. Despite repeated tests the valve is still failing to test.
The failure of the valve was reported to the well systems group on the<...>, as a result of this, discussion on the failed valve between <...> and <...> took place. This discussion outlined the
problem and the steps <...> would be taking to resolve the issue. Subsequent to this <...> have investigated using dsv to identify where the problem lay. A scale dissolver treatment has laso been
performed in an attempt to rectify the problem. <...> will be revisiting this well in the near future to perform some more investigation and plan to re-enter the well using a mobile offshore drilling
rig circa j<...>.
While pressure testing a cement abandonment plug on <...>, it was found that the shear seal rams of the bop stack were leaking. Subsequently the cement plug and 9 5/8" casing were successfully
pressure tested to 3000 psi using a flange sub and pipe rams. ater investigation showed that the side packers were damaged. No dangerous situation could develop as the well was fully cased off
with a pressure tested cement abandoment plug.
At approx. 15:17 the casualty, together with lifeboat no: 08 fell into the sea from the production platform. The lifeboat was subsequently recovered by the daughter craft of the stand by vessel
(sbsv) and taken alongside the sbsv at 15:47. The casualty as recovered to the deck of the sbsv but showed no signs of life. The casualty was officially pronounced dead at 17:25 by a doctor
from raf <...>. The police were informed.
Diver received fatal injuries while working on the <...> subsea template (tied back to <...>) from the vessel dsv <...>. Cap came off under pressure and struck diver who later died during
decompression. Other diver received minor injuries.
Operation: removal of <...> 52 running tool from 26" conductor pipe at bop deck, slot e3. Personnel involved: 2 x <...> service engineers 1 x <...> supervisor 1 x s<...> assistant rig supt. The air
trapped within the conductor pipe was n t sufficiently bled off prior to removing the connecting snap ring. The running tool was ejected from the 26" conductor pipe. The injured party was thrown
to the deck and sustained facial injuries. The injured party was medi-rescued at 0200 hrs and sent to bergen hospital, norway.

When directing tugger operations in the middle of the south drilling rig floor injured person sustained an injury to his left hand after being struck by a dropped torque wrench. The wrench was
dropped from a height of approx. 18 ft.
A scaffold squad consisting of 2 others and the ip were working on cd13 mezz erecting a scaffold. 2 were tying off boards on a platform approx 18 ft above deck level. Ip was cutting a board at
deck level 6 ft away from the scaffold. He was postioned under a main support beam and he felt he was protected from the operations above. One person knelt down to postion the short board
and knocked the board through the hole it was intended to fill. As the board fell it struck a cross member of the scaffold which deflected outwith the scaffold hitting ip on his left hand. Ip
sustained injury to his thumb. He visited the medic and was refered to the field doctor who in turn refered him to the a.r.i.
Whilst on station at <...> the starboard main engine shut down due to a high jacket temperature. <...> started to drift off station and a pot water hose lying on the deck shifted knocking the ip
over. Weather had been foggy but was 500 - 700 metres. Wind se 10 knots, sea <1 m. Temp +4 deg c. Baro 1018. Ip sustained injuries to head, arm, neck & nausea. Because of doubts over
whether the ip had been unconscious it was thought prudent to medivac. Ip treated as minor case at <...>t & released. Subsequently signed off by own doctor.
Drilling running in the hole with clean out assembly. Whilst tailing a stand of 3 1/2" drill pipe the ip got his left hand trapped between the stand of drill pipe and the iron roughneck.
Whilst running five and a half inch tubing. He caught his finger between the pipe and the jaw. Sustained crush type injury to finger.
Whilst pulling casing, the elevators were slackened off and the pin taken out. Elevators opened and thumb became caught in pinch point between the two opened sections. Actions taken to
prevent recurrence:- incident to be fully discussed at safety meeting in particular, to be aware of pinch points.
Removing bridle on crane. Standing on boom; signalled to crane driver to take up the slack , this action allowed the load to travel to the west which knocked the man over and caused his injury.
Actions: improvements to contractor's risk assessment proce ures and work activity procedure. Discussions with contractor to brief all employees.
The drill string was being pulled out of the hole and racked on the drill floor. The 7th strand of heavy walled drill pipe was being lowered by the driller onto the racking area, the derrickman half
way up the derrick was pulling it into position using a ugger winch. At the drill floor level the ip and another floorman were pushing the drill pipe into position prior to it being lowered approx
18" onto the floor. The pipe swung slightly hitting the ip on the chest. Following hospital examination and examin tion of his companies doctor the ip was declared fit to resume work the
following day. A tugger has now been utilised to pull drill pipe into position.
The <...> wireline crew were prep to rig down the wireline pressure control equip following successful run on well to set dummy pack off. The crew had drawn the tool into the stuffing box and
closed the work over valve. An operator had then released the d um brake to drop the tool 2 m. As the tool lowered the wire parted. Tension released the wire recoiled and struck the wireline cab
operator in the face. The cab window was partially open at the time.
<...> was four days into his offshore duty. At the time of the accident he was repostioning a 15 tom swl air hoist onto its fixed runway beam above the seawater lift pumps. The main work was
completed but the spare chain attached to the hoist remained oiled on the access scaffold. While attempting to lower this chain into its deck level catch baskit he lost control, and asthe remainder
of the chain snapped into its natural postion it struck him on the shoulder. This work task will not be repeated until we have carried out a critical task analysis and produced a written detailed
procedure.
Driller had just completed the removal of the lower crossover section of the bop stack in order to send it ashore for recertification. In order to carry this out the stack had been lifted utilising the
bop winch. At the actual time of the incident, the in ured party was positioned at the winch control panel and was setting the stack down after the spool removal in order to transfer the total weight
off the winch itself and spread it between the winch and turnbuckles positioned on either side of the stack. s an additional precaution to prevent the stack swaying, some wooden packing had also
been placed under the stack. Whilst operating the controls, the hydraulic supply hose and fitting came adrift without warning, striking the ip on the leg. A full investigation is being carried out.
A bundle of 2 7/8" drill pipe was being transferred between pipe rasks on the pipe deck. The ip was following the load. The load was being lowered into position when the operation was stopped
approx 3" from landed to allow the tag line to be cleared from nder the load. As this was occurring the load moved slightly trapping the ip right thumb between it & the samson post
Ip struck by 2 scaffold boards from bop deck scaffold

A scaffold clip fitting dropped or fell from <...> platform top sides and struck a welder who was working on the spider deck a light glancing blow to his right shoulder.
During removal of hydrill from bop stack, ip was injured when a scaffold board used for access above fell approx 15 feet and struck him on the neck.
A level control valve, lcv 5011a, on 'a' stream ceased operating on <...>. This did not cause major operational problems as there was stillsome control from 'b' stream. Spares were ordered on
<...> and on <...> an instrument technician was asked to remove the drive box from lcv 5077a. This was regarded as now instrusive work which in the normal course of events should not have
caused a hydorcarbon leak. However, when he removed the actuator lin age, the centre spindle of the valve complete with the drive boss was ejected from the valve followed by hydrocarbons.
The instrument tech rushed to a shutdown box and initiated a class 1 shutdown. This action and intervention by the operators isolated he leak 4-5 minutes. The instrument technician was
subsequently medivaced and is currently receiving treatment for shock.
<...> had just pulled back to surface after being unable to pass the sssv with a read memory logging string. <...> of <...> closed the hydraulic upper master valve from the <...> pressure skid on
the pipe deck and returned to the wellheads to line up the tree and riser for bleeding down through the closed drains. For the duration of the run a 10000 psi glycol injection pump was connected
in through the <...> bops. In line between the bops and the pump there was connected two lo-torque valves, one <...> needle valve, a check valve, and some connection hosing. All items in line
were rated to 10000 psi. Because of this connection arrangement it was possible to safely monitor the well head pressure being bled down at a pressure gauge on the glycol pump. To ensure as
true and accurate a reading as possible, <...> decided to make certain that the 3 valves were fully open. After confirming that the two lo-torque valves were open, he then proceeded to physically
check the status of the needle valve. When turning the valve anti-clockwise he found the valve turned freely, and therefore assumed that the valve was not fully open. After apparently opening the
valve 1-1/2 turns it was brought to his attention that the valve assembly was actually unscrewing out of the valve body. As he attempted to screw the assembly back into the housing, it blew out,
Tanker in range of 15-40,000 tonnes was passing <...> on sw corner closest point to <...> was 1.5 nautical miles tanker lost all engine power when due west of <...> and started to drift directly
towards cleeton 10 mins after power had been lost engi e power was regained tanker's closest point to <...> during this power loss was 1.08 nautical miles
While infield vessel was working deck cargo at <...> platform, stern aft quarter of vessel collided with diagonal brace on jacket - damage appear to be superficial but is under further inv
Supply vessel collided with vertical leg on drilling platform causing dent above water line
Whilst prep for rig move of jack up drilling rig - anchor handling vessel suffered total loss of power vessel started drifting and narrowly missed colliding with platform
Whilst changing position from <...> to south side of <...>, vessel had positioned approx 50 m from <...>. As vessel came astern, starboard engine remained jammed astern - vessel steered btwn
platforms whilst the engin- eer manually stopped engine - vessel pull d ahead on spring of port anchor wire - during this motion dsv scraped along platform leg and <...> riser - further contact
occurred btwn vessel mast and platform structure
During maintenance activities, vessel <...> was on station close to the alc on transferring 2" air hose supply to the column, the vessel appeared to be caught in a sea swell resulting in its aft end
coming into contact with the installation's e cape to sea ladder. This resulted to damage to the ladder's verticals and scraping the outer concrete surface of the installation. The sea state at this
time was in the order of 1.5 metres.
The supply vessel <...> while manoeuvring alongside the platform to load and discharge cargo, experienced a malfunction of the vessel's fwd propulsion system which causes the vessel to collide
with the platform on 2 occasions and in rapid suc ession. No personnel injured on platform or vessel. No apparent damage to platform although a close insp will be required to confirm this for an
area of leg 10 ft below waterline. The vessel sustained plate indentation of a minor nature to the vessel's po t bow approx 20 ft from the vessel stem. The vessel will continue on his normal duties.
Supply vessel <...> discharging cargo had difficulty maintaining position with strong head seas and wind when it came into contact with cross member on south west corner. At first inspection
removal of paint to cross member on south west corner. Min r structural damage to supply vessel <...> (pipe at stern of vessel used in conjunction with flexible hose. Wind ssw x7/8, sea swell
from 210' 21/2 - 3m. Heading of v/l time of incident 230. V/l on hand controls, all machinery operating c/eng visite bridge at time to warn of rising temp's on engine (bthruster)
A large section of mandolite coating on the underside of a wellbay hatch cover was discovered to have fallen to the well bay below. Activities during the previous 12 hours included working of
supply vessel with considerable number of deck lifts and normal drilling ahead
Transferring 50 gal drum of chem from main deck to lower deck - drum was being lifted by a single strop double choked around drum - as the drum was being manoeuvred over handrail of lower
deck, drum slipped out of strop and fell into sea.

Snubbing operation. Wire failed at weak point.

12 ft long dhsv fell through hole in bottom left hand corner of a cargo basket end - hole had been cut out of wire mesh crane had been slew- ing which caused basket to tilt - causing valve to
slide out of hole initially struck a light fitting prior to falling approx 10 ft to main deck
Alignment of pipework using chain block - chain block being used to allow pipework into position movement of other connected pipework caused overload of cahin block - chain parted
Pennant line fell from whip line hook. Investigation suggests release mechanism activated by contact with overhead beam.
During lift of 21,l25" bops a horizontal bestraining tirfor failed allowing bops to rotate slightlly-no injuries or personnel in vicinity. Check certs of tirfor line. All personnel competencies checked
and satisfactory.
A fork lift was used to lift a pallet of chemicals. Due to the design of the pallet, the fork lift operator lifted the pallet off centre. The pallet was raised approx. 7ft. At this point,the fork lift tipped
side- ways and came to rest on the north bulkh ad wall. Findings pallet design was poor. Forklift operator had lifted the pallet too high knowing that the pallet was off-centre. Actions taken to
prevent re-occurrence. Suitable pallets to be used in future by bw mud. Highlight incident and need for aw reness at all <...> safety meetings. Memo given to all <...> forklift operators regarding
unstable loads.
A deck level wireline pulley was being manoeuvred into position using tugger. The lifting point on pullet was only designed to hold the weight of the pulley during rig-up. When the pulley
reached appropriate position, the tugger should have been stopped. however, the tugger operator continued operation and overloaded the pulley eye. The eye failed releasing the tugger line up the
derick. This caused damage to the tugger wire and the pulley casing. On spite of the pulley's eye being damaged, the pulley did not fall and did not suffer any loss of operating integrity. The pulley
was then in position and supported by the wireline. At this point the gse were notified and permission was obtained to continue wirwline operations. A risk assessment was conducted before
proceeding.
During crane operations with the <...>,a 1 ton contaimer was knocked over on the vessel deck due to sudden vessel movement. 2. During operaions to regain control the vessel then moved to
within 4/5 metres of the riser access tower. Wind speed 27 knots. Direction-144 : wave height-3m :visibility - fine and clear actions
A driller had been backreaming out of the hole and had pulled 25 stands. On the 26 stand after screwing in the top drive to the drill string and with the elevators kicked back away from the pipe
14", the driller started to pull the drill string. After he had picked up 3'0" the retaining plate, for the main hinge pin, fell to the floor. Upon investigation it was found that the plate had caught up
under the slip handle and been pulled off. The retaining plate was held on by two wire locked 15/16 bolts and weighed 5 lb approx. No damage was caused by the plate, only lost time to the rig.
The plate was removed from service and a replacement plate removed from another set of elevators. Holes were drilled in the plate and two securing lines attached to the h ndle on the back of the
elevators and new bolts installed. Actions taken to prevent recurrence replacement plate was drilled and two securing safety lines attached to the handle on the back of the elevators and new bolts
installed. Manufacturers suggested modification: * modify elevator retaining plate to incorporate a securing safety line or re-design securing system. * set slips higher to make sure elevators do
not contact with slips.
Wind nnw, 45 knots, 4.5 m swell. Crane was lifting 30' tool from supply vessel when wave caused vessel to lurch, causing tool to be caught underneath handrail of vessel. One sling parted from
tool. Due to deck space available on boat, the crane driver d cided the safer option was to lift the tool on to the platform, which was done successfully. No personnel were injured.
An instrument spool weighing 0.2 ton was being lowered 15' by chain block, after 6' of movement the load went into free fall, landing on grating.3
After removal of electrode from barrow, the chain block held for approx 20 secs before the load chain slipped through the block.
At approx. 1645 hours on <...> <...> engineer having in conjunction with his colleagues completed production logging tool operations on well t-10, commenced rigging down wireline mast
equipment prior to resuming the next phase of the program which was on well t-03. On dismantling, the telescopic section of the mast was proving rather difficult to retract, therefore the platform
service engineer phoned the onshore manufacturer-representative for assistance. Having between them ascertained that the unit had become pressure locked the service engineer armed with this
knowledge from onshore support, carried out an effective repair which allowed the dismantling operation to resume. The wireline mast now fully dismantled was ready for transferral to well t-03.
Spotting of the mast then resumed onto the next well t-03. During the erection phase on well t-03 it was noticed that the telescopic tower was unusually slow in responding during certain stages
of the operation, that is to say, it was sporadic at times, very intermittent & very hard to judge the actual rate of ascent. Note: when the main boom (telescopic tower) is being extended the winch
lines require to be paid out thereby maintaining a safe distance from the top sheave in relation to proximity sensor and winch hook. The winch lines are free fall and their length diminishes as the

Drilling tubular dropped from grab of <...> hydraulic pipe handling crane. A 600 lb 31 foot long 5" diameter drilling tubular was being slewed clockwise in a horizontal position by the <...>
hydraulic crane <...> which has a 4.1 tonne swl at 8 metres, the tubular slipped from the grasp of the "grab" on the crane and fell 5 feet onto the rubicon pipedeck handrails causing minor
damage. The crane was being operated by remote control from the drill floor which overlooks the pipedeck. The crane was taken out of service and thoroughly checked for safe operation by both
the vendor and our independent lifting equipment certifying authority. Attempts were made to repeat the incident, but each time it worked as per design. The crane has been declared fit for
service.
Cargo handling from platform to vessel using whipline. Sea state calm. 1 tonne load landed onto vessel. Crane operator unable to lower line to release load. Lowered boom to release load, then
slewed out to sea to investigate problem. As he boomed down he aw a strand of the whipline part from the rope (approximately 150 feet back from the ball) and curl back towards the drum.
Whipline removed and sent onshore for inspection by sparrows and certifying authority.
Failure of pullift load chain. Link failed whilst supporting shaker table during normal drilling ops. Pullift under little load just supporting shaker.
During crane operations into the utulity shaft a louvre blade fell approx 13 metres narrowly missing one of the deck crew on inspection it was found to have come off the top of the redundant
steam boiler ducting. This ducting runs out of the drilling pack ge switchroom then routes in a diagonal direction upwards terminating 2.5 metres above the pipedeck the ducting in this area is
approximately <...> years old and had undoubtedly been struck occassionally during crane operations in this confined space. Recomm nded remedial action: remove redundant ducting in the
valley area. Install bumper bars where required. Complete a platform wide survey.
Total engine failure prevented crane boom being placed in rest. Boom at 45 degrees to the south during engine change. Weather deteriorated, wind veered westerly and incresed to 40/50 knots.
Slew brakes overcome (not designed for this load) and crane slewe into scaffolding that was in place for engine change. Scaffold and slew break stopped crane movement. Boom stopped close to
derrick but did not hit derrick. Slew and "cab" brakes checked two hours prior to incident, both on. "cab" brake forced out of eng gement by force applied. No items fell from scaffold or crane no
persons on scaffold. One person in engine compartment exited safely by alternative access route on hearing screeching noise. He was not aware of any crane movement.
Joints of heavy wall drillpipe were being moved from the pipedeck to the drillfloor using the automated pipe handling equipment. Once the joint reaches the drill floor a teflon "rabbit" was
inserted into the pipe (rabbit is used to clean out debris etc. F om inside pipes). The joint is then moved from the horizontal to vertical position using the hydraulic lifting arm. As the joint was
lifted into the vertical position the rabbit fell out of the bottom of the pipe and down to the weatherdeck approx. 15m be ow. The rabbit landed on top of a canvas habitat where two amec
personnel were working. On inspection of the drillpipe the thread protector on the pinend of the pipe was found to have a hole on it, which allowed the rabbit to fall through. Three stands of
pipework had been successfully removed prior to this using the same method. The size of the teflon rabbit was 1.2m long by 70mm diameter and weighs 5kg with small metal eye bolts in each
end.
Whilst using a 3 tonne chain block to lift a 500kg load, the chain block went into free fall, fortunately the load was only inches above its inetended location and the rigger managed to control its
descent to some degree. Operations suspended and the chain block quarantined, will be sent onshore for inspection.
During helifreight unloading a single freight item weight 1040 lbs was being transferred from aircraft to laydown area when the heliloader lifting appliance failed dropping the load. No injuries
resulted from this. Due to the need to maintain an operati nal helideck the damaged appliance and freight were moved to a safe area for examination. The heliloader was a registered lifting
appliance and was re-certified for service on <...> for loads up to 10 cwt. Examination of the equipment showed that loa bearing structure was corroded on the internal surfaces of box section
members. However a load test the previous day indicated no defects.
After lowering a grease gun to the deck using the tugger on the crane operator began hoisting up on tugger. When when the hook was approaching the walkway on the crane he stopped hoisting
the tugger. But it countinued to turn (that is normal) at the same ime the ferrule on the hard eye caught briefly on the edge of the walkway, lifting one part of the walkway (grating) and causing it
to fall from the crane and into the forward landing area. The grating suffered only slight damage and no other damage occur ed. The investigation of the walkway showed that 90% of the
remaining grating clips were loose and some missing.
Ip manriding in derrick when he became stuck, he did not signal quickly enough or the tugger operator did not react quickly enough to avoid injury. All procedures relating to manriding are being
reviewed. Notes 1. Visibility at time good. 2. Manrider was /8m from drill floor. 3. No drill floor operators in progress. 4. Drill floor quiet at time.
One of the four chains which are used on the bop emergency lift system parted. Immediate inspection of other chains.

During the lifting operation to remove the pack off adapter flange on well <...> the air winch tugger line, connected to the flange, parted 20 feet above the winch operators head. When the two
pieces parted, the winch drum end of the line fell and glanced the winch operator on the chin - he sustained no injury. The opposite end, connected to the flange fell into the well bay before
becoming entangled in the the racked drll pipe above the monkey board. The line was immediately secured at drill floor level u ing rope. The winch line that fell into the wellhead module
wrapped around the compact spool which had been barriered off for the lifting operation.
During tripping operations the derrickman attached the chain at the end of the monkey board tugger line around a stand of 5 1/2" dp in order to rack back same. As the derrickman started to rack
back the stand the dead end of the winch line eye slipped thr ugh the ferrule. The chain attached to the eye by a hook slipped fown the pipe. At approx 30' above the drill floor the chain unwound
itself from the pipe and free fell to to the drill floor.
Well services work was ongoing and east gantry crane was in use in mod 01. The hook was being lowered through a deck hatch when 'arcing' occured between hoist rope and deck. There was a
bang in the vicinity of the crane motor and the hoist ceased to ope ate. 1. Gantry crane isolated and taken out of service. 2. Motor returned to beach for inpection to establish reason for failure. 3.
Changes t0 earthing arrangements being discussed with beach. 4. Similiar equipment to be checked field wide
While moving a load on the top deck, the crane driver realised on starting to lower the load that it was freefalling. He put the control lever in the neutral position and applied the brakes. The load
was brought under control with no damage being done. Ac ions 1. Clutch pin link replaced 2. Vendor mechanic asked to check assembly pins on similar cranes 3. An incident investigation team
has been set up to identify underlying cause and actions to prevent recurrance 4. Information on problem sent to all <...> platforms.
Weather: wind 195 degrees at 10 kts, seas 5.2 metres max, temp 5.2c, visibility 10 mil. Incident occurred on an american hoist 11750 crane type, positioned in the north ease corner of the
platform. While moving a three tonne load (a reel for the wireline nit), the crane driver realised the load was freefalling in an uncontrolled manner. The crane driver brought the load under
control by putting the control lever in the neutral position and applying the brakes. The load was brought under control with no da age being done. The three foot freefall was in mid-air. Crane has
been takes out of service since the incident. An investigation team has been set up. Terms of reference include determining underlying cause and actions to be taken prior to putting cranes ack in
service and what needs to be done to prevent recurrence. Hse was informed by phone on the morning of <...>.
A kelly scabbard - containing a kelly - was being offloaded from supply vessel far supporter. It was observed that the end plate - 12" dia, 3/8" thick, 5 holes 9/16 dia and weighing 12lbs - on the
end of the scabbard had swivelled through 180 degrees, rem ining in place by one bolt. While transporting over the deck, the plate fell 15 feet onto the deck. On inspection it looks as though teh
plate was only ever secured by two nuts and bolts onto the scabbard. The one nut and bolt that was found was small eno gh to pass through the holes in the plate and the scabbard end cover. The
unit had been shipped from the drilling contractors yard. The deck crew observed the displaced plate as the unit reached the platform and stood aside in case the plate of contents o the scabbard
came adrift. The load was lifted in the level position.
A pump & motor assembly was being lifted into position when the slings supporting the load came free from the chain blocks hook, resulting in the load dropping 1 metre to deck. Damage was
incurred to the motor and a stair tread. Initial investigation sug ests rigging practices were suspect but a full investigation is under way at present.
After completing his pre op checks, the platform crane driver commenced raising the crane boom in order to swing the boom pass the drilling derrick before commencing liftng ops. When the
boom reached the min radius the crane driver heard a noise and reali ed that the boom cut-off switch had failed to operate, he stopped the boom by de-clutching the drive manually. He then
observed that the boom stops had been damaged by the excessive boom travel.
During routine weekly maintenance on the lifeboat when the winch was asked to raise the boat back on to the davits it went in the opposite direction and lowered the boat. This damaged the
sprag brake/clutch assembly and allowed the boat to descend into t e water. The boat was still attached to the fall wires. No person was in the boat.
During routine running of the draw-works by <...> personnel they observed smoke emanating from a hatch of the drill floor, below which is located the brake drum & clutch mechanism for the
rotary table. On lifting the hatch the operator observed a small am unt of flame & a large volume of smoke from the external paint coatings of the brake housing. The operator immediately raised
the alarm & extinguished the fire with a dry powder extinguisher. The fire party arrived & provided cooling water to the equipmen
During daily maintenance checks the well service driller over-hoisted the travelling block to collide with the crown block whilst attempting to test the crown saver. Impact damaged the blocks and
severed the hang-off line attachment chain resulting in a 0.25 kg severed chain link falling to the drill floor from thr top of the derrick.

The kelly and kelly sock were being picked up in a single operation, the kelly sock was being supported by 2 x 3 ton strops. The strops were secured above the kelly spinner and below, to the
kelly sock. During the lifting operation a collar on the kelly sock snagged on the kelly sock support/pivot. One of the two slings being used partially parted at this point. The slings being used
were fully certified from <...>. The failure occurred because of the excessive forces applied when the kelly sock snagg d and not because the strop failed during normal usage. Procedures will be
amended to ensure that the kelly and kelly sock are lifted in separate operations. The kelly sock collar will be modified to ensure that no further snagging can occur.
A one ton pod of synthetic base oil was being lifted using a set of mobile lifting forks from the main deck to the bop deck. The load snagged deluge pipework. This caused the load to slip off the
mobile lifting forks. The banksman had seen the problem and had asked the crane driver to stop, but the pod fell 35-40ft to the bop deck below. The lightweight metal frame around the pod was
designed to be lifted by forks. The forks in use did not have any restraining mechanism.
Lifting a tote tank - overhoist mechanism got jammed in rope. <...> was the boat being worked. Debirs that fell weighed approx 2 kgs
Loss of control of load as suspended overside. Control regained.
A length of drilling line (115ft) was slung approximately 30ft back from the end and picked up by the crane to a height of 50ft. Here it was realised that headache ball would reach limits so it was
lowered, pennant removed, hooked directly onto headache all hook and raised arppox. 40ft when the line slipped through the canvas strop to the deck. No-one was injured, no damage was
sustained. The strop was wet and line is greasy. The 'bite' of the strop was not checked the second time.
A 1 tonne chain block was rigged up to lower a small 5cm spool & valve assembly (approx, weight 50kg) approx 4 metres. On taking the weight of the spool the block held the load without any
problems. However,when the load began to be lowered, the chain sta ted to run through the block thus allowing the load to descend under its own weight. Due to the small weight of the load, the
rigger was able to control the descent by grasping onto the operating chain and allowing the load to be lowered safely. The fault chain block was immeadiatly taken out of service. Investigation
has revealed that the outer brake friction disc was not in the correct position relative to the ratchet mechanism. Similar chain blocks were recalled and inspected with no more being found
defective.
A 6" ball valve with a level control valve attached, (approx.550kg) was sitting on a support stool and being supported in the upright position by a 1.5 tonne nitchi chain block. A technician raised
the load in order to check a label on the valve. When he eleased the chain the brake did not engage andt started to run back through the block. The technician was able to arrest the fall by
grasping the chain and then securing it to make the load safe. The faulty chain block was immeadiately taken out of servic . Note: this is the second fault with chain blocks from this manufacturer.
All chain blocka of this make have now been recalled from service and are being sent back to the supplier. Further investigation will be undertaken in conjunction with the suppli.
Two men (drilling crew) were manouvering an agitator unit using mechanical lifting devices above the mud pits, the load (approx 500kg) was attached to a chain block which was attached to a
chain block which was attached to beam clamp, which in turn was fi ed to an "h" beam coated in a passive fire protective (pfp) material. (height from beam to deck (approx, 4m).another chain
block was attached to the unit to allow it to be moved laterally into position. Once in position, one of the men was instructed to p ck up the load. When the load was (approx, 450mm) off the deck,
the beam clamp detached from the beam and fell 2m and jammed in some overhead pipework. What happened was, the clamp had actually been secured to the pfp and not to the beam itself.
Attempting to free off annular preventer & lift trolley which was jammed bop lift frame lifted bop to max lift to enable mpi inspection activity - when lowered hanging arm on south side of frame
stuck in the lifting beam trolley - an attempt was made to f ee arms via use of hydraulic jack & chain pulls to lever up the assembly when this failed the lift frame hydrams were powered up/down
with too much tension on the chain lift the hyd power overcame capability of chain lifts - one parted/ one hook distorted subsequent investigation of hydraulics revealed that the control sequence
valve assembly on the lift/lower controls of hydraulic rams required freeing off. Unit to be tested for correct functions with frame diconnected from the bop. The inspection of seq ence valve is to
included in maintainance plan procedure.
1" manilla rope used to pull drilling line through sheaves whilst stringing the crown/travelling block, parted. The task being carried out was to install a new drilling line. This was contained on a
spool at rig-floor level. The line was being transferr d to its operating position in the crown and travelling blocks by attaching 1" manilla rope and pulling it up through the sheaves at the top of
the derrick. The operation required a certain amount of slack line to be present so as to reduce the loading on the rope. This was not maintained, consequently the amount of weight on the rope
increased, exceeding its load-bearing capability. The rope snapped as it passed over the crown block.

The swivel collar on the samson post had seized on. Application of wd 40 and grease would not release it. The cathead jerk chain was attached via a shackle to the swivel in an attempt to free the
swivel. Whilst pulling on the chain via the cathead the ch in broke. A roughneck was on the rig floor when the chain broke and sustained first aid injuries when he fell backwards onto the pipe
rack.
During a drilling operation to rack back pipe the travelling block came into contact with the kelly cock causing it to fall to the drill floor.
A piece of scrap wire cable approx 108 feet in length, 11/2" in diameter and weighing 446lbs, was being lifted by the platform crane to the scrap metal skip. The wire was coated with a heavy
grease. It was slung through a choked lifting strop at a point a out three-quarters of the way along its length. This imbalance, coupled with the lubricating effect of the grease caused the wire to
slip through the strop and fall to a landing area some 100 feet below. It was daylight at the time, cloudy but dry. Two me bers of the <...> deck crew had prepared the lift prior to its being taken up
by the platform crane driver.
A combination low head room geared beam trolley and chain block failed when under load removing a turbine engine from the gt 3 enclosure. The chain block failed when cracks were induced on
either side of the chain block assembly at the guide housing above the anchor points. The fso was called to the scene at approx 2340 hrs and the load was made safe using secondary lifting equip
and the area was barriered off until insp the following morning. A team was set up to inv the inc and a separate team set up to scertain the safest way to remove the rb211 from the enclos- ure
which was subsequently removed on the <...>. The failed chain block had a cert of test and exam dated <...> and a subsequent si 1019 dated <...>7. This instance being the 2nd t me it had been
used since re-cert. Two hse insps who were on the platform at the time viewed the scene.
Failure of lifting equipment (<...> 2 ton chain block - proof tested to 3.0 tonnes on 11/11/97) rigger was preparing to transfer a 2" valve, weighing approx 5cwt, from one chain block to another to
lower it 15ft to the ground. When the valve was ransferred to the 2 ton chain block, it started to freefall on release of the hand chain. The rigger immediately controlled the descent of the
freefalling valve by regripping the hand chain. A total of 6 chain blocks and 3 pull lifts were sent to the plat orm by <...>, dedicated to the job in hand, which was change - out of valve and spool
pieces on the a water injection pump y3003a. The work was immediately stopped and the remaining chain blocks and pull lifts were load tested by acl and witnessed by t e oie. Failed chain bloch
was quarantined at the request of the hse.
A <...>, attached to the west crane fly hoist, was being used to transfer a drum of cp 1550 corrosion inhibitor from the cherry- picker deck to the west side of the cellar deck. The clamop was
fitted on the drum then lifted and slewed clea of the platform. About half way between the pipedeck and the cellar deck the drum slipped from the clamp and fell into the sea. The drum was
retrieved by the standby vessel but was found to have split losing its contents into the sea. 1. The type barrel clamp in use on the platform had been withdrawn from use with plastic drums. 2. An
alternative method of transporting plastic drums to be sourced eg: cargo net, other sutiable lifting device.
The east crane was being used to pick up a tank of chemical, manifested as 5 tons weight, from the <...> supply boat. As the tank was being lifted, the alarm for the fly hoist (set at 7 tons) came
on. The load was then lowered back down onto the d ck of the boat. Damage was found on the hook and the pennant. The hook. The hook had been visually inspected the previous day by the
crane operator as part of his routine daily checks and was found to be in good order. During the investigation the tank was found tp be 9 tons in weight. Swl of the hook pennant was 8 tons. The
damaged equipment has been backloaded for inspection.
A 4 tonne utility tugger winch line parted on drill floor whilst transferring the travelling block from pipedeck onto the drillfloor. The tugger line was being used to assist the moving of the 9.8
tonne travelling block, which was being supported by the p atform crane, onto the drillfloor for installation. As the line parted the line began to feed back through the top derrick sheave falling
onto the drillfloor (dropped object) landing adjacent to the driller and winchman. There were 4 persons in the loc tion, 2 outwith the area of contact one adjacent to line when parted and one at
winch. On inspection of the tugger line the inner core showed signs of corrosion. It is the intention to send the wire onshore for strength testing to confirm that there was not an excessive load
supplied.
K lift, high reach mast wireline crew had finished on the c52 well and were in the process of rigging down. The job was progressing normally until the hydraulic arm was lowered. At about 2'
from the top the lower movable box support section dropped from t's fixing poiunt on the ram into the bvottom fixed section. Because of this the ram was unable to support the side force, the
ram bent and the top sections fell towards the deck. The fall was checked when the guy ropes came into tension. The assembly cam to rest with the ram bent to an angle of 30 degrees to the
vertical.

5.5" completion tubing was being hoisted from the rear of the temporary catwalk up towars the h.w.u. work-basket by the use of two winches. One winch was attached to the rear end of the tubing
by use of a certifed fibre strop and the front winch by use of single joint elevators. As the tubing was moved forward the rear strop became detached from the tubing. The forward winch operator
having noticed the rear strop becomming detached from the tubing, commenced to lower the tubing to arrest it's forward movem nt however due to forward momentum the tubing continued to
move forward and through the single joint elevators and then breaking through the wooden strop board at the end of the catwalk adjacent to the h.w.u. it continued to fall forward and down
coming t rest on the skid deck some 30' below. The final resting positon of the tubing was with the box end left supported on the h.w.u. structure at a height of 30' with elevators still attached and
the pin end on the skid deck, making an angle of approx 35 degr es.
A crawler crane had been assembled on the pipe deck for the purpose of removing the platform west fixed crane. A functional test was underway using a 25 tonne water bab when the crane
collapsed. The water bab went overboard. The crane jib came to rest anging down the side of the platform and the crane body capsized on the pipe deck. No injuries. Platform damage miminal.
Contractor involved is <...>.
Crane had been shutdown from midnight after working the supply vessel. Started working deck cargo moved 3rd lift from catwalk to 'v' door, when operator noticed the whipline drum was slowly
rotating paying out as though it was a controlled release control were in neutral. Load was already landed, roustabout pusher informed, load unhitched, crane was boomed up to 9m radius.
Headache ball was laid on deck, crane was switched off. There was no injuries or plant damage.
A compression fitting on an impulse line blew off. The crude oil metering skid on dp level / <...> platform. The system was operating at 12 bar 6. The instrument/metering technician working on
the skid was sprayed with crude oil. On investigation of the i cident the compression fitting olive was found not to have compressed onto the instrument pipework. The investigation is ongoing to
check other fittings on the skid. In addition the gas detectors around and above the skid did not detect the release of hyd ocarbon this is subject to further investigation.
A rope access team member was operating one of three 5 tonne chain block attached accross a separated talon connector on well <...> conductor at the 20' level. On the second pull of the chain,
the highest link connected to the hook of the chain sling ass mbly broke and fell into the sea and the chain block fell to hang from it's lower point of connection. The rigging arrangement had been
on place on the conductor for approx. 3.5 months the incident was not caused by any direct action of personnel.
On <...> the supply vessel <...> was engaged on the west side of the <...> installation. Atmospheric conditions, wind 18 knots, 335 degrees, sea 2-2.5m, visibility good & weather dry. On the
abovedate at approx. 10.20am the west crane landed a 10ft container onto the vessel port side forward, adjacent to the aft bridge superstructure. On landing the container the crane operator
lowered off his line to enable it to be unhooked. The crane pennant somehow became tangled with the vessels man overbo rd equipment and also the 2 boat davit and it is reported that the crabne
wire ball struck the port side bridge bulkhead. The report from the vessels master states that the impact from the ball on the bulkhead affected the control mechanism for the positi ning system
causing unplanned manoeuvring of the vessel. During manual control action to move away from the platform the stern swung to starboard and contacted the sw leg bracings.
Installing 24" riser guide at 11.6m. Guide toppled off clamp while adjusting in half shell. <...> comealong supplied by <...> failed. Allowing chain to pull out of unit. Riser guide was prevented
fro falling to seabed by previously installed safety strop. No injuries occurred. All identical comealongs taken out of service.
Start-up operations following a level 2 shutdown. 'A' injection compressor had been restarted following a level 2 shutdown tx0206a seal/lub oil reservoir had remained operational, circulating oil
around the system. 'A' injection compressor was brought into service. 1 1/2 hours later, the area operator noticed that the tank was buckled. An investigation has commenced and initial findings
point towards a minor explosion having caused over-pressurisation, estimated 0.3 bar. Suspect source of ignition is static discharge, but no explanation for source of combustible products is yet
forthcoming. Investigation continues including discussions outside the company. Oil level to be maintained above return pipe to prevent static discharge and full monitoring of oil flash point on
return to service.
During the start up of a gas turbine generator, the fuel control valve overfuelled the engine and, upon ignition, exploded in the exhaust ducting rupturing a flexible bellows. There was no resultant
fire or other damage. No person was injured.

Following the de-isolation of p98-high pressure condensate pump motor, re-instatement of the motor start cubicle directly above, which housed the starter switchgear for p34 water injection pump
motor, which was available, but not running. A flashfire was een by the technician installing the cubicle. He immediately raised the alarm to the ccr and tackled the fire locally. Platform fire alarm
was sounded, all personnel mustered and accounted for. Fire teams attended and extinguished the fire and remained t cool switchgear. Investigation team set up to establish causation. Nothing
evident in first 24 hours of inspection. All other cubicles
During normal ops a fuel change over was being made on p05 mol pump turbine. The turbine tripped and some moments later an explosion was heard. The source of the the explosion was not
immediately clear. No fuel - gas control action took place and eventual y the source of the explosion was traced to the p05 exhaust. 2 items of debris have been found on the platform top deck. No
muster was called as the engine was isolated and the incident contained.
Flash fire from turbo/exhaust manifold area caused when esd reset.
While flushing out a sample point on the <...> riser during daily sampling, a flash fire occurred at the inlet to the 25 litre metal sampling drum when gas given of by approx. 5 litres of oil sample
in the drum ignited. Taken :- the fire was quickly extingu shed by the lab technician who placed a rag * check elecrtical continuity of ground connections at all sample points over the inlet to the
drum, thus smothering the flame. * set up a maintenence routine in the maintenence management system tp conditions a the time were dry, cool with a 15-20kt wind blowing pr0mpt regular
testing of sample point ground connections. Electricity. This had then discharged across the inlet of the sample through the well ventilated module. Container and the instrument tubing ca sing a
spark to ignite the gas. * improve the sampling procedure concerning sampling. To prevent a similar incident occurring, the following steps have been subsequent investigation revealed that the
ground connection at the * all sampling suspended until checks complete. Sample point was inneffective and had allowed the build up of static
The make up tong counter balance line broke in 2 while the tongs were latched onto the pipe. Previous insp in april of the line revealed no faults. Counter balance dropped in its guides and the
line dropped to the floor. There were no injuries
Rotary hose (mud hose) parted from the top drive due to it snagging belowguide track after running in the hole with the last component of the b.h.a. (bottom hole assembly). The elevators were
unlatched and the driller picked up the block to get clear of t e lift nubbing, at the same time the make-up tong was brought forward in an attemp to latch it around the drill collar. This caused the
tong hang off line to come into contact with the mud hose pushing it forward beneath the guide track. The hose snagged nd it was pulled in 2 , parting at the connection of the top drive whilst
pulling up to get another stand. The hose fell approx. 15' to the drill floor, fortunatly theree were no persons standing in the area and no injuries were sustained.
Whilst conducting normal pig launching ops; valve b was at approx 80% closed whilst travelling towards 100% closed position when a large part of elec actuator assembly was literally blown off
actuator body - part in question incorporates main elec feed ca le and houses a key interlock and plug and socket arrangement feed to actuator motor length is approx 400 mm x 150 mm in dia
and weighs approx 10 kg
During flow testing of fire pumps two fire pumps starts due to 'dip' in firemain pressure. This caused water hammer in the vicinity of the pipedeck monitor (an-s-3935a) which resulted in a 1"
coupling and blank to blow off. Three persons were in the vic nity of the incident, but no injuries were sustained.
Whilst tripping out of of hole the blocks were being run down to latch onto the tool joint when at 30' the tong hanging line on the back up tongs became entangled on a shackle attached to the
mud hose. The downword movement otf the blocks caused the tong courter balance weights to rise quickly and strike the top of the guide frame dislodging the top counter weight which jumped
clear of its retaining pin and fell 60' to the drill floor with no injury to personnel
A slip segment fell 15ft and landed on the drill floor. The rig floor was clear of personnel and of any objects.
Retaianing bolts sheared and 230mm x 8mm metal plate fell 27 feet to the drill floor.
On <...>, the <...> ndes (new derrick equipment set) was drilling the 17 1/2" hole section. At 22:00 hrs a survey was being taken by the down hole tools which required the pumps to be cycled. A
man working on the rig floor in front of th doghouse, heard the pumps kick in and then saw a bolt (20mm x 50mm long) hit the rig floor on the east side of the iron roughneck. Then, looking up
he saw the broken bracket fall and land on the cable tray above the roughneck. The broken bracket was retr eved and found to have parted across one of the bolt eyes. The distance from the rig
floor to the cable tray is 12.8ft and to the bracket position is 75ft.
Top drive guard clashed with upper carriage grab of star racker, resulting in the pipe sensing roller being sheared from the housing and falling 90ft to the rig floor.
A 7ft scaffold tube was deropped from the pipe deck to the west drilling landing area. Barriers were erected and there was no damage.

Whilst a technician was ascending the shaft stairs, an adjustable spanner fell from his pocket and fell to the 77 metre level. No personnal were injured and no plant damage sustained.
During circ hole clean, a stand was in the process of being racked back when (2) bolts dropped to the rig floor, landing about 5 feet from dm. The rig floor was cleared and the stand duly
racked.the tds was lowered to the rig floor and it was as ertained that in fact 3 bolts on the bell guide had sheared. The remaining bolts were examined and found to be secure. The bell guide hinge
pin was also still secure.
The driller was working the drill string, with the link tilt in the park position, travelling the length of the stand (93ft) and the link tilt struck the underside of the monkey board, causing the centre
mechanism assembly, (weight approx 19 lbs and 1 foo in length), to detach and fall 85 feet to the drill floor.
5 stands of heavy wt drillpipe & 5 stands of 5" drillpipe were racked in preparation to run pipe back into well. Driller activated tilt to retrieve stand of 5" from racking and the shakle and pin
became detached and fell to drill floor. These items were not load bearing.
During routine testing of deluge system, the fir pump cut in. The ensuing pressure surge blew out the vamve stem, bonnet and handle from a fire hydrant valve. This assembly landed on a stairway
below.
A logging toolstring was being made up using the mousehole hatch to lower the end of the string below the drillfloor. The mousehole, although available, was not installed. During the operation a
stilson wrench was knocked, causing it to fall through the h tch, from the rig floor to the bop deck. The area below was barriered off, albeit not for this part of the job. No-one, fortunately, was in
the area. There was no adverse weather conditions.
Containers were being offloaded from a supply vessel and located on top deck. One of the pieces of steel banding that hold the wire mesh onto the tube frame fence on the north face, dropped
down to the walkway on the deck below. Contaienrs were not actually being placed on that part of the deck at that time, but clearly containers have come into contact with the fence on previos
occasions & damaged the banding. This piece of banding may well have been hanging waiting to fall & the deck vi- bration as containers was landed was enough to make that happen.
An insulator working in the area of the ngl roof reported that the top of k01 exhaust stack ( length 7.5m, diameter 1.2m ) has parted just above a flanged section and was resting across handrails
on the ngl roof ko1, ngl and gas compression plant were shu down and depressured. A risk assessment was carried out and the broken piece of exaust was removed to a safe location. An
investigation team has been mobilised to determine the immediate and underlying cause of the collapse assess the potential for recurr nce and to initiate a plan for remedial action. Weather: wind
south to south east - strong to gale force - rain and heavy showers.
During a routine launch of the <...> rov by <...> personnel over the port side of the psv <...> just prior to undocking, the sheave wheel attachment bolt failed. This resulted in an uncontrolled entry
into the sea by the <...> platform of the tether management system (tms).<...> rov and the broken sheave wheel.
Production operator had lowered a hose [1" dia] from upper level of gtm to the id weather deck. The top end of the hose was tied off whilst fittings were found. The weight of the hose caused it to
slip and fall to the id weather deck.
Some personnel were checking barriers of a radiological controlled area along wellbay maindeck level, eastside. A scaffold pole [approx 12'-15'] fell from above hitting outboard hand- rail, and
over board into the sea. Upon investigation scaffolding was being dismantaled on the eastside upperdeck walkway.
While taking lsa scale reading on the 1st stage separator, a 14" spec blind fell approxinately 2.5m from the 1nd stage separator outlet on vessel c1020, missing two persons by 0.75m. The spec
blind weight is about 30lbs.
Person walking aling the outside walkway when location sign fell and struck mans safety hat knocking it off his head. There was no injury or damage to equipment. There were no signs to shoe
that this sign had been forced from its original location. Like y cause the sign had been removed for whatever reason and laid somewhere out of site and the wind which was blowing in the area of
the incident dislodge the sign allowing it to fall.
While breaking out a stand from top drive system in our drill derrick, a steel die (100mm x 18mm and weight approx. 220grammmes), which forms part of the pipe handler for breaking out and
making up tool joint connections, dislodged from the torque wrench ie retainer and fell approx. 27 metres to drill floor. No damage or injury was caused as a result but personnel had been
working in the area. Drilling was stopped to allow investigation and repair.
Due to high winds in excess of 50 knots pieces of heat sheild, fell from the external derrick ladder, to pipedeck. No personnel were injured.

Part of a downhole wireline tool, which was being dismantled, was inadvertently dropped through the gap between the lublicator and the skid-deck grating, dropped down to x-mas tree mezzanine
level. To prevent recurrence, a hinged guard has been designed t seal the gap between the lubricator and the grating, and the relevant procedure has been amended to ensure that installing the
guard is included in the set-up process.
As it was <...> time we had made candle decorations with <...>. One person unfortunately left the office with the candle burning. To prevent recurrence all the candles were removed from the
<...> decorations. The fire was discovered efore anything else caught fire and extinguished.
Smoke was observed coming from the exhaust fan ducting of 2k101 c pt/ <...> compartment. The operations dept. Was informed and 2 operators were sent to investigate. They found a small fire
under the exhaust collector in the pt compartment. This was extingu shed with a hand held dry powder extinguisher but the fire had migrated outside the compartment to the north bulkhead of 'c'
module. Flame detection in the compressor area caused a class 1 fire and gas shutdown and the fire was extinguished by the automat c deluge system. An investigation into the incident is ongoing.
9 5/8" casing for well t5 was being cut ready for tie back and installation of next section of tree - when first cut was made a fire occurred - quickly extinguished by use of a charged hose which
was laid out at work
Vent stack purge ignitied by weather conditions. Extinguished using fixed halon system. 4 x 55kg bottles discharged
During the test run of a temporary power generator there was a flash from the alternator accompanied by the emmission of some smoke. The machine was immediately stopped and a dry powder
extinguisher used to put out some small flames within the generator. his occurred with no external connections made to the alternator out- going terminals. The frame of the machine was
connected to the platform earth. Damage was limited to the internals of the alternator which, when tested, was short circuited on two of three phases.
The platform had hired a temporary generator to replace the permanent essential services generator. The generator was being prepared for a stand alone no load run when there was a flash and
smoke in the control cab about 10 seconds after it was started. 3 personnel were present within the generator control cab when the incident occured but there were no injuries. A short circuit
within the control circuitry was thought to have caused the incident. The personnel immediately left the control cab after pr ssing the emergency stop pushbutton inside the cab. Three electrical
cubical covers were blown off at the same time as the flash and smoke was given off into the cab. The generator is now being removed from the platform and returned to the supplier, kolfo
limited. They will then determine the causes of the incident. Prior to being shipped offshore, the generator had been fully load tested and certified by a lloyds inspector.
Small electrical fire broke out on an alternator on 'b' generator.
K-570 air compressor was run up to allow repairs to k-580 radiator fan 00:20hrs the platform went to red hazardous status caused by smoke in module l1c. The alarm was investigated and on
entering the module smoke was seen to be coming from the k-570. As there is no remote facility in the ccr to shut down the machine the technician used the local stop button and also closed the
air outlet valve. One technician used the local stop button and also used the air outlet valve. One thechnician started to disc arde a dry powder extinguisher at the machine but as there was no
visible fire he stopped, he was joined by another technician and discharged two co2 extinguishers to cool the machine down. The module doors were opened and the technicians were relieved b
two red team members in ba who used a fire hose to cool the machine after it was confirmed that the machine was eletrically isolated.
At approximately 06:30 <...> foreman returned to u5 engine room and discovered smoke coming from the est door of the engine room. He shouted for assistance. Deck forman procceeded to the
u5 east door motorman opened the east door and discovered thick smoke, but no visible flames. Heaccertained that no one was in the engine room and then raisd the alarm by initiating the gpa at
the east side of u5. Deck foreman confirmed the alarm with an emergency call to the radio room/control room. At 06:35 a red uster was logged in the radio room/control room. <...> electrician
arrived at the u5 west door, opened the door and discovered dense smoke and flames at the ac switchboard. He re-entered u5 via the east door, confirmed that the source of the flames wa the 2ac
ciruit breaker and exited the room. Three other persons arrived in support and the fire was extinguished using a dry powder extinguisher the board was confirmed to be still energised by the
indicator lights being lit and the engine still running the 2ac engine was then manually shut down. The fire re-ignited due to heat in the panel and another co2 extinguisher was discharged into
the the panel. Red team arrived at the scene and secured the area. At 06:41 the fire was reported to be extinguished.further c02 extinguishers were required as the high heat intensity caused the
Normal porduction operations. A fire occurred when cm3201 a hazardous extract fan motor drive end bearing failed, causing level 3.1 shutdown. G.p.a sounded, all personnel to emergency
muster stations. Emergency response team deployed to scene. Fire extin uished by fixed protection system. Motor to be sent onshore for examination.

Smoke generation and fire was detected in the drive end of the motor enclosure. Fire was extinguished by on site personnel using dry powder extinguisher and electrical stop button. No fire and
gas detection or executive action and no alarm.
Garments were removed from a tumble drier, piled on a stainless steel table and left unattended. A garment in the centre of the pile autoignited after a period of time. This is thought to have
occurred due to a specific combination of temperature, compr ssion and water content. The alarm was raised by a passing production team leader who then extinguished a small fire.
H9515 vent fan d.e. motor bearing overheated, causing grease to ignite and produce a small flame. Flame was quickly extinguished by use of hand held co2 extinguisher.
During welding og u4ee roof ne padeye, fluid breached hot work enclosure, some being soaked up by fire blanket.welding flash/heat ignited fouid resulting in fire. Fire extinguished by the work
party very quickly using dry powder extingisher. On investiga ion, fluid found to have emanated from 4 off bunkering hoded ex of ibc bunking linesne corner u4ee roof. These hoses had recently,
on dayshift ben disposal (well clear of habitat). As welding has taken place at worksite earlier in shift, it can only be c ncluded that hoses moved from front of brisco panel to external of habiat at
a time just unknown. Investigation could not determine party responsible. One of the 4 hoses was labelled 'methanol'and dur to nature of fire(ie. Barely visible blue flame above liquid), it is
assumed flammable liquid was residual fluid from 'methanol'
Welding operation required at the north west corner of the pipe deck. Welding cables re-routed across the pipedeck. An independent work party discovered a smouldering welding cable joint. Dry
powder extinguisher utilised. Investigation highlighted that th welding cable insulation had suffered mechanical damage prior to the incident.
Smoke was detected in an heating ventilation air conditioning (hvac) duct. On investigation and removal of panels it was found that at the plastic retaining frame around the filter had been
damaged by fire as had some gas detectors. The filter is located .3 m from the heater bank. At the time of the incident the fans were not in operation as an elec shutdown and re-instatement had
occurred earlier in the day. The fans require re-instating manually the control logic should not allow the heaters to be energ sed when the fan is not running. The heater control system relies on 3
thyristers. Invs have shown 2 of the 3 to be in short circuit, this combined with the lack of air flow allowed an unwanted heat build up with subsequent ignition/melting of the nearby plastic
components.
The module 6 mud lab ventilation fan had been running continuously with the heater bank set at 12 c a maintinance routine was commenced and the temperture controller was operated to check
the heater bank sequentinal control.whilst carrying out this operation the muster alarms sounded, the electrican carrying out the work isolated the heater and proceeced to muster. The icident was
investigated while the muster was proceecding the smoke detectors in the mud lab which had actived and sounded the alarm was i entified, the area inspected and it was confrimed that the smoke
in the atmosphere had originated from the heater bank. There was no evidence of flame or combustion, personnel were then stood down from muster.
A field reactor (choke) fed of '600v via a 1200 amp contactor' coil overheated melting its lacquer coating. The lacquer ignited and started burning the adjacent control wire on the right hand side
of the reactor within cabinet e6 scr bay located in the dr lling switch room. The fire watcher working on a job in the switch room smelled smoke and investigated its source. He discovered a fire
in the e6 scr cabinet and activated the platform general purpose alarm. Two operations technicians arrived on the scen and extinguighed the fire with a hand held powder type extinguisher. As
soon as the drilling contractors electrician arrived on the scene the cabinet was electrically isolated.
The platform was on annual shutdown and the oil process was covered by a master isolation. It was therefore depressurised but not entirely degassed. The task in hand was to cold cut a flange
from a short half inch dia. Pipe stub on the oil metering skid a d weld on a new flange. The work plan which had been discussed in detail between the oim and the ssp included flushing the related
pipework with water from bottom to top until there was no trace of oil coming out og the highest point (which was the pipe stub in question) then isolate the system, & purge avoid in the system
above the pipe stub inert gas via a probe passing through the centre og the pipe stub. The old flange was cold cut off without problem and the new flange was being tack welded in place. When
the welder struck an arc for the third tack there was a bang and the pipefitter who was also close to the job saw a nine inch flame come out of the pipe stub/flange for about 3 seconds and then
extinguish itself. They immediately evacuated the are made safe the welding equipment and the fire watcher advised the control room. When operations personnel arrived on site, smoke/vapour
was seen to be puffing from the pipe stub. On investigation it was found that an isolation valve which was thought to be closed, and was tagged as closed was in fact open when this valve was
Normal gas export running both gas export compressors. Due to extremely high winds the insulation on train 2 exhaust had become loose and was in danger of being removed. When weather
permitted a temporary fix was employed by banding with ss band, using sm ll pieces of scaff board to add strength to corner areas. On the morning of <...> a production operator noted the scaff
board on the sw corner of the exhaust to be smouldering. On removal the board ignited and was extinguished using a fire ext.

Excessive vibrations noted by local worker, he informed ops control centre, on investigating he noted smoke and activated internal alarm, following this he discharged a dry powder extinguisher
contents to doose a flame from the drive end of the motor and associated pump. There was no release of pumped medium or damage to adjacent equipment. Presumed drive end bearing failure
was prime cause. Investigation underway and preventive action to be advised.
Welding 1" weldolet onto <...> crude oil line. Platform in total shutdown status, oil /gas free. Vapour from oil line. <...> line was water flushed to prepare for hot work - gas test at location, hot
water permit issued at site. When welding in progress sm ll flame noticed at penetration to <...> line at the weld site. Immediately extinguished and alarm raised. No damage to personnel or
equipment. Incident investigation in progress.
Technician investigating the reason for z-3150 gas compressor shutdown. On opening the modulee door he observed flames coming from ducting directlt above the turbine acoustic housing. He
contacted the control room for assistance and proceded to use a 1" h se reel to surpress the fire. The fire was extinguished shortly afterwards with support from platform fire team.
Fire p/p p-7003 was under investigation due to heavy exhaust emissions. It had been test run on a couple of occasions without problems. On the last run shortly after the engine was stopped, one
of the work party saw flames from around the turbine blower. e immediately alerted the others in the party and extinguished the flames using a dp extinguisher. A technician also ran out of 1" fire
hose and used a small amount of water for cooling.
Fire caused by debris blowing off skip and lodging itself between turbine exhausts.
During weekly testing of platform fire pumps the operator noticed a build up of smoke in the room. He activated the deluge in the room manually. The diesel supply to the fire pump was
isolated. When the response team arrived at the scene the pump was s ill running erratically on residual fuel so the response team leader stopped the fire pump by stalling it, the unit was cooled
down, room cleared of smoke and all personnel returned to normal duties. On further investigation it appears that the clutch ov rheated
Whilst closing a circuit breaker there was 'flash over' resulting in damage to switchgear in adjacent area of concerned circuit board. No personnel sustained injuries due to this incident.
A small explosion/fire occured inside housing on mol pump a. Localised damage to unit. Gpa on full muster, no injuries or subsequent damage.
G-8000 power generator was running on diesel fuel for approx. 7 hours. Fire detected in gas generator cell. Fire extnguished using one bank of halon
There was an indication of fire in the turbine enclosure for g8020. This resulted in a platform change of status and release of the fine water mist extinguishant system. On opening the turbine
enclosure doors a large amount of steam was observed to be pre ent within the enclosure. This was the result of the release of the fine water mist system and the subsequent generation of flash
steam. Once the enclosure cooled down initial examination indicated the following damage. Gas manifold discolouration between burners 2 & 5. Blacking/sharring of the epoxy on the
thermocouples. The connections on pigtails 5 & 6 only hand tight flexible on burners 6 & 13 full of diesel
At 03:50 hours, two gas detectors (ge10 and ge1) stuated at a low level, adjacent to the methanol storage tank in process level 2, went into alarm at 25% lel causing a gpa and class 1 esd. The
platfrm went to muster stations and the cause of the shutdown nd the cause of the shutdown investigated by the incident management team. The gas levels cleared within a few minutes and
following confirmation of a full muster at 04:15 and checks of the area utilising portable gas detectors, personnel were stood down t 04:18
Overflow of methanol during transfer from supply boat. The volume is estimated to approx 10l. The vapour from methanol spill triggered methanol detection sensor 10 gm 3/4, hence process
shut-down lasting 44 minutes.
Suddenly - without external disturbances - the shaft in the bottom of xv-q16-9 mapa butterfly valve on the linde a.6 nitrogen unit blew out. The grove for the retaining ring was worn out and
caused the r&t ring to slip, some n2 vented off (10 bar).
At 0100 a smoke detector in the oil sep module 4 came into alarm on inv it was discovered that the test separator c1004 had a jet of hydro- carbons leaking from it [contents of leak crude, water,
gas] the m4 panel operator immediately shutdown the test se arator to isolate it from production while this was happening another operator isolated the source of the leak. A hole in the bottom
spool to level switch] the platform gas detection picked up the release of gas placing the plat- form in yellow status the leak was isolated and equipment made safe.
During the shutdown actions from a level 2a shutdown the auto diverter closed faster than the production wing valve which caused the pressure to rise rapidly. The graylock coupling leaked
during this pressure rise then ceased as the pressure decayed.

Drains tank overspilt into sea

Operator was passing through process area and heard hissing sound gas leak from. Well 3 tell tale hole between actuator and xmas tree. Shut in and isolated.
Person observed condesate and water dripping from well 2 flowline on a blank flange. Well closed in and isolated to effect repair
Failure of seals on hydraulic actuator - 100 l of <...> t5 oil lost to sea
Actuator stem seal failed on hydraulic actuator for valve releasing 75 l of <...> t15 hydraulic oil to surrounding deck
Gas release from stem of 8" valve. Unable to isolate valve initially, continued to vent. Deluge initiated. It took 4 hours to isolate the pipework and stop the release. Immediate investigation due to
the time it took to get the incident under control.
During routine prod ops loss of containment of natural gas occurred from a 2" dia line conveying flash gas from tops of condensate surge drums to the platform hp vent system pressure in line
was approx 6.2 barg process operator heard the sound of escaping gas located the source of the leak and isolated the line using manual block valves prod process was then shut down in a
controlled manner
Valve to the tree flange nuts were slackened and flange was seperated with a wedge - escape of gas from the flange.
At approx 10:15 a valve tech was walking by the condensate pumps on 23a cellar deck and noticed a smell of condensate. On review of the line it could be seen that the pipe into a weldolet was
weeping condensate. Following this discovery the condensate lin was isolated and depress- ured peding a repair procedure.
A pressure gauge attached to condensate export line which was in op blew off - resulted in a release of condensate water and monoethylene glycol - estimated btwn 50-100 gallons of liquid
sprayed onto surround- ing structure and pipework - pipe was immed i
Platform suffered main power failure as a result of relief valve to hp scrubber having lifted resultant effect was a liquid/foam flow from hp vent on <...> platform liquid foam being mainly water
and glycol with a very small percentage of condensate - platform was depressurised - all lines drained & vented
Diesel bunkering hose became entangled in <...>'s propeller and was completely severed - release of diesel fuel onto deck and into sea.
Compressor activator usually operated by instrument air. At 105psi the activator would not operate so nitrogen bottle was used to open it. The activator was overpressured by the nitrogen bottle
and blew - causing damage to discharge pipework on compresssor.
A very slight discolouration was noticed near the bridge,upon investig- tion it was found that a 1" vavle on a diesel fuel line has suffered corrossion to the body and has resulted in a "pin-hole"
leak
Gas release occurred when compressor blew down and psv outline line on adjacent compressor was open to atmosphere - full installation muster occurred
Gas leak detected on a fitting within turbine driver enclosure
Condensate lcv on the <...> separator ws found to be leaking from the valve body -- small hole discovered in body -- possibly caused by erosion -- valve isolated, removed and changed out.
Vent valve moved off its sea from the closed position and partially opened was reset to closed position released gas passed thru normal vent system
Low level gas detection - leak found where psv had been removed. Change in wind direction caused backdrafting in vent system.
Modifications to flowline completed on a63. System filled with sea water and pressure tested successfully on bringing a 63 online . Gas escaped via sample point used during pressure test.
Conducting routine ppms on lifeboat 6 (air craft pressure checks). Upon opening the first bottle there was a big bang and both regulators came loose from their holding bracket.
Release of hydrocarbon gas during shutdown operations. System had been depressured flushed, purged and pipework opened, lazy gas migrated from oil separators in area 9 to the production
manifold on area 6b, which had a flange removed. An imbalance of pre sure between the two area hvac systems caused a flow of air through pipework deayubg h/c gas out of the separators.
Action taken to install suitable barriers (eg stopple bags) to ensure migration of gas could not occur.
Gpa acttivated by two gas heads at 24% momentarily. No obvious source of gas despite full investigation.

Hydraulic oil leaked from north crane engine compartment on to the mp turbine exhaust and ignited. Extinguished almost immediately by deck crew. No discernable damage to exhaust,
expansion joint/np injuries. Source of leak identified as hydraulic hose.
The safety officer was walking in module p05 when he noticed a gas smell and the presence of a small amount of condensate dripping from a flange, downstream of the pressure control valve
pv4171b (first stage separator gas outlet). The valve was isolated and the leak repaired.
New well <...> is being tested using the <...> burner booms. During the initial clean-up phase, slugs of water intermittently extinguished the flame, therefore carrying over small quantities of
unburnt condensate to the sea. This problem only occurred for a l mited period of time during which close monitoring of the spill was maintained and adjustment of burners was made to avoid
flame extinction. This incident resulted in a sheen (discolouration of the sea) of approx. 30m by 150m, ie less than 1bbl. Wind speed 7 knots, dir. 210 deg. Wave height 1.4m
Small condensate leak from grease nipple valve. Nipple regreased and exercised leak sealed no spill to enviroment
The water outlet valve of the first stage separator failed to close during an unplanned shutdown. This allowed oil into the water treatment plant in excess of treatment capacity for a period of 14
minutes. Initial quantity underestimated, calculations now show quantity to be 21 barrels of light crude. Investigation shows valve struck between auto/manual mode. Repairs now made. Checks
of other similar valves ongoing.
Construction work ongoing on lp plate separator vessel c402 "vapour" noticed emanating from 2" flushing point. Investigation shows origin was back pressure from closed drains drum system
created durning a coincident plant shutdown. "vapor" considered to b hydrocarbon/air mix. No fixed or local portable gas detector activated.
Level control valve on water side failed to close fully (10% open). This was in normal operation mode. Excess oil allowed into water treatment plant which could not cope. Spill occurred from
sea caisson. Maintenance investigation of fault ongoing.
During pressure testing on control line for dhsv the c77 valve came off the multibowl "graylock" clamp. Pressure at time was approx. 8000psi. The four allen screw type bolts had failed. These
will be subject to analysis. (hse onboard at time. Site made available for inspection by messrs <...>)
Bleeding down pressure in 13.3/8" annulus of well d15 on the connected dunbar platform. This allowed a slug of 1.6 sg liquid into the pipeline which could not be handled in the alwyn water
treatment plant. A new procedure is being developed.
An upset caused by a slug arriving in inlet separator led to loss of level in water led to loss of level in water side of main treatment vessel. This in turn resulted in oily water treatment plant failing
to cope with consequent release to the sea.
During normal production operations, minor gas leak detected from a flange on lt 25995b on the <...> separator [c111] located on po4 weather deck. <...> production shutdown, separator
depressurised and valves isolated. Face of valve flange re-dressed an after leak testing etc plant re-started.
Metal fatigue of connection on pressure transducer resulted in a gas leak inside the turbine enclosure of generator p801b. Generator was not running at time of incident. All other similar
equipment on generators to be inspected and checked.
An operator attempted to hammer open a 2" <...> union on chickson which was under 400b pressure. The resulting leak brought 5 gas detectors into low level alarm. Immediate response from
supervisor and drilling personnel ensured inventory safely vented of . Initial investigations indicate a breakdown of communication and inexperience of personnel. A full investigation is ongoing,
including a cause free analysis.
Ops tech noticed diesel mist emanating from hood of b gt. Machine was shut down & fuel oil isolated. Weather at time: wind 8 - 10 knots machine in question: egt gas turbine. Diesel was
contained within turbine enclosure.
Normal production operations were in progress at time of incident nightshift production supervisor was in process of routine walk about when he noticed a gas leak coming from the top of the
gas metering house closer investigation showed that the leak wa coming from the area of a 2" isolation valve on supply side of chromatographs. The supervisor immediately isolated the skid and
vented inventory to flare. Conditions at time were dry with very slight wind. Product was produced gas.

During routine plant checks an operator observed a small gas leak from the body bleed plug of a grove isolation valve on the hp 1 section of the gas compressor. The leak was monitored whilst
preparation for gas plant shutdown were made. At all times leak as determined to be a wisp of gas in an open ventilated module and not of sufficient magnitude to be detectable by gas monitors.
The gas plant was shutdown in a controlled manner and the body bleed plug was removed and replaced. The failed component was f und to be seized and full of rust particles.
Steady oil and gas production. During platform tour, a build up of ice and wisp of hydrocarbon gas vapour was observed from the body bleed of a valve (manufacturer grove). The valve is on the
bypass line of the gas reinjection compressor cooler. Valve is n open module location, weather at time, wind 15-18kts leak was such that it was not enough to be picked up by any area detectors.
Leak was monitored while the reinjection compressor was shut down, plant depressured and valve isolated.
Normal production operations were in place at the time of the incident. Ops assistant was making a tour of his area when he spotted oil leaking from a 1.5" class 1500 flange on the pipeline side
of the flowline instrument pressure sensing device. The ops ssistant immediately informed the control room technician who closed the well in and depressured the line. Contents of the leak eqate
to approximately 3-4 litres of crude oil. Due to the deck being plated in that area, there was no release to sea. Flow li e isolated depressured and flushed.
During routine bop test following installation of 13 3/8" casing - leak on kill line was observed well was in a safe con with all tested barriers in place - lmrp was retrieved and leak fixed
damaged o ring seal was thought to be cause of leak - riser joint was changed out
While the mechanical technician was walking past p8105 export pump he noticed there was a leak from the dart union of the seal flush line. The pump was not in use, so he pushed in the local
stop button, called the control room and informed the operator, then proceded to close the manual suction and discharge valves. The operator informed the <...> control room that p8105 was
unavailable due to a seal leak. The mechanical technician depressured the pump to closed drain to prevent any further leakage,then proceeded to raise a permit to repair the leak while in the
process of preparing the paperwork and isolations, the platform went into a shutdown with loss of power generation. On regaining emergency power it was required to reduce the levels in the
separators, to prevent liquid carryover to the fuel gas system, prior to starting the main generators. P8105 was tried but kept tripping, so <...> control room operator then tried another pump, the
instruction about p8105 prior to the shutdown was overlooked and they opened the pneumatic suction valve xv8105 on p8105, giving a release of fine hydrocarbon mist, caused by the trapped
pressure between the actuated valve and the manual valve, from the dart union on the seal flush line, which activated the gas alarm, due to the close proximity of a gas detector to the pump.
Having completed the setting and testing of a 4.5" petroline plug, at approximatley 52' below the swab valve, as part of the well workover programme for t05. The wireline lubricator was then
drained to the process closed drains. As the drain manifold was approximately 3' from the bottom of the riser,a small volume remained. To clear any residual hydrocarbons from the riser, the
riser partially filled with water and again drained down to the closed drains. After checking the bleed valve on the manifold an not getting any fluid release, the riser was undone and lifted clear
of the tree, with the remaining fluid in the riser, a mix of water and hydrocarbons being released and falling to the lower level of the wellheads. As a result of this, two gas heads i the vicinity of
t05 registered low level gas and the platform gas alarm was activated. This was the second and final plug to be set, the first having been set and tested, with the tubing then being circulated to
water injection quality sea water. The pro edure for circulating out future wells is to be reviewed. A provision for bleeding down the lubricator and riser is to be incorporated in future kill wing rig
up's, with the type of vavle changed form needle valves to ball valves. Type of valve changed f om needle valves to ball valves.
The fire and gas alarm was automatically activated at 08.02 on <...>. The deluge in process area <...> level 1 was automatically released. The cause of the alarm was "confirmed gas" in the
analyser house initiated by 2 gas detectors gp001 and gp002 locate inside the analyser house personnel working directly in the area were <...> instrument tech and metering vendor <...>. The
work in progress was calibration of transmitters for gas metering. The confirmed gas was caused when the instrument techni ian opened up the transmitter hood in preparation for calibrating the
transmitters. The hood is of a sealed type and it was determined that due to a minor leak on either instrument pipework or the valves within the hood gas pressure was held inside the ho d. Once
the hood was raised the gas entered the room and came into contact with the 2 gas detectors
At 23:40 hrs on <...> a platform level d with blowdown was auto initiated due to gp030 located in fire zone ab (level 1 process area) going into 60% lel, this initiated a platform level d with
blowdown and initiation of level 1 process area deluge a d platform gpa. While monitoring the fire zone in the icss it was apparent via the migration of the gas path as indicated on the
surrounding gas detectors in this area, that the alarm was genuine and all subsequent actions and incident response determined with this in mind
Well a6 on line, mist cloud on xmas tree observed by operator. Cloud determined as gas/condensate wingvalve shut and leak stopped. Leak was insufficient to trigger gas detectors. Xmas tree
inspected leak found to eminate from grease nipple on wing valv bonnet. <...> engineer mobilised well depressured above sssv. Grease point changed out and well returned to service

20% lel indication in process area level 1 from single gas detector. 60% lel indication in process area level 2 from single gas detector. In production from wells a1-a6 inclusive. Gas compressors
shutdown on process trip & gas venting to flare via vent s stem. Level d esd initiated automatically with b. Down and deluge release. Complex muster carried. Initial indications show downstream
of psv a body plug has become uinscrewed ojn low pressure side (mp sep area) psv internal seal failure allowing back pre sure gas from vent system to communicate into domw section of psv &
vent to atmosphere. (see attach)
The night shift elec person was walking between the sack store and u5 engine room on the upper walkway when he heard a screeching noise coming form the feul gas module area. The
screeching noise was intermittent, so he went down to the module where the n ise appeared to be louder. Nothing was obvious and being on his own and not fully conversant with the feul, gas
skid made his way to the control room and reported his observations to the control room operator. The lower level of the feul gas skid was in pected and nothing found. There are two vertical
ladders positioned between the gas compressure and surge drum the techs split up to inspect both areas. The screeching was coming from the suction pressure control valve. A small leak was
detected between the flange faces.
Routine vibration checks were being carried out on the emergency generator,p855 and p860 fire pumps. On starting p855 water was noticed to be leaking from a tapping point on the fire main
above p860. P860 was then started and p855 stopped. Two ops tech were investigating the leak when it was decided to shut down the fire pump. Before they were able to do this the tapping
point blew out and the water jet sprayed over mcc4. One tech mechanically isolated that section of the fire main while the other th c went to the control room to shut down the emergency
generator. There were thhen three loud bangs and flame was seen to be coming from mcc4. One of the techs operated the fuel emergency shut off valve for the emergancy generatorwhich was
attempting to estart, while the other thec attempted to extinguish the fire with a co2 extinguisher. At this time a gpa was operated and the platform put into red status. The smoke from the fire
increased and both tech withdrew from the area and handed over to two of the fire team who were wearing b.a. they entered the module and extinguished the fire with co2 extinguishers. The area
was then ventilated.
At 17.04 hrs an sps and red status was automatically initiated, by coin- cident high level gas heads adjacent to process closed drains break drum v5060. Almost immediately gas levels indicated in
the control room began falling and when two technicians arr ved at the scene no gas was evident at 17.15 hrs the platform was returned to green normal status and drill- ing operations resumed,
( the well has been closed in on red process operations were resumed as investigations proceeded.
On changing out prod wells from test train to main train in the wellhead area, the prod snr operator observed a fine spray of hydrocarbon gas/ fluids coming from well <...>. The control room was
informed and this well was closed in. On further inv a pin ole leak was found on the welded bend of the drain, upstream of the drain's isolation valves.
During <...> workover, drilling were pumping down tubing/annulus to pressure test wireline plug. Returns were to be monitored from 9 5/8 annulus. The assistant driller lined up from the 9 5/8
annulus up to the choke manifold and through to the trip tank pumping commenced at 1/2 bbl/min. Whilst pumping, the wireline operator took a bind on the p.o.p. and then sheared off which
confirmed the p.o.p. was set. The night shift driller then increased the pump rate up to 3 bbls/min and the pressure increased to 00 psi. The day shift driller checked to see if there were returns at
the trip tank but there were none. The <...> platform superintendent was informed by the control room that a fluid spillage had been reported from the well heads by the ops co-ord the latform
supt. Immediately called the driller on the rig floor to close down the pumps and to investigate where the spillage had come from he reported that the splitter valve on the choke manifold was
open, allowing the fluids to flow to the choke line, lo ated in the bop room which was open ended. The pumps were on for 1 minute at 3 bbls/min from pressure increase until shutdown. The <...>
supt. Informed the <...> rep who in turn contacted the oim, otl, safety officer and logistics supervisor who then inform d the standby vessel of a small fluid spillage of contaminated tsw. The oim
Normal process/flowline operations ongoing when bubbles were observe in the water north of the platform - nne from the birch caission - a sheen of approx 50 mtrs broad was drifting 500 mtrs
nne of the platform. Oim instruced shutdown of birch production at approx 15:50. Once shutdown, bubbles started to reduce considerably wind speed was approx. 30k at time of observation from
197o.
Normal production operations ongoing when a crude and gas release occurred due to a flange parting in a drain line on the inlet side of crude cooler. The gpa was sounded and all personnel
mustered at emergency muster stations.
During normal production operations, a mechanical technician was tasked with going to 'a' rr turbine enclosure to investigate vibration. On his arrival at the unit he entered to carry out the work
and was faced with a "glow" from the unit and when he loo ed closer could see flames. He closed the door after exiting and advised a production operator who manually discharged the halon
extinguishing medium. The gpa was sounded by the ccr and all personnel went to emergency muster stations. The emergency respo se team, were deployed and mustered at an area close to the
scene after which they investigated the scene and confirmed the fire extinguished and area safe. Investigation revealed that the root cause of the problem was loss of integrity of the air oil sea
between the compressor and the power turbine. This had been replaced in 95 but no locking washers had been picked. The high vibrations and lack of locking washers resulted in the retaining
bolts backing off and subsequent oil mist from the hot gas and ignition.

Ngl release in mod b from <...> sampler. No activity with equipment at the time of the event. Fracture of stainless tubing by swegelok fitting on air driven pump caused release of ngl in general
area. Sequence of gas heads (5 in total) lead to automa ed action - level 2 shutdown and depressurisation. Full gpa and operator isolation sampler has been stripped, modified and rebuilt
pressure tested and commissioned.
Preparations were being made for a shut down of the test separator within module 03 mezz level: whilst checking the sandwash drain line to ensure it was clear and obstruction free, the
production operator opened the drain line block valve. He immediately heard a flow through the system. He checked the test sep. Sand wash drain valves and found one he suspected was
passing. He then attempted to close the block valve but encountered difficulty. At this point a section of the drain line failed, discharging water and gas mist under pressure into the module. This
resulted in a manual level shutdown followed by an automatic level shutdown. The gpa was sounded, personnel were called to their primary muster points.
Whilst carrying out work to recommission the test separator, following a shut down and maintenance/ cleaning work on the vessel, a release of gas within the crude inlet line occurred, activating 2
x adjacent gas detectors. This incident took place whilst personnel were removing a spade from a flange within the system. The system was isolated, depressured and was thought to be gas free.
When the flange was slackened off, the entrapped gas was released, it was not a continuous flow and dissipated very rapi ly. Subsequent preliminary investigations confirm the system remained
isloated. A mouk incident investigation has been initiated to determine the cause of the gas presence within the line.
Enclosed module: lighting good: normal production operations. During normal productions operations, a hydrocarbon release occurred when pipework failed at 4" spool to psvs 0775/0776 on
the inlet of recycle cooler 'ex 0104x'. This resulted in a discharge of condensate within the module and subsequent release of gas. A number of the module gas heads were brought into alarm by
gas presence. Platform personnel were called to their primary muster stations by the general platform alarm and a level 3 shutdown initiated.
Pinhole leak developed on 8" pl 42054 a3384ax line from test manifold to test separator, resulting in a minor loss of containment of hydrocarbons into the module.
Normal production operations. Gas head (g262051) indicated low gas level in rpm module level 2, monitor screens in pcr checked and no othr gas heads in the area were in alarm but showed
that gd262051 had been fluctuating.
Normal operations, clear evening with little wind, gas head gd 262051 indicated low level gas 27% lel in rpm module level 2 mezz. The screens were monitored in the control room, no other
heads were in alarm but gd 262011 and gd 262021 were fluctuating bet een 0% and 15% two technicians were sent to investigate. Initially no reading of gas was indicated in the area but there
was still fluctuation on the con- trol room monitors. The technicians made a detailed search on the lp compressor level 2 and found localised area where gas was being de- tected on their meter.
The shift supervisors days and nights joined the technicians at the area and continued to search to pinpoint the leak. After checking the pipework a leak was found on 2nd stage discharge sp ol.
The compressor was manually shutdown, vented and isolated.
The platform went to alarm status after confirmed low level gas in m3e weellhead area. This was followed with confirmed high level gas in the same area. The platform went into automatic
shutdown and process blowdown, followed by power shutdown. Investi ation showed that the alarms were caused by a hydrocarbon leak from a hole in the flowline on well <...>. Initial
investigations point to this hole being caused bt sand erosion. The investigation continues.
This was a day shift cable splice area. The permit to work for day shift was signed over for night shift as fall back work. Nightshift looked at it but as cable no.s were not right it was left for
dayshift. The temporary floodlight in the confined area ov rheated and being held in plastic it fell on to the cables and set fire to them. This was detected by the operations team and the fire was
quickly extinguished.
Drained overflowed & 0.3 tonnes of oil spilled into sea.
After greasing sealing ring on a closed 12" ball valve with a hp grease gun gun was depressurised and internal non return valve within grease nipple sealed correctly grease gun connection adaptor
was then removed from nipple and within a few secs internal non return valve failed to seal allowing gas to be released. As a precaution a platform ga was manually initiated and the valve and
pipework was manually depressurised via vent system - duration of leak was less than 2 mins via a 3 mm hole
While carrying out pt train 2 fuel gas skid warm up procedures, operator observed small gas leak from welded joint on pipework. Pipework immediately blocked and vented, affected section left
isolated and depressurised.

On first test run of turbine (egt tb 5000) after major service by vendors, fuel gas leaked from this flanged joint of the main gas regulator inside this turbine enclosure. The joint was found to be
defective. Gas leak was detected immediately and isolated no leak test of this part of the system had been carried out after the service. A risk assessment has been carried out for the first run of a
turbine after service highlighting the requirement for a nitrogen leak test of the gas fuel system to be carried out
At approximately 07:15hrs whilst carrying out a routine backwash of the hydrocyclone (as per operational procedure), a pin hole leak was noticed from the base of the body of pcv 3701, the reject
ratio control valve. Approximately 10 litres of produced wat r was released before the line was closed in. To prevent recurrence the valve type is to be reassessed. Suspect that corrosion was the
cause of failure. Valve was replaced with same make until reassessment has been completed.
During routine preparation of plant for start up the wing valves were opened in readiness to start flowing wells. A small amount of gas leaked from the choke valves on slots <...> & <...>.
Hydraulic wing valves on both wells were closed and flowlines depressurised.
The fire and gas system detected gas on several heads located in module 2 lower and a shutdown of production and vessel depressurisation was initiated automatically. Muster alarm sounded.
After an initial spread of gas in the module indicated on the fir and gas panel, the gas levels rapidly reduced due to automatic blowdown of the equipment. At the start of the incident operational
inhibits were in place but these were removed immediately to allow automatic fire and gas functions. The cause of the rel ase was found to be a fractured instrument tube on the export
compressor discharge header, probable fatigue due to compressor vibration. Replacement works and inspection of similar installation undertaken.
During a period when the plant was shutdown but still under pressure and awaiting startup it was found that a grease nipple on a tk valve on the no 25 flowline/manifold was leaking a gas/oil
mist. On finding the leak, the header was immediately depressuri ed and a new grease nipple was fitted. The leak was not picked up by the f&g system, the whole operation took no more than 10
minutes.
Galley referigeration unit freon r502 leaked to atmosphere. Approx 1kg of gas was lost over a period of time, several weeks. No personnel injured as a result.
While bleeding down slot 12 annulus to flare via fixed pipework continuous sampling for fluid returns were being carried out via needle valve on tree cap. A hydrate formed in the needle valve,
pressure built up behind hydrate & then released to atmosphe e when ice plug broke down production operators informed ccr via 333 call to close in well. Muster alarm sounded manually from
ccr while incident was being investigated. Approx 5m3 gas released in open module dispersed to atmosphere.
Platform experienced an sd2 shutdown. The grease nipple on slot 23 top isolation valve to test separator header started to leak oil & gas. The hydraulic wing valve on slot 23 had already closed,
the bottom isolation valve off the test header was also clos d along with the manual wing valve on slot 23. The oil/gas leak quickly stopped.
Crude pump 'c' was online following plant startup. Approx 1 hr after startup whilst carrying out routne check, an operator noticed a slight gas/oil vapour leak at pump seal. He reported this to his
supervisor. The pump was then inspected & shutdown for repair.
During routine check by night shift operator a diesel spill of approx 6 tonns was disc on pa cellar deck leak was caused by an overflow from aux generator day tank initial inv indicates a manually
operates valve left in open position
During a major overhall of the west crane ca-a-7510 it was necessary to empty the diesel fuel tank. The low point drain was found to be blocked and to progress the work an attempt to use the
bottom plug was made. During the activity the plug was unscrew d fully and diesel was spilled down the crane pedestal having missed the catchment tray being used. A flash fire subsequently
occurred on the hot turbine exhaust adjecent to the crane pedestal. The fire was extinguished by the work party assisted by a m mber of the response team. Diesel tank contents at time
approximately 50 litres, spillage estimate 0.5-1.0 litre.
Main oil line pump p3070 being started on diesel fuel, engine appeared to start normally. After 8 minutes of running an ir detector inside the engine clousure alarmed in the main control room 1
indicating fire. Area tevhnician advised, went to investigate and confirmed fire and proceeded to push emergency shutdown botton. A second ir detector picked up the fire and the platform hazard
alarm sounded. All personnel commenced mustering. Emergency responce perdonnel extinguished on the outside of the engine to power turbine transition piece heat sheild using portable co2
extinguisher. Fiixed halon systems available but decided not necessary to use. Diesel and gas fuel supplies isolated, power supply isolated and fire dampers all closed no further signs of fire ut
smoke in both turbine hall and inside engine enclouser. After a period of time when it was considered unlikly that fire could reignite the area was vented by opening the doors, then entered the
emergency support team in ba sets to confirm area clear of fire. Ventilation dampers reopened and fans started. Fire caused by ignition of some burners while diesel fuel from the unlit burner
poured into the transition cone and then eventually ignited.

Whilst investigating hydraulic problems on the west crane one and a half bukets of hydraulic oil were drained from hydraulic system. The oil was manhandled down from the crane to the pedestal
platform below and was decanted into a 45 gallon drum. A funnel was not initially used and as a result oil was caught by the wind and sprayed onto the gas turbine exhausts below where it caught
fire. Immediately the fire was seen a gpa was initiated and the fire was extinguished.
Viscous chemical being pumped for process trial. Direct from chemical drum. Suction head maintained and air ingress excluded by the introduction of nitrogen. Overpessurisation of drum caused
rupture and loss of containment of chemical. Chemical loss contained within dedicated bund area.
Minor fire from instrument impulse line, gas leak ignited by faulty trace heating tape platform fire and gas system detected, plant shutdow and depressurised, deluge auto activated and fire
extinguished.
At approx 0800 hrs on <...> during an intervention visit to davy a small gas leak was detected from wellhead of well a2 platform was s/d but not vented, at the time due to a psd condition
attributable to low pressure in assoc well hydraulic unit - flo line pressure at this time was 150 barg. Leak was initially detected audibly which was poss because of the fact that cons were
particularly quiet due to s/d cons installation topsides are arranged to be of open construction, as far as reasonably practicab e - decks are grated and there are no windwalls open const provides
max practicable dispersion of any leaking gas, by natural vent initial invs suggested that leak was emanating from speed clamp or a body plug above clamp - it was not poss to determine ex ct
cause at this time due to wind cons during the inv it was found that the leak from the body plug stopped as the shut in well pressure increased - this has been attributed to the fact that seal afforded
by the ball and spring arrangement in the body plu is assisted by higher differential pressure, aiding ability to seal - well was therefore left shut in with no evident leak and platform demanned
overnight further inv was carried out on platform the next day and root cause of leak was established as body plug.
Commision work ongoing on diesel / gas generators. In engine room flexi hoses to engine were disconected due to preperation of pressure test of same. Hp fuel gas system in shutdown mode, all
ebv's fail safe open and vent for flare open. Detected gas in an ulus on fuel gas lines to engine 1c and 2c. Gas for flare system was pressured back through ebv's on fuel gas stamd.
During cargo offloading operation a bang was heard by the bosun. He found a leak at a viking johnson coupling aft of the turbet. He called to shut down the transfer pump. Cargo transfer
operation was suspended. At 1210 the general alarm was sounded. L aks discovered at the metering skid on stream / fcv and prover inert valve from stream 3. Approx 50l of crude oil spilled over
board.
While disconnectng the empty propane tank, gas was observed passing out of the hose end of the quick connector the operator immedately re-made the connection but the gas detection system
had already picked up and this resuiled in a pesd
Weather conditions light winds (n). At 05:40, <...>, the condensate reinjection pump, ddp32005 'b' was on line reinjecting condensate downhole. There was a sudden release of condensate &
associated gas on the north side of the <...> collar deck. This was detected by 5 flammible gas detectors ans as a result an automatic esd (level a) occured accompanied by the general platform
alarm. <...> personnel mustered in the <...> t.r. <...> personnel withdrew from <...>. The source of the leak was identified by emergency response personnel, as coming from the psv 32009 ('b'
condensate reinjection pump discharge) pilot assembly body. The equipment was isolated and depressured by emergency response and production personnel wearing b.a. allpersonnel were stood d
wn from muster at 06:35hrs <...>. The psv will be removed for full strip down investigation. Both condensate reinjection units remain isolated
During prep ops leading up to platform based proppant fracture of well a plume of liquid was sprayed into atmosphere when a lubricator was uncoupled to repair leaking joint - plume fortunately
contained mainly seawater from immed prced tasks
Gas turbine - flame detection in end. Platform shutdown. Co2 used. 17:36 extinguished. Platform mustered. 17:36 muster stood down. Minor damage. Field sgut-down for fortnight. Brought
on today. Running b up on gas - 3/4 hour on load. Ignition of diesel is lagging.
Gas detected, cellar decks - 3 gas alarms, muster continued, isolation spade taken out, from <> associated gas line. Loss of power has caused venting.
Minor gas leak detected by two flammable gas heads on <> cellar deck adjacent to well d8 during workover on well d8. Personnel sent to muster stations until leak identified, source shut off
and area gas free. Leak found on pipework to closed drains that h d been disconnected and isolated for the workover. Isolation procedures were found to have been followed but the application of
the isolation to the valve was not carried out efficiently. Determined that valve had possibly been knocked open during workover.

Hydrocarbon leak on production choke. Well had been shut in for heavy lift operation and on restart the choke which had originally been 'weeping' developed a leak. Well tech informed control to
close in well while he depressurised section of piping to clo ed drain system. Choke was subsequently changed out and well brought back on line without problem.
A sealant injection fitting failed, ie fitting broke off on xev 30056 <...> production riser esd valve resulting in a release of hydrocarbon fluid to atmosphere.
Perished o ring on in line stainer of main fuel transfer system gave way allowing release of 150 ltrs of aviation fuel to the bund and overboard.
Normal production operations slight smell og gas in vicinity of 'b' injection machine. Leak noticed on 3rd stage oil trap vx0215d seal oil sight glass joint. Sight glass joint failed, releasing gas/oil
into immediate vicinity. Remedial actions 1. Confi m type/thickness of gasket with manufacturer. 2. Remove all other gasket types and retorque on line. 3. Isolate sight level glasses on sour seal
pots. 4. Develop smp for repairs to sign glasses. 5. Reinforce handover and disturbed joint procedure at safety briefs.
<...> oil process had previously been on annual shutdown, but was restarted 3 days before the incident and was producing normally at the time. A jet of oil and gas was found to be coming out of
the production separator sight glass drain valve. A low level gas alarm was activated at 0657hrs but no action was taken until the leak was observed by a general assistant who was passing that
area at 0730hrs. The valve was closed as soon as it was found but there was a large pool of oil of approx 40-m2 on the deck late. The oil was running into the open hazardous drain gulley but as
the strainer was partially blocked the level in the gulley increased to a point where it overflowed to the storm drain pipework and into the sea. Some of the spray from the leak was als going
directly into the sea. It is estimated that the total leak was 150 litres, of which 30 litres reached the sea. The pressure in the separator at the time of the incident was 14 barg. It was not necessary to
bring personnel to muster stations as the as dispersed immediately when the valve was closed. The sight glass drain consists of a one inch ball valve and a half inch needle valve in series. Both
valves were found open. It is thought that they had been open since start-up but had been plugged with sediment/wax until the incident.
The plaform was in normal production operations. One of the two pumps from t71 open drains tank was pumping out routinely (on an automatic cycle) when an alarm (g223) indicated low gas in
the vicinity of the pump followed 3 seconds later by a high gas, au omatically activating the platform yellow shutdown. Two adjacent gas heads also indicated low levels of gas in the area. The
shift leader was in the central control room at the time of the incident and advised the control room operator that he suspected h knew what the problem was. He then went directly to the site and
within 2 minutes of the shutdown had verified the cause as a failure of the labour pump discharge hose. At this point there was no further leakage of gas into the package. Fluids released w re
predominantly water, but with c. 5% hydrocarbons and residual gas. The failure appears to be attributable to mechanical damage to the 3" hose, a <...> type fitted with cl. 150 connections.
Mechanical handling work had been taking place in the area the previous day and it may have contributed to this failure. This is the subject of an ongoing investigation. Hse duty advisor informed
at 14:45
Whilst in routine operation, an operator found a spray of liquid coming from the water outlet of v01 bulk separator just downstream of the vessel nozzle. Gas was not picked up on the site
decectors. A small hole was found on the first weld downstream o the flange. The liquid escaping was predominantly produced water with evolving natural gas. The separator was closed in and
depressurised and repairs are under way to the produced water pipework at present.
Oil was seen coming from the direction of the flare stack by one of the drill crew. Identified later as crude, the oil had dropped onto the sw corner of the moving pipe deck, head of nw crane and
nw corner of level 6 of the dgl. On investigating, it was ound that a production tech. Had inadvertently styood on an isolation valve to the maintenance vent line. He immediately closed the valve
to stop further loss of containment.
Very slight weep was seen at the 2" weldolet weld connection onto an 8" water outlet line from v1756. The 2" line was the backflush water supply line for the unit. The unit was locally isolated,
no interruption to process was experienced, as a spare unit as brought on line. Weld weep was spotted by an operator on walk-about who immediately notified his supervisor and isolated the unit.
The units themselves take produced water from the base of the separators and strip out the remaining amount of oil from t e water, before the water passes through a further vessel for de-gassing
before being dumped overboard. The units are housed in a naturally vented module.
A brass plug blew out of the duplex lube - 400 gas turbine. The brass plugs are fitted from the filter following lube oil filling. The oil had been modified for some years such that the are not used
for that purpose the mods a mild steel plug has been fit ed for the in order to prevent the plug from blowing out in the manner as experienced with the brass plug fitted to it on the inside of the
filter lid.
Drainage of water from off line production separator (v01) down to the closed drain (v45) had taken place. The oily water from v45 had been pumped to an online separator (v02) via a 2" cladded
line. Oily water spatter was spotted on adjacent pipework duri g a routine visit to the area. The line was isolated and the cladding removed. A 2mm hole was found at a bend in the 2" line.

A pre-perforation logging tool run on the main bore of dual lateral well 1-2 was in progress. Whilst running the toolstring into the well the grease injection presure was apparently lost to the
stuffing box system. Dead crude oil returns subsequently bled through the grease return line hose. A small volume of crude was spilled onto the rigfloor and onto the bop deck beneath.
During routine production operations, a pinhole weep was discovered on a 1" drain stub by the export flow control valve - crude oil was observed to be frothing on the surface of the pipe. The
pressure in the line was lowered and on dropping the pressure, he leak stopped. The platform is about to enter a 16 day shutdown and a controlled shutdown of the facilities to remove all
hydrocarbons from the topsides was initiated immediately - this is ongoing at present. A continuous firewatch has been placed on th line until the shutdown sequence is complete.
The platform had been shutdown for major maintenance and construction activity for 12 days. Open drains had been covered with a tarpaulin sheet for those activities in that area. Open drains
tundish loot seals are topped up with water in that area by a co tinuously running water supply. At the supply line for this top up water a further offtake can be used to supply wash down water.
During the isolation of the wash down water supply, the supply to the loot seal was incorrectly isolated - impossible to find out at what time. Over a period the water in the loot had evaporated
allowing a small amount of gas to be liberated from the drains tank residual oil and migrate up the empty loot. Gas detectors in the immediate vicinity detected the gas. All work was sto ped and
all personnel were called to muster. Production operators were working in the area, immediately realised the problem and corrected the situation. Internal investigation to determine causes and
make recommendations to prevent recurrence was organised.
At 0300 the electric power generator gt2 tripped on high exhaust temperature. When the generator was restarted at 0320 it would not take the normal load, and started "backing off". Gt2 was
then manually shutdown remotely. The investigating technician n ticed diesel spraying out of the 3/4" diesel fuel line inside the turbine enclosure. He isolated and stopped the leak from outside
the enclosure. As a precautionary measure the on-duty fire team and portions of the emergency team were activated. <...> control room (on scene command centre) was alerted. Supervisors and
the fire/safety officer investigated the site and the incident was closed at approx. 0430. A <...> announcement was made on the platform at 0700 for information purposes. Approx. 300 gallons of
diesel were collected in the closed drain system. The likely cause of failure of the 3/4" diesel fuel line at a weld near a union joint.
Release of diesel fuel during normal running of equipment, from a pressure gauge on the discharge side of the diesel fuel supply to the combustion chambers. Oil was seen running out of the
fitting. The machine was manually taken off line.
We had a diesel leak in gt2, an electric generator turbine. Remote sensors picked up a diesel mist inside the halon protected turbine enclosure. The turbine was stopped and the leak isolated from
outside the enclosure. Approximately 40 gallons of diesel w re collected in the closed drain system. The likely cause initially looks like a failure of the 3/4" diesel fuel line at a weld near a union
connected to the diesel filter. This failure and incident appear to be similar to an occurrence <...>. Area has een isolated, investigation team set-up.
Gas above the control action level was detected at t single gas detector which caused an automatic platform yellow shutdown. The level dropped off again within a few seconds. A small rise in gas
concentration was detected at a beam detector downwind toe g s head. Annulus venting had been completed in the eggbox next to the gas detector a short time prior to the shutdown. Gas heads in
the eggbox had been inhibited to allow this routine activity to be acrried out. The detector which tripped is not known to b affected by annulus venting and was therefore not inhibited. Detailed
investigations have failed to reveal any other potential source of hydrocarbons in the area and no gas has been detected since the incident. The detector has been proven operational. F rther
investigations are ongoing, but it is thought unlikely that any further information will be obtained.
Technician working on the ngl roof smelt gas and contacted the operator. Gas was found to be leaking out of daniel orifice box connected to the discharge piping from an ngl compressor. Early
indications are this box was not tightened shut. The leak was mall enough not to be picked up by the beam detectors some ten feet away. All hot work permits were withdrawn. The site was
investigated, and the daniel box tightened up and rechecked for leaks. Infra red sensor was checked and confirmed to be in workin condition. Incident investigation initiated.
Technician working on 66 ft. Level and faintly heard gas. He informed the operator. The site was investigated. A union coupling on the 1" closed drain system was leaking gas. All hot work
permits were withdrawn. The leak was isolated and the piping co nection tightened, stopping the leak. Incident investigation initiated.

During re-start of the ngl a small condensate leak gassing off from the bonnet of a 3/4" drain valve was discovered by the operator. Local gas detectors did not register the leak. Local isolations
did not stop the leak so the ngl plant was shutdown and he leaking valve and associated pipework removed (blanks fitted until repair complete).
An operations technician whilst carrying out normal watch keeping duties discovered a fine spray release of diesel fuel from the turbine drive to p04 mol pump. Following manual shutdown and
isolation of the turbine fuel systems it was found that a defect ve lip seal in the diesel fuel valve was the source of the leak. It is estimated that less than 10 litres of diesel was released. No fire
and gas functions took place.
Operator in ngl plant could smell gas in the area of v06 (hp gas scrubber) level transmitter drain valve. On inspection a small gas leak was discovered coming from the bonnet joint of the 3/4"
drain valve. The ngl was shutdown manually, the system purged nd the valve removed. On inspection a small erosion path was discovered between the valve body and bonnet seal faces. To
prevent a similar incident all other valves of this type used on this system are to be checked using scar radiography. Valve to be sen to beach to identify the corrosion mechanism. <...> circulated
to other platforms.
While running in hole with a wire line bailer tool string a small gas and oil release occurred from the lubricator stuffing box gland. The well was closed in on the blind ram bop and the lubricator
depressurised the hydrocarbon release was minimal and co tained quickly by the wireline team, oil contaminated the top part of the lubricator and the moving pipe deck head above the lubricator
but did not reach the bop deck level. It did not activate the fire and gas detection system. Hot work permits were imme iately withdrawn. Immediated assessment was the situation had been
controlled at source. Once the well was closed in and safe the situation was 'risk assessed' and a course of remedial actions developed to effect a repair to the gland and recover the tool string and
wire. An investigation of the failure mode of the gland packing will be carried out when the tool string and wire has been recovered.
A joint failed on the fuel gas demister of p06 which allowed gas to escape inside the hood. High gas alarm activated and the turbine was shut down and fuel gas isolated.
Auxiliary diesel generator j06 was being run up for its weekly test run to check performance. Engine was left running to warm through and cjecked after approx. 30 mins. Found running
satisfactory. Two minutes later on return of the technician to carry o t the running logs he found a fine spray of diesel fuel escaping from the fuel oil reservoir onto the engine. The engine was
immediately shut down and the leak isolated. He spillage was mopped up using absorbent pads, none of the spillage was outside the vicinity of the engine bay. Total spillage estimated at circa 1
litre of diesel fuel.
The ac lubricating oil pump bypass hose ruptured on compressor ko1 while the compressor was shut down on standby. Lubricating oil was pumped from the hose until the pump shut down on low
pressure. The oil flow was restricted in its flow by the stainless s eel braiding and flowed into the engine bed plate area where it was collected by the drain system and returned to the sea sump. No
spillage to the sea occurred.
Release of diesel fuel inside pressurised hood of k02 turbine during commissioning trials. Cause was traced to a failed bourdon tube inside the diesel fuel pressure gauge. This released a mist /
spray inside the hood.
During commissioning of k-01 systems s diesel gauge failed, spraying diesel fuel inside the enclosure. The fuel ignited on the hot turbine casing causing a flash fire. The fire was extinguished by
automatic action of the fixed halon system. The fire lasted no more than a few seconds.
A <...> dp guage failed in sevice allowing gas condensate at 140 barg to escape to atmosphere. Platform shutdown and personnel sent to muster stations. Leak isolated and area vented down
within 30 minutes. No one injured.
Lube oil caught fire inside the lighthouse area of the turbine non drive end bearing. The fire was contained inside the turbine enclosure. All lube oil and vent pipes in the area have been
dismantled, rejointed and test run. No leaks detected.
Oil and gas processing plant. Steady plant condintions. The only activiy was the draining of an overhead diesel tank into a drains vessel. This operation had been carried out on previous occasions
recently, at seemingly greater draining rates than on this occasion. Gas was detected in close proximty to an open drain, protected by a lute seal. The seal had been reported as having been topped
up with water at the begining of the shift. Platform automatic shutdown resulted. Emergency response team modilised a d platform personnel to muster stations. Gas dissipated quicky.
Investigation team set up. Enviromental conditions were still. Lute seal topped up. Draining of tank ceased.

The shift team leader was informed by the central control room of a slight rise in a gas detection monitoring head around the area of the booster pump for crude oil. On investigation he found a
crude oil sampling point isolation valve had been left in th open position. This led to the release of crude oil from the 1/4" diameter sample line. The line pressure upstream of the isolation valve
was approx. 10 barg. The oil released filled the "tundish" drain pot and overflowed on to the deck within a bunded rea. The leak was stopped immediately and was estimated to be approx. 15
litres in total. The oim on investigation observed a small amount of crude oil (less than 5 litres) spreading on the surface of the sea. The spill was observed to be broken up in ature and covered
an area of the sea approx. 1 mtr wide by 20 mtrs long. The spillage to sea was through 3 x 1/8" holes within the bunded area.
Low level gas indicated in z2 followed by high level gas which caused a platform sps. Source of leak was found to be the inlet flange at the base of rv35510 on the lube oil eliminator of the gas
export compressor. Rv35510 was off-line at the time of the ncident, ie. Inlet valve closed rv35509 was on-line. Rv35510 had been taken off-line earlier as it was believed to be passing, ie. There
had been signs of icing.
During bunkering into a permanent chemical tank from an ibc, the chemical tank overflowed. The overflow from this was not handled by the drainage system, due to partial blockage in the
drainage system. This resulted in an overflow of chemical into the mi dle deck level of the chemical package. The control room received a report that there was a strong smell of chemicals on the
m2/m3 roof area. The bunkering was then stopped and clean up operations commenced, as per the msds info. Two persons reported to t e medic complaining of sore eyes and respiratory
problems, were checked but did not require any treatment. The medic requested to see a further seven persons who had been exposed. None of the above nine persons required any further
attention but were recorded as first aid cases.
Gas head 2503 started drifting, low level gas came up. Investigation revealed a small gas leak at a 4" flange on the regen gas heater bank in msm b elliott s/d vent to flare msm b/d and isolated.
During routine platform insp it was noted the actuator for wing valve on well g2 was leaking gas and condensate from end nearest the well checks carried out with portable gas detector confirmed
100% lel up to approx 12" from actuator - well has been shut n at the waster and wing valve until service engineer repairs actuator.
At 10:35hrs i was called into the control room and made aware by the operator t bate that 3 gas heads were at a low level display in g module he had already been in contact with the area operator
<...> and the area was being checked out. I waited in the control room until i received information from the field by radio. During this time i called the oim and told him i would be updating him
on the problem very shortly i was informaed of a leak on the downstreamflange of ep22b's psv 4sa block valve. I w s asked if a mechanic and myself would come to g module to help evaluate the
best response to the problem. It turned out that one bolt of the four was slack. The leak was stopped by simply tightening it up. I then phoned the oim to update him that the problem had been
sorted
During normal plant operations a 20% l.e.l. gas detection was annunciated in the control room for gas compression module b1. The area operator investigated and traced the source to the pilot
valve exhaust of the <...> p.s.v. the p.s.v. was solated and standby p.s.v. put on line
Upon pressuring fuel gas skid an audible gas release occurred - skid was isolated and depressurised - on inv lagged 2" discharge line from fuel gas heater was found to be badly corroded The gas turbine driver was being test run following an overhaul by vendor. A diesel leak from a burner ignited. This was detected automatically, the engine shutdown & the co2 extinguisher
released. 'Gpa' initiated muster. Cause traced to leaking joint washer which has been replaced. After initial investigation of the fire & subsequent co2 release, it was decided to remove burner
nozzles 6 & 7 for closer inspection & to remove all associated liquid fuel pipework for pressure testing. 1. Burners 6 & 7 were removed to the workshop where they were cleaned and inspected.
New compression fittings to the liquid fuel inlets were fitted & the aluminium washers renewed. No damage had been sustained by either burner and it was decided to re-fit them. 2. All liquid
fuel lines from the fuel rail to the burner were removed & pressure tested to 16 barg. All were found to be in good condition with no leakage. 3. The burner shim pack gasket & the burner
gaskets were removed & replaced. 4. Access to burners 5 & 8 was not easily available & all connections to the burners were checked by the <...> rep who found no slack fittings or evident
damage that could have caused a leak. 5. A boroscope inspection of the engine bearings was carried out by the <...> rep who reported that no damage was evident & we would re-build & run the
During re-instatement of gas compression system following maintenance /inspection programme, leak occurred at 1" x 1500 rtj flange on train 1 stage 2 scrubber. At time of release approx. 12
bar in system. Automatic shutdown occurred (4 x gas path detecto s activated). Duration of leak approx. 20 seconds, system made safe. Environmental conditions - 10 knots, @ 300 degrees, clear
skies, 6 degrees c. Flange joint leak rectified, full check of other flanges on system. No further problems encountered.

Normal gas export running both gas export compressors. At 17:15 hours, the gas beam detectors detected gas at 3% lel, a prod. Operator attended the scene and noted a gas leak from the stem
packing on train 1 recycle valve. The operator requested a train sd, further inspection of valve revealed that the stem packing was missing and the stem shaft scored. High winds (35 - 40 knots)
from the se vented area extremely quickly.
On change over from gas to diesel feul on the main generation, a leak occured on gt1 diesel supply pipework to the turbine burner. This resulted in a fine mist of diesel which ignited on the hot
turbine surface. The fg detection system actioned and shut he turbine down. Operations then activated the halon protection system to extinguish the flash fire. Subsequent investigation of the
diesel system found a leak path on the fitting between the burner and supply pipework. The sealing washer was found to be damaged.
2 x measurement techs were carrying out a routine insp of gas metering orifice plate orifice plate is installed in a peco measure master dual chamber orifice fitting which is designed to allow on
line removal of orifice plate techs commenced releasing 4 b lts securing sealing bear - 3 of 4 bolts had been released when o ring seal suddenly blew out followed by release of gas
Steel small bore line parted from compression fitting.
Eroision of an LCV on a gas liquid separator caused gas blow-by and as a consequence a failure of the downstream 2" CS elbow, a hole 40mm2, allowed the release of approx. 16/18 scm of
hydrocarbon gas over a 20 min. Period at an upstream pressure of 4.5 ba . The incident commencecd with a general alarm of 02:06 activated by low level gas detection and following confirming
of the gas release concluded at 02:21 with the executive action to block and vent the installation.
Very difficult to understand explanation by <...> oim but this apprx to be procedure fault rather than sytem/equipment failure. Drain valve eventually shut and gas dispersed no consequent
problem. Small gas leak from back of flow of gas from flare system knock out drum via drain system into caisson. Due to drain valve being open.
Well a5 was in full production, when an ops tech who was carrying out his watch keeping routines heard the sound of escaping gas. On inv he found the leak to be coming from the male screwed
connection on a5 annulus needle valve. He immed isolated the valv . The pipework was vented down, needle valve removed and a body bleed plug fitted.
An operations technician was carrying out a site check in module 13 mezz gas plant, prior to the release of a spark potential permit. Whilst in the module he could smell gas. With the use of a gas
meter, he was able to locate the leak which was coming fro the turbo expander diaphragm flange on 24 pcv 3220 seal gas control valve. He informed relevant personnel and the turbo expander
was shut down.
A mech tech was working in module 14 mezz gas plant. As he walked past a valve, he detected a minor gas release issuing from it. He immed notified the control room who sent prod tech to inv.
The source of the leak was found to be coming from the stem of a block valve upstream of 32psv0029 on the gas export system gas export was shutdown to allow repairs to be carried out.
Whilst carrying out watchkeeping routines an operations tech. Noticed a mist of diesel oil coming from a pin hole leak on the discharge pipework of the main fuel pump on 'a' turbine. Ops tech.
Immediately wrapped pipe and and informed central control roo . Firewatch was implemented until gt could be taken offline. Release was found in the early stages total release was 2 litres.
Suspected vibration caused failure in a weld as no support bracket fitted as in other machines. Under investigation.
Whilst carrying out watchkeeping routines an operations tech. Noticed a spray of diesel oil coming from a leak on the discharge pipework of the main fuel pump on 'a' gas turbine generator. A
second gt was started immediately and the "a" gt shutdown. Ap roximately 5lts, of diesel was spilled into the halon protected turbine enclosure. The leak was on the same pipework on which leak
occurred previously, but in a different location. The cause of the leaks remain under investigation. The machine will not e run until the cause of the repeated leaks can be determined. (nb: the
turbines are normally fuelled by natural gas, but are running on diesel during current plant shutdown).
Gas lift compression restoring cylinder lube oil flow. The lube oil flow alarm was activated - maintenance called to attend and investigate/ repair. Work permit issued mechanic changed out an in
line bursting disc on lube pump discharge, it failed to res ore the lube pressure mechanic released lube oi pipework couplings to bleed oil through system (compressor is on line) all lines clear
except 4th staple cylinder feed. Mechanic slackened off the 1/4"s/s compression fitting to cylinder quill after 5 secs g s was released from the open end. Gas compressor was shutdown. Incident
investigation in progress.
Restarting the hypochlorinator generating unit after a filter change. Operations had started the feed pumps noted discharge pressure at 150 psi. They reset control panel output failure alarm which
activated (opened) pmv 8301 feeding sea water to duplex f lter then to hypocholinator manifold. On resetting the operators heard a bang and on investigation saw that the manifold piping (plastic)
rated to 225 psi, had shattered. They shut pmv and feed pumps.

At approx. 21:56hrs, there was a gas release from an instrument at 400 bar on the agi skid in m4 main deck. The automatic fire and gas system automatically detected the gas and general alarm
was soundedand a production shutdown and plant depressure- isati n took place. The leak ceased and the gas gas was dispersed naturally. All personell were mustered safely without injury. Hse
inspectors were on board carrying out a routine platform inspection at the time of the incident.
Evolution of gas & oil from flash gas compressor on <...> and subsequent evolution of gas from lube oil tank of this machine reported on <...> sequence of events started on <...> with a report of
extensive spillage of seal oil & gas detection in m3 upper mezz in vicinity of c0401/2 concluded with a report of smell of gas in area outside of m3 upper mezz which led to shutdown of the
c0401/2 on <...> and wholesale replacement of the oil in lube oil storage tank of c0401/2 poor planning and comm of preps of y1601 for removal of p1601 led to an inappropriate isolation of a
drain seal pot in m7 - error led in turn to back filling with deck liquids of that part of the misc vent system which vents sour gas evolving from co401/2 & gas from gas fuel system for gt2 & gt6.
Coincidentally the vent valve from the gt2 fuel system and valve admitting gas feed to that system were passing slightly because c0401/2 seal oil system was now being pressurised rather than
vented to the atmospheric misc vent, the pressure in the seal oil system was able to overcome the pressure in seal oil to lube oil buffer gas space; this overpressurisation led directly to transfer of
gas contamin- ated seal oil into lube oil system. Contaminated liquids in lube oil tank began inevitably to overflow through m/c bearings, labrynths and lubeoil vent in sw corner of m3 upper
During pressure testing work as part of riser shut down work on <...> a leak was discovered in the trunion of a manual 14" tk isolation valve. Work to repair the valve was started around mid-day
on <...> under boundry isolations that had been in pla e for shut-down work. 2 technicians, 1 <...>, 1 <...>, commenced the work by removing the trunion plate reataining bolts. This did not free
the trunion, further methods were used to extract the trunion, but to no avail. The <...> technician then reques ed that the valve be cycled as it was in the closed position. At this point it was noted
that an adjacent pressure gauge pi03505 was indicating 6-7 bar pressure in the line. The chief operator was summoned and 2 technicians left the work site for lunch. the chief operator vented the
pressure build up and at this point the trunion freed and fired across the walkway, just missing a workman. As a result of the recent pressure testing work, it was possible that up to 190barg could
have been trapped in the va ve cavity. A full investigation has been carried out and a detailed report will be submitted with the oir9b.
During normal plant operations on <...> a gas alarm was activated in m5c west. The leak was quickly identified by onshift operators and isolated.the plant was then shutdown in a controlled
fashion. The gas leak originated from a level control valve c nnected to a gas scrubber. It was found that the stem had blown out of the valve body. The control valve had been maintained on <...>
as it had been reported as seized in the closed position. The actuator was removed, leaving the valve stem exposed with no manula isolations applied. After the incident, the control valve was
stripped down and the plug was found loose inside the valve body having sheared off the valve stem. The stem was therefore held in the valve body by the gland packing alone. The stem
remained in place for two days before being blown out off the valve body releasing gas into the module.
A high fluid level was indicated within the atmospheric vent pot. Attempts to clear this were not successful. Shortly after the high level a 20% gas was detected in the cuttings process room in
mud module 2. The gas level increased to 60% activating the platform pa gas alarm (16:25). The level was cleared in vent pot and gas levels reuced to zero within 7 minutes. One gas head was
activated in the cp room. A controlled plant shutdown was initiated and the lp vent system isolated to allow flushing and ma ntenance of the atmospheric vent pot following a previous incident
(<...>) investigation concluded that there was communication within the east caisson betwwen the lp vent ststem and the open drains. This communication occurs when there is a high level n the
atmospheric vent pot, presumed to be due to back pressure. Remedial actions included inspection of caissons, resealing the caisson pipework, modification of the atmospheric vent pot and
installation of a dump line to allow debris to be flushed out. the final remedial action to install the dump line was scheduled for the next planned shutdown during <...>. It was not possible to
installi during the modifications to the vent pot due to restricted access to the bottom of the vassel. This dump line was installed <...>.
Gas was detected intermittently at the water injection vacuum pump exhaust vent. It was detected by the quality gas detector in line. During the release the levels varied between 0-30% of lel
peaking twice momentarily to 98% of lel - following invs it was found to be coming from aleak in the first stg gas coolers e2001 and e2002. The process was shut down and coolers stripped down
to identify mode of failure. This is still under investigation by the manufactures. Simultaneous oil and gas production/export nd drilling activities in progress.
A fuel gas leak occurred in <...> turbine enclousure when the o ring in the demister pot failed. Gas detection by fire and gas system resulted in general platform alarm and unit shutdown. The gas
level in the enclosure increased when hvac shutdown and re ulted in a total platform shutdown. The o ring had been made from extruded rubber and ends had been glued tog to fabricate the o
ring. The unit is shutdown until a correct specification o ring can be fitted, other machines will be checked. The vendor has een advised of the incident, they have been requested to confirm
correct part no.
Person noticed hydrocarbon fluids weeping from pinhole in weld on 1/2" tapping point for pressure transmitter on process pipework down stream of oil choke well <...>, control room advised
who shut down and secured well head.

A small release of oily water from a .5" branch connection on the reject water discharge line was detected by a passer-by. The process was shutdown manually and the line de-pressurised. On
further inspection a small crack was detected in the weld. The und r- lying cause is still to be identified.
On report of diesel spillage at turbine diesel day tank. Cr operator stopped the diesel circ pump on inv it was found that the recirc valve to the online diesel storage tank had been inadvertently
been left in the closed position. This resulting in diesel escaping from the tank via the flame arrestor. The platform drain system contained the spillage
Operator on routine plant tour observed oil/produced water leak in prod manifold area. It was identified as pinhole leak on np 218 prod flowline. Mcr and prod supervisor were informed immed.
Well was shut-in and flowline isolated and depressured.
At 0130hrs on <...> on <...> drill floor there was a release of crude oil from a wireline lubricator which activated a single gas detector to low limit and resulted in a small quantity of crude oil
spilling on the drill floor. At this time the wireline cr w were progressing a drift run on well np30 prior to running a plt survey. No other operations or activities were in progress. Leak was quickly
isolated by wireline operator closing a needle valve and did not cause any equipment damage or major enviromental pollution.
Module 11 gas compressor gb1101b - small bore 1" pipe fracture - operator found leak when smell of gas noted - no alarms initiated - m/c isolated for remould of offending spool.
Hydrocarbon leak via coiled tubing unit stuffing box. Leak was stopped by increasing hydraulic pressure to the seal.
Hairline crack on 6" discharge line adjacent to 2" lp flare line weld on gas compressor gb119b. Gas was smelled during flowline checks and on further investigation found gas leaking from crack.
Mcr notified and compression shutdown, isolated and vented. R port to be sent to corrosion engineer for failure analysis.
While checking casings in module 05 wellheads operator smelt gas. Upon investigation found the flange on sp35 flowline/standpipe spraying oil/ gas over surrounding area. Consider that extreme
weather conditions(and hence platform movement) may have contributed to this incident.
On initiation of planned blowdown a 2" vent line from 'b' train crude coolers failed. Visual inspection showed that a (approx 5-10 mm diameter hole had appeared in the wall of the pipe, allowing
gas to lead into module 5 for a period of approx 1 minute at an estimated initial pressure of approx 8-10 barg.
A gas release occured in module 6 gas compressor following failure of a 3/4" stainless steel pipe in the root of the 3rd from last thread of a 3/4" npt fitting. Fitting located in compressor hp
outletto metering line 'orifice plate' the leak was detected y fixed detectors and by subsequent identification with portable monitors. The leak was isolated and depressurised allowing a low level
gas (3 gas heads registering approx 30% lel) to be vented in approx 2 mins,
A hydrocarbon release occurred at approx. 1800 hrs at the metering skid. Gas detection was activated in the area of the metering skid. The <...> operator requested the area operator to investigate
the gas alarm. Upon arrival at the scene the area operator w tnessed oil leaking from several flow glasses on the metering skid. The <...> operator activated a class 2 shutdown at the request of the
operator at the metering skid. This incident is currently being investigated by the hse.
Two hihi gas alarms activated in pr1 which in turn initiated a gpa, esd1 plant blowdown and a full muster of all personnel. The cause of the gas alarm activation was the inadvertent release of
liquid condensate from a one litre sample cylinder that had ju t been filled by the metering technician. A written work instruction is to be prepared and issued detailing sample procedure under the
t-card system and to include an attached checklist/ aide memoir of valve sequences. A review is to be made of all tasks ransferred from the chemist to the metering tech. To determine if all
procedures have been communicated correctly and none missed. Ptq to be raised to propose modifications to: a: the handles on valves v1 and v4 on each welker cylinder to be changed to 't bar
type. B: the ultra-seal on each welker cylinder to be changed for parker (or similar) quick disconnects in which both the male and female sections are fitted with fail safe non-return valves.
C compressor shut down on 2nd stage high level in ko drum. The machine was being restarted but, prior to loading, a minor gas leak was identified in the interstage cooler end flange liner. The
leak came from an internal failure of the titanium liner. The ompressor was shut down and isolated. To prevent recurrance all existing liners have been inspected and a revised inspection
programme is being developed. Engineering support is being used to evaluate the need for fixed plugs or no plugs in the carbon ste l shelfs. Action will follow the recommendations
Maintenance operations on the <...> pig receiver. Cover plate of thermowell removed & gas found seeping from the instrument interior. <...> pipeline isolated & vented. Thermowell had been
damaged by sand erosion & was removed with a blank flange fitted. Co responding thermowells at <...> end of pipeline was inspected & found to be in excellent condition. Inspection programme
& operations philosophy under review to prevent recurrence.

The platform was in normal production operation. High winds were blowing otherwise enviromental conditions were normal. A leak of hydrocarbon from a flange weld of a'mol pump p0301a
was discovered by maintenance tech. The maintenance tech informed the entral control room who shutdown the pump. The leak of hydrocarbon was not detected by any gas alarms.
Operators working at oil pig launcher noticed large quanties of steam below mezz level. On investigation it was discovered a bend of pipework on degasser v2701 of oily water at a temperature of
approx 90 oc. The isolation valves upstream and downstream of lv 27016 were closed and the release stopped. The pipework was found to have a hole approx 4cm diameter at a 90 o bend (pipe
ident 2" pl-27-019-dia)
Platform at time of incident was on full production. <...> was undergoing coil tubing intervention work for milling out operations. The coil tubing unit was a 2" unit and at the time of the incident
was tripping out of the hole. At 19:30 there was a gas rel ase from the coil tubing pressure equipment. This initiated a gpa and platform shutdown. <...> was effectively secured and the gas release
isolated. On investigation it was found that the stripper mecannism on the coil tubing pressure equipment has failed d e to wear. This was subsequently repaired and pressure tested. Production
then recommenced.
Lab tech reported to ccr sampling on j5 complete. Inhibits not removed immediately due to other activities ongoing in ccr. Operator in process of isolating j4 had closed diverter valves and had
reached point of closing flowline material valve. Valve had b en closed approx 3 turns when there was a bang and oil/gas began spraying from gland on valve. Operatot called ccr saying that
release was due to his operations advised shutdown not considered necessary at this time as leak rate appeared to be decreasing. 2nd operator called ccr and requested level 2 shutdown. Level 2
shutdown initiated manually and executive actions functioned correctly. Diverter valve cracked open to allow blowdown of inventory through production manifold. Release continued. Ccr establis
ed contact with prod supv. Decision was not to initiate gpa at this point but tannoys put out to stop hot work immediately and return ptw's. Decision to remove inhibits on gas heads. Gpa and level
3 shutdown initiated automatically on removal of inhibits. all personnel went to muster and normal emergency response procedures implemented. Plant conditions continued to be monitored with
all personnel in safe location. Decision at approx release had decayed to a point where manual intervention to isolate leak considered safe. Manual intervention commenced 18:16 leak stopped
Whilst removing 1" rf ansi 150 blank flange, a small quantity of gas was released.
When using the vent header to blow down well <...>, following a SSSV leak off test, gas was released from a 2mm corroded pin hole in the line from the kill skid to the vent header mainfold.
Before incident: p74 skimmer pump had been replaced after failure, reconnection of the pump had been delayed as the electrician involved had been reassigned to a higher priority job. The pump
remained electrically isolated with the cable disconnected and the cable transit block to v88 open. This work had been done on hw permit [hw 16480], taken out on the <...> and suspended on the
<...> at 04.26 hrs. At the end of his overtime period on the <...> the rp signed off cw permit <...> associated with p74 pump removal & replacement at <...> & the mechanical isolation certificate
<...> at 2115. The remaining cold work permit <...> detailing mech isolation/ de-isolation requirements was not signed off until 0940 on the <...>. This permit was left on the rp's desk in the
permit office with a yellow 'sticky' on it advising nightshift personnel that electrical re-connection was required prior to p74 re-instatement. The dayshift rp was aware that elec work remained
outstanding on the pump but not the status of the transit blocks. There was no verbal handover from the dayshift rp to the nightshift rp and ets as these individuals were otherwise engaged at the
time. At the time the rp went off duty, [2130 on the <...>] 2 permits remained 'live' but suspended, p74 required cable re-connection and electrical de-isolation, the cable transits into v88 were
At approximately 08:40 fixed gas detection systems in 'b' module detected a significant release of gas. Platform went to muster. Investigation by emergency response team identified major failure
of <...> wellhead jumper hose. Hose dia 6", serial number 1 396, working pressure 5000psig, operating pressure at time of incident 700psig. Hose manufactured in <...> and tested to 7500psig.
Hose installed <...> and pressure tested for 4 hours at 4500 psig in <...>. Contents of hose released to module sweet wellhead fluid, approx 91% water cut). Hose locally process isolated and area
washed down. Muster stood down at approx 10.04. All production remains shut in. Investigation team mobilised, details of volume of release, etc to follow. Environmental co ditions at 0600 on
the day of the incident: wind 230deg at 8kts, ivs 10+nm, seas 05.m
At approx 04:50 on <...> a noise was heard by an operator outside module e. On investigation the c3 (hp gas compressor) outboard dry gas seal rotameter glass was found to be shattered and
hydrocarbon gas was being emmitted from inlet and outlet port . Local gas detectors registered the occurrence of gas although levels did not reach alarms settings (highest level seen was 10% lel).
The c3 compressor had been shutdown at the time of the incident although it was found to be pressurised to 740psig, casi g drains were opened and c3 depressurised. The ip compressor (c2) was
also shutdown and depressurised. An incident investigation is underway. A copy of the report will be forwarded on completion of the investigation.
On a liquid to fuel gas changeover, coincident high level gas indicated inside turbine enclousure g-8000, automatically shutting down the unit. On inspection a fuel gas supply hose to duel burner
no. 12 had burst.

On liquid to fuel gas change over, co-incincident high level gas indicated in the turbine enclousure of g-8000 which atomatically shut down the unit. On investigation a fuel gas supply hose to
duel fuel burner no 12 had burst
Gauge blew off at instrument fitting on the gas compression import export metering skid.
Diesel fire pump-fire in exhaust due to hydraulic leak.leak will be repaired today. No damage to fire pump.(module 15) fire activated smok and flame detector. Fire pump which was on test run
had to be shutdown.
Following the renewal of the seat on the air eliminator (manufactured by <...>, valve type also known as a vacuum breaker) on the 'c' salt water lift pump in module 3 (weirs submersible lift
pump). The pump was restarted to test for leaks as per normal ractise. During the test run, while the operator was recording the discharge pressure and checking for leaks. The bonnet of the air
eliminator failed (cracking in 4 places) releasing the 2" screwed vent pipe and a jet of water (discharge pressure 200pst). had the operator been in the vacinity of the pipe. He could have been
seriously injured.
Bleeder plug on bottom flange of xmas tree was passing. This resulted in a steady trickle of escaping fluids which was picked up by routine watch keeping operations. The indication was that the
seals on the pst nipple was passing. The well was closed in w th the dhsv closed. Pressure was bled down from the dhsv and the pressure reduction stopped the leak. A plan is in place to set 2
bridge plugs above the dhsv in the long string (the well is dual completion) and the short string. This will allow removal of the xmas tree and a repair to be effected.
C turbine was running on gas fuel suppling 50% of the platform power requirements on a load of 14mw. There are a total of 6 gas detectors in the turbine enclosure, 3 on the air inlet and three in
the air outlet. A gas alarm occurred at 1000hrs <...>, 1 head on the outlet had detected gas above the alarm level of 15% lel. Investigation of the day shift did not find any gas present within the
enclosure, although the detection system was reading approx. 6% lel. A further 2 gas alarms sounded during the nig t shift, one at 2000hrs and 1 at 2145hrs. Again investigation using a <...> triple
plus showed no signs of gas being present. During exhaustive checks trying to determine and detect the small gas leak, 2 out of 3 detectors on the inlet detected gas abov 30% lel. It is thought
that thisoccurred due to air pattern movement change with having the enclosure door open for some considerable time. This resulted in a turbine emergency shutdown, a release of halon inside the
turbine enclosure and a general platf rm alarm. After confirmation that no fire had taken pplace, the turbine was isolated from gas and diesal fuels and the platform personnel were stood down
from emergency stations. The cause of the gas leak has been identified as a 3" flange fitting. Furthe leak checks are on going.
<...> being visited for routine compliance insp activities - during helicopter approach a plume of what was thought to be gas was seen at platform - helicopter returned to <...> & standby vessel
instructed to move away from immed atea - <...> initiated an esd from info relayed from helicopter
Due to a generator fault main power supply was lost at 07:00 hrs. This resulted in a 2b shutdown closing all xmas tree wing valves. A gas leak was noticed venting from the lower master valve of
the xmas tree on well a31. An operator closed the downhole afety valve but could not depressurise the xmas tree as the wing valve was closed. As a precautionary measure personnel were called
to muster stations @ 07:33. The wing valve was opened and the xmas tree depressurised. The leak then stopped. The fixed ga detection system did not detect any gas during the incident despite
being close to the release. After the incident the gas heads were checked and found to be in working order. The platform remained shutdown until a wireline plug was installed above the ssv.
Investigation into the suitability of the stem packing fitted in the lower master valve is ongoing
During subsea jacket 'rov' inspection it was noted that bottom section of both fire pump caissons were missing- hence pumps located at 16.5m & 18m elevation- caissons broken at 12m. Hence
firepumps considered vulnerable to tide etc as now outside of caisson. Risk assessment done- no demanning but work restrictions imposed to minimise potential hydrocarbon incidents.
1.workforce & safety reps advised-satisfied with the short term measures taken by <...>. 2. <...> commissioned to examine the technical issues & the longer term remedial workscope. 3.both fire
pumps exposed to tidal forces, <...> is available but not believed to be in good condition. <...> appears ok but may not be reliable if called to operate. The <...>, a dive support vessel, was doing a
rov survey when it discovered that the fire pump a & b caissons had lost 6m & 4.5m of their caissons, leaving the pumps protruding out of the caissons ie without protection from the sea motion.
The a caisson is no longer secured by a subsea conductor guide whereas the b caisson terminates in its guide. Summary report caisson damage on n w hutton. Introduction a caisson survey of the
structure <...> was carried out on behalf of <...>. By <...> onboard the vessel <...> deploying the rov <...> on <...>. The survey incorporated all caissons on the structure & 2 were found to have
After a routine tubing/annulus communication check, it was identified that the 9 5/8" annulus pressure could not be bled down to zero pressure. On shutting in the 9 5/8" annulus resulted in
subsequent pressure increased to approximately 750psi. Repeated attempts to blow down the 9 5/8" annulus resulted in subsequent pressure build-up. At this time, it was unclear whether the leak
path was from tubing to 9 5/8" annulus or whether the leak path was past the production packer into the 9 5/8"

1220hrs drilling ahead in lewis iv sandstone, a drilling break was encountered at 15450-15446. A flow check was performed. The well was flowing slowly. The well was closed in on the annular.
An approx gain of 10bbls was seen. Shut in d/p pressure stabilis d @ 90psi sicp @ 240 psi. Mudweight was 12.8 + ppg. Well was circulated out w/drillers method, and well killed with 13.3ppg.
No gains were measured while circ out influx. No evidence of influx type was seen at surface. Rft pressures, taken part kick were easured @ 9.7ppg throughout the hole section.
During annulus pressure testing pressure was bled down from 650 psi to 0 psi above the annular safety valve which was in the closed position. Following this blowdown the pressure above the
asv was noted to build up from 0 to 57 psi in a period of 15 minut s (equivalent to a build-up rate of 2822 scf/hour). This pressure build-up rate exceeded the maximum allowable value of 900
scf/hour detailed in the mobil drilling and production procedures manual (dapps)
Pressure test performed on tubing annulus and there was found to be tubing - annulus communication. Well is completed in a reservoir interval of high pressure and the annulus exhibits a
capability of flowing if the surface pressure is lowered. Well has be n shut-in and further investigation to analyse the leak is planned
After bleeding down the tubing to remove a suspected hydrate plug at surface, the 'spent' perforating gun parted at the e-line weak point and fell thro' the tubing to the closed trdhsv. The gun was
stuck across the trdhsv and prevented the valve passing n inflow test. Attempts to retrieve the gun using standard slickline fishing tools proved successful. The valve failed in flow tests and a lead
impression block indicated the flapper had broken off and remained within the valve profile. The will has been lugged awaiting assembly of packing elements for a wrdhsv
During annual ppm's the a1 injection valve in this well was found to have failed.the a1 injection valve has been previously placed in the well to isolate t/a communication higher in the well.the
well is shut & will be killed & plugged as operations allow.
During annual ppm's communication between the tubing/annulus was found the well has gas lift installed with an asv which has failed to test. The well has been shut-in while further testing is
conducted to re- confirm the previous leak results.
Tubing to annulus communication developed in well on <...>. The communication has been traced to be below the asv safety system. It is thought that the source of the communication is most
likely through a gas lift valve below the asv. The asv has sinc been satisfactorily tested. The well remains on production. A forward programme to investigate the leak will be prepared as
operations allow.
During heavy lift operations for the abandonment of the adjacent <...> well, it was ascertained that the <...> dhsv would not close. Repeated attempts to leak test the valve failed. The dhsv was
subsequently locked open and an insert valve was retrieved a d a d8p plug set in the nipple profile of the dhsv. The well has been shut-in while further plans are considered to obtain an integirty
test of the insert dhsv.
During routine platform testing procedures, it was reported that tubing to annulus communication existed. Asvtested good (communication below asv). Since well was not being gas lifted, well
was left on production while investigation continued. Original ca ing/tubing pressure data supplied from offshore did not indicate tubing to annulus communication. Additional tubing/annulus
pressure test data since then has confirmed tubing ti annulus communication does exist. Well is presently on production with the kn wledge that gas lifting the well inits present condition is not
permitted. Forward program to investigate the leak will be prepared as operations allow
During heavy lift operations for the drilling of the adjacent <...>, it was ascertained that the b15 annulus pressure would not vent down and that tubing to annulus communication existed. Tubing
to annulus communication is suspected below the dhsv, since a uccessful negative test on the tubing was performed with the dhsv in the closed position. A bridge plug was set in the packer
tailpipe and a successful negative test performed. The well has been shut in while a workover program is prepared to replace the ailed tubing. Operations are scheduled to begin following the
completion of b46
Whilst drilling on well a20 at 15965",a mud gain was noted. The well was shut in and a shut in casing pressure of 23psi was noted. The tubing had zero pressure. The easing volume was
circulated out through the choke. Ther was no mud contamination noted n the returns to surface, and no cain in pit volume while circulating. A few check showed the well to be static. Normal
operations were resumed
Whilst cementing the 9-5/8" x 10 3/4" casting to a depth of 13046' around 300 bbls of losses were observed during cement displacement. Once cementing was complete, the well was observed
flowing. The annular was closed.sicp rose & stabilised at 200 psi. T e pressure was subsequently bled off and the annular opened. A small backflow was observed which decreased to static
conditions after 1hr 20 mins. It is believed that the cmt job had pressured up the formation.

Unloading perforated well. Coiled tubing and guns jammed up in riser above xmas tree. Shear bop rams operated and bottom half of guns released smashing through sssv @ 1500 ft subsea.
When circ bottoms up after check trip - erratic flow was observed and well was shut in - pit gain 1 bbl, pdp zero - pann 125 psi - well was circ via choke with 125 psi back pressure. Close in and
monitor press- ures pdp zero - continue circ conventionally
Well <...>: well ops prior to incident: drilling completed successfully. The zx tie back packer was set. The casing/liner was pressure tested to 3000 psi then circulated to sea water and inflow
tested with rates declining from 43 gal/hr to 3.3 gal/hr over 3 hours. The well was then cleaned up and dlt packer set to allow the removal of the bops and the installation of the spool type xmas
tree. This was followed by the re-instatement of the drilling bop. On releasing the dlt packer the well was found to be c pable of flowing at 118 gal/hr and the bop was closed. Pressure of less than
50 psi were recorded. The well was circulated over the choke and after 400 bbls hydrocarbon traces were observed in the water, some bbls of contaminated were recovered. Once a fu l bottoms up
circulation had been achieved, the well was still capable of flowing, and circulation was continued through the choke with back pressure equivalent to well pressures from recent surveys. Brine
was mobilised to kill the well and enable the pac er to be set above the suspected leaking liner shoe track.
Driller noted erratic flow rate for mud returns, picked up off bottom, observed gas breakout at bell nipple. Close in well (pipe rams) monitored well. No pressure increase noted. Ciculate out gas
cut mud, under controlled conditions over choke, whilst weighing up mud to 635pptf.
Following investigation to determine the sourceof high a annulus pressue in well <...> a tubing leak below the sssv has been identified. The rate of leakage is above the allowable sssv leak rate.
Remedial work to change out tubing is being planned.
On the <...> a small leak was observed from the wear brushing tie down bolts on the hp riser. The well pressure was bled off and the leak fixed. The well pressure was thought to be related to
thermal expansion of a trapped field.
Whilst drilling through the tor formation on sidetrack, the well began to flow, at a depth of 13202 ft. Closed well in, and measured pressures. Pdp = 355 psi, pcsg = 380 psi. Estimated 3.5 bbl
gain. Circulated out brine influx with drillers method. Pd = 355 psi. Killed well with 11.8 ppg, up from original drilling weight of 10.8 ppg. Opened up well, dead. Continued to drill. As detailed
in hse notification for well, possibility of brine flows from chalk when drilling 8 1/2 " sidetrack wl mud weight o timised for the reservoir. These chalks have been pressured up to 11.1 ppg in the
past, but this one was up to 11.4 ppg emw.
On going drilling operations on slot <...> the well was detected as flowing during a routine flowcheck, prior to pulling out of the hole with the drill string. Well was closed in and pressures
allowed to stabilize at 575psi. Influx circulated out with ex sting mud weight and killed with a second circulation, using 11.8ppg kill mud weight and by maintaining a pre-calculated, amount of
back pressure to ensure no further influx was allowed into the wellbore during well operations.
Drilling 8 1/2" hole through kimmeridge formation with 11.1ppg mud weight. Md 13770ft, tvd 12267ft. The gas levels increased to 30% total gas and the well was flow checked. The well was
found to be flowing. The annular bop was closed and pressures stabili ed at 360psi. The influx was circulated out and the well shut in again. Pressure stabilised at 425psi 12.1ppg mud was
pumped and the well killed.
Whilst pooh (9250ft:5770ft tvd) wiyh a 3 7/8" clean out assembly. An 83bbl water influx occurred. The liners cement job tol is probably lower than expected, with the flushed etive formation
exposed and water based cement spacers up to the tol. This result in the pressure at the tol = 4750psi. The linesr's integral.the back packer had previously pressure tested and was leaking. On
pooh with the clean out assembly. The etive must have been swabbed in. On closing the sidp = 250psi: sicp = 450psi. The slug wa displaced out of the dp using the drillers method the string was
stripped into tol and will be killed by the drillers method. Next the mud weight will be increased to 0.68psi/ft to allow a tie back packer to be run and set.
While drilling 121/4" hole @ 4682 mtrs m.d. an increase in returns flow was oserved. The driller picked up and spaced out the drill string and flow checked the well. It was confirmed that the
drill well was flowing and the well was shut in with the upper pipe rams using the fast shut in method. (while the well was being flow checked the night tool pusher and the night company man
were called to the drill floor) s.i.d.p.p. stabilised at 250 psi and s.i.c.p stabilised at 320 psi after 10 minutes the shut i pressure had started to fall, (indicating the formation had broken down and
crossflow was occurring)

On well <...>, the 7" liner had been set at 8,100ft with the shoe at 12,997 ft. A clean up assembly was in the hole and the well had been displaced to seawater. Seawater had been in the well for
24hrs. The sea water was being diplaced from the well with 6 0pptf brine in preparation for the perforating run which was to follow, when crude oil was seen in yhe sea water returns at the
shakers. The pumps were immediately stopped and the well closed in. Sidpp=100 psi.sicp=390psi. After discussions on the well si e it was decided to attempt to bleed off some of the drill pipe
pressure. This pressure had settled t0 50 psi. Which was bled off to the drillpipe to 0psi. Pressures were monitored and remained stable. The well was then circulated at 50 spm via the choke
anifold and no further crude oil was seen. The well was closed ib and there was no sidpp or sicp. Total volume of crude bled of 2bbls. By this time the wel was fully displaced to brine at 600pptf
and a flow check revealed that the well was stable. Prepara ions were made to pooh and resume operation as per the programme the crude was collected in the trip tank and pumped to the
production closed drain system.
Weather good. Well <...>, commenced rih with coil tubing, run to approx 30 meters when tubing hung up. Lost weight approx. 7000lbs and as a result started to pull back out of the hole in an
attempt to tag stuffing box with bha. Bha had parted from tubing a a result released oil and gas into the area (approx 1.5bbls) immediately run back into hole with coil tubing to get seal of stuffing
box. Closed rams on bop's on rig floor as per procedure. Investigation ongoing.
A coiled tubing sand cleanout was being carried out on well fa33. The well was being flowed and sand was being washed from the completion by pumping viscous fluid slugs through the coiled
tubing. At 2450mmdbrt, the operator began to pull out to check his pick up weight. No weight was seen on the weight indicator and a release of oil was seen at the top of the coiled tubing
stripper assembly. The operator quickly checked the injector head and observed that the coiled tubing had parted between the injector head and stripper assembly. The operator immediately
closed in the coiled tubing bop pipe rams. This stopped the flow. The operator then closed the swab valve and established that there was no coiled tubing across the tree. The coiled tubing triple
combi shear seal bops were then closed making the well safe with two barriers against flow. The area authority was informed of the incident and the well was shut in. In all a total of c. 0.5 bbl
hydrocarbon was released onto the bop deck during the period of c. 30 seconds between observing and stopping the emission. The remaining tree valves (lower and upper master) were checked.
With the well safe the spill was cleaned up. The coiled tubing was then rigged down. Wireline was rigged up and after establishing that the top end of the lost coiled tubing was below the dhsv
Whilst pulling the production tubing during a workover operation, the treated sea water fluid level was seen to rise in the well. The annular bag on the drilling bops was shut in and the well
monitored. No further pressure build up was seen. Tsw was circulated across the well via the kill & choke line. The well was topped up with 20bbls and losses were monitored at 12bbl/hr. The
base of the completion tailpipe was at 298m brt. The well was taking losses of 12bbl/hr at the time of the incident & contained a full column of fluid. An overbalance was maintained on the
reservoir throughout the incident to prevent any influx from the formation. It appears that some oil had been trapped beneath a plug set in the tail pipe. Previous attempts to pull the plug had been
unsuccessful. As the completion was being pulled to surface, oil beneath the plug expanded as it dropped below bubble point pressure and gas came to surface within the well bore. The incident
involved no loss of hydrocarbon containment. After the incident, a further attempt to pull the prong from the tail pipe plug was successfully made. No indication of pressure equalisation was seen,
however. As a further precaution, the fluid level has been allowed to dropin the well whilst still maintaining an overbalance on the reservoir to allow for further oil/gas expansion from under the
The dhsv on well 6-2 had failed a routine dhsv integrity test. Preparations were underway to change out the dhsv. During integrity checks on the tree by production personnel prior to handover to
well ops it was discovered the the lower master valve could ot be closed. Operational checks & maintenance was then carried out on the tree by cameron reps, however no cause for the lmv
failure could be identified. A lead impression block was then run on wireline to determine if there was any obstruction in the va ve. The indications from the impression block are that the dhsv is
lodged in the lmv. The well has been secured & preparations are presently ongoing to fish the dhsv from the tree & install a new valve in the dhsv nipple. Note: <...> has been a dead prod cer
since <...>. Coil tubing clean out & n2 lift in <...> failed to bring the well back to production. The dhsv was last changed out and tested on <...> after a gyro data survey. This was preparation for a
sidetrack during <...>. The dhsv has most likely been propelled up the hole, whent the valve was last closed for an integrity test.
<...> is a water injector. The a annulus pressure was seen to rise and fall with injection pressure. On further tests, the a annulus could not be bled down below 60 barg while well injecting, the a
annulus and well-head pressure fell as injection stopped. the well and a annulus go on vacuum within 1 hour. Communication is not thermally dependant. Communication is below the dhsv
nipple. The well is in the forward rig plan for a workover in <...>. The well does not have the ability to sustain flow to surface. injection will therefore be maintained to minimise the influx of gas
into the wellbore pending: the weekly requirement to check the a annulus for gas is continued, (however no attempt well be made to bleed down); no gas is observed in the a annulus; b and c
annulii are bled down as normal. The well will operate under dispensation within well integrity on <...> well <...>.
Tubing to annulus communication identified below dhsv unable to plug well die to scale - production continuing until end of march 97 when wo to be performed.
Whilst running completion after circulating to 1.29sg brine, during clean up trip observed gas bubbles at surface. Shut in the well and observed positive pressure. Stripped in, as per bpx policy to
kill well with 1.35sg brine.

Asv underwent routine test. Leak rate approximately 20 scf/min. Full annulus was bled down and entire completion string integrity tested. No flow through the completion resulted. The 20
scf/min is slightly above the api rp 14b specified rate of 15 scf/min for production safety valves same specification has been the "default" value used for asv's for the time being although it is
recognised that this is a different type of service and application. Well has been put back into service on gas lift
During a well operation on well a33 pressure had built up in the 9-5/8" annulus. The pressure was bled down to closed drains from 1900 psi. To confirm that the gas cap had been vented, a valve
was opened on the the cement unit, releasing initially water nd then some gas. Although the valve was quickly closed adjacent gas detectors sensed the gas release, resulting in alarm
annunciation. Investigation revealed that the bleed off line to the closed drains had been blocked by hydrates due to its small bor . Actions to prevent recurrence include well operations
procedures improvements (clearer procedures on vent requirements along with pipework diagrams) and clear instructions given to personnel involved in this operation.
Well operations ongoing on a17 milling obstruction in the 7" liner. At estimated bottoms up at approx. 2330 a 20% lel gas alarm was activated in the bop deck area. The well was secured by
closing annular bop's. During closing operations the gas indicati n rose to 60% lel activating the platform muster alarm. The detected levels quickly reduced on closure of annular bop below 20%
lel within 2 minutes. Zero pressure was indicated on the shut in well. The annular bop was opened to observe well and gas dete ted at 12% lel with a gas monitor. The well was closed in and
commenced circulation via choke to poor boy degasser until lel below 2% after 15 minutes. No gas had been detected during previous operations on this well. Procedures have now been put into
pl ce to monitor returns at bottoms up.
Whilst pooh with backed off drill pipe with its base at 8216 ft an influx of 26 bbls was identified from swabbing. The well was shut in with 80 ps on dp, 120 psi on annulus. Drill pipe was
stripped in through the annular to 15958 ft where dp stabilised at 0 psi. The well was stabilised using drillers method with gas being knocked out through the degasser. Pipe was then run into the
7" liner shoe at 18 587 ft where the well was circ to 12.3 ppg mud with no more gas returns.
Well <...> - well kicked after chemical cut on tubing @ 15,430'. Circulated out influx through choke taking (contaminated returns to slop tank. Sitp = 50psi,sicp = 50psi. Pumped sized salt pill
followed by 9.7ppg brine. Static lossed 4.5. Wait on weath r to continue operation as platform has no chemicals or brine left onboard (adverse weather has caused the supply vessel to divert to
<...> for shelter. While waiting on weather for 38hr static losses decreased oil and gas migration started up the annuls sitp = 0, sicp = 65psi. Closed well on bop.
When perforating the f band on well s30, an abnormally high reservoir pressure was recorded. This resulted in the blow out preventer [wire- line] being closed and the kill weight of the workover
fluid being raised from 11.4 ppg to 12.7 ppg in order to kill the well.
Drilling 17 1/2" hole on s57 when motor stalled at 1881 ft. After sev- eral tentative attempts to pass obstruction it was concluded that this was well s6 casing. Well s6 was abandoned in order to
sidetrck to well s57 risk assess conducted which concluded hat physical risk to installation was not present. Drilled ahead [with additional precautions] and were able to pass the obstruction.
Well <...> workover preparation for tide track. Whilst pulling out of the hole with the dlick joint fishing assembly it was observed that the well was not taking the correct fluid replacement
volume. Observation of the well bore pressure indicated that a hydrocarbon infllux had occurred below the bottom hole assembly (bha). Using volumetric stripping procedures the bha is to be run
back to bottom and the influx circulated out.
Whilst drilling 8 1/2" hole with 630 pptf mud at 17290 ft ahd the driller observed a drilling break and flow checked the well, which was seen to be flowing. The well was closed in & following
pressures recorded: sidpp: 300 psi scip: 210 psi. 2 bbl increa e was measured. Well was circulated to kill fluid at 661 pptf using wait & weight method - on completion of circ well was observed to
be dead and bop opened. Influx fluid was water which had been absorbed into the mud system by the emulsifiers [indicated y a decrease in mud weight & electrical stabil- ity] - drill string was
stuck and was released with a single jar down blow. Rotation of string was established & circ commenced. Dynamic losses of 1 bbl/min were observed. Circ stopped and lost fluids were o served
to be returning to mud system from well - optimum circ rate to minimise losses was established and well circ to ensure mud weight was even throughout system at 661 pptf. 50 bbl calcium
carbonate pill was mixed & pumped into well to cure losses. Whe losses are cured present plan is to pull out of hole to perform bop pressure test. Meanwhile future prog is to be disc by
geologists and reservoir engineers.

Six monthly planned xmas tree maintenance had been completed on <...> water injection well. As per procedure the tree valves were subjected to a full pressure integrity test. The following
valves failed: lmv, hmv mwv and pwv. The swab, service and kwv al met the required integrity criteria. Well integrity above a deep set ab-1 injection has been confirmed. The well will be left
with the tubing depressurised above the ab-1 injection valve and a plugging programme will be implemented asap. A tree valve inv stigation/repair programma will follow when
equipmentpersonnel are available.
During routine pressure monitoring, the production operator noticed the a, b and c annuli appeared to be in connection with each other. A series of checks were made and communication was
confirmed. The well was confirmed. The well is a <...> producer, producing 18,032 blals/d gross at 99.1% waterbut giveing 166 bopd. The well is currently closed in. Following completion of
the current well intervention (a1322) the well will be pluggged 9in the lower 3.68" tauape nipple. We will be mann ng up with drill crew in <...> and have scheduled a well kill with brine or
temporary abandonment with <...> as a priority.
Wireline toolrack toppled onto operator pinning him against toolchest causing fatal injuries. Investigation continuing.
Supply vessel <...> was backloading coiled tubing reels onto starboard side of aft deck. Two reels weighing more than 10 tonnes were being tug winched into position using both port and
starboard motor winches. One winch caused a sideways movement on a h lf height container. <...> was trapped between the two containers and sustained crushed injuries.
While acting as banksman for backloading of a boat - ip suffered a compound fracture of right wrist - acc occurred when tension was being taken up to lift an open topped container containing
scrap - as it lifted the container started to slide a few ft and was going to hit a breathing apparatus set on side of heli shed - put his arm out to try to prevent it striking bottles - he thought he was
clear of shed but as he moved back with container his elbow struck the heli shed behind broke his wrist
Casualty was employed as part of a work party retrieving a 64mm dia. Steel braided lifting sling from the pipedeck to the drill floor. During this process the sling fouled and looped around the
end, and on top of a protective bumper rail at the base of th "vee" door ramp, winching was stopped whilst an assessment was made of the guard rail and the operation recommenced. Upon
recommencement of winching the sling fell from the guardrail to the location of the casualty, striking him on the arm and breaking i
Ip was working on the derrick retrieving a section of 5" drill pipe. A tugger line driven from the drill floor winch was started to assist in retrieving the pipe . The line slipped free and struck the ip
on the forearm knocking him to the floor.
During running operations of 2.3/8" workstring on well d8, ip was operating the counterbalance winch pulling in the last sections of pipe past the hwo workplatform. As the elevators passed the
handrail he fended off the pipe by hand to prevent the elevat rs from catching the rail. At this point it is thought that the winch wire had built up on one side of the winch drum. The wire then
slipped off the built up turns and moved to the other side of the winch. The workstring subsequently dropped trapping i s hand between the guardrail and the elevators.
The operation in progress at the time of the incident was the function check of a new set of air operated slips, which had just arrived onboard the installation. To perform this function the slips
were connected to the air supply by two air hoses to effec opening and closing. This was operated by a pedal in the doghouse. The slips were functioned to the closed position by the assistant
driller. This caused the slips to fall onto their side. A drill floor tugger was connected to the slips, however they did not open due to the slips being caught under the frame. The assistant rig supt.
(ip) had been observing this from the doghouse, at this time he came out of the doghouse to assist and placed his hands on either side of the frame at the front in an attempt o release the slips.
When this failed, he asked for the slips to be lifted a little with the tugger. This lifting action allowed the slips to clear the frame and in so doing the resultant action of the pneumatic cylinder
extended the piston rod causing th frame to be driven to the floor striking his right foot resulting in a crush injury, breaking a toe and bone in his foot. Written instructions to be provided when
using this equipment. Training requirements for this and other work equipment to be assesse /provided. Slips should be marked in such a way that they are used only as intended the equipment
Whist carrying out maintenance on an emergency generator, <...> was 2 hours into his shift when the accident occurred. He was bleeding hydraulic oil from the generator starting system
accumulators through a hydraulic hose into the oil reservoir. The ose kicked as the pressure from the accumulators was released, resulting in a wrist injury. The working practice has now been
changed to ensure the accumulator is safely depressureised before bleeding oil from the system.

<...> (the ip) and a colleague were working on the pipedeck with cargo for a supply boat. A half height container containing sections of a milling trough was on the deck. The two men entered the
container in order to move some sections of the troug to enable other material to be added to it. They were lifting one piece when the ip trapped his hand between the through and the side wall of
the half height, resulting in the 'pad' section of his middle left finger being lost. He was casevaced the same morning. <...> was 9 days into his tour and 3.5 hours into his shift. Lifting pad eyes
will be fitted to each section of the milling flowline or trough, and slings fitted to each section to minimise manual handling requirements. A practical manual hndling assessment on the operation
of filling and emptying storage containers and half heights will be conducted and the incident will be discussed at drill crew and supervisors safety meetings.
Ip was assisting deck crew landing a lift of multi stacked skips when his finger became trapped between the lip and lifting shackle. Incident to be highlighted at safety meetings to heighten
awareness of the necessity to be alert when lifting operations a e undertaken and to keep fingers away from nip hazards.
Bottom single of a stand of 3.5" drill pipe was to be removed. The pipe was lowered into the mouse hole and broken using rig tongs. The ip assisted the floorman backing off the bottom single
using a chain tong. The floorman worked the chain tong while the ip supported the chain from the opposite side. Once the joint was backed out completely it dropped to the bottom of the mouse
hole - a few inches - and the pipe in the elevators swung clear. It was at this point thatthe ip felt his finger had been nipped. rig crews to be instructed not to support the chain tong by holding the
chain when backing off joints of drill pipe into the mouse hole or similar operations. Crews to be informed of incident and recommendation at toolbox talks and safety meetings. Detail of this
incident to be communicated to other installations.
Whilst steadying load of spool piece being lifted by crane, valve fitted to underside of spool snagged on pipedeck beam, the spool piece swung free and struck casualty on head. Sustained
lacerations to the face. Actions taken to prevent recurrence: 1. In ident to be raised at safety meetings. 2. Issue updated deck operations handbook. 3. Review progress of training/competency of
deck crew and crane ops.
Laying out 6.5 drill collars the operation proceeded as follows: 3 drill collars were laid out in singles from drill floor. A transit sling was wrapped around the front end of the drill collars which
was then lifted by crane in order to wrap remaining s ing round the rear of the bundle. The front end was lowered. The injured went to the catwalk to attach the back sling to the crane. At that
time the bundle broke and a drill collar rolled onto the injured's foot. The dunnage in the v-door prevented th full weight of the drill collar landing on his foot.
An end cap 'protector' fell during a crane lift from a supply boat onto ip's hard hat causing miror bruising
The chain block had been rigged at 0700 hours for a future operation. It was attached o a sling and lowered by rope. This lowering rope was then left hanging fro, the chain block. It appears that
the connection between sling and chain block has become i secure, and disturbing the hanging rope was enough to dislodge it. <...> was worling in the derrick sub base with two other roughneck
left to remove a hole cover, the other left to pass down more hose. <...> remained in the area below the ch in block and he if believed to have touched the rope hanging from it. The rope fell
approx 16ft to the grating deck,striking him on the head. Recommendations to prevent further occurrences: identify all rig-ups used by the well engineering department and nsure adequate
training. Provision (either by purchase in the market place or by re-design) of chain blocks with shackles rather than hooks for the semi-permanent interface of lifting gear to a fixed structure.
Specifically for the ttpe of rig-up used in he incident subject of this report, it is recommended to amend procedures to reflect the following: the rope used to lower the chain block into its final
position should be attached to the sling and not the hook, thus ensuring the chain weight rests on th sling at all times.
Lifting grating and securing to railings caught finger between grating and hand rail when one section that was being lifted slipped
Material from a dismantled scaffold was being lowered from level 2 plq external walkway to the valley floor. Whilst a 10' board was being lowered from level 2, the scaffolder on level 2 lost his
grip on the board and the board fell to the valley floor. n its decent, the board was deflected by a horizontal lag pipe, and the board struck the injured party ( material stacking scaffolder) on the
chest knocking him to the floor.
After the well intervention work on <...> had finished, the shearseal blow out oreventer (bop) (weighting ca 1 tonne, lingth ca 1 metre) and adaptor spool has to be lifted from the top of the
christmas tree out of the wellbay area. The job was complicated by a fire loop installed on a unistrut square above the wellhead. In order to lift the bop through the fiore loop,the bop had to be
rotated and tilted to one side, once through the fire loop the east crane would be used to lift the bop to the skid deck. Damaging the fire loop would cause a deluge release and consequent plant
shutdown. A scaffoid working platform was constructed around the treea at a height of ca 1.6 metre. Due to the risk of damaging the fire loop, 3 riggers were tasked to lift the bop through the fire
loop, using three chain blocks to turn , tilt and lift thes/s bop. Also at the worksite were an operations technician the well services supervisor (wss) the <...> picws and the <...> operator, <...>.
Using the chain blocks the bop was lifted off the christnas tree and an adaptor spool removed from the bop by the riggers with assistance of <...>. The spool was laid down on the south west side
of the working platform. <...> then stepped down from platform, the picws left the worksite under instruction of the wss to organise the the crane. The three riggers on the scaffold platform & the

A drillpipe single was picked out of the mousehole and was being moved to be made up to the drill string. The ip was restraining the drillpipe and nipped his finger between the joint of pipe and
the c-plate on top of the 30" conductor.
The decw crew were relocating a coil of wire using the crane and a polypropylene rope through a santch block to the capstan. The wire coil got stuck and the ip went close to free the coil. The
wire sling holding the snatch block parted and the rope swung and hit his left lower thigh.
Ip was helping deck crew unload supply boat. While positioning the last lift a half hige container containing 10 x 45 gal drums of de- greaser. The ship took a big roll trapping ip against a waste
compactor and the above half hige container.
Incident occured whilst reassembling a top drive drilling system. A torque arrestor had been hoisted into position and was being held at the corect height by a length of sort line, tied off to an eye
at the head of the torque arrestor. The ip was working t the base of the tourqe arrestor, attempting to align the torque arrestor with the link adapter support plate in order that the securing bolts,
which hold the two items together, could be inserted and the torque arrestor secured. At this point in the upe ation the knot in the soft line slipped and then came free. The torque arrestor weighing
approx 135 lbs slid from a height trapping he ip's lower arm against a temporary hop up at the same height the torque arrestor finally came to rest on top of the hop up off the ip's arm.
At approx 22:30 on <...> there was a lifting incident. Two drillers moving drill pipe were pinned against the wire line unit when drill swung. One driller was evacuated onshore with a twisted
knee.
The casualty was 8hrs into his shift and 13 days into a 14 day tour. The weather was calm and bright. Well <...> was being prepared for n2 lift operations. A 4 1/2" h-2 check valve had been pulled
from the tubing hanger on the well. The polished rod lubr cator (prl) had been removed from the tree and lifted up approx 3' using a tugger from the drill floor. The casualty asked the other crew
members to lower the shaft on the prl and remove the check valve. When this was attempted, the casualty had a parmale wrench holding the prl shaft in place and the other operator slackened the
jubilee clip that holds the shaft in place. When the jubilee clip was slackened off, the shaft slipped down through the wrench and the shaft with the h-2 check valve hit the opera or on the foot. An
investigation team was set up and their recommended actions are: 1. <...> wrench sent to beach for inspection. 2. Procedure for using prl's will be reviewed. 3. <...> to review operating the prl to
determine whether a better method of securing the shaft can be found. 4. Raise awareness at safety meetings.
The lm2500 turbine had been refitted to the turbine enclosure. The lifting frame used to install the unit was being removed from the enclosure using the overhead hoist installed in the enclosure.
The hoist and attached lifting frame ran off the end of the runway beam due to the fact that the pivoted end stop had not fallen back in place. The lifting frame struck the ip who was working
inside the enclosure. A design change work order [dcwo] has been raised to review the design of the end stops, in the mean ime a sign has been located adjacent the stops to alert personnel to
check the position of the stops.
A permit had been raised to allow <...> wireline crew to rig down and tidy up their equipment in mod 3 production. The work had progressed as far as putting the lifting cap onto a horizontal
riser joint. A certified lifting sling was attached to the pell by crane to raise the riser joint clear of the deck to allow the lifting cap to be fitted. Once the riser was raised approx. 6" to 8" from the
deck the lifting cap (approx. 60lb) was lifted by one operator with the intention of threading it onto the riser joint. The operator thought he had married the cap and riser joint and made to rotate
the cap full onto the riser joint. At this point the cap fell to the deck causing a crushing injury to his left hand when the cap hit the deck.
Whilst trying to manoeuvre fouled tailpipe assembly in the slip window, the tail pipe was raised causing the assembly to move sideways nipping ip's thumb on the slip bowl guide.
Ip was assisting in the deployment of an umbilical for a hydraulically powered clamp. His job was to manually feed the slack unbilical hose, which was laid out on the deck, forwards towards the
powered sheave used to deploy the hose to the underdeck. As t e unbilical was being lowered, its weight overcame the friction grip of the sheave and it began to pay out rapidly. As it gained speed
a kink in the slack umbilical, which was looped in a figure of eight on the deck, flew forward and struck the ip on the orhead. In a few seconds the hose movemnet stopped when all the slack was
deployed.
A crossover sub was being lifted using a tugger winch and being guided into poistion. The tugger wire caught up on the top drive - realising causing the x-over sub to move suddenly upwards trapping ips fingers between sub and elevators.

A 14" pipe spool for a new riser installation was being positioned over the edge of the north face of the top deck for welding. It had been positioned by crane and was being held by rigging and
located at the end to be welded by a <...> clamp. After som minutes in this position it slipped from the clamp and fell over the edge of the platform onto a scaffold approximately 2.5m below,
although it was still retained by the rigging. As it fell it pushed the injured person over. A cut to the back of his head was discovered some hours later. He does not recall hitting his head and it is
thought that the cut was caused by the zip on his hat liner. Conditions at the time were dry with a 10-15 knot wind. The area was well lit.
Redundant cable being removed, last cable snagged, extra tug given and hit ip in face causing lacerations & swelling to mouth
In preparation to test bop's <...> was observing the rate of fill of the bop stack looking through the opening in the rotary table when a wire line tool string with sinker bars some 18 foot in length
2" in diameter toppled over striking ip on the helm t and knocked him to the deck. The helmet protected him from more serious injury, although it caused his glasses to be pushed down on the
bridge of his nose resulting in a cut.
A work party were awaiting signing on of their permit prior to starting work. An hvac louvre box fell approximately 10 meteres from the top of the module to the deck, stricking the injured party
a glancing blow on the right lower leg. Louvre retaining sc ews sent for material and failure analysis. The wellhead and dc3w/d3ce ventilation system is currently being refurbished and any
similar problem will be highlighted.
The incident occured while pulling riser no 6. Tension was applied to one wire as part of the procedure to secure cone in position. While working beneath the wire the tension road separated from
the fitting to which it was attached. Releasing the wire. Th wire fell away hitting the ip on the shoulder and glancing his hard hat. Likely causes separation of tension rod from reducer nipple.
Either insufficient make up or the tension rod becomming backed off apr 3 threads remaining when it parted.
Whilst making up the bottom hole assembly on the drill floor, the iron roughneck was being used to screw together the component parts. The assembly fell forward and out of the v door striking
the ip who was working on the catwalk.
While working in the area below dga plant pipework 2 steel shims of approx 10 lbs in weight each fell from under the pipe. One landed on top of a field panel and the other struck the firewatcher
on the shoulder and hand. The shims fell about 6 m.
Ip struck by the top drive bails on the back, whilst removing slings from the top drive assembly.
Ip checking generator. Noticed leak of anti-freeze (ethyl glycol) from a 1/4 inch pip. Tried to tighten fitting with correct tool. Fittingr sheared off. Whilst trying to fit replacement and then blank
off liquid was sprayed over face and body. Ingestion occurred and vomiting resulted.
Preparation for well perforation. Rth using coiled tubing. Displacing well fluid (inhibited seawater) with nitrogen to create a 2000psi under- balance at the perforating depth displaced fluid routed
via mud returns trough injured person monitoring tubing head pressure adjacent to trough 70ppm h2s recorded on alarm in shorters co-incident with injured person smelling h2s. He collapsed as
he was vacating area via pipe shuttle
One of the engine room cats (generator) was overheating. The header tank pressure relief cap was turned to relieve pressure. The cap blew off spraying hot water onto lagged exhaust, the exhaust
deflected the spray onto the injured party. In his retreat th injured party slipped on steps. He received low level scalds to his back, bruising and slight strain to leg/ankle.
Ip was carrying out a routine function test on a high pressure trip switch associated with the gas compression modules. The ip had applied a "self isolation" from the pressure source and
connected the test instrument in readiness. Upon connection, the i noticed a rapid build up in pressure (given on the instruments digital read-out) which caused gas to back-pressure via the
hydraulic oil resevoir, resulting in failure of the glass "window". Flying glass from the instrument caused lacerations to the ip s hand and face. Upon investigation, it is apparant that the valve
used to isolate the pressure source from the instrument was passing and that there may be a fault with the instrument's pressure release valve which should have eliminated the possibility of gas
exerting a back-pressure on the oil resevoir.
Rig skidding operations on night shift. Hydranautics unit. Hydraulic fluid. Inside. 8.5 hours into the shift & 6th day on board. This man was working the hydraulic unit which is used to skid the
drilling rig.he noticed a trickle of oil from the unit and w nt to close the valve prior to shutting the machine down,it was while he was moving his hand to close the valve that he was hit by the
high pressure leak of hydraulic fluid. *inform and remind personnel the hazards associated working with high pressure sy tems. *'o' seal replaced. *procedures modified. *system fully inspected.

A minor gas leak on psh m28-14 (opps) created icing which caused activation of the switch function. The latter activated the opps primary protection function, i.e. closing esdvs 28-2&6 and fcvs.
The <...> gas process was shut down and restarted 6 times before trouble shooting identified the cause of the event. The psh was out of service for 8 hours.
The production was shut down due to the failure of a small piece of pipe in the water system. Difficulties in isolating the pipe caused a lenghty (unknown) shutdown. <...> crude feeds into the
<...> system and two <...> cargoes scheduled to load in july were defferred to <...>. <...> field normally produces <...> bbl/d.
Beam trawler onderneming g09 entered 500m safety zone while fishing.
At 04:30 hrs on <...>, the <...> standby vessel <...> contacted the installation control room and informed them, that a <...> fishing trawler <...> had no engine power and was drifting toward the
<...>, nd its positi n was 2 miles from the north east side of the installation. Weather condition at heather: wind 145 deg, 25/30 knots, 2/3 metre seas, visibility poor in mist, down to 200 metres in
places, cloud cover 8 oktas. The vessels sister vessel <...> was n location but unable at this time to offer any assistance. At 04:38hrs the oim on heather was called out, and the platform
emergency procedures for collision was activated. The <...> standby vessel <...> launched its frc, and the crew transfer ed a handline fron the sister vessel <...> to the stricken vessel <...> so that a
3" wire tow line could be connected between the 2 vessels. At 06:04 hrs <...> had taken up the slack on the wire tow rope and the <...> was on t w passing by the heather on the installations north
face at 750 metres. At 06:20 hrs the oim stood down personnel from their muster stations.
Collision with supply vessel <> during diesel bunkering operations. Damage to n.e. leg of quarters platform.
At approximately 06.20 <> the supply vessel <> was coming alongside the north side of the platform to discharge cargo when it experienced bow thruster control ploblems. The vessel went
under and made contact with the platform underdeck st ucture causing damage to the platform north side diesel bunker hose causing a spillage of approximately 10 gallons. An underdeck
inspection of the platform confirmed no structural damage.
N.leg access bidder damage. Possibly hit by supply vessel. No injuries no other damage vussible. Will be investigating over weekend.
Whilst discharging cargo at <...>, psv <...> struck the north west leg which is column 1.
Tanker <...> at <...> thruster prediction error on no.4 main engine; master immediately called immediately: on instruction from master esd <...> initated immediatly stopping cargo and releasing
hose and chain. 06.09 vessel into manual and fu l astern applied; no response at this time; all thrurster engaged manually with fulll thrust to star- boarm to clear <...>. Emergency pitch
applied,again no response. Main engine stop button, restarted 0814 when vessel abeam of the <...> and operating satisf ctorily at this time in normal manual control. Vessel make small impact
with the outer skirting of the <...> on port bow causing deep scuffing along 25 meters.
Engine failure of 1 engine on sbv <...>. Weather conditions 7-8 seas 45kt winds. Vessel unable to carry out standby duties and had to hold station until escort vessel arrived. <...> asked to cover
standby duties until <...> arrived. <...> arrived safely at <...> 2315hrs on <...> note: main shaft also reported to be loosening from gearbox
At approx. 17:15 during an operation to re-instate the whip line on the west crane, it was noticed that the root section of the boom was bent. The crane was immediately taken out of service
pending iinvestigation and repair. The main finding oof the inves igation was that the crane had been operating on reduced air pressure which affected the reliability of the pneumatic control
system and effectiveness of boom limit switches. Consequently it has been concluded that during operations at minimum radius, the crane driver would not have been warned nor prevented from
inadvertently touching the backstops. Changes to ensure correct air pressure and to warn of low air pressure have been recommended.
The drill crew were experiencing problems latching the heavy weight drill pipe. The roughneck was assisting by way of the man riding winch. When this operation was completed the roughneck
was lowered back to the floor. The stand was then lowered through t e table in the normal fashion, the driller noticed a flicker on the weight indicator and the brake was immediately applied. At
the same time a loud noise was heard in the area of the floor. The noise came from the top drive gaurd, which had been snapped f om it's mounting. On further investigation it was established that
the man riding wire rope had been trapped behind the gaurd, when the stand was lowered through the floor the tension of the trapped line had caused the gaurd to snap off and fall to the gr und.
Fortunately the gaurd fell to an unpopulated area of the drill floor.
Whilst running in the hole with 3.5" drill pipe, a falling object was observed landing on the drill floor just in front of the draw works. On further investigation the object was found to be a
securing bolt from the service inspection hatch for the crown lock main shaft. It would appear that the bolt in question had been left loose inside the inspection hatch, and subsequently fallen
down through the travelling block and onto the drill floor.

On <>r one of the crane operators noticed bent lacings on the root section of the west crane boom. The main finding of the investigation team was that the crane had been used to lift a chemical
tank skid unit which was located within the 11m minimm radius. Although the boom was at 11m at the time at which the load was taken, with no luffing motion, the resultant forces pulled the
boom against the stops.
Bunkering hose fell onto back of supply boat when it snagged on the boat whilst being hoisted back onto the platform. A one tonne strop failed when hose was snagged.
Dropped load <> replacement boom on platform. Full load test on crane.23 tonnes ok.24 tonnes brake slipped. Tried lowering bag to deck. Bag fell to the deck 6-8 ft. Bag split. No-one
injured.
During lift of 9.8 t bulk on the load line, the load line 'jumped'on the drum. The crane operator immediately stopped the lift with the load approximately 6' off the deck and engaged the load line
brake. Whilst turning his head to view the drum location the operator disengaged the lift clutch . The load then travelled through the brake and came to rest on the deck. No attempt was made to
arrest the load descent to avoid shock loading the boom and load line.
A lifting operation was being conducted which required a pipe spool- approx 3.3 tonnes, to be transferred from a platform crane to and errected scaffolding. As the lift was being transferred onto
the structural scaffold, a ladder beam, from which a chain lock was eing suspended started to fail-it started to buckle. At this point, the full load had not been transferred from the crane. The load
was immediately taken back by the crane, and the lift made safe. The structural scaffold did not collapse, nor fal over, but clearly the ladder beam was badly distored and the operation was
stopped. A full investigation was undertake, and initial indications are that there is evidence of internal corrosion of the ladder beam. A full report is presently being compiled
South crane was lowering an equipment cover weighing 0.2 tonne over the sea down to a lower module. When the whip line lever was put into neutral the l0ad continued to creep downward. A
crane mechanic was called out and arrested tne movement. Investigation ongoing.
At 0630 on <>, when pulling out of the hole, a roustabout was hit on the shoulder by a small piece of metal (approx. 2"x1"x1"). On inspection, it was found that the metal object had fallen
approx. 90ft from the elevator latch assembly. The driller lowered the elevators to the drill floor and they were then removed from service. The elevators and failed component are being returned
onshore to <> for analysis and proposals to avoid repeat failure. No injury occurred.
East crane was working the vessel <>. Basket (approx. 60 ft, weight 9 ton) was to be lifted from the vessel to the platform. The crane operator lifted the basket from the vessel and the operator
continued to boom, slew and hoist the basket clea of the vessel. When the load was approx 30 ft above the vessel the operator was aware that the hoist drum had stopped moving. The operator
advised the vessel to pull clear. When the joystick was put in the neutral position, the basket started to drop in a controlled manner to the sea. On touching the sea, full control was regained and
the basket was lowered on to the platform. The crane has been taken out of operation and the vendor rep mobilised to investigate the incident.
A 3 ton chain bock was being used to support a 12" water injection line along with hydraulic jack, to allow the installation of packing to be fitted to supports. On taking up the tension with the
chain block the chain snapped at the point where it meets w th the chain block. No injury or damage was caused by the failure. The chain block was certified by <> lifting on <>.
A 2 ton webbing sling parted when used to turn the bridle of a heavy lift into position.
Gantry crane stuck, tugger attached - wire rope parted, 1 tonne sling 4 tonne tugger. No injuries. (air tugger)
Making up sub on top drive unit when tong line parted. Line is rated at eight tonnesand in date for certification. Examination of east torque unit shows no mechanical defect.
A one ton sling parted durning a lift. It had become snagged under the load being lifted from deck level. The crane record showed that the sling failed at 4.5 ton. Crane in use was <> north
crane. No injuries or other damage. Full investigation including s tree. Cause tree analysis ongoing.
Supply vessel operations removal of bunkering hose from supply vessel wind 10-12 knots, sea 1-2 metres, visibility 2 miles. Overcast with mist. 3 ton sling while carrying out the normal retrieval
of the bunkering hose, the vessel deck crew indicated that he hook was connected ready for lifting the hose. The lifting sling attached to the hose snagged on one of the vessels stern bollards. The
crane driver tried to free the sling causing the sling to fall. Hose had been raised to around 2ft at the time. Leve 2 crane operator gaining experience under the direct supervision of level 3 team
crane driver.

Normal production operations ongoing at the time. Drilling operations ongoing, running 26" conductor pipework. Cold and dry with wind at 25 knots. Control (instrument ) technician in the
process of carrying out routine maintenance when a sling weighing ap rox. 3kg landed approx one and a half metres from where he was working. Investigation into what actually caused the sling
to fall is yet to be concluded. Once the findings are known appropriate action will be taken to ensure no reoccurence of the incident
An inlet header on the hydrocyclone package had been removed for valve replacement. The header was supported on chain blocks with two 1.6 tonne pull-lifts used to manoeuvre the header spool
out of the way for access to the valves. When returning the heade to position, it was necessary for one pull-lift to be operated to even the load as it was being lowered. When the operator changed
the gear to change direction to lower the chain free fell through the mechanism resulting in the load being dropped approxi ately 6 inches until it stopped on the new valve. When this happened
the operator noticed the pull lift on the other end of the header slipping. The load was made safe and the lifting gear involved removed to quarantine for technical examination. Environm ntal
conditions were good and the location was inboard of the module. Person involved in operation of the pull lift is a safety rep and is involved in the investigation. All other similar units on the
platform were checked and found to be operating correctly.
During tripping out operations of 5" drill pipe on well t 15, the drill pipe was being moved from the pipe shuttle, to the south pipe bay, using the heila pipe handling machine. At approx. 16:50
hrs, a joint of 5" drill pipe had been picked from the pipe shuttle with the pipe handling machine & was in the process of being moved to the south pipe bay. As the pipe was being manoeuvred
towards the south pipe bay & approx. 10 - 15' above the pipe shuttle, the grab on the end of the pipe handling machine's telescopic arm became detached. This resulted in the drill pipe & grab
falling back onto the pipe shuttle. The box end of the drill pipe came to rest on the hand rail of the stairs to the rig floor, with the pin end on the pipe shuttle. The grab was between the drill pipe
and the handrail at the south side of the pipe shuttle. Investigation revealed that the locking pin fitted to the pivot pin, which secures the grab to the pipe handling machine had failed. As a result
of this failure, the pivot pin was then free to move. This resultant movement led to pivot pin becoming clear of its bushing on one side. The weight of the drill pipe then caused grab & pivot pin
to swivel about the other bush, causing mechanical deformation of the lug. Once the pin was clear of bracket, the grab was no longer restrained & slid.
Following retrieval of wireline tool string into lubricator & riser attached to the swab valve on well a3, the braided wire parted in the pack-off assembly on top of the lubricator. He was released
for a period of 20 secs between the wire leaving and the floating seal segment assembly closing off the flow. The back pressure in the lubricator activates the segments. The seal can form a
pressure seal if hydraulically pressured. The action was taken in this case by the wireline winch operator. There were no injuries or damage other than the braided wire.
3 production operators and 2 deck crew were preparing to lift lid off pig launcher with crane. 1.2 ton swivel sling attached to lid then onto hook of 8 ton pennant. Crane operator told to hoist lid
which became stuck. Informed to lower off, informed to jib back and take the weight after repositioning, once again told to take the weight. This time the sling snapped, the lid remained in
position but the 8 ton pennant became detached from the main hoist hook and dropped to the ground striking person on ri ht shoulder. Deck foreman arrived and inspected hook which was found
to be in a locked position. This has since been removed and sent for analysis.
Whilst lifting a pipe carrier from the deck of the <...>, using the <...> east crane, one of the 3 ton attached slings fouled, and caught on to a 20 ton half height. This caused the sling to fail and
part, dropping the load to the supply vesse deck. The dropping distance was approx 4-5 feet, no personnel were injured. The crane overload alarm did not sound, and no damage was sustained,
by the crane or its equipment. After removal of damaged sling, checks for vessel and equipment damage were carried out. When satisfied work recommenced.
Skid deck hatch being lifted using 5 tonne tugger form drill floor. When the hatch was approx 1ft above deck one padeye bolt sheared and the hatch fell back onto deck
An iron roughneck required to be backloaded for onshore repair. The equipment was packed into a half height container on the pipedeck and securely fastened in position with timber shoring.
Prior to backloading the container was inspected by both deutag a d wood group deck foreman. The container was lifted and transported down onto the supply vessel deck; the platform <...>
generators were started sending a cloud of black smoke in the general direction of the crane drivers view was obscured and the containEr, by this time approximately 1.5m above the vessel deck,
impacted against adjacent containers. At this point thee container wall collaped and the iron roughneck fell to the vessel deck. The deck sustained superficial damage. In accordance with standard
operation procedure the vessel deck crew had retreated to a safe location prior to the container being lowered and were well clear of the incident. The container was fitted with a removable wall
on one side, although this was not apparent to those staff l ading the equipment. Prior to this particular duty the container had been used to transport bop's th the platform. These bop's had been
secured by struts tack welded the container floor. The weather at the time of the incident was well within limits for such a lift.

Nightshift crane operator had carried out the normal start-up and function tests prior to commencing crane lifts. All the tests proved successfull and there was no slippage on brakes. However,
when transporting a 1.9 tonne lift to the pipedeck, the boom s ipped approx. 5 feet. This occurred immediately after the signal to spop was given by the banksman. There were no clashes with the
load as it was still approx 15 feet above the deck. Operator immediately landed the load and made the crane secure he the co tacted the pss who called out the mechanic to invesigate the fault.
Whilst pulling out of hole (<...>). The ids (top drive) system seized on the torque tube. Torque tube assembly and supports were pulled upward and uncurred stractural damage.a metal plate,
approx. 5kg, was displaces from the structure and fill to the drill floor.
Whilst laying down 13 3/8" casing using 500 tonne spiders and single joint elevators, one of the slings connecting the evevator bridle to the spiders broke and struck a technician who was on the
stabbing board assisting backing out the casing joint.
When lowering the clamp to the drill floor with no equipment in it,it dropped onto the floor and the hinge wield fractured
Wireline lubricator, bop and shooting nipple were to be lifted through the rotary table using the travelling block. As the strain was taken up one leg of the two leg lifting chain
While pressure testing coiled tubing bop pipe rams the test tool was ejected vertically 50ft. Striking the underside of the top drive. The tool then fell to the drill floor
While removing the <...> bop,s by means of the rig tugger the rugger winch wire dislodged the split type rotary hole cover which fell through the rotary hole struck the bop trolley, then continued
to the skid deck, a total distance of 38ft. No injury or damage sustained.
In the final stages of running a new completion into <...> utilising hydraulic workover unit.encapsulated control and balance lines were being clamped to the completion string by two <...>
operators who were standing on a scaffold sited underneath hwu workbasket. Control and balance lines were routed from the spooler reel(sited on skid deck) via a roller sheave hung off access
scaffold to the completion string. During the operation a test manifold sited internal to the spooler drum fouled drum rotating mechanism causing reel to stop rotating. As completion was being
run in hole this caused excessive tension on the sheave and ultimately the scaffold to which it was attached resulting in partial scaffold collapse.
During back loading operations on to supply boat <...>, the boom walkway on the <...> east crane snagged one of the guy wires on the hydraulic workover unit (hwu). As the crane slewed further
outwars, the guy wire unsnagged, causing the h u to shake and oscillate. No injuries were sustained.
Whilst laying down a 2-3/8" joint from the hydraulic workover unit, the box end of the joint slipped through the weatherford (type p) single joint elevator. The free end fell 71" to the pipe deck.
No injuries were sustained.
Operation - unloading a boat. Enviromental conditions - good visability, moderate sea rate. Substance involved - liquid nitrogen container. Machine - crane with wire pennant. Events - during
normal crane operations of unloading/backloading a boat , the bo t deck crew hooked onto the load, the crane driver took the weight and the pennant wire parted from its socket. The swl of the
pennant is 15.5 tonnes and the weight of the container 10.9 tonnes. People involved - crane driver/ boat crew.
Equipment failure draw-works "brake releasing spring stop" failed causing braking shaft to over rotate. This allowed the pivot point under the spring to move under centre, rendering the brake
inoperable. There was no load attached to the lifting device at this incident. The driller controlled the situation using the secondary electric brake meechanism and operator skill. This type of
brake may be an industry standard brake unit.
14" diameter spool of approx. 6m in length, obtuce shape weighing 2.2t being installed on the east side of production deck mezz of the platform . The spool piece had been slung for lifting by
means of two three tons (swl) transit lifting slings at the cor ect angle. When moving the spool into its location the lifting sling ferrule on one of the slings came into contact with a protruding
piece of the platform steelwork. This resulted in the ferrule snagging and dropping one end of the spool approx. 4m. It id not make contact with any of the platform structure or equipment. The
load was left suspended by the remaining three ton sling. None of the personnel involved with this operation were hurt/injured. The incident site was made safe pending a full investigation.
Weather conditions fine.
During normal drilling operations the draw works brake failed. As a result the ddm(derrick drilling module) was allowed to descend and came to rest on the drill floor. During the descent the
brake which had been left on remained in the on position. On ealising there was a problem the driller operated the emergency brake. Contact with the drill floor caused damage to the equipment.
Weather was fair with light rain but had no bearing on the incident. Equipment is now quarantined subject to investigatio

The draw works brake failed during tripping operations the ddm (topworks descended approximately 50ft (freefall) until stopped by the draw works operators actions he controlled the ddms
descent by use of the balor brake (electromagnetic brakes) the failure caused no damage or injury
During lifting operations of a 50 foot wire mess completions container from the walkway of m6 roof west side, the container lifted out two sections of heavy duty handrail. The handrail fell from
m6 roof and was suspended above the walkway of the skid deck east side by the remaining handrail. The north crane was used during this incident. The weather conditions were fine. The
handrail was recovered and relocated.
A container was being lowered to the deck of supply ship mv <...>. On impact with container already on deck of vessel (to obtain correct location) a steel 't' rod about 60cms long weighing 1 kilo
fell from the underside of lowered container to vessel deck. Vessel deck crew were well clear of the dropped object. The steel rod is not a platform item of equipment and has the appearance of a
"home made tool". Due to the condition of the rod it is likely that it was jammed on the underside of the co tainer for some considerable time. And the impact of the container caused it to come
loose and fall. Asco has been informed and are attempting to trace previous locations of the containor to determine if anyone can determine the source of the rod.
While re-entereing a wireline tool into the lubricator the wireline bezame snagged - the wire broke at the weak link - the attached tool fell from the lubricator on the upper deck onto the swab uiv
on the mezzanine deck on damage.
Lifting by crane the dieseg bunkering hose. The dry break coupling snagged on the hose saddle causing the coupling to break. Lower half of the hose fell to seabed. Missed <...> by 3 1/2 m.
When lifting out a clamp from the wellhead using an air tugger. As the clamp passed through the drilling bop deck hatch, it dislodged a deck support beam (which formed the edge of the hatch
opening). This beam subsequently fell into the wellhead and lan ed five metres from the men who were vacating the area, having finished their task. The incident was a near miss. The air tugger
operator was in contact with two observers (radios). The construction of the bop deck is such that these beams can be remov d along with the deck plates, to increase the size of the hatch
opening. The beam is a channel section beam that sites in u-shaped lugs either end. To secure the beam and prevent it becoming dislodged the u-lugs and beam are drilled and securing pins fi
ted. It would appear that these retaining pins had not been fitted the last time the beam had been removed and re-fitted.
Work was in progress to change out the anchor points on the <...> passenger lift. Part of the work scope was to take the weight of the lift cab to enable the anchors to be released. During this
operation, the rigger had to release the gipsey chain to adjus his gloves. At this point he noticed that the weight had come off the strops. A further unsuccessful attempt was made to take the
weight. The lifting operations were suspended and the faulty chain block removed from service and replaced. The chain bloc has been sent for independent specialist inspection for the reason
and nature of failure to be identified.
During calibration tests an accomation jacket crane with water bag, the hook, rope and water bag was accidentally released into the sea. Suspect pump on crane hydraulics.
During tripping operations the derrickman attached the chain at the end of the monkey board tugger line around a stand of 5 1/2 dp in order to rack back same. As the derrickman started to rack
back the stand the dead end of the winch line eye slipped thro gh the ferrule. The chain attached to the eye by a hook slipped down the pipe. At approx 30' above the drill floor the chain unwound
itself from the pipe and free fell to the drill floor.
A sheave (1.7kg) dropped from the monkey board level durning a hoisting and lifting survey. It bounced from the derrick and landed in the process module at the back of the derrick.
Having just made a connection in the hwo unit work basket the jack started to push the pipe in the hole. The winch wore connected to the top of the pipe in the hole. The winch wire connected to
the top of the pipe was inadvertantly left in the 'pull' po ition. Lowering the jack the cable broke at the sheave. The one piece wound back on the winch, the other piece fell back onto the pipe.
Loop of 8mm wire fell 40 feet from its support sheave onto the work basket. Both ends of the wire were secured. One at the winch drum, the other to a lifting cap fitted to a joint of tubing that
was being stroked out of the well by the hydraulic worko er unit. On inspection of the sheave, it was apparent that the sheave wheel had siezed and the wire had worn/cut the sheave wheel in
half. All parts of the sheave remained suspended in the derrick. The sheave had been inspected on <...>.

Construction and commissioning work is ongoing during the hook up phase of the etap project. Whilst rigging for a 1.5 tonne lift of a spool, two 2-4 tonne beam clamps were rigged with two 2
tonne chain blocks onto two 2 tonne wire slings. The slings were ouble wrap reeve to reduce the weight loading further. When starting to place a load on one of these straps, it parted, the other
strap held the weight and the riggers made the sight safe. The task was being carriedunder the permit to work system by compe ent riggers. All straps carry test certification being purchased new,
they have been in use for a maximum of three weeks. A report on the sling faliure from a specialist vendor who examined it also is attached. We concur with the report and believe that t e sling
was damaged on a previous lift. All the slings in use on cpf have been called in for expert examination on site and toolbox talks have been held with rigging teams to emphasis the need to
examine slings for prior damage before putting them into se vice. Accident/incident report <...> details in investigation fully. The weather conditions were dry and clear.
The hydraulic actuator - weight 3.2 tonnes - for the heron 'a' oil inlet valve was in the process of being reinstated after repair. During the installation operation, the actuator was suspended at a
height of approx 6 feet from the deck and a few inches above a temporary access scaffold platform. The load made an uncontrolled descent after wooden blocks used for dunnage slipped form the
rigging arrangement. The load remained attached to the slings during the descent but the tempoaray access scaffold below was badly damaged. There was no damage to the valve actuator. An
investigation has revealed that the installed 14 tonne runway beam in the area does not provide enough headroom for the removal or reinstatement of the valve actuator. In order to gain extra
height the riggers clamped a 6 inch h beam on top of the existing runway beam & then set timber dunnage on top of that. The wire strops were then wrapped around both beams & the dunnage.
To gain height the choke hitch was set high on the reverse side of the beam. The load had been suspended just off the deck for approximately 30 mins to test the arrangement & takethe stretch out
of the strops. It had been raised to working height for over 15 minutes before slipping. The area had been barriered off for the lift to exclude non essential personnel, the two riggers and the valve
Te drilling mousehole (length 30', diameter 9") had been lifted from the pipe rack to the moving pipe deck using the platform crane. When the mousehole was subsequently lifted from the deck
the spacer(weight 18kg) which during normal operations sits on to of a spring at the bottom of the mousehole, slid out and dropped 2ft onto the moving pipedeck. The spacer and spring which
should have been removed prior to transportation were still in fact contained inside the mousehole. <...> were in charge of the operation for <...>. Actions to prevent occurrence 1. <...> on behalf
of <...> to develop a procedure for the safe lifting and treansportation of the mousehole to ensure the spacer and spring cannot fall outduring transportation. 2. All <...> crew to be made aware of
the incident through toolbox talks. 3. All <...> and <...> installations advised of the incident 4. <...> to carry out audit of this type of portable equipment and procedures amended to ensure safe
transportation.
As part of routine crane maintenance the operator checked the minimum boom radius cut-out, which worked correctly.he then proceeded to attempt to lower the boom, however as he moved the
lever to the 'boom down' position the boom began to rise further resu ting in impact and damage to the back stops. The operator was only able to prevent the boom from raising further by
switching off the engine. The operator sought the assistance of a colleague to observe the boom movement as he attempted to recover the boo to the boom rest. This was achieved successfully
and the crane was taken out of service until the root cause of the failure had been identified. Subsequent investigation by the crane mechanic identified two faults within the boom hoist
mechanism. 1) a pn umatic hose in the boom hoist clutch supply was found to be crimped by it's supporting bracket resulting in a restriction in the line, preventing the air pressure venting to
atmosphere. 2) a leaking shuttle valve within the boom lowering system was passin air through to the boom hoist system, such that even when selecting 'boom down' the boom would be caused to
raise. Actions have been put in place to check similar parts within the other cranes within the forties field & to prevent recurrence.
While the derrick man was operating the monkey board jacking system, the pin end of the jacking handle detached and fell 90 feet to the rig floor. The pin weighed approx 0.5kg. When removed
and inspected the weld connecting the pin to the handle was found to have broken. The handle was repaired and additional pins to back-up the new weld installed in the handle. The pin did not
strike anyone.
Normal drilling operations were in progress at the time of the incident a roughneck, <...>, was being winched up to approximately 13m above the drill floor using a man riding winch and riding
belt. When the winch operator, <...>, another roughneck, returned the operating lever ('dead man's handle' to the neutral position he realisedrealised that <...> was still being hoisted upwards. He
immediately moved the operating lever to the lower position, which stopped the winch from lifting further but didn't actually lower the man back down. At this point the rig manager, <...> took
over the controls & isolated the air supply to the winch using a quarter turn valve mounted local to the operator stance point. The stabbing board was then moved to a suitable height to allow safe
recovery of <...>. The winch involved was an <...>. Its <...> work identification no is <...>. The winch was immediately taken out of service and arrangements made for a lifting equipment
specialist, <...> of <...> to transfer to the platform to participate in the failure investigation. On stripdown of the operating lever (part no <...>) it was discovered that the lip of the 'raise' pilot valve
piston bore had been peened over slightly through contact with the head of the 'raise' actuating screw. This had prevented the pilot valve piston returning to its neutral position.the actuating screw
Drilling crew were running drill pipe in the hole. Conditions at the time of the incident were calm and visibility was good. The derrickman was on the monkey board using the derrick tugger
through a sheave. During this operation the sheave pin became deta hed and fell approximately 85 feet to the drill floor. Internal investigation team was set up immediately.

The bop deck crane/hoist was being used to transport bags of milled swarf from well 5-1 to the west end of the bop deck on the north track. The transverse trolley that allows the trolley to move
onto other east/ west tracks was not at the end of the track that the trolley was being operated on. The trolley reached the end of the track and rode over the stops at the end of the runway beams.
The west wheels of the trolley came off the end of the track. The hoist was secured and lifted back onto the tracks. A investigation team was set up, but initial thoughts are that the stops may not
have been fully extended at the ends of the track and the operator was not observing the travel extent of the trolley. The trolley will not be used without the transverse trol ey in place at the end of
the track that the hoist trolley is being used on. It is likely an engineering fix and procedures will be introduced to prevent recurrance but this is subject to the findings of the investigation team.
Whilst carrying out drilling operations on <...> well <...>. The drilling operators <...> were preparing to run in hole with first section of 9 5/8" casing. The section has been positioned into the
rotary table using the single joint elevator. The single joint elevator was connected to the main block and lifted approx. 20 feet. At that point the link connection on the single joint elevators parted
and the casing fell through the rotary table. The casing came to rest as the collar of the single joint elevator me the rotary table preventing the length of casing falling down hole. The operations
was suspended and made safe until an assessment could be made. Checks on similar equipment carried out and no defects found. Investigation as to the likely causes underway
An empty nitrogen tank was being back loaded from the platform to the far supporter . During the lift one section of 1/8" checker plate decking (1mx2m) blew off the tank and fell into a half
height container on the port side of the far supporter deck. The weather conditions at the time of the incident were wind 36 knots, direction 101 degrees, sea state 2-3 m. An incident investigation
has been initiated and is ongoing. Actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
While traversing the overhead crane in the ngl package, the crane hoist struck a valve assembly that had been installed at a lute seal in the deck surface drain pipework. The impact caused a 3/4
inch screwed nipple in the assembly to pull out of the trea ed socket, both the valve and the nipple fell to the walkway of the package, outside the ngl control room. The valve assemble weighed
7lb and fell approx., 20 feet.
Cargo transfer between platform and supply vessel <...>. Using the north west <...> hoist crane. During the transfer of drill pipe for back load, the boom hoist sprag clutch failed. The boom began
to free fall, causing the load which was posi ioned above the desired landing area to land heavily on the deck. The boom continued to fall until the mechanical breaks arrested the fall. The boom
fell from approx. 90' radius to 130'. Supply boat crew unhooked the load and the crane boom was raised and locked in a safe position to enable the maintenence team to investigate the failure.
A drill side track work over was underway, running a cement clean out assembly, operating the draw works. During the operation of the draw works a retaining wing nut weighing approx. 1/2lb
fell 30ft to the drill floor from the draw works line spooler susp nsion snatch block. The snatch block is an ansell jones 2 tonne rated block with a detachable sheeve face plate (to allow threading
the wire over the sheave). The wing nut had sheared from the bolt assembly
Whilst pulling the drillstring a travelling block dolly carriage compression spring fell some 50ft to the drillfloor. The compression spring was circa 1kg, size circa 14 by 13 inches. The spring
narrowly missed a person on the drillfloor.
The deck crew were back loading a 20' basket of scaffolding tubes and boards onto the support vessel (far supporter) deck. The crane driver was trying to turn the basket to allow placement on the
deck when it touched against the port side of the vessel, t is and the up rise of the vessel caused the basket to tip and 5 boards falling approx, 5 foot onto the support vessel deck. The boards and
tubes had been secured correctly prior to the lift.
A single joint elevator with chain and swivel attached slid down over the joint of tubing when the chain on which it was suspended broke. This was caused by the elevator not being slowed down
quickly enough when it was picked up to be positioned below the tool joint before
Well f06 wireling to replace insert valve below sssv and in retieving tool, wire cut and tool fell down hole - prong on tool is stock through flapper of sssv intend to set check rate below long dose
Riggers using 3 x 1 ton chain blocks to tirfor pipespool. Whilst removing the spool the rigger noticed that the load chain on the center block was running through the block-brake not holding. As
the spool was being supported by 2 other blocks the rigger as able to swap out the deffective block and complete the spool installation safely.
During crane operations on the skid deck, crane lifted and slewed with 8' container approx. 5ft, to move away from erected scaffolding. This was a blind lift. Container hit a handrail (approx. 60
kgs), handrail sheared at bottom of stanchions and fell dow to the impact deck below (approx. 20ft).

Dropped object: no injury to personnel. The south crane was put on the park brake facility, and the crane op went for a break. On his return he heard a banging noise on the drill derrick cladding.
He saw that the crane pennant hook was swinging in the w nd [gusting 40 knots] and striking the cladding. On further investigation he noticed that the geronimo line [10 mm derrickman's rescue
line] had been struck and that it had parted at the padeye on the monkey board level. The line fell approx 40 metres, oming to rest 2 metres above the south skid desk. The crane driver
immediately informed the hse advisor of this and an investigation team was formed to determine the root cause and to prevent reoccurence.
The supply vessel <...> was being unloaded of cargo via the platform east crane. A 20ft half height was hooked onto the whipline and when deck personnel clear, started to lift. At approx. 10 feet
off the deck the crane operator felt a loss of p essure on the whipline controls. The load dropped onto the deck turning onto its side spilling pipe onto deck which became lodged between other
cargoes.vessel deck crew later secured further with chocks ect. Control was available to lower whipline so that the headache ball could be lowered onto deck to release from load. The deck crew
unhooked the load, pulled the pennant clear and once clear from the vessel crane was shut down for further investigation. The main hydraulic oil supply hose was found to have burst at its mid
point by the support bracket.
Whilst lifting a 300kg flowline pipe spool from the cellar deck east lay-down area by crane, the load became snagged under a protruding structural beam causing the 1 tonne lifting sling to fail
resulting in the load falling approx 20 ft to the deck. No ersonnel were injured but the deck sustained a large gash. The area was barriered off pending inspection of the area and communication
with the hse
During top hole drilling operations, a securing pin dislodged from the bail ears hinge pin. The hinge pin fell 90ft to the drill floor. Significant vibrations are normally experienced during this
activity, the drill floor is barriered off and all bolts/p ns checked regularly. The dropped hinge pin was replaced and the equipment checked. Drilling operations resumed when the equipment was
deemed okay. The top drive vendor has been contacted to identify/discuss possible improvements to the bail ear hinge mechanism.
During rigging up operation of riser prior to connecting cp49 xmas tree to wireline bop, a 40' section of 5" riser fell approx. 15-18ft into module 02 well head. Investigations have revealed that the
drillfloor rotary table slips used to secure the riser n position were dislodged accidently by the rigging bridle ring in use with the draw works/rail arms. While setting up to lift the last 12' section
of the riser to stab into the 40' section of the slips. The rigging was drawn across the drill- floor and u wards with the block. The ring of the 3 leg bridle caught one of the outer lifting handles on
the slips and lifting them and allowing the riser to slip and fall clear of table through bop. Deck and into wellhead module below. Riser damaged scaffold adjacent to well <...>9
A joint of completion tubing was raised to the hydraulic workover unit workbasket, the laydown line tether was unhooked from the pine end protector, the protector was removed and the joint
stabbed into the previous joint. The pin end protector was re-conn cted to the laydown line tether by means of a safety hook. The tether with attached protector was released from workbasket, the
protector wt, 14 kg detached from the safety hook and fell approx 16 meters after first glancing a scaffoldaccess tower to hwu. the protector impacted a greted area on the unit sub-structure,
bounced and fell a further 4 mtrs to skid deck.
Crane boom being lifted from cradle as part of a driver examination when 2m out of cradle it fell back into cradle, damaging underside tubulars on the boom.
During wireline well intervention into well e9, the toolstring became stuck. After "jarring" in an attempt to free the toolstring, the wire parted at surface and went down hole. The well was
immediately shut in at surface. It is estimated that a maximu of 0.75 standard cubic metre of hydrocarbon gas was released via the top of the wireline lubricator (stuffing box) before the well was
shut in.
A liner & retaning ring was lifted out of the mud pump cylinder by a chain hoist on a gantry crane. When the load was above the cylinder top the gantry crane was swung over the main deck. The
load was then lowered and when the load was six inches above th deck the main lift chain parted allowing the load to drop the last half foot.
Whilst lowering the 21 1/4 bop onto the lp riser (bop deck module d2) the lifting rams a & b failed resulting in the bop dropping 6" onto the lp riser. The rams failed at the clevice end. The other
tow rams remained intact. The bop came to a rest at a light angle on top of the lp riser. The site was made secure. No personnel were injured. The investigation is ongoing as to the exact cause
of the failure.

When moving/lifting the pipestop during 95/8" casing operation a one tonne sling & 2 x 2 tonne shackles were secured to the pipestop. (weight approx 450kg). The sling was placed into the crane
hook of east crane whipline. The banksman signalled to the cra e operator to take the strain and lift easy. The sling was tensioned and it failed catastrophically at the hook end. The pipestop did
not move and the whipline jolted slightly. No personnel were injured. The data from the crane mipeg unit has been do nloaded for interrogation to ascertain possible causes.
While pulling a 1/4 tonne assembly along the deck the operating handle of a 3/4 tonne swl chain hoisr sheared off at the connecting bolt due to brittle failure. As a result of this there was no
longer any retention of the chain within the chain hoist and he chain was free to pull through. As the valve was only being pulled along the deck there aws no dropping of the load and subsequent
damage to people or plant
As a dunnage rack was veing unloaded one of the four legs parted transferring all the load onto the remaining three legs of the bridle. The weather at the time of the incident was;- wind 20 knots,
sea state 2m, visibitity good although lighting was by me ns of platform/supply vessel and crane lighting. During offloading of the tubing the crane driver felt and noticed one of the four legs of
the bridle part. The lift at this time was level with the pipedeck but still outboard of the platform. It was felt b the driver that the best course of action would be to continue with the lift and to land
it on the pipedeck as quickly as possible. The deck crew on pipedeck where told by the driver to stay clear whilst he landed the load which was done in a controlled anner. The failed lefting
equipment is to be depatched onshore for examination following which any corrective actions will be generated.
Emergency fire pump p27d was started as part of routine weekly checks. During initial run up (after about 3 seconds) a loud bang was heard and a flash was seen in the vicinity of the battery
banks. The operator immediately shutdown the pump. On inspection it was seen that 1 battery had exploded in the battery bank 'a' and the top of the batter was destroyed. Battery acid was
released during the explosion but largely contained by a lid on the battery bank the operator was injured and not exposed to acid spray.
After rig skidding of rig 1 from a61 to a67 the lower section of the wireline riser backed off between the pin and collar falling and striking a67 hatch cover, coming to rest on the substructure and
a67 hatch. Weather direction - 270 deg. Speed - 32kn gus ing 50kn. Sea - 5m sig - 8m max. Investigation ongoing.
A completion string had been run on well b15. During a rouine pressure test of the annulus with an applied pressure of 3000peo. The tubing hanger lifted approx 4 feet out of the bowl and past
the holding down bolts. At the time of the inc normal precautio s for pressure testing were in place with the surrounding cleared of personnel and barriered off.
Whilst dismantling a suspended scaffold platform, located above n7 on level 3 north west corner of platform, a scaffold tube 6 inches long slipped out of a jointing sleeve and fell approx. 60-80
feet to level 1 deck. A safety meeting was held to discuss t e incident and raise awareness to ensure this type of hazard is identified in future and appropriate barriers are erected below scaffold
operations.
A piece of wind wall cladding ( 3.3 ft x 8 inch x 1/16 inch,weight 5.6 lbs ) was found on the south walk way of the pipe deck. On further investigation by drilling crew it was found that the piece
originated from the east side of the racking board wind wa l. A reasonable assumption can be made as to what must have happened. While waiting on weather due to high winds in excess of 70
knots a piece of wind cladding came loose. This piece landed approximately 90 ft lower on the pipe deck walk way. The piece i part of a cladding member positioned directly adjacent to a
window cut in the racking board wind wall structure. This window allows the degasser vent line to be routed through the wind wall. The actual window in the wind cladding is not reinforced with
a frame structure. As a result the cladding member adjacent to the window was subjuct to increased bending stress (wind loading, derrick work).
A stainless steel plate 900mm x 320mm, weight 5lg fell onto an access platform on the crude oil plate coolers from the pipe work and has vacated the area.
A metal wedge approx weight 5kgs fell from a height in excess of 15 feet narrowly missing personnel below. This was on the south west corner of the main deck. There was no sign of other
personnel working or moving in the area. No wind or vibration which m ght explain the reason this object fell.
At 1400hrs on the <...> during the dismantling of scaffold no 9770 a section of handrail weighing some 18kgs fell away from its normal position striking scaffolder <...> then falling 30m to level
2 east side of the puq. As it fell its glanced off th live 18" cr gas production pipeline which is 8m above level 2 deck coming to rest on top of the scaffolding rack on level 2. The injured person
received bruising to his head and shoulder. He did not require any medical treatment. The 18" pipeline was no damaged.
The floor hands were cleaning up the derrick, wellservices were working below on rigfloor. One of the floorhands had an untied bucket and was filling it with water on a walkway without a
kickplate. The hose was partway around the bucket which was pulled a d knocked the bucket off the walkway. It fell to the rig floor below, no one was injured. The bucket had been initially tied
off but was untied to move to another location. This represented a high potential incident but no one was injured and no damage oc urred.

A helicopter trolley was knocked from its resting place in the helideck netting onto the pa top deck.
Techincian positioned ba cylinder verically againist the handrail, the the cylinder slipped and then rolled under the ajdacent stairtread falling onto the stairway below (approx 2 metres). It then
rolled down to the next level, hit the kickplate and rolle under the bottem step falling (approx 0.5 metres) onto the sloping roof of the walkway between the plq and ralq and subsequently rolled to
the north edge and then fell in clear space to the sea
A small piece of angle iron 4 x 4x4 cm /100 gr dropped from unknown height in the derrick onto the drill floor. Origin of angle iron could not be traced.
During routine wireline operations, a set of spang jars slipped from the operator's hand through one of the rotary table kelly bushing holes to the bop deck (36ft below). The bop deck was
barriered off to ensure no personnel would be in the area.
Work was ongoing, spooling a new guide wire onto a drum in the skyscape unit. The wire rope was fed round two snatch blocks to allow the wire to be fed onto the drum under slight tension. One
of the snatch blocks was anchored to a pad eye on the skyscape ase plate. During spooling unexpected tension was placed on the wire rope which lifted the baseplate. Although spooling was
stopped the motor continued to operate spooling about another two feet of wire onto the drum, this was enough to pull the baseplate off its two rear support lugs and it fell into the sea.
Information on this incident has been disseminated to other brae platforms and discussions with the equipment supplier are underway.
An operations technician was walking along the walkway on the pdr level 1 south east when a scaffold clip - weight 0.85kg - landed on the walkway approx. 1.2 metres away from his location. He
immediately looked up to see people looking over the handrails n level 5a, 38.5 metres above, where it was later established that scaffold erection work was being carried out. Immediately after
the incident all scaffolding areas on the cpf were checked for loose items. All scaffolders were councelled, at a specially onvened toolbox talk, on the need to ensure that all areas below any
scaffold work, erection, monification or dismantling, must be barriered off with imformative signs and chains to exclude passers by. This is reinforced in the permit to work system. Duri g
investigations into the incident one of the scaffolders involved in the work on level 5a came forward to the oim, accompanied by his safety representative, to admit to disloging the scaffold
clip.<...> accident/incident report <...> refers. The weat er conditions were dry and clear with minimal wind.
Two scaffolders were erecting a scaffold platform below the deisel tanks adjacent to the east stairway level 3. The oim who was on a safety inspection observed that the walkway below the
scaffold had not been barriered off and the oim instructed the scaf olders to stop the work. As the scaffolders were complying with this with this request a scaffolding clip weighing 0.5kg fell 6
metres onto the walkway below. Initial investigations show that the scaffolders were working under a bp permit to work procesur which staes that the performing authority are required to barrier
off areas below when working from height. The oim has requested an investigation team to investigate the reason for the non compliance with the permit to work precedure and actions to prevent
recurrence.
During a period of high north westerly winds (66 knots) a 1x2 metre 'filon' cladding sheet was blown off from the rear of the north east crane. The sheet landed on the platform level east
walkway.
As the chef was going out of the galley door onto the level 2 north walkway he heard the clang of a piece of metal hitting the deck. On turning he noticed a 6" triangular offcut of thin sheet metal
lying on the walkway 6ft east of his position. Although he did not observe the object falling, one corner of the object was bent over suggesting impact the incident was reported as a dropped
object and an investigation was carried out. The scrap metal skips on level3 above were checked and found to be in good rder. Nets were in place. No loose material was evident in the
surrounding area. A review of the procedures for transfer of sheet metal workshop to the skip was conducted. No evidence of poor practice was found. A subsequent review of the weather conditio
s at the time: weather 45knots/direction wnw suggests that it is unlikley that the object was dislodged from the vicinity of th escrap metal skip. This together with the lack of visual confirmation of
the object falling suggests that the object may have b en blown from a lower level. He lack of visual confirmation of the object falling suggest that the object may have been blown from a lower
level. The investigation report has recommended increased attention to housekeeping. Measures have also been introduced.
On the morning of <...>, scaffolders had accessed a worksite in the deckhead of package 2, above f-01 diesel fuel filter unit, from a hatchway in the deck above. Their task was to erect a scaffold
and, because of the array of cable trays and p pework below them, they failed to reconginse the hazard presented by the possibility of an object dropping through to the module deck below. In
consequence the clause in the standard procedure for the task, which would require the area below to be barred ff, was not followed on this occasion. At 1015 a man taking process readings in the
area below was alarmed when a scaffold clip fell past him, brushing againist his hand. He had not previously been aware of the work overhead. Due to lack of access, the ob cured overhead view
and noise in the area he was unable to attract the attention of the men overhead. He then raised a <...> safety first card and submitted it to the fire and safety officer, who immediately arranged for
the job to be stopped and initia ed a full incident investigation. Alough the man did not belive himself to have been physically injured in any way, he was nevertheless referred to the platform
medic who confirmed that no injury had taken place permit to work local rules will be amended

Drilling crew were mobilising on the platform and installing the rathole on the rig floor. A spanner was knocked off a grating on the rig substructure, falling around 10m to the bop deck. The
spanner landed some 5m from personnel working on the bop deck.
During a period of very high winds an operator working on the moving pipe deck heard a small piece of cladding (weighing around 1/2lb) fall onto the top deck central walkway 5m from where
he was working. On investigation it appears that the cladding had een removed from pipework on the ngl roof (one level higher than the main deck), but had not been secured properly. The ngl
roof was checked for any other loose material. On investigation it appears that the cladding had been removed some time before, but had not been secured properly by the person(s) carrying out
the work.
Normal platform operations ongoing. Routine maintenance taking place on v3002 (kick off compressor knockout drum). A discarded screwdriver blade (handle missing) measuring approx 9" in
length was dislodged, causing it to fall to the pipe deck 30' below mi sing a person working below by approx 4'. No injuries or damage to property resulted from the incident.
During normal production operations, scaffold poles which were temporarily stacked during a scaffold dismantle were left unattended in a well compartment. Due to the movement from the
platform the scaffold pole which was resting on the well 5-2 xmas tree nasa valve gas side, slipped and opened the dublock valve attached to the nasa. This dublock was not fiited with an end cap
(as is the normal practice) and allowed the gas release. An operator in the area smelt the gas and heard the release and manually initiated the yellow shutdown.
During a period of high winds, the anemometer situated on a mounting on the a frame of the top deck crane became detached and fell down onto an access platform on the crane structure. Due to
a management decision to suspend permits because of the adverse weather conditions, no personnel were in the external areas of the platform, the incident was not discovered until after the
winds had abated and an inspection for possible damage was being undertaken.
Electrician working on a scaffold just below the upper deck level (30m), dropped a 300mm section of unistrut. It bounced on the scaffold boards and fell through a small gap around a tubular. The
section of unistrut fell to the 19 metre level work area, ar und the <...> esdv platform. This landed approx. 2 metres from a welder working at this level.
After severe storms, a sheet of stainless steel cladding measuring approx 2m x 1.2m was found lying on the roof of module 18. Investigation revealed that the cladding had come from the allimec
hoist cab situated external to the flare tower and had fallen approx. 5m. Remainder of cladding around the hoist cab was checked for security. Minor repairs will be required.
At approx 1600 hrs a potential dropped object wedged between pipework and the bulk head of m1/m4 void space was reported. Investigation of the site revealed that a section of rubber matting
used as deck noise suppression had fallen 20ft from the deck abov and stop- ped 30ft above the deck walkway. The area was immediately barriered off and the matting brought to deck level under
controlled contitions. The area of deck where the mats are used were lifted immediately and stowed away safely. It was noticed t at many of the mats were loose and stacked unsecured against
handrails. The cause of the incident was not inially obvious with two likely causes being considered. These were:1) matting moved in high wind conditions or 2) matting stuck to the bottom of a c
ntainer and fell during transit. A number of interviews were conducted with personnel directly involved in crane operations. All those intervied stated that at no time during crane operations did
they witness an object falling from the base of the contain r. The conclusion of the investigation is that the matting was moved due to the high wind conditions.
Scaffolder moving tubes to a worksite on the skid deck. As he lay the tubes down on the grating one tube slipped through a small gap and fell 15 metres to the floor of module 'f' below
At approximately 10:00 am on <...> a witness reported a scaffolding board (approx 6ft in length) being caught by the wind in the north east corner of the platform and being blown overboard
where it fell into the sea. The board did not strike any of the platform or land on any vessels, no injuries were sustained. The falling board was not observed by the platforms standby vessels, no
injuries were sustained. The falling board was not observed by the platforms standby vessel the dea mariner. The witness i mediatley reported his observation to the control room. The safety
supervisor and scaffold foreman were called and investigated the area, a loose tarpaulin was discovered blowing in the wind on a section of a temporary water/debris barrier structure. The
arpaulin had originally been secured to the barrier by nailed down scaffold boards. It was concluded that the board had fallen from this area having become loose in the 45kt nw winds that had
prevailed through the previous night and were present at the ti e of the incident the structure was made safe and an incident investagation report will be submitted in due course.

Oil operator was functioning an overhead chain operated valve pw43 (produced water inlet v/v) on the b65 hydrocyclone package. As the operator pulled on the chain to operate valve, the
chainwheel came off the spindle & fell approx 4m to the deck. The valv wheel weighs approx 5kgs. The operator was "brushed" by the valve as it fell and subsequently reported a minor abraision
to the right forearm and slight neck strain. There was no plant damage.
A 2 x 2 metre section of grating had been removed at the mezzanine level to allow access to sea water lift pump below. A four sided scaffold barrier had been built around the resulting hole for
personnel protection, and one side fitted with a gate to allo access during lifting operations. One end of the gate was fitted with a "scaffold trolley wheel" for ease of movement. During the
movement of the scaffold the trolley wheel became detached from the scaffold tube and fell a distance of 3-4 metres onto 2 p rsons working below. One person was struck on the side of his helmet
and shoulder, the wheel then struck the second person on the hip. Both of the injured persons suffered minor bruising and grazing. They were both examined by the medic and were both fit to
return to work.
Fault tracing on running signal from pga (fire pump) to central control room (ccr). During test run, broken tacometer wire resulted in el. Starter engine on fire pump diesel engine to repeat starting
sequence. El. Starter was consequently overheated, resu ting in arcing of el. Cables to the degree that insulation on cables ignited. The occurance of the minor fire was immediately observed by
technician performing the test. Diesel engine was manually stopped locally. Fire was put out by using small amount of co2. Ccr was informed. Platform accident committee meeting has been held.
Facts from event established and agreed upon. Corrective actions proposed.
During operations, when drilling a 17.5" section at 5,500+/- when a lot of high power outage was required, smoke was discovered emitting from an electronic's cubicle in the drilling module
10,scr switchroom.the rig electrician who discovered the smoke imm diately informed the rig floor and drilling was suspended.
A stress relieving (heat treat) blanket was inadvertently placed over the end of a scaffold board which caused the board to smoulder and ignite. Was extinguished.
20 minutes into its warm up sequence after a water wash of gas generator p801a coincidental flame detection activated the f&g/esdsystem and the co2 protection.subsequent testing of the flame
detectors found them to be fully operational.
Casing cement programme in operation at the time of the incident. Wind 25 - 30 knots. Sea 3-1/2 - 4 mtrs. Visibility 8 miles. Mud logging unit ups cooling fa. Internal transformer overhrating
causing a small smouldering fire within the unit. The operator had left the logging unit for a period of about 10 minutes in which time the incident occurred. There are two smoke detectors in
close proximity to the ups unit. Neither detector activated. Both have since been tested and proved working. The operator o his return noticed smoke coming from the ups unit, he immediately
switched the unit off and informed the control room. The fire extinguished without the need for use of extinguishing agents. Investigation into the cause is underway.
Cable fires no, switch gear failure at present. Investigation to be completed by <> and forwarded to hse for reference.
At approximately 1225 hours a mechanical technician was in the area of the seawater lift pump when he became aware of an unusual noise and abnormal vibration. Deciding to investigate, he left
the area to obtain test equipment. On return, some minutes late he observed flames coming from a drive end motor bearing. He extinguished the flames and reported the incident. Currently under
investigation.
Operation: normal production operations were ongoing at the time. An operator noticed a large quantity of smoke emanating from the bearing housing of a seawater lift pump. The general
platform alarm was sounded to muster and account for personnel. The sea ater pump was shut down and isolated. Cooling was applied to the bearing housing by the fire team. There was no
interuption to normal production. 3
Change of sttus & sps from co-incident smoke detection due to bearing failure/collapse on cooling water pump motor. Although no fire detected pump room filled with smoke.
Maintenance supervisor heard loud bang, saw smoke and flame from electric generator number 3.he initiated the platform gpa, the automatic fire protection operated on smoke detection which
put the fire out. The platform pob at muster station, no party inju ed

Work was to take place to remove and replace five previouly identified defective cells of gt2 main battery bank. All potential loads that could be fed by the battery bankwere isolated at gt2 autoisolation panel by operation of the integral main isolator andle. On return to the battery charger unit which housed the battery cells, smoke was observed at one of the cells, boiling grease molten
solder running down the front of the cell. The problem cell was isolated from the from the rest of the bank by caut ously disconnecting the copper link to the adjacent cell.on testing the cable
connecting the hot terminal to the negative rail using a clip on type ameter, it was found to still have a 45a flowing through it. It was concluded that the cell must have an in ernal fault and that the
cable had to be disconnected, the safety way being by use of heavy duty cutters. On doing so, the cable came loose from the nowe
Reverse osmosis pump pulley "v" belt slipped causing it to overheat producing smoke which caused the platform to sps.
Electrician investigating main power generator shutdown & closing emergency board bus section spotted arcing,flame & smoke coming from kto810a kmi cubicile. Immediately opened bus
section with emergency stop then he grabbed a co2 extinguisher and extingui hed the flames within the cubicle. No indication of smoke detection was apparent in the main control room. Area was
ventilated and made safe. Platform gpa occurred due to loss of inst air, power should be supplied by above emergency switch board which was isolated. Once muster complete,the electricians
checked the emergency switch board and when satisfied it was safe to restore power, r.e.p. powered the board back up to restore lighting & power for platform use.
Fire in seawater lift pump junction box level 3 shutdown,gpa and muster fire put out using a hand held fire extinguisher. Rew stud down 18:15 p plant returned to production 10:20
A temporary diesel driven air compressor was being test run after replacing an oil filter. During start up smoke was noticed by the operator who then shut the unit down. A second operator
approached the unit with a dry powder extingusher, opened the sid access door and identified a small fire. The fire was then entinguished with the dry powder extinguisher followed by cooling
from a water hose.
Reported fire in pci gg enclosure. Smoke from enclosure door. Unit shutdown and vented. Halon initiated fire team alerted to platform pc. Platform bpa's sounded. Headcount correct at 13.48.
All comp trains blown down. Entry to enclosure made by fir team when safe to do so. Found fire, approx 24" by 6" section of wood still on fire. Foam utilised, confirmed extinguished.
Continued damping down section of wood when it was removed form enclosure. Wood chalk which caused fire was not initially appar nt. Unable to confirm period of time wood chalk has been
in position. Possibly utilised during initial installation. When situation secured, personnel stood down form muster stations.
Pump p7250 was being test run after maintenance works on the pump drive shaft and associated bearings, during the test run the turbo chrger failed and as a result of the failure a small flame was
observed in the area of the exhaust.
Smoke detection confirmed from lower ids eqpt room at 06.15 on<...>. Source identified as k9310b ventilation fan. Platform s/d automatically power loss occurred. Platform returned to normal
status at 06.55.
A permit was raised to remove 44ov cables from the ups system to allow fitment of a feeder manager into an adjoining cubicle on the main switchboard. The wireway cubicle was opened and a
spanner checked for size against one of the cable gland locking nuts at this point an electrical short curcuit was made causing an arc from the 440v cable across the spanner to the switchboard
casing. No electric shock was felt by the person holding the spanner, and there was no ensuing fire or explosion. As the arc occur ed the mccb breaker tripped immediately rendering the circuit
dead. On closer inspection it could be seen that the insulation on the cable concerned has a split or small cut which probably happened during original installation allowing the short circut to be
made. It was noted that the inner insulation had been stripped off the cable up to the gland plate, leaving the core insulation as the only protection. Recommendations following an incident
investigation are recorded on report number <...>.

While <...> chemical injection system was being test run a component failure occurred within the <...> variable speed drive unit located within the switchgear panel pc10a. This caused the front
plastic panel of the drive unit to be blown off inside the cub cle. The heat caused by the failure caused smoke to be released out of the top of the panel into the switchroom. The component failure
caused the red and the blue phase protection fuses to trip. A technician in the vicinity of the switchroom, alerted by t e noise noticed the smoke and informed the central control room. A portable
co2 extinguisher was applied to the cabinet as a precaution and a muster was called but stood down almost immediately. Coastguards and standby vessel similarly alerted and stood d wn. The
panel was isolated and investigations carried out on all other components of this type on the platform and no faults were found. The faulty <...> variable speed unit has been removed and returned
to the manufacturers for full investigations to be ca ried out and a report sent to <...>.
Two operations technicians were dispatched to investigate the alarm personnel were instructed to proceed to their alternative muster points. The night chef subsequently saw that the contents of
tumble dryer no.2 were alight and that there was smoke and flames within the machine.
<...> operator emptied his ashtray into bin and then went for a coffee on his return approx. 5 mins. Later a smell of smoke was being invest- igated by 2 presons. On opening up radio room door
the bin contents were smouldering. This was extinguished with a co2 portable extinguisher. Contents of bin were then checked, confirmed safe and removed outside for disposal.
The contactor for ventilation fan motor vm525a burnt out. Checks indicate the contactors right side phase had broken down along with the surrounding insulation. Location mm2 switchgear
room, enclosure 6b.
No.1 egt common alarm initiated on dcs. Area operator checked local control panel & reported fire detected in hood. No alarm on css panel but area checked, and fire in hood verified. Mcr
activated co2 from local firemans panel. Co2 initiated alarm on css anel. (require fire to be detected by two flame detectors before co2 extinguished will automatically be activated).
16:15 auto start of fire pump on demand. 16:25 duty operator requested to shutdown fire pump. On entry into enclosure, technician noticed smoke and flames coming from gearbox. Pump was
manually shutdown. Intial inspection revealed loss of gearbox oil.
After a generator service whilst starting the engine, cold start circuit "short circute" the arl caused oil to ignite - attendent staff shut down the engine and extinguished the fire with available fire
extinguisher.
An 11kv motor was undergoing a 2 hour uncoupled test run when it tripped out on a short circiuit, causing a significant upset to the platform power supplies. An on site inspection of the motor
carried out over the past two days found significant damage to the motor stator windings and highlighted two possible casuses of the failure. There were a number of loose stator winding wedges
which had contracted the rotor fans with at least one having broken up and there was a significant amount of liquid - probab y water/glycol coolant - found in the bottom of the motor casing.
During the test run the motor was under positive purge pressure with no indication that there was any hydrocarbon gas within the casing. The actual cause of failure will not be known until the
motor has been inspected at the manufacturers - it is believed that both the possibilities identified may habve contributed.
At approx 18.40 on <...>, gas turbine 3 (<...> turbo generator) received a signal from its control system to execute an emergency shutdown. The fire and gas panel in the control room showed
infra red and smoke detectors had been act vated in the enclosure. The egenarl alarm was automatically activated, personnel called to muster and the automatic release of halon within the
enclosure extinguishing the fire
During function testing of the ss2 rotary table smoke was seen emanating from under the rotary table. The alarm was activated locally and the fire team found smoke and flames coming from the
rotary table brake housing. The fire was extinguished by lifting the deck plate.
Diesal emergency generator running on load, which is situated in level 1 of the accommodation. An instrument operator noticed fire and smoke from the turbo charger unit situated on the top of
the emergency generator. He notified the main control room who ctivated the general alarm. The fire team extinguished the fire and made the area safe. All personnel were stood-down from the
general alarm. An investigation is underway to confirm the cause of the fire which at the moment is thought to be the result of failure of the turbo bearing.

Ccr alerted by smoke detection in c8 fan room, moduel d. Investigation carried out by team techs who found c8b bearing smoking. Fan buttoned in on ccr panel. Unit started on demand when
button released causing small fire on inboard layshaft bearing. Fire mmediately extinguished by team techs using portable c02 extinguisher. Fan electrically isolated and water applied to cool
bearing. Muster initiated on outbreak of fire.
At 0148 on <...> a small quantity of hydrocarbon ignited within the area of 'a'generator trurbine exhaust. This was quickly extinguished by a hand held co2 extinguisher and water from a hose
line. Investigation suggests that ol. Either heating medium o degreasing chemical was washed down from the waste recovery unit above during chemical cleaning operations some oil fell onto
exposed insulation material and some formed a small pool alongside the exhaust. The exhaust heated this to ignition temperature and the fire occurred
Minor external leak discovered in a bleed plug and bonnet flange on valve hv m28-3a. No activation of permanet gas detection system. This valve is formally a part of the <> gas pipeline.
At approx 1750 hours the control room requested investigation of a low interface level in scapa separator. An operations techincan proceed to the area and on arrival at the northwest entrance to
the scapa pancake he could smell gas and saw a white cloud o hot water/gas escaping from the south end of the scapa separator. He requested that production be shutdown from the control room
- a class 2 esd was intiated. On investigation the leak was identified as comming from the interface level bridle area. The s parator was isolated from the process systems and the manual vent line
to lp flare opened and draining of the separator via the sandwash system commenced. Attempts to isolate the interface level bridle and the level transmitter were unsuccessful due to th valves on
each being inoperable. During this period there was one low gas alarm active (10% lel). The liquid which had been escaping from the failed drain line fitting became a gas release which in turn
caused a confirmed gas situation on the scapa panca e and actived a class 1 esd and gpa at 1752 hours. The operations supervisor requested manual activation of the scapa deluge system to dilute
and contain any leaks. The platform blowout system was the requested and was actived by the control room operator
Hydrocarbon gas leak from well m37 production wing valve due to failure of stem seal.2 20% gas alarms were activated. The wing valve was immediately closed followed by the hydraulic and
master valves.
During normal operations the fire and gas panel indicated gas detection in m4, the m4 operator was tasked to investigate the alarm. In the interim period a second gas detector was activated which
put the platform into a level three shutdown and gpa. A po itive isolation of the damaged line was effected (spades and locks).
During normal operations a rising pressure in the <> unit resulted in failure of the lid seals.the ensuing gas leak produced two gas detections in the module resulting in a level three shut down
and platform muster.
Hydrocarbon gas leak from well m18. The platform production had previously shutdown due to a logic problem. At approx 6:50 2 15% gas alarms activated in the wellbay. Investigation revealed
that there was a hydrocarbon release form the joint between the xm s tree and the transition spool to the choke valve on well m18. The well and flowline were isolated and depressurised.
From the occurrence of a 2a production shutdown the produced gas process sytems automatically vented to the flare system. The flare system was not ignited at the time due to no or very low
volumes of gas venting which was unable to sustain a flamed flare the venting of the gas sytems at the shutdown was blown back towards the platform with a southerly wind at 15 knots where it
was drawn into the hvac to migrate into work areas and the accommodation. Low gas detectors were activated at 15% lel in modules m2 & m10. The flare is normally maintained lit by a flow of
purge gas to the flare system. This has recently been isolated due to under lagging corrosion.
From the occurrence of a 2a production shutdown the produced gas process systems automatically vented to the flare system. The flare system was not ignited at the time due to no or very low
volumes of gas venting which was unable to sustain a flamed flar . The rapid venting of the gas systems lifted the water and accumulated gas condensate from the flare 'u' seal. These fluids were
blown back towards the platform with a se wind at 6 knots and fell out onto the roof areas from where they were drawn into he hvac to migrate into workareas and the accommodation. Low gas
level detectors were activated at 15% lel. The flare is normally maintained lit by a flow of purge gas to the flare system. This has recently been isolated due to under lagging corrosion. this
corrosion problem and a repair programme is with engineering support. Until the recommissioning of the purge gas supplies, an alternative means of continuously supplying dry fuel gas into the
flare system has been provided.
Whilst starting up oil production after a previous production trip, fluctuations in the produced water flows to the <> unit caused a rising level and rising pressure. The gas rising pressure
caused gas leakage from the <> lids which activated gas d tectors to initiate a level 3 shutdown and gpa. The area production operators quickly arrived at the location to notice that gas rapidly
dispersing and within minutes the area was clear.

During recovery from a shutdown, a slug of oil/condensate carried over into the water outlet from the third stage separator. The light ends flashed off into the wemco unit causing gas to be
released from the lid seals. Local gas heads detected the gas a d shut the plant down. Platform personnel were called to muster.
During recovery from a shutdown, a slug of oil/condensate carried over into the water outlet from the third stage separator. The light ends flashed off into the wemco unit causing gas to be
released from the lid seals. Local gas heads detected the gas a d shut the plant down. Platform personnel called to muster.
During recovery from a shutdown, a slog of oil/condensate carried over into the water outlet from the third stage separator. The light ends flashed off into the <> unit causing gas to be released
from the lid seals. Local gas heads detected the gas a d shut the plant down. Platform personnel were called to muster.
During a production start-up, a leak was spotted on a 50mm line on the oil metering system in module 5 production mezzanine deck.the leak was immediately reported to the production
supervisor who was in the local control room in module 4. On investigation a pin hole leak was found on the pressurising line up-stream of the isolation valves to stream 2. Start-up and export
was stopped, the line was isolated and drained, then fully spaded off before resuming start-up. The estimated discharge from the leak was approximately less than a barrel (42 gallons). The line
has subsequently undergone n.d.t inspection and report .
At approx 18:20 a message was tannoyed to the duty electrician as the no.2 solar generator had shutdown. Shortly after this the control room operator recieved a phone call reporting a gas leak in
the <> cellar deck north east corner. The gas detection s stem at this point picked 20% LEL in zone 32. A platform operator had been sent to investigate the problem on <> On his arrival he
discovered a valve had blown fron the base of a fuel gas filter.
Whilst using cengar air saw to cut penetration into solar room module external wall. Air saw blade inadverantly partly cut into 2" fuel gas line feeding no3 solar generator. Fuel gas line was on
the internall wall in close proximity to penistration. Thi result was gas leak into solar room, gas detected platform shut-down. Personnel to emergency stations.
Gas leakage from process small bore piping on condensate pump discharge on new phoenix triplex module on v<>.
Coiled tubing string hadbeen pulled out of well <> after an aborted roto jet cleanout job. The pressure in the reel had been bled off and the bottom hole assembly was being broken down by
<> and <>. Pressure had been trapped due to a bl ckage in the rot-jet filter and toolstring whicih caused nitrogen gas and dust to be released into the faces of both persons.
Oil leak from hydraulic hose. The generator was shutdown and a replacement hose procured.
Whilst working condensate pump a to refit a relief valve a fluid containing meg/water/condensate leaked. The leak was largely in a spray mist form was arrox 2-3 gallons.
Whist carrying out daily plant checks on at a production leak on valve bv62x situated on top of the <> slugcatcher. The <> gas stream was immediately shutdown and safely vented. The
valve assembly was removed, repaired and refitted by the m chanical lead technition where upon the system was tested before resumption of gas production open actions.
It was noticed that condinrat water mix was falling on to <>. Most probable source is the lp venton <>.
Night shift operators were carrying out routine pigging operations. While pressure was being introduced to the pig launcher in a controlled manner the seal on the pig launcher door failed at
approx. 700 psi.
In preparation of sour gas flow compressor tb 5000 was being deisolated after routine maintenance. During reinstatment of the fuel gas system local gas alarms activated at 50% lel. The fuel gas
supply valve was closed and area checks carried out.
Whilst prepering the <> to <> pig receiver the door of the receiver opened- approximately 6 barrels of stabilised crude oil escaped from the receiver onto the area operator shut in the
receiver immediately. Approximately 1 barrel of crude oil to the sea direct with approximately 3 barrels of draining indirectly via deck drains to the drilling sluice- way over a 24 hour period.
Whilst commissioning mp compressor after major overhaul a gas leak occured on g155 discharge line, initiating executive action and a class 2b shutdown. The leak occured on a 3/4" vent
attached to a spacer ring on the inlet line to psv325-b rated a 1500psi investigation continues - initial investigation suggests a fatigue related failure - onshore analysis being actioned. Oir/12
raised.

At 21.32 on <> a fire at g160 turbine exhaust, within area 1 was observed and reported to the ccr using the 199 facility. Gpa/muster action. Fire believed to be caused by seal oil which has
sprayed onto the exhaust cladding during a previous inciden ans entered below lagging to hot wxhaust. Unit has been shut down for approx 4hrs due to a shut- down ealier in the say.
Incestigation continues- independent onshore team mobilised.
A pin hole leak was discoved in an armoured hose. An estimated 25 litres of crude had been lost on to the deck. There was no spillage over board. The hose connects a point on the b to a crude
line to a sampling unit. The unit has beem shut in and the repl ced. Although the incident is still under investigation it would appear that the hose had been rubbing against the steel hinge of a
cabinet. The replacement hose ahs been run in a different configuration to prevent a recurrence
During adjacent b44 workover heavy lift operations, it was ascertained that the b35z asv was leaking. Repeated attempts to leak test the valve failed. A bridge plug was subsequently set in the
production tubing tallpipe. Tubing and annulus pressure wer vented to zero pressure and the asv/trdhsv closed. The well has been shut in while further plans are considered to obtain an integrity
test of the asv(ava brain changeout).
Incident occured on the <> platform at 18:35 hrs on <> when preparations were being made for a waterwash of the mp turbine compressors. Gas was detected by gas heads 57a and 57c in
the turbine enclosure. A class ii shutdown was successfull initiated and production and drilling wells immediately secured. An investigation has been launched to determine the cause of the
incident and identify any corrective actions/lessons learned.
During well flowing operations to the test separator a high oil level was detected in the test separator which resulted in carry over of crude to the hp flare knock out drum. The high level trip
switch was initiated on the hp flare knock out drum which i volved the associated safety systems being initiated, resulting in production being shut down on the platform. Prior to the high level
trip switch in the hp flare ko drum being activated a small amount of crude oil was discharged along with the gas being vented up the flare stack which resulted in the outfall landing on the east
side of the platform. All saftey systems were initiated as per design with no danger to platform or barge personnel.
During sand wash operations the inlet pipe spool to the sand wash degasser was eroded by process fluid which caused loss of containment. As a result gas detection sensors were activated which
initiated the gapa, production and water injection shutdown. Al platform personnel were mustered and accounted for. Weather conditions at the time: wind speed 15 knots, wind direction 260 sea
state 1 metre. The area was re-checked and found to be gas free. The eroded spool piece was removed and pipework blanked off sing blind flanges. Production operations were then restarted.
Adjoining pipework is being ut checked. Review of current pipework arrangement and material specification.
Lubricator had been installed on well a21 and was to be tested to 2000 psi using halliburton unit. The kill side of the well was rigged up to the <> unit. The hmv was closed on the well. The
derrickman was instructed to test the lubricator. The w llhead kill line was opened up to the <> unit. The derrickman opened up the kill line valve on the cement unit and because bleeder valves
were in the open position on the unit a small quantity of gas was released from the unit causing the gas det ction system to be initiated. On hearing the alarm the derrickman closed the unit kill
valve. The kill and swab valves were closed on the tree. The cause of the gas was traced to a passing hydraulic master valve on the tree. See wells it sys text
Operations in progress. Summer shutdown activities. Plant fully depressurised and inerted. Power supplied by two avon turbo-generators running on diesel fuel. One single flame detection was
signalled in control room. The flame detector is located in the e closure of turbo generator p801c, at low level and looks below the power turbine. One operator was immediately sent to the
machine. Looking through the enclosure's window, he noticed smoke and manually released the co2 in the enclosure, which also shuts t e machine down. It is believed that a small flame was
caused be oil comming in contact with the hot exhaust. The source of oil is from the bearing housing via the labryinth seal. Discussions have been started with the manufacturer to determine the
exact c use of the leak. Checks are carried on twice daliy in turbines enclosures to monitor the situation.
The incident took place on the <> platform in the south well bay on the gas well n24. It occurred under normal operating conditions with the wells flowing. Some construction personnel,
involved in cold works unrelated to n24, were present in the well bay at the time of the incident. The mechanism of one of the spring hangers supporting n24 flowline suddenly ruptured releasing
the spring and piston assembly. Under the force of the springs, the assembly was ejected againist the pressure pilots installed on he flowline. One of the pilots connection was ruptured, resulting
in a gas release. Production personnel were immediatly alerted by the personnel present at the scene and by the triggering of one of the gas detectors installed in the well bay. They immedi tely
shut the well and depressurised the flowline. An investigation is ongoing to detemine the cause of the rupture. Actions to avoid recurrence will dephend on the results of this investigation.

The turbo generator p801a had been shutdown for maintenance and the co2 system isloated to allow access in the enclosure. Mechanics were working inside the power turbine enclosure when
coincident flame detection alarm was recieved in the control room. Because the co2 system was on manual and isolated, co2 was not released on flame detection. The control room
operatorimmediately contacted safety and area operator to investigate and alert work party. The oim was informed. The mechanics working in the enclosure did not see any flame, but remarked on
an outbreak of smoke. On investigation in the gearbox enclosure it was found that that some smoke was coming from the lower part of the insulation surrounding the power turbine exhaust
diffuser. The enclosure door were closed and the co2 manually discharged. Initial inspection of the equipment revealed traces of oil in the area of the power turbine exhaust diffuser. The lagging
will be removed to check for any accumulation of oil in the insulation material. Immediately after the incident, it was observed that the pressure in the power turbine bearing seal air supply was
zero, when it should have been 2 bars. When the machine is running, air taken off from the avon compressor is injected in the labyrinths in order to create a barrier and preclude any oil leak
The incident is a "follow on" to the incident reported on the <>. On the <> incident an oil leak ignited a small fire. After this incident all residual oil was cleaned up. The power turbines
insulation was inspected and considered to be n a satisfactory condition. On the <> p801a was started. During the machine warm up cycle, co-incident uv detection automatically initiated a
co2 release. It is most likely that residual oil was still available in the insulation after the<>, which ignited. The power turbine insulation has been completely replaced since the incident.
Boroscope inspection concludes no oil leakage since the <>t incident. The power turbine labyrinth seal has been tested as satisfactory.
During normal plant monitoring, an operator noticed ice build-up on the lagging blanket on 3/4" valve y09218 on the gas injection flowline. On further investigation a small (wisp) gas leak was
seen from rtj joint between the 2500 rating valve body and bla k flange. The joint was replaced with a new one which was monitored after installation and found to be ok. Investigation report <
> was completed. The replaced rtj was sent to the beach for failure cause analysis.
During monitoring of the plant an operator noted severe movement on an actuated valve hv 13480 <> production bypass choke valve. The actuator appeared to be driving the valve open and
closed vibrating severely. It was then the operator noticed a fine pray of oil coming up the stem of the 6" valve. The operator reported this immediately and the <> process was shutdown and
de-pressurised. No gas detectors operated due to the rapid action taken. On investigation it would appear that the rotork actuat r internal circuit board had failed and the gland on the valve was
leaking. This valve will remain out of service until the full repair is carried out. An internal investigation report is being completed. An oir 12 had been completed also.
Following the test flow of the lower cretacious well slot 9, the xmas tree cavity was to be depressurised to enable rigging down of the <> equipment. The well service engineer proceeded to
depressurise the tree cavity to the open drain system vi a hose & not the process drain system as per the procedures. This caused a minor gas release & subsequent gas detection in the well bay
initiating a yellow shutdown & emergency muster. The engineer concerned isolated the nasa valve immediately & reported to the control room. The gas dissipated quickly & the area was checked
out. Once satisfied normal oil/gas production was restarted. However a full bp investigation has been initiated. The lc slot 9 well remains isolated & the tree has been depressurised as per standard
procedures.
During normal production operations a production technician while performing normal duties noticed a small drip/spray of oil and gas coming from the cyrus metering manual block valve down
stream of lcv 13099. The leak was contained by absorbent pads, the ystem was manually isolated drained and the plug replaced. A program to replace the body bleed valves on similar valves is in
place.
Routine oil and gas production operations were ongoing. Approximately 1 hour before the release the gas plant had tripped and hence all the gas was being flared. Wind 20 knots from 110 deg.
Sea 2-3 mtrs. Visibility 10 miles. The gas detection in the area ndicated a release of gas. This came in as a high gas alarm approximately 20 to 60% lel. Operations technicians were despatched
and confirmed a smell of gas in the area. The <> and test separators were shut down and depressured manually. The gas releas continued. The technicians continued to investigate and traced
the source to the <> separator psv 13114. This gas a 1/4" diameter tell tale vent pipe on the bonnet that was leaking gas. The psv was manually isolated and the leak was stopped. The tell ale
indicated the back pressure from the downstream flare side of the psv was leaking back.the psv has been removed and is being returned for examination by our valve vendor, <> to determine
the cause of the failure. Investigation into the cause is underway.

At 10:25 the platform general alarm sounded, this being the result of 3 gas heads in zone f, process area, coming into alarm (low level 20%) the platform personnel mustered and drilling
personnel made t15 well safe. Investigation of the alarm by the fast response team, discovered upon arrival, at the process area, that methanol was coming out of the vent pipe of t8180 and on
being informed of the situation,isolated the bowser connected to the tank. At the time of the alarm, the production operator had bee bunkering, methanol into t8180 and on being informed of the
situation, isolated the bowser connected to the tank. Due to the prevailing wind conditions at the time the methanol was being blown back onto the platfrom and as a precaution, the <...> meth
nol pumps were shutdown. The fast response team ran out a fire hose and washed the methanol into the process area's closed hazardous drains and continued flushing for a further 15 minutes
after the methanol had ceased to flow the vent pipe. It has been c lculated, from the tank volumes, that approx. 40 gallons of methanol was dischardged from the vent of t8180. In order to prevent
a similar incident, the following actions are planned: 1. Methanol bunkering has been deemed to be a two man task. 2. Instal ation of either a tank level repeater guage at the bunkering point or
Whilst blowing down the topsides export gas system for maintenance on a metering skid valve, a confirmed gas signal in the wellbay level 2 east initiated the gpa, firepumps started blowdown
commenced and deluge released as per f & g c& e's. On completion f blowdown the production and test manifolds pzv's were inspected via their tell-tale holes. Gas present at pzv on production
manifold pzv isolated pending removal or repair. Note: pzv is on line with 1 spare.
Well a8 pressure monitoring impulse flexi-hose developed a leak during manual re-pressurisation. The hose developed a leak which allowed gas to pressure the external rubber protection causing
it to baloon and burst. The hose was being slowly pressured ma ually locally via a needle valve. The hose was isolated immediately and as a result only a small volume of gas dispersed to
atmosphere.
Wind 23 knots at 137 deg 12:52 - technician reports leak from pipework nw weatherdeck around the mp sep. Pcv-43008. 12:54 - ops eng and ops sup attend the scene. 13:00 - oim site visit initial thought on mode of failure was that undercut on welded pipe upport (welded to piework) had produced a 1/4" dia hole. (decision to stop the process in a controlled manner) 13:05 - pa
announcement to stop work and asasemble personnel in the tr with an explanation of the situation. 13:07 - all work stopped. Permits eturned to the permit office and personnel assembled in the
tr. 13:10 - contacted duty manager 13:11 - gas export shutdown 13:25 - condensate export stopped. 13:25 - mp separator isolateed and blowndown. At no time did any gas register on the icss as
the rea is very open and the wind direction was favourable. 14:10 - pa announcement to inform personnel that the situation had returned to normal, and permits were reissued.
Oil production was shut down at 15:20 owing to a problem in the slop oil vessel. At 15:30 a scaffolder noticed oil leaking from the mol pump suction header and reported it to the ccr:- 2 operators
confirmed the leak and a precautionary gpa was sounded. La er inspection found internal corrosion had caused the loss of containment.
B export pump being test run following maintainance. After pump started, pinhole leak occurred in crude export pump suction pipework. Process plant shutdown and depressurised. Manually
activated level 2 shutdown. Straub clamp fitted to area of pinhole lea and manifold pressure tested to check for leaks. Long term intent is to change out the export pump suction manifold
pipework. *note: due to the minor nature of the leak it was possible to fit the straub clamp without requirement to shutdown. Shutdown was effected to carry out further investigation and testing.
One gas head in low alarm and one gas head in high alarm on loss of water seal to open hazardous deck drains in module 16 gas compression. The water seals in this warm module tends to
evaporate. To mitigate against this a continuous trickle flow of water had been piped to each deck drain via plastic tubing. A needle valve fitted to the tubing blocked up hence the seal was lost.
On loss of the seal the module hvac which keeps the module at a slight negative pressure, sucked out some gas from within the drains system. The effected drain seal was topped up with water
and the normal trickle flow of water reinstated. Subsequent investigations into possible source of the gas in the open hazardous drains system has identified that a liquid overflow from the in
ection compressor seal oil degasser tanks is piped into the open hazardous drains. A change request has been raised to repipe these overflows into the closed drains system to prevent gas entering
the open drains system.
Normal platform production ongoing at time of incident. At 1812 hours <...> in module 04 in vicinity of the metering skid, two gas heads came into low alarm. (gas head numbers 9139 and 9143).
Immediate investigation at the scene identified a condensate leak from a four bolt flange, fitted with a spectacle blind, on an atmospheric vent line from the prover loop on the metering skid. A
manual level 2 shutdown was immediately initiated from the ccr and the metering system depressurised. A precautionary mus er was also initiated from the ccr until system was depressurised and
the area made safe. The leaking flange was repaired and similar flanges in the same area were inspected prior to recommencing production.

During our <...> pipeline survey the rov observed bubbles emanating from the top valve xxv-3753. On closer visual inspection of the valve the bubbles were recorded as gas leaking from a bleed
plug on the bonnet of the valve at a maximum estimated rate of 8 scfd. The leak does not affect the valve integrity. Repair procedures are being developed for replacement of the plug at next
practical opportunity.
Defective weld, observed by module operator during start up operations: whilst preparing plant for start up the module operator observed a small pool of oil originating from a small crack in the
weldolet on the export pump recycle line 1" purge point. In rder to prevent a hydrocarbon release the startup was aborted and the system isolated for repair. The offending pipework was removed
for examination and repair. Similar pipe work and fittings adjacent have been inspected for similar defects prior to resta t of production. Further checks of adjacent pipework to be carried out after
plant restart. Contents of the pipework system is hydrocarbon.
The glycol regeneration package had just been started up after an unassociated unplanned shutdown. At 08.20am (30 minutes after restart) a leak was detected by sight at the top nozzle of the
glycol reboiler bridle. Leak was a mixture of steam/glycol vapou at approx. Temp of 200 c. At 08.30 a single smoke detector was activated by the steam/ vapour. System was shut down and the
leaking section of pipework was blanked off.
Isolating gas well for maintenance, suspect blockage which them cleared resulting in a minor gas release into the gas compression module
Release of gas occurred in u5 from pilot operated rv9324 during loading up of the recip comp. In injection mode. Gas release due to down stream isolation valve found in the closed position.
Gas release from k9320 gas re-injection compressor cyl 4 valve cover, joint failure. Module/equipment made safe. Normal status then repairs commenced.
During process of hand loading the reciprocating gas compressor rv9322 pilot valve operated venting gas into module, gas tech observed leakage ans stopped machine, informing control room.
Platform then went to gpa status and sps operated due to coincidenc gas heads in u5wmezz.
Rv9327- gas was found to be leaking from the pilot valve vent port onto the module.
A hydocarbon gas release from the vent port of a mono block 3 valve manifold fitted to a well <...> conduit number <...> used for measuring the well thp. The release was caused by the failure of
an incorrectly selected blanking plug that had been fitted to the vent port the volume of gas was assessed as moderate as the inventory was rectricted to the volume between the flow wing valve
and the master valve when the plant tripped
Gas pig receiver being isolated to allow rouine change out of psv. Passing primary isolation valve resulted in gas emission from bleed. This release was detected by fixed gas head, resulting in
platform gpa status
Hydrocarbon leak from temperature capillary on discharge line of crude oil export pump p3070. Oil spill into module. Minor spill to sea.
During the transfer of barite from silo p.4 to the mixing hopper tank, the operator noticed a rise in pressure to 40 psi. He bled down the system and on checking the hopper, he found the viewing
window had blown out.
Recommissioning tests purging fuel gas system stable environment.fuel gas. Gas turbine generator g-5010b technicians/engineers were preparing to start a main generator on fuel gas. While
purging the fuel gas system gas was released into the turbine enclos re and the platform general alarm sounded, system was shut down instantly by personel working on generator. Investigation
revealed that a compression fitting had become ? All siilar fittings on this and similar systems were checked and a full investigation initiated
Platform in normal operation with commissioning work in progress. Two operations staff were commissioning on main power generators and walking towards the fuel gas heaters they noticed a
smell of condensate and while one person informed the control room t e other investigated around x204 feed bottoms exchanger area. On shift ops team leader arrived on scene and by this time
leak of condensate had been discovered on the plate exchanger. Within 10 mins isolation of the exchanger was completed (unit not on p oduction and in fact not operated to date). The platform
was shutdown as a precaution exchanger contents drained and prepared to be flushed. Environmental conditions at the time wind 10 knts @ 225 degrees vis 10 mls with 1 m sea. Area is busy
thoroughfar , no gas detection arose even with portable unit. But unable to determine accurately how long leaking before discovery.
At 15:50hrs on the <...>, valve stem packin's found to be leaving condensate. The valve was manually isolated and repaired, approx 3 lts of fluid drained to the deck of the production module, this
then being washed to the hazardous open drai s system. System pressure was around 13 bara and the liquids and pressure were residual. Vessel off line at time of leak. Weather - wind 14-16 knots
direction 310

Plant operative under normal conditions, when at 08:40hrs a report of a leak from a valve was passed directly to the control room. Operations personnel & myself arrived on scene. The valve in
question is an automatically operated valve which opens & dumps condensate on high vessel level and closes on low level. The construction is a bettis actuator fitted to a ball valve leakage
appeared to be coming from area where the actuator bolts to the valve body indicating gland leakage. (this to be determined) deci ion taken to shutdown the platform under controlled conditions
isolation of the train prior to valve removal & overhaul. Platform was shutdown at 08:49.
Small gas leak discovered on valve 08-fcv-0206. Gas issued from a plug fitted to the flow control valve bonnet yoke. Normal pressurised state. Discovered during routine inspection, line
isolated, depressured and plug inspected and made good.
At approx 16.20 on <...> instrument techs working in the production wellbay choke valve area noticed gas escaping in the vicinity of their own task. They reported this to the control room who
sent an operator to investigate.. He isolated a ouble block and bleed valve from which gas was escaping from the downstream block part of the valve.
During post fracturing well clean up of wellslot 14 36 the 1/2 inch heavy wall s/s pipe work which formed the depressurisation line from the temporary proppant catcher to the lp flare header
[downstream of 02-psv-0045 mp sep] failed. Failure occured throu h erosion of two[2] 90 degree bends due to particuate matter in high velocity gas. During venting operations the area operator
was alterted by the noise of the escape. He informed llr, isolated and monitored.
A production shutdown level 2b scs operated from scs 03-pt-156/160/161 on investigation 03-xxv-0133 platform resdv had closed. The system was reset, the valve was then operated [given an
open signal] and observed hydralic fluid flowed from under the laggi g around the activator. On further investigation, the position indication shaft was found to be missing. The securing
arrangement had come loose and the shaft was forced from the actuator by hydraulic pressure [202 bar][transaqua]. The indication shaft co ld not be located some 20 - 25 ft from the edge of the
platform structure and some 15 ft above the walkway.
As a result of a routine review op operating data a leak was located on a production jumper between the wellhead and the subsea manifold. The amount of hydrocarbon released was very small. It
was identified when the flowline pressure decayed to the ambien sea bed pressure during shutdown,when it should have maintained 90 to 100 barg.
Feed heater x-0205 was found to be leaking condensate on to the bunded area. The unit was isolated, taken out of service and drained. Windspeed was recorded at 35 knots, direction 345degs.
The leak was discovered by the construction superintendant. The quantity of loss was 40 litres of consensate/water mixture. The equipment involved was a heat exchanger. The incident is
reported on <...> incident report <...>.
Oil and gas leak resulting in three gas heads in high gas alarm. Situation under control in 6 mins and gas dispatched.
At 06:00 hrs on <...> as part of the annual shut down preparations, n2 purging operations were being carried out. The hp separator was to be charged with nitrogen to a pressure of 20 bar(normal
operating pressure -60 barg) bj services were carrying out this procedure, during the operation a loud 'bang' was heard, initially the operators were unsure of the cause as there was no visible
evidence of eg a burst hose. However the injection manifold that was screwed into a ported blank on the pipework, had moved through 90 degrees. The operation was suspended and the
occurrence was reported to the installation management. Further inspection revealed that the gasket between the ported blank and valve y 031109 had blown. The control of hydraulic power to the
pump is via a wind in / out knob which is attached to wire, the wire had kinked and operation of the knob had little or no effect on the pump speed. The <...> operator at the injection point had
requested that valve y 031109 be closed, before he had confirmation that the pump had stopped.this this action reduced the volume that the pump was acting upon and a very fast rise in pressure
occurred. Pressure relief during the purging procedure was from the plant psvs this path was isolated when valve y 031109 was closed and the only pressure control was at the pump. The
The production systems were being restarted after platform shutdown. Hydrocarbon gas was detected in module 15, adjacent to the drains system and automatic level 2 shutdown and blowdown
was initiated and platform personnel were mustered. Gas dissipated ra idly and personnel stood down. Investigation revealed that a level control valve on the hp flare drum was stuck fully open
and a header drain valve was also passing oil into the drains and subsequently vent system. The excess gas in the atmospheric vent s stem leaked out into the atmosphere causing the shutdown.
Whilst draining down the <...> seperator, the water dean hose broke caused a spill of contents, and a gas alarm woth a full muster.
A minor gas release occured due to <...> drag valve stem seal passing gas to atmosphere. Valve is located on open area of pp main deck. It was detected by a vigilant operator who heard the leak
during carrying out routine tour. Unable to tighten gland the system was shutdown, isolated and vented and spares organised for the repair . There was no automatic detection, small leak in an
open windy area a platform incident report has been raised and is being investigated by a team including a safety reprentative.
Residual vessel nitrogen purge gas was being used to assist in the displacement of spent sulfacheck to overboard. During the operation the purge gas migrated through an interconnecting open
bund drain. The release of combined nitrogen/hydrocarbon/fluid wa detected at 25% lel by local gas detection. Placing platform to general alarm.

Release of dead crude and associated gas from 'o' ring seal due to failure of 2 out of 4 retaining bolts on a multi-purpose pump suction manifold. Coincident hi level gas initiated platform
sutdown/blowdown and brent system esdv closure. Oil and gas release contained within pumproom.
During a draining operation of sulfa check vessel v21003a nitrogen purge gasses migrated via the drain system to atmosphere. The nitrogen purge contained residual hydrocarbons and these were
detered by the fixed local automatic detection system. The saf gaurding system completed executive action in accordance with system requirements and the platform was placed on general
platform alarm status with all plant shutdown.
During the comissioning test run on train b 3rd stage gas compressor two gas leaks were detected om the 1" methonal injection line to the dry gas header. The leaks occured on the upstream
flange of hv-00024 and the down stream flange of hv-00025. The head r pressure at the time was approx 200barg the 3rd stage gas compressorwas immediatly shut down and the leakage isolated
by closing the dublock valve hv-00023/29 the dry gas header was then depressurised to flare.
During cargo offloading the watchman on deck discovered a leak on the metering unit. He immediately informed the ncg and the cargo pumps were stopped and the cargo transfere operation was
suspended. No gas sensors were triggered, the area was searched by se of portable gas meter. No gas was detected. Approx 50 liters of crude oil was spilled on deck. No oil spilled overboard. A
leaking gasket was observed on the flange of produce inlet valve stream no 2.
During commissioning test runs on the hp fuel gas compression, two leaks were detected on the system. The fuel gas compressor was being slowly pressured up to 220 barg prior to test run
commencing. When the system pressure had reached 164 barg, two leak were detected simultaneously at 33-ebu-1718 and 33-fo-1740a. A small quantity of hydrocarbon gas was released to the
atmosphere. The system was immediately depressured and tests suspended pending investigation and repair.
Durning start up of <...> compressor 'a', 3rd stage. A gas release was discovered from a flange down stream of filters on the seal gas on the machine. The machine was immediately shut down and
blown down to h.p flare and the leakage the leakage ra e rapidly decreased. The flange bolts were tightened up and the flange was service tested durning the next start-up using a portable gas
detector. No leaks detected.
Compressor 'a', 3rd stage was running under normal conditions when the site operator discovered a very small gas release from a flange on the seal gas system to the machine. The machine was
immediately stopped and depressured to hp flare. The bolts on t e flange was re-tightened and the machine restarted. All flanges on the seal-gas system for the machine were also checked before
start-up. Flanges were checked during start-up sequence using a portable gas detector without any leaks detected.
The hp <...> compressor train 'a' was running under normal operating conditions when the production superviser observed a minor gas leak from the 0.75" blind flange on hv-10412 bleed valve,
between the double block valves on the 3rd stage seal gas iquid trap. He immediatedly radioed to the control room to shutdown and blowdown the machine. As the leak rate was very small no gas
detectors were activated. The joint was replaced. When the machine was restarted the gas detection system was activated an the ncc (control room) again instructed to shut the machine down.
The leak was traced to the 0.75" drain connection on the seal gas filter 04-f-005a. The o-rings were found to have failed. These were replaced and the machine was leak tested using nitroge
Process plant, hp compression and fuel gas compression were all on line operating conditions were stable at 0055 hrs gas were detected at the water treatment and water inject areas and also on
the main deck. The on shift process operators and bosun were nstructed to check out these alarms. At 0059 hrs esd1 occured due to high level gas detection and the process plant was
automatically shut down. At 0102 hrs the leak was confirmed to be at the fuel gas stand at valve 33-esu-17424. The leak was immediatel isolated by closing the vavle stand inlet block valves and
the system was depressurised to 0 barg
When assembling the cylinder and pipework on fuel gas compressor b after repair work. The discharge pipe flange on the cylinder was incorrectly installed (not properly aligned) causing the o
ring to blow during test run. The inspection prior to test r n also failed to notice the problem.
Leask occurred from mechanical seal unit on oil transfer pump a. Oil transfer pump a was immediately isolated and de-pressurised and stand by pump activated. Oil transfer pump a was
prepared for mechanical seal inspection/replacements less than ibbl was split on the deck and cleaned up.

Nitrogen compressor 'a' was started up prior to making adjustments to the control system at about 0145. Within seconds of start-up a loud bang was heard from within the enclosure, followed by
the gpa. On completion of the muster, the response team on sit reported a significant amount of water and water vapour within the enclosure. There was no evidence of smoke or flame. The area
was secured and the muster stood down. No personnel were within the enclosure at the time of the incident. Initial investigat on revealed catastrophic failure of 4" nrv2 and significant damage to
air/water plate cooler. In view of the potential for injury of this event it was decided to instigate a formal investigation into the fundamental cause, presently in progress. A platfo m instruction has
been issued as an interim measure to prevent personnel making un-controlled entry to the enclosure of the 'b' machine with the machine runnning.
Psv on condensate re-injection pump discharge vented internally and through a vent port causing condensate to collect on the deck and initiate a flammable gas detector. This was caused by pump
start up against a closed valve thereby causing an over-pressu e. This over-pressure was not detected as start up is made with the low pressure trip inhibited. This inhibit also automatically
inhibited the high pressure trip which was not noted by control room personel. The psv sealing mechanism failed and when the psv operated allowed condensate to vent via the post. The machine
was isolated. Condensate was washed into the drain system. Investigations are continuing but it is intednded to initiate an engineering change to separate the inhibition of the low trip fr m the
high trip and to provide a fail safe to prevent start of the pump against closed valves.
Flammable gas was detected on two heads in the stripping gas compressor compartment shortly after the compressor was started up. Gpa and esd 1a occurres and personnel went to muster. Cause
was found to be a minor leak on a flange in the balance line. Com ressor was isolated and depressurised. Flange was connected and tested to 1 bar by the manufacturer during a recent
maintenance. System and flange cannot be tested at a greater pressure due to seals in the system. Intend to discuss qa procedured during c mpressor maintenance with vendor to try to reduce
possibility of future occurrences.
Gpa initiated by single flammable gas detector on mezzanine deck 13:38. <...> investigating the incident were withdrawn from the area when three flammable detectors and one toxic detector on
the cellar deck alarmed. This resulted in an esd 1a on the platfor . The situation was evaluated by the control room and the ert recommitted when gas heads cleared. There were no leaks or other
obvious signs of gas detected. Likely root cause was due to methanol and hydrocarbon vapors being released from drains system fo lowing hosing down operation of residual methanol from a
bunded area. All deck drains checked to ensure that a good water seal is present. This practice is to be included in operator routine tasks.
Leak of methanol in tracer line to stripping gas compressor bravo. Gas detection picked up the leak and activated gpa. Leak was located repaired and the line tested.
Due to a defect in a gasket, gas leak occurred on the hamilton slug catcher meter orifice carrier. Gas detection picked up the leak and activated gpa. Leak was located and line isolated, blown
down and the gasket replaced.
A export pump was being used at the time. A flammable gas detector located by the pump skid went into alarm. Gpa was sounded and hands went to muster. A small quantity of oil had leaked
from the "c" pump which was offline at the time.
During steady production at 06:48 hrs the installation gpa was initiated by the activation of a gas detector on the dd cellar deck adjacent to the condensate re-injection pumps. The installation
came to muster and investigations were carried out by the em rgency response teams. It was identified that there was an escape of condensafe from b pump. This was isolated by the emergency
response teams and the area made secure. Maintenance department to flush and purge b pump and carry out investigation on the es ape of condensate from the pump and repair the defect.
Investigation revealed fractured suction head bolt. Bolt to be sent for analysis. All other suction head bolts to be checked during repair. Awaiting spare bolt for repair of pump.
Condensate pump b discharge. Psv leaked condensate from a part in the back flow preventor on the valve pilot gas detection. System initiated gpa.
Routine test for ellon subsea well was ongoing. A small gas leak developed at 'b' daniel orifice meter. Two gds located just above the gas metering skid were activated (no wind at time of incident)
which gave us an esd 1. Faulty equipment isolated and ven ed. Replacement of seal gaskets at gas metering stream in progress.
Hydrocarbon leak from do5 flowline. Well was being restarted with choke set at 10/64". Production wing valve was opened and well technician observed gas leak in mainifold area. Requested
control room to shut in well. Flowline was depressurised to drain an leak stopped. One gas detector went into low alarm. Investigation revealed faiure of one 3/8" a-lok compression fitting on
flowline. Repaired and well restarted satisfactorily.

The damper assembly on seal oil pump 'a' had been removed for replacement but then refitted as the new unit was incompatible. As the original damper had zero charge when reinstalled attempt
was made to recharge it. Due to the bladder in the damper being amaged, nitrogen at 150 bar pressure was able to enter the low pressure (suction) side of the seal oil pump. The mechanical seal
failed causing damage to the pump and associated drive, guard and motor.
Internal stall of engine compressor, causing supersonic flow reversal, allowing brief venting of combustion products into ge enclosure.
The alpha main generator <...> was being installed after removing the charlie generator for maintenance (4000 hour service period). This was done during daylight hours, and approx 4 hours into
the planned work schedule f r that day. Prior to running up the alpha generator, the integrated hi fog fire protection system was being initiated. This is acheived by inserting a pre-charged nitrogen
cylinder into a pressure reducing regulator which in turn feeds a local pressure i dicator and enters a second regulator on the hi fog cylinder itself. This was successfully completed on the first of
the two systems. On completion of inserting the second pre- charged nitrogen cylinder however, the top of the regulator and diaphragm on the hi fog cylinder separated under great pressure. The
two technicians working on the unit at the time were unhurt by the incident. The area was cleared of non essential personnel. The hi fog system was then checked. On inspection some slight
damage wa found on the charged nitrogen cylinder housing and the local pressure indicator. A video was taken as evidence of the damaged equipment.
Normal production operations were ongoing on the platform when a gas alarm adjacent to the gas scrubber v05, was activated in the central control room. All hot work was immediately ceased
and the site investigated by the shift team leader. The shift team eader smelt gas as he approached the scrubber v05, saw a leak of condensate from a pinhole on a 2" elbow on a level bridle, and
initiated a production shutdown. The leak was isolated locally providing single valve isolation the area was ventilated and the gas scrubber isolated to provide double valve isolation. Incident
investigation initiated.
During routine operations a smell of gas was noticed in package 5. Investigation revealed crude oil dripping from a body cavity vent nipple on esdv 3141. This valve is on the 6" oil return line
from the de-watering hydro-cyclones to one of the main separa ors (v04). A manual yellow shut down was initiated and the valve isolated. There was no inidication of gas on the fire and gas
detection systems.
Normal production operations were ongoing on the platform when a gas alarm adjacent to the condensate pump p74 was activiated in the central control room. No work permits were issued at the
time of the incident (as shift changeover). The site was investig ted by the operations technician and a leak of condensate from a pinhole on a 1" recycle line from p74 was observed. A production
shutdown was initiated and the leak was isolated locally. The area was ventilated and an incident investigation initiated.
Location - at end of mol pump line, t71-lp drain tank was being pumped when gland packing on the pump suddenly started leaking. Event - a gas heak immediately by the pump went into high,
quickly followed by a second and platform went into auto shut-down. ost event - because platform realised immediately the problem, decided not to go to muster. Will report as oir/9b/12 because
of auto-shutdown.
At the time of the incident the platform was operating under normal steady state production conditions. Routine drilling activity was in progress on fb 3-3, water injection sidetrack well, although
this had been hampered by downtime due to severe weather conditions over the weekend. At 2000 drilling personnel working on the bop deck noticed a smell of gas which they thought to be
coming from eggbox 4 and they immediately reported it by telephone to the central control room. No indication of gas was evident on the f&g panel in the ccr. The fire and safety officer, <...>,
and shift team leader, <...>, who were in the ccr immediately went to investigate the incident. On arrival on the bop deck they too were aware of a gas smell but gas presence was not indicated on
the portable monitor carried by them. They decided to descend the emergency exit stairs into eggbox 5 so as to approach eggbox 4 by its main door. When they reached the bottom of the stairs in
eggbox 5, they became aware that crude oil was spraying out of a fitting on the xmas tree for well <...>. They immediately exited eggbox 5 by its main door and hit the emergency shutdown
button for the eggbox which is located just outside. Through the door window they were able to see that the leak died away rapidly. Susbsequent investigation revealed that a pipework assembly,
Normal plant operations - ngl condensate gas - pipework above condensate pumps - a <...> control technician (<...>) entered the ngl west door and could detect a strong smell of gas but could see
no visible leaks. He informed the ngl control room and along with a production technician (<...>) he proceeded to the p97/west door area. Above p97/98 they saw gas condensate flashing off
from a stub connection at pit 8217. After quickly checking if the leak could be isolated they went to the ngl co trol room to report the leak to the ccr the plant was then manually shut down via the
yellow shutdown button. Local incident investigation report raised.

The platform was returning to normal operations from a planned shut down for maintenance and construction activities. The hydrocarbon gas release occurred in a joint that had not been
disturbed during the shutdown wor. The gas release was detected by a pr duction operator who heard the leak and smelt gasas he approached the vicinity. The well associated with the flange leak
had been brought on line some 20mins before. He judged that he had clear access to isolate the leak at the isolation valve. He did thi immediately and stopped the leak. The operator and shift
team leader took the decision not to sound the general alarm because the leak was stopped immediately and the gas dispersed and the operating plant shut down. The leak was not detected by the
fire and gas detection system, a gas point detector that was located nearby was hpwind and did not pick up the leak. The wind was blowing from the south at 10knots. The detector was checked
for operation and found to be functional. The leaking joint was examin d and found that the sealing ring had been installed out of true with the joint face therefore reducing the sealing contact on
one side. There was evidence of scuffing of the ring that is concluded to have come from the original installation of the joint
Normal plant operations. Hydrocarbon gas (stripping gas) - a gas release was detected at g5208 in package 5 west which went from low to high alarm and initiated a yellow production shutdown.
One other detector in the area went to low alarm. The gas dispe sed immediately. The investigation failed to find any leak path. Investigation centred on operation of dearator towers and the
overflow lute seals. The most likely cause was thought to be loss of level in v28 injection water holding tank which allowed str pping gas to escape the lute seal to atmosphere. The level
transmitter and low level switch were found to be defective. Transmitter and switch repaired. Local incident and investigation report raised <...>.
The oil return pipe from the recycle oil pumps to the 3rd stage separators developed a pin holeleak due to apparent corrosion. During an attempted emergency repair the hole enlarged to
appoximately 1/2". The oil process was shutdown to prevent further leakage.
During underbalanced drilling operations, a routine inspection of the bop stack revealed a small gas leak from the flanged connection between the double gates. The leak was isolated, repaired
(by re-tightening bolts) and pressure tested.
The unit had initially been purged with n2 and all known disturbed flanges checked for leaks. It was only when gas was intorduced that the other flange was identified. Procedures changed to
identify any piece of equipment or flange to be identified and dded to the check list and isolation certificate.
Normal gas export with both export compressors running. At 1930 hours the gas beam detectors detected gas at 19% level. A production operator attended the scene and noted a gas leak from
the stem packing on train 2 recycle valve. The operator requested a train 2 shutdown to effect a repair. The stem packing was renewed. Weather conditions:- wind 30 kts. Dir. 180 degrees.
Internal modifications to glycol contactor vessel, prior to commencement the column to be removed was flushed with sea water, and after gas testing to permit vessel entry. The condensate
column was cut in half with a cutting disc. The top section was th n removed from the vessel. The bottom section was laid out horizontally inside vessel in order to remove the side nozzles to get
out through the manway. Whilst removing the second nozzle residue condensate ignited and flashed out of the end into the ves el internal. Burning continued inside the half column. This was
extinguished by the fire watcher using a dry powder fire extinguisher. <...> present on site at time of incident. See short investigation report.
Dry gas export valve leaking (pv 56003b) discovered by prod supv during walkthrough. Release had not activated local fixed gas detection. All ongoing hotwork ceased, permits returned to mcr,
area barriered off. Release found to be from gland packing, v lve pv56003a was brought on line, and pv56003b isolated upstream and downstream with manual isolation valves. Gas pressure
vented through 2" drain line.
2 <...> gas turbine generator using diesel as fuel. Smoke reported coming from enclosure vent pipework. Operator dispatched to investigate. Nothing obvious looking through enclosure windows,
no heat or uv detector alarms. Opened enclosure and found sma l diesel leak & flame at 4 burner. Machine was shutdown by control room & diesel isolated locally. Flame went out. Investigation
showed minute hole/crack in 1/4 od stainless pipe leading to 4 burner when pressured to 60 bar g. New pipe fitted and tested. achine then switched over to gas fuel.
Gas pelease from v2060 (export compressor suction scrubber)
Hissing sound heard by ssp on walking past "a" gas compresser k2010. Small leak discovered on 3rd stage pressure transmitter p2033. Control room contacted and compressor shut down.
A general alarm was initiated by low level gas detection. The gas release was found to be from stem of a pressure control valve (worn seals) on hte fuel gas skid.

Gas detected in gas turbine enclosure unit 040. On inspection found a 2mm dia hole in the ss annular fuel gas supply line. Line had been rubbing against adjacent py cooling air hose fitting.
Unit was shutdown and vented and fuel gas pipe section replaced.
Whilst starting gas generator unit 060 a ga was initiated by gas detection in the unit enclosure, the automatic actin was to shutdown the unit. The unit had reached the stage in the start sequence
where the gas starter had a supply of 200 psi. Following shutdown the gas levels rapidly dropped to a safe level. Following investigation the cause of the gas release was identified to be the
misalignment of the spigoted 6" exhaust flange between the starter motor and flexible exhaust pipe.
Whist reassembling fuel gas pipework to <...> g-610, a blind flange was removed. At the same time 050 gas compressor was vented. A minor release of gas issued from the open ended pipework
into the <...> enclosure. The release was less than 1m3 for a short duration.
<...> g600 shutdown on high t-max, on investigating it was found that the exhaust lagging was impregnated with hydraulic oil and had ignited. The fire was extinguished with a single hand held
extinguisher.
A technician reported a smell of gas around the gas metering skid. On investigation a gas release was evident when feeling around an insulated gas chromatograph sampler. The insulation
prevented identification of exact source of the leak. Heat trace wa isolated and the process shut down and depressured in order to remove the insulation identify the leak and repair or remove.
The leak was around the sampler piston cylinder to mounting flange joint which is an o ring type seal. The sampler was removed a d a blind flange fitted until repair or replacement of the
defective unit.
The platform was shutdown and blown down. A test was being carried out to access leakage through the maintenence valve in the riser downstream of the esdv. A pressure indicator has been
rigged up with a short length of plastic tubing to a 3/4" piping isol tion valve on the depressured side of the maintenence valve. The plastic tube failed under pressure due to the 3/4" valve passing,
leading to a gas release. This was detected by the fire and gas system which initiated a trip of main generation (plx). The iser esdv was immediately closed by the operator. The crew mustered.
The permanent tubing was reconnected. An investigation will be carried out.
During an operations routine of changing over a duplex filter on a densitometer, on moving the arm towards the off-line filter, oil started to spray from its filter lid. It then took a couple on
minutes to swing the arm into its original position with th loss of approx. 1/2 barrel of crude oil to sea through gratings. Gas inhibits were in place at the time but two gas heads registered low
levels. Immediate actions: isolation of filter and foam used as precautionary measure. Investigation revealed a dama ed o ring. Weather conditions: wind 12.6 knots, 300 degrees, sea 2.5 metres.
One gas head came into low alarm for module 13 mezz gas plant.operations technician was sent to investigate and found a small leak which was coming from the turbo expander diaphragm
flange on 24 pcv 3220 seal gas control valve. He was able to nip up valve and stop the leak.
Ops. Tech. Was preparing gas metering stream 3 for maintenance when he felt a faint smell of gas. He traced it to the primary isolation valve for the densitometer. Investigation showed a small
spot of ice on valve body. This covered a pinhole leak. He ontinued with preparation which also included isolation of this valve. It will remain isolated until replaced, when an investigation will
be carried out on the valve.
Whilst walking through platform checking on ongoing operations, an unfamiliar noise was noticed. This was traced to the west mezzanine deck. Initially what appeared to be water dripping onto a
pipe and evaporating was observed. However, closer inspection howed this to be a suspected gas leak at the 2 o'clock position on a pipeline. A production operator was called and he was asked to
identify line. Then informed by production shift supervisor that this was crude oil header to wellstream coolers, suspected gas leak, although no alarms had annunciated. Decision made to
shutdown production immediately and isolate section of pipe for inspection.
Vent hose from slot 1 gas lift supply line ruptured, thus releasing a quantity of gas into the module. This action caused the plant to shutdown/depressurise and automatically initiate the general
alarm. The gas lift system to all gas lift wells has been i olated until the investigation has been completed. The likely cause was a passing valve on hp/lp interface caused over pressurisation of lp
vent line which lead to vent pipe rupturing. Personnel working adjacent to the hose witnessed the rupture but no in ury occurred. Terms of reference: * determine the immediate cause of the
accident * determine the underlying causes, including any breakdown in management systems and processes * consider issues not directly related to the incident, but having an effect o the
response to it * make recommedations to prevent this type of event recurring * consider the competency of individuals involved and the procedures and practices in place.

Minor release of gas from clamplock sealon slot 16 ag1 flowline. The leak was discovered by a technician working in the area. He smelt gas and reported it to the central control room. The fixed
system did not detect any evidence of gas in the area. As a recautionary measure the well was closed in, depressurised and isolated. The subsequent restart of ag1 and area gas check, a second
leak was found on slot 25 at nasa weco coupling. The agi system was shut down and depressurised and an icc put in place. An investigation team has been set up to determine the cause and
actions required to prevent re-occurence.
The inlet flange joint on 3" valve gr033 upstream of psv4205 on the regeneration gas heater was noted to be leaking by a person in the vicinity - the source of the leak was located by sound and
smell. The size of the leak was not insignificant but was no large enough to have been detected on the fixed monitoring systems in the area. The position of the leak was such that no isolations
were available, necessitating a platform shutdown to effect a repair. The potential for escalation from the event would a pear to be low at this stage and an investigation is in hand to determine the
cause of what is most likely a gasket failure.
Whilst recommisioning the water handling process the production operator was having difficulty in establishing the level in the <...> unit (v1200) due to an erratic leveltrol. The <...> unit is
effectively used as an atmospheric water settling tank for re oval of remaining oil before discharging the water overboard. The operator had shut in the outlet to the <...> as the level control valve
as passing, until reasonable levels were established. It appeared to him that the levels were still low. At this poin both high level alarms in the oil and water legs annunciated in the ccr as flow into
the <...> appeared to suddenly increase. The operator attempted to open the outlet valve to arrest the rise in levels but by this time oil and water had spilled out the op of the vessel creating a
small spill and spray of oil and water on to the deck. To prevent further release of liquids, the operator in the ccr manually initiated a level 3 shutdown of the process
Production had been shutdown due to an unrelated event at time of incident. C5010 gas compressor was offline. A crew member noticed smoke coming from the compression module and called
the ccr. Two operators were sent to the scene to investigate and discov red smoke and a small flame coming from the power turbine casing/gearbox drive shaft area of c5010 gas compressor. The
operators immediately knocked out the fire using a dry powder extinguisher. The fire was not picked up by fire & gas detection and so no alarm was activated and therefore no muster took place.
The fire team went to the scene to confirm the status and to cool down the area of the fire. The machine was fully isolated for detailed inspection and investigated before restarting production. The
ire had been caused by a small amount of lube oil leaking from a screwed fitting on the gear box drive casing which had been ignited by the hot surface of the power turbine casing. A full
investigation is being carried out into the incident.
Normal operations were in progress when a hydrocarbon gas release was noted.
Preventative maintenance was being performed on well a17 xmas tree. An instrument technician effected some local isolations to remove a number of pressure gauges. Having completed this
task the technician took the guages to the instrument workshop. A s ell of gas was noted by an operator approximately one hou later. He traced the leak to well a17 where gas was noted leaking
from 1/4" instrument pipework. The operator isolated the leak at the 9 5/8" annulus. Investigation concluded that the instrument technician had not applied the correct isolation. When the
instrument pipework was originally disconnected no gas leak occured. The technician did not cap the open end. It is assumed that some form of blockage was present in the pipework that cleared
wh lst the technician was working in the workshop.
The platform had been shutdown since <...> and train 2 gas compression (k202/203) remained shutdown while its compressor bundle was being changed out. During the start-up of train 1
compression (k102/103) gas passed from train 1 to train 2 via passi g valves and a open-ended pipe resulting in a gas release. A blank flange had been fitted in place of an nrv on k203's discharge
as an isolation while its bundle was being changed out. However, this flange had been fitted on the upstream-side instead of he downstream- side of the discharge pipework. The gas release was
detected by operators monitoring the start up for potential gas leaks. On finding the leak the plant was shutdown and depressured.
A production maintenance technician was tasked with cleaning two fuel gas filters (v400a & b). The task was performed on v400a using the appropriate operating procedure. For v400b the
technician had opened the line to the closed drains. However, it was n t possible to comply with the procedure as the relief line to flare was spaded. Assuming the filter was depressurised he
cautiously slackened the filter lid. A release of gas and liquid occurred activating an overhead gas detector to 20% lel. The chief perator was in the module and requested a manual shutdown as a
precautionary measure. Investigation concluded that the line to the closed drains was blocked and it was not possible to depressure the filter pot. The filter has been isolated to prevent use,
pending further investigation.

Having completed the isolation, an operator began removing an instrument drain plug on v111 when it blew off causing a release of gas (the operator was unfamiliar with the unusual isolation
valve type, ie the valve handle is in the open position when the andles are turned 90 degrees to the valve). Unable to stem the release, the operator radioed the control room and activated a plant
shutdown from outside the module. The control room operator activated a plant shutdown and blowdown. A nearby ground leve detector registered 20% gas. The instrument was later isolated
by the chief operator.
While the platform was shut down isolations were performed to allow a heat exchanger to be physically isolated to allow work at a later date. When the spades were fitted the permit was signed
off but the isolations were left in place. Unfortunately one o these isolations was a locked open drain valve on a line to flare which was isolated with a single isolation. When production was reinstated no problems were experienced until a high pressure compressor shut down and as a result blew down thereby incre sing the pressure in the flare system. This increase in pressure was
sufficient to cause gas to leak past the isolation valve and be vented from the drain point. The amount of gas released was very small but activated a gas detector a few feet away. Th duration
was a few seconds until the pressure in the flare returned to normal. The valve was isolated and production returned to normal. When a permit is signed off as complete, the isolations must be
returned to normal status and not put on long term i olation. The conditions that existed to make this isolation regime safe may change and the isolation standard may no longer be acceptable.
While drilling well n32 at depth 13,727 ft, a drilling mud hose suffered a major failure at swaged/bonded section while under pressure at 3900psi causing a loss of approx. 40 barrels of xpot oil
based mud into the sea. The hose connection was located in a area not normally accessed by personnel and nobody was in the vicinity. The hose was rated for swp of 4000psi and test pressure of
6250psi. The damaged hose was returned onshore for survey and analysis. New hose fitted and tested to 4500psi. Weather c nditions wind south-east 15 knots, air temp 5 degrees, sea temp 7
degrees, sea conditions moderate se sea and swell.
Normal production operation. Mcr received an alarm from sp21 that the well had shut in;operator sent to investigate. Discovered 12mm instrument line had parted at the pilots for uhmv on sp21
on the choke gantry. Oil was spraying from open 12mm line. Immed ate isolation put in place and repair undertaken.
Whilst investigating reported gas leak inside gas turbine z-1300, high leve gas was detected in combustion air inlet ducting resulting in esd level 3 - total platform shutdown. Gas was found to be
leaking from a fitting on the fuel gas system. The cause, hich allowed gas to remain in the system under pressure whilst the machine was shutdown, was eventually traced to an incorrect isolation
for unassociated work some 2-3 days earlier.
Whilst conducting fault finding on p-4003, high level gas was detected in the combustion air inlet ducting resulting in an esd-3 total platform shutdown. The machine was isolated whilst platform
was restarted. The unit remaining out of service whilst in estigations continue.
Following completion of maintance activity on the gas metering skid the equipment was being de-isolated. Durning the de-isolation gas escaped from the pipework into the module. The operator
immediately closed the valve to stop the release
At appromimalety 0200 hours the area operator for pr1 was carrying out routine checks on plant and equipment. At this time he observed an oil spill at the north end of the hydrocyclone skid
adjacent to the lp condensate pump. The operations supervisor was called to the area by the operator. Upon his arrival futher investigation revealed that the backing plate on pi 2654 (range 0-280
bar) had parted from the gauge body (the operations supervisor had already been in this area at approximalety 0145 hours and o leak was observed). No fuilds could actually be seen leaking from
the guage although hydrocarbon spillage was clearly visible. The quantity of oil released was estimated to be less than 50 litres. No gas alarms had been actived. Based on the evidence av ilabe
the investigation team concluded that the hydrocarbon leak path via the faulty weld located on the rear of the pressure indicator. Gas detectors in the area of the leak were tested to confirm all
were operational.
At 0445 hours gas was detected in pr1 (ge-085 gas head high high). The situation was investigated by the area operators and the operations supervisor and the leak was traced to a vent port on pi
4028 (condsensate metering). The plug was isolated at the <...> valve and changed out. On further investigation it was noted that the seat on the plug was damaged allowing gas to escape.

The operator had started intial shift plant checks when he noticed a distinct smell of smoke/hot lube oil coming from 'a' jbgt. On further investigation within the load gear box compartment, it was
found that a small amount of smoke was circulating within the compartment and subsequently being blown out of the compartment by the hvac fans. The operator reported to the main control
room operators and requested assisstance with further investigations of the compartment. On inspection of the compartment the intial assessment was that a small lube oil leak impinging on the
hot exhaust surface at the most northerly end of the gear box drive shaft (below no.2 bearing) was the most probable cause of the smoke. Whilst awaiting input from the goc on guidance on the
availabilty of 'c' jbgt and possible load reduction, the operator and the operations supervisor proceeded to carry out further investigation. On opening the east door to the load gear box
compartment 10-12" flames were evident at the most northerly point of the drive shaft. The door was closed and the operator and the operations supervisor return to the gcr for a co2 extinguisher
which was used to extingus the fire. The operations supervisor co-ordinated the reduction in load for shutdown of the unit in a manner not to compromise the other units. The unit was shutdown
<...> satellite indicated gas on deck. Release caused by fracture of instrument tube betweenhi/lo pilot and npt valve.underlying cause is movement of conductor and vibration.new fittings and
pipework installed as well as 1 extra guide to minimise movement.
Gas release from swab cap when pressure gauge broke off. Vibration believed to be primary causation.
Redundant flow lines were being removed by a pipefitter with an electric hacksaw. Unable to gain access to a stub fitting to cut it off, he walked around the header to a better position.
Unfortunately he positioned himself at the wrong flowline (origina ly there were 18 similarities) and began to cut the stub on that line which was live (gas 60 bar). As soon as he had penetrated
the stub gas was released. The oim sounded the ga and activated esd/blowdown. The leak path was small and no gas alarms were activated.
Two mechanical technicians were working on train 2 gas compression module. Four studs were loosened, one removed at one end of a compressor balance line when natural gas within the line
was released at a pressure of approximately 1290 psi. The gas was immediately deluged.
The pressure in the inner annulus of a wellhead is monitored by a pressure gauge connected to the annulus by small bore instrument pipework. The compression fitting connecting the small bore
pipework came apart for a reason still being investigated. The wells are natural gas. There were no injuries and the gas escape did not ignite.
Following opening of 3sdv6116 by piper main control room the downstream pipework of 3sdv6116 was exposed to 3.1 bar pressure. The outlet flange of this sdv immediately began to leak to
atmosphere (diesel initially from interface liquid seal in vessel 3c61 0 then gas). Local gas detector pr2-ge24 picked up low (10% lel) gas alarm. Operator was sent to investigate and found cloud
of gas/diesel in area. The operator then called the piper main control room to initiate a class 2 shutdown and blowdown (gpa was a so initiated). As a precautionary measure, the level of shutdown
was raised to class 1.
Whilst carrying out a routine inspection a technician heard a gas leak. This was traced to a small leak to the "destec" flowline joint. The installation was vented and the joint changed. The
defective joint was very badly corroded from the inside with about 50% of the material missing.
Following intrusive maintenance into the 12" gas line off the test separator, a pressure indicator vent line was found open and leaking hydrocarbon gas the valve and vent line had been used to
verify mechanical isolations made on the system unfortunatly t e valves had been left in the open position on pressurisation of the system. The gas leak did not cause a platform alarm.
The production department were lining up the well j14 to the test seperator. One operator operated the choke valve manually. During the operation the choke valve failed releasing hydrocarbons
from the valve actuator bonnet. The operator isolated the sect on op pipeline and drained to the closed drains system to stop the leak. The choke valve was removed for examination and
replacement the operator was not injured only contaminated with hydrocarbons.
High flow alarms and low pressure alarms annunciated in the ccr on the <...> platform for the 10" west riser on the water injection system. The ccr personnel immediately shut in the west water
injection manifold and the riser valve. The first valve close was well a6 and the pressure immediately stabilised. The prognosis was that the subsea flowline jumper had failed. This has now
been confirmed as the mode of failure following subsea inspection by the dsv <...> on <...>.
Hydrocarbon gas release (methane) from 1/2" s/s impluseline connecting the orifice to the dp cell during repressurisation of the plant. The gas was released in a zone 1 metering hut on the top
deck of the pd platform.
Bubble of toxic gas released from sump causing a single toxic gas head tg013 to alarm briefly at high level before returning to zero. Muster called in accordance with platform procedures.

Gas commpression system was in recycle mode following dga plant trip. At 15:27 gas heads in vicinity of c2 & c3 alarmed at low level. Quickly follwed by several other gas heads indicating
presence of gas below low level alarm point. Gas plant shut down an muster initiated. Subsequent investigation indicates that release was probrably caused by leakage from corroded pipework
beneath insulation. Detailed report to follow after lagging has been stripped.
<...> was in normal operational when a toxic (h2s) gas detector went into high level alarm (offscale>50ppm). An emergency muster was initiated from the ccr. All personnel were accounted for.
Ccr confirmed detector tg013 in vicinity of the south side dr in sump and wells t8/t6 was already falling. The area was checked by ert and a 8ppm h2s level recorded, source not identified. A
second sweep of the area failed to detect h2s or other hydrocarbon gas. The area was confirmed secure. The muster stood dow at 0542. A detailed investigation report will follow. No injuries, or
plant damage occurred.
Operational tests on <...> started to raise concern with the intregity of the <...> subsea test line. The <...> standby vessel <...> was requested on the <...> to check the <...> area at first light on
<...>. At 07.55 the sbv advised a roken sheen on the surface in the <...> area. The source was not confirmed. A dsv was mobilised. The csol <...> arrived in field <...> and at 11.55 noted patches
of oil and gas coming to surface. <...> production was shutdown. Rov and diver advised <...> flexible jumper parted from <...> wellhead.
Low level gas indication in m1 after <...> had an esd valve closure. (<...> process shutdown at time). Source found to be a leak- ing gasket at the gas lift inlet to fcv to ta05. Gasket changed out.
Gas compressor shutdown (train 1 was already shutdown and train 2 tripped on high discharge temperature). Leak emanted from <...> and <...> gas lift flow line fanges, one on <...> and two on
<...>.
H.p ngl pump discharge line failure occurred at a previously installed 'furmanite' clamp. The escaping ngl's immediately gasified and brought platform to g.p.a status and subsequent shutdown,
blowdown and power loss. The ngl pump stopped automatically (as per s/d philosophy), and the ngl/gas leak ceased. The gas dispersed within 30 seconds via the natural ventilation of the open
module.
Employee observed an ngl release from a pipe spool and activated a mac point. A pin hole leak had occurred on the discharge pipework of an ngl pump at the 11 o'clock position throught a weld
Natural gas liquids (ngl) leaked from pipe spool due to weld failure, which caused a change of platform status due to gas detection. Further investigations are ongoing.
During an rov survey of the nw face of the <...> a jacket, the rov discovered some bubbles of crude oil leaking from an instrument tapping point on the 8" <...> riser at a depth of 498ft. The
tapping point was found to be fitted with a damage redundant pr ssure transmitter. This was leaking a small quantity of crude causing a slight disclouration of the sea surface (<...> completed and
sent to the relevant authorities). As a result of the discovery the <...> riser was shut down and depressurised and no furt er leakage was observed. Wind speed was 9kts at 70 deg. Wave height 1m.
The use of the rov to close the two needle valves on the tapping point is being risk assessed at the present.
During a routine test on slot 21 a pinhole leak was observed at the 8 o'clock position on the 3" crude oil pipework outlet (line no 3" d3a- 1109-pa-t) of the test separator (09-410-2005) the leakage
at the time was predominately produced water and the sep rator was shutdown depressurised and isolated. A temporary propriety clamp was fitted until the 3" spool piece could be replaced with a
new one. The surrounding pipework was inspecteed ultrasonically for defects but no features were detected. The pinhole piece of pipe will be inspected in an attempt to determine the cause of
the pinhole.
During normal gas lift operations the operator in the area detected a 'smell' of gas. On further investigation a small leak was found, on the upstream flange of valve gp 1251 of the 6" to 4"
discharge line from the hp compressor. The compressor was immed ately shutdown under controlled shutdown sequence. The fixed gas detection did not pick up the leak due to the small amount,
the open configuration of the module, and wind direction.
During normal operations 'a' turbine showed a small gas reading of 19% of lel on one gas head, whilst the turbine was being changed over from fuel gas to diesel it tripped due to infra red
detection and halon was released in the enclosure automatically. A susequent blackout ensued due to running on one turbine at that time. On further investigation a small crack was found in the air
purge line to the diesel burners. During the changeover to diesel, diesel fuel had entered the line from the fuel block causi g a very small amount of diesel to be sprayed over the exhaust area
which evaporated, and activated the ir detector, halon release and turbine shutdown.

A production operator found a small condensate leak from a flange in the gas compression module. The system was shut down and the line depressurised. There were no gas alarms triggered due
to the small quantity and the open nature of the module. The leak as traced to a flange on the pipework from the lp discharge scrubber. The leaking condensate had been partially contained within
the insulation on the line. When the insulation was removed the leak was confirmed as coming from an rtj joint fitted with a s ectacle blind. After the bolts on the flange were tightened the joint
tested ok and the plant was restarted. The total volume of the leak was estimated at some 5-10 litres which had flashed off to atmosphere below the platform.
During a set run operation of the "a" turbine a fire and gas excutive action instigated a general alarm and halon released in the turbine enclosure. Platform personnel went to full muster. Intital
indications showed an infra red detector in alarm. On insp ction it was found that no fire was evident. On further inspection a diesel leak was located on the turbine itself. After confirmation that
the diesel supply had been isolated, platform personnel were stood down.
The fire and gas system on gas turbine 'c' detected a small leak on the fuel gas pipework. The turbine was immediately shut down under control. It was investigated and found to be leaking from
the main distribution manifold for the gas burners on the ga generator. Turbine has remained shut down and manifold will be replaced by the wglit turbine engineers.
Following a loss of platform generation and production, an operator detected gas coming from the cabinet containing the specific gravity analyser system for monitoring import gas quality. The
isolation valves to the cabinet were closed in and the cabinet ented. The equipment was manufacturered by <...> and problem believed to be associated with the regulator diaphragm. The
equipment to remain isolated until investigation complete and recommendations actioned.
During preparations to isolate the 'b' gas turbine it was noticed that diesel was emanating from the fuel pump. The system was immediately isolated and made safe. On detailed inspection it was
found that the 'o' type ring seal on a pressure gauge tap-in n the pump body had opped out of its location. This resulted in fuel spraying towards the enclosure door. Had the turbine been
operational, there was the potential for a fire.
Production operator found a small condensate leak from a flange in the gas compression module. Portable gas detection equipment recorded 4% lel in the surrounding area and 9% lel around the
leaking flange. The system was immediately shut down and the lin depressurised. There were no gas alarms triggered due to the small quantity and the open nature of the module. The leak was
traced to a flange on the pipework from the lp discharge scrubber. The leaking condensate has been partially contained within the nsulation on the line. When the insulation was removed, the leak
was confirmed as coming from an rtj joint. The <...> plant has remained shut down until cause identified the total volume of the leak was estimated to some 3 - 4 litres which had flashed off t the
atmosphere below the platform.
Normal production operations ongoing. Fire and gas system showed a detector in the gas compression module reading 40% lel. A number of further detectors then started showing gas.
Compressor shutdown on f&g executive action. Gas levels then decayed before eaching the point where the f&g system would trigger a full plant shotdown and general alarm. On closer
investigation using portable detection, operators found that a 3/8 " helix impulse line instrument tap point had been sheared.
Discovered gas/liquid leak on well no1 flowline flange downstream of choke flange. Well isolated and flowline depressured to effect repair.
Pig train sent, with 2 off 0 -1 g beg sources from <...> to <...> platform - when arrived at <...> one source plus holder missing. Suspect at <...> reception facillities - preparing to track source
using special equipment. <...> onboard.
Esd 3 platform blackout and full muster caused by detection of fuel gas in power generation turbine z-1300 (gt4) combustion air inlet ducting during machine start up. N.b. gt4 was shutdown to
investigate duel fuel operational problems and was being test un. The gas detected had migrated from the machine combustion chamber to the inlet ducting and not from an external source.
A section of the south mezz deck walkway grating main support structure gave way whilst installing a replacement grating panel.
7" liner set- dart not released-poor cement bond-drilled out with 9.2/ gal mud-1.2 bbl influx 1900 psi casing pressure-circulate out brine influx with 14.8/gal-squeeze50 bbls cement @ shoe-wait
on cement

After completion of well a tubing to annulus communication was noted. Well has installed gas lift valves with aflas seals. Initially thought cause of tubing to annulus communication was that seals
require higher temperature and longer exposure for energis tion when compared to standard seals. Well retested 5 days later. During test communication still evident. Asv has been subsequently
tested and held pressure. Well returned to production, pending workover currently scheduled for <>. During workove investigation programme will be performed and gas lift valves will be
replaced if necessary.
As part of routine test on well <> tubing-annulus communication noted. Annulus build-up recorded 153 psi in 2 hrs, equates 16422 scf/hr - above mobil drilling and prod procedures
recommendation of 900 scf/hr. Well asv and dhsv both tested with good test . Leak path evidently below asv. Well returned to production and leak investigation programme planned. Dhsv and asv
to be tested every three weeks to ensure integrity, until leak investigation performed.
After a routine tubing/annulus communication check, it was identified that the 9 5/8" annulus pressure could not be bled down to zero pressure. On shutting in the 9 /58" annulus, the pressure
increased from 49psi to 330psi in 40 minutes. Repeated attemp s to blow down the 9 /58" annulus resulted in subsequent pressure build-up. The the thp remained at +/- 725psi throughout the
build-ups. The dhsv and asv have been tested and are operational. There is no tubing to annulus communication above the dhsv.
After a routine wellhaead maintenance and tubing/annulus communication check, the folllowing was identified: the hydraulic master valve *(hmv) and production wing valve (pwv) failed
integrity test. These tests were conducted on <>. As this placed th well outside the mnsl dapp procedure, the well was immediately shut in and a program issued to safely isolate this well until
work over could be scheduled.
Hydraulic master valves (hmv) and production wing valve (pwv) failed integrity tests. In addition the dhsv failed to completely close, possibly due to scale.
After a routine wellhead maintenance and tubing/annulus communication check, the following was identified: the lower master valve (lmv) failed an integrity test possibly due to a sheared
operating spindle. The dhsv is closed but unable to be tested due to the unknown position of the lmv gate. As this placed the well outside the mnsl dapps procedure, the well was again isolated on
<>.
Tubing to annulus communication was previously identified and subsequently a-1 injection valve run below the leak path to isolate the wellbore from the reservoir in <>. <> perforations
were added in <>, but efforts to re-run the a-1 injection valve failede resulting in a slickline/toolstring fish. Subsequently, a tubing bridge plug was run to above the slickline fish at 7,546ft
wlrkb to determine tubing integrity. The bridge plug was successfully pressure tested from above and t that time noted that the annulus pressure was following the tubing pressure up. An a-1
injection valve was run on a tubing packer to 7,550ft wlrkb but failed when inflow tested. An attempt to retrieve the packer/a-1injectionvalve was aborted when the lickline hung-up in similar
fashion to the operation which resulted in the slickline fish. A plug was set in the trdhsv at (710ft mdrkb and a successful leak-off test performed (well temporarily suspended)). Therefore, tubing
to annulus communication ha been confirmed between trdhsv at 710ft mdkrb and bridge pug set at 7,546ft wlrkb. Forward plan is to make a second attempt to re-run the a-1 injection valve on a
packer and commence water injection at a restricted rate (slickline fish) until a workover
While attempting to cycle open an omega uni-balance pressure plug installed in the tubing string on well a20 a gas alarm and platform shutdown occurred at the <> cement unit. The unit was
using water to cycle the plug open at 2300'. The tubing vo ume to this depth is approximately 53bbls and the cement unit was being utilised in order to maintain close volume control. The plug
was cycled 11 times with no apparent flow seen from well through the rig choke manifold. The 12th cycle attempt was bled d wn recovering the fluid used to pressure up system and was followed
by a surge of fluid containing gas. The bleed off line was immediately closed off, however the gas detectors had already tripped causing a platform shutdown and loss of production.
Well a2 being isolated and flowline depressured for intrusive choke valve maintenance. Surface safety hydraulic master valve started to open due to logic of control panel. Release was through a
"bleed valve attached to the swab cap. Well subsequently fu ly depressured above sub-surface safety valve. Full report attached.
Drilling 6" hole sect. Inc. With 10.8ppg mud. Flowcheck made foll. Drilling break. Observed press. Build up after end of circ. Period. Cont. Circ. Conventionally. Suspected well might be u
tubing no further difficulties.
Running completion on <...> well was killed with 12.2ppg & been in static condition for two days when it was noticed flowing. Well was shutin,opsc. Kill pill(hi-vis) was pumped = 60bbls &
displaced 12.4 ppg brine. Total of 15bbls were bullheaded away to the formtion observed wel. Well static cont. Run completion.
Well handed to production engineer for chemical squeeze. Well handover sheet completed showing blowdown v/v open. V/v subsequently left open whilst well was opened and a gas release (hp)
occurred. Operator immediately shut the well and reported the releas to the ccr.

Drilling 8 1/2" section. Exoerience 8 bbls/hr dynamic losses. No static losses. Gascut mud returns. Stopped drilling. Flowchecked, well flowed. Closed in well on annular preventer. Attempted to
circulate (drillers method) with 30 spm. Unable to pressure u to required pst (1060 psi). Mixed lcm material and condition mud in reserve pits. Monitored closed in well for 4 hrs. No secondary
buildup. Performed regular flow checks. All static. Gascut mud at bottoms up. Flowcheck static. Closed annular preventer bu did not close in well on choke.routed 40 bbls gascut mud via poor
boy degasser. Opened up annular preventer. Flowcheck static. Pump out of hole @ 30 spm. Spot 40 bbls lcm above top sand @ 11850 ft. Continued pooh into window. Circulate bottoms up. No
dynamic losses. Flowcheck static.
Drilled 8 1/2 hold to 13487ft, very slow progress. Pumped out 28 stands & 2 singles, noticed 70bbl gain in active pit. Closed in well, no pressure observed. Open well, observed slight flow, rih 2
singles and installed kellylock. Closed in well, sicp 220ps , total influx 100bbl bit depth 11678ft, mudwt in use 620pptf. Circulated drillers method, observed losses. Attempted to strip in with
650pptf mud. Open well, no flow, no losses. Attempt to free strings, so far without success.
Stopped circulation. Monitored well over trip tank. Well flowing. Closed in well on annular preventer after 20 bbls gain. Monitored pressure build-up in annulus (float in drill pipe). Initial
pann=300psi, build up to pann=350psi. Circulate 650pptf mud @ s m (first circulation drillers method). Pst=650psi. Pch (initial)=450psi, pch (final)=80psi. Light mud returns (635pptf). No
hydrocarbons. Closed in well after 120% bottoms up closed in pann=100psi. Bleed of pressure in 50psi stages to zero. Total returns bbls. Flowcheck over triptank, well static. Continued
circulating and conditioning mud. Completed wiper trip to section td @ 13487ft. Pooh.
Whilst snubbing in (under well pressure of 2700 psi) a gas lift insert string (glis) on well <...> using a hydraulic workover unit (hwu), it was noticed that the well started to flow through the glis. A
kelly-cock was installed onto the glis and the well was brought under control after a minor release of hydrocarbons. The glis completion consisted of; a tailpipe with 2 wireline retrievable back
pressure valves (check valves) 2-3/8" 13%cr l80 tubing with cs hydril connection and 5 side pocket mandrels (spm) with pre-installed dummy gas lift valves. (all assemblies were tested in the
onshore work- shop to 5000 psi for 15 mins. <...>'s body tested on the <...>, check valve assemblies tested from below on the <...>). The <...> was configured from the wellhead up as follows;
<...> blind/shear rams, <...> annular, <...> 2-7/8" pipe rams, <...> 2-3/8" - 3-1/2" variable bore rams, <...> 2-7/8" stripper & a <...> annular. Upper kill & choke lines were fitted between the <...>
blind rams & the <...> variable bore rams, there was also lubrication & bleed off lines between the <...> strippers. Portable gas meters were positioned in the workbasket of the unit prior to
runningglis the check valve assemblies were tested to tubing head pressure 500 psi for 15 mins. Against the workover valve block by closing the upper annular bop. The string was run in hole
<...> investigation into premature activation of radial cutting torch. Sequence of events. Well intervention work to shut off water in well <...> was in progress. Part of the task required the tail pipe
on the isolation packer to be severed, this was to be carried out using a 'radial cutting torch'. The tool string was made up as per the 'operating manual' and run into well at02:45 on <...>, the top of
the isolation packer was tagged at 4630 mbrt at 05:30. After several attempts to run into the packer the tool was recovered to surface with the intention of removing the 'nogo' ring which was
thought to be preventing the tool entering the packer. On retrieving the tool it was noted that it had fired and that the lower half with the nogo' ring was missing. Immediate actions. <...> checked
the annulus pressures on the well to confirm the integrity of the tubing, all were as per initial readings prior to running the tool, he then contacted the onshore well service support group and
advised them of the problem. Initial investigation into cause of incident. Interviews with both of the <...> engineers, <...> and <...>, confirmed that the tool had been made up properly and at no
time during the run had the tool been fired deliberately <...> demonstrated the firing sequence to <...> (oim) and <...> (fso), the system is such that accidental initiation is not possible. <...> then
Circulated bottom up on a junk run from 13383ft. Gas level increased to 36%. Driller flowchecked - no flow, shut well in. No pressure build up. Circulated remaining bottoms up volume through
choke/poorboy degaser as a precaution until gas level dropped to 0%
Drilling operations were in progress with 8 1/2" hole @ 13341ft in the kimmeridge foramation. Surface gas readings increased rapidly and the well was flowchecked. After 15mins flow was
observed and the well was closed in. After pressures had stabilised an the relevant well kill preparations had been put in place the well was killed using the wait 8 method. This was only partially
successful using 13.7ppg mud & further well kill operations were implemented to kill the well, successfully with 14.5ppg mud. he well was then flowchecked, opened up and normal drilling
operations resumed.
Having set the 7" liner to isolate a high pressure zone of kimmeridge formation, the mud density in the hole was subsequently reduced in preparation for the lesser pressured reservoir. On drilling
out the shoe track a kick was taken associated with 10 bbl influx. The influx was circulated out and then heavier mud circulated to balance formation pressure.
Completion string was being pulled fm well d7 for change out of the esp. Well had previously been circulated with brine. Suspected that packer at lower end of completion was tight within the
casing. Possibility of shabbing expected.
During routine annuli checks in eggbox-2 an operations tech observed that the 'a' annulus 1/2" pipe-work downstream of the dublok valve had sheared. The annuli contained treated seawater at
zero pressure. The 3" mcevoy and dublok valve were subsequently isolated. Actions - investigation team set up.

Whilst carrying out drilling operations on <...> well <...>, the top hydril bop had to be closed. At that time in the programme the well was open hole into the reservoir and loggong whilst drilling
operations were in progress. The well was cased to 2773 meter and the tool was 10 meters below the case shoe when the tool encountered an obstruction. During an attempt to drill and slide
through the obstruction the hole was packed off and circulation was lost. The tool was worked free and a high gas reading was bserved at the drill floor and the tool was pulled back into the
shoe. Observation of the annulus showed gas bubbling, and gas was evident at the shale shakers with a trace of oil in the returns. Top hydrill on bop was closed and well checked for pressur for
two hours. Onshore drilling engineers contacted and a circulation plan agreed to allow for two full circulations of drill pipe and annulus down to td. After each circulation flowchecks are to be
carried out. As there was no pbu it is believed this wa migration due to the period of time logging of the well has taken. Thus normal well procedures allow for this event.
The drill string was run in to the bottom of the will. Prior to drilling ahead the mud was buing circulated and conditioned. As the mud from 'botton uup' reached the surface gas was detected in the
mud. This was also detected by the platform gas
Down-hole safety valve on this water injector well was routinely tested. Failed to stop backflow of water from the formation. Both master valves have been successfully integrity tested. Generic
risk assessment for water injectors, where a dhsv failure has occurred, is in place. It is considered to be the most safe to continue injecting until remedial action can be taken and dispensation has
been given for this.
During routine testing of the tubing retrievable downhole safety valve, the valve failed to close. A repeat test was conducted and the valve still failed to close. The well has been left shut-in
pending remedial action to occur over the next few days [cur ently waiting on weather].
Whilst pulling production tubing in order to replace an electrical submersible pump. Gas alarms were initiated, on examination oil (approx 3-4 barrrels) had escaped through the blow out
preventer. The well was shut in and water (filtered sea water) was in ected to "kill" the well. The operation of pulling the tubing had been on going for about 12 hours when the incident occurred.
Echo meter readings verifying depth of fluid were being taken after every 10 stands of pipe had been removed. The cause of the r lease of crude oil & gas is thought to be a release of a pocket of
gas entrapped in the submersible pump. Its subsequent expansion raised the fluid level rapidly bringing the crude oil to the surface. There was no fire/explosion and no one suffered injury
During routine well maintenance it was discovered that slot 23 dhsv failed open. There was no loss of containment, nor was the integrity of well threatened, due to the upper master valve, lower
master valve and wing valve still available. The normal flow ath is through the upper master valve, through wing valve to the flowline, which has a choke control flow control valve. The three
way split to different manifolds each have their own double isolation. A well team complete with the relevant equipment have been mobilised in order to change out the dhsv.
Whilst rimming in hole bha became stuck,repeated jarring released it suddenly.once pulled out of hole logging suite was found to be missing which included 2x radioactive sources
cs.137,74gbq,nos 1225gw & am 241/be,185gbq nos 1372k. Drill collar covertor , rill floor & hud system checked for contamina- tion.they were not contaminated.
The well was circulated to seawater under controlled conditions. After pressure tests and clean up we commenced pulling out of the hole with the clean up assembly. 22 stands were pulled out
with the hole taking the correct volume and no indications of s abbing. With the bit at 19,910 ft flow was observed from the drillpipe. The well was closed in with 2050 psi on the drill pipe and
annulus.
Kick while drilling s60 @ 11752 ft. Correct procedure by driller, correct operation of equipment
Whilst logging up through reservoir.(s60) with drill pipe conveyed logs@ 11655 ft. Proper fluid displacement. Was not ocurring. Hydril was closed to circulate well to fluids to disperse off any
invading fluids from reservoir (none was found) gas cut. Mud irculated to surface through. Choke gas. <...>.
<...> whilst drilling 8 1/2" hole with 645 pptf mud at 11115ft ahd (8871 ft tvd) the driller observed a 4 bbl pit increse and flow checked the well, which was seen to be flowing. The well was
closed in and the following pressures recorded.
Drilling 8 1/2" hole at 15341 ahbdf (9683 tvd). Well kicked. Well shut in on t.p.r's. Then transferred to bag. Initial pdp-240psi pann 160 psi final pdp-410psi pann 380psi after 1 hour. Pit gain 20
bbls (not accurate). Drilling mud weight .655psi/ft. Kill mud weight .718psi/ft (includes 200psi overbalance). Kill method wait and weight. Dp pressure fell to 370psi decide to kill with no
overbalnce. Kill mud weight 700 pptf. (also losses have been seen at 15263' (9260 tvd).
During initial function of dhsv via remote well head panel pressure was seen to drop suddenly to zero. On investigating a pipe was found to have become detached from a fitting on inspection it
was noted that fitting had not been made up. Refitted pipe & tested.

Following replacement of tree on subsea well <...> (by <...>) they were unable to obtain satifactory leak off test on dhsv production to continue following assessment procedure by ah onshore to
offshore management
When drilling ahead 81/2" hole at 11,847 ft.md/11593 ft tvd gas alarms on dp shaker area d3 were activated at 20% initiating gpa and at 60% lel initiating level 3 shutdown and associated
production shutdown (level 2) well j18 was closed in with sicp=620ps sid=660psi. The well was circulated to kill mud of 13.1 ppg then to 13.9ppg. No influx volume was recorded. All gas
circulated out as per procedures.
Observed flow from well <...> while drilling 8.5" hole. Closed in well and monitored pressures. Used wait/weight method to regain control over well.
Observed oil at surface after in flow testing from well ta-25s1. Circulated to kill mud.
During a routine hydrostatic pressure test on <...> well a2 a failure occurred at the flx pacher. The failure resulted in the surface held section of 2 3/8" and 5 1/2" tubing being displaced vertically
through the riser. The drill floor was not occupied at the time, in accordance with pressure test procedure, and no injuries resulted. An accident investigation is currently underway to establish the
cause of the failure. Operational activity at the time of incident was running a new completion.
He was about to reinstall the hooking arrangement on the stern of the lifeboat afetr 4 pm certification. Instead of using a chain block for adjusting the hook, the crane was used directly. The crane
was asked to move up 1 cm and at the sametime he tried t align the boltholes using his finger, the tip of the finger (half the nail) was cut off.
Whilst supply vessel was receiving back loads from platform <> apparently caught his right hand in load. It would appear that during positioning operations he became unbalanced on the
vessel deck and fell# forward. This could have been caused by an accumlation of events.
During rigging down operations a grease control unit was being moved from adjacent to the dog house to the entrace of the v door by use of a tugger. Two assistants were guiding the unit towards
the door access (raised approx. 4" from floor) when the load as lowered, one of the assistants sustained a fracture to his right foot when the underside of the unit clipped the top of his foot.
Whilst installing an 8 inch vent spool to the <...> riser system, the spool was suspended overbaord for fixing at the two flange points. The spool was to be rigged and lfted to the horizontal
position for bolting to pre-installed pipe work. Whilst positio ing the spool using chain blocks the lower flange snagged on a scaffold fitting bolt. As the lower flange became unsnagged, the
upper flange spun into the scaffold handrail trapping and crushing the injured person's hand resulting in the injury.
A water container suspended by a crane suddenly dropped onto foot of injured person. Water was being transferred from one container to another. Failure of crane suspected, cause yet to be
determined.
The injured party was involved with routine drilling operations on the rig floor. The ip inadvertently stepped forward, placing him below the elevators which were being lowered at the time. The
elevator horns struck a glancing blow to the ip's hard hat. His fall was arrested by a colleague. He was attended to on the scene by the platform medic prior to removal to sick bay for further
treatment and observation.
Commenced erecting haki scaffold base. Standard fell over srtriking ip on back of safety helmet approximately one inch above bottom edge and also stricking ip on back of skull, knocking ip
unconscious. Examined by medic and doctor, transferred to hospital for precautionary x-ray and observation.
Rope change out on the east crane. Weather overcast and raining. The main hoist rope was being spooled off the drum into a skip on the pipedeck below. There was two turns left on the winch
drum and the rope socket was turned to the correct position for th new rope going on. The old rope was not tied off. Suddenly the rope retaining wire snapped and the rope broke free, falling
downwards to the direction of the skip. The ip was standing next to the skip pushing the rope into the skip when the untethered ro e fell on him injuring his arm.
Whilst pulling out of hole, in the process of applying the tongs to the drill pipe, ip's left hand was caught in the jaw of the break out tongs. Ip attended the medic who assessed the injury as a soft
tissue injury to the left index finger. Ip recieved first aid treatment, was stood down for rest onboard to the end of shift and returned to work on light duties next shift. Ip eft the platform <> at
the end of tour - he reported on <> that he advises he attended his gp who reffered him for x-ray which determined he had sustained three hairline fractures of his left index finger.

<> were rigging up a hoist on the skid deck level above b30. This required a hoist to be disconnected by a sling/shackle to a spreader beam. Once the beam was over the hole in the deck the
hoist was to be lowered through. It was during this operation t at the accident occurred the hoist chain had been lowered through the hole but the body of the hoist required turning before it could
be pushed through. In the process of manually turning the hoist it want through the hole in the deck due to the weight of the chain and trapped the injured parties hand.
Roustabout/pusher was guiding load of drill collar suspended on crane pendeant on the northwest pipedeck. The load struck an h frame of a sampson post trapping injured parties hand between
the load and the post causing laceration and fracture to is right iddle finger and possible fracture of adjacent finger.
Working in rig 2 on the monkey board running back drill pipe. The main block came into contact with the monkey board. While tripping pipe out of the hole, ip was working on the monkey
board. He was pulling back a stand of pipe after unlatching the elev tors. The driller was lowering the travelling blocks, which hit the monkey board, causing it to spring up and hit injured party
on the right leg.
<...>, roughneck, was guiding a crossover into the iron roughneck, to be made up to a bha in the rotary table. The roughneck operating the controls on the iron roughneck closed the pipe spinner
across the crossover before it was fully located ins de it. This resulted in the crossover being ejected outwards, forcing <...>'s hand against a stand of drillpipe suspended from the top drive above
the rotary table
Lowering steel plates from main deck to 23m level via platform crane. The load stuck an obstruction as it was being landed, the injured person was holding on to the steel plates and they swung
against a waste skip crushing his hand between the skip and the plates.
At 23.25 on <...> whilst working on the drill floor the floorman was assisting in the removal of the elevators from the bails in order to pick up the kelly. The elevators were supported by a sling
and tugger winch. One side of the bails was freeded whil t ip was freeing the other side the elevators twisted round and he momentarily caught his left hand little finger between the elevator horns
and the bails. As his finger became sore he consulted the bravo medic who on examination suspected a fractured fin er. Ip was medivaced to the beach the following day <...> were <...>
confirmed he had fractured the bone in the tip of his little finger in his left hand. Ip was 5hrs 25 mins into his shift and two days into a 14 day work cycle action
Ip was attempting to operate the interlock mechanism of the pob deck crane runway transverse beams. This mechanism is operated by a chain pull bell crank that releases a cam device which
allows the transverse trolley to be aligned for cross movement. As he pulled the operating chain the lever and chain (weight approx. 1kg) became detached and fell hitting him a glancing blow to
the right shoulder. The retaining pin for the lever had previously been fitted with a sub-specification bolt that had worn and c me loose. The lever mechanism had been reported defective the
previous day and had been given an initial examination (restricted due to lack of scaffold access) but not taken out of service. Actions taken to prevent recurrence:- 1 sparrows to review inte rity
of the securing pin design. 2 include checks of the transfer trolley lever/pin mechanism as part of the sparrows maintenance management document. 3 advise other platforms of this incident. 4
highlight the incident at platform tool box talks, with mphasis to take equipment out of service if its safe operation is suspect, and bring this to the attention of the area authority.
While lifting bundle of pup joints, a bundle of two heavy weight drillpipe joints shifted. The movement of the hw bundle struck the back of the right foot of the injured person, compressing it and
causing it to be trapped. Alert action on part of the ba ksman resulted in the ip's foot being quickly freed. The person was 10.5 hrs into his shift. 1) stopped job to investigate. 2) reinforce current
pipe handling awareness campaign. 3) review pipedeck stacking practice.
Running completion on <...>. Dry/daylight hours. 4.75 s.w.l. shackle. North "v" door tugger. Tugger line running against "reda" cable. Lead floorman went up derrick and secured line out of the
way by means of a shackle. (not moused). Running line bac ed off the shackle pin resulting in the fall. Pin hit <...> and "d" section bounced off the floor and gave a glancing blow to his partner.
(no injury).
While standing on drill floor, struck on arm by an object which fell from racking board level (90ft)

The ip was carrying out his floorman duties on the rig floor. He was 11.75 hours into his working shift and 12 days into his tour of duty. The derrickman was racking back a stand of 6.5/8" drill
pipe at monkey board level when his safety helmet fell off nd dropped to the rig floor (85') and struck the floorman on his safety helmet. Initially the floorman stated that he had no ill effects but
later complained of a sore neck. He was examined by the platform medic who arranged for him to be sent in to <...> for a precautionary medical examination. As a result he was given some
painkilling medication and pronounced fit to return to work. Initial investigation revealed that the derrickman's helmet was not secured as directed by <...> procedure for orking aloft, which state
that a chin strap will be worn and recommends additional safety lanyard attachment. This procedure is to be reviewed abd reinforced to all platform crews at safety meetings.
A fire occurred during maintenance activities on the puq hazardous area open drains caisson. The 2 mechanical technicians in the area were caught in the initial flash and received superficial
burns to the ears. They escaped from the area. Automatic delug and shutdown / blowdown occurred. The general alarm was sounded and the pob was mustered. The fire was extinguished using
foam applied by the platform emergency response teams. The area was made safe and 'sterilised' pending the arrival of an investiga ion team from bp and the hse. Full details of the investigation
findings will be forwarded in due course,including notification of over 3 day injury if it becomes applicable.
During work on the platform programmable logic control, a fault caused the platform to shutdown system to operate. This in turn activated the vent line xv on the diesal storage legs. The
compressed air vented from an 8" line at 160psi and the nesuing rele se struck the ip on the back. The ip was examined by the medic who found no signs of injury, but rested the ip for the day.
Whilst the ip still suffered pain, he was sent to the doctor onshore, who also found no signs of injur but referred him to his own pp. The platform is not connected to the reservoir and is being
commissioned at present.
During an unplanned deluge release the ip was making his way out of the wellbay area, when he came into contact with a fixed hand valve. The deluge was operating in this wellbay area at the
time of injury. The ip was assisted to his feet and walked to the sick bay. He was attended to by the platform medic then transferred to a & e at ari. The injured person had worked for 13 days of a
14 day rota. He was in ninth hour of his shift period of 12 hours. He was undertaking pre-commissioning work on well bio xmas tree.
A flange on one of the platform's compressor trains failed at 2600 psi, resulted in an escape of some 250 m3 of gas. The event occurred during installation and testing of a joint blind. The event
was considered very similar to the <...> accident in <...>.
A fire broke out in a turbine at 0700 hrs and was quickly put out by the emergency fire-fighting system within the closed space of the turbine. Production was automatically shut down.
Preparations were made to evacuate the 69 persons on board, but this was called off.
While working on the uk <...> field, the standby vessel <...> lost power in its steering and got adrift in 5-8 metre waves and 35-knot winds. 130 non-essential personnel on the <...> platform were
airlifted after fears that the vessel would hit the platform. Helicopter was called to the area and other standby vessels tried to get a towline on the vessel. At 2310 hrs the next day tow was
connected by the <...> anchor-handling vessel.
Standby vessel <...>, reported that a supply vessel of approx 4,000 tonnes was heading towards the platform on a possible collision course and they had been unable to contact the vessel. Platform
gpa and muster initiated and emergency response plan implemented. Contact was established approx 20 mins before the closest point of approach and the vessel altered course.the vessel was the
<...> and was returning from the <...> platform, approx 10.25 miles from north east of <...>. At this time the <...> platform was on the second day of a planned shutdown, and plant was already
closed in.
On <> the supply vessel <> was bunkering potable water on the n side of accommodation platform ap1. During this operation the vessel experienced total loss of propulsion. The vessel
drifted in an easterly direction toward the <> parting the bunkering hose. The vessel master was able to use his bow thrusters for limited steering
<...> - Fishing vessel <...> fouled her nets in the area of <...> field at 06:30hrs. Co-ordinates <...>. Vessel freed from snagging at 08:00hrs approx. Leaving half her net remaining at the site (as
advised y vessel skipper). Subsequent rovsurvey carried out in the evening of <...> have revealed damage to subsea wellheads <...> (Manifold Valve Hydraulic Jumper) and <...> (Gas bubbles
were observed escaping from flowline jumper on downstream side of fl xible coupler, approx 1.5m from tree).Further survey to take place in next few days to assess real extent of damage once
marine growthj and trawl debris removed. Both wells shut in and isolated.
The port stern side of the <...> then glanced across the splash zone of the south east leg of the installation.

At 15.58 hrs on the <...> the <...> the standby vessel for the <...> platform (official number <...>) was observed from the platform not displaying any navigational lights. The platform was advised
that the <...> had lost all power and was drifting towards the platform the oim initiated emergency procedures onboard the platform and notified hm coastguard. The <...> platform standby vessel
transferred to the scene and attended the <...>. The <...> drifted north of the <...> pl tform and reported at 16.55 that all power and main engines had been restored. The platform was then advised
that a replacement stand by vessel the <...> would relieve the <...> at 06.00 hrs <...>. The master of the <...> reported th t the loss of power was due to his number one generator tripping causing
all load to be transferredto his number four generator which then shutdown due to overload causing total loss of electrical and consequential loss of main engines.
The incident occured when the supply vessel <...> was discharging/loading deck cargo on the north side of the <...> platform. The heading of the vessel was 025 degrees. The vessel had just
loaded a lift on port side mid-ship, for which the ma ter had to come close to the platform. The boat went too close and came in contact with a diagonal brace of the structure. This was remarkable
by some of the platform personnel, who described the effect as if a wave had hit the platform. The master of the <...> immediately reported the incident to the radio operator who advised the oim.
The platform structure was visually inspected and no damage could be observed. The <...> master was called by radio and confirmed that: * the vessel made only monir contact with the platform
and he could not observe any damage from his deck. * all equipment was working properly and the cause of the incident was a human fault. Superficial pain scraches on the diagonal brace were
subsequently insp cted by means of abseilers, and the diagonal brace were
The incident occurred during a cargo transfer operation at the <> platform. The vessel <> had taken up position alongside the north face of the platform . The vessel master has stated that the
tide was pushing the vessel tow rds the platform hence the requirement to move and re-position. During this manoeuvre the vessel clipped the underdeck walkway. No damage was caused to the
platform, the vessel steaming light was broken and the after mast bent by approximately 10 degrees The weather conditions at this time were as follows: Wind - 326 degrees, @ < 1kt Visibility 10+ Nautical Miles Sea & Swell - 0.8 m. A full incident investigation has been initiated.
At 1204hrs while bunkering water, the <> made contact with the A5 boat bumper (Platform South/West corner) after it's bow thruster hydraulic system caused the controls to momentarily stick
in the "Hard to Port" position. The weather cond tions at the time of the incident were Wind WNW - 25-30kts. Sea - 1-2 metres with max swell of 3 metres. Once control of the bow thruster
hydraulic system was regained the bunkering hose was removed and the boat moved away from the platform to perform c ntrolled testing of the bow thruster hydraulic system. The hydraulic
system functioned correctly and nothing conclusive was found. The boat bumper was dented and the top support pipe has a slight kink on the top side.
Vessel ROV support <> using platform as way mark on Auto Pilot. Auto Pilot not switched off until vessel 10 to 60 metres from installation.
Whilst moving the vessel from the southern side to the eastern side of the unity platform there was a failure of the ships starboard "taut wire boom" causing the vessel to swing starboard. At the
time the vessel was engaged in rov work at <> unity
Standby Vessel coming alongside and collided with platform brace. Incurred damage to vessel ballast tank but persons onboard platform unaware of any apparent damage to platform
Two x 1.5 tonne come-a-long chain pulls were being used to provide lateral support for the <...> lubricator during chemical cutting operations, these were attached to structural steelwork using 2
tonne slings. The <...> chemical cutter was run to sever the 4.5" 13.5 lbs/ft fox chrome tubing at 736ft. The weight of tubing including buoyancy factor 8073 lbs, the block weight was 62000 lbs.
Weight was taken on the tubing before the cut (75000 lbs) on weight indicator, this gave an over pull of 5 00 lbs. On the tubing. Prior to the <...> cutting the tubing, the driller, slackened the chain
pulls in anticipation of some upward movement when the tubing parted. The cut was initiated. At this point the tubing jumped approximately 3 ft. In the s ips, the upward movement caused the
chain pulls to tighten more than expected causing the chain on one of the blocks to part. Weather was fine, sea state 0.5 to 1.0 mts., Wind 8 to 10 knots sse, visibility 8 miles plus.

During an operation to lift the wireline lubricator, completed with wireline tool. The lubricator was lifted off the deck approximately six feet. The banksman signalled to stop lifting and to boom
up to position the lubricator above the BOP's. T was a this time the brake failed to hold the weight and the lubricator dropped to the main deck. It then stepped into the hatchway of well B8,
lodging between the htachside and the B.O.P. Additional pressure was applied to the whipline brake, arresting any f rther movement. The lubricator came to rest about 20-30 degrees from the
vertical. As the lubricator came to rest, the tool string protudedapproimately 6 feet into the well bay and the plug pin sheared and drooped the plug. The plug fell onto the gra ed well head
mezzaaine deck.At the time of the incident well B8 was shut in and isolated, with the following valves closed: Down hole safety valve; Manual Master valve; Swab valveand Hydraulic wing.
Following the incidentthe incient the whip line bra e was inspected and tested and found to be in full working ordeer. It was therefore concluded that the crane driver had failed to apply sufficient
pressure to the whip line brake pedal, allowing the whip line to free fall when the control level was returned to its neutral position.
Crane positioned over lift but boat pulled away. Container dragged down the boat and went overboard.
On the evening of <...> at 22.40, the south crane driver on being informed that rig2 had been skidded on to drilling slot a14, for wire line operations, arranged with a banksman to carry out a test
on the field of operation of his crane. It was known hat on slot a14 collision could occur between the rig and the crane walkway at the machine house rear, which the driver can not see from his
position. The driver discussed with the banksman the likely area of collision and positioned him where he could cl arly observe imminent collision and inform on his radio of any need for the
crane driver to stop. The test commenced and the driver slewed the crane. The banksman, over the radio, notified the driver that collision was imminent and the driver stopped his lew but the
crane hand rail on the machine house walkway struck a protruding beam on the rig structure and was damaged. The damage to both rig and crane was moved to the rest position. An lp1 has been
raised to initiate a full investigation.
The north crane was discharging the vessel <...> and on his whip line had a container of 4.5 tonnes held at 10 feet above the deck.The operator was positioning the container for lowering when he
noticed it drop slowly.He immediately hoisted to chec the movement and on stopping the hoist again saw the container drop slowly.He then positioned the load and placed it on location on the
deck,ceased his operation and called the crane technician to check out the whip hoist system.The technician on checkin found that the whip hoist was slipping and set about adjusting the brake.At
the adjustment point he found that the rod assembly was turning freely,indicating that something further was wrong and on removing the brake cover found that the adjustment rod h d
broken,rendering the brake inoperable.The part in question was an original manufactures part fitted at the last major overhaul 3 months previously.The reason for the change was that the part had
thread damage and was considered to be unfit for use.No da age or injuries occurred as a result of the incident.
Following the repair of a pump. The top drive was being lowered to make a connection to continue drilling. When the top drive was approx 30ft above the drill floor, a 7lb filter cover detached
from the top drive and fell to the drill floor. No personnel w re involved. An lp1 incident investigation was launched to determine the cause of the incident and identify any corrective actions /
lessons learned.
Section of rubber, weighing 40lbs, fell approx. 90 ft from the south crane cathead bumper frame. The incident occured during the transfer of a container from the pipe deck to the skid deck.
Personnel were clear of the load as per the crane operations proc dure. The rubber bumper has been replaced, and the incident is currently under investigation. Preliminary findings suggest that
the cause to be general wear of the material attributed to normal use. In that regard, the focus will be on addressing the insp ction frequently to highlight areas of concern to prevent future failures.
<...>.10:05. Jarring operations in progress to pull a bridge plug from B37.Wire line ran over a sheave at deck level,up round the sheave at the top of the lubricator,and into the well.Lower sheave
bracket fractured.Sheave assembly catapulted into roof o the module and fell onto the front of wireline winch.The sheave and parts of,did not land outside that barried-off area.The sheave in
question is treated as lifting equipment under <...> regs and load-tested and had valid certification.There were 2 opera ors in the winch cab.There was no damage.No personnel were injured as a
result of incident.The area was barried-off and no unauthorised personnel were allowed within.The sheave was 14" diameter and weighed approximately 18llbs.The investigation has thus f r not
identified any cause of the failure.The work was being done within standard operating procedures and the equipment was not exposed to loads above the SWL.Operation continued only after
replacement sheave had been inspected and dye-pen crack tested.T e failed equipment will be sent ashore for analysis.A review of SWL's for equipment will be carried out to ensure current
arrangements are still valid.
Whilst pulling out of the hole on a28 the top drive torque wrench tension spring broke. The hook end of the spring fell from the wrench some 90 feet to the drill floor landing on the north side
racking board the unit is manufactured by <...> the weight of the hook end is approximately 75 grammes. Both springs were changed out for new after occurrence. New design of spring requested
from shore base.

Near miss occured on completion of a lift of lenghths of steel to the laydown area at the east side of the pump room. The steel was being manoeuvred into the pump room to be stored. The crane
hook (liebherr standard whip line) was positioned adjacent and nd outboard of the lay down on the level above. As the load (-750kg) had been landed and the load was about to be disconnected
the crane hook was lowered slightly. The outboard pennant (one of two 10 ton 15 ft) ring moved up the hook and consequently slip ed down through the hook gate. This was due to the ferrule on
the pennant snagging on the on the structure above. The pennant, still attached to the load, then fell from the hook and was suspended outboard of the handrail on the lay down. There was no inj
ry to personnel and no damage to equipment. The load did not move and the pennant was pulled back onto lay down area. The operations involving the east crane were stopped and the crane hook
checked for any abnormality to hook gape gate mechanism. It was f und to be intact and had no play. Investigations ongoing on installation and <...> attempting to source alternatives to hook
design to prevent reocurrence.
The top drive system weight was positioned on the two support pins on the dolly tracks. Two 10 ton 50 foot slings, chain hoists were positioned in the derrick from 10 ton beam clamps and
secured to the top of the top drive system for support. At 00:45 on the <...> the mechanic and the floorman proceeded to take up the strain. As the tension was taken on both the chain blocks a
loud bang was heard from the south side of the derrick. Operations were immediately suspended. One of the crew ascended the derr ck to investigate and discovered that the tension screw on the
south clamp had sheared, and the north clamp tension screw was bent. Operations were suspended and made safe, and the rig superintendant and platform rigger called to the rig floor. Both clamp
were removed and the platform rigger installed 10 ton slings around the beams to secure the job. Prior to ordering equipment, the job had been surveyed by the platform rigger and the rig
mechanic. Tow 10 ton chain hoists and two fifty foot 10 ton slings ere requested. It was intended to use the platform supplied 10 ton beam clamps. The rigging was intended as a back-up safety
device in event of failure of the hydraulic retract system or the 2 1/4 stop pins that the top drive was resting on. The beams in the derrick are 90 degs away from the designed load of the beam
When nippling down the bop overshot mandrel (2.35 tinnes) all but 4 of the 16 locking bolts were recovered. These were left in for safety until the driller was ready to remove the overshot.) The
driller had rigged up 4 x 3.25 tonnes and 2.65 tonnes shackl s to his travelling block rig up lines - which were capable of lifting 15 tonnes. Also 4 x 3 tonnes and 2 x 8 tonne slings. When ready,
he connected to the bop overshot mandrel with the 4 x 3.25 tonnes shackles, then engaged the drawworks and started to ull the overshot mandrel. During this part of the operation, he pulled up to
8 tons with no movement of the overshot. He shutdown the operation and checked to see what was wrong and found he had forgotten to retrieve the 4 bolts left securing the mandrell to the bop.
He then removed the 4 bolts and proceeded to lay down the mandrel. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the 4 x 3.25 tonnes shackles and the 2 x 6.5 tonnes shackles, 4 x 3 tonnes slings
and 2 x 8 tonnes slings were all deformed and unfit for futher use.
After drilling to 3490 ft with top drive the driller was instructed to pull back inside the casing shoe at 3411 ft. When the top drive was broken out from the string at 90 ft in the derrick one of the
floorman, <...>, heard the sound of something impacting on the drill floor just behind him. Upon investigation it was discovered that a pin 6" long by 2" diameter and 1lb in weight had fallen
from some where up the derrick missing him by 3 ft. The operation was shutdown immediately & the drill floor cleared. The rig mechanic & the rigsuperintendent then went up the derrick to the
monkey board level & conducted a visual inspection to find where the pin came from. It was discovered that one of the link tilt hinge pins had come out of the link tilt on the top drive & fallen to
the rig floor. After checking that the link tilt was still secure the top drive was then lowered to the drill floor. The operation was shut down and the top drive was thoroughly checked over by the
maritime hydraulic rep who was on the rig at the time conducting maintenance checks, to see if there were anymore loose items. At this time it was discovered that the retaining bolt had been
placed in upside down allowing it to come free once the locking nut came off. Prior to the incident, the top drive was visually inspected the day before on the <...> and also on the planned weekly
As part of the workover carried out from the south drilling rig (dr2), long bails (50 feet) had to be used. The dangerous occurance happened when these long bails were removed. The crane was
used to lead the bails through the 'v' door. The crane was then ttached to the north bail, the retaining latch bar securing the bail to the "cow horn" was unbolted so that the bail could be laid out,
meantime a roughneck had unbolted the south bail. When the crane picked up the weight of the north bail, the hook turne allowing the opposite bail to slip from the "cow horn" and slide down
the 'v' door. Actions to prevent a similar incident will be fully defined following a cause tree analysis. In the meantime, drilling personnel have been requested to improve communicat on during
tool box talks and a standard instruction covering all bail change out operations is being written.
The incident happened on the <...> platform when an empty tote tank was transferred from the helifuel storage area ( module d05 deside the helideck) down to the pipedeck using the north crane.
Enviromental conditions were good (wind approx. 12 knots, fair, ight time but good lighting). Personnel involved in this routine operation were the crane operator, one banksman, and one deck
crew at helifuel storage area, one banksman and one deck crew on pipe deck, all in radio contact. After lifting the tank from th helifuel storage area, the crane driver was moving the load literally
and down to its destination when it struck the top of a rack located on d04 roof just in front of the crane cabin, dislodging two sections of wireline lubricator. These pieces of equip ent fell to the
pipedeck, first onto a skip, and then further onto the deck itself. Total fall: 9.3 metres. Preliminary recommendations to prevent similar incidents are: 1. Relocate the rack in question (done) and
rearrange deck space on d04 roof. 2. Surv y the site for potential unsafe storage. 3. Improve general hazard awareness and observation techniques. 4. Review spot lights orientation to preclude
dazzling of crane operator. 5. Review benefit of additional night shift crane operator or appointment of assistant deck foreman.

The incident occured on the <...> platform a skidding operation of the south rig (dr2) from slot 13 to 6. The rig was initially skidded one slot east. The second stage of the operation was to skid
the rig two slots south. This second operation was in progress, after approx. Five minutes, a loud "bang" was heard. The skidding operation was stoppedimmediately and during inspection it was
discovered that a clamp (no.20) had fallen from the skid base to the bop deck approx. 12 metres below. Initial inspection shows that the clamp is distorted and the two bolts attaching the clamp to
the skid base have sheared. The clamps are attached to the mobile rig by two bolts and normally secure the rig in position on the skidding beams. The clamp fouled on the existing structure, the
bolts subsequently sheared, leaving the clamp free to fall. A formal risk assessment was carried out for the rig skidding operations on <...>. The risk of falling objects was identified and mitigation
specified. A pre-job safety meeting was heldprior to starting the operation. The skidding operation was carried out under permit to work. The bop deck was barriered off and announcements made
prior to starting the skidding operation as per safe operating procedure (<...>). With all precautions put in place, the incident did not have the potential to cause injury to personnel. After the
The incident occured on the <...> when a transferred to its storage location on the north side of the bop deck using the 40ft north bop gantry crane. The bop gantry crane is equipped with tow pairs
of winches (east & west). The four slings were attached to he bop. The bop was positioned to its final location to be lowered down when the brake on the west winches failed. The west side of the
load dropped approx. 9 inches. The tool pusher decided to pick up the level bop in order to land it immediately in a se ure manner. When the load was approx. 1 inch from the deck, the bolts were
being installed to the bop stump when the bop again dropped on the west side. The crew continued to land the bop to make the situation safe. The crane was subsequently inspected an the brake
spring washer common on the west winches was found split in 3 pieces. Further investigations are ongoing, and the other bop crane brakes spring washers will be inspected for any defect prior to
use. Contact will be made with the manufacturer to assess the cause of the spring washer failure, and regular inspection/change out of this component will be included in the preventative
maintenence plan.
The incident occurred on the <...> during a supply vessel operation when a pipe carrier was back loaded to the <...>. Wind = 160 degrees, 30 knots sea state = significant wave 1.7 metres,
maximum wave 2.5 metres the load was attached to the c ane hook by an intermediate pennant. This pennant was equipped with a hook at the bottom (attached to the load lifting slings) and a ring
at the top (attached to the crane hook). After landing the load, the slf deck crew asked the crane operator to lower a little more and slacken the pennant to allow them to unhook the load. The crane
hook was over the side of the vessel, and whilst being lowered it touched the water. When the crane driver went to lift it up it was noticed that the pennant had come off the crane hook. The
pennant left on the vessel was recovered onboard using the <...> crane. Inspection of the crane hook and pennant showed yellow paint marks on of both components, but no mechanical damage
except that the crane hook safety latch return spring as not operating properly. By pushing the hook safety latch against the safety pin, a gap could be observed. However, it was not possible to
remove the ring through this gap by hand. At this stage, it is believed that the pennant/hook assembly rubbed agin t the side bumpers of the vessel and the pennants ring was forced out of the
As the <...> south crane was being used to land drilling equipment on dr2 drill floor, a bolt fell from the head of the crane boom to the drill floor. On investigation it was found thay the bolt was a
retaining bolt from the crane boom walkway which had she red. All bolts on this and the other two platform cranes were checked and found to be satisfactory.
Pennant detached itself from nab crane: this incident occured on <...> at 22:45 hrs. The nab crane was back-loading cargo to the supply vessel <...>. The wind speed was approx. 10 knots & the
sea state was 1 to 1.5 metres. One of the lifts to back-load was a gas rack which was attached to the crane hook by a pennant. This lift was safely landed on the deck of the safe truck. The crane
operator then lowered his line so that the supply boat deck crew could unhook the pennant from the load. The headache ball was lowered over the side of the supply boat, dipping lower than the
lift on the deck. At this stage, the upward force thus applied to the pennant ring was enough for it to pass through the gap between hook & latch, detaching itself from the crane hook. As the crane
driver recovered the hook, the pennant was left on the deck of the supply boat. Investigation after the incident revealed that there was a gap of approx 22mm between the hook itself & latching
mechanism. This could be increased by applying pressure between the two faces. It is thought that this was sufficient to allow pennant to pass through, when accompanied by the upward force as
the pennant was slackened off. A very similar incident occured during march this year. As a result of this, the safety pin of the latching mechanism was machined so as to prevent any significant
During the n39 drilling programme, the drilling assembly was being pulled out of the hole. The normal procedure is to pooh a stand of drill pipe, disconnect, and rack in the derrick. To do this
with the new top drive, the elevator bails are tilted to pr sent the stand to the derrickman at the monkey board. Then the bails are moved back to the vertical position and top drive is lowered to
pick-up the next stand. The bails are moved by means of hydraulic pistons and their position is controlled by the dril er using a 3 way switch located on the top drive console. There are three
positions: neutral (bails in vertical position) tilit (bails tilted towards the v door) and drill (bails tilted in the opposite direction towards the drawworks). After having racked a stand, the top drive
was lowered with the bails accidentally tilted towards the drawworks. The bails struck a fixed access platform causing it to fall 10 meters below. Fortunately the platform fouled on structural
braces 12 meters above the drill floor rawworks. A piece of tubular (1m long 6kg) ended up on the rig floor close to the drawworks.
One of the electrical control umbilicals to the top drive system got caught on the stabbing board framework. The control umbilical was then stretched and parted 30ft below the monkey board. It
fell to the rig floor as it disconnected itself from the secur ng rings

Platform shutdown for planned maintenance and construction activities. Isolation valve xxv14123 sea water outlet 1st stage hp compressor after cooler was being installed. A 1 tonne chain block
was used to spring the pipework to allow a joint to be installed at the valve flange face.the installation work was performed by score valves ltd & the lifting operation was performed by a <...>
rigger. The chain block was used to open the flange face but on release of the hand chain, the chain block brake failed to arrest the load and the load began to move. The rigger prevented any
significant effect by holding the hand chain & applying sufficient effort to control the movement of the pipework. The rigger reported the failure & the chain block was removed to quarantine. The
chain block was withdrawn from the dedicated shutdown rigging loft supplied by <...>. From investigation <...> had sourced the rigging equipment from <...>. Acl had sub-contracted to <...> The
platform requested the assistance of <...> to assist in the investigation. The unit has not yet been dismantled but it is assumed that the pawl was not engaging the brake mechanism. It was
suggested that this could be due to excessive gap between the brake discs/hub/ratchet. A tirfor also supplied with the shutdown rigging loft failed pre-task checks & two beam clamps which had
Platform shutdown for planned maintenance and construction activities the gas compressor gearbox was being lowered to the deck under the direction of two <...> riggers using the platforms
fixed trolley beam hoist l51163. The gearbox load was 8 tonne. The swl of the trolley beam hoist was 12 tonne. The lifting equipment had been certified in <...> by <...>. Minor defects had been
identified during the recertification but these had been repaired and from investigation did not contribute to the failure. The riggers noticed that during the decent the hoist and load shuddered.
The riggers inspected the load and rigging equipment but could not identify the reason. They continued to lower the gearbox at a slower rate and once again the load shuddered. It was identified
that the hoist block was now of the level the load was secured by the platform crane and lowered to the deck safely. The trolley beam hoist has been removed from service and is to be sent
onshore for further analysis. The platform requested the assistance of <...> to assist in the platforms investigation. It was identified that the load chains were twisted. This resulted in the chains
jumping off the hoist sprockets this would not have been immediately identified during pre - task tests checks. It is probable that this fault is introduced at assembly by the manufacturer/supplier.
To free off sticking brakes on the drawworks, it was necessary to run the drawworks and engage gear monemtarily. This caused the brakes to free, but makes the handle "kick" against the stop.the
brake stop part- ially came away (broken weld) jamming the br ke in the release position. The blocks dropped appoximately 2 feet until the pup joint connected to the top drive rested on the rotary
table. The travelling blocks lent on the torque tube and the momentum of the drum caused the drill line to jump wraps and become loose on the drum.
Removing scaffolding materials from East flare using helicopter. The load caught under the LP flare wind strakers and the helicopter winch wire parted at the hook. Load fell onto flare rails.
During lifting operations of a load approximately weighing 5 hundredweight there was a near miss which involved the ponderball striking the boom sheave guard which resulted in both damage to
the guard and lifting rope. The crane in use was the telescopic ipe rack crane and at the time of the incident the limit switch had been over-ridden. The suggested causes for the incident were lack
of attention by the driver, operation of the crane when the safety limit switch was over-ridden. A full investigation is underway.
Steel box section (4" x 4" x 30" approx. 10lbs) skid on bottom of container (Well services control line basket), detached while container was being worked by crane, item detached at approx.
Height of 5 ft above deck.
During reorientation of tubing hanger a needle valve assembly came in contact with the topdrive bale and subsequently fell to the floor approx 60'. The hose connected to the needle valve
assembly glanced the injured party party across the hand.
A wireline tool string fell through the mousehole and on to the BOP/skid deck below. The wireline failed after the tool was pulled into the wireline sheave. There was no scabbard on the
mousehole (i.e. It was just a hole)....cont...Under investigation <...> by <...>.
Whilst rigging a 250kg spool in D3C, the load being rigged commenced to descend under its own weight. The chain then rubbed against the scaffold installed for the job, which stopped its
momentum.
The Pipe Deck Machine (PDM) failed during operation. This PDM lifts length of drill pipe or casing from the pipe deck onto a conveyor which transfers them to the drill floor. The equipment
failure is a fracture of a hydraulic cylinder rod. This PDM is ope ated under a S.S.W. and no people are allowed in the area during oeration. The environmental conditions played no part in this
incident.
Drilling operations on Well <>. The derrick drilling machine (DDM) was preparing to move over centre of a stand of drill pipe. The block was extended into the top of the stand of drill pipe.
During this operation a funnel guide was struck. This caused t e funnel guide, weighing 19.2 lbs to fall 98 feet to the drill floor. The operation was stopped. The incident was reported to HSE by
telephone. No person received injury through this incident.

During the racking back of a stand of drill pipe, the upper carriage arm of the Pipe Handling Machine appeared to extend beyond well centre (without intervention from the operator). As the
blocks were lowered the retract position the torque wrench guide unnel collided with the top of the stand of drill pipe shearing the retaining bolts. This resulted in the guide funnel spacer
(approximate weight 3lbs) falling 98 feet to the rig floor. Safety wires prevented the guide funnel from falling to the rig floor No person was injured in this incident.
An 800kg rated pull lift (chain lever hoist elephant type) was being used to support a pipe in order to remove a flame arrestor for maintenance. When the lever on the pull lift was moved to the
lower position, instead of holding back the load, the chain an free and lowered the pipe to rest on a scaffold platform. The pull lift had been manually tested before use. No one was injured or no
damage sustained to any plant or equipment. This was the first use of the equipment since it arrived on the platform o <> as part of the statutory changeout of platform lifting equipment. The
pull lift was immediately quarantined and returned ashore for an independent analysis and report. All other items in the rigging loft were inspected and another 5 defects discov red. A user
feedback report was raised against the supplier of the equipment (<>) we have requested that the rigging lofts are changed out as soon as possible due to a lack of confidence in current
equipment.
Whilst 2 Bail arm elevator links were being lowered (utilising a tugger) from the drillfloor a 1 tonne sling parted at the ferrule and one bail slid down the vee door ramp to the catwalk (each 1/2
tonne bail was secured with a 1 tonne sling). The lift wa controlled and no personnel were in the immediate vicinity as per standard operating procedures for this type of operation.Probable
immediate cause has been identified shock loading on a choked sling (SWL x 0.8) possibly caused by a wrap jumping on the tugger. Inspection of the sling does not indicate its condition to be a
significant factor.Actions to prevent recurrence include a review of refresher training requirements for the drill crews, and update in the standard work procedure for this operati n specifying the
use of higher rated slings to take account of potential shock loading
Drilling operations - Running 12 1/4" hole with new bottom hole assembly on <> Well <>. Retract system of Top Drive Equipment over hoisted and impacted onto Crown Block Bumper
Bars. Shim plate, nuts and bolts fell from crown area of derrick (weigh up to 0.5 kg). Significant damage to derrick crown area, retract system dolly rails & rollers.Possible cause. Over hoist of
retract system. Overruning of upper hoist rails. Area cleared of personnel and barriered off. Equipment isolated. Area checked for damage, potential dropped objects. Investigation initiated. HSE
Duty Officer, <> informed via telephone by <> OIM <>. Weather 20 knots @ 300 degs.
During conductor centraliser replacement operations on <> platform, a centraliser component weighing 170kg was being lowered from the lower West side wellbay mezzanine deck (27m above
sea level). During the lowering operation, the air controlled wi ch was noticed to run away, as a result the load descended in an uncontrolled manner. After striking a guide can, the manual break
was applied and the load came to rest 10m above sea level, no damage was sustained by the guide can. This air winch had been successfully used on three previous lifts in the same location, all
previous lift weights were higher or equal to the lift described above. The air winch stalled at load of 37kg when tested by crane mechanic, thus indicating mechanical failure. The winch as
quarantined and is to be sent to a 3rd party for examination to determine the cause of the failure. Winch: I<> 905 Kg. Weather - Wind 7 knots 228deg. Clear.
Whilst lowering a 0.3 tonne load 4ft with a 1 tonne <> type chain block, the lifting device was unable to support load in static position without manual intervention (ie hald
chain).Investigations have shown that all activities were carried out co rectly as per (unwritten) lift plan, and lift as carried out was well within the expected capabilities of the equipment.The
chain block was quarantined and will be sent for srtip down and thorough examination.
The lifting chain of a 3 tonne chain block failed as a 2 tonne spool was being lifted. The spool had not moved when the failure occurred. It is believed the load chain snagged in the lower block.
Normal deck operations were ongoing moving 45 gall chemical drums from skid deck to pipe deck. Chemical: castrol solvex wt2 corrosion inhibitor one barrel was transferred successfully to the
pipe deck. On the cranes return a second barrel was attached to vertical barrel lifting device (ident. No <>). The deck foreman secured the device to the drum ensuring that the locking pin
was fitted and the clamp tight. He signalled the crane to begin the lift. The load was suspended approx. One foot above the de k to ensure that it was secure, then lifted up. The deck foreman
withdrew to a safe area. While his back was turned he heard a noise behind him. On turning round, he saw that the drum had released itself from the lifting device and had fallen on the deck. The
impact had caused the drum to burst open allowing the contents to spill out. He was aware that the drum contained toxic fluid and did not approach the spillage. He immediately barriered off the
area and notified his supervisor. The supervisor then no ified the osa and ccr. Platform was called to muster to ensure that all personnel were kept clear of the area. The chemical was identified as
harmful and a chemical spillage operation was implemented.

During vessel discharge operations involving the <> the body of a brass padlock was seen falling from a 20' half height container and hit the west skid deck - no one was injured - The lock was
not part of any of the <> containers we conclude that it came off another container.
The east platform crane was being used to 'backload' equipment onto the vessel <>. A 7 ton container being backloaded was being held in position for the vessel to manoeuvre into a suitable
position to enable backload operations to commence. hilst awaiting the vessel final positioning, the load was suspended for approx 15 mins. As the vessel manoeuvered under the suspended
load and the crane started to lower the 7 ton container, the load went into 'freefall' for the last 4 metres before hitt ng the vessel's deck cargo. Two of the vessel's deck containers were damaged.
Initial investigations have shown that the crane's power load lowering chain had failed.
13-5/8" drilling riser was racked back in the derrick with two singles and a 7' pup joint of 5" drillpipe required to reach the fingerboard (riser section 28' long). The riser section was being moved
to give more deckspace. Two derrickmen were used to con rol the drillpipe box into the elevators with air tuggers.the first attempt to latch the drillpipe box failed and the standy began to 'belly'
causing the box to lower in the mast. A second attempt to latch the drillpipe box was not possible as the box was now lower than the elevator.the riser section continued to fall across the drillfloor
landing on the doghouse roof.the drillpipe pupjoint above the riser section had kinked and the remainder of the drillpipe was left in the southeast leg of the derrick.th driller was in the doghouse
at the time(on the brake) but moved out of the way when he realised what had happened. Operations were stopped and the area made safe by tying back the drillpipe into the derrick. The riser was
also held on a tugger for security pending the investigation team.
Chain block used to lift seawater filter units on <> platform failed when lifting filter element. Technical investigation into cause of failure is currently being carried out by <>. Initial
investigation has determined that a chain link failed where the lifting chain enters the hook clench device. Chain and block have a safe working load of 1.5 tonnes. Element being lifted weighed
approximately 150 kilos.Block and hook assembley currently being dispatched to <> for detailed Technical examination.
During cementing operations on <> liner section, the cement swivel was held in place to stop rotation by an air winch tugger via a snatch block on the driller's side samson post. When the drill
string was picked up, no slack was put onto tugger li e which was subsequently tensioned. The snatch block hung up on the top of the samson post and was subsequently pulled open splitting the
sheave which fell about 8ft to the drill floor. There were no personnel within the immediate area.
At 07:30hrs while landing the suspended BOP assembly (50 tonnes) on D21 wellhead, one of four BOP Emergency lift chains (21.7 tonnes SWL each) snapped. Landing operation was almost
completed at the time of the incident. As no obvious external reason could explain the failure, the landing was completed without further problem, using the 3 remaining chains. The snapped
chain identification number is <>. It was last load tested in <>, last inspected offshore by <> <> and is pr perly colour coded. The chain had been stored in oil bath and had not been
used since its last test in <>. No injury to report as nobody was exposed to hazard during the landing operation as instructed during the pre-job safety meeting. Such a po sible failure was listed
on the risk asssessment down on <> and the redundancy of chains mentioned as existing safeguard. All remaining chains have been removed. Complete chain will be sent offshore for detailed
failure analysis.
The incident occurrred during tripping operations, pulling out of hole racking back stands of 5" drillpipe in the nw racking board. The derrickman having attached the tugger chain around the
drillpipe in preparation to rack back the stand was distracted f om his operation, due to the fact that the tugger line had become snagged on a snatch bloke at the rear of the monkeyboard.
Meanwhile the driller continued to lower the blocks and elevators. The elecators contacted the tugger line which resulted in it par ing. The tugger chain fell downward 30' initially restricted by the
drillpipe untio it unwpapped. (probably after contacting the next upset down the pipe) the free falled a further 60' landing on the drillfloor within a few feet of the foot of the pipe.
Whilst personnel were carrying out Wireline Operations at well E16, a lubricator was in the process of being positioned for stabbing on to a wireline B.O.P. The lubricator was suspended between
9-12" above the B.O.P. The lubricator was suspended on the en of a tugger wire, the tugger and wire had been re-certified in <> of this year. Both were rated for the task. During the final
stages of 'stabbing' the lubricator onto the B.O.P, without warning, the cable parted approx. 2" above the counter balance (t is is the part at the end of the cable which actually supports the load).
Personnel working on the task jumped clear and the lubricator toppled to the east of the worksite. Whilst falling, the top of the lubricator fouled the unistrut supporting the overh ad Gantry crane
electric cables, carried on falling, and came to rest entangled in the Gantry crane steel rope and lifting sheave. This prevented the lubricator from crashing to the deck. No personnel were injured
during this incident and at no time was he well in any danger.The failed cable and associated tugger will be examined and the cable sent for analysis to an independent vendor.
A drilling probe was being lifted from one area of the platform to another via platform crane. At an early stage of lifting, probe disengaged from lifting tool and fell to deck. No injuries were
incurred. Investigation is ongoing into cause of disengagement.

Conditions at the time of incident; windy, vis. Good; drilling crew personnel were in the process of changing out upper i.b.o.p on <> top drive. An arrangement of 1 ton slings and pull lifts were
rigged up in order to lift solid bodied elevators high o main shaft to gain access to connections. These were to be broken out by the rig tongs. This operation also required the top drive to be made
up to a drill string due to the high break out torque of the i.b.o.p. at this stage it was noticed that the top rive unit had started to bottom out on the dolly track stops. In order to make the operation
safer it was decided to pick up the drill string and top drive approx. 6" to ensure more movement could be made with the top drive later in the operation. The are was cleared of personnel and the
lift commenced. During this, the sling parted and a chain pull lift fell to the deck. No personnel were injured or damage sustained. A company investigation is currently ongoing.
The pump cartridge was being removed from the pump body by the use of a 3.1 tonne 'elephant' chain block to allow for the installation of a new cartridge. As the cartridge was lifted clear of the
locating studs it was observed to slip a short distance of approx 1". Two more similar short slips of the load on the chain block were observed. The load was successfully landed on its support
plinth without any damage or injury to personnel. The reported defective chain block was removed from service and sent o shore for independent examination. All similar chain blocks of the
same rating were quarantined in the field as a precaution. The independent examination inlcude load tests and a full strip down for internal examination. No fault was found with the chai block,
it was found to be in a good operating condition. It is suspected that during the lifting activity that was the cause of this report the pull chain may have been twisted resulting in the chain jerking
as it passed over the pulley wheel, and this w s not observed by the persons carrying out the lift as the reason for the slippage of the load.
Whilst backloading cargo onto the <> (The vessel was positioned with the starboard side to the North face of the platform) using the <> Crane, an empty container was being placed in
position when it became snagged on the bulwark of the vessel.
While offloading materials from a supply vessel, one leg of a four wire sling on a gas bottle rack snapped. The vessel reported this to the crane but by this time the rack was over the platform
deck. The rack was landed on the platform without any further problem. During lifting a second rack it was noted that the lift was at an angle. On landing on the platform it was observed that one
shackle had fallen back and the sling was looped under it.
A snubbing operation was in progress - running in drillpipe to well P1. Another length of pipe had been hoisted to the snubbing unit and was suspended, with the lower end held by an operator to
prevent it moving. Whilst waiting for the previously lifted p pe to be lowered into the well, the suspended pipe became detached from a hook and fell 2 1/2 - 3 ft to the work basket floor. It then
leaned against the mast. No reason was found to why the hook opened. This hook plus three others quarantined pending further investigation.
While function testing the black gold telescopic mast to check the hydraulic circuits prior to it being fully erected the jib was raised 1m from the cradle. At this point one of the main frame pivot
brackets failed causing the jib to cant to one side and landed askew in the cradle. Further inspection of the failed bracket revealed that only one bolt had been engaged as the other appeared to
have been sheared for some time as indicated by the discolouration of the remains of the top half of the bolt. The m st had just arrived from the beach and had been certified fit for purpose. The
mast was shipped off for repair and further inspection.
An initial investigation into a reported vibration concern with goods lift failed to establish cause. Lift was isolated until more detailed investigation could be carried out. This latter investigation
showed that the drive shaft connecting the motor to t e winch had sheared. Investigation into cause of failure continues all safety devices and over-rides were operational and would have
prevented any free fall situation.
Whilst manoeuvering the end channel cover (2.1 tons) into place on gas cooler e-2031 the 3 ton <> chainblock failed at the hook swivel assy resulting in the channel cover dropping approx
0.5m onto the deck. No injury to personnel occurred but the deck late was damaged. Other similar chainblocks are being inspected. The failed equipment has been returned onshore for analysis
to determine the cause of failure.
O ring leak on tree crossover causing hydrcarbon release. During the wireline fishing operation on s-58 a 1950 lb, overpull was being held on the wire while flowing the well in an attempt to free
off the toolstring downhole. While this operation was taking place due to the fact that the well was flowing with wire in the hole. The wireline crews were constantly manning the work site e.g.
rig floor/wireline unit & wellbay mod-05. On <> at 5:00 am, while <> [night shift wellserv supervisor] was monitoring the wellbay area he heard a loud popping noise, on further
investigation it was evident that there was gas and oil spraying out from the tree crossover hammer union. On seeing the extent of the leak <> contacted <> [wellserv wireline operator] by
radio and instructed him to close the shear seal bops. He also phoned the mcr and informed them of the situation in the wellbay. As the shear seal bop was closing, several production operators
arrived in the wellbay. Once the wireline operator confirmed that the shear seal bop was closed he was then instructed to close the hydraulic master valve by the wellserv supervisor. At the same
time the production operators closed in the swab valve nd lower master valve. Once the tree was confirmed closed the wellserv supervisor and a production operator bled down the wireline riser

On completion of perforations on well <> the sheaves were being rigged down. The bottom sheave was chained to the floor and suspended by the floor winch. The brake was removed and the
sheave fell 3 feet to the drill floor.
Whilst pulling out of hole (CN36) with a clean up assembly after circulating to inhibited seawater. A pressure switch cap became detached from the IDS (Top Drive Assembly). The object fell
some 90' striking the doghouse and landing on the drillfloor. T e opeeration was suspended to check all similar attachments on the top drive assembly securing mechanisms were replaced (grub
screws) and indication marks installed as a visible indication of any movement.
During a routine operation on well J2 a near miss occurred during a wireline tool change. The well was shut in at the time of the near miss, the wireline lubricator de-pressurised and
disconnected from the rig up. An air driven chain hoist which was su ended from an "A" frame on the deck above and being used to lift the wireline. The actual near miss occurred when the
wireline luricator was in the suspended position and the crew were about to remove the wireline clamp which held the wire in position d ring lifting of the lubricator from the deck to the vertical
position with the air hoist. The tail end of the chain fell from the "A" frame some 50 feet above the wireline deck level, glancing off the lubricator maifold breaking the glass of the pressure gauge
and coming to rest with the endof the chain hanging 6 feet below the wireline deck. None of the crew members were injured and only minor damage to equipment was sustained. After a site
inspection and investigation by the Management Team it was dee ed to be safe to continue with current operation prior to rigging down off the well, The air hoist was removed from service and
detailed investigations are in progress.
While lifting a joint of 10 3/4" casing across the pipedeck. There was a failure of the grab unit of the palfinger causing the joint of casing to fall approximately 4ft to the catwalk. No-one was
injured and no equipment was damaged
Rigging foreman had rigged up the 5 tonne chain block. (<> type, supplied by <>) to lift a load in the well head area, on attempting to take the load the ratchet failed causing the chain to
pass through. He immediately removed the faulty chain b ock from service and obtained another one and completed the task. This was the first time the chain block had been used since receiving
it onboard during last lifting equipment change out in march. Chain block was quarantined, a controlled test was conduc ed confirming failure. Incident investigation team has been formed. Chain
block to be sent onshore for technical inspection.
Crane on <>. Fall wire parted while lifting a load . Caused by alledgedly wrong reeving of fasll wire. Load fell/lower 20 to supply boat deck
At the start of the crane operations on <...> satellite the crane operator was raising the boom of the crane from its rest, surface water laying on a boom plate above him cascaded onto him causing
a momentary distraction. The crane boom struck the side of elideck perimeter with the boom light causing it to be torn from its mountings and to fall to the deck below.
<...> - After rigging up the 9-5/8" cement head to the casing string, the Mud Pump was slowly started (in order to break circulation). Before any noticable pressure built up, the cement head
became disconnected from the casing and fell approx. 11 t to the drill floor. No injury to personnel occured.
Whilst welding a patch on a sea water injection booster pump G164 recycle line,a flash occurred from the unwelded 6" x 1/16" gap at the top of th patch and travelled approximately 6" up to the
flange directly above the patch area.The duration of the ignit on (which self extinguished) was approximately 3/4 seconds. No injuries were sustained to worksite personnel,the worksite was
made safe and incident reported immediately to the CCR. No detectors or alarms were initiated.The PTW for the task was suspended and the worksite inspected by the duty Production
Supervisor. Mechanical/Electrical Isolations and Risk Assessment were actioned prior to the task commencing.The deareator tower (D124) stripping gas inlet and outlet to flare had been isolated
and vessel v nted and the line being welded remained full of sea water during the task.The weld was completed and MPI tested by removal of the full spoolpiece to the construction workshop,
then reinstated and the system recommissioned. OIR12 to follow.
Parked but not adequately secured cargo trolly on north east side/corner of the helideck, was forced over the side of the deck by windpressure. From the rotor of a landing helicopter. The trolley
dropped into sea approx. 60m below. No injury/no damage besidesloss of trolly. The walkway underneath helideck is about 4m wide and open to the dropped trolley. No personnel nearby when
incident happened. Trolleys position on the helideck was not in accordance with instructions. Notice to hlo has been issued.
During normal operations a large section of the passive fire protection (Mandolite) has fallen from one of the Wellbay roof hatches onto the M49 Xmas tree, causing damage to the tubing head
pressure gauges and instrument stub. On further investigation it as established that deck operations were ongoing in the area, the lying down of a load on the above deck may have caused the
Mandolite to break free and fall. The immediate action was to shut in M49 and depressurised the well, all other wells in the East ection of the Wellbay were subsequently shut-in and a risk
assessment completed for the removal of remaining Mandolite prior to start-up.Wind 27knots @ 210 deg., Sea 3.5 to 4 mts., Visibility 8 miles.

A 30" long section of redundant 2.5" pipe fell vertically onto the grating. The pipe has fallen approximately 10-15 feet from a void space between the generator room and the control room walls.
Several 20mm nuts were found lying on the deck area around the solar turbine exhaust stack on module n8. On investigation it was found the nuts had fallen a considerable height from the
flanged sections of the stack. Further investigation by the maintaina ce supervisor and loss prevention supervisor highlighted a problem on the exhaust stack protection frame and associated
guides. It was found that the insulated spacer blocks had disconnected from the guides allowing lateral movement of the stack. Some of he material associated with the spacer blocks was later
found in the area below. The area around the stack has been barriered off and personnel made aware of the problem. The maintenance supervisor has instigated a daily inspection program to
visually ins ect the stack and record status. A high percentage of secured bolts remain in place. Plans are being developed to carry out repair work and conduct a design review for long term
corrective action.
The incident occurred on the <...> during construction work in the south drilling rig. Abseilers were installing cables in the south west corner of the derrick. One abseiler dropped a spanner
insecurely held in his pocket. The spanner fell on a safety net i stalled in the gap left on the south side of the derrick to protect the bop deck below. The net was attached to hand rails approx. 1
metre above the south skid deck. The spanner bounced on the net and ended up approx. 3 metres away from personnel working n the skid area. A risk assessment ans site visit had been carried
out. As part of the precautions against dropped objects, safety barriers and safety nets had been installed to protect personnel, and the abseilers had been instructed to secure their tool . The safety
net served its purpose, and although the spanner ended up not very far from the personnel, the energy of the object was insufficient to cause major injury. After this incident it was stressed again to
the abseilers that all tools should be se ured and the barriers have been deployed further away from the base of the derrick.
Section of cladding which was in two parts, situated around a flange. One half dropped onto the mezzanine deck below. Dropped 6 metres, weight 1kg and was approx 25cm in diameter. No
injuries.Object emanated from insulated pipework below walkway above
While working on the north gantry of <>, removing a non return fire damper from the hvac system. The centre rib of the nrd (metal strip 2" x 3ft long, weight approx. 6kg) dislodged itself and
fell through grating panel down to the deck of <>, about 15 t below the worksite. No injury or damage incurred.
At approx. 0945 hours it was reported to the drill floor that an emergency battery pack fell from a strip light in the derrick approx. 180' to the skid deck.Weather conditions at the time of incident wind SW, 45-50 kts. Clear visibility. Current ope ations - Drilling 8 1/2 " hole as per drilling programme. Type of batteries that were involved in the incident - NICAD rechargeable - which
remained intact upon impact. Sustaining incessant high winds over the last 8 - 10 days from various directions wh ch appears to have caused vibration to slacken fittings. All other light fittings in
the derrick checked for integrity along with the lighting circuit isolated for that particular system.
During a routine tour of the installation, the Safety Supervisor noticed that a stack of 3 pallets of drums at the east side of the sack store laydown area were listing at an angle of approx. 30
degrees from the vertical and in danger of toppling onto the adjacent East escape route and guardrail beyond
<> took a call on <> from <> HS&E Safety Advisor <> about a dropped object on <> central platform <>1. The incident took place at about 18.00 hours on <>t. A 30" isolation
valve being installed as a replacement to V-961400 at the discharge of compression train 1, became unstable due to inadequate support. The valve slid and fell from its final location between pipe
flanges some 3 metres above deck. The valve is installed in a vertical orientati n being some 10 tonnes in weight. There was no injury to personnel and no structural damage. <> confirmed
HSE considers this type of incident reportable. It was agreed the conversation was a formal report of the incident. A full investigation nto the incident has been undertaken and the investigation
report is attached to the OIR9B.
Operator stepped on grating on stores laning area outside engine room stores. Grating flipped vertically and operator prevented 11m fall by grabbing hose and grating over the gap
It appears that the proximity switch between dolly beams at monkey board level worked loose due to vibration and was suspended by its own cable. The cable lay across the face of the dolly beam
and, at some stage, the travelling block dolly rollers severed the cable causing the switch to fall. This switch does not generate an alarm, it is used as a reference point for calibration. All other
proximity switches have been checked, secured with an additional double locking nut and attached safety line to hold t em in place should they become detached. The safety line can not come into
contact with the dolly beam.

At approximately 19:15 hrs a member of the night shift was entering the <> hvac room on level 1 south side of the <> platform when he observed the non directional <> antenna fall from
the underside of the helideck glancing the level 1 deck then fall i to the sea. At the time of the incident the platform was experiencing severe snow squalls and lightening. Initial investigation
indicate that the glassfibre "whip" aerial broke just below its first joint. The remnants of the aerial will be removed so tha the cause of this failure may be established; a visual inspection suggests
that the coupling itself is still intact. Night time wind direction 345degs at 28 knots with snow squall gusting to 50 knots.
A handjack from wash water control valve <> worked loose falling from level 2 down on to level 1 missing a person by six feet. Approximate weight of the handjack was about 3 kgs. The likely
cause was the circlip came loose or was incorrectl fitted to the retaining pin on the valve. The pin had worked its way loose over a period of time due to vibration. Incident report <> raised for
this incident.
In <> wellbay level 1a a well service team were opening the xmas tree swab valve on well <> when a noise was heard from below. Looking down through the grating it was noticed that a 1
1/4" x 4 ft steel pinch bar, weight 10kgs had fallen throu h level 1a deck grating 16ft to level 1 deck below. The bar had fallen into an area that was permanently barriered off. The barriers were
not specifically to mitigate for dropped objects from the work site above but to keep people away from cutting re injection pipework. The bar had earlier been used by the team in opening torque
valves. The majority of grating is 1 1/8" spacing but the section immediately adjacent to the well are 1 3/8" grating.the tool slid through the larger grating slots but would hav not gone through
the smaller. Likely cause:- 1) improper storage of tools 2) lack of care and attention 3) incorrect selection of tools action taken:- inspected areas for other potential dropped objects investigation
recommendations:- 1) fabricate st rage bins for drilling/ well service hand tools for wellbay or other grated work areas. 2) barrier of deck area below when work site decks are gratings. 3) better
selection of handtools thereby avoiding the potential for a dropped object.
At 1345 hrs on <> a person ascending the stairway to the oim's office stood on a grating which gave way and fell to the deck 5m below. There were no injuries. The area in question is on the
top landing at the section where cabling penetrates th outer wall to the office block and comprises a small section of approximately 425mm x 140 mm weight 2kgs. The small section of grating
had been welded onto the main landing section. The cause of the failure was severe rust and degrading of the welds an the fact that it had been welded onto the grating unsupported. The area
was immediately barriered off and the south stairway top landing grating was also inspected. Priority message was sent to the other forties platforms to check similar areas of grati g. Investigation
team set up to determine the underlying cause of the incident.
On <> around 1040 in the morning <>, <> shift team leader, discovered a fragment of brick on the ngl roof south west corner, just to the west of control valve, pcv 3051. The brick
fragment weighed 0.2kg and measured approx. 60x50 25mm. It had to be assumed that the brick fragment had fallen from the flare deck above. (bricks sandwiched between steel gratings are used
to form a heat resistant barrier to protect the upper structure of the flare tower) no other fragments were discove ed in the vicinity and no signs of damage as a consequence of the brick falling
were apparent. It is not possible to say exactly when the fragment of brick fell. Operational conditions at the time of discovery were normal and the weather calm, dry and sun y. Actions taken to
date:- 1. Area barriered and restricted to essential operations personnel. 2.area inspected by operations personnel and <> (<> inspection engineer) . Binocular survey of underside of flare
deck carried out by <> 4. He icopter survey carried out by <> of flare deck upper surface no signs of distress or damage have been observed in the course of these inspections. We are
presently in discussion with <> to determine possible causes of the fr gment becoming dislodged. The likely next step will be a further helicopter survey using a specialist photographer to
Scaffolding operations were in progress at a site above the level 2 external walkway on the south side of <>. A connecting, higher level walkway was being used as a temporary laydown area
for the scaffold materials. A tube approx 2 metres long hat had been put down in this laydown area rolled and fell through the gap between the walkway grating and the kickplate. It fell cleanly
into the sea and was lost. Had it rolled at a slightly different angle, it is feasible that it could have fallen ont a maintenance platform area some 6 metres below and whilst its fall would almost
certainly have been broken by some non-process pipework with minor damage potential, it could nevertheless have struck an individual on the maintenance platform. There was n fact nobody
there at the time but as this area had not been barriered the potential existed for a person to receive a major injury as defined by RIDDOR. One of the scaffolders, <>, immediately reported the
dropped tube to the platform HSE Co-ordinator,<>. <> Report No <> has been raised to investigate and make recommendations from this incident. For further details of this summary
please see OIR9B
Drilling in progress on <>. Floor man came down from the Belly Board (40") with a Wind Wall retaining bolt, the nut and locknut was missing from the fixture.The bolt was still in position
when spotted by Rig Floor man before he removed it and broug t it down to the Drill Floor. Following a search of the Drill Floor the missing nut was located.Weight of the nut which had fallen
(at some unknown time) was @ 100 grams.The remaining fixtures were checked on the Belly Board, 4 of which were found to be loose and required tightening. It was noticed that two of the
bolts had locknuts missing. Investigation team set up and other <> platforms with similar Drill Derricks notified.
While two platform personnel were passing through Package 5 West side, carrying out an advance safety audit - they discovered a small section of cable tray lying on the deck. On initial
inspection it was obvious that it had dropped from redundant cable ray in roof area above. Tray looked badly corroded - for rest of report see OIR9B.

During normal operations a technician noticed that the wheel (weighing 12 lbs) from a chain wheel valve for PO5 MOL pump resting on small bore pipe work at a height of approx 7ft. On further
investigation it became apparent that the wheel was from the suc ion valve directly above. The wheel had vibrated off its shaft and fallen from a height of approx. 18ft.
2m rectangular length of light steel to secure vertical edge of corrugated sheeting on Level 3 office porta cabin became dislodged due to high winds and fell approximately 8M to Level 2 walkway
below. As the bottom edges of the sheeting were exposed, it ould appear that the high winds occurring at the time of the incident had entered behind the corrugation at this point and caused
enough movement of the sheets to dislodge the corner edging piece, which then fell to the walkway below. The weather conditi ns at the time of the incident were: Wind NNW @ 30Kn, with a sea
of 3-6m.
The <> rig mechanic was preparing an air receiver vessel at the base of the drilling rig for internal inspection. Whilst engaged in this activity the toe of his boot contacted a loose section of
timber which was partially concealed in the rig support tructure. The timber (700mm x 100mm x 50 mm weight 2kg) fell 10 metres onto the bop deck.
A team of five scaffolders were erecting scaffold just below the monkey board on the drill derrick during mid-morning, approx 11:00 hrs the weather was dry and misty with a wind speed of 18
knots from the south east. One of the scaffolders was moving arou d the derrick sides (outside bracing) making the scaffolding safe, when the cable from the fall arrestor made contact with his
hard hat and despite the chin strap being worn, dislodged the hard hat, which was fitted with ear defenders which then fell appr ximately 60ft to the rig floor. The hard hat was fitted with ear
defenders. The only person present on the rig floor was the tugger operator who was in visual contact throughout the operation. The surrounding area was barriered off to all other persons. T e
hard hat fell approximately 10ft away from the tugger operator. As soon as the scaffolding was made safe, the team descended and the incident was reported to the fso/hsec at 11:30hrs. The
incident was confirmed and then reported to the installation manager at 12:00hrs.
Abridged version - see oir9b - A 3m length of 3/4" instrument tubing was removed from a stock rack on skid deck and laid on support grating so technician could cut 20cm off one end - long
piece slid away, dipped through the access stair, falling approx. 8 to the BOP area below - no-one in area at time, but potential for injury.
The scaffold equipment had been secured by wire and rope lashing on the east/west walkway of the spider deck on the south side of the conductors after being used for conductor chock
replacement. A bad storm developed on the afternoon and evening of <> and upon inspection as the storm abated on <> the scaffold equipment was found to be missing.By visual inspection
it was found that the wire and rope lashings had broken and that the boards, tubing and fittings had been washed overboard. On <> the spider deck area was inspected for damage and no
damage was evident. Various boards were recovered and removed from the area.
After the severe storm on the night of the <> it was noted the following morning that 2 sections of cladding had been blown off the south side of the Derrick onto A module west laydown
area.No one actually witnessed the loss of the cladding but th rigger <> noticed that they were missing while checking around the platform for any storm damage.Area to be checked for
integrity of other sheeting and arrange for the replacement of the cladding at the earliest opportunity. The weather condition overnight overnight were 68-80kts in a westerly direction with a sea
state of 8 metres.
Two scaffold boards were being transported down a stairwell. A gust of wind caught the scaffold boards. The boards were blown out of the carrier's hands and over the hand rail. They fell into the
sea; one of them glancing off a light fitting on the cellar deck causing minor damage.
Anemometer cups and arms of wind sensor <> found on skid deck, had become detached and fell from drill derrick. Anemometer weight : 0.65 kg fallen : approx 150 ft weather conditions :
wind 220 degrees (south westerly) + 50 knots. Immediate action : checked visually, from as best an advantage point available due to weather, that no other parts of anemometer in potentially
hazardous condition. Investigation implemented - report <> likely cause identified as worn bearing allowing significant play on speed sensor spindle. Resulting vibration from excessive wind
causing cap and lock nut to work loose.
Cladding restraining bracket fell from the <> gt and was found inside the turbine hall, module 10 & 11. Cladding weight: 0.5 kg fallen: approx. 25 ft length approx. 3 ft weather conditions: n/a
as inside the module
Transporting a choke valve by crane, when the valve handle became detached and fell to deck approximately 10ft. Valve handle weight: 5.5kg fallen: approx. 10 ft weather conditions: fair
immediate action: task stopped & made safe. Sor issued. Investig tion implemented - report <> likely cause identified as: handle shipped not properly secured.

Cement pump room module 5. Whilst carrying out diesel pumping operations on slot 23 the driller heard a noise from somewhere within the cement room. On further investigation a 300mm dia,
approx 8kg, heat trap which had been fixed to a sprinkler frangible bulb was found lying on the deck approx 12 ft below from where it had originally been positioned.
Two UV light fittings dropped three metres to deck. [Approx 4 feet long-10lb each).
A mechanical tech. Was attempting to retrieve copper tubing from a pipe rack, as he tried, a heavy steel wall pipe became dislodged and fell to the floor narrowly missing him. The pipe was 9' 3"
long and 2" in diameter, weight approx 22 kgs - Rack locate 8' 8" above floor level
As caisson submersible pump 34/425/2008a was not pumping it was decided to remove it and install the spare pump. The pump and the motor which i around six feet in length is made up with
twelve seven foot riser sections (5" dia) and following preparations or removal in good weather conditions, the first riser section was removed and while preparing to remove the second section it
was noticed that the eleven feet of exposed electrical cable suddenly disappeared down into the caisson. At first it was thought the cable ties had failed however as the rest of the riser sections
were removed it became apparent that the submersible pump had parted from the riser. Final removal of the riser sections revealed that the pump had parted with two seven foot sections of he
riser plus the electrical cable and fallen approximately 500 feet to the seabed. The ciasson which is around 235 ft. In depth is located in the centre of the platform jacket. It is suspected that the
riser flange bolts have either sheared or slackened off during operation. Investigation underway.
Baggage store on edge of helideck. Down draft from rotors caused portable drill to become unstable and fall 30 feet to lower deck . No injury
During construction work to extend the <...> helideck, a steel beam weighing 217kg was temporarily placed on the radio room roof. The beam was subsequently dislodged from its rest position by
the down draught and vibration of a landing helicopter. One end of the beam slid off the radio room roof, across an adjacent walkway and came to rest wedged against a scaffold platform. It fell
approximately 6ft below the level of the radio room roof. The radio room roof is no longer used to store any materials and will shortly be under the new helideck extension.
The gas vented through lt-vent was ignited by lightning. The fire was extinguished with fixed co2 system. The low temperature (lt) vent is a cold vent, equipped with a dedicated, manual operated
co2 snuffuing package, foreseen to be used if the vent should be ignited.
Firepump G5026 (<...>) was on-line to back up the utility water system when a class 1 platform shutdown was initiated by F & G detectors on the <...> pancake. Deluge of the area was activated
automatically by F & G system. On investigation it was found tha a major mechanical failure had occurred on G5026 with debris being ejected through the diesel engine casing with a localised
fire ensuing. Recommedations/Actions: - the fire was extinguished by the fixed systems. The fire team then ensured that all fire within the fire pump compartment was fully extinguished. Strip
down the engine to determine the root cause of the engine failure.
Indiction of fire in m10 switchroom on the fire & gas panel in the m13 main control room. The on duty production electrician and production supervisor went to m10 to investigate the alarm and
found there to be a fire in the "dynamic brake" cubicle. The f re was extinguished using the hand held dry powder and bcf extinguishers located in m10, the <...> electrician then arrived and
isolated the power supply. Further investigation would indicate that the fire was caused by a fault on the contactor that had mad it overheat, melting and igniting the plastic. The fire was
contained within the steel cubicle and had not spread to any other part of the switchroom. Wind: 23 knts ssw sea: 3mts visibility: good
Various faults in the accommodation electrical power circuits caused to portable electrical equipment. Damage was accompanied by overheating and smoke.
The platform was in normal production mode. At 5.45 the general alarm sounded upon smoke detection inside the compression local control area. The reason was because of an electrical short
in the cubicle for one of the cooler motors. The platform went t muster and the smoke was investigated by a team in "BA" gear. The short was contained in the cubicle. The cubicle has been
isolated and investigation commenced. No-one was in the control area at the time of the incident. Initial investigations have f und the fault to be in the cubicle and not to be caused by anything in
the field.
Vent stack fire caused by snow storm. Extinguished utilising 1 x 50kg halon cylinder
Electrical Circuit to Antifrost heater was re-energised - C/B would not close - explosion and fire observed at Meter Stream #2 Instrument Enclosure. Flame dissipated and equipement was
isolated and site secured pending investigation.

Roustabout reported a loss of steam to the pipedeck wash down unit. This was reported to both rig mechanic and electrician. They investigated the cause and found that the boiler had tripped on
feed pump overload and pressure in the system had bled down to zero. The pump overload was reset by the electrician. No obvious reason for the overload had been ascertained. The unit
successfully started up but was shut down again due to a slight leak of steam from a level gauge. On completion of the repair, the mech nic switched on the 400 amp circuit breaker. Immediately
the circuit breaker flashed over and a fire developed. The alarm was raised and all personnel were sent to muster. The equipment was electrically isolated and the fire extinguished by the
emergency eam using dry powder extinguishers. Once the fire was out, a member of the fireteam was trying to ascertain if there was sufficient heat from the breaker to cause reignition. Whilst in
b.a. he removed his glove and placed his hand in the vicinity of the b aker, sustaining a small thermal burn from a protrusion on the breaker. No medical treatment was required. A full
investigation to asertain the root cause is in progress.
Cold flare purge ignited during thunderstorm. Suspect static discharge. Alarms raised and automatic shutdown (level 2) initiated, muster 2 G.A. No damage apparent to cold flare. Nobody
injured. - for full report see OIR9B
The <...>'s artificial lift pump P6530 failed to stop on receipt of a trip signals from the shutdown logic because the electrical motor contractor (motor switching device) contacts had welded in the
closed position. An attempt to shutdown the pump ha stopped fluid flow through the pump, resulting in rapid overheating and mechanical damage to the fluid end rotating element. The pump
was stopped by disconnecting the HV switchboard feeding the pump motor and stopping the electrical generator connected t it. There was no loss of electrical containment.
Instrument UPS Invertor panels GX 4027C/D.The system changed over to its bypass supply in response to a minor HVAC fault. The changeover generated an alarm in the CCR. An electrical
technician sent to investigate found the cubicle hot to touch and on o ening the panel observed smoke and an electrical burning smell. The technician isolated the electrical supplies bringing the
situation under control.Further investigation revealed that four of the smoothing capacitors had failed, expanded and distorted he busbar. The failure is considerd to have occurred during the
changeover of supplies. The capacitors were found to have been installed longer than their recommended working life.The failed capacitors were replaced. All similar capacitors in the system are
to be replaced. The relevant pmrs will be reviewed to include manufacturer's recommendations on working life.
Oil export pump p306 de bearing seal failure caused overheating. Small fire from residual oil. Flame detected by ird deterted by ird detector. Fire put out by ops tech.
Two personnel were working on the mezzanine above the SW corner of the BOP deck. They noted a smell of burning and checked around to investigate and found a fire at a field control station.
One person raised the alarm whil the other tackled the fire with a Dry Powder Handheld Extinguisher. The platform General Alarm was sounded on receipt of the alarm call and emergency teams
responded to the incident. It was noted on the arrival of the teams that the fire was out. The mu ter of personnel continued until the electrical equiment was isolated and the area made safe. All
personnel were accounted for and were stood down from the muster at 1015 hrs. Cause of the fire - A link cable within the control station had short circuited to earth due to a cut in the insulation
and moisture within the enclosure.Weather - visibility clear Wind direction/speed - 216 deg @ 18 knots Sea state - 2 Metres.
Abridged. See oir/9b for full report. At 0112 hours, the fire and gas detection system detected a fire within the enclosure of the b power generator, causing carbon dioxide (co2) fire suppressant to
be automatically discharged from the fixed systems. The machine was shutdown automatically during this sequence. Operations personnel confirmed the status on site and control room staff
sounded the general platform alarm (gpa) to call platform personnel to muster. Necessary external contacts <> control room, coast guard and the <> drilling rig working within the <> field
- were made by the control team. Emergency response teams were deployed to the scene, and prepared firefighting equipment to allow manual intevention to contain escalation if ecessary. They
confirmed that the fire had been extinguished by the co2, and set up ventilation to allow heavy smoke logging of the turbine enclosure to be dispersed. Fuel and power supplies to the b power
generator were further isolated by operations per onnel. All 116 pob were accounted for very promptly, the headcount being completed within 9 minutes. Off duty personel were stood down from
muster at 0143 hours, emergency teams remaining on standby for a period therafter until ventilation and cool down o the area was complete.initial indications are that a loss of cotainment
An electrical fire broke out at the junction box for mud pump nr.2. The fire has been caused by the generation of a hot spot. The hot spot eventually melted the insulation and the cable then made
a short circuit with the junction box. This melted some co per from the lug and the cable, and then arced to the box.The hot spot occurred because a wrong size lug (300 mil) had been crimped on
a smaller size cable (240 mil), causing poor conduction from the cable to the lug.
Main bearing on the barite recoverey centrifuge overheated and caught fire during mud treatment operations.The fire was promptly put out by portable CO2 fire extinguisher. Nobody hurt during
the incident.

Plater was removing structural supports with a burning torch within an enclosed habitat. A section of <> tarpaulin was not covered by the fire blanket and therefore exposed. It subsequently
caught fire and the plater immediately isolated his oxy fuel feed. The firewatch man rapidly extinguished the fire by hand/fire blanket. Overall the fire lasted for a few seconds. No injuries
occured. All naked flame sites have been checked to ensure no exposure of <> tarpaulin to flame, spark or slag with sui able coverage by fire blanket. Incident will be discussed at future safety
meetings and tool box talks.
Smoke/flames were observed coming from one of the temporary centrifuges. The electrical suuply was shut off and the fire extinguished with dry powder. The fire was a result of overheating
caused by metal to metal friction ignited a rubber o ring. The pl tform mustered whilst the fire was extinguished.
At approx 0750 hrs an operations technician was checking out a suspected failure of the oil heater element on the lube oil tank on the <> water injection pump. Whilst surveying the area he
removed the fill cap (approx 50mm diameter) from the tank, upo removal he observed a small amount of smoke, he quickly replaced the cap, and informed the control room of the events. On
hearing the radio transmission a second technicia immediately responded to the scene and assisted to isolate the equipment. On recei ing the message in the ccr a full muster was immediately
called and platform fire team attended. A foam branch was laid out for cover, whilst a co2 extinguisher was used to inert the tank via the fill cap. There was no apparent residual heat within the t
nk or further evidence of overheating. Coastguard, standby vessel and other emergency contacts were alerted as per emergency procedures for platform musters. The platform crew were stood
down from muster after ten minutes. The cause of the overheating is ubject to ongoing investigations and the heater element is being pulled for inspection. Conditions at the time of the incident
were : daylight, dry and clear. Wind direction 320 degrees at 22 knots.
During stable production operations an alarm was received in the Central Control Room at 23:55 for a common alarm activated on K 3000 VSD due to low level cooling water in the header tank.
At 23:56 the on site Electrical Technician approached the unit, s elled burning insulation, he immediately isolated the equipment with the loacl trip button. Looking through the cabinet louver be
observed flame which died out following the isolation. On duty personnel were stood by during a further full isolation of t e equipment. Subsequent examination revealed that the water coolant
system had failed causing water to leak over several banks of thyristors and capacitors which had allowed short circuiting of the capacitors and heat/flame damage to the wiring and term
Confirmed Flame detection within Generator Hood and auto release of Inergen extinguishant. Platform held at muster for 20 minutes. Platform was running on a single generator operation when
SPS followed the loss of generation and AC power. All emergency eq ipment and support services operated as per design.
During change out of turbine meter, operations technicians went to clean test separator outlet filter basket. The following is a sequence of events. Prior to the commencement of any work the line
had been water flushed and nitrogen purged. Turbine meter i same line (approx. 2m from filter pot) had already been removed from line, washed out using same water hose and replaced into line.
Filter pot lid carefully removed ensuring that no pressure was trapped in filter. Filter basket was removed and on inspect on found to be blocked with same type of gel material from well a1
returns along with a small amount of residual water. A "green" water hose was run out from a nearby hose station (the same hose and station as used previously). The hose was turned on and imed
into the basket to wash out gel, there was a "blue flash" and a "crack" from inside the filter basket. The hose was immediately pointed away from the basket and switched off. The basket was
inspected to ensure nothing had ignited.
At 03:30 hrs on <> hd 17 heat detector in the ccr indicating high temperature at the top of s429 vent stack and automatically activated the general plant alarm. The chief operator and a plant
operator went immediately to the scene and confirmed that the vent stack offgas had ignited. They immediately informed the ccr operator who manually activated the halon sniffing system which
extinguished the flame. The atmospheric vent collection and fluids knock out systems were checked and no abnormal conditio found. There was no activation of any process plant or other safety
system alarms at this time. The weather conditions at the time were winds of nnw 35, 50 knots, seastate 8 -12 metres, visability 1-3 miles in heavy snow squalls. The weather forcast indi ated a
moderate to high risk of lightning during snow squalls.
With the platform in normal production mode, a platform alert was initiated by smoke indication in n25 switchroom. All platform personnel were mustered at their lifeboat muster points within
the tr. Initial checks of the switchroom were conducted and the resence of thin smoke was still evident. Further systematic examination of the electrical cubicle (45v) revealed a failure of a
securing bolt on a bus bar connection which had allowed short circuiting of two phases. A further investigation is ongoing to identify failure mode.
C.r.o. working near f & g panel detected burning smell. Doors were opened to locate source and flames were observed on top of power supply unit. At this point p.s.u. (power supply unit) failure
alarm operated and operations team leader appeared. Both o ened panel back doors to access burning psu co2 extinguisher picked up at control room door and flames knocked out with two puffs.

During the restarting of the gas turbine driven gas compressor the newly installed exhaust bellows lagging caught fire. Fire detection system called for deluge and the fire was extinguished. The
technician in attendance also released the fine water mist p otection internal to the turbine hood as a precaution. A full muster of platform personnel was completed.
Fire in laundry caused by a number of towels auto igniting. Removed from a dryer that had not completed a hot/cold cycle due to a fault and left in bundle. Detection systems activated alarms and
muster called. Minor damage to adjacent wall covering. No injuries. Fault repaired - age of machine may lead to change out.
During normal gas injection operations (single train ops) the HP & LP vent stacks were struck by lightening twice in a 15 minute period. On both occasions the vent stacks caught fire. The
operations team made the correct PA announcement & platform genera alarm to alert all personnel of the situation. They also with the aid of the response team fired off the fixed halon system
which extinguished the fire in seconds. During this period the process plant was held in a steady state to avoid a blow down. A l halon systems were replenished and spare bottles re-charged.
Normal platform operations were ongoing. Three main power turbines were supplying power. Main power generator 'c' indicated 'fire' by way of a single flame indicator. Area operators were
sent to investigate. Flames were seen inside the enclosure and th operator initiated manual halon release. The platform was called to muster stations and all process plant shutdown till fire was
confirmed as out.
During routine operations on the a boiler system, the operations tech- nician also checked the b boiler operation and observed that the pilot burner was alight but also yellow flames were observed
inside the burner tube itself. It was suspected that the oiler tube may have failed and that glycol had entered the flame tube and ignited. The boiler system was shut down and the fuel gas
manually isolated
An oil plant operator was conducting routine reinstatement checks following a maintenance shutdown. This operation included access above v74. The operator brushed against an electrical cable
which arced to earth. The breaker was tripped. Immediate site in estigation identified incorrectly terminated live cables, appear to be from removed floodlight fitting. Site made safe. Formal
investigation in progress, reported as a dangerous occurence electrical short circuit.
Platform operating under normal steady state conditions. At approx 15:25 smoke was detected in Module'D' C9 fan room. An emergency shutdown was initiated resulting in activation of the
blowdown system and main power outage. The platform general alarm was ctivated -personnel to muster stations
At approx 0300 hrs on <> a fire alarm for Module "D" computer room annunciated in the Control Room. A second alarm initiated a halon gas release and a level one shutdown. The platform
was called to muster and emergency team deployed. Fo lowing investigation the area was declared safe and secure. The muster was then stood down. Subsequent investigations revealed that an
overheating fan starter capacitor was resposible for the smoke in the Computer room. For rest of report see OIR9B.
During de-commissioning operations on well <> involving the cutting and pulling of 20" casing the rig electrician heard a bang in the direction of module 24 and on entering the scr switch
room found smoke and a smell of electrical burning. After trip ing the ship to shore power supply and raising the general alarm the area was inspected by the emergency response team. They
observed that in one of the general electric scr cabinets a phase 3 600v auxiliary fuse switch had blown and flashed across the t rminals. Following an inspection of the remaining scr cabinets
normal operations were resumed. Platform investigation ongoing regarding failed fuse switch.
At 21:52 hrs on <> the f and g system detected smoke in room (office) 703 (lv. 7 of accommodation module on investigation a waste paper bin was found to be smouldering. Gpa was initiated
and persons muster stations) water was poured onto the paper debris and heat/smoke extinguished.
During methanol loading on <...> the hose started to leak. It was near a coupling at sea level, 35 metres from the boat. Stopped and changed out a5 metre length. The "new" hose did also start to
leak after a short time. The opeation was stopped and the new ose ordered. The methanol spill was ca. 50 litre.
The platform was 9 days into the annual shutdown. The workscope associated with this incident required inspection on 'b' manifold nozzles. The auxiliary manifold comprises 7 off downcomers
and the inspection necessitated the removal of 5 of these downcome s in order to facilitate the 'b' manifold valves removal. A red-hot work permit has been issued to grind through seized bolts
(burning was also identified as an option). C48 downcomer has been removed, the inspection has been carried out and the mechanics had replaced c48 downcomer but the retaining bolts were
only approximately finger tight. Fire blankets had been installed on the c48 downcomer, which was adjacent to the downcomer (<...> flowline), on which the red-hot work was being done. The
retaining b lts on the test manifold valve on this riser were in the process of being flame cut as they were seized. As a result of this red-hot work, a slight gas seepage through the upstream flange
of c48 manifold valve ignited and a slall fire ensued which was qui kly extinguished by the on-scene firewatcher. To prevent activation of platform fire and gas esd and associated gpa, the flame
detection b3/1 fd1 and fd2 (level 1 authorisation), covering 'b' module auxiliary manifold had been inhibited for the red-hot work.

Prior to starting 2k101a <...> compressor a high liquid level in the interstage scrubber needed to be cleared. At about 2230 hrs the system operations began draining down the interstage scrubber
via the closed drain under <...> guidance. A leak occ red (condensate) at a compression fitting serving the suction scrubber to closed drain and caused two level gas detectors to activate. The gas
detectors both reached 25% lel causing a class 1 fire & gas ESD.
The incident occurred when operations were ongoing to re-instate cooling water pipework on the <...> Interstage Cooler. One part of this activity was the removal of a blank flange on line <...>
which ties into the LP flange. The 6" bli d was unbolted and left lying loose on top of the flange whilst the spool was prepared for re-instatement. The 16" flare valve had not been isolated for the
task. During well operations there was a surge of gas to the LP flare system causing the blank fla ge to move, resulting in a gas release into the module. The platform subsequently shut down on
coincident high-level gas detection. Detailed investigation performed indentified failure to follow procedure as the immediate cause.
Intervention visit to investigate a recurring low level gas detection. On entering vacinity of gas detection it was apparent where the gas was coming from ie prenure indicator guage pi-0208
damaged tube. Supply to guage isolated and gauge removed. Replacement fitted and back on line.
Platform was not manned at the time of the incident. Small volume gas release in M.E.G combination inlet ducting for rogen unit. Caused by solenoid valves paring - platform shut @ level
three.
On platform shutdown the hydraulic system oil reservoir became over pressured and blew the top mounted pump out of the tank. There was no-one nearby due to the platform shutdown.
During the mechanical maintenance on valves associated with the hp vent system it was noted that there appeared to be evidence of liquid.`
Small gas release from the pig launcher. One of the hydraulis pig fingers had been removed and a flange fitted. When the launcher was used the flange leaked. Launcher shut down and vented.
New seal fitted pressure tested to 1250psi test ok. Returned to service.
Scaffold foreman was moving scaffold tubes from ac cellar deck to at when he noticed a smell of condensate. On arriving at the pumps he noticed a stream of fluids coming out the back of a
gauge on the discharge line from pump a. He could not isolate the gauge so he stopped the pump on the emergency stop button. He called for assistance and was met by <...> who isolated the
gauge using the wheel key the area was washed down with water and the gauge was replaced.
Whilst carrying out fire start maintenance checks on ac cellardeck, the lead instrument technician noted a sheared 't' stainless steel impulse line. The s/s line was approx 12" in length and had
fractured at the compression fitting . No evidence of either damage or corrosion was found. Loss of containment.
Gas leak from the fuel gas inlet to K400 gas turbine.
During routine checks it was found that the 30" flange on the compressor discharge header was seeping gas.
Generator G6001 on line and on load; Engine backfired causing gasket failure and small hydrocarbon release and ignition. Engine shutdown and fuel gas supply isolated.
Water was being transferred from the vessel <...>, when the hose from the platform ruptured. The pumping operation was stopped and the hose uncoupled. The boat crew reported that the hose
had split at the coupling. The north crane lowered his h ok to recover the hose to the platform for repair and the hose was hoisted on to the platform. The vessel left the platform. While the deck
crew attempted to tie off the lower section of the hose the end suspended from the crane parted from the coupling a d the hose assembly fell to the sea, narrowly missing a deck crew member on
the lower deck. No injuries occurred as a result and the hose has now been recovered onboard the beryl alpha. Weater conditions were good, no wind, good visibility.
Date <...> - time 15:15 hrs - area 1 gas compression. During normal running operations a leak was found by a <...> operator, he immediately alerted the ccr who sent production operator to
determine the degree of hazard - the ccr monitored the area continu sly - at no time was any gas detected on the area fire and gas detection system, due to the leak being relatively small. On
reaching the area the operator determinedthat an "o" ring at the plug on the pilot valve assembly on psv 325a - g155 3rd stage of he mp gas compressor was leaking, a small build up of hydrates
was taken off line and shut down in order to investigate and conduct repairs. The psv had been replaced during the recent shutdown and had been on line for approx. 36 hours. On exposing the pl
g it was confirmed that the "o" ring seal was split. The male and female thread assembly was in good condition. The "o" ring was replaced using an oem part. The system was re-commisioned and
brought on line, tested and found to be leak free. An investigat on has commenced into the cause of this loss of containment.

During preparation for the removal of a sand probe in n4y flowline a double block and bleed mechanical isolation was put in place. The flow- line had been flushed, drained and at zero pressure,
however an instrument tapping between the xv and the manual b ock valve was indicating pressure. To prove the double block and bleed, the instrument tapping was cracked open to vent the
pressure. The operator noted gas spluttering from the vent on the instrument tapping indicating there was a blockage in the vent. W thout warning the gas flow increased without opening the valve
further. The volume of gas escaping within a relatively small area, coupled with minimal wind conditions, activated the gas detection and subsequent gpa and deluge release. The operator immedi
tely closed the vent tapping. An lp1 has been raised to initiate a full investigation.
During run up sequencing of the mp compressor after a compression trip, gas was detected within the turbine enclosure on module 4 activating the automatic gas detection system, halon
suppression system and initiated a gpa. An incident report was raised to determine the root cause and to identify any corrective actions to prevent reccurance.
A coiled tubing operation was in the process of being set up on <...> platform to carry out a sand isolation procedure on production well a23 in the well bay. The equipment had been positioned,
interconnected and in the early stages of being funct on tested by the contract services company halliburton when a small casing hydraulic oil returns tank (~0.5m cubed) became over pressured.
The equipment was not connected to the well at this time.the result of the over pressure was to deform the tank, sit ated on level 3 well bay, and ultimately caused a welded corner of the tank to
split and allow the hydraulic oil to be ejected approx. 8 metres. Two personnel were wetted by cold hydraulic oil (type g millermatic). The c/t supervisor immediately shutdown he operation and
deployed oil spill kits. The two affected personnel required change of clothing and showered. No first aid was required. A local investigation team is being set up and the contractors shore based
organisation being contacted for more information.
After a maintenence operation on a gas metering orifice plate, the metering stream was repressurised. The metering technician who was present noticed a small leak from a compression fitting.
On attempting to tighten the connection, the 1/2" fitting parted allowing gas to escape. The technician isolated the upstream valve and fitted a cap to secure. After examination of fitting it appears
that it was incorrectly made off (under-tightening_ and that a genuine swagelok fitting was assembled with a ringlok fit ing which is believed to be a copy of swagelok. This assembly was supplied
by the equipment vendor.
Gas leak, about 5m3 from hose on double block and bleed system, when outboard xv failed. Suspect seal failure within the valve.
During a routine check the well operator noticed a hydrocarbon leak from the kill swing valve stem of the n32 well. Operation initiated a well shutdown which included the dhsv. Further
investigation showing that the stem packing had failed.
Platform was in steady state oil and gas production. No drilling activities. Power generation turbine g41101a was on load and running on diesel fuel.during watch keeping activities, a technician
noticed dense white mist issuing from the turbine enclosure xhaust fan. The turbine was immediately shutdown and inspected. There was 25 litres of diesel fuel present in the base of the
enclosure. Further investigation discovered that the compression fittings on the diesel ring were found to be slack. The machine as a history of vibratory problems which may have contributed to
the problem. G41101a is a <...> turbine. It was noted that the turbine enclosure oil mist detector did not operate. Platform investigation is ongoing to establish the cause of oil mist detector failure.
Normal gas export operations were in progress. Open module area with good natural ventilation and normal weather conditions. Hydrocarbon release was export gas - A leak occurred on the top
connection of the balance line - on the probe body. The probe sect on has thermal insulation enclosure
During routine production operations, gas plant processor control problems resulted in some controlled flaring of gas through the HP flare system- The Fire and Gas system detected gas in the
location of the <...> separator - At 14.23 the Gas Detector wen into high alarm
At approx. 0110hrs the <...> scada operator acknowledged a 60% alarm on gashead f12, located in the process area. He then telephoned the arbroath operator, made him aware of the situation and
requested he investigate the alarm. At approx. 0113, gashead d5 & d21, both located by the wellhead area, came into 20% alarm, as a result of these heads indicating 20%, the montrose operator
initiated an arbroath level 3 shutdown. Also, as a result of the coincidence 20% readings, the platforms ga sounded and the platform personnel reported to muster stations. Investigation by the frt,
found that p8105 mol pumps mechanical seal had failed and a fine spray of crude was leaking from it the production operator was contacted and the pump was isolated and depressurised via the
closed drain system, the leak ceased at approx. 0117 hrs. It was estimated that approx. 2 galls of crude leaked, this was fully contained by the bunded area around the pumps, and was washed
down the open hazardous drains. All actions as per cause nd effects were executed, p 8105 was left isolated and drained down.
Well a3 being flowed via 2inch warm up line to vent system.(normal routine operation). Small hole evident in line causing small gas escape to atmosphere. Note:insufficant quantities to initiate
fixed detection systems.operator closed in line and stopped activity.

During a platform shutdown caused by process instruments, the wells automatically shut in and the wellhead pressure rose to its shut-in level at the same time, the inner annulus pressure rose to a
similar pressure exceeding ist alarm point set at 170 barg. This indicates thast tubing to inner annulus communication occurred. Well A1 is being flowed in order to reduce the pressure seen in the
annulus at surface to below the alarm level.continuous monitoring is being carried out. The inner annulus is designed to contain the original shut-in W/H pressure.
Well 8a swab valve had been maintained and hydraulically tested from underneath by fluid in the xmas tree pressurised via the kill w/v. The test rig was removed from the kill w/v and fitted to the
swab cap for final gas service test. The operative left th kill w/v open and its blind flange plug out when the hydraulic master v/v was opened gas escaped under pressure through the 1/2" NPT
connection at the kill W/V flange.
Steady state operations: Test sep. Operator noticed dripping condensate from a lagged valve. Lagging removed which identified condensate spray from valve stem seal.Note 1: Valve was a
manual isolation valve to a level control bridle. Action taken: Test separator taken off line and depressured. Note 2: No automatic detection of gas from fixed detectors Wind speed in module
17 knts 152 degrees
Process upset caused high pressure in open drains system which blew out water seal in mod 05 plant room drains. This introduced gas into the plant room and ccr which resulted in a gpa and
muster. Full investigation is ongoing with hse.
Whilst investigating the cause of a gas injection blowdown valve not opening, the trapped pressure/gas between the double gate seals was suddenly released. The Mechanical Technician suffered
only superficial injury and returned to work shortly afterward. he valve had been removed from the process and was awaiting backload ashore. Investigation is ongoing.
Gas release from A15 Gas Injection Flowline which is under construction. Passing valve caused gas to migrate along the flowline and discharge from graylock flange. Full investigation ongoing.
The export pump (PX0102A) in Module 13 was being worked on by the maintenance department and had just been run for approximately 25 minutes before being shutdown. At 1745 hrs the
CCR got indication of high gas in module 13 and sounded the GPA moving all personel to Emergency Muster Stations (coastguard alerted). The problem resulted from a gas / oil leak from a
flange on a 10 inch suction line upstream of the pump which sprayed the product into the module. Investigations are ongoing and reports being com iled.
During permit controlled task to repair coupling guards on <...> compressor, gas pockets were released initiating gas heads in the module. Review of isolation identified that standard isolation did
not cover route to degasser. As a result there wa more gas than expected released to the module resulting in one high gas alarm and several in low alarm. The task had been controlled with an
operator on site. The job was stopped and reassessed when this hazard was identified.
B' gas injection compressor had been returned from maintainance, de-isolated and start up checks completed. Lube oil circulation was established <...>. Compressor was pressurised to 45 Bar
20/9 to service test two PSV's that had been re-certified, the c mpressor was then depressurised. Lube oil remained online. At 16:00 hr <...>, lube oil was found to be offline, initial checks found
nothing untoward, the lube oil was re-established at 16:30, at 17:00 it was reported that the lube oil/seal oil reservoir w s distorted.A level valve for seal oil o/h tanks had stuck open and 3000 lts+
had been pumped out of the lube oil reservoir. Gas always present in the tank was mixed with air drawn in to replace volume of oil removed. It is thought an explosive mixture as ignited by a
source not yet confirmed. Full investigation ongoing.
Minor gas release-llg indicated on 2 gas heads in pac module due to pinhole leak on gas supply
Minor gas release from 1/2 branch on oil inlet to 1st stg sep.12" line from pin hole leak fitting to flange weld. Small gas release not detected by gas heads. Train one shut down manually by
operations staff.
Gas released in process module u5w lower due to reciprocating compressor k9320 cylinder no 3 head/valve cover joint failure.
Minor gas release in gas compression module (u5w mezz) due to leaking sealant port on ba19/20 injection manifold block valve. Fire and gas panel indicated 2 gas heads on llg.
Technicians monitoring area for potential leakage from pre-identified broken joints (post shutdown work), at 40 BAR pressure a technicians attention was drawn to a noise and then spotten gas
emitting from Pas Boot Area - platform GPA initiated on coincide ce low level gas. On investigation drain balve between PAS Boot B/V and LCV was found to be partially open. As the leak did
not appear until 40 BAR it would appear there had been a blockage in the drain pipework.

Gas escaped when a valve block assembly parted from a dp cell on bbo2 gas lift flowline due to the fitting of incorrect retaining bolts.
Abseilers were descending column 1 on a man riding winch to access a fixed airline breathing system located at the worksite. As the fixed H2S detectors were indicating readings of 0PPM and
22PPM, 10 minutre rescue sets were being worn as a precautionary m asure for the 3 minute journey to the worksite. When the work party reached the 130m level, the air supply failed on a set
being worn by one member of the work party. Winch operator and standby man were contacted and the work party were recovered immediat ly. Subsequent checks indicate that the pressure gauge
on the BA set is stuck at 220 BAR.
A minor gas leak which was not detected by the fixed monitoring system was noted during routine watchkeeping. <> flowline pressure switch nozzle weldolet was found to have developed a
hairline crack in the weld.
Following the overhaul of k13800, the injection compressor was being prepared by operations staff for reinjection. During the start up sequence gas was detected in m3ee, the gas level indicated
was below the alarm level. The compressor was manually stoppe which initiated an automatic shut down/blow down sequence. Upon investigation the gas was found to be coming from the
module drain.investigation ongoing.
At approx. 16:15 hrs on <> the control room received a call to say the smell of gas mp compressor 6. Operations staff with a portable gas detector were despatched. A leak from a pinhole in a
dublok double block and bleed was discovered u der lagging. The valve is an isolation valve for a pressure transmitter on compression export. Operations personnel isolated the valve and the
leak immediately stopped. It was tought the leak was from the threaded connection between the valve and transmi ter inst. Turbine, but on close inpsection a tiny pinhole was discovered close to
the point where one of the double block connections screwed into the valve body [export comp ko801b]. Normal production operations in process at the time. Weather conditions 10 knots wind at
300degs sea state 1 metre swell with 10 miles visibility. Air temp 9degs.c.
During the re-opening of well slot 21, instrument linework (12mm) located on the flowline pressurisation/depressurisation header, was forced out of the connection fitting, by the process gas
pressure in the system, gas escaped to atmosphere for 5 minutes ntil isolated by process operator. System operating pressure at time (55bar)
Metering stream 3 taken out of service to remove/inspect/refit filter. During reinstatement the metering stream was being depressurised with condensate liquid, the condensate liquid passed the
"o" ring seal of the filter housing resulting in a loss of hyd ocarbon containment gas detection (fixed) activated resulting in full platform production shut- down and depressurisate. Platform alert
activated (automatic) the stream inlet valve being used to pressurise/service test the system reclosed and metering st eam depressurised. Wind 23 knots direction 300 degrees visibility iomile sea
state 2.3 m swell
At approx 01:06hrs on <> a low level gas detection alarmed in the process area, followed by a second head which initiated a general platform alarm. A third gas detector indicated in the same
area. Incident team leader and ops team co-ordinator dispat hed to investigate. The incident team leader was unable to locate the leak either by sound, smell or sight, nor could the gas detectors
easily be identified (21 gas detectors in the process area). At approx 01:11 OIM issued instruction to shutdown and blo down level 3. At this point the detectors were reading between 20 - 28%
Lel, once blowdown commenced these readings quickly dropped to zero. Incident team checked area to make sure it was all clear before returning to the control room to establish search or the
source of the leak. Platform remained shutdown until source of leak discovered and rectified. Addition. Two minor leaks were discovered on the MP Compressor Recycle Line. One leak was on
a flange and a spiral-wound gasket was replaced. The other as a stem gland valve leak which was rectified by tightening the gland packing.Normal production was resumed after the leaks were
rectified.
During a production system start up following an unplanned production systems shutdown, a gasket seal at F2115 Ctriethylene glycol carbon filter top cover failed. Hot tri-ethylene liquid escaped.
The vapours produced caused 2 fixed point gas detectors to ctivate. The result being a general platform alert and production system shutdown. Operations personnel located the source of the
escape and isolated the filter unit until an inspection/repair could be made to the filter unit. Volume of liquid lost approx 60 lts. Wind 220' at 15 knots. Sea state 1.5m, Vis 8-10 miles. Dry & clear.
G.P.A. alarm from fixed gas detection - Muster all POB. During "Well B6" clean up from a previous frac on this well a loss of containment of hydrocarbon/water/propant mix occured. A failure of
pipework due to erosion was the cause of this incident. The wi d direction being north east 0.40deg - 18 knots. The platform production was shut down. The failed pipework system is isolated. No
person injured. HSE duty officer informed at 03:30 <>.

Normal process operations ongoing. Person working on level 4 mezz. Noticed minor gas leak from 'b' export gas compressor discharge pipework and contacted platform central control room.
Production staff attended the area and confirmed that leak was from re undant pilot assistance pipework for the discharge psv. Production staff immediately shutdown the affected gas compressor
and depressurised the system. The leakage point was from a weld on a spoolpiece. Due to low quantity of gas from the leak no field ga detectors went into alarm. As excessive vibration is thought
to be contributory factor in this event, temporary supports will be fitted to the pipework. The redundant pipework will be removed when the compressors are shutdown. The plant is to be surveye
to identify any pipework of a similar configuration.
While commissioning the gas re-injection compressor, the re-injection riser valve was equalised to 450 bar. On opening the valve a leak of hydrocarbon gas occurred from one of the valve tell tale
ports to atmosphere. This was noticed by <>(com issioning manager) who immediately had the valve closed and compressor shutdown and de-pressurised. The gas immediately dispersed and
did not activate the module fire and gas system. The fire and gas system was checked and found to be fully operational. W nd was 193 degrees at 34 knots. No one was injured and no damage to
plant occurred. A full incident investigation is ongoing.
At 1055 on <> a technician was working in level 4 process area when he noticed gas leaking in the underside of the A Export Compressor discharge cooler. He immediately stopped what he
was doing and contacted the platform Central Control Room. An i mediate reponse to the leak was initiated where it was discovered that the leak was from a 1" drain line from the cooler
discharge pipework.The A compressor was shutdown and the system vented to flare. A Task Risk Assessment was carried out to enable r medial work to be carried out to the pipework.As there
has been a previous similar event involving vibration induced fatigue to small bore pipework a small team has been set up to determine the extent of the problem and options for reducing
possibilitie of any further leaks. Actions include but not limited to; Establishing potential for defects on similar fabrications Establishing root cause of failure to determine future engineering
solutions Reviewing previous history of similar defects and ensuri g corrective actions have been followed up, Reviewing findings from small bore pipework survey carried lout during <>.
Leak from badley corroded drain valve on gas metering outlet on seperator. There was no fixed detection. It was manually detected but, did have problems isolating leak. Shut down vlave failed
to close then had to go to manual closing valve upstream.
<> generator had been worked on i.e. psv recertification. Psv refitted and on start of m/c flexible nose between psv and hp vent system failed. Gas leaked into <...> enclosure initiating
detection and subsequent platform <> esd. Gas spread to <> hall and <> control room. Operators manually isolated vent system and naturally ventilated closed spaces.
<> generator had a diesel leak inside the engine unit housing. No injuries.
Small gas leak from dew point metering analyser. Gas detected from 1 ton level gas head. Precautionary muster. No e.s.d. platform to alarm status on confirmed low level gas conditioning
module um4ww. Leak found to be from the gas dewpoint analyser samp ing cabinet located on the glycol contactor outlet line. This was confirmed by hand held meter readings, the cabinet was
isolated and remaining area checked. Platform returned to normal at 0440hrs.
Leak reported by platform personnel and location of leak given as rm4e gas compression module. Area tech. Investigated and leak originally thought to be from valve flange and gas compression
shutdown. Further investigation found leak to be from a pinhol in the body of the 3rd stage discharge esd valve. Gas process manual blowdown initiated. Preparing site for valve removal and
investigation.
At 2353 hrs well <> was opened to recommence production from the <> facilities after a maintenance shutdown which included a number of valve change outs on the production manifold
assembly. Immediately on the well being beaned up, the platform went to general platform alarm status on a coincident low level gas detection in m3e where the <> flowline ties into the
production manifold. The gas dectection level immediately increased to a coincident high level initiating fire grade 1 shutdown (surface process s/d, emergency depressurisation process and
closure of the <> system riser esdv's). The shutdown actions were confirmed and the hydrocarbon gas levels monitored, with the platform muster and <> supervisor called out via <> at
0007 hrs on <>. At 00:16 the <> bell 214 was requested to be on standby and contact was established with <>. The process was fully blown down at 0020 hrs and the external door to m3e
was opened to provide natural ventilation. Gas level monitoring continued but the reduction was slow due to limited natural ventilation and contact was made with the coastguard at 0025 hrs.
With the gas levels slowly reducingthe emergency support team were despatched to provide a natural ventilation route from m3w via m3c and finally opening a through route into m3e at 0117 hrs

Fuel gas leak occurred in P4250 Gas Turbine hood causing platform to go to GPA status.Confirmed high level gas shutdown P4250 Gas Turbine as designed.Shortly after this,confirmed high level
gas activated in the Air Intake of P4250 Gas Turbine resulting in Platform Blackout,PSD (production shutdown),blowdown and closure of the <> System ESD valves.All these actions were as
design. Emergency response team arrived at the site of the Incident and confirmed that the Gas had dispersed from the Hood.Platform ire/Gas system was reset and the platform returned to
normal status.Investigation team set up.On initial investigation,no obvious signs of where the leak occurred have been seen.A series of N2 pressure testing programmes have started to identify the
location of the leak.
Fire grade 2 shutdown caused by coincident smoke in TFL engine room. The TFL pump was being used to bring on <> wells following a process shutdown (normal operation). The engine had
been running for approximately 30 mins. Prior to the smoke detection the crankcase dipstick had ejected due to a faulty seal causing a small amount of lubricating oil to be sprayed over the
engine. The dipstick was secured and the engine continued to run. Just as the engine was being shutdown due to the pumping operations eing complete, the smoke detectors were initiated. The
initation was caused by fumes from burning lube oil which had impregnated the exhaust manifold lagging. The area was manned at the time of the incident and therefore was no naked flame
present.
A pig trap isolation valve was being leak tested using a 24" internal test tool manufactured by <>.the test tool had been pressurised with nitrogen to 100barg .during the removal process of the
tool following successful test of the v lue the tool was ejected from the pig trap.the tool and its carrying trolly travelled across the deck space colliding with and finally resting against a handrail.
Damage was sustained to the tool, its carrier and the handrail. No persons were injured.no o her structural damage was sustained. The platform was depressurised at the time.two technicians were
carrying out the testing operation and the area was cordoned off investigations conclude that nitrogen had leaked past the tool seals pressurising the spa e behind.when the tool seals were relaxed
the back pressure propelled the tool from the pig trap.a full investigation has been conducted.the tool and its seals have been sent for examination.
At approximately 20:30 hours the control room oprator requested a process operator to investigate a slight oil sheen on s/board side of vessel. The source of the sheen was quickly identified as
being a leakage of oil from the impulse line for pressure tr nsmitter 02-pt-0715 it was found that the isolation valve was immediately closed and the leakage of oil isolated at the time of the
incident inst. Department were attampting to clear a blockage in the impulse line. Since the incident has occurred the pipi g of the impulse line has been altered to accurately reflect the p & id.
The production chemist was taking crude samples from sample point on export metering skid fast loop system. 2 toxic gas detectors & 2 flammable were inhibited. After taking samples the 4
heads alarmed. As they were inhibited no automatic gpa or shutdown. abinet was isolated from outside. Half a barrel of crude leaked after seal on pump found be faulty. Pump was isolated and
removed. Technical anaylsis & investigation of failure being currently looked into.
Discharge of crude emulsion to sea. Maintenance was being carried out on the produced water system. Valve inadvertently opened allowing oil thru to the produced water caisson which was not
properly isolated from the system. Retrospective report as spill o ly identified following invest of subsequent incident on <>. Oil & gas production suspended and investigation carried out.
Report to be forwarded to hse and dti
Discharge of crude oil to see approx 1m. The cuase of the incident is not known with certainty - believe discharge from produced water caisson due to level transmitter malfunction . On discovery
of dischage oil spill procedure instigated. Dispersant used to break up spill. Oil & gas production suspended incident under investigation. <> informed.
Single gas detector on dd cellar deck detected flammable gas by transfer pumps. Work was ongoing in the area at the time flushing the transfer pumps with hot water with the vented water being
led by hose to the closed drains. The pump was mechanically is lated and being flushed with hot water to remove wax deposits from the suction strainer via a line to the closed drain. A
temporary hose was fitted to a 3/4" valve so that some of the flushing water could be bled off to the hazardous drains to visually c nfirm that the pump was fully flushed. The temporary hose
consisted of a crimped end fitting onto a smooth piece of tubing (not serrated). While under pressure (3.5 barg) the hose blew off releasing some hydrocarbon vapour/oil which activated the
detecto . Replacement of such hoses is already underway and all fittings will be inspected. The use of all utility hoses and temporary tie ins to be covered by a controlled procedure. Until the
above is completed the oim has issued a memo to all personnel.
A gas release on the fuel package meter was noticed by an operator were a leak of nitrogen through the terminal casing exiting at the cable clamp. The pressuration was stopped immediatly and
the 24v power supply isolated to the flow meter tag number.

A leak of high pressure gas took place from the flange of a 12" ball valve in the injection compressor PSV on the flare header line. Leak was caused by closure of a 12" valve at a pressure
specification change which should normally be kept open. This al owed full system pressure to be put against a lower rated flange on the valve.The valve flange seal then leaked and allowed gas
to escape.Leak was observed by personnel in the vicinity and reported to the control room. GPA was initiated and oil produ tion shut down to allow system to be pressurised and made safe.An
internal investigation is in progress in to the closure of the 12" valve without the upstream 6" isolation valve being closed first.
An operator was carrying out a routine pigging operation on the <> 12" injection pig trap to launch an intelligent pig. On conclusion of the interlock sequence the operator opened the tell-tale
bleed valve to ensure that the launcher was free of toxi and flammable gasses. The gas test carried out proved to be negative. The operator then realised that he had forgotten to carry out a
section of the procedure that required the interspace between the kicker line isolation valve and the pipeline isolati n valves to be vented to flare. This procedure is normally carried out at the
beginning of the operation.The operator proceeded to open the kicker line isolation valves and the pipeline isolation valves without closing the tell-tale bleed valve. It wa following this that a
release of gas occurred from the tell-tale bleed valve on the <> pig trap door. The escape of gas was detected by fixed gas detectors and the installation GPA was activated with the resultant
level 1A shutdown. A full investig tion of the incident has been carried out and remedial actions to prevent recurrence are being implemented.
Gas leak was observed coming from the valve stem on the Temperature Control Valve (TCV) on the hot gas by pass for the A injection gas compressor. System was isolated and de pressurised. A
technical investigation into the cause of the stem leak is currenyly in progress.
Two operators were tasked with looking at the interface level transmitter on the <> slug catcher methanol boot. On investigation it was found that the <> transmitter could not be verified as
the level glass was dirty.The operators informed the CCR that the bridle would have to be blown down. Inhibits were applied by the CCR to the gas detection system & the operators isolated the
double block & bleed valves and connected up the temporary pipe work to the closed drains. On the initial attempt t blow down the bridle the liquid could not be evacuated from the level glass
confirming that a blockage was present.The closed drains valves were isolated & the gas side of the bridle opened to re-pressurise the bridle. When this was completed the orig nal isolations were
applied and the bridle blown down successfully.A sea water utility hose was then connected to the top of the level glass & the level glass flushed through.On completion of the operation all the
valves were isolated & the sea water tility hose depressurised. On breaking the mcdonald coupling joining the two lengths of the utility hose a small amount of gas was released which was
detected by a gas detector which activated the GPA. During the disconnection of the hose an operator su tained a slight laceration to the middle finger right hand. Laceration was cleaned plaster
Seal on B stripping gas compressor leaked process gas into compressor hood while A compressor was running. Cause is thought to be a failure of the B discharge valve to fully seat, and a passing
NRV. Due to the failure of the discharge valve to seat full , the logic did not allow the blowdown valve to open thereby allowing gas back to the B compressor causing the seal leak.The oil
production system was shut down and the fault investigated. Prior to re-start the B compressor was isolated and inspected w th all hood doors fully shut. Blowdown and discharge isolation valves
on A compressor were confirmed shut. Once production re-started, the B compressor was leak tested with N2.An Operating instruction will be issued to ensure that before starting any tripping
gas compressor, the Valve status on the offline machine is checked and the blowdown valve is open and discharge valve shut.
Whilst lining out <> gas pig receiver the in board <>, <> gearbox came away from the valve assembly due to a fracture in the casing of the mechanism housing. This incident is subject to
a full ongoing investigation details of which can be obtained from the SHE Team, <>.
The area technician was completing the de-isolation of <> flowline as part of the well engineering perforating activity on this well. As he was cracking open the flowline valve to upper
manifold isolation valve he observed oil leaking from the upstream flowline located on the ground floor level. The assisting well services operator proceeded to close the isolation valve as the
area technician went to investigate the location of the leakage. The source of the leak was identified as an open instrument t pping point isolation valve. This valve was closed and the leak was
secured. Area technician observations at that time were that this tapping point did not have a blanking plug installed similar to the adjacent tapping point on the same flowline. Throug out the
above the area technician was in radio communication with the process control room, where the operators were closely monitoring the status of the gas detection system. Throughout the duration
of this incident only three heads detected an increase in gas levels with a maximum of 46% lel. As the result of securing the leak, the indicated gas levels quickly dropped to normal zero% levels.
Whilst removing guns from well there was a leak from free standing stack approx 40 litres spilt. No platform muster or gas detected.
Following a test run on the CRI generator, the automatic diesel fill up failed, causing a spill of diesel on the pipedeck. Approx. 10 gallons was spilled; this was contained in the immediate vicinity
on deck.

At 05:05 hrs the platform was shutdown on indication of fire in leg 'A'. Onsite investigation showed that these indications were not genuine. The smoke detectors had been contaminated by sea
water from a leak at the top of the main service water riser loc ted in the leg. A small amount of H2S was released from the standing water at the bottom of the leg.The service water was
shutdown and the H2S cleared below 5ppm by 05:35 (without the aid of forced ventilation). And the platform returned to normal status
At 2020 hours, <>, <> went to a level 3 shutdown as a result of gas detection in module 02, gas compression. A precautionary muster was called. The affected plant was isolated, the
remainder returned to normal production. Nitrogen/helium leak as performed to locate source of gas. Recycle valve fu1430 was found to have a leak on the stem packing. This has been repaired,
and the compressor train b repressurised ready for service.
Priming of 'a' train 1st stage intercooler, ex 0215a with seawater. This involves venting of displaced air into the module, but in this case hydrocarbon gas was present giving a release into the
module resulting in fire and gas detection, automatic shutdo n and a muster. Gas entered into the sea water system via a ruptured disc which had previously failed.
Platform operating normally, when at approximately 07.55 three x gas heads in two separate fire areas within module 02 went into alarm. Firstly on low then on high. The CCR initiated a level 3
shutdown. The area was checked out following depressurisation but nothing found indicating where a release could have occurred. Investigations ongoing.
The accident happened during the recertification of the PSV (PSV 1415). After a routine pre-test of the valve, the test rig was blown down in preparation for the disassembly of the valve.
Because the design of the valve, gas pressure remains in the dome of the main valve. The injured party began to undo the instrument tube fitting which is connected to the valve dome. The tube
then blew out of the fitting and struck the individual on his left hand. <...> was treated at <...> Hospital where he was retained for two days.
Normal production operations in progress with an emergency response exercise ongoing. The exercise entailed copious amounts of water being sprayed onto module 3 roof and the pipedeck. Two
gas alarms were activated, one in low gas and the other in low gas oing to high gas later. Over a period of one minute 17 seconds both these were observed to be continually falling and
subsequently cleared. It is suspected that the amount of water entering the drains from the exercise and entering a common header, resul ed in a back pressure in the drains in Module 2 which in
turn forced any gas in the drains out through the gully seals. The source of the gas in the drains and the reason for its expulsion are still being investigated.
During operations to run casing into the hole, the mud fill hose was inserted into the open end of the casing on the rotary table. Before the valve was opened the pre charge pump was activated
causing the pressurised hose to be ejected from its position. he hose glanced the hard hat of the person operating it and sprayed water based drilling mud onto the drill floor. An investigation team
was set up including senior representatives of the drilling contractor. Investigations found that the low pressure fil up line had been connected to the high pressure mud pump system due to the
unavailibility of the low pressure trip tank system. When the mud pump was started the 2" valve on the end of the fill up line was left closed allowing the mud system and hose to ressure up to
relief valve pressure. The pressure lifted the system relief valve which caused a sudden pressure decrease in the fill-up line this caused the hose to recoil from inside the casing and struck a
glancing blow to the foreman's hat.
At 2.20 0n the <> during normal production operations, two gas heads g5220/g5221 located near t71 initiated low gas alarms in the ccr. The plant operator was requested to investigate and
reported no obvious gas leaks in the area, but suspected the lo gas could be coming from p10 pump gland.while the plant operator was locating a grease gun to pack the gland, the crt tech reset
the two gas heads, g5220 remained normal, g5221 came back into low alarm then went into high alarm initiating a yellow shutdo n. The plant was made safe and the source of gas was discovered
coming from a cover plate joint where a removed pump p11 had once been in place the cover plate joint was replaced and tightened and no further leaks were detected. The operating pressure of
71 is 12mbar. At the time of the incident the wind spped was 22 knts and direction was 315 degrees. Further actions to prevent recurrence:- 1. Other <> platforms notified 2. Cover joints and
glands on p10 to be checked 3. Checks cross field to ensure all pumps have adequate number of clamping bolts on the joints.
On the morning of the <>, <>, a non-destructive testing technician employed by <>, was carrying out ultrasonic thickness checks on gas pipework on the ngl roof. Whilst an area of
external corrosion was being cleaned up using a hand craper, so as to provide a good surface for the ut probe, the pipework perforated allowing gas to be released to the atmosphere. The
operating pressure of the pipe that perforated was ~12.5 barg. The arrangement of the pipework restricted access to some extent and meant that <> was fortuitously standing on the opposing
side of the pipe to the area that perforated. <> was not injured by the release and rapidly withdrew both himself and his non-intrinsically safe test equipment from the immedia e location of the
leak. He then telephoned the central control room using the platform emergency number, 555. Operations personnel (<> and <>) and the fire and safety officer (<>) immediately went to
the ngl roof where <> indicated the location of the release. The wind conditions were relatively light - the platform weather monitor records 9 knots @ 300 deg - but sufficient to be carrying
the released gas away from the platform and dispersing it towards the west (this ap ears contrary to the anemometer's record but may be due to flukey conditions around the flare tower.) <>

At the time of the incident plant operations were normal and no work was going on in the mol area in the vicinity of the lp condensate pumps, p-74 and p-75. The first warning of a problem came
at 1239hr when a low level gas alarm, g 5220, annunciated in he central control room, the ccr operator (<>) immediately called upon the operations shift team leader (<>) and the fire and
safety officer (<>) to investigate. As they approached the area the gas alarm went from low evel to high level and an automatic yellow shutdown of the plant took place. In the package there
was a smell of gas and a search of the area around gas detector 5220 revealed the source of the leak as a pinhole in the pipe to flange weld of the first fla ge off p-75 pump in the 1/2" nb recycle
line (line no<>). The operating pressure of this pipework is ~12barg. Due to the limited extent of the release no other gas detectors in the area went into alarm and, following consultation
between he ccr and fso the oim concluded that a general alarm and muster was not required. The wind conditions were typically 10-15knots from 290-340deg
At 23.40normal
duringflowing
recovery
of the plant
following
a shut down
21.15, traces
of oil
water
were
discovered
on the
top deckcausing
North West
corner, The
Westbarrel
walkways
Deep Gas
Lift area.forOn
During
operations
of well
A07 (Slot04)
a leakatdeveloped
on the
2" and
barrel
nipple
screwed
into the
C annulus
head spool.
nippleand
provided
connection
the
investigation
that leak,
a carry
over had
occurred
upter)
th ough
thewere
LP flare,
of anthrough
oily water
mix.edge
TheofOIM
implemented
controlled
down of
The who
windimmediately
was light (15took
access valves ittowas
the discovered
C annulus.The
trapped
liquid
(dirty w
and air
expelled
the top
the screw
thread. aThe
leak wasshut
observed
bythe
areaplant.
operator
knots) in
from
an East South
direction.The
investigation
indicates
two non return
valves
leading
from injury
the separators
to V17
0 pump
were passing,
allowing
overfill and eventual
action
conjunction
with East
the control
room and
the well was
shut in that
and precautions
taken
against
potential
from re ease
of the
valvedischarges
assembly while
the annulus
was depressurised
from
passage
to V161
then to the LP
flare. All level
indicators that
and the
switches
function tested during
both independently
and throughofactual
filling
of both vessels
and found
operate
effectacting
vely.
approximately
20and
bar.Subsequent
investigation
has identified
nipplehave
had been cross-threaded
the original installation
the valve
assembly.
The weight
of the to
valve
ass mbly
Twothenew
non will
return
valves
are en route
will be
changed
outthreads
prior to
plant.
on
nipple
have
contributed
to theand
fatigue
failure
of the
onre-start
the topofedge.
The original valve assembly has been removed and replaced with new barrel nibbles and rated instrument
fittings.
A gas release was detected at G3445, this gas head went to high gas, initiating a yellow shutdown, other detectors in the area also detected high gas. All detectors quickly returned to zero after the
initial alarm. V28/29 were being isolated at the time for planned maintenance. External environmental conditions at the time of the incident were logged as calm.
Description :- OIM informed by the Shift Team Leader to investigate a minor leak he had noticed on his inspection of the plant by VO2 - MOL Separator. On investigation it was found that
produced water was dripping from the underside of the 18 inch inlet h ader to the vessel. I informed the emergency response team to standby as a precautionary measure to allow the Operations
Team to shutdown vessel and isolate in a controlled fashion. On isolation of vessel prior to venting down, the weep developed into a s all pinhole jet of produced water. See OIR9B for rest of
report
During a shift handover inspection a pinhole leak was discovered in the spool which connects the scale inhibitor supply to the production flowline of well fb21. A fine spray of well fluids was
emanating from the leak. Due to the small nature of the leak, he fire and gas system had not been activated. The operator activated the eggbox emergency shut in. Although the downhole safety
valve closed, the actuated production upper master and flow wing valves remained stuck in the open position. The operator clo ed the production lower master valve to ensure isolation from the
well. All other wells in the eggbox shut in without fault. The flowline was isolated from plant and the leaking spool removed for inspection. Inspection of upper master and flow wing valve
actuators initiated. The fire and gas system checked and found to be fully functional. Corrosion of carbon steel spool by neat scale inhibitor solution was confirmed as the cause of the leak. The
fitted spool was found to be of incorrect metallurgy. Stain ess steel is required for this service. The tree valves are suspected to be sticking as a result of corrosion materials in actuator can.
Normal routine operations. Operations technician was walking between well eggboxes and the mol control room when he smelt gas, looked around and saw a gas leak coming from the main
production manifold. The technician initiated a platform yellow shutdown ( rip and vent). The shift team leader was informed who contacted the oim. Oim arrived at the scene to witness extent of
the leak. Oim instructed the control room technician to sound the gpa and call all personnel to emergency muster stations, time 01.15. A no time did the platform fire and gas systems detect any
gas. The emergency response teams isolated and depressurised the pipeline. The scene of the incident was made safe, at this point personnel mustered at emergency stations were stood down.
Weather was still, mild with no wind at all.
While carrying out well service operations, as per programme <> for bullheading well <>, in preparation for drilling operations, there was an apparent failure of a 1/2" b.s.p. swivel blanking
cap, on the chicksan line rig up. This caused a rele se of treated seawater, at a pressure of 1100 p.s.i., onto the b.o.p. deck. On noticing this, the service crew isolated the leak immediately,
informed the control room and their supervisor. The operation was suspended until a full investigation was carried out.
Pigging operations on the <> pipeline were ongoing, the receiver had been on line for pig receipt for a period of four and a half hours before the leak occurred. The weather conditions at the
time of the incident were - wind 193 degrees at 5knots, a d a sea state of 1.2m. (the weather had no impact on the incident). At 10.50hrs a leak was reported from the door of the <> pig receiver.
The leak was isolated by the shutdown of the <> production and export system, and depressuring of the rec iver. An estimated spillage of 1bbl crude oil occurred, with 4.5 gals spilled to sea.
(oir12 & pon 1 completed) initial investigations indicate the failure of the door seal as the cause of the leakage. A detailed investigation of the incident is ongoing.

During portable mini meter proving operations crude oil was lined up to the portable mini meter prover situated external to m4w. During this operation an oil spillage was quickly noticed internal
to the module. The alarm was manually raised immediately an the system isolated. On investigation it was found that two 12mm drain valves on inlet lines to the mini prover were inadvertently
left open prior to starting the operation. The spillage was contained within the module and successfully cleaned up. The sp llage of crude oil in the module was estimated at 400 litres.
At o859hrs an operations technician discovered a sheen on the sea east side of the platform and informed the ccr. Interface levels on separator trains checked and "b" train not clear. Wells
immediately started to be closed in. Demulsifier pump on chemical injection skid for "b" train found not to be operating, which caused the deviations in the separator interface. All wells closed in
15 mins later and standby demulsifier pump started. However, incurred short term increase in oiwob figure from normal 4 ppm to 125 ppm. Amount of crude actually evacuated to sea was
estimated at 0.02172m3. Oiwob sample taken after wells closed in - 5 ppm.
A GPA was activated when two gasheads 1304 and 1305 sensed a minor gas leak from the <> relief valve. The platform was shutdown and blowndown and in the ensuing investigation a small
leak was also detected at the discharge block valve inlet flange.
At 20.40 A Gashead in BG532 Avon Cell was found to be reading high after the introduction of gas to the engine on initiation of the GPA manually, the engine was checked and a small fitting was
found to be missing from the gas fuel rail on the engine.
Snubbing pipe into well - small quantity of gas released as tool joint passed through rotating head. Residual pressure due to insufficient bleed down between snubbing rams by operator.
During sphere launching operations, the hamilton pig launcher was being pressurised from 2 barg N2 to 67barg with process gas. When the pressure reached between 5 and 6 barg a minor leak
was noted on the door seal. Pressurisation was halted and the pres ure vented off. The launcher was isolated and left at ambient pressure.The door seal will be removed at the next intervention
visit and examined for damage or embrittlement. If necesary the manufacturer will be asked to examine the seal and determine the leak causation.
A 5mm leak developed on line 2" p-694-1a, c130 line to co2. Shortly after it was discovered and two gas heads registered 27% and 11% lel. The line carries crude and oily water back to the
second stage seperator. Total loss of inventory is estimated at o e barrel, half of which found its way to the sea causing a slick. The leak was temporarily repaired until the manifold is replaced. It
has been recommended that the corrosion monitoring programme be reviewed for this system.
Loss of containment, filter failure. Prior to the incident, the platform was in routine operation, exporting oil and exporting and injecting gas. Ongoing maintenence in a number of areas around the
plant, including internal cleaning of the test separator were in progress, with men inside the vessel at the time of the incident. One field operator was working adjacent to the crude oil booster
pumps in the separation area main deck north. At 14:25, a loud bang from a piece of equipment in the separation, main deck north, was heard by a production operator, who was working on a
crude oil booster pump. Simultaneously, the main control room operators noted both low and high gas alarms on the fire & gas system. In conjunction with the alarms and the production
operators radio message to the mcr, the cro initiated a manual red esd (process shutdown). (note that the reason an automatic esd didn'toccur was due to the fact that the control action inhibit for
the separation area was on for sampling purposes). The production operator reported in that one of the new allocation meter filters on the palaeocene separator had failed and that oil and gas were
leaking out. The 'o' ring lid seal on the plenty filter upstream of fx 41051 allocation meter failed (parted) thereby releasing hydrocarbon oil and gas to the atmosphere. The bottle screw used to
Prior to the incident, the platform had shutdown on a blue esd resulting from a fault in the west crane <> fire & gas panel. It had taken approximately an hour to start and put onto the main
switchboard one of the main generator sets, which is requir d prior to recommencing production. The next step in the start up is to start a main seawater lift pump and a main cooling medium
pump (both 6.6 kv drives). Seawater lift pump 67-7001 was started at 0208. At 0210, a loud bang was heard by personnel in the main control room. An operator went outside to investigate and
reported that there was a large seawater leak downstream of the seawater booster pumps. The control room operator shut down the lift pump at 0211. Inspection at the time revealed a complete ru
ture of the main seawater header immediately downstream of the booster pumps. Subsequent inspection revealed 3 complete 'separations' of gre pipe joints as well as evidence of movement of the
line along its entire length as far as the export gas intercool r. System overpressure is one possible cause, while weak pipework joints in the gre is another. The basic cause of the incident has not
been determined as yet
As part of normal ongoing oil production an export oil booster pump was running. Without warning the drive end mechanical seal failed allowing hydrocarbons to escape from the closed system
to the surrounding process area.The pump quickly isolated and es aping light oil hosed down using fire water. All escaped oil & firewater washed into hazardous drains system. Virtually no oil
escaped to the sea surface. Failed seal to be examined to establish cause of failure. Weather fine, with 17kts east winds.

As part of ongoing normal oil production an export oil pump was running. What appears to be caused by erosion, a hole (approx 3mm diameter) suddenly appeared in a 1 1/2 diameter pump pipe
spool & sprayed oil onto nearby process area . Red ESD initiated a d pump isolated. Foam (AFFF) laid over deck. Gas triggered alarms. All to Muster stations, but immediately made safe and
repaired. No contamination of sea. Similiar pipe spool on a second pump to be NDT'd..
Portable water tank <> was put on line at 17;00 on <>. At 00.00 hrs a "strange" smell was detected coming from the galley hot water supply. The incident was reported and the system
shutdown at 01:00 hrs. On <>, <> was isolsted and the syste flushed with water from <>. Draining and system flushing was completed by 07:00 hrs and no further odours detected.
Samples of the contaminated water were sent for analysis. <> remains out of service pending further investgation.
The chef reported a noise which sounded like air or gas being released. Platform personnel reported this to the control room. An esd-2 was initiated. No gas had been detected by the platform
systems. Platform personnel found the source of the leak and ented down the relevant flowline which instantly stopped the leak. Flowline and well isolated from the process.
During making interfaces <> failure in the F & G panel caused level 0 blow down. Blowdown occurred whilst attempting to rectify fault. Non ignited gas release. No impact on <>. No
injured persons. Smells reported onshore. 1400kg gas. <> investigating.
On <> while attempting to blowdown the <> installation it was noted that the riser valve, LD-ESD-30003, was passing.On <> the valve was integrity tested and it allowed a pressure of
89.5 barg in the downstream piping to rise to the pi eline pressure of 111.6 barg in about one minute. The top works of the riser valve LD-ESV-30003 were examined during an open-close cycle
to investigate the possibility of the valve not closing properly. During the operation the keyway was correctly posi ioned in both the open and closed positions confirming that the problem is
within the valve. Interventions to the <> installation have been suspended, with the exception of interventions directly associated with the vlave, until further safety evalua ions have been
performed.
During routine start up of the <> platform the A crude oil transfer pump was started up. A sight glass on the B pump seal system common suction line failed and crude oil was released onto the
platform. The process was immediately shut down and measu es to contain the spillage implemented. The <> which was alongside the <> went to precautionary muster which was stood
down once the leak had been contained and area declared safe. An investigation is currently being undertaken by an dependently led team which will submit a full report. The <> is presently
shut down until the investigation is complete.
On <> as the <> production module was being repressured following a planned shutdown a minor leak of condensate was observed from the plate heat exchanger on the suction to the export
pumps. After inspection of the leak it was decided to depr ssure the plant and repair the exchanger. The exchanger was leak tested satisfactorily and the plant repressured ready to start the export
compressor. At 06:30 on <> a gas detector went in to alarm and an operator went to investigate. He reported a con ensate leak to the control room from where the module was immediately
blown down. A manufacturers representative has been mobilised to lomond and is currently inspecting the exchanger.
Production Operator heard abnormal noise during outside duties on the <> module. It was caused by a leaking door seal on the HP Filter vessel - It was localised but was such that remedial
action was necessary to limit release - The vessel was bypasse , isolated and vented to flare
During watch-keeping routines a fine mist of oil was noticed at the elbow (hairline crack) on c7 chemical injection line, just before the quill. Heavy seas (mean 8mtrs) and vibration on c7 flow
line assembly were noted at the time of failure.
A point gas detector came up with a low gas alarm at 1515. The CCR informed the area operator to check the metering skid. The operator found a HC leak in a tie in point for a jet mixer (not yet
installed). The tie in point, being a 4" line is a dead le . The pressure in the line is 24 Bar. The volume of released crude oil estimated to 5 litres.The CCR advised the OIM and a Yellow
Shutdown was initiated as the leak could not be isolated from the plant. All unessential personnel were moved out of the plant modules by tannoys. The general alarm was not initiated. The
leaking spool was then removed and the tie-in point blanked off by a blind flange. The inspection of the affected spool revealed deep corrosion in the heat affected area of a weld. Thi pipework
was installed 12 months ago.

During <> the area operators smelt gas in module 4 mezz.. The investigation revealed a minor leak from the upstream joint on the PSV protecting the DE seal oil pot for MOL pump A. It was
decided to change to the standby MOL pump and repair he minor leak. Whilst in the process of changing the pumps, oil started to leak from the PSV joint. The operator contacted the CCR
immediately and shut down the plant by initiating a yellow s/d. During the pump changeover, the mechanical seal of the DE of the MOL pump A malfunctioned and crude oil filled up the seal oil
pot. The level transmitter did not close the outlet to LP flare. This pressure in the pot did not rise to the trip level of the high level pressure switch protecting the pot and the CC never got an
alarm. The crude oil filled the pot and the inlet pipe up to the PSV located at the mezz. Level above. The crude then leaked through the upstream joint of the PSV. The incident was responded to
immediately as the operators were alraedy in place as they were changing to the standby pump. The pressure in the system was 22 Bar at the time of the incident.
The platform chemist was taking samples from individual xmas trees. While flushing through from the sample point to the closed drain to get a representative sample, he heard a sound. He looked
round and saw that oil and gas was being released from the ann lus closed drain line on A4 wellhead. He immediately shut the sample point and informed CCR over the radio. The leak
disappeared when he closed the flushing valve of the sample point to closed drain. When the operators arrived, they immediatel;y cleaned u the released oil. No oil was spilt to sea.The reason for
the spill was that oil flushed to the closed drain system from the sample point was back flushed through a loose instrument fitting on the annulus drain connection from well A4 to closed drain.
First up, LAH in the LPP flare KO drum. On draining this vessel crude oil was found. PAH was then reported on both Glycol skids and the LLP flare KO drum, also LAHH on the Produced
Water Plate Separator Train 1, which had been commisioned earlier in the d y. The LLP drum was drained to the local open drain. (A proportion of the oil draining went to sea due to the poor
operation of this drain gully (approx
5 Lts)). On review of Produced Water System, the plate separator outlet valve was found to be losed. Oil had filled this vessel and overflowed onto the
LLP flare KO drum.
On <> Power Generation Turbine a minor diesel jet leak occurred on combustion can 10 diesel supply line check valve. As a precaution the Fire team was mobilised while the machine was
changed over to Gas fuel thus depressurising the offending line. After removal the screwed connection on the check valve was found slack and abnle to be tightened by approximately half a turn.
The Turbine had been overhauled a week previously when the fuel nozzles and check valves had been renewed. <> who supplied and fitted the check valve were contacted and replied that
they were satisfied that no leaks had been observed during the post inspection programme running checks. They also state that check valves of the type installed are torqued in the factory to
achieve the correct opening pressure. Thus our conclusion is that it was a quality control issue at <>. On <> the machine had run all day on diesel fuel with a load of about 10 megawatts
without leakage, but when the incident ccurred the load was 20 megawatts.All other check valves on the machine were inspected and found ok. Three signs have been posted in the Turbine
Control Room overlooking the Turbine Hall instructing those responsible to check for leaks immediately a tu bine is fuelled by liquid.
During a routine inspection of topsides process pipework on the <> platform prior to starting some planned maintenance activities, a minor gas leak was found by the Platform Instrument
Technician using a portable gas detector. The gas leak was locate to a "Hub" type joint on the well flowline on the North side of the mezzaine deck. Wind speed at the time was 18 knots.
Normal production . Hydrocarbon Gas. No machinery. During routine production monitoring of gas processing area the Production Supervisor noted/heard sound of gas/air escaping - subsequent
inspection of the area revealed small pinhole type leak on a 1" e bowlet, location on the bend of 8" gas line to gas compression second stage discharge scrubber. Process was immediately shut
down. Subsequent NDT inspection showed no wall thinning of the gas line, the defect area showed original weld preparation had crea ed minor raised area in the line of gas flow causing some
turbulence of gas/liquid and subsequent area of erosion.
Normal production ongoing at the time of the incident. Whilst carrying out routine duties in the wellbay module, an operator detected a smell of gas. Further investigation located a fine mist spray
from a weld on a 1/2" chemical injection point on t3 prod ction flowline. The control room was informed and a controlled manual shutdown of the well was carried out. This was followed by the
depressurisation and isolation of the flowline. Normal operating pressure of the flowline is 62 bar. Initial investigation would indicate a hairline crack in a weld.

Condensate booster pumps have been installled on the <> platform to handle the production from the <> platform. The <> condensate is comingled with the <> platforms condensate
and arrives at the riser platform via the <> via the <> pipeline. The combined condensate is routed across the bridge to the <> platform through the <> booster pumps, back across the
bridge and into the <> pipeline. The main <> booster pump process and drains pipework is totally segregated froem the <> process facilities. Maintenance work had been carried out on
the <> booster pump system necessitating the isolation and draing of the suction pipework. On completion of the work and during the introduction of condensate into he system, the closed
drains were overpressured. A gasket in a flanged connection on the drain line, which runs through the process module, failed resulting in the release of condensate. This was detected by the fire
and gas system and the ga sounded and ll personnel mustered. Platform was manually shutdown, blowndown and the process module deluge activated. Root cause was a failure to adhere to
procedures resulting in process valves not being in their correct operating position.
During the 8000 hour service on train one gas leak was discovered on the reinjection compressor. Ne-c0310-3 the compressor package had been s/d and isolated as per the amoex isolation
procedures. No intrusive work was planned for either the gas compresso or re-injection compressor. The leak was found to be coming from the 3/4" cooling gas return line flange (900~rtj) at the
drive end of the re-injection compressor, where the pipe joins the compressor casing. The re-injection blowdown valve was opened to epressure the compressor and the leak stopped. (the
blowdown valve had been shut to prevent the possibility of backdrive should the inlet/outlet valves leak). It was noted that the flanges were fitted with the incorrect bolts. The flange had studs
fitted hich were double nutted instead of set bolts as per the specification. These bolts were also fitted in the cooling gas return pipe flange at the non-drive end of the unit, although this was not
leaking. Upon further inspection the thread of the bolts was lso put into question. This was checked using a thread gauge and found to be 3/4' unc instead of 20mm as per the manufacturers
drawing <>. Although the threads are very similar in pitch, the bolt diameter has a difference of .8 mm. The bolts fitted were found to be slack and not at the correct torque for this rating of
During routine monitoring of plant and machinery a smell of gas was detected by Chief Operator and Production Supervisor. Further investigation using portable gas detectors revealed the source
of the leak to be a 10" manual isolation valve (Valve 16) on he upstream side of the metering tube. (Operating pressure 165 Barg @ 60 deg C) on removing the valve insulation the gas was
identified as coming from the valve bonnet flange. The valve was isolated, depressurised and the leak stopped. Valve details - <> Environmental conditions:- Wind 10-12 kts at 180 deg. Temp
- 15.3 deg Celsius. Sea state 0.5 Mt good visibility. On replacing sealing ring and gasket there was no obvious evidence of the failure mode of the sealing arra gement. All bolts were found to be
tight so the mechanism which caused the leak is unknown.
Normal operations ongoing - While performing an induction tour the medic reported to the control room an unusual smell at South side of intermediate process area. Pinhole leak discovered from
the bottom of a 1" pneumatic control valve. The valve isolated and leak stopped after approx 2 mins
<> Platform is currently in Combined Operations with the <>. Well <> on the <> platform was being brought into production for the first time when a hydrocarbon leak occurred
through a grease injection fitting on the xmas tree pr duction wing valve. The leak was detected by personnel observing the commissioning activities from a safe area. The production wing valve
was closed immediately and the xmas tree depressurised and made safe.
During water injection well <> an hp flexible hose was connected between <> and adjacent manifold to balance pressure over the valve on test. The 12mm connection onto the du-bloc from
the flexi-hose parted from the male connection on the du-bloc causi g the flexi-hose to whip back under pressure (system at 287 bar) striking the operator involved in the work
During routine checks around Module 25 Pig Trap Area, a Production Operator noticed a small leak coming from the rear of a 2-inch drain line from the <> Platform Pig Receiver. He
immediately isolated the Receiver from Hydrocarbon service.The <> informed immediately by the onshift <> Platform Production Supervisor.Spool piece removed and repaired, and system
re-instated.
During routine plant tour a small gas leak was observed at gas outlet from hp seperator (fa210) upstream of 02-plu-128a. The bypass around the control valve was opened and the valves upstream
and downstream of the control valve were closed to isolate the eak. A vessel shotdown is planned to remove the tailed spool. Work order raised to fabricate new spool. Onshore facilities
engineering to review failure to ensure suitability of replacement onshore facilities engineering to review inspection procedures an initiate survey of similar gas pipework. Oir12 will be
submitted.
A deck co-ordinator reported smell of gas at north west corner of the captruss at the flare gas let down skid. A check by an operator identified a pin-hole leak in a 3" gas line from fuel gas heater
skid to flare gas let down skid. Area of pin-hole leak located at a pipe support fixture. Production shut in as soon as possible.

At 8:20 on <> a low gas alarm was indicated in module 11 gas compression module. The main control room operator alerted the outside operator to investigate the alarm. On arrival at the
nodule, the operator reported to the mcr that there was gas in t e module. The mcr operator alerted the production supervisor who went directly to module 11. Meanwhile gas compressor gb 1101a
had tripped. Gas was found to be coming from an instrument tubing line which had fractured. The instrument line was isolated and the gas leak stopped. The gas which had been released into the
module had caused various gas detectors to register gas concentrations in the range 0-18% lel. Only one detector had exceeded the 20% lel threshold required for a low gas alarm. This detector
ad peaked at 22% level. The gas in the module dissipated quickly via the forced ventilation system. The instrument tubing was situated on the gas compressor gb1101a discharge side. This line
operates at approx 20 barg. The fracture of the tubing was most ikely caused by vibration induced fatigue. The instrument line was remade and the compressor brought back on line. An estimate
of the amount of gas released into the module was made based on the proportion of the module affected and the gas concentrations experienced. On the basis it is estimated that the order of 11kg
Mod 11 - fatigue failure on gb1101 a gas comp. - crack on weldolet on discharge spool. Causing small gas leak. Discovered by operator using gas monitor. Machine shutdown & isolated, spool
removed for repair.
During routine inspection by area operator. A weld fracture was noticed on gas compressor GB1101A suction damper. The machine was shut down and isolated, and the suction damper removed
for repair.
On a routine inspection in the area of GA0392 LPG P/P's a smell of gas was noted. On closer inspection a small leak was discovered on a weld, discharge side of GA0392S. Removal of lagging
identified a cracked weld. Loss of containment was small and therfo e not detected by fixed gas detection. Failure was dicovered by routine check in the area by plant operator.
While rigging up chicksan bleed down lines to the low pressure (0.5 - 1 bar) closed drain system (mod 4 west wellhead area), it was found that the isolation valve on the closed drain system was
seized; no movement was possible. It was assumed that the is lation valve was in the closed position and the manifold blanking cap removed to facilitate the connection of a 1" flexible hose
whose end was disconnected to allow pressure testing. Over a period of approx 10 minutes, a small volume of gas back flowed f om the drain system. Along the 1" line and into mod 4. This was
detected as two gas heads as a low level release. The open end of the 1" line was immediately reconnected to the rest of the chicksan bleed down lines and isolated using lo torc valves. The
control room was then contacted and the platform brought back to normal status within 3 minutes of detection.
A 1" drain line connected to a 1" drain valve (attached to a 3" ngl line) failed at the neck of a weld neck flange. Failure resulted in uncontrolled release of ngls from vessel @ 38 barg into module
no. 5.
At 08:15 'C' compressor tripped on seal high pressure from the 2nd stage drive end seal. Because of the wear on the seals it is necessary to crack open the drain until the compressor starts. When
the compressor restarted sufficient gas came out of the d ain to trip a gas head. It was a very still day. The general platform alarm sounded and the whole crew went to muster.
Normal production operations ongoing at the time.Environmental conditions Wind 8 to 10knots at 270deg. Sea 1mtr. Visibility 8-10 miles some rain. While under normal operations a low
(20%) gas alarm activated in the CCR. On investigation by the produ tion staff it was observed that gas was escaping from a crack in one of the instrument impulse lines associated with the
turbine driven gas compressor. The machine was shutdown and de-pressured. Investigation is underway.
Half inch inpulse line connected to a well head sheared due to well movement.a gas detector picked up a release the platform was shut in remotely from rn. An intervention crew flew to platform
understock repairs.
I was on the cellar deck of <> platform by condensate pump a when low oil level was reported by contro room. Level was 50%. Within 4 ft of pump the seal popped & condensate began to
spray out of the pump. The xzv to the suction of the pump was within 6 ft & i stepped straight to it and closed the valve the approximate loss of condensate to the deck was 20 gallons which was
washed down to hazordous drains immediately
On <> personnel were onboard the <> carrying out various activities including opening up of vessels, which had been previously purged & flushed, for internal inspection. The crew
included the OIM who is a substansive <> and 2 production techhicians. <> were working on opening up Production Separator 'A' on the <> cellar deck. Due to the condition of the bolts
a grinder was being used. Regular hosing down of the immediate area had been taking place as the work progressed to keep the area clear of any oil, debris etc. The production separator is on a
skid which forms a "bund" with grating over part of the area and this was also hosed down frequently. At approx 1650 hrs a small fire & smoke was noticed. Dry po der extinguishers were used
and adjacent fire hoses were deployed by the mechanical technicians who were working in the area. (Note: these Technicians are also Response Team members). Also the contract SO who was
on the platform with the team assisted. The OIM co-ordinated activities and manually initiated the deluge at the skid. The alarm was initiated and personnel mustered. The OIM made the
necessary all stations call and began accounting for the POB assisted by the contract SO and also utilised th normal communications in the event of a muster. The <> Incident Control Room

On pulling coiled tubing to surface (well i2) an escape of hydrocarbons was detected at injector head. <> electronic depth counter registered 330 feet of coil remaining in hole. Pipe was
immediately run back in hole (approx 3-4 ft), sealing on stripp r and stopping hydrocarbon release. Release of hydrocarbons set off platform low level gas alarms initiating a g.p.a. swab valve
mumv and scssv were closed and pressure above humv vented to to closed drains drains injector was disconnected from riser and coiled tubing bottom hole assembly (8.3" in length) was found to
have been pulled off at slip connector.
Two mechanics were preparing to remove an nrv from a gas link from the 3rd stage sep. They had slackened off all the studs but while they slackened off the last one, they heard pressure being
released and smelt gas. They then re-tightened the studs to a rest the leak. The line immediately downstream of the nrv was subsequently found to have 2 bar of residual pressure in it.
The platform general alarm was activated by 2 low level gas detectors coming into alarm in the area of the lp flare k.o. vessel. Investigation showed that nitrogen foam in this vessel, to allow it to
be spaded, had collapsed. This allowed vapour from res dual liquids in in the vessel and pipework to escape through an open nozzle on top of the vessel which was being used as a vent.
The platform was under its annual shutdown. Gas was detected at low level alarm in the area of the esdv enclosure. <> platform south. On investigation by the prod. Supv., A leak was found
on pressure instrumetation for the gas export riser. This leak as isolated and repaired. A further leak was also subsequently found at the gland of the gas export sdv 11156. The export riser has
been depressurised and plans are in place to repair this.
A hydrocarbon gas release occurred when a 1/2" <> compression fitting failed within the gas enclosure house on the gas metering system. The event leading to the incident occurred during the
de-isolation of metering stream one, the weather condition at the time were fair (25 knot northerly wind). The gas release into the metering house was contained and no personnel were in the
enclosure at the time. Initial investigation revealed a defective fitting on the vent line from the gas analyser system to LP flare.
During shift checks, the Operations Technician noticed a smell of hydrocarbon in the PD proces area. On further investigations, he noticed a small leak from the underside body of methanol plug
valve PD-CMPL-1671 on the methanol skid manifold system was p essurized. Effective double blocks and bleeds were intiated to isolate and depressurize the faulty valve. The faulty valve was
removed and the flange faces blanked.
A fuel gas leak occurred on the body bleed of the pilot regulator on the fisher 31032 fuel gas regulator for g8020 main generator. The gas detection system in the fuel gas cabinet detected a high
level of gas, tripped and shutdown the machine.
A night shift production operator noticed a small pool of oily water on the deck of process module 4. The source was traced to a pinhole leak on a 6" low pressure line which returns oily water
from skimmed oil tank below deck back into the 2nd stage sepa ator in the module above. The section of pipework was promptly isolated by the operations technicians and the leak assessed by
platform management. The leak was clamped and the line was subsequently returned to service. The complete line section is curren ly being assessed by inspection technicians and an early
assessment will be taken on spool replacement.
Pin hole leakage in 6" produced water outlet, downstream of lcv 2219b, suspected internal corrosion, erosion. The leak, a very small spray of produced water was not of sufficient size to activate
the automatic gas detection system, the spray was noticed y a passing operator. Propriety clamp fitted over the leak. Repair order raised to replace pipe spool.
The turbine was being re-commissioned following a planned shutdown and the utilities operator was on site to de-isolate the gas supply. The reintroduction of the gas supply immediately triggered
gas detection inside the turbine enclosure. This in turn aut matically activated the general alarm and personnel went to muster. The operator was able to isolate the supply before going to muster.
The situation was monitored by the emergency response team and nobody was committed into the module until gas levels ha declined to normal levels (which occurred with 15 minutes).
Personnel were stood down after the turbine was checked out and confirmed safe.
Halon release in module 8 following detection of gas by beam detector during spading operation on closed drain system on a1 separator. Whilst carrying out a full isolation of the a1 separator the
first positive isolation to be put in place was a spade in he live closed drain system. During the insertion of the spade one of the gas detectors which had not been inhibited detected over 60% lel
of gas shutting down production and discharging 17 halon spheres. Halon spheres reinstated prior to restarting productext_line. Investigation.tion. Investigation commenced.

A gas release was visually detected coming from the choke bonnet on well <> by well services personnel working in the vicinity. The well was closed-in at the time. The control room were
notified straight away and immediate action was taken to isolate t e leak. The size of the leak, coupled with the wind and weather conditions were not significant enough to initiate the f&g
detection in the module.
In investigating a suspected gas mod valve problem during turbine commissioning, and with the turbine shutdown but still live to gas, the mod valve was stroked which resulted in the injection of
a set quantity of gas into the turbine, which, being unignit d, percolated through the machine and into the enclosure susequently setting off the gas detection and initiating a platform general alarm
and muster.
The Fire and Gas system detected low levels of gas in process module 7. As the gas leak could not be traced to any equipment in the module itself, further investigation centered on the void
spaces between adjacent modules. These checks revealed a leak i the drains system pipework where it crossed the void space. A controlled plant shutdown was immediately instigated.Gas levels
were monitored throughout but did not increase further. When plant was confirmed as fully shutdown, module was ventilated unt l gas levels were reduced to zero. Repair options are presently
being examined.
Discovered gas/liquid leak on well1 flowline flange downstream of choke valve. Well closed in ~ flange gasket replaced and retightened - re-pressured and gas tested ok.
On visit to platform discovered gas & condensate once again leaking from hub flange on well1 flowline. Pipe misalignment suspected ~ well shut in and flowline depressured to allow for new
pipe spool to be fabricated and installed.
The sprinkler system in accommodation module n4 was isolated and drained down in order to change frangible bulbs which had been reported as having a slight leak. On completion of the bulb
changeout the system was reinstated and refilled. At this time it w s noted that the pipework was becoming very hot. Cables in the accommodation were evacuated in case frangible bulbs should
burst and release hot water. A short time later a bulb burst in one of the cabins. The platform alert was sounded and all persons mu tered and were accounted for. The source of the problem was
found to be a faulty thermostat which controlled the immersion heater in the sprinkler water header tank nq-v-3901. This heater is provided to prevent freezing of water within the header tank. Th
thermostat had failed in the 'on' position causing the water in the tank to overheat. Modifications to the system are being investigated.
When the test separator was de-isolated on completeion of internal works and closing up it was filled up with water to carry out a final leak test. At this point the level neucleonics were assumed
to be still isolated. However a level indication was obser ed in the CCR from LX 1302
A radioactive source was returned from offshore by supply boat. The source was not removed from the container at <> and the container was sent to poa but not unloaded. The container was
sent from the <> back to <> where the source was discovered three days later. The source was in its dedicated container. No personnel were exposed to radiation.
Repair work to the ESD valve on the <> 12" re-injection pipeline at <> required a pig with a radioactive source to be inserted into the line prior to the valve being welded back into place.
The <> placed the source into the pig and the p g was inserted into the line by the Synetix RPS and two scaffolders. Once the pig was inserted the <> carried out radiation level
measurements around the area and recorded a reading of 15 micro sieverts per hour. The area was contained within a habitat. A reading taken the following day revealed radiation levels of 50
micro sieverts per hour. Lead sheets were placed on the pipe and a barrier erected. Further measurements recorded levels of 1-2 micro sieverts per hour at the barrier ten inches from the
pipe.Possible radiation doses have been calculated and demonstrate that they were not sufficient to cause harm to health. This was confirmed by the <>.
Radiation source would not re-enter its container after an exposure.contingency measures required to remedy the situation.
Down hole communication was discovered via routine annulus pressure monitoring when there was a significant change in pressure. Well was shut in on <...>,sssv shut and tubing bled.pressure
remained constant indicating probable leak below sssv.hse in <...> (<...>)informed <...> @ 15:40 who stated no need for written report.straddle fitted <...> to rectify problem.

Whilst monitoring the well for down hole losses over the trip tank the well was observed to flow at estimated 5 bbl/h. The bop was closed on the upper variable rams. No pressure build up was
seen at that time. After 10-1/2 hours and commencement of pumpin . A pressure of 100 psi was seen on the drill pipe. Attempted to circulate out influx convent- ionally but induced downhole
losses. Drillpipe circulated to 640 psi/ft mud by tht time. Bullheaded annulus contents and lcm to the loss zone. Final dp and annu us contents and loss zone. Final dp and annulus pressures =
zero. Static downhole losses=75 bbl/h
Whist running in hole at 4361 ft the well (ba05) was observed to be flowing. Closed in well on hydril & monitored build up = 140 psi
Rih check trip assembly in well <...>. Last circ <...> @ <...>. Since then a rft had been run [tubing conveyed logging]. Subsequently ops were suspended to carry out derrick insp [<...>] when
circulating @ 11997 ft returns were observed to be err tic and gas cut. Detected level increased in active system. Closed in well on annular preventer: attempted to establish circulation over
choke. Brought up pump slowly to 40 spm. No returns, pumped a total of 50 bbls closed in well on choke. Monitored pres ure build-up. Opened up well, monitored over trip tank. Filled up well
with 630 ft pptf mud. Initial loss rate 100 bbls/hr decreasing to 25 bbls/hr. Sus- pect loss zone @ 12,325 ft [low pressure sand]. Total losses 140 bbls. Closed in well on annular prev nter, due to
limited active mud volume. Build lcm pill and mud. Meanwhile monitored pressure, no build-up opened up well, filled up with 27 bbls mud. Monitored well static post event analysis: suspect
gain caused by bringing up trip gas [rft run] from hor zontal section. Losses induced while attempting to establish circulation. At no time over balance primary control was lost. Plan ahead: pooh
inside 13 5/8" casing shoe off load mud [wow for boat handling] rih to 12 1/4" sec td [in stages, condition mud] a td, circulate hole clean. Pooh run 9 5/8" casing
<Minor> perf. 9 5/8" csg over new prodn. Zone. Displace to kill wt brine and flow check. Took 5 bbl gain and shut in. 1st circ. Of drillers method showed no hc's but still 200psi sidpp. After
several circulations and flow checks well is seen to flow @ 2bbl per hour, suspect supercharged formation. Further circ. Showed 2bbl gain. Shut in well and monitored pressure increases.
Sample a bled at choke confirmed gas. Killed well with driller method & kill wt brine (580pptf).
While pulling out of the hole the well was observed to flow and closed in with blow-out preventers. Two barrels gained, 20 psi on choke, 0 psi on drill pipe. Choke stabilised at 60 psi after 1 hour,
the drill pipe remained at 0 psi. Circulated out a small volume of gas using driller's method. Observed and verified well static.
Drilling 8-1/2" hole at 10216 ft, no drilling break, increase in return mud flow noted (flosho) increased from 27% to 32%). Pick up 30' and flow check. Well appeared to be flowing. Bubbles in
mud at bell nipple plus smell of gas noted (no gas detected on as pack, platform gas detectors or hand held monitor). Close in with pipe rams, pdp 50 psi, pann 50 psi increasing to 60 psi. Stable
after 5 min. No pit gain seen
Whilst pressuring up for a routine bop test on <> the wellhead stand- by man heard a loud bang followed by a release of water. A riser spool tie-down screw from <> was found on the deck
some 3m from the wellhead. The adjacent well <> access p atform was distorted from a high pressure impact with the associated steelwork indicating 3 impact points before the tie-down bolt
release, the bop hydro-test pressure was at 4200 psi and <> had the 5.1/2" x 7" liner installed awaiting pressure test.
Whilst checking for pressure on a annulus on <> after cutting tubing with 4s explosive tool. Opened bleeder plug at manifold and found gas to be present. Closed off bleeder plug to discuss
way ahead and shortly afterwards noted that the bleeder plug had started leaking. The super- visor isolated same at manifold, stopping leak, and whilst on his way to inform control room, the
platform changed status on co-incident low level gas. Leak was noted from noise rather than smell. A gas sample taken for analysi as well was in abandonment stage with completion isolated
from reservoir by deep set cement plug and packer.
<> drilling operations ongoing. Phase 8 1/2"-actual td: 7,394m while tripping out of hole a gain of 2m3 observed. String run back at 7060m where another gain of 3m3 noticed. Well shut-in.
Casing pressure recorded at 460psi. Hydrocarbon influx circu ated out using w&w method (obm sg: 1.80 to 1.84). Well found to be static after circulating.
D22 is a pre-perforated well with the perforations isolated by a deep set packer & plug whilst running completion. When displacing above the packer to seawater, the underbalance caused the
barrier to fail with subsequent influx of hydrocarbons & release a surface gas. Bop actuated & kill procedures implemented (w/w method). Platform was mustered & all non-essential personnel
were transferred to the <>. Well kill complete within 24 hours
Drilling operations had just stated circulating e10 well. When gas from the shale shakers led to coincident gas detection, and as a result, a level 3 shutdown. The tree had been removed,riser
nippled up and the tubing hanger released.40' of tubing had b en unstung from the pbr. Circulating had commenced at 50gpm/1400psi.30bbls had been pumped when gas appeared at the shale
shakers.the returns were routed via the poorboy degasser.at no time was control of the well lost.

Well e10 was being prepared for the setting of cement plugs, above perforations. A cement stinger had been run in hole to 14500' and circulation commenced. Prior to bottoms up, circulation
was stopped and a flow check carried out. The well was static w th no signs of gas. Circulation restarted and immediately two gas detectors on the drill floor went into alarm, causing automatic
production shutdown. The annular preventer was closed and circulation stopped. Gas levels receded. At no time was there lo s of control on the well.
<> well 1.1 had been drilled to td @ 3703m, a wiper trip had been carried out with no indication of problems hole fill or condition. Whilst pulling the bit up into the completion tailpipe a 10bbl
mud loss was observed downhole between 1520 & 15 5hrs. The well was flowchecked until 15.55hrs. And was stable. Circulation was commenced at 16.07hrs. And 4 minutes later water based
mud and oil were ejected onto the drill floor. The driller reacted quickly and shut the well in via the annular preventer about 2bbls of mud/oil fell to the bop deck and activated low gas detectors
in well compartments 1 and 2. The cause is currently presumed to be the failure of the production packer at 2975m, allowing mud to u-tube into the completeion annulus. In turn th s has allowed
the oil from the sump beneath the packer to be forced into the tubing through the gas lift mandril orifice valve. Weather conditions at the time were:- mild, overcast and calm.
Gas lift well underwent routine safety valve testing. Tubing retrievable safety valve tested fine. Annular valve does not close. Will be attewmpt to cycle valve further. Chemical wash planned as
means of removing debris possibly fouling intl. Valve mechan sm. Failing these efforts, annulus will be depressured of gas and filled with water, well produced under natural flow. Well currently
shut in.
After successful scale milling operations on a7, coil tubing op. Opened circulation sub as instructed. While running back near to bottom for final clean up, coil tubing suddenly stopped passing
through bop or stripper section and coil tubing fractured ab ve stripper.3000 psi in coil jumped to 5100 psi then was released through fracture. <> it was identified cause was a mechanical
failure in injecture head. Coil tubing operations to descale well a7
In preparing a4 well for work over drilling were circulating fluid to replace the fluid in the well and remove the gas cap. While lubricating out pressure from a4 well the contaminated kill fluid
emerged from the secondary gas vent 30' above the rig, impa t deck, well bay and into the sea. Estimated amount into the sea is 100 litres of kill fluid - oil content unknown at this time. Wind 16
knots, 185 degrees. Sea state 3 - 2.6 metres, swell direction 230 degrees. Overcast with showers.
<...> - Mud weight reduced from 11.5 to 11.3 ppg - Pooh - test BOP - RIH approx 600ft BHA well seen to be flowing - well shut in 200psi casing pressure and 140 bbls influx - strip to 13390 ft
packed off - pull back to 12267 ft (7" liner set at 11924 t and kill well with 11.7 ppg. Forward plan to Pooh - install low torque subs - RIH to bottom - circulate out remaining influx and continue
drilling. Investigation team flown out to establish root causes of incident. Executive to follow up incident with office inspection of investigation findings.
<...> A - Background <...> drilled to depth of 14085feet,, 4 1/2" liner set & cem, cleaned out & displ. To 11.8ppg comp. Brine. First set of perf. Guns deton. Prematurely while running in hole,
perf. 7" liner.8 days spent restoring well to poi t where perf. Guns could be rerun. Platform shut down was instigated on <...>. In prep. For press. Test.<...> to <...> pipeline. Over the course of the
8 days there would have been a build up the reservoir press. Due to a) no reservoir drawdown in the s rrounding area, all wells being closed in and b) op req'd that one water inj. Pump remain
online to maintain a load on turbine It has been estimated that these two effects could have inc.reservoir pressure by approx. 200 psi (equivalent to 0.6 ppg increa e). Event - drill pipe conveyed
perf. Guns run in hole, set on depth and fired by applying pressure to the drill pipe. 100 psi applied pressure was left on the well to confirm detonation. The guns fired, loss of press. Noted, the
annular was opened and t e well flow checked. Flow check to the trip tank confirmed the well was flowing (10bbls flowed back) and was shut in at 08.00 hrs <...>. Drill pipe/annulus press. Built
up to 100/125 psi respectively over course of 1 hour.Subs. Actions - well was c rc. Using the drillers method. 97 barrels of contaminated brine at 11.4ppg circ. Out. This equates to an influx of
<...> - Well <...> located on the <...> satellite platform was completed on <...> and then suspended. On <...> the well was being inspected due to injection problems when pressure was observed
on the gauge that monitors the void between the tubing han ar plugs. The pressure was bled off but continued at 100psi/min. A safety review has been carried out which concluded that the
pressure rise is caused by a failure of the lower tubing hangar plug. The well currently has two satisfactorily tested barrie s. The upper tubing hangar plug and the tree cap.
<...> Field - Small gas leak dectected during routine ROV survey of F1 subsea wellhead. Subsequent investigation and testing indicates a leak from the 9-5/8" gas lift annulus leaking to the sea
via the conductor/20" casing annulus. Leak rate approx 2-3 l/min at sea bed conditions.See attacement for more detail :1) Minutes of meeting 2) Non-standard operations risk assessment 3)
Monitoring instructions

<...> Platform - GAP at Shaker house. 430psi on drill pipe and casing. Circulated out through choke. Maximum 50% LEL <...> Gas kick, circulated out. Mud weight increased. Drilling resumed
<...> - Incident - Well Kick Well Control Operations - Stripping into well <...> Incident - Well Control Operations - Off Bottom Well Control 7<...> See well file for additional information.
<...> - Influx (kick) during liner inflow test
<...> Platform well number <...> While circulating bottoms up for a geological sample, the drillier notified fluctuations on the returns with break out of gas, whcih initiated low levels of gas on
the fire and gas panel in the CCR. The spaced out nd shut in the well. He circulated the well with 14.7 ppg mud to kill the well. The BOP Hydril was used to shut in the well and allow
circulation of the gas through the drilling choke and poorboy.
<...> - Description of events leading to Operation of BOP Equipment t 0045 hours on <...>, during A32 completion operations, the annular preventer was closed following an influx of 8 bbls of
hydrocarbons into the well bore. Background Compl tion tubing was run with 10.8 ppg nacl/Kcl brine in the well. A fluid loss control device (KOIV), which is used to maintain a column of fluid
in the well while running the top hole completion, was deliberately broken to facilitate future logging and stimu ation operations. The well went on losses in excess of 200 bph. The fluid weight
was reduced in stages from 10.8 ppg to 9.5 ppg in order to control the losses to a manageable rate. The well was monitored, found to be static then took an influx of 8 bbls. Action Taken The
annular preventer was closed and <...> Well Control Procedures followed. Kill weight brine (10.3 ppg) was bullheaded down the tubing x 10-3/4" casing annulus and the completion seal assembly
stung into the packer bore. The well is now nder control and the annular preventer has been opened. Currently proceeding with planned operations
<...> - Loss of power (hydraulic) from <...> unit. No gas release. The Packer seal failed resulting in the loss of hydraulic oil from the <...> Unit (BOP Control) The hydraulic oil was lost into the
Petro Free (ester based) mud. This failure rendere the Blow Out Preventer system from having an energy source (Hydraulic Power) The system was Shut Down - the hydraulic oil replenished and
the well closed in. No environmental discharge occurred. The Overshot packer on the riser (Bell Nipple) is above the BOP stack - its present function is to control mud containment while
tripping. Well Number : <...>.
<...> - As a result of a PM by <...> it was established that the Hydraulic Master, The Lower Master xmas tree valves and the Deep-set injection valve on well M3 were defective. While trying to
obtain a second isolation barrier to allow w reline operations to rig up, the stem of the lower master valve broke, leaving the valve in the closed position. A programme was initiated for a <...>
Gate Valve milling unit (hot tap machine) to mill/drill through the lower master valve to allow ac ess to the well bore, so it could be plugged and the defective xmas tree removed (see attached
procedure). Whilst attempting to complete this operation the shaft of the milling tool broke. The two sets of safety seals and the hydraulic stuffing box of the equipment ensured the shaft
remained in place and there was no loss of containment from the well. Subsequently the mill shaft could not be removed and the valves on the xmas tree could not be closed. Contingency 1 (well
kill) as detailed in the well inter ention programme was immediately instigated to kill the well. (Fluid pump/brine tank and chick-san had been previously installed for this eventually). Once this
operation was completed liquid N2 was used and an ice plug was created in the well bore, this llowed the defective xmas tree to be removed and replaced with another. All the operations were
<...> - After milling the 7" packer and slowly POOH to 11169' (7657' TVD and 1567' AH above 7" liner) The viscous mud started to swab. The well had previously been flow checked for 2 hours.
The packer was then RIH to 12481'. After circulating an conditioning the mud to 0.650 psi/ft mud and influx was detected. The influx was circulated out and the mud weight increased to 0.680
psi/ft. The reservoir pressure was significantly higher than predicted.
<...>. When drilling at 12481' AH(9442'TVDBDF) a 16bbl influx of water (plus a small amount of gas) was closed in. The mud weight was increased from .630 to .670psi/ft. The well was killed
by the wait and weight method. The supporting water in ection well has been closed in and the intention is to drill ahead to td at /- 13000' hole size 8.5". SIDPP=390 psi, SICP=530psi. <...>.
Kick occurred on <...>. 10 Barrel Influx. Closed BOP's. Circulated 10 Barrels. OIR 9b to follow. Well Number <...>. After drilling to TD at 13160ft, the hole was circulated clean. After shutting
down the pumps and flow checking, the we l was observed to be flowing. It was subsequently closed in and approximately 10 bbls influx was recorded, with a SIDPP 0psi and SICP 150 psi. No
swabbing had occurred, but ther mud weightwas being controlled from 685 back to 680pptf. It is probable that ome lighter fluid (than desired) had ended up in the annulus at the time the pumps
were shut down. This light fluid, added to the loss of ECD and the 'cleaned up' annulus (ie lightened further), caused the annulus to kick. However the mud weight in the dr ll pipe remained at
680pptf and thus no SIDPP was seen. The kick was circulated out using the driller's method (as for swabbed kicks). The well was killed at 40 spm with an additional 100 psi back pressure being
held over the formation.

<...> - Drilling of <...> had encountered severe losses whilst drilling the <...> formation. These losses had continued througout the section, including the reservoir formations. During drilling 81/2" hole through the <...> reservoir at 15 406ft, with losses at approximately 380bbls per hour. 45% LEL gas was detected by the hand held gas meters in the mud treatment skid (no indication on
fixed detection). Due to severe losses, no increase in the return mud flow or pits levels was observed. he drill string was picked 25ft off bottom and the well shut in with the annular preventor.
Pdp 700 psi, Pann 390 psi. Pressure rose to Pdp 870 psi, Pann 530 psi. Stable after 15mins.
<...> - Sand injection was being carried out on Well <...> Xmas Tree in order to calibrate the flowline sand detectors. Whilst openeing the swab valve to allow the sand injection to commence, gas
started to leak from around the swab cap threads. The well was flowing steadily at the time of the event and the sand injection exercise was being monitored locally by operating technicians.
Action taken:- 1) Swab valve closed manually by those on site 2) Xmas tree closed in from CCR and system depressur d to enable examination of swab cap seal. 3) Seal removed and inspected,
found to be split in two horizontally at one part of its circumference, and partially split at the other. 4)New seal installed and pressure tested. Well brought back on line for ompleteion of sand
trials. 5) Damaged "O" ring to be sent ashore for further inspection. Suspect gas ingress into the elastomer causing explosive decompression when depressured after leak testing. Requires
confirmation.
<...> is a perforated well . With the perforations isolated by a deep set packer and plug whilst running completion. Whilst displacing the hole from mud to brine above the packer a small flow
from the well bore was noticed. The BOP upper pipe rams ere closed and well monitored. Kill mud was introduced using W/W method. It is assumed that there has been some form of failure of
the Baker retrievable packer. The packer remains in the hole and the well temporarily suspended with cement plugs for other operational reasons Well number <...>.
<...> - Pressure up Xmas Tree to N/up BOP stack. Observed slight traces of 1.32 brine leaking from BPV. "Leak" of BPV means loss of one (of 2) safety barriers. Second barrier is 1.32 brine.
Action Taken: Carry on N/up BOP stack. RIH with hanger re rieving tool on DP secured with a Kelly valve to re-establish continuity, pressure test BOP body and riser connections and provide
second tubing barrier.
Well <...> - Drift runs were being carried out on well <...> from the south rig on <...>. On two separate occasions a leak was observed at the stuffing box. This necessitated the closure of the top
set of BOP's and the bleeding off of pres ure in the lubricator to atmosphere. After both leaks, the stuffing box packings were changed out. Stuffing box and packings have been sent onshore for
inspection.
<...> - A <...> elbow failed on the <...> BOP accumulator. This accumulator is designed to store a reserve of pressurised hydraulic oil which is an independant form of power to operate the Blow
Out Preventers. One of the two seals in a <...> elbow failed. This elbow is positioned in the main hydraulic high pressure supply line. When it failed the pressurised contents of the 20 accumulator
bottles vented their stored hydraulic energy through the leak to the <...> room. The spilt hydraulic oil, 180 galons, covered the floor of the <...> room. None escaped down the drains in this room
as they were plugged. There is a 3" lip sill on the door which acts as a bund. The spilt hydraulic oil was cleaned up. However, a small hole in the door sill allowed a few gallons of oil to leak out
of the <...> room and onto the deck outside. One to two gallons of this oil managed to fall into the deluge drain before it was cleaned up. The deluge drain drains directly into the sea below, where
this oil fell. The failure occured while a new 12 1/4" bit and Bottom Hole Assembly were being run into a new string of 13 3/8" casing. The casing had not been drilled out and was a tested
pressure barrier.
The spot hired supply boat <...> was along the west side of <...> and preparation for the lift of a process vessel to the platform weather deck was ongoing. The seaman's thumb was somehow
caught by some part of the hook or the pennant eye just ab ve. Detailed circumstances are unclear at this stage of the investigation. The seaman sustained an open fracture of the distal phalanx of
his right thumb (almost complete detachment).
During the installation of <...> actuator on <...>, problems arose locating the actuator on the keyed stem. The work party then decided to rock the actuator back and forth to aid installation. The
actuator was suspended from a chain block and lif ing plate - the hook from the chain block dislodged resulting in the <...> actuator and lifting plate to fall approx 5ft on to the deck. The IP
received a glancing blow from the actuator on the outside of his left ankle. IP was treated for bruising how ver, no improvement was observed in his injury and consequently IP was Medivaced.
X-rays showed that his ankle was broken.
The injured party's foot was trapped under a wooden spreader beam (deployed to separate individual rows of horizontal completion tubulars). After the crane dropped the weight off the tubular
bundle, the change in weight distribution caused the wooden spre der beam to move downwards, trapped the man's foot, causing the injury.

While in the process of pulling out of the hole with the casing cutter assembly,the stand was set in the slips, broken & spun out. The mud bucket was placed around pipe to allow the fluid to drain.
The stand kicked off the joints in the slips and sprung t ward the i.p. lifing him up & pushing the i.p. out of the v-door. The i.p. came to rest against the pipe on the catwalk.
Whilst securing coolers following a cleaning operation, an overhead right angled bracket supporting an inertia reel tool balancer rotated through 180 deg. The carabiner, securing the tool balancer
to the bracket, somehow released itself causing the tool b lancer to fall and strike the inured person on the safety hat, neck and shoulder. The incident investigation is not yet complete.
At approx 11:15,whilst offloading and backloading the <> the intention was to lift a 40' basket of screens from the deck of the boat, to the pipe deck of the platform. The crane operator lowered
the 30ft pennant which caught up on the lifti g bridle stowed within an adjacent basket, recently backloaded, and now lying to port (platform west) of the "intended lift". Two deck hands attempted
to disentangle the hook from the bridle of the basket before signalling the crane operator to "pick up". as the crane operator began to "pick up" on the line, the hook swung to starboard (platform
east) and the open hook caught under the edge of the 40' basket. As the crane operator "picked up" on the line, the vessel also heaved resulting in a proportion of the basket weight being taken by
the pennant. This caused the basket to pivot and move to port, trapping one of the deck crew between the two baskets. Weather at the time: wind 245 deg t x 30 kts, sea max 2.5 metres, vis 8
nautical miles and fair. The pen ant and hook assembly involved was taken out of service immediately and a full investigation is being conducted.
A team were dismantling flowlines in the wellhead area. <> was the supervisor in charge. The work was being carried out from a purpose-built scaffold. Chain blocks, beam clamps & slings
were used to assist in handling spools & fittings as they were lowered onto the scaffold. <> was assisting by manoevering a tee-piece which was resting on the scaffold & held up by a chain
block. As he did so, the centre of gravity shiftef & the tee piece rolled over & around onto his right foot. The weight of the tee piece is approx 150lb. He was 11 days into a 14 day offshore tour.
He reported to a medic for examination & whilst there was bruising/swelling to the foot there was no indication of boney injury. Having completed his 14 days offshore, h went home where an
X-Ray showed a fractured bone in his right foot.
Burns to hands and head injuries due to being thrown back. 0835 - Medivac to <...>.
The accident happened during the recertification of the PSV (PSV 1415). After a routine pre-test of the valve, the test rig was blown down in preparation for the disassembly of the valve.
Because the design of the valve, gas pressure remains in the dome of the main valve. The injured party began to undo the instrument tube fitting which is connected to the valve dome. The tube
then blew out of the fitting and struck the individual on his left hand. <> was treated at <> Hospital where he was retained for two days.
The IP was working on BOP/SHALE SHAKER carrying out general duties. Activity being carried out at the time was drilling and the sustance being used was Oil Based Mud. The IP went to the
Shaker Area to relieve the Shaker Hand for approx. 15 mins. At 12:00 hrs IP reported to the Medic complaining of breathing problems. He was treated by the platform medic & then after
consultation with the onshore doctor was med-rescued by Coast guard Helicopter This incident is still under investigation, report number : <> Weather - wind 268 degrees - 24 knots. Rain &
Misty. 3rd day of Tour - 5.5 hours into shift
The ip was inspecting the end of the joint of a pipe, suspended by an elevator link tilt, prior to it going into the hole. In preparation, the the next length of pipe was raised (by using a tugger) from
the pipe deck catwalk, through the 'v' door. The lea ing end of this pipe impacted on the pipe being examined and it was pushed toward the ip. It hit him and knocked off his helmet. The ip
continued working and only reported his injury to the medic several hours after going offshift. He worked his normal fi ld break the day after that. The instruction for this type of operation has
been amended to ensure that only one joint is suspected on the rig at any one time.
When assisting with drilling operations on the north rig floor, ip (roughneck) trapped his finger between the elevators and bails. Prior to the work commencing the driller had given a <...> to the
crew.
During drilling operations on <...>floor for Well <...>, injured party's little finger on his left hand became trapped between the make up and break out rig tongs. Safety awareness for this type of
incident has been reinforced through tbt's an the re-emphasis of the RA which was already in place.

Laying out 5" drillpipe from hole using pipe elevators. Wind direction 225 degrees. Wind speed 10-12 knots. No adverse weather. The drill pipe elevators link tilt lock dogs were secured in the
open position to allow the link tilt to fully extend to positi n the drill pipe elevators at the drill floor mouse hole. The securing rope had gradually slackened off to a point where the lock dogs
partially engaged the link tilt. When the single stand of drill pipe was lowered into the mouse hole the link tilt only xtended to mid position. When the elevators were unlatched they swung
backwards towards the rotary table, the lock dogs then disengaged and the link tilt fully extended.this resulted in the elevators moving quickly towards the mousehole. When the elevator were
unlatched and swung towards the rotary table, the injured person moved towards the elevators and was stuck on the thigh when the elevators moved back towards the mousehole. The injured
person was operating the elevators. He was one week into his two week offshore rota. He commenced shift at 1800hrs. An internal investigation is ongoing to identify actions to prevent
recurrence.
5" dp elevators were being replaced. As removed from bails a roughneck had removed its retaining pins from its elevators. The driller came over to help not knowing pins had been removed and
pulled on the bails causing the elevators tp drop to the rig fl or, grazing the inside his leg from his knee to his shin.
Ip was part of a team of two pipefitters and a welder contracted to enterprise oil to perform consruction work during the <> platform <> maintenance shutdown. The work was part of a
modification to the pipework between the 20" oil export lin and the densitometer skid in module cim which involved the cutting and welding of pipework to and from a 2" stub-piece horizontally
exiting the 20" oil export line. The line had been cold cut and prepped with a grinder on the nightshift, the dayshift co tinued the work. When the first welding arc was struck there was a bang,
through what appears to have been a conflagration within the 20" pipe upon which the team were working. As a result of the conflagration, a jet of flame appears to have escaped fro the large
diameter pipe striking the ip resulting in burns to the back of his left hand and lower arm. Ip received treatment from the medic and was then evacuated to hospital. Days into tour - 4 days
time into shift - 3.5 hours
Leak snoop testing diving system 1/2" oxygen lines. The system was pressured to 210 bar, <> and <> (Mechanics) had previously taken up 3 leaks on the system and were re-checking the
fitting on top of our DM-3 module when the ncident took place. <> and <> identified a small leak coming from the previous repaired fitting, in addition another leak was detected on the
second oxygen line, both lines run parallel with each other and 4" apart. <> left the area to vent down the system, <> continued his snoop testing of the previous repaired fitting. The snoop
testing operation, because of limited access to the fitting meant that <> had to be on his knees. It was at this time that the pipe ame out of the fitting, grazing the right hand side of <>'s face,
and exposing his right eardrum, to escaping high-pressure air.Both lines have subsequently been replaced by stainless pipe to allow completion of the pressure testing. These will e renewed with
<> in due course.All further high pressure testing will be performed at increasing increments and on identification of a leak personnel to retreat from the vicinity and the system to be
depressurised.
HSE verbally contacted <> - Report <> to follow. Summary:-Whilst conducting Nitrogen N2 operations work, an N2 line was isolated ready for venting. Before the line was vented, two
operators were struck on the leg and suffered extensive ruising. Both men were taken from normal duties and referred onshore to the duty Doctor. A full investigation was conducted.
A gas leak occurred from a graylock flange on a15 gas injection well flowline. The flowline had recently been installed by the construction dept. onboard. A misunderstanding of the permit
explaining the status of the job by the prod. dept. caused the problem. This resulted in an uncommissioned flowline being connected to a live system by a single closed valve. It is assumed that
gas passed a diverter valve, so pressurising the flowline and causing gas to escape through the flange. The initial discharge may have been air sitting in the flowline. An investigation report
suggests that the incident could have been caused by inadequate isolation of the flowline from the live system and confusion as to the status of the line when permit was signed off.
Wind: NE. Force 3. Current: Southerly 1-2 knots. At 1645 <...> ran into <...> east side. The collsion happened when the First Officer was explaining the sailor details with the ORO system.
Drawings were studied on the bridge. The First Officer meant the shuttle engine was disconnected approx. 50m from <...>, while the study was ongoing, but doubt the shuttle was disengaged.
Positioning of <...> acc. to enc. drawing. Apparent damage to <...>: scraped off paint. Damage on the vessel's bow and bulways.
Whilst undertaking plant checks onboard <...> at approx 2000 hours on <...> a Production Operator, <...>, detected a smell of gas in the vicinity of Ruston Gas Turbine 1 skid which previously
had been prepared for planned maintenance work. An initial investigation revealed an open valve from RGT 1 fuel gas demister to the closed drain system and an open end on the same demister
where the fuel gas pipework had been split to effect isolation. The valve was immediately locked closed and a blind flange fitted to the fuel gas demister. The smell of gas immediately
disappeared. A formal investigation was conducted on <...>, moreover, the resultant findings are contained in an attached BP Amoco internal doc. dated <...>.

Whilst undertaking plant checks onboard <...> Jacket at approx 1100 hours on <...> a Mechanical Technician detected a small liquid leak plus on closer examination a small smell of gas coming
from a 1.5" cavity bleed plug on the bottom of a 30" Manual Block Valve BAGPOI64 which is located outboard of ESDV 2121 and between ESDV 2121 and PL22. An accurate gas check with
instruments revealed LEL levels between 7% and zero, nevertheless, because of the importance of the valve in relation to PL22 and ESDV2121, the platform was shut down and the platform side
of the 30" Block valve was fully isolated and depressured. Activities commenced immediately to initiate the depressurisation of PL22 via both <...> & <...> via <...> platform. Accurate gas
measurements have been taken on an hourly basis since the discovery of the gas leak, the results of which are attached. A formal investigation into the cause of the leak & any repairs necessary
will be conducted by <...> once PL22 Sealine has been depressured and safe access can be gained to the 30" valve assembly.
Oil Production from F9 Sub Sea Well. At 15:05 <...> <...> Sub sea W/I Well tripped on low LP1 hydraulic pressure. At this time the control room staff took F9 (Oil Producer) off line, depressurised the F9 flow line and made the well safe. At 18:07 <...> the platform lost communications, power and all hydraulic control with both F9 & F10 Sub Sea wells. From OIR/13 :- Video
shows extensive damage to the Sub Sea structure of F9 with a large amount of fishing equipment still entangled. This includes bottom rollers, chain, net, buoys and wire ropes.
MV <...> suffered a loss of steering whilst inside the platform 500m zone The vessel pulled away under reverse power and using remote steering. Closest approach to the platform was 150m.
Production personnel observed that the HP & LP headers supplying the <...> with hydraulic fluid were registering low pressures. The hydraulic fluid supply to the <...> could not be maintained
and the system was shutdown and isolated. Initial investigations on the topside equipment indicated that the problem was associated with the Subsea umbilical as the telemetry signals to the <...>
were also affected. A survey boat was brought into the <...> Field on the <...>, and an ROV survey revealed that a full set of Fishing Gear including nets, weights, chains and trawling wires had
extensively damaged the <...> and wellheads and the Trawling Wire was still wrapped around the wellheads with PN6 being the most seriously affected wellhead.
DSV <...> was moving back alongside <...> (North face) after over-boarding the new fire pump caisson which was slung beneath the vessel at -90m. Whilst setting up for the dive position the
vessel rolled to Port which allowed the main crane jib to contact the main RSJ below the platform lifeboats. As the Jib rolled away from the platform it struck the underside of No2 Lifeboat
puncturing the outer skin of the boat and wrenching the mooring pins from the side of the boat. The RSJ is also distorted on the lifeboat land area support frame.
Supply Boat <...> lost control and reversed astern into platform causing serious damage to lifeboat- The vessel was in the process of releasing a cement bulk hose to be retrieved by the platform
crane, when vessel developed manoeuvring difficulties and was coming astern quicker than expected - See OIR9B for report
1.The supply vessel <...> closing to replenish platform with potable water on the west side. 2. 27 knots 160 degrees (observed on OIM's office weather display.) 3. The vessel approached platform
and experienced power failure on port engine. 4. No injuries to personnel on either platform or vessel. 5. Damage to Leg B1 NW corner. 6. Damage to fire water main (mitigation in place). 7.
Survey of damaged area scheduled. Initial inspection carried out. Written report and digital images available.
Failure of Tanker mooring hawser as reported by Master of <...> offload tanker:- At 15:28 the vessel head moved out to starboard causing a hawser tension of 9 tons. <...> platform was requested
to stop cargo as the vessel was making ready to depart. At 15:31 the vessels head was moved to port by three large swell waves - the hawser came under tension three times and on the third
occasion it parted - maximum hawser tension was just below 50 tonnes. ESD's 1,2 & 3 were activated, main engine thrusters taken out of DP to manual operation and the vessel manoeuvred clear
of the buoy. There is no injury to Personnel, no damage to vessel equipment and no pollution.
The supply vessel <...> was manoeuvring alongside the platform on the weather side to start offloading operations. He was approaching using his 'joystick' control when he realised he did not
have power to his thrusters. He changed over to manual control but before control was established there was a collision between the vessel and the platform. The vessel then pulled clear and the
captain checked out his control systems. Weather at the time - Wind 20 kts @ 190 deg. Sea state 3 - 4 mts, visability 10+ NM. The main damage to the platform was involving the escape platform
for the liferafts, lifeguard guide wires and bunkering hoses.

The activity in progress at the time was backloading a container from the platform to the supply vessel. The weather conditions at the time were 3.5 sig wave height (4.2 max) @ 260 degrees. The
wind speed at the time was 35-40 knots. Visibility good. The mast of supply vessel <...> struck a support frame of cable trays on the SW corner of the Cellar deck during cargo unloading
operations. Minor structural damage was incurred to the support frame. The vessel pulled clear quickly and returned to <...> with minor damage to the mast and aerials. The environmental
conditions at the time of the incident were suitable for the activity. It is not yet known what caused the incident. The potential of the incident was to severley damage the cables and to disable
safety critical systems. (T&Gas, TDS etc).
While engaged in offloading cargo from standby boat <...>, a container was lowered into postion on deck. While the crane driver was in the process of working the boom and whip line to unlock
the load, it was noticed that the boom was still rising. The crane operator had to disengage the pump drive clutch to stop any further raising of the boom. It was noted that the crane was sitting
against one crane backstop - the other side was clear. It was found that one of the boom pump control ball joints from the control cable end to the crank arm had come apart, also the servo control
valve neutral centering spring was broken. The high limit cut out had operated, but due to the servo centering spring being broken the pump had not returned to neutral position and had continued
to hoist the boom until the crane operator had stopped it. Immediate actions taken were: Linkage repaired and servo spring renewed Inspection of boom carried out by OIE East crane checked out
for similar problem Increased frequency of checks on these components instigated.
Well - intervention operations were being carried out on C-24 using a slickline mast from the skid deck. Weather at time of incident was calm (05-10knts) After completing a drift run, well Ops
were attempting to lift/separate the lubricator from the BOP in order to change tools. During this operation, the main (1ton) tugger (OCA18441) parted from it's anchor points on the main mast
(OCA17715) The lubricator had not been lifted at this point and the winch remained suspended on the wire. No injuries resulted from the incident. A full investigation of the equipment involved
will be carried out onshore to determine cause of failure.
A 24" pig receiver valve (MOV 12/5) was required to be replaced as part of a planned shutdown workscope. The work required the valve to be lowered through the deck on the platform 68ft
elevation and cross-hauled under the deck in a number of pre-planned stages (12) . The rigging arrangement comprised of a number of air hoists and manual chain blocks and was devised such
that a minimum of two blocks were attached to the valve at any one time. The old valve was removed and the new (14Te) was being installed (reverse sequence). The weight of the clamp was on a
15Te <...> Air Hoist (Model No. <...> 10 mtrs, pendant control) with the crane wire attached (no load) and the adjacent inboard chain block attached (no load). The load was being lowered on the
air hoist and when it was brought to a stop , continued creeping downwards. The deadman's handle was re-opened and attempts were made to raise the load, to no avail. At this stage, the crane
wire was tensioned and the air supply was isolated and the supply hose cut. The air hoist stopped when the crane and adjacent block took the weight. It is estimated that the valve slipped approx 1
metre - See OIR9B for rest of report
While carrying out wireline work on B45 the slickline parted at the wireline hole.The tensile rating of the 0.125" alloy wire is 2600 lbs, and chemical damage is not suspected. At the time an
MPLT log was being run into the hole at 150 ft/min with 250 lbs weight recorded at surface. Depth approx 12800 ft. The wire parted at surface, at the wireline drum. The wireline toolstring was
not lost downhole as the wire caught in the bottom sheave, preventing loss in hole. There was no loss of containment. The toolstring was recovered without further incident. No injury to
personnel, or damage to other equipment was caused as a result of the slickline failure. Initial investigation has begun, and the wire failure appears to have been caused by damage to the wire,
causing weakening of the slickline tensile strength. Two areas undergoing investigation are the wireline stuffing box piston, and the counterhead assembly. The wireline unit is being shipped
ashore for inspection and modification or replacement of the counterhead. The stuffing box piston was inspected and found damaged. Further inspection is now ongoing. No other wireline ops
have been compromised.
After making a connection, the Driller functioned the Kelly Cock to the open position. When the Driller started rotating the drill string, a knocking noise was heard from the TDS3 and the pipe
handler was moving. The Driller asked the Derrickman to check the TDS 3. When the derrickman checked the pipe handler it had stopped moving and the noise had stopped. The South side Kelly
Cock actuator arm was in a position higher than normal, the cam follower had jumped from its groove. This had been causing the knocking noise and the motion of the pipe handler. As the
actuator was out of groove but clear to rotate the driller decided to drill the stand down to where they could get a closer look (to rack the stand back would have invovled operating the valve and
actuator again). The driller then continued drilling and the end of the actuator arm broke off and fell approximately 95', landing in the left-hand side pipe racking area. The Cam follower is a
cylinderical object 3.5 in lenth with a maximum diameter of 2 in and approx 2.5 lbs in weight. The incident is still under investigation. Manufacturer had been contacted for technical advice.

The roustabout crew were removing excess drilling tools from the rig floor and pipedeck catwalk areas adjacent on the <...> Platform. The equipment was to be spotted at their designated storage
areas. At 2045 hours on <...> the IP (Banksman) and another assisting landed a low pressure riser handling clamp (approx weight 208 lbs) on the west side of the pipe deck They had positioned
the clamp on its side with the intention of tying off to the handrail. The other worker had his back to IP and pushed the clamp towards the handrail whilst IP lowered off the clamp. At this point
assuming that the other man had control of the upright clamp, IP proceeded to remove the crane hook from the sling and signalled the crane operator to jib up clear of head height. The other man
was unaware that the crane had been released, and did not have control of the clamp. The clamp started to fall over, and the other man jumped clear shouting out as he did so. The clamp fell onto
IP's foot, causing severe bruising. Ip was assisted to sickbay for treatment and sent onshore for further investigation and returned home evening of <...>. IP has <...> years job experience in

this position. He was approx. 2 hours into his shift and 7 days into normal 21 day tour of duty. 2 corrective actions have been identified with regard to material

During drilling operation on <...> Well A35 object was heard to fall onto the drill floor, suspected to have come from the torque wrench assembly located approx 94 ft above drill floor within
derrick structure. Drilling operation suspended and a course of action determined to carry out an inspection of torque wrench unit. Rig floor was barriered off then drilling continued until the
torque wrench assembly was accessible. Removed for inspection/repair. Found that dropped object was a tong die which weighed 349.4gms and measured 150mm x 30mm x 10mm. On
inspection tong die had fallen from lower clamp jaw, past sheared cap screw. Inspected for further defects. Jaw removed, redressed & reinstalled. Drilling continued. During inspection 30mm
hollow bushing fell from link hanger, not reinstalled deemed not effecting integrity of equipment. Rig Super requested services of <...> Engineer to carry out full inspection of equipment &
investigation of incident. Services of a <...> Engineer have been requested to carry out further inspection/investigation.
Dropped object on drilling rig. Drilling jar weighing 1.8 tons was being lifted when it slipped out of elevator and fell 5' back to drill floor. Per OIR9B While picking up a set of 6 5/8" drilling jars
weighing 1.8 tons and 31 feet in length, from the drilling rig V door using the blocks, the tool joint of the lift sub (6 7/16" OD at pick up point) slipped through the elevators (7 1/16" ID) and fell
approximately 5 feet. The jar lift sub came into contact with the box end of the 6 5/8" spiral heavy weight drill pipe tool joint, that was 3 feet above the rotary table and came to rest on the drill
floor.The jars were pulled back into the V doors with the cat walk winch which was still attached to the pin end of the jars. The 6 5/8" manual elevators were changed out for 5" manual elevators.
Investigations have determined that the wrong size elevators were used to perform the lifting operation of the jars. This was not a lifting equipment failure. The incident has been fully discussed
with persons involved in this operation and the need for correct equipment selection will be emphasised at tool box talks and safety meetings. Investigations are ongoing regarding this incident to
determine if other corrective actions are applicable.
Wireline BOP unit, in frame, lifted off supply vessel <...> on <...> at 0815hrs and landed on the pipedeck. The unit was then lifted down to the skid deck <...> at 1000hrs. On preparing to remove
the BOP from the lifting frame the wireline supervisor noticed that one of the valve guide bars had been bent and that one of the legs of the lifting bridle had been damaged.
Rigging down wireline lubricator. The lubricator was lifted clear of the BOP resting it on the deck at a slight angle. The bottom section was attached to a sling and the weight taken on the tugger
line. The lubricator was separated into two sections, the upper two pieces being in one and the bottom piece held by the tugger. The top section was lifted clear and held by the mast. The lower
section was raised in order to lower it on to the deck, as this happened it swung in towards the BOP and the injured party attempted to restrain it. In doing so the injured party trapped his finger
between the BOP and lubricator. The IP was 7.5 hours into the shift and had been on board 3 days. Procedures used and toolbox talks have all been reviewed following this incident.
IP was working at MSF level as part of a work party which was removing lengths of hose from a bulk loading line. The intention was to lower the bulk hose to the MSF level where the excess
lengths would be removed. When the load was lifted by the crane, from the bulk hose station outside Module 24, the hose parted from the coupling attached to the crane hook. This caused the
hose to drop approx 75 feet to the landing area below where the IP was standing. The hose stuck him a glancing blow causing the injury. A full investigation is underway.
The crane operator noticed that 2 of the lattice joints and the first boom section were slighty distorted. Onshore support have advised the damage still allows use of the crane. Single fall only. A
structural engineer will be moblised today to provide support offshore.
The east crane went down to the <...> to pick up the motor for the compressor. The weight of the lift was 18 ton with the rigging arrangement passing through the lid of the protective wooden
casing and attached directly to the motor housing. When the crane took the load the whole package lifted from the deck of the boat but the crate lid fairly quickly started to part from the crate and
at a height of approx 2 metres still within the confines of the vessel, the crate parted from the lid and fell to the deck of the <...>. No one was injured as the deck crew on the boat were in their
safe haven. There were no work parties on the platform working under the route the lift took to get to the pipedeck due to safety precautions taken prior to the lift.

Whilst booming up close to the minimum redius the driver was asked to stop and boom down a bit. The crane did not respond and continued to hoist up through the limits. The automatic cut outs
did not activate and by the time the cut out brake was applied the boom had come into contact with the back stops. The damage is to the boom foot section. Various lattices have been bent and
some have had the welding torn..
Following an electrical power failure to the west crane, the headache ball became trapped in the cage at the end of the boom. Having had several attempts to free it off it was decided to try and
pull it free by attaching 5 ton wire strop and onto a deck beam. The crane operator raised the boom but saw no load indicated on the wire. At this point the 3 ton strop parted.
Whilst drilling the shoet track, the brake man heard a metallic object strike the drill floor. He investigated and found that a retaining pin which holds the elevator bale lug in place had come adrift.
The elevators were at a hight of 70 ft at the time. It was lunch break and there was no one on the drill floor. It appears that the end of the retaining pin had worn away due to contact with the
elevators over a period of time and allowed it to come adrift.
Whilst springing an 8" production flowline to allow replacement of a block valve, the chain block being used (1-1/2 ton) suffered a failure of the hoisting chain. The two riggers operating the
block fell to the gratings with one sustaining a fracture to the left wrist. Accident notification <...>.
At the time of the incident a directional drilling assembly was being broken down in the Drill floor mousehole. Three floormen were carrying out this operation and the Driller was also on the
drill floor although not directly involved in the operation..... The iron roughneck was attached to the assembly and the break out function operated three times to ensure the connectin was loose.
The main upper and lower jaws of the iron roughneck were then released and the pipe spinner section attached the assembly. The spinner was then activated causing the complete assembly in the
mousehole to rotate. The chain tong suddenly spun round with the rotation and struck the left ankle of the floorman who was standing in front of the iron roughneck. See 9b for full text.
TIR.During drilling operation 13:30 Roustabout hit on ankle by chain. Suspected fracture Medivac to hospital in <...>
Operation ongoing on the drill floor was the connection, termination & testing of all the control lines into the tubing hanger. Different size tubulars (5 1/2" and 7 ") were on the pipe deck in
bundles, that were piled up against sampson posts. The deck crew were searching for a specific joint of 7" tubing for the space out of the landing string. This was going to be required on the drill
floor in the next couple hours. The drilling deck crew hooked the crane on to a bundle of 6 joints of 7" tubing which was in the pile of tubulars. The bundle weight was approx 3.3mt. the crane
driver was instructed by the deck foreman to take up the slack on the slings. The IP moved between the bundle and a container, sited approximately 8" from thew tubulars, to pick up a tag line and
attach it to the end of the bundle proir to moving the lift. The bundles on the pile slumped downward and pushed the bundle attached to the crane away from the pipe, like a pendulum. The bundle
swung towards the IP who jumped up to get away from the swinging load but the bundle contacted his leg & knocked it against the container. The load swung away fron the container back to the
pile of tubulars. IP moved away from the container & continued to the end of the pipe deck where he rested. He then went to the Medic, who after examining the IP, made the decision to medivac
Drill pipe was being pulled out of well <...> and racked back into the derrick. The drill string had been set in the rotary table and a 90ft stand of drill pipe disconnected and suspended in the top
drive system. A mud bucket was installed around the disconnected joint and the stand raised with the draw-works to allow the drilling mud to drain out from inside the drill pipe. While the mud
was draining from the drill pipe the Top Drive System was inadvertently lowered. The suspended drill pipe stand came into contact with the drill pipe in the rotary table and as the Top Drive
System continued to be lowered it came into contact with the top of the stand. Simultaneously the mud bucket was opened and the suspended stand of drill pipe dropped onto the rotary table. This
forced the mud bucket away from the drill pipe and it struck a glancing blow to one of the roughnecks. No injury was sustained.
Whilst running in hole with 2-7/8" drill pipe a length had been raised to the level of the work basket descended in an uncontrolled manner, still attached to the laydown line and the counter
balance line, back to the pipedeck. The joint of 2-7/8" drillpipe suspended from the gin pole by the counter balance line descended in an uncontrolled manner, the box end struck the guard chains
at the basket level. The joint continued downwards, with the pin end still attached to the laydown line which guided it to the pipedeck where the shackle and karabiner between the lifting cap and
counter balance line swivel were damaged and became detached. The pipe came to rest on top of the drill pipe stacked on the pipedeck. One man was working on the pipedeck within the HWU
barriers 'rabbing' joints of drill pipe several feet to the east of the catwalk at the south side (tower end) of the pipedeck. No injuries were sustained.
Whilst springing an 8" production flowline to allow replacement of a block valve, the chain block being used (1-1/2 ton) suffered a failure of the hoisting chain. The two riggers operating the
block fell to the gratings with one sustaining a fracture to the left wrist. Accident notification 12519.

While offloading explosive bunker No. PETR 961105 from the Supply Vessel,<...>, the bunkers bridle snagged on the vessel escape hatch doorway. The east crane operator lowered the bunker to
compensate and free the bunker. On landing the bunker on the platform it was found that one of the bridle legs ferrules had been damaged and the bridle leg had been pulled through the damaged
ferrule. Wave Height 3.6metres, Wind Speed 20Knots. Swell 5metres.
Breaking off top drive from drill pipe after circulation complete. A return spring locating loop sheared. Both parts of the spring fell 94 ft to the drill floor despite the spring coils having a safety
wire through them. The safety wire parted at the time the spring failed or at some previous time. Weather conditions were reasonable at the time of the incident.
During tripping operations running in the hole with a 26" drilling assembly, manual rig tongs were being used to double check a connection that was already torqued up with a stand alone tubular
tong. Whilst removing the rig tongs after the torquing operation, a 23 inch length of stainless steel Unistrut, weighing 3.8 lbs fell from the Monkey board level, and dropped approximately 71 feet,
landing on the driller's console roof. Operations were stopped, and the rig floor cleared of personnel. A full derrick inspection proceeded to identify the source of the Unistrut object. The weather
conditions played no part in this incident. No person was injured. The incident is under investigation.
The wire rope on a 5T Tugger parted and fell to the floor. The tugger winch was not in use at this time - it was stored against a fixed point using a 1T lifting strop. No persons were injured. The
weather conditions played no part in this incident. A team is investigating this incident the report number will be <...>. From TIR. Wire rope on man-riding winch parted and fell 22 feet to the drill
floor. Suspect wire failed due to chaffing on clamp(s). Under investigation.
During the drilling shutdown of the <...>, new finger sections had been installed at the finger board to allow additional strands of 51/2" drill pipe to be stored in the derrick. These new finger
sections were in use during the drilling of the 121/4" section of well <...> and 51/2" drill pipe was being run into the hole. The next stand of drill pipe (approx 93 feet) was in the process of being
taken out of the "fingers" approx 84ft above the drill floor. The inner latching bar was operated pneumatically as normal, however when the limit stop bar of the latch contacted the stopper plate,
the plate was sheared from the assembly and dropped to the drill floor The stopper plate was approx. 80 grams in weight and struck the drill floor in the "setback" area., approx. ten feet from the
nearest floorman.
Lifting arrangements on the crane were being altered from those required to backload tubulars to those required for the remaining backload to an attendant vessel, the <...>. The arrangement for
backloading the C17 tubulars was to use the crane whip line together with a 20 foot x 6.6 tonne SWL 2 leg sling, (overall weight of 2 leg sling was 54.5 kg). The required arrangement for the
remaining backload was again the use of the crane whip line but with single pennant. The majority of the 2 leg sling arrangement had been laid out in a samson post storage area, but when
positioning the final coil of a single leg, the master link flipped over and slid through the guardrails. The master link and length of sling that followed dragged the remainder of the arrangements
through the guardrails. The entire sling arrangements dropped a total of 46 metres to the sea below, and it is estimated that it narrowly missed a walkway some 10 metres below the storage area.
The sling did not contact any part of the installation and no one was injured during the event. Storage of lifting equipment has reverted to purpose built storage horns in the area. Correct storage
requirements re-emphasised.
A request had been made to have 25 stainless steel sheets moved down to a workshop container, situated on the Mezzanine Deck. One member of the deck crew slung a pallet of 25 sheets using
two man made fibre slings (2t x 4m) in preparation for transfer to the mezz deck below. Two deck crew later returned to the sackstore laydown area, hooked on the load and gave the signal for the
crane operator to pick up. The wind conditions at the time were 023 T x 10 KTs. The crane operator picked up approx. 3' from the deck and satisfied with the stability, rigging method, and weather
conditions, picked up the load and slewed around, counter clockwise, to platform North. The two deck crew proceeded to the Mezzanine deck to receive the load. As the crane operator lowered
away, and slewing to the platform west, approx 15ft from the laydown area, the load began to tilt to platform East. As he slewed closer to the laydown area twenty sheets slid from the pallet in an
Easterly direction and dropped approx 32 metres into the sea below. The remaining five sheets slid off the other side of the pallet and onto a tool store container on the Cellar deck approx 8
metres below.
A PLT tool was run into the well (EA08) on 0.108" Dia wireline to a depth of 2050ft. The well was opened up to 80% choke and flowed at a stable rate for a period of 4hrs 13:30 hrs to 17:30hrs.
The choke and Flow Wing Valve were closed in at 18:35, the wireline operator started to pull out of hole 1900. After picking up 130' the wireline parted 1910. It is suspected that it broke at the
lower sheave but it could have been at the depth counter, which is mounted in front of the wireline unit. The toolstring in the hole weighed 450lbs and the weight of the wire left in the hole is
approx 50lbs. The maximum pull up weight noted was 550lbs and no increase in tension was noted before the wire parted. The pull out of the hole speed was being closely monitored to insure the
max. speed of 200 ft/min was not exceeded. The wire passed a torsion test before the wireline invervention but the wire on the surface failed the same test after the incident. A 7" piece of wire
found at the scene snapped when light strain was applied. The wireline operator started shift on the day of the incident other than the driller in the dog house. The weather was poor with wind
speeds between 45-50 kts from a WNW direction.

Note there has been a delay in reporting this incident as it was initially considered non-reportable as the wire-line break was inside the lubricator. After extended investigation and discussion,
however, we believe that it is appropriate to raise a report as the break could still have resulted in the cable whipping around on the BOP deck. Well service operations were in progress on well
<...>, a dead production well that is being converted to produce water re-injection. The operator was about to run in hole with a guage cutter but found that when he moved the control lever
forward the reel did not spool out. He moved the control lever back to neutral and we believe inadvertantly through the neutral position into the pull out of hole position. The toolstring ran up to
the stuffing box and the wire parted at the rope socket. The wire was pulled out through the stuffing box and fell down to the deck. A very small release took place from the stuffing box gland
before it sealed itself. Initial investigation concluded that the operator had made an error manipulating the control lever and also by leaving residual hydraulic pressure in the system, through not
having the so called "double A" valve backed off. Backing this valve off, depressurises the hydraulics and thus would not have allowed the unit to run out of hole. Subsequent investigations
During lifting operations to remove production flowline from eggbox 5. <...>, involving the use of BOP overhead crane intended for use as an anchor point for 1 ton chain block, the hoisting
chain of the 1 ton chain block was subject to sufficient tension to cause the chain to fail. This was due to the BOP crane being used as the lifting device prior to the flowline being fully clear of the
stud bolts of the X-Mas Tree. The chain parted with sufficient force to cause the chainblock to jump off the master link (over coming the safety catch) and fall approx 3 metres into the eggbox
below. The area was barriered off as per the risk assessment. The flowline was immediately re-rigged and the lifting operation completed in order to make the site safe. There was no injury to
personnel and the only equipment damage was that of the chain block.
During the <...> shutdown, a beam trolley and a lifting tackle fell from a permanent runway beam that runs north to south in the water injection area. The beam trolley had been issued through the
lifting loft and had been erected on the lifting beam. The permanent trolley had been removed some years ago. On erecting the trolley, the rigger confirmed that the end stop nearest to him did
arrest the movement of the trolley at the end of the beam. A lifting tackle was then rigged to the trolley and then used to lift a valve 3ft off the deck to take it to a waiting barrow. The rigger then
walked the valve along the length of the lifting beam towards the south end stop and the barrow. On reaching the end of the beam, the trolley passed under the original stop and fell to the deck.
During racking back of the kelly following circulation activity, the tugger wire appeared to snag on the choke manifold adjacent to the sampson post which supported a pulley through which the
tugger wire was directed. The manifold was snapped at the pup piece at the vertical section of the manifold. The weather was fair with slight/moderate wind conditions. Loss of mud/water - 1
barrel, contained within platform drains. Tugger on North west side of drill floor. Tugger line caught underneath section of manifold whilst taken up. Failed to notice line catching manifold.
<...> were rigging up their lubricator on the drill floor prior to plugging well <...>. A lifting collar was used which grips on to the top of the lubricator stack and BOP's. The lifting collar in
question is in two parts and held together by 4 bolts and a shackle either end, SWL was stamped on the collar as 1 ton. One of the bolts on the collar sheared dropping the bolt head (weight
approx 2 grams) about 30' to the drill floor. Initial investigation did not identify any reason why the bolt should shear. I saw this as a failure of a load bearing part of a lifting device. Work was
suspended on the drill floor until the lifting collar was removed and an investigation team set up. Early indications suggests that the bolt was over torqued and there is a possible design failure of
the clamp, investigations are ongoing. There were no injuries. Weather at the time was strong Easterly wind @ 35 knots with heavy rain.
<...> Supply Vessel had arrived alongside <...> Platform to load and unload cargo. The Platform also requested 100m3 of diesel to be transferred from the vessel to the Platform. During the the
diesel transfer operations the cargo was still being loaded/unloaded. As a result, the Crane Operator was manoeuvering a 10 ft container alongside the filling hose when he inadvertently hit the
loading hose connection. The impact split the connection and an estimated 3 barrels (500 litres) of diesel was spilled before the NRV's on both lines closed. Of the diesel spilled approx. one barrel
(160 litres) went directly into the sea and two barrels (350 litres) directly onto the vessel deck. Degreasing container was loaded down to the supply vessel to enable the cleaning of the deck.
Unfortunately diesel spill to sea was lying on surface due to prevailing sea conditions.
Drilling crew were assembling drill string using 2-7/8" drill pipe. Eight singles had been run in the hole. The first seven singles were fitted with a Lift Nubbin. The Lift Nubbin was not fitted to
either the eighth or ninth single. On lifting the ninth single from the cat-walk into the rig floor it slipped through the elevators striking <...> on the left side of his body and also his right foot. <...>
was positioned on the right hand side of the drill floor. The elevators were approximately 25 feet above the drill floor when the single slipped through them. The elevators being used were Latched
Single Joint type with tapered inserts suitable for 2-7/8" drill pipe. The Upset on the drill pipe prevents the pipe from slipping through the elevators. These elevators have been replaced with 27/8" Latched Single Joint Drill Collar type which require the fitting of a Lift Nubbin to the end of the drill pipe. <...> started his shift at 06:00 hours. He had started his tour on <...>.

Drilling crew were pulling out of the hole on well No H59 when the connection between the monkey board tugger wire rope and the pull back chain separated. This separation resulted in the pull
back chain sliding down the drill pipe from the monkey board level onto the rig floor. The connection consisted of the wire rope having been threaded through the end ring of the chain and then
clamped back onto itself by means of a Eureka wire rope clamp. Inspection of the <...> clamp identified that the clamp was designed for use on 12 to 13mm diameter wire rope and that the tugger
wire rope was 10mm diameter. The <...> rope clamp had been fitted on <...> by the drilling mechanic. This was carried out as a repair as the original Hardeye and 18 inches of the rope had to be
removed due to damage incurred. All <...> clamps have been removed from the drilling store and are locked up in the safety tech's office. On order are two complete certificated assemblies each
one consisting of 30 mts of 10mm wire rope with Hardeye and connected to 1 meter length of appropriate chain by means of Hammerlock coupling.
C1 crane was working the supply boat, <...>. The crane operator had lifted a container and when swinging it over the pipedeck, the cover of the boom floodlight fell onto the pipedeck close to the
<...> unit. The plastic frame hit the deck and the toughened glass shattered. The wind was 25Kts-045 Deg. The plastic frame without the glass weighed 1.2kgs. The floodlight was inspected and
no damage found on the four corners of the fitting. It looks as if the retaining screws which screw into the toggles had worked loose causing the cover to drop. All other light fittings on the both
cranes were checked and the retaining screws could be tightened 1/2 turn. Reviewing crane check list and PM,s to include the checks on the tightness of all light fitting attachments and covers on
a weekly basis.
ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE OIR/9B. Drilling. Taking 7" casing through the V door a 3t strop caught up & parted with the casing falling back through the V door to the catwalk (height
unknown). Work stopped pending conclusion of investigation and putting preventative measures in place.
At approx. 14.00 hrs crew members were informed that the wind had dropped enough to start rigging down the mast. Guy wires were slackened off and middle & upper sections of the mast were
lowered and then crew started to jib down the mast. Two crew were checking that no cables or guys could get caught. When the mast was approx. 45 degrees crew heard a slight cracking
noise.The operation was stopped and visual checks made. It was thought that the Headache ball on the main mast had hit the front of the mast and caused the noise. The decision was made to
continue lowering the mast but a louder crack was heard and operations were stopped at once. Further checking revealed that the weld in front of the pivot point had broken, causing the beam to
bend upwards and the mast to skew to the left. The area was cordoned off and personnel warned by PA announement to stay clear of the area.. The mast was later lowered safely using the crane.
<...> deck crew has been offloading the supply vessel <...>, including bunkering potable water using the west side bunkering station at +30.1m level. On completion of bunkering, the pot water
hose was disconnected by the <...> deck crew and picked up by the <...> West Crane. On instruction from the deck crew, the crane operator raised the hose to the required level above the hose
station, to allow a strop to secure the hose at the station on the west side of the gas treatment module, +54.1m level. The attending member of the deck crew leant down to pick up the securing
strop from the deck, at this point he heard a noise and was struck a glancing blow by the hose falling into the sea below. The hose had parted from the coupling, which was left hanging from the
crane hook.
Basket containing shear seal assembly and two flanges was being backloaded onto a supply boat. During the lowering operation the basket "hung up" on a second basket already on the boat. The
force on the first basket caused it to rotate violently, breaking the rope lashing on one flange allowing it to tumble out of the basket. The flange came to rest in the second basket.
Abridged See OIR/9B. Drilling Operations : Whilst picking up a 5" drill pipe form the V-door it was observed the tugger was straining to pick up a joint of pipe.When investigated at the crown, it
was noticed that the sheave on the 6.4t <...> Snatch Block had failed and the tugger wire was being retained at the crown by the safety sling. The operation of picking up pipe was suspended and
the sheave, tugger line and safety sling were changed out. A visual inspection was made of the other sheaves at crown. The sheave had had a visual inspection carried out 5 days earlier.
Certification of Snatch block was checked and found to be satisfactory. Investigation Summary : <...> tugger winch is groved to take 13mm wire and is run through a 6.4t Snatch block because
the tugger is rated at 2.5t (2.5t pull each side). Manufacturers recommended size of wire for 6.4t Snatch block is 20mm to 22mm. B.I.S. inspection stated verbally that it is an acceptable practice
to use smaller wire on a larger rated Snatch block, given that the inspection should identify any wear and depending on tolerance be changed out. Inspection on a 'sister' Snatch block identified the
following : MPI passed. Visual inspection indicated wear to one side that the wire was not running centrally in the wheel. This is causing a side loading groove. Snatch block was condemned and
Air hoist was being used to lift a section of riser back into position over the seawater cassion 16 in M7. As it was being hoisted the up control was released to stop the ascent but the load was seen
to creep back down albeit very slowly, this was repeated and after it continued to creep down it was allowed to come to rest on the blocks. The air was disconnected and the job stopped. An
investigation is ongoing.

0.108" Slickline was being used during routine wireline operations at Well A16(01). While attempting to set a type TKN Lock Mandrel at 17950 ft in the well the 0.108" failed and parted at
surface at the lower sheave wheel. This resulted in 17950 ft of wire being 'lost' into the well; with no loss of containment, and the other loose end recoiling back to the wireline unit without
endangering any personnel nor adjacent plant. 1. An incident investigation has been initiated. 2. A sample of the failed wireline is being sent ashore for analysis. 3. Current ongoing review of
upgrading of wireline units to utilise 0.125" slickline being expedited.
The main drive shaft sub on the top drive was being broken out using rig tongs and the EZ torque. Four attempts were made using the EZ Torq with the maximum line pull of 100,000 ft.bls being
applied with no success. To assist the break our the yellow tugger was rigged up with a sling to the tong to assist the EZ torq. The tugger line was rigged up through the cat head roller guide. Four
pulls were made with the EZ Torq with tugger assistance and it was observed that the connection was starting to free off. The tong was then moved down to the bottom of the main shaft sub to
make it easier for the roughnecks to operate and another pull made with the EZ Torq with tugger assistance. During this operation the welds on the cat head roller guide failed and the cat head
roller assembly moved down the sling and came to rest 4 ft from the centre of the rotary table. The maximum dimensions of the cat head roller guide are 0.6x0.6x0.4m. The roughnecks on the rig
floor had moved to a safe area during all the high torque break out attempts. No personnel were injured during the incident.
Shear Seals were being removed from slot 19 (Well Bay) and positioned on the Impact Deck. 2 x Pull lifts were rigged up and used as directional aids to allow the shear seals to be lifted through
open hatch on impact deck. Whilst lift was taking place one of the pull lifts failed. The pull lift in question was being used to position shear seal in its vertical position. During use whilst the
operator was releasing tension the chain of the pull lift passed straight through the mechanism. On investigation it was found that the chain end stop had been placed on the last link of the chain.
All other chain blocks in Rigging Loft have the chain end stop in its correct position ie second last link which acts as a "choke" and stops the chain from passing through the mechanism.
A set of four-leg pullers had been used to lift the master bushing from the rotary table. Once this task was complete the pullers were uncoupled from the master bush and the pullers were then
dragged across the drill floor by the tugger. One of the four hooks on the puller snagged on the iron roughneck rails and broke off. The broken hook is being sent ashore to identify the mechanism
of failure, this will allow us to determine if the hook was subjected to excessive force or if there was fatigue or other metallurgical failure. No one was injured during this incident.
<...> crane operator lowered a chemical bin containing some residue of non hazardous powder chemical to the deck of the <...>. As the unit was moved towards the bulkhead at the side of the
vessel the unit struck a container on the deck of the vessel. This caused the lift to rotate. As the unit being lifted slowly rotated the corner of the unit went into the doorway access at the side of the
vessel. The vessel heaved and as it dropped the corner of the container snagged in the top of the doorway. The effect of this was sudden shock loading if the lifting bridle causing it to part. The
immediate action was to complete the lift safely. The pennant involved in the incident was removed and a new pennant fitted. The chemical spill caused by the shock effect was very limited and
contained.
Prior to unloading supply vessel the East crane had to be changed from the whipline to the main block configuration. The platform helideck is utilised for this operation as it allows easy access to
the equipment. IP went to the helideck to assist in the changeover. The crane operator manoeuvred the crane round to pick up the main block from its stowage position on M15 roof. As the boom
slewed round across the helideck the hook of the pennant struck <...>, who at the time was kneeling down, on the left rear side of his head knocking him to the deck. The crane operator did not
see <...> until the hook had struck him. The crane operator had radio contact with the <...> roustabout who was on the M15 roof below the helideck waiting to lift the main block from its location.
The blow resulted in <...> sustaining a small cut to his ear and although he completed the task, approx. one hour later he reported to the medic with head pains. The medic administered first aid
treatment and following consultation with onshore doctor <...> returned to work. The following shift, he reported back to the medic and was sent onshore as a precautionary measure. IP examined
by <...> doctor and sent home. On returning offshore, again felt unwell and again returned onshore.
A new air conditioning compressor was to be installed in to M17 plant room. The compressor weighs approximately 290kgs and was located on the lifeboat deck north below the plant room. The
task involved lifting the unit from its location on the lifeboat deck approximately 6mtrs, up to the walkway on the west side of the plant room, through the door & into position for installation. The
riggers on collecting their permit (CWP10468) with attachments, Safety Checklist 44 and Risk Assessment 155 went to the worksite with the <...> supervisor and assessed/planned the task to be
done. They then went to the <...> rigging loft, selected & inspected the portable lifting equipment that they would require. After successfully lifting the unit from the lifeboat deck level to the
plant room west walkway, they were in the process of transferring the unit using 2 X 1 tonne chain blocks, from one block situated at the door of the plant room to another block situated inside the
plant room. On raising the unit approximately 60cm above the deck, the locking mechanism within the first block (S/No. <...>) failed which resulted in the unit falling to the deck, once the
manual haulage chain had been released. No personnel were injured and the unit sustained minor damage. The riggers made the worksite safe then reported the incident to the mechanic who

At 0900 hrs on <...> routine unloading of the supply vessel <...> was being carried out. Drill pipe was being removed from the deck of the vessel. The last lift of pipe was attached to the platform
crane by the vessel deck crew ready to lift. One of the slings on the pipe caught up on a small capstan on the deck of the boat and before the crane operator could release the strain the sling parted.
The platform crane is a <...> diesel hydraulic Pedastel unit. The weather at the time was : wind 23 knots, sea state 2-3 metres.
On completion of discharging diesel from the <...> to the <...> Platform the <...> coupling was disconnected from the vessel's diesel supply tank and the bulk hose was laid across the main deck.
The vessel's crew then hooked on a canvas bag containing a UHF Radio and also the wire strop supporting the bulk hose to the crane pennant. The <...> Crane operator received a hand signal
from the vessel's deck crew to raise his line. At this point the crane operator was unaware that the wire strop attached to the diesel hose was not in fact hooked on to the crane pennant. When the
diesel hose was raised approximately 30ft from the main deck of the vessel the hose fell from the crane pennant to the deck of the vessel. The diesel hose was reconnected to the crane pennant
and the lift completed without further incident.
During boat loading operations a waste skip that was being lowered onto the <...> supply boat struck the edge of a half height already in the boat. As a result one end of the skip entered into the
boat's crash barrier access hatch, when the boat fell in the sea/swell the weight came 'on' the skip it was trapped and part of the lifting arrangement failed/parted.
Wireline Operations Good Visibility, wind 16 knts 185 degrees. Whilst taking the weight of a logging tool on mono coax wire. The wire was overtensioned and parted at the weak point The tool
dropped 4 feet missed the boarded area, hit the deck grating, damaged the deck grating, slid through to the next deck. Weight 150lbs Work areas on both decks were barriered off
The operation in progress was pulling out of the hole with a clean up assembly from 17,000 feet. There was excessive vibration on the drill string whilst hoisting each stand. A loose link tilt stop
bolt had been detected earlier and removed. The Derrickman had been instructed to continually observe for other loose fittings as each stand was being raised. Whilst pulling a stand at approx.
11,700 feet with the top drive at 90 feet above the drill floor, the driller noticed on the camera monitor that one of the link tilt to bail linkage arms had come free at one end. Almost immediately
the link tilt stop bolt dropped 90 feet to the rig floor, no one was injured, the nearest person was approx. 6 feet away. Operations were immediately suspended and the top drive inspected. During
inspection no other loose bolts were discovered, there was evidence of wear on the retaining pins. In an attempt to reduce further movement of the tilt linkage pins and damage to the securing
pins, washers were installed, and new pins installed.
During drilling operations on <...> Rig 81. Attempts were made to pull cut section (100 ft) of 9 5/8" casing from inside 13 3/8" casing. A spear had been run and attached in the 9 5/8" cut section
and a pull of 150,000 Lbs exerted using draw works. In addition a fluid pressure of 1000 psi was applied internally to attempt the release through the cut of the cement bond to the casing. A
movement of approx. 7 ft was observed but before the onshift Asst.Rig Suptd. who was on the rig floor could react on the brake and pull the travelling block upwards the pipe was hydraulically
ejected and bent against the topdrive. The rig floor had been previously cleared of non-essential personnel. Remedial Actions :- Reinforce need for vigilance by onshift Rig/Sup - Driller on the
brake. Stage the applied pump pressure in small increments eg 250 psi (staged).
During maintenance activities the travelling block dolly was inadvertantly run off the torque tube (guides). Whilst attempting to refit the dolly back in the torque tube using a tugger winch and a
rigging arrangement, six securing bolts failed due to overload. This was considered a dangerous occurence in recognising the potential for heavy equipment being dropped in a vicinity where
personnel may have been present.
Whilst making up an assembly consisting of a swab valve and crossover on the skid deck, the sudden crane movement/operation resulted in the assembly being dragged to the hatch opening
where the crossover parted from the swab valve and fell 30ft to the deck below.
During routine crane operation from the <...> to <...> Platform, a bundle of 4 drill collar was lost from the back of the <...>. During the lifting of 2 bundles of drill collars, a 3rd bundle was
hooked onto the crane hook, inboard side only. This resulted in the 4 drill collar slipping out of the strop from the back of the vessel. The 2 bundles were landed on the pipe deck with the enpty
strop.
The east crane boom winch pawl bearing shaft assembly worked loose and fell off the crane to the lower walkway. The object was then identified as being the crane boom pawl pin. This was fitted
back onto the crane and the crane boom put to rest. Investigations revealed the pin holding the bolt had vibrated loose and dropped out. It bounced off the unit and onto the walkway below.

"D" Fire water submersible pump motor weighing 3.985t was being transported from the South Cellar deck laydown area to the pump caisson in the Utility module. Equipment being used was:- 2t
floor crane ESA2624 2.5t pallet trolley OPH5786 1.6t tirfor hoist GHTM010 The motor had been moved down the walkway and after turning into the module the pump had been moved 3 metres
into the module when the floor crane was noticed to begin leaning to the right - the operation was stopped and the load lowered the 6 inches to the floor. The leg of the floor crane had buckled believed to have weakened when the load was unevenly distributed while turning into the module. The motor transportation was completed using another 2t pallet trolley ESA2668. The use of
pallet trolleys is the normal mode of operation for this task, but using the floor crane was thought to give greater manoeuvring ability, but the load distribution was not fully assessed. The floor
crane has been inspected and no defects found. The item has been removed from the platform and will not be replaced. The requirement to assess all aspects of the operation , including
transportation, to be disseminated at platform safety meetings.
<...> and a <...> hand were working together to re-position a hydraulic skid weighing 1.5 tons on the rig floor. The <...> hand was operating the sir tugger to lift the skid while <...> held it in the
correct position. He called for the load to be lowered. It came down quicker than he expected and crushed his left foot. He managed to extract his foot and was given assistance by the <...> hand
and also the driller who was close by.
During the rig down of J207 well the coiled tubing injector head was removed with the aid of the rig drawworks and winches. The injector head was held off by one winch while other lifting gear
was removed. The next step involved attaching a lifting cap to a second winch to connect to the BOP stack and remove it. During this activity the winch driver mistakenly selected the "hold off
winch" and operated it. Consequently the injector head, (weight approx 5 ton) was pulled over resulting in a damage to equipment accident. No one was hurt however there was potential for a
fatality.
Whilst transferring oil drums from the skid deck to a landing outside the east door to the BOP deck, the east crane came into contact with the 'name sign' installed on the east face of the drilling
derrick housing. The drum was immediately landed and the crane returned to its rest to inspect for damage. Initial inspection revealed minor damage to the bolt on walkway on the right side of the
boom with no evidence of damage to the boom itself. <...> engineers have been mobilised for a precautionary check of the boom prior to further use of the crane. The name sign was visually
inspected with no damage found.
Whilst reeving in the first stand of the 3 3/8" drill collars from racked position in mast towards elevator, the bottom connection failed allowing the bottom joint to fall across the derrick.The top
two joints then fell to the rig floor landing on the rotary table before falling across the derrick.
Three lengths of 4" flat bar slipped out of slings (2 X 1 tonne plastic coated wire slings) when being transferred by crane to fab shop steel rack and landed on storage container roof (flat bar
slipped from a height of approx 8 feet above container/18 feet above deck). No injuries and only slight damage to storage container roof. Investigation team coming from onshore on Tuesday as
second dropped object in last couple of weeks.
Flushing of HP/Export seal oil tank through Norson air driven pumps. Preparations were also being made to circulate oil via skids own electrical pumps. Skid had been de-spaded to allow the
operation to take place and to allow the seal oil tank to breathe as it was intended to pressurise the compressor casing to prevent internal seal oil loss. During preparation, an explosion occurred
inside the seal oil tank. The tank has since been isolated awaiting formal inspection.
The assistant driller was tasked with transferring bulk Bentonite from its storage silo to a mixing surge tank. Following the normal start up procedures for the air compressors, the assistant driller
turned on the power to No 1 Compressor <...> at the control box and then pressed the GO button (Green) to start the compressor. After approx 3 seconds there was an explosion in the control box
which resulted in damaging the control box door, top hinge was sheared off, middle hinge partly sheared but bottom hinge was left intact and the door was buckled. The equipment was made safe.
The problem was traced to a loose phase terminal connection to the compressor motor causing a flash over between 2 phases which resulted in and internal explosion in the control box which
damaged the box. Inspect other similar control boxes for similar faults. Reviewing Planned Preventative Maintenance performance standards.
Plant operation was steady prior to incident. A fault condition occurred on <...> generator 'D' resulting in an explosion within a 13.8 KV cubicle, feeding the production board transformer. A
platform shutdown and blowdown was initiated automatically by confirmed smoke detection in the generator department. Comprehensive investigations were carried out to identify the source of
the problem. It was concluded that the fault originated in the generator lineside cubicle due to the ingress of water. A flashover occurred and induced an excessive voltage which resulted in the
damage to the 13.8 KV feeder cubicle.

A scaffold clip (weight 0.68 kg) fell from scafflold around a turbine exhaust that was being dismantled. It landed on a small walkway 18 metres below. The area/walkways immediately below the
work area had been barriered off. The walkway where the clip landed ( a person was on the walkway at the time (no impact). The risk of a dropped object and the need to barrier off below had
been covered in the risk assessment and TBT. The possibilty of a dropped object landing on this walkway had not been considered as it was not directly below the worksite. It is unclear exactly
where the clip had fallen from. None of the scaffold crew saw or heard it fall. The need to consider deflected objects when planning barrier locations below scaffold installation/dismantling will
be stressed to scaffold crews and permit preparers.
A bolt (approx 80mm long by 22mm diameter) became detached from a subframe on an air driven winch sited above Slot 1 in the wellbay level 3 and dropped some 6 metres to the level below
which was barriered off. The winch is an <...> unit SWL 9072 kg supplied under hire by <...> and marked with an <...>. The subframe is of a design by <...>. The winch is one of a set used for the
positioning of materials for installation by divers at various sub-sea levels as part of modifications to the platform well slot conductor guides. The bolt dropping was noticed by a roustabout on
duty adjacent to slot 1 in the wellbay and reported to the rigging foreman, and occurred jsut prior to completion of a period of winch use. The winch was taken out of service and all subframe
bolts were checked and "nylok" nuts are in the process of being fitted. A regime of inspection of the subframe bolts has been initiated. No damage or injury occurred.
A Laboratory Technician was in the process of obtaining a crude oil sample from production well ANP34. When he opened the valves on a <...> the 12mm instrument tubing blew out of a fitting
which was attached to the end of the <...>. A jet of oil was released striking him on his face. He immediately closed the valves on the <...>. On investigation, it was found that the instrument
tubing had parted inside the compression fitting ferral, with some 18mm remaining in the fitting. The failed section of 12mm instrument tubing and compression fitting have been sent for
analysis. A review will be carried out to determine if present sample drain pipework is suitable in view of local vibration.
The <...> drill crew were about to rack back a stand of pipe complete with a down hole tool with the Varco pipe handling machine. As the machine was being positioned onto the stand a piece of
angle iron which weighed 8.6lbs was seen falling from the upper arm assembly of the pipe handling machine which is a distance of approx. 85 feet. The piece of angle iron landed on the rig floor.
Following an investigation it was found that the angle iron was a support bracket for a sensor head which had been fitted to the pipe handling machine assembly head. It is suspected that raising
the arms of the PHM to the maximum height caused the bracket to come into contact with the underside of the upper column cross member causing the retaining bolts to shear. The operation was
stopped to allow inspection and repair. Investigations into the root cause of this incident are currently ongoing.
When riggers were attempting to unravel a "birds nest" of cables laying on top of auxilary sea water lift pump prior to the pump being installed, the barrow on which the pump was sitting moved
and caused the pump to roll over the chokes on the the 'A' frame of the barrow handle. The man holding the handle was struck on the right foot by the 'T' bar as the handle fell. The man had been
on shift for three hours. Remedial actions to be taken are: 1) Review and action transportation needs for similar equipment. 2) Review risk assessment for handling this type of equipment. 3)
advise other installations in the field. 4) Review event in the detail with relevant groups. 5) Complete basic risk assesment training.
While transporting a metal plate bending machine to a worksite on hydraulic pallet truck over ratings it was noticed that the machine was not centrol on the truck. The party lowered the load to
adjust the postition of the machine, during this operation the machine toppled forwards causing the counter balance weights on it to move nipping the IP's index finger of the right hand between
the weights and the persons grip point on the machine.
During running of 7" prodution tubing, plastic tubing thread protectors were being removed on the drillfloor and rolled along the catwalk. Where a roustabout would collect them and put them
into a skip on the gas compression roof. As one of the box end protectors (7 3/4" DIA X 6 1/2 " LONG, 3LB) was being rolled along the catwalk, it bounced up over the 15" high kick plate and
through the railings of the catwalk guard rails . It fell a distance of 25 to 30 feet, landing on the derrick sub-base, close to where a scaffolder was working, putting up hand rails.
A 2m section of 10" diameter lightweight HVAC ducting, located above and between cooling medium coolers, fell approx. 10ft to the deck shortly after a technician had been in the area.
A brick sized piece of concrete was found on Column 4 Gas Tight Floor. Inspection carried out and found to have been from 87 metre level. Investigation ongoing. No impact on Integrity.

Pin for double clevis bracket securing top drive link tilt chains to bails dicovered missing. Weight of pin 5ozs potential to have fallen up to 90ft to area below.
Whilst carrying out transfer of 5 1/2" tubular form pipe deck to drill floor utilising palfinger a length of tubular slid out of the palfinger grab landing on the skid deck. TIR ; About 21.00. Dropped
tubular on drilling floor in concurrent operations area and pierced the blow out panels. Level 2 incident with high potential, Shell mobilising full investigation team <...> <...> informed <...>
A piece of metal plate weighing approx 15Kg was found on the RPM roof. As no reason could be established for the plate to be there, it was suspected that it had fallen from the flare tower.
Substantial areas of the platform were barriered off while investigations were carried out. It was established through elimination process that the piece of metal had in fact come from a failed RB
211 exhaust baffle.
Whislt pulling out of hole with drillstring conveyed wireline logging tool, the IP was holding the wiper onto the <...> cable to prevent oil base mud being spread across the platform. As the cable
and drillstring were being pulled out of the hole a sudden change in tension within the cable caused the cable to recoil. The IP's right hand, which was holding the wiper on the cable, suffered
transmission of this force. Accident notification <...>Q88.
The Operation in progress was to open up crude oil cooler E 42180 for cleaning. Opening the cooler requires removal of large stud bolts that secure the cooler plates between the two end plates.
The stud bolts are loosened by way of a ' gun' which is suspended from a balance unit which is there to take the weight of the gun itself. The two Mechanical Technicians had completed loosening
the bolts and had removed the gun. One Technician was tidying away the gun and hoses while the other was allowing the wire to feed back into the balance unit. The unit is at a height of
approximately 8-9 ft. Therefore the wire is allowed to run free, back to the unit from the extent to which a man can reach - approximately 6-7 ft. On releasing the wire, it rewound into the balance
unit, the balance unit failed at the point where it is supported and the unit fell to the deck. The supporting bracket, securing clip and casing boss were left attached to the cooler.
Bolts holding the bonnet onto the body of mud pump #2's PRV sheared at 4460 psi while pumping out of hole. The PRV was set to relieve at 5000 psi. The bonnet travelled upwards, hit the roof
of M5 sackstore and fell to the floor. No one was present in the sackstore at the time and no one was injured. The PRV was replaced and all 4 retaining bolts on this new unit and the other two
units fitted to mud pumps #1 and #3 were checked and torqued back up to the correct value.
While drilling well B19, the drill crew noticed an object fall and land onto the drill floor. The object was a small hook weighing .25kgs. Prior to the hook falling there had been extensive jarring
while pulling out of the hole. The derrick is inspected on a weekly basis. No one was injured. No enviromental condition played a part in this incident.
In order to pre-empt mechanical failure of the 'top drive' blower motor at a critical juncture in the future, it had been changed out for a like for like unit (12 KW 440V 3600RPM) complete with
cowl and integral rain protection cover. Initially the top rain protection cover was found to be loose and so the 4 retaining screws were tightened. After running for a shortwhile the cowl on the top
of the motor was found to be 'rattling', the reason for which was immediately identified as one of the 3 cowl screws having worked loose. The screw was tightened, the remainder checked again
and the unit allowed to run operationally, albeit, with periodic checks. A check has been conducted at 2300 and at that time all appeared well. At 2330 one of the 3 floormen on the drill floor
heard a noise close by. On investigation it transpired that the rain protection cover from the blower motor (12 1/4 " dia x 2lbs in weight ) had become detached from the motor and fallen approx.
55 ft to the drill floor. The cover missed the 3 floormen by 3,4 and 6 feet respectively. Subsequent investigation revealed that metal around the 4 spot welds holding the rain protection cover to the
cowl had failed.
A <...> Floodlight Type 47LE/250S glass reflector cover broke off fitting and fell to deck level (approx 10 metres) landing on top of the Compressor skid and shattering.
While helicopter was making its final approach to ETA-CPF helideck, the downdraft from the tail rotor caused a plywood lid from a packing crate to lift from the mezzanine deck 40 metres away
and tumble over the adjacent handrail onto the vacuum pump pipework located below on the weather deck. The packing crate lid was made of 10mm plywood measuring 3 x 1 metres. This was
observed by a member of the helideck crew who advised the HLO who immediately contacted the CCR. The lid was retrieved and the area checked out. There was no equipment damage but the
incident investigation concluded that there was some potential for personal injury under different circumstances. The basic causes of the incident were a failure to secure the lid effectively
following initial removal and sub standard housekeeping. All packing cases and similar light items have been removed from the area, procedural controls will be established and the incident will
be a topic for toolbox talks for all crews.
Maintenance Technicians were accessing the mezz deck on a process vessel to progress their work activity. After ascending the vertical ladder the retainer bar was returned to its closed position
and when this was done the bar striking against the temporary stop dislodged it from its anchor point. This resulted in the stop dropping 20 feet to the deck below. Following the event a platform
inspection was carried out to ensure that there was no likelihood of a repeat occurence.

Persons working at height whilst moving boarding struck adjacent cable tray dislodging 4 metal items which then fell to the floor. The items were 2 x steel cut sections, (2kg approx. each, light
holder, air hose connector section and a file without wooden protective handle. The area immediately below had been barriered off & access denied during this work. The team involved reported
this incident immediately as the HSEC arrived on scene immediately after the occurrence. The incident was then reported to the OIM. Discussed with scaffolders concerned & determined that
there were still potential dropped objects lying on cable trays. These were removed immediately.
During setting up of rigging equipment a beam clamp was being lifted into position by hand, when the knuckle insert within one of the clamp jaws fell out and dropped to the scaffold floor below.
On investigation, it was found that the spring pin which is normally engaged in the knuckle was missing. The clamp was quarantined.
During wireline operations through drilling derrick on well FA03MC34 and local adverse weather conditions (winds over 50 knots) it was noticed that 4 of the drilling derrick heat shields above
the monkey board area internal meshing had come loose on the north and east sides. Decision was taken to suspend and rig down wireline operations pending mobilisation of a team of Abseilers
to address heat shield problem by removing same during suitable weather window.
During severe weather a passer by noticed a loose and damaged heat shield at helideck level that protects the heli fuel package supply line. The loose section has been made safe by removal, and
is undergoing repair prior to re-fitting.
Working on Well. Handed over to well services to work on SSSV. On pressure testing, small bore pressure fitting parted. No Injuries. Repaired and retested. From OIR9b: Whilst pressure testing
the wellhead swap cap, a stainless steel compression fitting the THP impulse line on FA 15MC06 was found to have parted
The activity in progress was the dismantling of <...> spent & blank perforating guns which had been used in the perforating of Well H61z. The procedure for dismantling the guns required them to
be removed from the drill string & transferred to the catwalk, where the sub - connectors could be reomved from the ends of the guns. The dimensions of a sub-connector are approx 6.5" long &
2.875 diameter weighing approx 1 kilo. All guns had been verified as spent during this operation. On removal of the sub-connector from this particular blank gun, the su-connector was propelled
some 50 feet along the catwalk & hit the bulkhead of the drilling mechanics workshop. The work of dismantling the guns was performed by <...> personnel. Prior to performing this work a full
Risk Assessment had been carried out which highlighted the possiblity of trapped pressure being contained wihtin the blank guns. The actions to prevent re-occurrence will be determined after the
investigation has been concluded.
During the night shift of <...> the rig had run open ended 5" drillpipe and a set of 750 ft cement plug from 13135 ft. The rig had pulled the drillpipe out of the hole to 8700ft, positioning the
drillpipe all within the 9 5/8" casing. The block c/w Powered Top Drive (PTD) was some 40 ft up the derrick when an object fell from the TDU, hit the scaffolding at casing stabbing board level
and bounced behind the draw-works. The job was stopped and a quick search revealed the dropped object to be a 5" length of 1" threaded bar c/w nut. This was later weighed at 0.8 Kg. All
personnel were cleared from the floor area and the PTD lowered to floor level where an inspection of the PTD took place. It was found that one of the U bolts that connect the load compensator
between the hook and the Kelly swivel had sheared out. Drilling reviewed with <...> the feasibility for operating without the Compensator Assembly. The assembly was agreed to be removed and
the Well Construction and Maintenance Team Leader issued instruction as to the new operating parameters while <...> either source or redesign alternative attachment.
During high winds 51 knots, some badly corroded sections of thin galvanised unistrut were dislodged from the top of the <...> and landed on the pipedeck below. The largest piece weighed 100
grammes, and was approx. 60mm long by 50mm wide. The material was crumbly in nature, and broke very easily. The wireline job in progress was made safe, and suspended until the remaining
material had been removed from the unistrut.
Person was making his way through the BOP deck to the scaffold access ladder situated on the North/East side of the drag chain carrying a crow bar and ballpin hammer. As he approached the
north face of the BOP deck he stumbled and lost his grip of the crowbar he had in his hand, which then slid on the grating, falling over the side, then down on to the impact deck below, dropping
37 feet. The tools were not secured during transit. Weather was fair and bright with light wind. Temp 10 deg C. Decks were damp due to heavy overnight rain.
A piece of metal flashing (stainless steel) 170cm x 40cm weighing 4.5kgs fell from the North-east corner of the drilling derrick and landed approx. 225ft on the East side of the skid deck. Normal
activities taking place although no personnel were in that area. Cause still under investigation. All derrick area, pipe deck and skid deck barriered off and personnel prohibited from entering. Two
abseiling teams inspecting remaining flashing on derrick.

Incident Date: Between <...> and <...> (Time unknown). Four days after fitting the damper mechanism on the CCTV system on the North Crane Jib Cathead, at an inspection by the <...>
Engineer, it was discovered that the damper unit had become detached from its mountings and was missing. Presumed dropped into sea. Platform sweep to see if it had fallen and was lying
anywhere on the platform was carried out without success in finding it. Approximate dimensions: 1m long x 25mm width. weight 2kg. There was no evidence of impact damage to the brackets,
camera, or surrounding area where the damper became detached. The threaded ball joint fittings at the end of the damper remained secured to the brackets on the Cathead. This would suggest that
the damper cylinder and damper piston backed off from the threaded ball joint connections which was still attached to the mountings.
A 1kg piece of Calcium Silicate insulation dropped 15ft to the deck below. An operator was working in the area and saw the insulation fall. Weather conditions Wind SW 50+knots.
A scaffold clip was found on the Production Level West walkway below scaffold operations which were being caried out on the walkway above. This area had not been barriered off. Scaffolders
interviewed were unaware of any scaffold fitting falling onto the walkway. As this was the only activity of this type ongoing then the clip must have fallen from the work site above. Scaffold
material was being stored on the walkway above for use at the site and it is possible that a clip had fallen between the kick plate and the accommodation wall to access the walkway below. The
clip would have fallen around 20ft via an indirect route due to various obstructions between the two deck levels. Scaffolders were asked to be more vigilant working at heights and only to store on
the scaffold fittings intended for immediate use. Access to the area below was immediately barriered off to all personnel for any further work in this area.
During routine plant checks an operator discovered a piece of rusty metal on the deck adjacent to the production deck south walkway. The irregular section measured approx. 35cm x 2cm and
weighed 120 grams. Investigation revealed that this had emanated from a section of Unistrut 3m above and it was in fact the capping which had rusted and detached itself. No work was going on
in the area at this time. An investigation has been set up into this incident.
Injured party was using a HP water jet hose to clean out a blocked drain. The hose was approx. 2 metres into the drain when it flew out of the drain striking the person causing the injuries.
On the night of <...> the platform was being subjected to very strong northerly winds (75 knots+). <...> a <...> electrician going about his duties came across some large pieces of passive fire
protection that had become detached from M10 South external bulkhead and had fallen to the deck below. Parts of this fire protection had fallen from a height of approximately 5 mtrs. The area
was barriered off, once the high winds had dissipated and daylight was in <...> the area was fully inspected. Some of the fire protection was detached from the bulkhead and hanging loose. <...>
personnel were utilised to remove the loose fire protection from M10/M11 South external bulkheads immediately. No personnel were injured and no equipment other than the loss of the fire
protection was damaged. A survey of the other areas on the platform where passive fire protection is located will be conducted and the relevant remedial actions to prevent recurrence taken.
While pulling drill pipe out of the hole there was a requirement to drift the pipe to ensure a clear passage through the centre. In order to achieve this the pipe was being racked in the derrick in
stands of three joints and, before racking it, a drift was being dropped down the stand from the monkey board level (approx 90 feet above the drill floor) and then recovered at the drill floor. This
drill was then attached to the elevators, with a soft rope, to transport it to the monkey board for the next stand to be drifted. This operation had been carrying on for several hours and the soft line
had deteriorated without any of the drill crew noticing. Eventually the line snapped and the drill fell from the monkey board to the drill floor. The weight of the drill was approx 3 lbs. The drill
crew were standing clear at the time and no injury occurred. Since the incident a procedure has been written for this operation and a pocket has been fabricated, to attach to the elevator bail arms,
to place the drift in for transporting it to the monkey board.
Survey work was being carried out on V 442 D.A. Tower to identify a position to install a new ESDV for inlet water to D.A. Tower. Individual carrying out this task climbed on to the structure to
position survey equipment, this would enable him to obtain necessary information to complete the task. At this point the individual stepped on a piece of angle iron. The angle iron parted from the
main structure falling approximately 4 Metres to the deck below. Pending full investigation the area was barriered off and all ongoing work within the immediate vicinity halted.

Nightshift Operator noticed piece of galvanised steel metal (rusty condition) lying on external walkway outside Production Module 5. Size 600mm X 600mm X 2mm thick, weight approximately
2kgs. Immediate cause: Recent adverse weather conditions. Root cause: Corrosion of pop rivets and securing strap attaching sheeting to main structure of Compressor exhaust.
Whilst a work party was working on sea water lift pump (P-4201) a section of lagging from the adjacent pump set discharge pipework (P-4200) fell approximately 20 ft to the deck, narrowly
missing the work party. The lagging section weighed approximatley 3 kg and fell as P-4200 was being started up. The vibration caused the lagging to dislodge, as the retaining screws had become
loose. At the time of the near miss, three persons were working on the adjacent pump (P-4201). The work was stopped and an insulator was instructed to inspect other lagging on the pump and
adjacent units. All lagging on the units have been inspected and secured and investigation is in progress to reduce the vibration and assess the type of lagging fitted. Procedural controls have also
been implemented to restrict activities in the area during startup of the pumps.
During dismantling & material removal of scaffolding from module 30 on <...> a section of handrail 2m x 1m gave way and fell away from the stairway landing area. A <...> scaffolder who was
working on the landing and was leaning against the handrail fell outwards. The fall of both scaffolder and handrail section was stopped by a horizontal beam to the inboard side of the module. The
scaffolder was pulled to safety by his fellow workmates. Investigations have revealed anomalies in the fixings (bolts) on this section and these are being sent for analysis. An independant
inspection programme is due to commence on platform <...> to establish current status of all platform handrailed areas.
Rigblast technicians, while disconnecting a length of 2" wellhead deluge pipework with a dog leg section, snagged a 4mm lighting cable (240v) and sheared the cable, at the same time exerting
pressure so as to stretch an adjoining 2.5mm cable (240v). The circuit ELCB's tripped, affecting some emergency lighting at the North & North East corner of the platform. Realising the damage
caused, the incident was reported to the control room, where upon the associated circuits were isolated and made safe by the nightshift electrician.
The 0.215" wireline broke at surface (at the wireline unit drum), while wire in hole. Running in hole with wireline when break took place. The wire fell downhole with broken end hanging up on
the bottom wireline sheave on the rig floor. Discovered the broken end of the wire was buried in the wireline drum on the unit. Initial observations showed the wire trapped underneath wire wraps
on the units drum and bent and snapped while running in the hole. The maximum weight pulled on the wire just before the break was 1200 lbs.
While trying to retrieve a 3.813" pack off from the SSD @ 14702 ftRKB on well SP-52 the 0.125" wireline (Type GD31MO) broke at surface (at the wireline unit counterhead). The wire recoiled
back to the stuffing box and fell down the well. A release of gas and hydrocarbons was noticed at the stuffing box. The bop's were closed and inflow tested for 30 mins. When broken off there was
no wire present. The tree was shut in again with no indications of wire. The tree and PCE was vented to 0. The Area Authorities were informed and the area cleaned of displaced hydrocarbons.
The dayshift Well Services Supv. was informed and in turn the immediate Supv. in town were made aware of the situation. Estimated amount of oil released 0.5 litre. No oil discharged into the
sea.
ROV Supervisor was returning to the dive spread via the SE stair. As he approached the 3rd fron bottom stair tread, a section of alloy scaffold tube (16" x 2", weighing 1.7 Lbs) landed on the dive
spread 5 ft ahead of him. He sustained no injury. Subsequent inspection identified that the section of scaffold tube had fallen a distance of approx. 60 feet from the underside of the upper-walkway
grating East side.
Drilling of the top section of a new well had commenced. Excessive vibration caused the wire securing 4 of 5/8" x 1 1/4" bolts on the automatic elevators to break. One of these bolts slackened
with the vibration and dropped approx. 30ft to the drill floor. All the equipment had been checked prior to use and the certification was confirmed to be valid. Following investigation into the
cause of the incident, the elevators were replaced and all personnel advised of the potential hazard. The area under the elevators has been barriered off when in use and drilling has recommenced.
During the night shift approx 0230, a 3" clamp fell from level 5 to level 3 onto the walkway where men were working. Abseilers had been and would be later working on pipework on level 5
fixing these 3" clamps and several were laid on the grating near pipe penetration holes - which is believed to be where the clamp fell through.
A plater was carrying a piece of angle (approx 80 x 80mm x 1.5m) from <...> to <...> across the bridge enroute to the fabrication shop. After stepping off the gangway onto <...>, the piece of
angle was left unattended, leaning against a handrail whilst the plater went to move his location T- card. On his return, the angle was not where he had left it. The piece of angle had fallen
between the handrail and gangway, approx 10m to main deck level below, striking and creating a hole in a fibreglass immersion suit box. The angle bar was placed up against the permanent
handrail on the barge and it is assumed it had either slid along the handrail, was knocked by the movement of the gangway or slid due to movement of the barge, causing it to fall to the deck
below.

During disconnection of flotel gangway, the structure was slewed astern having been raised approx. 30cm from <...> deck. This was not high enough to avoid colliding with a permanent guardrail
and a temporary scaffold built "gate". The "gate" was lifted by the gangway "foot" and fell into the sea. As the gangway continued to slew, the "foot" deformed the permanent guardrail on the
bridge/gangway landing platform.
A portable gas detection meter was being used by <...> at the nitrogen pump unit on the east side of the weatherdeck. The meter was placed on top of a 5 gallon drum near the nitrogen unit. A gust
of wind caught and lifted a section of tarpaulin attached to base of adjacent scaffolding. The tarpaulin caught the gas meter knocking it over the east hand rail, the meter fell to level 1 deck below
breaking it on impact. No injury was involved.
Sheared locating bolt (30mm/400g), suspected to have dropped from vicinity of flare tip, found on top of incinerator module. Bolt thought to be from structural assembly that folds down top flare
platform. The top flare platform is held down with 24 similar type bolts. In the event of a major failure of these bolts, the platform could not fail. On discovery, area barriered off. Platform
continued in production awaiting suitable weather window to inspect top flare platform.
During the start up a completions running operation on TA07a loose hinge pin was discovered in the single joint elecators being used for this operation. As the roustabout on the catwalk went to
latch the elevators around the third joint to be picked up he noticed the hinge pin was protruding by 1-1/2". He immediately stopped the job and shouted to the floorman on the Drill floor that
something was wrong with the elevators. The two men hoisted the elevators to the Drill Floor and detached them from the Tugger line. They then turned the elevators upside down and attempted
to remove the hinge pin completely. This they managed easily by pushing out the hinge pin using the latch lock pin.
A small sheet metal sign approx 6" X 10" which was banded on to a beam at the monkey board level of the derrick, fell from the beam to the Pipe Deck below, landing on a container roof. Early
investigations show that the stainless steel banding used to secure the sign may have been caught/snagged by a tugger wire that operates in the area of the sign. All work suspended and another
similar sign removed from the same area. Investigation team selected and investigation ongoing
Electricians were de-isolating an electrical circuit in the 440v Switch Room on completion of routine maintenance work. Whilst replacing the breaker chassis into the starter cubicle a flashover
occurred within the panel initiating a Class 2 Shutdown (loss of Power Generation). Smoke from the Switch Room entered the Main Control Room (MCR) activating the release of halon and
necessitating the relocation of operations personnel to an alternative muster location. The GPA was initiated manually (as a precautionary measure) prior to the relocation of personnel from the
MCR. The Emergency response team was mobilised to investigate the incident. Smoke was present in the switch room and Main Control Room but no fire was apparent. No personnel were
injured. A full investigation into the cause of the incident is ongoing.
While off-loading cargo from a supply vessel the Crane Operator observed smoke coming from the engine room of the <...> crane. He immediately suspended operations, secured the load and
went to the engine room to investigate the cause of the smoke. When he opened the Engine room door he noticed smoke in the deck head area and a smell of hydraulic fluid. On approaching the
crane engine, small flames were visible on the upper section of the engine in the area of the exhaust manifold block. Using the dry powder extinguisher at hand, he extinguished the flames and
alerted the Marine and Material Co-ordinators. On closer investigation it was discovered that the high pressure hydraulic hose from the slew pump had failed at its swaged connection and that the
fluid had sprayed over a substantial area of the engine room and its roof. The fluid from the roof had fallen onto the hot exhaust manifold block giving rise to smoke and the minor fire. No
significant damage was sustained to the engine. A temporary repair was completed to allow the suspended load to be landed and the crane stowed safely, pending delivery of a replacement hose.
At 15:30 on <...> a fire was observed within G160 turbine exhaust plenum enclosure on restart following repair to a lube oil joint. This was extinguished manually by intervention by personnel in
the area during the run up of the unit (fire team members). The platform GPA was activated and Beryl Bravo and onshore informed of the situation. The area was made safe and an onshore
inspection team arrived <...> to lead the investigation into the incident. The investigation report shall be made available to HSE when approved by <...> management.
Fire in gearbox compartment of 'A' generator in module 3. Halon manually fired and GPA sounded. Personnel proceeded to their muster stations. The fire was extinguished by the platform fire
team. Statements from Onscene Commander and Fire Team Leader state the fire was behind the lagging on the exhaust vent wall. The generator was isolated and remains shutdown at this time.
An investigation is ongoing to establish the root cause and recommend corrective action.

Standby vessel <...> reported that at 04.00 hours they observed flame coming from the <...> flare stack at a location approx 2/3 of the flarestack height. Platform operations team observed flame
coming from the atmospheric vent and closed the fuel gas supply. The OIM was alerted and responded to the CCR. The atmospheric vent was purged with nitrogen, which extinguished the flame.
Nitrogen purging is currently being maintained. At first light the OIM, Ops Supv, HSEC and Deck Foreman observed the flarestack through binoculars. Blackening of the atmospheric vent could
clearly be seen around a flange and also blackening of handrails directly above this location. The OIM reported the incident to the HSE via telephone at approx 0945 hrs. The investigation team
for this incident identified that, while this event is not a normal operation, it was considered in the plant design and catered for with the plant equipment provided.
Fire occurred in a plastic waste bin within the mechanical workshop. At the time of ignition no personnel were at the location. Alarm raised initially by smell of smoke on weather deck from Hvac
exhaust. This was immediately followed by GPA and ESO with blowdown due to smoke migrating into MCR floor void. Emergency muster and EIR team mobilised. Fire observed by EIR team
during search and extinguished with local extinguisher. Note: No evidence of external heat source apparent or placed in bin. Some 70 minutes earlier a rag containing debris removed from the
flash gas compressor filter had been placed in the bin. It is now suspected that this material may be pyrophoric and may have automatically ignited, causing the waste bin & material to combust further analysis to be conducted.
At around 0500hrs on <...> 2 x UV fire detectors activated in Module 4 (separation). This initiated a fire alarm, deluge in the module and a level 3.1 shutdown of the platform. All personnel were
called to muster. The emergency response arrangements were activated and all POB accounted for in the process. HSE, Coastguard and Police were notified and SAR helicopters scrambled. The
cause of the detection was later found to be a faulty male-female socket on the DC (output) cable of a welding set. Personnel and emergency services were stood down after 90 mins.
At approx 2015 on <...>, the shift chef in the platform galley could smell smoke. Upon investigation, the smoke was traced to the rear freezer. Cautiously opening the freezer door, the chef was
confronted by heavy smoke. He shut the door and raised the alarm by phoning the C.C.R on 333. The fire team were mustered and extinguishing action undertaken. Flame had been detected
within the freezer. Following damping down operations an inspection of the freezer was undertaken in order to determine the cause of the incident. Close inspection of the site identified a piece of
charred metal had become detached from a system above stored food produce cardboard boxes. This turned out to be the return bend of the defrost heater element from the evaporator coil block.
It would appear this became seriously overheated, detached from the system and set fire to the food boxes below. Further investigation identified restraining clips which should have held it in
position were absent, as was the protective mesh intended to be in position at the end of the evaporator coil block. An investigation identifying follow up actions was undertaken.
On <...> at approx 21:35, the GPA was sounded and an announcement made that there was a fire in the galley. All personnel were mustered at their lifeboat stations. The incident room was
manned and took control of the incident and the fire team was mustered. At 21:43, the fire which was caused by ignition of the deep fat fryer was reported out from the scene. After a full search
and confirmed POB at 21:54 the order was given for all persons to stand down at 22:05. The incident is currently under investigation.
At 2224hrs the platform was brought to hazard status due to the manual activation of a GPA on the drilling engine package. A problem with the switchboard was first noticed by a repeater alarm
from the switchboard on the drillfloor. The maintenance staff were called to investigate the alarm and when entering the switchroom observed smoke in the area. Having first activated the GPA
they called the rig electrician who went to the cabinets, accepted the alarm on the panel. opened the cabinet and extinguished the fire with a hand held CO2 extinguisher. The platform returned to
normal status at 2254hrs. All power to the six cabinets was isolated. Heat damage to internal cabling and relay switches was observed. At the time there was no current going through the relays as
the equipment the cabinets feeds was not in operation (Rotary Table and Draw works) however the feed to the cabinets was energised.
After blowdown of the HP gas compression train for routine maintenance a number of small quantities of burning carbon type material were noticed to land on external areas of the plstform. The
majority of these self-extinguished however one deposit which landed on a cable tray was extinguished by a scaffolder. Light winds at time circa 12 knots blowing flare directly across platform
allowed material to fall to the deck.
Fire grade 2 shutdown caused by coincident smoke in TFL engine room. Engine had been running as part of normal operations for some 45 mins. Initial investigation would appear that the
detection was triggered by a leaking exhaust manifold gasket.

During normal shift checks on P65550 (diesel electric firepump) the exhaust was noticed to be very smokey. It was decided to stop the unit for investigation. Just after it was shutdown a small fire
developed under the North turbocharger. The fire was extinguished quickly by the technician who had just shut the unit down. TIR - A lot of smoke coming from exhaust of fire pump. Often
switching pump off flumes were noticed and extinguished straight away. Probably caused by diesel contaiminated logging <...> currently on platform and is aware of incident.
A <...> mechanic was carrying out monitor performance tests on the north Helideck monitor at 17.15 hrs. This involved setting P21 (Fire Pump) first in line in the auto start sequence , and
running the pump. Vibration readings were also taken on the pump. After 20 mins running P21 it was shut down manually. As the mechanic was walking away from the pump he noticed thick
black smoke coming from the top and Easterly aspect of the engine. The mechanic investigated the origin of the smoke and could see flames coming from exhaust area of engine. He extinguished
the flames with a dry powder extinguisher. He repeated the process twice more as reignition from the hot exhaust on the engine took place. He informed the control room.. The shift STL arrived
on the scene . Shortly after the mechanic calling in the CCR tech had gone to muster on the OIM's instructions. He then activated the fire pumps manually to bring them on line as P21 was first in
line in the sequence it started up immediately.The mechanic still being in the Utilities package then shut down the pump manually and then turned the key switch on the panel to the off position. It
was at this stage that the P22 & 65 started. The fire teams arrived on the scene shortly after. The supply pipe to the Lube oil pressure switch on P21 is made from copper and secured to the switch
KTO1 Gas Compressor Train Inspection, pitting repairs to 1st stage cooler shell. The train was purged 3 times with nitrogen & spaded . All 5 scrubbers had their access doors removed & the 3
coolers had the end covers removed. The train had been open for 24 hrs prior to the accident. Prior to EO2 repairs the area had been correctly checked out for the issuing of the Hot Work Permit.
Two fire watchers were on station at the site. The welder, <...> had completed 15 min of grinding in the cooler. When he lit his torch to apply heat treatment to the shell the 8" inlet pipe above him
must have had a pocket of residue gas in it which flashed. His firewatch went to put it out with his glove when his mate used a dry powder estinguisher. This 8" pipe had just been internally
NDT& no gas was detected. As a precaution the 8" pipe was blanked & a further spade fitted on the start up gas line (which was locked off). On fitting of this spade no gas was detected. The
welding repairs continued without further incident.
Removal of redundant shipping pump 12" suction pipework from "G" module. the section of pipework was purge with nitorgen and also flushed twice with water and gas tested prior to work
being started. Previous cutting of the pipework was performed using an Air driven saw but, due to the time taken it was decided after discussions to use a grinder to progress with the remaining
sections. A risk assessment was carried out on using a grinder to cut through the pipework. The area of the pipework that was to be cut was filled with water prior to cutting commencing. On
breaking through the pipe wall a small amount of oil started to seep out which was ignited by the sparks from the grinder. this was immediately extinguished using a fire blanket. Cutting of the
pipework utilising the grinder was stopped. Further work on the removal of this pipework will only be performed using a air driven saw.
During drilling operations the crew were working the drill string free when the derrickman noticed and reported smoke coming from the topdrive unit. Drilling operations were immediately
suspended, power to the top drive shut off and a platform shutdown and muster were initiated. The drill crew took the necessary emergency action to prevent any escalation. One member of the
drill team reported having seen a small blue flame, by the time he got to the level of the top drive with an extinguisher no flame could be seen and the top drive unit was cooled with a water hose.
Emergency reponse teams were dispatched to the area to investigate and after establishing it was safe the muster was stood down. Initial investigations suggest that the cause may have been a
sticking brake rubbing on the turning pipe. No evidence of naked flame fire has so far been established. The investigation continues.
During start up of power generation switching operations there was an electrical fire on one of the LV breakers causing burns to the Electrical Technician in the vicinity. This is subject to further
investigation and a report will follow. (IP remained in hospital for more than 24 hours).
Normal production operations were ongoing at the time of the incident. A fault light occurred on the fire & gas panel for P 445 A fire pump. The field foreman attempted to establish if any work
was being done on the fire pump from the PTW issuing authority. The field foreman informed the control room operator of the situation. The C.R.O then requested the on duty production
mechanical technician to investigate the cause of the fault. The P.M.T. reported back to the C.R.O that he had found a minor fire to the electrical wiring adjacent to a lubrication oil pump and he
had extinguished the fire. The C.R.O deployed a team of three (3) personnel ( FTL Chief Op - Operator and production electrical technician ) to the scene of the incident. After inspection of the
fire pump by the team a decision was made to electrically isolate the pump to prevent any further damage or reccurence of the fire. The Chief Op informed the C.C.R. Op on the current status of
the pump and single fire pump restrictions were implemented. Barriers were erected around the area and an Operator was left in attendance for fire watch purposes until the pump motor had
cooled down. Note: Fire Pump 'A' was the duty pump, this was changed over during the incident by the C.R.O. Op ensuring full cover should another incident occur.

At approx 01:30 on the <...> H430 Heat Medium was started on diesel. Coincidentally, a Diesel Coalescer common alarm initiated in the CCR. On investigation at the diesel coalescer, M420, no
fault was evident although the DP on the Online Stream (Stream 2) was high. Shortly after Stream 2 tripped and Stream 1 failed to take over. This resulted in a loss of main power generation.
Stream 1 Coalescer was brought online and main power generation was subsequently restored. Shortly after main power was restored and the Heat Medium system was being restarted there were
reports of a partial power failure from the operators out on the plant. The electrician on shift requested the presence of the shift team leader in the LV switchroom. There were signs of smoke
around SD200C section of the switchboard and blackening around the strater cubicle for P430S Heat Medium pump. It was confirmed that SD200C was dead, as the incomer breaker had tripped.
The incomer breaker and the Bus Tie Breaker from SD200B was then isolated by the duty electrician. An investigation team is now investigating the incident. Additional Information: Platform
was in shut down mode at the time of the incident. No smoke was picked up by the smoke detector in the area, (the detectors in the area were checked out after the incident and no faults found).
At approx 1100 hrs the smoke detection system indicated fire/smoke in the sauna on level 1 of the living quarters. When investigated by technicians, smoke and a minor fire was found in the
vicinity of the coals/element uit. The technicians administered first aid fire fighting with a hand held CO2 extinguisher, turned off the power switch and informed the CCR. As a precaution the
OIM initiated a GPA and a platform muster of 67 POB was reconciled. The Incident Co-ordinator and Fire Team A further investigated using breathing apparatus and cooled/vented the area. The
RPE electrically isolated the sauna completely. During the investigation it was established that the fire had been caused by plastic drinking water bottle, which was on top of the hot coals, melting
and ignited. An extended period electrical isolation has been put onto the sauna unit and a review into the operating procedures and use of the sauna is in progress.
A major overhaul of 'A' <...> generator was ongoing. To assist in the removal and storage of components during the work, a load bearing scaffold was constructed across the top of the four
generator units. The scaffold ran in close proximity to the exhaust ducts but under normal conditions temperatures were not excessive. During the night shift a rigger working in the area reported
burning on the scaffold to the Main Control Room. A production operator was sent to investigate and found a scaffold board burning. He extinguished the board with a portable water extinguisher
and a water fog blanket was then kept on the board as a precaution. On investigating the cause of the fire, it was concluded that a large piece of ducting removed from 'A' machine had been placed
too close (within inches) to the 'C' generator exhaust duct and concentrated it onto the scaffold toe-board, eventually causing it to ignite. To prevent reoccurrence, the stored ducting was moved
further away from the hot exhaust and the two adjacent platform scaffold boards removed. It is believed that there is a leak from the bellows section of the 'C' machine exhaust which was causing
higher than normal temperatures but this has yet to be confirmed. A sample of the scaffold boards is also to be analysed onshore to confirm that they are the correct fire retardant specification.
Platform in steady state operation, additional activity includes wireline team and campaign maintenance team. Shortly before 20.50 a control room operator and gas plant operator noted a severe
vibration/noise coming from the D module mezzanine area adjacent to the control room. On investigation smoke and sparks were seen coming from the P125A electrochlorinator pump, an
emergency stop was initiated , alarm raised (initiating a manual muster at 20.50), an appropriate fire extinguisher was discharged by the operators on the scene and a local cooling water hose
applied. Emergency response personnel were deployed to the scene, confirmed that a minor fire had been extinguished, applied additional external cooling to the skid, the situation was secured
and the muster stood down at approx 21.20. Preliminary investigation indicates that the fire was caused by a bearing collapse, a formal investigation has been initiated and will be reported
through the <...> system, a detailed report to follow in due course. The early intervention of the operators ensured that the situation was brought rapidly under control, F&G systems did not alarm
(minimal smoke dispersed by HVAC)
The G8020 RB 211 main generator tripped on heat detection in the gas generator enclosure. The fire water mist system operated in accordance with the machine protection and the platform status
changed to general alarm. The platform continued on emergency power. It was found that an IP blled valve flexible connector to the power turbine duct outlet had detached. It is suspected that this
resulted in the feedback of hot air/fumes into the enclosure which activated the head detection. An investigation is ongoing into why the IP bleed valve flexible connector detached and the
machine is also being examined with support from the <...> representative. Although no evidence of fire or explosion can be seen, the occurrence is being reported due to the release of hot
air/fumes within the enclosure.
Work on reinstating the "B" utility water pump was in progress - water from a known leak spilled onto the deisel unit starting solenoids causing an electric short and a minor electrical fire. Flames
were approx. 6in high and fire quickly extinguished using a hand held fire extinguisher. A temporary repair (neoprene bandage) was in place on the leaking spool and prior to the commencement
of the "B" utility water pump, plastic sheeting was in place to protect the pump. This sheeting had to be modified to facilitate access for the utility pump (end was rolled up) and a bucket with a
temporary drain arrangement (plastic sock) was installed to direct the water away. From discussions with the work party, it appears that the leak got worse to the extent that the temporary drain
arrangement could not cope. the bucket overflowed into the plastic sheeting where it pooled and eventually spilled over the fire pump. The basic cause of the incident is seen to be failure to
expedite the fabrication and installation of the replacement spool despite the fact that the repair was highlighted as a priority 3 and the problem was highlighted during the Lloyds testing of the
fire pump on <...> by the Independent Competent Person. Recommendations :- to reinstate /improve local protection of the fire pump tp prevent a recurrence. For rest of report see OIR9B

Shortly after the start-up of 'A' <...> Gas Turbine Generator, a diesel leak and smoke was discovered within the engine compartment by an operator performing routine checks. The area is covered
by Heat and Gas detection and protected by Halon . No alarms were activated. The machine was shutdown manually and an investigation was initiated to identify the cause of the leak. The
preliminary investigation identified that diesel fuel entered the purge air manifold through one or more non- return valves. From here it is believed that the diesel leaked through either a fracture
or hole in the purge air manifold. The precise leak point and cause can not be established until the system is stripped-down and tested. This work is presently ongoing.
Report on Area 3 Incident. At 0835 dayshift, during a gas compression maintenance shutdown, a Permit had been issued to allow removal of redundant instrumentation from a gas scrubber.
Whilst he was in the process of slackening the 2" flange, the mechanical fitter observed a small amount of gas to be exiting the joint at low pressure . He retightened the joint and called for the
process operator. The gas that had escaped had been drawn into a ventilation extract located above the vessel. A single gas detector within the extract initiated action at 60% LEL platform
shutdown, vent and GPA. The technician reported that he had not detected a smell of gas in the area during the release.
While preparing to flow well B05 to the production header, gas was inadvertantly routed to the kill system, and then through the NE aux flare. No measurable wind. Gas from aux flare drifted
back onto platform. GPA and deluge activated in mod 7. Deluge activated manually in modules 2 & 4 as a precaution. Investigation is ongoing to identify root causes and implement corrective
action to prevent recurrence.
Gas was released from the stem of a Gray gate valve (32 HV 2002) on the gas injection line to injection well B22 in area 5. The leak was identified by the gas compressions systems operator
visually and audibly while performing routine checks on the glycol regeneration unit nearby. The gas injection line was depressurised. Witnesses describe a 1-3 foot long white plume. Area 5 is a
windswept area. There was about a 13 knot wind blowing at the time of the release. Gas detection did not register any gas in the area. Mechanical failure of the valve stem packing is suspected, to
be confirmed by inspection of the valve during dismantling.
During routine operations an operator discovered a small bore pipe (10mm St/St 316) connected to a well flowline instrument had broken and resulted in a quantity of well bore fluids from ANP
27 production well being discharged downwards to the wellbay deck on level 1. Failure occurred at the first connection downstream of a 90 degree coupling. Detection systems were not activated,
the operator noted the oil spill first with little attendant liberated gas. An estimated maximum time to detection of failure is put at 20 minutes due to number of personnel transiting the wellbay
areas at this time. The pipe concerned is attached to the production well flowline high pressure pilot instrument and under normal operation there is approx. a nominal pressure of 11 bar of well
bore fluids (oil, water, gas - no H2S) present. The operator made immediate local isolation at flowline double block and bleed valve and the area affected with the hydrocarbon spill was cleaned
up to the open hazardous drains. Thereafter the affected small bore line was replaced and the well returned to service. A review of the small bore lines in this area/service is to be undertaken. The
affected item is to be returned to shore for failure analysis.
During normal operations, a small pinhole leak developed in 3" WW-25022-1DA-WI duplex pipe downstream of FV25070 in a reducer (1 1/2" - 3") on the cyclone Water Recirculation System.
The leak was detected by Operator observation at a very early stage and a small amount of oil (less than 1kg estimated) was lost in conjunction with the mainly produced water stream. Little gas
was evolved as the process is reduced to LP pressure prior to recycle. The system was immediately isolated using both XSV and local valve isolations and the pipe removed for inspection/repair.
First indications are that erosion of the pipe had taken place perhaps due in part to the system also containing varying quantities of sand.
Whilst carrying out his normal duties in the Wellhead area an Operator noticed a discharge of well fluids emitting from Well A27. The operator immediately shut the well in. On investigation it
was discovered that the 10mm stainless steel impulse line from A27 Hi pilot had sheared. The instrument involved was PSHH 01010-23. The operator could not give an accurate amount of oil
spilled, however the estimated release was for less than 5 mins. No automatic detection systems were activated. Both HP and LP impulse lines have been replaced with 6000 psi flexible hoses to
prevent recurrence. A modification request is being submitted for replacing all small bore stainless steel impulse lines with high pressure flexible hoses. The failed section of 10mm instrument
tubing and compression fitting have been sent for analysis. On investigation it was found that the instrument tubing had parted inside the compression fitting ferral, with some 18mm remaining in
the fitting.
Well <...> had been subjected to a scale squeeze and part of the procedure required an overflush with seawater. A painter who was working in the area observed some liquid coming from the
flowline drain pipework. The plant team leader was informed. He immediately ordered the well to be shut-in and the line depressurised, flushed and an isolation put in place. A support had been
welded between the flowline and the drain line. The leak point was at the drain line weld. The flowline spool which includes the defective drain line will be removed and returned ashore for
repair/replacement. Several other flowlines have a somewhat similar arrangement. It is intended to examine these for potential failure.

During ongoing work within separator B (AN-V-0311) by two scaffolders (employed by SSL) hydrocarbons were noticed coming from a nozzle on the inside of the vessel. The scaffolders
immediately vacated the vessel and the vessel sentry notified the main control room. All work on the vessel was immediately suspended and a thorough check on all the insolations of all vessels
was then carried out. The mechanism whereby the fluids entered the affected vessel was quickly ascertained to be via a common manifolded 12 mm tubing fitted between Separator A and B
routed to the drains system from the instrumentation drain and vents and trycocks. The fluids noted by the scaffolders had entered during instrumentation calibration work on the adjacent A
Separator. The 12 mm piping was immediately isolated and capped to prevent further reoccurrence. It is estimated that approx 1 barrel of fluid had entered the vessel. Some of this may have
entered during earlier calibration work. Investigation is ongoing to determine causal factors.
During routine operations, an Operator discovered one of the new flexilble hose fittings had partially fractured at the Low Pilot take off point from the flow line of Well A33. The Operator
immediately informed the Central Control Room. He then managed to isolate by closing a Dublock valve upstream of the leak. In doing this the Low Point Pilot tripped causing the well to shut in.
Failure occurred on the upstream 6mm side of a "JIC" stainless steel elbow. The area affected with the hydrocarbon spill was cleaned up to the open hazardous drains. The failed hose/fitting was
replaced and the well returned to service. A survey of all similar hoses and their fittings is underway. The affected item is to be returned to shore for failure analysis.
At approximately 0308 hrs an Operator reported to the control room a crude spill at the North West of the platform. Within a minute he had identified the source as the inlet pipework to 'C'
degasser.The Control Room staff immediately began shutting the inlet XSV03840 to 'C' degasser, XSV03847 from 'A' Separator, XSV03921 from 'C' Separator and XSV03848 from 'B' Separator.
The failed line was drained by opening to Closed Drain using 2"-DC-45640-1AA. The area affected with the hydrocarbon spill was cleaned up to the open hazard drains. The pipework lagging
has since been removed so as to inspect for any further corrosion on this section. This section of pipework is to be returned to shore for analysis. A replacement section will be fabricated onshore.
Further NDT will be carried out on 'C' degasser pipework.
Gas leak on Flare Ignition Line - South end of platform. Leak not detected due to wind blowing gas out to sea. From 9B: The OIM whilst walking along the South Lower Walkway noted a
different noise, when he approached the Flare Boom the noise increased and appeared to be concentrated around the HP flare scrubber. He checked upper deck and confirmed his suspicion that
this was a gas leak. Operations requested to check and gas leak confirmed. Platform shutdown and blowdown and personnel mustered at muster points as precaution.
Approx 2 barrels of oil released to sea due to instrumentation fault on <...> Unit. Gas alarms activated. Crew went to muster at 1728 hrs and stood down at 1733 hrs. Coastguard informed. From
9B: Interface level controller on V-240 <...> failed causing LCV-240 to open fully and start to empty the contents of V240 (water and crude oil) into T400 <...>. This caused the unit to overflow
from the lids on top of the tank onto the module floor and into the sea. Appox. 0.4 m3 to sea.
<...>. Work was in progress to fit a riser onto well A31 (when sidetracked will be well A42). As part of this work part of the wellhead assembly, a test protector assembly had to be removed. The
vendor representative was working on the removal of the test protector when it was ejected under pressure and blew approx. 12 feet into the air. The test protector had been installed 30/4/99. No
injuries sustained. There is no built in device for monitoring or assessing for trapped pressure. The incident is under investigation. The cause of the trapped pressure can only be due to a leaking
seal (one way) or due to temperature effects. Remedial Actions: raise a safety advisory document; review procedures for removal of these test protectors; educate crews on the potential for trapped
pressure; record in <...> and identify wells in which similar equipment is installed.
There was a leak of condensate from the Non Drive End bearing seal of 'B' Export pump in mod 04. This was reported very quickly by a witness onsite and the CCR were able to take action to
prevent an escalation. One gas detector alarmed at high gas LEL and 3 others were activated at low level LEL.
Burst Mud Hose at pressure between 4000 - 5000 psi. Drilling related incident where the HP mud pumps were being used to fill the trip tank. The pump was brought up to speed against a closed
valve on the standpipe. A module interconnecting hose burst under pressure. No personnel were in the area at the time of the incident. The incident is under investigation after which further
details will be available.
A gas injection compressor was being brought back into service. Gas was detected adjacent to the compressor. The compressor was shut down, this stabilised the detected gas levels and operators
carried out an inspection of the area. Gas was identified to be coming from a hazardous open drain adjacent to the compressor. The drain water seal was replenished stopping the leak.
During routine check by cro of f&g system a possible leak was indicated. Area was checked and leak found. Isolation put in place. Blow down and fitting repaired.

Area technician discovered minor gas leak from MV9300 stem packing tell tale during routine watch keeping duties. Technician stroked Vv. and attempted to inject stem sealant, but was unable
to do so, as the NRV on the sealant injection fitting was found to be passing gas (evident when removing external jacking plug). Gas compression shutdown, blown down and isolated. Sealant
injection fitting replaced and valve stem packed with sealant. Gas compression repressurised. Note:- There was no indication of gas on any of the gas heads in the vicinity of MV9300.
After report from drilling of gas coming from module ssp and oil tech. Investigated and could see mist coming from l3e. Due to poor radio reception they returned to the control room to instruct
shut down of train 1 (the platform was in the process of shutting down for planned maintenance, and there was only one oil well, <...> flowing). Ssp and oil tech then re-entered module and could
see oily water coming from 1/2" bleed line (holed/eroded) between <...> test sep manifold block valves. Ssp instructed cro to initiate gpa and open train 1 blow valves. Local isolation applied and
leak stopped. Total duration of leak 15 mins. No gas heads indicating any levels throughout this operation. Awaiting information from onshore on calculated gas volume of leak.
Gas release from Recip compressor K9320 due to cylinder No 5 head joint failure.
During routine watchkeeping the control room operator noticed gas indication on fire and gas panel for U4.2. Technicians were sent to investigate and discovered a leak from nipple connection on
sightglass assembly on V9030 Booster Compressor 3rd stage suction scrubber. Booster Compressor shut down and blow down, sight glass removed and blanked off. (Sight glass has internal
velocity check valves but these failed to seal).
While investigating a blockage on <...> chemical injection line the area technician cycled the upstream Oliver Vv at the flowline tie in point. The valve stem immediately started to leak
hydrocarbon fluids. The Technician closed the downstream Oliver Vv to isolate the leak from the flowline but the downstream Vv passed and the stem leak did not completely stop. The technician
closed in the well and depressurised the flowline. The well flowlilne was isolated and the leaking Vv assembly replaced. NOTE. There was no gas detected on any of the fixed gas heads
throughout this event.
Gas was first detected at 06:10 by several gas heads on the fire & gas panel, indicating a rise in level circa 5 % LEL. The gas technician was sent to the area to investigate the effected area and
could find nothing evident. Gas technician returned to the control room and gas heads were continually monitored. They continued to show a small increase affecting a large number of gas heads.
All Heads still below 10% LEL. Two technicians returned to the area and found a gas leak on a redundant 1/2" methanol injection line on the booster compressor (K9300). Booster compressor
manually shut-down on the CRO's instructions at 06:38, machine auto blew down and depressurised when stopped, stopping the gas leak. No gas heads reached alarm point, and no platfrom
muster. The leak was identified as a hairline crack of approximately 50% of the the circumference of the 1/2" pipe. Gas pressure in line was 75 bar at 140 degree C.
At 1605 the recip compressor (K9320) tripped on high temp indication Cyl 5 head end. The compressor immediately shut down and went into automatic blowdown. At 1625 the platform changes
to hazardous status, indication of high level gas in gas compression module. Several gas heads indicated LLG and 2 heads (over recip comp) HGL. Two technicians in the module at the time
observed gas coming from Cyl 5 head joint. Over the next 25mins the recip continued to blow down to zero and the escaped gas dissipated from the module. The platform returned to normal
status at 1651. All platform F & G and shutdown systems worked as per design.
At 22:21 platform changed to hazardous status due to co-incident LLG in U5 gas compression on gas heads 193, 196 System blow down and plarform returned to normal status at at 22:44. On
investigation leak discovered to be coming from gas export orifice plate carrier.
At 17:22 the Recip Compressor tripped on high temp indication Cyl No. 5 The compressor immediately shut down and went into auto blow down. Gas head 53GD181 went to LL Gas at 18:01. At
18:03 53GD 186 also went to LL Gas. The platform changed to Alert status, co-incident LL Gas. Area tech in module at time could not identify area of leak and was told to leave module by CRO.
Over the next 45 minutes as the recip continued to blow down to zero pressure the gas leak stopped and the escaped gas dissipated from the module. Last gas head showing LL Gas (53GD 181)
cleared at 18:12. The Platform returned to normal status after all zone gas heads had returned to normal levels. All platform F&G and shutdown systems worked as per design.
Safety Technician spotted a pin hole leak from mechanical seal cooling system cyclone. The unit was isolated locally immediately and the unit changed out. The F & G system at no time indicated
any hazard in the area. The total volume of liquid spilled was approx. 1 litre the make up of the liquid was 71 % water and 29 % hydrocarbons. This was all contained in the bunded area around
the pumps.

Area technician spotted a pin hole leak from the mechanical seal cooling system cyclone. The unit was immediately isolated and replaced. The F & G system at no time indicated any hazardous
level of gas in the area. The total volume of liquids was 75% water and 25% hydrocarbons. This was all contained in the bunded area around the pumps. Findings: Cyclone body internal erosion
from sand causing pin hole leak. The dirty drain return line was blocked by sand/deposits at the base of the cyclone, this eroded away the body as the clean return line continued to flow and
maintain the contrifugal action of the fluids.
A gas release occurred following gas turbine engine changeover. During introduction of gas to the engine, gas was detected in the turbine hood. Gas detection shut down the turbine. Power failure
occurred on the platform. All personnel mustered until power restored. During commissioning procedures, hydrocarbon gas was released from a 1/4" drain valve in the fuel cabinet under turbine
hood (investigation ongoing).
Following a smell of hydrocarbons in the utility shaft a search took place and a small leak was discovered on an oil rundown to storage line below the 76m level and below the isolation valves.
Substance was crude oil.
A mechanical technician removed a blank flange on a 4 inch hazardous drain line. His intention was to modify the drain to allow for future disposal of oily water. When he removed the blank a
small amount of gas was released causing two gas heads to indicate coincidental LLG and GPS status. He was immediately aware of the situation and quickly fitted the modified pipework to stop
the gas. He then contacted the Control Room to advise them of the situation before reporting to his muster point.
During watchkeeping operations in the utility shaft the area technician noticed a fine spray of crude oil coming from P3080. The area technician contacted the cro & requested oil export to be
shutdown. When the pump shutdown the leak stopped and the technician was able to approach the pump & indentify the the source of the leak, which was found to be from a pinhole on the NDE
mechanical seal cyclone. The pump has been mechanically & electrically isolated pending further investigation. Utility shaft is protected by IR line of sight oil mist detectors & catalytic gas
detectors. During the period prior to the release & at the time of the release, no rise in oil or gas levels was detected.
<...> is an Enhanced Voidage well, producing water. The drip-type leak from the flowline Grayloc coupling was spotted by a technician working nearby. The E.V. Pump was shut down
immediately, then the flowline isolated and depressurised.
<...> - Small influx of HC gas triggered alarm when gas detected at shale shakers. Well <...>. Platform to muster. Later stood down.
While circulating "bottoms up" on side track well <...> (well with known gas connection problems and high expectancy of gas shows), coincident low level gas was detected on drill floor area,
resulting in change of platform status.
Cell group 2 run down line developed a leak from a 2 inch weldolet, downstream of the isolation valve hcv 3066.
<...> was being opened up after a platform shut down, when the hub joint connecting the choke to the flowline began to leak. The well was immediately closed in, depressurised and isolated.
P-3060 oil booter pump mechanical seal failed, causing a hydrocarbon leak, during the isolation of the suction valve, the seal leak rate increased, and the two technicians had to withdraw, as the
suction valve is located below the pump. One of the technicians felt unwell and had to stop by an air vent while he gathered himself, the gas head level in the vicinity at the time was between 12
&14% l.e.l. Support was standing by at the top of the column in preparation to assist the two technician, who by this time had made their way out where they were checked by the medic and found
to be ok.
Area technician noticed a slight leak emanating from the kill wing valve flange joint on the side <...> Xmas tree. He informed the ICC and the well was closed in immediately, isolated and
depressurised.
<...> - <...> technician smelt gas while in the vicinity of <...> Xmas tree. The area technician was called and the leak eventually located using Snoop solution. The 1/2 NPT plug on the isolating
valve for the Swab cap pressure gauge was found to be the source of the leak. The well was immediately closed in and de-pressurised.
An operations techncian working in module discovered a dead crude oil leak from a 30mm x1 5mm hole in the bottom of the 24" oil rundown line. The technician informed the control room and
the platform was manually shutdown via an sps. No indication of hydrocarbon gas was detected by fixed or manual detection systems. No spillage of hydrocarbon to the sea. Platform muster
initiated as a precautionary measure.

Leak occurred on Cell group 4 rundown manifold. the cell group had been settling after exporting since 2100hrs <...>. At 1803hrs on <...>, gas detector GD23 started to indicate gas. At 1809hrs
gas detector GD 23 came into alarm (No other gas heads in the area showed any gas levels). CRO dispatched two operations technicians to investigate. At 1812hrs the gas level indicated on
GD23 started to drop as the two technicians had identified a pinhole leak in cell group 4 rundown manifold and had applied a local isolation. At 1842hrs GD23 indicated zero gas levels.
Well clean up operations were underway post well fracture on production well B2. Wind at the time of the incident was 320 deg @ 20 kts. A 12mm inst sample line came adrift next to isolation
valve on the water/condensate line from the test sep to the temporary filters. This resulted in a discharge of water & condensate from the 12mm line for a period of 1 - 2 minutes approx. Due to
the nature of the well clean up operation, the area is continuously manned. The operators present took remedial action and isolated the line. Well clean up operations were suspended and all
instrument fittings are being checked prior to recommencing. No gas was detected on the platform fixed detection system. No personnel were injured. No equipment was damaged.
During removal of temporary well clean up equipment used to clean a fractured well and tied into the platform process equipment. A leak of produced water (From TIR : produced water &
condensate, est 5t) from V-0207 platform test separator pipework where a tie in to an actuated valve on the clean up equipment was being removed. During removal the valve upstream flange
started leaking fluid some of which 'flashed off' and initiated a general platform alarm. The platform personnel were mustered quickly and the area secured. Isolation of the vessel was in place but
a padlocked valve had been inadvertently left open. Weather conditions light breeze, good visibility.
On the nightshift of the <...> work was ongoing with the MEOH pump P-2820A. During re-commissioning of the pump it was suspected that the PSV was passing. During efforts to confirm this a
decision was taken by the area operator to remove the security device associated with the PSV downstream isolation valve (normally locked open). The valve was operated to the closed position.
This, and subsequent actions, resulted in an increase in pressure in this part of the system, as a cosequence a release to atmosphere of approximately 12 ltrs of methanol occurred. The release was
from a failed gasket on the flanged joint on the pipework downstream of the PSV immediately upstream of the aforementioned isolation valve. At the time of release all other safety systems
relating to the pump remained active. The pump tripped on high pressure as designed. The methanol was contained within the immediate area of the pump skid. The weather conditions played no
part in this incident.
Normal production operations. Weather fine, wind 180 deg @ 10 knots. Single fixed point gas detector activated adjacent to MOL condensate pump (P0307A) 18:29 hrs. Area operator requests
pump S/D ex CCR. CCR S/D pump (auto closure of suction & discharge XVs & opening BDV, drain V/V and P/P recycle V/V) 18:32 hrs. Spillage was contained within a bunded area connected
to the closed drain system. Operators diluted release using washdown water hose. BOL investigation into failure of the pump mechanical seal commenced. Loss to be quantified by calculation for
OIR12. Condensate lost from pump calculated at 221 kg.
Due to process upset, operations to maintain level in MP separator required condensate pump B to be placed on recycle. This caused pump suction pipework to vibrate resulting in a gasket failure
in a 1/2" flanged joint. There was an associated leak of ~10L of condensate from the flange. Personnel were present at the site and initiated a shutdown of the pump. As the pump was shutting
down one gas detector saw gas, no executive action was taken.
During normal operations whilst the FPSO was moving to a heading of 195 degrees a jet of steam/water mist could be seen on the CCTV monitor and was located as coming from the produced
water reinjection flexible hose on the turret. Production was immediately shut down and the produced water flexible hose consequently depressurised and drained. Current investigations have
shown that this drag chain flexible hose had failed through the complete thickness of the wall in a single location. Failure also caused some limited external damage to the adjacent test flexible
line. Production remains shutdown as a consequence of the previously planned shutdown workscope which is currently ongoing for a duration of approx. 42 days. This incident is currently under
investigation and our full investigation report will be forwarded once it is completed.
Normal production ongoing, three dual fuel generators were in operation on diesel waiting to go onto gas. A single low level gas alarm came up and reset immediately, in the vicinity of 'D'
generator intake. This occurred twice. On investigation by the area operator no gas was detected in the area, however he did notice that more than the normal amount of vapour was being vented
from 'D' engine crankcase vent. Suspecting something amiss he checked the local engine control panel and found 'High Crankcase Pressure' and 'Low Seal Oil DP' alarms present. He suspected
the pressure was being generated from the fuel gas compressor and immediately closed the manual isolation valves on the gas feed to 'D' engine. The pressure in the fuel supply line immediately
dropped from 270 Bar to zero. It was also observed the gas fuel blowdown line to flare for the engine was iced. Subsequent investigation revealed the 'closed' main fuel gas feed valve to 'D'
engine was partly open. This had allowed gas to feed the engine and in the absence of the HP oil seal (not present whilst on diesel) the gas had found a path via small bore pipework into the
crankcase and to flare via the blowdown line.

<...>. Tree closed in; gas leak 13-3/8" tree joint no alarms. Annulus? Minor leak. Investigation+proposed action to resolve, ongoing. OIR9bto detail problems. Met with <...> well engineering
manager to discuss way forward, no further issues - see Wells IT systemfor more details. RT <...>. Closed Out. A Team of painters were sheeting in C51 Xma tree & its associated pipework,
guages etc. prior to commencing painting operations. On completion of the sheeting task one of the painters noticed a smell of gas in the area around to the west side of the Xmas tree. The
painteres checked for gas with their portable gas monitor and on obtaining an alarm condition on the monitor the informed the main control room operator who in turn directed the Lead Op Tech
to the area. The Lead Op Tech identified a slight gas leak condition in the vicinity of the 13-3/8" Greyloc joint seal on C51 tree. The gas leak is very localised & would appear to be emanating
from this one location on the joint. When testing for gas around the tree with the portable monitor, no gas readings are obtainable at a distance of 9-12" away from the tree. No gas has been
measured by fixed detection in the area. The module area is naturally ventilated. The area has been barriered off & all work suspended. The Ops Tech are monitoring the situation & testing for gas
After an 8000 hour service, 'A' turbine had been despaded and N2 pressure tested, and was being run up for the first time. At 40 seconds into the start cycle propane was introduced into the
combustion chamber, with the intention of igniting it to establish a pilot flame. Prior to the gas being ignited, 3 gas heads in the combustion air intake ducting detected gas and set of the muster
alarm. The turbine tripped on 'Fire and Gas detected' automatically shutting off the fuel system. The turbine area was secured and checks for the presence of gas were carried out. No gas was
detected and further leak and pressure tests failed to reveal any leaks. Platform proceeded to complete muster.Severe outside weather conditions meant that the primary vent fan was not supplying
enough air pressure into the combustion chambers to prevent propane escaping up the air intake. There was no 'leak' as such, all turbine and platform safety systems worked as designed. If these
safety systems had failed, the only likely outcome would have been for the start sequence of the turbine to stall a few seconds later when no flames were detected in the combustion chambers.At
no point would main fuel gas have been introduced , and only a small amount of propane would have passwed up the air intake to the atmosphere. The need for the secodary vent fan was not
The <...> is in shutdown mode and following some minor modifications to inlet pipework to the degasser vessel a pressure test was being carried out utilising N2 as required under OCoP 2.005 to
ensure integrity of modifications (Class 150 system, 2 bar test pressure). This system was isolated from all other systems via a master isolation. However some 5-10 mins after the pressure was
built up in the degasser a workparty in Leg C4 reported a minor leak of crude oil/water at level 14. They were advised to leave the leg and 2 operations techn. were sent to investigate. At this
moment a low level gas was recorded in the control room following shortly some 3 mins later by a co-incidence low level gas which initiated platform hazard status. The highest level recorded on
the 3 heads registering LLG was 27% LEL. The N2 pressure was immediately vented from the degasser and confirmation was received by the tech. sent to investigate that the leak had stopped.
The oil/water mixture spilled to the gas tight floor and the estimated volume was 25 litres. The pressure had caused the residual water/oil mixture in the degasser, following flushing, to pass
through 3 isolation valves already isolated as part of a master isolation. These valves have now been identified as passing and have been added to the passing valve register. Work orders will be
At 22:10 on <...> whilst re-starting the water injection process after a shutdown, fixed gas detection in the <...> de-aerator tower recorded coincidence high level gas. This shutdown the process
and depressurised. On investigation it was found that gas cooler e3800 was the cause of the gas in the service water return system and this had been picked up on the fixed detection system in the
de-aerator tower. During the incident other service water gas detection systems were monitored and no gas was present in any of them. Once cooler e3800 had been isolated the gas levels dropped
in the de-aerator tower. A hand held gas meter was used to sample the atmosphere in the cooler water box and gas was detected. The water injection, lp, system was run up to flush the system and
no further gas was detected. Cooler e3800 was isolated from the process.
At 10:45 on <...>, an oil sheen was reported over <...>(sub sea satellite of <...>). The standby boat was dispatched to investigate. The standby boat reported that there was oil in the water over
osprey.the osprey process was instantly shutdown. Whilst depressuring the system to pinpoint the cause of the release, it was noted that p7 flowline de-pressurised to hydrostatic head. The <...>
flowlines were being submitted to cithp during the esdv testing programme <...>. It is suspected that a connection on the flexible jumper, or the flexible jumper itself, between p7 fwv and the lbm
(line block manifold) developed a leak.
Eight inch water injection spools were being removed from M3E. The spool hit a grease nipple on a manifold extension isolation valve. This bent the nipple allowing the release of a small
quantity of hyrocarbons from the nipple threads. The plant was shutdown in a controlled manner to allow repairs to be carried out.
Following a SPS caused by a high level in the flare scrubber vessel the process was restarted. At 18.31 hours the water injection system was restarted. At 18.36 hours Dunlin deaerator tower
vacuum pump was started. At 18.36 gas was detected in the <...> tower. The platform went to GPA status but did not SPS. Two gas detectors in the tower went into fault, the third one triggered
the GPA. Manual gas readings were taken. The platform did not SPS as it should have done. Gas levels in the <...> tower were monitored at 37% LEL. At 19.04 hours gas levels fell to 3% LEL.
Redundant 2" ballast line failed causing liquid to leak from oil storage cells at the 32 meter level in leg 'A' . No alarms were actuated and the leak was found during normal routine leg inpection.
Non-esential personnel were down-manned as a precaution.

Platform taken to GPA status on initiation of module smoke detection due to paint fumes from hot pipework associated to instrument air dryer. Action taken to bypass and isolate the air dryers to
investigate overheating. Subsequent to further investigation the heat source causing the external paint on the discharges pipework to suffer heat damage was determined to be due to an ignition
within the air dryer assembly of lube oil contamination from the supply air compressor. Ignition was only confirmed after detailed investigation into material properties within the after filter
cartridge which suffered heat damage. Dryer assembly fault identified to blockage in purge air system reducing the effectiveness of the regeneration process cooling period.
The "B" compression train had tripped on hi hi temperature. Following the trip the compressor was being restarted when the upstream flange on the 2nd stage recycle valve, FV1430, failed. Gas
was released and 2 gas heads went in to high alarm. As a result a level 3 shutdown was initiated. An investigation into the incident is ongoing.
The process facilities on the Central Processing Facility at the <...> platform had been experiencing carryover in the process gas stream during the dayshift of <...>. These problems had been
experienced previously with carryover into the Export Gas Compressor Suction Drums, in this instance the carryover had been detected in the fuel gas scrubber vessel. It had been previously
requested that a sample should be obtained each time carryover occurred. With the carryover to the fuel gas scrubber the Production Chemist was requested to obtain a sample from the vessel.
The Chemist phoned in to the Control room to say that there was no suitable sample point and was told not to bother taking the sample. However he continued to progress the job and during the
sampling process a volume of hydrocarbon wasa released into the atmosphere. The release was controlled when the scrubber automatic outlet valve closed on the condensate dump line activated
by the scrubber low level switch. This then allowed access to manually close the isolation valve. The released quantity of fluid was approx. 150 litres of condensate and glycol mix which was
directed down the drain system. The automatic Fire and Gas detection System was fully operational (proven directly after the incident) and did not register any indication of gas at the time. No
During a period of steady plant operation, one of the services team enroute to a task with a colleague on the PDR platform noticed crude oil spraying from a fitting adjacent to 'A' MOL pump. He
contacted the Control Room and the Area Technician by radio and then stood by the local platform shutdown buttons while observing the leak. The CCR monitored the area for gas and fire alarms
but none were activitated. On arrival the area technician assessed that the leak was from a small bore (12mmOD) instrument fitting on an impulse line to a pressure transmitter. He isolated the
impulse line at the main block valve and the leak stopped immediately. Spark potential permits on that level of the platform were withdrawn as a precaution while the deck and adjacent structure
were cleaned up.Further investigation revealed that there were two compression fittings and one screwed fitting which could have been responsible for the leak but the area technician was unable
to identify exactly where the leak was coming from.The fittings had to be disturbed to effect positive isolation but none were obviously slack when dismantled. It was noted that the screwed NPT
fitting was only "home" by 4 threads and there has been a question raised about the extent of the taper on the male fitting. The compression fittings appeared from inspection to be in good order
During normal production operations the glycol filters (FO2/03) were block valve isolated and were being drained in preparation for the repair/replacement of the glycol <...> pumps (P93/94)
located in the NGL package 8. The glycol in the filters has a high gas content and would have been locked in system pressure of 35barg.The filters do have a vent although this is only to
atmosphere and the existing filter change procedure calls for venting prior to draining: it is assumed that they were not vented prior to the drain down. (Note that this will need to be checked in a
follow up investigation when the operations shift team involved return to the platform - they departed the field some 3-4 hours after this event occurred and have not been readily available for
witness statements) The filters were drained via a hardpiped 1" drain line to the LP drain system. Upon draining the filters high gas was detected at gas head GH5238 in package 5 resulting in a
yellow shutdown. The gas was released from an open drain tundish adjacent to the gas head. Although the tundish is protected by a loop seal, which is kept topped up by a constant trickle of
water, it is evident that the fluids release into the LP drains was sufficient to blow past this particular seal. The LP drain system normally operates at 25 mbar pressure and any pressure /gas is
Due to coiled tubing sand clean out operations on well 3-6, V03 test separator required regular sandwashing. During one of the sandwash operations on V03 five fixed gas detectors in the
separator area detected high gas. As a result of gas detection, the fire & gas system initiated a production yellow shutdown. The control room technician operated the general alarm and all persons
were instructed to go to their muster stations. Nine minutes after the general alarm was raised the fixed gas detectors were reset to normal condition indicating that the gas had dissipated. The
separator area was surveyed with portable gas detectors; the tests confirmed that there was no gas remaining in the area. Although there was clearly a sufficiently large release from the point of
discharge of the sandwash pipe to cause the five detectors sequentially to go into alarm, the operator in the area maintains that in his location at the 'deadman's handle' remote actuated valve
upwind of the point of discharge, he was unaware of any significant gas smell or other indication of a release. The incident investigation team have identified a list of actions to prevent recurrence
centred on revising the existing written procedure and re-inforcing its diligent application. The defective level instrument has been repaired. For fuller report see OIR9B
During normal steady state running, 3 gas detectors inside the turbine enclosure went into alarm (G - 78 high, G - 79 Low & G - 80 Low). The Control Room Operator initiated a manual
shutdown of the turbine and the other generators picked up the load. On investigation the gas had dispersed from within the (pressurised ) hood & no immediately obvious source of the leakage
was apparent Subsequent Investigation:- Gas fuel lines were leak tested to ascertain where the leak was. The system was tested up to the gas fuel block v/v and found to be sound, indicating that
the leak was between this point and the burners. Blanks were sourced and flown out to the platform and a leak test was then done on the lines to the burners. This highlighted that the 5/8" NB
stainless steel feed pipe to the purge solenoid had failed due to fatigue.The failure was near to but not in a weld. There was no evidence of mechanical damage or erosion/corrosion. A replacement
spool has been fabricated and installed. It has been recommended that an inspection of on-line machines takes place to determine if similar pipe-spools show signs of vibration or rubbing that
could point towards a similar failure in the future.

Whilst refuelling <...> Converter Unit refuelling hose split just down stream of isolation valve. Small spill of diesel in gully between Drill Derrick and NGL package @ 0.3bbl.
CCR detected a series of gas alarms in the MOL area (G032 - Adjacent to PO5 and G5220/1/2 adjacent P74/75) resulting in an automatic shutdown at 19.24 from high gas on G5220. (SNR Deck
Op) was asked to investigate. On arrival at the MOL he noticed a smell of gas and a minor fog in PO5 Tun dish. He detected no reading. He carried out extensive testing in the area after this and
did not detect anything.. Following start up later that night (approx 22.00hrs) whilst he was asked to be in attendance to provide constant monitoring he detected gas and tracked the source to PO6
Tun dish. He was joined by a tech and they proceeded to refill the Tun dish on PO6. The reading was unaffected after filling. They were joined by the (STL) after the Snr. Deck Operator reported
the gas to the MOL control room. It was then discovered that valve DO - O62 on a small bore drain line leading into the tun dish and leading to V45 was open. When this was closed no more gas
was detected. For rest of report see OIR9B.
A high pitched noise was heard, probably gas of some sort escaping or venting in the vicinity of the roof of the NGL area. The noise was immediately investigated and found to be a gas release
emanating from the gland of an 8 inch actuated ball valve downstream of the discharge from the fin fan cooler AO2. At the time of the incident we just started to run up KO2 gas compressor
associated with the system. It was most unlikely at this point of selecting the compressor to run (KO2) and actuating the ball valve in question that the gas release had commenced. It is estimated
that at the point of detecting the release from initiating the ball valve to the open position was approx 2 minutes. On reporting the incident, a controlled shutdown was initiated with the
Emergency Response Team in attendence as a precautionery matter. It should be noted that at no time during the incident was any level of gas detected via the platform fixed fire and gas system.
On assuring myself that all the appropriate actions , precautions had been put in place., I initiated a platform NGL sequence 3 trip and vent to de-pressrise the gas plant and vent down to zero
pressure. At all times the situation was under control and I did not initiate a muster. The weather conditions at the time of the incident were: Wind Northerly (360deg) @ 25KN, with a sea of
CRO and SSP noticed gas heads (G417, G418, G419, G420, and G421) drifting to a maximum of 11% LEL. The heads cover the East side of the <...> gas compressor and the area technician was
asked to investigate. On arrival the area technician could not detect any gas in the area using a <...> triple gas meter, but on further investigation of the surrounding area he noticed an area of
frosting on the lagging of a 2" take off line from VD-226 (<...> 3rd stage booster scrubber) to the Hi Hi level, switch LEA2241. On arrival of the SSP the compressor was shut down from the
CCR and a blowdown initiated. When the compressor train including the scrubber (normally 30 bar) were confirmed as depressurised, the section of the lagging (which now showed no signs of
frosting) was removed in the presence of the OS and OIM. On removal of the lagging an area of corrosion was noticed. The compressor was fully isolated to await further inspection by the
onboard platform inspector.
Firepump FA-AK-724 was running to maintain seawater/firemain pressure following a manual SPS and trip tests prior to commencing shutdown activities. The deluge in the fire pump enclosure
was manually isolated under an isolation certificate as there have been occasions of deluge released due to localised heat build-up and activation of frangible bulbs in fire pump enclosures. A
firewatcher was observing its operation as ventilation was being re-established. Whilst on duty the firewatcher noted smoke and small flame possibly from lube oil residue near the crank case
cover of the fire pump, which appeared to have traces of a leak. The firewatcher noted that the firepump exhaust also appeared to flash or smoulder. The "fire" was extinguished immediately with
a dry power extinguisher. Another fire pump was started and FA-AK-724 was shutdown and isolated for examination and investigation which is on-going at the time of reporting.
At approx 0359 <...> a nightshift <...> operations technician and <...> pressure testing technician were preparing to perform a pressure test on VL-318 <...> pig launcher using N2 as part of the
shutdown reinstatement programme. This pressure test was to 140 bar and was designed to retest a relief valve which had been installed during the current platform process shutdown. As the
pressure test reached 140 bar N2 gas was seen to exit a downstream grease injection fitting on XCV31521. The pressure test was immediately stopped and inventory vented to flare by the
operations technician. On examination later the grease fitting had obvious external body corrosion and as a result a small hole had manifested itself through the end of the grease fitting to provide
the leak path to atmosphere. The main fitting was also found to be still intact in the valve, removed then changed out. Testing was carried out under controlled conditions. The area was barriered
off and personnel exposure was limited to authorised work party only who were not injured at all.
Whilst the platform was in shutdown mode - limited hydrocarbon inventory in the <...> facility, power supplies were lost - the fault as of yet untraced. Low instument air pressure resulted in a
deluge release in module M5 & GPA status @ 2115 hrs. Installation boundray isolation values were quickly confirmed as closed & there was no hazardous situation Emergency Co-ordinator, <...>
Ops Control Centre & revelant outside agencies were informed. Non-essential personnel were down manned as a precaution - due to projected time remaining in essential battery operated
supplies. 46 went to <...> & 11 to <...> until power supplies could be re-established & proven satisfactory. During the power outage & whilst running the emergency generator a small lagging fire
occurred on the <...> Emergency Generator turbo unit. The exhaust glowed red when running during a Black start following loss of platform power. Personnel were in the module observing the
machine. The engine was immediately shutdown and the smouldering fire was extinguished using a hand held dry powder extinguisheer unit. The cause of the over-heating of the turbo unit is still
under investigation and advise from specialist vendor is also being sought.

ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE OIR/9B FOR FULL REPORT. Gas Release occurred at 15:19hrs from the PA11 shutdown valve on the H01 Well in the A-Module on the gas injection line task in
progress was replacement on PA11 valve which was passing gas. Release occurred from valve grease nipple when grease gun was removed. No GA, muster or shutdown was initiated.
High pitch noise reported coming from the Gas Compression area of platform. Area operator investigated. He reported leak from Gas Export Compressor #1 2nd stage. No gas detection activated
during incident. He then requested the control room to stop repressuring the compressor & commence blowdown of the train to allow access into area. A mechanical tech was then asked to attend
to assist with both finding & isolating the leak. A pipe joint was found disconnected on the impulse line to PDX 51357, this was isolated & joint reconnected. Maintenance had been carried out on
the compressor by the Instrument dept over several days, this included the disconnection of the impulse lines to PDX 51357 in order to blow through the impulse lines & remove blockages within
them. Vendors had completed their checks on the gas generator & power gas turbine & requested the train be made available to start. The control room commenced repressuring the train in
preparation for starting. Lagging around the Instrument pipe had resulted in the pipe being missed when Instrument dept. had visited the area to check everything was OK to start. The pipework
had not been reconnected when work had been completed.
Equalising pressure across Well P12 DHSV during wireline operations. Isolation valve from methanol block to Well P8 was not fully closed which allowed methanol into P8 methanol supply hose
( stainless steel ). P8 hose failed at 350 Bar. Fine mist observed - estimate approx. 2 litres released. detected visually by operator on scene and by gas beam detector. Equipment shut down and
made safe. Investigation into hose failure ongoing . Dependent on results the P.M.programme to be amended and brought forward to check similar hoses. Weather : Strong westerly wind.
Lub oil leak from 1/2" 300lb flange on lub oil header of associated gas compressor. Leak was spotted by area technician, and compressor was stopped. The lub oil pump was then stopped. The
spill was contained within the module, with no spillage to sea. The cause was a failed gasket.
At 14.22 on <...> platform GPA sounded. Indicated fire in GT8210. Hood ventilation tripped automatically, Inergen system was automatically released and the fire indication reset. Subsequently,
low level gas was indicated in the hood. When all alarms had reset, the area was checked out and there are indications of probable flame at one of the gas burners. When the machine is cool
further investigations will commence to determine actual cause of release and mode of failure.
Failure of welded pipework caused gas release. Gas release was noticed although no detection alarm was raised. Noticed by visual inspection. Leak was coming from crack in pipe ont the instage
line of export gas compressor. Compressor shut down. New piece of pipe to be fabricated. Small amount of gas released.
<...> Platform - Whilst bringing well (<...>) on line the A annulus pressure was inadvertently allowed to rise. The vent plug in the A annulus pressure gauge blew out allowing a small amount of
annulus fluid (water and oil) to spray into the module before the gauge was isolated.
GTI was in operation on diesel fuel. Leak occurred from diesel fuel pipe connection to burner No 2. Leaking diesel caught fire. Fire was picked up by flame detection (inside turbine hood) and
the machine was shut down manually by a technician.
The NUI OIM and one of his technicians were standing on the deck immediately above W450 on <...> platform when they could smell gas. They descended to the wellhead area and traced the
gas release to W450. First indications were that the gas was leaking from a joint on the FWV exit pipework from the Tree. The well was immediately closed in and isolated to protect platform
integrity. The OIM on the nodal platform (<...>) was informed and dispatched an investigation team.
A gas release occurred on the <...> production module causing a platform shutdown (PLX), this initiated a blow down of the process plant and the general alarm to sound. The platform mustered
as did the crew of the jack up drilling rig <...> which was linked by bridge to <...> The source of the gas was indicated by the fire and gas system to be in the <...> analyser house. The emergency
response teanm attended and could smell gas, but there were no obvious signs of the leak. Subsequent tests on the equipment in the analyser house using nitrogen traced the leak to PTFE joint
rings at a kidney flange on a flow transmitter FT 24014A. The joint rings were replaced and the instrument returned to service. There was no obvious damage to the leaking joint rings.
A gas release occurred on the <...> causing a platform shutdown (PLX): this initiated a blow-down of the process plant and the general alarm to sound. The platform mustered. The gas was
released during de-isolation of a metering flow cell after maintenance. On the cell manifold a vent cap had been inadvertantly left off. The escape of gas was heard at the time and immediately reisolated. Automatic shutdown occurred as the gas set off the detection system. The <...> was pressured at the time but not exporting.

Operation - pulling 5" drill pipe out of hole Iron Roughneck. While pulling out the hole the Floorman operated <...> Iron Roughneck to retract jaw to break connection. As he did this a hydraulic
hose burst spraying hydraulic fluid all over the Floorman and into his eye. Hydraulic hose pressure 1800psi. His eye was flushed with eye bath and received medical attention by Medic. Person
was medevaced to <...>. Initial findings of investigation. Breakdown work had been caried out on the <...> and the Hydraulic ram had been put back in with the clevis the wrong way up. This
resulted in chaffing by the metal stop for the dump valve against the hydraulic hose resulting in the leak. Iron roughneck had been in service <...>. Weather conditions were not a contributory
factor. Person was on his 10th day into trip. Accident report <...> raised. (IP spent more than 24hrs in hospital, hence major injury)
Operator was changing well A5 from Test manifold to H.P. production manifold. On closing Test Divertor Valve a minor leak (pin hole - c 1/2 litre) was noticed from sealant injection nipple on
T.K. ball valve. Immediately shut in Well and depressurised. Complete change out of remaining Test Divertor valve sealant nipples been added to Shutdown plan (Shutdown start <...>). Changed
nipples out for stainless steel plugs with thread sealant (as per manufacturer's recommendations). Weather conditions were not a contributory factor.
Following sand washing of C1002 LP Separator, the drainage caisson pump was put online to remove any build up of oil in the caisson, as per procedure. Approximately 15 minutes later it was
noticed that oil was leaking from the discharge pipe work that was hidden due to scaffold erected immediately underneath the pipe work. The oil was leaking from the pipe work and through the
gratings into the sea. The pump was shutdown and the discharge pipe work isolated. Quantity of Oil spilled = less than 5 litres. Weather Good - Wind Northerly at 20 knots. Sea 2 metres.
At 1026 during normal production operations, a DCS UCP pre alarm UA5152 associated with P0301S MOL Booster pump alerted the CRT. The Area Tech who was in the CCR at the time went
to investigate. In the LER he noticed two alarms on the UCP annunciator, 03PAH5157 NDE Seal Oil High Pressure and 03LAHL5159 Seal Oil Level High Low. At the pump he observed smoke
and a loss of inventory, contacting the CCR he requested the pump to be shutdown. Soon after he also requested the presence of the Fire team. The Gas Plant Area Tech and a member of the Fire
team arrived to give assistance. The CCR CRT started P0301A and shutdown P0301S, he requested the Area Tech to close P0301S suction valve. The Area Tech informed the CCR CRT that they
would await the arrival of the Fire team before closing the valve. The on scene member of the fire team prepared the necessary firefighting equipment. On the arrival of the On Scene Commander
and another two fire team members a foam blanket was laid around the booster pump and a CO2 extinguisher discharged at the Non Drive End of the pump as a precautionary measure, a boom
barrier was erected to contain the hydrocarbon spillage. When the area was considered to be safe and after consulting the CCR the Area Tech closed the suction valve. A General Alarm was
initiated from the control room. Platform Shutdown initiated. The Area Tech then opened the casing drains and with the assistance of the fire team applied a Double Block and Bleed to the pump.
Gas detection indicated in the well bay. Level 3 automatic shutdown. Personnel mustered. Gas release in progress in well bay. Drilling personnel made the well M52 safe and then proceeded to
their muster stations. Closure of the downhole safety valves was initiated. Valves 15-XV-1101 & 15-XV-1102 closed and 15-XV-1718 opened, which subsequently depressurised the gas lift
header to flare. Later investigation of the well bay area discovered that a stainless steel needle valve on M31 gas lift flowline 2"-PG-15220-AE-0 had been knocked off by the M31 oil flowline
support, which is adjacent. The support was observed to be moving due to the force of the sea reacting on the well conductor. The rest of the well bay equipment was visually inspected for any
pipework etc. that may have been subjected to the same conditions, none were found. The NRV, where the needle valve is located on M31 gas lift flowline 2"-PG-15220-AE-0 was subsequently
turned 90 deg from its original position, this now allows the movement of the adjacent pipe support clearance. See OIR9B for full description.
During nomal operations the control room operator was alerted by a low level gas alarm in the 'B' <...> gas generator enclosure. The main control room instructed the on duty Mechanical operator
to investigate the gas indication, on arival it was immediately established the there was gas present in the enclosure. The operator immediately switched the machine to diesel fuel to prevent any
further gas release. "A" machine was then started and put on load, the "B" machine was then shutdown for close inspection to establish the source of the leak. On further investigation it was
established leak had originated from a crack in the main gas manifold. Environmental Conditions Wind 25knots NE : Sea 3.5 mts : Visibility Good.
During normal operation one of the drilling roustabouts reported a gas leak coming from the vicinity of M42, on further investigation it was established that the leak was coming from the impulse
line upstream of the choke. The inner annulus blow down line PSV was found to be rubbing against the impulse line, this had caused the wall to thin to such a degree as to fail. The root cause of
this incident is the poor installation of the mid annulus blowdown line which had been sited far to close to the impulse line. When the line was removed a hole approximately 1.2 mm in length &
0.5 mm in width was found in the tubing at the point where the PSV had been rubbing against it. Environmental Conditions: Wind @ 12 knots from the West. Visibility: Good @ 10 miles plus
Sea state: @ 1 metre

While carrying out NP23 (slot14)redrill. A leak developed at the swaged connection of the 6" shock hose located between module 02 and drilling rig 39 (Mod 05) resulting in a loss of eco green
(SBM) mud under pressure. Leak was reported by operator and shock hose isolated. Clean up operation was then instigated. Fluid conditions: Pressure 4000psi, Temperature 172 deg F / 77.7 deg
C.
During normal operations the control room operator was alerted by a low level gas alarm in the "A" <...> gas generator enclosure. The main control room instructed one of the operators to
investigate the gas indication, prior to the operator's arrival a second gas head was activated bringing the platform to general alarm status and muster. The platform muster was achieved within ten
minutes with all personnel being accounted for. Further investigation following the incident revealed the source of the leak as a crack in the gas manifold adjacent to pipe union nipple, this will
now be sent onshore for further inspection and replacement. Environmental conditions: Wind: 25 knots E Sea: 3.5 mts Visibility: 2 miles.
During normal operations the control room operator was alerted by two 15% gas alarms in the 'A' <...> gas generator enclosure, the duty operator was dispatched to investigate, he confirmed the
presence of gas and manually switched the machine to diesel fuel. Further investigation following the incident revealed the source of the leak as a crack in a metal elbow, which is part of the
flexible 'pigtail' between the fuel gas ring and the burner. Wind : 25 knots East. Sea : 3.5 mts. Visibility : 10 miles.
During normal operations the facilities supervisor was checking the area around the platform generators. He opened the door to the 'B' <...> gas generator enclosure and noticed a smell of gas.
The fixed gas detection had, at that point, not picked up any gas. The supervisor decided to shut down the machine for further investigation to take place. Further investigation following the
incident revealed the source of the leak as a crack in the gas manifold adjacent to pipe union nipple, this will now be sent onshore for further inspection and replacement. Environmental
conditions. Wind 20 knots / N. Sea 2.5 mts. Visibiolity 20 miles.
In preparation for a planned production shutdown the power generator (<...> 'B') was changed over from fuel gas diesel. The operator noticed smoke emanating from the generator enclosure and
immediately switched the unit back to gas. He then informed the main control room operator. The machine (<...> 'B') was then shut down and <...> 'A' put on line. The investigation then revealed
that the supply pipes (known as pig tails) to the number 4 burner had been rubbing against each other and a hole had developed. There are two supply lines to each burner, a pilot line and a main
and these two had been chaffing against each other.
The platform was in normal production with the additional wire line workscope being carried out on an adjacent well T2. During the blowing down of the lubricator a leak was detected in a fitting
on well flowline for T8. The flowline pressure was 63 barg The weather was calm after a period of high winds, the leak was heard then smelt by the wireline crew member who easliy found the
source and reported the fault. The leak was detected in the flowline from T8, to its choke, at valve 15 chemical injection point. This is on the well bay mezzanine deck east side adjacent to T2
(slot 15) The fracture is in the weld of the 1/2" methanol feed line to the injection fitting. The short 1/2" line is attached to a large 2500 rated isolation valve, which is braced upstream, directly to
the flow line. The fault was discovered at 06 10 hrs on the 7th Oct and isolated at 06 15. It was unnoticed at the previous visit to site at 23 00 hrs that night, and steady flow conditions had been
maintained all night by production. The crack is approx 10mm in length around the weld root. The escaping gas was undetected by the wellhead fixed sensors although the conditions at that time
were calm. Indications are that the securing bracket on 1/2" line/valve may have been impacted by the movement of T4 flowline . An investigation report has been produced detailing actions to
An operator discovered a small gas leak on a drain line from K106 Sales Gas Compressor. The Compressor was shut down in a controlled manner. A gas detector located approximately 12 ft from
the leak registered 10% LEL. The failure appears to be vibration/fatigue related but this has yet to be confirmed.
At approx 22:00 on <...> general platform alarm (GPA) sounded indicating 60% gas in M3 Cellar. A 2A/2B shutdown ensued and the platform mustered. Just prior to the incident the first stage
separators were being exposed to a number of well kicks as they came back into production following a recent shutdown. This resulted in the separators spilling gas to flare. The initiating event is
thought to have been the blowdown of pressure in vessel V210 expander discharge scrubbers. This combined with the plant flaring heavily at that time, a pressure excursion from V425 (Flare
Scrubber) overcame the lute seals (Water seals) in the open drainage system and initiated the GPA.
During a routine gas test an operator noted an oil and gas spray leak coming from a cracked weld on a reducing elbow spool (1" to 1/2") joining the chemical injection point small bore pipework
to the 10" Test Separator inlet mainfold. The leak resulted in a loss of containment.
Small release of diesel fuel inside enclosed skid-mounted duel fuel turbine-generator set. Incident happened whilst technicians were in attendance in vicinity of set's HVAC outlet. On changeover
from gas to liquid fuel they noted haze being emitted from HVAC. They initiated manual shutdown of unit. On investigation after set shut down it was found diesel had been released onto hot
surfaces of turbine.. There was no ignition and no automated fire/gas/smoke detection.

During pig launching from pig launcher V-1001 the door was opened and residual gas at atmospheric pressure caused the fixed gas detection system to operate resulting in a platform GPA/SPS.
Two operators were in attendance and had followed the the launch preparation procedure, which required the launcher to be drained and vented to atmosphere before system interlocks operated.
The weather conditions within the area at the time were unusually still (7kt winds from the south - pig launcher at North end on platform). The gas detectors are in close location to the door. It is
estimated that
Instrument Technician was bleeding off hydraulic pressure from instrument line in Baker Panel by slackening a fitting when the fitting failed. No injury occurred. Subsequent investigation showed
that the fitting had not been made up correctly.
Rig - <...>. During Wireline Operations on <...>, crude oil was viewed emitting from the GRAY Hammerlock Crossover on top of the Xmas tree by a production operator who immediately
contacted the Main Control Room. The Production Supervisor immediately proceeded to the Wellheads and on investigation deemed that the leak was from the space between the crossover and
the Hammerlock nut and the leak was intermittent as the well casing rocked from wave motion. The Production Supervisor contacted the Main Control Room for Wellserv to be instructed to close
the Hydraulic Master Valve and cut the wire. The Hydraulic Master Valve was closed using the ELMAR Panel located local to the Wireline Unit and the wire was cut with approximately 11,000ft
in the hole. The Production Supervisor sent another Production Operator to the ELMAR Panel to ensure that Hydraulic Master had been closed. The Lower Master Valve on the Tree was also
closed, to ensure 2-barriers were in place on the reservoir. The lubricator was bled down to remove residual oil from the riser. Approximately 1BBL of Crude Oil was spilled during the incident.
ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE OIR/9B FOR FULL REPORT on <...>, process isolation procedures were implemented on 06-FCV-127A, and this was recorded on isolation certificate 07760. 3
valves were isolated, ('A' MOL pump suction valve, discharge valve and re-circulation). Prior to starting this workscope, both drains had been opened 24hrs. Cold work permit was raised 18073
and issued. Personnel involved, installed clamp and hydraulic jacking equipment to raise bonnet from valve. When raised 1/4 inch, some indication of some bubbling, work suspended until this
ceased. Re-commenced work, raising jack a further 1/4 inch, with a reduced flow and no gas release. Body appeared free. Workforce requested further assistance. After 2 pulls with lifting
equipment bonnet came apart from body, simultaneously a release of oil & gas occurred. Methane detectors detected hydrocarbons. Personnel stood down. Area of release covered no more than
5m x 5m. No pools of oil present immediately after the incident. Estimated volume of hydrocarbons was minimal (4 to 5 litres). On inspection of the internal of 06-FCV-127A, there was a build
up wax.
Normal production operations, Operator noticed fine spray of oil/water. Supervisor and OIM checked and found pin hole leak on weld on choke of NP21. Well shut-in and depressurised. Unable
to fully isolate to change out so took a short production shut-down to change out choke.
ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE ATTACHMENT TO OIR/9B. Single flame detector alarm activated. Upon investigation of the area Module 02 drilling diesel generator room, a small fire was found
upon which it was extinguished using a dry powder fire extinguisher.
During routine platform inspection by the production supervisor a small pinhole leak was observed from an elbow on the 4 inch gas line from the test separator to the flare knock out drum.
Production was shut down as was gas import. A full isolation was effected following formal risk assessment. Production was re-established at 0500 hrs the following day. HCR supplementary
information report will be submitted. No alarms/muster.
Small leak of gas issuing from flanged small bore stub pipe on discharge side of EA1107. Leak was passing an RTJ type gasket. Leak was discovered by Operator during routine checks. No
alarms were initiated. The gas compression system was shut down and the affected area isolated and purged with nitrogen. Repair made with new RTJ bolts and flange. The isolation boundaries
for this job are from 40XCV8024 to 11XCV6095 including the gaps vessel. The leak when discovered was estimated at 100/min.
The night crew noticed a smell of gas in the area of the Upper Central Corridor. It was a very calm night and they were able to trace down a leak on a corroded section of the 18" Flare blowdown
header from Mod 11 to flare via Mod03. A small gas leak was discovered. It was obvious that the plant would have to be shut down and vented to make a repair. The plant was shut down within
10 minutes of discovery. Blow down and N2 purge followed. Presently assembling scaffold access and cleaning the affected pipe prior to NDT survey by <...>. Onshore engineering support
requested and in operation.
Night shift reported a smell of gas in the Lower central corridor - the leak being traced to a corroded 2" closed drain pipe. A controlled shut-down of production took place and the system was
purged and flushed for investigation. The line was cleaned for NDT testing by <...> and a repair carried out.

Following routine greasing of JS Xmas tree, integrity testing of the tree valves was in progress. With uppermaster valve closed, the production wing valve was opened as part of the test sequence.
A loud noise was heard at the tree similar to a high pressure hose discharge. Simultaneously, a gas detector for the well bay was activated. The P.W.V. was closed immediately, the gas head cleared
and re-set. On investigation it was found that the grease nipple fitting on the P.W.V. had been left slack after the greasing operation. This was tightened and the integrity testing was completed
satisfactorily.
During routine production operations the fuel gas treatment package was brought on-line following a plant shutdown. A low level gas leak occurred past the seal arrangement of the fuel gas filter.
The platform was brought to muster on 2 coincidental low level gas alarms. A manual blowdown was initiated to de-pressurise the plant.
Propane was released when the crimped fitting at the torch end of an Oxy Propane burning torch parted. The user of the torch received minor superficial burns to his face when the released
propane ignited. Supplier investigating potential material defect.
<...> - Well <...> was being prepared to be brought on stream. The well was being pressured up to open the TRSSV with methanol. The tree valves were open (UMGV and LMGV) and methanol
was pumped into the tree up to 11,400 psi to equalise the pressure across the TRSSV. The TRSSV was cycled open with the FWV closed. At this point a leak was observed from the joint between
the FWV actuator and the valve body. There was a steady drip of methanol from the joint (1 drip every 30 seconds). The TRSSV was closed, UMGV's closed and the tree was de-pressurised. The
bolts of the leaking flange were checked and found to be below the recommended torque.
<...> was processing and exporting hydrocarbon condensate at a rate of 378.6 SM3 at 275barg. The process was stable and all operating parameters normal. Hydrocarbon export was being
achieved utilising P1210/30 (booster) and P1270 (main export). At 20 07. 07 OMD 31102 went into alarm, this was followed by GDR 31111 indicating low level gas in PN1 @ 20 08.10 platform
changed to muster station and all persons proceeded to muster. At the time of the event there were two operations technicians in the area who reported that condensate was leaking from an
instrument. They also instructed the Control Room Operator to initiate a stop to P1270. As they were unable to gain access to the transmitter to isolate it directly, they closed remote valves to the
instrument by an access platform adjacent to the pump.
At 22:30 hours, gas detection detected a gas leak within the enclosure of K2410. The machine was shutdown and blown down. The leak was identified on the fuel rail.
At 21.00 hrs. During routine operational checks, a production operator noted an audible gas leak from the discharge flange of the compressor body on K2430 Export Compressor. The compressor
was running at this time, unloaded, on hot standby. The unit was shut down and blown down immediately.
During normal operations a leak occurred on a water wash instrumentation line to a flowmeter. The water wash feeds to the NLG treatment system and is directly exposed to hydrocarbons. The
leaking process system was shutdown in an to attempt to isolate the leak. As pressure was decaying in the system, gas & NLG's back flowed to the leak source. A precautionary muster was called
and very soon after gas heads begun to register the leak. The whole plant was subsequently shutdown and blowndown. Emergency teams stood by until confirmation of blowdown was achieved.
Isolations were effected to the leaking system by the Emergency teams to reduce the loss of residual fluids/gas in the system as the NLG's flashed off. Once the isolation was in place and the leak
confirmed secure the muster was stood down.
On <...>, <...> was in final stages of removing hydrocarbons from the process systems to facilitate the annual shutdown work programme. Prior to the incident all wells had been closed and liquid
hydrocarbons removed from the process systems. Operations teams were also in the process of removing the last few pockets of hydrocarbon gas prior to commencement of purging operations. At
the time of the incident a gas pocket was being vented through the blowdown system to flare. An overboard vent hose from module B to below cellar deck level had inadvertantly been left
connected and open to this line. The hose was unable to cope with flows/pressures involved and split releasing hydrocarbon gas into module B. The release was quickly detected by platform gas
detection systems and appropriate shutdown/blowdown systems operated. Emergency response procedures were initiated immediately and the incident was quickly brought under control. A full
investigation of the incident is underway and a copy of the report,<...> will be forwarded in due course.
Crude oil weekly sampling bombs were prepared on <...> by the metering technician and installed on <...> at approx 0800. The units were on line and metering checks completed satisfactorily at
1200 and 1300. At 1402 a smell of gas was reported, no gas levels were evident on any fixed systems in the area. The metering technician was tasked to investigate. On arrival at the G module
metering skid location a spray of crude oil was noted at the sample bomb location. The metering technician made a decision to isolate the leak and reached through the oil spray and manually
isolated the sample bomb, in this process his coveralls (arms) were contaminated with crude and he received minor splashes to the face (eyes protected by safety glasses). The leak rapidly
diminished. Approx 10 to 20 litres of crude oil was released into the module area. After the incident the area was cleaned with all spillage contained by the platform drains system. An incident
investigation has been initiated. Initial findings indicate that the immediate cause was a failure of the bursting disc on the crude oil side of the weekly sampling bomb which caused crude to vent
locally.

On <...> operations personnel were in the process of restarting hydrocarbon production following a plant shutdown. During the process of lining up the wellheads (located in module B) to the
production manifolds, a low level gas alarm activated in Module B. Operations Personnel in the area were requested to investigate the gas alarm. A small gas leak was found at T10Y flowline near
the production choke. The wellhead valves on T10Y were immediately shut in and line drained down. The leak was caused by failure of a welded nipple at a chemical injection point on T10Y
flowline. Reason for failure has still to be determined. During the incident a total of 2 gas heads came into low level alarm condition as the ventilation system moved the small pocket of gas
through the module. All process systems remained shut in until the failed section of pipework was mechanically isolated from the system. This incident will be documented under <...> report. An
OIR12 will also be submitted for this incident.
Following the completion of a planned 18 hour shutdown. Cold import gas had just been introduced into the main gas lift manifold which was pressurised to approximately 50 barg(g) and to the
individual well flowlines. Operations personnel were monitoring 2 joints in the same area which had previously been breached in the shutdown. then recommissioned. There were no leaks from
these joints. However, they noticed gas escaping and vapouring from another totally different section of pipe. They isolated this pipe locally from the gas lift manifold and opened the manual
blowdown line, advising the control room operator then opened the PCV in the leaking line to ensure that all the gas would blowdown to the cold flare header. After 15 minutes, the release of gas
stopped.
The mechanical maintenance department had replaced a leaking flange gasket in the 2" gas lift methanol injection line to TA-12's gas lift line. A toolbox talk had taken place and it was decided to
carry out an in service pressure test using process gas. The gas lift line to TA-12 was deisolated by operations personnel who then proceeded to carry out repressurisation. The block valve for TA12's gas lift was slowly opened pressurising the line. The operations technician was monitoring the flange where the new gasket had been fitted when he heard gas leaking. Coming down off the
scaffold where he was monitoring the flange, the technician saw gas escaping from TA-12's gas lift flow transmitter 5-way manifold vent valve. The technician immediately closed the mainifold
block valve to TA-12's gas lift line and the flow transmitter vent valve stopping the leak. While the manifold block valve was being closed the platform status changed to hazard status.
Due to problems on the heating medium system, <...> wet wells were closed in & no produced water was being taken off the hudson sep/dehydrator. The only water that was routed to the hudson
produced water flash drum V1820 was seawater from the 8" pigging operation. At approx 01:15 a technician noticed that a leak had occurred on the skimming line from the PWFD to the closed
drains. To allow access to the line to carry out a temporary repair, the produced water level in the flash drum was lowered. This action reduced the leak greatly & the technician left the scene to
obtain synthaglass bandages to carry out a repair. At 01:41 a low level hydrocarbon leak was detected by 1 gas head in M1 went to high level in M2. The gas leak in M1 went to high level approx
6 seconds later but investigations have shown that this was due to the head being poisoned by the oil mist. The level in the produced water flash drum was raised by the CRO and another
technician islolated DC1039 below the vessel, which stopped the hydrocarbon leak. The platform returned to normal status at O1:59, the pipe was bandaged & <...> pigging operations resumed.
Following maintenance on the diesel engine of #2 fire pump (Z5520) the unit was undergoing a test run. After the unit had been running under load conditions for 5 mins one of the hoses on the
hydraulic starter motor (black start system) parted from it's swaged connection. The pressurised hydraulic oil sprayed out from the hose whereupon some came into contact with the hot engine
exhaust ducting. This created a flash fire. The power/utilities technician was present in the module whilst the unit test run was being carried out. On observing the incident and the resultant fire at
the exhaust he immediately ran around the unit and initiated the emergency stop pull switch. As he exited the module in order to run out a fire hose, the fire self-extinguished, the hydraulic oil
leak stopped due to the S/D of the unit. The fire pump room is fitted with a heat detection system. The platform did not change status due to the nature and short duration of the ignition.
<...> - Hanger seals were tested to 3000psi. Well inflow tested for 24 hours. Reverse circulated well with 830 barrels of seawater to remove gas. Bullhead tubing with 550 barrels of seawater.
Removed Xmas tree, installed 5.5" AVA plug and prong. Rigged up 13.625" BOP's and riser and carried out pressure test to 3000psi. Ran landing string, pressure testing landing string to 1000psi.
Pulled 5.5" AVA plug and prong. Set Magna Elite plug at 1183 feet and pressure tested to 2000psi. Unseated CTA @ 2538 feet. Unseated tubing hanger and opened by-pass loop which caused
trapped gas to 'U' tube and crude oil / gas release on to drill floor.

<...> - Reservoir Isolations were: Production packer tested to 200 psi. Magna Elite plug set at 11818ft in production tailpipe and pressure tested to 2000 psi. Cement plug set on top of packer and
plug from 11818 ft to 11062 ft. The 9-5/8" casing was cut at 6584ft but the casing could not be pulled free or circulation established. Another cut was made at 5547 ft, again the casing could not
be pulled free or circulation established. A cut was made at 4490 ft and the casing was pulled back to 3473ft. (3 attemptsewre made between 4490ft and 3473 ft to establish circulation without
success). Attempted to circulate, established circulation shortly after which the audible alarm in the dog house alarmed to indicate gas in the shaker room. The annular was closed in immediately.
The platform gas heads detected one hi-level and one lo-level gas in the BOP deck and the platform changed status. The area was confirmed clear of gas by members of the drilling crew. The well
was then circulated clean via the poorboy degasser, the first 80 bbls of returns had some entrained gas.
Employee ducked under hose obstruction and his safety helmet disturbed a 3/8 small bore line He realised that the contact had caused a leak and immediately proceeded to report what he initially
thought was an air system. He met an Operating Technician who identified the leak as gas. The local process primary isolation valve was closed and a bleed valve on the leaking section was
opened to depressurise the sytem. Additional valves were closed and finally the Gas Compressor was shutdown as the isolation valves were passing. The leak was minor and no emergency actions
were required. It should be noted that the Operations Supervisor was on site during this incident and that the actions taken were done in a deliberate well controlled manner.
B' turbine (<...>) changed over automatically from running on gas to diesel due to the closure of the V4 import gas sub sea valve. During routine monitoring, an operator observed smoke coming
from the enclosure. He immediately shut down the turbine and advised the central control room. There was no executive action from the fire and gas system within the enclosure. On closer
inspection it was found that the smoke had been caused by a diesel supply fitting to one of the combustion cans leaking onto hot surfaces. Although there were no fires in this instance, given the
circumstances, it would be reasonable to say that there was potential for a fire.
During normal operations 3 Gas Heads (2 'Y' and 1 'X' Circuits) registered 20% Gas on the Porch of Module 5A resulting in a GPA & Muster. The Gas Import & Production was shutdown. On
investigation no leak could be detected. The plant was left fully shutdown. Overnight a series of leak tests were completed, this continued into dayshift. Fire & Gas systems were also checked to
ensure that the alarm was not spurious. A Full Operational Risk Assessment was undertaken to bring the Gas import system back on line under controlled conditions. The NLPG was brought back
into the system successfully, however during final checks a leak was detected in the Relative Density Analyser Cabinet. The Gas Import was immediately shutdown to effect a full isolation and
prepare a repair plan/solution. The isolation of the RD Analyser was put in place and the plant was brought back on safely and successfully.
<...> slickline pressure control equipment comprising riser, dual BOP, lubricator, liquid seal system and stuffing box had been rigged up on well 107 xmas tree on the morning of <...>. This was
for retrieval of downhole pressure memory gauges. The equipment was pressure tested between 09:15 and 09:45 hrs to 500 psi/ 5 minutes and 8500 psi / 10 minutes with good results. No physical
leaks were seen during the pressure tests. The test fluid was 50/50% water / mono ethylene glycol. After testing, the pressure within the wireline rig up was decreased to 6000 psi to equalise well
bore pressure and the xmas tree upper master valve & swab valve were fully opened. After 10:45 hrs, while <...> were holding a toolbox talk prior to running wireline into the well to retrieve the
gauges, a barely audible gas leak was heard. On investigation, the source of the leak was found to be the connection between the main wireline BOP block and the top wireline connection sub. No
wireline was run in the hole. The xmas tree upper master valve was closed and production operations personnel vented the pressure within the tree cavity and wireline equipment to the closed
drains until zero pressure was indicated . The gas escape ceased during this depressuring operation. The xmas tree swab valve was then closed to give two barriers between wellbore pressure and
Following review of side scan sonar survey results, 4 'Bows'/Spans have been reported. Subsequent investigation by ROV/profiler has confirmed that at 3 of these locations the pipeline (bottom of
pipe) is proud of the seabed. Venture are currently evaluating the spans to establish what corrective action needs to be taken. The main concern that we would have is that the pipeline might
progress to a full upheaval buckle and potential failure. Venture are to contact Marathon Oil to seek agreement on the use of their standby boat to protect the location from fishing interaction.
Venture are also to contact the Kingfisher organisation to make sure that this location is notified to fishermen.
On the evening of <...> the platform tripped (blackout) and blowdown occurred. All battery (UPS) supported systems - ESD, F & G, Control, Communications, etc - powered down. The only
operational systems available were hand-held VHF, PA and diesel driven emergency air compressor and fire pumps. Ninety three non-essential personnel were downmanned from platform as a
result of the loss of all life support systems. The residual POB of 56 comprised a team who could tackle the technical problems, provide emergency cover and deliver a limited catering service.

<...> platform was shutdown for maintenance on <...> By <...> all wells were shut in, liquid inventory pumped away, all risers closed, boundary isolation applied and production systems
depressurised. <...>, 1122hrs, due to an unforseen consequence of planned work on the firewater control system the platform lost the capability to generate power (no firewater pumps or normal
lighting). 1222hrs, after discussion with myself (<...> Operations & Maintenance Team Leader) and consultation with the responsible electrical person, the OIM (<...>) committed to the
evacuation of 94 non-essential personnel. 1256hrs, transfer of non-essentials to <...> platform & <...> storage unit commenced (onwards to <...>). 1933hrs, evacuation complete. 1741hrs,
emergency generator B online. 1840hrs, main generator A online and power restored. The initiating function has been effectively disabled. <...>, re-mobilisation of non-essentials after upmanning
criteria plan satisfied. Internal investigation underway.
Whilst carrying out routine operations on an Oil Process Manifold, the operator noticed sparking from a broken 24v limit switch cable. The limit switch was immediately isolated.
At 16:25 hrs on <...> hydrocarbons were detected in the potable water system on the <...> platform. The <...> notified the planning meeting verbally, and a tannoy announcement was made to all
personnel to refrain from drinking/using the potable water system. Prior to this, work had been ongoing at the Export Oil Meter Sample System, using the potable water to flush through this
system. The flushing operation at the sample system had utilised a potable water source from the nearby chemical skid, which was directly connected to the potable water tanks and the
accommodation water supply via the steriliser unit. The steriliser unit tripped at 3:58pm alerting the control room to a problem, arrrangements were made to investigate this, but before this could
be done reports came from the galley of fuel smells/sheen in the water supply. The Maintenance Supervisor, the Mechanical Lead Tech and the Production Supervisor, along with the 3 members
of personnel who had ben working on sample system made their way to the worksite to investigate. Muster was called and the decision made by the OIM to evacuate all non-essential personnel.
38 people were evacuated from the platform by helicopter, and accommodated in Aberdeen overnight whilst the situation assessed. 18 essential personnel remained on the platform. The Onshore
On <...> at approximately 0400 hrs the General Platform Alarm (GPA) was activated following a gas release from the drains in M3 Cellar this activated a 60% LEL indication. A shutdown was
initiated and the platform went to muster. Prior to the incident the platform suffered a power blackout. This caused the plant to trip and a partial blow-down. Its beleived this caused a pressure
excursion from the V425 (Flare Scrubber) which overcame the lute seals (Water seals) in the open drainage system and initiated the GPA. HSE Inspectors <...> & <...> were on board at the time
investigating a similar incident.
During investigations into abnormal noise emanating from diesel engine air compressor on platform south crane, a 2" X 4" section of the body casing failed. This projected parts of the failed
section into the engine compartment space narrowly missing two mechanics who were investigating the problem. At this time <...> the unit has been removed and will be forwarded to <...> for
specialist examination and report.
During routine operation at around 230 barg, on <...> <...> Platform experienced a total shutdown, causing the wellhead PMV to immediately shut. The pressure relief Valve installed inboard of
the ESDV at <...>, set a t 265barg, did not open. This PRV is confirmed operational and recently tested. Up on restar, NCP water injection export pumps were operating properly, but no flow was
recorded at <...>. Due to very poor weather, the ROVSV did not complete the inspection until <...>. Two defect locations were noted. typically 500 to 1000mm length, 25mm width and the 6-7
oclock positions on the pipeline. The pipeline was laid in <...>, and had been in service approximately <...> years. The 2 water injection pipelines in the <...> field run from <...> Platform to a)
<...> manifold, operated by <...>. b) <...> manifold, operated by <...> both were brought into use in <...>. The <...> Pipeline is scheduled for pigging/intelligent pigging in <...>, for the first time.
The pigging loop and valves are currently being refurbished.
Investigation and remedial work carried out by <...> - Elec Tech. and <...> F&G Tech. Investigation of a 'Fire' signal in the main control room F&G panel eventually led to the two techs to check
the operation of the turbine fire protection interface module in the turbine cab. Following numerous tests the module was removed from its mounts and the back plane checked to reveal that two
wires had overheated and severed. It is suspected that one of the wires had been impinging on an adjacent pin and the insulation had been worn down causing a short. All remaining cables
checked Ok. Damaged cables replaced, unit function tested satifactory.
Normal production in progress. Calm weather, temp normal. Routine annual structural insp by ROV team discovered two, not normally flooded members, flooded. Recent diver inspection
confirmed a weld defect. This defect is reported to pose no threat to the integrity of the jacket at this time. Divers are scheduled to restart remedial work on the defect circa <...>. At the time of
this first discovery on <...> a precautionary non-essential evacuation was initiated. This was called off when Engineering calculation and modelling indicated no threat to the structure.
During emergency response exercise, respose team suited up and wearing BA, one man (<...>) became distressed and ill. Contacted medic, sought onshore advice. Will send to hospital <...>. as
routine. The BA set he was using was found contaminated with an oily sludge. 12 similar sets were found with contamination.

During the storm of <...> the spider deck walkway was damaged by wave action. Weather - Winds in excess of 100mph South West, Seas - 8 Metres. By observation from DM5 walkway several
sections of the spider deck walkway grating panels have been damaged or torn out. A total of 5 panels have been lost and 10 panels damaged beyond repair making a total of 15 panels (1.5m x
1m) requiring replacing. The spider deck is still accessible by the stairway on the platform south side. During this period of adverse weather two cladding panels were also torn out of the derrick.
The installation had been subjected to extreme adverse weather conditions of 75mph+ winds and heavy seas of 10mtr+ waves throughout the day of the <...> and the early morning of the <...>
After weather conditions decreased and at first light of the <...>, a storm damage inspection of the installation was undertaken. It was discovered that the caisson of 'D' fire pump just below the
spider deck level had split in two and had dropped approx. 2mtrs. Production on the platform was shutdown; the oil and gas export pipelines were subsequently isolated. A risk assessment of the
situation was then undertaken with the help of onshore support. Due to the complex nature and location of the incident, it was decided to remain in the shutdown mode until all relevant onshore
personnel could formulate a plan of remedial action. The caisson detached and dropped at 08:14hrs on the <...> striking the platform structure and possibly the oil riser on its way down. The fire
pump discharge pipework became detached at approx. 02:30hrs on the <...> and disappeared into the sea. Damage at the present time is unknown. An integrity test of the pipeline is being carried
out. The Diving Support Vessel <...> has been mobilised, to carry out sub-sea inspection work of the platform structures and oil export pipeline.
<...>. Unseat tubing hanger and unsting seal assembly from production packer, monitor well on trip tank for 15 mins - static. Commence pumping 9.5ppg NACL Brine. Note gas at surface after
10bbl pumped. Shutdown pumping (local alarm activated). 1 Low Alarm on rig floor: 3 Low and 1 High in Derrick substructure. Shut in well on annular immediately after pumps shut down.
Monitor well pressures: Opsi on tubing Opsi on annulus. Circulate out crude contaminated brine from annulis to tst sparator. Monitor well-static.
Investigative work by <...> platform and the semi-sub <...> showed there was a hydraulic leak in the control line to the DHSV, of well <...>. To effect a repair requires a full workover of the well
including retrieving the subsea xmas tree. This type of tree requires diver intervention to manually disconnect the flowlines. The rig closed and pressure tested the xmas tree valves prior to
departing the location. On arrival the DSV found a stream of bubbles issuing from the tree, indicating that one of these barriers was leaking. DSV intervention was cancelled.
<...>- Following a bit trip and BOP test the BHA wa run to bottom. Drilling resumed from 17229' - 17269' with 12.2ppg mud weight. At 02:30 hours a 3bbl pit gain was observed. The well was
flow checked and shut in. SIDPP was 150 psi and SKP 250psi. The mud weight was increased to 12.5ppg and then to 12.8 ppg and the well killed in two circulations. Subsequent to this the mud
weight was increased to 13.5 ppg to counter increased amounts of gas in mud. An open hole leak off test to 15 ppg EMW was performed before drilling continued.
Subsea well BS3 tripped closed on electrical earth fault, Water Technician manually S/D HP water injection pump 484, 3 joints on the pump suction pipework started leaking. Suspect the pump
NRV had failed and in addition the spill valve on the pump discharge had not opened on a low pump flow when the subsea well had C/I.The technician opened a valve to depressurise the system
and the leak stopped.
<...> - During rig-up slickline, system was about to be flushed through to pressure test bop's. The bop's were located at drillflooor level with a wireline riser connecting them to the Xmas tree. At
this point the wireline bop's were open, with no lubricator fitted, and the well was isolated on the swab valve and UMGV. As the swab valve on the Xmas tree was being opened by the PICWS, to
allow the system to be filled with water using the cement unit, the operator positioned on the drill floor noticed what is assumed to be some trapped pressure between the swab valve and UMGV
being vented on the drill floor. He made his way to the control panel on the GCR to function the BOP's to closed position but inadvertantly functioned the UMGV to the open position instead. As
the PICWS in the wellheads was still cracking the swab valve to the open position, this allowed well pressure to vent up the riser onto the drill floor. The platform GPA was triggered by a gas
release on the drill floor at this point. The PICWS at the Xmas tree, on hearing the GPA, closed in the swab valve immediately to isolate the well and the operator on the drill floor made contact
with the PICWS in the wellheads and returned to the control panel. He realised his error and dumped the opening pressure to the UMGV, and functioned the BOP's to the closed position.
<...> - At 0330hrs whilst circulating clean after setting a balanced cement plug to provide and abandonment plug for the original hole, a confirmed indication of low level gas was noted by the gas
detectors in the bell nipple. This brought the platform to GPA status. The well was flow checked and found to be static, however the well was noted to be bubbling at the flowline and a smell of
"rotten" gas was evident. At this point the well was closed in on the annular BOP and monitored for pressure build up. SICP = 0psi. It was not possible to determine the SIDPP at this time as a
wiper ball was being circulated down the string following the cement job. In order to ascertain the SIDPP the well was circulated over the choke at SCR until the ball was out of the string (a good
indication of this was observed when the circulating pressure dropped dramatically.) The well was closed in and observed for pressure build up. SCIP = 0psi, SIDPP = 0psi. A bottoms up 10% was
circulated at SCR of 35 SPM over the choke. The well was then closed in at the choke and upstream valve and monitored for pressure build up:- SICP = 0psi, SIDPP = 0psi. THe choke and
upstream valve were opened and observed for flow (none observed). The annular BOP was opened and the well flow checked and found to be static, with no indication of gas at any of the bell

<...> - Hydrocarbon Release. In preparing to side-track the existing <...> well the 9-5/8" casing string had been cut at 5806' (in the <...>) and was being recovered to the surface. Circulation via
the B annulus was not possible due to degraded and settled out Gypsum based mud. At 4,400ft circulation was regained and circulation with seawater initiated to remove the settled out mud from
behind the 9-5/8" casing. During this circulation an indication of gas at the bell nipple was observed (coincident LLG from the gas detectors in the bell nipple) resulting in platform GPA status.
The well was closed in with the annular BOP and observed for pressure build up (none evident). A full circulation over the choke at reduced rate was performed. The well was closed in and
monitored for pressure build up none observed. The well was opened and a 10 minutes flow check performed (static). Conventional circulation at normal rate was resumed with a flow check
carried out after circulating 500 strokes (static). At which point pulling and laying out of casing resumed with regular flow checks (static).
Brent C - BC 31 well was being circulated while a mud pump was being repaired. Indication of gas at the shakers. Well closed in on BOP. BC PSSI 44 (expected gas at shakers) inplace. One
barrel gain, continued circulating and increased. Mud weight from 630 to 650 pptf.
<...> - During a perforation run on <...>, depth indication was lost at 5222 feet. It was decided to withdraw the tool string to approximately 4000 feet and allow the timer to expire. The C.R.O.
was instructed to monitor the C.I.T.H.P. the C.I.T.H.P. was seen to decrease and the pressure in the A and B annulus increased, indicating that the perforating guns had fired. This was an
umplanned detonation.
<...> Well <...>. Small influx (6.4 bbl) while drilling rat hole in Valhal formation below base of <...> reservoir. Well closed in on BOPs. Initial CSIP = 130 psi, slowly building to 1800 psi. While
drilling below Britannia Reservoir @ 16065' MD (13593' TVD) in the Valhall, increase in pit vol. detected. Mud pumps shut down; well continued to flow. Well shut in on annular at 16.00
5/4/2000 & shuy-in pressures monitored. A 6.4 bbl gain was measured. Mud weight at time of influx was 10.8 ppg. The SICP built to 1800psi & the SIDP built to 1480 psi. The middle pipe rams
were closed on the pipe & kill operations started. The well was killed with 14.5 ppg mud.
<...> 20.50hrs <...> went to GPA due high level gas indication in drilling package module no.1. Automatically shutdown & blowdown due to the confirmed HLG from 2 zones. Well <...> being
recirculated to seawater from tubing to A annulus & back to reserve mud pit no.3. Tubing of this well had been bullheaded with seawater & a plug had been sent & pressure tested. The tubing was
perforated & the circulation of oil based mud from the annulus commenced. The volume is approx 270bbls. 240bbls had been circulated & it had been noted that relatively clean oil based mud
had been returned to mud tank 3. Next 30 barrels was seen to be dirty water. The drilling crew immediately isolated the returns from well <...> via a low torque valve & the UMG on <...> was
closed, which at the time was under the control of Well services. 21.12 gas level were confirmed to be below the lower explosive limit as the remote panel link back to the DCS was inoperable at
the time. F&G remote panel was adjacent to affected module safety margin 20mins was decided upon to monitor for signs of migration. Source been isolated & no further registering of low/high
levels from the adjacent modules. Fire team sent and findings indicated safe to enter for investigation. On entering gas adjacent to the head over the top of mud reserve pit no.3 which indicating
<...> - During coiled tubing operations in <...> at a depth of 17.143' the 1-3/4" coil got stuck. At 1630hrs it was noted that the quick connection below the CT BOP started to leak severely. After
attempting to tighten it up and contact with the base, it was decided to apply the shear seal and cut the CT and close the well. After the shear the Swab valve and upper master valve on the Xmas
tree were closed. NOTE: the BOP was tested to 300 psi/5min & 5000psi/15min on <...> @ 9.30hrs and <...> @ 0130hrs. CITHP = 53 bar, A-ann = 7 bar, B-ann = 0, C-ann = 0.
<...> - At depth 12584'. 42' into <...> reservior increased gas level 30% noted. Circulated BU - increased flow noted. Shut in well. (No Influx). Circulated driller method calculated RIH mud
12.2ppg. Suspected overpressure due to water injection changing up formation. Well examiner informed and operation ongoing.
During the setting of a wireline DHSIT (Downhole Shut In Tool) the toolstring became stuck and while fishing the stuck tools, the fishing toolstring could not be released. A cutter bar was
dropped down the wire followed by a drop bar. This cutter did not cut. The wire was then manipulated to encourage the operation of the cutter. During this operation the wire parted at 1550lbs.
The wire in use is 0.125" Supa 75. Normal working limit is 1550lbs (60% of max.). When the wire parted it was caught in the lower wireline pulley and has subsequently been secured at surface.
No loss of containment or personnel injury occurred.
<...> - Coiled Tubing milling operation had been ongoing on <...> well <...>, during these operations the Coil Tubing became stuck at 7257ft. During attempts to work the Coil tubing free the pipe
fractured at surface at the Stripper (Stuffing Box). Emergency procedures were implemented and well secured. There was no loss of containment from the well or spillage with only water being
vented from the failed pipe. Present well conditions are stable with 17barg shut in pressure, and the well is secured with the Coil Tubing BOP's closed and capped providing surface barriers. The
Coiled tubing does remain through the Xmas Tree therefore restricting any operation of the tree valves, Shear Seal Bops are installed on top of the Xmas tree and are available for use if required
or should situation escalate. Further remedial action is being planned and platform based incident investigation is in progress.

<...> -While testing 13 3/8" casing it failed at 1100psi. Returns were observed out of the 30" conductor. The void space on the wellhead was then tested and found to be in good condition. A leak
in 13 3/8" casing was then identified with a cup type tester at 187ft. (MSF 185ft BDF).
<...>- Drilled to above the Leine Halite and within the Leine Potash with a programmed mud weight of 18.25 ppg. Measured depth was 6894 ft brt with a tvdbrt of 6854 ft. The well was flow
checked at 23:00 hrs on <...>, prior to POOH for the programmed BHA change. Whilst conducting the flow check it was observed that the well was flowing intermittently. Whilst it was flowing
the rate was not in excess of 6 bbls per hour. From 23:00 <...> to 01:00 <...> the well was monitored whilst the BOP was open in the hope that the flow rate would diminish and to ensure that flow
was not a result of supercharging the formation with ECD. During this time total returns from the well was 12 bbls. From 01:00 - 02:00 bottoms up was circulated to check for bottom samples.
Bottoms up indicated that the mud had been cut back to 18.15 ppg and high levels of magnesium and chlorides were noted, as seen in the previous brine flows on the <...> project. From 02:00 to
03:30 hrs the well was monitored in the hope that the flow rate would stop to allow us to safely trip out of the hole to change out the BHA. The flow rate was in the region of 5-6 bph with no sign
of a diminishing flow rate. At 03:30 the well was shut in with the BOP and pressures were monitored until 06:00. During this time the SICP rose from initial shut in at 220 psi to 250 psi. SIDPP
<...> - During attempts to conduct repair to Well C43 xmas tree HMV using LMV and SSSV as barriers, it was established that both valves (LMV and SSSV) had failed to hold 100% on leak-off
test. Well was shut-in. Onshore departments informed of situation. System pressures monitored and flow checks recorded. Downhole safety barriers set on wireline in preparation for tree
changeout.
During drilling operations (running in the hole after having changed the auto track assembly). The BH2 tool containing a radioactive source got stuck. Attempts to free the drill assembly resulted
in the drill string parting. All further attempts to recover the equipment have failed and a decision was reached on the <...> to put a cement plug in place and abandon the lost equipment and
source.
<...> At 01.35 hrs <...>, the general platform alarm was activated as a result of high level coincident gas present on the <...> platform wireline deck and well bay areas. The source of the gas/oil
was subsequently found to be from the Equalising Valve fitted to the shear seal BOP's installed on the <...> well intervention rig up. This well was being logged at the time the gas escape
occurred. The wind speed was 15 knots 290 deg. The BOPs above the leak were closed as part of the standard response but failed to arrest the leak that was below the BOPs. As a consequence 2 x
personnel equiped with BA were requested to close the shear-seal BOPs to stop the leak. Closeure for the shear-seal BOP is on the rig floor. This action was taken and the leak subsided. Non
essential personnel were evacuated commencing 0320 hours.
<...> - Whilst commissioning <...> unexpected complex A and B annulus behaviour was experienced while well was being commissioned. Subsequently, it has become clear that there is
communication between the A Annulus and the B Annulus. The well has been shut in and is being monitored while it is cooling down. There is no indication of any lack of integrity in the well
completion. Further programme options are currently being developed.
<...> - Well <...> has been closed in since <...>. While monitoring the tubing head pressure and the "A" and "B" annulus pressures, a sudden increase was observed in the pressure of the "A"
annulus. This increase equated to the closed in pressure of the well. To enable safe investigation of the well, (gas and liquid relief path) it has been necessary to continue production from the
platform, restricted to the minimum level. As a precautionary measure 39 non-essential personnel on board have been transferred to <...>. Further programme options are being developed and a
team of well specialists have arrived on the platform to assist. Overnight Methanol has been pumped into the well to prevent formation of hydrates. The SSSV is closed and the fluids in the well
have been blown down (via the process) from an initial 728 bar to 160 bar (which is the set pressure of the "B" annulus). We now have tubing, the "A" annulus and "B" annulus at the same
pressure of 160 bar and these pressures are being continuously monitored. Further programme options to kill the well are being developed.
<...> Drilling BOP was closed after drilling the 7" liner shoetrack because an influx was observed. Note: liner shoe was set above the reservoir (12587 FT AH, 8227 FT TVD), ALL BHA was still
inside the liner. Annulus was 620 PSI ANI DP pressure was 500 PSI. Total influx 10 BBL. Good reaction of driller, while drilling the previous 8 1/2" section, the formation was charged with
heavy mud (ie. mud losses to the formation that all came back when the pumps were switched off). The same happened when cementing the 7" liner. However, when the cement job was
completed, the zxp packer was immediately set and prevented any backflow from the formation (i.e leaving the formation charged). When the shoetrack was drilled, the mud 630 pptf) had already
been displaced to a lighter mudweight (475 pptf). It was thought that the influx was caused by charging the formation aggrevated by the light mud weight. The pressure was bled-off to zero and a
20 minute flow check was conducted. The well returned some fluids tailing off to zero (total returns were 23 BBL). It was then decided to proceed with drilling operations at 2200 hrs. From then
on there were no additional gains or losses.
<...>- Brilling Break noted when drilling into formation. Well flowchecked as per procedure and noted. BOP closed in and pressure observed to increase in drill pipe to 150 psi. Mud weight
increased and circulated under controlled conditions to kill well. No hydrocarbons detected through choke. Increased mud weight to give 200 psi overbalance and continued to drill ahead.

Well <...> had been completed in cased hole. Tubing Conveyed Perforating [TCP] guns had been run and the well was pressured up to trigger the firing sequence. Prior to this calculations had
shown that the completion fluid was of a sufficient weight to give an overbalance of 200-400psi. After detonation of the guns the well was monitored by circulating over the trip tank. Losses were
expected. The trip tank level was seen to rise indicating that the well was flowing. The trip tank was then switched off and the well visually flow checked, appearing to then be static.
Investigations were then made to check for external leaks into the trip tank. No leaks to the trip tank were found. Visually the well did not appear to be flowing, however the trip tank was
continuing to rise - unbeknown at this time to the OWE. The flow line valve to the shakers was then opened and the level of fluid in the bell nipple dropped to the flow line level and the well
could then be seen to be flowing. Shut in well and circulated out influx by drillers method.
At 15:00hrs <...> a large object was sighted on a potential collision course with <...> platform. Investigation found object to be an RAF target pontoon 19mx4mx2.5m (20 ton). Pontoon taken in
tow by stand by boat until salvage vessel took control. All actions co-ordinated through HMCG.
<...> crane <...> west. Whilst working the deck 29a unloading wire-line equipment, from the <...>, a retaining ring fell from the crane boom area, this was followed by a shaft, 235mm x 20mm
diameter, which hit the main deck from a substancialheight just missing the main deck crew. All crane operations were then ceased and the crane removed from service pending an investigation.
Wireline operations were in progress, the lubircator was removed from the B.O.P's to allow the wireline tool to be lowered down onto the main deck. (The tool is 10' long and weighs 150lbs).
Two men held the wireline tool upright while the third member of the team disconnected the wire, he then joined the two men on the deck and they commenced manually lowering the tool down
onto the deck. As the tool was lowered the bottom slipped and the tool fell through the gap in the deck hatch (allowing access to the well) falling approx. 5'. As the tool fell it struck a deluge sray
head, shearing it off. No other damage was caused and no injuries occurred.
The supply vessel <...> was alongside the <...> platform at 11.15hrs to work cargo. The first lift was a sphere carrier containing 3 x 24" sphere weighing approx. 110kg. As the lift was taken from
the deck, the carrier end <...> and a single sphere dropped onto the vessel deck from approx. 3-4 metres. The platform banksman immediately notified the crane radio to lower the rack back onto
the vessel to prevent spheres escaping. The escaped sphere struck a container and came to rest close to the original position. The deck crew <...> sphere, closed and fastened the end gate and
resumed operations. Once on the platform, the carrier was inspected and bolts were found to be badly rusted and partially <...>.
The north rig drill crew were pulling out of hole and racking 3 1/2 inch drill pipe. As the block was being lowered the elevators made contact with the monkey board causing a springboard effect
which flipped the hinged end of the board back towards the derrickman, striking his leg.
During drilling of N41 triassic well 8 1/2 phase the drill crew were tripping out of hole (wet) using the mud bucket. The toolpusher was operating the brake. The pipe joint had been broken and
the fluid drained before spinning out the joint. As the mud bucket was opened the drill crew noticed that the drill pipe was bending. The stand of drill pipe then broke free of the joint and pushed
the IP, who was holding the mud bucket, back towards the racked stands of pipe.
During the removal of a 15ft bail on the north drilling rig <...>, the top end of the suspended bail dropped and struck the drill floor. As the bail was being lowered it made contact with part of the
derrick structure which took the weight of the slinging arrangement. The sling slipped changing the centre of gravity of the load and causing the bail to rotate and strike the drill floor.
During completion of the 7" tubing in well N20 the internal lip of a set of HYC elevators caught on the box section of a joint of the casting tubing which was positioned in the rotary table. This
resulted in the "C" plate on the top of the elevators becoming dislodged and the "C" plate, plus associated bolts fell approximately 45' to the rig floor.
Between the hours of 01:00 hrs and 04:00 hrs the <...> north crane was being used to off load the supply boat. During the time the status of the Expro slickline operation on N29 was as follows:
Out of hole with wireline, lubricator removed and placed in 'V' door for stuffing box maintainance and general redressing of tools ongoing, new knot tied. At 04:00 hrs the crane lifts were
completed and then the go-ahead was given for the wireline to recommence. The wireline was then rigged up ie. tools made up and lubricator stabbed on. The incident then occurred when the tool
string was pulled up to the stuffing box with the use of the wireline unit at which point the wire parted at the bottom sheave and resulting in the toolstring falling onto the Swab valve. After an
investigation into the cause of the incident it was found that a container from the supply boat had to be landed on top of the weight indicator hose and thus gaving out a faulty signal to the<...>
gauge at the wireline unit. The hose however was not burst but due to the hose being compressed it stopped any signal coming from the load cell to the unit but however a reading of 150 lbs was
trapped in the line to the <...> gauge. (This weight just happens to be around the correct toolstring weight at surface).

During workover operations on Well N29 the drill crew were tripping out of the hole on the north drillling rig DR1. The derrickman had unlatched the elevators and was racking back a stand of 3
1/2" drill pipe. The driller lowered the blocks while the elevators were still swinging causing them to make contact with the monkey board. The impact resulted in the board being pushed down
causing two of the retaining nuts to fall to the drill floor.
The top half of N3 xmas tree was removed successfully. During the removal of the lower half of the tree a chainblock failed - investigation ongoing.
Lifting 'mousehole' sheath from the drill floor to release a sling from beneath the flange using bushing pullers and a tugger winch. The lifting gear (bushing puller) detached from the load while
under stress, causing a recoil action. <...> was standing close to the mousehole waiting to remove the wire sling as soon as it lifted. He was struck on the lip and forehead by the bushing pullers.
For rest of report see OIR9B
A 16" pipe was being rejointed and during this time it was supported by a 2 tonne chain block. The block was attached at a bend in the pipe in order to provide stability, to keep the joints faces
parallel and to ensure that the pipe did not come off its existing supports. The pipe spool weighed 668kg. The chain block failed where the upper hook is attached to the block by a swivel. The
metal of the bracket where the swivel attaches broke. The chain block had benn inspected on the<...> by an independent inspector. The chain block fell but as it attached several metres from the
place where the people were working it caused no injuries. The pipe also did not fall, it just stayed on its supports.
During a lifting operation to lower a spacer bracket weighing approximately 300 kgs from deck level to a position under deck, one of two air hoists working in tandem failed. The load travelled
uncontrolled for 2 metres until the slack was taken up by the second hoist. One of the fixed ends of the chain on the failed hoist had parted from the hoist resulting in the loose chain running
through the hoist and wrapping itself around a scaffold tube. Each hoist is rated for 6 tonnes. No injuries to personnel were sustained and there was no damage to plant, equipment or the
environment. The failed hoist is to be shipped ashore for examination. All other hoists of a similar type have been withdrawn from service pending determination of the root cause of failure.
The Deck crew were relocating an <...> basket from the South side of the <...> Weather Deck (pipe deck) into a bay on the the North side. On positioning the basket it made contact with a section
of channel iron which was sitting on top of a skid beam (approx 2 ft above deck). The channel iron was knocked off the beam and struck the left foot of the roustabout (channel iron approx 100lbs
in weight, 6" x 3" x 14'). Bridge of left foot has skin graze and bruising across top of three toes, localised minor swelling and tender to touch. Has full movement of toes and foot. Treatment clean and apply pressure bandage, elevate foot and presribe Nurofen tablets. After sending onshore for referral, the classification "accident" was determined after visitation to ARI and an X-ray
performed. Results indicate fracture to one bone between first and second toe and bridge of left foot. Convalescence and expected days lost is 28. Investigation is being conducted. Remedial
action is toboth communicate incident and action deck management plan for designated steel stock storage area to avoid conflict and congestion of work sites on the <...> platform.
Drilling 8-1/2" hole rotating @ 180 rpm with 600T solid block elevator. Driller noticed on elevator bail retaining lug was hanging open. Pin for the lug was found on drill floor, safety pin was not
found. It is believed that vibration may have caused the safety pin to become dislodged.
A <...> PLT tool was being run in hole in <...> Well D03 at approximately 2000m. The wireline technician on the panel noticed the hydraulic pressure to the Upper Master Valve (UMV) was at
3500 psi, the panel was pumping, suggesting the UMV was moving. This loss of hydraulic pressure was due to a leak from the wireline hydraulic unit hose reel supplying the UMV. To prevent
further movement of the UMV which would close on the wire, the DHSV supply was locked in at the Kick panel on the Xmas tree and the 500 barg supply from the wireline hydraulic unit,
(which was previously supplying the DHSV), was transferred to the UMV. As the wireline crew attempted to source a spare hydraulic panel, further hydraulic fluid leaks occurred from the
hydraulic panel and the UMV closed, cutting the wire in the process. The PLT tool string dropped down hole and the cut wire at surface came out of the grease head and fell onto the BOP deck.
The area was correctly barriered off as per normal platform procedures. One of the wireline operators was on the deck at the time although at a safe distance from the ejected wire. Pressure was
held within the lubricator due to the correct functioning of the check valve within the grease had, there was no loss of containment. The well was isolated at the Xmas tree swab and the lubricator
Whilst slewing the crane to the position of the V door in the drilling derrick the crane boom contacted the derrick water table and broke a boom floodlight mounting. Sheared mounting bolts fell
to the deck.The floodlight remained attached to the boom.

Well <...>: Completion had been cemented and tubing pressure tested to 3000PSI, and successfully inflow tested. 0.108" wireline equipment was rigged up over the well in 'open hole' mode i.e.
an open riser section at surface to act as a guide through the drilling bop equipment was required. The wire was successfully tested to 23 turns prior to running in hole. While pulling out of hole
with a 0.108" wireline toolstring (safety valve nipple wiper tool) at approximately 300' below the rotary table, the wire parted at the bottom sheeve on the drill floor. This caused the wire at
surface to come back down the 'V' door to catwalk and, the remaining wire above the sheeve to fall down to the drill floor in a coil, barriers along the catwalk and the drill floor were in place as
per standard procedure and on-one was working within the barriers as per procedure. No jarring or over pulls on the wire were ongoing, just normal pulling out of hole operations. Due to the
nature of the toolstring (rubber wiper blades), the toolstring did not fall down the hole pulling the wire behind it. This allowed the wire on the drill floor to be secured with an appropriate wireline
clamp. The wire was then re-tied back to the drum and pulled out of hole to surface. On examining the broken wire it broke after on 7 turns. 500' of wire was spooled off the drum and re-tested
Whilst lowering the crane boom to pick up a load outside level 2 of the accommodation, the wire rope caught between 2 sections of the helideck safety net frame. As this was on the blind side to
the cab, the crane driver was unaware and carried on booming down, as instructed by the banksman. When the banksman realised what has happened he instructed the crane driver/mechanic to
slew left. When the crane boom slewed left, a section of safety netting, which the crane boom had been in contact with came away and fell down to the landing area, approximately 50 ft below.
(The section which fell was not either of the sections which the crane boom wire had caught between).
While RIH with rotary drilling assembly at 11189' the travelling block was being raised to pick up another stand. When approx. 60' from the drill floor the drill line tail slipped out of the holding
clamp. This resulted in the drill line becoming 'bird nested'. The travelling block was safely stopped and area barriers erected. The blocks were safely lowered, then hung off prior to replacing the
drill line in the draw-works drum. The design of draw - works ensures that no load is taken by the holding clamp. which is primarily there to anchor the free end on the line onto the draw-works
drum. Also the drill line is enclosed within the draw-works such that the bird nested line is restrained. It should be noted that a 'slip & cut of the drill line had been carried out 6 days prior to this
incident. This would have been the last time this clamp was disturbed.
Whilist performing wireline drift run using super 75 0.108 inch wire on well cn23. after increased pick up weights observed a dicision was taken to pull out of hole. The wire parted at the top
sheave of the lubricator. The area was barriered off as per the normal procedure and there were no persons on the drill floor at the time.
3 technicians were working on the Level 2 East Mezzanine when they heard a banging noise, they went to investigate and found a 15/16" AF combination spanner on the ESDV Platform on Level
2 Process approx 8 metres from where they were working. They checked the area and this was the only loose item that could have fallen from the process levels above. The near miss was then
reported to the HSE Co-ordinator and a investigation team was set up to determine the cause and make recommendations to prevent reccurence. All personnel working in the compressor area on
level 5 <...> were interviewed and asked if they could shed any light on the incident. A technician informed the investigation team that he was working on the GG lub skid on C compressor and
that one of the spanners he was using was missing when he returned from the mech workshop. The spanner was left on the skid and due to vibration fell to the deck 26.5 mtrs / 87 ft below. He
was not aware that the spanner had fallen. The spanner fell through the transit opening on the deck at the side of the skid. A plate is to be made cover the transit opening. The spanner was a
combination type 15/16" AF weighing 0.8 kg.
The lubricant applied on the drilling line has a tendency to accumulate at crown block level on rigs. The tar accumulation is supposed to be monitored during daily and weekly inspections and
cleaning organised when required. However, on the <...> at 23.15hrs a sizeable chunk of tar (12" x 8" x 2", estimated weight 1lb) fell from the crown block area and landed on the drill floor V
door area, 170' below. There were no personnel present on the drill floor at the time of the incident.
CRI emergency door fell 14 ft to the skid deck. The weather was NE30 knots. On inspection middle of three hinges had failed and other two hinges were corroded. <...> deputy asset manager has
restablished that the door blew off in severe weather ( It was a door due to be changed out in a weeks time). <...> has been advised of RIDDOR para 77(b) &(c) and will revert back to <...> <...>
with further details.
The fabrication crew were cutting holes in contractor well-bays(HSE action item) at main deck level. (Contractor 2-3 area). As stated on the permit, a precaution to the potential hazard of sparks
falling to the lower area while cutting the holes was to have a fire watcher postioned at the lower level and gas checks of the area carried out. During cutting operations sparks fell over the PCHE
body (described by the firewatcher as a lazy flame 50-60cms high). The firewatcher immediately activated the fire alarm, called to his colleagues above and then extinguished the fire using his
20lb dry powder fire extinguisher.
Whilst running up the Number 2 diesel genrator on <...> vibration and hunting noise was heard by the crew. On investigation it could be seen that the generator in the area of the alternator was on
fire. Fire was extinguished by use of hand held dry powder extinguisher. Generator has been isolated.

Well N36 workover was ongoing on the south rig DR2 Mud Pump No 1 was started at 24.00 hrs pumping brine. After a few minutes operation the pump stopped and the derrickman was sent to
investigate. A single smoke alarm was initiated on the safety sys. Simultaneously, reports of smoke coming from the north mud pump room were being phoned into the <...> control room. On
investigation it was found that DC motor GM 1601B had failed causing carbon dust to flashover. All similar motors are being checked and cleaned.
Main power generator P801B was running on fuel gas when a high exhaust gas temperature trip occurred. During the rundown of the unit two flame detectors, situated beneath the power turbine
came into alarm and fired the CO2 protection system. On investigation there were no physical signs of fire. The power turbine seal air system was checked and a non return valve found to be
sticking.
After repairs to a gas turbine compressor exhaust bellows (K201S), the machine was tested. The compressor was loaded after a satisfactory warm-up period. A small fire occurred on the black
outer skin of the bellows in the patched out area. The fire was quickly extinguished by operators monitoring the test.
During start-up of electrical generation P801C in P06 hall two flame detectors in the turbine enclosure activated and with subsequent CO2 discharge. No obvious fire damage observed. The area
was cleaned, the seals checked and the machine re-started. A similar shutdown occurred whilst the start-up was being checked by operating personnel. Finally insulation was removed and
replaced to cure the problem.
A minor fire occurred in the "A" Turbine Enclosure when the RB 211 turbine was being run down after a test run. The machine had been running on liquid fuel. Prior to this there had been a
number of failed starts when using liquid fuel. 1 x flame detector operated in the enclosure, and on investigation a small flame (2 to 3") within the enclosure was observed from the outside of the
enclosure. The flame self extinguished prior to entry into the enclosure. There was no activation of the CO2 system as this requires the operation of more than one detector. (All detectors in the
enclosure were checked after the event and all proved to function correctly.) No manual intervention using firefighting equipment was required and the machine was isolated and made safe. An
examination of the machine was carried out and the exhaust diffuser flange was found to have a gap between the flanges, where the flame was observed. Sooty deposits were noted in the area, and
it was possible to insert a 20 thou feeler gauge into the flange gap. Diesel fuel carryover from the attempted fuel starts or incomplete combustion from this process is thought to have been ignited
by the hot exhaust during the rundown process. Extensive checks being carried out to set the machine up for correct start up capability. Manufacturers <...> have been contacted and a high
ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE OIR/9B. A small fire occurred in the galley on <...> platform. No personnel were injured during the incident. The deep fat fryer was being drained in preparation for
cleaning at the end of the shift. The fryer type is a <...>, and the oil in use was <...> cooking oil, flash point 320 degrees. Galley staff were draining oil fron the fryer via a tap. When the fryer was
almost empty, the residual oil ignited, resulting in a small fire. The galley staff responded swiftly, applying the fryer lid, covering the fryer with a fire blanket, and informing the control room. The
incident was then attended promptly by the HSE Co-ordinator. Area owner power attended and proceeded to investigate fryer. Platform <...> investigation commenced. Full checks carried out on
fryer electrical switches and thermostat and all functioning correctly. A fault was located on 2 of the heater elements these were replaced and a full test of the equipment carried out and found to
be satisfactory.
Following the completion of the maintenance on MPP A it was decided to restart unit and the isolation on G21190 A2 was therefore removed and the breaker racked back in. The isolation on
G2110 A1 remained as described above with the breaker racked in to give the "available" status to the control system. The control room operator gave a start command to G2110 but the pump
failed to start. The electical technician went to the MPP swithroom (LER) and when he removed the breaker for G2110 A2 he noticed the main fuses were missing. Having not placed the original
isolations on, and knowing that removing the fuses isolated the unavailable machine, he therefore assumed G2110 A2 was the unavailable pump and advised the control room that we had tried to
start the wrong pump. On this advice the control room operator then gave a start command to G2110 A1 believing it to be the available unit (when in fact it was removed). Upon receiving the start
command the disconnected cable for G2110 A1 was immediately energised. <...> pump technicians were in the immediate vicinity of the seal oil skid where the cable was suspended and noticed
significant sparks and a loud crack as the cable energised. Please see OIR/9B for remainder of summary.
The instrument technician was called to investigate a trip alarm on the electrochlorination unit, a piece of equipment used to produce hypochlorite from seawater to inject into firepump/seawater
lift caissons to control bacterial growth. A visual inspection of Electrolyser A bank found the panels buckled outwards, smoke damage to the electrolyser case and the cell union (union between
positive/negative ends of the flow tube), overheated and blown out. The exact time of the incident itself is not known, (as the fire was completely contained within the panelled unit, so it was not
detected by any of the external platform F&G devices), nor was the incident witnessed by any personnel, (no visual indication or noise reports). The unit was fully isolated pending a detailed
investigation by the vendor.

Fire in AK fire pump room B. Deluge operated manually. At 15.10hrs zone 56 fire detection alarm was initiated in the control room. On investigation, thick black smoke was observed coming
from a small opening in the fire pump room door. At this time the engine, which had been running as result of fire and gas system checks, was observed to be not running. It was confirmed from
the scene , the deluge system within the enclosure had not automatically operated. An attempt was made to initiate a release of the system from the break glass unit, situated outside the fire pump
enclosure. This also failed, resulting in a manual deluge release being executed. A fire team equiped with breathing apparatus was despatched to the scene, however at 15:21 hrs, the fire was
brought under control by the initial response team, using the fixed system. Initial investigation indicated that a cooling water hose had failed, causing the engine to overheat. This in turn resulted
in the engine rocker cover gasket failing, allowing engine oil to come into contact with the ajacent exhaust manifold, causing the initial fire. It is believed that this fire then burnt through the
shrouded plastic small bore pipe, supplying the oil pressure gauge, allowing pressure fed oil to fuel the fire. As no shutdown system is engineered into the controls of a diesel fire pump, the engine
Due to the fact there was a possibility of running the Gas compressor Z-3150 later in the day, the day shift gas technician was preparing the machine and had started the lub/seal oil system to
allow it to stabilise, then went about other duties. When he returned to the machine at approx. 10.00 to check on the system he noticed that there was no indication of lub/seal oil pressure and that
the pumps had tripped. On checking the oil sight glass there was no indication of an oil level. He proceeded to commence pumping new oil into the tank when he noticed what appeared to be a
light in the sight glass. On inspection he found that there was an actual flame in the sight glass. He immediately stopped the flow of new oil, informed the Control Room of the situation and that
he required assistance. He also ensured that all the associated pumps and heaters for the lib/seal oil tanks were switched off. At this time there was no further indication of flame, but the tank had
a high surface temperature. The operations personnel them proceeded to cool the tank externally until the surface temperature was considerably reduced. TIR: Fire observed in sight glass of the
main tube oil tank for the gas compress on Z3150.Presently extinguishing fire and suspect caused by failure of electic heater thermostat. Investigation required.
During normal processing conditions, with 2 Compressors running the fire & gas panel in BA control room recorded one IR detector in alarm in <...> enclosure. Upon investigation, visual
confirmation of a fire was given by the outside operator. The GPA was sounded and the platform given a level 3 ESD from the conrol room. Halon flooding was then activated to the Turbine
enclosure. <...> Coastguard informed & <...> mustered. Emergency Muster & Headcount successfully completed. <...> informed. <...> informed HSE by telephone. <...> Compressor House
doors opened for ventilation. Enclosure doors left closed to maintain Halon blanket. AERO Emergency Controller updated. Incident Team visual check of enclosure-no fire found. Control Room
check & reset Fire & gas panel. OIM brief to muster points. Enclosure monitored during cooldown. Emergency Control team regroup to formulate plan & perform risk assessment prior to
enclosure investigation. Initial Investigation by platform staff found that HP Hydraulic Oil leaking under pressure from a loose fitting sprayed onto a hot pipe and auto lighting. The machine is
currently electrically & mechanically isolated pending further investigation.
<...> was visited for routine maintenance. Arrival at 07:30, routine plant inspection revealed no leaks. Arrival at 07:35 well <...> was taken off test and well <...> was put on test, no leak on well
<...> at this time. At 11:00 a full gas leak survey of all the xmas trees showed no gas leaks. Work ongoing in the wellbay throughout the day on the gas dectection systems. At 16:00 Team Leader
smelt gas in the wellbay and looked for and found a leak from the flange where the production wing valve attaches to the xmas tree on well <...>. The production wing valve, flowline black
valves, upper master valve, lower master valve and then the down hole valve were closed and isolated on well <...>.
During routine operations, a mixture of water/condensate was vented from the AX Low Pressure vent system. No slick observed on water and no smell of condensate at the incident scene.
Platform was shutdown until investigation identifies the cause, and ensures problems are remedied.
The flowline to well N9 was being prepared for gas injection. Two operators were present on site when the Control Room Operator opened the pressurisation valve. When the pressure reached
200 barg the operators saw icing up at a joint on the choke valve. They asked the CR operator to close the pressurisation valve and they depressurised the flowline locally. At 150barg the leak
stopped. Gas leak was not detected by gas sensors.
Wind Speed 38 knots - Wind Direction - 250o. 4 gas detectors, in area of miscible gas compressor went into low level alarm. A process operator went to investigate, found a small leak on the antisurge valve gland and rectified it. Approx one hour later the same gas alarms were activated. Operator immediately went to affected area and requested a manual shutdown of the compressor. A
second leak was found on the discharge SDV plug valve stem. An attempt was made to repair this but on retesting the leak was still present and the unit was then shutdown.
The miscible gas injection compressor K6001 was being started. The wind speed was 21 knots from the North. A single low level gas alarm was received in the control room and a Process
Operator was sent to investigate. The Operator confirmed a gas leak ffrom the compressor casing discharge flange and requested a manual shutdown and blowdown of the unit. The compressor
shutdown and blowdown systems activated normally and the leak stopped.
At 1330 hrs an operator working on the <...> weatherdeck smelt hydrocarbons. Initially he was unable to find a leak. After returning with a colleague the leak was located underneath insulation.
He advised the Control Room, who shutdown and blewdown the system. The subsequent investigation identified that an incorrect gasket had been specified and fitted. The correct gasket was then
fitted and unit restarted.

<...> -The seal locator and wireline entry guide were being recovered. The well control fluid was brine (with sufficient S.G. weight to control the well). The driller noted a smell of hydrocarbon.
He immediately closed the BOP and monitored the well. The control room confirmed that low level gas alarms had been initiated in the shaker area. There was no build up of pressure so the gas
was circulated out via the choke manifold and poorboy degasser.
<...> - During circulation, using brine, gas was detected on the rig floor. The control room gas detection registered it at 28% L.E.L. The BOP's were closed and the gas diverted through the
poorboy degasser and vented at a controlled rate.
Following routine maintenance on LP associated gas compressor K101A, the unit was restarted with a process operator in attendance. The operator completed his checks of the unit and left the
area. Approx. 55 mins later, 2 low level gas alarms were received in the control room and the operator was sent back to the unit. Although he could not see or hear any leaks the operator could
smell gas so he requested the control room to stop the unit and blow it down. Further investigation revealed a seal oil level transmitter flange was not tightened properly.
During routine checks by a process operator, a gas leak was noted at the grease nipple of MOV 46004 in module P04 on the <...> platform. The control room operator was informed and the
affected line isolated and blown down. The leaking nipple was removed , cleaned and replaced.
Leak of Hydrocarbons from a corrosion hole in a produced water line, from the test separator V8010. The test separator was shut down at the time. On discovery of the leak additional isolations
were put in place and the contents of the separator drained. Most of the leaked hydrcarbons were collected by the open drains, however, it is estimated that 0.5 bbls of crude oil were lost to sea.
Normal platform operations in progress. Smell of gas detected by person working in area of fuel gas skid, reported to control room and production staff sent to investigate. Minor leak confirmed
at weld on vent line to flare downstream of PSV, crack between 1 1/2" weldolet and 8" flare pipework approx 330 degrees, (no fixed gas detection initiated). Hot work permits withdrawn,
pressurised shut down performed. Plan implemented to reduce plant inventory in a phased manner so as to minimise back pressure on the flare system and thus minimise any leakage from crack.
Crack monitored during blow down and negligible leakage of gas detected. (Fixed detectors in area checked after event and all were functioning correctly.) Although leak was small it cannot be
isolated (as it is part of flare syatem) hence plant remains shut down until repair has been completed. Affected section of pipe/weld to be sent for analysis to establish failure mode. Investigation
launched into cause of failure; to be led by Ops Mgr from independent business unit.
A Hydrocarbon Gas Leak was discovered by one of the platform staff during normal operational duties. Normal platform operations were taking place when a leak on 4" pipework to a Blowdown
Valve for the 'A' Export Compressor Discharge Cooler was noted. The leak was from a crack in a weld to a 1" weldolet fitting. Pipework material Stainless Steel M15A. Permits to work in the
immediate area were withdrawn. The 'A' train was depressurised and the system positively isolated. 'B' and 'C' trains were checked for any similar conditions, none were found. Repair procedure
drawn up to replace pipework. Weather at time - Wind 315 deg @ 10 knots. Pressure 1015 mbar Sea 1 to 2 metres.
During a routine tour of the platform production personnel found a minor gas leak from a 16" hub type flanged joint on the ECA pipework connecting the ECA riser tower to the <...> wellhead
tower. Section of line was immediately isolated, depressured and inerted. Full investigation team mobilised to investigate cause of joint failure.
A leak occurred on plate exchanger X-109 which was in duty on the methanol distillation unit on level O of the <...> Platform. The leak involved approx 2 litres of methanol/water mixture which
dripped into a drip tray underneath the exchange and then into the closed drain system of the platform. The plate exchanger was operating at its normal working pressure of 0.5 bar. The lead was
detected by the Prod Tech. during routine inspection.
Venting on the platform, Block Valve in the vent line closed, should have been open, gasket blew out. Valve left shut following maintenance 2 weeks previously.
Plant operator smelt hydrocarbon in vicinity of fuel gas skid. Shut down of fuel gas system initiated . Crack found in base of instrument Pitting 10m3 released.
On the <...>, approximately 0910, the three infrared flame detectors in PC1 RB 211 turbine enclosure came up simultaneously. This initiated a General Platform Alarm, and the personnel went to
their muster stations. The investigation found that during compressor unloading, the blow-off valves on the gas turbine compressor had operated (as would be expected), and had discharged hot
air into the turbine enclosure. The flame detectors mistakenly interpreted this turbulent hot air as fire, and operated as configured. As part of the executive actons resulting from the initiation, a
PSD should have occured on YM subsea. This failed, although testing later in the day was successful in shutting down YM. This spurious failure has been a common problem in the past, and is
being remedied by the ongoing telecomms upgrade (only YM and YD remain to be upgraded). A fuel gas valve was also slow to close, and a corrective action has been put in place to more
closely scrutinise the operation of all such valves through increased frequency of PM.

The west facing dome end had been removed and laid down next to the cooler, exposing the open flange connection to the closed drain. Shortly afterwards a gas release was observed coming
from the closed drain, the drain valve was immediately closed and the leak stopped. A back pressure had built up in the flare system as the result of draining a well effluent to the closed drain
system. During the leak, a gas detector activated above the pig launcher (just beneath the drain line) at 30% LEL, this occurred at 15.55hrs. The construction crew were on their tea break at the
time, so nobody was in the immediate vicinity.
Routine operations ongoing with the well test separator operating @ 122 barg. Minor leak developed from failed CAF gasket on "B" gas stream orifice carrier. Since the orifice carrier is located
directly under the roof of the process area, in close proximity to the gas detector heads, the leak was quickly detected and the metering stream isolated manually. Within 10 minutes the stream was
fully depressurised to the flare system. This part of the platform is not enclosed and ventilates freely, although the wind was quite mild @ 4 knots 150o. There was no hot/naked flame work in the
area and, therefore, no reasonable prospect of fire or explosion. The failed gasket was examined and found to have minor damage of 2-3 mm on the sealing face. It has been replaced and normal
operations resumed. The failed gasket had last been replaced on 25th August 2000, during routine planned maintenance operations.
Routine well test operations were being conducted with <...> well D06 routed to the separator. Operating pressure was 120 barg and temperature 66 Deg C. This section of the platform is an open
area and wind direction was 310 Deg @ 210 knots. An operator in the area noticed a leak developing from a flange on the separator gas outlet pipework, the size of the leak was increasing
suggesting that it started relatively recently. A gas cloud was noticed dispersing over the south side of the platform and condensate spillage on the deck. The Control Room was contacted and the
well fluids were diverted around the separator by-pass away from the leak path. This was immediately followed by manual isolation and blowdown. Pressures subsided relatively and that no time
did any gas detectors in the area go into alarm, this was due to the moderate wind conditions taking the gas cloud over the south face of the platform. There was no obvious ignition source in the
vicinity at the time. A manual platform GPA was sounded and emergency personnel mustered. A full platform muster was not considered necessary as the leak was contained very quickly and it
was clear there was limited potential for escalation. The leaking flange in question is 1500 lb rated although it only sees 900 lb service; the failed joint is currently being inspected. It is known that
An increase in flaring was noted. Production operators began making checks. During this work a significant release of hydrocarbons took place. The platform gas detection system actioned
correctly and a platform ESD1 occured. No injuries to personnel were sustained. Detailed investigations are in progress.
Pin hole leak in lower elbow of Interface Level controller bridle for LICA-23 on V2201 resulting in a produced water leak from the pipe. This was spotted by a maintenence technician and
immediate action was taken to shutdown and isolate the affected process.
25% LEL gas detected in the combustion air intake of Z-4002 water injection turbine. Z-4002 was shutdown for maintenance with the gas generator and power turbine removed and the inlet
ducting blanked off. Wind speed was 35 knots from the south. On investigation it was found that x2 6mm vent lines from the fuel cabinet had been disconnected and not blanked off or isolated
from the Low Pressure vent header. The LP vent header is normally at atmospheric pressure. Coincident with the gas being detected, the gas compressor Z-3150 was being started in module 6.
During the purge cycle gas is vented to the LP manifold. Immediate action was taken to isolate the vent lines. For investigation purposes the circumstances were recreated to ascertain the source
of gas and the volume released. This was found to be 0.1m3. A level 3 investigation has been initiated to identify underlying causes for the incident.
A Well operations technician noticed a hydrocarbon drip from the chemical injection tapping on the Christmas tree closing spool of CN17 oil well. On closer examination he obseved a bubbling
at the weld. He reported it to the control room who closed in and isolated the well.
The hydraulic system for the Iron roughneck and topdrive was being circulated but due to a line being open in the system never achieved any pressure and a spill occurred.
Platform was in normal operation when a member of the crew spotted diesel leaking from a fuel supply line. The supply line was isolated and depressured. On investigation the leak was found to
be coming from a weld. The line in question is stainless steel. Environmental conditions: wind 10knots @ 140 deg. Sea 1 mtr. Vis 8-10 N miles. Cloud 2/8.
An operator was asked to line out the methanol pump D to <...> during the morning. Having completed this he was called to attend to a high level in the production separator B. At 0636hrs the D
pump tripped(no known reason), at 0642 the subsea barrier valve to <...> some 200 to 300 metres away was opened. At around this time the operator returned to the site and noticed the 20 litre
calibration pot was broken. He checked around the system to ensure all was safe. It is felt from the ongoing investigation that pressure from the discharge of the pump found its way through the
pumps and NRVs to pressure up the suction pipework. The max capacity of the calibration pot is 20 litres. However the operator did not notice any MEOH in the adjacent area other than that in
the bund which was minimal. No injuries to personnel were recorded and minimal damage to flanges were recorded HSE were informed on the <...>.

The Operation Technician started up B glycol skid and then when carrying out the post start-up inspection he found a small water leak coming from under the condenser pipework that had not
been there before. B Glycol skid was shutdown and the insulation was stripped at that section to reveal heavy rust scabbing through which the steam had escaped. The steam smelt of gas
condensate so it was sampled and the concentration of hydrocarbon in the steam was below dectecable limits.
Normal steady production operations. The Operation Technician was carrying out routine housekeeping when a small leak from a pinhole in the pipework appeared. He had been working in that
area all morning. He immediately isolated that piece of pipework. The pipework contained produced water and about 3% methanol at 1/2 bar pressure. Failure may have been the results of
erosion. This is to be investigated. Weather at the time a wind speed of 15 knots clear and dry.
On the <...> the <...> platform was in injection mode. All <...> and <...> wells were on-line. During the regular checks a production technician witnessed a smallbore instrument feed separate
from a tee-piece. Automatic activation of the deluge system took place due to recognition of gas being present by the gas alarm system in the area. In addition the wells closed, processes shut
down, firepumps started and the platform general alarm was sounded. POB went to muster stations. A more detailed report is attached.
During the service testing of production train 2 a leakage of natural gas was detected. At the time of the leak the wind direction was 330 degrees with a strength of 22 knots. The service testing
procedure was being followed at the time and the pressure was being taken up in steps. At a pressure of 370 psig the gas alarmed, automatic deluge operated and POB mustered and were
accounted for. The cause of the leakage is being investigated.
Mechanical failure of valve V-452331 body. This valve is located on the high point vent of level transmitter LT-45017(contractor bottom H/C level transmitter) During night shift of <...>
mechanical isolation MIC9833 was removed under a "temporary deisolation to test" Preparation were made to enable a service test to be conducted on production train 4 following shutdown
maintenance actvities. A marked up set of ELD's detailing all joints disturbed during maintenance activities & the boundary limits for the service test were prepared & signed onto by OIM,SPE &
safety Officer. Three of the shift team then utilised the drawings to confirm the integrity of the proposed gas flowpath & signed onto the ELD's. A tool box talk was conducted & documented
conditions associated with GWP 54658 were discussed & signed onto by individuals involved in the work scope. The service test of production train 4 in accordance with <...> & <...> was
connected at 22:25 At all times during the test at least 1 individual was located <...> top deck <...> 10 Mezz level & <...>10/09 main deck, to monitor disturbed joints throughout the test,
consequently the service test was suspended between 23:00hrs & 00:20hrs to allow a meal break & again at 00:35 due to ESD3A caused by failure of HIPP's pressure transmitters PTWhile undertaking welding activites on the new tie-in pipework a spark ignited a small gas release from a flange on valve XCV-46007, resulting in a torch fire approx. 3 to 4"long. The flame was
quickly put out by the fire watch and no damage or injury occurred. The platform has been shutdown, leak testing done to dentify the source of the leak and subsequently de-pressurised in order to
change out the gasket.
At 12:41 the platform gas detection system detected a release of gas which was vented by a member of the crew who was despatched to the scene. He activated the deluge system which, in turn,
activated the emergency shutdown (E.S.D)) system. The company emergency response plan for onshore and offshore was then activated and HSE informed.
Compressor discharge on 20" line. Vent plug on valve leaked. DC1 compressor on <>. Air compressor shut down and leak repaired.
The HSE had to investigate a leak from a Christmas tree valve on the field's initial condensate production well when a small seepage drip of methanol test fluid was discovered on one of the valve
flanges during start-up test procedures. <...> said the tree bolts had not been sufficiently torqued up. The stimulation vessel pumped heavy brine into the well to reduce the pressure at the top of
the well to zero. Then the well was repaired and reinstated to production.
The platform was shut down due to a gas release. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) was informed that the blow-down and flare systems were not operating as intended, exacerbating the
danger to the platform. Given the risk to staff aboard the platform, halting production was the only course of action that could be taken. Prohibition notices were issued that highlighted "a
significant number of deficiencies in the organization, training, procedural matters, and hardware surrounding compliance with fire and explosion-prevention regulations and the quality of
emergency response to the first gas release". Incident 1 this day.
The platform was shut down due to a gas release. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) was informed that the blow-down and flare systems were not operating as intended, exacerbating the
danger to the platform. Given the risk to staff aboard the platform, halting production was the only course of action that could be taken. Prohibition notices were issued that highlighted "a
significant number of deficiencies in the organization, training, procedural matters, and hardware surrounding compliance with fire and explosion-prevention regulations and the quality of
emergency response to the first gas release". Incident 2 this day.
The platform was shut down for 24 hours after that a small gas leak occurred. All 63 crew were called to muster stations, and a coastguard helicopter was mobilized as a precaution but not
required. No further information available.

One of the production HPHT wells on the platform experienced higher than normal pressure. The platform was put into production in <...>. Production (30000 b/d of condensate and 130 MMcf/d
of gas) was maintained at a lower level for the safe investigation of the well. <...>'s <...> stimulation vessel mobilized to enable preparation of the well prior to full investigation with jackup <...>.
A helicopter lifted 39 non-essential personnel to <...>, a specialist team was flown out to the platform, and 64 of the crew remained onboard. <...> said the Health and Safety Executive and the
Coastguard are being kept fully informed of the situation.
<...>- Circulating out of Gas Bubble on DR1 for Well N11 Operation: Circulating gas trapped below packer after milling operations - put over the choke as a precaution. Conditions: Night time,
weather good. Substance: Calcium Chloride Brine Events: While milling packer, an anticipated gas bubble was circulated to the surface (maximum length +/- 20m inside 9-5/8" casing.) Part
played by personnel: To avoid brine splashing out of the rotary table (when bubble at surface) the annual preventer was closed to divert the well bore to the choke manifold. The well was then
flowchecked via the choke manifold as a precaution until it was verified that the well was static. The well was then opened and bottoms up circulated - no gas.
<...> Whilst drilling in Zechstein(measured depth 5894ft TVD 5487ft 630pptf mud) observed sudden increae on flow gauge - space out and shut in well on fixed pipe rams - monitored closed in
pressures; pressures levelled out at SICP - 2710 psi, pit gain 57bbls. Circulated out influx using Driller's method. Carried out intermediate circulation with 720 pptf mud. While circulating
annulus gas free, choke manifold buffer tank washed out. Well shut in whilst buffer tank removed. Gas in annulus subsequently lubricated out.Well control ops. continuing, following repairs to
buffer tank.
<...> - While drilling the 4.125" hole of <...> (a TTRD well) a bit failure occurred at 10978' after penetrating the reservoir at 10858'. The OBM weight was 0.630 psi/ft. After flow checking and
washing out to 10068', a second flow check confirmed the well to be stable. A slug was pumped and 4 stands of 2 7/8" drill pipe were POOH. The well was found to be flowing from the annulus.
The same 4 stands were RIH as it was thought the well was U tubing. After running 1 stand of 3.5" drill pipe the BOP's were closed. Due to low string weight, stripping to bottom was not
successful. The well was then killed under controlled conditions using the driller's method with a mud weight of 0.640 psi/ft. The string was RIH to the top of the reservior under stable conditions.
The well was again circulated under controlled conditions and repeated flow checks confirmed that the well was dead.
<...> W3 workover. The well had been killed with 484 pptf KC1 brine. The tubing had been cut and retrieved. A BHA had been run to cut and pull the AHC production packer @ 7191'. The
drillstring had been pulled out of the hole and a flow-check was being performed within the BHA just below the BOP. (Bit @ 713', w/hd @ 352'). After 15 minutes flow was observed and the well
was shut in. 9 bbls of an increase was noted and the pressure stabilised at SIDP 150 psi & SICP 450. The well was initially lubricated with brine and then bullheaded with 527 ppft POBM. The
well was flowchecked and confirmed dead.
The drilling rig <...> was moving from the <...> location to the <...> standoff location. When it became free at the <...> location , it unexpectedly moved towards the wellhead. The footprint of the
jack-up port leg overlapped the footprint of the protection frame on the wellhead. The well and pipeline remain shut in and depressurised until they can be inspected. The rig is pinned at a safe
location whilst investigation into why it moved are done. A survey of the rig port leg is to be done.
Whilst manoeuvring to a position alongside the southern side of the platform under the crane for cargo transfer the supply vessel <...>came into contact with the platform leg. The points of
contact was the platform SW leg and the vessels starboard quarter. Weather conditions were within operating NUI and the vessels operating parameters. Photographs were taken of the leg. An
investigation team has been set up to review the incident.
During wireline operations on <...> well D5 the wire parted. The parting of the wire was between the winch drum & the stuffing box. Wireline operations were suspended & the well isolated.
There were no injuries, release of hydrocarbons to the environment was minimal (
At 08.50 the Platform General Alarm (GPA) was activated by the Fire & Gas system, the Fire & Gas was intiated by smoke indication in the BA compressor module on <...>. On hearing the GPA
all personnel are instructed to don their BA & to proceed to their muster point. Whilst donning the set <...> a Rigger noticed that the hood had become detached from the regulator & realised that
it was unusable. <...> subsequently then made his way to his muster station. On investigation, of the BA compressor module, it was confirmed that there was no fire. 08.51 the OIM made a public
announcement, over the tannoy, that the incident had been investigated and that there was no fire however, personnel must continue to their muster stations. The apparatus was supplied & is
maintained for <...> by <...> for the duration of the additional workscopes & shut down activites on <...>. On investigation of the failed set it was identified that the failure mode was the same as
the previous failure. The twice daily inspection routine previously instigated has been reinstated after finding that the exercise had ceased. Personnel have also been instructed to inspect their own
sets, at least once per shift, to ensure that it is still operable. They have been issued with a procedure to help them through this process. The incident is the subject of a full accident and incident
Installation unmanned (NUI) Hydrocarbon release via TEG flash drum PSV resulting in Platform level 3 ESD. PSV reseated and normal flow resumed following intervention visit.

Small pin hole gas leak found on teg train fuel gas regulator to burner braided hose. Fuel gas supply isolated and new fuel gas hose fitted.
During Routine testing of the fire and Gas system, Halon was accidentally released - 30kg
Release initiated by high temperature indication in emergency gen. room. High temp. due to fire dampers not being open whilst engine running.
Platform was manned at the time. Well D3 was being brought on line. Immediately after opening the wing valve and pressuring up the flowline to just under 3000 psig, two fittings on the orifice
meter box popped. The well and platform were immediately shut in manually and people went to muster. The flow line de-pressured throught the fittings. Initial sightings of the fittings does not
show any indication of the olives biting into the instrument pipe. These fittings had been undisturbed since the well was hooked up several years ago. The platform remains shut in whilst we
investigate the cause of failure and check similar fittings for correct engagement.
Diesel bunkering was ongoing. Windspeed 16kts weather good. Diesel was noted spilling from overflow through grating to sea. Pumps were stopped immediately. Est 20 USG spilled to sea.
OIR12 raised. Procedures state constant monitoring of levels during bunkering operations. Operators attention was not on task in hand.
Gas leak along stem of choke on well #2 detected by audible noise from working party on well #4. Investigation revealed gas leak from choke packaging. Isolations carried out and line
depressurised to make safe.
Hydrocarbon release from fractured weld on 1" pipework - K1602 comp. Local gas detection reading 5- 6% LEL. Unit stopped & depressured pending metalurgical analysis of defective pipework
& further NDT survey of related pipework.
When pressuring up K1602, a small gas release was detected from the door seal to Fuel Gas Condenser V3003-A. The Fuel gas skid was isolated and vented.
During investigation into a liquid let-down problem on compressor suction scrubber, a condensate release resulted from let-down line . Strainer between SQV2204 and 2" Valve C214.
Gas release. Turbine enclosure. Gas detected. Compressor shutdown. Initial investigation has uncovered pyro pressure sw, which affected diaphragm. Platform to muster 22.46. Stand down 23.05.
No one injured.
Whilst carrying out a run through of Extinguishment Releases for procedure update one bottle of Halon was accidently released. Platform was unmanned at time. Remote operation.
Small Gas Release from thermal weld where thermometer fits. Coil turbine operations being undertaken at the time to clean up a well.
During routine inspection of the <...> facilities by ROV. A hydrocarbon leak was discovered at oil production well 'PB'. The leak was located on the flowline connector flowline connector
flowbase interface (downstream of the production choke). The estimated oil leak rate was 20ml/min. The well was closed in and isolated from the manifold. Further surveillance confirmed that
the leak had ceased. Plans are currently being developed to effect repair of the connection by DSV intervention.
During a routine annual pipeline inspection by the DSND surveyor, operating a stealth rov, a gas leak was detected at the <...> which is connected by pipeline to the <...> satellite installation. The
leak was coming from the south west side of the wellhead protection structure, between side panel WZ and the roof panel, and was estimated to be approximately one cubic metre per minute. The
vessel left the 500 metre zone when gas bubbles were observed, and the <...> and connected facilities were shut in and depressurised to 15 bar. A separate diving operation from the DSND <...>
identified the leak source as a vent on valve GO2, which is a double block and bleed assembly between the manifold and a pressure transducer. The vent valve was partially open and there was
also a leak path around the vent plug. The leak has been stopped by secure closure of the vent valve. Additional work to seal the vent cap will be completed at the next planned diver intervention.
During routine operations a smell of hydrocarbons was noted by two operators. The smell was traced to a weeping pressure tapping plug on the injection gas to export metering orifice plate. The
smell was only detectable up to 3 feet and the leak was traced to the exact plug by portable gas detector. The offgas injection system was shut down and vented to reduce any risk during
investigation. Plug is to be removed and examined for any damage or possible corrosion. This incident is subject to a full ongoing investigation details of which can be obtained from the SHE
Team leader, <...>.

A GPA occurred on the <...> cellar deck on <...> at 02:23hrs due to activation of a single flammable gas detector in the pig trap area. At the time production personnel were in the process of
receiving a gauging pig launched earlier from the <...>. Platform procedures for pig reception from this system were followed and the pig receiver door was opened to remove the pig from the
receiver. On opening the door a small amount of liquid (approximately half a cupful) flowed from the receiver and some seconds later a GPA was initiated. The investigation revealed that the
individual gas detector concerned (KGD 1056A) is shown on the DCMS screen to be several metres from the launcher, and hence was not inhibited by the CRO. In fact the detector is adjacent to
the receiver and hence was initiated almost immediately. The primary recommendation of the investigation is to produce a definitive list of required inhibits for each piging operation (checked via
SAT).
A power outage occurred on the Douglas installation 20:20hrs on <...>. Operations at the time of the outage where normal. During preparations to restart plant, operations staff observed water
leaking from the base of the Sour Water Stripper. The stripper contained water with less than 40 ppm oil in water. This was leaked from the hole in the vessel. Weather conditions - south easterly
light breeze and calm seas. Plant left shutdown and vessel was isolated. Visual inspection revealed a hole in the water outlet nozzle. Inerting and subsequent spading of vessel ongoing.
Investigation team from onshore being arranged.
GPA was initiated due to toxic gas detected on the DD platform mezzanine deck south. Initial investigation did not detect any gas in the area. Subsequent to the stand down, a process operator
detected gas issuing from the vent on the Gas corrosion inhibitor tank. This second emission did not set off any fixed detection. A preliminary investigation found that the inhibitor fluid contained
entrained gas and it is thought that this may be tracking back through the injection line from the gas export pipeline. The injection pump has been isolated and a new NRV will be fitted to the line.
Contaminated inhibitor will then be pumped into the export gas for safe disposal. Similar systems are in the process of being checked for any similar problems. This incident is subject ot a full
ongoing investigation details of which can be obtained details of which can be obtained form the SHE Team, <...>.
GPA sounded due to three gas detector heads going into alarm. Gas was released from the <...> gas reinjection pig trap when the tell tale was removed in preparation for opening the pig trap door.
Gas heads in the vicinity had been inhibited but gas travelled outside the area and initiated the GPA. The GPA was initiated and personnel went to muster stations. Cause was identified and
normal operations resumed once the area was checked clear of gas and no damage or further leaks were identified. This incident is subject to a full ongoing investigation details of which can be
obtained from the SHE team, <...>.
GPA sounded due to a single gas detector going into alarm. Gas was released from the <...> gas re-injection launcher whilst loading a Bi-di pig. Gas heads in the vicinity had been inhibited, as per
procedure, however, the gas travelled north east outwith the area and initiated the GPA. The GPA was initiated and personnel went to muster stations. Cause was identified and normal operations
resumed once the area was checked clear of gas and no damage or further leaks were identified. This minor incident is subject to a full ongoing investigation, <...>.
The 16" <...> pipeline was in the process of being de-watered via the oil export line when the pigs stopped moving due to low dp across the pipeline. A decision was made, after consultation, to
divert the water down the hazardous open drains caisson using a 1" hose. This new configuation increased the differential across the pipeline & the pigs started to move forward towards the pig
receiver. Three pigs were anticipated to arrive in the trap. There was some dubiety as to how many pigs were actually in the trap. During this deliberation the pipeline was still de-watering into the
caisson. Before it was ascertained that there was 3 pigs in the trap, nitrogen behind the third pig had entered the caisson. The nitrogen found the least path of resistance, being the hazadarous open
drains drum. The liquid level in the drum was low, therefore, the nitrogen went into the drain system. The pressure of the nitrogen lifted 2 drain caps and down corners & into the drain system.
The pressure of the nitrogen lifted 2 drain caps & discharged "dirty" water onto the deck. At the proximity of the export launcher this discharge of water had entrained hydrocarbon which was
released & activated 3 gas detectors in the immediate vicinity. 2 heads went into low alarm (20% LEL) and 1 head into high (60% LEL) 1-2 minutes later all 3 heads returned to zero. This
P & ID <...> refers The injection Gas Pig Launcher had been previously subject to a full hydrotest to 1.5MAWP. Following overhaul & bench testing PSV34003 (fitted to the injection Gas Pig
Launcher) was returned to service. The Pig Trap & associated pipework were subject to leak test (N2) A satisfactory test could not be achieved & a decision was made to remove & examine the
valve. The Pig Trap was depressurised & vented to the flare header. A flange to the downstream ball valve (DD-VH-012) was unbolted in preparation for PSV 34003 removal & the upstream 1/2"
PSV impulse line was capped. Gas migrated from within the flare header through the associated pipework & pressured the pig trap which resulted in a N2/gas mixture passing through the valve
disc to the broken flange & atmosphere. Gas detectors KGD 1035A & 1036A detected the gas & intitated a level 1A ESD at 7.30hrs. The plant remained shutdown Loss of plant air resulted in all
flare ESDVs failing open & the topside inventory vented to flare. Gas again migrated through to the pig trap & exited through the flange. Gas detectors KGD 1035A & 1041A detected gas
resulting in a second ESD 1A at 0800hrs The environmental conditions were dry with a light westerly wind (10 knots) The incident is currently subject to <...> internal investigation.
A GPA was initiated when gas detector DD-KGD-1064A, situated in the DD metering house, went into Hi alarm 17% LEL. The cause for the alarm was a discharge,

Whilst working underdeck, a scaffolding squad reported a smell of gas in the vicinity of the production caisson area. Investigation revealed that the recycle oil pump was releasing a mixture of
water & hydrocarbon condensate from the suction side via a compression type union. The pump was immediately stopped & isloated & the area washed down to the drains system. Estimates
suggest approx. 20 litres of condensate to have been released, although no release to sea occurred. Subsequent investigation has confirmed: Solid particules were found when the pump was
stripped: these would have created a flow path back to the suction side & lead to poor pump operation. The failed compression fitting (approx 30mm) initially appeared tight however, the
insertion depth of the pipe was in question. The fitting was then correctly remade. The root cause would appear to have been that the pump was not bolted to a mounting plate & therefore
unrestrained. The stroke of the pump is in the same plane as the fitting & pipework & it is believed that the pipe was gradually pulled from the fitting by the pump action. Remedial action has
been taken: All similar pumps have been inspected to ensure adequate containment & restraint. Maintenance routines are to be amended to reflect the need to check restraining/mounting bolts are
At the time of the incident work was in progress to restart the power generator following construction activity. A low pressure diesel system was overpressured which resulted in the system design
pressure being exceeded and which resulted in a failure of a duplex filter. This failure resulted in the loss of 35 gallons of diesel. A technical review established that whilst the system design
pressure was exceeded the hydraulic design pressure was not exceeded and the integrity of the pipework was maintained. The line was subject to a line walk prior to restarting the pumps and a
further line walk following system pressurisation. Investigation as to cause and preventative measures ongoing.
The <...> gas/condensate field is connected to the <...> Platform by a <...> multi phase pipeline. Production had been shut down since <...> due to events on <...> Platform. A drop in pressure was
noted by <...> and pipeline isolated and an investigation into the apparent leak began. On the <...> a break in the pipeline was found <...> km from the <...> end. An investigation is being
conducted to establish the cause of the incident. The pipeline and <...> field remain shutdown.
At 1505 hours a member of the crew, reported a water leak from the Production Separator. The leak was first seen as a drip from the insulating cover on flange joint connected to level switch
LSLL 0212. With assistance from a colleague the insulating cover was removed and the leak was then seen as a small jet. All personnel were mustered and the platform was manually shut down
and vented (ESD Level 1). The process vented to 0 psi. There was no release of hydrocarbons, only produced water. <...> Control Room and Duty OIM at <...> Office were advised of the actions
taken by the OIM offshore.
Gas generator enclosure 2 - 6% LEL indication on one gas head. On investigation opened door this went up to 60% LEL initiating a level 4 A platform shutdown. The cause of release reported as
being two fuel gas injectors slightly loose.
<...>, an <...> Pipefitter and <...> were reinstating PSVs 34111 and 34112 on production seperator B. The system was isolated on a single valve isolation, ICC 012464. <...> removed the blanks
for PSV 34111 and no pressure was evident. He then proceeded to clean the joint faces with emery paper before reinstating the PSV. <...> hopped up to inspect the groove in the joint face he had
been cleaning and caught the handle of the isolation valve causing it to open. The production seperator had a pressure of about 16 bar inside which was released hitting <...> in the face. <...> was
on the 15th day of his tour offshore and 3 1/2 hours into the shift. To prevent recurrence the system has been depressurised and the valves secured. An onboard investigation has been carried out.
An independant investigation is to follow.
<...> is a normally unattended installation. At 03:00, gas heads detected high gas within the wellbay. Due to inclement weather, platform intervention was not possible until 16:30. The cause of the
leak was identified as a sheared 1/2 inch instrument tubing to a flowline pressure guage. The cause of the failure was attributed to excessive flowline vibration and inadequate support to the
pressure guage. Further investigation ongoing.
On nightshift plant checks on the <...> platform, the plant man manually started the <...> drains carsson pump to pump out any oily water build up to the oily water drains separator on the <...>
platform. On completing his checks in the process area he proceeded to the <...> swichtgear room and noticed a spray of oily water above the switchgear room door. On closer inspection he
noticed that it was coming from a corrosion scab on the under side of the 2" 150 rated discharge pipework from the <...> drains caisson. The plant man immediately switched off the pump
manually and isolated the line and pump. On further inspection in daylight the leak was found to be from a 10mm diameter corrosion scab on an otherwise pipework with good protective coating.
Initial indication are that the corrosion occurred where rain water collects in a slight sag in the pipework between two supporting beams. On discussion with the plant man it was estimated that the
pump was operated for 5 minutes and the duty of the pump is 1.39dm3/s @4.0 bar dP.

The well had been opened at 0800 hrs <...> & was being monitored by <...> Well Testing. <...> was on the wellhead platform inspecting the voids on the 15k Xmas tree for pressure build up.
Steam/smoke was observed coming fm a flange connecting the temporary DST flow line to the tree. On closer inspection this was observed to be a very small leak of condensate. This was
reported to <...> supervisor & the <...> Drilling Supervisor who immediately shut the well in. At this time the well was flowing at 11000 psi, temperature of 99 Deg Centigrade on a 34/64 - fixed
choke. The fixed gas monitoring system had not registered any rise in levels & the men that found the leak had personal H2S monitors with them which did not show any levels of H2S. Once the
well had cooled down, the <...> Drilling Supervisor investigated the cause of the leak. The bolts were found to be under the original torque setting of 550 ft/lbs. Prior to commencing flow, all of
the flange bolts had been torque up to 550 ft/lbs. And the flow line was sucessfully pressure tested with 60 /40 glycol/ water mix to 13.2 k psi. The flange & ring gasket were removed &
inspected. No damage occurred to the 15K BX154 ring gasket and flange, no marks or cuts were apparent on the gasket. The gasket was replaced & the flow line was again sucessfully pressure
Generator Failure, power loss, followed by comms loss. When visited , battery voltage down to 10V. Platform still flowing and had not shut down.
While carrying out tests on well storm choke, the valve became dislodged from its locking nipple, moved up the hole hitting the underside of the partially open swab valve. It lodged itself in the
xmas tree. Due to its position both the hydraulic and manual master valves cannot be closed. The swab valve is inoperable. At the moment a procedure is being developed to kill the well and mill
out the tool. Further investigations will be required to identify the failure mode. HSE will be informed of the conclusion. This is the only Storm Choke we have in use.
Well head hydraulic failure for <...> platform alarmed on RN at 06:15 <...>. Due to poor weather intervention crew not sent out until 12:45. Platform was found to be fully shut down by the ESD
system. One of the Hydraulic Accumulators supplying hydraulics to the well bay valves was found to have fractured at its base, resulting in the accumulator being projected with great force out of
its holding. The pressure in the accumulator was 400 bar of both hydraulic oil and nitrogen. There was a large spill of hydraulic oil. All of the safety valves failed shut as per the fail safe ESD
logic. There are other redundant accumulators that can be brought on line. <...> have sent out a full investigation team, who will decide if the wells can be brought on line. HSE asked what was
being done to check if other accumulators were not in the same position and what risk assessment done to ensure any one working near the on line accumulator was safe. OIR9B requested. Full
<...> investigation report accumulator. <...> talked to <...> OIM <...>; 15:30 <...>.
Minor contact (scuff) by another inspection vessel <...> in the field at the time . Paint removed from one of the cross members on the jacket (steel) structure. Some damage to instruments on the
vessel. Damage to the ROV launch structure on the side of the vessel. The vessel has been stood off and sent off to <...> harbour to meet investigation team. Installation inspected by standby
vessel - photographs and witness statement have been taken.
Operation - Backloading of 4 1/2" drill pipe using the East crane - sea state 2.1 mtrs. Drill pipe weighing 4.6 te was being lowered down to the PSV <...> using the east crane (<...> OS215) whip
line (sw16.86 te.) During this operation the load began to drop. Crane Op slewed boom away from aft of <...> preventing the load coming into contact with vessel. Load came to a halt approx.
20ft below the sea surface. Preliminary investigation has identified equipment failure with the most likely cause being the failure of the whip line hydraulic motor - investigation ongoing
Due to insufficient clearance ROV could not be lifted overside by dedicated lifting machine. Manually handled ROV over rails but let go before tension transferred to dedicated ROV
lifting/umbilical line. Shock load broke wire rope and ROV fell into sea. Recovered SBV before it could sink - platform on annual shutdown
The weather conditions were very northerly gale force 9/10- est 56 knots at sea level. During the night the Talisman sign in the west sign of the monkey board on the derrick at 220 metres above
sea level sustained wind damage with a section becoming disodged. The panels are plastic - size 1. 5m in length and .50m wide. Weight - 2 kgs. At daylight it had been noted that the panel had
been lost rope access deployed to survey and confirm security of all other panels. On conducting a search of the area below the derrick no signs of the item could be located and it was assumed
that it was carried to sea by the strong winds at that time. No injury to personnel or damage to any other equipment was sustained. The event was not witnessed.
Rig 40 Mud pump No 2 was being fitted with a new valve cap retention system. The work was being undertaken by the platform drill crew. The valve cap retention system was being lifted from
the mezz. level to the lower level of the pump room by using a chain hoist on a dedicated Trolley Beam assembly. The valve was rigged with a 1 tonne webbing sling having its "eyes" passed onto
a T - piece on the cap retention module and the loop of the sling attached to the chain block, the estimated weight of the assembly - 400 lbs. Whilst lowering the new cap retention system down to
mud pump No. 2 the load came into contact with a steel mudline and became unsecured. The webbing sling came off the T - piece and slipped through the hook of the chain hoist and the load fell
2.5m to the floor striking the pulsating damper, support frame and charging pump enroute. No injury to personnel was sustained. The work was suspended immediately and the site secured. The
incident is currently under investigation.

A number of Samson posts were being removed from the south pipe deck. The task was nearly completed. To remove the posts a sling was double wrapped around the post followed by a single
wrap higher up. The Sampson posts were lifted with a crane. The IP was restraining the sling in position with the flat of his hand to avoid the single wrap opening up. As the crane took the strain
on the line, the pendulum effect of the line caused the line to pass over the left side of his left hand trapping his glove and nipping his hand. The IP subsequently suffered restriction of function of
his left hand. This resulted in him being incapacitated for part of his normal duties, i.e helideck Fire Team Leader, for more than three days. He has therefore not been deployed to the Helicrew,
but remains on duty as Deck Foreman.
During casing operations from the stabbing board Pig 2, the Le Fleur line nozzle caught on a thread of the casing which caused the Le Fleur hose to bend then spring towards IP. His hand was
caught between the Le Fleur nozzle and a top drive hose causing a compound fracture injury to his right index finger. Ip was medevaced at 0200hr on 7 June to Aberdeen General Hospital, where
it was later determined that amputation of the right index finger at the second knuckle was necessary. IP was then discharged from hospital on 7 June.
Two deck crewmen were preparing to lift a pump casing assembly (300kg), on a trolley barrow. There being no suitable pad eyes or other attachment points, wire rope slings had been attached by
choking them around the suction and discharge nozzle pipe work. These slings were attached to a pedestal crane hook. The banksman instructed the crane driver to commence lifting slowley with
the intention of lifting the assembly sufficiently high above the barrow to confirm that the assembly was properly balanced prior to conducting transfer of the pump onto the platform utility shaft.
The nature of this lift was such that the crane driver was blind at the hung location. After raising the pump by several inches it was clear that the slings required to be repositioned therefore, the
driver was instructed by radio to lower the load. When the assembly made contact with the barrow the top heavy nature of the load and orientation of the slings caused the barrow to lift in an
unstable manner and the load to move sideways crushing the finger of the IP against a steel waste skip. The load was made safe and later moved safety using a improved slinging arrangement.
Load testing area 10 overhead crane (proof load required was 12.5 tonnes). A written lifting plan was being followed by the technicians. The crane winch failed to raise the test load. The final
drive rotated at its entry into the winch drum but the drum did not turn. Removal of the winch and strip down revealed that the welds that secured the winch to the shaft had failed around the
entire circumference of the shaft. The (<...> year old) design did not incorporate splines or a key way. The welds provided the primary load path from shaft to drum.
Seven inch tubing was being removed to surface using a cut and pull casing spear assembly. The 7" tubing had been landed in the rotary table. An attempt was made to disengage the spear from
the tubing but was unsuccessful. The top stub of thr 7" tubing was broken out using the rig tonge. (The rig tongs and rotary table were used to break the connection instead of Weatherford tongs
due to the fact that the top stub could not be rotated while still engaged with the spear) Once the connection was broken, chain tongs were used to back out the connection. While backing out the
joint of tong.
Whilst racking back a stand of drill pipe in the derrick there was a sound of something falling onto the rig floor. After the stand was pulled from the elevators a part of a roller was found on the rig
floor. The roller was part of the elevator straightening system. No one was injured. No additional damage sustained. The rig floor was cleared, the top drive system lowered and examined. The
roller was approximately 6 or 7 ounces in weight with external diameter of 2.5" and an internal dia of 1.5". It fell approximately 100'. An investigation has commenced to identify the cause of
failure. The roller will be sent ashore for metallurgical examination.
While carrying out pre-use checks on the North Bop crane the <...> wireline supervisor functioned the crane gantry to the ground approx 5 meters. The crane was isolated and further investigation
found that a roller pin had parted from the rope guide. The pin weighing approx 7 ozs was intact and was replaced using the threaded retaining bolt. No personnel were injured.
Whilst changing out the hoist rope on the West crane, a sock which was attached to the hoist rope failed to grip the rope sufficiently. The rope was being spooled off the hoist drum along the jib to
the Cathead and down onto the spooling Unit on the Pipedeck. When the sock failed the rope passed through the Cathead sheave & dropped down to the Drilling Services Module Lower Level
East side laydown some 60 ft below. The rope being still attached to the Spooling Unit was spooled up onto the unit. No injury was sustained by Personnel. Corrective actions to prevent reoccurence: Check with Crane manufacturer as to any other means of performing rope change out other than using a sock. Consider repositioning Crane boom so that Cathead is not positioned
outwith handrails. Position Cathead above deck area. Check will be carried out on the competence of personnel fitting the sock to the hoist rope.

Whilst unloading casing joints from the supply vessel, <...>, a casing end protector weighing approx 10 kg fell approx 60cm onto the deck of the supply vessel. Weather and sea conditions at the
time were : Sea state - less than 0.5 metre wave height Wind Speed - less than 10 knots Supply vessel deck hands had cleared from the area prior to lift commencing. Investigation identified that
the locating clips on the casing end protector were loose. This was also found on other casing end protectors. <...> investigation report raised.
The IP (<...> Roustabout <...>) was removing the extraction tool from the centre strongback. The IP signalled to the crane operator to lift the extraction tool from its locating position on the
strongback. During this lift the extraction tool lost alignment and the IP used his hand to re-align the tool while the lift was in progress. At this point the IP's left hand glove was reported to have
snagged on the extraction tool preventing removal of his hand from the tool. The IP was unable to signal to the crane operator to stop the lift and his hand was crushed between the extraction tool
and a strongback brace. The IP suffered crush injuries to third, fourth and fifth fingers of his left hand and was medivaced to <...>.
A load of 0.5 Tonne max was being lifted with a chain block, SWL 1 Tonne, <...>. During early stages of the lift the chain block operating chain's ratchet mechanism failed allowing the block to
'freewheel'. The load was made safe by the Operative maintaining a continual hold on the operating chain of the block, and the load was then lowered safely back to deck level. Had the load been
suspended at a greater height, the consequences could have been far more serious.
A bundle of 3 steel beams (approx. 6 meters long) weighing between 0.2 & 0.3 tonnes was to be lifted from the pipe deck by the west crane. The beams were re-rigged on the pipe deck having
been lifted to that location by the east crane. The bundle was rigged using 2 x 1 tonne slings double wrapped & choked. In addition, due to the wet conditions, a fire blanket had been wrapped
around the bundle to prevent slippage of the slings - this also minimised the risk of damage to the slings. The load was rigged by two deck crew members & was visible to the crane operator, who
was also in radio contact with the deck crew. The deck operator gave the crane operator the instruction lift the load, they having failed to notice that one of the slings had become snagged on a
lifting lug on a deck hatch. As the crane took the weight of the load the deck crew stepped back clear of the tube bundle but within a second or two the snagged wire rope sling failed as it was
subjected to an overload. Both of the deck crew were close to the sling when it failed & sprung free but were not struck by it.
During the decommissioning and removal of a seawater lift pump, the submersible pump became detached from the discharge rider to which it was attached. The supply cable feeding the pump
dropped back down the main caisson along with the pump. The heavy duty cable struck the casualty on the hand before coming to a halt when the cable subsequently pulled out of the glanding on
the now free falling pump.
24 stands of excess 5 inch drill pipe were being run into the well from the derrick, in order to be laid down single by single. 12 stands had been run by the derrickman, who was then replaced by
one on the stand in derrickmen. As the IP put the 7th stand of drill pipe into the open elevators, it sprung back towards him. This occured at the movement he was leaning forwards to close the
hold of the stand. The movement of the stand when he grasped it, caused the back of his right hand to collide with the horn (handle) of the elevator. IP felt the impact and continued to run the
remaining 5 stands of drill pipe. On returning to the rig floor, he informed the driller and then the <...>. He then reported to the medic.
Backloading supply vessel with quad containers (containing empty Nitrogen bottle) which became caught in crew door opening in the stern wall of the vessel, concident with vessel motion in sea
swell. One of the four legs on the lifting set parted. Load lowered safely to vessel deck with no damage.
Whilst lifting christmas tree from wellhead to sub-base, using tugger (air), a lifting beam clamp fell or part failed and clamp fell. It struck man on head/neck a glancing blow (helmet was being
worn). No significant injury. IP is sleeping at the moment, is still on platform. (may be injury or d.o.). Tree was being moved from well centre, to corner of sub base to allow the BOP's to be
installed( Cranes waiting on weather). Tree was lifted by draw works on slings and pulled at bottom using 1.3 tonne sub base winch. During this operation, a beam clamp used in the rig up failed
and gave a glancing blow to the tugger operator.

Whilst conditioning mud system the driller had worked & tacked back stands 97 & 96. He then continued to work stand 95 over its 90' length. He brought the top drive down to rig floor level to
allow roughneck to wash off some mud debris. As he brought stand down towards drill floor he operated the link tilt mechanism to position elevators in fully extended "drill down" position. At
this point, driller handed control of operation over to assistant driller advising him to continue to work & rack back stand 95 whilst observing all relevant drilling parameters.Driller then left
drillfloor & went to KCA office. Assistant driller continued as instructed & raised stand 95 into the derrick. He inadvertently left elevators in fully extended drill down position. He thought this
overpull was attributed to a downhole problem. Driller had returned to drill floor at this point & took control of operation. Driller discovered that elevators had made contact with south monkey
board bumper bar, damaging steel work. Only other person in vicinity at time of incident was a roughneck who was preparing TRIC card in doghouse. He was unaware of incident. No personnel
were in the derrick at time of incident.
Monkey board commissioning was ongoing. Load test completed and the monkey board was being powered down to its rest position. The movement is initiated by an air ram directly below the
monkey board. The rate of descent of the monkey board was enough to engage the safety 'Skylock' fall arresters. The Operator was still attempting to drive the Monkey board down and the
continued downward motion of the ram overstressed the hard eye of the safety lines which were anchored at the top of the framework. The safety lines were pulled out of their hard ferrules and
the lines dropped down the side of the monkey board. The board then lowered to its rest position and made safe.
The load limit on a tirfor was exceeded while being used on coiled tubing operations. Coiled tubing operations were being conducted on BB25, as part of these operations there was a requirement
to split the BHA from the coiled tubing to recover spent perforating guns. The connector was split and then the injection head was being hydraulically jacked upwards to allow removal of
injection head by East Crane. There was a retaining wire attached between the injector head and the skid deck beams. This retaining wire was not removed prior to jacking injector head was
jacked upwards. Initial findings as to why incident occurred : lack of attention.
During skidding operations a section of shaker house hand rail over spilled out of its socket and fell two levels to the top of the wing tank. No injury was incurred. The area below was barrried off
as a precaution. And the area was to be clear.
While pulling out of hole well 39, top drive snagged strand of 5" drill pipe causing a long pin to shear and fall onto dog house roof. Air pressure problems in the top drive , causing pipe retaining
flippers to release pipe. Per OIR9B Whilst P.O.O.H. drillstring, the topdrive snagged a stand of 5" drill pipe causing a 5/8" dia. x 3" long pin to shear and fall to the drill floor, where it landed on
the doghouse roof. At the time of the incident, the driller had removed the elevators having been told that the Starracker had control of the stand.The top drive was retracted and driven down as
normal. The driller then observed that the stand in the Starracker had "more than normal" freedom to move and immediately stopped driving down.
The Crane pendant detached from the hook and fell 2ft to the deck. (No load). Whist positioning East Crane, in preparation to lift two conveyor slings from East side of conveyor to west side of
conveyor, the short pennant ring caught on lower scaffold fitting of temporary conveyor handrail. It then detached from the two fall hook block and landed on the pipe deck. All the work party
were clear of the incident.
While lifting the flush mounted spider from the rotary table, the air winch wire broke. The parted wire fell to the rig floor in two areas, around the winch itself and around the rotary table.
A cross over tool was being lifted by crane from the pipe deck to the drill floor. The cross over slipped out of the sling and fell approx. 7 feet to the walkway. Drilling operations were being
carried out at the time. The incident has been investigated.
While changing out a 12" butterfly valve on a service water manifold, using a chain block a link of chain failed. No injuries. Chain block will be returned for examination.
Preparations were being undertaken to remove a 10 tonne <...> gear trolley from an overhead beam for recertification. A scaffold tower had been erected to allow access to the beam and the
trolley. The scaffolders were moving the trolley to a position above the scaffold whilst operating the trolley. The gypsy chain bacame detached and struck one of the work party a glancing blow.
Travelling chain block was being removed from lifting beam, it was to be sent ashore for maintenance when chain detached itself and fell 12ft to floor below, chain did strike man holding the
chain (glancing blow) no injury. Chain associated wih chain block.
During operation to install BOP - A hand rail was dislodged and fell into the drilling sub base.

Annulus pump p65140 was being lowered into position when the pump started to run away pulling 2 x 30m-5 ton wire slings, 30m of electric cable and 30 m of discharge hose with its final pump
position not known at this time. The 1010kg Flygt submersible pump was being prepared for installation. The pump load had been transferred onto 2 x 2 ton wire slings which were attached to the
2 x 5 ton pump suspension slings with a single "Bulldog Grip" on each leg. The pump had been raised slightly and then lowered, to confirm rigging integrity, where upon the discharge hose was
connected to the pump. The pump was suspended in this configuration for approx 30 mins while the hose connection was being made, and upon commencing to lower the pump the 5 ton wire
slings ran through the "Bulldog Grips" rapidly and without warning , dragging all attached materials with it. The snatch load on the 2 ton wire slings when the 5 ton sling ferrule/thimble hit the
"Bulldog Grip" resulted in failure of both 2 ton slings.
The deck hatch cover from M2E to D2C was being replaced after having removed a large pipestool from D2C. The hatch cover was suspended on 2 slings and about 4" above the aperture when
one of the hatch liting points failed. The cover tipped at an angle and the snatch load caused the second lifting point to fail resulting in the hatch cover falling approx 12" through to D2C and
coming to rest on top of a redundant vessel. Damage was limited to a broken light fitting and denting to cladding around to a broken light fitting and denting to cladding around redundant
pipework. The shackles had pulled through the two lighting bars on the 4 x 4 hatchvoer which weighs 751bs. The lifting bars although slightly wasted in the middle, appeared of sufficient
diameter and hence strength to support the load. Subsequent investigation had revealed that most of the material, building the diameter of the bar, was 25 years of painted in corrosion products
with very little solid metal.
The Hydraulic workover unit, sited over <...> was rigged up for wireline operations from the pipe deck via a deck level sheave to the gin hole sheave and then through the HWV to pull the PES
HE3 plug. The equipment on the wireline were 2 1/8" flow petrol jars with a 400LB spring which fired at 650LBS, the max allowable is 1900LBS. The jars were used 5 times. When the operator
began sitting down the tool string to reset to reset the jars, the tool string parted at the counter head. The wire tangled at the deck level sheave which prevented the tool string from plummeting
down hole. A wire clamp was immediately fitted in front of the deck sheave to secure the wire. The ductility test was completed prior to use with the wire breaking at 27 turns (18 turns is the
minimum allowable) The area was barriered off as per procedures and winch operators followed correct procedures for the operation. The unit wire spool was changed in <...> when unit was
returned to beach. Previous use was on <...>.
During lifting of a compactor bag from the supply vessel, a gust of wind caught the bag and it overturned. The tools contained within the bag, nut splitter & needle gun, fell approx 100ft into the
sea.
Wireline personnel were pulling toolstring out of hole as per programme for well <...>. The tool string was at surface, operator was supervising trainee and teaching him how to tag the stuffing
box. Trainee tagged stuffing box first time ok. He lowered toolstring approx 1ft, but instead of putting wireline into neutral, he put it into gear. This lead to the toolstring hitting the stuffing box at
speed and the wire parted at the rope socket and fell to the wireline deck. The load cell hit wireline deck with force and parted. Pressure was applied to stuffing box to ensure no hydrocarbons
were released.
Back loading operations were ongoing, transferring drilling tubulars to vessel. Part of this operation involved picking up bundles of tubing & attaching labels to each sling. Bundles were picked
up in lots of three to a height of approx 4' from deck level, to allow access to attach labels. During one such operation, one of the three bundles moved to the left by 6'. This allowed end of bundle
to pass under top rail of a section of crash barrier/hand rail which runs along north end of pipe deck. (These sections have to be removable to allow rig skidding operations to take place).
Movement of the bundle lifted barrier section out of its location sockets & allowed it to fall to skid deck below (40'). Operation was stopped & foreman went down to skid deck to check for injury
or damage. Barrier section was found lying on deck adjacent to module 6 bulkhead. No persons were in area at the time & no damage was found. He immediately arranged for barrier to be lifted
back to pipe deck & refitted to its correct location. The incident was not reported until 13.00.
Newly installed topdrive varco unit being operated and hit the monkey board. No-one injured. Reason for immediate investigation is :- 1-this is one of 4 incidents related to drilling ops on <...>
since <...>. 2-concerns arising from <...> HSE offshore visits. The TDS Link tilt had been activated by the driller as he was lowering a string of fishing tools into the mousehole. A visual check
was made as the elevators descended past the monkey board then the driller transferred his attention to the tools as they entered the mousehole. As the blocks were lowered a noise was heard in
the derrick and on investigation it was evident that one of the link tilt operating arms had come into contact with the board and bent it downwards.

While operating the Topdrive (TDS) new unit - it is reported that a shift in wind direction caused snagging of one of the unibicals which freed at one end resulting in the free end and part of the
unbilical falling to the drill floor-no one injured (see reasons for investigation as given on the topdrive monkey board TIR Separate sheet) A change in wind direction caused one of the umbilicals
to snag on the bottom of the dolly track which is part of the top drive system, this resulted in the umbilical being pulled free from the top drive. The free end of the umbilical hose then fell back 30
feet to the drill floor. No injuries. Operations have been suspended. A review audit is being arranged.
Whilst running in hole with 5" drillpipe, the electrical umbilical for the top drive parted. One umbilical ring (metal) fell to the rigfloor. The umbilical parted when the topdrive was approx. 25ft
from the rigfloor, leaving 4ft protruding from it's conncection on the top drive. The remainder of the umbilical was hanging with the damaged end 2ft from the floor. No-one was injured. The area
was barriered off whilst the umbilical was isolated. Weather conditions. Wind- 22Gknots, 302 degrees, raining.
During backloading equipment to the vessel <...>, the West Crane pennant snagged on the base oil discharge line, bending the pipe and damaging the pennant.
Shackle pin and retaining nut became detached and fell to drill floor from monkey board.
1 fire pump being lifted (15 tonnes). Lift secured on top of case on runway beam. After lifting 4ft, 2 wheels of the lift on runway been tilted over. No affect on platform operations. Did not affect
other fire pumps. Team onshore is being set up to investigate. No hydrocarbon at the bottom of the casing. Team will prepare plan to take incident safety. During the lifting operation to remove
fire pump B riser the trolley hoist partially came off the lifting beam on one side. The riser was being lowered at the time to allow adjustment to the lifting arrangement to allow more height.
During routine deck operations a scaffold ladder beam was being lifted by the platform crane from a storage area on level one of the quarters and utilities platform to a level above. The area in
question has recently become more congested than normal with construction materials stored there for a forthcoming shutdown. As the lift commenced the ladder got caught on the edge of the
frame of a grit hopper stand which was located in this area for grit blasting operations. When the stand was dislodged it fell off and landed upside down on a walkway 2.5 metres away. Prior to the
investigation it was discovered that the frame of the stand, manufactured from I Beams was buckling, creating an ideal snagging point for the ladder beam to snag on, which it did.
<...> were in the process of traversing the BOP deck crane in order to change from the south lane into the north lane. During this operation the air exhaust fell from the 18 tonne crane motor to
the deck below, a distance of approx 10 metres. The weight of the exhaust is approx 1kg. The operative of the BOP crane was not injured and there was no damage to plant or equipment. The
incident was reported to the operative's supervisor who reported the incident to the HSE Co-ordinator and the OIM. They visited the scene and had the crane taken out of service until an
investigation is carried out.
A pump contractor had been given the task to remove three pump cartridges from our main oil line pumps PO4. PO5 and PO6. The platform rigger had hung lifting equipment above PO4 for the
task in hand. The equipment had been drawn from our rigging loft. During the process of lifting PO4's pump cartridge (weighing 2.08 tonnes) an <...> Chainblock HOL 3 mtr, SWL 3.1 tonnes
was being used. The incident took place when the pump cartridge was being lifted clear of the pump barrel prior to lowering. At this stage the cartridge suddenly moved downwards by two links
(approx 2"). The load was moved again as it was assumed that it was caught on something and the same slippage occurred. Further lifting equipment was then rigged to lower the load safely to the
deck. The chainblock in question was immediately quarantined and an incident investigation team formed to look at the problem. A serious occurrence report (SOR) has been raised and circulated
around other installations to warn them of potential problems with 3 tonne <...> chain blocks. The chain block has been sent in for examination by third parties to determine mode of failure. A
report on this is awaited. All <...> platforms have quarantined the same type of chainblocks till the report is available.
At 05:10 the night shift crane operator picked up a 1/2 tonne explosives box to backload onto the supply vessel. He had raised the boom from the rest and slewed over towards the box to be
picked up, lowering the hoist rope at the same time. The boom was positioned above the box (at approximately 30 -40ft radius ) and the boom control lever was placed into neutral, the engine was
put into idle, whilst the deck crew connected the load. As the operator raised the load and selected full revs, whilst hoisting up, he noticed that although the control lever was still in neutral the
boom was still rising towards the minimum radius position. The operator selected lower but the boom continued to rise. He lowered the load on the hoist to allow the deck crew to make the load
safe and he cut the engine, which stopped the boom. By this time the boom had overcome the boom stops and was approx. 5 - 10 degrees beyond the vertical point. Crane made safe. Cause - the
crane operator was not instrumental in the cause of the incident. The immediate cause of the incident was likely to be partial seizure of the boom hoist clutch assembly, specifically , the bell crank
pivot pin. No personnel injured - weather conditions - wind NW 18 - 20 kts - Visibility good (dark) - sea state 3 metres.
An attempt was made to pull a joint of 2 3/8ths pipe upwards using a 4.6te tugger and a one tonne strop. It was thought that the pipe had a slip joint in it which would be pulled open by this
action. The pipe did not have the type of joint that allowed this type of movement and so the strop parted.

Whilst carrying out function checks, following repairs to torque converter, the crane boom failed to halt at limit switch. The crane driver put the hoist into neutral position but the boom continued
to rise. The crane driver pushed the engine stop button, which stopped the boom raising. The boom had contacted the back stops and distorted them. The boom finished up in an almost vertical
position. Crane made safe and investigation carried out.
Location : BOP deck/Eggbox 2 The operation was to change the tree top access flange to access the 23/8" tubing rather than the 51/2 " tubing in preparation for slickline work. Two men were on
BOP deck operating the <...> hoist and two men working on scaffold tower below in eggbox, fitting bolts to flange. The operators on the BOP deck confirmed with the operators in the eggbox
sufficient bolts were installed on the flange and they were going to remove the lift cap and install the pressure retaining cap. It was removed using BOP deck hoist and placed a few feet away from
open hatch, where it was unhooked from hoist and laid on deck with sling, which was still threaded through the eye on the lift cap. The operator intended to lift the cap to one side, grasping the
ends of the sling, but as he started to move he slipped and one end of the sling fell from his left hand allowing the cap to slide onto the floor. The cap (31.5kgs) fell into eggbox striking one of the
operators on the shoulder. It then fell from the scaffold tower to lodge between a handrail and small bore pipe. For full report see OIR9B
3 men were attempting to pull a barrow laden with 2 mud pump motors, weighing approx 6.4tonnes in total, from top deck fab shop onto top deck following maintenance. Barrow had SWL of
10tnne. Bottom runner for sliding door protruded upwards about 1" & some difficulty was encountered when the barrow wheels came into contact with it. The men were using a Tirfor pulling
device, suitably anchored, but had run out of slack line before barrow had cleared the runner. Unsolicited assistance was offered by a crane operator who had witnessed problem. He lowered crane
hook to the men & they then attached to strops on barrow. Front wheels of barrow cleared runner as crane pulled, but as back wheels contacted runner, the front wheels of barrow came off the
deck & rose about 2' in the air. The 2 motors then slid off barrow onto the deck, causing some damage to barrow & to deck surface. All personnel were standing clear at time. Crane driver was
partially unsighted & no means of communication available other than hand signals. Unfortunately the men at the barrow had no knowledge of recognised hand signals. Investigation team
established to identify immediate & system causes of incident, & to develop recommendations, corrective actions & highlight lessons to be learned.
Whilst removing a single joint P/U elevator from a 2-7/8" dp joint, hand was caught between elevator and lifting nubbin, when pipe made slight drop in mousehole.
On arrival of vessel at platform crane operator picked up lift as required from the vessel onto the platform the container was decanted to the platform deck then set back on the vessel, on returning
the container to the boat the skipper requested that the crane move some of his (five bundles of drill pipe) deck cargo for him so that his deck crew could put deck post in place to prevent his load
from moving as they were expecting some bad weather. The crane operator then moved four bundles of drill pipe without any problem but on moving the fifth bundle a joint of pipe came loose
from the bundle and landed on top of some containers which formed part of his deck cargo. At this point a swell came through under the vessel which then caused the vessel to roll and
subsequently the joint of pipe went over the starboard side aft of the vessel.
Travelling block (lifting device) run into crown saver whilst running out of the hole. Damage to crown saver structural steel work and torque tube support.
Whilst changing out old winch cable, connecting sock between old and new wire fouled on crown block sheave causing wire to part from sock and fall to drill floor.
Whilst replacing potable water bunkering hose in parking position - the hose came adrift of the hammer lug fitting at boat end-flexible hose and remaining lengths fell to main deck laydown area,
striking GA glancing blow on back. Action taken:WO raised 1430719 to fit pipe spool from upper deck to main deck with a drain valve - to allow draining of hose prior to storage - amend
maintenance instructions to include cutting slipping hose at ferrule and every 3 months.
Two men were lowering a channel beam down to their workplace using a one ton chainblock, the chain snagged and came away from block.
<...> comments The <...>-platform is being commissioned with <...> on site drilling. At about 10.30, <...>-platform crane was tested after commissioning. Crane manufacturer contractor <...>'s
crew on board. Crane tested by picking up 10ton pod containing H2 bottles. Crane failed & pod fell over side. Boom went down (brake failure). Load recovered vy SBV. Crane driver &
contractors treated for shock. Much damage to platform. Investigation ongoing. FORM 9B: Functional testing of <...> crane by crane manufacturers, <...>, with weight of 10tne when crane failed
causing boom to fall & strike north east corner of platform. This test had been done numerous times during preceeding days without incident. Weather: Seas 5sec swell, wind 220, 10knots. Full
invest. being carried out by <...> in conjunction with <...>.
A pipe fitter was working with a rigger to instal a 3" stainless steel spool on a raised scaffold. The spool had a pipe support shoe welded in place near the end being handled by the pipe fitter. His
right hand was holding this as the item was being moved into position. Due to shifting weight, the spool moved and trapped the person's small finger between the support shoe and a small cable
tray running across the scaffold. Crush and lacerations to right small finger requiring steri-strips. Over 3 days RWI. Unexpected movement of the spool piece being handled. Lack of due care and
attention by injured person - getting on with the job. Insufficient attention to the potential hazards on TOFS. Personal Counselling in standard of care given.

ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE OIR/9B The drill crew were engaged in setting down drill pipe. Having lowered a single into the mousehole the joint was unlached. Roughneck released the jaw
with his left hand and then moved over to his right and repositioned his left hand on the right elevator horn to pull that jaw clear of the drillpipe which it was hooked on. This was done within 1"
of the drill floor, resulting in the elevator body catching or rocking back towards the closed position while his hand was still on the horn. With his hand still holding the elevator horn it was pulled
against the drill pipe creating a pinch situation between the pipe and the handle. Stopped job. IP given treatment by medic and subsequently hospital treatment onshore. Investigation and time out
for safety before resumption of drilling. Instruction issued to all drillcrew that hands should be kept clear after unlatching the elevator. Review operation procedures for elevator handling - amend
and implement changes as appropriate.
At 1000 on <...> a wireline mast transported as deck cargo, was being lifted from the supply vessel <...> to the helideck lay down area using "A" crane on the NW corner. The mast was a <...>. It
is fitted with an inertia reel "emergency shut off" air line hose, bolted in a crash guard frame on the side of the unit. When the mast was lifted from the deck of the <...>, the lifting bridle caught
under the crash guard frame and sheared the 3 retaining bolts. The reel and frame were left suspended by the inlet and running end of the air hose. The deck crew observed the situation and
continued to lift the unit to the platform via outboard arc. No personnel/equipment were under the load during the transfer. As the unit was being brought into the landing position, the inlet end of
the air hose parted, resulting in the running end paying out and the reel assembly dropping 3' onto the top of an adjacent container. The load was landed and the reel made safe. An investigation
was initiated and it determined that the unit was requested to be transported in at half height, but this did not happen. This would have prevented the snagging of the bridle when lifting a vessel.
Travelling hook of 12 Ton gantry crane sheared at the shoulder as a 10 ton wireline unit was being lifted to move its position. (Well within the SWL). Type <...> Pneumatic chain hoist Model
<...> Hook suspension with Pendant Control. The catastrophic failure occurred without warning as the crane was taking the strain. The load had not left the deck level so there was fortunately no
danger to personnel from dropped load. The same crane had transferred the same wireline unit without incident across the impact deck earlier in the operation. Certification is in order. Operations
were ceased immediately and incident investigation initiated. All other gantry cranes in this area were quarantined from use. The mode of failure is to be determined by technical analysis. The
failed unit and all others are being removed onshore for detailed inspection.
During the afternoon of the <...> at 1600hrs the IP was part of the deck crew, who were in the process of lowering a drilling sub ( aprox 4" in length and weighed 200kg) into a half height for
return to shore. Once the load was landed in the half height in vertical position, the IP was steadying the load, the load swug towards the edge of the half height. At this point the IP quickly
rmoved his hand from the sling and struck his letf forearm between elbow and wrist. The IP did not report this injury until the following morning as he felt no discomfort until then. The <...>
(health) examined the IP and intially treated him and classed the injury as restricted work injury due to bruising ( this after consultation with onshore doctor). The IP left the platform on <...>. The
IP visited his GP who referred him for x ray on <...>. Injury was then diagnosed as a fracture.
Whilst landing a container on the Galley landing area on the south side of the <...> platform using the south crane, a piece of tubular aluminium which was part of the outer perimeter of the helideck netting support structure , fell to the cellar deck (120ft) below. It missed two deck crew, standing on galley landing area and was observed by one of them who discovered the object on the
south cellar deck walkway. The object weighed 9 kg and was 4ft in length. It is concluded that the crane wire had come in contact with the edge of the helideck whilst landing a container on the
galley landing area which caused the object to fall. However this contact was not the primary cause of the tubular section becoming detached from the support structure. Previous damage to the
helideck had caused the tubular section to have become detached and it was dislodged by contact with the crane wire. The exact cause and timing of original damage cannot be established but is
associated with either direct contact with a load or by the crane wire snagging on the edge of the heli-deck. Underlying cause was conflict between south crane operations and Heli-deck perimeter
due to the design change introduced when the replacement accommodation was fitted in <...>. For rest of report see OIR9B
The drill crew were pulling 8 5/8" casing out of M37 well in preparation for a re-drill. They were laying single joints down in the 'V' door using single joint elevators. The weight of a joint is
approximately 1500 Lbs and the lifting equipment on the elevators is rated at 5 t SWL. As the driller lifted one of the joints from the casing string the hammerlock fitting which attaches the swivel
to to the master link parted. The joint of casing was at this point still sitting in the box (female) threads of the casing which was still in the hole and this prevented it from falling across the drill
floor. On examination of the lifting equipment there appears to be some distortion of the master link although this can not be verified to have happened at the same time as this incident.

ABRIDGED VERSION - SEE OIR/9B Whilst moving a gas lift choke from the upper deck to the wellbay deck walk way using the east crane, the load was caught by a gust of wind and hung up
on the handrails. The deck operator radioed the crane driver to stop the booming up motion to prevent any damage to the load or handrails. Unfortunately before the operation stopped the strop
parted and the choke fell into the sea. The Facilities Supvs, OIM & Safety officer informed who checked platform drawings to ascertain if there were any pipelines etc. in the area where the object
was dropped & observed production trends for any changes. Following a discussion with the OIM & Production Supv it was felt there was no need to stop production, as there was no indication
of any susceptible pipelines or changes in production trends. It was ascertained that the operation was carried out as per the normal platform practice. That is to say two members of the team
dispatched the load from the top which was subsequently handed over to the other two members of the team at the wellbay deck level via the radio. It should be noted that the crane driver was
unable to see the landing point and was relying on the banksman slinger for guidance. When asked if they would carry out this operation any differently in future, the general concencus of the
Crane was lifting an empty hook and ball in preparation to slew the jib to pick up another lift. With the hook some 2 metres above the deck there would have been enough clearance to commence
slewing and at this height the ball would have been about 4-5 metres above the deck. The crane driver heard a hissing sound and pushed the operating handle back to the neutral position to set the
brake but the hook and ball free-falled to the deck. The crane driver switched off the engine and both brakes came on so no rope continued to spool off the drum. There's no damage to the deck
other than a few scratches. Crane ball had free-fallen some 4 metres onto the pipe-deck narrowly missing some tote tanks and landing about 3-4 metres away from one of the deck crew operatives.
Immediate Action: Isolated crane. Initiated Investigation (Onshore team being sent out). Weather conditions at time: not relevant in this case.
Employee (IP) was assisting in laying out Drillpipe and was banking a double lift down onto the deck beams. Due to poor communication procedures between himself and the crane driver, the
load was lowered onto his foot causing a minor crush injury. Subsequent Medivav and X-ray at ARI showed no fractures to any bone.
During routine drilling operations part of the Varco top drive unit (Link Tilt assembly) was kept in the Hydraulically operated open mose. When the Varco was drawn up past the Monkey board
the Yoke and actuators contacted the derrickboard, cleared but were sheared when the Varco was lowered through on the return journey. The Onshift Driller was in the Doghouse at the time of the
incident. No other personnel were either in the Derrick or on the Drillfloor at the time of the incident.
During pulling out of hole operations on rig 81, a small metal guard from the monkey board air tugger fell approx 85ft onto drill floor.
Failure of lifting equipment. Main wire rope being reeved in preparation for the drilling operation. A soft rope was coupled to the main wire rope using an approved snake connector. Two drill
crew were spooling the main rope from the drum around the dead man anchor and the soft rope was passing over the crown block sheeves. Monitored by the derrickman. Operation was being
controlled by the driller in the dog house. During the operation the coupling between the soft rope and the main wire parted and the wire rope fell from the crown to the drill floor. The operation
was stopped and there will be an investigation to why it happened.
Manriding winch pneumatic emergency back up system was overpressurised which resulted in rupture and disintegration of the air mist lubricator. A new manriding winch had been installed on
the drill floor. This had an emergency back up system which was designed to provide operation of the winch in the event of loss of the primary air motive power. A 200 Bar.g N2 cylinder with
pressure regulator and hose had been connected up to the winch. Day shift drilling mechanic attempted to test the unit and during this the air mist lubricator disintegrated. A floorman working at
the choke manifold nearby was hit on the buttock by a small piece of shrapnel and sustained slight bruising and felt a ringing sensation in his ears.
Divertor assembly was being lowered through the rotary table in to the divertor housing. During this operation the lower section of the assembly became disconnected and dropped approx 3ft on
to the top of the bell nipple on the bop stack
Drilling operations on new platform well were ongoing. A seal on one of the hydraulic motors for the monobeam pipe handling system had failed. The complete motor assembly was replaced with
a new unit and the motor was being test run. Whilst building up the hydraulic pressure to the motor, the four end cover bolts on the control shutter housing field and the shuttle valve fell
approximately 30 metres to the drill floor. The drill floor had been barriered off and all personnel excluded from the area during the function testing. The failed hydraulic motor was the same pipe
as the original varco unit, but from a different manufacturer <...>. Following the incident the motor was examined but detailed checks by the vendor are required to establish the root cause of the
failure. The hydraulic power system itself is also being investigated before the moonbeam system is put back into operation.

Drilling directional hole with mud motor stalled and was pulled off bottom to restart it.While lowering back to bottom, operator was distracted by a high level alarm on the TOTOO monitoring
system. Operator continued to lower drill drive while checking alarm. Drill bit bottomed out and approx 100klbs was lowered onto the bit. This caused the drill pipe above the rotary to bend. This
put extra force on the top drive alignment cylinder. The cylinder sheared and a 5lb piece of steel fell approx 60 ft Top drive - Varco TDS 4-3
<...>.The glycol hose fitting near the top of the wireline lubricator was ripped off after becoming snagged in the rising chain of an air hoist. There was a gas release from the lubricator. The
wireline BOP was closed, shearing the wireline and isolating the well.The air hoist was not being used at the time; it appears that the safety catch on the hoist was impacted by a nearby sheave,
causing the load chain to drop down and the non-load chain to rise inadvertently. Incident investigation report received from <...> who followed up during inspection on <...>.
Operation. Driving 26" conductor. During this operation the long drive shoe had to be lifted from the catwalk to the rig floor to be installed under the pile hammer. Once the chaser is connected to
the hammer the crane transport slings are removed. This is done by feeding some slack into the double wrapped sling which in turn allows the sling to slide down the chaser, was deflected by an
elevator sitting on the rig floor and fell, (still double coiled). 40' to the level below. The sling had fallen through a 10 inch gap situated around a joint of conductor which was protruding through
the rotary table. The weight of the sling was 28kg.
Whilst lifting a spreader beam from the supply vessel <...> approximately 3 to 4 metres above the vessel deck, a length of timber, about 7ft (4x4) 4.6kg in weight, fell on to the vessel deck. Noone was injured. As the platform (crane driver) did not see anything untoward with the suspended load, he continued the lift onto the platform. At approx. crane cab eye level, he noticed another
loose piece of wood on the load. He shouted a warning, (by radio), to the drilling deck crew, to stay clear. The wooden length then blew off the load and fell approx. 16 metres onto the chemical
lay down area on the north of the D.P platform level 3. Again, no one was injured. The sea state was calm, with only mild wind at the time of the incident.
While trapping out of the hole for a bit change. An object fell out of the derrick and landed on the drilling dog house roof. Two roughnecks were working on the drill floor when the object fell.
The object was identified as a PHM/TDS anti-collision proximity sensor, and had fallen from a height of around 120ft. The operation was shut down while an inspection of derrick sensor area was
made and confirmed safe to continue opreations. Sensor head demensions 2" x 2" x 2" weight = 8 ounces.
Coil tubing equipment was rigged up on Well J1 and the coil was in the hole at the time attached to a packer which was net at approx. 13595'. The next part of the operation was to pump seawater
into the well. While starting the power pack which supplies hydraulic pressure to operate the coil tubing equipment, it appears that one lever was in the wrong position during start up and because
the coil reel was chained off preventing it from turning the injector activated and pulled the reel up approx. 10" and pulled the keir over approx. 20 degrees. The gooseneck on the injector was
bent over but there was no hydrocarbon release. The operation was suspended and remedial action was planned and undertaken to return the reel and keir to their original position.
The crane mechanic/operator had just completed work on the G1 north crane as part of annual crane maintenance. The G1 crane was fitted with a four fall main block rigged for two falls with an
8ft pennant lifted via a master link to the hook. At approx 11:15 am whilst lifting the crane boom from its rest and simultaneously lowering the main block ( intent was to lower block to deck for
visual inspection) the pennant and hook fouled a handrail section on the eastside pipedeck walkway. As the hook hung up on the handrail, the pennant master link was dislodged from the hook
and fell outboard of the handrail approx 30ft down to the main deck walkway below, narrowly missing a member of the drilling team. There was no injury or significant damage to the platform.
Weather conditions at the time were very good with full visibility and very little wind speed. The block and hook were taken out of service . Following checks, a single fall block was fitted and the
crane returned to service. A detailed investigation is underway, investigation report to follow.
While proceeding to lift the wire line lubricator, a link in a chain assembly failed. Certificates for the lifting equipment show it was inspected <...>. The lifting equipment is specifically used for
the operation and was being used as intended. Initial investigations indicate the link failed at the weld. The item will be sent onshore for examination to determine the cause of failure.

Operation : Drilling Derrick upgrade works. Weather: 360 deg 22 knts Sea state 2.5 mts. Angle tie brace fell 40ft (approx) level between Girth 5 & 6 on drilling derrick to rig floor. Angle brace
dimensions:- Weight 8.5 kgs size 2"x2 1/2" X 7ft. New section of steelwork rigged into position, marked off and drilled. The above mentioned section was removed by means of releasing 2 x
securing bolts at top leaving 1x bolt securing bottom section. (This practice was carried out several times prior to incident) On releasing the top bolts, the section of angle iron broke free and fell
to rig floor. From the preliminary investigation , it has been concluded that the cause of failure was a fracture at the single bolt hole. Section of failed steelwork sent ashore for analysis which will
determine the action of plan for further work.No injury to personnel or damage to equipment was experienced.
At approx 1215hrs the wireline crew were laying out & setting up their equipment on the East side of the Skid Deck. As one of the crew members walked towards the Shaker House & when he
was approx 4 - 5 feet away from the North Skid Beam an object dropped from somewhere above. It fell and struck the deck to within a couple of feet to the left of him. He noticed that the object
bounced and landed under the pipework from Rig 40 Pit Room, at this time he identified the object to be a scaffold base plate. The W/L Op reported the matter immediately to the supervisor who
was at the worksite. The Supervisor in turn reported to the <...> Supervisor who was in the vicinity at this time. The <...> checked out the area above - the Pipe Deck & Shaker House Roof, he did
not find anyone working in the area & nothing untoward was observed. The <...> contacted the OSA who also went to investigate & pictures were taken of the site. It has been unable to establish
a cause for this incident, the most likely being poor housekeeping. No injury to personnel was sustained or any damage to equipment. Weather: WSW, 10knts, Overcast, dry.
Person was removing an empty compactor bag from a storage area adjacent to the compactor machine. The 14.5kg metal weight which is placed on top of the bags to prevent them blowing in the
wind slipped off and fell through small opening between the deck kick plate and bulkhead, landing area approx 25' below. No injury to any personnel. Weight has been removed and area is to be
made secure to prevent any object from falling through opening. This incident is under full investigation.
A steward was in the process of tidying the Galley Cold Store when a ceiling panel adjacent to the bulkhead fell. The panel missed the steward by approx. half a metre, landing at an angle of
approx. 45 degrees against the top of the entrance door and stacks of bottled water. An investigation/traction report has been raised on the platform.
An operations technician whilst going about normal duties noticed a sign lying on the walkway at the NW corner of the cellar deck. It weighed 2.5 kgs and measured 50cm x 20cm. It had fallen
from the mezzanine level above, a height of approx 6 metres. The weather was windy - wind speed approximately 40 - 45 knots. Further investigation revealed that it had fallen due to metal
fatigue at the fixing points due to the repeated action of the wind over a long period (sign had been in place since platform commissioning). Full survey of similar signage carried out by the
platform staff. One other sign found in poor condition. Traction investigation report raised.
5/8" bolt vibrated loose from top drive and fell 20 feet to drill floor. No injury or damage was sustained due to policy of no personnel on drill floor during milling operations.
Shortly after the steward closed the rear door of the galley, he heard a noise which turned out to be a ceiling panel falling from the mess room ceiling, located immediately above the milk
dispenser. There were no personnel seated in the mess room at the time.
Small pieces of de-laminated steelwork found on walkway. Support beam for overhead walkway gratings corroded/affected by weather. Largest piece found on walkway approximately 0.23kg and
beam approximately 6-7 metres from deck.
A handle of winch control weighing 300grammes broke off and fell 90ft to drill floor. No personnel in area.
A roller bearing on the dolly truck carriage fell 50-60 feet to the rigg floor. They were picking up the cat walk to skid the rig. The casing of bearing might have failed because the bearing pin had
been recovered in tact. No injuries. Searching for pieces and have recovered about 1.5 tonnes of materials. Waiting to hear from one of the HSE inspectors before anything is fixed.
The derrickman was adjusting the guide vanes on a discharge elbow section of the HVAC system in the active pit room. The elbow section became detached from the main ducting section and fell
a distance of 2 metres onto the floor of the pit room. The elbow section weighed approx. 60 kg and was secured to the main ducting section by alloy pop rivets. The pop rivets had failed allowing
section to fall. Incident took place in active pit room - no injuries. Derrickman was adjusting guide veins on a discharge elbow section of the HVAC system in the active pit room. The elbow
section became detached from main ducting and fell 2m to floor of pit room. It weighed 60k and was secured by alloy rivets - rivets failed.
Whilst erecting scaffold in D3E mezzanine scaffolder transported from boards onto storage area, one clip was inadvertently allowed to fall through a penetration. The clip ricocheted off various
structures reducing its momentum before entering the east drill , which was occupied by a team of abseilers carrying out annual inspection.

During routine drilling operations, a section 7 inches long of the belveille spring on the top drive fell about 100ft and landed on the drilling doghouse roof. There were no people on the rig floor at
this time. Weight of spring 1 1/2 pounds.
Failure of <...> Topdrive. Whilst drilling well <...>, the bale arms opened violently resulting in the fracture of 2 retaining clamps and damage to the bale arms. One of the clamps struck a
roughneck a glancing blow on the shoulder. He saw the medic and returned to work. The well was suspended and made safe.
Drillpipe finger latch (approximate weight 2 kgs) fell from Monkeyboard level, landing on cover of drilling line spool (external to derrick). No-one injured.
Normal pipe handling operations and on working the TDS to allow racking back a stand of drill pipe. A clevis hinge pin connecting the chain to the drill pipe elevator link clamp assembly
dropped from the 90 degree level. The top drive was lowered to the drill floor and hinge pin found. Investigation ongoing.
Vessel <...> was conducting an ROV survey and was moving station yesterday evening, when the taut wire clump weight of the <...> taut wire system Mk8-15S was lifted from the seabed in
preparation for the vessel move to another face of the platform.The vessel was moving because her engine exhaust was hanging in the air and becoming noticeable to persons accommodated on
the <...>. Soon after starting to lift the clump weight the taut wire parted and fell to the sea bed. Approx 107m of wire was connected to the 350 kg weight which dropped approx 4m to seabed at
<...> of the SE corner of the platform. A <...> ROV was in the water in its <...> garage at the time and this was dispatched to video the landing site and provide a survey fix on the clump weight
location. This was confirmed to be in open flat seabed with no pipelines or structure in the vicinity by camera and sonar.The wire was visible figure eighted on the seabed adjacent and around the
clump weight which was sitting on the seabed in its normal orientation. The incident was immediately reported to the <...> CCR and the vessel completed her move to the south face and used an
alternative ROV mounted transponder as a third reference to set up on DP while fitting the replacement clump weight to the taut wire to resume normal operations . Fitment of the replacement
At 1950 hrs on <...>, <...> flare ignitor was discovered on the south west stairway landing area leading from level 1 to level 2, adjacent to the Shallow Gas Lift package, by an Ops Electrical
Tech. carrying out his routine tour of duty. The flare ignitor tip, weighing 3 kgs., had fallen approx 200 ft, passing through the stairway overhead mesh prior to landing on the kennedy grating.
Platform areas with the potential of being subjected to further dropped objects from the flare were barriered off. At first opportunity during daylight hours, photographs were taken by helicoptor to
assess if further dropped objects were imminent from the flare top Weather at time of discovery:- Wind speed 25/30 Knots, drizzle During the day prior to the incident the weather was sunny with
wind speed 20/25 Knots.
Several lengths of cable tray total length 3 metres dropped onto the deck outside the heli clerks office at between midnight and 05.15 am on <...>. They dropped from approx 6m. A member of the
helideck crew spotted the tray on his way into the heli office to start work. He barriered the area off and reported it to the safety dept immediately. The area is underneath the centre of the
helideck. There was no injury at any time. It would seem that a combination of corrosion weakening the bolted attachments, wind and vibration from helicoptors arriving and departing were the
main contributing factors to the cable tray sections falling to the deck below. As the cable tray was redundant and in an inaccessable area it has been overlooked during routine visual inspection.
What is disturbing about this incident is that it is almost an exact mirror image of one that took place on <...>. It is with regret that the corrective action of reviewing the frequency of cable tray
inspection does not seem to have been timely enough to identify this specific hazard. The abseiling inspection that was carried out in response to the accident the last time seems lacking in its
suitability and sufficiency. Outwith the inspection by the abseilers the yearly routine inspection cannot hope to be effective if it involves only a superficial visual inspection of cable trays from the
Mechanics and technicians were woking on NW crane at the level (approx 10m from the deck.) A 10m (approx) section of boom cable was being removed. The cable had become slack on the
drum and was tangled. The crane mechanic tied it off and proceeded to cut the boom cable in order to remove one wrap off the drum. He fed the end to his colleague who was standing at the same
level. His colleague directed it down to the deck level below. The mechanic then cut the other end of the wire rope. His colleague tied a length of rope around the end and used this to lower it
down the last couple of metres. The piece of rope used was not long enough to ensure the cable could be lowered all the way down so he let it free fall thinking it would fall on to the deck below.
It dropped three levels in between the gap at the west side of the accommodation module and the stairwell hitting areas of ducting and pipework ( no damage observed) It was deflected into the
sea at level 1.
Hi rope abseillers were engaged in preparing PO3 discharge line in the MOL for painting. The pipe work was at floor level as were the abseillers.Whilst buffing the discharge line, one of the
abseillers struck a nearby crude oil sample line with his elbow, dislodging a swage lock compression fitting that was attached to the end of a sample line. This resulted in crude oil escaping for 10
- 15 seconds at 15 bar. The sample pipework was from the MOL booster pump discharge line approx 1 metre in length, made from small bore stainless steel tubing, size 3/8th. The fittings were all
compression type. One of the abseillers was able to quickly isolate the line upstream of the sample point .Approx 5-6 litres of HC is thought to have been released. All HC was contained. There
was no F&G alarm or action. FOR FULLER REPORT SEE OIR9B.

A 110v magnetic clamp type 110v fluorescent fitting was temporarily clamped to container to get it out of the way by a technician who was in the process of disconnecting and securing it.
Unknown to him within minutes the container has backloaded onto a boat. While in transit to being sited on the boat the container came into contact with another and the fitting became dislodged
and fell to the deck - a fall of approx six feet. No one was under the lift. The fixture was retrieved , checked and found to be in working order.
Work was ongoing in the drilling derrick by <...> personnel sub contracted by <...> to upgrade and refurbish the <...> derrick in preparation for spudding of the forthcoming <...> well. Two <...>
technicians were working at the 85 ft level of the derrick putting up an angle on an 'H' beam diagonal for handrails. Part of the operation required the angle to be clamped to the beam and holes
which needed to be drilled marked using a Claver clamp (type of 'G' clamp). The clamp was attached to the steelwork at one end and tied off with rope to a fixture at the other end. On completing
their operations the technicians released the clamp from the steelwork and proceeded to release the tied off rope end by undoing the rope knot. Unfortunately the Claver clamp and rope slipped
from the glove of one technician and fell to the drillfloor where IP was standing with <...> supervisor assessing requirements for next job. The clamp fell circa 85 ft and struck IP on right shoulder.
Claver clamp dimensions- overall length 15.5 inches and 1.9 kg weight. IP's initial position was in the driller's doghouse but as soon as he saw his supervisor in the area of the drillfloor he went to
assist him. Supervisor had proceeded to drillfloor from pipedeck though erected barrier. IP was medivaced to Aberdeen Royal Infirmary for x-ray but was released later with severe bruising.
Shackle pin dropped from roof of M4 through pipe penetration to M4 floor below.Area below was barriered off at time of incident as part of work precautions. No persons were within barriered
area at the time.
ABRIDGED VERSION OF TIR REPORT. Two sections of oily water caisson (MHL) removed, the rest secured to the spider deck. At 08:30 hrs <...> part of the remaining caisson seen to have
disappeared (fallen into sea). Lost; about 20metre of 36" caisson weighing approx 5T (in air). Remaining caisson secured using 2 x 25T winches at +12 level. Various checks to review potential
damage from dropped caisson undertaken - first pass assessment shows no problems. ROV being sourced to check location of fallen caisson. Per OIR9B At 06:00 a rigger was checking in DM5
(diving station under cellar deck) and noted that the caisson was still suspended as it had been left overnight. When he revisited the area he found that the caisson had dropped into the sea. A
ROV was mobilised for jacket inspection. The jacket was inspected from top to bottom in the drop zone and no damage was found.
The C1 crane (west side) had been moving the BJ coil tubing equipment from west to east across the pipedeck. Both cranes were then used to lift the coil over the centre catwalk. The C1 crane
was then shut down and parked with the boom facing the derrick. The work was progressed just using the C2 crane (East side). After about 5 mins the light fell from the mounting on C1 crane,
this mounting was 130ft above the deck. The total light fitting which weighed 40 lbs had caused both securing bolts to unscrew (these bolts are a solid fixture, not a swivel) and the fitting fell to
the deck on the outboard side of the top driven diesel power pack. The weather at the time was 27 knts 160 deg. The crane was lowered and the other light inspected, the bolts were found to be
loose.This light was removed. Both lights on this crane were installed on the <...>. Both these lights were fixed securely at the time.
ABRIDGED - SEE OIR/9B The down draft from landing helicopter was directed across solid deck of 'parking area' on Module 15 roof outwith landing area where a scaffold board was picked up
& flipped over handrails & fell onto pipedeck below. Parking area was part of original design for Chinook operations & isn't used for current aircraft operations. For ongoing construction
operations a number of heavy pipe sections etc had been laid in this area. Subsequently scaffolders had bundles of boards in this area for use on scaffolds being built in the proximity. Slings had
been pulled back of top bundle leaving them free to be moved, management team identified further items in area that could have equally been wind blown dropped objects. Distance between
aircraft position & boards is well outside landing area, however solid deck will have prevented down draft being dispersed. It is evident from investigation that personnel, including helideck crew
haven't recognised potential for objects to be affected by helicopter down draft. Individual responsible for leaving slings off also left potential for bundle to have fallen over. Other boards objects
being used had been left lying without due thought to hazard potential. Lack of due care & attention to storage & handling of materials. Too many materials being supplied to platform for storage
Whilst cleaning up after job completion an <...> Technician noted that a Purge nozzle from the HVAC System had fallen from its mounting on the roof of M7. The purge nozzle is made of
lightweight spiral stainless steel and weighs 0,40kgs. The area was barriered off and an abseiling team directed to inspect the remainder of the nozzles. During inspection a further 30 of the
nozzles showed signs of metal fatigue and were removed.
A valve and gear box was being dismantled - isolations had been carried out for the job the previous evening. The gearbox thrust housing needed to be stripped to access the shaft nut. Sixteen cap
screws that hold the housing to the valve had to be removed. Twelve of these had been removed before the workforce broke off for lunch. When work was resumed after lunch, and the remaining
four cap screws were removed, the valve spindle was propelled into the air taking part of the gearbox with it. It is believed that there was a build up of pressure and investigation is under way.

A piece of metal flashing (stainless steel) 2.6 metres in length, 220mm x 240mm, 1mm thick weighing 6.7 kgs fell from the South West corner of the Drilling Derrick and landed approx 230ft on
the North side of the Skid Deck on the <...> Package damaging a light fitting. Normal activities although no personnel were in that area. Cause still under investigation. Exposed area of skid deck
barriered off and personnel prohibited fron entering . 2 x Abseiling teams mobilised from <...> to inspect derrick.
A section of 2" pipe 2.5 m long with a .25 elbow c/w its pipe support fell 2m to deck - total weight of assembly was 16kg. The 2.5 length was vertical to the floor, the elbow hit the floor first with
the other end toppling over brushing against the leg of a worker nearby as it came to rest on the floor- the worker received no injury. The pipe had been cut earlier into two pieces and the lower
half held in place by a single pipe support 1m from the elbow to a section of unistrut attached to a support beam on the deck head above. The personnel working on level 2 were attempting to
remove a 1" branch from the upper of the two cut sections , this operation caused a guage on a nearby salt water line to snap off causing a water leak. The work stopped whilst a repair was made
and the water mopped up. A steward was called in to mop up in the plant room below and equipment and barriers were removed to give him access. Once the guage was replaced up on level 2 the
crew returned to tidy the site and make safe the upper section of pipe they had been working with when the leak stopped. Whilst securing the upper section the lower section fell to the floor of the
plant room below.The pipe support had come free from the unistrut, the pipe support had been visually checked prior to cutting the pipe on the level above.This assembly must have been loose
A helicopter was landing on the heli-deck above, and as vibrations peaked, a ceiling mounted overhead projector in the cinema on the top deck of the accommodation was heard to fall from its
mounting onto a sofa below. The projector weighed 7kg and fell 2m. No one was using the cinema seating area at the time.
During routine operations the platform was in normal production when a machined stainless metal object weighing 4.25 kg (100mm dia x 75mm long) was discovered in the walkway adjacent to
"A" generator set. This was a machined item and unfamiliar to the platform crew. The wind that evening was slight, although over the past two weeks, the platform had been subject to storms. The
initial investigation revealed that the item had fallen from the exhaust support structure on the "A" generator. Further investigation traced another item identical to that found by "A" generator,
which had fallen from the "C" generator stack. The drop is approx 25m to the generator cantilever. The items are trunions from the stack supports. The area was barriered off and platform staff
alerted to the dangers. The <...> was also informed as they have identical assemblies. An abseiling team was mobilised to secure the remaining trunions until a permanent solution can be found.
This is likely to entail a substantial scaffolding structure to be built. A full report will be issued indicating the root cause (once known) and actions taken to prevent re-occurrence.
During routine drilling operations on <...> a section of the Crank Pin on the Link Tilt Assembly on the <...> unit Top Drive unit fell approx. 90 ft onto the Drillfloor. This section of pin weighted
approx. 2lb. No injuries were sustained to personnel working on the drillfloor below, two metres from contact point of pin and floor. The rig was immediately shotdown until full inspection of all
moving parts on <...> unit were completed. <...> Engineer has since completed full inspection of unit. NDT checks on Link Tilt Yoke indicated minor cracks on the hinge padeye. The full yoke
assembly has now been removed from the Top Drive Unit. Following a full risk assessment an agreement was reached to recommence drilling operations.
A permit was raised to skid the rig floor over slot <...>. This involved a movement 21 feet east 10 feet south. The movement east went ahead OK. During the skid south the catwalk came into
contact with the box section pipedeck handrail. The operation was stopped at this moment. Decision was taken to skid a couple of inches east to free the catwalk. It was during this moment that
the handrail sprung back into position then forward striking IP in the face. Operations were stopped and immediate medical attention sought, IP was moved to <...>. In hospital >24hrs.
The drilling derrick has heat shielding panels to give protection to drill crew working on the monkey board area, from potential radiated heat from flare system. During severe adverse weather
with high winds some of these panels became loose, and flapping in the wind caused small sections to break off and be carried off in the high winds, one piece landing on the platform east main
deck. (No damage caused) As the high winds were forecast, warnings and actions had already been put in place restricting people movements on the exposed areas of the platform. The initial
reports of the loose panels came from crew change persons arriving on helicopter, who reported immediately on arrival. The panels are subject to regular inspection and repairs, the last having
been carried out late <...>. Barriers and controlled access are still in place until weather allows abseilers suitable access to carry out remedial work.
The lead roustabout was asked by the night mechanic to position a new high pressure wash unit pump inside the shale shaker house as the one in operation was faulty. On doing this task he gave
assistance to changing out the units. He was informed the L.P supply and base oil feed lines had been disconnected and the system had been depressurised by functioning the H.P lance (gun) - no
pressure. On disconnecting the HP hose from unit via a quick connect fitting, the hose whipped due to being under trapped pressure and projected the I.P left hand against the frame of the unit
causing damage to his ring finger ligaments. I.P was medivaced ashore and x-ray showed/confirmed damaged ligaments.

The drillcrew were tripping out of the hole for a bit change. During this trip the two roughnecks working on the rig floor heard a thud. Upon investigation it was found that a steel shim, used for
aligning the top drive guide rails, had fallen to the floor. At the time of writing report, the height dropped was still being determined. The shim was 11 " x 3 " x 0.25 " thick and weighed 1.8
pounds. The well was secured to allow a full investigation to take place.
At 0225 hrs on the <...> the platform produced water caisson has "fallen to some unknown point subsea. The caisson parted company approx. 4.5m above sea level at c flanged coupling held by
20 bolts. The dropped section of caisson has a mass of 25 tonnes. As a precautionary measure, personnel were removed from <...> to <...> platforms until the integrity of thew <...> jacket can be
assured by an ROV survey planned this afternoon.
Whilst running the 9 5/8" casing shoetrack on well J132, an object was seen to fall down to the rig floor from the derrick. On inspection it was found to be a walkway grating fastner. The
operation was immediately stopped and a maintenance team inspected the entire derrick walkway to find where the fastener had fallen from and were there any more loose fasteners. Six other
loose grating fasteners were found and replaced. The location of the fallen fastener was not sourced. Deemed secure the casing operation continued.
Operation: Changeover of control transformer Substances: Halon Equipment: Mud Pump No 3 Blower Motor Control Transformer During routine changeover of the mud pumps control
transformer, the unit relating to mud pump no. 3 blower motor overheated. The rig electrician observed smoke emitting from the BD panel board and switched this unit "off". The smoke caused
the smoke alarm to be activitated in rig 41 SCR room. This was followed by activitation of the Halon protection system. The duty was put back to normal, the F& G panel reset and the Halon
replaced. Cause of motor BD panel in rig 41 SCR room over heating still under investigation. Prompt action by rig electrician and production tech prevented further escalation.
Operation: Normal drilling operations Substances: Smoke/Halon Equipment: BA Board Feeder - Rig 41 Switch Room During normal drilling operations the Mud pumps were called for. This calls
for extra power for the shakers & mud feed pumps. At this time a fault developed within 480v switch. Exact cause unknown at this time.Smoke emitting from faulty switch caused smoke detector
located inside panel to be activitated in switch room. This was followed by activation of Halon protection system in area. Alarm activated in MCR & onshift operators went to investigate. They
met rig electrician & mechanic outside switch room. It was observed that Halon status lights showed system had activated. Team checked area completely for any signs of fire; none found. At this
time, rig electrician noticed the BA board was "dead". No flashmarks, burns etc external of switch which led electrician to believe cause was internal. Electrician removed lockout key to prevent
any further operation. No injuries. Incident investigation ongoing.
An employee was walking past the Rig Superintendent's office - he saw smoke and smouldering paper in the waste bin. He removed the bin from the office and was assisted by another employee
to extinguish the smouldering paper. At this time the fixed smoke detection system automatically activated , which resulted in the General Platform Alarm being initiated. All personnel were
mustered and accounted for. There was no injury to personnel or damage to equipment. On investigation it was found that an individual had emptied an ashtray which had contained a partially
extinguished cigarette. After this incident it has been decided to stop employees smoking in the Drilling offices.
Grinding was taking place in the main Fab shop Mod 58 MSF. The drain in the fab shop was covered by a fire retardant blanket. Unknown to the grinder the drain had backed up. Diesel and water
from the drain was now saturating the fire retardant blanket. Whilst grinding continued sparks ignited the saturated blanket. The fire was immediatly extinguished by the fire watcher using a dry
powder device. The blanket was removed once the fire was extinguished. The drain was inspected and discovered to contain water and diesel. The drain cap was removed and the ODDC pump
was started to facilitate better drainage. A fir ehose was used to evacuate any remaining sludge from the drain. The drain cap was replaced and the drain filled with water. A new fire blanket was
installed.
08:11hrs smoke detector indicated in Mod 65 mezz level. A Prod. Operator was sent to check out the area and tannoy is issued from CCR. He arrived in approx 90secs. On arrival sparks and
smoke was found issuing from "A" seal oil pump drive end on the mezz level of Mod 65. The pump housing was glowing. The operator depressurised and stopped the pump from the local control
room, he informed the CCR. Another Operator arrived on scene and they proceeded to the mezz level and activated the motor shut down directly from there as well. At this point flame issued
from the drive end of the motor. A dry powder extinguisher was used to put out the fire. The CCR was informed. The gas export metering system was depressurised as a precaution. The area was
monitored whilst the motor cooled down for another 20mins and there was no further evidence of smoke.
At approx 03:00 hrs, the driller observed a flash on the service cable for the <...>. Night shift maintenance personnel were informed and the system was found to have already tripped on its own
earth leakage protection. The system was isolated immediately to allow investigation which was found to be external cable damage.

Cooling Medium Pump BD-PM-44660, running normally on line for a number of weeks, tripped without any remote indication, only "pump trip" indication. The RPE investigated and discovered
that internal 'Flashover' had occurred in cucible FD4 of replacement Module switchboard BD-L-44050. Initial investigation revealed YELLOW phase connection at the connector had suffered
heat damage at the neck of the crimp connector causing failure and 'Flashover' between Yellow and Blue Phases. TIR .Flashover on switchboard in replacement process module heat damage - no
fire detection/fire cooling pump tripped- standby pump tripped- stanby pump kicked in and process stabilised. Cooling pump not repaired- awaiting spare parts.
At 23.45 a night shift crew member observed a bundle of folded galley cloths smouldering on the laundry metal bench. The IP applied water from an extinguisher, but the smouldering did not
stop. As the IP opened the towels, flames appeared. The IP successfully extinguished the flames. There was no change of status. The fire appears to have been caused by combination of using a
higher than necessary drying temperature, and the presence of residual grease or detergent in the clothes. This was caused by a loss of accomodation water supply during the wash cycle.
Confirmed smoke detection in leg C3 caused a change of platform status and a platform and Brent systems shutdown. The smoke originated from fire pump diesel engine module CC13 adjacent
to leg C3. The fire pump P7250 had just started to maintain the firemain pressure after a service water pump trop. It is believed that failure of the turbos on the diesel engine failed causing over
rich combustion in the engine, and consequent smokey exhaust. Investigation is still in progress. No fire occurred, although as a precaution, the deluge was manually released in CC13. The smoke
in leg C3 dispersed naturally.
At 12:11 hrs a report of smoke and flames emanating from an HVAC fan located at the North East side of the Pipedeck above the Valley area was received in the Process Control Room. A
platform GPA status was immediately initiated, and 2 operations personnel sent to investigate. They confirmed that smoke was visable, emanating from the drive belt cover of the Drilling Engine
Room HVAC fan, accompanied by glowing embers within the cover. The Emergency Response Team was then dispatched to the scene to extinguish any remaining embers and cool the drive belt
housing to ensure that subsequent reignition did not occur.
A smoke detector located in <...> Level 4 West corridor, came into alarm on the central control room fire and gas panel. The Deck Coordinator and Shift Team Leader went to investigate and,
having confirmed that smoke was indeed emanating from the shower room water heater enclosure, immediately roused out the personnel in that corridor. Based on this initial report back to the
CCR, the OIM ordered Emergency Response Team 1 to muster and shortly after, at 2300hrs, a full platform general alarm. An electrical isolation of the shower room was made in the meantime.
The HSE Coordinator and ER Team 1 extinguished the fire with a hand held CO 2 extinguisher and cooled the enclosure with the local fire hose. The fire was confirmed as extinguished at
2311hrs. The fire was contained in the room water heater enclosure. Initial investigation suggests that the residual current device supplying the immersion heater has overheated and ignited the
insulation local to the residual current device. All POB were accounted for at 2315 hrs and, following further checks to ensure that the incident was now fully dealt with, the muster was stood at
2332hrs. Personnel resident in L4W have been relocated to alternative cabins. An investigation is ongoing to fully establish the cause of the incident. Inspections of similar immersion heater units
Hot work was being carried out in a pressurised habitat in the Mud Treatment Skid (MTS). This was suspended due to an indication of smoke on F & G panel in Control Room. Simultaneously
smoke was seen coming from the ventilation from Mud Lab. This was investigated by <...> personnel who spotted smoke. Smoke & flame seen and GPA alarm initiated manually. Fire extingusher
used by <...> personnel to extinguish flame. ER team carried out further investigation to ensure that the fire was out and area safe. Further investigations ongoing.
Fire was detected automatically in generator GB 531, platform muster by 19:10 hrs. Generators Inergen fixed fire protection system operated manually 19:11 hrs. and fire immediately
extinguished. Initial inspection indicates fire seated in area of air cooling pipework lagging 'directly beneath turbine'. Investigation continues. Total Inegen released 11 x 80 ltr. cyls @ 200 barg.
Fire in module 3 switchroom resulting in damage to a living KV switchboard when remote starting the MOLS booster pump.The likely causes are unknown at this stage - action taken - platform
emergency response to alarm. M3 switchboard power supply isolated. Restoration of power supply to the rest of the platform. Area barriered off pending investigation by onshore specialist team.
An auxiliary lube oil pump deadheaded as a resullt of the failure of it to cut out once attaining desired system pressure. When personnel opened the pump compartment containing residual, the
heat that was generated inside this compartment together with the ingress of oxygen caused a fire. This was extinguished without further incident. Investigations are ongoing but indicate potential
failure of pressure microswitch.

An electrical short occurred within a 440V Motor Control Cubicle resulting in a flash and the generation of a small amount of smoke. Preparatory work was in process to bring <...> Generator
back into service. This comprised a test run of the lube oil system via the electric driven auxiliary lube oil pump. The unit failed to start and when the Technician went to switch off the power
supply there was a short circuit and electrical flash within the control cubicle. - fuller details on attached report - see OIR9B
During routine laundry operations the washing machine <...> was ready to be emptied 15/20 minutes after completing its cycle. The stewardess noticed smoke coming from the machine and
called the chef/manager from the galley below.He opened the door and found the contents to be smouldering, and on moving them, flames were noticed. During this period a smoke alarm
activitated alerting operations personnel to the situation. On noticing flames, the stewardess activitated the local Manual Alarm Call station calling personnel to muster. A CO2 extinguisher was
used to extinguish the fire. Initial investigations point to the heating element staying on after the washing machine had drained and completed its cycle. The chef/manager commented on seeing
red hot elements through the machine drum. Duration from initial discovery of situation to full muster being declared and stand down from emergency status was 20 minutes . Fire was
extinguished shortly after activation of general platform alarm.
Investigating K-2510 circuit breaker alarm, it was noted MCB10 & MCB16 were tripped (24 volt cct.s). MCB's were reset and shortly after smoke was seen venting through Bently Nevada
vibration racking. The MCB's were then opened manually and on closer investigation a patch wire was noted to have overheated & stripped the outer insulation from the wires. Some of the other
wires within the loom also showed signs of heat damage. As a precaution the adjacent UCP for K-2010 was also isolated.
On investigating loss of power on FADL-7 Trace Heating Cubicle Feeding Trace Heating Distribution Board SW-L-8431 main fuses in FADL-7 had blown. When L-8431 was opened a smell of
burning was noticed and further investigation showed the outgoing core on the red phase of the distribution board contractor had burnt clear of the contact terminal. The MCC FADL-7 was
isolated and placed on EPI.
At 13.42 the Operations Gas Technician noticed a haze coming from around the coupling cover within the acoustic hood of Export compressor K2420. On investigation he discovered a small
smouldering lagging fire. He instructed the control room to shutdown the machine and raise the alarm. He then put the fire out using a dry powder extinguisher. An investigation into the cause is
underway.
During the commissioning of the <...> - <...> subsea power link the electrical protection operated. On investigation an electrical flash over was found to have occurred in the 13.8 kV junction box
on the side of the transformer L8110.
<...> platform in steady operation. <...> Maintenance and Drilling refurbishment personnel also on board. At 10:23 a small loss of power was observed in the control room followed almost
immediately by a loss of all main power generation causing a platform blackout condition. Concurrently an electrical technician reported a small "explosion" within the Module H switchroom. A
platform muster was initiated, fixed smoke detection confirmed the verbal reports. Emergency shutdown system (ESD1) activated automatically resulting in process shutdown and blowdown. The
responding emergency team confirmed a fault had occurred in the C6B (air compressor) motor control centre on the utilities switchboard within the switchroom. The resultant fire/explosion
severely damaged the MCC, but self extinguished prior to the arrival of the response team, the fire was confirmed extinguished, the incident was confined to a single MCC cubicle, the area was
electrically isolated, ventilated and secured. No injury resulted from this incident. Muster was stood down at 11:33. The platform remains shutdown whilst an investigation is completed and a
remedial workscope developed and implemented.
<...> platform in steady state operation. <...> Maintenance and Drilling Refurbishment personnel on board. At 11.26 a manual call point was initiated from the drilling area followed by a call to
the control room indicating that smoke had been observed rising from rubbish bags temporarily stored between the drill derrick and the drill module on the skid deck. An emergency muster was
called. A crane mechanic operator also observed the smoke and immediately deployed an adjacent fire hose and applied water to the location. The crane mechanic operator was relieved by the
emergency response team who had been deployed to the scene. The ERT applied additional cooling, confirmed the situation was secure and the muster was stood down at 11.39
Wind speed 2 Knots, direction 141 degrees. Visibility very good. <...> Helicopter approaching from the west. The tail wheel of aircraft missed the landing area and came into contact with the
perimeter net. Following a signal from the HLO the pilot lifted to reposition the aircraft within the " Circle". Damage sustained to a section of perimeter netting and associated supports.
At approx 0500hrs operators engaged in pre-start up activities following platform shutdown smelt gas in "B" module. Subsequent investigation identified two leaks on a normally closed crossover
valve between the platform gas import and gas lift header. Two separate leaks were evident, one on a valve body plug and the other on one of the valve body flanges. The gas system was shut in
and depressurised. There was no indication on the platform fixed gas detection system for that area. Valve to be replaced.

Routine process operations: Weather 160 deg 20 kts. B gas compressor had been given a start & unit sequenced up to "manual drain down" a point where the system operator drains down the
compressor barrels. The test separator was being made ready for fuel gas service in preparation for the start up of the <...>. However, problems were encountered with a high level pressure switch
(PSH119) which was activitating early and tripping the test separator. Arrangements were subsequently made to check /calibrate PSH119. At this point "B" compressor had reached & was being
held at "manual blow down" for approx 2 hours. It was decided to shut the unit in until fuel gas was available to prevent excessive lub/seal oil contamination of the compressor barrels. During the
compressor shutdown sequence, the pressurising valve XV241B did not close fully & as the logic progressed through the sequence, the lube and seal oil pumps were stopped. At this stage, the
compressor seal was lost allowing gas to escape into the module. Following the gas alarm, the pressurising valve was closed with manual intervention & the lube seal oil pumps were restarted
manually. The manual restart restored the compressor seal. The valve and air operated actuator were inspected & there was evidence of leakage around the valve stem although no leak evident
Shortly after changing the fuel source from diesel to fuel gas on 'B' <...> Gas Turbine Generator & while the unit was running on fuel gas, a Lo-Level gas alarm was initiated in the main control
room, the source indicated as being within the fuel gas enclosure of the machine. The MCR alerted the system operator to this condition. When the system operator opened the compartment door
he observed a stream of gas emanating from the Digicon fuel gas control valve. At this time the operator requested the unit to be changed back over to diesel fuel supply. The fuel changeover was
successful & the fuel gas to the system was isolated. The cause of the leak is not known at this time and is currently being investigated . The enclosure is covered by Heat and Gas detection &
further protected by Halon deluge system. the approx dimensions are 1m x 0.6m x 2m.
A construction worker on the Riser Access Tower main deck heard what he thought was an air line blowing off and made his way to the mezzanine deck to check. On arrival he located the source
of the noise and realised that there was a gas leak, he informed all other personnel on the Riser tower and advised them to vacate the area, which they did. He informed the CCR and then waited
at the Riser Tower Bridge for the area operator to arrive so that he could show him the source of the leak. The leak came from a small pressure relief valve fitted to a larger valve. When the
operator closed the large valve the leak stopped. The line was then isolated and the area declared safe and normal work resumed. A new PRV was sourced and fitted to allow inspection of the
faulty unit. The spring in the PRV was found to be corroded and had broken. The ongoing investigation will determine the quantity of gas released: evidence for this conflicts at present.
At approximately 02:00 hours the area operator reported that G3807b (Crude export pump) drive end mech seal had failed, resulting in the loss of containment of crude oil. The operator switched
over the pumps and G3701b isolated. Most of the oil spill was contained within the bund and from the bund to the open drain's caisson via the overflow. The estimated spillage of crude oil was
approximately 2 barrels. A very small amount of crude oil splashed over open grating and into the sea (estimated at 2 Litres). The reason for the seal failure is being fully investigated under
incident report <...>.
Fuel gas is heated prior to entering turbines. To protect heater there is a minimum flow switch, which has to be reset before heater can start. On each of the 3 turbines (2 generators & MP
compressor) there are warm up lines to flare. These have to be manually opened to satisfy the minimum flow switch for the heaters. Warm up line to MP compressor has a logic panel which
requires sequencing, this locked up preventing insufficient gas flow to satisfy heater. A further routing for fuel gas is through deaerator. This vessel normally uses fuel gas to strip all O2 from sea
water injection. Decision made to increase gas flow through this vessel in order to satisfy fuel gas heater flow switch. This method had been used in the past although on this occasion a low water
level was not observed. Water dissipated from vessel & through booster pumps minimum flow valves. This allowed gas from deaerator to be expelled from minimum flow vent & migrate into
module 2. Line of sight detectors initiated the executive action. An S1 has been raised to ensure a liquid seal is maintained during future operations.
Work over on well <...>. Three mechanical plugs installed in the tubing prior to skidding rig over well. Tree removed. Riser & BOP stack installed & tested at time of incident.The back pressure
valve dart was removed followed by the back pressure valve (BPV) itself. Once the BPV was at surface crude oil in the tubing migrated into the BOP stack (the crude oil was in the tubing at the
time the barriers were installed.) A tubing hanger retrieving tool was made up on 7" tubing. As the retrieval tool was run in the hole, a small volume of crude oil overflowed the top of the 7"
tubing due to the piston effect of the tool in the drilling riser The tool was withdrawn from the riser and steps taken to pump the crude to drain facilities onboard the platform. Total volume spilled
on rig floor +/_ 5 gallons. Estimate of crude in BOP stack +/- 15 bbls.
Instrument connection on impost line for the high and low pilot switch installed to production well, ref <...> became slack resulting in a loss of containment crude oil. Loss of approx 25 litres,
duration approx 5 mins. No injuries.
The gas plant had been restarted and export commenced at approx 0500 hrs following a planned outage. At 0726hrs the fixed gas detection system annunciated a hi gas alarm (20%lel) in the
CCR. On investigation in the field it was confirmed that there was a minor leak from a gas metering sample probe on the export metering skid. The operator immediately initiated a controlled shut
down of the gas export system and depressurised the metering skid.

Following completion of the annual maintenance shutdown main power generation unit 'B' was changed over from liquid fuel duty to platform fuel gas. 15 minutes after transfer to fuel gas, gas
detector GP 005 (located in enclosure vent exhaust ducting) reached 16% LEL initiating a platform level 'C' shutdown & platform alarm. All personnel were mustered & checks inside unit
enclosure carried out. Investigations are still ongoing to verify source of leak. See attached technical report.
Platform in steady state operations. During routine area tour, operator noted condensate leak from stem area of XZV-62025 (Flycol Contractor Condensate Outlet Valve). Production halted and
vessel blown down. Investigations revealed valve stem retaining nut had backed off causing 'o' ring to extrude. 'O' ring replaced and unit service tested.
9.30hrs Gas release from propane cylinder. Ops Techs were trying to find leak on propane system and door was open in the enclosure they were working in. Some of the propane air was drawn
into adjacent turbine (cold at time) enclosure where detection system activated & alarm, shutdown and muster ensued. From 9B :- Release of propane gas from turbine start- up system during reinstatement procedure after maintainance period. The in-line filter was not sufficiently tightened after its change out and gas escaped from the rubber seal.
During process start up after a maintenance shutdown period a technician passing outside midule L3E AT 02;55 hrs could smell gas. He opened the module door and could see a haze in the
module with a strong smell of gas. He reported this to the CRO who then checked the gas cards in that area. There was no indication of any gas on any of the gas cards for that area. Two techs
entered the area to investigate and noticed a spray of oil coming from a weld on the pipework to the HP separator. The area was evacuated and the CRO instructed to shut down and blown down
the process at 03:00 Hrs. The fire and gas panel was monitored during this period and at no time was there any indication of gas in L3E. The nearest gas head to the leak was approx. 3 m from the
leak. No work has been carried out in this module during the shutdown.
The operations supervisor noticed produced water leaking from a pin hole on a welded seam of the 8" take-off line from the HP separator V-210. The line I/D is 8WP661-A1106. The decision was
taken by the OIM to carry out a controlled process shutdown.
Crude oil observed spraying from <...> artificial lift manifold valve grease nipple during a planned shutdown of the artificial lift system. Operations isolated the artificial lift manifold from the
pressure source by closing the injection drive annulus block valves on all connected wells.
Engine was running on Bars for approximately 16 minutes at approximately 05:15 hours. One flame detector associated with the B power generator alarmed in the CCR. On shift Production Team
Leader (PTL) contacted a colleague to check out and report. This man entered Gas Generator enclosure and saw flame through the bulkhead in Power Turbine (PT) enclosure He contacted on
shift PTL and informed him that the flame detector was genuine and that we had a fire in the PT enclosure. The PTL immediately set off halon system. At this time more operators had attended
the scene and a visual inspection took place. No flame was detected at this time. The door was closed to maintain halon.
Acetic acid was being decanted from the chemical storage area into the storage tank in Mod 04. The tank had already been filled earlier in the day. Due to the breakdown in communication
between operators a second filling was commenced which led to overflow of Acetic acid in the Module. The spillage was contained, treated with neutraliser & the area hosed down. An
investigation is underway to isolate background causes.
Restart of A power generation unit GX-4001 A: unit was restarted on fuel gas; when gas was introduced to burners, gas was detected within the enclosure - one detector in high alarm, two
detectors in low alarm, and a forth detector detected gas but level was below low alarm threshold. Fire & gas system automatically shut down the unit and depressurised the gas system for the
unit. On inspection, found impulse tubing to high pressure switch not connected. Investigation initiated & ongoing.
06.30hrs there was a fire in the Utility System in the power generator area. Fire went out quite quickly. Platfrom shut down. Power generator shutdown. Using power generation from offshore ring
(from <...>). <...> took TIR at 08.10 and informed <...> of the situation at 08.45. There were No injuried/mustered/ muster stood down shortly after.
On <...> at approx. 16:40 hrs a small release of gas ignited on the Drill Floor due to a static discharge. Well Ops text (<...>) - Incident on <...> on <...> POOH with <...>, 15k perforating guns on
slickline. Weeping of gas from slickline BOPs so applied more grease pressure. Excess grease was being collected in a bucket with metal handle. Flash fire due to static. Person burnt. Bucket
replaced with metal one, properly earthed. Safety alert to be issued. Discussed with <...>.
During a Hydrotest procedure a braided hose failed at around 500 barg. The injured party was approx 10 feet from the release (reading the pressure chart recorder) and was struck by the force of
the water jet on the inside of his left wrist. His hand was knocked back onto the chart recorder causing a secondary injury to the back of the hand. The incorrect hose had been used for the test. A
review of the procedure and the test rig design has been undertaken and modifications are to be proposed.

At approx. 08:10 hrs <...> a fire was reported in the location of the Gas Injection Turbine Exhausts - Module 06/16. The GPA was sounded and the platform called to muster, all 115 POB
mustered and accounted for in 15 mins. As a precaution the platform's production was shutdown & depressurised. Drilling operations were suspended and the well made secure. Because of it's
remote outboard location the fire had not been detected by the fixed F&G system. Personnel were stood down at 09:45 hrs. Permission to restart production given at 10:30 hrs. The cause of the
fire appeared to be lubrication oil dripping into the insulation of the 'C' injection turbine exhaust ducting. This equipment remains shutdown pending a full strip down investigation.
On <...> at approx. 08.40 hrs the platform went to a GPA status due to multiple Gas head activation in Mod 16. This was initiated by a Gas Release in the Mod 16 caused by the failure of a sight
glass in an overhead seal oil tank associated with B compressor. The sight glasses on the seal oil tanks are a vertical arrangement of 5 separate sight glass panels. The second from top panel sight
glass had failed. This allowed the release of gas and a substantial amount of seal oil under pressure to escape.
During a Hydrotest procedure a braided hose failed at around 500 barg. The injured party was approx 10 feet from the release (reading the pressure chart recorder) and was struck by the force of
the water jet on the inside of his left wrist. His hand was knocked back onto the chart recorder causing a secondary injury to the back of the hand. The incorrect hose had been used for the test. A
review of the procedure and the test rig design has been undertaken and modifications are to be proposed.
At approx 03:00hrs, while running 'C' Fire pump for engine oil temperature checks, a small fire broke out on the engines turbocharger unit. The fire was put out with a powder extinguisher by an
Operator sent to the scene. The pump was on manual, the power to the <...> panel turned off and the diesel fuel was isolated. The Fire pump engine is a 12-cylinder, 45 degree V-twin,
turbocharged diesel unit. On top of the unit is a governor unit which is fed oil via a fixed brass pipe. An elbow fitting on this line failed. This led to a spray of oil onto the hot turbocharger casing
which then ignited causing a small oil fire.
In preparation for a recip compressor start the M/C had been pressurised by the gas techinician to 10 bar to blowdown pulsation bottles to remove liquids. The CRO was monitoring the relevant
zone gas detection on the F&G VDU and low level gas was detected at head 53GD188. The CRO contacted the gas techician and asked if he was doing anything to cause this gas indication. He
was not and went to the area of 53GD188 to investigate. He could hear gas leaking from the pipework in the vicinity of the discharge RV's and went to the M/C blowdown. When the gas detection
level had returned to normal levels the gas technician tried to trace the source of the leak using SNOOP. It was eventually determined the gas was coming from the body of the pilot valve for
RV9327, which was then isolated. TIR:- Gas compression Module - Following a power cut - on restarting, gas escape from pilot operative relief valve - O ring failure No alarm - No muster. LEL
observed in compressor room. Level less than 25%.
Well <...> was being reverse circulated through the test separator, to displace the contents of the 'A' annulus and tubing with seawater. ('A' annulus had kill weight brine and the tubing had base oil
in it). The mud pumps were connected to the 'A' annulus to pump the seawater, and the flow wing was connected to the test separator. After seawater had been circulated all around, the well was
closed in to check the pressures. There was approx. 400 psi left in the tubing and annulus as this is the back pressure of the test seperator. The operator on the drill floor opened a double valve
isolation on the riser (tubing side) to bleed off this pressure to the atmosphere. On opening the valves gas was vented, and tripped the platform, due to high level gas.
<...> spotted a water mist in the area of P306 export pump and on further investigation found a pinhole leak. Mechanical seal cyclone lower Swagelok fitting. Fire and gas system at no time
detected the presence of any hydrocarbon gas. Total volume of produced water discharged approx 1/2 litre which was contained within a bunded area.
Fuel gas leak in mod L4. Corroded line between knock out pot and separator (No info on size of release). Shut down production. Personnel gone to muster. No plans to downman. Plan to resume
safe operations in +/- 1 hour. Shift supervisor carrying out process walkabout spotted a pin hole leak on fuel gas pipe work (spool piece weld). Fire and gas detection system at no time indicated
presence of any hydrocarbon gas in the vicinity. Process was shutdown in a controlled manner and isolation applied to fuel gas system.
BA05 flowline pressure switch offtake 1/2 stainless steel braided flexible hose ruptured midway along its 2m length. Hydrocarbons released into wellhead module L3 (Open plan). Coincidence
low level gas platform GPA, process manually tripped immediately,coincidence high level gas SPS. All platform personnel mustered, gas heads monitored for decay. When gas dispersed two
technicians dispatched to investigate, locate leak source and isolate.
During start up of booster comp. CRO noted gas detector GD171 indication increase to 25% - gas tech proceeded to investigate when GD175 started to increase. On investigation gas found to be
leaking from NPT thread of stainless steel fitting on RV9031 pilot impulse line (situated near the ceiling of the module). Machine S/D & B/D at 21.50 hrs. Max gas levels gd 171- 48% & GD
175-19%

At start of bullheading operations between <...> and <...> using chicksan pipework a gas release occurred from a coupling seal. The wells were closed in and depressurised by the area technician
who was on site. Only one gas head gave a low level indication and there was no change of platform status. Incident under investigation.
Area technician whilst carrying out watchkeeping duty spotted a leak from P308 oil export pump mechanical seal cooling sand cyclone lower swagelock fitting. Fire and gas system at no time
detected the presence of any hydrocarbon gas. Total volume of fluids discharged was one litre contained within bunded area surrounding the export pumps. Hydrocarbon fluids made up of 78%
BS & W.
Work was taking place on well <...> a cement job a two inch dry cement hose was parted, this covered the area with large quantity of dry cement and two employees were exposed to this dry
cement. Our medical people were unhappy about this because of the chemical in the cement and arranged for the two people to be airlifted to <...>. Arrived at 05.35 hrs this morning. Under
observation at the hospital.
During routine watch keeping operations a smell of hydrocarbon gas was discovered in the area of the ventilation extract from the utility shaft. The fixed gas detection system did not indicate an
increase in levels. The area techs entered the area to investigate and discovered a leak from a weld on the oil to storage manifold at 76m level in the utility shaft. The upstream and downstream
valves were closed and the leak stopped. The manifold remains isolated and depressurised until a suitable repair can be effected.
A work party in the unility shaft noticed a small leak from a weld on an oil to storage maniflold at the 76m in the utility shaft. The leak was described as a pinhole - approx. 1/6th of an inch. The
area tech was called and isolated the upstream and downstream valves and the leak stopped. The manifold remains isolated and depressuised until a suitable repair can be effected. Please note :This manifold is the supply to cell group 3 and is different from the manifold with a reported leak the previous day which was the supply to cell group 1. No increase in fixed gas detection levels
was recorded.
At 14.10 hrs an indication of hydrocarbon gas was detected in the utility shaft on the oil to storage filling line (10 inch) below the 76 mtr level, two gas heads indicated 6% and 100% respectively.
Initial investigations revealed a pinhole leak at a weld, a mechanical isolation was applied to the line to stop the leak. The leak has been stopped and a full investigation to determine the cause of
the leak has been initiated.
Smell of hydrocarbon.Two technicians smelled gas at minus 76 metre level. No fix of detection activated. Hand held gas meter indicated 4% LEL. No alarm and no muster. They could not see the
force of hydrocarbon and they commenced rigging up lighting. Today at about 3pm the LEL dropped to about 1%, similar to an incident in <...>. <...> procedures adopted for this case. Rigging up
of lighting is expected to continue to early evening. Suspect leak from small pinhole next to veil oil rundown lines as was the case in <...>. Rundown lines are isolated contacts dead crude. Some
gas pressure, low few bars, no spillages to sea. Investigation awaiting for improved lighting.
Release of gas from CT stripper observed, lasting for approx 30secs (verified by witnesses) & dispersed vertically around injector head naturally to atmosphere. No platform fixed detection
alarmed during release. At this time no estimation of volume of gas provided. Events taken to secure leak. Immediately on observing leak, CT operator increased hydraulic pressures on stripper
from 700 to 1400psi. This took approx 30secs to complete & secured well. Also tubing & BHA was RIH to space out to close pipe rams (quicker to effect seal) rather than having to close
shear/blind rams if it wasn't possible to seal stripper. Events leading up to release. <...> coil tubing spread had been rigged up freestanding on BB25. A spool tree well with a previously installed
workover valve block. A venturi bailer/drift BHA had been run to a HUD & was being pulled to surface, BHA was around 10' from stripper at time of release. This was 1st run in hole for the coil
tubing on this well. Nothing untoward observed either during trip in or out of hole. At time of release wellhead pressure was 640psi, monitored by sensor located on combi BOPS on R/U.
Small leak on stuffing box on wireline. - went to alarm - not to muster.- went out of alarm cleared normally. BB25 East skid deck. While running in hole on wireline at approximately 4300 ft a
small gas leak was noted at the top of the lubricator coming from the stuffing box. The weather conditions at the time were flat calm and bright sun light. The stuffing box packing pressure was
increased and the leak stopped. No platform fixed fire and gas was activated.
A fire occurred in GTI turbine hood. The automatic halon replacement did not extinguish fire. Fire team with BA extinguished manually platform went to full muster but later stood down. No
injuries. Cause as yet unknown Coastguard and <...> police informed. SAR helicopter launched but not required. Duty press officer informed 23.00 hrs.The snuffing system was activated but did
not put fire out. Emergency team with BA, killed the fire with foam. Process shutdown and ESD valves were operated. For rest of evening at 22.29 platform back to normal, as so far as the
emergency goes, they began after that to re-establish power with gas turbine 2. At this moment in time company have emergency power but experiencing problems with power from GT2. Because
of power problems, possible removal of non-essential personnel. Notifier spoke to duty inspector <...> on night of incident.

There was a release of hydrocarbon gas/condensate from the gland packing of the TEG contractor hydrocarbon section level control valve-LICA49600. This initiated a change of platform statusGPA & subsequently caused the platform to shutdown and blowdown automatically via the fixed detection systems installed for the purpose.
<...>-Operator in wellbay compleing watchkeeping activities heard a small puff of gas in the locations of <...>. Took some time to locate the source and found it to be from the tubing hanger
orientation pin. The operator stated there was no smell associated with the sound. The ASV was closed and pressure above the valve was bled to zero pressure.
During normal operations a report was received from survey team technician that there was a small leak from a rundown line in module CD20 on the cellar deck. On investigation it was found to
be from oil rundown line stream 'C'10" P152 on a weld on the lower half of the pipe upstream of process installations. The process was manually shutdown. The leak was running for
approximately 20 minutes until the process was secure, the fluid mixture was oily water, 92% BS & W. The estimated quantity of oil discharged was 2 litres. The fluids were contained within the
module and flushed to the local drains which are connected to the closed drain system. There was no escape to the environment. The local gas detection heads did not register any gas. These were
monitored throughout the incident.
During plant watchkeeping duties the shift supervisor noted a hydrocarbon leak in the oil rundown line to storage external to col 4 on the west cellar deck. The hole is approximately 3 mm in
diameter. An area tech had been in the area 5 minutes previously and had not noted the leak, therefore it is assumed it was not leaking at this time. There is no F & G detection in the area,
therefore no indication was available to the CRO. Due to the small size of the leak a temporary patch was able to be applied and the leak was stopped. Barriers were erected to restrict the area.
Two technicians were swinging a spectacle blind in the outlet line of a crude oil cooler. When the blind was removed there was a release of hydrocarbon gas from the flange space. One of the
techncians felt dizzy and as a precaution, visited the medic.
Area technician on watchkeeping duties observed a slight spray of oil from the valve stem, and evidence of oil on the deck. He immediately isolated and depressurised the system. The fire and gas
system was operational but the leak was too small to be detected by the fixed systems.
<...> technician was opening up blowdown valves pm <...> lubricator, when he heard and saw a release of hydrocarbon gas from the vicinity of the blow-down valve and contacted the control
room. The leak was traced to the stem packing of PI 44800 isolation valve.
A hose used for diesel transfer on the deck split and around 50 litres of diesel escaped. The system was isolated and the hose removed for Investigation.
During watchkeeping activities it was discovered that a pinhole had developed in process rundown line 10" P-152 on a wld. The process was immediately shut down. The discovery was made at
22.00 hrs, the isolation value was closed at 23.03 hrs and the leak stopped at 22.15 hrs.
During normal operations a single gas detector GD 320021 went into low level alarm, but reset immediately. The area technician checked the area and found a steady drip from <...> stem seal
chevron packing. The area of the spill was contained within the module and chanelled to open hazardous drains. The leak was immediately isolated and system drained.
During routine electrical maintenence a technician noticed a small damp patch underneath the housing of transformer <...>. On closer investigation the source of the leak appears to be from the
drain plug and or the bottom of the sight glass. The cooling fluid is midel 7131 and could possibly contain PCBs.
Main oil export pump P-3010 had been running for 5 hours when there was a low level gas, fire and gas indication from M1West pump room. On checking the module, the area technician found
the NDE mechanical seal was leaking.
During routine watchkeeping duties, the gas technician noted a smell of gas at RPM level 2 mezzanine. On further investigation he eventually traced it to PSV 49334. The gas did not register on
the platform fixed detection system. The PSV is the pressure relief for seal gas system on the LP compressor. The LP compressor was shutdown and the line was isolated. The PSV was removed
and backloaded for investigation and redress.
During checks in the module an operator discovered a gas leak on a manual isolation ball valve body cavity vent plug. The release was not large enough to activate a line of sight detector sited 2
metres above. The valve is fitted in the gas export pipework. The platform was shutdown manually and the pipework between the next available isolation valves in the system blowdown. The leak
was further isolated by closing the valve itself and the leak was stopped before the rest of the process blewdown.
There was a small gas release detected by the watchkeeper using portable equipment, but the release was from a 1" duplex line. The platform was shut down. There was no GPA and no muster.

During preparations for well clean-up of Well B21 a chicksan connection had been used to pressure test a tree to 345 bar on four occasions with N[2]. The same connection was being used with
an alteration in the downstream piping to introduce hydrocarbon gas to the tree from another well at 40 bar pressure. Operators noticed a leak from the chicksan connection, acted immediately to
stop the operation and secured location. (The connection connects all the wells together to allow gas to flow).
Gas release from gas instrument tubing. Failure associated with condensate pump. Release less than 200 litres condensate from 12mm tubing contained by bond system. GPA - full muster stood
down at 1501hrs. Gas detection A LL Platform shut-in full muster. 12mm pipe had sheared. Pipes all now replaced and failed pipework under analysis. OIR will be submitted once release figure is
calculated. Investigation to follow. Follow with tele conversation with<...>.
Normal production operations were ongoing. 25Kts wind speed from 000deg, 2m wave height. Production operator was in the vicinity of the second stage separator on PAU 2 Upper and noticed a
small leak of crude oil originating from under the insulation on the 8" balance line connecting the 2nd stage separator to the coalescer vessel. He immediately contacted the control room who
initiated an ESD 2 which shut the plant down and then initiated a blow down of the separator vessels. This action stopped the leak. The line insulation was removed and the line inspected. A 3mm
hole was discovered caused by external corrosion due to CUI ( Corrosion under Insulation). A temporary repair has been implemented and NDT performed. The section of the line involved is
scheduled for replacement at the first available opportunity. Estimate of crude oil leaked 100 litres. No hydrocarbons were discharged overboard.
Flange leak - vent line to flare system - 1kg of gas released - no detection - no shutdown
Instrument pipe seal at the gas compression train - a gas release in which a local automatic shutdown was initiated. The automatic shutdown was immediate - a matter of seconds - investigation
ongoing
Export gas compressor had been isolated to carry out work on its pipework. Process isolation included drain vent valve (V-7179). This valve was opened to facilitate draining of the system. On
completion of work process isolation removal was commenced including the valve which was signed as being de-isolated in the closed position. The compressor was re-started but tripped due to
high level in the KO drum. This Drum was manually drained to the gas scrubber and a sudden escape of process medium was noted. V- 7179 was found to be locked in the open position. The
valve was closed and the spec blind swung into the closed position. At the time of writing preventative measures are still under discussion. However, the rigor with which permit and isolation
procedures must be applied is being reinforced to all operators, and the training /competency assurance process is being reviewed.
Tungun impulse lines were replaced by stainless steel on <...>. The main generator tripped off gas at 08.22. The production operator was sent to investigate. When passing the compressor skid,
gas was smelt .It was found that process impulse tubing for 47-PIT-2001 had sheared off at the lifting. The leaking line was immediately isolated and a cap was later fitted to the process
connection. The line was not adequately supported. The gas compression skid is to be surveyed to identify additional support points. The sheared line has been sent ashore for analysis to
determine the exact cause of failure. Design of the small bore tubing is to be reviewed and a vibration survey carried out on the skid including small bore pipework. The gas compression will not
be run until after the instrumentation has been reworked and the vibration survey is completed.
<...> well fluids have not contained H2S at measurable levels, however sampling of the gas stream on <...> indicated an H2S concentration of 6ppm. More accurate sampling was taken from Area
A wells, Area B production header, <...> and FPSO process. The sampling identified that the levels of H2S were correct and not attributable to another contaminant (mercaptans). This accurate
sampling was completed on <...> when appropriate test equipment was availlable. Continuous biocide dosing of injection wells has recommenced. The process and <...> open drains was shock
dosed with biocide. Process vessels jet washed. Continuous dosing of flowing acquifer wells. Indication of an H2S scavenger system. Connection of biocide to well C8 in preparation for well
clean up. Micro-Biological study of <...> reservoir to identify treatments. Toolbox talks and safety awareness presentations. All personnel carry H2S gas detectors when sampling. Risk asessment
for sampling where expected measurements greater than 15 ppm.
<...>: Four inch manual valve on well C70 found to be leaking gas on body flange. System isolated, everything shutting and gas manifold blown down. No gas detected on platform gas heads.
Amendments received <...> Operations start up activities after annual shut down. Weather: 200 Deg 14Kts. At approx 1515hrs operations engaged in pre-start up activities following platform shut
down and observed gas escaping from VB20205 body joint located in 'A' module. A further leak was observed on a bleed plug attached to VC20206. The gas system was shut in and
depressurised. There was no indication on the platform fixed gas detection system for that area. Valve to be replaced.

Fire pump P-7250 diesel engine being test run for investigative instrument maintenance. Fire pump had been running for approx 8 minutes when a fireball was noted coming from the drive end
left hand side turbo blower. Personnel evacuated the area and diesel was shut down using the remote fuel shut-off. The area was manually deluged.
Diesel leak from a pressure gauge on a ring main pump. Estimated between 5 & 10L.
Main oil export pump number P3070. Leak from a pin hole on welding three quarter inch line to DE cyclone separator. The amount escaped is being calculated, based on information that the line
pressure was 15 bar. 40 minutes duration. Platform mustered immediately after incident, detection system. Muster stood down at 07:54 hours with all gas heads being below LEL (no imminent
safety hazards). Actions taken; main export pump is currently being shut down. Oil ESDV are closed, preparation ongoing to mechanically isolate DE cyclone prior to re open all oil ESDV. Full
tested isolation to be achieved on P3073 prior to remedial work and inspection.
Confirmed HLG module M3W causing platform shutdown and ESDV closure. Response teams on standby until natural ventilation had reduced gas levels. On investigation leak was from
corrosion hole in 2" closed drains line Hole had approx dimension of 15mm x 10mm and fluid released was oil/gas/water mix.
P3320 pump primary and secondary seals failed resulting in oil spill into leg C4. Pump automatically shutdown on primary seal failure and automated valves closed. Leak across seal face resulted
in an oil spill of 50 litres. Subsequent pump isolation and drain down of head effected.
Person experienced allergic reaction and skin irritation. Initial Investigation leads us to believe that this was due to prolonged exposure to windbrone spray of platform produced water, with
entrained low process chemicals.
5 litres of crude oil was released . Released from 0.2mm hole for 15 minute duration, well <...> at well head area. Pressure measurement lines (impulse lines) eroded due to contact, creating the
hole which resulted in the release. Well was not shut down impulse lines replaced. Quantity & fluid composition was insufficient to activate automatic shut down systems. Per OIR/9B 1/2"
stainless steel impulse line worn through due to clash with adjacent 1/2" SS impulse line , resulted in release of Annular fluid with entrained cruid oil of approximately 5 litres.
While taking daily logs on the sub-main solar generators. the power tech noticed what appeared to be a smoke or vapour cloud inside the accoustic hood of GT2 (G-8550). The machine has dual
fuel capability, but was running on diesel fuel at the time. Investigation revealed that the source of the vapour cloud was a section of flexible braided hose with flanged end fitting, located in the
fuel gas supply line.The vapour was observed to be coming from between the steel braiding and the solid steel outer shroud which connects the hose to the flange. The leaking medium was
identified as diesel vapour. The machine was shut fixed detection system within the hood (IR's kheat detectors and gas heads) activated during the period of the leak.
During a watchkeeping tour of his area a technician entered wellhead module m3w. On entry, the technician detected the smell of hydrocarbon gas which he traced to a "pinhole" leak in shared
manifold spool for <...> and <...> flowlines. A controlled shutdown of the <...> process was carried out by the operations team and a manual GPA initiated to muster all personnel.
Routine process watchkeeping duties were being carried out around the <...> process module. An audible noise, inconsistent with the normal plant operation was heard as the operator was in
close proximity (within 1 metre) to the leak. Following further investigation this was traced to the osprey gas sampling skid whereupon a minor process gas leak was found to be emanating from a
1/4 " braided Swagelock hose. Through process gas, the leak was not of the magnitude to be detected by the portable gas dectector held 1 metre from the source. The local isolation vales leading
to the skid were immediately closed and an effective isolation made. Hose to be sent ashore for analysis to investigate suspected internal integrity failure. New hose fitted to skid, tested and
returned to service.
A gas release was picked up by the fixed gas leeds in the compressor module 2. All at muster, POB accounted for . Cause not yet known. A gas release occured in the <...> gas compression
module M02 Lower Mezz on <...> @ 12.43. A number of gas detectors went into high or low alarm, the plant was shut down & depressurised, deluge was initiated & personnel mustered. The gas
was dispersed through natural ventilation of the module. An investigation has been carried out to determine the source & potential cause of the leak. Following the incident the source of the
release was identified through nitrogen pressure testing. A large leak was found on gland PV 7444. This tied in very well with the observed patterns of development of the gas cloud from the gas
detection. This valve was isolated, and the remiander of the system tested to a higher pressure, no further leaks were found. Following the initial investigation a total of 11 actions were raised &
are at present being followed up.

A machine had been shut-down & was restarted at 02.00 it was on full load, importing, exporting & injecting gas at 02.30. At 02.43 the CRR was alerted to a low gas alarm GIR9489 FA 02-14
Mezz North. An operator made his way to A machine to investigate the alarm. He entered the module from from the west side, as he approached the compressor he noticed gas coming from the
NDE head on the 2nd stage compressor. The weather conditions were as follows: wind 18 knots 110 degrees. The incident has been investigated & actions put in place.
During planned work to remove and clean a blocked restriction orifice on one of the fuel gas filter pots, it was required to isolate and depressurise the unit. Once the filter pot was depressurised it
was necessary to drain off NGLs which remained in the bottom of the unit. A sight glass drain was selected for draining the NGLs and a bucket was placed underneath to initially contain the
liquid prior to it flashing off. The operator was present during this process and the rate of drain was of a level which the operator felt was not a cause for concern. During the draining of the vessel
a gashead in close proximity to the work went into alarm condition - this gas head (a simrad IR detector) is located at the fuel gas cooler seawater exit which historically blips into alarm due to an
occasional small amount of gas passing accross the internal sealing arrangement and exiting via the cooling water outlet to the drainage systems. This alarm was responded to in the normal
fashion but as the operator made his way to the gas head a 2nd head subsquently and very rapidly went into high alarm. This 2nd head in High alarm resulted in a coincident high level gas
shutdown/blowdown of the process and a change in platform status. The weather at the time of the incident was flat, calm and there was very little wind to disperse any accumulation of gas. The
Firepump <...> was being tested and on the sixth test the pump started then cut out. The work party could smell diesel fumes and on investigation it was found that 10mm diesel supply line to the
engine had blown out from the compression fitting. There was a potential for ignition/fire from atomised diesel coming into contact with hot engine. The shaft driven diesel pump had immediately
stopped pumping diesel when then engine cut out, limiting the diesel spill to a maximum of approximately 250ml which was contained within the firepump bunded area. The rubber ferrule within
the fitting was found to be of a different size and shape to the other fittings on the pipework in that it did not have the metal insert ferrule. Initial recommendations - 10mm stainless steel pipework
and swagelock fittings fitted. Check remaining pipework fittings on both fire pumps and secure. Source new pipework, fittings and ferrules from engine manufacturer and change out stainless
pipework upon receipt.
Leak developed on closed drains pump P6700 discharge pressure gauge. Suspect leak at the Bourbon tube caused by discharge pressure fluctuations. The pump controls the level in the closed
drains drum V6790 so is pumping probably 90% water and 10% crude oil. Leak was observed by Plant man carrying out late night plant checks. Immediate action taken to isolate gauge.
Immediately prior to incident a process upset was experienced when a cooling medium circulation pump situated on ETAP CPF QU platform tripped. Cause of the cooling medium pump trip
hasn't been confirmed, staff working in area believe they didn't contact any stop buttons & checks on platform EDCS by electrician didn't identify any fault. Stand-by pump was started remotely
from CCR but the interruption to cooling medium flow resulted in high discharge temperature trips on platforms gas export compressors at 11:24:32 & 11:24:37. At 11:25:52 a low gas alarm was
detected by DG16001 101B. Area operator investigated the low gas alarm & identified small leak from downstream flange of PSV280021. He isolated spare PSV & isolated leak. Interrogation of
platforms data recording system shows that as a result of partial gas plant trip, pressure in HP flare header increased to 2.7 barg, system is rated to 19.6 barg & normal operating range is bet 0 & 5
barg. Time of the peak in the pressure detected corresponds to time of detection of low gas. Immediate problem resolved by valve isolation of PSV & investigation team has been set up to
determine cause of joint failure. Our records show flange was last disturbed during PSV recertification in <...>.
ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE OIR/9B. <...> platform operating in NUI mode. At approx 10:20, 'line of sight' infra-red gas detector came into low alarm (20%LEL), indicating in <...> control
room.SBV <...> dispatched to platform reported no visual signs of release but did report noise 'similar to an air hose venting' coming from platform. Based on this <...> shutdown was initiated by
<...> control room. Limited quantity of gas vented to atmosphere in controlled manner. Operation in progress prior to gas alarm was recommissioning of gas lift to <...> well 174, following earlier
maintenance. This led control room technicians to surmise that problems could be associated with this well. Emergency shut off valve & Well 174 were closed. Boxed inventory was allowed to
depressure & as it depressurised fire & gas detection indicated a decrease down to zero. At 16:26 the SBV also indicated that noise from platform had stopped. Intervention team, of minimum
personnel, visited <...> on <...>, monitoring indicated that no gas detected. No signs of damage. System was purged with nitrogen & leak indentified at flow transmitter vent valve at gas lift
manifold on Level 11. It was discovered valve had been partially left open possibly following maintenance.
<...>. At the time of the incident the plant was undergoing a production re-start following an earlier export shutdown. Well <...> was not actually flowing when at 0230 a low gas alarm in egg box
4 was seen on the CCR fire and gas panel. An Operations Technician was despatched with a gas detector to investigate the low gas alarm. Another Operations Technician working nearby, on
hearing an unusual noise from the wellbay, went to investigate. Both Operations Technicians arrived on location and through the eggbox door witnessed hydrocarbon escaping from the <...>
flange on well <...>. The initial gas detection changed to Hi gas. One Operations Technician initiated the local egg box shutdown and the other contacted the CCR. The CCR initiated a Yellow
Shutdown (YSD). Gas levels rapidly reduced although three other detectors went briefly into low alarm as the gas dispersed past them. The event from initial detection to reset of the gas detection
lasted less than 4 minutes. A general alarm was not raised. Immediate actions taken were to isolate formally the tree pending mobilisation of a specialist Technician to assist with investigation of
the leak. Initial findings are that a soft iron or mild steel joint ring had been used for a duty where stainless steel should be employed. Accelerated galvanic corrosion of the joint ring had therefore

Following a planned maintenance shutdown, the operators were preparing the plant for recommencement of well production. Gas from well 3-1 was being used to pressurise through the plant. A
noise was heard in the vicinity of VO2 and an operations technician observed that there was a leak from the upstream flange connection on PSV278: which is located on the VO2 separator. The
CCR and STL (who was in the CCR) were immediately informed. The STL instructed the operations technician to refrain from investigating further until the STL was on site. On arrival of the
STL, he was informed by the CCR that a single gas head(G5212) had gone into low alarm and the STL ordered a manual yellow shutdown, which depressurised the plant and stopped the leak.
PSV278 had been removed and replaced as part of the shutdown work scope. The separator pressure was 0.5 barg at the time of the leak and no wells were producing. A full investigation has been
started to determine the reasons for the joint to fail and to understand why it had not been detected during the pre-start leak testing programme. The joint has now been remade tested and
recomissioned.
At 0845 hrs on <...> March the General Platform Alarm was auto initiated by a high gas alarm being activated from G5220, in package 2 MOL area. G5221 also came into alarm. A P.A.
announcement was made and the platform personnel went to their Muster Points. The Incident Co-ordinator was informed by radio and he and another member of the Fast Response Team went to
investigate. They reported back that there was a smell of gas and that T71 was showing 100% full and the immediate area around T71 and the Wemco was flooded, water was also pouring down
from above and rising from loop seals, which had also brought up some oil and gas. The Incident Co-ordinator called down the rest of the Fire Team to the West side of Package 2. The team
quickly assessed that due to the amount of water in the drains systems from Wet Testing the Deluge, it has filled up T71 and come back up the Drain Loop Seals as there was signs of small
amounts of oil on top of the water. As the smell of gas had dispersed two of the Fire Team went into the package and manually dumped the level in T71 to the drains sea dump. The all clear was
passed back to the control room so the mustered personnel were then stood down. There is a modification already in the system to upgrade the level control on T71 to enable it to be fully
Leak from flange on 8" <...> line feeding PSV 401 discovered by Production Technician conducting normal plant routines. Upstream valve isolated, flange bolts (2 at rear of flange) retightened.
Line deisolated and tested for leakage. Returned to service. Approx 3 litres of hydrocarbon lost, contained in bund and drained to open drain system.
A leak was noted approx 08:00hrs on <...>. On the 11/2" back weld class 6000# socket weld elbow pipe work for pressure transmitter 468 off P06 discharge spool. The system was operating at 94
bar at the time, the leak gradually became worse. As a result the decision was made to shutdown P06. P05 was currently undergoing a DE Seal change out. This resulted in a platform shutdown. 2
litres of HC (approx) leaked from the pipework but it was all contained within the drain system leading to V45. Decision to carry out a <...> report was deferred until <...> when HSE was
consulted for advice. After the section of pipework had been removed to the fabrication shop for inspection and repair, it was examined by the Offshore Inspection Engineer. The leak was found in
a defective weld. It was 17mm in length in the centre of the weld. The defect fillet weld was removed by grinding, then welded and on completion NDT and a pressure test found it to be
satisfactory. The section of pipework was returned to service. Resonance vibration by hand was observed up to the fist small bore pipe clamp support during process operations by the OIE. This
vibration is thought to be significant enough to result in fatigue stress, contributing to the leak. However after grinding, no volumetric internal flaw was found during evacuation. This finding
Bunkering had commenced at 06:18hrs and the hose split at 08:06 hrs after having bunkered 196 m3 of diesel. Diesel bunkering operations are carried out using 3 x 15 metre and 1 x 6 m length
of hose between the platform and the supply vessel. The hoses are connected and hung off permanently on the platform and lowered down to the vessel for bunkering operations. The failure
occurred upstream of the joint on the second length of the hose on the platform side. Once the hose has been lowered down to the supply vessel , the second length of hose is lying in the sea, and
should therefore not have weight placed upon it. In addition flotation aids are attached to the hose. Due to previous incidents of hoses failing it was agreed that they would be changed out on a 4
monthly basis. The hoses were last changed out on the <...>. and were due to be replaced. FOR FULLER REPORT SEE OIR9B
Normal plant operations - weather clear and dry. Mixture of water , dead crude, condensate overflowing from tundish drains on LP drain system (T71). T71 has been recommssioned after pump
(P10) changeout. Pump had been tested using water and found to be operating satisfactorily. Vessel was brought on line to normal operating status. During normal operations fluids flow into the
vessel and are pumped out automatically to the main separators. During one of the pump out operations gas was detected on level 2. Investigation by Production detected gas/water coming out of
one of the tundish drains, almost immediately gas alarms in level 1 in the vicinity of T71 activated. Manual Yellow shutdown GPA activated, contents of T71 dumped into the Sea Sump, gas
levels subsided quickly. Initial investigation showed impellor key had stuck across the discharge NRV from P10 (T71 pump) allowing LP condensate from P74 to discharge into the vessel T71:
pressurising the vessel and blowing the tundish loop seals, early indications also show T71 vent to LLP flare NRV also stuck closed. Full investigation initiated - ongoing.
Normal platform operations. Weather dry and clear. Low/High gas alarm operated in CCR. Fire and Gas control action shut platform down. Production Operator sent to investigate. On arrival at
the scene he observed a small spillage of oil/water in the MOL walkway. He identified the oil and water had come from one of the drain tundishes from the low pressure accumulator vessel. Spill
cleaned up and no discharge to the sea. NGL plant had tripped 10 minutes prior to incident, investigation team set to review the interfaces between both systems and identify the cause of pressure
excursion.

Whilst walking past V18 - Ops Inst Tech noted an intermittent hydrocarbon gas leak coming from the gland on V18 pressure control valve (PCV8180A). The plant conditions were steady. There
was no work taking place within the NGL plant at the time. The weather conditions were cold and with a strong notherly wind blowing. V18 pressure was reduced from its normal operating
pressure of 24bar to 18bar to reduce the pressure on the gland of PCV8180A. Attempt made to nip up gland on PCV8180A, but unable to do so as no adjustment left on gland packing.
PCV8180A was isolated whilst V18 pressure was controlled via the manual bypass valve. Additional packing was added to the gland of PCV8180A and the gland was adjusted. PCV8180A was
returned to service, no further leaks were noted.
Oil mist alarm came on for GT3 in the control room - The CRT notified the mechanic immediately via radio. A few minutes afterwards, the mechanic informed the CRT that there was a leak
inside GT3 enclosure. The unit was immediately shutdown from the control room. A decision was taken to monitor unit until it cooled down before opening the doors and doing any sort of
investigation. After unit cooled down. On investigation it was found to be a diesel leak , but source could not be located. On <...> <...> personnel found leak and repaired same. About 2 litres of
diesel was spilled. GT3 was restarted on <...>.
<...>- Description-Eggbox 5-Well 5-3. After well maintenance the well was being brought back into production. The plant was steady, no one was in the vicinity of the the eggbox. The gas supply
valves were opened and within a couple of minutes a low gas alarm head was activated. The gas supply valves were shut off and the eggbox investigated. It was discovered that on well 5-3, a 1/4"
valve on the non-active sidearm gauge block valve manifold was left partially open with the seal cap missing. This was the source of the minor hydrocarbon release of GAS. No further leaks were
noted. An investigation has been initiated to understand the root causes of this occurrence and recommend steps to minimize repetition.
Shortly after commencing flowing hydrocarbons from <...> 10 to the production train via <...> the operations area technician noticed an escape of vapour coming from the body filler connection
(Giant button head type) on the LMGV (the middle of 3 ports on the LMGV th the back of the <...> tree). He immediately informed the SSP/OS and the flow from <...> was shut in.
After <...> oil process shutdown and subsequent restart "B" Train 1st Stage Separator was successfully taken online. "A" Train was left for approx 90 minutes due to Shift Handover / Safety
Meeting. During this time the interface level in "A" Train 1st Stage Separator dropped unexpectedly via suspected passing valves allowing crude to enter P.W. system and exit to sea via Degasser
vessel discharge. Action on discovery of excursion was to immediately increase interface level in "A" Train separator by opening up high BSW wells.
On <...> H.P. Gas Compressor HP Discharge trip 12mm impulse line found with small fracture releasing subsequent HP Gas inside module during normal operation of compressor. Impulse line
was immediately isolated by Operations Technician closing double block valves. Levels of gas dissipating within module not significant for fixed gas detection system to detect. Platform did not
go to GPA and machine was not shutdown.
During normal watch keeping duties an operations technican discovered produced water coming from a "pinhole" leak on a produced water line connecting the produced water hydrocyclone
package to the produced water degrasser downstream of the 'A' train level control valve. He immediately informed the CRO & a controlled shutdown & manually activated blowdown of the 'A'
train first stage separator was carried out. This took approx. 10 mins. The section of pipework was then isolated. The amount of produced water lost was calculated as not exceeding 20 litres. The
OWOB average value for that 24 hour period was 3ppm giving an estimated oil loss of 0.00006 litres.
Minor gas release to weld failure on fuel gas vessel bridle drain spool. Gas dispersed naturally in open module. Leak rate insufficient to initiate platform detection system. Vessel blow down
manually following process shutdown.
Hydrocarbon release discovered by operations technician during routine watch keeping duties from pin hole leak on 2" return line from the fuel gas scrubber <...> to the 2nd stage process
separator <...>. System shutdown and blown down in controlled manner and isolated when flat.
The technician spotted a pin hole leak at the bottom of the third stage separator, the process has been shut down and depressurized for repair. There was no spill to the sea.
TIR comments At about 02:50hrs, Fire broke out in No 1 generator (turbine). GPA and muster took place. Coast guard informed. Fire extinguished by sprinkle systems. Fire team checked area &
made safe. Power switched to alternative turbine. Platform operation resumed. FORM 9B comments Fire detection in GTI turbine hood enclosure. Auto release of Inergen fixed extinguishant.
SPS (surface proess shutdown) initiated automatically. Initial indication of source is lube oil ignition on hot turbine exhaust.

As part of the investigation work following <...>, in which an oil leak had been identified from the power turbine bearing cover, generator GT1 was being load tested to determine extent of the oil
leak. During testing, an oil mist was noted by the operations personnel outside of the enclosure and the machine shutdown. During the run down, a small flame was observed by the operator and a
single flame detector of the F & G system. The emergency stop was actioned and the inergen extinguishant released which extinguished the flame.
<...> 2" valve was opened and the Echometer checks progresses then a stem seal developed a small leak at 21.15hrs. Attachments will follow.
While recommissioning the diesel system on C1 crane the operator omitted to fit a pressure gauge which he had removed for the venting the system. The operator was called away to assist in
critical plant operations and when he returned he overlooked the presssure gauge and continued to commission the diesel system which caused diesel to spill out of the gauge point causing 0.025
tonnes of diesel to spill onto the sea. The system was shut down immediately and the gauge was fitted. Good operations meetings to be held to highlight that when personnel are called away to do
other jobs, before resuming the job to retrace steps to ensure that all equipment is correctly installed before reinstating any systems. Weather 10kts, 247deg sea state 0.5-1.0 mtres
Maintainance ( Mechanics) was being carried out on AGT#1. This required the machine to have fuel change overs carried out. On change over from diesel to gas, a flame detector was activated.
An operator checked out the alarm and found no fire, so the alarm was reset. 3-4 minutes later another flame detector was activated ( a different one to the first). The operator checked the area
again and confirmed a fire in the hood. The control room operator then activated the CO2 manual discharge from the MCR, the operator confirmed the activation of the CO2 and that the fire was
extinguished.
Platform was on normal production when Turbine generator <...>#2 shutdown automatically and the turbine enclosure automatic fixed CO2 extinguishant fired off. Operators were in attendance
at the machine within two minutes and on local alarm panel, alarm 400 "Fire in enclosure" was active. Operator checked through hood window and no flames could be seen. CO2 had
automatically activated and extinguished fire. Internal inspection of turbine found a nut backed off half turn on the fuel gas inlet to burner #4 causing the Dowty seal to be loose. Further
investigation ongoing with equipment manufacturer <...>.
Mechanical Seal failure on #2 Crude Oil booster pump. Resultant loss of Hydrocarbon activated a local gas detector & shutdown the platform automatically. No fire, explosion or injuries resulted
from Hydrocarbon release.
Gas release occurred while carrying out a sand filter changeover on a temporary sand filter package, being used for a Solids Production Survey on <...> well <...>. The release was due to a 2"
drain cap being left off a sand filter pot. The gas release operated the wellhead area gas detection which initiated a platform SPS which closed in D410, in conjuction with a manual of the
temporary package.
Equalisation of pressure across T10 SSSV using diesel had been completed. When returning the well to production a (diesel) leak occurred when a 3/8" instrument fitting parted on the flowline.
The leak was immediately isolated and the diesel contained using a spill kit. A small amount of diesel which could not be contained leaked to the sea. Activities halted and an investigation is
underway.
During normal operations of the <...> facilities a gas leak was discovered in the closed drain system. A pin hole in the piping was apparent in the system. A controlled de-pressurisation of all the
platform hydrocarbon systems was carried out. Subsequent NDT showed the fault to be localised and not caused by corrosion. Platform will remain shutdown until repairs carried out.
Injured Person (IP) was removing <...> Hub from B2 Oil Flowline choke location for machining of the flange face. The blind hub flew off under pressure and hit the IP on the R.Shoulder. The
man had been sitting on a small purpose built access platform at the time and was knocked backwards onto the deck approx 1M below. Prior to work start, the flowline had been checked and
indicated depressurised. Weather: Wind 210 deg @ 10 knots; Temp 8deg. Actions taken:- IP transferred to s/bay by stretcher. Coastguard called forward and IP transferred to <...> Hospital, <...>.
Wellbay barriered off, other work in that area suspended. Work area left intact. Initial investigation team set up. Photos taken of the area. IP interviewed. Onshore investigation team sent offshore
to continue investigation. Detained in hospital >24hrs. IP's occupation = mechanical technician
On starting up from control shutdown small gas release issued from a cracked glass on a level guage. This caused the fire and gas system to shut down production by way of gas detection. There
was no general alarm or muster. Normal work has been resumed. Minor release of gas, only a blip showed on the computer trace.

CCR picked up an alarm on G3150B Density Pump to indicate that the pump had stopped, this was followed by a second alarm from the switchroom to indicate that the power supply to the pump
was off. Person in the area also called the CCR to report oil leak. The CCR operator requested oil plant operator to investigate the fault, on arrival at module 4 mezz the operator observed that the
pump seal had failed and was spraying oil over the surrounding area. The pump was isolated and the oil spill was contained within the surrounding area. No fire and gas executive actions.
Investigation into the failure ongoing.
Source of pollution : From drainage water caisson (Sea Sump) some internal damage may have been contributory factor which allowed oil to be discharged to the sea. Cause of pollution : LP
separator sandwash operations were taking place at the time of the discharge. Our LP flash drums and recovered oil drums are sandwashed at the same time. The recovered oil drum is sandwashed
direct to the sea sump.There may have been some oil in the centre section of the recovered oil drum as we drain it to the sea sump prior to commencing sandwashing. Detailed cause of pollution
under investigation. Steps taken to prevent recurrence.
On <...> at approx. 16:40 hrs a small release of gas ignited on the Drill Floor due to a static discharge. Well Ops text <...> - Incident on <...> on <...> POOH with <...>, 15k perforating guns on
slickline. Weeping of gas from slickline BOPs so applied more grease pressure. Excess grease was being collected in a bucket with metal handle. Flash fire due to static. Person burnt. Bucket
replaced with metal one, properly earthed. Safety alert to be issued. Discussed with <...>.
A routine pressure test on the choke/stand pipe manifolds was being conducted between the cement unit and the drill floor. When performing the final test a leak was observed from the 3" x 1002
hammer union elbow connection located on the skid deck. The pressure was bled off and the union hammered up. The line was retested , the leak was still present. The pressure was bled off and
the leads were checked, and cleaned and a new replacement seal fitted. The 3" x 1002 union elbow was refitted. Line test repeated, and having passed 500 psi test pressure was raised to 4500psi.
The union elbow immediately parted at the threaded elbow connection that had previously been dressed. Operation was suspended, area barriered off so no danger to other persons.
Whilst drilling 8.5" hole with 11.2PPG mud and a surface pumping pressure of 4500psi. a BHI flow metre transducer was in use on the mud service line situated at the skid deck level. The flow
metre has 2 x 1/4" impulse lines 14" long, rated to 15000 psi with 1/4" stainless steel elbows. One of the elbows partially washed out, spraying the area with approx 1/2 bbl of LTOBM.
Small gas leak at compressor C5015 from the 3rd stage seal gas DP gauge. Alarm indication on CCR fire and gas panel at14-30% LEL. Alarm investigated and gas leak confirmed. Platform level
three shutdown initiated by CCR operator. Gas dispersed rapidly after shutdown of plant; operations technicians then isolated the defective instrumentation. Weather conditions - Visibility good:
wind speed & direction : 10-15 knots SSW.
Fuel gas leak at compressor C5010 from the <...> Gas Generator Fuel gas manifold (Fuel Rail). During test run after engine change, gas detection initially at 20% LEL on three heads, rising to
60% on one head resulting in ESD of the unit and plant automatic shutdown. Alarm investigated and gas leak confirmed from uncapped 1/4" test nipple on fuel rail, gas monitor returned to
normal within 5 minutes of initial detection. Weather conditions:- Visibility good: wind speed & direction : 10 - 15 knots SW
Gas Compressor C5010 was started up, gas was detected by one gas detector. The readings were highly variable 15% - 28% - 45% peaking at 77% momentarily as the unit was shutdown. On
investigation the gas was found to be from the third stage sealgas DP gauge instrument in a drain point sealing cap. The cap has been replaced and the unit restarted without problem.
A 3/8" instrument pipe on the diesel fuel system to the B <...> Generator was found to be fractured. The pipe is a connection to the pressure transmitter and the fracture occurred at the connecting
union. The machine was immediately shut down and the second generator was started to provide power. Repairs have been affected.
ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE OIR/9B Normal operations were ongoing: when undertaking a training session in M6 Mezz on the newly installed fuel gas import/gas lift system the operator
discovered a gas leak emanating from a flanged joint on the system. This was reported to M13 control room and the 'on shift' production supervisor, the fuel gas import(135bar) & gas lift (155bar)
were depressurised and isolated. Inspection of flange joint ascertained the cause of the leak was a result of some of the bolts on the flange being loose. The bolts were re-tightened and the system
pressured up in increments to 130bar; with no indication of leaks operations resumed. The gas detection heads within the module did not activate, inspection and tests showed these were fully
operational. The leak occurred 10 days after gas was first introduced to the system, investigation of the incident could not ascertain the root cause, evidence & documentation have been passed to
the onshore engineering department for further investigation. Wind at 18 knts from 030 deg.

During normal operations a three inches flanged joint was found to be leaking gas on the fuel gas import crossover to the gas lift header. The leak was isolated and the system depressurised, the
cause of the leak is under investigation.
Wind speed 10kts @ 130deg. Sea state 0.7M. While bringing on well SA, surging resulted in a high condensate liquid level in the HP separator. An operator was at the HP separator monitoring
sight glass readings and discovered a drip increasing to a spray from the valve stem of the HP separator LCV bypass valve. (valve 43 for LV02002) PCR was informed and all wells shut in, and
plant blow down initiated. HP separator outlet ESDV shut and leak halted. Area washed down & remaining condensate washed to drains. Estimated duration of leak 5mins. Estimated amount of
leak 7litres of which approx 2litres passed to sea. Statutory authorities were advised of the incident. A new valve of the same specification was installed, which when pressurised had a slight leak
at the stem detectable using a gas detector. The old valve was stripped down, repacked and rebuilt, pressure tested to 70barg and reinstalled. Production was restarted and the valve was put under
a monitoring regime of inspection every 2hours for the first 24hours followed by twice daily for the next 6days. Investigations are ongoing as to why the replacement valve was not gas/condensate
tight. It's difficult to determine the root cause of the leak, but there were some contributory factors, which may have resulted in the leak. The gland follower securing nuts had worked slightly
Small Leak of gas - auto direction nil, gas was smelt. Platform shut - in @ 14.30, reviewing & investigating incident. Relief valve RV20007 on first stage of suction scrubber developed a minor
gas leak from the tell tale indicating a failure of compensating bellows. Gas was noted to be escaping from the vent pipe (smell) but there was no indication from the area gas detection system due
to the low levels of gas present and prevailing weather conditions.The leak and weather conditions were monitored and production shutdown to replace the defective relief valve. The RV is being
sent for onshore inspection to confirm the failure mode of the bellows unit. Previously reported gas leaks from RV 20007 identified that the gas compressor settleout pressure increased when a
process shutdown occurred causing the RV to chatter. An engineering modification was completed to reduce the effects of the settleout pressure increase. Modification (MRF 511) status is being
confirmed/ reviewed.
Small leak (hydrocarbon) found on blind flange at the tie-in point from g8001 demister drain to lp flare system. This leak site was identified as a result of a proactive survey of flanges in the
process gas system as a response to an earlier incident. It was the only leak site found as a result of the survey
Well services crew had just completed top up checks on well N21 A annulus as the last job in their planned programme. Two gas heads in lower well bay triggered and platform shut down
automatically. We suspect cause of problem was small gas release from top up needle valve which had recently been in use and probably closed on a hydrate/debris which let go (right below gas
heads). Gas heads clear within 2 minutes. Minimal wind in area. All wells tested individually for leaks prior to plant restart.
Process was in steady state production low level gas indication was observed on control room monitors in the gas metering area fluctuating between two gas heads at 6% and 23% (below
executive action levels). OIM was informed and decision taken to sound GPA, shutdown process and blowdown activated manually. Production operator also confirmed a gas leak was evident
visually and audibly at gas metering stream 2 flow transmitter housing. He withdrew and reported back to control room. All personnel accounted for and remained at internal muster stations. A 10
knot , north easterly wind was blowing and would have taken gas into and across the platform. On completion of the blow down and zero indication of gas, the area was checked out. Stream
leakage. It was subsequently isolated and checked. A damaged seal was found between the transmitter to manifold block.
50m3 estimated gas release-well <...> at 23:07 hrs. Late reporting-apology given unable to contact <...>. They will notify the ICC also. Stainless steel instrumentation small bore tubing failureblew off at T piece on well head -Initaited process shutdown as 2 gas heads fired off-process blowdown initiated-muster-leak isolated and investigation from onshore team to take place, including
independent representative. Well <...> was being brought back on line after a planned shutdown. Instrument tubing on "A" top annulus pressure instruments, blew out of "T" piece and released
gas in well bay. Process shutdown automatically on two high gas and commenced auto blow down. CRO set off deluge in well bay manually. Gas heads returned to normal and leak found. Leak
source isolated at tree valves. Commenced detailed examination of all small bore tubing in well bay. Plant remains shut down.
Platform shutdown on a manual SPS/GPA when it was noted by an operator that a pin hole leak had occurred on E1030 oil export cooler spraying crude oil onto the deck. Process system shut
down, depressurised and oil leak contained. Platform remained shutdown until oil cooler was isolated for further investigation.
Plant in steady state operation, oil and gas export. Wind 8 knots clear with calm seas. Wind direction 090 degrees. Export spec. Crude oil leak from E1030 Oil Export Cooler. Local gas head
above cooler activated. Operator visually confirmed leak - informed shutdown & isolation.
During routine inspection of Module (Wellhead Module 07 Vessel 0707 {<...> Test Separator}) by operator a small pinhole leak was noted coming from a 2" Valve on the Leveltrol bridle. The
vessel was depressurised and removed from service. The valve was then replaced. No module alarms were initiated due to fluid mix and small volume leaked.

Pinhole leak in produced water line from Vessel 1305 FWKO in Module 13 noted by Production Operator. This leak was of minor nature. The line was isolated and drained in preparation for
replacement spool. NDT check on the rest of the line and the similar system in adjacent module are ongoing at this time. These lines are part of the corrosion management procedural checks, at
this time we have requested a review of the frequency of inspection. No fixed detection alarms were activated by this minor Produced water leak.
During normal operations a small leak of injection water developed from a 12mm bleed nipple. This water sprayed upwards onto the roof of the adjacent switchroom, travelling along the flat roof
and running into and through a cable entry transit. The water found its way into an electrical cubicle and caused a short between the phases. The resulting short circuit blew the main fuses and
safely tripped the supply to the board. Indication of incident was by internal smoke detection system. This is normally an unmanned area. No platform alarm was initiated in response to this
smoke alarm. Operations personnel were sent to investigate and report. Subsequently checks on the rest of the platform switchrooms were carried out to ensure any similar areas are identified and
checked.
Normal operations, well producing. Open well. Weather good. Well fluids produced water and crude oil. Water 90.28%. No machine involved. Suspected fatigue of 12mm x 2mm instruments
pipe. Person observed loss of containment reported to MCR and closure of the THP block valve. 12mm x 2mm pipework connected to Parker 'A' lok fitted to THP guage on the kill wing side of
CP 69 sheared resulting in a small hydrocarbon release.
Time of incident, 07:18 hrs. Portable mobile deisel air compressor caught fire. Extinguished by workforce and then fire team.Platform alert was initiated and production shutdown. Under control
& extinguished by 07:35 hrs. (Diesel driven compressor. Extinguished by water hose. Sound insulation was on fire. Permission to disturb site denied. For investigation offshore).Air compressor
barriered off pending further investigation.
Small gas release reported in module 3. Gas was found to passing through the gland packing of valve No. 03LCV8014. The leak was investigated and the system shut down and the leak has been
repaired.
Corroded pipe work caused the release of hydrocarbon fluids. It was dead crude oil which was released. It did not contain gas. No injuries. The area has been depressurised and drain manhole
have been isolated and depressurised
The Ops supervisor was walking through the gas compression module and noted a smell of gas. He traced this to be a 'Bestobell' deck penetration seal where gas was seen to be bubbling out. The
OTL and OIM were called to the area and the decision was taken to shut down and isolate the system (test separator offgas line). The leak of gas was small and insufficient to initiate the fixed gas
detection system. The affected system remains shut down until a repair can be implemented.
Whilst lifting the actuator from HV 14183 the actuator was being "rocked" on the lifting gear to loosen the mounting spigot. The final two bolts were removed and once the actuator was freed
from the valve spindle, a loud bang was heard, accompanied by a release of high pressure (330 barg). Injection water: Two persons were struck by the water sustaining minor injuries. The system
was shutdown and made safe.
Whilst lifting the actuator from HV 14183 the actuator was being "rocked" on the lifting gear to loosen the mounting spigot. The final two bolts were removed and once the actuator was freed
from the valve spindle, a loud bang was heard, accompanied by a release of high pressure (330 barg). Injection water: Two persons were struck by the water sustaining minor injuries. The system
was shutdown and made safe.
During a process shutdown following closure of the riser valve on the F.P.S. <...> platform, the main contractor changed from fuel gas to diesel fuel. 'C' tripped on change over and B kept
running. On inspecting 'C' enclosure the ops tech also went to inspect the 'B' engine through the enclosure windows. He noticed a jet flame inside the enclosure. At this time, the machine tripped.
The operations technician, immediately activated inergen fire suppressant to this enclosure. This was manual activated. After a period of time, (about 1hr). The 'C' enclosure was inspected by the
platform emergency response team. The 'B' enclosure was then cooled down using the forced vent fans. Once cooled, the enclosure doors were opened and the engine inspected. A leak was
detected from the diesel fuel system. A fitting at a T.I point point was found to be loose.

<...>. Whilst carrying out an intervention on well J16, a leak of hydrocarbons occurred of estimated volume 1.25 standard cubic metres from the nipple on the service wing value of J16 tree. The
service wing valve had just been opened to bleed down the pressure in the lubricator installed on J16 well, when the leak occurred. The nipple was removed and examined on the platform and no
evidence of damage was seen on the nipple. The experienced and fully competent <...> person, who installed the nipple, had done so in the manner required by existing <...> procedures and this
operation was witnessed by a core member of our operations crew as defined within the procedure. The fixed gas detection did not activate as a result of this release and hence there was neither a
GPA, not a muster. The release with no specific actions taken as the upstream pressure was of limited volume, which exhausted through the deck path. Current procedures are being amended to;
a) Provide a torque setting whilst tightening nipples. b) Test seal before nipple is put into hydrocarbon service. Gas detection in the area of the release is being checked for correct operation.
On <...> <...> was in production, at 11.53 Gas Detector GDR34007 went into alarm & initiated automatic shutdown, blowdown & deluge release. Full muster was achieved within 15 mins & the
process blowdown was completed at 12.45hrs. AT this time the investigation into the cause of the leak commenced. A leaking 0.5" flange on the discharge of the Column Compressor K2510 was
located. The platform returned to normal status at 12.34 hrs. Initial investigations indicate that the flange has been incorrectly torqued. The compressor had only run for 12 hrs. The platform
suffered a gas release from a 1" flange coming from a 10" line from the column compressor. This release initiated alarms, a full shut down of process and blow down. Additionally the deluge
system operated in the area of the leak. The platform went to full muster as did the adjacent drilling rig. Leak is inaccesible and they are erecting scaffold to inspect. Defective process isolated.
A small pin hole leak condensate line detected by technician, platform was shutdown. Line will repaired prior to start up. Cause of hole unknown.
Hydrocarbon release to atmosphere during blow down activity on process.
A major gas release from 10 inch inlet to second stage separator caused by crack in weld.
During normal oil/gas production operations, two gas heads in module B picked up low levels of gas in the wellhead area indicating that a gas leak had occurred. A precautionary muster was
called prior to further investigation. All plant conditions appeared normal. During the muster situation, gas levels were confirmed and began to increase. OIM instructed full blowdown and shut in
of process facilities. Once the plant was confirmed to be secured an emergency team was committed to the module area to investigate the source of the leak. The leak was quickly identified to be
from a 1/4" SS line that connects the well T14 annulus to a pressure chart recorder. This line had been in contact with a flange and had been wearing away. Once insufficient thickness remained to
withstand the pressure (gas lift pressure around 1900 psi) a small pinhole leak formed (approx 0.6mm dia.). Process plant remains shut in for a full investigation and remedial works prior to
restart of plant. Environmental conditions were good during the incident with 2m seas and 10 - 15 knts Northerly wind.
During normal oil/gas producing operations, an oil plant operator found water to be leaking from a flange on the vessel V6 level control bridle. The operator effected partial isolation of the flange,
however as fluid/gas was still leaking he energised a manual call point. This action initiated a platform muster. During the muster situation, gas levels were confirmed to have risen to 15% LEL on
three gas heads in the module, this in itself would not initiate an emergency situation. Shutdown of the plant was manually initiated by the Control Room. Emergency teams investigated the leak
confirming that a 3/4" carbon steel pipe nipple had failed at a flange releasing a small quantity of oil, gas and water into the module. Further valve isolations secured the leak and the area was
declared secure. Process plant remained shut in for a full investigation and remedial works completed prior to restart of plant. Environmental conditions were good during the incident with 2.5 m
seas.
During normal oil/gas producing plant startup operations, gas compressor C3 was in the process of being put on line having just been started and been offline for 24 hours (due to an unrelated
control problem elsewhere on the plant). The operators involved had started the machine, had just begun to put it online and were conducting routine checks on the system. Gas was noticed to be
escaping from the compressor barrel inlet flange joint and the machine was shut down. All remaining plant conditions appeared normal. Numerous gas heads were operational at the time of the
release , however the leak was of insufficient size to register. All gas was vented from the module by the HVAC system to a safe area. Environmental conditions were good during the incident
with 2-1/2 m seas and 20-25 knts westerly wind.
During normal production operations a pinhole leak developed in <...> oil metering stream three. The leak was found by operators in the area who noticed a smell of hydrocarbons. The oil plant
operator was immediately notified and the oil plant shut down and depressurised. All released oil was contained within the save -all bund on the metering unit and was subsequently recovered
through the closed drain systems. The pinhole leak was traced back to a low point on a strainer spool that connects the metering loop to closed drains. The line has been removed for inspection
and connections isolated. All remaining metering stream drain connections in a similar configuration have been subjected to UT examination, no further problem areas found.

During normal production operations a pin-hole leak developed in the <...> Densitometer by pass line. The leak was identified by the gas detection system and alarms announced in the control
room. This alarm condition results in the platform being called to muster stations. The plant was shut down and depressurised manually. Subsequent investigations by the emergency teams
identified a corroded spool and isolated the source of the leak.All released crude oil was confined to the local area of the module and recovered through the drain system and the oil recovery
system. - No environmental damage or contamination sustained.
Small leak from impluse line on gas compressor train No.2 between gas compressor and discharge line. One gas head low level gas compressor close down. Leak identified and pipe replaced.
Leak occurred when compressor started up.
During scale squeeze operations on well <...>a 500 psi rated hose failed, causing a release of system pressure. The system was rigged up and being operated as per procedures. During the incident
the pressure within the hose was 2900 psi. There was a mechanical failure of the hose. The route cause is unknown but may be due to constriction in pipework. The incident is currently under
investigation. There were no injuries.
It was noted that an oil leak had developed within the vicinity of the crude oil booster pumps on the cellar deck, P1. On further investigation a fine spray of oil was emanating from the sand
cyclone line on P1101 crude oil booster pump. The pump was subsequently stopped by the area technician and the line isolated. There were approximately 25 litres of crude oil contained around
the pump area, none of which was discharged overboard.
After the platform had been in an APSD (Abandon Platform Shutdown) condition the import of gas pipework was in the process of being repressurised form the gas pipeline. This required
equalising across the riser XZV2330 using nitrogen and then system repressurisation via HCV2303. Just prior to achieving normal operating pressure of 130 bar a low level gas alarm was
indicated on a single gas head (GDC 60854) in module M2. Initial investigations revealed that a hydrocarbon gas leak had developed at OCV0007 from the bonnet gasket on the import gas
system and instructions were given to the control room operator to immediately isolate the import gas system and blowdown. The systems supervisor then proceeded to the area and a local
isolation applied the total duration of the leak was 5 minutes from detection isolation.
P1411 MOL Pump was shut down due to internal repairs to B train separator. An opportunity was taken to inspect the seal balance line pipework, which was a hydrocarbon breaching activity. A
mechanical maintenance technician commenced removing the final 2 bolts the flanges parted and crude (export) oil spilled out under a initial pressure was not dissipating, he refitted 2 of the 4
bolts, tightened up the flange and stopped the leak. It was very quickly established thereafter that no mechanical isolation had been applied to the unit.
On <...> G8000 generator had been shutdown to complete a 1000 hour service and it had been recommended by EGT that the Fisher fuel gas regulator should be changed out every two years as
part of the maintenance strategy. The system pressure was increased in stages to check the new fuel gas regulator flanges for leaks and there were no leaks present when full system pressure was
achieved. It was noted at this stage that the downstream pressure reading was actually 33 bar when it should have been 28 bar. Subsequent adjustments of the pilot regulator did not indicate any
changes in downstream pressure and it was during this phase that a failure of the diaphragm or internal seal occurred resulting in gas venting from the regulator port. The platform changed to
hazard status and the 3 off gas heads within the fuel gas cabinet indicated high level.
During wire line operations a gas release occurred. The well was shutting and any residual pressure was bled off through the poor boy de-gasser. No injuries.
Hydrocarbon leak detected by a technician, coming from a temperature transmitter fitting (TZA6213) which failed on closed drain pump P6213. The pump was stopped immediately and local
mechanical isolation effected.
At 0645 <...> there was a noticeable step change in the flowrate and injection pressure to Hudson water injector W1, the flowrate increased from 1500m3/d to 4400m3/d and the ITHP dropped
from 142 to 81 bar. The sub-sea manifold pressure also dropped from 145 to 87 bar. At the same time W2 flowrate dropped from 5700 to 3250m3/d and the ITHP dropped from 150 to 90 bar. In
the early hours of the <...> the <...> water injection pipeline was dosed with biocide, a total of 230 litres were injected at a concentration of 689ppm. An investigation was completed at 11.00 on
the <...> and after closing both the FWV and UMGV with the choke fully open the flowrate did not decrease indicating a flowline leak.
During Flushing operations of the <...>, Prover in preparation for hooking up the mini prover. A discharge of approx 100 litres of crude oil occurred from the outlet of the flushing line. The oil
discharged over the bulkhead and adjacent pipework for a period of approximately 5 mins. No oil went to sea.

During routine fiscal gas routines a gas release occurred from A 3/8" instrument tubing. The source of the gas was from the gas header caused by a passing instrument block valve. The line had
been monitored for 30 mins prior to the release without an emission but, as gas compressor No: 1 tripped and blowdown commenced, There was sufficient flare header back pressure to pass the
secondary isolation block valve and release into the module.
During wireline operations an operator detected gas leaking from the Lower Master Valve stem, he immediately informed his supervisor who instructed the closure of the Down hole safety valve.
Control room was informed of the situation and the slot was depressurised. No fixed fire & gas detection was activated. Exact causes not known at this time, LMV stem packing may have failed
due to wear, exact cause of failure will be determined on examination of valve.
Gas detected in the module and it was below 60%LEL. The plant was shut down manually to investigate the leak.
The B main oil line (MOL) pump required to have its drive end mechanical seal changed. A permit to work was initiated to carry out the work. One of the technicians re-commenced work on the
pump at 12.45. Slackening of the mechanical seal securing studs commenced. On slackening the last securing stud crude oil began to escape from behind the mechanical seal under pressure.
Technician sprayed with crude oil. No gas detection was activated during the incident.
<...> - Annulus integrity investigation on KA07 (oil producer) has shown that there is communication between the A annulus and the sea.
At 1047 hours on <...> a platform electrical isolation signal was sent from the Fire and Gas Panel to initiate this output. The electrical isolation caused a full production shutdown and loss of
external communications from the platform, with the exception of the VHF radio. There was no injury to personnel or damage to the environment. Difficulty was experienced sustaining the
emergency or essential generator on line to provide electrical power. This was due to spurious outputs from the Fire and Gas panel causing electrical isolations. The Fire and Gas Panel would not
reset and indicated possibly only one of the two channels were operating . There was also a problem with communications between the Fire and Gas and ESD Panels. At 1437 hours a partial
evacuation of non-esssential personnel commenced by helicopter and was completed at 1619 hours. Those personnel were transported to <...> Fault finding on the Fire and Gas and ESD Panels is
being investigated by an <...> Engineer.
The number of people on board is 117. There was process problems which meant loss of power. Emergency power kicked in at 06:15. There was a temporary loss of jockey pumps which meant
the fire pumps kicked in. A low fire main pressure activated the general platform alarm. Regained power at 06:20 and I started the process back up. Everything turned back to normal.
Due to loss of power supplies compromising emergency and basic life support systems, 26 non essential personnel from a total POB of 57 down manned to <...>.
<...>Platform - Prior to skidding the rig & restricting wireline access to slot 8, a closure test was performed on the DHSV. During this test the control line pressure was bled off and indications
were that the valve had failed to close.The well is of a high scale regime and suspicion is that scale build up is preventing closure of the valve. A task based risk assessment has been completed
offshore, a programme developed and the appropriate tools ordered to allow for the reinstatement of the DHSV facilities. NB Note that this valve has failed to close on one occasion previously
due to scale build up (see OIR9b <...>).
<...>. To recommision well B52 the area operator as per normal procedure had lined up the kill line to inject gas down Xmas tree B52 tubing to assist in opening the DHSV which had been closed
for a heavy lift in the area. Approx 70 bar was required to open the DHSV. Within approx 5 mins. of his operation the CCR operator acknowledged a gas head reading from the local area detector
and a telephone call reporting a small gas release under the grating in the wellhead area. On investigation a small leak was identified on a greylock on the free kill valve. The well was secured and
vented immediately. There was no executive option. The ring join on the greylock was replaced and pressure tested by maintainance. B 52 was shut in for 11.5 hours during a heavy lift in the
wellbay. The line of sight detector activated a high alarm which is classified as 1.0 meter . We do not measure % LEL with the LOS. No further action required
<...> - Drilled from 18448' - 19039' mdrkb. Bit quit. Flow checked - static. Pumped out of hole from 19039' - 12000'. Flow checked - static. Trip out of hole to 9000' at 3 mins/stand. Flow checked
- static. Pumped slug. Pulled out of hole to 2900' at 1 1/2 mins/std. Hole fill correct up to this point. While pulling from 2900' to 1900' started to pull wet and incorrect hole fill observed. 2bbls
under theoretical displacement. Flow checked - static. Pulled further two stands from 1900' - 1700'. Incorrect hole fill. One bbl under theoretical displacement. Flow checked - well flowing
slightly on on annulus, pipe level dropping. Well shut in. Annulus pressure increased to 180 psi over 15 mins then stabilised. 0 psi on drill pipe. Circulated drill pipe and annulus volume above bit
while holding 200 psi back pressure on choke to remove any possible imbalance due to residual slug. Monitored well. 180 psi on annulus. 0 psi on drill pipe. Pumped through float and confirmed
both pipe and annulus stable at 180 psi. Appears small influx swabbed in at some point on trip. Held safety brief and commenced stripping in hole.

<...> - During well maintenance work, with the intention to change out the 7 5-1/2 completion string, it was suspected that the 9-5/8 casing had parted. After retrieval of the top part of the 9-5/8
casing it was confirmed that the casing had parted at 4660 ft. The well had been pressure tested to 1100 psi surface pressure confirming that communication with the resevoir was sealed off. The
well will be abandoned with a bridge plug and 2 x min, 100 ft tested cement plugs in the bottom part of the 13-5/8 casing from 4655ft upwards.
While running liner into Well <...>, problems encountered at 1120ft. The liner could not be moved up or down. The decision was made to continue to work the running string in an attempt to
make downward progress. During this operation, the travel of the drive was approximately 1 hr 20 mins without any problems or progress. At approximately 00:20 the driller saw two warning
lights flash on his TDS(Top Drive System) control panel and immediately on noticing this heard a loud bang on the drill floor. The driller secured the brake and went out to the drill floor. The
driller found the free end of the TDS umbilical lying on the drill floor. The area was made secure and the umbilical electric supply isolated. Upon inspection of the umbilical it was found to have
sheared off from the TDS. The umbilical had fallen 98ft to the drill floor. Operations were suspended until further investigation could be carried out.
<...>. The 12 1/4" hole was being drilled on C29. The hole depth was 5447 ft & the mud weight was 9.9 ppg. At 5447 feet the Driller noted a 5 barrel gain in the mud returns. The mud pumps
were shut down & the well bore was visually monitored. A slow weak flow was seen. A slow build up of pressure was noted on both the drill pipe & casing sides of the well. Both stabilised at 245
psi after approx. 5 hours, which indicated an under balance in the well. The upper annular of the BOP was closed & the well bore secured. After circulating with 11.6 ppg kill weight mud no shut
in pressures were observed. A mud sample proved to have no hydrocarbons, but weight had been reduced to 9.4 ppg & salinity decreased, indicating that a less saline fluid (water) had mixed with
the mud. 11.8 ppg mud was used to give an additional overbalance margin. The well was observed to be stable. Normal drilling ops restarted. Note: C29 is being drilled in an area between two
existing water injection wells. It is probable that the formation has micro-fractures which are in communication with the existing water injection wells.
<...>: <...> @ approximately 06.00. Well <...> was 'shut in' at the BOP after landing the 10 3/4" / 9 5/8" casing at 9747 ft (3058 ft TVD) when a 4 bbl/hour mud gain was observed while
circulating. A maximum shut in casing pressure of 70 psi was recorded. The returning mud densities from the well had been observed to have dropped from 11.8 ppg to +/- 11.0 ppg during the
circulation period after landing the casing. This allowed the well to flow from a zone at 5447 ft (2809 ft TVD) which had been encountered while drilling the 12 1/4" hole and been controlled
with an 11.6 ppg mud weight. (See <...>). The reduction in mud density while circulating with the casing was believed to have been caused by a combination of barite drop out from the mud and
dilution by the water influx. The intruding fluid was water with no associated hydrocarbons (gas or oil). An attempt was made to circulate and raise the returning mud weight to 11.8 ppg but this
proved impractical due to continued dilution and/or barite sag. Additionally mud losses were being observed while circulating at relatively low pump rates. After 24 hours this operation was
abandoned. The 9 5/8" casing annulus was subsequently cemented back to 5000 ft (2773 ft TVD). At the end of the cementing operations the mud weight at the flowline was 11.7 ppg and the well
<...>: Whilst RIH with 5-1/2" liner string on 5" drillpipe, pit volume discrepancy was detected. A flowcheck proved positive and the well was closed in using the annular preventer. SICP = 240psi,
no indication of SIDPP (due to float equipment in liner shoetrack). Pit gain 27bbls.
<...> - During workover on well <...> - 1) <...> : Tubing Hanger latched with spear and working string to release tubing from cut @ 17130 ft. Tubing freed and picked up 18 ft when fluid influx
commenced. Annular BOP operated but fluids escaped to drill floor with delay in activating internal Top Drive BOP. Internal BOP operated and well made safe. Platform to muster @ 06.41 hrs
with return to normal status @ 07.01 hrs. 2) <...>: Operation involved cutting tubing and pulling from well, when the tubing was cut a spear was used to pull from well, it would appear that the
tubing was not completely cut and during the pulling process a packer was pulled. This resulted in brine release into the Derrick. BOP was closed and well made safe.
<...>: While reverse circulating the string content after setting a cement plug with annulus pressure of 2600 psi, the BOP lower pipe rams bonnet seal failed. Ram assembly to be replaced.
Well <...> - A high annulus alarm had been announced on the well. The gas detectors in the eggbox were inhibited (as per routine procedure) for the blow down to start. The technician attempted
to connect the flexible annulus hose, but found that the snap on connector would not seat, preventing the hose from being connected. In order to eliminate the possibility of pressure coming from
the tree side of the annulus connection, the Technician closed in the valves from the 'A' annulus to the blowdown. The Technician then tried once more to fit the flexible hose onto the snap
connector onto the tree. As the Technician attempted to fit the hose, a small amount of gas and fluids was released from the hose connection. Unfortunately this small amount of gas was sufficient
to set off a gas detector (GD-5362) on the mezzanine level above and outside egg box 4, resulting in a YSD. It is thought that hose blockage resulted in residual pressure being in the hose at the
time of connection.

<...> Coiled tubing was stuck in the hole in well <...>. The well has been beaned up and flowing to the test seperator at 2000 m3/day. Seawater was being pumped down the coiled tubing reel,
using the cement unit. 30,000 lbs overpull was applied to the coiled tubing in an attempt to pull the coil free. The coil parted below the upper stripper. Produced fluids were released from the well
through the upper stripper. The blind rams on the upper Quad BOP were closed immediately., the well was secured and the release of fluid was stopped. The swab valve and Flow Wing Valves on
the Xmas tree were then closed and inflow tested. THe LMGV and UMGV were also closed and passed inflow tests.
<...> - Discovery of H2S at a concentration of 4ppm in flowline R31 while evacuating wells <...> and <...>. H2S was never anticipated in GD well fluids, this finding therefore is reported under
schedule 2, para 13, section c.
<...> Platform - While drilling 6" hole on well <...> at a depth of 14896 ft an increase in background gas was detected (40%) in the return mud. Stopped pump and flow checked on trip tank
indicated gain of 7bbls in 5mins. Shut in well and monitor through choke. After 10 mins observed SICP 400psi and SIDPP 0psi. Open well and monitor flow on trip tank to obtain influx rate. Shut
in well after 18bbls gained. Monitor well through choke while increasing mud weight to 12.5ppg Circulate with 12.5ppg mud at 80gpm using drillers method. Shut down mud pump, chut in well
to check pressure. Reading of 0psi. WEll opened and flow check for 15 mins indicated well static. Circulate and condition mud and weighing up from 12.5ppg to 12.8ppg. Reinstate drilling of 6"
hole at 04:30 hrs on 11 January. Second influx at 09:30hrs on 11 Jan at depth of 14933'. Carried out the Weight and Wait method to achieve static condition. Mud wieghtincreased from 12.8 ppg
to 13.8ppg.
<...>: During testing of KA05 A Annulus it appears that the A, B & C Annuli are in communication. KA-05 is an oil producing well currently closed in, producing 1425m3/d gross fluids, of which
96% is water. There is current CITHP of 1180 psi. While filling inhibited potable water into the A annulus, which was at zero pressure, it was noticed that air was blowing from the B & C annulus
(also originally at zero pressure.) The assumption being made is that there is a path for the fluid in the A annulus to pass into the B & C annulus. The operation was stopped to evaluate the
situation. The well remains closed in.
<...> - As part of the annulus investigations on <...> reported on <...>, it has become apparent that there are several wells with uncertainty in their integrity. It was decided to downman nonessential personnel on <...>, until the status of the wells could be confirmed. 22 people were downmanned, leaving 29 POB. This downmanning was carried out using one helicopter, making two
return flights to <...>. Work is continuing to determine integrity levels, and corrective action is in progress where exposure exists. <...> has been killed, and A annulus lubrication is about to
commence on <...>. <...> has a shallow-set plug to remove, then annulus lubrication will follow. Kill capability is on board.
At 23:15 on <...> the wire parted at surface whilst jarring to release a deep set injection valve. Environmental conditions were not good. The wire jammed in the top sheave between the wheel and
staff - wire in the hole was circa 2880 metres. The BOP's were shut and inflow tested, a toolbox talk was held with the WSS and crew regarding the way forward. The wire was clamped and held
to allow a second clamp to be installed above the BOP's with the lubricator raised then 2 sections of lubricator removed to allow back feeding of wire through the stuffing box onto the winch.
Recommenced jarring to release the pulling tool and retrieved wire and toolstring. No hydrocarbon release or injury to personnel throughout the incident. Sent in the broken section of <...> wire
for onshore analysis - spooled off remaining wire and installed a new drum of API 9A wire to continue the work. Procedures for jarring/rest duration of <...> amended pending results of
metallurgy report.
<...> - During coil tube operations to clean out post cement squeeze programme in well A23, the coil tubing was being run in hole, a small leak was observed at the quick union connection above
BOP's. Coil tubing pulled out of hole, well secured and made safe and repairs initiated. Note Well is currently cemented off and the production tubing is full of inhibited seawater. No
hydrocarbons present.
<...>: Operation rotary drilling 8 1/2" hole with 14.7 ppg OBM in the mid shale formation of the piper formation at 11,765 ft. A drillpipe connection was made. Once drilling re-commenced the
sperry sun data engineer informed the driller that the volume in the mud pits had increased by 18 bbls during the connection. The driller immediately carried out a flow check using the trip tank.
The level in the trip tank rose by 10 bbls in 1.5 minutes. The driller spaced out the drill string and closed in the well on the pipe rams. Time: 04:30 hrs. The surface pressures were allowed to
stabilise. The well was killed by increasing the mud weight from 14.7 ppg to 15.3 ppg.
<...>. Drilling 8.5" hole with 12.8 PPG 08 MUD. Upon encountering a drilling break at 14421, the decision was made to flowcheck at 14424. The flowcheck showed the well to be flowing, so the
well was closed in using the hard shut method. Once surface pressures had stabilised, the influx was removed using the drillers well control method and then the well was killed by increasing and
circulating around 14 Oppg MUD.The BOP were also closed at the following times for pressure monitoring only.

<...> first developed tubing/A annulus communication in <...>. The well was plugged and a leak investigation conducted. A PES straddle was set across the leak path, restoring integrity. Tubing/A
annulus communication has again developed. A plugging/leak investigation programme was prepared, this involved rigging a circulation line up to th e A annulus. The following Anomolies have
been identified with the A annulus valves. A/. The left valve operates but fails to hold pressure B/. The right valve stem rotates but does not operate the valve. Various plugging operations are
currently being evaluated.
The Field Standby Vessel <...> struck the NUI <...> South West Leg. The installation was unmanned <...> reports no injuries to vessel's crew. Superficial damage of the platform leg reported
damage to focsle. The incident is now under further investigation by <...> & the vessel's owners <...>.
0835 <...> Platform. P Switch burst on crane while lifting 7T load 6-8' off deck. Crane driver stopped, inspected leak where upon the load was released to deck. Crane moved into crutch
obstructing helideck. From OIR9B: At 0835 hrs <...>, a 20ft half height (7.3tonnes) was being raised to take the weight before being backloaded to the <...>. The load was lifted to about 6 to 8ft
and a weight recorded and relayed to the control room. On resumption the crane would not respond to any controls and the lift remained suspended. The crane driver called for mechanical
assistance. The mechanic discovered oil spraying out from hoist cavitation pressure switch (PS003) in the engine compartment. The crane was switched off. As the released oil was being mopped
up the engine compartment the lift lowered of its own accord landing on the deck and on another half height. No injuries to personnel were sustained and no significant damage ensued. The HSE
were advised and an internal investigation is ongoing.
During the lowering of the new nuggets slug catcher from P05 weatherdeck to P02 on the <...> platform the hoist chain parted. The lift (approx 38 tonnes) stuck the edge of the walkway before
falling into the sea. Full investigation in progress.
A scaffold buff inside the module approx 20 feet high. Installing small channel, the channel dimension 800mm long, approx. 80mm wide, approx weight 10 kilos (max). In order to get the angle
iron to the top of scaffold, decided to haul it up by a piece of rope, person at the bottom of ladder tied the angle iron and stood back, person at the top of ladder hauled the angle iron to the top,
while at the top appeared to hang up and fall out of the rope, it then fell and struck the 2nd bottom rung of the ladder.
The incident took place during drilling operations running 9 7/8" casing into Well N42. The casing string was at a depth of 4269m and the string was being worked because of tight spots in the
well. The driller picked the string up 1-2m above the rotary table when the draw works clutch lost grip and the string slipped. The driller immediately applied the emergency brake, however, due
to the short distance involved the elevators landed on the flush mounted casing slips. A piece of the 500 ton casing elevators guide was damaged and broke off. Investigation revealed no further
damage.
Ar approx. 0300hrs on <...> with the top drive set at 20m, the drawworks brake failed and the top drive dropped to the rotary table. Nobody was injured. This followed intervention work on the
brake which had been requested by the driller since the brake was getting "hard" valves, the regulator and the master cylinder were systematically changed before the failure occurred. 9B
Description: Drilling of N43 Triassic Well 12 1/4" phase was in process when the performance of the draw works brake deteriorated to such an extent that a repair was deemed necessary. During
the maintenance intervention on the brake, the top drive descended approx. 20M making contact with the rotary and damaging the pipe handler and casting.
Whilst carrying out wireline operations the operator lowered the toolstring from the stuffing box. The assistant broke lubricator from BOPS and proceeded to bounce on the wire. Started to pick
lubricator on <...> mast and whilst picking up wraps on mast, winch drum gears slipping /jumping. Stopped picking up (approx 3 ft above bops) Went round back of mast to check drum and
noticed winch sub assembly had come free from frame of mast at one side. Drum was sitting at approx 45 degrees held only by two of its four tie down bolts. Lub immediately re-stabbed onto
BOPS to remove weight from winch. Further inspection of winch showed that the two remaining tie down bolts were bent, a protective safety guard was bent sufficiently to force out a securing
bolt and the winch sub assembly was bent where the tie down bolts pass through it.
Well <...> Workover. Operation - Setting of 4.3.13" AFT-2 using wireline equipment with a 0.108" API 9a wire. Whilst attempting to jar the AFT-2 into position the wireline snapped at the
counter head and wrapped around the stuffing box sheave. Note - the wire was tested prior to commencement of the operation. The area had been cleared of personnel prior to the operation, as per
normal platform procedures.
Link for cable support chain on BOP hoist fell out. Item (approx2oz) hit person on hard hat. No risk of injury due to small size and short drop. Instructed to commission full review of BOP crane
before returning to service following replacement of BOP cable support chain.

Whilst lifting 2 drums of hydrochloric acid using a cargo net, damage was incurred to 1 of the drums. This was in preparation during rig up of pumping unit to carry out acid pickling of well slot
4. Weather conditions were good at the time. Event leading up to incident was method used to lift drums. Roustabouts decided that best & safest way from their point of view was to transport
these drums in a cargo net.They tipped 2 drums over onto their sides & positioned them side by side within cargo net; crane then lifted this up onto laydown area. Drums were manually handled
out of cargo net & put back into upright position. As second drum was being lifted upright by roustabouts, vapour was released from sealed cap & was breathed in by IP. Actions taken:- IP sought
immediate medical treatment from platform medic. Doctor called for advice & IP sent onshore for examination. IP returned to platform following day after examination by onshore medical staff.
Area barriered off in preparation for investigation team. Work suspended until analysis of incident carried out. Investigation team set up to investigate incident to determine root & contributory
causes.
A 10 ton A60 rated containerised cabin was rendered inaccessible to the crane when the drilling rig skidded over it & it was trapped under overhang of the Derrick. As rig was shutdown for an
extended period due to equipment failure, it was decided to recover unit from under the overhang, to permit it to be backloaded. Method of recovery involved a combined lift, with crane attached
to one end of container & other end being lifted by chain blocks hanging from beam trolleys, mounted on 2 parallel runway beams, attached to derrick sub base. This would allow container to be
slid out from under overhang & enable crane to lift it clear. When the unit was lifted clear of the deck it slewed slightly, allowing north beam trolley to move along beam. When it contacted the
end stop on beam, the stop was displaced upwards & trolley & chain block travelled under the stop & fell from the beam, landing on top of the container. Just as trolley began to move, the STL
observed that bottom bolt was missing from end stop, but the trolley had struck the stop & fallen, before he had time to take preventative action.
A <...> coiled tubing reel (16.5 T) had been lifted by crane onto a spooling frame and the crane disconnected from the reel. When manoeuvring the reel into position to start spooling, two of the
hydraulic ram rods sheared. This allowed the reel to slip and twist within the frame. The work area had been barriered off during this operation and two <...> personnel were working outsdie the
frame, a safe distance away from the reel. Operations were suspended and a proceedure written to safely remove the reel from the frame.
A piece of freight weighing 448kgs was being unloaded from the helicopter cabin onto the Heli-loader (SWL 510KG). As the load was slid onto the heli-loader, the platform tilted slightly to one
side. The load was lowered to deck level and the loader moved to a safe area at the edge of the helideck. When the cargo was removed, the loader was examined and one of the chassis rails was
found to have failed. The failure was attributable to corrosion of the rail.
Main crane lifting compactor (3 tonne) 1-2m off deck when crane released load, crane quarantined and investigation underway. From OIR 9b: A waste compactor weighing 3 tonne was being
moved in preparation for shipment to shore. The load was hooked on to the crane and the lift commenced. When the load reached a height of approximately 4' from the deck the crane rope
spooled out allowing the load to drop back onto the deck in an uncontrolled manner. Weather at the time: wind 12knots @ 240deg. Vis good with cloud @3/8 <...> crane No injury or damage
sustained.
Dropped crane pennant from crane onto back of supply boat. Working with whipline and pennant dropped from main hoist hook. From OIR9B: At Approx 0904hrs, during backloading operations
using the whip line from <...> platform on <...>, a pennant fell from the main block some 200ft onto the deck of the <...> (supply vessel). There were 3 deck crew onthe deck at this time attending
to the whip line hook. The lift had just been repositioned closer to the stern of the boat to make room for some further lifts that were to be positioned mid-ships using the main block.
While carrying out wireline operations the stuffing box wire guard fell 40ft to the main deck. No injuries to personnel were sustained. On inspection the back bracket had broken above the
sheave-retaining bolt (through hub). The material appeared to have an inclusion within the casting. No further damge ensued no injury to personnel occurred. An investigation into the dropped
object is under way
A mechanical technician was carrying out maintenance on a fire hose reel when the reel fell landing on his foot just above the steel toecap giving a glancing blow. Went to <...> Medical Centre
and <...> Hospital for examination. No fractures. Returned to work the same day.
Two operations technicians were operating a large manual isolation valve on B2 flowline. To carry out this operation a small deck hatch had been removed to allow access to the valve handwheel.
One of the operators was acting as stand by man while second operator climbed into the hatch opening onto the bonnet of the valve (normal operating procedure for this operation). Whilst in
hatch operating handwheel a short length of scaffold tube (approx 750mm in length) fell from above deck flooring through the hatch. The length of tube passed through the hatch and landed on
lower deck 3 metres below. There was no scaffolding activities in the area at this time, it is thought that the length of tube may have been used at some time for extra leverage on another task and
had been left on steelwork (not proven) and became dislodged at this particular time. Incident investigation commenced and a sweep of this entire area carried out for other potential dropped
objects - nothing found. Personnel made aware of this event and the requirement to maintain clean safe worksites through pre-shift briefs, and that tubing should not be used as levers or cheater
bars.

Whilst cleaning out extract ducting from a mixed hopper shroud a flogging spanner was dislodged and fell eight feet to the deck. Spanner never struck anyone and area below was barriered off
during the task, to prevent personnel entering area. Flogging spanner approx 12" long and weighing 1kg. From condition of spanner it was apparent it had lain in this location for a considerable
period of time, and there was no evidence to suggest it had fallen on to shroud from somewhere else. Sweep of area carried out (nothing found) and investigation commenced.
The IP was participating in the routine loading of 6 pigging spheres into the sphere launcher on the 36" <...> to <...> pipeline. All 6 spheres were in position in the launcher, and the loading chute
was being moved back to its normal position when the last sphere rolled out striking the IP on the leg. The IP was flown to <...> and checked at hospital. He was sent home to recuperate. Incident
investigation is ongoing, with the immediate action to prevent recurrence being to limit the number of spheres to be loaded to 5.
Two people were making bottom assembly, which seals pipes. They saw something fall. A roller fell 15 metres from the two people. The roller is part of a piece of machinery called a pipe
handling machine. The roller weighs 2.7kg. No one was injured. The roller is held in position by two plates and the plates have been damaged, hence the roller fell. There is an investigation
proceeding into the incident and as to how the plates are damaged and how long. A full report will be made.
BOP lifting cage fell onto left foot whilst removing cage from BOP. The <...> electric line work party were preparing to change out the main seals on a twin wireline BOP. THE BOP's were
mounted in a lifting and handling cage. To gain access to change out the seals involved setting the BOP's complete with cage onto a test stump for stability, then removing the cage to gain access
to remove the BOP's bonnets to gainaccess to the seals removal of the cage is normally achieved by taking the weight of the cage on the crane, removing a top and bottom pin from the cage to
allow the cage to open and be removed from the BOP's. The BOP's and cage were installed on the test stump and there was slack in the lifting slings while the BOP's were secured to the test
stump. One of the operators was screwing down the BOP nut to secure the BOP's to the stump but just as he finished the operation and before the tension had been taken up on the lifting slings,
the second operator removed the cage locking pins prematurely resulting in the cage openeing and falling approx. 10 inches onto the IP's foot.
During routine drilling operations on well <...> with 2 7/8" drillstring. A 10mm Dia x 80mm long retaining bolt from one of the handrail sockets on the intermeidate racking board approx 50-60
feet above drill floor fell to the floor. Note each of the sockets on this hand rail has 2 retaining bolts.
The operation at the time was pulling out of the hole laying out 7" tubing. On lowering a single of 7" tubing into the mousehole with the link tilt on, the derricksman unlatched the elevators. As
the elevators swung back, an object was observed falling 6ft to the deck. On investigation this was found to be a <...> pipe handler die. There are two clamping jaws, forward and rear, fitted to the
pipe handler. The dropped item was the die from the forward clamping jaw assembly. The keeper plate c/w its two retaining bolts and wire lock was completely missing. On investigation it was
noted that the rear clamping assembly has one sheared retaining bolt and no locking wire. On further investigation and consultation with the <...> manual it was discovered that both the forward
and rear keeper plates up as per <...> manual. The <...> manual was in fact incorrect, the clamping assemblies were installed correctly as per <...> Safety Alert <...>.
The gas vented through, LT-Vent was ignited by lightning. The fire was extinguished with fixed Co2 system.
At approximately 21:40 hrs one of the plant technicians requested the CRO to remotely start the <...> North fire pump, for test purposes, whilst he proceeded to the location. Upon arrival he
opened the fire pump room door and heard the starter 'clunck in' however the pump did not start. He continued around the pump and spotted, what appeared to be electrical arcing coming from
the gap between the doors of the starter battery cabinet. He requested the CRO to put a remote stop into the pump whilst he isolated the electrical AC supply to the fire pump control panel. He
observed smoke coming from the battery cabinet door vent and opened the door to investigate further. This revealed a small fire coming from the top of one of the battery cells - he initially tried
to knock out the flame using a clean rag but this was ineffective so he picked up an adjacent dry powder extinguisher and extinguished the fire with this. Initial examination revealed the cell
vent/filler cap had been burnt (and dislodged whilst the fire was extinguished) due to local arcing on one of the cell pillars, with link attached.
Slipping fanbelts generated smoke resulting in a change to the platform status and loss of power to drilling modules. Smoke generated by slipping fanbelts of K-2522, which supplies Mod 9
transformer room, initiated the smoke detection in the room and caused the platform to change to hazard status. It also resulted in a loss of power to the drilling modules. This in turn stopped the
offending fan and closed the dampers to the room.
Small fire on number 2 caterpillar exhaust. During changeover rost fuel to diesel resulted in overspeeding. Lost power to drilling. Between 5-7 feed power to drilling. When shutting down a
drilling rig caterpillar engine the unit tripped on overspeed. This overspeed and subsequent emergency shutdown caused a burst of flame (18" high) to be ejected from the exhaust for 3 to 5
seconds. No spill, malfunction or damage was found and the unit was inspected and restarted without problem.

Platform POB called to full muster due to smoke being detected in M2 West. Source of smoke investigated and found to be caused by HVAC fan K-9523A drive belts failure. The fan was
immediately stopped and alternative ventillation started. Further investigation has shown that the fan impellor has seized. Root cause still to be established.
During commissioning activities on <...> Gas Compressor. One of two standby men observed flames coming from the turbine inlet cone at 6 o'clock position. Standby man shutdown BC 2 locally.
3 hand held extinguishers discharged at cone. Extinguished fire reported to the MCR. GP A initiated by the MCR. Emergency Team mustered and headcount successfully completed. Incident
Team proceeded to BC 2 to perform visual check, no fire found. MCR check and reset Fire and Gas panel. OIM brief to workforce. Compressor monitored during cooldown period. No fire
damage. The machine is currently isolated and vented pending further investigation.
On a gas compressor unit there was a fractured air line to the combustion chamber. The fractured air line allowed hot combustion gases (flame) to escape from the combustion chamber. The infra
red flame detectors immediately activated shutting down the compressor and isolating the fuel sources, resulting in the immediate loss of flame. This did result in a production shut down of the
installation and mustering of all personnel while the incident was investigated.
Slight smell of condensate gas on the AC Cellar Deck. On investigation some insulation was removed and corrosion was seen. Prior to further investigation the platform was shutdown and
affected pipework vented and isolated. Upon further investigation pitting corrosion was seen and perforation in the form of a pin hole leak.
During normal operation of a diesel driven generator, a 1/4" pipe blew off a lube oil filter, spraying mineral oil onto the engine exhaust duct. The oil ignited and a small fire started. Operations
personnel working in the area activated the deluge system and extinguished the fire. Just prior to deluge activation two flame detectors went into alarm.
During start up of the plant after summer shutdown and monitoring of process modules, a gas leak was observed on a flow transmitter No: 7543. ESD of all wells initiated to reduce back pressure
in flare header.
During preparations for N30 choke and instrument spool inspection, a gas leak was discovered at the flow line pilot. Adjacent scaffolding work was immediately stopped and personnel stood
down. On arrival at N30 requested the control room to quickly depressurise c104. N30 was then lined up to the test header and the flow line depressurised to zero which then stopped the leak.
A minor gas leak found on instruments pipework to both PFV's on compressor K201S.
Whilst decanting a tote tank of Methanol into vessel T8180 it was observed that fluids were emitting from the vessel atmospheric vent at the west side of the platform and being windblown onto a
small area at the southwest corner of the cellar deck. Decanting was immediately stopped to prevent further overflow and T8180 vessel equalised with T8190. These measures stopped the
overflow of methanol. It is estimated that the total quantity of the overflow was approx 5 gallons. The residual methanol on the deck was then washed down to the drain system with water. Due to
a partially blocked drain a small quantity of methanol entrained in the water was flushed over the side. A full investigation is ongoing to determine the root causes and prevent reoccurrence.Weather at the time was:- Wind 15 - 20 knots 260deg. Clear conditions
Following a 20% LEL gas alarm indication on the <...> Scada Panel at 0515hrs the on- shift <...> production Operator investigated the scene and on his approach observed what proved to be a
hydrocarbon mist in the area. At his request the <...> CCR Operator initiated a Level 2 production shutdown. This level of shutdown initiated a blowdown of the process systems . The platform
was operating in combined operations with the <...> drilling rig. The General alarm was then activated and all <...> personnel went to muster stations. When the platform Emergency Response
Team were despatched to the scene they reported that the hydrocarbons had leaked from a fractured impulse line. With the support of the Production Operator the line was isolated. After isolating
the leak path the complex personnel were stood down at 0550hrs. Production remained shutdown whilst further investigation took place. A full investigation is under way.
Small fire at base of G Gas Turbine exhaust stack at the accoustic hood penetration, which was put out with a CO2 extinguisher by the fire team. The fire was caused by oil lying around the
exhaust base. The oil appears to have come from the lubrication oil tank breather flame trap coalescer. The oil had seeped through mating faces on the flame trap coalescer and run down the
outside of the breather pipe and collected around the exhaust base. The purpose of the lubrication oil tank breather is to prevent the lubrication oil tank becoming pressurised or drawing a
vacuum. The purpose of the flame trap coalescer is to collect the oil vapour passing up the breather pipe in a fine wire gauze. It then runs back down the inside of the breather pipe into the
lubrication oil tank. Corrective Action: Strip down flame trap coalescer, inspect and clean gauze ensuring it is not clogged. Check condition of gaskets and replace.

ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE OIR/9B. No activity ongoing at the time of discovery. Wind 6 knots at 353 deg, calm, fair conditions. Cylinder involved 47 kg propane,(BOC). In storage rack for
empty cylinders. Cylinder showing signs of corrosion around base. The welder, in passing, noticed 'smell of gas', (no hot work activities were ongoing at the time in the fab shop) he identified that
propane was leaking from the base of the cyl, he immediately contacted the control room and informed them of the situation. He removed the cylinder from the rack and placed it about 3 mts
away in a down wind position. He then moved to a safe position and waited for HSEC to attend. On appraisal of the situation HSEC contacted the control room updated them and requested
permits and personnel in immediate vicinity be withdrawn as a precautionary measure, and placed barriers around area. Platform emergency response team assembled in the control room where a
contingency plan was discussed and implemented. This was to make the cylinder safe under controlled conditions. It was ascertained that there was no liquid content in the cylinder.. A pressure
guage was fitted to determine pressure in cylinder which was 3.5Bar. A 1/2" hose was then fitted to guage and lowered overboard into sea and secondary valve opened to 0.2Bar and monitored.
ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE 0IR/9B At 07:52 Operations technician noticed a gas release at the South end of the gas metering skid. The release had not activated any fixed gas detectors,
therefore automatic shutdown had not occurred. The technician alerted the Central Control Room (CCR) and requested that the process was shutdown. The CCR commenced a controlled platform
shutdown and an announcement was made (via PA) withdrawing permits and requesting personnel return them to the CCR. HSEC and another Ops Technician went to the scene to assess the
situation. There was a visible release and a smell of gas in the area, the release however was being dissipated by the strong wind from the south. This was carrying the gas into the module
however the rate of ventilation/dilution was felt to be such that there was no great risk of a build up of a flammable gas cloud. The CCR were requested to vent the relevant section of plant. The
general alarm was sounded as a precaution. There was a significant reduction in the leak as depressurisation commenced. A further site inspection was made by HSEC & BOTL when the pressure
was reduced to 15 bar (approx). The leak had almost stopped and when the pressure was almost atmospheric a local isolation was made.
Gas was detected above the B export/MP compressor at 11:53 hrs <...>. Plant blowdown was immediately initiated (auto) and the GPA was activated, all personnel accounted for. The plant had
been at normal export conditions and no work was underway on the compressor. Once depressurised and purged an investigation revealed that the flanged SAE joint in the (1.5" 150 bar) seal gas
supply line would not hold pressure. Strip examination showed that 2 of the 4 bolts had worked loose and that the O ring in the joint had blown out. A full investigation is now underway, the plant
remains shutdown and the other compressors are being checked.
Normal production operations in progress. Weather; wind 12 kts @ 280 deg, clear and bright. Condensate. 'C' MOL Pump, one of two on line at time of event. Area naturally vented with turbo fan
assistance as per normal operation mode. A fixed gas detector activated in low level in the vicinity of 'C' MOL pump, an operations tech was sent to investigate whilst control room tech proceeded
to shut down pump. On arrival at the pump the technician reported back that condensate was leaking from a welded connection on the drive end seal of the unit. The pump was shutting down
when the tech arrived. The Business Team Leader, HSEC and two other techs arrived at the area and after initial assessment commenced closing valves to isolate pipework and placed spill pipe
bunding around pump base to prevent spread of condensate. The spades were then removed from the drain line to allow leaking section to be drained down quickly under controlled circumstances
and prevent further spread.
During maintenance activities, a leak was noticed on the vessel's bridle drain valve. Technician attempted to close valve but valve plug ejected from body. Gas/condensate escaped from valve.
Bridle was isolated. No injuries sustained.
Whilst running up pm 2000 gas compressor, the compressor surged. This appears to have caused a failure of the seal gas system. A 4 bar bursting disk failed and gas was vented to atmosphere.
This was defined as a 'high gas' alarm and the platorm shutdown. Shell have instigated a level 3 investigation.
The condensate export pumps re-inject condensate and produced water into the gas export line. The pumps are the reciprocating, triplex ram type. At 1330 on <...> a gas detector alarmed on PR
Cellar deck in the pump area. Before the area operator arrived at the scene the PR condensate system was automatically shutdown on low level in the condensate surge drum. At the scene the
operator found that the duty pump had suffered a failure of 1 of its 3 ceramic sleeved rams. The pump was isolated. Approx 150 litres condensate was lost to sea. Investigation is ongoing. 2
similiar pumps are being checked. OIR/12 to follow.
At 1700 hrs the 2 IP's started to disassemble a small spool (4" diameter by 1.3m long) from between two valves. It had been depressurised through 1 1" drain line. One of them removed the four
bolts and the top part of the clamp, then used a hammer to free the second half of the clamp. Then a sudden and brief release of wet gas still trapped in the spool ejected the Graylok seal which hit
one of them in the face. He remained conscious & walked to the sick bay. He was medivaced from the platform. At the time, he had been on shift for 10.5 hrs with 12 days on board. The 2nd IP
was supervising the other technician who removed the Graylock clamp. When there was a gas release it hit the other Ip in the face. 2nd man was suffering from shock and may have inhaled some
gas.
Hydrocarbon release/leak observed from failed gland packing on MPP - A. Recycle valve. The unit was shut down and depressurised. The module is relatively open and the leak dispersed
naturally due to a 24 knot wind from the south. The amount released is calculated to be 98.4kg.

During the re-instatement testing of the <...> discharge header, low level detection alarm was initiated in the <...> metering shed, with a subsequent General Alarm and Muster. The testing was
immediately stopped and the section of plant under test was vented, with all platfrom personnel mustered safely. The area of the gas detection was investigated following the depressurisation of
the system and the gas detection levels lowering. The initial investigation could not identify the leak, but following a limited pressure test of the metering transmitter manifold with N2 it was
found two 1/4" plugs were leaking. These plugs were subsequently re-made and pressure tested satisfactory. The metering shed was no an area in the re-instatement testing which required
monitoring.
Fuel gas skid No 2 was isolated for work on a vessel drain valve which was removed from the skid, a General Alarm (GA) was initiated on low level gas which subsequently went to high level
gas and an Surface Production Shutdown (SPS) was initiated. Just prior to the GA it is believed that a gas compressor RV lifted. A subsequent inspection of the isolation to Fuel Gas Skid No 2
revealed that a route to the vent system was left open and it is believed that the original GA was initiated by back pressure in the platform vent system from the gas compressor RV. An SPS also
initiates a vent process and this contributed to the duration and quantity of hydrocarbon which vented via the Fuel Gas Skid. NB there is a 10mm orifice plate in the Fuel Gas Skid vent pipework.
A wire line crew on <...> heard a loud resonance on <...> - [approx 1 km]. Standby vessel was sent to investigate and reported a large mist cloud. <...> are investigating the incident. From OIR9b:
NUI team visiting <...> notified the <...> they could hear an abnormal noise coming from <...>. The <...> is some 550 yards from <...>. The standby vessel confirmed the noise and later observed
a mist at Cellar Deck on the <...> jacket. The Southern half of the <...> Field <...>, which feed into the <...> was production held and the <...> riser ESDV 2100 (on <...>) was closed. The
pressure on <...> at this point was recorded at 5.1bar. Shortly after the Standby Vessel reported that the noise and mist were decreasing. The <...> was depressurised and isolated. The standby
vessel reported noise ceased and mist disappeared, indications on <...> and <...> also indicated that pressure in the Southern half of <...> field including <...> were at zero. A team was dispatched
to the <...> and found a 2 inch liquid drain line on the <...> header had been cut out by sand and an eliptical hole 18mm x 16mm was present.
A smell of gas was observed by the Area technician during start up of the gas compression training module 6. The fixed detection system did not detect any gas. During the search to find the
source of the smell, the lagging on HE1-1562/2 was knocked causing a sudden increase in the smell. HE1-1562/2 is the 3-phase separator V-3114 outlet ESDvalve and suction to HP scrubber
inlet. Technician immediately withdrew from the area and initiated a gas process shutdown and blowdown. The gas process has now been isolated and awaiting N2 and helium leak detection
equipment to investigate further. TIR 4am in gas compression unit a smell of gas was detected. No fixed alarm was raised, probably very small quantities involved, location of leak was not
detected. Shut down gas compression unit and commenced investigation by removing lagging and valves. Not able to detect leak at this time.
A smell of gas was noticed by the gas compression area Technician during the start up of the gas compression train. The system had been out of service since a previous gas release on this
particular valve. This was a new valve installed and the system had been N2/He gas tested successfully prior to restart of the system. The leak did not operate the fixed gas detection. It was
smelled and proved to be a leak using a gas meter at valve stem.The system was subsequently shutdown and blown down. Investigation is ongoing. TIR The area technician smelt gas from a valve
on module 6. He confirmed gas release using gas meter, he then shut down the valve. The leak did not operate the "fixed gas detection" system. This is a repeat of an incident that happened <...>.
The valve was replaced at the time. Currently investigating to find sourece of leak.
In module 3 high pressure water injection was started gas fuel. Diesel fuel from the dual fuel system had seeped past the slit off valve & ignited in the combustion system of the turbine producing
smoke which escaped into module via 2 pin holes in exhaust. Smoke eventually set off 3 smoke heads & activated platform hazard status & was mustered. Water injection system manual shut
down. Exhaust being reported. P4001 HP Water Inj pump was being started on gas fuel. Diesel fuel from the dual fuel system had seeped past the SOV and ignited in the combustion produced an
excessive volume of smoke which migrated into the module via two small holes in the exhaust bellows flange. The smoke initiated 3 smoke heads and put the platform onto hazard status.
Shutdown of the machine was performed manually, and then smoke heads cleared within 2/3 minutes.
Coupon tool was being depressurised-did not isolate gas detector, changed platform status. During a routine operation of on-line change out of a corrosion coupon, the coupon was withdrawn into
the retrieval tool and the process isolated from the tool by its integral Double Block & Bleed arrangement. When the tool was being depressurised to remove the coupon, the platform fixed gas
detection was initiated by a single gas head, in an adjacent cluster of three. This resulted in a change of platform status, but no process shutdown. The circumstances on site were immediately
relayed to the control room by the radio man at the site. The gas head was reset immediately and the platform returned to normal status.

Hydrocarbon release from CN39 THP tapping instument tubing when well closed in and isolated. UMGV and FWV were both closed prior to release. Fitting in question was 10mm monel and
appears that fitting had not been properly assembled resulting in the retaining olive being loose. One gas detector in M4 wellhead area detected a smell of gas and alerted the area authority who
isolated the source of hydrocarbon release.
The lower level alarm was activated in the control room following an oil leak from the door seal. The quantity is being investigated and the cause. Night staff will be interviewed and more details
will be sent. Indication of low level gas from 1 gas head noted in the CCR. Investigation revealed hydrocarbons leaking from north door of prover loop.
The mechanical seal on main oil export pump P-2201 failed allowing hydrocarbons to escape into the module and minor overboard spill via gaps in the module floor around the pump.
B Compressor had been isolated and SD since <...>. Subsequently it was found that the compressor had seized and therefore required barring over. During an operation to split the coupling
between the HP and LP compressors, AC power was lost to the panel that controls the compressors. This loss of power invoked a logic sequence to start the DC lube oil pumps. The split coupling
allowed approx 1bbl of lube oil to spill into the compressor skid. No loss to sea occurred nor was anyone injured in the process. An investigation is ongoing to look at root causes.
Buffer tank operating at 3 bar had leaking gauge fitting... From OIR9B: At the time of the incident production was shut down due to problems with the gas compressors. Plant was pressurised
awaiting availability of one of the compressors. Two low gas alarms were activated followed by one alarm reaching high gas alarm setting, thus activating the General Alarm. Weather at the tme,
wind 19knots @ 040deg - s ea 3m - visibility good - cloud 8/8 - temperature 5 deg c. Investigations show the level transmitter in the slugcatcher vessel was reading incorrectly which allowed gas
to migrate into the flash (normal operating pressure is 0.6 bar) Vessel protection valves PSV's are set to operate at 6 bar. The fittings on a pressure gauge on top of the vessel started to leak a small
amount of gas which activated the adjacent gas detection devices. The platform blowdown was manually initiated from the Control Room.
At approx 1000 hours , <...> pinter found an audible gas leak. It was coming from a grease nipple on MOV 30081. He contacted <...> the production operator who cordoned off the area. Platform
staff were informed. Closer review of leak was made and the OIM decided to SD platform isolate and repair leak. Leak was not significant enough to trigger the gas alarms but could be felt by the
back of the hand. Isolation was put in place and repair was carried out. Platform was returned to production at 1600 hours.
07:24hrs. Instrument fitting failed on CD West Well bay on <...> Platform. Area secured barriered off. All personnel accounted for. Scaffolders were working in the area. <...> reported injured
knee. No visible injury, but may have been in shock. Helicopter due at platform at 09:30 hrs to medivac IP back onshore for further diagnosis. Probable limited hydrocarbon release. <...>
requested fitting be quarantined, and photographs taken, and damaged pipework isolated, but agreed production could be re-started.
<...> Satellite was operating normally AM 9.4.01, when confirmed gas detection at generator Fuel Gas skid caused the platform to ESD. At 13.00 a satellite crew attended the installation. On
investigation it was found that the base cap on the FG regulator had failed allowing FG to be released. The cause of the base cap failure is under investigation.
<...> . When bottom hole assembly was at the surface, the drilling supervisor was advised at 06:00 of a very slight well fluid influx of 1301 per hour. By 2200 it had increased to 400 litres per
hour, a new BHA ran in the hole and influx monitored (200-300 litres/hour). Intermediate circulation in the 9 7/8 casing at depth 5300 metres was acceptable. During intermediate circulation at 7"
casing shoe at depth 5860m and at 1500 the well was shut in due to an increase of gas migration to surface. The gas was vented off via the poorboy degasser vent line on the north drilling rig.
<...> Platform. - The Wireline Riser was installed onto well T8 SWAB valve with the BOPs and Lubricator positioned above on the top deck just to the east side of the <...> drilling rig structure.
The <...> rig were drilling the 12 1/4" section of the <...> (T21) well. When retrieving a tool during wireline operations on T8 for inspection / redress the operator encountered a sudden overpull
when the odometer indicated the tool was still registering 153 ft below the SWAB valve. Simultaneously the wire parted at surface and exited out of the Lubricator Stuffing box and the tool string
plus wire fell back down the well. Gas then started to escape to the open atmosphere from the 1/8" orifice on stuffing box left by the wire when the stuffing box BOP also failed to operate. The
pressure in the well at the time was 697 psig. Wind conditions at the time was 12 knots from a direction of 200 deg.The Schlumberger operator took immediate action and the Blow Out
Preventors closed within 30sec. The 7ft section of the lubricator above the BOPs then took another 90 secs to depressure to atmosphere. During this time the operator made the well further safe
by closing the SWAB and Surface Safety valves on the well. When the incident occurred the Process Operator who was on top deck at the time immediately informed the <...> drill floor. Neither

A wire line was being carried out on well D07 which included a fluded drift, a set of <...> gauges and a sample bailer. Pulling weight where being taken every 1000 feet. At 1100 feet the PW was
observed at 900 pounds. At 1200 feet a pw of 1300 pounds was seen with no tool string movement. All surface equipment 3 valves etc were checked. Attempts were made to work wire for ten
mins. Pulling weight was increased to 1600 pounds and the wire parted at stuffing box.
<...>. Drilling 8 1/2" hole with 1.50sg. SBM at 3448m MD. During recording of slow circulating rates (at 12.00 shift change) noted flow from well was erratic. Flow check gave indications of
gain following which well was then closed in with Annular BOP (12.55). As there was no pressure build up with well closed in to indicate an influx or under balance in the well , the well was reopened. Circulation was resumed while increasing mud weight to 1.52 sg. Just prior to bottoms up there was a high gas cut in the mud at rotary table so well closed in with Annular and circulation
continued through open choke manifold until gas levels reduced. Opened well and continued circulating normally to balance mud weight at 1.52 sg. Closed well on Annular before next bottoms
up and finished circulating bottoms up through choke as precaution. Opened well again and continued circulating normally while increasing mud weight in stages - 1.54, 1.58 and then to 1.63 sg.
with regular flow checks and checking bottoms up gas levels until gas peaks stabilised. Continued drilling ahead at 11.30 on <...>.
<...>. On <...> at 14:39, the BOP (annular) was closed following positive flow check. At time of closure, the 9 5/8" shoe was at 6582m MD, the 8 1/2" bit at 6595m MD & the 8 1/2" TD at 6717m
MD -20m MD into the <...> Reservoir. Prior to closing BOP, operation at time was conditioning the mud by circulating. Mud weight varied from 1.63 to 1.80 sg against a weight of 1.70 sg. At
14:30 a flow show indicated an increase in flow out & a flow check showed a gain of 200ltrs in 4mins. BOP was closed at 14:33hrs. Initial SIDPP was 200psi & the SICP was 20psi. After 2hrs,
the SIDPP was 480psi and the SICP 260psi. At 16:48, we commenced circulating via choke manifold & degasser. Mud weight out was varying between 1.66 to 1.97sg & losses were 2.5m3/hr. No
significant gas in mud. At 20:00 hrs circulating was stopped. The SIDPP was now at 485psi & SICP at 850psi. SIDPP & SICP were bled off with 570litres, well opened & flow check made. Was a
gain of 2.19 m3 in one hour. At 22:00, recommendation made to circulate conventionally at 800litres/min with losses at 5-6 m3/hr. At "bottoms up", maximum gas was 0.22% & flow check
showed 0.5 m3 gain in 1 hour. After a second "bottoms up", maximum gas was 0.08% & losses were 1.6 - 2.5 m3/hr whilst circulating. On <...> at 10:45, planned drilling operations
recommenced.
The SSSV on well <...> was being set in the nipple at 1198 feet. The control and balance lines were flushed while running in hole. The SSSV was run in hole and jarred down to set the SSSV.
Hand jarring was used initially and then the wireline winch to complete the operation. One and a half hours were spent jarring down in total. The control was then pressured up to check the SSSV
positioned correctly. On pressuring up to 5000 psi the SSSV was pumped out of the nipple indicating it was not fully set. A second attempt was then made to reset the SSSV with a further1.5
hours jarring. The control line was again tested but showed signs of a slight leak at 5000 psi. It was decided at this point that no further advantage would be gained from further downward
jarring.The control line pressure was left at 5000 psi and a 1200lb bind was pulled on the wire to check the setting status of the SSSV. The control line pressure was then checked again and found
to have decreased more. The pressure was then bled to zero and a second 1200lb pull was taken on the wire, at which time the wire parted at the counter head assembly at the winch. One end of
the wire was attached to the main drum while the second end was jammed in the counter head assembly. A wireline clamp was then fiited to the wire still in the hole. No movement of the wire
<...>: When drilling the 8.5" hole section of CN31 S3 at 13607ft a 2 barrels influx was detected. The Brent reservoir had been penetrated at 13440ft and 0.620psi/ft oil based mud was being used.
The well was closed in and circulated to 0.680psi/ft mud by the drillers method. The well was opened up and confirmed to be stable at 0900hrs on <...>. As 3 heads detected gas in the shaker
room the platform production was shut down.
<...>:drilling at 11962'. Reservoir entered at 11800'. At 15.48, platform went to change of status. Alarm was due to platform gas heads in bell nipple detecting hydrocarbons. Drilling contractors
alarms not activated. Shale shaker header box was checked with hand held monitors & found gas free. Second check made in header box & a momentary reading of 14% LEL recorded. Rig's
chart recorder system was checked & found to show no hydrocarbons. Well was closed in with zero stand pipe pressure & zero casing pressure. Despite lack of shut-in pressures, well was
circulated bottoms up through back pressure manifold. Bottoms up planned at around 4000 strokes. During circulation, derrickman saw increase of 18 bbls at the pits. He called drill floor &
asked him to shut down. Well was closed in & no shut-in pressures observed. Circulation restarted as increased mud volume was assumed by drill crew to be back flow from sand traps. When
derrickman realised excess volume was going to be greater than expected 40-50 bbls backflow from sand traps he again asked driller to shut down. As a result, total of 188 bbls of extra mud taken
to surface. Annulus volume is 184 bbls. See OIR9/B & cont sheet
<...> - When drilling the 8.5" hole section of <...> at 14221' AHBDF a 5bbls influx was detected and the well closed in. The <...> reservoir had been penetrated at 14185' and 0.655 psi/ft oil based
mud was being used. The well was closed in and circulated to kill mud.
<...> - On the <...> the Well head maintenance engineer on the <...> platform reported that the A annulus on well 2z appeared to be in communication with the tubing. Subsequent wireline runs
made since, suggests that the tubing may have parted from the hanger in this well. Further intervention operations are currently being performed to determine the full extent of the damage to the
tubing.

Vessel collision occurred during unloading operations. The Seastate at the time was 1 metre, wind 314 degrees at 14 knots. The Marine Vessel <...> & <...> platform were engaged in cargo
handling operations. The <...> was slowly moving astern and hit the platform. No obvious damage could be seen from the platform to either the structure or vessel. The Structure will be inspected
by a specialist team. The Vessel returned to <...>.
Construction work installing a 3" methane pipe spool using rigging equipment to install pipework through deck penetration. It became clear that the chain attached to the lifting block needed to be
repositioned for final alignment of new pipework. Whilst lowering down on the chain block to enable the strop to be repositioned the pipe work swung capturing the injured person between the
pipe flange and the platfrom access ladder where he had his hand. Ip was taken to the <...> Medical Centre and then to hospital for further treatment. Construction has stopped and an
investigation is taking place.
<...> platform is an NUI. The visiting crew had just arrived on the platform and were completing platform inductions when a bang was heard. Smoke was detected manually at the A Battery
charger. A GA was initiated and the platform ESD system was activated. A small fire was extinguished within the charger using a CO2 extinguisher. Fire involved one of the radio frequency
suppression capacitators on both battery chargers were subsequently replaced. No further faults were found. Units were returned to service.
Normal operations were in progress. Visibility was good with light winds(5knots) from the west. Smoke, and some flames, were observed at the lagging on the waste heat recovery unit coil and a
platform GPA was initiated. Shortly after, based on further assessment, the process was shutdown. A fire team was mobilised and the fire was fully extinguished. The area affected was found to be
small and there appears to be no associated equipment damage. A full BHP internal investigation is currently in progress to determine the cause of the fire.
Internal failure in 13.8kv switchroom B harmonic filter resulted in overpressure panels blowing off attended by smoke. Platform suffered a power out and multiple smoke heads in alarm as
protection systems operated. Plant went to auto blow down with GPA. All hands mustered with no injuries. Fire and emergency team dealt with incident and isolated harmonic filter system.
Systems being checked and A harmonic filter being tested prior to any use.
Platform in normal operations, no abnormal operations or electrical load changes at the time of the incident. 3 electricians were in the switch room, discussing their activities of the day, when they
heard a loud bang coming from one of the transformers. They could see sparks coming from within the switchboard/transformer followed by thick brown smoke. On seeing this they immediately
left the switch room, whilst exiting the switch room one of the electricians activated the Manual Call Point and then proceeded to muster. On hitting the Manual Call Point the platform GPA was
activated and all platform personnel mustered. The Emergency Response Team proceeded to investigate and identified which transformer had blown, no extinguishment was required. The affected
transformer was electrically isolated from the main electrical systems. The rest of the platform systems were then reinstated. The failure of this transformer will be the subject of a detailed internal
investigation.
A fire & gas alarm was received at the Field control room from the un-manned drilling platform. This resulted in an intervention team being sent to investigate. The intervention team found that
the halon fire protection system had discharged. Further inspection revealed external paint blistering on an inverter cabinet, which provides an uninterruptable power supply (UPS) to the platform
emergency shutdown system (ESD). On opening the cabinet, extensive damage was observed to cabling and door mounted instruments. The source of the damage was identified as over heating of
the power resistors and overload protection coil in the conditioning circuit. The equipment vendor has examined the equipment and his detailed report is awaited. Initial investigation suggests that
the failure is due to the age of the components, the equipment being 15 years old.
At approx 1125 hours on <...> , AC power was being reinstated to the NUI platform <...> from <...>. A cable failure occurred in the EX feeder cable junction box. Damage was sustained to the
door of the box and on preliminary investigation, some scorching was found to the cabling inside the box. No further damage was sustained and no harm to personnel occurred. An AC electrical
isolation was put in place and the platform was SD. An investigation team has been set up to determine the route cause of failure.
A crew visited <...> platform on <...> and found evidence that a small fire had occurred, localised at the transition bellows, between the air cooled diesel generator engine extract cooling duct and
fixed extract ducting. This bellows is made of tarpaulin type material and is rectangular in shape. On inspection the lower side of the bellows was found to be burnt away, further inspection shows
damage to light fixture above generator with minor paint loss on roof of enclosure. Checking of control room records on the loggs complex showed a single heat detector had been activated on
<...>.

Normal operations. Fine conditions 1012 @ 250 degrees a quantity of natural gas was released to the atmosphere whilst opening up a flowline that has not been in recent use. A steel sampling
line, 1", had been fractured for some time as the forces of the break are rusty. It appears that the cause of the fracture could be differential movement between fixed and flexible pipe section.
System was installed in<...>.
Installation in production but unmanned at the time of the incident. Gas detected by the remote control room. Installation shut down and depressurised. Investigation team flew out the next day.
Erosion hole discovered in a water drain line from the test separator. Pipe spool removed and pipewash blunked and pressure tested . Plant returned to production - but test separator and
appropriate well is not being flowed ntil repairs carried out.
Weld failure of 1" water outlet line. Platform shutdown on gas detections 5 mins for venting Inventory loss associated with vent.
<...> is a NUI and whilst unmanned a leak has occurred resulting in the hydraulic fluid from the main tank draining into a well head skid and then overflowing to sea. Leak was observed when
crew were completing manning checks. Tank was completely empty. The platform was shut down at the time of the leak. Leak was caused by failure of a hydraulic pilot valve whose mechanical
seals failed, due to particulate contamination of the oil. The valve failed in the vent position. There was a design failure in that these pilot valves vent to atmosphere rather than back into the main
tank. The majority of the oil was contained within the panel and 231 was lost to sea.
For Operational reasons there was a requirement to remove DD-PCV-20062 and investigate for a blockage. The valve and associated pipework was flushed for 45 minutes using hot water. On
breaking the flange a burst of atomized steam with entrained hydrocarbon residue was released. Immediately detector DD-KGD-1058A, some 3 meters down wind, went into Hi alarm and
activated the platform GPA. Within seconds of "hitting" the Hi alarm the gas detector returned to a stable reading of 1.4% LEL.
While pulling the coil tubing out of the workover rig on well D5 the stuffing box leaked and an amount of crude oil escaped. Amount is estimated to be approximately 80 litres. A full <...>
internal investigation is currently in progress to determine the cause of the leak.
During the early morning of <...> abnormal process conditions were observed in the HP Vent Knock Out Drum. The installation was unmanned and the intervention OIM was briefed prior to the
planned visit. On arrival the OIM and a production technician conducted an inspection tour. A strong smell of condensate was found, a low Production Separator level was noted as well as
confirmation of the higher than usual KO Drum level. Steps were taken to remedy these conditions. Within an hour of arrival there was a change in the noise level associated with the Production
Separator LCV and condensate was found to be leaking from the lid of the Oily Water Separator. This situation was recognised as gas breakthrough of the liquid level in the Production Separator
and immediate steps were taken to manually isolate the source. Approximately 5 litres of condensate was released. The hydrocarbon release was attributable to four main functional failures of:
Level control, alarm and trip - Production Separator Overpressure trip - Oily Water Flash Drum Level control, alarm and trip - Oily Water Flash drum Failure of the Oily Water Separator to
contain liquid Our investigation addresses the following areas: 1) The root cause of failure of each of the safety critical elements. 2) Review of the appropriateness of the maintenance regime in
Installation in production. Operator discovered hydrocarbon condensate to be leaking from behind pipe insulation. Pipe at 40-50 bar pressure. Production was shut down as a precautionary
measure to allow investigation. Leak source was a plugged threadolet which was found to have pitting corrosion. Leak path was via the plug thread. There was no loss of strength in the assembly.
Heat-traced, lagged pipework susceptible to external pitting due to contact with condensed water which gets trapped under the lagging. This is particularly the case at vertical bends. Following
actions initiated: 1) Effect repair, pressure test and return to service 2) Check state of similar appurtenances on similar installations & take any necessary remedial action 3) Assess need for heat
tracing on any of the hydrocarbon lines at this stage of the installations lifecycle 4) Establish forward action with respect to pipeline modification (to remove vertical bends) and to appurtenance
removal
Spray of methanol reported coming from discharge pipework of LP Methanol Pump 8-G-6620A/B. Leak traced to loose connection on pressure transmitter PAHH 6624. Pump which was being
run on recycle was shutdown and fitting retightened. Approximately 400 litres of methanol was lost.
On <...> a disturbance was seen on the surface of the sea from helicopter returning to shore from the <...> platform. The location was near the <...> subsea template and pipeline. Further
investigations hav shown that there is a small leak downstream of the subsea wellhead. The 3 wells J1, 2 3 were sequentially shut in and pipeline to <...> was depressured from 76 bar to 15 bar to
limit losses to the environment and make safe the operation. Discussions have taken place with the owner <...>, HSE and the <...>. As the Operator we await instructions fron the Owner for the
future course of action.
During well services intervention programme an unplanned release to atmosphere of circa 11.5 kg of hydrocarbon gas occurred. This was detected by the platform fixed detection system
activating an automatic shutdown and general alarm.

During start up local gas dectectors initiated gs in the atmosphere. The local control room operator stopped the start sequence before executive action. And the release was from 12 bar fuel gas
system.
At approximately 1800hrs, well F3 at Franklin was opened up for the first production. Immediately following the opening of the choke, a loss of wellhead pressure was noted and as a precaution
the choke was closed. At that time a leak was reported in the methanol injection line to the tree. The well was shut down and the area made safe. As a result of the leak, approximately 25l of
methanol was released. None was lost to sea. At the time of the incident, the platform was cleared of personnel due to start up. Preliminary investigation has indicated that the leak occurred at a
joint. Further investigation ongoing.
<...> - A wireline tools string had become trapped in the surface Xmas tree. Methanol was injected to clear. The xmas tree valves were opened and the wire line parted. The upper section of the
wireline exited the grease tubes and a low pressure grease return hose from the line wiper parted, 2 BPLS of seawater/ Glycol methanol and gas were expelled from the ruptured hose.
While carrying out a slickline gradient survey on KA03 using 0.125" slickline the operator could not move off a designated station. He attempted to move the toolstring up the hole and observed
an increase of weight indicating that the tools were stuck. The operator increased the pulling tension on the wire in four increments from 1000lbs to 1800lbs the wire parted at the wireline unit
drum. The area was secured and barriered off. No personnel were on the main deck. The wireline crew were in the unit and had the protective window closed.
Operation: Normal drilling operations Substances : Smoke/Halon Equipment - Rig 41 Switch Room Normal drilling operations ongoing at time of incident. Drilling backup diesel generator
(EMD 2) was running onload when the armature brush gear flashed over causing damage to the local field wiring. Smoke produced from this event transgressed through the louvre/dampers and
into the SCR room, and initiated Halon Release. All electrical supplies to the engine and generator were isolated to make safe. The control room and the Rig Mechanic/Electrician checked the
area for fire and sources of ignition. The Halon was replaced, the system made good, incident investigation is ongoing.
Operation: Isolation integrity checks. Time:0115hrs apprx Weather: Fine conditions, NW 6-8knts HP flare system 12" valve (VB21524) conducting a holding test, by introducing gas from the gas
import line into the HP Relief header line to establish an adequate holding test pressure. While the gas was being introduced into the line one of the Operators went down to the P1 point to check
the pressure & observed a leak coming from the flange upstream of the 12" valve. The Operator contacted the MCR by radio & informed them of the leak & he closed the pressure test source gas
valve, he then opened the 12" valve to release any pressure from the line. As soon as the pressure was diminished in the line he closed the 12" valve again to provide an isolation from the HP
header.
Operation : Normal production operations Time: 1002 hrs Weather: Fine conditions , SE 10 knts A flame alarm (B2FD1) was activated in the MCR, the area showing up as being in the separator
area 'B' Module. One of the operators left the MCR & went to the module to investigate the cause of the alarm. At around the same time a Mech. Tech. who was setting up a job on the adjacent
crude oil booster pump reported a fire at the crude oil booster pumps via 666 (Emergency Number) telephone call from a phone located close by. The operator who went to investigate the alarm
entered 'B' module from the East side and went along the mezz walkway towards the west side of the module. As he approached the East side he could see smoke/haze rising from between the
separators at the booster pumps.
Weather: Clear, Vis - 10nm+ Time: 1230hrs (BST) During period of helicopter operations on the <> a member of the helideck crew noticed a fishing vessel approx 1200m on the platform East
side & that it was heading towards the installation. The incoming chopper landed on the deck and the helicrew went about their duties. While awaiting arrival of offgoing pax the crew noticed the
F/V still heading towards the installation. <> advised the <> that this vessel was approx 500-600m distance from the platform & that it was heading towards us.
Operation: Normal production operations. Time 2345 hrs Wind Speed 08kts, SSE (160deg), Calm. The platform automatic gas detection system was activated by an indication of gas in the <>
module. The F&G system showed that 2 lo level and 2 hi levels alarms had indicated simultaneously. This initiated a Class 1 shutdown of the process system & activated the platform GPA. All
POB went to Muster. The Ops Supv'r, on duty in the MCR at this time, put out a tannoy announcement advising all personnel of the gas release in <>. Within 3-4 mins of the initial gas
indication various other gas detectors located on the 68' level were activated & the Ops Supv'r initiated a class"0" shutdown & platform Blowdown.

Weather conditions at site: Good, Visibility: Good. During an operation to re-install an external bulkhead panel, used as a transit route for the installation of Thyristor panels within the rig 40
Diesel Generator room. a small section of steel plate (approx 3'x2') normally welded and bolted to the top of the bulkhead and fitted around a protruding overhead trolley beam, became detached
and fell to the deck adjacent to personnel involved in the re-installation task. The plate fell approximately 15', no one was struck or injured by this event. Examination of the bulkhead panel area
from where the small panel fell indicated considerable corrosion around the weld area causing the weld to subsequently fail and the small upper panel to become detached during reinstallation
ops. A report is currently being prepared by the platform inspection engineer with a recommendation to replace/repair the offending panel as required. Inspection of similar removable bulkheads
and panels will also be carried out.
Incident occurred during drilling operations on <> at 1700hrs . The operation in progress at the time was running 7" liner on 5 1/2" drill pipe. The IP was attempting to assist the other two floor
men in removing their rig tongs after a joint of pipe had been made up. The jaw of the make up tong opened and swung around trapping the IP's fingers between the make up tong jaw latch handle
and the break out tong supporting arm.
Operation: Running diesel EMD Generator. During the running of Rig 41, No 2 EMD it was observed that sparks were emanating from the exhaust of the unit. The observer immediately
contacted the MCR where one of the operators left to investigate. At this point in time the MCR contacted the drilling rig mechanic and electrician to advise them of the incident and to shut the
unit down. On his arrival at the NW end of the CPP the operator observed that the exhaust lagging was glowing red hot around the silencer which is situated about halfway along the exhaust
length. At around this same time the rig mechanic and electrical were shutting down the unit.
The helicopter arrived at approx. 0930 and <> was manned with 10 POB. A general platform walk around was completed and no new faults apparent. Planned work activities for the day were
undertaken. This included Fire & gas PM, Crane Maintenance (AP Crane) and Abseiling work. At 1245, due to deteriorating weather conditions, the decision was made to deman <> earlier
than planned. A helicopter was requested from <> for deman. Platform crew began demanning checks and discovered a substantial gas leak from the tell tale on the <> Inlet Bettis Valve
Actuator.
At 18.01 hours on <> a gas detector went into low alarm on the cellar deck of the compression jacket. Within thirty seconds it went into high alarm. This initiated the general alarm and
shutdown/vent of the platform. Throughout the response, another gas detector near the one mentioned above went into low alarm, no other gas detectors went above 10% LEL. The response to the
incident was to remain inside the temporary refuge until the platform had completely vented. Investigation of the source of the leak is ongoing. In the mean time the platform remains shutdown
and vented. At the time of the gas release, one of the compressors was being loaded up with gas and the detector is underneath that unit. No maintenance work was occurring in the area at the
time. The wind speed was negligible (less than 5 knots) and the sea flat calm. During the response the coastguard was kept fully informed, as were BP's own response organisation. No external
help was summoned.
At 22:00 hours, a person noticed that the 23C drilling National crane main block was paying-out. There is only day-shift working on the platform. The crane was in its rest position at the time and
turned off. There was no load attached to the block. Upon noticing this occurrence, the main block was retrieved (by starting of the crane and using it in the conventional manner) and strapped to
the crane structure to keep it in place. The crane was paying-out due to the weight of the block. The crane has been taken out of service pending investigation into the cause of the problem.
When working on well <> crew member noted gas leak from <> Choke Valve. Isolated well and depressurised platform. Inspector <> at <> informed, <> advised, case ref. <>
Following repairs to the 'B' train turbine exhaust a compressor seal problem was identified on start-up, investigation work was being carried out on the dry gas seal. Pressure was introduced into
the unit loop to test the seal and the technician in attendance noticed a smell of gas adjacent to the work site. The leak could not be pinpointed, was not audible and was not detected by the fixed
detection systems. A gas detector was brought to the site and the leak identified as coming from the stem seal and top flange of the seal gas filter duplex changeover valve adjacent to the work
site. The leak was undetectable at above 10 inches with a gas detector (0% LEL) As there were no adjacent isolation valves the platform was de-pressurised to allow the loop to be isolated, a
repair was carried out. A service test was carried out following the repair and a further leak was identified by gas detector on the bottom flange. A repeat isolation and further repair was carried
out before the plant was re-pressurised and re-started.

27AC crane (<>) was lifting a small container (6ft in length, 2.4 tonnes) from the standby supply vessel <>r on to the main deck. The crane was using the auxiliary winch to lift the load. At
approximately 50ft above sea level the container suddenly dropped to the sea whilst still attached to the crane rope. The container delivered a glancing blow to the aft port quarter of the <>
causing some minor damage. No prsons were injured. The platform crew other than those directly involved in the incident were restricted to AQ platform. Once in the sea the container began to
sink whilst still attached to the crane. Recovery of the container was not possible and it was necessary to cut the crane rope. Within 15 minutes the container had disappeared below the surface of
the water. The crane was returned to its rest and the container position, tide etc reported to the coastguard.
Normal plant production operations ongoing. At 06:05 hrs the GA was initiated by a smoke alarm in the accommodation level 2. No permits out at this time. All POB mustered, fire team
investigated and found in room 205 a pillow smouldering over a bunk wall light fitting. They made the area safe by removing the pillow and mattress from the room and the lighting circuit was
isolated. No persons injured and all POB accounted for. All other accommodation areas checked and then all personnel stood down from muster at 06:47 hrs.
During platform esd full function test, routine utility checks were carried out on equipment. After completion of the tests, further utility checks were carried out to ensure that all the equipment
was working correctly. During these checks a smell of gas was noted by a platform technician from the area around #2 Gas turbine. On investigation with a gas detector, the leak registered 100%
only when the portable detector was placed directly over the source. A fixed gas detector within the cubicle did not register presence of flammable gas. The Gas Turbine was immediately isolated
and the suspect part removed and replaced, the turbine was then reinstated and further checks carried out with no leaks detected.
During normal drilling operations, the Driller observed an object falling to the north side of the rig floor from the derrick. The Driller then went to invesitgate and found the cover from a Top
Drive temperature switch on the deck. The Drilling Supervisor was immediately informed. The Top Drive was checked over by maintenance personnel and a new switch cover was fitted. The Top
Drive was examined for any other potential problems. No further potential issues were identified.
The electric pallet truck operator was moving a pallet of 40x25kg bags of Sodium Bicarbonate from the top of a palleted stack (2 meters high). The pallet truck was a 'walk by' not a 'sit on' type.
Whilst reversing the truck from the stack to lower the load before travelling, the truck overturned. No injury was sustained or further equipment damaged. The load was within the truck
specification. A number of sacks burst when they struck the deck. The truck batteries also leaked a small quantity of battery acid. The drilling safety inspector barriered off the area, the leaked
battery acid was neutralised and the truck electrics isolated. An investigation (A489) is under way and root causes and establish actions to prevent.
At 19.52 on <> during a start up after a plant process shutdown HiHi gas was detected in the area form 2 detecors that reached 30% LEL. The GPA activated and the platform mustered. Full
emergency procedures were actioned. The gas reduced below 10% within 2 minutes. Emergency response personnel declared the area safe and muster was stood down at 20.29. The release
occurred when D105 separator ESDV had been given the open signal to allow fuel gas through to area 5 fuel gas scubbers. At this time the facility was depressured and fuel gas did not exceed 1
bar. Risk Assessment was conducted which determined that N2 testing of the associated pipework and equipment would be undertaken to detect the leak site. Subsequent testing found a leak on
D122 fuel gas scrubber lid seal "O" ring sealed joint. An investigation into the joint leakage hs commenced initial indications suggest thermal contraction after cooling may have loosened the fit.
At twenty minutes past midnight the Control Room on <> responded to a gas alarm, GD239 20% LEL, on the Additional Gas Compression Module (AGCM). An operator was dispatched to
the area to investigate the cause. The alarm did not re- activate. On identification he found some small pinholes on the pipework on the compressor blow-down line. Gas was barely observed by
the operator at less than 2psi. The release was therefore minor in nature. The AGCM was shut down as a precautionary measure and the system isolated until the line can be inspected, then
repaired or replaced.
The GPA initiated on Hi Hi gas detection on GD333/4 situated within the Skene compressor meter house - the meter house is a 3x2 metre enclosure containing chromatograph, Jiscoot gas
sampler, H2S analyser and numerous pressure transmitters. Two gas heads are located in the ceiling of the naturally vented enclosure with a three metre spacing, automatic shutdown/blowndown
was initiated when the heads passsed 20% of LEL. The maximum reading of 40% occurred within approx. 30 seconds after which gas cleared within a further 4 minutes.

While carrying out pre start up checks for use of the south BOP crane the <> wireline supervisor started to lower the crane hook, at which time a pin approx 4" long weighing 1lb dropped
approx 12 metres. Nobody was hurt in the area. On investigation it was found that the limit swith activation pin had sheared off the crane rope guide. The crane was immediately isolated and a
full inspection and repair was planned.
While investigating a trip on the G 3802C sea water injuction pump the area operator smelt burning around the pump and noticed black smoke emitting from the top section of the pump motor
casing. The Area Operator immediately called the Production Supervisor requested the CCR to initiate a manual class 2 shutdown and GPA as the smoke was becoming heavier. The platform was
depressured while the emergency response team commissioned several fire hoses to cool the motor casing. At no time were external flames observed.
<>. Time of Incident- 03.00 Sunday <>. Received information -04.40 from Safety Officer. Futher call from Coast Guard later in the day (11.00) reporting an explosion (re-confirmed by <>
as incorrect). Initially informed 4 personnel associated with incident received minor injuries but latter informed a 5th person was injured as a result of fall during muster. All 5 medivac off and 2
kept in hospital over night for observation. Personnel were removing flange BOP Module 5 causing a high pressure release. 1 person receiving a direct blast in the face. There was no ignition
(thus no explosion) gas alarms were initiated, GPA sounded and personnel mustered. Investigation reported to underway. On the basis of the I believe the press office issued a briefing.
During the night wind was gusting at 70 knots from the south east. The top drive blower hose was caught by a gust of wind and was blown against the derrick. On impact a flueroscent light cover
and tube was knocked off and fell approx. 40 feet to the North skid deck. The light circuit was isolated and the glass cleaned up. No personnel injuried. There is no method to retain the hose
hanging from the top drive. Personnel working on the derrick have been instructed to be more vigilant during the bad weather.
During normal production well testing operations a pin hole leak developed in the seal flush line of the test separator pump. The area operator was alerted to this by a third party and after
contacting the control room proceeded to isolate and depressurise the discharge line from the test separator. The CRO also remotely isolated the test separator and initiated a blow-down of the
same. The amount of fluids spilt to deck were calculated as 25 litres, the composition as follows, 3.75 Ltr crude oil, 21.25 Ltr produced water and 6.15 SCF gas. All spilt material was contained
within platform deck and cleaned up by the area operator. Engineering dept has been assigned the task of determining the suitability of the seal flush line.
During normal production operations a hairline crack developed in the flow line production well <>. This caused approximately 0.178 Ltr produced water, 0.073 Ltr crude oil and 0.409 SCF
gas to leak from the flowline. This leak was observed within five minutes of developing, as the operators were in the area at the time adjusting well chokes. The equipment was manually isolated
and depressurised. All other flowlines have been visually checked and found to be of sound construction. The crack is on a full metal part of the flowline and not on a weld or flange. The flowline
is to be dismantled and sent ashore for analysis.
Restarting the compressor as they were doing so, the alarm sounded, reading 23%. When investigating a leak was found to a PSV manifold. Pilot line connection and that was leaking at the
connection. Quantity unknown at this stage.
They had been experiencing problems with the crane hoist brake. They shut the crane down last week and isolated it and called out specialists of the company who maintain the cranes. Yesterday
morning the crane specialist and the rig mechanic were doing some work in the machinery space on the hoist hydraulic system. As they were doing this we heard a rumbling sound and when they
investigated, they discovered that the hook and line (about 200m) had disappeared and gone overboard and it has gone into the sea. We are now investigating as to why this happened. There was
nobody in the vincinity or no potential to cause injury, the line just went into the sea.
During the blow down of a pressure transmitter, a swagelock fitting failed on the instrument pipework resulting in a gas release, 29.9kg.
Offloading racks of tubulars from a supply boat, as the crane was lowering one of the racks on the platform the lifting assembly moved, making the load unstable. One end of the rack dropped
about 1m to the deck.

The wire line was coming out of the hole on well <>, during the recovery of the tool string tagged the stuffing box. The tool string tagged the stuffing box at the top of the lubricator stack and
the wire parted. The tool string dropped into the well, the ball check valve in the stuffing box opened, so there was no lose of containment and the broken wire was retained in the location of the
lower sheaves. As a precautionary measure the wire line BOP was closed. Investigation has revealed that the double A regulator used to control lift power was fitted back to front and was there for
ineffectual. This problem may have existed for 9 months as the winch will operate normally. It only presented itself when finite control was required. However, this was put down to aging
equipment. <> have contacted <> wire line and urged them to issue a safety alert.
<> While recovering 9 5/8 casing from the well the joint in question was lowered down the V door ramp and the pen end rested on the pipe stop on the catwalk, the single joint elevator from
the travelling block was removed in order to attach the single joint elevator from the air tugger on the rig floor. At that moment when the joint was free from either single joint elevators a sling
was applied to the pen end of the joint on the catwalk to enable it to be lifted over the catwalk pipe stop. The crane was hooked on and the crane driver took the tension on the sling and
inadvertently lifted the joint up over the stop allowing the joint to slide down the V door ramp uncontrolled, hitting a back upright post and coming to rest on the catwalk door ramp uncontrolled,
hitting a back upright post and coming to rest on the catwalk.
During reg down of BOP stack the chalk and kill lines were being removed, this requires the four bolt clamps holding each line to the BOP to be removed. At approx. 19.15 hours, the assistant
driller and the assistant derrick man were removing the clamp holding the flange faces of the kill line to the BOP. During the operation the IP was standing on the upper part of the BOP facing the
assistant Derrick man. Three of the four bolts were removed from the clamp. on slackening the fourth bolt, the kill line sprang out and dropped suddenly trapping IP's right hand between the kill
line and the upwards pointing valve spool.
AT 05:45 a gas leak was reported by operations personnel coming from one of the four 6" manual isolations valves for the compressors PSVS at K201A. This particular PSV had been removed
and blocked off. A stop and depressurisation of the equipment was done immediately. Subsequent testing of the valve revealed it was from the body plug and body seal. 7 kilograms gas released.
Just before 07:00 the platform went to ESD2 status. The shutdown was generated due to a leak from the bleed plug on the nuggets sea line depressuring line ESD. The shut down was generated
during the isolation of the nugget system for repair of a minor leak. Amount leak 5.85kg.
Following routine restart of a gas injection well, <> module DC to north, the operator was carrying out leak checks when he heard a sudden noise when he found gas leaking from the master
seal. Tell Tale Port, the operator then requested an immediate shutdown and low down of the gas injection facility. The platform response team were mobilised the situation was assessed and a full
master of personnel was missed out. The amount of gas released 2.16 kilogrammes.
While pulling out of the hole, and on breaking joint no: 243, which had a plug set inside, gas was release through the joint connection between 243 and 244. Joint 243 remained stadded and partly
threaded into joint 244 to keep control of the gas being released.
Crane rope came into contact with a light fitting positioned at Level 5 on the east side of the D07 accommodation module. The battery pack for the light fitting was dislodged and fell
approximately 15m to the pipedeck below. The battery pack weight is approximately 3 Kg. At the time of the incident the wind speed was 34 knots and direction 045 deg.
The North crane on the <> platform was offloading bundles of casing from a supply vessel. Whilst boomed out over the sea, a hydraulic hose fitting parted in the whip line control system,
causing the load to drop approximately 15ft before the brake applied. The load was left hanging over the water for a considerable time before the crane was operational. The load was then taken
inboard and landed safely. No one was injured. An investigation is currently ongoing to determine how the hose fitting failed.
Drilling operations in progress, dismantling the drill bottom hole assembly. The draw works break practically released allowing the travelling block to lower slowly, causing damage to the top
drive assembly and bending one section of the drill collar. To be confirmed subject to detailed investigation.
Operation at the time involved pulling out of the hole and laying out 5 1/2" drill pipe. The drill string had been raised and the slips set with one single above the air powered slips. The driller had
set the slips and slacked off the string weight onto the slips. He had then monitored the elevators via the doghouse camera as he slacked off. When the elevators were below the tool joint, he
applied the D'work Service Brake. He then gave the roughneck the go ahead to break out of the joint with the Iron Roughneck. As the Iron Roughneck was being traversed into position there was
a loud bang. The Roughnecks vacated the Drill floor. The Drill crew then regrouped and observed that the Top Drive had come to rest with the saver stub stabbed into the box of the joint of drill
pipe apprx 30' in the air. The top Drive weight was now resting on the joint of drill pipe. Work was suspended and the area barriered off. An investigation was initiated and a Traction report raised.

Routine operations were ongoing - Weather conditions 12 knots: 300 deg Location cellar deck, well bay area, east side An operations technician noticed a drip of oil from a leaking weld on a
reducer attached to the HP manifold upstream of a 2" techlok fitting on the celldeck wellbay area. This was reported to the Control room. Consequently the platform was shutdown in a controlled
manner. No F & G systems were brought into alarm during this time. An investigation into the incident has been initiated.
Normal platform operations, member of wireline crew passing through area heard a hissing noise, on investigation he noticed a fine spray of hydrocarbons (Crude Oil) coming from a fitting on
well T21 flowline, this is a tapping with 3/8" instrument line to guage panel. Immediately reported to Operator who organised the shutting in and depressurising of the wellhead and flowline.
Being a fine mist the accumulation of oil was minimal, the wireline personnel were regularly through this area and no leak had been evident, estimate the leak duration prior to being found as 1-2
minutes.
Whilst carrying out routine operations around the <> gas compression skids the night shift health care technician noticed a smell of gas in the vicinity at 01:25hrs. He contacted the <>
control room immediately and the shift supervisor made his way to the area. On arrival he observed a leak from one of the Weko Unions associated with the temporary flow line installed from
well <>. The night shift well test engineer was contacted immediately. <> tech was instructed by the Shift Supervisor to initiate a General Platform Alarm immediately and instruct GIII to
initiate alarm. On arrival at the scene the well test engineer immediately initiated a well shut in via a local control panel on the <> weather deck. None of the platform fixed gas detection
located around the gas compression detected the leak.
<>. Whilst walking through process area LUL 2, a contract tech. noticed a leak from a flange area authority and shift supervisor informed and attended immediately. Upstream and down stream
isolation valves closed to isolate flange on fov-97093.
Platform in state operations. Warm up of well <> ongoing through warm up line into HP Flare header. Confirmed gas alarm in process area level 1. Platform shut down, blown down, deluge
released, GPA initiated. <> and <>rig to muster. On confirmation that platform was gas free and safe; investigation revealed a hole in the HP Flare header opposite the tie-in for the well
warm up line. Production to remain shutdown until a repair has been completed.
During platform walkabout the Operations Supervisor noticed smell of gas around gas compressor, further investigation showed gas percolating from 1" stub piece offtake on 2nd stage suction
scubber. Machine shutdown and blowndown for further investigation. nveinvestigation.
While bunkering diesel oil from the supply vessel, the captain of the vessel noticed diesel spraying from the bunkering hose into the sea. He immediately stopped pumping and informed the
platform. 7 M3 of diesel had already been bunkered from the vessel prior to the leak. Approx. 250 ltrs of diesel was spilled into the sea.
Diesel fuel oil leakage occured a no load test run of turbine after completion of a service.
Very small lateral hairline crack detected in the pipework to the pilot gas regulator in GT1 Turbine. Technician was completing re-instatement testing of the fuel gas circuit. He checked the lines
and connections with a nitrogen pressure test and purge. The crack was not detected at this stage. He then applied fuel gas to the system and checked for leakage using a portable gas detector. The
crack was not noticed since the turbine hood enclosure has a full draught ventilation system in operation. A final check of all connections that were distrubed when the new regulator value was
fitted was done using soapy solution. This test revealed the crack in a 1/4 inch pipe supply at the regulator inlet port.
Reported Late <> - Minor gas leak occurred from a 3" pipe flange when the fuel compressor was being started. The leak was noticed by person on site and the machine shut down manually
within 2 minutes of start up. No injury occured. Weather at the time was dry but with wind speeds excess of 40 knots from the south. The compressor is located in a module open all sides to
atmosphere.
the <> radios <> of lost power and location. Standby vessel <> notified and transits to location. Ship is 1.1 NM from rig. Emergency alarm is activated and crew reports to muster. <>
and <> is activated. Ship is reported stable with anchor dropped and holding: <> commenced POB evacuation 65/77 crew members via helicopter support to nearby <>/<> installations.
Other vessel support at location: <>, <>. Situation continued stable, and <> with standby support vessels alert through daybreak. Wednesday 1st May 02, weather - winds 22 knots @ 218
deg with 21/2-3 m seas. The combined installation status is safe with both wells shut in and topsides vented. The 12 man essential crew will remain on stand by with emergency evac available on
the nearby <>.
Depresssuring and draining crude booster pump pipework into the hazardous open drains, in preparation for a spool piece replacement. . Gas detection initiated within module task taking place
and in two adjacent modules. gas communication had taken place via the drain system.

Sometime overnight <>, the caisson parted at apporx 8m level taking approx 25m of caisson and the original repair clamp with it. Left in place is the platform support clamp and the caissson
section above. In addition it was found that the guide at the +8m level had broken in 2 although both parts are still attached to the jacket. Some damage was also noted to the scaffold structure
erected for fitting the temporary clamp - this scaffold was not certified for use at the time.
Rolls Royce B gas generator tripped due to governor problems. Igniters were subsequently changed out. Several attempts to restart the generator. After startup, a small fire was noted in the power
turbine enclosure. The generator was shut down and the fire extinguished itself. Maintenance noted evidence of small oil leak, splitline joint tightened. Pedestal depression fan flexi hose found
ruptured. Hose replaced Demister fan pads changed. Machine back on line 04:30hrs-<> with operator standby. Small glow noted in the transmission tunnel due to residual oil. Extnguished with
dry powder Machine remained on line without further problems. Igniters were susequently changed out..
Coincident high gas detection whilst carrying out wire line operations. Perforation operations had taken place on well <>. The procedure called for the well to be flowed for 15 minutes to clean
up the perferations. During this operation, the THP dropped down to a flowing THP of approx 35 Barg and stabilised. At the time of the incident, wireline were pulling out of hole on well <>.
The wing valve had been closed and the THP on the well and riser had been steadily rising back towards its shut in THP.
<> Smoke alarms activated in water injection ,module 5. Believed to be from an air compressor motor overheating. General platform alarm and muster. Whole <> and incoming fields shut in
to investigate. Platform stood down at 12:55 as situation under control. Exact cause of smoke being investigated prior to re-start. No injuries. <> GPA was initiated by CCR operators @11:56 in
response to coincident smoke detection in mod 05. 3.2 shutdown was automatically initiated. ERT entered mod 05 in <> after one smoke head reset, and quickly established that the cause was
mechanical failure of 'A' instrument air compressor CX3001A. No further escalation: module was ventilated
Whilst raising a container (20x25gal drums of T32 LUBE oil) from the <> supply vessel- on east side of platform-hydraulic supply to rear slew motor on east crane was lost due to failure of 1"
swagelock fitting. Crane uncontrollably slewed quickly from east to north through 120 deg. Crane tech stopped power and jib came to a halt approx 2m from east derrick.
Optimsing production following a level 3.2 shutdown on the <>. The injection compressor had tripped and <> had suffered a level 1 shutdown. The hydrocarbon release appears to have been
caused by the failure of 'C' booster pumps drive end mechanical seal. The mechanical seal was removed and a new seal fitted. The drive end seal flush line was found to be choked and this could
have been contributed to the failure. The unit has now been returned to service satisfactorily.
Blow back occurred in fab shop whilst lighting up on a burning torch which resulted in an explosion in the oxygen hose which flash backed all the way to the flame arrestors on the Oxy bottle,
flaying open the hose along its length. This was followed by a release of acetylene into the fab shop which resulted in three gas heads coming into alarm 2 in Hi and one in low which in turn
isolated the welding sockets for the module.
Running a neucleorics source down a hole (on a wire) radiation produced from the source indicated the rock structure to give a better understanding of the formation of the well. Whilst doing this
the production logging tool became stuck in the hole. Unable to retrieve it.
<> TO FOLLOW First reported to Duty Officer. High level shut down on <> led to loss of power. Spoke to ? as at 03:30, Marathon were trying to re-power with power from <>. If this
fails they will consider precautionary down man. 9b form Level 4 shut down. False output from MCL panel during deluge testing resulting in loss of topsides power generation and supplies from
<> Resultant gas release in Mod 16 followed by GPA and Muster. Gas release followed a loss of of HVAC to hazardous areas and is believed to be from the drains system. No failure of any
equipment has been identified that could have resulted in gas release.
Gas release in wellhead module 02 resulted from bleeding down operations on <>. The gas was released from the stem of a low-torx valve in the line.The stem leakage was thought to be caused
by an internal seal failure. Further investigations are ongoing. The resulting release caused 3 gas heads to come in at low alarm. the delay in registering this incident was caused by the 9b form
being lost in transit from Marathon and the decision was to whether this incident was <> or <>
Coiled tubing operations were ongoing on well <>. <> the pull lift formed part of the rigging arrangement associated with the equipment on the drill floor. The pull lift provided horizontal
restraint on the injector head and associated componenets to retain the assembly in the vertical position. The assembly was support from the above by the drilling blocks. Whilst running the coil
tubing in hole, the pull lift failed, causing the injector head and associated assembly to lean forward. An alternative rigging arrangment was put in place and the injector head/assembly was
returned to the normal position. No injuries were sustained in the incident. The assistant driller was the only person in the area at the time, and he was located in the dog house.

During start up following level 2 shutdown, gas alarm G9112 came on low, followed very quickly to high, in the control room. On investigation, a leak was found - (LIC-0558) on VX0103X. The
valve was installed a few weeks previously. The gland packing, where the leak was found had not been adjusted during installation but was monitored during initial installation and found to be ok.
The gland was pulled up and the valve stroked after start up to ensure there was no further leak.
On <> at approx 14:24hrs a gas alarm in Mod 04 went into low. On investigation of the Module a condensate release was discovered. The platform was shutdown from the CCR and the source
of the leak bowndown and depressurised. Subsequent inspection indicated a failed "end cap" and the MOL recycle header.
Drilling ahead on <> 1/2" section, the string became stuck on bottom. Bit depth 10064 ft . TVD of 8449 ft & inclination at bit was 86degrees. Within the tool assembly are two readioactive
sources. Source 1AM241Be. type NSR-M serial number aoo80 Strength After five days of trying to free the drill string, the decision was made to cut the string & abandon the feel assembly plus
the radioactive sources.
During removal of cylinder suction valve on the ACT compressor the valve was forced out by an unexpected release of gas pressure putting the platform to a GPA for 1.1mins. The pressure record
of the compressor did not show a positive pressure after the machine had been shut down and blown down for maintenance purposes. Investigation as to the cause of the gas release concluded
that residual condensate liquids had flashed off increasing the internal pressure slightly above atmospheric. By design the compressor does not have dedicated atmospheric maintenance vents,
considered a design shortfall.
At approx. 15.00hrs the platform east crane was working the <>. Having completed six lifts on to platform the next container hooked on by the vessel was supposed to be RBF6111. The actual
lift hooked on was in fact the K Winch WU03BC weight was 7.8 tonnes there was no heavy pennant identification attached to the bridle. The crane driver had committed to the lift. The captain
attempted twice to contact the crane operator to warn him that he had a heavy lift attached. The crane operator did not hear the captain due to background noise on his held radio. The crane alarms
activated warning of heavy lift but the driver had already committed to the lift. The lift could not be returned to the boats deck as it was now positioned over the containers. During the morning
team talk which included all parties all three heavy lifts were to be made using the west crane on double fall. The PSS also informed the captain of this requirement.
The Ruston generator G860 was running for 25 minutes when F&G coincidence smoke alarm and GPA activated. F&G executive action had shutdown the Ruston and tripped the dampers.
Operations response reported smouldering and a small fire at the exhaust penetration through the bulkhead on the east side. This was put out using a hand held CO2 fire extinguisher and area
cooled.
<> wireline crew where pulling out of the hole after a mis-run. They got the surface and closed in the Work Over Valve block and lined up to bleed down the lubricator. They then began
bleeding down the pressure (550psi) The wire parted and came out of the stuffing box. <> informed. TBT held falling and removed the lubricator. TBT held and removed the toolstring in
stages. Removed the tools and noticed that the SRP plug stuck in the riser. Laid down the lubricator and tied a new rope socket and picked up lubricator. RIH and latched and pulled SRP plug.
During reinstatement test run of P306 oil export pump after a pump overhaul the starter cubical and or motor failed. On an initial test run on normal load the pump tripped on overload, the pump
was checked and the was reset. On the 2nd start a flash was reported from motor area L4W and shortly afterwards the platform went to alarm room. On investigation of the smoke the starter
cubical for P306 was reported to damaged.
West crane boom slipped due to suspended water ingress into the brake assembly whilst lowering off a 5.4 tonne lift. The load dropped approximately 4 feet before the brake became effective 2
feet above the deck. At this point the load contacted some nearby equipment causing only minor damage. After initial safety inspection of the crane by the mechanic the load was safely lowered to
the deck and the crane boom placed in the rest pending a full inspection.
During routine watch-keeping duties, Operations Technician discoverd a leak on the oil rundown line to cell 17. Line isolated. No gas heads initiated. Estimated volume 13.5 kg. (Subject to
confirmation by Process Engineers). A temporary patch has now been fitted and the line will be brought back into service once the appropiate deviations are approved.
An electrician was opening the door between D1CN and DICS to move between the modules. Due to the fact that maintenance work was ongoing on the HVAC system and one fan was shutdown,
a dp existed between the two modules. As the electrician opened the door the differential air pressure lifted his hat and swept it down the utility shaft in D1CS.

It was reported that at approximately 13.30 hrs that a scaffold fitting had fallen from area where scaffold was being erected beside the west crane pedestal. From the laydown area 7 - 8 metres
away personnel observed scaffold fitting falling onto the roof of the rigging loft and bouncing into the sea. There was no injury to personnel or plant. An initial safety inspection of worksite
showed barriers had been put in place to provide an exclusion zone below workparty. Tannoy announcements were also made informing personnel to keep clear of the area.
Coiled tubing in progress on <> with logging tools in well at approx 6300ft. During routine checks approx 1.5hrs after the well was opened up a small gas leak was identified on a coiled tubing
riser section. The connection had previously been pressure tested a 5000psi. Pressure in the riser during the operation was 780psi. The coiled tubing operation was immediately stopped and
started to pull out of hole. Once at surface the well was closed in, leak isolated and riser depressurised.
A test bar was installed to the coiled tubing 6/8" pipe slips to perform a pressure test prior to rigging down and moving equipment across to the next well. The test bar was restrained with a sling
to the BOP body. The BOP was pressure tested tp 500 psi and then to 5000 psi for 15 minutes with seawater using the rig cement unit, on completion of the test the pressure was bled back to the
cament unit. There was a NRV in the line used for the BOP test which prevented the pressure being bled down from the BOP body itself On the word of the cement unit operator that the pressure
had been bled off, the coiled tubing operator opened the pipe slips.
At 22.29 on <> a single H2S Head went into alarm on GTF column1, followed at 22.32 by a second H2S head. At 22.36, 2 gas heads monitoring col 1 went to LLG then at 22.38 a 2nd
confirmed LLG went to alarm. At this point, platform went to GPA status & a full platform muster inititated, at 22.49 a full muster of 155 confirmed. At 22.40, main rig & concurrent operations
were confirmed as secure. From the time up to & beyond the 1st indication of gas the CRO was able to confirm the oil process was steady. Col 1 level was steady & no other abnormal conditions
other than HLG & H2S levels were apparent on the process. CCTV was monitoring col 1 GTF & no indication of leaks or damage visable. At 22.37, SPS was initiated automatically as a result of
a confirmed fire indication in M1E turbine, later confirmed to be a result of the sub Main Detroit engine overheating.
There was a high level gas alarm in the prover loop module, which caused the platform to muster at 10:45 <>. There was a limited gas release but there had been a seal failure which had caused
oil spill into the module and contaminated the gas detection heads. The prover loop module was being de-isolated after maintenance when the seal failure occurred. Valve was subsequently shut,
the spill of dead crude into the module was completely contained, no oil went to sea. Platform back to normal by 12:00 <>.
The smell of gas was noticed by a maintenance technician who informed the ICC. The leak was detected using Ultra Sound leak detection equipment. The leak was subsequently found to be
coming from a choke bypass valve gland tell tale.
CRO was monitoring CCTV screens in ICC when he noticed a leak on the run down line. Two technicians were dispatched to column 4 and on arriving at the 100m level, confirmed a pin hole
leak on 'B' rundown line.
During construction work to convert office space to temporary cabins, a joiner cut through a live 240 volt UPS cable. The circuit protection operated as per design and no persons sustained any
injuries.
During de-isolation of the fuel gas system for generator G-1010, following a maintenance shut down, coincident high level gas was indicated in the enclosure. This was traced to an undisturbed
Swagelok fitting which was found to be incorrectly made up. The fitting was replaced, pressure tested and machine restarted.
Export system restarted following 3 day shut down for stock building. Eleven minutes after system pressurisation a joint blew out on Maurer samplet QV8004.
A box containing a valve was stored on the South East corner of the RPLQ roof lay down area next to the South access stairway. During helicopter landing of flight 1 at <> hrs which was
approaching from the South West, the wooden box lid was blown off the RPLQ roof as the aircraft passed by the rotor wash from the aircraft as it landed on the helideck. The box lid is
approximately 34"x 42"x 1" with 3 braces each 37" x 11/22x 3" and the weight of lid is 31 lbs. The distance that the lid was blown is approximately 30 feet South and 40 feet down on to the North
West corner of the pipe deck. Weather at the time of incident was clear with wind from 33 deg @ 18 knots (Northly). The box was sitting next to the handrail, ,which is 48" high and the boxes
dimensions are 34" width x 41" depth x 51" height.
While drilling well <>, a new stand of drill pipe was picked up & added to the drill string. The top drive was screwed into the drill string & the correct torque applied. The driller picked up the
drill string out of the slips putting the full string weight (170,000lbs) on the connection between the top drive & drill pipe. This connention failed causing the drill string to fall 4 feet back to
bottom.

Supply boat was being backloaded with several appliances from a recent scale squeeze program. While backloading a pump unit PSL7315, a sheet of rubber matting (1.82m x 0.93m, weighing
8kgs), was observed to detach and peel away from the underside of the unit. It subsequently fell/glided an estimated height of 100ft on to the deck of the vessel. The deck crew were standing
inside their safe haven at this point as per procedures. The unit was checked by the platfrom deck crew when it was hooked and there was no evidence of loose rubber underneath. The loading
operation of the container weighing 8 tons, was completed safely. The platform deck crew noted that there was now evidence of additional flaps of rubber visible on the unit. We suspect that the
rubber matting may be an anti-slide/anti-vibration device affixed to the underside of the unit, the owners are to be contacted to confirm this.
While working in an adjacent area, a technician noticed a change in noise level coming from the Pigging platform which is the location of value <> on line 30" <>. On investigation he found
gas was leaking from the vent in the valve body. The upstream value and the leaking suction valve were closed and vented down to the flare.
A pipe support had been removed to allow a flange joint to be loosened and a locating dowel fitted. This was to ensure correct alignment of a low meter contained in a vertical section of the 10"
line. To allow the support to be reinstalled underneath the pipe, the weight was taken on two chain blocks fitted to lift the pipe. As the weight was taken on one of the blocks the burden chain gave
way, and approximately 1.5m of chain fell to the deck. As the pipework was properly connected and still secured by the other block, there was no danger to personnel working on the job.
Wellbay door barrier bar had been removed from location slots and placed in corner. It appeared that the bar had been removed as a precaution beause it was too long but had been balanced on the
grating in its new location. While conducting housekeeping the bar was unbalanced and fell approx.10 feet through the mezzanine level grating at the corner of M3EE away from the walkway. All
other similar bars in the wellhead were immediately checked.
During normal watchkeeping in Repacement Process Module (RPM) level 2 mezzanine, gas was observed to be comong from a 2" stub piece weldclet weld. The 2" stub piece was on a 24" line
No.PX49126-A93848Y which is the HP compressor K-49400 2nd stage suction line and the 2" stub was the mounting for low transmitter.FT49402 (TORBAR). There was no gas shown on any of
the local gas detection devices in RPM on level 2 mezz. After consultation with the <> and <>, all hot work was stopped immediately and the operations department undertook a controlled
blowdown and investigation into the cause.
Technician walking along west Module deck walkway heard bolt drop to the grating from the module above. The module above is under construction (<>). The bolt was a 4" bolt and fell
approx. 10 metres.
During plant watchkeeping duties the area technician noticed an 8ft piece of unistrut lying on the walkway. The support had fallen from above the gas cooler BC-E-49180 which was supporting
the deluge pipework. There had been strong winds for 2 to 3 days and the Tech was doing an area check when he found the uni-strut lying on the walkway. He carried out an immediate check of
similar supports and found a second bracket had failed at the top of another uni-strut section on the next cooler, he immediately removed the section for obvious safety reasons. Replace all
affected cabon steel brackets with strainless steel ones to prevent any further incident. Work order to be raised to completed remedial actions.
Well <>No. <>. The tubing spear had been lowered into the mouse hole. The mouse hole plug was being pulled up with the winch to support the bottom of the spear while it was being
unscrewed. At this moment, the lifting eye bolt sheared. The lifting strop and sheared eye were ejected from the mouse hole on the end of the winch cable. There were three people standing close
by on the rig floor, none of whom were contacted by the equipment, they immediately moved out of the way until the cable came to rest. The plug and lifting eye were new and had just been
installed.
Whilst performing jarring operations to install downhole equipment, the wire jumped from the bottom sheave causing mechanical damage to the wireline which resulted in the wireline parting.
The parted wireline was caught in the bottom sheave. The site was made safe, clamping the wire and applying pressure to the stuffing box. Throughout the wireline operations all signs and
barriers had been in place and there was no personnel in the vicinity of the operating area.
During start up operations of gas well <> the operations technician noticed a whisper of gas from the SWAB Valve stem seal packing, whilst the well was being pressured up. The well was
closed in immediately and depressurised.
While lifting a section of penetrating gun with the pal finger crane,the connector to the gun appeared to fail allowing one end of the gun to fall to the deck
<>. Well No. <> While carrying out coil tubing operations on <>, a section of the tubing split resulting in a release of well fluid.

The operation in progress was utilising the Pallfinger to move the drilling bottom hole assemblies from the catwalk to a bay between the catwalk and the Pallfinger. On lifting a non-magnetic
heavyweight, the fifth or sixth lift, it dropped 5ft just as it was to be lowered into position.
Drips from a leaking coupling on the bunkering hose while bunkering from supply vessel. Pumping stopped. Hose isolated and drained down back to vessel. Leak estimated at 0.001tons PON1
form submitted.
Whilst wet deluge testing in module D3C. The blowout panel 8x2 metres (weight 4.5 tonnes) broke free from anchor chain and dropped into the sea. This was under the centre of the platform,
thus no potential for injury to other or equipment.
When lifting east crane boom out of its rest . The protection clamp located on the boom snagged on the timber support frame of the boom rest sheared 1 bolt-3"x1/2" and dislodging pieces of the
timber frame which fell approximately 20ft to the walkway below.weight of timber 8.6lbs. No injurey to personnel.
While racking wireline riser into riser storage rack, IP grabbed the load to try to steady it. The load swung away from him, trapping his hand between the load and an already stacked riser section.
The IP suffered cuts and bruising to his hand, resulting in Restricted Workday case.
An operations technician noticed a smell of hydrocarbons in the area as he was introducing gas into the KO Pot. The leak was traced to the stem of the KO pot sightglass bridle isolation valve.
The bridle was isolated and depressurised. the fixed detection was operational, but as the leak was so small it was not detectable. The leak rate is estimated to be between 0.001 kg/min and 0.03
kg/min and the leak path is estimated to be between approx. 0.1mm - 0.5mm. Estimated amount of gas released is between 0.075 kg-0.15 -Hydrocabon Leaks was used as a basis for estimating
amount of product release. Applied guidelines from O.C.O.P.1.015 Hydrocabon leaks, reporting guidelines 6.6.1.
A report of a minor hydrocarbon oil leak from a hose west mud tanks was made to the control room a approximately 08.30 by the KCA mud technician. Upon investigation by the oil technician he
found the leak was coming from BD 9 flowline bleed hose . The hose was duly isolated to stop any further losses. No oil had been spilled to sea the spill was the contained with absorbant matting.
When replacing the hatch cover above well <>. just before finally lowering into postion the lifting lug cover, which was lifted ouward, was raised to avoid catching on the hatch safety barrier.
This action resulted in the lifting lug cover dislodging and falling through to the wellhead. The size of the lifting lug cover is 10" x 10" x 1/2" and weighs approx. 5lbs. The area had been barriered
off for this lifting operation hence there were no personnel in the immediate area.
<> was the next well on the concurrent well access plan and during the nightshift on Friday 12 July a chicksan manifold was assembled in <> adjacent to <>. This manifold in <> via a 1
inch flexible blowdown hose. During the day shift of 13th July <> was closed in and the operations department were to carry out leak off tests on the Xmas tree valves prior to handing the well
over the Well Engineer. The Operations technicians opened the valve at the closed drain/blowdown manifold they heard gas escaping into the module from an open 2 inch valve on the chicksan
manifold adjacent to <>. The chicksan valve was closed immediately and the gas release stopped.
Whilst well services were rigging up chicksan on the "A" ann of BD19 they noticed a "frothing" of Hydrocarbon liquid/gas emanating from the innermost flange between the inner "A" ann and
the compact spool. After informing the Operations department the pressure (50 bar) in the annulus was bled down to zero bar.
While raising the well service mast a 14lb locking pin fell to the deck from a height of 30ft and landed on the skid deck hatches, some 16ft away from the operators. The pin measures 3.25" dia
x12" long and is part of the upper section. The bottom section had been raised successfully followed by the upper section - the operator confrimed that the two locking pins had latched into place.
Whilst attemping to raise the middle section (to take the mast to it's full operating height) the operator experienced resistance (heard "hydraulic motor labouring"). As per procedures, he lowered
the section one foot and checked the guy wires were not fouling and tried again. The locking pin was then ejected and fell to the deck. Operations were suspended and the area cleared of
personnel.
There are four Umbilicals that run from the Top Drive to the Derrick service points. One of these umbilicals is of a smaller diameter than the other three. (Approx. outer diameters are, one at 3
inch and three at 6 to 8 inch.) The smaller umbilical is attached to one of the larger umbilicals at several points along its length by a attachment link. The smaller unbilical has a nylon strap around
its circumference and the larger umbilical has a metal loose fitting ring around its circumference and the larger unbilical has a metal loose fitting ring around its circumference. The attachment
link joins the metal ring to the nylon strap. The metal attachment link weighs approximately 3 oz's and is a two piece link that is cold riveted together. During operations the attachment link split
an fell approximately 40 ft to the drill floor. There were three floormen on the drill floor at the time. however the dropped object never came in to contact with any of these idividuals.

During planned annual platform shutdown, technicians were removing LP 2nd Stage Suction Scrubber (V49110) closed drain spool. A minor gas release occurred from the downstream valve
490CV025, which was not fully closed. Residual gas activated 2 adjacent gas heads giving confirmed LLG. The valve was fully closed immediately. The process was shutdown and depressured at
time of incident.
After a gas release on the same branch on another platform, increased inspection was instigated. During one of these inspections, a smell of hydrocarbons was detected and on further
investigation it was observed that gas was escaping from a weld on a 2" stub. The stub is on 24" line, number PX49126 - A93848Y which is the H/P compressor suction line to the second stage.
This stub is the mounting for a <> type flow transmitter FT49402. The platform was shutdown in a controlled manner. No fixed gas detection went into alarm condition but in subsequent
investigations it was found that one gas head had detected a level of gas, below the alarm point, at 12:10.
A dropped object weighing approximately 1lb. fell 55 ft to the drill floor from the top drive unit. A roller assembly fell from the IBOP actuator while drilling. Initial observation is that the two
bolts holding in the roller assembly had sheared. There is evidence of wear around the actuator shell about the level of the lower bolt, due to contact with the yolk for the IBOP actuator.
During scaffold operations a section board was lowered down onto a section of grating in a normally unaccessable position. The grating panel collapsed and fell approx. 30 feet onto the D Deck
walkway. The grating panel was found to be in a very poor state and had become severally damaged during the fall, after it was deflected off some HVAC ducting.
Whist wireline operations were ongoing on well <> a minor gas leak from one of the unions on the wireline riser was picked up as low level gas by a nearby detector. Initial Findings The union
was type 9 1/2 x 4 TPI Otis It was determined that the union only leaked during the well/riser equalisation process as the pressure in the riser rose from zero to the full well pressure of 520 psi
where it resealed itself. The total duration of the leak was 6 mins and it can be assumed that during this time the pressure rose from zero to 520 psi. Gas detector (GD319) was 1.6 m away from
the union and read 29% LEL for 1 min before decreasing to zero in 4 mins. as the seal was re-established The o-ring seal from the union was found to be pitted in several places but had held an
initial test of 5000 psi.
A technician whilst carrying out watch keeping duties heard a noise as he walked across gratings in module M3W, upon further inspection it was found that 2 grating clip's had fallen approx. 7m
onto scaffolding below. There were no people in the wellbay at the time of incident.
During watch keeping duties a technician spotted a smear on either side of the oil export booster pump suction header. Oil export pump was running at the time and this was shutdown and the
section of pipework isolated. The leak was very minor and there was no evidence of further long term dripping at either the grating or below in the bilge water. The bilge water is very clean and
any contamination would have been very evident. No hydrocarbons were discharged to sea. Programme of inspection to be carried out to determine extent of corrosion.
Short desciption of incident: Whilst singling out heavy-weight drill pipe, the top drive system was lowered to the rotary table at which point a metallic ping was heard by the crew and a yellow
painted retaining stud with a spring washed and self-locking nut attached fell approx.7? from pipe handler to drill floor. The stud was 12mm diam x 1110mm long and total weight of object was
130gm. The stud was one of two holding the torque wrench lift cylinder spacer on the storage plate on the side of the pipe handler assumbly. This appears to be a relatively new feature as it was
noted that our old pipe handler assembly is a newer model. The newer model was fitted within the previous 24hrs and the top drive had only been used to run in 50 stands of drill pipe then lay
them out in singles.
During transfer of drilling mud from the platform to the supply boat <>, a section of the platform bulk hose had developed a leak causing approx. 200 litres of Oil based mud to escape to sea.
The sea state at the time was 2.7 mtrs and wind direction was 008 deg at 22 knots. The spill lasted for 45 seconds before the hose was isolated
Please refer to <> report <> raised on <>. Extract from above report: "As a result of checks around the platform following storms. A unidentified item, suspected as being part of the actual
flare tip, was seen lying on the top landing of the flare tower. An exclusion zone was put in place immediately to remove the risk of injury caused by a falling object". Regular checks on the
position of this object were made, viewing from below and, when possible, using crew change helicopters. The object was last confirmed to be in the same position on the 14th Jan 2003.
Following further storms, it was checked again on the 16th. On this occasion it could no longer be seen from below and it was thought that it may have been blown into a "blind spot".

Operation - Cutting drill line. Whilst cutting drill line a section 41 mm diameter x 36.6 metres long fell from the pipedeck onto the skid deck below the vee door area. Incident investigation - <
> commenced onboard offshore installation.
A 6 foot scaffold pole knocked off into sea. Lubricator skid being lifted to supply vessel moved outboard and collided with scaffold pole. Scaffold was erected on main deck and attached to
handrail. Stand by vessel was 50 feet to side, no divers. Area is now taped off. OIM has set up an investigation team. Rated as high potential severity incident. BOL will send OIR/9B, have
contacted ICC also.
During routine power generation operations and during normal environmental conditions an explosion occurred within a <> manufactured power generation duel fuel power turbine system. No
personnel played any part in this incident. Company incident report<> refers. <>, <> advised by telephone.
Whilst lifting a section of temporary talk drive from a half height container, a portable lifting sling lifted at 1 tonne parted. The load fell 2ft into the container. No personal injuries occurred during
the operation. <> <> Ref.
During commisioning of Solar gas turbine 'C' a small gas leak was discovered in the gland of a valve bonnet in the fuel gas line. The line was vented to allow repair of the valve gland leak. During
venting gas escaped from instrument pipework and entered the turbine compartment ventilation ducting. This resulted in the gas detectors (3) within the ventilation duct activating. A platform
emergency muster occured. The turbine was not operating nor was the ventilation system due to ongoing commisioning work.
Person taking pressuried gas condensate sample. Wind speed 55 mph direction 120 deg. Condensate, Piping associated with gas condensate separation. Sample collection container detached
underpressure. Manual sample operation which involved attaching and detaching the container. Valve was closed to prevent further uncontrolled release.
Drilling 100deg 34 kts, 4mtr, 5.6 degC, Dark N/A Automatic pipe handling machine Drilling ahead when a small steet roller 2.7lb from the PHM (pipe handling machine) vertical roller guide,
detached and fell to the drill floor. Approxamately 15 metres. No personnel injured. Drilling work ceased, a full investigation was initiated of the incident and inspection of the derick. Equipment
removed from service.
On dismantling some lifting equipment it was detected that a load bearing pin had sheared resulting in deformation of a lifting clamp used for installation flowline - during rigging down following
a flowline changeout, it was noticed that a beam clamp used during the process had partially failed. It's assumed this failure occurred during the changeout operation. Beam clamp was found to
have been one of four purpose made for the specific task. It had been fabricated by welding extensions & pins to a standard beam clamp & designed to locate in opportune holes in a hatch cover
brace. The modification was carried out by a specialist lifting equipment company, & was certified for use. It is not regarded now as being fit for purpose . Clamps of a similar design had been in
use periodically for this type of task since 1996.
A discharge from a 4" sewage pipe occurred, this pipe is located above the servery in the dining room/galley. The area was contaminated with raw sewage. Likely cause - poor engineering
design/inadequate material Actions taken - Platform emergency control team on platform alerted. (General alarm not sounded). Leak isolated - area barriered off. Dyce Control Room Informed drilling operations suspended. Down man of non essential personnel carried out on <>. Teams organised to rectify problem. <> Occupational Hygienist now on platform to monitor and
advise on the hygiene issues. Senior investigation team from outwith the <> to investigate.
Drilling operations running PLT logging string. Weather fair, wind 16 o 18 knots at 25deg. Muir Mathieson weather vane potentiometer. Under investigation to establish cause of failure suspected
stress/vibration fatigue at connection where indicator vane connects to fixing ring. This part of the weather station is non rotating, it is the fixed element with the direction pointers N,S,E,W
attached. It was the W pointer that had parted and fell to the pipe deck. Object dimensions 29 cm x 9 mm weight 138 grammes. Person traversing walkway found section of vane lying in walkway.
(No one observed or heard object fall). He reported to the drilling representative who identified the object.
Normal platform operations - weather fair, 17 to 20 knots at 25 degrees Dropped object weight 2.8 kg Distance dropped 32 metres Crane - <> Suspected cause, external corrosion of lid fixing
band - to be established through examination. Crane had been in operation for a short period, but it is unknown whether this occurred prior to, during, or after crane usage. A protective cover/lid
was found on walkway on level 3 of the platform. The lid was identified as being from the crane exhaust to prevent ingress of rain etc. The platform management were immediately informed who
quarantined all cranes and discussed with <> the remedial actions required to ensure safe operations to continue. The lids were removed from the 3 remaining cranes and replacements ordered.
Regular checks of this equipment has been included into operators pre use/daily check list.

Normal well start up operations Weather clear and windy Wind speed 40 knots at 216 degrees Hydrocarbon Gas Well <> instruments 6mm tubing During routine well start up operations an
attendant operator observed a small hydrocarbon leak from 6mm tubing routed to well instrumentation. He immediately informed the control room and the well was closed in, and flow line
depressurised. There was no activation of well bay fixed gas detection systems. Investigation commenced. Initial indications are that sheet metal cladding has been fretting against tubing and
formed a cut in the tubing.
Wind direction 230 deg at 18 knots Fair and clear Operation at time - laying out assembly line At 13.15 hrs the rig crew were laying down the 5 3/4" venturi fishing assembly. The last two items to
be laid down were a double of 3 1/2" drillpipe. The driller ran the first into the rotary table, set slips and DOG collar. He released the 175MT BJ solid body elevator spider elevators (serial ~
W1026) to allow the operator to break out the connection. After the connection was broken out, the Driller latched the elevators picked up and retracted the blocks. As the top drive was being
retracted the joint of 3 1/2" drillpipe slipped through the elevators and dropped approx 3 ft onto the rig floor, the top end of the joint fell against the North - East mezzanine deck handrail where it
came to rest. There were 3 other personnel and one other working on the rig floor at the time. There were no persons injured during this incident. Investigation ongoing , but immediate cause is
suspected to be due to a missing spring on the right hand slip segment.
A piece of stainless steel cladding became detached from process pipework and fell to deck 6-7m. The route of fall was not direct to deck, the cladding impacted other process pipework and
equipment. Early indications are that the cladding restraint (stainless steel banding) had cracked (due to stress or corrosion or a combination of both). The cladding on this part of the pipe was in
two (hemispherical) pieces, only the lower piece fell, the upper part was retrieved to make the area safe. The cladding had been in place for approx 10 years.
A half-height container with 5 tonnes of test weight was lifted from the <> to be transferred onto the supply boat <>, in the process the half-height container struck part of the helideck
structure. The strike resulted in material damage and an antenna falling down in two pieces. One piece (0.5 to 1 kg) fell 68.5 mtrs into the sea [ unable to deteermine as it was not retrieved] and
the other piece (0.2kg) fell 14.25 mtrs onto a container roof on level 2 of the accomodation module.The half height partly landed on the handrails at the SE Foam station/ stair landing, then swung
back against the safety fence. There was resulting damage to the foam tank pipework, a telephone hood, radio antenna, the top rail of the safety fence and a light fitting. The crane operator was an
experienced driver.
The B Power Generator was being run up, it reached minimum speed and commenced its warm up period of 15 minutes. Approximately two minutes from the final warm up (excitation energised)
it tripped out electrical protection. Several minutes after the trip a 11kv shutdown occurred, this was activated by the fire and gas system, (more than one smoke detector activated in the area
which gives indication of confirmed fire and activities shutdown). Personnel opening the door to the generation room also saw smoke and reported it to the CCR. The General alarm was activated
and full muster of personnel carried out.
Normal Plant Operations Weather, wind at 150 degrees at 15 knots Clear Mild conditions During routine monitoring of plant, an operator found a "T" shaped steel plate , weight 2.5 Kg in the
proximity of a walkway. The steel plate was found to have become detached from an overhead pipe run support bracket. He placed a barrier around the area and reported to his supervisor. The
immediate area was then checked and investigation commenced to establish the cause of failure. Suspected fatigue at weld which attaches plate to pipe clamps combined with slight movement of
pipe on overhead pipe rack.
At 03.16 mains power generation was lost and problems were encountered Established to have been from technical problems and was not initiated by events also reportable under <>, eg fire or
explosion. Platform UPS battery supplies were operating but have limited life. At 04.23 preparations began for partial downmanning as a precaution against prolonged loss of power. Emergency
generation (limited life support) was re-established at 06.00. This was prior to the first personnel leaving the platform, however the decision to continue with the precautionary downmanning
pending assurance on emergency power availability. The first helicoptor arrived at 08.30 and POB reduction commenced . POB reduction completed 12.30, POB reduced from 121 to 46.
Normal plant operations. Weather fair and clear. A piece of stainless steel cladding 800 mm x 280 mm weighing 2kg became detached from process pipework and fell to deck 2.5 mtrs below. The
route of fall was not direct to deck and was outwith recognised walkway or access route. Indications are that the cladding restraint (stainless steel banding) had cracked (due to stress or corrosion
or a combination of both). The cladding on this part of the pipe was in two (hemispherical) pieces, only thelower piece fell. The cladding has been place for approx 10 years. Plan implemented
and progressed to survey all areas and replace abnding on lagging which is made up in 2 sections.

Whilst performing routine plant checks, technician could smell hydrocarbons in PT mini-module. Investigations suggested that the smell was coming from the cocondensate export sample skid.
Examination of the skid revealed condensate bubbling from a section of pipework adjacent to a weld. Appeared to be a pin hole or a cracked weld. Skid was isolated and vented to prevent further
leakage and allow removal of the section of pipework.
A section of the liquid metering system was isolated in February to allow the system to be run in bypass. During the depressurisation of the Barque PB - Clipper PT sealine gas was detected in the
mini module the source of the release has been traced to the back pressurisation of the bleed used to form the bleed of the double block and bleed isolation.
An <> team commenced the change out of the final (18th) telephone hood located in the PT process area of the <>. Prior to this change out all other hoods had been changed without
incident. The hoods were being changed from a steel clad type to a fibreglass type due to condition deterioration of the original items. Whilst loosening bolts, there was an apparent failure
(shearing) of the bolt. This caused the hood to rotate about the bottom left hand bolt in a clockwise direction. The hood, whilst rotating, came into contact with a double block valve liquid
sampling facility attached to the bottom of the production separator level indication bridle. This contact resulted in the shearing of the uppermost stainless steel fitting associated with this
sampling facility. Failure of this fitting caused an uncontrolled release of fluids , subjected to 7 Barg Pressure to take place. SEE <> FOR FULL DETAILS. TOO MUCH INFORMATION TO
ENTER ONTO DATABASE.
At 05.20hrs whilst on a routine plant inspection an operator noticed a small liquid leak from a 2 inch condensate return line which comes from the gas compression system adjacent to the second
stage separator. At 05.25 a controlled shutdown of gas compression system was conducted. The leak was then reduced to a steady drip after the compression shut down. When the lagging was
removed from around the leading pipework it became apparent that the leak was fom a pinhole downstream of the isolation valve. At 05.30hrs a full shut down of oil production facilities
commenced. The separator was then isolated depressurised and a nitrogen purge was placed on the system.
During supply ship off loading operations, the bundle made up of two 8" drill collars was being lifted from the vessel onto the platform. As the load was being lifted over the pipe deck it was
noticed by one of the deck crew that a protection cap fitted to the end of one of the drill collars was loose. He immediately advised personnel in the area to stand clear, as the load was being
lowered onto the deck the protection cap fell from the bundle from a height of approx 20ft. It landed on the pipe deck and fortunately no injuries were incurred. Approx weight of cap was 4kg.
The cap was a metal protection cap.
Bulk hoses were being changed out using crane. While bringing hose onto pipedeck by crane IP steadied hose to assist it around containers. Hose moved and IP had finger caught against
container by hose coupling . IP reported injury to medic and after examination/strapping was sent onshore for further examination at <>. IP was subsequently expected to report to <> doctor
for confirmation of the severity of the injury, however this failed to happen within 3 days of the injury occurring due to IP incurring another unrelated illness.
During a slip and cut operations on the drill line, the drill line on the external spooling drum caught on the steel cover. This lifted the cover sufficiently to allow a gust of wind to tip it over. The
cover then fell approx 40ft to the skid deck below, coming to rest against the north hard rail. No injuries occurred as no personnel were on the skid deck at the time. Initial investigations reveal
that the cover was not sufficiently secured. The cover weighs approx 1 tonne and the wind speed was in excess of 35 knots.
Dropped object incident without personal injury, occurred on the drilling module . The object was a pipe stop from one of the pipe racking fingers at the monkey board. The object dropped from
the monkey board level, striking the drill floor in the pipe racking area, (approx 90ft). At the time of the operation the pipe rack was tripping out of the hole with 5" drill pipe. The driller was
pulling 60ft of a 93ft stand of pipe and the drill crew were on the drill floor. The pipe stop and finger from which it dropped were not being used to pipe racks at the time. After the incident, the
work was stopped, a full inspection of other racking fingers carried out and a discussion with the rig crew to review this incident. All other pipe stops were found to be secure.
Commissioning fire heater no.1 after package recertification - two work parties had been directly involved in the re-installation of fuel pipe gas work. The pipework had been partially installed
previously by the first work party. The second work party then proceeded to recognition/test the package using fuel gas. Whilst the unit was on start up cycle, a smell of gas was noticed in the
vicinity of the burner head. The manual isolation valve and gas inlet ESDV was immediately closed. A short time after this had been carried out, the platform muster alarm was automatically
activitated by the fire gas system due to gas detection in the plant room. The second work party made the area safe and reported to the allocated muster stations. Further investigation showed that
a flange that had been installed by the first work party had not been properly assembled /tightened.

Production had been started for several days following a planned shut down. Compressor operational problems had prevented the restart of gas lift wells. These had been resloved and gas lift well
<> was being brought into commission when a gas release occurred. Two operators in the vicinity of the gas lift manifold identified a gas leak coming from a blanked off stub on the blowdown
header. They immediately contacted the CCR and gas lift was shut down, they then began closing off all manual isolation valves from the gas lift manifold. A second smaller leak was also
observed from another flange on a connection to the blowdown header. System was quickly isolated and depressurised. A single gas head activated on the fire and gas system, at low level alert
status, in the vicinity of the leak.
A small liquid leak eminating from the end of a temporary repair clamp on the condensate return line to the second stage separator
No persons injured. Gas compression wan being re-started after planning shutdown. Vendor reported a smell of gas in Module 2 adjacent to ACL2 local control room. Upon further investigation a
hairline crack was found on a 3/4" line to high pressure switch PSH 2154 off main discharge pipework on the HP compressor. The leak was not significant enough to be detected by the platform
fire and gas system. Line has since been repaired and radiography carried out on adjacent 3/4" pipework. A further detailed examination to be conducted by the Offshore Support Group to
determine the root cause of the failure and to implement actions to prevent recurrence.
Drilling operations in progress. IP was working in the drill derrick racking back tubular stands of 5" drill pipe in the finger area. A stand of drill pipe came loose from its securing rope and
travelled towards the IP who was crouching down to retrieve a tugger wire. The stand struck the IP in his lower back region. Weather conditions at the start of his shift were suitable for this task to
be performed, however as the evening progressed the weather deteriorated. This was a contributory factor in this accident. The risk assessment conducted for this operation did not take into
consideration adverse weather. This accident was initially recorded as being minor, however the IP's condition did not improve to allow him to return to his normal duties. Following the
investigation the risk assessment has been reviewed and amended to include adverse weather limitations. Personnel have also been informed in this change in procedure/practice.
Gas Process had been shut down and blown down to facilitate a back-flush of the closed loop cooling medium side of 3rd stage printed circuit heat exchanger. During the 1st backlash of the
cooling meduim to the module open drain gas was detected by two fixed "line of sight" detectors resulting in a process shutdown and blow down winds are 18kts and the operation was taking
place in an open module.
Hand tools and fixtures (total weight 6.7kg), were being transferred from deck level using a winch. Stitching on the abseilers bag being used to hold the tools failed at approx 50 metres and the
contents fell to the deck. All tools and fixtures were recovered inside of the extensive 'Dropped Object Exclusion Zone' that was barriered off for the operation. Winch operator and personnel in
the tower had full view of the immediate area and no personnel were at risk.
Platform was engaged in normal Production operations when the gas compressor K21016 tripped on a high liquid level in the 2nd stage discharge KO pot V21008 Event. At 08:00 the vessel level
initiated the high level alarm on TDC. The CRO noted that the level controller output to KO LCV - 21008 -23 was at 105%, so he backed off the compressor to reduce the throughput and increase
the temperature from 27 - 29 degrees to reduce drop out. He then called on the area technician and TCI to investigate. At 08:02 the compressor tripped on HH level at 70%. The TCI confirmed
that the valve was in the closed position with the o/p still at 105%. He then took local control of the valve positioner and attempted to move the valve. Whilst doing this, the valve came free and
the TCI was able to cycle it from the positioner.
Oil migrated into vent of T2640 - reclaimed oil tank, this vent line is common to T2630 oily water separator and is at atmospheric presssure. The high level alarm on T2640 (LE2640) failed to
operate and therefore the pump on this system did not start, this caused level in the tank to contunue rising and migrate to T2630. T2630 lid seal leaked and a minor gas release occurred. The
platform F&G System operated, and initiated a GPA status due to confirmed low level gas in module CD1 local to the leak point. There was dispersion of the released gas through the extract
ventilation. The reclaimed oil tank pump was started manually and the liquid level in T2640 dropped to normal levels. No executive actions were initiated or occurred as result of this incident.
Environmental conditions were not a factor,
During routine activity, an audible gas leak was detected at the suction ESD valve XZV-961681 on compression train 1. The leak source was confirmed as the monitoring port on the cavity bleed
plug. The process train was immediately shut down and depressurised to enable the plug to be replaced.

Fuel gas was being introduced back onto the platform after intrusive maintanence activities on this system.As fuel gas was introduced, the 2 production operators on the scene realised that there
was a problem.the control room stopped the introduction of gas.Records indicate that gas had flowed for a period of 21 seconds. This gas was allowed to escape from the systemas a consequence
of a valve being left in the open position (which should have been closed).The gas followed a vent path through a flexible hose to a discharch point below the spider deck level.However, a
restriction in the form of a flame arrester had been placed in the line at the lower end of the hose causing an over-pressure and subsequent failure of the hose in three places. These failures
allowed a gas cloud to form within D2 module and under the cellardeck. The gas alarms were activated and the platform emergency procedures instigated.
During reintroduction of D sea water lift pump for the compression system, the pump was put on a test seqence for approximately 40 seconds after which time witnesses described a "flash and a
bang" from junction box. The system was made safe and investigations revealed the source being an apparent electrical incident inside the JB which resulted in flame/burning damage to the inside
of the JB and to the cables within it. There were no injuries and investigations as to the cause of the incident are being conducted by the Electrical Engineer.
1 of 2 turbines was unavailable due to essential maintenance & other had tripped previous evening & that turbine was in process of being restarted. Seawater cooling system also been shut down
at time of turbine trip.To facilitate turbine start-up, seawater cooling system was being started. At the same time seawater overboard dump valve was opened, 1 point gas detector went into high
alarm activating GPA. Gas detector almost immediately returned to effectively zero level. On-scene Controller & buddy were sent to investigate, no signs of gas found. Initially thought that GPA
& seawater startup may have been coincidental. Second attempt to start-up seawater system then commenced (approx 30mins after initial attempt) with all personnel located on DA.
Normal operations, plant stable. Weather conditions southerly wind circa. 10knots, sea state 1 mtr, visibility 10 miles +. 16:43 platform GPA activated by a Lo single gas detector, DD-KGD3802A, situated within the enclosure of DD-K-30001B Stripping Gas Compressor. The platform went to a full muster whilst the control room monitored the gas detectors within the enclosure (3
flammable & 3 toxic). Only DD-KGD-3802A was reading high, however, once the two other flammable gas detectors lifted off 0% LEL the OIM instructed the machine to be shutdown and
depressurized. Shortly after the machine had stopped and depressured the output on DD-KGD-3801A started to return to zero. On attaining a full muster the OIM announced for the Muster
stations to stand down with restrictive access in and around the compressor enclosure. A preliminary investigation has indicated that there may have been a flange leak. This incident will be the
subject of a further internal investigation.
A 4 tonne structure was lifted from the loading area, DD weatherdeck, to a position above the open area south west of the fuel gas skid. The load was then lowered, on release of the brake the
load freefall 1-3 feet. The Crane Operator returned the joystick to a neutral position, allowing the brake to be applied. The loads fall was halted and the decision to stop the job was made. The load
was carefully returned to the loading area and the crane was shutdown to await a technical investigation.
Normal platform operations prior to the alarm. Platform GPA activated by Lo gas detection from DD-KGD-1070A. On investigating the area of the gas detector, the Onscene Commander + his
Buddy confirmed that there had been a very small release (less than 1/2 litre) of hydrocarbon from within the mechanical seal area of DD-P-20010A crude transfer pump. The spillage had been
restricted to within the pump skid bund. The failure mechanism can only be ascertained once the pump has been isolated, purged and a detailed stripped down inspection completed.
During a routine daily inspection of the DD weatherdeck gas was observed to be coming from the top of DD-PSV-34113B. The control room was immediately made aware of the leak, whereupon
the area Operator was instructed to line up DD-PSV-34113A and isolate DD-PSV-34113B. The leak was coming from a straight barrel 1/2" nipple screwed into the top of the pilot operated PSV.
The nipple connects the pilot to the bleed ring via the signal line. The size of the release was difficult to estimate due to the gas dissipating into the atmosphere immediately on leaving the vicinity
of the nipple. The quantity of gas cannot be estimated as the duration of the leak is unknown. Restricted access has been set up, around the PSV, until a repair procedure has been developed in
conjunction with <>. Causation cannot be determined until the nipple is removed and inspected.
Well <> had been isolated. During de/isolation an isolation valve on the <> platform was opened up as part of the sequence. The pipe work was jolted, most likely by a hydrate build up. The
resulting shock damaged some of the pipework supports such that one was fractured and fell onto the lower platform deck. investigation as to the cause of the incident is ongoing. Lloyds register
has performed an initial survey with further ndt planned in the near future, meantime the pipeline has been shut down and taken out of use until fully inspected.

A metal scaffold board, approximately 3 feet by 1 foot, was heard falling to the weatherdeck on DW platform - underneath DS9 unit. Conditions were windy. The scaffold was on the BOP deck of
<>. Further investigation revealed that the board had fallen about 1.8 meters to the deck. All other boards were checked and confirmed secure.
During nippling down operations on the BOP stack a 3 ton sling parted when attempting to disconnect the <> hose of the upper choke from the BOP. The sling was attached to 4.6 ton drill floor
tugger, the tugger line recoiled back to the drill floor when the sling parted and jumped off its sheave in the crown. Before lifting, the area was cleared of personnel and no injuries and no damage
to plant occured.
The gantree crane was being used in the BOP area and as the job finished they parked the crane and a bracket fell from the gantree crane to the deck. No Injured Parties. The bracket fell approx.
8-9 metres and it weighed 2.3 - 2.4kg. An investigation will be carried out. All other cranes will be checked.
During routine watch keeping on <> Generator G-4550 the RPE noticed diesel in the enclosure sump.Further checks revealed a spray of diesel from the diesel pump discharge line. This rigid
line had been rubbing on a metaflex lube oil line. The fretting had caused a pin hole leak on the line with an estimated leal of between 8.3 kgs and 16.6 kgs of diesel fuel. The machine was
shutdown in a controlled manner. The section of line was replaced and the machine returned to service after a check of all similar lines in the vacinity. <> G-4500 was also checked and
potential fretting points were separated. None of the fixed detection systems within the hood activated.
During process restart it was identified that there was a significant increase in HP water inj flow to the subsea wells. This increase caused a protection trip on the wells which were open for
injection showed an indicated reduction and step change in pressure. All subsea water inj wells were immediately shut in. Further tests have been completed as advised by the onshore team. All
indications were that a failure had occurred in the integrity of the <> water injection sub sea pipeline. the location of the failure has been investigatigated by the <> Diving intervention
vessel. Their initial findings are as follows: ROV inspection Approx 1000m from <> water injection linear block manifold (WLBM) a rupture was observed within the bundle between
towheads 3 &4.
Approximately 13:30 hr on the <> shift watchkeeping duties identified minor weep crude oil eminating from level transmitter LT200114 situated as virtical bridle on the <> 2nd stage
separator V-20110. The bridle was immediately isolated at the local isolation valves and subsequent investigation identified a 'pin hole' leak on the lower body weld between top and middle bead.
A mechanical and corrosion damage report <> has been raised.
A light fitting on the bathroom cabinet caught fire in the toilet of room 102. A water leak had occurred in the toilet earlier in the morning. The water was isolated but it is suspected that residual
water from the leak had caused a short within the light fitting. The fire was extinguished and the power isolated.
<> form They were replacing the well head deck hatch this weighs about 2 tonnes.They were using a four leg chain block and they had the area barriered off on the deck and on the floor below,
there was an operations technicians on the floor below outside the barriers watching the lift. The rigging slipped around 5-6 feet the hatch went from the horizontal to the vertical position and
ended up in a precarious position. They secured the hatch in place with a secondary lifting device and left it until the morning to investigate. <>form -At approx 21:00 hrs on <> a main deck
hatch slipped whist being suspended during lifting operations to reinstate above DA-07. Whilst retained by chain lifting bridle throughout, the deck plate inverted 90' to rest on skid deck above
opening to wellhead. Immediate cause was determined that the hatch lift position was not the centre of gravity due to the offset penetration on which the chain/clamp lifting brothers affix.
Leak of diesel fuel oil from1/4"line within Solar Turbine G8550. Estimated volume of 50 litres escaped from a bypass line cnonection which was found to be cross threaded. Leaking fuel was
contained within the turbine enclosure and at no time escaped to sea.
Operation: Pulling a stand of drill pipe out of the hole to rack it back in the Derrick. The weather was fine and dry, the rig floor tidy and clean. The stand of pipe was being pulled out of the hole
by means of the travelling block & topdrive (VARCO TDS 4), when at approximately 60ft a clevis pin weighing 0.113kg fell to the floor. The job was stopped and supervision called to the drill
floor. On initial investigation it was evident that the split pin had failed allowing the pin to fall from the link tilt clevis. The top drive unit was thoroughly checked, all like components changed out
for new before returning to service.
6 hours after oil process plant start-up, area tech identified a pinhole leak on a 1" class 900 chemical injection stub piece on <> flowline a 00:10 hours. Flowline for <> is located in enclosed
module M3E. Fluid from oil well <> is 95% produced water 5% crude oil. Normal operating pressure of this flowline is 14.5 Bar. On identifcation of leak, <> Xmas tree values were closed,
isolating the flow from reservoir at 00:20 hours. Following this the production manifold valves were closed in an attempt to isolate the flowline from the production train. This operation was not
fully successful in stopping the leak, the control room operator then initiated a controlled Dunlin process shutdown.

A wire line drift run was being carried out on <> using 0.108 slick line. The wire parted at the K-Winch counterhead whilst pulling 1030lbs (maximum allowable pull 1250lbs) The wire broke
surface leaving 17720ft of wire down hole. No impaction pesonnel due to barriers being in place.
SMALL GAS LEAK ON <> WELL CHOKE START TELEPHONE CALL FROM <> PLATFORM REPORTING AN ALARM INDICATING A FIRE OR GAS RELEASE IN THE
WELLHEAD AREA. INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS BY <> SHOWED NO FIRE BUT EVIDENCE OF A GAS RELEASE. @ 18.26, UTC <> REPORT THAT A FIRE TEAM HAD
COMPLETED INVESTIGATION OF THE MODULE AND ANY GAS PRESENT HAD NOW DISPERSED. FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS WOULD BE MADE. 9B form GPA following
deluge release Mod 56 North followed by several gas detctors in alarm.. Normal operations ongoing, no out of ordinary activity. Deluge activated in MOD 56 North from local release button.
central Fire and Gas Panel indicated fire (as a result of deluge release) and CCR intiated GPA and muster. Following deluge release open path detectors indicated gas in the area. this was
investigated after the deluge isolations and nothing found.
During test run of C compressor a significant gas release occurred from 14" gas inlet grayloc connection to EX0125C cooler. This occurred even after extensive inert gas pressure testing and leak
testing had been carried out prior to the compressor being returned to service. The gas release caused 2 gas detectors to come in high and subsequent intiation of a level 3 shutdown. GPA was
initiated and all personnel mustered. Plant depressurised as per design. Investigation is ongoing.
During night shift on <>, bull heading operations of Production Well <> commenced utillising a temporary chicksan and high pressure hose connection from injection Well <>. The
Temporary pipework had been previously connected and pressure tested to 7500psi by <> Reps. on the <>. The bull heading operation commenced at 2217hrs on the <>. Production
operations were steady and <> bull heading was ongoing, when at 0004hrs a high gas alarm (GOP9882 FAS56-01) was seen to annunciate on the Fire & Gas matrix in M56 Wellbay. Seconds
later another gas alarm annunciate in low alarm M56 FA56-02 (GOP9810). Approximately 20 seconds later a second gas head came into low alarm in FA56-01 (GOP9881) giving 'confirmed low
gas' in that area. The GPA was sounded and a manual Level 3 Platform Shutdown was initiated. Approximately 2 minutes later all 3 gas detectors reset. Investigation ongoing.
At 07.45 am with wind speed of 11knots, wave height of 2.5mtr, in good visibility with the crane working vessel at west side of <> platform the following happened. Vessel was <>. Crane
proceeded to lift skip number <> from vessel, which was located on starboard rail nearest to crane. Once crane hooked onto skip, slack was taken up at top of the swell. Corner of skip caught
onto one side of safe haven doors located along inside wall of vessel deck. As vessel lowered from top of swell & as crane was lifting, one of the 4 legged bridle on skip caught onto safe haven
door & stretched one of the legs which then snapped one of the legs. Due to limited deck space on vessel it was felt safer to lift skip onto Platform to minimise any further risks. Deck crew on
vessel at this point were still within safe haven out of danger. When skip was located on platform, the deck crew did not approach skip until this had been safely landed onto pipe deck. Total
weight of skip including weight of spool peices inside skip was 1.6tonnes.
A 3.1 tonne chain block malfunctioned during lowering of a 0.5 tonne load. Load had been initialy raised and suspended without incident. On attempting to lower load it was discovered that the
chain was attempting to pay out freely and gain speed. The technician realised this promptly and regained a grip on the chain, thus preventing the load from free falling to the deck below. Load
was then slowly lowered by technician but had to be restrained throughout lowering operation. Chain Block Details: Grampian Test, 3.1 tonnes capacity with a 5mtr chain and the part number is
<>. Block had not previously been used on platform since being supplied during routine change-out of lifting equipment.
A confirmed gas alarm in an air intakeof a export compressor caused an ESD1 and platform GPA. Platform muster at 14:15, gas alarms cleared quickly. Once established no danger in the area,
muster was stood down at 15:20. Cause of gas alarm, suspected to be hydrocarbon gas in trained in nitrogen which was being vented following a leak test of process equipment in the upper deck
area. Investigations are ongoing to establish the source of hydrocarbons. System currently isolated. Production resumed at 22:40.
The <> was producing gas and condensate. Weather conditions were fair, wind was 10 knots, at 140 deg at 14.37 two line of site detectors initiated an ESD1 and a GPA as a result of gas
detection at the north end of the mezzanine deck of the <>. A full muster was achieved by 14:51. The gas indication cleared at 14:41. Subsequent to further checks and conformation of muster
the platform was stood down at 15:23. Upon investigation it was found that a drain valve was part open and it was suspected that the associated blind flange was incorrectly fitted allowing
passage of gas to atmosphere. The drain valve is situated on the line between the LP Fuel Gas Receiver and the NGL splitter. The line containing the leak point was being brought into service for
the first time after the August shutdown. It was being brought into as production was being tuned across the platform. Investigations have concentrated on the history of the failed joint and the
verifiction of similar joints on the platform.

We has a hydrocarbon release from a fractured tie in point. This was on the gas meter in stream and it was part of a 2 inch bleed assembly. The stem was isolated and depressurised to allow
removal of the spool.
Well <> was being brought back on line whilst equalising across the wing valve, prior to orging it, a leak occured on the washwater system. The washwater and methanol pumps were
subsequently shut down manually and the leak isolated. The fluid used to equalise across the wing valve was a combination of washwater and methanol. Upon investigation it was discovered that
a spool had ruptured on the washwater system.
The plant was running steady when an operator noticed a leak at Well <>, its flowline and SDV 1308-2. The SDV was manually taken offline, isolated and depressurised. On inspection it was
established that the leak was from a body cavity vent plug.
Well <> <> slickline crew were pulling 4 x memory gauges c/w 4.25" QX lock mandrel and gauge carrier from the 4.250" QN nipple at 3345 m bsv on Well 105. The weather was cold but
clear on the PDR weather deck work area. After 1 hr of jarring at 18:00 lbs on 0.125" Alloy (type GD31MO) slickline, the wire parted at the weight indicator pulley and stopped at the top sheave
leaving approx 6 ft sticking out from top of stuffing box. The BOP's were closed and the well made safe.
Fire Offshore. Platform had been shut down for 21 days for overhaul. Gas export generator No. 2 being returned to service during which time smoke & steam observed in enclosure (exhaust
cladding may have become saturated with oil during overhaul), exhaust cladding seen to ignite. Extinguished with CO2, platform shut down, full muster - all accounted for.
During routine 3 monthly partial closure testing of 12" EADV 21551, on the import line from <> to <> (<> end), it was found that the air powered actuator was unable to move the valve.
It is believed that deterioration of the internal pistol seal had occurred, allowing equalisation of pressure across the piston. The forward plan is to work the valve closed and isolate the pipeline
pending installation of a replacement actuator. Completion of the repair work is expected to be by <>. A detailed analysis of the underlying failure mode will be carried out in due course.
Planned maintenance was being completed on the fuel gas system of PO6 main export pump turbine. A permit was issued to work on the Ignitor fuel gas filter which had been correctly isolated
and purged. The performing authority broke containment on the fuel gas filter which was outwith the boundaries of the isolation. When containment was broken there was a gas release from the
lid of the filter. This was not picked up by the platform Fire and Gas detection system (although when checked afterwards it was found to be fully functional) and the platform was shutdown on a
manual yellow shutdown. The leaking filter was then repaired and leak tested and the area made safe.
At the time of the incident plant operations were normal and no work was going on in the MOL area in the vicinity of the LP condensate pumps, P-74 and P-75. The first warning of a problem
came at 0330hrs when a technician smelled gas and observed liquid leaking from the common discharge pipework downstream of P-74/P-75. The technician immediately called upon the
Operations Shift Leader to investigate. The STL immediately visited the area, confirmed the location and source of the leak and ordered a manual (sequence 2) platform shutdown and isolated the
source of the leak. The leak was located at a small hole on a weld on the common 2" discharge pipework (FA - DP-276) downstream of the P74/P75 condensate pumps.
Scaffolder was erecting scaffolding at 66ft level SE corner. He had attached a dropper (vertical tube) to a tie tube (upper horizontal tube) and tightened it. Then he slid down the dropper to fix a
ledger (lower horizontal tube) to the dropper. Whilst standing on a butt attached to the dropper, the double (scaffolding fitting ) that was attached above gave way and the dropper fell down into
the sea, and the individual fell off the scaffold. Scaffolder fell approx 2 metres until his inertia reel held him. His colleagues were alerted and came to assist. IP was recovered by using the inertia
reel retriever handle within five minutes.
At approx 03.15 hrs on <>, a platform hazard warning light fitting bracket failed and fell from its location on the level 2 West Bulkhead. This dropped object, approximate weight 2.5 kg struck
the IP and further fell to the deck landing in close proximity to a fellow worker. The approximate height from the bracket support to the IP's head was 1 metre and the further fall 3.2 metres. The
task was stopped and the area barriered off. Though apparently uninjured at the time, the IP was later seen by the installation medic when the IP developed pain in the back and neck, as a
precaution he was medivaced from the installation to <> on the <>. At the time of the incident the weather conditions were fair and the area was artificially light with sodium lamps, wind
conditions were from SW and 10 knots.The IP was working night shift and had been on the platform for 11 nights of a 14 day trip. He commenced duty at 1900 hrs and was due to finish shift at
07:00hrs. An externally led investigation team has been set up to investigate the incident.

Under normal operations until plant upset caused by trip of compressor, and during upset period had catastrophic failure of high pressure gas line, platform shut down, emergency procedures put
into place, all personnel mustered.
A routine check on a recently repaired section of drain system pipework from vessel V20 (fuel gas receiver) detected a hydrocarbon leak from a screwed union joint. Part of our S.S.O.W. (SIRP)
determines that the reinstatement of plant after isolation requires routine monitoring of any reinstated joints. It was during these checks that the small leak was discovered. NGL plant was
shutdown and isolated, as local isolation of V20 is not possible. The joint had been recently disconnected to allow removal of a defective spool for repair, After replacement, the section had
passed a 14 bar leak test, prior to NGL start-up.
During commissioning work on Condensate pump P97, calibration checks were being carried out on newly installed field instruments. The Condensate pump had been isolated under ICC for
approx 3 weeks. The pump had been purged and left open to atmosphere. The impulse lines associated with the new instruments had been broken previously to allow installation of new impulse
lines, and these had been leak tested. The technician was attempting to calibrate a differential switch and found that access to a vent plug was restricted due to the new installation configuration.
Attempts were made to gain access to the vent plug by releasing adjacent pipework brackets, this proved unsuccessful. It was then decided to remove the complete switch to allow access to be
gained. Knowing that the pipework had contained water he checked that there was no pressure in the associated pipework, he then slackened an impulse line fitting and a small quantity of water
trickled out.
5" drill pipe was being picked up and run in hole (RIH) prior to starting sidetrack drilling operations. Thirty-two joints had been RIH, on picking up the 33rd joint with the elevators (Varco BNC
350 tonne) they opened causing the joint to fall back through the "v" door down the ramp and onto the MPD. At the time of operation there were two roustabouts on the MPD and three
roughnecks on the drill floor, all were stood clear and no one was injured. Prior to the load being picked up it had been verified (by one of the roughnecks) that the elevators had been latched. The
operation was immediately stopped and the area made safe. The elevators have been quarantined and will be returned to onshore for examination. Alternative elevators (BJGG) are being used to
continue with operation. All <> sites have been informed of the incident and it has been recommended that use of this type of elevator is discontinued until the cause of unlatching is known.
While tripping in the hole with a weatherford Whipstock on 5" DP, a Mule Bar retaining pin dropped to the drill floor, some 90ft from the back of the monkey board. The retaining pin struck the
drill floor in an area adjacent to the standpipe manifold, bouncing under the 'V' door, which was closed at the time and continued to slide down the ramp coming to a rest on the moving pipe deck.
No injuries were sustained Operations were suspended and a further investigation for any loose items at the monkey board level was conducted - nothing found.
A small section of right angled uni-strut (weighing 0.5 kg) fell approx. 40' from the communications tower on to the top deck during high winds.The uni-strut was badly corroded and holed across
80% of the surface area. The area below was barriered off until rope access technicians has carried out an inspection of the tower the following morning. Tannoy announcements were made to
inform platform personnel.
There was a gas alarm which resulted in a shutdown and muster. A 4m jet of oil occured in a decompression plant. A foam blanket was applied. Normal system pressure 110 bar.A ring believed to
have parted - this is to be isolated later this afternoon and followed up by a leak test before start up. NB <> field also shut down but restarted at 2400hrs.
Minor hydrocarbon gas leak from failed casing weld on P74 LP condensate pump. Following a single low gas alarm, a local isolation was being carried out, during which a second alarm came up,
automatically initiating a yellow (depressurising) shutdown.
A section of acoustic wall panelling (weighing 2 kg) was found lying on the deck adjacent to the west access door. The operator who found it had been using the door regularly during that shift
and stated that it must have fallen between 04:00 and 05:30 hrs when no one was in the area. It fell a height of approx 3 metres.
A smoke detector was activated in the utilities room on level 1 of the <> Accommodation and this was indicated in the control room. Upon investigation by the Safety officer, it was confirmed
that there was smoke in the accommodation and the General Alarm was initiated. The platform went to muster and all persons were accounted for. The mounting bolts on the motor had sheared
due to over tension and vibration. This resulted in the motor dropping approx 1" and the fan belt, now misaligned, rubbing against the drive belt guide. The belt overheated and started to char and
smoulder. The damage was confined to the internals of the fan motor with no possibility of spread, and with light smoke filling the east end of accommodation. The motor was isolated and made
safe and the area thoroughly ventilated. No fire extinguishing equipment was necessary. Normal operations resumed and an investigation team was set up. Production continued, as there was no
threat of escalation.

Bolt and nut weighing 12gms and 5cm in length, fell approximately 10m in height, from the NGL roof area to the moving pipedeck below, narrowly missing a member of the wells team. There
were no persons working on the NGL roof who could have dislodged this at the time and no persons were observed by the wells team at the time of the incident. The area below the NGL roof
hangover was barriered off immediately and an initial search was conducted of the high level area immediately around the presumed source of the object. A number of additional small, potential
dropped objects were recovered and other potential dropped objects, not so small were observed lying on sections of steel support work beneath the gratings. A high level sweep involving
abseilers is set to recover all the items and to survey the area for any remaining.
<>. Produced water re-injection (PWRI) was reinstated to well <> at 05:30 hrs on <>, and was subsequently shut down again ast 17:00 hrs that same day. At 17:00 hrs an instrument tech.
noticed a leak, which he described as equivalent in size to a domestic water tap, spraying out about two or three feet. The leak consisted of water, but with a very small content of oil, and was well
within the consent requirements for overboard discharge. The leak started sometime between 05:30 and 17:00 hours but it proved impossible to be more specific with regard to the duration. The
on-duty production techs immediately opened the annulus blowdown valves and depressurised the system.
2 Air fittings (crows foot type) weighing 20 gms and 50 mm in length, fell approximately 10 m in height, from NGL roof area to the moving pipedeck below, missing a member of the wells team
by 3m. There were no actual work fronts ongoing at the time on the MPD but one person was in the vicinity. During a sweep of the area for any more PDO's another fitting was discovered and
removed. The investigation concluded that the two fittings in question had been allowed to lie on the deck partially hidden from view and accidentally kicked over the edge by the person walking
past. Apart from the search around all access points to the BOP deck temporary scaffolding kick plates have been secured to prevent any further objects from falling to the BOP below.
Steel securing rod for fencing, weighing 1Kg and 1.5m in length fell 15m from the NW crane to Level 2 walkway below. At some time in the past, the fencing had been removed to allow access
and had not been replaced securely in that plastic tie wraps were used instead of steel bandit type. Due to the effects of weathering over time the plastic degraded and broke away. This allowed the
horizontal steel securing rod, bent to the curved shape of the pedestal handrail and under tension, to spring outwards towards the sea, allowing the crane drip tray section to catch and tear the
fencing apart, allowing the vertical securing rod to fall.
During normal operations, a pinhole leak from a valve section on hydrocyclone V1751 led to the release of produced water. The leak continued for approximately 15-20 minutes until the platform
was shutdown. The released fluid was contained to the platform.
Whilst carrying out a condensate pump changeout a small leak of gas from the seal bearing escaped. The gas heads adjacent to the pump operated and closed the platform down with a Yellow
Shutdown Controlled action. Platform unable to start up due to adverse weather policy. Wind 55k sea state 13m wave height. No helicopter in the field.
Currently operating as an unmanned installation. The NUI team (6 personnel) carried out a planned maintenance visit. During initial platform inspection and manual gas checks, an instrument
technician discovered a leak from slot 14 flowline, the technician immediately contacted the OIM, who carried out a site visit and initiated a yellow shutdown. Slot 14 was isolated, flowline
depressurised and the area barriered off. The leak was emanating from the flanged joint, downstream of the wing valve at the flowline connection. Initial investigation confirmed the failure of the
RTJ, (found to be holed). An investigation team has been set-up to establish the root cause and prevent recurrence.
During platform shutdown, work was carried out to install a carbon fibre DML pipeline wrap on a corroded pipeline. After the initial curing of the resin impregnated wrap and during the final
baking process at 120 degrees a small fire was noticed inside the sealed area around the work. Fire was immediately extinguished by the fire watch man assigned to the job. Platform fire protector
systems weere not activated
Whilst man rigging operations were being undertaken in the derrick, an object was heard dropping striking the drill floor. A search revealed a 3/4" UNC nut had been recently fitted on a newly
installed intermediate tie back plate of the top drive torque tube. A check of the installation revealed the lock nut to be missing and have dropped approx 84 ft. The weight of the nut was 56
grammes.
Small Steel Plate 3.5" (10oz) found on rig floor. This was subsequently certified as part Varco roller guide system thought to have fallen from TDS.
CRANE BLOCK PULLED INTO SHEAVES CAUSING MINOR DAMAGE TO WIRE ROPE. CHANDELIER STOP DEVICE DID NOT OPERATE CORRECTLY
During SCAR radiography on a 2" dead leg line on the oil inlet to Crude Oil Cooler the radiographer noted tha the wall thickness was down to 0.87mm. They noticed salt deposits on the floor
area underneath the dead leg and on further investigation found dampness on the underside of the line indicating that produced water was seeping through the pipewall (1 drip/5minute). Salt
deposiits on the floor area underneath the landing EP230.

Work was underway on Generator GH-533 to remove the endshield of the alternator for routine maintenance. The endshield of Generator weighed an estimate 250-350kg as a result a lifing
method statement was as it was a non-routine lift which detailed how it would be removed & suspended whilst an internal inspection was carried out. 3 chain blocks - 1 tonne rated were set up
from a dedicated lifting beam. The endshield was transferred from one block to another until it was clear of the exiter and assembly. During process of transferring the load to the last of the three
blocks, the last block failed to hold the load and allowed the endshield still supported by the second block, to swing back towards the Generator still supported by the second block. Both units
sustained minor damage which can be redressed. As a consequence of their correct position pertaining to the load during the task, none of the three personnel in the alternator house at the time of
the incident were injured.
While making up a stand of drill pipe the tope drive actuator rod clevis casing connection the actuator position to the link tilt split in 2.The uncsecure half weight 600grams fell to the rig floor
while the secured half remained attached to the link tilt crank assembley. No individuals were in the vicinity of the rotary table at the time. top drive system is a <>.
During watchkeeping duties an operation technician discovered an oil stain on the south side of the oil export module. On investigation he found hydrocarbon oil coming from a pressure gauge
PI3092. The line supervisor was informed and the pressure gauge was isolated at the local instrumentation manifold.
A split pin failed, this caused a device pin to work free and this fell 70 feet onto the drill floor. There was no injuries sustained. The rig activity was stopped at 07.30am and the rig was made safe,
an investigation is on going.
At approx. 19.45hrs on the evening of the <> while rig floor operations were ongoing to rig up <> Coiled Tubing, a locking pin and retaining spring assembly (weighing 61 gms in total)
fell /- 41ft from the coiled tubing gooseneck to the drill floor. No one was injured during the incident, however members of the <> drillcrew and <> Coiled Tubing crew were present on the
drillfloor at the time.
The motor unit which drives the Elliot gas compressors is fitted with an EXPO air purge/pressurisation system. The air line supplying the EXPO system is fitted with an inline Rotameter made of
glass. During a purge initiation of the motor the glass rotameter shattered. The air pressure at the time was normal - approximately 8 Barg. It is suspected at present that, due to exessive air flow
during the purge initiator, the metal float inside the rotameter has been propelled against its stop with enough force to crack the rotameter glass body which has then shattered with the additional
force of the internal air pressure.
During the back loading of an IBC a spanner was dislodged from the IBC frame when it struck the safe haven of the supply vessel <>. The spanner dropped approximately 10 feet onto the
deck. The supply vessel deck crew were in the safe haven at the time of the incident.
During pulling operations of a 5.1/2" HE3 PES plug using a wireline unit, the slick line broke between the bottom sheave and unit. The wire was being pulled at 1200 lbs overpull at the time.
When the wire parted, the wire jammed up in the bottom sheave causing the wire not to fall down the well. At the time of the incident, all barrier signs were in place. No personnel were in the
area. <> Well No <>.
As a load comprimising four drillpipe pup joints (5ft, 8ft, 10ft and 15ft in length - each pup joint individually slung with a pair of 1 ton slings) was lowered onto the back of the supply vessel the
load swung underneath the bumber bar on the starboard aft side of the vessel or the bumber bar. Due to the position of the load, and the motion of the vessel, the sling attached to one end of the
15ft pup joint parted. There was no one in the vicinity of the lift at the time of the incident and the load was safely laid down on top of drillpipe already backloaded to the vessel. OPerations were
then briefly suspended while the incident was discussed by the captain of the vessel, the crane operator and the deck foreman. At the request of the captain, the 15ft pup joint was hooked on to the
crane and the load re-positioned to ensure it was properly stowed for transit. Platform supervision were then informed and the incident discussed with the relevant parties, before activities
resumed to complete backload operations.
During bad weather on the <>, a strap from the heat shield on the drilling rig fell 20 feet to the monkey board area. Because of the bad weather there was no one standing at the time and the
incident was discovered today <> at 10am.
A 10ft half height (4.8 te gross) was lowered to the deck of the supply boat <>. After being landed, the load was picked up again to reposition it tight to the boat side. At this point the boat
dipped with the swell and the corner of the half height caught under the top of one of the escape openings in the safety barrier on the starboard side of the boat. The pendant hook and master link
were deformed by the sudden load and the pendant hook became detached from the half height master link, allowing it to drop some 2m to the boat deck. The pendant was rated at 8 te. Weather
conditions prevailing were: Wind 325 deg at 20 knots. Sea 2/2.5 mtr. No one was injured as a result of the incident.

During operation of oil export module pump station, a start attempt was made on PV 3060 crude export pump, which was required for service due to the increased production from the incoming
fields. The pump tripped immediately and the technician onsite heard a 'bang'. On investigation the pump HV motor terminal box was found to be holed in one place - approx 6mm diameter - and
the cover and enclosure casing distorted/ballooned. History:- This event has occured after a similar although lesser, recent event to the same unit in which the phases were suspected as having
"flashed" to earth due to water ingress - this was thought the root cause at that time due to approx. 0.5 litres of water draining from the enclosure when opened. After this event the HV terminal
box was replaced with a new unit. T
Due to reported problems with recently installed RSI - Rope Speed Indicator) - overprotection system on the East Crane on the Installation, company required a hydraulic engineer to visit the
platform and perform some tests on the system. During subsequent testing, to give and extra safety margin in event of failure, the overprotection system setpoint was reset at 9 metres from boom
end rather than 2 metres as it would be for normal operations. The system functioned four times and cut out, as it should have but on the fifth time it did not. Consequently the block continued to
travel upwards whilst the crane operator immediately tried to lower the block but this action failed to stop the block moving upwards. He then tried to knock off the control air supply to the
hydraulic pumps, but this action also did not stop the block travelling upwards. Finally the Emergency Stop on the engine was actuated which operated too late to stop the block hitting.
A loss of seawater cooling to the process system caused a chain of events which led to the oil export system shutting down. Pressure in part of the system between the Crude Booster pump
discharge and the Oil Export Module, which includes the crude coolers began to build up and an operations technician noticed that one of the plate type crude coolers was leaking oil. It was
isolated immediately, but an estimated 100 litres of crude oil had leaked out. This was contained within a bunded area fitted with a hazardous drains system. Investigation revealed that the system
pressure had built up to 15 barg due to back pressure from the oil export system.
EJ226 - 2nd stage booster cooler 'B' train gas compressor - has a Furmanite constructed clamp fitted across the channel head to cooler shell flanges due to a previously detected water leak. The
cooler had experienced several thermal cycles ie. online/offline due to the recent poor reliability of the gas compressor. The thermocycling had resulted in the reappearance of a water leakage
from the cooler. Furmanite was mobilised to reseal the clamp through the injection of specialist sealant with the cooler fully depressurised and isolated. During this operation, a minor amount of
hydrocarbon gas was purged from the clamp by the injection of the sealant.
During re commissioning of Drilling Switchboard FA LJ-779, smoke was observed coming from part 1, left hand side of Switchboard. The RPE requested the switchboard to be isolated and an
investigation began to discover the source of the smoke. The fault was subsequently traced to a faulty Control Transformer. Investigation into the cause of the fault has identified a suspect cross
connection in control wiring. Further checks into the control wiring integrity are ongoing and the switchboard remains isolated at the present time.
Whilst pulling out of hole 6 5/8" drillpipe, the derricksman was pulling a stand back with the tugger. The chain on the wire tugger line caught on the safety rope which was attached to a tool for
lifting the finger latches and for installing drifts in the pipe. The tugger chain pulled the rope, causing it to snap and the tool to spring from the walkway beam and fall to the rig floor. Immediate
Action Taken: Shutdown and take TOFS. Inspect derrick for any loose objects. Held toolbox talk with both crews advising of events. Determined no others= similar tools existed or at height.
During watch keeping duties the nightshift power technician found lying on the module floor between the two turbines a ventilation inspection hatch. (dimensions 18" x 24" and weighing
approximately 2kg). On investigation it was determined that the inspection hatch had broken away from its securing fasteners and had fallen approminately 20 feet to the module floor. Three out
of the four retaining lugs on the ducting were missing or damaged. The turbine and the associated ventilation system has been shutdown to faciliate a temporary repair to the ventilation inspection
hatch. A notification has been raised to renew/replace the ventilation inspection hatch securing mechanism.
1 foot square ventilation duct weighing approximately 1kg made of sheet metal fell 15 feet to the module floor. No one was injured, no other equipment was damaged. The only damage observed
was to the corner of the inspection hatch when it struck the deck.
Reported Late <> - Pressure transmitter failure resulting in a hydrocarbon release. During ongoing oil export pump module pump stop/starts the nightshift oil technician observed a spray of oil
emanating from the production suction pressure transmitter associated with oil export pump PV3070. The surrounding area/equipment was covered with a light film of oil, no oil was lost to sea.
The pump had previously tipped due to a process upset and the technician on observing the oil spray immediately isolated the pressure transmitter from the suction pipe work and thus securing
the area.

The injured party (ip) was engaged in fitting a new fall rope to the platform TEMPSC. The old rope had been removed, and the new one fitted. The IP then went to adjust the new rope, and
attempted to undo the adjusting nut with a pair of Stillsons. The nut was somewhat seized, and freed off suddenly. This caused the Stillsons to move rapidly, due to the force being applied. Due to
the way in which they were being held, and the stance of the IP, it was not possible to stop before the IP's finger impacted a steel sheave in the vicinity causing the injury. The weather conditions
were good. The IP was on his second day offshore and approximately 8 hours into his shift. Main recommendations are: to improve the planning of these jobs, and esure the correct tools and
equipment are available and used. Also to use any tools correctly, and in a manner which minimises risk in the event of sudden movement or slippage.
At 00:15, There was a fire detection alarm in GT2 power turbine hood enclose. The areas technician made an emergency stop and a shut down was initiated. Platform was called to muster and the
fire suppressant was triggered at 00:24. The fire was confirmed extinguished and at 00:30, personnel was stood down from muster. Platform is now returned to normal stuatus but processing shut
down.
Whilst attempting to retrieve the meter prover sphere during normal routine work and following all standard procedures, the prover loop was isolated, drained, depressurised and opened.
Difficulties were encountered in locating the sphere in the recovery chamber, so the loop was re-instated and the diverter valve cycled in an attempt to bring the sphere home. On opening the
sphere chamber the door a second time, the shpere was still not home. However as the chamber door was being closed to repeat the cycling there was an unexpected release of pressure and
approx 200 litres of oil was emitted into the module. This release decayed after a few minutes suggesting pressure had been trapped behind the sphere although all vents were opened per
prodcedure. There was no loss of oil to the environment.
While preparing mini prover for certified prove runs, an oil leak developed from the water draw off soleniod. The mini prover was tied in to the platform oil metering skid, which was supplying a
stable crude oil through the mini prover unit. The contract vendors for the mini prover were preparing the auxilaries for the skid wehn oil began to spray from the "o" ring seal within the soleniod
unit. The PICWS made attempts to isolate the mini prover to mtem the leak and notified the control room immediately. The oil technician was pispatched to investigate and carry out further
isolations on the mini prover.
While starting up G03B condensate transfer pump to allow for maintenance work to be carried out on G03A the operator noticed a condensate leak from the 1" weldolet on the suction pipework
on G03B (1" C-2794-1a). He immediately shut down the pump and notified the CCR operator on the radio that there was a condensate leak and that he was in the process of isolating it, GSE
1187 indicated 53% and set off the 20% gas alarm in the CCR at 10:43 hrs. The CCR operator called in all hot work permits. The indicated gas level started dropping immediately and was down
below 20% within a couple of minutes. The panel was reset at 10:55 hrs and the gas detection returned back to normal operating mode. Pump isolated and pipework removed for inspection and
repair. Engineering to review piping arrangements with recommendations & carry out vibration survey within the module in the vicinity of the pumps.
Spurious activation of Fire Loop FL2087/IR detect initiated an SD3 shutdown. Shutdown of production with loss of oil export, gas import, water injection. As a consequence of the shutdown,
production <> flowline suffered a loss of containment at a previously repaired section of pipework. This well has a BS&W of 99.9%. This loss of containment was witnessed as being
predominantly water with a small amount of hydorcarbon liquid evident. There was no activation of any gas heads in the area, there was no smell of gas in the affected Module. Due to the
possibility of further failure and possible escalation the shutdown level was enhanced to depressure the production facilities. On activation of the SD2 and depressurisation, the spray that was
evident from the leak path of the flowline reduced immediately to that of dripping water. The flowline was taken out of service prior to start up by means of physical disconnection.
<..> registered general cargo vessel passed within 600m of the platform initiating response from standby vessel and shut down of offshore ops.
A 2" 1500ft manual isolation valve was being closed as part of an isolation for train gas compressor. On moving the valve (ball type) from its open position towards its closed position, gas started
to escape from a body cavity bleed value (1/8" orifice size)). the platform shutdown automatically through local gas detection. A full muster was called. The gas system was blown down 7 fully
depressured & a new 2" ball v/v was fitted 7 tested. No person was injured, there was no ignition & no equipment damaged.

IP was working on the weather deck rigging up 6 5/8" drill pipe for the workover on P1 well. IP was working as banksman to the west crane and had both radio communication and a good
unovstructed line of sight, for handsignals, with crane driver. Crane was lowering a two legged sling (brother pennant) and IP grabbed one of these slings, second sling (which was actually not
required for operation), swung freely and hook at end of sling struck IP on lower right leg. Incident occured on <> but IP did not report injury to medic until 19.15 hrs on <>. IP was 1 day
into tour and 2 hours into shift. Single pennants will now be used for this operation to prevent re-occurance.
An Explosive Tubing Punch was run on slickline into P1 production well down to a depth of 9,200 ft. the tubing punch was kept at this depth for 1 hour but no indication of the explosive firing
was noted. The punch was then pulled out of the hole when at 3,800 feet the explosives fired perforating the production tubing at that depth. When back on surface it was confirmed that the
explosvies had fire downloaded information indicated they had fired at 10.25 hours at 3,800 ft.
A planned preventative maintenance rountine was being carried out on AGTH3. This required the machine to have fuel changeovers carried out. At 10:45hrs, turbine tripped on change over to
diesel fuel, flame detector alarm annunciated at AGT control panel. On investigation, a small flame was seen inside the hood of the AGTH3 by maintenance tech in attendance. An extinguisher
(dry powder) was used by another maintenance tech to extinguish the small fire. The main control room was contacted on emergency No 333 and incident reported. The local diesel inlet valve
was then closed by operations.
A planned prevenative maintentance routine, capacity checks was being carried out on fire pump no 2. . This involves diverting the normal flow route of the pump from the ringman to a test
header and flow rates are measured. At 1013 hrs No2 firepump was started to carry out checks and at 1015hrs platfor had RED ESD? due to the reverse flow in the ringman causing FSH 74888 to
alarm. Upon investigation it was fuond that the test header line,WHG11? is common for fire pumps No2 and No 4 had parted at a joint in FWPH No4 and partially flooded the room. The
pipework is GRE at the point of separation. the ringma on fire pump no 2. this
While carrying out equalisation to the downhooe safety valve, using the main methanol pump. via P7. The flexible hose failed on P7. resulting in methanol being released to the atmophere. the
pump was stopped by the operator <> within 1 minute. approx 5 gallons of methanol were released. The pump was steady at 220 bar pressure at the time of failure. the supply valve was closed
by <>. After the incident area was made safe, the entire location was hosed down using a fire hose. The environmental conditions at the time had a 15 knot north wind no rain hose tag No <
>.
Plant was operating in steady stage condition with export gas train 1 running. At 10:08hrs, train 1 -1st stage anti-surge controller (ASC) went into 'SAFETY ON' condition caused by the closure of
a valve restricting gas flow to the compressor. The separator valves opened because of the restriction, resulting in venting to the flare stack. Shortly afterwards a scaffolder working at the west end
of the wellbay heard an unusual noise in the wellbay, unable to be heard on the telephone, we went to the control room and informed the production supervisor. The production supervisor went
with the scaffolder to the wellbay and noticed gas coming from the blind hub joint on one of the HP flare lines.
the <> test pipeline (PH1001) ESDV would not close. The valve was functioned several times without product or pressure in the system. The valve subsequently closed. The actuator has been
removed and was found to require minor work to bring back into service. The pipeline has been out of service since the 19th april. .
A filter capacitor failed within UP-00-8520 which is located with addtional telecomms equipment room. smoie generated by the capacitor failure activiated local smoke detectors & GPA.
Platform mustered & full head count took place 4 minutes for <> & 8 minutes for <> from alarms. fire teams went to scene and dealt with incident. Electrica Dept removed capacitor &
inspected UPs. UPs found OK and ble to be re-instated without capacitor. Personnel stood down after area deemed safe by Fire Chief and Electrical Foreman.
"Whilst racking in No 2 generator vacuum circuit breaker, an electrical short circuit occurred damaging the vob and the buzz bar spouts. Initial investigation indicates a malfunction of the bus bar
shutters. The local switch room ESD was activated by one of the electricians involved in the switching operation. No personnel were injured. Management investigation team mobilizing to
platform as today <>"
EMAIL message from Inspector. 'call from <> today re a release of hydrocarbons from a drain on MOL pump No.3. It seems that the pump had been isolated for work on the strainer / recycle
valve, and that a drain valve had been left open when the pump was put back on line. Hydrocarbons were released into the hazardous open drains system, setting off gas detectors in the wellbay.
There is no idea yet of quantity released.' 9b form - Reinstating pump. Drain valve not closed. Hydrocarbon entered open hazardous drain systems and activated wellbay gas detector. Voume
released not yet known. Investigation ongoing.

Gas detection indicated hydrocarbon release inside AGT hood. Checks on small bore fuel gas pipework are ongoing. Investigation continues. Quantity released unkown at this time but estimated
to be minimal.
Platform was on normal production when Turbine Generator AGT#3 shutdown automatically upon ignition of gas inside the turbine enclosure. General Platform Alarm (GPA) activated and all
personnel mustered. Once gas levels inside the enclosure had reduced, enclosure doors were opened for inspection. Fitting on fuel gas line to turbine found to have failed. Fitting removed and
being returned to vendor for analysis. Replacement fitting installed by vendor technicians (already onboard servicing another machine).
During watch keeping duties, a small lump of ice was spotted on an instrument valve a small gas leak was discovered. The valve was on the TEG contactor outlet and so gas export was shutdown
while the valve was removed and the line plugged.
At approx. 23:10 the platform standby vessel reported an infringement of the platform 500m zone by a fishing vessel. The <> was able to contact the fishing vessel (subsequently identified by
its markings and the fishing vessel altered course to take it away from the platform). <> on way.
While operating a winch at Monkey board level (83ft above drill floor) a fuel filter fell 35feet from the winch onto a beam. Weight of fuel filter was 14 ounces. Cause of incident: a Fuel Filter was
being used as an air snubber on the air outlet of the air winch - incorrect use of equipment. b. Due to incompatability by threads the Fuel Filter was only secured by one thread - incorrect
installation of equipment.
Gas release in module C5 from a 3mm hole in pipe. Pipe contained NGLs at 15 barg from V2030 third stage gas compression suction scrubber. Initial release of Gas was witnessed by an Area
Tech who immediately requested Shutdown & Blowdown of Gas Compression System via a Radio call to the Control Room Operator. Subsequent shutdown & blowdown of Gas Compression
initiated Isolation of system via Automatic Closure of ESD Valves. Fixed Gas Detection did not detect leak - location of leak is open on 3 sides and prevailing wind (32 knots from 120 degrees)
was blowing gas away from the Platform (overside handrails are 4.6m from source of leak).
At 06:05 on <>, nightshift could smell smoldering on the west side of <> platform. On investigation they found flames coming from the lagging area of G600 exhaust - over the walkway at
the flange joint to the Ruston room bulkhead. No flames detected in the Ruston room or in any enclosure. Flames only externally to the Ruston room. G600 was stopped with emergency stop and
flames extinguished using a dry powder extinguisher.
On-line repairs were carried out to the <..>-year old seawater system piping on the installation. The cunifer piping had suffered wall thinning and pinhole leaks, due to internal erosion caused by
flow velocities. Nearly 20 m of repairs were required on cunifer lines ranging from 2" to 24", incorporating complex geometries that included tees and an 180' elbow. Welding was not possible.
During initial running of unit 060 K2400/2500, the start sequence was initiated as normal. The compressor went through its purge cycle normally then pressurised the compressors. The suction
valve was called to open at this point but failed to do so. The start sequence shutdown at this point leaving the compressor casing pressurised at approx 4 bar. The operator went down to the area
where the 060 suction valve is located and on entering the area could hear noise of venting. The operator traced the noise to an Oliver double block and bleed valve downstream of 060 suction
valve which is the TROS chemical injection point. The vent was found open and the bleed plug removed. The operator closed the vent and replaced the 1/2" plug. The venting was timed to last
approx 3 minutes from start sequence to sealing off the bleed valve and consisted of initial N2 gas and then hydrocarbon gas at 4 bar. No gas detection in the area picked up by any gas readings.
On <>, while carrying out other duties it was noticed that a sheet of stainless steel cladding had become dislodged from a section of pipework. At this time it can only be assumed that at some
time in the past the cladding had become windblown. The sheet 1200mm X 500mm and weighing approximately 3Kg had come to rest some 3m away from its original position securing itself
between the platform structure and pipework. The cladding in the immediate area was checked - all were found to be in a secure condition. No injuries or damage reported as a result of this
occurrence.

During cargo operations a half height weighing 2.7 tonnes was being back loaded from the North face of the platform using <> crane onto supply vessel <>. As the crane operator was
attempting to locate the load onto the starboard side of the vessel the load caught under one of the access hatches along the bulwark. As the crane operator began lower off the load the vessel
rolled from port to starboard, this caused the load to flip onto its side and stretched the 8 tonne crane pennant hook resulting in the bridle from the load parting from the crane pennant hook.
Cargo operations were halted,appropriate personnel involved and an independant onshore investigation team were set up. Weather at the time of the incident, wind speed 20 knots, significant
wave height 4 metres. Additional Information: During the investigation, it has come to our attention that during this incident, the Crane Pennant Wire did in fact disengage from the main hook
block. It was later retrieved from the boat deck and returned onshore for inspection.
Injured Person (IP) was working on the compressor deck and had positioned himself inside a scaffold barrier, with his hands resting on the top rail of the scaffold barrier. He was waiting to install
a pipework support bracket into place. As the load was being lowered on a chain block, it unexpectedly swung, trapping his right hand between the load and the barrier. This resulted in a
laceration to his hand between his thumb and forefinger. Injury occurred 10 days into his tour and 11 hours into his shift. Environmental conditions were good. Actions taken to prevent
recurrence. Costruction Superintendant and scaffold Supervisor to agree on a standard to be implemented when erecting a scaffold barrier, fully enclosing the worksite. The Construction
Supervisor to reinforce at TBT's the need to adequately plan and continually risk assess the task and the worksite. Conclusions and recommendations to be included in the Supervisors Safety
Brief.
Dropped object - packing case lid blown over handrail from Seaview Stores Roof (adjacent to helideck) to top deck by Fab shop. The down draft from a landing helicopter which overflew this
module roof flipped a packing case lid over the handrails and it fell onto the top deck below. Lack of procedure for storage in area. Investigation has identified need for more specific control of
this area and need to review Adverse Weather Policy also.
When walking across helideck, a person noticed a piece of metal lying on the adjacent roof area module 9. A section of stainless steel heat panel weighing 4kgs and measuring 350mm x 300mm x
2mm thick came loose from within one of the turbine exhausts and was blown from the exhaust on module 10 roof, landing adjacent to the helideck area module 9 roof. This was reported by the
individual to his supervisor who is responsible for that area. Weather conditions were fair and visibly good, wind speed 20 knots at 060 degrees. Surrounding area and external turbine exhausts
checked for other potential loose items. Alpha turbine shut down and isolated to allow internal inspection of heat panels. Investigation commenced.
When working on the top deck a crane operator noticed a piece of metal falling onto the deck are of module 10/11 roof. He requested one of the deck operators to check the area who found a
section of stainless steel heat panel weighing approximately 0.2 kg and measuring 370mm x 140mm x 2mm thick. This appears to have come loose from within one of the turbine exhausts and
was blown from the exhaust stack. This was reported by deck operator to the <> CCR. Weather conditions were fair and visibility was fair, wind speed 20 knots at 140 degrees. Work in the area
was suspended, barriers erected to keep personnel clear of the location, surrounding area and external turbine exhausts checked for other potential loose items. Investigation commenced.
<>. Following the recovery of the Milling Assembly from <> well, the decision was made to abandon any further well entry activities and to commence a complete rig down from the well.
Later on the Well Service team were faced with the problem of disposing of the surplus <> gel pill (approx 260bbls). A discussion was held between the <>, <>e Wireline & C/T Crew
Chiefs, <> Tool Pusher and the Drill Rep to determine the safest method of disposal. It was decided that the safest method would be to pump the chemicals back into the process via the riser in
place on the Drill Floor as a combined operation between Drilling and the <> Crew. It was during this operation that the platform detected high gas levels in the mud pit area resulting in a
production plant shutdown and platform GPA. Possible immediate cause? Check valve installed the wrong way round in the line. Gas release estimated to be 40m3. Full incident investigation
report to folllow.
Nightshift personnel commenced change out of Cooling Water Valve 40-TV-004 in module 13mezz at approximately 01.45 hours on <>. The task had been started by dayshift personnel who
had removed some of the flange bolts on the valve and left it in a safe condition. The nightshift team had lifted the 16? header and removed the old valve, they then inserted the body of the
replacement valve. During the reinstatement of the valve body the header was lifted further to allow sufficient clearence to fit the lower gasket. Shortly after this at approx 02.15 hrs the 2 tonne
wire sling which was supporting the suspended header snapped and the wire sling dropped to the deck 4 mtrs below.

Abridged Version - See <> - Hydrocarbon gas release discovered from a Techlok joint on the discharge line of the EOR compressor resulting in a platform GPA. There was an indication in the
control room that the MI Compressor had tripped. An Op. Tech. was sent by the control room to investigate the cause of the trip. At this time, it was thought that a shutdown button might have
been pressed. The Tech. went to the compressor deck and checked out all the shutdown buttons, which were ok. On leaving the deck the Tech. was aware of a hissing sound. As this was out of the
ordinary the Tech. decided to investigate, he discovered a gas release from a techlok joint on the discharge line of the compressor.
During drilling operations of laying down the shooting nipple and on completion of wireline operations, the drill crew had attached the utility winch and log line load cell to the 9 7/8" Bowan lift
cap on top of the shooting nipple. The slack was taken up and the dog collar removed. The operator had double checked that the pipe rams had been opened and observed 1750 - 1850ft lbs on the
long guage. An attempt was made to pull the shooting nipple from the rotary table. No movement was observed. At this point the wire parted and fell on to the drill floor.
Section of uni-strut 8 1/2" x 1 1/2" weighing 0.085kgs fell approx 10 metres from the derrick onto the rig floor
During commissioning of the AG1 system, the area operator heard a gas leak coming from a flow transmitter on the gas injection manifold. The system was manually shutdown, the manifold was
blown-down and the transmitter isolated.
During daily helifuel checks an operator inadvertantly left a bleed valve slightly open. Approx 10 litres of Jet A1 flowed into the bund and a small quantity sprayed onto the adjacent deck.
Equipment isolated and investigation commenced
There was a non-drive and seal failure on the "S" MOL booster pump. This resulted in a small fire, initiating deluge release and automatic general alarm. A complete muster of all personnel was
carried out and the safe shut down of the process plant. The small fuel fire was extinguished using a local fire extinguisher. The emergency was over at 02.30hrs . An investigation team has been
formed to determine cause of this failure.
During bleed down of a wireline lubricator via the mud gas system on the rig floor, a procedural error resulted in gas passing through the liquid seal and initiating a Yellow shutdown following
high gas detection.
A section of cable tray, 28 inches in length fell approximately 35 feet following direct exposure to high wind speeds of approximately 60 knots. It was later found by a platform crewmember and
reported to the HSE Advisor. A platform team has been mobilised to investigate the incident.
MOL pump P3600 was running, the duty operator was checking the pump and noticed a spray of oil from the non drive end cyclone filter line. The operator manually shutdown the unit. The
oilspray was contained within the pump skid.
HP diesel supply 1/2" stainless steelpipe fractured and diesel released into Acoustic Enclosure of Turbine Generator #3. Leakage detected by passing technician, unit shutdown automatically on
low diesel pressure. Fracture caused by vibration fatigue of pipe at compression olives within parker coupling.
Normal operations were in progress - Wind 45 knots 210 degrees, Sea state - 4m. An Operations Technician on tour noticed a fine spray of crude oil leaking from a 1/2" seal flushing line on the
DE of main oil line export pump P3420 onto the pump skid and deck area downwind - no oil to sea. The unit was shutdown and isolated. The pipework had been checked during the previous
week by our Inspection Department, and no patent defect was noted. The pump was known to be worn and was subject to regular vibration monitoring when used. Suspect vibration induced
failure of small bore pipe at weld. Structural , Piping and Vibration specialists are en route to the platform to review situation for all MOL pumps.
During adverse weather conditions the Area Authority was out checking the work site for safety when he found a section of corroded cable tray one metre in length on the deck, approx 2 metres
from a Technician test running a chemical pump. The Technician arrived just ahead of the Area Authority and had not seen or heard the object fall, assumption is it had fallen prior to his arrival.
Weather - wind 65 knots, 270 degrees (W)
Diesel released into acoustic enclosure of turbine for generator number 3. Some spillage out of enclosure into adjacent walkway. Leakage was detected by a technician carrying out checks in the
area. The turbine was shutdown by the technician. The leak was caused by the fracture of a small bore stainless steel pipe to a pressure guage on the HP diesel fuel line. Fracture caused by
vibration fatigue of pipe.

3hrs after C5015 start up, a passing Ops Technician smelled gas. He contacted Control Room for assistance to find source. It was identified as coming from 2nd stage seal gas differential pressure
indicator PDI - 35276. Unit was immediately shut down & instrument isolated. Gas dispersed rapidly after unit shutdown. Visibility good; wind speed & direction : 40-45k, 198degs. 1001mb.
Cause:- Failure of 3 stainless steel cap screws securing DP bellows unit casing to differential pressure gauge. Gas pressure at approx 300psi forced flange faces apart breaking seal. Gauge type:
Stewart Buchanan R96. Connecting flange blocks :- 9E6157 DP Cell ITT Barton. Unit that failed was rated to 2500psi max working pressure. It is only subjected to 350psi max in this case,
equating to less than 15% of its MWP.
MOL Pump P3610 was running, the duty operator was checking the pump and noticed a weep of oil from the drive end cyclone. The weep was wiped with a rag, the weep developed into a fine
mist spray. The operator manually shut down the unit. The oil was contained within the pump skid. Controlled shutdown of production plant was initiated. Investigation of failure mode ongoing.
During scaffolding dismantling operations a 4ft length of corroded cable tray was dislodged and fell to deck 15ft below.The cable tray shattered into smaller pieces on landing. Area below had
barriers erected for scaffold operation and one scaffold technician was working in the area removing equipment, he was unharmed as he was aware of corroded cable tray in area and the potential
for corroded pieces to fall. Weather conditions were not relevant. Cable tray replacement is due to resume at earliest opportunity.
HP diesel supply 1/2" stainless steel pipe fracture and diesel released into Acoustic Enclosure and deck of module. Fracture caused by mechanical damage tp pipework which reduced rating of
pipe. Mechanical damage occurred due to contact with adjacent small bore pipework. Turbine would not start due to problems with the fuel system. Operator investigated and observed diesel
leak.
Operator in routine duties noticed a build up of ice on NGL heater unit E2770. On closer inspection the ice was seen to be forming due to a leak of condensate from the heat exchanger which was
dripping a clear liquid onto the floor. The ice was approx 8 square inches. The operator informed the central control room and the OTL proceeded to the area with an operator and together isolated
and drained down the vessel and the cold separator V-1730.
Pigging Operations were in progress - Wind:- 5 knots 180 degrees, Sea state:- 1m An operations technician observed a spray of crude oil leaking from a 3/8" instrument impulse line on MOL
Export Pump P3420 onto the pump skid and deck area. He had gone to restart the pump which had shutdown on high sea line pressure during pigging operations to FC. The leaking fitting was
immediately isolated using the swagelok valve at the leaking joint. The failure was due to a combination of incorrectly made up joint and sea line pressure rise when the pig arrived at FC. - There
was no loss of oil to sea.
Montrose Operations Technician noted a leak of hydrocarbons from the 3/4" screwed connection on the discharge spool from P3420 to MOL Recycle Cooler (E2220). The leak was contained
locally and was estimated to be less than one barrel.
Normal operations were in progress. Wind:-22 knots 180 degrees, Sea state:-1.8m. An Operations Technician observed a spray of crude oil leaking from a 3/4" MOL pump casing vent nozzle pipe
work on MOL Export Pump P3410 onto the pump skid and deck area. This was durng a routine visual inspection of the Pumps. The failure appears to be a weld securing the pipe work to the
casing. Pump shutdown and isolated, spill cleaned up immediately. Maximum crude oil spilt is approx 3bbls. 50 ltr to sea.
Following a production upset, the main power generation turbine changed from gas to diesel as per design. During the changeover a fuel rail pigtail fractured resulting in an immediate shutdown.
Reason for failure is under investigation.
Wireline Operator had pulled out of the hole and the swap had been closed. He then pulled the tool string into the lubricator but pulled too far and into the stuffing box and broke the wire at the
surface. The tool string fell back down the hole and onto the top of the swap valve.
A test port on the nine 5/8 annulus and well M53 was found to be leaking gas. This port had been changed and pressure tested successfully on the <>. It was also found to be leak free at 09:00
hrs.
During a plant start up, following a planned shutdown, a small amount of gas was seen to be emitting from the open end of a water injection flowline. This flowline was open because a spool
piece had been removed in preparation to change out the Xmas tree on <> injection. When the production wells were being started up there was a gas detection alarm annunciated in the main
control room. The alarm was recorded on two heads but never reached any higher than 30% LEL. The production was immediately shut down to investigate the route that gas could enter the
water injection system. The investigation is still ongoing.

At approximately 1500hrs a small gas leak was detected coming from9 5/8" pack off tie down bolt on the wellhead of <> gas lift well. The well was immediately shut in and depressurised to
allow an investigation to take place. The bolt was an industry standard item, which is sealed by a simple packing seal. A new design of boltt was in fact on order to be fitted as part of the well
improvement program. This has now been completed on <>and is to progress on the remaining gas lift wells.
During routine visual inspections (watch keeping) a mechanic spotted slight frosting on a fuel gas supply line. Suspecting a leak the turbine was immediately switched to diesel fuel then promptly
shut down for inspection. On inspection a compression fitting was found to be 1/4 turn short of being correctly assembled.
During routine inspections a production operator noted a slight smell of gas which he tracket to a pressure control valve on a six inch line from 2nd stage gas compression to flare (PVC 15 1072).
Leak from the valve bonnet indicating gasket failure. Shut down and isolated for repair.
While breaking out a stand from the top drive a bolt and an actuator roller fell from the derrick onto the drill floor. No injury sustained ie during normal operation the bolt had back out and fallen
to the floor allowing the unfixed roller to follow. It appears that the bolt (normally wired to capture) had not been wired or the wire had failed and been lost earlier.(Most likely the former)
During the transfer of the welded middle and bottom sections of the new 10" riser (approximate weight 10.5 tonnes) by the MD crane from the welding location to the storage location within the
installation frame on the MD main deck, a steel shim of approximate weight 15kg was dislodged from its bolted position on the welding location section of the installation frame and fell through
the deck openings into the sea. All work was immediately stopped for assessment and investigation. The adjacent plate in the welding location guide was removed to prevent a recurrence.
A 1.5 tonne safe working block was being used to steady the end of a 10" venturi spool, to permit the mounting of instruments. A link parted for no apparent reason. No other damage was
sustained to persons, plant or equipment. The chain block has been replaced to steady pipe end.
During normal operations it was discovered by the operations techs on shift that a "hot spot" was developing on the surface of the B Heat Medium Exhaust within the steelwork exhaust frame,
external to level one accommodation, the paint was also seen to be blistering. No fire was present however it is thought that some internal combustion was in progress from soot/tar residue that
may have accumulated in the bend area of the exhaust over a few years from the process. External exhaust was cooled with firewater and the internals have been nitrogen purged. The B Heat
Medium was shutdown and the area was monitored until it stabilised. The unit will be left shutdown until the incident investigation is complete and subsequent remedial actions carried out.
As a result of an earlier electrical incident that affected much of the emergency generator supply panel and platform electrical supply, several safety systems running on battery backup were
shutting down. As a precautionary measure 18 non-essential personnel were evacuated to <> by helicopter. At no time was there any potential threat to the lives of the POB as a result of the
electrical incident. The incident in itself was not of high potential and was dealt with using established emergency response procedures. The cause of the electrical flashover in the SD500A
cabinet is still under investigation. It is suspected that it was a result of a problem within the motor control centre cubicle (MCC). Immediate Action: (1) Precuationary down man of 18 nonessential personnel. Dyce ERC mobilised for support. (2) Preparations made for further down-man if it became necessary. (3) Electrical fault rectified. Main electrical supply re-established at
1625. Onshore incident investigation team being mobilised.
During annual sea trials for launching platform lifeboats (Type - <>) the fall cables started to whip owing to the swell. The whipping intensified and resulted in the limit switch stop breaking
away from its guide. This resulted in the stop descending all the way down the cable and coming to rest on the cable fall ferrule. Note: The limit switch stop is known as a 'Hockey Stick' type and
is physically attached to fall wires. Prior to the launching of Lifeboat No 3 a toolbox talk (TBT) was undertaken to address the events that occurred during the recovery of lifeboat No. 1 and to
ensure that this incident would not occur during recovery of lifeboat No 3.
Redundant extraction fan unit weighing approx 25~35 kg and mounted on the side of a container used as store on the pipe deck fell approx 2.3m to the deck within close proximity of the
scaffolding foreman, who at the time of the incident was in the process of measuring the immediate area for the construction of a hop up to assist in the removal of the unit. Prior to the incident
the unit had been identified to be removed from the side of the container.

Tool - Type of Marlin spike used for splicing wire rope etc. (size 30cm weight 600g - sharp point. Tool was found on the stairwell just below the West crane. That day a boom wire change out had
been carried out on West crane. The tool was being used on the wire rope up on a work platform above the engine housing. Initial Investigation although not conclusive: Tool had been
inadvertently left on work platform. Due to nature of tool being round, while the crane has been slewing over a period of time the tool eventually manoeuvred itself to a position where it found a
gap in the kick plate. Dropping to the stairwell. Insufficient assessement of potential for dropped object (gaps under kick boards). No inventory of tools being used as this is seen as a safe working
platform and tools not secured.
Lifting operative were underway on the pipe deck to transfer, by crane, a skip to the production deck. Weather was clear with good visibility and a northerly 10 knot breeze. The skip was hooked
up and lifted off the deck to allow to be maneouvered lengthways to lift out of the area. When the skip was approx 1.5 foot off the deck the IP was positioned at the left end of the skip, with his
left hand on the vertical corner of the skip. As the skip was being moved it collided with the stationery skip resulting in the end of the IPs little finger being amputated above the first knuckle.
Lifting operations were immediately halted and the IP reported to the medic for treatment. The medic, on advice from the onshore medical services, dispatched the IP to <> by <> helicopter.
The incident is under investigation.
Running pipe in open hole, the derrick man was operating the pipespinner when he heard an object land approx. two feet behind him. The job was stopped. The object was found to be an 8" long
cast alloy handle (6oz), that had fallen96 feet from DBU-15 inertia type fall arrestor slung above the upper racker for maintenance and inspection.
During a lifting operation, using two fixed 1.5 tonne chainblocks, to remove a water injection line filter vessel lid (1.5 tonnes approx) one of the chainblock ratchet mechanisms failed causing the
load to free fall approximately 6 foot. No personnel were injured. Both chainblocks were removed from the site and sent onshore for further inspection. A full investigation into the incident is in
progress.
Whilst moving the gantry crane for wall service equipment, two large sections of the hose support carriage fell approx. 40 feet on to deck. No personnel were injured. The crane was inspected for
unsecured items and returned for service. Modifications have taken place to replace the support system with new design.
Flame detection inside gas turbine enclosure (RB211) on <> at 19:48. CO2 extinguisher activated and compressor tripped. ESD activated and platform blowndown. GPA and Platform crew
mustered. After CO2 ignited the flame/gas detectors reset and alarms continued. Set of 2nd bank of CO2 to extinguish again. Gas/flame detectors now flat. Fire team with foam/water on standby
and enclosure being vented. Re-start not planned pending further investigation and re-supply of CO2. Fuel gas/diesel isolated - only water injection running. <> informed for follow-up by HSE
this morning.
Good visibilty, wind approx. 175 degrees at 15 Knots. Three items of well related construction equipment, each 2 metres in length and a total of 66Kgs dropped when being lowered on 1 tonne
slings be East crane. On lowering, items contacted 'I' beam 8 meters above laydown deck area and snagged on beam when being pulled back to clear it. Sling parted and items fell 8 meters to deck
below. All personnel clear of area below lift as per standard banking procedure. No hydrocarbon contamination equipment in vicinity of lift. Following investigation the following actions have
been implemented to prevent recurrence: 1. A procedure for the control of lifts through East side steelwork to C1 East laydown area implemented and deck personnel brief. 2. An MRF has been
raised to survey laydown area with a view to reducing potential snagging. Fax info, Whilst lifting a bundle of 3 metre long shafts of steele, the load caught a bean and one of the pieces of steel fell
to the deck. No injuries reported.
A diving support vessel was working alongside the platform. At about 1200 hrs on <> the DSV developed a failure in DGPS system. A near miss situation occured with potential of hitting the
platform . No physical contact was made during the incident between whe rig & boat. From <> - Whilst in close proximity (10 metres) to the <>Platform the dive vessel <> suffered a fail
of its DP navigation system which resulted in the senior DPO deselecting the system and manually taking control to stabilise the vessel
Electrical three phase cable to motor on No 4 Shaleshaker shorted to earth due to installation & mechanical braid failure by rubbing on metal bracket. Flame detection in the area activated an auto
process shutdown, GPA and derrick deluge system release. All emergency actions worked as per design and procedures and all POB accounted for. Actions being taken to prevent reoccurrance: 1.
Cables to shaker 4 re-terminated. 2. All similar cabling checked out for condition. 3. Sample check of all Ex junction boxes in area for water ingress. 4. Planned maintenence inspection routines
for the shakers rescheduled for 3 monthly checking. (previously 6 monthly).

During a routine inspection a small pinhole leak was noted on the 2" closed drain header pipework. Further checks found another small leak futher in on the pipework. It appears a small quantity
of Crude Oil was lost into the sea as a result of these leaks. A PON1 has been raised notifying the relevant interested parties of this occurrence. To effect repairs the line was isolated from the
drain system and specialist wrapped to return to full integrity. A full survey will determine the condition of the drain system pipework, New section of drain pipework will be fabricated and fitted
on arrival offshore.
At approximately 19:30 on the <> an area operator during routine plant operations/inspection in module 30, observed an LPG leak from the metering skid and immediately isolated the system.
Investigation has revealed a failure on pump GA3005A (densitometer pump). System was in operation at 70 bar at the time of incident with throughput 3.5m3 per hour. Estimated product loss
was approximately 30 ltrs. This pump is a manufactured and factory sealed unit, it will be returned to the manufacturer, <>, for investigation into failure and report back to platform.
At approximately 16:45 on <> well intervention work was being carried out on <>, at the time of the incident a correlation pass with 45ft 2 7/8" perforating guns at a depth of 18,772 ft. The
well was flowing to the last separator at approximately 1500 bpd. When the wire was being pulled back onto the mobile drum, the drum veered away from the direction of the wireline sheave, this
caused the wire to move gradually towards the edge of the drum. The high-tension alarm was activated and eventually the wire parted when rubbing against the sharp edge of the drum spool. The
<> Dual BOP's were closed to attempt to gain a seal, the worksite was made safe and a person situated at Shear Seal Panel. <> was shut in and Well integrity maintained.
A small fire was discovered on the south side floor of the turbine combustion chamber housing, this was extinguished using a portable fire extinguisher. The incident is under investigation.
Leak developed on water take-off line from gas scrubber.Temporary clamp was fitted but leak deteriorated resulting in a single gas head being activated. Process was shut in and system
depressurised.
A minor pinhole leak was detected on level switch bridle 22 pipework on the <> Test Separator FA 0707. The well was removed from the test separator and the separator shut down and
depressurised, the affected limb was isolated by local valve and drained down. The pinhole was found to be at the bottom of the spool, the vessel is believed to contain a large quantity of sand that
may have extruded into the limb providing an environment for microbiological action corroding the pipework and valve.
ABRIDGED REPORT - SEE <> At approximately 20:10 on the <>, whilst draining down the heather pig trap which contained approximately 2 to 3 Brls of hydrocarbons at 25 barg, one of
the production operators involved in the task noticed hydrocarbons spilling onto the deck from a split connection on the flexible discharge hose from the Diaphragm Pump being used in the
Vessel Cleaning programme. The production operator immediately ceased draining and informed the main control room. The onshift production team supervisor went to investigate and the OIM
and Safety Officer were informed. The incident caused an environmental overboard discharge.The industrial cleaners pump discharge was connected to a valve purposely installed on the closed
drain system manifold via 2 x 2 inch flexible hose conneceted together by instantaneous couplings.
Whilst carrying out routine sampling, water was observed cascading down from a produced water line. This was immediately reported to the main control room and was investigated. The system
was isolated and drained and a repair was made effective.
During routine PPM's on crane operations to check (stall test) the mechanical hoist limits on the whip line, one operation caused by the 'Baby' ferrile to travel through the limit and make contact
with the underside on the whip line sheave on the bottom cathead. The testing was suspended and investigation into cause. Close inspection revealed the sheave had been "splayed" at the point of
contact with a 3" crack noted on the inner surface. The ferrule above the baby suffered only minor damage and was deemed safe for continued use. Mechanical and electrical simulations could not
duplicate the problem. The set limit was lowered to 10ft below the sheave (previously 4ft) to give the driver a longer reaction time in the event of any failure of any failure of the limits. The
damaged sheave was replaced with new unit (<>)

During routine drilling operations on <> work was in progress to pull 2-7/8 drillpipe from hole. At approx 0620hrs on <> a dropped object fell from the monkey board level (approx 95ft)
striking Injured person (IP) who was working on the drill floor below. This object struck the IP on his hard hat causing him to fall forward. Work was immediately suspended, IP was sent to the
Medic, the drill floor cleared and the elevators slowly lowered to the floor. Investigations have established that a spacing piece (weight 248gms) normally held within tne elevators had been
allowed to fall loose as a result of shearing of one of the two Studbolts holding the floating plate onto the main body of the elevators. The elevators had been on hire and have been removed from
service pending specialist investigation into the cause of the Studbolt failure. The IP has subsequently been medevaced from the platform after showing signs of emotional distress.
The work party were engaged in wet blasting the flare line of the produced water gas break out vessel and they punctured a hole in one of the fittings, in a half inch threaded ball valve. This
resulted in a release of of produced water and gas. The work was immediately stopped. There were no alarms activated and no muster required.
In preparation for removal of the West Crane whip drum gear box, the existing rigging arrangement was about to be changed over, the whip drum was rocked manually and it was following this
motion that the whip line began to play out through the retaining bulldog clip holding back arrangement. The rope continued to play out through the retaining bulldog clip assebly until it came to
the drum end clamping arrangement, this is when the 2 tonne holding back sling parted. The whip line and hook ended up in the sea at NW corner of the platform clear of sensitive subsea
equipment. Oil export and fuel gas import pressure trends normal. Wind 060 at 6 knots. Slight cloud - fine sea 1 mtr 3.9 sec period. Further info given in part b q 3 Object entered the water to the
North West of the platform (IWO boom rest)
During routine NDT operations on produced water gas break out vessel it was noticed that the top leg on interface switch was weeping water/hydrocarbons from weld between isolation valve and
level switch. NOT Operations were suspended and plant shutdown. Defective level switch was removed from service and inspected by Offshore Inspection engineer. A build up of crud lying in
the bottom leg had caused internal corrosion. This curd in all probability over a period of time built up and caused the failure. Operating pressure of vessel at the time of release was 0.6 bar.
Hydrocarbon released was very slight, and was mixture of gaseous oily water. Vessel inspection period is being reviewed from 12 monthly inspection period to 6 monthly.
A 3ft aluminium spirit level fell from the drilling rig onto the skid deck area. The spirit levels' final resting place was approx 1metre from the base of the wireline mast where well intervention
work was going on. Noboby was hurt during the incident, however the spirit level had breached the safety barrier, falling outwith the expected drop zone, in effect the dropped object had travelled
into the wireline operational working area. Spirit level landed on the skid deck approx 22m from derrick (drilling rig), barriers set at 10H on the skid deck. Weight of spirit level 567g. Wind speed
30-40 knots.
Z-4003 water injuction turbine was being restarted after shutdown when smoke was observed from ventilaton outlet. Source was identifed as exhaust volute. On shuting down the machine small
flames were observed which were immediately extinguished using a water hose reel.
The operation ongoing on the drill floor was the re-run of a "combination test tool" to pressure test a newly installed annular preventer. The test tool was being re-run, as it did not seat properly
the first time, therefore it was decided to measure the drill pipe whilst running the tool, to ensure it was installed at the right depth. The IP was measuring the stand of pipe in when assumed that
the test tool caught on the Upper Pipe rams. As a consequence of this, the elevators moved down from the tool joint at the top of the stand, and allowed the top drive to contact the stand, and
allowed the top drive to contact the stand, excerting addtional weight on it. This caused the stand to pipe to bowe-out towards the V-door. When it came free it sprung back, striking the IP, causing
him to be thrown against the Iron Roughneck, then onto the floor. The IP lost consciousness. IP medivac'd to hospital & remained >24hrs.
During fishing operations on <> using 5/16" braided wireline. Heavy pulling was being used, as per the well programme, and the wireline parted on surface at around 9-10,000lbs pull.
At 9.00 am whilst the derrickman was moving a stand to the back of the finger board, the stand pipe which was taller than most of the other stands possibly came into contact with a unistrurt
electrical cable support. A secton of galvanized steel cover panel, weighing 100 grammes and measuring 245mm X 40 mm X 1mm fell from a point 3.5 netres above monkey board level to drill
floor. The process of pulling out of hole way suspended and an inspecton of the derrick conducted. Three other pieces of unistrut cover were removed and work recommenced after consultation
between <> and <> safety representatives.

Water inj pump P42182 tripped due to the failure of the accoustic hood inlet fire damper. Following reset of the damper and restart of the ventilation fan, smoke was observed coming from
beneath the turbine exhaust cladding. Fire water was applied external to the cladding until the temperature of the exhaust was below 75 degrees C. The machine remained shut down for
investigation. The platfrom status didn't change due to the smoke because of early Operator intervention, who was on scene as the machine was started up after the minimal trip.
Drilling operations were ongoing with drill strings being run in the hole. A roughneck observed half section of a metal sleeve fall onto drill floor. Operations were immediately suspended and drill
floor made safe. The remaining half of the sleeve was identified on the hose from which it had fallen and was removed. The half sleeve weighed approx. 2 kgs, and had come loose and fallen 20
metres from a phoenix 5 k mud hose connected to top drive. The hose itself was new having been installed during preparation. The section which fell was part of a half sleeve for the hose fitting
assembly. The two halves of the sleeve were taped together and should have been removed before putting hose in service, however no markings of information provided by supplier highlighted
the requirement to remove the sleeve. All other hoses were checked and a similar sleeve removed from one other hose in the derrick. A safety alert was raised and sent to other <> drilling sites,
the hose supplier was also contacted to highlight the problem.
The platform was in normal operations. A senior member of the platform management team was conducting a routine site survey and noticed a slight smell of gas. This was traced to a leaking
grease nipple on a shutdown valve (SDV3231A) on the discharge of the second stage gas compressor(2A). Scaffolding operations in the immediate area were suspended when the leak was
identified. An initial attempt to place a grease cap over the nipple was unsuccessful, the compressor was shut down to allow for a repair to the grease nipple. The gas release was noted as a minor
leak, there was no automatic gas detection given the low gas level even immediately adjacent to the grease nipple. The shutdown was a result of a precautionery manual intervention. It is not
possible to confirm the time of the start of the leak, however, earlier routine operator checks had not noted the leak. The leak was insufficient to have been recognised by the scaffold team in the
area at the time.
On a routine plant walk around on CP an operator could hear an unusual noise. On investigation, he discovered a spray/mist emanating from a hole in the liquid let down system on the ST2/ST3
slugcatcher. The CRO closed in the vessel remotely at the ESDV and the operator closed in the outlet of the vessel manually. The gas detection system did not pick up the escape. The fluid
contained copious amounts of produced water, some condensate and sand. Lloyds inspector is currently reviewing the pipework for any further evidence of erosion. The wind was light at about 9
kts from the NE. The platform was producing normally at the time.
The satellite platform <> was not manned at the time of the incident. Weather conditions were fair. <> 03:00hrs - <> control indication of smoke alarm in battery room on RC platform.
08:00hrs - <> control informed myself the <> Team Leader on the <> satellite platform that a second smoke was now indicating and the fire and gas panel had issued its corresponding
actions. Via <> Logistics I instructed the standby vessel to take a closer inspection of the platform, the <> reported smoke issuing from ducting on the south east corner of the cellar deck.
<> control instructed to issue a red shutdown of the <> platform (highest level of S/D) Note: the platform production facilities were already shutdown and depressured due to annual S/D's on
other platforms in the field.
At 09.30 a factory vessel named <> entered the 500m zone and struck the jacket of the <> platform on the SW end. As a result all personnel were mustered on BD and 109 subsequently
down manned by SAR helicopter winch (helideck unusable as it is on BD). No information available on why. HSE/MCA/MAIB now investigating.
Injured party guiding hyd accumulator into position. Whilst colleague lowered using lifting tackle. Injured party trapped his left thumb between the accumulator and the location base plate.
Firepump was being run for the purpose of testing and taking readings. Operatives noticed oil mist fumes above the pump emanating from a leak in the pipework carrying engine oil. Operatives
then noticed some small flames on the exhaust manifold. Oil mist had continued the manifold and ignited. This was immediately extinguished with a hand held extinguisher. Fixed detection and
deluge systems were not activated. The leak was identified to a loose union coupling and this was repaired.
Preparations were in progress to handle a regular supply vessel (<>) on the north side of the platform. Potable water was to be bunkered onto the platform and cargo was to be
offloaded/backloaded. Weather conditions were fair (wind 5-10 knots, waves 1-2 metres, good visibility). The crane operator picked up the end of the potable water hose from the platform hang
off point with the north crane, and started manoeuvering it down towards the supply vessel. The crane driver and banksman noted another (snagged) hose would prevent the hose being
manoeuvered further, and so decided to lift it back up and return the hose end to the hang off point (to allow them to go and de-snag the obstructing hose). The crane operator was watching the
hose end and the banksman at the hang off point, when the hose parted at the hose end coupling/connection.

An operations technician was walking past the south crane pedestal when he heard something land on the deck behind him. This item was identified as a Kennedy Grating Securing clip. The clip
size is 75mm x 30mm x 25mm and it weighs 0.25 kilograms. No injury sustained and no damage to equipment. Approximate height of drop is 40ft.
Having reached section TD (171/2 hole) on well <> and unable to pull out to run 13 3/8" casing due to adverse weather conditions (wind speeds exceeding 50 knots). After 18 hrs of wow an
object fell out of the derrick and landed on the dog house roof. The object was identified as the wiper motor section of the casing stabbing board camera. It is believed four bolts had worked lose
in the strong winds causing it to fall from +/- 40 ft. The wiper motor weighs 5 kilos and measures 8" long x 4" cylinderal in shape. At the time x2 persons were working out on the drill floor. The
rig floor was immediately barriered off until the other 3 cameras in the derrick had been inspected.
Co-incidental high gas detected in 'A' Main generator. Gas turbine enclosure caused a Level 3 plant trip and blowdown, shutting down main generator & inhibiting the start of emergency
generator's. The platform GPA was activated and all personnel reported to muster. The gas leak was later identified as coming from a failed gasket on the gas throttle valve seak leakage vent line
'shutflow indicator'. The complete assembly was replaced and a nitrogen pressure test carried out. The machine is an act LM 500 Gas turbine powered generator, which was running on gas fuel at
60% load.
While pickingup + running 5 1/2 drillpipe singles in well <>, the floorcrew were using manual drillpipe slips. After making up a single of drillpipe to the string , the 3 floormen pulled the hand
slips and placed it down on the rotary table of the drillfloor.. after releasing grip on the handles of the slips, the slips toppled over and struck one of the floorcrew on his right foot.
The operation was to change out the upper multi bowl on a <> surface wellhead. The running tool was inserted into the upper multi bowl. the <> engineer energised the running tool with the
3 activating bowl. The UMB was lifted 2"-3" and monitored. All seemed OK so the lift was continued slowly. The progress of the UMB was monitored at all times to ensure it was free from any
obstruction during its passage through the guide former. After approx 20ft the UMB dropped off the running tool and landed on the well head, it came to rest at an angle of approx 30 degrees-40
degrees from vertical. The UMB weighs approx 2.3 mt upon investigation it was found that the r/t was not made up as per the <> procedures. The <> engineer admitted to his mistake. duri
Control Room Operator attempted to start out LP/IP compressor and one of the cooling medium pumps tripped. Electricians checked the system and found no activation of protetion devices. On
starting the transformer within two minutes an explosion occured in the LP/IP B cubicle, simultaneously an explosion occured in the fuel gas heater cubicle on DP switchroom. At this stage in the
investigation we believe the two explosions to be part of the same event. The incident also happened in the drilling and production platform switchroom.
While carrying out maintenence on the test separator oil LCV, the actuator was raised on a chainblock and strop. Durinng the cleaning of the valves prior to reinstatement, the wire strop around
the lifting beam became detached allowing the valve actuator chainblock and strop fall to the deck. Note - All lifting equipment apppears to be in good condition. Further investigations are
ongoing.
Construction technician discovered a section of H beam (approx. 5kg) lying on the deck just off the walkway at the UQ end of the North Bridge level 1. Object had fallen about 15ft from pipe
support. There was no evidence thaqt anyone was involved at the time of incident. The beam was an end stop forming part of a pipe support slide shoe. There is evidence that the tac weld
penetration is poor and a combination of age, poor weld weather and vibration may have led to the failure. Scaffold erected to protect personnel and adjacent 'H' sections to be inspected and
secured. Survey to be carried out to endure threre are no other similar arrangements on the installation.
As part of planned maintenance work on the north crane, it was necessary to transport a load sell and laptop computer up to the crane cab. The load sell and laptop cases were tied to the end of a
rope and look out posted at the base of the crane. The cases were being lifted up to the crane when a gust of wind caused them to spin with the result that they became detached fro the rope and
fell approx 50ft to the main deck. The heaviest of the 2 cases weighed approx 8 kgrms. further information for part B5 level 5 north crane.
<> 05:00hrs Area operator noticed smell of gas. Leak found to be from 2 mm hole in a pilot flow line from the flash drum to PSV's. Hole to local corrosion - stated to be common. Gas
detectors did not respond . Platform shutdown and blown down. Line repaired. Early <> Plant re-commissioned and production re-started. <> A leak of hydrocarbon/NZ was noted by smell
initially and then visibly confirmed by the local operator. The leak was from the 3" pipework immediately downstream of the fresh drum vessel V-1304 between the vessel and PSV 13252 which
relieves to the LP from system. The hose size is the said line allowing the escape is approx 2mm diameter circular. It appears to be a corrosion effect to the line causing the hole. Note the point of
release was under from coding material.

22:30 <>. G1061 Ruston turbine low level gas muster. Fuel gas line fitting leaking. No olive in the joint. Level 3 Investigation. To be reviewed during inspection visit on <>.
After completion of cargo operations at the platform in the North Sea, a supply vessel was moving clear of the 500m safety zone. About 50m from the platform, the master transferred engine
control from joystick to manual at the aft console, but found he was unable to control port or starboard main engines. The port propeller at that time had 20 of astern pitch. After contacting the
engineer in the machinery control room, the master operated the port engine emergency stop. However, it appeared to him not to work. In fact, the engine did stop. It went through its stop
sequence, including disengagement of the clutch as the engine slowed down. But with the vessel moving astern, and with 20 astern pitch on the propeller, the shaft did not stop. Thinking the
engine hadnt stopped, the master naturally pressed the emergency stop a second time. This reset the engine controls, re-engaged the clutch, and the momentum of the turning shaft restarted the
engine. The platform control room was informed of the situation and, shortly afterwards, the vessel made contact with the spider deck of the installation. The crews on vessel and oil platform were
mustered at this time. The platform was undamaged, and the vessel sustained minor damage. Effective operation of the vessel thrusters, and the masters good seamanship, prevented extensive
<> (WHP level 5 process area) Smell of Hydrocarbon in a cabinet when the door was opened the gas inside activated an adjacent gas head. This gas is activated on 25% LEL. On this
installation this results in a platform muster. The technicians have located where the gas was coming from, which was from a joint in some small bore pipework and repaired. @08:15 A small bore
pipework compression fitting leaked. This leak was extremely small and had taken several hours for the gas to build up within the meter sampling cupboard.
At 01:23 on <> during a process start up, a small gas release was detected by 2 line of site gas detectors in areas PN1A. Platform muster was indicated automatically by the fire and gas system
but the process remained running as per design as the gas levels detected were relatively low (automatic shutdown was indicated at 75%LELm whilst premium detected levels were only 33%
LELm). On investigation by the area technician, a small leak was discovered on a newly installed differential pressure transmitter. The leak was promptly isolated and detected gas levels
subsequently subsided. Later investigation revealed that on of the flange adaptors on a differential pressure transmitter assembly appeared to be incorrectly torqued. On dismantling the transmitter
the installed black viton O ring was found to be damaged. This was probably due to it being forcibly extruded from its rebate in the flange adaptor.
An oil-rig support vessel in automatic steering slowly closed a rig complex. The port main propulsion unit was running, and the starboard one was stopped. This was normal procedure during the
night in calm conditions. In preparation for the days work, the vessel was then stopped just outside the 500m zone, and the duty engineer was ordered to start the starboard propulsion unit.
Meanwhile, the bridge watchkeeper decided to increase his distance from the nearest rig by turning the port propulsion unit control to astern thrust and increasing the propeller rpm. He did not,
however, disengage the automatic steering, which over-rode the propulsion unit manual control. The vessel, therefore, started to move ahead along the course selected, towards one of the nearby
rigs. To counter this unexpected movement, and thinking that the azimuth propulsion unit was pointing aft, the bridge watchkeeper then increased the propeller speed further. Shortly after, the
vessel collided with a leg of the rig, causing minor damage to both.
Offshore support vessel offloading to platform. Port engine fluctuations noted and vessel losing position. Ahead pitch applied with no effect. Vessel collided with platform. No damage to vessel,
fender on platform dislodged. Port pitch brought to zero position and then ahead which cleared the pitch sticking astern fault. Vessel cleared platform. Fault resolved in air control system.
Emergency Depressurisation and surface Process Shutdown automatically initiated from the Fire and Gas system due to detection of High Level gas (actual reading 77%LEL) on the Central
Weather Deck Subsequent investigation showed the gas came from a leaking drain plug on Hol Gas Recycle valve VPX24010-07).
A 3 man party were involved in removing gratings in an area known as WA1 on the well-head jacket. Having removed two sections by lifting and sliding them along the grating support beams
onto the adjacent grating using a home made tool, a third section having been moved approx. 1 metre along the beam dropped suddenly at one side. The latter resulted in the individual on that
side letting fo of the tool used to lift and slide it along, followed immediately by the second person having to let fo due to the weight of the grating. The dropped grating fell directly into the sea
below the well head jacket. It is noted that at the side, the grating initially, the support beam narrows some 1 metre, along its length from approx.100mm to 50mm in width. The tool used to lift
the grating had made on the platform by the work party from 20mm diameter stainless steel instument tubing, approx. 0.5m in length and formed in the shape of an elongated "s".

At 03:38 hrs <> <> was performing a well test operation.during the operation hydrocarbons was observed weeping from a dynator 15k connector. The dynator connection was situated down
stream of the 15k choke and up stream of the heat exchanger in the well test area of the main deck. A small amount of condensate was cleaned up from the deck. There was no spill to the
environment. When the gas was observed by well test crew the well test ESO button was actived immediately. Wind NNW 12 knots Swell NNW 2mtrs 6 sec VIS + 10nm bat 1015y temp +14oC
Operations tech on his normal rounds became aware of a slight smell of hydrocarbon gas, investigation revealed that the upstream flange on compressor K2410 discharge pipework PZV has a
very slight leak. This was checked with a gas meter and found to be 27% LEL at a range of 0.1 of a meter. Leak was assessed using criteria illustrated in <> and decision was reached to
depressurise the compressor pipework. The machine, which had been running was unloaded and shutdown, depressurised and isolated. Further investigation has revealed that the 1/2" impulse line
from the upstream flange on the pilot operated PZV had a hairline crack adjacent to the weld. The PZV location was on the mezz level of a open module on the upper deck.
During routine sampling operations on the Gas export line, the lab technician experienced a failure of a sampling hose. The gas pipework was at 130 bar. The sampling hose was rated for 210 bar
and has 6mm internal diameter and is approx. 1m long with pre swaged connections. The lab tech was pressurising the hose in preperation to taking a sample, he noticed small pieces of debris
being disturbed within the sampling cabinet and discovered that there was a leak blowing from the hose via the stainless steel braiding. As yet we have not been able to observe the size of the leak
path as it lies within the braided section, he estimated that it was about 50mm from one end and 25mm along the hose from the swaged connections, he also estimated that it was leaking for a
maximum of 30 secs before being isolated.
Whilst taking a sample of condensate from sample point QP-11021 adjacent to the 1st stage separator, the rated sample hose in use failed. The hose appeared to develop a "pin hole" type leak,
unable to confirm as it is leaking under braided outer sheath. Sample was condensate at 90 Bar and 100 deg C. Isolated straight away but still has a small spray before isolation valves closed.
Estimate volume 100cc leaked out.
Whilst carrying out inspection of K2410 re-cycle valve, a smell of gas was noted from the immediate area. A search of the area revealed a small condensate leak from the DP transmitter PDIT
22041 on TEC outlet cooler. This was isolated. The party continued a sweep of the weather deck and no other leaks were noted. The leak appeared as beads of a clear liquid on the bottom of the
transmitter (like a drop of water). As stated the smell of gas was very localised and the leak hard to find.
During a routine isolation on P-1250 condensate export pump. The drain valve failed in the open position, this was compounded by the main isolation valve passing, causing condensate to be
continuously passed to drain. The platform was progressing a manual shutdown when attempts to close the drain valve resulted in a hydrocarbon release from the valve stem, initiating ESD and
Deluge release. The platform was held to muster till systems depressurised and area proved secure.
Reported Late <> - During a routine operation to prepare for launching a condensate pig to pressure the launcher, the operations technician 'cracked open' the pressurisation valve. When
opening the valve, there was a sudden emisssion of condensate/gas from the valve stuffing box and bonnet joint. the result of the hydrocarbon release was due to the equipment failure of globe
valve VP 13103-05
During routine drilling operations a bundle of three tubulars was being inspected. The bundle was being held at waist height by the platform crane. So as to indicate which tubular was going to be
inspected next the IP tapped the pipe with his hand. At that moment the bundle moved trapping his fingers momentarily. The tubulars involved were enhanced performance drill pipe, these have
extra spiral upsets along their length. The contact of these to each other may have caused the bundle to move unexpectedly and the left secure had a standard drill pipe bundle. The IP pulled his
fingers clear unassisted, realising immediately that he had suffered some injury, he reported the event through the medic and the IP was subsequently referred to <> for detailed examination. He
is not expected to return to work within 3 days.
At 22.35 our standby vessel picked up a radar target on potential collision course with the platform. The vessel did not respond to calls on the radio. Standy vessel contacted platform and
estimated impact time 40 mins. Platform told to muster in time for potential abandonment. Vessel changed direction and standby vessel confirmed no further risk to platform. Personnel stood
down. Wind was 10 knots west seas one metre visibility ten miles.

During the setting of a wire line plug in <> well <> at a depth of 14,277 feet the wire parted at surface, this wire line operation was being undertaken as part of preparation work prior to
removing the christmas tree. It was during the setting of 1 3.313" x line plug that the wire line parted at the lower sheave on the rig floor and became trapped on the stuffing box. The sheave has
an elevation of 25ft from the rig floor, the other end of the wire being spooled back onto the winch drum. After the wire had parted the well was made safe by closing the dual BOP's which are
positioned on the rig floor. There were no personnel injured or oil or gas release as a result of this incident. Investigations into this failure has considered the effects of the well conditions and also
the jarring that had been required to set the plug. Further discussions will focus on measures to prevent a re-occurence.
Steady production operations. Process Operator reported leaking fluid in Module A Separation. Source of leak traced to inlet pipework to separator V2 (Highlander Production Separator). Oil
dripping from lagging on pipe. Highlander wells shut in. Risers, pipework and vessels flushed with seawater. Risers isolated. When pipework can be accessesd cause of leak will be investigated.
Weather Fine/Clear Wind 12 knots 150 deg Sea 1m Vis 8nm.
The incident occurred during the removing of a large pig launcher assembly and blanking off the remaining pipework. The Launcher Assembly had been lifted through an opening made in the
grating (whole area barriered off) a blanking flange had been lowered into an open flange (18" dia pipework) through the open hole, a second flange was to be lowered down onto a scaffold yet to
be built onto the lower platform. Two men in the work party, in the process of securing the first blank flange narrowly escaped being hit by a piece of Kennedy open grating (size 3'x3') that fell
approx 20' through the open hole onto the scaffold they were working on.
Drilling rig was conducting a workover on <> and was in the process of removing the completion. Recovering 72ft long 3 1/2" tubing fish which was part of the lower completion. The fish was
set in the slips. As a 6ft pup was being broken out from the recovered fish with a chain tong there was a release of mud at pressure. Two personnel were sprayed with the escaping mud, a third
person was thrown back onto the floor. The 6ft pup section was ejected and fell landing some 5ft away. No personnel were injured, however they attended the Platform Medic for a check up.
Operations were suspended until the cause of the incident was investigated. The mud had been trapped in the 3 1/2" tubing downhole (at approx. 15371ft) between a lower wireline plug and plug
formed from mud, sand and well debris. As the last threads of the pup were backed out the trapped pressure was released. Wind speed 15knts. Direction SE. Sea 2-3m.
Whilst the team were attempting to retrieve a 3.5 pas plug the 316 inch braided wire parted at the surface. No injuries occurred, the area was barriered off at the time and the sample of the wire
has been sent ahsore for analysis.
<> While handling casing with the pal finger crane, the casing was being lowered onto the catwork. One end of the casing touched another joint which moved and hit the IP on the knee. The IP
tripped or fell and hit his head. The IP medi ? as a precautionary measure. TELEX At 151317, UTC coastguard helicopter R-OC was scrambled to the <> platform to evacuate an oilworker who
had a suspected fractured neck. <> landed at the <> at 1540 UTC and the injured person was transferred to an awaiting ambulance. Auxiliaries from <> were at attendance. <> returned
to <> at 1604 UTC. Sarops terminated this time. precautionary measure
During a workover with the tubing hanger pulled back and the annular BOP closed on the landing string the well was about to be circulated clean of oily water by taking returns to the test
separator which was at 4 bar. On opening up to the test seperator gas from the separator back fed into the drilling riser, the space out was incorrect and the annular BOP had been closed on the
tubing hanger by mistake. The resulting gas release was contained be closing the top pipe rams and isolating the test separator.
During a routine maintenance check on the life boat the coxswain noticed a burning smell. The check was terminated and electricians were asked to investigate. They found evidence of a small
explosion inside one of the battery banks and loose terminal. The electricain then suspected that a hydrogen build up was ignited by a spark from the loose terminal when the engine was started
for test. Lifeboat in out of serve.
High pressure Nitrogen re-instatement testing being carried out by the Operations department staff on the Wet Gas Scrubber low level switch. a one metre length of flexible hose, rated at 3500psi
was being used. While pressurised to 135 bar, a Gyrolok fitting failed but only the volume of the 1/2 inch diameter hose was vented due to isolation valves being closed. Hose whipped violently
and although a techniciain was in the vicinity, no injuries were sustained.
Whilst reducing the HP water injection O2 analyser flow (QT-3601) one of the panel mounted bourdon gauges burst and vented out of rear blow out disc. The gauge was promply isolated and at
this time the second stage let down regulator developed a body joint leak, the main inlet valve was then isolated immediately. On closer investigation, it was discovered that the first stage let down
regulator had been changed out at some time for a suitably rated needle valve, the failed gauge being sited downstream of the needle valve. The failed gauge was rated 0-160 bar while the
operating pressure of the HP manifold is in excess of 220 bar.

During normal watchkeeeping technician note leakage (water) from a 1" drain line branch off the HP suction scrubber liquid outlet line of gas compressor train 1. Leak originating from weld area.
Techincian alerted control room and gas compressor train was immediately SD (Manually) and depressurised. Leak stopped immediately. No hyrocarbon release was detected at any time. Note:
Initial onsite investigation would indicate potential potential fatigue failure. Full examination ongoing.
Following maintenance on G 8020 generator, when the Fisher fuel gas regulator was changed out, upon affecting reinstatement of the value into serivce, the valve failed and gas leaked from the
pressure envelope. The valve had previously been N2 reinstatement pressure tested prior to the failure. On introducing fuel gas to the system, and during setting up of the regulator, it failed
internally and gas emitted from the 1" vent port on the underside of the unit inside the fuel gas cabinet on the machine. Subsequently the platform changed status following detection by the F&G
detection system. The operator who was adjusting the regulator immediately closed off the manual block valve to stop the gas from leaking to atmoshhere, and opened the doors to ventilate the
area. Pressure in the system immediately prior to the leak was 30.5 barg. Total leakage is estimated to be
Indication of fire in M7 Electrical Switch Room changed the status of the platform.Iinitial assessment by a company technician and the KCA electrician comfirmed the presence of smoke in the
module and identified a fire in the Dynamic Brake Contactor Cubicle. The fire was quickly extinguished with portable CO2 appliances and the cubicle electically isolated.
During a lot on a water injuction well a 1/2" ashford needle valve was operated. After opening this valve a second valve was the opened to bleed via the needle valve. At this point the stem
assembly struck a piece of steelwork and bounced onto the technicians leg (causing no injury) the second valve was immediately closed to stem the flow. The fluid released was sea water with a
drive pressure of 40 barg.Subsequent investigatons identified that the valve had not been fitted with the backoff repevention cap as per previous safety alert in <>. Full survey ongoing to
identify and rectify any further valves.
A flanged joint in the outlet pipework from the gas metering system had a minor emission ( with reference of <> Less the <>).This was being monitored on a regular frequency. The oil and
gas process systems shutdown due to a deluge release caused by a spurious fault When the process systems were restarted the minor leak increased due to thermal expansion/contraction of the
process pipework. The gas metering pipework was depressurised and the flange bolts were tightened up on the flange where the leak was. On repressurisation there was no leak detected from this
flange.
Heating Medium pump motor P4412 bearing appears to have overheated giving off sparks and a small flame. Incident was spotted by Technician in the area and the pump was stopped almost
immediately. Pump is being removed for overhaul.
During normal operation a worker spotted a crude oil leak in module M2 from a pressure gauge. The worker informed the control room and a technician was dispatched immediatly to investigate.
The leak source was from a differential pressure gauge on the Hudson crude oil cooler and the techician managed to isolate the instrument immediately.
During wireline operations on slot <>, the team ran in the hole to latch the fish tool, they commenced jarring to 1200 lbs, following 2 jars the wire parted at surface. All surrounding areas were
barriered off at the time as standard procedure for these types of operations. BOP and swab valve were closed to provide 2 barriers making the well safe, the team then stopped and carried out a
TOFS.
A broken lamp was found on the pipedeck. It was immediately identified as a lamp from the crane boom , and that it had fallen approx. 15ft from its position on Pedestal Crane PC2.The crane
was in its boom rests at the time. No-one was injured and there was no damage to any other piece of plant.
Electrician observed large section of extract fan lying on external walkway, on closer inspection he established that it had fallen from approximately 8ft from its mounting brackets above. Design
was such that it was fixed to the underside of unistrut frame, other similar fans checked are fixed on top of the unistrut frame. Weight of fan section is approximately 80 kgs. Size 3ft in length and
16" in circumference Likely causes pre-investigation - Inadequate design and/or installation of securing frame/brackets Corrosion Fatigue/vibration over period of time.

The accomodation drains system had backed up creating approx 1" of dirty water to be present in the galley cooking area and laundry floors (no dirty water entered the main galley area). The
nightshift chef contacted the control room, the immediate response was to barrier off the area to restrict access. Teams were called to assess the plan and clean up. Normal toilet facilities were
prohibited - signs and barriers were placed on the toilet blocks and tannoy announcements were made. Decision to downman non-essential personnel until such time normal
accommodation/galley facilities are operational. Blockage in drain pipework, initial cause thought to be solidified cooking fat deposits. Immediate action was to barrier off areas. (Areas remain
barriered off). <> and <> teams called to assess situation. PTW raised to unblock drain to prevent further ingress of dirty water. Communication of incident and precautionary measures to all
personnel.
Due to down hole tool failure, drill pipe was being "tripped", i.e. retrieved to surface to allow change out of tool. The 1st stand of 95' was pulled out of hole, disconnected & racked without
incident. Auto slips in use to minimise handling. Rig Mgr relieved Driller at console & took control of operation. He picked up 2nd string, checked rotation of draw works drum, & saw that string
was lifting correctly. After stand had been elevated approx.12' above rotary table, Rig Mgr briefly turned his attention to Martin Decker weight load indicator. He was then alerted to the block &
drill string descending; disc brake was applied. The KEMS had been disabled due to problems experienced earlier when brakes were intermittently sticking on. This was thought to be KEMS
system fault. Drill string was picked up & stand racked back normally. No personnel were close to rotary table at time of descent & no equipment damage.
Some problems were experienced starting a main generator on fuel gas. Checks proved that the solenoid valve on the gas ESDV was faulty. A new solenoid valve was installed and successfully
function tested using air. Then the main gas isolation was removed and offshore personnel commenced setting up a running pressure on the valve. The valve was cycled a number of times to prove
stabilty, however on one operation there was a gas release which activated the gas detection system and subsequently shut down main generation. There were no effects on personnel.
During lifting operations to clear low torq v/v assembly from well bay to main deck, thw 55kg load caught under the I beam, before the lifting oeration could be halted the 1 ton webbing strop
failed allowing the load to fall 8m onto the mezzanine grating, causing slight damage to an instrument junction box and isolated hydraulic pipework on well. <> actions area made safe.
During fault finding on BC3 gas compressor, following a fail start post water wash. An audible gas leak was detected by a systems tech in attendance. The leaking process gas was found to be
leaking from a crack in a weld around the base of a 1" blanked line connected to the compressor head plate. Standby man contacted the MCR to instruct machine to be vented. Machine then
vented isolated and area made safe full investigation to follow.
NUI not manned in normal production. No control actions were being undertaken at time of incident. Weather was "severe" at time, excess of 45k winds. At 1300, gas detection & level 3
shutdown were indicated on <> platform. Platform automatically shutdown at this time (indicated remotely on manned <>). Could be seen from screen that gas detection was from fuel gas
skid area. After shutdown gas detection levels (on the 2 local heads) dropped away altho' 1 head remained at 20-25% for a period as residual hydrocarbon depleted from fuel gas skid. This
returned to zero. Gas heads which detected leak were Optima plus type. (Normal point type detectors). No personnel involved in incident other than in remote monitoring of situation. Due to
severe weather, no visit possible that day to investigate cause of release. Once platform deemed safe, small team visited following day.
<>. Production well <> had been closed in waiting reservoir pressure support from adjacent water injection wells to return well to production. The well valves were being equalised to
opened well to production when a gas was noted to be leaking from the stem of the Kill Wing Valve. The well was shut in at the Lower and Upper Master Valves and the tree depressured. The Kill
Wing Valve was greased and tested to prove the leak was sealed. T10Y will remain shut in until a programme of work has been completed to ensure the integrity of the well.
<>. During circulation of the well a 4 bbl pit gain was detected. Circulation was stoppped and well was shut in on annular preventer. Pressures were monitored and bled off to zero. Well stable
and static. Further information from follow-up telecon:- When kick occurred, well was being circulated after running 7" liner and prior to cementation. On closing in pressure on annulus was 190
psi, rising to 800 psi. Pressure was bled off to zero, giving back 25 bbl. Mud weight was 14.8 ppg at time of influx and was not subsequently increased. Kick was believed due to losses
experienced while running liner. No gas was detected.

<>- Prior to the scheduled well head maintenance on well <> isolations were being put in place when it was noted that there was a continuous backflow on the gas string. There was a PBU
of 0 to 85 bar in 10 minutes. An integrity test showed the well would not bleed down above the gas string, the test was completed twice and failed on both occasions. The activated UMV and the
manual LMV were both integrity checked and found to be holding. A risk assessment for continued operation was put in place, with the proviso of remedial works at the earliest opportunity. The
works are commencing on the <>.
<> - During normal production operations hydrocarbon gas percolated back to the platform from a subsea well hydraulic fluid return line; a quantity of gas was released into a safe area. A level
3 incident investigation will be convened to further investigate and review the events.
<> - 1.75" <> coiled tubing had intended to RIH to set a 4 1/2" PES plug @ 18400' (for zonal isolation purposes) on well <>. They had been unable to run below 16113' (inside 4 1/2"
liner, deviation = 76.5 degrees) due to helical friction lock up. Unsuccessful attempts were made to pull back and RIH again, and even spot (by pumping through the reel) friction reducer (<>).
Each time they pulled back they were unable to re-run down to previous depth. At 01:00 hrs two gas heads on the Drillfloor (east side) detected gas. These heads are at the elevation of the injector
head, a Crowcon gas detector at the Driller's Dog House window did not register a gas release.
<> - A swabbed influx in sub-hydrostatic well which migrated to surface & required well to be circulated (precautionary) to re-establish seawater columns: <> was perforated using drillpipe
conveyed TCP guns on 9.2.2. Allowable tripping speed for pulled out of hole (to avoid swabbing) had been incorrectly calculated (too low a yield point YP had been used - viscosified pill in liner
had been overlooked). Back calculation (using correct value in well plan) predicted that swabbing did occur. Prior to TCP operation, at end of clean up, the flowline valve (which had been
temporarily repaired) started leaking again. A leaking flowline valve, during tripping operations, makes actual hole fill more difficult to measure. Prior to pulling out of hole, trip tank was
circulated across well & leak rate past flowline valve (down to shaker header box & then to active pit) established.
<> - Whilst drilling <>, (<>) 8-1/2" hole section with 490 pptf mud, instantaneous losses (dynamic losses = 180 bph) occurred after penetrating the <> formation @ 10358'. The open
hole section was swept clean of cuttings and then the pumps stopped. Static losses were 60 bph dropping to 30 bph. A 20 bbl Check loss pill was spotted on bottom but failed to cure losses
completely. The well was then circulated to 470 pptf (with the bit inside the shoe). Whilst finishing the circulation top 470 pptf mud, the Flo-Sho indicated gains. The pumps were stopped and the
well flow checked - 5 bbls were observed to flow from the well.
<> - On completion running 4.1/2" liner pressure test was carried out. The well started to flow therefore the BOP's were closed. Currently seeking to find location of leak.
<> - An annulus leak investigation had taken place on the "A" annulus of CN-09 oil producer. Following the removal of the chicksan rig up from the annulus valve, the oil technician was deisolating the valves, in order to reinstate the annulus monitoring instruments. When he opened the inner valve of the pair, which is connected directly to the compact wellhead, a leak occurred
from the joint between the two valve arrangement. He immediately closed the valve and the leak stopped. The leaking fluid was later confirmed to be water with a trace of oil based mud. No oil
was present in the release and no gas was detected in the area.
<> - A communication problem exists with well <>. This communication problem is between the reservoir and 'A' annulus. Because of this the well has been closed in and is being
monitored. Preparations are in place to kill the well. Necessary mud to kill the well is available. Tubing head pressure (closed in) is currently 70 bar.
<> - When carrying out Open Hole activities on the Brent reservoir on CN08s4 at 14464' ahbdf the well was observed to flow. The well was closed in after flow checking, a total gain of 9bbl
was recorded. The well was circulated through the choke using drillers method which confirmed that the well had been u-tubing due to mud imbalance and that an influx was NOT taken.
<>. Drilling 8 1/2" hole on <> to 17137ft. Indication of gas at surface from bottoms up of last connection. Indications of increased flow. Well shut in with annular. On investigation no influx
recorded. SIDPP: 385, SICP: 390 rising to 450 psi. Suspected supercharging due to previous losses. As per <> well control manual treated situation as influx until convinced otherwise.
Attempted to circulate out potential influx using drillers method. Unable to sustain well control initial circulating pressures without closing choke.
Cormorant Alpha - While drilling ahead in the four and a half inches section in the reservoir zone of well <>. While taking a directional survey, a pit increase of four barrels was observed. After
a positive flow check, the well was closed in on the BOP. The annulus pressure stabilised at 180 psi, drill pipe presssure was 0psi. Well was circulated using the drillers method to remove the
influx. There was no hydrocarbon release at any stage of the event and the platform did not change status.

<> - While drilling ahead 12-1/4" hole at 10666 ft ahbdf, 2 ft drilling break was drilled to 10668 ft ahbdf into the <>. A flow check proved positive and the well was closed in using the
Annular Preventer. SIDP = 580psi, SICP = 610psi. Pit gain 5 bbls.
<> - Well flow checked positive after drilling 8-1/2" section. BOP annular closed and 250 PSI annulus pressure noted. The well was circulated over the choke and gas detected on bottoms up.
Weighted up mud from 700 pptf to 725 pptf to give 200 psi over-balance and primary well control restored.
<>. The ongoing operation was bullheading completion with seawater. After 25bbls pumped, the area tech working in the vicinity discovered a leak at the flow wing valve actuator tell tail. He
informed the night shift well services supervisor. The bullhead operation was stopped and the well closed in on the UMGV (which was passing) and the LMGV. The UMGV greased and inflow
tested for 30 min. Both tests recorded and found O.K. From the process plant, a double block and bleed is in place and also the flow line drained. The operations were suspended.
<> - Coincident oil level gas observed at rotary table gas detectors, causing platform GPA status. Gas breakout caused by small quantities of gas coming out of solution from oil based mud,
which had been circulated to surface during normal cementing operations on <>. The well was closed in on the annular BOP as a precautionary measure.
<>. During routine jarring operations on <>, the 0.125" wireline parted at surface. The toolstring had become stuck and jarring was being used to attempt to free the tool. Jarred for a total of
4.5 hours in a 10 hr period with rests between jarring. No one was in the area as it was barriered off as per wire line procedures.
<> Whilst drilling <> the reservoir was penetrated and total losses were experienced. Somtime later the well started to give back fluid from the loss zone. The BOPs were closed and the well
circulated under controlled conditions. The indications were that gas had become entrained in the mud systems. There was no indication that the well was in an under-balanced condition.
<>. Annulus flexible hose chafed through due to rubbing against BC 25 flowline support bracket. Leak was isolated using a double block.
<> - During operation to retrieve packers from CP72, following 16 days shutdown. The design of this type of packer allows well pressure to be monitored through the drillpipe, when the packer
was engaged, there was 500 psi noticed below. The pressure was bled down to zero and monitored to check any flow. (static) The next stage of the programme was to apply pressure at 1000 psi 3000 psi through the packer to test the liner and liner lap. This test failed indicating a leak in the liner float and shoe or the liner lap. Flow back was measured to establish the possible leak rate.
Flow rate was established at approx 3 bbls/hr. The BOPs were closed to allow continued monitoring of the downhole pressure as this was the best option rather than releasing from the packer and
losing the monitoring capabilities at surface. Brine was delivered to Platform at 7.30hrs on <> and 11.3 brine was used to circulate the well.
<> - The 2 7/8 drillstring was in the process of being pulled out of the hole. At depth of 12255ft the driller noticed that the pipe displacement of the trip tank did not correlate to the theoretical
displacement of the pipe. It was found that a volume of 0.5 bbs of oil was swabbed into the well. The driller stopped pulling the pipe then performed a flowcheck, he noticed that the well was
flowing very slowly. The driller closed in the well using the fast shut-in method and recorded the annulus and drill pipe pressures. Line supervision were then informed of the incident.
<> Whilst tripping in hole with a venturi junk basket, a 5 bbl discrepancy was noted at the trip tank. The well was shut in and observed. It was concluded that hydrocarbons had been swabbed
into the wellbore on the previous trip out of hole and when running in with the venturi junk basket the well hydrostatic had been reduced sufficiently to allow hydrocarbons into the wellbore.
Following the shut in, a spray valve was installed and the pipe was stripped in hole from 8423 ft to 9700 ft. (current clean out depth was 9756 ft). The well was then circulated to kill weight brine
and operations continued.
<>. After drilling to section TD on <> (<>) , the string was pulled back to the shoe and a flowcheck made. The flowcheck revealed a small flow from the well. Shut in, observed pressure at
325 psi. Stripped in to bottom. Circulated out influx and monitored pressure build-up. Pressure rose to a maximum of 1375 psi. Circulated out influx. Opened BOPs. Well static.
NO INSTALLATION. On <> diving operations were conducted to install a wellhead protective structure on suspended well <>. <>. A brine flow was noted coming from the corrosion cap
vent tube. The rate was estimated to be 11 barrels per hour. <> have submitted notification to cure leak and side track well - No further action

<>. <> well <> is a gas production well on a normally unmanned installation. During annual testing operatons we have identified a 5 1/2" <> SP-2 Tubing Retreivable SSSV failed in
the open position. The valve failed to close on demand. Further operatons, to repair or lock out and install an insert valve, are planned to take place in the next 10 days.
<>. Well <> was being prepared for a PLT survey. A lubricator was connected up to the tree in mod 6. The top of the lubricator assembly extends up into Module 5 (BOP deck). <> had
completed a successful pressure test on the riser and were preparing to open up the well. The <> operator started to open up the tree swab valve and at that point a release of gas occurred in
module 5. The deluge activated. The GPA sounded. He shut in the swab valve immediately. Initial indications are that the in-line valve from the pressure test pump skid had been inadvertently left
open and gas travelled from the well, through 1/4" needle valves, back to the pump skid and was released via the pump reservoir tank. An investigation has commenced to determin the root cause
of this incident. Human error. Incorrect line up of plant. Incident passed to <>
<>. At 0615 we were drilling 5 1/2" in the <> at 5168m MD (3934.5 TVD) at an average ROP of 4/5 m/hr. Hole angle is 56 deg and open hole section is 771 m long. A drilling break
occurred with the ROP increasing to 17 m/hr. The driller picked up for flowcheck and alerted the Drill Rep and TP while lining up on the Trip tank for the flowcheck. The Flowcheck remained
static for 5 mins then started to increase with a gain of 3 bbls over the next 5 mins. The driller was instructed to space out and shut in at 0625. The well was secured on the upper pipe rams at
0627 with a total pit gain of 5bbls. The bit depth is 5165m MD 93933m TVD) Pressure build up was monitored . The <> and town were informed at 0640. Final SIDPP and SICP were recorded
as 340psi and 495psi respectfully. Kill mud was weighed up and the well kill instigated, utilising water and weight method increasing mud weight from 1.15 to 1.22 initially and later to 1.32.
Initial report: The <> has been struck by the supply vessel the <>. The platform is at muster at the moment. Standboat arriving to inspect for any possible structural damage. Further report:
Whilst on station in close proximity to the East side of the platform (<>) the supply vessel, the <> struck the <> North East leg. The damage resulted in a loss of the platforms escape to
sea ladder located on leg. The vessel was carrying out delivery operations and had been onstation and being worked by the platform deck crew since 0750hrs. After the collision had occurred the
vessel captain/master advised the platform that the <> had made contact with the platform's leg, they also advised that the vessel's autopilot appeared to have failed, but manual control was
fully functional. The vessel then moved to approx 100 mtrs east of the <>, postion advised by <>. Weather conditions were fair.
Standby vessel <> had been on close standby since 08.17 hrs for abseilers working on the flare tower. At approx 15.15hrs the CCR received a phone call from an employee reporting the the
standby vessel had just collided with the platform. At the same time the skipper of the <> called the CCR to report that he had collided with the platform and was pulling away to inspect the
damage. The skipper of the boat made contact with the CCR several minutes later, saying that he had sustained damage to the top of his mast with nav lights hanging down and damage to the
minicom aerial. Immediate actions: At approx 15.22, the <> was instructed by the OIM to move out of the platform 500 mtr zone. OIM, OTL and HSEC attended SE corner Level 1 to discuss
what happened with witnesses. After examination on the 66ft level, marks on a fire main discharge pipe below the 66ft level were observed. Paint had been scraped. No other damage was
observed.
At 09:45 hrs <> the <> MRV was undergoing routine marine operations within the 500m zone of <>. It was to carry out back load and bunkering operations. On moving astern to come
within reach of the CP crane the Captain had difficulty in stopping the vessel from going astern. The Captain used the vessels other engine/thrusters to manoeuurve away from the platform.
However the vessel glanced caisson, which contains the incoming risers from <>, <> and <>. These lines have been shut in till the caisson can be proved sound. The vessel was instructed
to leave the 500m zone of the platform. A visual inspection was carried out on the vessel and the caisson. Damage appears to be superficial i.e. seaweed deposited on the vessel and 2 ornage paint
scuffs on the caisson.
Platform undertaking normal ops. at the time. Environmental conditions N/A Mud Pump Rig 40 at approx 04:00 hrs, two men were working in a restricted work space,removing heavy steel casing
from a Mud Pump. A chain block was attached to the casing in order to take the weight and lower the casing to deck grating level. Once the casing was located on the deck grating, the chain block
hook was in the process of being detached when the casing slipped a few inches trapping the injured person's left foot between the casing and the side of a fixed steel ladder. This caused the
injured man some pain and he subsequently reported to the sick bay. Over the next few hours the pain in the man's foot did not abate and he was Medivac'd to <> for further examination by
onshore doctors. Following the medical examination the man was sent home in order to rest his foot. <> refers.

Shutdown construction crew were removing pipework using static rigging arrangements from cooler E107B. During this operation, a 1 ton wire sling broke causing the IP to fall over and sustain
injuries. There was no potential to drop any loads. This incident is currently under review and investigation.
During drilling operations a guard (approx 1/2 kg) from tugger winch postioned on the monkeyboard level parted from the winch and dropped to the drill floor below. No one was injured and this
incident is currently under review and investigation.
A 19kg sheave was dropped approximately 10ft during transportation from the crown block to the monkeyboard level. No one was injured and this incident is currently under review and
investigation.
The platform crane was lifting a load from the supply boat to the platform and the lifting lug on the side of the load appears to have caught on the side of the vessel. The load was just being picked
up when one leg of the lifting assembly broke. The load dropped about 20cm to the boats deck. The platform sent some slings down to the boat and the load was reslung and lifted onto the
platform. No personnel were near the load at the time. An investigation is being carried out on the platform, inclusive of witness statements.
At approximately 23:00 on the <>, when lifting a transportation basket from the supply vessel "<>" the <> North crane developed a malfunction of the hoist mechanism. The crane driver
immediately instructed the Captain of the supply vessel to move off and after clearing the deck with the load, the lift slipped into the sea. The crane driver applied the emergency brake to arrest
further descent of the suspended load. A crane expert travelled to the platform some 20hrs later. No one was hurt and an investigation is currently ongoing.
Supply vessel <>, reported that at 08.20 hours work commenced backloading lifts to the vessel. The first lift was a PSL pump unit, and at approx 1.5 metres above the deck, the corner of the
unit hit the cargo rail and a side door on the unit sprung open. The crane driver did not see this, as it was on the blind side to him. As the unit was lowered further , the door was dislodged from its
hinges and dropped 1.5 metres to the deck. The deck crew were stood well back from the landing area and therefore no injuries were sustained.
While attempting to lift a skid deck hatch, the lifting ring on the hatch failed as the load was applied by the lifting equipment. All personnel were clear of the lifting equipment at the time.
Maritime hydraulics top drive torque arrestor return spring sheared. Portion was ejected from V-door and landed on pipe deck. Top drive was not in use at the time. No personnel in the immediate
vincinity - observed by someone at a distance. Top drive was parked with the spring approximately 3 metres above the drill floor deck level.
A drill crew of five men consisting of the driller and three floormen were working on the drill floor. A derrickman was located on the monkey board. Ropes were in place and the top rope was
slipped for the stand to be latched. Whilst running 3.5" drill pipe in the hole, the stand being handled by the derrickman located on the monkey board level failed to latch and landed across the
derrick in a north easterly direction. This caused the stand to flex north/south across the derrick with the base of the stand still inits original position on the drill floor.
Deck crew were in the process of lifting a well control sub from a basket situated on the wireline mezzanine deck. During crane operations a section of removable handrail was dislodged from it's
sockets on the upper deck of the wireline platform by friction from the crane pennant. The handrail struck a running beam then a power pack before landing on the pipedeck 30' below. The task
was suspended; area made safe and time out for safety took place with the OIM and the drilling representative present. Full investogations into the incident then took place.
Gas Compressor CX0201C in Mod 06 was being removed for refurbishment. During lifting operations one of the 10te air hoists being used for this purpose failed to hold the weight and allowed
the compressor to lower back onto its plinth
During a period of high winds a piece of tar (accumulation of drill line grease) weighing approx. 182 grams fell from the derrick to the drill floor. The accumulation is thought to have been
dislodged by high winds (gusts in excess of 80 knots). No injuries or damage sustained. Prior to the incident the drill crew had slipped and cut the drill line.
A wire lubricator was being rigged down from <> using the mast winch and a purpose built sledge. The sledge allow's the lubricator to slide across the skiddeck as the lubricator is lowered by
the mast winch. The sledge was not sliding easily and two men were pulling on the handles to assist. As the sledge crossed from one skid deck hatch to the next it slid more easily resulting in a
rapid movement over a couple of feet. The rapid movement and resulting swinging motion allowed the stuffing box to come into contact with the mast structure and the guard (to prevent the wire
jumping from the stuffing box sheave) snagged the mast and broke off. The guard was made from a cast aluminium alloy and weighed 800g, it was 8"x6" in size and fell approximately 25 ft inside
the mast tower. No personnel were in the immediate area.

Operation in progress was running 7" liner, this involved moving the joints of liner from the pipedeck to the catwalk using the Palfinger. The 40ft joint was lifted approx 10ft as the Palfinger
started turning toward the catwalk the joint slipped out of the grab sideways. The joint fell onto the handrail and onto the BOP deck in the sub base 22ft below. The weight of the joint is 0.5 tonne.
The final position of the joint lay with the box end embedded in the deck and the pin end resting on the pipe deck handrail. the grab was not inadvertently opened and did not have any visible
damage. No personnel were in the direct area of the lift.
Description (<>): Wireline operations were taking place in <>. A 3 1/2 inch lead impression block (LIB) had been run to a hold up depth of 10162 ft. Whilst pulling out of the hole the wire
parted at the winch, with the toolstring at 9755 ft. The wire initially dropped into the well and the loose end recoiled up onto the drill floor. The wire had jumped off the top sheave and was finally
snagged on the shaft of the upper sheave, preventing it disappearing into the well (see rig up schematic). Barriers were in place and no personnel were near the wire when it parted. Comments: As
the toolstring was hoisted slowly from 10162 ft the line tension was approx 1300 lbs, well within the working limits of the wire (see below). The winch operator was glancing at the well
schematic to check for potential restrictions e.g. gas lift mandrels, when the wire parted.
During drilling operations on <> a piece of metal fell to the drill floor. On further investigation it was found that on The Top Drive Section (TDS), a section of a spacer, on the extended bail pin
between the connecting link and swivel, had sheared and fell. The distance the section fell was:- approx 60ft The section weight 250g. On a later search of the drill floor area, a 2nd section from
the spacer was found weighing 600g.
During a lifting operation to change out the HP compressor bundle weighting 6.5 T, a chain roller guide weighing approx 1/2llb fell from the chain block to the deck approx 15 feet below. No one
was injured. The bundle was being lifted using a 10 T beam trolley. As the trolley had reached the limit of its travel a 3 T chain block on a 5 T beam clamp was being used to move the bundle
laterally as it was being lowered. When the bundle was about 6 inches from the deck, peices of a chain guide fell from the beam trolley. A LOLER plan was in place. These peices did not form
part of the load bearing parts but merely guided the load bearing chain into the unit. The opeation was made safe by lowering the bundle onto the deck. Further investigations are continuing to
identify the cause of the guide failure.
Bondura retaining plate on the bondura bolt on the dolly frame in the derrick made contact with a flange on the dolly track. This resulted in the bondura retaining plate and retaining bolts falling
onto the drillfloor. One person was working in the area at the time. The track has three flanged sections over the travel of the rollers at the 33 meter, 32 meter and 12.5 meter levels above the rig
floor. Although witness statements suggest the plate most likely fell after contact at the 12.5 meter level, there is evidence of contact (scraping) on the 33 meter level also. During the
investigation, it was not clear-cut as to which flange this last collision actually occurred. There is therefore the potential for the clash to occur at any flange. Three bolts had sheared at this time
dropped along with the retaining plate. In total, the dropped objects included 3 M14 bolts (51g each) and the 775g retaining plate itself. The retaining plate was found near the man riding winch at
the v-door and the bolts almost directly below.
Personnel were cross hauling an 8in pipe spool (approx 2 1/2m long) to work site and had rigged it ready to transfer the load from one chain block to the next. At the time of the incident, the
spool had been lifted approximately 2 inches from the deck. As the load was taken up on the second chain block, the chain was released, the spool immediately started to lower to the deck. The
gypsy chain was observed to tbe free and had not locked in position. The rigger grabbed the gypsy chain, which stopped the load lowering to the deck. The load was then lowered to the deck
under control, the supervisor was informed and the rigging equipment was quarantined.
Tripping drill pipe at time of incident. This operation involves the drill line passing through a guide which comprises of 6 rollers within the guide body and is suspended on the outside of the
derrick at a height of approx 25ft. A retaining pin (approx 600 gms 61/2 in length) for one of the guide rollers fell from the guide and landed behind the Draw works on the drill floor. No
personnel were in the area the time.
The crew made up of 1 driller at the draw works controls and 2 roughneckson the rig floor were laying down the wire line Pressure Control Equipment when the 1mm man rider winch cable wire
dropped to the rig floor from a height of 25 ft. The man rider winch was last used around 16:00 hrs and unnoticed to the crew was shackled to the tie down pad eye located 1ft above the rig flooer.
The wire was snagged to the top drive which was at the time around 100 ft high. During the rigging down operations the top drive was lowered to approx.33 ft above the rig floor when the cable
wire parted 29 ft from the tie down point. At the time the roughtnecks were 20 ft away. Further investigations presently on going.

At approximately 13:15 commenced filling water bag. At 15 tonne, stopped filling and checked MIPEG reading. Hoisted bag up, lowered bag down, everything ok. Filled bag to 30 tonnes,
stopped filling. Checked reading on MIPEG no problem. Continued filling bag to 35 tonnes. Instructed crane to slew right away form platform to a safe distance and stop. Then instructed crane to
lower boom to maximum radius (34.0 metres). As the boom was being lowered the boom seen to drop about 1 meter, at about 14:30. Stopped job. Decided to abort test and empty bag. Instructed
crane to boom up. At this point the boom dropped 3-4 metres and then stopped causing the crane to shake violently. This occurred at about 14:40. Crane driver was ok. Opened bag water release
rope with a boat hook. Pulled rope and emptied bag into sea. Once empty instructed crane to boom up. Said he couldn't nothing happening. Went up to crane and found oil leaking from boom
hoist motor. Parked up crane, shut down and isolated crane again. Returned permit and keys to control room.
During offloading operations from the vessel to the <> PLATFORM, the crane began to lift a cargo basket containing well servicing tools. The deck crew were clear. As the basket began to lift
one of the tools protruding in the basket caught under the lip of an adjacent container and caused the basket to tip over .This allowed the tool to fall approx one metre to the vessel deck. The tool
weighs in excess of 50kg.
During removal of the old UPS from platform crane a scaffold tube was dislodged by the load & it fell to deck. Prior to this, the UPS scaffold had been inspected by <> who gave approval to
its suitability for the work to commence. The helicopter had approached the platform with his load line below the helicopter & once over the load it was lowered to allow the<> to earth the
static charge. Once the load line had been connected to the UPS lifting frame, the <> advised the helicopter pilot that he could continue with the lift. The pilot proceeded to take the weight &
then lifted the load straight up to approx 1 foot above the scaffold platform. The <> then gave the instruction to the pilot to move to the right.
On <> the <> deck crew were working the <> supply vessel. Sea state was 3 to 5 metres, wind speed was 14 knots. While the crane operator was hoisting a cable transporter ref. CDT-A71
(4.5 tons weight), the boat pitched and rolled resulting in the cable transporter catching on/in the crew escape hatch at the stem of the vessel. As the boat continued to pitch and roll the sudden
jerk caused one of the four padeyes to be pulled out of the transporter frame. The crane operator noticed there was a problem and lowered the lift back on the Supply Vessel deck. At the same time
the Vessel captain notified, by radio, the crane operator that some damage has been caused to the reel transporter lifting gear. The Supply Vessel crew investigated the damage and modified the
lifting gear arrangement to allow the lifting operation to take place.
Dropped load. Whilst lifting off the potable water hose from the saddles on the north East side bunkering station to lower them to the boat (<>), the hose got caught on the saddle and stretched
and parted, resulting in the hose falling into the sea and narrowly missing the banksman. Noone was injured and the hose was subsequently recovered from the sea.
As part of Forties Bravo Technical Assurance Plan, NDT inspections were being carried out on the installations lifeboat davits. This did not affect lifeboat availability. Tiny cracks were detected
on three davit structures. One other boat had already been removed from service to carry out a repair of its davit winch. Our structural engineers advised the installation manager that the defective
davit structures should be taken out of service until effective repairs are carried out. This has left the platform with two serviceable lifeboats out of six. To meet the installations safety case
provision, a measured down manning plan was actioned to allow for the repairs of the davits. The installation POB is currently capped at 47.
During lifting operations from the supply vessel "<>" the platform NW crane was preparing to transfer a nitrogen tank from the vessel. The weight of the tank was manifested as 10 tons. As the
tension was taken up immediately prior to lifting, there was a catastrophic failure of the crane pennant at the master link end, resulting in the parting of the wire rope from the ferrule .The pennant
fell back onto the nitrogen tank and deck and was recovered by the supply vessel crew. The SWL of the pennant was 15 tonnes. The tank had not yet cleared the deck. All personnel were clear of
the area. The platform crane slew back onboard and the master link taken off the headache ball. A 10 ton pennant was then fitted to the headache ball of the crane and used to retrieve the damaged
15 tonne pennant. There was no damage evident on any part of the pennant that might have contibuted to its sudden failure. The failed pennant had been examined and certified on the <>. All
lifting operations have been suspended pending investigation.
This incident occurred during normal lifting operations from the supply vessel to the platform, lifting operations were in compliance with platform procedures with barriers erected restricting
unauthorised personnel from the area. The weather conditions were: wind speed circa 19 knots 194 degrees, sea state 2m swell with good visibility (10 nautical miles). The North East crane was
in operation carrying out the lift. As a nitrogen quad was being lowered to the platform top deck, a hose supplying the Torque Converter unit failed resulting in a loss of transmission to the hoist.
As a result the load started to lower without initiation from the crane operator.

Whilst unloading cargo from a supply boat, five lifts of tanks, weighing between 3 and 5 tonnes had been carried out. The remaining lifts involved heavier loads and it was necessary to stop and
change the main block.The boom of the North west crane was lowered onto the helideck to facilitate removal of the headache ball and repalcement with a heavy lift block. Immediately following
this, the crane driver raised the boom to a height of about 8 feet above the deck where it stopped. The driver was unable to raise it any further. When he attempted to lower it back onto the deck, a
loud bang or crack was heard and the boom fell approx 4-5 feet, coming to rest on top of the newly fitted block which was still sitting on the helideck. No personnel where in the immediate
vicinity at the time of failure. Upon investigation, it was found that the prop shaft had been sheared between the pump tower gear box and the boom drive gear.
An operation was ongoing to change out the Bottom Hole Assembly. A Drill Collar was in the elevators with the Link Tilt engaged whilst a Stabiliser was being brought in through the V door to
connect to it. The Elevators were orientated so that the handling horns were facing the TDS Torque Tube. This is normal procedure when making up the BHA. The Driller picked up the Drill
Collar and also disengaged the Link Tilt. The momentum of releasing the Link Tilt and the TDS travelling up the derrick, caused the Elevators to contact the Torque Tube. Each of the four
sections that make up the Torque Tube has 2 recessed lifting points to faciliate assembly. As the Elevators contacted the Torque Tube whilst travelling up the derrick, one of the handling horns
caught in a recess causing a 4" section weighing 500g to break off. This landed on the Rig floor between the hole centre and the Hawk Jaw (Tubing make up equipment). All personnel on the Rig
floor, other than the Driller, were stood by the V door, some 5m from where the broken horn landed. No damage was done to the Torque Tube or TDS.
When attempting to make up a connection of 5 1/2in drill pipe using the Top Drive System (TDS) half of the Bell (stabbing) guide weighing 55lb, fell approximately 6ft from the TDS to the
Rotary Table. The Bell guide had been contacted by the drill pipe causing one half to shear off. No one was injured in the incident and the operation was stopped immediately. An investigation
Team was set up and mobilised to the Fulmar. The saver sub and Bell guide had recently been replaced to change from 6 5/8 to 5 1/2 drill pipe.
Hydraulic Oil filter changeout had been completed on C1 Crane on platform west. Crane Operator and Mechanic were testing the operation of the Crane which was proved to be satisfactory. No
hydraulic leaks were evident after the filter change. Mechanic and Crane Operator were departing from the area of the Crane when it appeared that the Crane boom was beginning to lower. There
was an unknown mechanical failure that allowed the crane boom to fall onto its own boom rest from an angle of 45 degrees. The Crane boom suffered extensive damage. As a result of the
unknown failure, mechanical parts flew off the top of the crane cab, one of these items striking the Crane Operator as it hit the deck. Environmental conditions were a clear and bright dry day. The
affected area was barriered off and fallen debris left in-situ. The crane boom came to rest in a safe position. An onshore Investigation Team was mobilised to assess the incident and were
accompanied by HSE Inspectors. Investigation is ongoing.
The <> was in combined operations with the <> platform. During the work over programme for well <> it became apparent that an air-operated winch (tugger) of BEEBE manufacture
with SWL 150kg, was not operating correctly. It would work with no load attached but could not lift a TIW valve (76kg load). Mr <> (of <>) contacted the company in <> who had
recently refurbished and certified the winch for advice following which he checked several items on the winch & found them all to be satisfactory. The air motor was removed & apart from a
small cut in an O-ring he found nothing untoward. The decision was taken to replace the motor & try the winch again. An area on the <> weather deck, around which was a barrier for lifting
operations, was cleared of all personnel & an attempt was made to lift the valve again.
When the platform crane lifted gas rack No 06314 (1.3ton) from vessel deck the main lifting ring on the 'fifth leg' opened up approximately 8mm. The crack was observed by the officer on watch,
when the gas rack passed the bridge windows on its way up to the platform. The deck crew were immediately informed and the gas rack was landed safely and quarantined. Gas rack laded safely
on the platform and quarantined. Lifting bridle removed from the gas rack as sent back to <> for independent analysis of failure.
Drilling were laying out single lengths of drill pipe from well <> to the pipe deck. A single length of drill pipe was pulled out of the well and the tail end moved over to be lowered into the
mouse hole. As the single length was being lowered into the mousehole the driller went to operate the link tilt in order to push the top end over to vertical. At this point the drill pipe was released
from the elevator supporting it at the top and it consequently fell fully into the mouse hole. Operation was immediately stopped and made safe. An investigation team was formed and confirmed
there was no defect or failure in any component of the lifting component of the lifting equipment or controls.
<> was undergoing routine cargo operations. As a container was lifted approx. 10 metres above the <>'s deck the crane operator lost control of the lift and the load descended to the vessel
deck under the crane's UP system. After 10 minutes the crane operator regained control of crane operations and repeated lift, again the load lowered itself toward sea level (<> had backed off
station) then emergency stop button was engaged causing load to stop 4m above deck. Power was reinstated to the crane and the lift was completed. The crane was shutdown awaiting full
investigation. Initial reports indicate that there was particles of steel imbedded in the disc of the brake unit. Full report to follow.

The lathe was lifted from aux engine room and landed into an open basket on main deck. The crane was disconnected from the load and the crane operator lifted the whip line/forerunner clear. As
the whip hoist was being picked up the forerunner from the main block dropped to deck, dropped a few feet behind the 3 deck crew members.
During wireline operations on <> whilst attempting to pull DSIV FISH overpull was taken on wireline. Wire parted at surface and caught up in stuffing box sheave. On this happening the
wireline operator closed in the BOPs and bleed off pressure in the lubricator. On further investigation it was found that there was a fault on the load cell in the counter head, within the wireline
unit this would indicate/inaccurate weight load on wire. A secondary weight indicator has been installed in unit.
During ongoing drilling operations; running 5.5" liner. A joint of liner was being lifted from the "V" door into the derrick using a lifting "nubbing" and pick up elevators. The nubbin released from
the joint liner as it was almost into the drill floor and the joint fell back down the V door.
During routine drilling operations involving lifting and lwering of connecting riser between Wel <> and rig BOPs, the lifting bridle attached to the top of the riser parted and allowed the riser to
fall approx. 30ft back on to the drillfloor. At the point of failure the riser was in the process of being raised from the horizontal (catwalk) to the vertical (rigfloor) planes. No personnel were
injured in this incident. Investigations revealed that all normal procedures had been followed prior to the incident. The failed 10-ton set of brothers will be sent to specialist vendor to ascertain
mode of failure
Rigging operation to remove GA0911D water injection pump cartridge (WT 1.6T) transfer along Runway Beam R0903 by means of 3T trolley, then transfer load 20ft laterally by means of three
2T blocks to the transport barrow at the module door. The cartridge was successfully moved to the end of the beam. During the transfer of load to the beam and through the stop gates to fall off
the end of the beam allowing the load to swing towards the personnel using the lifting equipment. The block and trolley fell approximately 25' but did not land on the module floor as it was still
attached by chain to the cartridge lifting shackle. The cartridge remained suspended and was then lowered by means of the third chain block to the transit barrow. Grampain Test to examine stop
mechanisms to determine cause of malfunction. Review the requirement for the main transfer trolley system presently in place with a view to removal of the whole system leaving simple end
stops and main beams in place.
The operation to pull out the hole had been ongoing for approximately 6 hours with the joints of pipe stacked in the drilling deck. The weather was cold @ 4.7 deg c, moderate wind @25kts.
While ongoing pulling out of the hole with 2 7/8 pipe the mud bucket came free from the tie back hook and struck the IP on the left hand. The IP at this point was stacking the joint of pipe into the
base of the derrick. The operation was stopped and the IP was escorted to the sick bay for treatment. The tie back hook was replaced for a crabina type hook.
During a lifting operation a chain block failed in service, (chain link snapped) <>. On <> another chain block failed under the same circumstances. All chain blocks of this design and
manufacture were removed from service and a Safety Alert requested. Secondary rigging was used in both instances and control was exercised in both cases.
CN-24S2 liners were being set up. The drill string was being lowered to put weight down on hanger and check that the hanger sljps were set. During this operation a one ton SWL sling parted.
This sling was a safety sling on the cement line into the cement head. The sling was attatched to the west drill floor tugger. When the blocks were moved down the safety sling attached to the hose
became tight and parted.
When installing a 15te winch on a lifting beam over a sea water lift pump on Uq level 1 using a 0.7te pull lift, the hook on the pull lifted parted from its socket. The operation demanded the pull
lift was used in horizontal mode and was employed to draw together the two havles of the 15te winch to locate it onto the lifting beam. When the hook parted it remained attached to the winch
and the remaining pull lift dropped a number of feet but remained attached to the other side of the winch. Two men were in attendance carrying out this task and were working from a fixed
scaffold structure. Neither were struck by the pull lift falling and so no injuries occured.
After circulating the <> well after the line cement Job. The next operation was to lay out the cement head. The cement head was made up to the top drive but the elevators could not be latched
at the same time because the %ft pup joint on top of the cement head was too short.. When the top drive was backed out from the 5ft pup, the weight of the cement head buckled the 2 7/8"
drillpipe and the box of the 5ft pup slipped down and out of the top drive guide funnel which ws to be used to stabilise the assembly. The cement head fell to the drill floor with the 10ft pup and
single joint of 2 7/8" drill pipe below. No personnel hurt and the area was secured.

During normal drilling operations the main riding tugger wire(dropped object) is stowed in the derrick. On this occasion the wire had just been stowed and this was the first occasion that the top
drive was being moved past the stowage location.It appears that the tugger wire had become snagged across the top drive dolly-tracks and was severed the first time that the loading wheels in the
dolly tracks passed this point. The cut wire fell down to the drill floor, one end hung up on a part of the derrick, the second part coiled up on the drill floor with one section of wire making contact
with a member of the drill crew. The contact was a glancing blow to the man's shoulder. The injury has been checked out by our medic and confirmed as bruising with slight muscle strain and
discomfort. The man has gone back out on shift on normal duties. The area is currently barriered off pending full internal investigation, work will not recommence until this is completed.
During slick line operations on completion of a tool run the team were preparing to split the lubricator above the BOP in order to retrieve the tool string. The crane was being used for the lifting,
while the lubricator was still attached to the BP a command was given by the banks men, that the crane operator interpreted as up and so continued to pull upwards. This resulted in a three tonne
lifting bridle being damaged and wire ropes within the bridles parted.
While lowering a temporary air compressor from the platform to the supply vessel '<> a 1/2" drive socket fell from the compressor to the boats deck. OIM issued a briefing note to platform
personnel highlighting the dangers of poor housekeeping and for the deck crew to be more vigilant prior to backloading equipment. Consult with deck crew, Safety Reps and other interested
parties to brainstorm ideas which might lead to avoidance of a similar incident.
Whilst carrying out wireline activities on <>, the wire parted in the vicinity of the cab, cracking the window. The tension on the wire at the time was 1550 lbs; the wire was rated at 2720 lbs
breaking strain and 1900 lbs operating tension. All personnel were behind the barrier. No environmental considerations.
<>. Operation: Preparing Well <> for abandonment. Bullheading of sea water to displace trapped hydrocarbons in the tubing was ongoing, the top half of the Xmas tree had been removed at
this stage and the riser installed. The top section of the production tubing became detached at the downhole safety valve. The tubing was ejected from the well & the valve "T" & its lifting frame
were lifted approximately 30 feet into the derrick. As the pressure dropped the tubing went back inside the well and the valve "T" assembly returned to the drill floor. During the descent the
lifrting strings on the valve lifting frame became entangled on the stabbing board resulting in the stabbing platform breaking off and falling to the drill floor. All drilling operations were then
suspended and the area made safe. The well had been effectively "killed" with seawater prior to this operation and remained in this stage throughout above incident.
As part of the overall process of re-establishing gas compression following completion of remedial work on the export compressor, work was ongoing to restart the HP compressor. Several
attempts were made to start the compressor, culminating in an explosion within the motor housing enclosure. Damage was confined to the enclosure itself with no automatic fire and gas detection
or executive action. No personnel were in the area at the time. From a preliminary examination, it is suspected that gas had migrated into the housing and had been ignited by a source yet to be
identified. Further investigation is ongoing to establish the route for gas ingress and the ignition source.
Operation: Weather damage to erected Habitat at old MLQ module, located for Asbestos containing material removal. An unexpected squall blew through the complex with winds and gusts in
excess of 45 knots. During this squall, wind pressure entered the scaffolded and tarpaulined habitat, erected for the safe removal of Asbestos material mixed within deck screed and although the
Habitat was protected on all sides by the old accommodation external bulkheads, the wind pressure build up was of sufficient energy to lift the tarpaulin and external securing battens off the roof
of the scaffold.
Operation; Coiled Tubing Operation, replenishing liquids holding tank: Weather very good, clear skies, light wind. Whilst carrying out water replenishment the holding tank at the coiled tubing
operation on the platform pipe deck, the operator carrying out the task sustained injuries as a result of the filing hose connection failure at the tank filing valve position. This connection failure
was a result of excess pressure build-up at the valve, which had been placed in the closed position by the operator shortly before the hose connection failed, and whilst the supply pump was still
pumping. The filing valve had been closed by the operator in order to address a leak at the hose/valve connection.
person investigating the noise made by a dropped object, found a section of decommisioned pipework (2" 1500# v/v with attached 4' length of pipe weighing approx 80 kgs) which had dropped
approx 2' displacing a guard rail before coming to rest on adjacent walkway. The person moved the broken section further on to the walkway to avoid any risk of object falling to cellar deck 20'
below. The person was part of a <> team onboard to survey <> as part of <> renewal program. The person was passing on an adjacent walkway when he heard the initial noise.
Investigation initiated.

A request was made remove eight TSI tank holding lindibolts (weighing approx 4 ounces each) form the North skid deck plate. After receiving the relevant PTW and risk assessment two
construction personnel started to remove the locking nuts from the lindibolts attached to the deckplate and allowed then to drop into the North side of mod 5. Personnel working in mod 5 heard
the bolts dropping and on investingation found the bolts and attempted to stop the work, however the work was already complete. Nobody was hurt during this incident.
Rig crew were removing & securing the main block hang off line at approx 65 level. As the line was being secured into location the cover from a boxed sensor on the mud pump sandpipe
gooseneck fell to the Rig Floor below. The cover weight 550g, and is secured on the box by 3 welds along the hinge and 2 clips to lock it closed.. The cover is 6"x 6" square with a 3"x 6" lip at a
right anlge along which is the hinge. No pesonnel were injured as a result of this dropped object.
During fault finding operations on the gas import/export (GIE) skid a section of wind wall approx 2.5m x 0.5m weighing around 23kg became dislodged after minimum pressure was exerted on it
by an employee's toe. This resulted in the section falling from GIE level 3 to level 1 walkway, a distance of apprx 18m. There were no injuries to personnel, property damage sustained consisted
of bends to the fallen section of wind wall and a dent to a light fitting (integrity unaffected). The adjacent fittings were immediately examined and found to be secure. All fittings of a similar
nature throughout are presently being checked. An engineering study regarding the suitability and positioning of clamps to be initiated. Any substandard clamps will be replaced if these are found.
A 20' container was being as a control point for access to a restricted area. The sentry decided to open a small rear door of the container in order to improve ventilation. When he did so the door
detached fromits hinges, fell through the scaffolding and hence fell to the sea ( a height of aroun 30 metres). On inspection it was apparent that the three of the four hinges were severely corroded
and appeared not to have been supporting the door. On opening the door, the fourth hinge failed and the door fell away. Weather was good at the time, no dividing operations were ongoing at the
time of the incident. The door aperature has been bariered off and investigations are ongoing.
At approximately 10:30hrs on <> a worker was walking down the steps from the accommodation to the pipe deck when a locker door fell from a skip located on the accommodation roof and
landed in front of him after striking a nearby container. Two waste skips were put on the accommodation roof on the <>. The skips were relocated from the pipe deck and were being used for
discarding material from the cabin refurbishment in level 1 (one). Work in these cabins was completed and work shifted to level 3 (three). Following a manual handling assessment these skips
were located to the accommodation roof lay down area. On the morning of <> materials including locker doors and side panels were put in the metals skip. The metal skip was noted to be full,
uppermost on the skip were some locker doors and side panels. Additional materials were stacked at the side with the intention of getting another empty skip in the late afternoon (no lifts on
accommodation between 9 - 5).
Working on pig reciever door when threaded bar sprung out and hit thumb. Whilst undoing the ratchet mechanism on the pig receiver door, the ends of the treaded bar which forces the scissors
closed sprung out of their recesses in the scissors. The IP was steading himself by leaning on the side of he expandable collar with his Lt hand. The ratchet mechanism bar sprung loose hitting his
thumb.
IP was opening the second half of maintenance access doors into the cooling water pump house on gas compression roof. The door was more difficult to open than the first half, so the IP pushed
the door to increase purchase. As the door opened the top central door stop fell 2 metres and hit him on his safety helmet. The door stop weighed 8 lbs.
Potable water bunkering operations were in progress from the East side. A rigger working on the walkway outside L2W heard a crashing sound from inside L2W, when he investigated he saw a
length of pipe on the deck & water cascading all over. He informed the area tech who stopped the bunkering opetation. The plastic pipe that fell was a 90 degree bend, the vertical section was 6 ft
long & the horizontal secton was 11 ft long, the pipe diameter 3". The horizontal section was supported ( to prevent the plastic pipe sagging) by 3" angle bar for its full length, this was attached to
the pipe when it fell to the deck. There were no apparent supports on the horizontal secton, although an angle bracket was attached that may have been fixed to a support at sometime in it's
history.Tthe estimated weight of the fallen pieces is 100lbs from a height of 12 ft
A member of the platform deckcrew observed an object falling towards the west side of the platform from height. The item was carried in the wind missing the deck and falling to the sea. It could
not be seen in the water and it is assumed it sank. The object was described as being flat and from the observation it was estimated to be less than 0.5. square meters in size. As it drifted in the
wind it was described as not being very heavy. From the elevation of observation it could only have come from the platform flare stack. The platform is presently shutdown and preparation is
underway to carry out a flare inspection. Barriers have been erected to create an exclusion zone around the flare base and deck areas till area proved safe.

IP was struck by an 8 foot scaffold board that had toppled over after being stored in a vertical position in the vicinity of where the person was sitting. This an "over 3 day <> Reportable
Inccident".
A section of the North Office Block (NOB) HVAC lagging which is constructed of stainless steel plate fell to the deck into a walkway. The section was approx 1 meter square and weighed 2 kgs,
it is estimated it fell 10 meters. Nobody was harmed by the incident. High winds gusting to 60 knots are thought to have contributed to the incident, however it can be seen that some of the pop
rivits have failed due to corrosion. The remaining sections of cladding were checked immediately and similar vulnerable sections were safely removed.
Two days prior to this incident a wooden packing case containing a cooler plate pack had been stored on the landing platform at North East corner of the lower deck. A work party at an adjacent
lifeboat witnessed the lid from this case being blown off the landing platform and falling into the sea approx.90ft below. We have been unable to ascertain when the lid fastenings were removed.
There was no damage or injury caused by this incident. The lid was constructed of 1/2" plywood measuring approx. 8' X 4. weight: approx. 20 lbs. Wind speed at the time was averaging 40 Knots,
gusting 45 Knots.
All drilling operations had been suspended due to adverse weather conditions and all relevent personnel restricted to the accommodation. The weather conditions at this time: Wind 185 Degrees
@ 70 knts+ Wave height 5mts Visibility 8 miles. When the weather conditions had abated an inspection of all areas was undertaken. It was discovered that a metal aluminium storm window
approx. 1.5 mtr x 0.75 mtr had been blown from the wireline deck which is on the North side of the drilling derrick to the pipedeck approximately 5 mtrs down and 15 mtrs across to the East. No
personnel were injured. The area was fully checked out and found to be all in order.
Two vendor personnel were removing a doorframe on the north face of drilling module. One person was knocking through the securing bolts with a 3lb hammer, which were sticking with paint
and corrosion: the other was crouching below him holding the frame. Hammer head came off the shaft, struck the lower person a glancing blow on his hard hat and then dropped by the side of the
walkway grating approximately 20ft to the walkway below. The tool was new and had been supplied as part of the vendor's toolkit. Upon examination the the hammer was found to be of very poor
quality, although this would not have been immediately apparent before this incident occurred, it was obvious that the head had not been adequately secured. Further examination identified a label
on the shaft, which was poorly written and suggested that it may not apply to this particular type of hammer. There were also no manufacturers marks to be found anywhere on the tool. This all
points to a tool of very dubious origins.
A crew member was proceeding along the south west walkway of <> platform, level 'C', when he was startled by a loud metallic sound. Upon investigation he noticed a piece of grey material
lying on the roof of the trash compactor. Once retrieved, it was identified as a metallic outer focusing plate of a satellite communications dish. the plate was approximately 50x15cm, 2mm thick
and weighed 356g. it fell approx. 25 feet. immediate actions taken were checking of all dishes visually, to identify any further loose focusing plates. none were observed. Plans have been put in
place to remove these focusing plates, as they are now on redundant communication dishes. none of the in-service dishes utilise focusing plates.
An air hoist was being dismantled from a runway beam under a Permit to Work.The rigger removed the bolts that secured the side plates and removed the nut from the main load pin. Upon
pulling the two plates apart the hoist fell 3m to deck. No persons were injured and no one was in the vicinity which was barriered off as part of the PTW controls.
During routine crane maintenance operations a mechanic was coiling a hose feeding whilst pulling it up from the deck below to the NE Crane Sump area. During this task the hose knocked a 2
metre section of hose from the sump area through a gap. (The gap allows rotation of the crane around the pedastal). The section of hose weighing 1.5kgs fell five metres to the north walkway. No
one was injured. An investigation then was undertaken and the causation was deemed to be poor housekeeping in conjunction with a historical lack of protective kickplate to prevent objects
accidentally being dropped through the gap. Recommendations from the investigation are to improve and maintain standards of house keeping and to install a kick plate on the edge of the sump
area.
On the date and at the time stated two technicians were placing isolations on a well when a 14lb sledgehammer fell through a hatch from the BOP deck some 4.5 metres above missing the nearest
technician by some 1.5 metres. It would appear that the sledge had been left on an adjacent valve abov the hatch toe guard rail from the previous days work and over a 24 hour period migrated to
the edge due to plant vibration. A platform investigation team was immediately set up to determine the cause of the dropped object and provide recommendations to prevent reccurence. A time out
for safety was carried out for all platform personnel highlighting the incident and the requirement to follow jobsite standards with particular emphasis on leaving jobsites in a clean,tidy and safe
condition.

A thin section of wall cladding approx 5' long and 4" wide fell (50' approx) from the NGL wall above the crane store on the South west of the platform. The wind was approx 44 kts from the
North west at the time. The section was discovered by an Operations Tech on a mezzanine landing between levels 1 and 2 of the South West stairs. It was lodged in the grating. The stairs were
barriered off until checks were made to ensure no further pieces of loose material were potential dropped objects.
Two loose scaffold boards blown off office block roof by downdraft from approaching helicopter. Boards bounced on the deck below, one of them striking a person on the shoulder on rebound.
The person was waiting to board the helicopter and received bruising to his shoulder. An investigation team was set up to investigate dropped object.
As a man was coming through a door from the NGL package to level 6 of the Deep Gas Lift skid (DGL), a 4lb mash hammer fell directly in front of him, causing him to jump back. Fresh marks
and paint chips on pipework above, (thought to have been struck by the hammer as it fell), suggests the hammer had fallen from the ledge of a structural H-beam, some thirty feet above. Initial
investigations established that no one was working above at the time of the incident and it would appear likely the hammer had inadvertantly been left sitting on the ledge some time in the past.
Vibration was probably responsible for the hammer eventually falling.
Wind 32 Knots at 142 degrees sea 2.5-3m. Temp 9.1 degrees centigrade. Description: Whilst carrying out gas tests at the start of a day shift an instrument technician observed an object lying on
the Kennedy grating adjacent to slot 5 in the well bay. Slot 5 is a dead well and the operational status at time of incident was that the well had been isolated, flushed and drained down prior to
disconnection and positively isolated from the process. Investigation Revealed the object to be chemical injection quill and dublock valve arrangement weighing approx 40kgs which had dropped
approx 2.5m from slot 5 flowline. The Duplex "weldoflange" joint attaching the quill to the flow-line had fractured around its entire circumference, causing the quill to become detached from the
flow-line. Platform OIM requested OIE (Offshore Inspection Engineer) to attend for an engineering opinion. Further inspection of the equipment to determine the mode of failure will be carried
out onshore
A half moon C-plate used to allow cuttings reinjection hoses from the skid deck into module M6 fell through the opening. The plate struck the top of FA01 XMAS tree and sheared off the swab
vent valve and landed on the mezzanine deck adjacent to the tree. The plate fell approximately 6 metres and weighs approximately 15 kgs. The exact timing is unknown as the plate was
discovered on the deck. There was no injury or release of hydrocarbons. The well was flowing at the time of the incident with the swab valve close as per current standards. A full investigation is
in progress but initial indications are that the 2 half plates had not been refitted correctly after recent installation of new hose.
While lowering an IBC onto life boat landing, a deckcrew member leaned on lifeboat access gate. The gate fell from hinges into the sea, deckcrews foot made contact with the lifeboat. Although
there were no chances of the deckcrew member falling to the sea, this is a clear failure of safety equipment.
Whilst scaffolders were working down on M5 walkway, scaffolder noticed and heard dropped object which fell 3m away from him adjacent to the crane pedestal. He looked up to see if he could
see anyone above but all that was visible was the crane pedestal. Picked it up and reported it to supervisor. Object is a brass ring approx. 5cms in diameter weighing a few ounces. The dropped
object was identified as a handle securing fixture from a portable pistol drill. Crane Op thought it might be from a drill used for a task on east crane access door. Investigated by platform engineer
and crane op. It was found that it has indeed come from the drill in question. A task had taken place by crane op on east crane access door but the handle at the time wasn't attached to the drill for
the task so it was thought that it had been taken off for a previous task and left unsecured. Ring fell approx.14m to deck.
Personnel working in the process separation module (M4) hear a noise behind them. On investigation they found a piece of cladding had fallen from an insulated section of pipe overhead. The
section of lagging/cladding had been removed and replaced less than 3 weeks previously during major shutdown work scopes. It is believed that the cladding had been improperly reinstated after
work and been vibrated loose when the process plant had been restarted. The section of cladding weighed approx. 5kg, measured 24" long with approximated diameter of 12". No individuals
harmed during the event.
The incident occurred during well service activities on <> well <>. A coil tubing BHA (Bottom Hole Assembly) was being broken out using two 36" pipe wrenches. The connection was
found to be very tight so a pry bar was used to lever the wrenches as the connection was being trapped with a hammer. The connection released suddenly jarring the IP's elbow. The IP returned to
the coil tubing cab and was able to operate the controls. He was advised to see the medic shortly after the incident which he did. The following day he was sent ashore for further examination.

A team were carrying out maintenance work on control equipment. All the tools and equipment on site were placed in a bucket. Unfortunately the bucket was inadvertently knocked over, resulting
in a 2' 150 metalfex gasket, weighing approximately 150g, falling out of the bucket and through a gap between the flare pipework and the deck and onto the walkway, some 40' below, narrowly
missing someone who was passing by. The incident was reported to the SEA who visited the location. At first it was unclear where the metalfex gasket could have fallen from as no other activities
could be viewed from the walkway. However when visiting an upper level, it was clear that there was some maintenance work being carried out. The site was tidy and all tools and equipment
were stored in a bucket. When the operator was interviewed, he admitted that the bucket had been inadvertently knocked over and that the gasket could have fallen out and through the gap in the
deck around the flare pipe work but this was not observed at the time. The operator, until informed was unaware than an incident had occurred. See <> for further details.
While transferring a compactor to the galley landing area, a redundant junction box fell from a gantry 10m above onto the deck approximately 5m from where the deck crew were working. The
personnel were looking up at the time and observed the item falling. The electrical junction box had been cut away from cables some considerable time in the past, but evidently redundant
components were left in position. The item weighing 1Kg was dislodged during crane operations to place the compactor resulting in a dropped object. Job was stopped and area checked for any
further potential dropped objects associated with the junction box. Incident reported and investigation ongoing.
A section of kick plate at the mezzanine level of the external of module 4 had corroded badly and become detached. It fell approximately 3 metres to the deck below. The weight of this item was
approximately 3 kilos. There were no personnel in the area at the time that this fell.
Task being carried out by abseilers was to remove a counter weight wire normally used to support the tongs in the drilling derrick. After taking the counter weight wire's end up to the monkey
board and securing the wire by means of a wire sling, they proceeded to transfer the wire end onto a lowering system. The lowering system consisted of a 10.5mm static rope fed through a petzel
stop and the rope was secured to the wire by means of 1" climbing tape, tied off by a Prussick method. Whilst removing the securing wire sling and transferring the weight of wire end onto the
lowering system the wire suddenly left the abseilers control, dropping to the rig floor 50 metres below. Personnel were in the area below at the time. No one was injured. Wire size 16mm, length
approx 80 metres and total weight of the wire was approx 85kg. Work was stopped and area made safe. Work has been suspended until investigation complete. Investigation into the incident is
underway.
During the routine service work of the Well <>, the SSSV had been recovered from the well using Wireline equipment. The tool string configuration was made up to include 8ft of stem and
mechanical jars for the nipple brush run, to remove the accelerator and spring jars. This operation had been carried out. The same tool string was then connected to the running tool for the SSSV
and was installed onto the replacement valve atthe lower jar tool connection. The SSSV was then lifted with the tool string and was being lowered into the well riser, at which point the valve and
jars fell into the riser and down onto the swab valve. The drop was approximately 10ft. The riser cap was immediately installed. The shift team leader was informed of the situation, <> then
closed LMGV (lower master gate valve).
At approx 10;35 on <> <> was being prepared to come onto production. The wellhead valves were opened and V - 40004 had been initially cracked open to pressurise the flowline to a
wellhead pressure of approx 2745 psig, and then was subsequently being moved to the fully opened position and was about 90% open when the position indicator plate blew out of it's location
hitting the corner of the production operators safety glasses knocking them to the ground. The indicator plate travelled in an easterly direction and landed about 20 feet away at the methanol
injection pump.
During start up of P1402D water injection pump work party noticed part of a retaining clamp on the walkway of level one north - U.Q. The broken bracket was traced to the exhaust pipework
from a firewater pump situated on level two north UQ, a difference of height of approximately 40 feet. A.F.W.P has not been run since nightshift on <>, Weekly Checks. The bracket is badly
corroded and could have fallen anytime prior to the findings on <>. It is possible it fell as a result of vibrations during water injection start up or water injection tripping.
The wire guard from a helideck perimeter light fitting became loose allowing the plastic light diffuser to blow overboard during high winds. The diffuser fell to the lifeboat deck on the west side
level one which is approx 100ft below the helideck. Fastening arrangements on the light fitting have been improved and a procedure to check the fastenings introduced.
The weather covering above the sliding door to the platform stores (size 1400mm x 300mm x 100mm) swung free, pivoting on the south top bolt.

At 03.05hrs on <>, a Zodiac Liferaft, located on the rig"C" Wellhead jacket level 1 north side, became detached and fell overboard into the sea. This was reported to the rig Control Room
Operator and to SBV <>. Reported to the Coastguard at 03.16 by SBV <>. Weather at time of incident was gusting +/- 60kts, Northerly. Investigation is ongoing.
Techician found section of grating lying across stairwell in M1W. The section of grating weighing approx 30kg had fallen approx 3 metres from a fixed working platform located above the
stairwell. The technician immediately secured the area to prevent access to the affected areas and also to secure the grating sections. On investigation it is apparant that the grating panels were not
secured on the working platform structure following a previous removal operation and that this had been compounded by a previous modification to the main grating panel. It is suspected that
vibration over time had allowed the panel to work loose and subsequently fall. the access platform is used extremely infrequently and it has not been possible to trace the timing of either the
grating removal or modification..
A piece of steel 106mm x 106mm x 3mm was found lying on the helideck during a routine pre-flight check. It was some distance from the landing circle. It was identified as a shim from the
turbine exhaust stacks adjacent to the NW corner of the helideck. Upon visual inspection using binoculars, it can be seen that a number of these shims are missing. It is thought highly improbable
that a piece of this material could travel as far as the helicopter landing circle, and the likely potential outcome is for an injury to personnel. Also, with the wind from the stack, the flight path is
from the diagonally opposite side of the helideck, maintaining the maximum distance between stack and helicopter.
Operations: Routine Process Ops - Replacement of exhausts. Two members of the replacement project were preparing their job when they smelled burning. They stopped what they were doing
and proceeded to check the surrounding area immediate to the exhausts. On checking the top of the exhaust duct they discovered that a four foot long scaffold board had caught alight. As they
made their way away from the area to raise the alarm they met up with three of the operations team personnel and advised them of their findings. The operations team immediately went to the
scene and ran out a fire hose from a local hydrant and very quickly extinguished the flames.
Platform undertaking normal ops at the time. Environmental conditions N/A Fire Pump 'A', Module 'D'. At approximately 14:00hrs on <> an emergency 222 call was made to the platform MCR
informing the operator of heavy smoke emitting from within the Fire Pump Room 'A' at Module 'D'. The platform GPA was activated manually calling personnel to muster stations. The scene of
the incident was investigated by the Platform OSA, the pump had been stopped and the engine diesel fuel supply isolated. No flame or fire was observed just dense smoke. A decision was made
by the Platform Manager to commit personnel in <> to investigate the extent of the damage within the pump room.
<> is a normally unmanned platform, it was reported from <> prior to departing <> that the platfrom had shut down no A/C power. Upon arrival, inspection of the platform was completed,
the emergency generator was started, but failed after a few min, due to a large amount of smoke coming from the generator building, investigation shows evidence of a fire around the radiator and
top water hose area. An investigation is ongoing under direction of Turner Diesel.
A generator had run out of diesel and required to be restarted. The generator was started remotely from the control room, with two persons in the generator room witnessing the start, as soon as
the generator started sparks were seen to be coming out of the generator. The persons in the generator room immediately tried to stop the generator using the remote 'stop' button but when this
proved not to work so the engine manual stop lever was used instead. Following the generator stop the exciter end of the generator could be seen glowing within its housing, so a CO2 fire
extinguisher was discharged into the generator to ensure there would be no chance of a fire breaking out. The generator was left under observation until it had cooled down. It is suspected that the
insulation resistance of the generator wa low, possibly due to dampness, so the platform resistance and this was found to be low. The main generator will be cleaned and dried and rested before a
start.
During normal operations the fixed detection systems detected flames in zone 3 AC Cellar deck, this resulted in automatic activation of general Alarm and complex ESD and blowdown. The fire
was confirmed by observation from radio Room window and was seen to be in the location of GA1108 air compressor. Whilst the platfrom POB were mustering the fire was observed to diminish.
The fire team attended the scene and observed a small fire local on the air compressor GA1108 and it was extinguished by fire team using a hand held extinguisher. all persons accounted for with
no injuries sustained. a similar slightly smaller air compressor GA808 had been isolated as a precaution. An investigation team is being mobilised and will be conducting an investigation into the
cause of the fire. The platform is currently shutdown pending results of the initial investiagtion about the suitability of continued operation of the remaining air compressor GA808.

During normal routine operations one of the platforms electrically driven air compressors tripped, following an investigation into the cause of the trip and subsequent remedial actions the
compressor would not resart. During this period the platform compressed air system pressure had dropped and could not be maintained with the air compressors that were on line at the time. In
order to increase and maintain the pressure within the platform compressed air system and the diesel driven black start air compressor was started locally by area plant operator. Approx 25
minutes after start up the black air compressor caught fire. The fire was detected by the platform fire detection system and the general platform alarm was initiated automatically by the fire and
gas panel.
At approximately 22.30 hrs on <> the Platform Emergency Alarm was sounded on confirmation of a fire on G401A oil recovery pump on the <>. The Area Operator requested to investigate
the fire used a portable dry powder trolley unit to extinguish the fire and was later assisted with cooling operations and securing operations by Fireteam members. The pump was isolated and an
ESD2 initiated. Nobody was hurt during the incident. The area was barriered off for full investigation.
On first energisation reinstatement of seawater lift pump 'B' on <>, after a short period of operation all three main HRC protection fuses at the HV switchboard feeder cubicle VCB ruptured. At
the same time a 'flash/sparking' was witnessed from the motor cable field junction box, which resulted in permanent distortion damage to the JB hinged door. The root cause was the lack of
availability of specific cable termination Instruction or Procedure for the correct termination of this HV cable.
TIR: At 21:36hrs <> shut down level 3.2. due to an emergency caused by smoke detection in MOD16. POB 114 mustered all OK. Fire Team investigating appears to be regulator to instrument
UDS in Battery charger room. Normal power lost, now on emergency gen. Trying to restart. <>:During total loss of Field power, the Central F & G Panel indicated coincident smoke detection
in Mod 16 which resulted in a Level 3.2 Shut Down. Loss of field power due to Power Generation problems on both <> and <>. No emergency situation main power had been established on
<> and auxiliary systems were being reset. Inst UPS inverter powered up.
At Approx 14-50hrs a bearing seizure in 'B' Seawater Lift Pump on the MSF, resulted in smoke detection operation and a subsequent GPA. The platform was in normal operating mode prior to the
incident. Smoke was being generated in Module 58 (the Module Support Frame). At the time of the initiation of the GPA, the source of the smoke had been identified by operations personnel as
'B' Seawater Lift Pump. The emergency stop button was activated, stopping the motor. The two operations personnel withdrew to a safe distance and monitored the situation, remaining in
communication with CCR. Smoke levels quickly reduced with the shutting down of the motor.
Fire in Laundry No 2 tumble drier. During the dryng cycle of galley cloths they overheated and started to smoulder The drier was isolated. On checking the drier a fire was visible. The drier door
was opened and the fire extinguished.
HVAC supply (west side of drilling modules) fan motor BD -K 95533. This is situated external to module. The mud engineer on seeing smoke and small (approx 6in height) flame coming from
the end of the motor reported this to the operations control room. Simultaneously the rig electrician in response to a low flow alarm to the module supplied by the HVAC, arrived on scene and
pushed the local stop button to ensure the motor had stopped. No flame apparent at this time. Motors was then isolated. Suspect flame from paintwork and smoke from possible collapse of
bearing. To be investigated. Flame time span approx 1 minute area non - Hazardous. Integrity envelope actions instigated.
On the <>, with the platform on steady state conditions, a test run of a Booster pump was carried out in Leg C4 following maintenance on the pump seal system. During the test run of P3220
Crude Booster pump in leg C4, the bearing collapsed and hot grease and/or flames were seen coming from the bearing housing which was also reported to be glowing. The pump was immediately
shutdown via the local stop button. The flames were only seen momentarily and extinguished themselves once the pump was shutdown. No fixed flame detection was activated on level 16 (three
detectors fitted) or any other level, were activated. No hydrocarbon detection either portable or fixed was indicated.
Small electrical fire discovered in chemical skid from trace heting cable. 14:00 technician in the chemical skid module notice sparks coming from end of traceheating cable after the system had
been de-isolated. Maintenance work had been carried out on corroded junction boxes external to the chemical module which supplies the heating tapes. He immediately contacted the control
room to inform the CRO of the situation and requested that an electrician be dspatched to the area to isolate the electrical circuit. At the same time a small flame had developed at the termination
end of the cable. The technicain immediately extinguished the flame using a dry powder extinguisher. 14:02 the power technician arrived to location and confirmed that the electrical safety
devices had activated and that power was isolated from the ciruit.

Export gas compressor tripped on lo-lo lube oil pressure. Operations investigated CCR indication that standby pump had cut in. Arriving on location they found affected pump was running but not
making pressure. Sparking was evident in the coupling guard and action was taken to stop the pump on the emergency stop button. A dry powder extinguisher was used to suppress flame,
followed by fire water hose to cool coupling assembly. Initial findings indicate that the breakdown of this pump seems to be due to a failure of the coupling membrane on the motor hub. All bar
one of the coupling bolts on this hub are loose, This may be due to some combination of slack bolts or vibration levels before failure.
A pool fire was observed in the ?A? GT Load Gearbox compartment in a contained area under the ?bell mouth? where the turbine shaft enters the combustion chamber from the Load Gearbox.
The fire covered an area of approx 3 metres square, with a flame height of approx 6-12 in? and appears to have been the burning of oil residues and oil absorbent pads that had accumulated in the
affected area over a long period of time. The fire was contained to the sump area and caused no damage to any equipment. The fire was reported to the CCR by the Condition Monitoring Engineer
who was engaged in watchkeeping on the ?A? GT. which had been emitting smoke (assumed to be an exhaust leak) since 13:30 that afernoon. The fire team responded, shutting down the GT and
quickly extinguishing the fire.
Fan belt on extractor fan in plant room. It overheated and "flames" were visable. Fan belt extinguised and plant shut-down. HVAC fan rubber drive belt snapped. Broken belt shredded and fell to
lowest point within guard housing. Continued friction of drive motor spindle against belt caused over heating and ignition . Emergency response team extinguished using CO2 and dry powder
portable fire extinguishers.
The fire and gas panel in the indicated that there was smoke present in Mod02 Drilling Switch Room, at the time of alarm switch was unmanned. The area was investigated and smoke was
confirmed, but no fire was evident. When smoke was cleared, it was established that all safety systems had operated correctly, and electrical isolation was effected. Investigations by Rig
electricians discovered, Silicon Control Rectifier cubicle No.1 had sustained heat damage. Further investigations indicated that a fault had developed at the rear of the circuit breaker carriage.
Main control room had indication on fire and gas panel of smoke present in Mod 02 Drilling Switch Room. Platform personnel were called to muster. The area was investigated and smoke was
confirmed, no fire was evident. It was established that all safety systems had operated, electrical isolations were confirmed and the area was ventilated. Investigations by operations and rig
electricians discovered that Silicon Control Rectifier cubicle No. GEN-1 had sustained heat damage. Breaker will be removed and sent onshore for further investigation. Switchboard will remain
out of service until independent engineer has inspected all other cubicles. Drilling Operations suspended until independent assessment complete.
Area Technician observed flames on the roof of the turbine enclosure for P42182 HP Water Inj Pump.The flames were coming from the turbine exhaust where the transition piece exits the roof of
the enclosure. The Central Control Room was contacted and appraised of the situation, advising the CR operator to initiate a Platform Alarm status, the Technician simultaneously stopping the
turbine and then doused the flames using an adjacent hose reel.
During an abandonment exercise, an indication of smoke was detected within the telecoms shack, by the control room operator (CRO) and reported immediately to the command and control
team. Platform communications were disrupted leaving only hand held radios initially. Two members of the ECC Team inspected the Telecoms shack and it was quite apparent that a fire was
emanating from the rear panel of the PA stack with a significant amount of smoke in the vicinity. An initial attempt using hand held carbon dioxide extinguishers was made, whilst the fire team
was made ready. One arrival of the Fire Team, electrical isolations were put in place and the fire dealt with. The HVAC system was then utilised to remove smoke and assist inspection of the area.
Further inspection revealed that the cause of the fire may have originated from the PA system. Investigation ongoing.
During welding operations on the Wellhead jacket a pre-heating band became dislodged from B40 leg hook. The heating band fell onto the welding habitat floor, laying heat side down on a fire
blanket. This went unnoticed by the welder and firewatcher as their view was obscured by a scaffold hop up. The heat produced by the heat band conducted through the fire blanket onto the
habitat "plastic" floor causing the sheeting below the fire blanket to melt and when the fire blanket was lifted ignite. At approx. 21.30 the firewatcher noticed sparking and advised the welder to
halt operations. On moving the scaffold hop up for access the heating band and fireblanket was moved and flame was then noted. The firewatcher and welder disconnected the power supply and
proceeded to extinguish the fire using dry powder.

Operation: Welding 2" flange within Habitat. Two personnel were involved within a welding Habitat, welding a 2" flange to a purge line pipe stub on an 18" line. This was the "C" gas compressor
suction line. The line had been depressurised, drained, isolated and inert gas purged prior to the welding operation, power tool grinding had also taken place prior to welding. Satisfactory gas tests
had been carried out a few minutes before the welder struck an arc. As the welder struck an arc at the work piece, a roar was heard followed by a pressurised jet flame discharge from the 2" line
stub. Neither of the two men were injured but were shaken up. Both evacuated the Habitat immedaitely and reported the event to the Main Control Room. The permit was immediately withdrawn
and the job stopped. An investigation was initiated and is currently ongoing. <> refers. Additional to the <>report, an investigation by a team from <> is also underway.
Operations: Routine Process Ops. Weather: N/A in this case <> <> template (water injection) wells tripped resulting in G109D Water Inj. pump tripping on high discharge pressure (2150psi).
When recommencing <> and <> subsea injection wells thru? 12? subsea pipeline, Operations were unable to establish more than 500psi pipeline pressure with flow rates in excess of
100,000 bbl/d indicating a gross Subsea leak. No visual leaks observed topside and it is suspected that there may be a subsea pipeline failure. Further Operational checks confirmed that topside
pipeline integrity was maintained and the suspect line was shut in. A dive vessel is being sourced to conduct a subsea inspection at earliest opportunity. <> - Subsea pipeline inspection was
conducted earlier today by ROV from the <> and it has been confirmed that there is a section of the subsea pipeline on the SE side of <> which is fractured.
Environmental Conditions: - Wind Speed 30kts, SSW. Operations: - Normal daily process operation. During routine inspection a small pinhole gas leak was observed on 3" weldolet tie-in to the
12" <> off-gas line. The leak was confirmed by a member of the operations team using an MSA passport 5 portable gas monitor. The gas leak could only be detected at close range to the source
of the escape. A controlled shutdown & depressurisation of the<> process, separator & gas lift systems was immediately undertaken & isolation applied. The immediate area of the leak was
barriered off. The gas leak was not detected by any of the fire & gas detection systems & no executive action of a shutdown system occurred. It is suspected at this time that the pinhole is the
result of internal/external corrosion of the weld. A full investigation of the cause will be undertaken on removal of the defective spool piece.
At 09:39 <> a UV detector came into alarm on the AC cellar deck area, which started the fire pump. A second UV came into alarm that then initiated an ESD of the platform gas compression
facilities. The platform general alarm was sounded automatically. Flames were seen coming from the condensate pump area. Emergency response teams kept back and monitored the situation. All
deluge systems activated except one. the flames died down and eventually turned to black smoke. The fire team then put out a small pool fire beneath the pump and continued to cool the area. The
condensate which was on fire, was identified to be 200-L-150<>. The area has been barriered off pending investigation by Internal Investigation team and HSE Inspectors. The platform remains
shutdown until initial investigation reports have been studied. No one sustained injuries in the incident.
fault finding had been ongoing for a couple of days on one of the Ruston Gas Turbines. Various mechanical parts have been changed to get to the root cause of a problem. This line had been
disturbed and refitted, the union fitting is tight on the line but we suspect the Olive inside maybe worn. This will be changed out and inspected as part of the incident investigation. The gas was
detected by the automatic system which shut the machine down (which was being run up for a test) automatically. a small amount of gas was released into the enclosure which is force ventilated,
and then extracted from the enclosure by fans.
At 11:45 <> a Technician could smell gas on the main compressor deck on the <> platform. He immediately contacted the production Team who proceeded to investigate on the main
compressor deck. When nothing was found they continued the search to the Cellar deck below, where they identified a minor gas leak from the top simco fitting of K100 Gas Compressor was
immediately shutdown and de-pressured. The compressor will remain shutdown and isolated until <> where a full platform shutdown is planned. At this time similar fittings on the other three
compressors will be inspected to prevent re-occurence. No personnel came into contact with the release or were injured because of it.
On plant walkround, crew member heard gas escaping from area <> flowline. Closer inspection showed gas leaking from flowline thermowell fitting. Platform was shut down and depressured.
Prior to this, plant was not flowing and shut in at w/heads but still pressured, due to compression outage on <>. Well <> flowline was blinded upstream of leak point, but leak point was close
to production header. Weather was fine and dry with a 15 knot easterly wind.

On<> at 20:00 hrs, <>l control Room received an indication of a single gas head alarm/detection in the Cellar Deck Safe Area on Inde <>. The standby vessel in attendance at <> was
despatched to investigate and reported a 'smell' of gas and a high pitched noise emitting from <>. The <> OIM made the decision to ESD <> and instructed <> Control Room Operator
to proceed with initiating the ESD process. Two hours later <> Control Room informed <> Control Room Operator that the ESD had apparently failed to shut in Wells <> & <> on <
> (suspect indication fault) and that they were proceeding to shut these wells with individual signals.
A service test was being carried out on a 30" line following the replacement of 2 small bore PSVs. Included in the test envelope was a 30" ball valve which had been subject to a stem seal repair 2
days earlier by "<>", a company previously used by <>. During service test, a sound was heard from the stem seal and the incremental pressure build up was stopped at 400psi. The decision
was made to depressure the system at this point. on inspection of the valve a piece of sealant flew out from the valve bonnet and hit an individual on his safety glasses.
An intervention crew were visiting platform <> to reset the wells. Shortly after arrival the crew were making their way down to the cellar deck area when they heard the sound of escaping
gas/air pressure. On investigation gas was found to be escaping from one of the grease nipples on the sea line side of the ESDV. The platform wells were isolated and the ESDV shut, in order to
commence topsides blow down from <> and sea line blow down from <>, however, once the venting operation had begun it was noted that a smell of gas was coming from the area of the
vent line. Venting was ceased and the smell went away. Subsequently the platform sea line and topsides were vented down from <>. The grease nipple was replaced on the ESDV and all vent
routes have been isolated (The platform logic does not perform to auto vent). Further investigation is to be carried out to find the source of the gas leak from the vent system.
A GPA and class 2 shutdown was activated when a 3/4" needle vent valve on <> wirline lubricator was left open while opening up the live well. The well was shut-in immediately and gas
detection was activated. A muster was completed and no personnel were injured during the incident. An investigation is currently ongoing.
During normal production operations a hairline crack developed in the flow line of production well <>. This caused approx 2 Ltr produced water, 1 Ltr crude oil & 0.545 SCF gas to leak from
the flow line. The equipment was manually isolated & depressurised. All other flow lines have been visually checked & found to be of sound construction. The crack is on the second weld from
the PWV. There were no signs of any leak on this flow line at 0700 hrs as observed by area operator. The leak was reported by a third party (instrument pipe fitter) working in the area at 1125 hrs.
The spillage of oil/water was contained within platform decking. The flow line section is to be dismantled then returned to company for LSA decontamination and inspection/analysis by beach
engineers.
While picking up five and a half inch pipe work from the deck, the iron rough neck developed a hydraulic leak so the mechanics were investigating the source of the leak. The IP was
approximately 12 feet from the iron rough neck when the mechanics activated the hydraulic power supply the IP was struck by a spray of hydraulic oil and received an amount of oil to the left eye.
IP was wearing safety glasses but the oil travelled down his brow and into his eye. The eye was washed immediately on site and the offshore medic conducted further investigations. The IP was
returned onshore for further medical checks and was discharged later. Preventative measures: Reviewed the risk assessment for the work, to reduce the amount of people involved when carrying
out checks like these. Also increase the Mechanics PPE. Fit protective covers over the aperture of the machine to stop anything coming out.
Gas leak on 'C' stream gas metering skid. Normal Oil and Gas Production was ongoing. Wind speed 10Kts 20 degrees. Wave height 0.8m. At 21:24 hrs on <> 1 gas detector in P01 module
Mezz level came into high alarm and 2 other gas detectors in the same area started to indicate rising gas levels. ESD2 was initiated to shut down Oil and Gas Production and the Emergency
Stations Alarm was sounded. The P01 module was immediately blown down followed by the rest of the Gas Processing modules. The Muster of Platform personnel was completed and platform
personnel stood down at 22:05 hrs. On subsequent investigation by testing with nitrogen a leak was discovered on the stem seal arrangement of a 24 inch Mapegaz isolation Valve No. XV 5413C
located on the outlet of the 'C' stream of the gas metering skid. The 'C' gas metering stream was isolated and restart procedures commenced at 04:00hrs approx. Gas plant start up on hold.

At 16:05hrs on <> several fixed gas detectors in P01 went into alarm initiating an ESD2 shutdown. The Control Room operators immediately blew down the plant. The Emergency Stations
alarm was sounded and all personnel instructed to go to their muster points. The Control Room on <> was evacuated to <>, from where the incident was managed. The leak was found to be
associated with the condensate outlet from C200 (Gas Test Separator). This separator has been used recently for the clean up of <>. Well <> was flowing through Separator at time of
incident. The condensate line was found to be ruptured downstream of a control valve (LV5019a). The ruptured line was isolated and C200 has been taken out of service.
We arrived on the installation at 07:03 after the helicopter had completed a visual on the platform. On my first tour of the installation at 07:05, I noticed a smell of condensate/gas on the cellar
deck, when I arrived at the Production Seperator I noticed condensate/water/gas spray coming from LCV 1262. The platform emergency shutdown (E3 and de-pressured) was activated on the
cellar deck and a full muster was completed. After the plant was de-pressured the LCV was isolated and the vessel was drained. The LCV was replaced and the old one was sent into the beach for
further fault finding and cause of leakage.
Ramping up gas export rates; watchkeeper found small leak from valve flange. CCR/Supervisor/OIM informed. Shut in metering skid, put gas plant on full recycle, hydraulically tightening bolts
on flanges to maximum torque. Line was then pressure tested which proved good. Gas export recommended.
At 21.25 on <> the failure of a 1" drain pipe spool from the test separator sand trap occured resulting in a loss of containment. At the time of failure the sand trap facility, in particularthe
DB&B valves, were being utilised to control a service test of the test separator orifice carrier, which had been the subject of recent maintenence. At the time of failure auto deluge initiation,
platform blow down & general Platform Alarm were activated by gas detector AD-GPL004. All personnel were mustered and topsides blown down.
Minor Diesel Leak observed on Governor Fuel Inlet Connection, machine shut down and repair effected.
Diesel Leak from Diesel Burner Pressure Gaige Assembly, machine shutdown and repair effected.
During routine inspection tour of <> platform the OIM, whilst in module L3 East, noticed a small surface coating of oil approx. 0.5 metres in diameter on the floor to the west of the Crude Oil
Cooler. A quick scan of the module confirmed there was no major leak in progress, further investigation showed the leak was coming from a high level which proved to be a small spray from a
pinhole on a 90 degree bend on the crude oil inlet to the MP Separator V-200. The Area Technician carried out a controlled Blowdown and Isolation. The water content at this point of the process
is circa 80% and given the very small rate of leakage did not present any significant risk.
Operations Team Leader identified a hydrate forming on the 2" condensate return line from the fuel gas compressor to the free water knock out (FWKO) vessel within the fuel gas skid boundary.
The compressor was shut down and the problem investigated by removal of the pipework lagging. A pin hole had formed, causing a small amount of condensate (estimated max 200ml) to leak
and form a hydrate on the underside of the pipe spool.
The <> supplies injection water to the <> via an 8" concrete encase subsea pipeline approximately 3 1/2 miles in length. Normal operating pressure is 173 Bar. During normal operation, the
water injection pumps on the <> platform tripped. Investigation showed no pressure in the <> water pipeline. The line was closed in and isolated pending investigation. An ROV vessel was
mobilised on the 26th and found the pipeline to be leaking approximately 2000 meteres from the<> end. The pipeline remains closed in.
The <> was being manned up by helicopter. On the approach to the platform a slick was observed in the sea by the platform. The slick was in the form of a straight black line on the water
estimated at 500m long by 1.5 wide. On investigtion of the well head area the production supervisor reported a spray of mist coming from the production manifold with oil spill to the sea. Shut
down of the <> wells was initiated and the field OIM was informed who in turn informed the <> duty manager, the environmental manager and the <> Coast Guard. When the <> wells
were shut in and the platform made safe, the area of leakage was cleaned up to allow investigation of the leak source. It was found that a welded joint on a 'T' piece on the manifold from the
production header to the closed drains had failed.
In preparation for isolation of B, degasser the vessel was being drained of stagnant produced water. Vessel had been offline since January and drain down was part of an overall procedure to
prepare the vessel for re-coating internally. Initial drainage was to close drainage system with final flushing to open drains. During drain down low and high gas alarms were activated 91x hi and
1x lo).
Plant operating in normal mode. One Lo level gas alarm in "D" Rolls Royce generator enclosure. Operator investigating and manual shutdown initiated. One Hi level gas alarm during unit
shutdown sequence. Investigation into reason for gas release commenced.

Platform process systems in normal operation. A liquid hydrocarbon leak from the base of the slop oil vessel was observed CCR, informed. The CCR initiated a Level 2 shut down. Assisted by
two other operators, the started A and B slop oil pumps to empty the vessel. They also put down a foam blanket as a precaution. The slop oil level dropped and the leak stopped. A visual
inspection was carried out and a hole in the base of the vessel by the Pump suction Line was identified.
Following a shut down caused by a perforation of the slop oil vessel the following took place; no work had been undertaken on this equipment prior to the leakage. During pressurisation of gas
injection compressor CX0204/5X (prior to start up) gas detector G9424 went into high alarm. A leak was detected at the 2nd stage casing drain valve stem but it is not known if this was the
source of the gas detected. The suction manual valve was closed. A repair was effected on the valve packing stem. Pressurisation was again attempted and gas detectors G9423 and G9424 went
into low alarm. The suction manual valve was closed and the compressor depressurised.
Hydrocarbon release from drive end mechanical seal on B booster pump
Chemical treatment of the platform cooling medium system was taking place. Biocide was added to a drum containing corrosion inhibitor, and pumping of the mix into the cooling medium
system commenced. A chemical reaction occurred, generating heat within the drum, and vapour was released from the drum vent into the module. The horizontally mounted drum was cooled with
a water supply via a hose, but it subsequently ruptured around part of the perimeter of the end plate. The chemicals were contained, as the inner plastic drum did not rupture. Cooling was left in
place, and the area ventilated. No injuries were sustained. An investigation is ongoing into the incident.
G9410 & G9427 activated due to a leak from the Jiskoot Sampler in MOD 13. Platform was in normal production mode with stable operating condition. Two gas heads alarmed. 1 at high level
and the other at low level. On investigation by a production operator, a leak from the NGL/Jiskoot sampler was seen. The sampler system was isolated and a strip defect report has been requested.
"B" MOL export pump had tripped on pump protection systems ie DE radial vibration. This was followed by gas detection (2 low alarms) in the Module. On visual examination the B MOL pump,
the DE seal was seen to have failed. The initiated a platform level 2 shutdown and gas alarms were reset.
During draining and topping up cooling medium head tank-gas alarms went into hi and tripped the acommodation cooling medium XXV's
Platform in normal operatinal mode. Gas release in Mod 16 resulted in 4 gas heads going into high alarm and one head into low alarm. The platform went to muster as a result of the gas release.
The platform and sequence of gas head annunication at the time of the event would point to the leak emanating form either the open hazardous drains or one of the lute off the lub/seal oil tank
reservoir vent line. The investigation report is still ongoing. High pressure leak sources in Mod 16 deck level are limited and these have all since been tested at working pressure using nitrogen
with no leaks found. TIR Gas release in gas compression. 3 high level, 2 low level.
Steady production operations prior to incident and weather was approx 288/12 9999. At approx 03:09hrs on the morning of <>, the 'B' Injection Compressor (AX0201B) Power Turbine
shutdown due to a Hi Hi vibration signal on the DE of the shaft. Upon initial resart to confirm operations and vibration readings, a large bang was heard and the control rool noted that the gas
generator exit temperatures rose. The caused the start sequence to abort, being out of sequence. The fuel gas supplies to the gas generator were immediately isolated and the OIM informed.
Although the start sequence was initiated, the incident took place within the two minute pre-start check period, ahead of the hydraulic starter operation and well ahead of the turbine exhaust purge
period.
On<> at 1530 hrs, gas detection systems were activated in Mod 03 whilst draining-down operations were taken place to the open drains system, on MOL Booster pump 'A'. Two gas heads were
activated at low alarm level, and one at high. The executive action associated with coincident low level gas detection in such a process module should result in isolation of supplies to welding
sockets. This did not occur. Subsequent live system test could not repeat this fault - the system is now operating to design. Investigation into the causes of the hydrocarbon release are ongoing.
Platform Operating facility had taken a level 2 ESD shutdown. This was followed some minutes later in Mod 16 (compression module) by gas heads in high alarm: First at drain North of 1st stage
suction scrubber A mod 16 deck, second 11 seconds later at local HVAC extract grille, third at +21 seconds also at grille. A level 3 F & G shutdown occurred and the platform went to
GPA/muster. All three heads reset to normal within 6 minutes.
After re-instating the fuel gas wing of 'A' injection compressor in Mod 16, an operator started the hazardous inlet and extract fans in the 'A' injection gas generator enclosure. On start-up of the
fans, two gas detectors went to low alarm.. The initiated the Local Module alarm and welding socket isolation occurred. Both gas detectors dropped to normal reading almost immediately.

The B injection compressor had been recommissioned following an engine wash. After the test run, the machine was shut down using the normal shutdown sequence. As the machine ran down, 5
gas heads came into into low alarm. The CCR operator initiated a platform level 2 shutdown as a precaution. A full investigation to identify the source and reason for the gas alarms is being
carried out.
<> well was closed in for tree and SSSV leak off testing. An individual reported to Operations smell of gas in the vicinity of <>. On investigation the area authority noticed produced water
weeping from <> choke body tell tale hole. Well services confirmed the intermal tuning fork seal had failed due to the well cooling down. At no time did the platform fire and gas system detect
gas in the module. Having identified the source of the leak <> was depressurised and isolated from production and reservoir. Recommended change out seal prior to the well producing again.
During routine logging operations the injector was noticed to be slipping on the coil. The pressure to the tensioning rams was increased to prevent slipping and shortly afterwards a pressure drop
was noticed, followed soon afterwards with reports of a hydraulic leak on the injector head. The operation was stopped and the pipe slips closed to secure the coil. Initial investigation found a bolt
with characteristics of a fatigue failure on the drill floor, the bolt was approx 2 1/2" long, " diameter with the head being approx 1 1/8", the weight of the blot is 200g. Approx. 30 gallons of the
oil was lost from the hydraulic system and was contained within the drill floor, draining to the drains recovery tank with no environment impact.
Whilst importing process fluids into platform storage, a low level gas indication activated for one gas head in the utitlity shaft. On investigation it became apparent that cell group 3 manifold had
a small leak. At the time this cell was settling with both import and export valves closed. The product in the manifold is a mixture of crude and produced water with very little gas. The technicians
investigating were able to isolate and stop leak. A temporary patch was then applied and manifold left isolated for inspection.
Whilst importing processing fluids into platform storage, the area technician during watch keeping duties, smelt gas and traced this to cell group 3 run down line to cell 15. This is at an existing
clamp located approximately at 70 m level of utility shaft. Both import and export valves were closed and cell 15 isolated at the 76m level. Oil still leaking from run down line into the annuals
and contained within utility shaft, there is no environmental impact. the product in the manifold is a mixture of dead crude and produced water with very little gas.
During watchkeeping duties an opertions technician thought he had smelt hydrocarbon gas at the Utility Leg 76 metre. He could not identify a source. Cell group 3 was pumped down to water.
The cell group was isolatied. 30 minutes later a H2S detector went from 2ppm to 4ppm. Followed shortly by a gas head going to low level alarm. A short time later a second gas head went into
alarm causing a GPA status on the platform - LLG at 76 m level. The gas indication peaked then trended downward. At 01.45 the LLG gas was able to be reset. Cell group 3 was further pumped
down until water was found at the sample point as per procedure. On inspection a jet of water was seen coming from cell 18 rundown line Attempts to fit a temporary patch were unsuccessful due
to pipework configuration. Awaiting specialist clamp to effect repair.
During Normal platform operations a low level gas alarm alerted the contol room operator. On investigation of the alarm A small leak of produced fluids on cell group 2, cell 17 import/export line
was identified to be the problem. The line was isolated inspected and a repair completed.
During normal platform operations a leak produced hydrocabon fluids developed on an existing repair. The system was isolated, inspected and a further repair was completed.
During watchkeeping it was noticed there was a minor gas leak from the stem seal on the HP compressor 2nd stage recycle valve UCV49402, this was 100% closed. There was no indication on
the fixed F&G detection system. As a precautionary measure all hotwork was stopped in the RPM module. Having consulted onshore support and manufacturer agreement that this valve stem seal
can be tightened online. After holding a TRIC toolbox talk the load on the compressor was reduced to open the recycle valve by 2%, this would reduce the load on the valve seat. Two Operation
techs working together tighted the seal holding down nuts to compress the chevron seal and within half a turn of the nut the gas leak stopped. The recycle valve was cycled to prove operation and
there was no stiction.
Whilst investigating the condition of a temporary patch on the degrasser outlet line in the utility shaft he was overcome by hydrocarbon gas due to the failure of the repair.
During normal running of Sub-Main generator GT2 the area tech noticed that the main diesel supply valve had gone fully open with no change in generated load, on checking the engine he
noticed a diesel leak from a braided hose that supplies diesel fuel to burner can 4. The machine was shutdown and the enclosure HVAC was left on to cool the engine down. The hose was
removed and inspected, it was seen that the inner sleave had become detached from the crimped end. No diesel escaped to the environment all was contained within the enclosure.

Crude oil cooler E42160 isolation was in progress for plate clean. The COC was hotflushed to remove wax, drained to closed drains system, seawater flushed for 3.5hours and isolation applied.
The vent valve was opened and water was seen to drain from the valve. The technician was in the process of continuing with the isolation when he was informed of LLG by the control room. He
looked at the drain and saw oil coming from it. He immediately closed the drain valve, vacated the mudule and proceeded to muster.
The diesel day tank supplying the drilling Caterpilars overflowed. The tank is an automatically filling tank controlled by level switches and a solenoid valve. The solenoid stuck in the open
position and the high level alarm activated. The alarm was investigated and the diesel supply isolated to the day tank. The initail investigation found that the time from the High level to the time
that the mechanic made his way to the engine room to isolate the supply was 3 minutes. In this time the daytank was overflowed, the volume to overflow the tank after the high level alarms
approx.1000 litres. The environmental risk had already been identified in the IMRODdocument and a procedure which is clearly displayed at the workshop details the steps to be taken in the
event of a high level. The overflow/vent from the tank comes out at the East landing area, diesel spill will run down the bulkhead and into the deck drain which then goes straight to sea.
During backloading of 100bbl base oil to the supply boat, a leak was identified at the connection between the lower section and the mid section of the hose, a slick of oil was seen in the water
approx. 10m x 2m long. The supply vessel confirmed that they had received 100bbl of base oil. The hose was retrieved to the platform where the connection was examined and found to be made
up incorrectly to the coupling (cross threads and only 3 threads engaged). the connection was being disassembled to inspect the internals of the connection when the lower section of hose came
away completely from the mid section. Operations were suspended when the leak was identified, awaiting further recommendations from the investigation team.
During normal platform watchkeeping operations produced fluids was seen to be coming from a pin hole leak on cell group 3 Import/Export manifold at the 76mtr level in utilities shaft.
During watchkeeping duties an opertions technician thought he had smelt hydrocarbon gas at the Utility Leg 76 metre. He could not identify a source. Cell group 3 was pumped down to water.
The cell group was isolatied. 30 minutes later a H2S detector went from 2ppm to 4ppm. Followed shortly by a gas head going to low level alarm. A short time later a second gas head went into
alarm causing a GPA status on the platform - LLG at 76 m level. The gas indication peaked then trended downward. At 01.45 the LLG gas was able to be reset. Cell group 3 was further pumped
down until water was found at the sample point as per procedure. On inspection a jet of water was seen coming from cell 18 rundown line Attempts to fit a temporary patch were unsuccessful due
to pipework configuration. Awaiting specialist clamp to effect repair.
The C.R.O noticed an oil leak in Column 4, when checking C.C.T.V. screens in ICC. Oil export was shut down immediately and two technicians were dispatched to Column 4 to physically check
the source of the leak. The leak was located on FCV 3061A, the oil booster pump recycle line, which was then isolated and drained down.
During normal oil export operations the CRO noticed a LLG alarm from M1WP/P room in the vicinity of P3020 pump. He immediately informed the area technician, who after checking the
pump confirmed that the drive end seal had developed an oil leak. The pump was shut down, isloated and the casing drained down.
P3070 Oil booster pump was started at 01.00 hrs, seven minutes later the pump was S/D manually due to high vibration indications of 14mm/sec. The CRO was monitoring the pumps on the
CCTV when he observed a leak of crude oil coming from the sand cyclone separator pipe work. Throughout the period the fixed F&G detection did not record any abnormal levels. The amount of
oil leaked was estimated at 1 litre. Initial investigations revealed that the leak was from a 1/2 inch screwed fitting into the sand cyclone body.
Whilst carrying out oil pigging operations to launch a pig to <> it was noticed the access door seal had developed a leak. The launcher was immediately isolated and drained down.
During normal oil export operations, the CRO noticed the Export Pump P-3010 N.D.E. seal leakage alram. The area technician was immediately sent to M1W Pump Room, where he confirmed a
leaking N.D.E. seal on the pump. He asked the CRO to trip the pump, after which it was isolated and subsequently drained down. during run down of the pump a LLG alarm was activated in the
vicinity of the pump but this reset approx. 2 mins later.
During running operation of G1050 sub main generator fire was indicated on one Infra-red Detector (IRD). Immediate response revealed smal flame approx. two inches long on engine main
casing. Engine was manually shutdown and Fine Water spray (FWSS) manually initiated by the RPE. Two IRD' indicating fire are required for system to activate automatically. On investigation
small droplets of lube oil on casting were flashing off.

During normal oil export operations a LLG alarm was initiated by the F & G Panel indicating a gas leak in the vincinity of P-3020 Main Oil Export Pump. The pump was immediately shut down
and the area technicians were sent to M1 West Pump Room , who confirmed that the Drive End seal of the pump had developed a leak . The pump was isolated and drained down . The platform
general muster alarm was initiated due to the indication of gas in the pump room.
During normal oil export operations, a LLG alarm was initiated by the F & G panel indicating a leak in the vicinity of the Main Line Oil Export Pump P-3020. The pump was immediately shut
down and the Area Technicians were sent to M1W Pump Room, where they confirmed a leaking N.D.E. seal on the pump. The pump was isolated and subsequently drained down. The platform
general alarm was initiated due to the indication of gas in the pump room.
While carrying out preparation work for de-watering operations, an indication of H2S, approx. 30ppm was noted on the gas Tight Floor of Column 1. There was also 1 gashead registering slightly
above LEL. There were no personnel in the column at the time and it was immediately barriered off to restrict any entry. The St-by H2S Extract fan was started and the level of H2S gradually
dispersed back to normal levels Update: Since this incident occurred, the platform has experienced a gradual rise in the level of oil below the G.T.F. of Col 1. The current train of thought is that
these two factors are linked. Re-flooding operations are currently taking place to facilitate oil removal.
GPA Status this morning @ 00:20. The incident has been reported. Low levels gas in CD3 extract ducting, 25-30% lel (Low alarm 20% high alarm 50%). Gas readings in modules CD3, CD6,
CD7 & CD7A at around 2-4% lel, with one spike to 16% lel. (Low alarm 20% high alarm 50%). After stop period to check systems and review ongoing work scopes and when gas alarms in the
ducting had fallen, entered modules to check source, nothing obvious. Reviewed process and ongoing activities. Purging and flushing of oil run down system, the 3rd run-down line was isolated 1
hr prior to the alarm. One assumption that the gas has percolated back up the reclaimed oil line from Col 4 storage into the drains interceptor tank in CD3 and vented out of the external overflow
and into CD3 extract system which was shut down due to a fan problem.
During routine operations watch keeping, the technician became aware of a burning smell as he entered module RD4E. On investigation he located a seal leak and a small flame coming from the
Lean TEG booster pump P49685 mechanical seal. The flames were extinguished manually and the pump shutdown and isolated mechanically and electrically.
During normal platform operations a leak occurred on oil rundown line "B". the leak was of a minor nature and was not sufficient to activate the platform fixed fire and gas detection system. The
leak was discovered by operations personnel carrying out normal watch keeping duties. The leaking section of pipework was isolated by closing the line isolation values. This stopped the leak. On
investigation the leak was found to be emanating from a hole approx. 2mm dia. Located at a 3" weldolet attached to the 8" rundown line. The fluid in the line is comprised of produced water
(97percent) and crude oil (3 percent).
Late report for <> Incident which occured on <> <>. Leak from cell Group 4 existing patch on oil filling manifold (20 inch P-0930) between Rotrok valve and butterfly valve to cellcontinuation of pre existing leak. Leak rate checked, and comfirmed about 1 litre/hour (15% water). Operations team monitoring every 12 hours. This leak is at the same point as a previous
Hydrocarbon leak which dates from <>, <>. At the time of the initial leak it was stopped by the application of a temporary epoxy putty and patch. The pipework has been mech isolated. A
"Stats clamp" is due to be installed on 17 September.
Whilst carrying out preparation work for "A" and "B" stream rundown lines spools change out on the 85m level of the utility shaft (replacement spools already on site), a member of the work
party observed liquid leaking from a pinhole on "A" stream run down line 8" PL-42167-A11440X. The standby man for the work party contacted and informed the ICC operator at 16:22 hrs of the
leak and along with work party immediately evacuated the utility shaft. An operations technician then closed in "A" stream upstream block valve 42PLV1139 located in D2C at 16:56hrs. On
confirmation that the utility shaft was still clear of any gas (HC and H2S) 2 of operations technicians entered the utility shaft and proceeded to the 82/85m level and closed in down stream block
valves 42PLV152 and 009/41 at 17:12hrs thus isolating the pinhole and stopping the leak from the spool piece.
At 20.10 the operations tech was in RD4E when he smelled hydrocabon gas. On investigation condensate was found to be leaking from, a pinhole on the diaphragm/body joint area of the pump.
The pump was isolated to stop the leak and the area secured so that there was no spill to the sea. No gas heads came into alarm in the affected area. Leak estimation calculation fron OCOP 1.05
using Appendix 2 small continuous leaks diagram. Hole size 0.5mm. system presure 1 bar (overestimate). Equates to Mass flowrate of 0.002kg/min. 0.002 x 60min x 2hrs = 0.24kg Clasification
minor.
Chemical pump operation. Wind 270 deg @ 29-34 kts; wave 4-5 mtrs; vis 10 mile. Methanol Positive displacement pump pipework. Failure of a Techlok 1-1/2" 2500# hub on methanol pump "B"
resulted in a discharge of methanol under 50 barg pressure. Pumping system taken out of service for investigation. Failed hub component sent onshore for failure analysis.

Preparation of equipment by operations group prior to handover to construction. 22knots, 270 deg, sea 1.5 metres, weather fair. Hydrocarbon condensate flange fitting associated with ball valve.
At the time the operations group were preparing the MP compression system for nitrogen purging. Observing operation of remotely controlled valve opening.
During the commissioning phase of the compressor K0402, a single gas detector alarmed low level, (20 %) on the MD filter package. Operator investigated, no obvious signs of leak found, he
then checked with hand held gas detector and found a small leak on an 8" - 600lb flange joint down stream of valve 04119. The empty compressor was shut down immediately and depressurised .
Investigation underway.
Cementing operations had commenced on well<>. The cementing lines and unit had been pressure tested and a toolbox held to discuss the task. During start up the cementer stopped his unit to
complete a calibration check. upon restart he noticed a blockage in the cement transfer pipe work between the storage bin and cement mixing head. This pipe work was a mixture of steel and
rubber flexible hose. The cementer then commenced the task of unblocking the line. During unblocking of the line the Drill Rep, Asst Rig Supt had arrived on site, when they heard of the
blockage they called down the mechanic. Upon arrival at the site the mechanic noticed the rubber hose moving and shouted a warning. The end of the rubber hose released from the king nipple at
the cement storage bin end and cement was discharged into the immediate area. As a result of this discharge 6 personnel were exposed to cement. The medic treated all of these individuals for eye
and skin irritation.
During normal plant operations a member of the team noticed a gas/condensate was leaking from a 6" flange on the scrubber line to LP Separator inlet. The CCR were immediately informed and
the plant was shutdown in controlled manner, investigation initiated and on going.
Maintenance had been completed on the fuel gas feed to the Ruston generator. A flange on the fuel gas pipework had been poorly aligned. The system was de-isolated ready for a test run. The fuel
gas system was pressurised and there was a gas leak from the flange which brought in 2 F&G heads, confirmed gas. The fuel gas sytem auto isolated itself and the GA automatically sounded.
Crew mustered and leak was investigated, no gas was found but pipework was isolated. System was not properly leak tested on reinstatement.
Operations team located leak on Fuel Gas burner using hand held detector. Leak reported and compressor shutdown safely and immediately. Investigation to identify leak took place and is
suspected to be failed weld on burner pipework. Burner removed and replaced with new, additional monitoring carried out on other burners.
At approx 1345hrs a report of a cloud of mist was observed on the PM metering deck. BJ operator called the radio room who then called the control room & the plant man was asked to
investigate. The CRO (who was standing in for the CRO's lunch break) called to the CRO on lunch to attend the control room. Upon CRO arriving the deputy CRO went to assist the plant man.
Upon investigation by the plant man he was informed by BJ man that he had walked into a cloud of mist and felt dizzy and he and his associate withdrew from area. After a search of the area
(although he could smell something) he found nothing on this deck but told the operative he could not continue his work. Eventually plant man saw a cloud of condensate/water escaping from
PM-LCV-2402.
At 22:00 hours initiated by coincidence gas detection in PT process area and all personnel mustered. (coincidence indication was spurious as one gas head within same zone had drifted to low
level). Upon investigation (22:05) audible leak was apparent from 1/2" pipe coupling on PG-2111 on Production Seperator PT-V-2120. The technician in attendance closed the isolation valve but
this failed to give secure isolation. PW wells were closed in and the PT process vented to ensure adequate isolation. The leaking coupling associated pressure guage and pipe fittings were
removed prior to a blanking plug being fitted. The integrity of the plug was checked during repressurisation of the process, prior to normal work activities continuing. All other platforms within
the field of the same vintage have been checked and no other fittings found.
An operator on the platform observed a release of condensate spray coming from condensate pump A. He raised the alarm, the Emergency Teams mustered and the platform was shut down and
blown down. Once safe, the area was investigated and the release was identified as having come from a flexible hose on the discharge transmitter line. the hose has been removed and the failure
mechanism will be determined.
Fishing vessel allegedly entered 500m exclusion zone of the platform.
The power technician was starting G1040 when a high exhaust temperature trip initiated at 66% engine speed. The machine continued to run up even after the technician pressed the stop button.
Machine was then shutdown by turning off the control panel. At this time the platform went to GPA status with voted low level gas and flame detection in the engine enclosure and voted smoke
detection in the generator module, M1W. Once the machine had shutdown the areas were checked and clear of fire and gas detectors were reset allowing the platform to return to normal status.
(Ended here)

<> was engaged in normal production operations on <> when a coincident low level gas in a closed process module, caused a platform change of status and a full muster occurred. Event:
Earlier at 03:45, during the nightshift of the <>, a problem was encountered with an outlet XCV on a Gas Scrubber, where by the NGL condensates could not be offloaded to the Oil process
facility. The NGLs were drained off to the closed drains system and were received in the Degasser vessel. At 04:28, a coincident low level gas was initiated by the Fire & Gas system. Gas heads
618 & 619, situated in an extract ventilation ducting in DC1, were activated. The Degasser outlet lines tie ins with the discharge line from the Reclaimed Oil Tank, (ROT). The NRV in the ROT
dischage line is passing, thus allowing Degasser liquid to backflow into the ROT.
A diesel spill occurred during bunkering operations from supply vessel to T7120. The overflow to sea was observed from the generator G1030/40 diesel day tank atmospheric vent. Bunkering
operations were halted immediately. Initial findings as to why incident occurred: Investigation found that a linked valve handle that should have opened T7110 outlet and return valves during the
bunkering operation had only operated the outlet valve. This caused the diesel system return line to become pressurised and the diesel day tank for G1930/40 overflowed via the atmospheric vent
to sea.
1/2" BSP F Swivel T in West crane engine housing failed causing hydraulic oil to leak onto turbine exhaust situated below crane, and onto walkway & pipedeck. The leak was observed by the
Services Coordinator, who radioed the Crane Operator immediately. At the time the crane was working the supply boat, and was about to land a container on the pipedeck. The crane operator
landed the container safely, then swivelled the crane so that the leak would land on the pipedeck, instead of the hot exhaust of the trurbine. The crane was then stopped, and the leak immediately
stopped. The duration from the Services coordinator obseving the leak, to the leak stopping was 5 minutes approx. While the hydraulic oil was leaking onto the turbine exhaust, the deck
Coordinator believed he observed a flicker of a flame. There was also considerable smoke. He immediately deployed a fire hose and doused the exhaust. However, prior to actaully turning on the
fire water hose, he observed that any flames had already extinguished themselves. end
A single gas detector went into low level alarm at 17:50 on <>, the control room operator contacted the area technician, this was investigated by the area technician. On investigation of the area
in RM4E level 3, a gas leak was found emanating from K-21008 gas compressor 2nd stage suction cooler E-21008 plate pack. The system pressure was 20 bar. The gas compressor was running at
the time of the leak. At 18:20 the gas compressor was shutdown by the area technician and the gas inventory blowndown. The leak then stopped. No other fixed gas deletion operated low level gas
never escalated above single low level gas. RM4E is an open module and the wind speed was 30 knots from 011 degrees. Gas did not accumulate in the module.
Area technician observed leak from a Techno wrap bandage on a 3" GRP flowline (Line No P046 1106T. P and ID No COA-B-05-0088-002 from the degasser pumps/reclaimed bil pumps to
storage in C4.The techno wrap which was located at the top of the leg was installed in <> and was high lighted the temporary repair register. No hydrocarbons were detected by the platform
F&G System and the area tech reported that the leak would appear to have been mostly water. Short term repair option being assessed.
An area technician detected a smell of hydrocarbon gas in RM4E level 2, this was quickly traced to a Cosasco assembly on the hot gas lift line 4" G-4691-A15148AX-PG. The line was operating
within its integrity envelope, with a line pressure of 120 bar. The pressure retaining cap on the Cosasco assembly (Material number SP-C158) was found to have 2 x 1/4" NPT holes which should
have been terminated by a plug and gauge. On measuring the emission with a gas detection meter, the leak was 5% LEL at a distance of 0.1m from the source, this is classified as a minor
emission. The assembly was terminated with a 1/4" valve and gauge to monitor the internal leakage of the blank within the Cosasco assembly.
During watchkeeping in the wellhead module (M3C), the area technician observed oil leaking from the stem body of a 1/2" swagelok ball valve (Type SS-45F8) on CA26 B annulus blowdown
line. The annulus pressure at this time was 50 bar, the annulus MAASP is 206 bar. M3C is an internal module, the fluid was predominantly hydrocarbon oil, no gas detection operated and 0% lel
was detected on a portable gas meter. The total volume of oil released over the 30 minutes the leak was active was 900ml. The majority of the leak was captured in a bucket, no oil went overboard
- no environmental impact. The line was quickly isolated, at 05:45 the leak had stopped.
An area technician detected a hydrocarbon leak emanating from a 'Keystone' instrument enclosure. On investigation he found that an instrument 5-way manifold assembly had a leak from a valve
stem (AGCO Type EM6TVIS-4SG). This manifold is rated to 276 bar @ 260 deg. The system the instrument was connected to was on the gas compressor K21016 export line XCV's. The
compressor was not running at the time of the gas leak. The technician quickly isolated the system, which was at 5 bar pressure. No fixed gas detection operated. The line quickly depressurised
when isolated and the gas leak duration was 30 minutes.

On the <> during steady state operations a water leak was discovered from an 18" overflow line from an Oily Water Separator to an overboard sea caisson. The water leak initially was coming
out the pipe wall coating which appeared extrenally corroded . No hydrocarbon gas or H2S was detected by the fixed detection systems. The leak was reported and the area tech was sent to
investigate. By the time the area tech had arrived in the module a hole had appeared in the pipe wall. The hole was estimated to be 10mm. A reading of 5ppm was detected from a distance of 0.5
metre from the water leak by a portable gas detector.
Diesel spilled to sea from a pin hole leak in the bunkering from the attendant supply vessel. During bunkering operations, the leak was detected by the Supply Vessel Deck personnel, the pumps
were stopped immediately and the hose returned to the platform. Whilst returning the hose to the platform the pressure/head within the hose was sufficient to discharge approximately 55 litres of
diesel into the sea.
Reported to HSE as <> on <>. The leak occurred from an open discharge PT vent on P3210 Oil booster pump in leg C4. This leak was caused by the movement HCV 3267 during logic
investigations to allow P3200 (<> System Pump) to evacuate <> storage cells. The leak was caused by the incorrect application of OCOP 2.001 as the vents were left open to a hazardous
area. HCV3267 moved due to the incorrect isolation of the air system supplying the actuator associated with this valve.
On <> during steady state operations a Oil leak was discovered from the Crude Storage Crude Cooler E11316 B The oil leak was contained within abund below the cooler. No hydocarbon gas
was detected by fixed systems or by a portable detector carried by Area Techinician investigating the reported leak. The oil leak was coming from the cooler plate pack. No change of platform
status occurried and the oil cooler was isolated and drained. A strip down of the cooler will identified cause of oil leak.
Duel fuel Solar generator, G-1030, was started up on diesel then switched over to run on fuel gas. When switched over to fuel gas supply a LLG alarm was activated at 10% LEL on a single gas
detector, G-65863, which is situated under the hood. Two adjacent gas registered 3 and 9% LEL. The technician switched the machine back to diesel which effectively shuts off the fuel gas
supply. He then rigged up a gas meter and pump to the sample point for the three heads under the hood but all registered zero. With the CRO monitoring the readings on DCS the area technician
again switched the machine to fuel gas and once again head G-65863 went into alarm with the two adjacent heads registering gas
The oil and gas treatment plant was runnung steadily.Wind was a slight Southerly breeze.An operator witnessed the initiation of a gas release from a recycle control valve,FCV 30109, on the A
injection gas compression system. Gas was seen to be escaping from the control valve. The control room was advised and the A injection gas compression system was shut down. The compression
system was isolated and purged.The area was barriered off and an investigation started. Subsequent investigation determined that the leak was from the valve stem gland - the bolts compressing
the gland packing material had failed (due to fatique). The release was located at the top of the North East side of the Cooler Deck. The fire and gas system did not detect any gas and no gas was
found on a subsequent check of the relevant platform areas.
At approximately 17:00 hours on <>, following a level 2b ESD, both off gas compressors had tripped, from which the A compressor failed to restart. An instrument technician was sent to
investigate the reason the compressor would not start. He identified a loose proximity cable, and that a locking nut had backed off and was missing on the FCV30109 recycle valve packing gland
studs. He replaced the nuts and the machine was restarted. At 18:20 hours the valve packing was seen to be leaking by personnel in the vicinity. The leak was immediately reported to the CCR and
the compressor was shut down at 18:25 hours, isolated and subsequently the line was purged of gas. The valve had been recently returned from score UK where it had been stripped, inspected and
overhauled. The valve will be removed and independently examined to determine the cause.
Normal operations, plant stable. Wind 4 kt SW, Sea state 0.2m, visibility very good. An unplanned production shutdown occurred on a neighbouring installation (the <>). This caused the oil
production system to shut down on the <> platform (<> ESD 2B) at 0810. Following the stripping gas compressor A shutdown, a single point gas detector (KGD-3701A) in the compressor
enclosure was activated at the high level (60% LFL) at 0830. This generated a General Platform Alarm and all personnel went to muster. At 0834 the remaining two gas detectors in the enclosure
were activated, causing a total production and power shutdown (ESD 1A).
During well servicing work a valve was opened to pressurise the well christmas tree on well <>. A release of gas occurred from the <> weel bleed for the wing valve flance. Approximate
quality of gas is 30-40 kg.
At approximately 14:00, an unplanned CO2 release occurred in the <> Control room, switch rooms, telecom room, MPP electrical room and drilling switch room. This was due to a system
failure caused by a faulty relay during normal routine autotest process of the safety system (24 hour frequency test). The personnel onboard mustered at alternative muster point outside due to the
CO2 discharge inside. At 14h23, full muster was achieved. The situation is now normal, but with a manual CO2 system in place until a full investigation is carried out. No personnel were injured
as a result of this incident.

During the Start Up sequence of G4500 (GT4) Avon Gas Turbine driven Generator a "Heavy" lite of was incurred causing damage to the unit's exhaust system. The damage to the Exhaust system
allowed the release of Exhaust Gases into the module which activate the Module Smoke detection system initiatng a General Platform Alarm and Process Shutdown.Cause of incident is believed
to be due to excessive build up of Fuel gas within the Turbine Unit during the start up sequence - Investigation to identify the reason for this occurring ongoing. During the investigation it was
identified that there was a potential for asbestos content in the debis material associated to the Exhaust system (Flexible Bellows ect.). Precautions including access restrictions were initiated
whilst further investigations were carried out to confirm substances including analysis of a material sample. The results of the sample analysis received on the 28th April comfirmed a content of
asbestos (White ) Fibers. Full survey and remedial action plan to be deveolped and implemented.
Release of petroleum hydrocarbon from an offshore installation. At approx. 15:00hr on the <> G8550 sub main generator tripped on low fuel pressure. Subsequent investigation identified a
leak, which had emanated from the diesel fuel discharge pipe work within the turbine enclosure. Upon inspection it was found that the 0.5" tubing had split approx. 50% of its circumstances on
the discharge section pump.Iinitial indications suggest a fatigue fracture of the tubing which led to a leak of approx. 100 litres of diesel which was contained within the turbine enclosure, There
was no environmental impact. All small bore pipework within this enclosure was checked for clashes and signs of fatigue and seeps.
<> platform were in steady state operations supplying Water Injection to the <> and <> fields. There was a sudden change in the demand of Water Injection on the platform and an attempt
was made to stabilise the situation. Wells were closed in topsides and subsea and High Pressure Water Injection pumps were shutdown to try to bring the flowrate down but Water Injection to the
subsea fields was still found to be above expectations. The crossover to the subsea pipeline was closed and the pipeline pressure was noted to drop to 2 Bar topsides. Attempts were then made to
ascertain that the leak was in fact subsea before calling for a DSV to carry out an inspection of the pipeline by ROV or diver. All investigations at present point toward failure of the pipeline
subsea but investigations are still ongoing. Investigations will be utilised to a DSV for inspection as soon as warranted.
A similar leak occured almost three years ago. The leg was flooded with water to a depth of 65m above the seabed. Investigations t that time using ROV camera footage indicated that the leak was
coming from a stub end of a pipe which penetrated the cell top. ROV's were used to cap the stub pipe. At this time to the best of knowledge the source of the leak had been eliminated and
dewatering activities were commenced to allow further inspection and a permanent repair to be put in place. It was recognised that the leak may roccur during this process hence a procedure and
contingency equipment were in place. The contingency equipment included additional air operated ventilation and independent means of pumping oil from the leg. Dewatering of A leg was in
progress. At 05:00 on the <> the liquid level was 44m above sea bed and pumping was recommended to lower the level further.
At 13:50 a pinhole leak was reported in flowline <> in the body of the NRV. At 14:00 the decision was made to manually initiate a GPA and manually initiate a shutdown and blowdown to
depressurise the flowline an allow an isolation to be put in place without putting personnel at risk. At no time did any fixed detection within the module activate. All executive ESD actions were
manually initiated. <> is an oil flowline. Wind NNW 20-25kt.
An oil leak occurred from a vent on an air driven Wilden pump in A leg. The pump was installed in the leg to pump out water/hydrocarbons from the leg (There is a leak from the top of the cells
at + 32m). The leg is currently flooded to 66m level and the pump is installed on the 95m level. On <> at 07:30hrs, 2 operation tech went down the leg on routine inspection. At the 90 meter
level, they smelled what seemed to be hydrocarbon. They were withdrawn from the leg and the pump stopped. Oil spilled down the inside wall of the leg. They were withdrawn from the leg and
the pump stopped. Oil spilled down the inside wall of the leg.
At approximately 20:40, following process re-start the operations technician started the densitometer pumps. Shortly afterwards he heard a loud bang and observed stabilised crude oil leaking
from an instrument fitting on the densitometer skid. The technician evacuated the module. The leak brought several gas heads in the module into low alarm. However three gas heads in the
neighbourhood of the densitometer skid indicated high level gas. The platform status changed and the process shutdown and was blowndown on confirmed high level gas. Within minutes the gas
levels fell back to background level apart from one situated at the densitometer skid. The module was ventilated and a local isolation applied to reduce the quantity of hydrocarbon released. At
22:07 the leak had stopped and gas levels within the module were confirmed as less than 5% LEL. The platform was returned to normal status. The spilt hydrocarbon was contained within the
module.

Single gas head in the East wellhead module indicated low level gas reading. The area technician investigated and discovered a small leak in the chemical injection line (Antiscale) routed to Well
<>. He observed small amounts of 2 phase release from <> antiscale chemical injection line. The chemical injection line was isolated immediately. Following isolation the technician went to
raise the isolation paperwork. On return the line was found to have sheared at the stauff clamp. <> Oil Well has been closed in for a long period of time due to reservoir management
requirements. The tree valves and flowline block valves were closed however the flowline was still pressurised. The gas head which indicated low level gas is situated approximately 2ft from the
leak point. As a single head indicated low level gas only no executive actions were taken automatically. The release point was manually isolated.
Platform shut down for maintenance and construction activities. Following isolation and flushing for breaking containment residual volatiles generated vapour on opening. Gas detected on
MOD56 at 3rd stage separator. Three gas heads on low alarm. Low level gas detected in Mod 56 3rd stage separator. Local alarm sounded and area evactuated.
At 04:30 hours two line of sight gas alarms reported "high" gas presence (alarm range is
We were breaking containment on the W27 Launcher and some hydrocarbons were present in the vessel and was spilt whilst opening the door.
Fire gas panel indication of release of gas from <> at VO2 initiated a yellow shutdown and general purpose alarm. Platform personnel mustered on initiation of general platform alarm. Prior to
the event the plant was being started up following an unscheduled shutdown well <> was being brought on line and draining down was taking place on V160 to T71 and were pumping out T71
to the separators. The draining down of V160 was thought to have caused oil to be drained as well as water to T71 and the oil gassing off, this was believed to have caused an overburden of gas
thus pressuring the line causing the water lute seal to be breached by what was estimated to be a small bubble of gas. Personnel in the area at the time smelt gas at the same time as the GPA was
sounded.
At 08.04hrs on <> a gas detector (G5231) located next to the HP condensate pump P98 in the NGL activated. First lo then hi. This was follwed by G5234 (lo) and G5232 (lo). The platform
went into auto shut down on yellow logic. The plant was in a stable running state at the time of incident, two mechanical technicians were working on P98 changing out the DE seal, and were in
the proces of breaking the seal body from the pump casing. Weather - Overcast, moderate Easterly wind. Sea State 2-3m. Yellow Shut Down activated, all personnel directed to muster. All POB
accounted for within PFEER guidelines. Emergency response plan for Gas Release put into action. All non-essential personnel confined to TR (N. Accomodation). Plant depressurised. After plant
had blown down completely, and initial assessment had been completed and communicated, the Incident Coordinator and the ER teams, began a systematic sweep of the platform with portable
gas detectors. They did not detect gas at any time. For the rest of the report see <> Containment was
The plant was operating in a stable condition with normal operations. During routine Operator checks gas was smelt on the NGL roof and on investigation the Operator identified a leaking blank
flange joing on vessel V16. The plant is external to the modules, wind conditions were moderate and no gas was detected via the protection systems. Normal operation pressure for V16 is 36 bar.
The decision was taken to depressure and isolate the vessel requiring the shutdown of the NGL plant. There was no requirement to shutdown platform operations or to muster and at no stage was
there felt to be a risk of fire or explosion. The incident is considered notifiable on the basis that for the period of the leak it was condidered to exceed 1kg /hr. Once the vessel was made available
the investigation identified that the blank flange had been fitted incorrectly (raised face outwards) during the 2000 shutdown. T
During start-up of P98 condensate pump, an on-site Operations Technician reported a leak of condensate from the loading valve. Valve is 1" class 600 ball valve. The leak was identified as
emanating from the valve stem gland. Weather was clear with SW wind at approx 18Kts. Pump was shut down locally but leak continued. Ops Technician then tripped and vented NGL plant. A
single gas head went into low alarm. Further action was requested by HSE coordinator and OIM (General muster and Yellow shutdown at 17:45hrs). Isolation of the valve was then effected and
the muster stood down at 18:17hrs. The valve was subsequently changed out for a spare and then sent onshore for technical investigation.
During normal production operations, a High & Low Gas alarm annunciated in the CCR for Pkg 5 from low level detectors at X10 & X02 (coolong exchangers). The platform Fire & Gas system
automatically initiated a yellow shutdown and the CRT sounded the platform general alarm as per the procedure. The gas heads were re-set by the CRT following the initial muster of the CCR
team and both were at low gas levels (

A gas condensate pump (P97) was in the process of being de-isolated for a test run. The seal oil tank to the LLP flare had just been opened when a low, the high gas release was detected. A small
amount of gas had been released from P97 seal oil tank vacuum breaker and this was picked up by a gas detector located approx 30 inches away. This initiated a yellow shutdown (automatic
process shutdown). The vaccum breaker was found to be loose. P97 was re-isolated and the seal oil tank bled down.
P10 is a submersible returns pump for the LP drains vessel T71 and pumps out on level control; it is not in continual service. The day prior to the incident it had been reported that P10 was
underperforming. Checks revealed that the pump was not being effectively greased due to a split in the grease injection line. The line was repaired and grease injected. The pump was backflushed
to clear a suspect suction strainer blockage and test runs on the pump indicated an improvement in performance although vibration levels were higher than expected. Nightshift instructed to
monitor the pumps performance. During the nightshift, pump was monitored and discharge pressures checked to assess pump performance. Although performance was poor it was no worse than
the previous night. At approx 0204hrs a low gas alarm in MOL adjacent to T71 (G5223) annunciated on the F&G system, CRT requests nightshift Deck Coordinator to attend and investigate.
At around 2110hrs, on <>, a spray of oily produced water was seen issuing from pipe work at the bridle of V01 separator. A partial isolation around the leak was achieved by the on shift
operations team. They had to leave the area when the leak turned more to oil and gas, triggering the gas heads in the area and resulting in an automatic plant shutdown and sounding of the GPA
alarm. Once the plant was depressurized and gas levels in the module had reduced, an Emergency response team effected a complete isolation of the leak. The area was confirmed safe, and
platform personnel stood down from muster, at around 2200hrs. On investigation a hole was found in a carbon steel T piece, part of the seawater sand wash system designed to allow flushing of
the V01 boot and the bridle. This holed T piece had been in communication with the fluids in the separator allowing release of the fluids to atmosphere, An estimated 3 barrels of oil was released
where it drainded safely via the V01 bund and deck drains to the open drains tank T71.
Elliott gas compressor AD220 was online. 0910 hrs - A low level gas alarm annunciate in the control room at 25% LEL - 0910 hrs - 2 technicians investigate the potential source of the
hydrocarbon leak. They reported back to the control room a confirmed leak in the vicinity of the 1st stage discharge pipe work leading to the 2nd stage gas cooler. 0915 hrs. The compressor was
shutdown and the inventory blown down. 0922 hrs. OIM puts the platform onto GPA status and the Oil process is shut down as a precaution and Separators blown down. 0937 hrs. Gas heads in
M4 module at zero. 0945 hrs. Local hand-held reading 2%lel. Source of leak still to be determined due to restricted access to pipework.
Following the completion of water injection well (<>), a PLT was being run to establish if the well was in communication with the reservoir. This PLT run, which was part of the injectivity
tests, required a steady injection rate of seawater at a pressure of 3000psi, via the cement pump, shortly after starting the pumping process the operator noticed that the injection pressure was not
increasing. On investigation he found that the suction valve from the batch tank was still in the closed position. In order to re-prime his cement pump he shut down the pump, and bled back the
discharge pressure (approx 50psi / 0.5bbI of fluid), no request was made to the GSF Driller to for the two valves on the pump-in T be closed prior to this taking place. At this point the operator
smelt gas in the area of the displacement tank.
A process level upset occurred on the 3rd stage. A train separator and test separator at 19:17 which caused instability in the Oil and Gas compression process system. This later manifested itself at
20:30 by causing a process trip of the gas compression system. A restart of the Elliot booster gas compressor (AD220) was carried at 22:22hrs. At 22:50 high pitched noise was heard by the gas
compression technician. The individual investigated the source of the noise and found that it was coming from the channel head gasket on 3rd stage compresion cooler. The Gas technician
immediately called the control room and requested shut down of the compresor. This was immediately carried out and the compressor was made safe. Investigation on the leak on the 3rd stage
cooler is ongoing, the bolt holding the channel head, cooler bundle and body have been checked for correct tension and investigation of the gasket and face of the chanel head will commence
once the system has been fully N2 purged.
Following the discovery of a minor leak on a flexible hose connecting the temporary hydrocyclone to the LP Separator, the affected section of the hose was removed and replaced by a new
section. The entire line, which consisted of several flanged flexible braided hose sections, was consequently being service tested, using the process fluids at normal operating conditions. At
approximately 13 Bar, an existing section of the flexible hose split, causing produced water to be discharged. The operator present, immediately isolated the supply at the LP Separator. A gas
beam detector picked up a high level which resulted in a Red ESD. Approximately 30 mins later the operator realised he had an above injury his left knee, apparently caused by the initial
whipping of the hose. He was treated for pain and bruising.

Platform was on normal production when at 11:38hrs, a single point gas detector (GP 750427) situated on top of the <> separator came into alarm at+/- 10%LEL. The control room operator
(CRO) requested the area operator investigate the area. At 11:39hrs a second single point gas detector (GP750420) situated on top of <> Separator came into alarm at +/-10/% LEL. The CRO
informed the area operator to vacate the area immediately. The area operator had already climbed the access ladder on the separator and he noticed a gas leak coming from the top of the orifice
plate carrier. He immediately commenced returing to the control room. At 11:40hrs and 11 :41hrs, two single point gas detectors on the adjacent <> Separator came into alarm at+/- 10% LEL..
At 11:41hrs, a red ESD was automatically initiated as GP's 750427 750427 confirmed gas in a hazardous area.
Whilst scrolling the DCS screens, the control room operator noticed 2 low gas alarms active in the main deck production area. The area operator was dispatched to investigate where he found oil
leaking from the body of LV 41041 <> HP Separator Oil Level Control Valve. The operator contacted the control room and the Platform was manually shutdown. Local isolations were applied
to the Oil Level Control Valve. Plans are in place to renew the Oil Level Control Valve and check out the Fire and Gas System prior to re-start of production.
Shortly after launching a PIG to <> and whilst still under operating pressure, the PIG Launcher door seal leaked hydrocarbon into the atmosphere. Several local gas detectors initiated executive
action and automatically shutdown the process. Personnel on the Platform were mustered. The PIG launcher was isolated and depressurised. On inspection of the PIG launcher door seal was
found to be broken at approx 10 o'clock position. A new door seal will be fitted and pressure tested prior to further use.
Platform was on normal production when Area Operator heard an unusual noise emanating from the Gas Treatment Module (GTM) at approx 03:25hrs. Area Operator informed the Control Room
and went to investigate. The Control Room Operator (CRO) checked screens on Central Safety Systems (CSS) and there were no indications of gas. Area Operator eventually traced source of
noise to an instrument take off on the inlet to the Zinc Oxide (ZNO) Beds, Flow Element (FE49040B). The decision was made to shutdown and depressurise Gas Treatment Module at 03:55hrs as
instrument and source of leak could not be isolated.
When opening a Pig Launcher door, a small amount of hydrocarbon liquid laid inside the launcher vapourised off and activated a local gas detector. Went to muster, Weather conditions 19 degrees
celcius and very still. Hydrocarbon vapours soon cleared and local gas detector alarm reset itself. Safety Officer and Fire Team Member inspected area and reported all clear Personnel stood
down.
At approx 11:45hrs, metering technician heard a noise emanating from the gas export metering skid, upon further investigaion, he could see ice forming and hear gas escaping from the bonnet
grease injector on gas export metering steam #2 manual isolation valve GS 56056. He immediately returned to the control room and informed area production tech and control room operator of
what he had seen. Area production tech and metering tech tool a portable gas detector to investigate leak. Area production tech informed CRO and production supervisor in control room that leak
could not be isolated locally and decision was made to shutdown production and blowdown gas compression throught to gas export valve. which included gas meter steams. All personnel were
called into the accommodation (temp refuge) and all permits were returned to the control room. Platform was on normal production at time of incident with one compression train on line Wind
15knts direction 15'.
Normal operations. Sound 20 knots 350o. Platform automatically shutdown on gas detection when zinc oxide filter door lip seal failed. Platform mustered platform blowdown. Zinc oxide filter
door is a band lock type mechanism as found on P16 launchers. Lipseal that failed had only been in service 13 days. Door seal surfaces to be inspected & new seal fitted & pressure tested with
nitrogen prior to being put back in service.
During normal plant watch keeping duties the day shift oil and gas production operations technic and discovered a small gas leak from a 6" blank flange on the second stage of the export gas
compressor K2060. The operating pressure of the system is approx. 145 bar. The machine was shut down to allow investigation and repair.
During normal operations at exactly 06:30 on the <> a General Platform Alarm was initiated by high gas levels in Wellhead Module C3. Both gas heads that were indicating were found to be in
the location of the gas export metering skid. All personnel were mustered and accounted for within 9 minutes and emergency teams mobilised. The Plant was shutdown automatically on a Surface
Shutdown (SPS), and the OIM requested a Total Platform shutdown (TPS) to close in the sub surface safety valves on the wells. Emergency response team were sent into the area once the gas
levels had reduced to zero. No immediate visual indications of any problems identified.The Onshore emergency coordinator informed of situation. The source of the leak was traced to a 10mm
instrument tubing which had failed at the fitting on the metering skid of the gas export system.

Operations were attempting to start 060 turbine which was failing to meet required speed. Upon investigation it was discovered that a 1/4" tube on 310-32 fuel gas starter pilot regulator had
broken inside the tube connection. The release of gas would have been for 1 minute on each of the 4 attempted starts, the pressure in this line is 2.5 bar via a regulator.
A master isolation was installed on 050 Avon turbine along with a second isolation for its corresponding compressor (K2300) to complete annual maintenance and change out of the compressor
inner bundle. These two isolation was installed at 08:44 on <>. A cold work permit (CWP No 490475) was raised to remove three RV's on the 050 fuel gas system for 4 annual re-certification
(AK-RV-602, AK-RV-602-1, AK-RV-602-2). The master isolation raised for 050 was deemed sufficient to allow this work to occur. The RV's were removed on the morning of the <> after the
master isolation was installed. At 18:05 on the <>, a low level gas indication was observed in 050 enclosure which died away.
During start up process plant after annual shutdown, a low level gas indication alarm operated in the AP Metering hut. On investigation it was found that a 1/2" gyrolock cap on the end of the
bleed from DP-046 instrument block was found leaking. The bleed needle valve was found slightly open and the bleed plug sealing face was found contaminated with grit so not allowing a seal.
The whole of the instrument fittings within the metering hut was snoop tested during N2 test on <> and was recorded as having no leaks. However on the <> a pre-commissioning engineer
removed the bleed cap and opened the bleed valve on DP-046 to conduct pre-commissioning checks on a control loop. The engineer confirmed that the valve was closed and the cap replaced but
did not conduct any local test on the cap or inform operations that the bleed cap had been removed.
During pre-commisioning function testing of a new system valve (XZV-2903), the valve stoked from close to open, as the valve started to move it exposed the valve cavity to pressure at which
point N2/hydrocarbon/water was released to atmosphere. Initial investigation shows that the cavity body bleed was left 5 turns open. Part of the commissioning activities included bleeding
through the valve hydraulics line, due to air in these lines the valve remained in transit until an SPS was initiated and the valve closed, sealing the cavity from the process pressure. System
Pressure 75 barg. Leak time 6 Mins. Total Volume 6 Litres. Conensate/ water ratio 50:50. Condensate Volume 3 Litres.
During a shutdown, the 20" main gas export ESDV was leak tested. The test showed that the valve was leaking and it was judged that the rate was too great to allow the platform to recommence
production. The platform has remained shutdown. The platform are working towards removing the actuator (possibly the valve) and in order to comply with company isolation standards, the 20"
line from <> to <> will be blown down.
Following repair to the 20" gas export ESDV the line was being repressured when leakage was observed from the 20" manual ball valve fitted to the discharge of the pig launcher. The leakage was
to atmosphere past the seals between the valve bonnet and the main body. The platform was depressured. The platform has remained shut down. Work is in progress to replace the valve.
During stable production operations a technician smelled hydrocarbon and traced it to a small gas leak at a pinhole on the 2" pipe that runs from the glycol contactor scrubber to the closed drains
vessel. The plant was manually shut down and depressured. Preparations are being made to repair.
A minor gas release occured while isolating Flare Knockout Pump G6001B. Both the suction and discharge valves were shut and the operator was removing the plug on the casing to connect a
N2 purge hose. The operator was called away to attend another part of the plant and failed to re-insert the plug. It is assumed that condensate in the pump casing flashed off and set of a gas
detector positioned 0.7m away. This resulted in a yellow shut down of the plant, activation of the GPA and persons going to muster. No adverse environmental conditions at the time.
Production Technician noticed a small quantity of oil leaking from overhead pipework in module 4 deck during watch-keeping activities. This was investigated further and the leak traced to a
fillet weld on a 1/2 instrument tap in on an orifice carrier from 10 line immediately downstream of train 2 produced oil booster pumps. High vibration had been noted in this area during
operational mode. Both trains shutdown, train 2 produced oil remains offline.
A Well Service Technician observed an oil mist spraying around the area of <> christmas tree and flowline from a 1/2" instrument line adjacent to <> flowline. After an initial attempt to
isolate the leak, which was unsuccessful, the central control room was notified and 2 operations technicians were sent to investigate. In order to completely isolate the leak, two valves from the
North and south of the wellbay WCD system were isolated, together with both valves to the main 2" WCD header. After successful isolation, the section of fractured pipe was replaced and the
system put back in service. No gas detection was observed before of during the incident on the platform fire and gas detection system. See <> for additional information.

On platform start-up following a process shutdown, crude was observed leaking from the bandlock closure on the prover loop launcher. Production was shutdown manually and the prover loop
isolated. An investigation has been initated. Approximately 2 barrels of oil was released prior to the plant being shut down. The release was contained within the immediate area with no
environmental impact.
Wind:-35 knots 240 degress, Sea state:- 2.5m. Turbine generator Number 1 was down for change out of Lube oil cooler. Due to operational requirements the operations required this Generator to
be run up, on doing so a DC lube oil pump started up resulting in an oil spill at the cooler on the external walkway, this was caused by inadequate isolation of the uinit for Maintenance. Note: The
fan motor at the cooler which was being maintained was isolated, but the oil feed to it was not. Time out for safety with all platform crew was carried out. Relevant individuals coached in their
role within the permit to work and Isolation process and procedures. A more robust shift handover process has been introduced and incident included in a live Toolbox talk folder for all personnel
to read. Maximum lubricating oil spilt was approx 2bbls. 400ltr to sea.
Wind:- 5knots 350 degrees, Sea state:- 0.5m Plant steady, Normal Operations.Smell of Fumes ingested into HVAC. Operator sent to investigate and discovered a spray of Export quality Crude Oil
from a Duplex type Vee Bee Crude Oil Filter basket lid. Decision to shutdown production at the time to quickly disperse the pressure and prevent further spillage and contamination. Filter basket
had been changed out approx. 1 hour previousely. Investigation under way to ascertain the root cause of the leak.Estimated spill 2 Barrels = 0.26 te
A crew member reported smelling gas in the wellbay. A tech investigated and found gas escaping from a different pressure monitoring cell on well <>. As the tech isolated the leak sufficient gas
had been released to initiate gas detection, general alarm and automatic shutdown/blowdown. Platform personnel went to muster and emergency duty stations. All personnel were accounted for.
The fire team investigated and confirmed that the leak had been isolated and that the gas had dispersed. Personnel returned to normal duties.
For operational reasons Turbine "A" was switching from gas to diesel fuel. A leak developed on a flexible fuel supply hose. An oil mist developed and was picked up by the detection systems and
an alarm raised. The turbine was promptly shutdown.
Release of H2S from the Drilling Module Pill-pit room occured when the mud circulation pump was started by the operator in the adjacent module (Mud Pump Room). As part of drilling
equipment preservation maintenance, the pump was started to circulate Dromus B (a tank preservation fluid) which was in the pit, this resulted in all three H2S detectors within the HVAC extract
system for the pits activating resulting in change in platform status and process shutdown with all the correct executive actions taking place. Upon change in platform status the pump was
immediately shutdown by the operator. There was no smell of H2S in the Mud Pump Room(adjacent to the Pill Pit room) by the operator. The H2S levels indicated in the control room were
approx 16ppm (executive actions take place a 10ppm with 2 from 3 voting). Personnel on the platform were automatically called to muster upon change in platform status. Ventilation continued
to ventilate the area and the H2S levels returned to normal within 10-15 mins
During a period of ateady production operations, a technician observed a minor gas leak emanating from the stuffing gland of Gas Lift Choke valve FCV - 02016 on Well <>. The line
containing processed gas was operating at a pressure of 140 barg at the time. The Technician notified the Control Room immediately and the line was isolated and depressurised. The Leak was not
of sufficient volume to be detected by the platform gas detection system.
A member of the drill crew was carrying out a gas test prior to the endorsement of a hot work permit. He observed a reading of 13% LEL on his gas meter while checking the area below the east
end of the gas lift manifold in Production Module 2. He contacted the control room and a technician was sent to investigate. He detected a minor gas leak emanating from the stuffing gland of
Gas Lift Choke valve FCV - 02017 on Well <>. The line containing processed gas was operating at a pressure of 140 bar at the time. The technician notified the Control Room immediately and
the line was isolated and depressurised. The leak was picked up by the automatic gas detector above the valve which read 6% LEL. The low level alarm point is 20% LEL.
Whilst working on an adjacent vessel oil was noticed on Mod 02 deck. This was investigated and a hole was identified in the 4 closed drain under FAD201 <>. This line was not under pressure
immediately isolated. Spill Vol. - 25 litres crude. Est 5mm hole at weld.
During normal production operation, a hole developed in "A" booster pump discharge line. Production was shut down and all personnel put to muster until the leak was isolated and secured.
Hydrocarbon release on 6" line to 03SV479 off 12" 031165 "S" MOL suction line. Hydrocarbon release contained within MOD 03 - approximately 1.5bbls.

Gas release from well <> flow line. The system is fully depressurised emergency response teams in attendands platform POB fully accounted. 18 persons downmanned to the <> platform.
At the time of the incident the sea sump pump was operating in its normal mode and pumping a mixture of oil and water from the sea sump to the reclaimed oil tank. The pump is not run on a
continual basis but it is run for a few hours each day. Two technician working down on the <> <> observed a liquid spraying out of one of the pipelines. The techs informed the control room
and the shift supervisor went on site to determine the the extent of the leak. It was noted that the leak was from the sea sump pump discharge line going to the reclaimed oil tank.
After a spurious trip the gas technician was in the process of starting Z-3150 back up when low level gas (single head) was detected from MOD 6 MEZZ. The area technician took a gas meter and
confirmed the presence of low level gas in the module 24% LEL. The gas compression system was then manually shutdown and blown down. The leak was identified as coming from the IP after
cooler E3113 gas seal. The gas head that had been in alarm reset while the system was blowing down.
When preparing to launch oil pipeline to <> the pig had been secured inside the launcher and the launcher was being re-pressurised. At approx.28 bar, an oil mist was observed from a 2"
pressure relief line. The launcher was immediately de-pressured and the oil spilage was cleaned up without loss to sea or loss of production.
Hydrocarbon smell on M5 walkway mezzanine level. Technician entered the module to investigate. Discovered oil leaking from densitometer pump P-3001B, mechanical seal. At this time the
control room tech informed him that low level gas was being indicated on the Fire and Gas Panel by a Gas Head in the vicinity. He immediately shutdown and isolated the pump. This action
stopped the leak and the indication on the Fire and Gas panel cleared shortly after. The oil spillage was contained within the bunded area of the metering skid. The area was immediately cleaned
up and maintenance informed to repair the pump. Metering skid, Densitometer pump P30001B taken from actual response brom B5.
Oil found to be leaking from grease nipple on Test Separator oil outlet value and an estimated 13 litres of crude oil was spilled onto the deck. F&G system was not activated and oil was contained
without spillage to the sea Test Separator had been at 12 bar but not in use. Vessel was depressurised and a leak lock adaptor fitted to the grease nipple.
Indication of gas on fire and gas panel by one head detecting low level gas, in the vicinity of A train 1st stage separator oil outlet pipework. Technician was sent to investigate with portable gas
meter to identify any potential leaks. On arrival discovered crude oil leaking from hole in a spool on the oil outlet pipework from the separator to the closed drain system. This was reported back
to the control room and the A train process shutdown blowdown. At no time had the fixed gas detection within the module indicated level of hydrocarbons that would have initiated automatics
shutdown. Separator drained and the spool removed, being placed by a blank flange prior to restarting the process.
Water injection system on <> platform, supplied water approx. 145mb to water injection wells on both <> and <> platforms, during steady plant operations, water injection system tripped
at 22.09 hrs. The trip was due to low suction and discharged pressures on the pipe and injection pumps. Routine checks were carried prior to restart. However on attempting to restart the system
first water injection pump, increased pressure. At approx. 130 bar and it tripped again. Further attempt was made to start the system, and no discharge pressure was attained. It has been concluded
that there is a failure of a 16" water injection line somewhere on subsea section between the two platforms.
The drilling package was being re-commissioned in preparation of making the systems operational. As part of the procedure inhibited seawater process line were being checked to determine
integrity. The fluid line from the shakers to pit number 2 was required to be checked for free movement of liquid. The control was informed that the line was to be cracked open for short duration,
who informed the party to take their time in completing the task. The valve was cracked open for a duration of 20 seconds and closed. Shortly aftrewards the platform detection systems in the area
detected high levels of Hydrogen Sulphide gas which activated the platform executive action shutting down the process and activitating the platform toxic alarms., all personnel going to muster.
The drilling package was in the process of being re-commissioned in preparation of making the systems operational. As part of the comissioning procedue inhibited seawater process lines were
being checked to determine integrity. The fluid line from the shakers to pit number 2 was required to be checked for free movement of liquid. The control was informed that the line was to be
cracked open for a short duration, who informed the party to take their time in completing the task. The valve was cracked open for a duration of 20 seconds and closed. However shortly
afterwards the platform detection systems in the area detected high levels of Hydrogen Sulphide gas which activated the platform executive action shutting down the process and activating the
platform toxic alarms, all personnel going to muster.

At 01:45 hrs <>, the ST slugcatcher on <> experienced a high level (liquid). This caused an ESD of the <> satellite platforms incoming to <>. Compressor A being starved of gas
surged. The operators in the vicinity on the plant could smell and hear gas as the compressor ran down to idle. He noted simultaneously that <> weather deck had 1 gas head in alarm up. The
CRO ESD'd and BD the plant. The winds were 5 kts from the North.
At 01:20hrs <>, the <> TEG sump (CP-T-3304) started to dump its contents (19 cubic metres) via the tank's overflow. The fluids on the whole were collected in the vessel's bund, which
drains to the open drains caisson. The vessel was locally shut in along with systems that could possibly feed the LP vent. Subsequent preliminary investigation indicated a problem with the LP
vent system. It is believed that a blockage exists in the vent system, which caused back pressure to affect the TEG Sump vessel.
At 13.30 hrs <> the CRO noticed a drop in flow of about 0.1 mcmd. This was not considered unusual as wells frequently drop off flow due to liquid loading. Well <> was brought up to make
up the deficit. At 16.00 hrs the platform was zero nommed and all wells but <> were shut in. <> was metered through the test separator and was supplying gas for electrical generation. At
handover 17.40 hrs it was noted that the test separator was flowing more than would normally be required to supply the RGTs. The loss was discussed.
At 0830 hrs <> following a mini SD on the platform, the B compressor's turbine was being water washed. During this process a low-level gas leak occurred. The GA was initiated due to a
confirmed gas (10%) in the turbine enclosure, the platform personnel mustered. Further investigation has shown that a retaining ring on a shroud on the starting caused the leak. The platform is
currently shut-in pending a repair. The mini SD was not contributory to the leak.
Intervention to reset WHCP prior to starting the pressure in topsides was about 7 barg. opened all the master valves and several wing valves brought the topsides pressure up to 15 barg this is
when the audible leak was heard from the North weebay. Quickly located source of leak on redundant well flowline corrosion coupon CP602 closed all wells and export then vented down
topsides to zero leak stopped left platform isolated. Leak was coming from PTFE seal in corrosion coupon through 4mm hole in the cap.
A gas leak
Prior to the incident, the <> had been shut down and the process system had been de-oiled with seawater in preparation for a leak test to be carried out on the main oil export line to the <>.
During the rig up of temporary pumping equipment to complete this task a tie in point on the main export line was going to be used to inject filtered treated sea water. This point was opened to
drain the contents into the platform drains system. During this draining operation a spill of approximately 5 litres of crude oil occurred onto the deck of the process area, flammable gas heads
close to the spill were activated and generated a General Platform Alarm. The operation was stopped, a decision was then made to use a different injection point which was hydrocarbon free. The
spill was cleared up and disposed of.
Flushing operations were being carried out on the IP manifold using injection water. During this operation the pipework ruptured, causing gas alarms to activate due to contamination of the water
and a platform GPA.
The platform had been shutdown since <>, all hydrocarbons removed from the process facilities and shutdown maintenance in progress. Radiography was being conducted and the associated
dark room equipment established in the chemist lab. Developing equipment was in use developing films taken that night. The heating element for the fluid was inadvertently left out of the tank
and powered up. It appears that this may have either melted the the electrical cable causing sufficient heat to set fire to the plastic waste bucket adjacent to the work area or that the area itself may
have melted that bucket and ignited the waste in the bucket. Heat detection picked up the event and the platform was initiated.
During routine watchkeeping operations a leak was observed from the closed drain return line to the A train separator. The leakage was in the form of an oily water mixture (approx.10% oil)
estimated to be in the region of 3 litres/min and was emanating from a previously applied temporary patch. The leakage was totally contained within a bunded area on M2 deck level. The SSP
who witnessed the leak immediately requested the closed drains pumps to be SD and the AXZV feeding the A train separator to be isolated. Initially the leak subsided however during preparations
to inspect the patch and attempt further repairs the leak was observed to return- it was assessed at the time that the isolation valves feeding the A train and Hudson Separator must have been
passing. The SSP immediately requested the SD and depressurisation of the Separators following which the leak was suspended.

During normal watch keeping activities, an operations technician noticed a leak of produced/oily water on the deck of M2. On further investigation, a pin hole leak was found on a 3" closed
drains return line. The leak was estimated to be a maximum of a 10lts/min and was in the form of a fine spray. The leakage was being contained on the platform deck area on M2 and within the
pig launcher drainage bund area on P1. The leakage was primarily water with a maximum oil content estimated to be in the region of 5%. It is estimated that the maximum duration of the leak
prior to detection would have been 30 mins due to the last check within the area. The operations team under the supervision of the SSP were able to stem the leak using a standard rubber wrap to
allow a full temporary repair to be completed by the maintenance crew during a day shift.
On attempting to remove coupons from the above location, (CP7921), high pressure nitrogen was released to atmosphere, after the installed plug was backed off. As online retrieval of equipment
was not being utilised this location was set to be serviced with hand tools, when this line was completely flat. The release of nitrogen confirmed that this line was in fact still under pressure. The
plug was immediately reinstalled after the release.
Area technician located a leaking SS316 braided hose on the Hudson fiscal metering sampling system @ 00.03 hrs. Crude oil was sprayed onto the skid bund and the surrounding deck grating
which subsequently cascaded down to the hard deck spillage is estimated at approximately 40 lts. The leak was observed as part of normal watch keeping duties at no time did any automatic
detection initiate. The platform operations crew were immediately mobilised to clean the spillage. The leaking hose has been removed for further analysis/failure mechanism checks.
During normal watchkeeping activities an operations technician noticed a minor oil leak emanating from one of the MOL pump minimum flow recycle valves FCV1131. The oil was fully
captured within the platform drains system. On closer examination it was found that both the valve actuator bonnet and the gland follower assembly had worked loose. It is thought that this failure
had been caused by vibraton in system with the movement of the bonnet assembly then causing a failure through damage to the gland packing itself. The system was immediately SD,
depressurised isolated to allow remedial repairs to be carried out. Futher investigation into the nature of the vibraton induced failure will be carried out. The total quantity of crude oil discharged
via the leak path is estimated to be 10 litres
During normal area inspection the platform inspector noted a small spray of crude emmanating form the sand cyclone on crude oil booster pump P1101. He immediately contacted the control
room and the pump was shutdowm and isolated. The spill was completely captured in the adjacent hazardous drains gully. No spillage to sea occurred. Total oil discharged is estimated at 0.25 ltr.
It is suspected that sand erosion is the failure mechanism. Unit to be sent for failure analysis. Radiography survey being organised to check remaining units.
During a routine test run of one of the platform diesel fire pumps (DFP1) a significant hydraulic leak occurred on one of the supply hoses feeding the inlet cooling air damper. The initiation of the
leak was noted by technicians descending a stairwell above the leak site. They proceeded immediately to the fire pump room. The technicians supervising the test run was aware of a problem due
to instability and was in the process of shutting the pump down when the technicians entered the fire pump room to make him aware of the external leak. The fire pump was only running for
approx 3 mins in total. The hose is located external to the fire pump room. It is estimated that the hose rupture resulted in a leak of approx.1000lts of hydraulic oil to the platform deck level.
A 1/4" braided steel hose from the recirculation/drain line from the crude oil export sampling cylinder failed while the technician was operating the sampler. The hose was operating at 25 barg,
and the leak resulted in an oil mist being released from the failure point of the hose. The technician was sprayed with oil, but was unhurt. He immediately stopped the recirculation pump, isolated
the argon supply and depressurised the hose to drain. This stopped the leak. The hose has been replaced, and other hoses on the system inspected. They will be replaced when spares are available.
The mode of failure will be determined by testing, and the replacement strategy for such hoses is being reviewed.
During routine Technician checks of the MOL pump on P1111, he noticed a small pinhole leak had just occurred from the sandcyclone. The pump was immediately shutdown and isolated. The
offending sandcyclone was removed from service.
During the current ongoing <> DSV intervention, as part of the concurrent ROV survey works, two leaks were identified coming from the <> Manifold Water injection header. The two
defects were found to be, one at the six o'clock and the other in the three o'clock position. It was not possible to ascertain the leak rate as it is water leaking into water and was seen as a shimmer
in the water around the pipe only. Following discussions with the <> platform the water injection manifold was isolated both from the topsides and subsea equipment. Further
discussions/investigations are ongoing with <> to determine failure mechanisms and to propose repair methodology.

As part of the ongoing DSV (<>l) intervention programme on the Hudson facility a sheen was detected alongside the vessel at 14:25. The ROV was dispatched to try and identify the source of
the leakage. Oil leakage was confirmed to be emanating from a grease nipple assembly on the Test Riser routing valve of U1 (PIV M123) at 14:40. The platform were requested to close in U1.
The vessel ROV then confirmed that the leakage had ceased. As part of ongoing inspections by the ROV leakage was again detected from the same point (minor gas bubbles only) at 18:35.
Following discussions with the platform an enhanced isolation and further integrity checks were completed.
Gas bubble observed in the drain seal trap at gas compressor Tr.1. The Technician observed a small number of gas bubbles in water of drain seal trap in the lude oil pit for gas compressor tain 1.
The flow was very small and the gas was undetected by yhe fixed system, even though one of the gas heads is located immediately adjacent to the drain. Investigations revealed that a bypass v/v
was cracked open on the compressor NDE HP soul seal oil pit. When this v/v was closed, the gas bubbles ceased. It was not possible to determine the volume of gas released, since the length of
time the v/v had been open is not known.
The alarm was activated in module 11A at 20% LEL, a second gas head also activated momentary also at 20% LEL, at which point the fire and gas system logic shut down the effected process
module as per design cause and affects. The shutdown effected module a gas compression and module 5A NLGP. In addition to the flammable gas defected, 1H2F Head was activating.
During operations to blow down well annuls pressure after wireline operations to plug the well, a temporary flexible hose was connected between the tree & the open drains tundish in module 11.
When the valve opened drains to vent liquid to the drain, gas emanated from the hose leading to 2 gas heads detecting >20% LEL. This caused executive action to transfer the A power generation
turbine to liquid fuel & to shut down NLGP import gas. On witnessing the 20% LEL in the control room, the CCR immediately contacted the area operator in attendance with the wireline
operatives. The area operator instructed the wireline operative who immediately ceased the operation & made safe. This is an additional executive action added in the last 4 years to prevent
unnecessary platform blackout. In the past turbine fuel transfer has been slow to react & when the 60% LEL level had been reached & the platform shutdown was initiated, fuel transfer had not
been made resulting in blackout.
During normal Production Operations an H2S alarm registered in the Control Room (CCR) indicating presence of gas in Mod 11A GLC. The reading on the panel showed the levels fluctuating up
to a maximum of 25ppm. The Field Operations Technician was asked to make a visual investigation with caution. Subsequently, 2 flammable gas heads gave indication in the same area, moments
apart - one at >20%, one at
During normal production operations at 00:50 hrs a flammable gas detector in Module 11A gas lift compression module alarmed peaking at 27% LEL. Whilst this alarm was being investigated by
the operations team at 01:00hrs, a second gas head on the other circuit activated at 20% LEL followed by an H2s alarm in the same area. At this point the fire and gas system logic executive
actions automatically shutdown the LP and HP gas compression train and shutdown the Import gas system. "A" and "B" Turbines successfully changed over from gas to liquid fuel. The gas
detection levels began to drop almost immediately after the system shutdown. Mod 11A is closed on 5 sides with windwalls that do not reach all the way to the roof of the Module. The weather
was fair (wind 14 kts at 130 degrees - South easterly).
The on platform riser ESD Valve for the remote well <> (<> Field) was being leak/integrity tested. Following completion of the testing the down stream pipework was repressured in
readiness for returing the well to service. Shortly after teh repressuring operation the GPA shouded (16:26) and personnel were mustered. The GPA was activated as part of an ESD leve 3b shut
down which was initiated as a result of gas detection in Module 1 Level 1, West side. The platform was returmed to normal status and pesonnel stood down from muster at 16:45. The cause of the
hydrocarbon release was traced to failed instrument fittings/tubing associated with instrumentation serving the Well <> flowline.
time into shift 3 hours No of days into tour 2 The injured party was investigation the source of a leak on small bore hydraulic pipework associated with the wellhead control system. Wearing PVC
gloves he ran his fingers along a length of tubing. Sensing he had cuaght his thumb on a burr he removed his hand to find a small puncture injury to his thumb. A number of alternate means were
available to identify where the leak was coming from. Further investigation revealed a pinhole leak due to rubbing. The tubing in question tied into a panel mounted pressure indicator that had at
some point come adrift from the panel and hence rubbed against adjacent pipework

Platforms sodium hypochlorite generator out of service to allow for refurbishment & repair. Temp facility was in place to provide the sea/service water system with the chemical. This consists of
tote tank containing sodium hypochlorite in solution, air driven injection pump & flexible suction & discharge hoses connecting tank to pump & from pump discharge to service water system.
System in use since 10/3 & was anticipated to be req'd for only a couple of weeks. Now anticipated could be req'd for many weeks to come. At 06:30 on <>, leak had been noticed from
discharge on pump. Pump shut down & temporary system isolated from service water system. Left for several hours to allow for depressure. Approx 13:25, <>was asked to investigate problem.
<> heard this over radio & proceeded to site to assist him. <>proceeded to disconnect hose at discharge of pump.
At approx 0200 on<> a production technician discovered Braco Micronic SV/200 leaking from the wellhead hydraulic control system. The fluid was eminating from a damaged Haskell pump
head. The pump was stopped and isolated. Approximately 300 lts. of fluid had been lost.
At 16:03 on the <> BC1 compressor tripped during CCC anti surge maintenance work. The operations team then prepared the machine for a re-start. During the re-start gas detector 54-07 in
the Avon starter motor house was activated sounding the GPA. A full platform Muster occurred and the Fire team, with full BA were sent to check the area. When all areas were confirmed clear
and vented, the platforms system technicians were sent to check gas panels and confirmed a gas leak had occurred. Investigations currently being progressed to determine where the gas escape
occurred. A full repair will be completed once the leak source has been identified. Internal incident investigations will also be conducted.
At 1440 hrs on the <> at the <> the <> diesel day tank low level alarm activated in LOGGS MCR. Upon visiting the platform it became apparent that the crane diesel bunkering hose was
leaking diesel onto the deck and into the sea. On closer inspection the filling handle trigger mechanism was in closed position but still leaking diesel, and the 2" isolation ball valve was 20% open.
An isolation chain was in place but still allowed the valve handle to move. Approximately 5.5 tonnes of diesel was lost to sea. The valve was temporarily secured and isolated. The next day the
valve was removed for inspection. The filling handle was repaired and the new 2" ball valve securely isolated.
<>. A spillage of fluid had previous occured at the C77 manifold connection to the <> production well head. During attempts to kill the well a small amount of oil and gas was seen coming
from the connection. The well had been subsequently killed and the control line displaced with heavy weight fluid.
(Further report):- It was noticed the C77 valve on the chemical injection was leaking chemical from between the seal piece and the multi bowl. During remedial action to control the leak a
quantity of gas was released from the leak on the C77 valve/wellhead interface. The chemical pump was stopped and the line displaced to Glycol/water in order to increase the hydrostatic to a
value greater than the wellhead pressure. This was done with the well on line so as to keep the wellhead pressure to a minium. The well was shut in and subsequently displaced by bullheading 3 x
tubing volumes of treating seawater down the tubing. Refer to <>
At 05:30 hours mud circulating at start of drilling new 'through tubing' well program. Confirmed high level gas detected on drill floor when BOP top section valve opened as per procedure muster
actioned. Calculated hydrocardon release minor (0.19m3 - 0.5kg) based on pipework (BOP volume). Platform investigation in hand.
<>.Eight <> wells (<>) on the west side of the platform had been shutdown to change out their non return valves (NRV) after a pin hole leak was observed on <> on the <>. The
NRV's had been replaced and a gross leak test 5 bar and pressure test to 20.6 bar was carried out. No leaks were observed. On the startup of the wells, a minor oil leak was observed coming from
the 9 o' clock position between the NRV and flange on <>. No gas was detected by the fixed platform gas detection heads nor by portable units. The manifold valves are not tight shut, therefore
to effect repair on the NRV, the west side main double block and bled valves were closed. To further speed up depressurisation, when the pressure had reduced to 5 bar (3rd stage pressure), the
wells on the East side were also closed in and the <> process blown down. Personnel were mustered as a precautionary measure.
<>. Whilst circulating casing contents prior to performing cementing operations high gas reading was observed in the header box. The well was static (i.e. this was NOT a Well Control
Situation) but the BOP was closed and the well circulated via the choke and degasser as a precaution until the gas readings reduced, after which the BOP was opened and the well circulated
conventionally.
During fault finding on a Penguin 440 volt electrical control equipment in Module M1E, an Electrical Operations Techinician received a shock from cubicle BCL-1347, LHS 1E1.

<>. A failure was recorded while carrying out routine 6 monthly leak off test on the Baker Oil Tools LEAVS-1 annular safety valves was closed by bleeding off the control line pressure of 5000
psi. (1500 ml as opposed to 105 ml at installation). When an attempt was made to bleed off annulus pressure above the valve, the time taken for the pressure to drop suggested strongly that the
gas was passing the sleeve in the valve or past the pack off. Further tests were carried out by a Baker Oil Tools engineer but final conclusion was the same: the annulus safety valve failed.
<> - <> TRSSV Failure to close. During normal shutdown of well TRSSV failed to close. A series of hydraulic cycles failed to initiate closure. All parameters recorded and forwarded to
Onshore Well Engineering Support Team who are developing a remedial plan. <> Report <>.
This event has been registered as a near miss incident. The well was flowchecked and preparations were made to POOH. The ESD system level 3 was inadvertently activated by a team of
inspectors that were testing the lifeboat release systems. 1. This event caused a total power shutdown, including batteries, UPS etc. 2. The breaker was reset within a minute but it took up to one
hour to return the rig to full power. 3. The power blackout also affected the Azonic (24 volt) BOP control system, which was powered down by the ESD. 4. Pipe rams could not be closed,
however, the shear ram could be activated separately. 5. This issue has highlighted the system's hierarchy on board and steps have been taken to restore power to the UPS even in the event of a
total blackout. The steps taken to move forward are as follows: 1. A wiper assembly has been run in the well to circulate fresh mud (after 48hrs. of logging) and circulate out trip gas. 2. The
assembly will be retrieved and the BOP control system modified with a by pass to the Azonic system. 3. The system will be commissioned and tested before running casing mid of week <>.
During a routine wireline programme on <> Gas 11ft change out programme, a 3.688 R Plug Body was set in downhole nipple profile at 15828. An attempt was made to shear off running tool
which was unsuccessful. Heavy jarring then took place over the next 8 hrs to try and release the RX Running tool from the plug body. During this operation the 0.125 Supa 70 wire broke at the
bottom sheave on the rig floor and jammed in the stuffing box sheave at top of lubricator. The well pressure was still contained, no injury to any personnel as the rig floor and surrounding area
was barriered off and clear of any personnel. The loose end of wire was retrieved and tied back to the wireline unit. A forward programme was then issued from the beach to continue with the
operation.
Well <> has been closed in since <> unenomical to produce due to high water cut. During routine monitoring of wellhead operations, a production operator noticed a small pool of oil had
appeared on the top of the Electrical Submersible Pump cable penetrate. Further investigation showed that oil/gas was leaking past at the cable seal. The well is known to have tubing to the
annulus communication so attempts were made to bleed pressure via the "A" annulus. The bleed off line is 1/2" diameter and not large enough to make any significant pressure difference. Pressre
remained ca 100 bar. The choke was replaced in the flowline and the well opened up to process which immediatly gave a 100 bar reduction in annulus pressure. Within 2 hours the annulus
pressure had dropped to 63 bar and by next morning was down to 58 bar. CITHP was recorded at 13 bar and 9 bar in operation on a 50 choke. By morning there was no visible signs of leakage
and it continues to be monitored pending plans to address the area of concern. Refer to <>
<> - While making a connection at 17154' on well <>, it was noted the well was flowing. The BOP's were closed in and the 4 bbi influx was successfully circulated out and the well was then
killed by circulating around 14.2 PPG mud.
<>. Encountered drilling mud losses drilling at 16095ft on <> in lower <>. Reduced mud weight from 13.6ppg to 13.0ppg. While monitoring well observed 1 1/2/bbl gain on trip tank.
Shut well in on annular. Initial shut in casing pressure 360psi. Shut in drill pipe pressure 10psi. Monitored well prior to circulating over choke.
<> - Operation; completing inflow test on bot liner top packer on well <>. Event; Followed standard inlow test procedure (see attachment 1). Displaced well to seawater while maintaining
BHP constant with final SIP = 3100 PSI. Attempted inflow test - failed at 500 PSI shut in pressure. Action; Displaced well back to 13.4 ppg mud using DP stepdown chart. Flow checked well static.
<>. On <>, a clean-up trip with a 6" bit was being carried out in <> well <>. The mud weight was 11.5 ppg and pore pressure 9.1 ppg. The assembly was pumped out until it was above
7" liner top and inside 9 5/8" casing. At approximately 17:30 a flow check was carried out and an attempt was made to POOH wet. Swab analysis performed prior to this operation had indicated
no issues with pipe pulling speed of 60-90 secs/stand. Three stands were pulled and the trip tank monitored to evaluate the hole fill. After a three stand trip the tank had increased by 5.7 bbls,
which when added to pipe metal displacement gave a total increase of approximately 8 bbls. The well was immediately flow checked for 30 mins and was found to be static.

<> The well was taken over from production and the annuli pressures were C zero, B zero and A 2.2 bar. During a perforation programme excessive wellhead settlement to 6 to 24" allowed C
annulus to strip out of unihead as it sank inside conductor. When the problem was discovered a 10' gun was in the well and unable to pass 5303' The gun was pulled from the well and made safe.
Electric line was rigged down. Production operations checked the isolations from the process side and wellhead instrumentation. Main rig was drilling <>. The drilling was suspended and
drilling string was pulled back inside previous shoe. OIM and SWE were informed. The annulus pressures were continuously monitored. A reference point was set up to monitor wellhead
settlement.
<>. Well Control Occurrence. During circulation (with annular closed and through choke manifold) after unsuccessful inflow test on 4 1/2" liner, a gain of 2.7 barrels was observed. The well
was closed in on the choke and pressures allowed to stabilise. An influx was circulated out under controlled conditions using the drillers method and the well was then displaced to kill mud.
<>. Well <> had been suspended with a kill string in the hole to allow a 4 week platform shutdown to take place. Upon retreiving the kill string the kill weight mud of 585pptf was found to
have sagged resulting in gas shows at surface. Mud at shakers was found to be 480pptf. A flow check was carried out and the well was static. The BOP was closed and mud was circulated and
conditioned mud through choke. Mud weights out were 480pptf to 540pptf. The well was circulated until no indication of gas in the mud. The well was then opened up and flow checked - static.
In the subsequent process of weighting up and conditioning the mud, a pit gain of 8bbls was observed. The well was flow checked and observed to be flowing. The well was shut in and observed
with no presure increase on surface gauges. The well was then circulated 1 1/2 times bottoms-up through choke with no indications of gas on drilgas monitor or at shakers. The pit gain was
attributed to u-tubing.
<>. Whilst conducting operations to recover +/- 18,400 ft of 1 3/4" coil tubing, a coil tubing overshot was run over the top of a fish (+/- 172 ft BRT) with only the pack off installed and not the
gripping slips. The intention was to cut the "fishing" coil at a point above the gooseneck, install wireline equipment and run a drift throuh the "fishing" coil into the section of the coil to be fished.
This would ensure that a subsequent electric line conveyed severance charge would pass through the top of the fish. After the overshot was positioned over the fish, a successful inflow test was
conducted confirming that the bore of the coil tubing was isolated from the well above via the overshot pack and the dual check valve in the original coil bottom hole assembly.
<> After adding perforations on drill pipe (overbalance to reservoir with well fluid) and preparing to run completion on <> (DTI No. 211/29-C28) the well was observed to be flowing at
0.4bbl/hr. The BOPwas closed in as a precaution and pressure built up to 50 psi before stabilising for 30 mins. The pressure was bled off to 0 psi and was observed to remain constant for 1 hour.
The BOP was then opened and the well monitored over the trip tank, the well was static initially and losses of 0.2bbl/hr were later observed.
<> - After completing Leak Off Test of well <> the production SSSV. The production SSSV had been left closed and depressurised above to allow greasing of the valves to take place. This
had just commenced on the tree valves when a loud noise was heard and movement of the tree was observed. The operation was stopped and investigated. The Production Upper Master Valve
could not be closed and neither could the Production Lower Master Valve. The tree was then closed in at the FWV's and checked for integrity which was found to be okay. After completing a risk
assessment the well was depressurised.
<>. Suspected collapsed casing. While carrying out a drift run on T2 on <>, prior to running a production log and calliper survey, the drift tool hung up at 5987 ft MDBRT. Samples of the fill
were retrieved to surface and sent off for analysis. The analysis showed that the sample was probably shale from behind the 9 5/8"casing at this depth. The hold up depth was very close to a
known hole in the tubing so it is suspected that the casing is also breached around this depth and shale has intruded into the tubing. The well has been shut in and further tests are planned to
determine connectivity with the reservoir for the purpose of killing the well prior to workover or abandonment.
<> - Tubing to A Annulus in <> Platform Well <>. At 02.55hrs <> <> indicated an immediate increase in A ann pressure from 22.6 bar to 569 bar, indicating tubing to A annulus
communication. The B annulus remained stable at its normal controlled pressure of 220 bar. Subsequent monitoring indicated the TRSSV and A to B barriers remained in place. The Well
remained closed in and Blow Down to 70 bar above the TRSSV while all well parameters monitored. An Onshore Investigation and Recovery Team progressed a remedial programme and the <
> Jack Up Rig was programmed for <> arrival to implement a Well Kill and work over programme.
<>. 0700 During routine worover on <>, BOP's were closed in following a loss of fluid into well. 0800 Seawater bullheaded into tubing (250 bbls@2000psi). 1330 Well monitored with a
further 210 bbls of seawater bullheaded downhole. 2200 Well monitored for further losses using Trip tank to assess fluids. 2300 Loss assessed and agreement reached to continue normal
workover procedure.

<>. 22:00 <> during a routine workover on CP61. BOP's were closed-in, initially on the annular preventer & then on the upper pipe rams, following a 3.5 bbls gain into the trip tank.
Operation at the time was POOH laying down 5 1/2" tubing. 11 joints of tubing had been pulled. Brine weight in use at the time was 12.8 ppg. Pressure was monitored for 3 hrs. Casing pressure
rose to 42 psi over this period. Drill pipe pressure was 0 psi. 01:00 <> well bull-headed with 25 bbls of 12.8 ppg brine. 01:15 well circulated with a hole volume (1200 bbls) 12.8 ppg brine,
through the choke manifold, holding 200 psi back pressure. No influx observed at surface. Lost 25 bbls to formation during circulation. 04:30 monitor well. Tubing pressure increased from 0 psi
to 246 psi and casing pressure increased from 0 psi to 246 psi and casing pressure increased from 30 psi to 289 psi over a period of 89 hours. 21:15 <> well circulated to 13.8 ppg brine through
the choke manifold using drillers method. DPP 560 psi @ 50 spm.
<>. 1700 Hrs. Well Control observation of 9 bbls discrepancy in fluid trip tank. Well closed in. 2030 hrs. Bullheaded 50 bbls of 13/7 Brine into formation and monitoring pressure. 2330 Hrs.
Bullhead further 50 bbls 13.7 Brine into formation. 0400 Hrs (22/11/03) Bleed down and monitor pressure, gain of 0.5 bbl. 0530 Hrs. Well closed in and monitored. 0600 Hrs. Continue to
monitor pressures. 1100 Hrs pressure static with no losses for last 5 Hrs. Normal operations continue.
<> - 13.30 Hrs. (<>) Well gain of 5 Bbls noted on returns. Well closed in. Pressures monitored on ongoing basis. Pressures bled down with rapid return to 40 psi. 17.45 Hrs. Perform top kill
operations using using 14.3 ppg Brine. Continue to monitor well on active service. Decision to mix water based mud to displace kill fluid in well. 1045hrs (<>) Displace well fluids with 14.3
ppg WBM, circulate and continue operations. Flow check showed well static. 0530 Hrs (<>) 12 bbl gain noted on Trip tank. Stab Kelly cock and close in well on annular.
<> - The 2 7/8 drill string was in the process of being pulled out of the hole. At a depth of 17160ft the driller performed a flow check every 5 stands. On the 11th-15th stands the driller noticed
that the pipe displacement of the trip tank did not correlate to the theoretical displacement of the pipe. It was found that a volume of 2.5 bbls of oil was swabbed into the well. The driller stopped
pulling the pipe then performed a flow check, he noticed tthat the well was flowing very slowly. The driller closed in the well using fast shut in method and recorded the annullus and drill pipe
pressures. Line supervision were then informed of the incident.
<>. Well abandonment <> was closed in on the annular preventer and well control operations were initiated to kill a sea water influx. A flow check on the well revealed that the 11.9 ppg
brine was flowing at 4.8 bph with a total pit gain of 5 bbls. The well was shut in and the pressure build up was monitored. The maximum pressures were: SICP 1550psi, SIDPP 1480psi. A mud
weight of 16.04ppg was calculated to balance the formation pressure and final mud weight of 16.4ppg versaclean oil based mud was circulated under controlled conditions to provide a 120 psi
overbalance. S-11 was flow checked and remained statric thereafter.
<> - Well <> is an ESP Producer. Completion tubular were being pulled from the well,with 300ft remaining. The well was losing approx 20bbl per hour of 10.5ppg brine. Having laid down a
joint, flow of crude/calcium chloride brine started from the tubing and an attempt to stab a safety valve by the rig crew was made but increasing flow prevented this. The BOP blind/shear rams
were then closed to secure the well. Approx 2bbl of crude/brine was spilled on the drill floor. The closed in well recorded 45psi pressure. 300bbl of heavy brine was bullheaded into the well to
redcue pressure to zero. The well was opened and losses of 20bbl observed.
<>. Findings and Conclusions: closed blow out preventer and observed pressure build up in well S-70 to 1570psi. (Incident reportable since BOP was used to close in well). It was determined
that water at a low flow rate was coming into the well vai the newly cemented liner shoe track. Because of the flow rate - 3 1/2/ barrels per hur, drill pipe was able to to ran into the well to a
position where heavier fluid could be pumped. This overcame the influx of water.
<>. At bottoms up from 20407ft increasing gas levels were seen at the shakers/flowline. Gas levels rose to an indicated 25% whereupon the well was shut in on the Annular Preventor and
pressures monitored. At this time no pressure build-up was seen on the drill pipe or casing. Circulation resumed over a fully open choke in order to process the mud returns through the Degassers.
Indicated gas levels rose to 85% at the shakers/flowline although handheld monitors indicated 0%. Circulation was stopped at this point and the choke was closed in order to monitor pressures
(well still shut-in on Annular Preventer). At his point pressure was seen to build on both drill pipe and casing.
<>. At 0800 hrs on <>, we identified a potential tubing failure above the packer on well <> on <>. This is a gas production well. The well has communication between the production
tubing and the inner casing annul;us, and is exhibiting SIWHP (approx 1000 psi) in this annulus. This is approximately 50% of the MAASP (Maximum Annulus Surface Pressure). The well is
currently shut in and options are being considered for the future of the well.

<...>.The drillstring had been pulled out of well <...> to a depth of 10000 ft and the well circulated clean. Prior to continuing to pull out the well was checked for flow. Over a period of 3.5 hrs
40bbls of mud returned from the well. The well was closed in and a pressure build up observed. The casing pressure stabilised at 260psi. Well control contingency procedures were put in place.
An estimated 20 litres of crude oil leaked on to the lower deck M4 when a 1/4 when a SS chemical injection line sheared due to flowline movement and vibration. A pigtail loop was part of the
pipe design to allow for the movement. Well <...> is 94% so the total produced fluids was 500 litres. Leak was detected by an operator and not picked up by the F&G detection. All leakage was
captured in an adjacent open deck drain and did not spill overboard.
Fire was indicated on 2 detectors while <...> pump was running and pump shut down automatically. The FWMS was activiated but there was no evidence of actual fire. FWMS was reset and
cause of indication was investigated but no conclusion has yet been reached.
Surface process shutdown manually initated from control room at 03:30 on <...> test manifold block valve being greased to achieve seal, with <...> closed in at xmass tree. When grease gun was
removed from grease nipple, check v/v failed, and grease was seen squirting out of this nipple. Ops tech attempted, unsucessfully, to replace the cap. Oil was then seen coming out of nipple, <...>
was flowing to the test sep. at 22 barg at the time. The ops tech immediately radio'd the control room to manually initiate <...>, and evacuated the area. NO LLG or HLG alarms indicated on the
fixed fire and gas system. The ops. tech who was greasing <...> was splashed with oil. Key events were:- 03:30 - <...> manually initated from control room 03:35 - Medic mustered, ops tech
splashed with oil examined by medic, cleaned up, and declared fit. 03:44 - Full muster, wellheads checked for gas with hand-held monitor. 04:13 - All personnel stood down, return to normal
status.
During off loading of supply vessel <...>, it was noticed that immediately after a cargo basket had been lifted from the deck of the vessel, one of the four lifting slings slackened. The lift had
progressed sufficiently that the crane operator made the judgement to continue and the lift was completed without further incident. Once the container was landed on the Platform deck, it was
confirmed that one of the lifting eyes has sheared off. Weight of unit when discharged from vessel was 1300kgs. Weather conditions: 282 Degrees, 22kts, 3.8 metres Sig Wave. The empty cargo
basket will be returned within another unit for inspection/repair. The padeye will also be returned onshore for further investigation and failure analysis.
<...> oil export pump was started at 04:27, the <...> knowing the pump had just been started made his way into D1CN to check to ensure everything is OK as is good operating practice. On
entering the module the <...> noted oil leaking from the top 1/2" SS swagelock fitting for the DE and NDE mechanical seal cyclones, he exited the module immediately and phoned the control
room, instructing the CRO to shutdown the pump, this was duly done and the pump shutdown at 04:30. Confirming all gas heads were clear and that the area was safe the <...> and another
technician made their way, with a gas meter, into the module, investigations revealed that both of the leaking fittings were loose and obviously had not been tightened correctly. A routine had been
done on the cyclones which involved them being removed for inspection and cleaning, carried out on <...>. As this was the first time that oil export had been online since the cyclones were
removed for maintenance it is assumed that they were not refitted correctly following that scope of work. The isolations for the cyclones are local on the 1/2" SS pipework, the number of fittings
that would have to be 'split' to allow a SW reinstatement test to be completed is the same as required to complete the job, therefore a SW reinstatement test was not done as there was no
During helideck checks a piece of composite/plastio material 4" x 4" was found on the helideck. A full search of the area was completed in an attempt to identify where the material originated
however no other similar material was located. It is suspected that as per a previous incident this material may have come from the exhaust stack structure. Previous works completed on the
exhaust shack had indicated that all shims remaining in position had been extremely secure. There is the possibility that this may have been a piece of debris that had previously become detached
(prior to the abseil remedial work) but that had subsequently gone unnoticed until the high winds have dislodged that item which is relatively lightweight. Until confidence can be gained in the
condition of the shack shims through inspections and area checks the previously agreed helicopter flying envelope erection will be reapplied.
A three tonne chain block (<...> ) was being utilised to remove East crane slewbox for maintenence. On lifting the slewbox approximately 4" out of retaining boss, the rigger stopped lifting
operation momentarily and removed hands from Gypsy chain where upon the load began to lower back into boss. Weight of slew box - 500kg. Block removed from service and quarantined for
examination to be organised by the contract supplier. Near miss report to be filled to ensure lateral learning across industry. Reference <...> - Chain block tight load slippage.

Description :- Wind 22-26 knots, direction 240 degrees, sea state 2-3m Plant production rates increasing requiring additional pump to be brought on line. MOL pump P3420 was started by oil
plant operator, as the pump was running up he noticed a fine spray of oil adjacent to the recycle line pressure indicator. The pump was immediately shutdown and isolated. Approximately 2 litres
of stabilised crude oil was wiped up from the adjacent pipework. There was no escape to sea. Further investigation revealed a crack in the threaded part of the pipe nipple screwed into the PI
fitting, approximately one third of the way up the threads. When the nipple was removed the fracture spread across the whole of the threaded area and the upper part came away. The nipple has
been sent onshore for additional investigation. The nipple was replaced and the equivalent nipple on MOL Pump 3410 was given a close visual inspection by the OIS inspector. This will be
replaced. SCAR radiography is scheduled in the next two weeks and this area will be included in the workscope. The construction supervisor has inspected the Pressure Indicator pipework
general arrangement and he will be submitting ideas for improving the layout.
Environmental conditions: Wind Speed 12kts, SSE. Operations: Inboard Deck Operations. Equipment : <...> Crane <...>. The West crane was working with chemical containers. The crane
operator landed an empty tank and picked up a full tank and when slewing into position to land the load the crane operator observed that the load was slowly lowering of its own accord. The crane
driver advised his deck crew of the problem and instructed them to remain clear of the laydown area. The load was landed safely by using the hoist lever to control the landing. The crane was then
shut down and the problem was reported to the crane mechanic. The crane mechanic found that the Whip Hoist winch brake band adjusting stud had sheared at the point where it screws into the
brake yoke. The crane mechanic advised that the failure of this adjusting stud does not allow the load to go into "freefall" and also that if the crane was shut down due to internal losses in the
hydraulic system the load/hook would still only creep down and that there would be no likelihood of any free fall condition. An advisory alert was issued to other <...> installations that may have
the same or similar type cranes.
At 03:24 a production technician was walking through the AC cellar deck when he became aware of a fine mist falling from the area of the K200 Suction boot sight glass. The K200 gas
compressor was immediately shutdown and de-pressured. The production technician had walked through the area some 40 minutes earlier and is confident that the leak was not present at that
time. Subsequent investigations have identified a pinhole on the back of the sight glass body. The sight glass has been isolated, removed from service and blanks fitted. The Suction boot is a
vertical section of 24" pipe directly underneath the gas compressor. It is equipped with level control and high-level alarm function for compressor protection. In normal operation a liquid level is
maintained in the boot (a volume of approximately 50 litres). As the leak point was a pinhole and it's maximum duration was 40 minutes, the quantity of fluid released was very small (estimated at
less than 1 litre). No personnel came into contact with the release or were injured because of it. An internal investigation of this event is being mobilised.
During normal supply vessel operations, the East crane 30 tonne pennant hook caught on back rail of supply vessel causing overpull resulting in damage to pennant and boat rails. A full
investigation is being carried out.
<...> seal balance line was noted to be leaking crude oil from a threaded joint at the DE of the pump. The pump was shutdown and repairs carried out. Volume of spillage 1 litre.
<...> had been returned to service after repairs had been completed leaking threaded joint on the seal balance line. Approx 8 hrs after return to service a leak was discovered from a different
threaded joint at the entry to the DE sand cyclone. Volume of spillage circa 3-4 litres. (see Incident <...> for previous occurrence)
Eleven KV Breaker Short Circuit resulted in heat and fire causing damage to inside of cubicle. Preventative Measures: This was a mechanical failure investigation is still ongoing.
Environmental conditions: Wind Speed S.W. 25kts. Normal Production Operations: Vis. Dark Following high winds, a section of partly cut away cable tray cover was found lying on the deck
grating at the N.W. corner of the Production Deck level walkway. The cover was a piece of heavy duty stainless steel approx, 17" x 13" The piece of steel appeared to have been cut across half of
its width and then snapped /torn off across the rest, this, in all probability by exposure to the recent severe prevailing winds at that time. The piece of metal had fallen from a position approx. 15
metres above the location at which it was found. It is believed to be the remains of a programmed destruct operation carried out earlier in <...> and overlooked when the task was completed.
There were no witnesses to the event. No personnel were injured. No damage was sustained to any part of the installation, machinery or associated systems. Upon discovery of the fallen steel
cover, a platform investigation was instigated and a company report compiled and submitted to onshore management. Following due deliberations, it was considered of sufficient importance to
raise this <...>.
Environmental conditions: Not Applicable in this instance. Normal Production Operations: Vis. good, artificial and natural light. Two technicians were carrying out a planned maintenance task,
re-pressurising, with Nitrogen, a bank of hydraulic accumulators. A portable <...> pump was utilised for the task. This was a new addition to the platform and required the fitting of a three foot
long half inch stainless steel tube from the HP outlet of the pump to the existing fitted pipework where an inline tee piece facilitated the mounting of a PSV. A total of four new joints were
required to complete the rig up configuration. The work was carried out by the platform's Inst. Lead Tech. a man experienced and trained in this operation. During the charging operation, when
the pressure from the pump reached 130 bar, a connection on the recently fitted tube failed under pressure and the three foot section of pipe struck one of the Techs. in the chest. Fortunately no
serious injury occurred. Subsequent inspection of the failed union identified that it had not been correctly fitted and connected. The man responsible for fitting the tubing immediately admitted his
error.

<...> sand cyclone was found to have a pin-hole leak failure. Hydrocarbons were released from the leak site to the surrounding area. The platform fixed gas detection system did not detect the
leak. The estimated hydrocarbon discharge is 10 litres. The pump was shutdown immediately and isolated.
During normal Plant operating conditions an H2S gas alarm for module 11A activated indicating 40 ppm. An operations technician was requested to investigate and reported seeing gas leaking
from the vicinity of the HP compressor discharge cooler. Upon receiving this information at 2155hrs the Gas compression system was manually shutdown from the control room and the inventory
blown down. At 2157 two gas heads in the mezzanine level alarmed indicating low-level detection at 20% LEL at which point the Fire and Gas system executive action shut down the import gas
system and changed the Turbines to diesel fuel. The gas detection was reset within several minutes of the initial alarm.
Personnel were carrying out a non-destructive testing survey (MPI) on an 18" <...> flare header in <...>. While using a scraper to clean surface rust from the line a corrosion blister was removed
and a 4mm hole appeared at the 12 o'clock position. A hydrocarbon leak occurred at this time and the workparty vacated the area and reported the leak to the control room. Three local fixed gas
detectors did not pick up any gas and no automatic shutdown was activated. The system pressure at the time would have been 0.3 - 0.5 Bar. <...> is an open module and the wind direction (035
deg & 12 kts) was blowing any gas released away from the platfom. The area was barriered off and all personnel called back to the TR by initiating a general platform alarm (GPA). A controlled
shutdown was then carried out from the control room to limit the back pressure the line would see and a nitrogen purge was applied to the flare system to prevent air ingress. <...> putty was
applied to the hole at 13:30 on <...> and a <...> wrap fitted after surface preparations had been completed.
Well <...> was being flowed via a cold start system to warm up prior to export. There was a hydrocargas (?) release from a pin hole leak in the body of FCV 13777 (flow control valve) on the
down stream side. Leak was observed by work party nearby who reported to control room immediately via radio. Control room operator immediately dispatched are authority to investigate, on
confirmation of pin hole leak CRO closed in FCV 13777 and leak stopped immediately. System depressurised and isolated. Remove FCV 13777 for onshore analysis. Wind 30knts South, dry.
Normal production operations, NGL production restarted four hours prior to incident. NGL production noted to be reducing . Area production Technician inspected plant and noted leak of NGL
from chiller E5 cladding. NGL unit shutdown and leak stopped. Localised gas monitoring conducted in area. Gas levels reduced immediately when unit shutdown. Unit remains shutdown and
isolated to allow investigation of leak. Weather: Wind 260 frg, 17-21 knots sea 1.5 knots visibility clear 10 miles.
At 0:400 hrs the nightshift area authority was making his way around the south walkway on level 2 when he found a section fo firebrick weighing approximately 0.25kg lying on the deck. This
brick had been part of the heat resistant fire shield which is located at the top of the flare tower, some 200 feet above. It is not known when it fell but it is likely that it was dislodged by the severe
winds that had been experienced the previous week. The weather conditions were relatively calm when the object was found. An inspection of the remaining bricks was carried out using the
infield shuttle helicopter and no evidence was found to suggest that any further bricks are in imminent danger of falling. However, a repair order has been raised for a closer inspection and any
necessary repairs which may be identified.
Leak on "S" Tilt Plate Separator Pump caused by a mechanical seal failure. Leak consisted of crude oil and water. Quantity of crude oil = 3ltrs (approx). Contained within Module no discharge to
sea. Production depressurised via flare in a controlled manner. Mechanical and electrical isolated completed for repair.
The East Crane on the <...> Platform was about to be used to remove equipment from the drill floor. The whip line compressing headache ball and integer hook complete with pennant line, was
positioned at the V Door Entrance to the Drill Floor. When the pennants hook was being postioned at the entrance to the drill floor by the crane diver the headache ball is believed to have
contacted the Derek Roller causing the ring of the pennant to be released from the headache ball hook. As a result of the pennant (10 tonne rated 30 feet long weight 25 kilograms) fell a distance
of 25 metres to the skid deck below.
At approx 14:50 during compression washing of compressor K2400, an Operations Tech noticed vapour emanating from the base of a welder 1" NPS branch fitting on the 18" diameter gas
recycle line. This had the appearance of water steaming off. The recycle gas line was approx 2 metres above the deck. On ascending an adjacent platform to gain a better look, it was evident that
there was a gas leak from the base of the branch fitting. This unit was shut down using the manual unit ESD. Once the unit was blown down and isolated and scaffold erected to allow close
inspection, it was found that there was a crack in the 18" recycle pipeline. The crack was visibly approx 125mm long in a longitudinal direction at the surface of the pipe with indications that it
probably penetrates the wall for this length. The nature of the crack appears as probably a fatigue failure and it seems to have propagated in both directions from 1" NPS branch fitting which is
welded to the line pipe. The 1" branch fitting is of the integral reinforcement/flanged forging type (flangeolet) located on top of the horizontal 18" line.

At approximately 13:30 on <...>, it was noted by a crane operator in the East crane that the West crane boom appeared to be bent. This was noticeable because the West crane was parked with the
boom in the air and it was silhouetted against the white clouds. This was reported to the services coordinator, who immediately went to the crane to look at the damage (attached) and the crane
positioned. It was slewed to various locations around the platform to see if it could be identified where the boom could have come into contact with structure in such a way to cause this damage.
This was inconclusive as there seemed to be no structure of an appropriate configuation, nor were there any containers or other units in place which the boom could have been lowered upon. On
completion of the photographs, the crane was put into the rest and taken out of service pending further investigation and inspection.
TIR<...>about 30ft, the area is sealed off and an investigation will be carried out in the light in the morning. <...>B: A piece of rust weighing 2kg and measuring 9 1/2" x 12 x 3/8" fell from the
underside of the drill floor to the skid deck (approx 30ft). The piece of rust was witnessed falling but could not be identified where it came from exactly (SE corner of the drilling structure). The
area has been barriered off until a full investigation can be performed. There was no operation in progress which could have disturbed the rust. Weather conditions were calm but freezing. The
piece of rust by it's nature has come from the structure. Further investigation will be carried our during daylight.
Fire and gas alarms indicated high gas level on numerous gas heads in module M4, low level gas indicated in module M5 and MSM. Process shut down and blown down automatically.
Normal production operations 0:142hrs smoke reported from under C3 compressor Turbine by Production Technician. Compression shutdown 01:47hrs General Platform Alarm sounded and
blowdown initiated . Emergency Response Team monitored situation. Fire contained within turbine enclosure. 03:45hrs muster stood down. Turbine allowed to cool down. 07:30 Turbine
enclosure opened to investigate. Investigation to cause ongoing. Wind 320 deg. 16-18 knots Sea 1.5 meters visibility clear 10 miles.
A flame arrestor weighing 7kg fell approximately 10 ft onto a not normally accessed gantry. The flame arrestor fell from the end section of a 3" diesel tank breather pipe for Ruston diesel fuel tank
<...>1. The gantry has no through route and is only used to gain access to the flame arrestors and Ruston exhausts. The flame arrestor was discovered when the <...>, was carrying out an
inspection. Refer to inspection report <...> for further information on the failure. The flame arrestor is one of two in the area, the arrestor that fell was attached via a screw pipe connection, whilst
the other flame arrestor is bolted in place and is still secure.
As a container was being lowered from the platform to the boat, one of the whip line guides (a piece of steel approximately 900mm x 25mm x 7mm) became detached and fell into the sea. The
flat bar was a guide only, and was not load bearing. No one was injured, and no other damage was sustained. This crane was taken out of service, and is currently quarantined, awaiting inspection
by the Crane Specialist Contractor.
Cargo operation from the supply vessel -<...> had commenced using north side pedestal crane. The crane was rigged on a two fall block to allow two heavy completion baskets to be off loaded
from the vessel. The first lift weight 5 tonne had been off loaded from the vessel and landed on the <...> deck. Having lowered the unloaded block down for the second lift the crane operator
noticed the rope on the right hand side of the hoist had slackened. He immediately stopped the operation to check the situation and the <...> was requested to exit the 500m zone. He noted that the
rope weak link had parted on the drum. The block however was secured by the wraps of rope remaining on the drum. Having assessed the situation, to minimize any hazard the rope was spooled
back on the drum and the crane boom set down on the rest. The crane remains out of service pending investigation of the failure. The rope on the <...> had been replaced in <...>. A full
investigation of the failure mode is to be carried out by the contractor who is responsible for the maintenance and operation of the crane.
A section of timber from the platform south crane rest became dislodged and fell approx 25m onto a laydown area below. The cranes were not in operation at the time. It appears that the timber
had failed due to rotting around the fixing bolts. The section of wood was an 8' x 3' section and apppox 0.5m long weighing approx 5kg. The fallen section was observed by two of the drilling
team. The poor condition of one section of timber had been reported a few days earlier and a work permit was in the system for checks to be carried out on both crane rests by abseilers who were
onboard. The North and South crane rests are now being checked and made safe. The timbers will them be replaced with new ones.
A section of angled module cladding material measuring 1m x 200m x 200m x 1mm weighing 2kgs, became displaced during high winds from storage below RPLQ and entered the open access
hatch for column 2. The cladding struck the HVAC ducting in the can area of the column and fell onto scaffolding, behind the leg sentry's position. The hatch was open to allow the man riding
winch to operate as required, whilst hi-rope personnel were working below the gas tight floor.

Gas release occurred at approx. 14:00 <...> from the <...> area from <...> level control drain line at a 3/4 inch drain to atmosphere. System pressure was at 160bar. AGCM brought online
following maintenance activities. Released volume estimated to be 100kg, approx. duration 5 minutes. On visual detection of release the machine was closed off and an investigation by the
operations team instigated. No gas detection or deluge activated as there was not sufficient accumulation of gas due to location etc. This incident is currently being investigated.
Platform operating with normal production, compression and export systems. Small wisps of smoke were observed to be coming from underneath the turbine skid at C3 compressor. This was
believed to be due to the weathering of residual lub oil from a recently repaired leakage. The unit remained online to allow further investigation into the source of the smoke, The remaining doors
were replaced on the turbine enclosure. Soon after, a flame was observed to be coming from the underside of the turbine skid. The unit was immediately shut down and the watermist activated,
extinguishing the flame. The GPA was sounded, the platform shutdown pending a full investigation. B (4). Adjacent to C3 Gas Compressor Turbine enclosure.
The platform was in the process of starting up following a planned shutdown. Weather conditions at the time were: Wind 4kts at 177deg, air temp 7.1 deg C, QNH 1027 mB, Sea State 1.7 mtrs at
2.9 sec. Hydrocarbons, Condensate export valve FCV - 12041. Process start up. Area checked out by technician, source of leak confirmed. Wells closed in and spill kits deployed and line isolated
locally.
During start up operations, an operator discovered a hydrocarbon release from a vent pipe. The system was immediately shutdown and depressurised by the operators attending. The defective
section of pipe was then locally isolated. All associated pipework on the system will now be inspected by the platform Installation Integrity Engineer prior to further start up operations
commencing.
At 07:04 a power blackout occurred shortly followed by a change in platform status due to the indication of smoke in M4W. The platform personnel were mustered and the process shutdown. The
smoke heads cleared swiftly and the Emergency Response Team were despatched to investigate. They confirmed no indication of fire in M4W although there was a water leak from the GT4
alternator cooler and an electrical smell. The Avons were isolated and the main platform power restored using sub generators. Further investigation into the condition of GT4 is still ongoing.
At 06:35 a confirmed high/high gas alarm was detected above 'B' booster compressor on the upper deck. On investigation, a leak was found at a pressure transmitter, ID number <...>B. The small
bore impulse line locking nut had loosened allowing hydrocarbon gas to escape to atmosphere via the tell tale bleed. The release was stopped by tightening up the locking nut. No one was injured
during this incident.
During normal Production Operations the Hydrocarbon area Technician noticed ice forming around the stem packing of the 2nd stg HP gas recycle valve <...>. On investigation it was seen that
gas was passing the stem seal into the atmosphere. the area was barriered off to restrict access. Subsequently to tighten the gland packing. This was done successfully and the production process
was returned to normal production. (Original <...> showed date of incident as <...> - correct date advised by <...> as <...>)
Weather @ time of incident rain/sleet showers. Wind -270'40+knots. Barometric Pressure - 998millibars. Visibility circa 3 miles in showers. Incident description: Following repair work to cracked
pipework with compressor envelope, the unit was being repressurised in preparation for exporting gas. During physical checks of the compressor it was identified that there was gas escaping from
the vent port on LP2 compressor discharge gauge <...>. The plant technician immediately closed the isolation valve for the vent port. The estimated duration of the leak was 10minutes, from a
0.19" diameter hole at a pressure of approximately 6.5 Barg (on average). Unit had previously been (gross) nitrogen leak tested at 5 Barg but leakage path not identified.
Platform operating as normal with production and compression systems online. The NGL plant had been restarted the previous day. A leakage of NGL's past a drain valve to the closed drains
system resulted in the formation of a hydrate in the downstream pipework. This allowed pressure to increase in the closed drains system. The pressure increase resulted in a leak in the closed
drain pipework, at an area later found to be affected by very localised internal corrosion. This therefore led to a release of hydrocarbon gas, believed to be flashed-off NGL. The hydrocarbon leak
was identified by persons in the area. Fixed gas detection was not activated. The wind direction took the escaping gas away from the platform at the East side. The source of hydrocarbons was
positively identified as the NGL system, which was subsequenetly shutdown, vented and isolated from the closed drain system. The duration of the release was approximately 45 minutes, during
which time productions systems remained online as normal. The NGL system remains shutdown while an investigation continues, and remedial actions are implemented.

At approximately 10:30am on <...>, a scaff board narrowly missed an individual standing outside Mod 23/24 East and landed on the deck of Mod 14. Wind speed 50 - 56knots, direction 252 - 360
deg, temp 2 - 3 deg celsius. Personnel had worked on dismantling the East Crane scaffolding. Due to a backlog of work the basket required to remove the boards was not available so equipment
was secured in situ on the carousel. The securing arrangement should not have been affected by the wind. After the incident, on inspection of the area, there were no loose boards discovered and
the arrangement appeared as it had been left. Despite attempts at securing the boards, it is assumed that one did come loose, and we can not discount the possibility that there may have been
unsecured boards prior to the event.
A deck crewmember attached to the Barite bulk hose to the platform crane in prepartation for a supply vessel offload. The Crane operator lifted hose from platform retaining fingers and started to
slew left. As the crane operator orientated the hose clear of the retaining fingers the hose parted and fell into the sea. The supply boat was standing clear of the platform and was not struck by the
falling hose end. The bottom of the hose was still attached to the platform by the manifold and was retrieved by the deck crew. On inspection of the piece still attached to the crane, the hose had
parted within the metal casing containing the Waco fitting which is passed down and attached to the supply vessel. Upon investigation it has been discovered that this hose was not included in our
maintenance system for end of life change out. This has now been corrected.
At 1530 on <...> an Insulator was working on top of the skid flash drum and smelt gas. This was reported to the CCR and a gas release was confirmed by use of gas detector at site. Unit was
shutdown and flash drum de-pressurised.
A fine hydrocarbon mist was discovered emitting from an instrument double -block-and -bleed valve block, following a report of a smell of hydrocarbons at the RPML (Lower level of the
replacement process module). This valve was on the downstream side of a non return valve in the line between the desander and well <...> flowline. (Line number <...>. P&ID numbers <...>,
<...>) <...> had previously been line walked, opened-up re-checked and had been flowing for some hours without cause for concern. The leak was stemmed immediately upon the closure of the
instrument valve block, bleed valve. The leaking hydrocarbons were totally contained within the confines of the <...> deck, in the immediate vicinity of the desander package. The leaking fluids
had a BS&W of 99% and were estimated to have been leaking for no longer than five minutes. This estimate is based upon the time between technicians passing the area previously and a call to
the control room by a passerby, expressing conern of a "smell of hydrocarbons". The control room confirmed (with a <...> trend) that neither of the seven gas heads in the module registered a gas
reading.
At 0545 on Thursday <...> high gas detection in SE corner of <...> at gas detector <...> initiated a yellow shutdown of the platform process and a general platform alarm. Platform personnel went
immediately to muster stations. The high gas alarm cleared within 5 minutes. Emergency Response teams conducted a sweep of the area and confirmed there was no gas present. The platform
stood down from muster at 0640.
The crew chief was conduction pre-operational checks on his equipment, (the equipment had only been on the platform one day) prior to running 4.5 inch liner, he observed that the tong spreed
was running too fast and decided to adjust the make-up speed control on the PCT (proportional control torque) unit. He was in the process of manipulating the regulator valve, which as he backed
it out, the complete regulator plus the threaded body was released with approximately 10 litres of hydraulic oil onto the rig floor. The crew chief immediately went and shut down the power to the
unit and the work party started to contain and clean up the spill, (the release was contained within the drill floor). One of the work party stated that he thought the oil release reached
approximately 4 to 5 feet in height. The regulator was found lying next to the PCT unit during the clean up operation. The pct unit was immediately taken out of service and replaced by another
unit which was checked prior to use. Weather conditions at the time of the event. Wind 13knots @ 334 degrees. Sea state 0.8 metres.
<...>. Operation:- J1 Gel Squeeze, tubing head pressure:- 2173 PSI. Fluid on well:- Seawater. With coiled tubing pulling out of hole at approx 5775ft. with approx 4000lbs on weight indicator,
water spraying from stripper/injector area was noticed. An attempt was made to run possible fractured pipe back in hole without success, the lower pipe/slip rams were then closed followed by the
upper blind/shear rams, this contained the release. The lower blind /shear rams were later closed allowing the pipe to drop through the X-mas tree.The well was then closed in at the X-mas tree
and coiled tubing equipment rigged down.Later examination of the coiled tubing showed the cause of the release was a fracture in the coiled tubing.
<...> - Drilling operation <...> (<...> redrill). During the operation the annular preventor was closed in a controlled manner. Indication of well flowing? Closed BOP and monitored pressure.
Stabilised SIDP 200 psi, SICP 360 psi. Performed well killed calculations (12.6 ppg EMW) and weighted up active mud to 12.7 ppg.

Whilst using the overhead lifting beam trolley to transfer CATgenerator within the drilling sack store area, the traversing wheel and handling chain dropped to deck from a height of approximately
4.8 metres. The size of the wheel is 7" in diameter and weighed approximately 2kg. Initial investigation found that the securing grub screw holding the wheel in position had sheared allowing the
wheel to become detached from the shaft and fall. Further details and recommendations will be added to Synergi Report No: 8808 as they become available.
On the new <...> NUI platform there are currently 2 wells in production (<...>) and <...>) with a third well currently being drilled (<...>). On each well there are fitted individual flowline venturi
meters with two tapings for DP cell measurement. On each tapping there is fitted an over pressure protection device to stop the DP cells seeing full CITHP. Each pair of DP cells is located in
pipeline supported instrument housings. It was observed on <...> that on well <...>, a gas leak had occurred in the venturi metering cabinet on Well Slot 2. Under investigation it was found that
gas was emanating from breather holes from both pressure- limiting devices. After isolation and removal of the devices it was found that the "O" ring on the small internal piston in both cases had
completely disintergrated.
Normal platform operations were in progress when a low gas alarm annunciated in the CCR. Shortly after the status of the gas head changed to high which resulted in an automatic fire and gas
control action (Yellow shutdown). The cause was identified as being a pipework failure on a liquid drain to V45 (closed drain collection vessel) Resulting in a loss of gas condensate. The drain
operated at low pressure (
Routing cargo handing & potable water bunkering opetrations from MV <...>. Environmental conditions good- Wind 179 degreess @ 13 knots. Wave height 2.3 meters. <...>t East Crane
Following lift and clearance of 'mini container (1800kg)' from vessels deck, the Platforms East Crane experienced mechanical failure which resulted in un-breaked fall of boom below hariziontal
plane and loss of load to sea. Final resting postion of boom vertical with boom tip in water. No injuries reported following incident.
During operation on the drilling drawworks, the travelling block/topdrive assembly was being lifted in order to provide clearance for the wireline riser. As the blocks were raised past the monkey
board level, the man-riding winch line became snagged on the blocks, resulting in damage to and failure of the manriding wline, approximately 90 from the manrider hook. The manrider was not
in use at the time. Both free ends of the line fell to the drill floor. The floor was unoccupied at the time, with drill crew personnel being located in the Drilling doghouse. There was as a result no
direct risk to personnel. The operation was suspended while the lifting equipment was inspected and a full investigation carried out. Initial findings are that failure to secure the manriding winch
wire to the derrick structure at the monkey board level, had allowed the cable to lie in the path of the travelling block, The investigation continues. Other crane and hoisting devices with
suspended load including offshore personnel transfer equipment eg <...> , <...>. Offshore deck operations and offshore transport, including all lifting and crane work, and all helideck and sea
transport activities.
Platform muster at 0337hrs after multiple gas-detectors in high alarm in Mod 04. Due to a condensate leak from <...> recycle cooler vent valve attachment point.
<...> rec'd on <...>. <...>: Platform went to GPA and muster as a result of gas detection in Mod 05. Mezz level. Two gas heads went into high and three into low. This resulted in a level 3 ESD gas
shutdown and subsequent deluge of the affected module.
Incident was reported to the ICC on <...>. While carrying out repairs to <...> Xmas Tree valves a member of the work party stood on a metal plate that was covering an old flow line penetration.
The plate moved, tipped over and fell through the aperture it was covering and landed on the deck 3.7m below. The plate measured 350mm x 300mm x 5mm and weighed 5.9Kg. The potential for
dropped objects had been recognised during the work preparation, and the area immediately below, in pan deck had been barriered off as a control measure. The member of the work party
sustained minor bruising to his knee, and was treated by platform medic. <...>
During windy conditions a 10cm x 10cm x 1m long section of angled HVAC stainless steel corner support fell 15 feet, landing on <...> laydown area. This was reported by 2 personnel in the area.
Following an earlier power generation outage on <...> an MCC trip coil burnt out resulting in general alarm. During attempts to reinstate main power on <...> problems were experienced with the
running of the emergency generator. The emergency generator was stopped resulting in loss of power to the platform. As a measure a down man of non essential personnel took place during <...>
whilst attempts were made to reinstate electrical power to the platform. A recovery plan and investigation is currently ongoing.
An over the side scaffold platform was under construction on the south west corner of the platform on level 1. During the build of the scaffold 'Birdcage' construction a scaffold board was passed
out to be laid on the frame work. As the board was manually passed to the scaffolder by one of the work team the board made contact with a scaffold pole and it was dropped. The board fell
through the framework and into the sea. IT was recovered by the standby boat that was posted on close standby in accordance with overside work procedures. The scaffold board fell directly into
the sea withot making contact with the sub structure.

2 weeks after fitting a new seal to the pig launcher door during which time 2 successful launches had been made, a routine launch of a pig to a nigg oil terminal was being conducted . The pig
launcher was being pressurised and experienced a failure of the seal on the launcher door. This resulted in a discharge of crude oil from the top of the launcher. The operator immediately aborted
the launch and isolated the pig launcher. Due to the interlocking key process it took him 2 - 3 minutes to complete the isolation and stop the discharge. The pig launcher is situated on the
production platform roof in a plated area. Crude oil sprayed over adjacent equipment and down to the east porch on the level below. The area is also deck plated with no direct access to the sea.
Oil spill containment kits were utilised to contain the spill, however, some oil overspilled from the porch level to the sea.Estimated spill to sea was 0.4 curm or 400 litres, the platform
daughtercraft was launched and it is estimated that approximately 300 litres was recovered from the sea before the slick dispersed. Investigations are ongoing to identify the root cause of this
incident.
Operations: Normal Production Operations: Vis. Dark Environmental conditions: Wind Speed S.W. 31kts Production department conducting start up phase on 'A' gas compressor. During this
phase a heat detector activation in the same area. This action resulted in automatic initiation of the Class 1 Emergency Shutdown system. The general platform alarm was initiated and all
personnel were called to muster at approx 00:15hrs. An operator was requested to check the engine compartment on 'A' gas compressor. He confirmed that the water mist extinguishing system had
activated and that no fire/smoke was visible inside the main Avon engine compartment. He then inspected the power turbine compartment and confirmed that there was a fire in this area. The
operator discharged a portable dry powder extinguisher ont o the fire and reported that the fire appeared to be out. He left the area and reported to his muster point. The Emergency Response team
were deployed to the area and confirmed that the fire was out and the area deemed secure. The muster was stood down at approx 00.53.
Environmental conditions were good but cold. Wind speed approx 25kts and direction 140deg. Compressor unit K104 was being started and was going through its start-up cycle when one of the
operatives on deck smelled gas. He called the control room operator and the OTL went to the site to investigate the problem. The OTL both heard the release and smelled gas and then discovered
that one of the transmitter 1/4" impulse line valves on the compressor gauge panel was in the open position. This was immediately shut off and a plug subsequently installed. The gas release
occurred for an estimated period of 4 minutes at a pressure of 50 psig. Investigation is ongoing into the root cause and the OIR12 will follow on completion.
During normal production operations, a smell of gas was detected in the vicinity of train 2 mid life compressor (MLC) 2 gas cooler. Location of incident is open deck with good dispersion. Wind
speed was 17 knots, direction 094 degrees. Further investigation using a portable gas detector traced a gas leak to the pilot valve post on <...> MLC discharge line, Operation pressure was 58 bar
with a set pressure of 73 bar. The compressor has been S/D and pipework depressurised, until the PSV is repaired. Investigation into the failure mode has still to be conducted.
A small gas weep was seen coming from the impulse line feeding <...> on the <...> gas compressor. This was seen by the area technician during routine duties. The weep was immediately reported
to the control room by the area technician. The compressor was shut down and blown down. None of the platform fixed gas detection picked up any gas readings. The machine was isolated and a
repair carried out.
A Fire and Gas Technician observed a pinhole leak (weeping) on a 12" inlet to low pressure (LP) separator <...>. The specific location is on the inside of a 90 degree bend downstream of <...>,
inboard on Mod <...><...> level. Leak was found during a normal maintenance and would have otherwise been difficult to detect. Following an assessment the separator was isolated and depressurised in a controlled manner. Thorough UT examination is currently in progress to assess the remaining system pipework before a repair proposal can be assigned. In the interim onshore
integrity histories on the system, chemical dosage effects and preparing short term recommendations for repair. The separator will remain out of service until a suitable repair can be carried out
and examination of remaining existing pipework is completed.
Environmental conditions were good. Wind speed approx 35kts. An integrity engineer was completing corrosion checks on grating around a redundant water vessel. The vessel package was
mounted on checker plate which was overlaid on grating. The grating was supported by a main RSJ. Upon chipping away at corrosion around the grating to check for integrity , the checker plate
with vessel package gave way and ended up supported at 45 deg through the deck. Whilst the vessel moved from horizontal to 45 redundant 11/2" pipe dropped from the roof area to the deck. At
the same time redundant cable tray fell from above and grazed the back of the engineer. The vessel could not fall through the deck due to its shape and the support below. However the checker
plate and vessel have been restrained by hold down straps and slings.

During routine pressure testing operations of well control equipment using seawater the Kelly hose ruptured but remained intact, at 4800 psi, the test had already been performed to 5000 psi but
was being repeated due to a passing bleed off valve. The working pressure of the hose was 5000 psi (test pressure 10000 psi) and the hose was in good condition with approx 18 months of
service. The blocks were at approx 80ft and the rupture occurred in the mid section of the 75ft Kelly hose. With the blocks in this position, the rupture was at the lowest point in the loop,
approximately 45ft above the drill floor. The reaction of the hose from the release of pressure propelled the hose upwards and to the south of the derrick where a loop of the hose ripped the nylon
netting to prevent the umbilicals fouling in high winds and went over a strengthening beam of the derrick structure at approx 55ft above the drill floor, the final resting position of the hose
partially outside the derrick structure. Approximately 2 bbl of clean seawater was released to the drill floor/dog house roof and the skid deck. The pressure testing operation was being carried out
with all precautions in place, barriers erected around all affected areas, high pressure testing tannoys and pressure being staged up to the test pressure. The site was secured for further
<...> crude oil booster pump is located at level 18 in Leg C4. Following a pump failure a new pump was fitted that had been tested in the vendor's workshop. After a successful re-instatement
pressure test had been carried out to 10 Bar with service water, the pump was de-isolated for a test run with process fluids (crude oil). Personnel were monitoring the pump for leaks during the
first start when after several minutes running leaks were discovered from three different points on the pump bowls. The pump was immediately shut down and de-pressurised. The leakage was
contained and estimated at 1 litre/minute for 11 minutes. No executive actions were initiated or occurred as a result of this incident. Environmental conditions were not a factor.
At 0755 a diesel smell was reported to the CRO, the CRO contacted the power area technician immediately to investigate. On investigation of area M1W (solar generator hall), the technician
opened the hood door to <...>. Looking inside, a diesel leak was observed, the machine was shutdown at 0825 and the diesel leak stopped. The diesel was contained within the bunded area in the
bottom of <...> housing. Approximately 50 litres (42kg) of diesel had leaked from a 1/4" fitting (<...>) on the univalve to diesel fuel solenoid line. The line pressure was 29 psi.. No excessive
vibration on this line was noted. The diesel was leaking from the pipe entry into the fitting.
400 litres of diesel leaked to pipedeck. Incident contained, no leakage to sea. Incident caused by sub contractor failing to comply with requirements of permit and deviating (unauthorised) from
agreed procedure.
During routine daily activities work party was traversing along the seaboard North - South walkway on the East side of the platform <...> level 2. As they were walkiing, a 3.0' x 2.0', 12.5lbs
corroded section of windwall dropped vertically 10' from above and came to rest 2' from them. They immediately reported this to their supervisor. Subsequently the <...>, <...> and <...> examined
the site. During this investigation the object was identified as a piece of windwall from the HPU room above the drillfloor. The HPU unit is located approx 100' distant and 33' above the PLQ
level 2 walkway. A substantial wind from south west must have carried the windwall section to land in the near vicinity of the PLQ area above the walkway in the near past. Wind today was
blowing from the North at 17knts, from this it is evident that this piece of windwall had been in situ above the walkway for some time.
2230: <...> gas compressor tripped on lo lo suction 1st stage gas compression machine. 2250: Area tech leaves module M4, the seal oil system was normal and machine was at step 50 in the start
up sequencer. 2335: M4 Gas Head 408 (M4 West) went into low level alarm, gas heads 409 and 410 increasing. Gas appeared to be migrating across M4 west to east. Various other gas heads
showing low levels. 2345: Manually depressurising <...> by using <...>. Pressure decreased from 20 to 5bar over a period of 30 minutes, no increase in any gas head levels observed. 0020: 1st
stage A train purge valve to <...>t closed by area tech. 0030: <...> compressor depressurised to 0 bar and all gas heads cleared. On checking machine status it was at step 50 which is a shutdown
state but not a blowdown step. Elliott seal oil pump was running with 50 bar showing on the header rail. <...> seal oil extract fan was running but only showing 1-2 amps. The seal oil extract
ducting was checked and found 2 loose covers approx 25mm square, covering 7mm holes situated almost directly below gas head G408. Gas tests 4" from the holes revealed that the gas meter
read 10% LEL, at the holes the gas meter read 100% LEL. The seal oil extract fans were checked out and found the drive belts had disengaged from the fans therefore no extraction of oil gas mix
Environmental conditions: wind 220 @ 25 knots. Barometer 1002. Temp 11C. Cloud 7/8 Cover. Immediately prior to this incident, work was being carried out within the area of the production
manifold, sited on the cellar deck of the production platform, to replace corroded cable tray support unistruts. The trays were temporarily supported by ropes during this work. At 08:18 following
the removal of the supporting unistrut, the cable tray sagged by approximately 2 inches, resulting in the failure of a compression fitting on the A4 well PI to PDI instrument tubing line that was
enclosed within a lagged box attached to the underside of the cable tray. This led to a release of hydrocarbons from the pipe. Immediate action was taken to isolate and vent down the production
header and Train A & B. A Platform General Alarm was sounded and a full muster carried out. There were no injuries or ingestion of gas/condensate as a result of this incident.

'D' Hazardous HVAC Supply Fan tripped due to catastrophic failure of motor bearing. HVAC system was running normally at the time although the platform production systems were shutdown
due to an earlier incident. On entering Mod 08 HVAC plant room there was a smell of burning . On approaching 'D' hazardous supply fan it was thought that the belts had sheared as they were
hanging beneath the protective guard. Small, flickering flames were seen coming from the drive end pulley area, probably from lubricant or grease. An initial attempt was made to extinguish these
with 2 x powder extinguishers - this proved ineffective due to air movement in the plant room. A hose reel was then deployed to spray water on to the pulley and belt. The fire was extinguished
and the area made safe. Investigations are ongoing.
<...>. Annulus communication T1. T1 is a water injector in <...> field. There has been communication between the injection tubing and A (9 5/8") annulus for a considerable time so this annulus
saw full injection pressure. It was dicovered that annulus pressure between the 9 5/8" and 13 3/8" (B annulus) casing had risen to full injection pressure suggesting a failure of the casing
somewhere between the surface and the top of cement at +/- 1400ft. This brought the pressure above the maximum allowable annulus surface pressure for this annulus which is 28 Bar. The
annulus was bled off several times but the pressure returned to water injection pressure. The well was then shut in. The pressue returned to equilibrium with the reservoir and is currently +/- 25
Bar. Following further investigation and consideration the well has remained shut in.
The construction of a scaffold at the +7.5 M LVL on the <...> platform was ongoing. During this work a pair of scaffold poles were being lowered down to the worksite. One of the poles became
free from the "bundle" and fell approx 6'. As it fell it struck one of the scaffolders on the rib cage in an area underneath the right arm. The individual was seen by the medic and was available to
return to work shortly after (ie hours later). Weather conditions: light drizzle, wind direction 320, wind speed 15 knots.
Gas release during isolation of MP/LP for thrust bearing & coupling guard removal. Prior to the gas release, in preparation for thrust bearing change on "B" MP compressor, a process isolation
was being applied. A pressure build-up in MP compressor was subsequently found to have occurred over the course of the morning. This gas was subsequently released. Investigations are ongoing
into the cause of the pressure increase and the subsequent gas release.
A gas leak was discovered on an orifice flange located downstream of D3506 (ie separator upstream of the HP compressor). On visual detection of the release the machine was shut down and an
investigation by the operations team instigated. No gas detection or deluge was activated. This incident is currently being investigated.
Background: A minor external gas leakage has been detected during in service inspection. In order to be able to carry out a repair work. Gas flow from <...> via TP1 have been Stopped. Process
Module "<...>Tie-in Metering" Upper Level Zone 1.
After closing the crane crab door, there was a loud noise from the deck below. The counter weight that closes the door had detached itself from the pull wire and fell to the deck below. The
counter weight weighs aprox 5.5kg and fell 7.8 metres. This incident is currently being investigated
The <...> was in close approach to the East face of the <...> Wellhead platform in preparation for a well intervention programme. Environmental conditions at the time were wind direction
270deg, Force 3 & 4, wave height 0.5 metres, visibility 10 miles. Dry. 2 <...> scaffolders were dismantling an overboard scaffold that had been constructed to temove the TEMSC PROD in
advance of the <...> coming alongside the East face of <...>. One scaffolder was working overside dismantling the scaffold, the second scaffolder was inboard of the platform handrail (acting as
standby man and assisting with material removal). Unkown to the scaffolders the <...> had commenced its approach to locate on the east face. As the <...> approached it's final location, the
standby scaffolder recognised the risk, reached overside and pulled his colleague inboard just as the <...> came into contact with the scaffold structure. Contact was made between the temporary
outboard scaffold and the <...> after crane A frame. The operation was stopped land made safe. Incident investigation launched.
An Operations Technician reported a smell of hydrocarbon gas in the vicinity of <...> Oil Producer. The Shift Supervisor and Technician investigated the 'smell' and (found) a hydrocarbon gas
leak from gas lift flowline connection flange directly into the 'A' Annulus on the wellhead. The leak was sufficient to indicate a hydrocarbon gas level in excess of 20% LEL hydrocarbon gas on a
portable gas meter when it was held approx 1 meter above the leak. The reading adjacent to the leak was in excess of 50% LEL. No other accurate measurements were taken using the gas meter.
None of the local fixed gas detectors picked up any gas and no automatic shutdown was activated. The system pressure at the tiem was 101Bar. The gas lift to <...> was stopped, the gas lift
manifold manual isolation block valves were closed. The Gas lift flow line and 'A' annulus were blowndown through the installed blowdown line. As the annulus was depressurised, the well
stopped flowing. Personnel were held in the platforms temporary refuge until the gas leak reduced to a level indicating below 20% LEL measured 0.1m from the leak. This occurred at 03:30hrs by
which point the 'A' annual pressure had reached 14Barg.

The platform gas compression was operating under normal conditions. At 23:00hrs, during routine watch keeping, the Area Technician discovered a hydrocarbon gas leak from the gland on <...>
3" recycle valve on the gas export booster compressor in module Z2. The gas compressor was immediately shutdown and blown down to atmospheric pressure in a controlled manner by the
process control room operator. The time taken for the gas compressor to reach atmospheric pressure was 10 minutes. At no time during the release did any of the fixed gas detection systems in
this or any adjacent areas register any hydrocarbon gas. The machine is to remain shutdown and depressurised until the gland and gland packing are replaced.
The platform generators were switched from gas to diesel due to the platform being shutdown for an integrity inspection. This required the fuel gas system to be shutdown. A 1/4" instrument line
between the fuel pump and a pressure gauge on the "A" generator fractured causing a loss of containment of the fuel. The unit was shutdown and the "B" set started. When this was run up a
similar line fractured (partially) causing a loss of containment on this unit. Both fractures were on stainless instrument piping and the failed pipework has been sent in for analysis.
During routine area checks the area tech for process whilst in Module L4E noticed a small Area behind the hydrocyclone pump was puddled with produced water and on inspection it was noticed
that there was product leaking from the 3" closed drains header return line to the process from the closed drains pumps. Due to the line containing trace hydrocarbons the platform process was
s/d. The water content at this point of the process is circa 95% and given the small rate of leakage did not present any significant risk.
During a routine drilling operations to assemble a BHA, a 30ft x 8" Jar slipped out of the elevators and fell 20ft making contact with the East wall of the drill floor. Rig operation immediately
stopped and area made safe. Senior supervision and platform main control room informed. There were no injuries.
During routine operations a piece of stainless steel sheeting of dimensions 2m X 1 m and weighing 10Kg was discovered lying on the outboard grating of the Mid Life Compressor scrubber
cantilever. The weather station indicates that winds were 48kts gusting to 61kts. Wind direction 120 deg. Investigation into where the sheet originated from showed that it had come fromt the top
of the compressor start up room some 15m above where it was found.The stainless steel sheets are used as shimming material and had been stowed on top of the start up room for some years.
They had been secured by using 4 scaffold type clips, and in the horizontal plane.It would appear that over a period of time these had become loose and the top sheet dislodged by the wind. See
photographs in attachment. All sheets have been banded and made safe. The sheets will be removed from the compressor start up room roof on completion of our investigation. All other areas
have been checked for any similar storage.
An operator, during routine monitoring, observed a leak from the downstream flange of the wing valve of the B48 well. The well was shut in. The gas heads were not activated. No musters or
executive action taken. This incident is currently being investigated.
During an attempted start of Power Generation Turbine 'A' the operator in attendance at the machine observed a small flame in the vincinity of the exhaust outlet within the enclosure. The
machine was also in attendance. The operator immediately reported to the control room and requested shut down of the machine and initiation of the fixed carbon dioxide extinguishant system.
The machine was isolated and left closed in until a controlled entry was made to confirm that all flame had been extinguished. There was no fire detection and no executive action or alarms. The
location of the observed flame was outwith the detection field of fixed flame detectors located within the enclosure. It is believed that unburnt diesel within the machine has entered the exhaust
lagging at a transition piece near the roof of the enclosure. The diesel had subsequently ignited at the surface of the exhaust joint due to the high temperature of the exhaust. A full investigation is
ongoing in conjunction with <...> and will be closed out prior to restarting machine.
**<...>** On Evening of <...> (18:30hrs) a faint smell was noticed in PC mezz, level process area. This is a noisily ventilated area which made identification very difficult, lagging had to be
stripped off the fuel gas pipework. The source was finally traced at 16:00hrs on <...> as being a very small leak from a 3/4" tapping off 2" fuel gas supply line to gas generator G8300. Spool
removed and sent ashore to inspection. Fracture in pipe do not know at present wether it is well defect or fatigue. As a point of note the gas was found to perculate some distance inside the system
2000 lagging. When gas detector probe was pushed in lagging gas was detected, the leak source was approx 4 metres distant. The line runs at normal operating pressure of 20bar
During bunkering operations of base oil from the supply vessel into the platform wing tank 5.3 tonnes of base oil overflowed from the tank vents into the sea. Platform procedures have been
reinforced with operating crews. Incident investigation is underway to determine what further measures need to be undertaken to prevent reoccurrence.

During test running after a major overhaul, a high pressure leak developed from the east crane hydraulic pipework. This oil was sprayed over a large surface area. The engine was immediately
shutdown, and the leak ceased. Approximately 15 litres of hydraulic oil was spilled, of which perhaps 1 litre reached the sea. The leak stemmed from a failed 'O' ring, which has been replaced,
and the system is back on-line. It is being reported on an OIR9b and OIR12 since technically the hydraulic oil is hydrocarbon based. A PON1 has also been submitted.
Initial <...>: At 0430hrs routine inspection of oil import/export leg revealed small gas leak. Levels had not triggered alarms. Subsequent tests revealed 15% LEL gas in leg. Precautionary
downmanning initiated. About 50% of POB 104 taken to <...>t. Last reports were that gas levels in leg were stable and remedial measures under consideration. Cause of leak as yet unknown.
Further details from <...>: A hydrocarbon leak occurred at the 12 o'clock position on a T piece weld on 3" drains line <...> in leg C4. The T piece forms a junction with discharge from the slops
tank on C4 gas tight floor and the commom discharge of the closed drains degasser vessel and reclaimed oil tank. From the T piece the co-mingled fluids route to the oil import manifold located
on level 14 of C4 from where they pass into the selected storage cell group.
A plywood base which forms part of a trolley used for carrying objects across the helideck during helicopter operations broke free and was swept over a handrail and helideck netting and fell
approximately 18m to the process deck below. The base was attached to the steel frame of the trolley by four pop-rivets which had sheared. The likely cause of failure of the pop-rivets was a
combination of high winds and helicopter down-draft.
At 16:52 a sounding of the General Alarm and initiation of a process ESD was co-incident with a telephone call to the AQ Control Room. That call advised of a gas escape in the AC Main deck
metering shack. The phone call was from the Technician engaged in routine maintenenace activity in the Metering Shack. Indication on the Fire and Gas Panel confirmed a gas concentration
greater than 60% l.e.l. in the Metering Shack. All personnel mustered. The station progressed through its automatic Shutdown and Blowdown sequence. The Emergency response Team was
mobilised. The team confirmed the origin of the gas release and the location was made safe by the closing of additional block valves upstream of the affected equipment. Subsequent investigation
determined the most likely cause as the inadvertent opening of a vent associated with the equipment under maintenance. The equipment has been returned to service. The full detail of the incident
investigation will be captured in an incident report.
At 11:30 ops attempted water wash, as turbine B was cranked. voted low level gas detected within turbine enclosure. Unit auto shutdown, subsequent GA and muster. Additional information turbine type <...>. 2 x gas detectors voted at 10% LEL, these are sited in enclosure ducting. Fuel gas is the propellant for the start system. Platform status already shutdown for other activities.
At 17:35hrs a <...> carrying out combined scheme inspections in the MD cellar deck area, became aware of a noise and noted a small gas plume emitting from a pinhole in a weld on a 16 spool at
the <...> wet gas metering orifice carrier. The plume was described as small with a length of approximately 0.5 metres and dispersing away from the platform in the 25 kt wind at 225 degrees.
Total dispersion was estimated at 1.0 metre. He immediately called the control room and the section of plant was shutdown in a controlled manner and isolated. The time taken to do this from first
notification to total blow down was 20 minutes. The estimated leak rate at 25 Bar pressure has been calculated at 0.03 KGs/second which is below the detection rate for the acoustic gas detectors
which is 0.1 KGs/second and therefore no automatic executive actions took place from the F&G system. Personnel were recalled from the work fronts back to the accommodation module as a
precautionary measure whilst the section of plant was shutdown and vented. A formal isolation was then applied.
At 07:30 on <...> a Structural Maintainance technician noticed a smell of gas around the metering skids on the metering deck of the PM platform. This was reported to the Operations Supervisor
who asked an Operations Manager to investigate. The source of the leak was quickly established as phase 2 chromatograph let down skid. The platform metering technician who was working
close to that area isolated and vented the skid at 07:45. Subsequent investigation revelaed that a 37mm stainless steel diaphragm within the regulator had failed, having a 5mm split in it. This
allowed gas to vent through a vent hole in the regulator body into the let down skid cabinet the escape to atmosphere through a vent pipe situated in the top of the cabinet.
The A crude oil train was being started up following some work on an LCV. The area technician heard a rumbling noise and discovered crude oil spraying from a pipe flange. He shut the system
down, and the leak stopped. It emanated from the flange tapping point had sheared off. The train remains shutdown until investigations are complete, and an effective repair carried out.

An electrician was carrying out PM routines in module 16 shaker deck when he observed a bent pin on the distribution board. He took the bent pin to module 16 switch room to compare the pin
with isolator cubicle KB on <...>, the cubicle isolator was marked 'Spare Cubicle'. The cubicle cover (440v/ 600 amp) was removed set aside and laid down, the electrician went back to the
cubicle and a flashover occurred. Full details have still to be determined by the investigation team. The indicator panel on the drill floor came into alarm and the electrician (injured party IP) was
seen going into drilling office/ toilet area with blackened face. The Area Authority (Toolpusher) and the <...> responsible electrical person were requested to go to the drill floor where the IP was
then accompanied to the sick bay and given treatment by the Medic. An investigation team was set up and information gathering commenced. Due to the potential an independant investigation
team was requested and arrived offshore am on <...>. Permission was given to disturb the scene of the incident. Duty inspector advised. OSD 2.4 well engineer spoken to regarding further
investigation.
During start up of BTurbine the Turbine Technician was making his final checks in the B Turbine enclosure prior to introducing any load. He noticed flames at the Free Turbine end. He shut the
door of the enclosure, alerted the Utilities Tech to the situation and activated the Emergency Stop on the turbine control panel. The utilities Technician made a 222 call to the CCR informing the
CRT of situation. The general alarm was sounded and the platform went to Muster/ Emergency Stations.
At approx 1900hrs the OIM was in transit through the module when he noted a significant amount of oil on the module deck. He brought this to the attention of the oil tech to investigate the
source. There was a small, continuous flow of oil from a crows foot fitting off the mechanical seal of P1001 test separator pump. The technician in conjunction with the CRO, swung the oil well
off test to allow the pump to be shut down. It became apparent at this point that the mechanical seal on the pump had failed. The amount of oil discharged to the module from time of discovery
was estimated at 3 litres. This was disposed of via the module drainage system. There was no potential for an environmental incident.
Two gas detectors on <...> cellar deck North were initated at the low level by gas leakage from the <...> condensate pump A mechancial seal. The GPA sounded and a level 1a shutdown of
process and utilities occurred. Gas levels dropped rapidly after shutdown. No residual gas or condensate was found by emergency response teams during initial investigation. The pump was
shutdown and electrical and isolations applied. System flushed and pump removed for further investigation of seal failure. Replacement pump and seal currently being installed
Wind 8 knots, direction 235 degrees, sea state 1.3m. Platform Operators observed pressure in the cold vent system leading to the flare bridge. This is not normal, on investigation it was also
observed that the drains sump tank pumps were struggling to cope with the level, this is an indication something was draining into the tank, during normal operations the pumps cope but not in
this instance. A valve on a crude oil filter drain had been left open and draining into the tank. Residual oil entered the vent and was carried forward with the vent gases, resulting in an oil mist
exiting the cold vent with the gases, the oil being heavier than the gas meant that the droplets fell back onto the vent platform and into the sea, resulting in PON1 and OIR12 submissions.
During a general platform alarm for an incident on the , where exhaust fumes from a leaking gasket caused a GPA ( during recommissioning), a fire occurred in one of the tumble driers in the
laundry.On hearing the GPA the laundry staff turned off the tumble driers and opened the doors as detailed in their procedures and proceeded to muster. The GPA for the first incident had been
deactivated after the exhaust leak had been resolved. The GPA reacitvated on smoke detection in the laundry - all persons were still at muster. On investigation a fire was found in one of the
tumble driers in the laundry - following electrical isolation the fire was extinguished using CO2 and then water by the <...>. Investigations have shown that the fire was due to spontaneous
combustion of the galley cloths being dried. A review of emergency shutdown procedures and the materials that are dried in the tumble drier is underway. A safety alert will be raised on the Sadie
network to highligh this incident.
Weather conditions - wind 30kts from 160deg. Low cloud and raining. East Crane was in use carrying out routine deck lifting operations when the deck crew and crane operator heard a bang
followed by a hiss of what was thought to be an "air release". The crane operator sees an alarm indication, depicting low N2 pressure on the "ultra protection system" (UPS), stops the crane and
makes safe. The normal N2 operating pressure is circa 160BarG. Crane operator investigated and found the main N2 hose had ruptured releasing the system contents to atmosphere, external of
the crane. Cause of rupture due to the hose 'rubbing' against a scaffold tube exacerbated with crane vibration. Incident investigation initiated, <...>.

Following a shutdown on the <...>, a pump was over pressured whilst starting it up. This caused the diaphragm and seal to break, allowing 20kg of condensate to be released into a bunded area,
over a period of 15 minutes. The condensate was completely contained within the bund, and the liquid was removed using absorbant cloths. As a precaution against fire, a spark potential permit in
the area was suspended. To prevent further spilling of condensate, the pump was locally isolated and a parallel pump was used in place of the damaged one.
GPA and level 1a shutdown occurred due to two line of sight gas heads in alarm on the <...> platform weather deck. Subsequent investigation found a stem gland packing leak on the cooler deck
anti surge valve from the A export compressor, FCV 30105. All work was terminated while the source of the leak was determined. Compressor has been isolated. Preparation to purge system for
valve removal is ongoing.
Scaffold rack M1W external was being dismantled (Scaffold rack is a long standing structure) and inspected as per the inspection programme weekly. After an in depth Risk Assessment tube
dismantling commenced, it soon became apparent to the work party that the tubes were in a worse condition than originally thought, after removing one of the clips from a vertical pole the
corrosion on the pole underneath the clip was so severe the weight of the pole above the corrosion (13ft) caused it to sever and fall into the sea (Approx. 30 metres). The Standby boat was stood
off from the Platform and not in any danger. Equipment and walkway below were protected by a purpose built scaffold protection barrier.
Smell of smoke was detected on the west side of the module by Well Serviced Operator who reported this to the Control Room. Nightshift SSP and Technician investigated but found nothing on
the west side. As there was an easterly wind, they also investigated on the east side and found a pile of smouldering embers on a scaffold that had been erected for the installation of replacement
turbine exhausts. Two weeks previously, a scaffold and lagging shield had been erected alongside P-4004 exhaust so that work could commence on the installation of P-4003 exhaust while P-4004
remained operational. The sheets of lagging appear to have dropped out of place allowing the wooden boards to be exposed to the heat of the exhaust. Weather was calm with a 7 knot wind.
A routine operation was ongoing where a person had connected a chemical tote tank, containing Methanol (TROS 518), which was located in the chemical bund on the weather deck via a flexible
rated hose to the fixed tie - in point in the bund. The Methanol was being decanted to fill vessel V2804 that is situated on M4 main deck. The level had been checked prior to decanting and was
confirmed to be 42%. The Lab Tech proceeded to line up the system and tote tank valves to begin decanting operations. The Lab Tech proceeded to line up the system and tote tank valves to begin
decanting operations. The Lab Tech proceeded then to the control room, to inform the Control Room Tech that he was decanting Methanol into V2804, and to monitor the level in the vessel on
DCS. Once DCS was showing the vessel was above 90% full the Lab Tech headed back up to the bund on the Weather Deck to close in the valves on the chemical tote tank to stop decanting
operation. Prior to the tote tank being isolated the Mod 4 Area Tech who was working in the area adjacent to the V2804 Methanol tank, observed a leak from the PV breaker PSV 6245, situated
on the top of the vessel in the line going to the Hazardous Vent and the Closed Drain. The Area Tech contacted the CCR to inform him of the leak and to have the decanting stopped.
A <...> maintenence electrician informed the RPE of a light fitting he had worked on the previous day, stating it was in a very poor condition. The damaged fitting had been replaced and it was
being stored inside <...>. Upon inspection by the RPE the fitting was observed to have suffered from severe heat damage. The fitting (<...>) was installed on the platform external walkway at the
corner of modules <...> and <...> adjacent to a redundant process module. The fitting was mounted at an angle of approximately 45 degrees on a two legged frame. The fitting was identified as
<...> (<...>W) and the circuit was still live when the work party went to isolate it for maintenence. Investigations are ongoing trying to determine how long the fitting had been in this condition.
Although the heat damage as severe, no fire or smoke was ever noticed or detected.
At 0545 hrs during routine utilty shaft checks the SSP and an area technician observed flluids leaking fron the area where the 3 run down lines meet the horizontal manifold at the 82m level. No
hydrocarbon was registering on their portable triple gas detector, they left the shaft promptly and commenced a controlled shut down of the platform. The run down lines were isolated in D2C The
OIM and operations supervisor (Who were in bed at the time) were informed of the situation. At 0600 hrs the platform was shutdown. At 0604 hrs the platform went to GPA statues, low level gas
in the utility shaft, three gas heads were in alarm at 20% with several other adjacent gas heads hovering just below the alarm level. The OIM reqested the platform to be blown down, two gas
heads remained in alarm 20%, these were closely monitored and gas levels did not increase, in less than 15 minutes the gas heads started to reduce in level to 12% and 17% in less than 25
minutes both gas heads were reading 7% and 13% and they were reset. The situation was closely monitored for a further 30 minutes.the gas levels continued to drop to 6% and 8% at this point all
personnel were stood down from muster and instructed to remain within the TR until further notice.

Centrifugal crude oil booster pump <...> which is located in leg C4 suffered a seal failure, causing a release of liquid hydrocarbon to atmosphere. The failure was noticed by a work party engaged
in an unrelated job in the same area. The pump was shut down at the time to enable the work party to work below the booster pump level. It is unknown if the failure had occurred while the pump
was still running. The reporting party vacated the area immediately when asked to do so by the control room operator. The pump suction valve was then closed to prevent further loss of
hydrocarbons. No hydrocarbons were detected by the fixed detection systems (oil mist or gas detectors.)
After calibration of an export metering pressure transmitter, the swagelock fitting was left finger tightened. The export system was not operating and the pressure in the system was at 2 bar. Dead
crude seeped from the fitting until it was discovered and tightened up to stop the seep. A leak volume of 1.5 litres was released. No fire and gas detection operated and the leak was contained
within the bunds in the module.
Shortly after commencement of diesel bunkering operations a leak was identified on the transfer hose. Bunkering operations were stopped immediately.
At 17:05 on <...> overhaul work was being undertaken on the west crane. A 427kg pennant was being lifted using a 3 meter 10mm diameter sling with a SWL of 1 tonne. With the lift at a height
of 3 to 4 metres the sling failed approximately 100mm from the eye and the pennant dropped to the deck. The work was being undertaken inside a controlled area that was barriered off with only
the banksman in attendance. The sling was within certification, correctly colour coded and was received as part of batch of 20 slings in <...>. The batch of slings have been quarantined within the
stores and onshore actions are being progressed with the supplier. A full offshore investigation is underway.
<...> platform is a nomally unattended installation. The platform was manned up in the morning and a full platform inspection carried out. No failures identified. On the demanning inspection the
vent stack purge gas supply regulator was identified as failed. On initial investigation it is suspected the diaphragm has failed causing hydrocarbon gas leak to local atmosphere. The regulator was
isolated immediately and the leak stopped. Due to imminent demanning of the platform a visit has been arranged today for further investigation. This will be determined and reported out on the
<...> form
The platform was shut down for planned maintenance.Pre-start checks were being carried out in preparation for recommencing production operations. While performing check on the main power
generator 'A' a quantity of diesel was was observed in the bund/sump of the RB211turbine enclosure. The PSV on the diesel fuel supply to the engine was observed to have a leak from the body of
the valve. (Turbine B did not show any similar problems. turbine C exhibited similar problems, but to a lesser degree) E&C PSV'S sent for examination & inspection. TIR;During routine
maintenance of the power genetator turbine (which was shutdown) a diesel release was found to be coming from the pressure relief valve. Size of release not know. There were no injuries or fire.
Eni. were told this was a reportable incident.
The platform fixed detection picked up readings of between 4% and 13% lel within module M4. On investigation a gas leak was found on borsig gas compression. The machine was manually shut
down and blown down. The leak was found to be the gas cover. The time between the gas detectors picking up local readings and the machine being shutdown was approx. 2 mins. At no time
during the period did any of the fixed gas detectors read any level above the initial max 13% lel (only this high one one detector).
This incident is registered under <...>. At 04/05 hrs on <...> the solar turbine driven generator <...> tripped due to flame detection within the turbine enclosure. The fixed water mist protection
system was auto released by the fire and gas system. The platform was progressed to hazard status by the action of the fire and gas system. The 60 pob on the platform were held at muster for 15
minutes. The generator was running on fuel gas and was electrical load sharing with an <...> generator. The <...> accepted the solar electrical load and the process plant remained on line. The
plant was retained at this table operating condition during the incident. Subsequent investigation had not determined any indication or source of hydrocarbon (diesel/lub or fuel gas) leakage that
would initiate the flame detection. The scan of the turbine and F&G systems are slow to provide definitive of the initial alarm prints. Present deduction is extinguishant release and unit trip was
due to fault with flame detection and no fire existed. Ongoing investigation continues under <...>.
The operations team were changing back from from emergency power to main power generation following a planned main power outage. Generator b had been started and placed on the bars. An
attempt was made to start the seawater lift pump a remotely from the control room. Three personnel were in the switch-gear room at the gt b control panel when they heard two loud bangs. (the
control panel for gt b is located at the opposite end of the switchroom from the seawater lift pump a's control cubicle). One technician looked round the corner at the 6.6kv switch gear panels and
noticd smoke and a small flame coming from from an electrical fire in the sea water pump a panel. He extinguished the fire with a co2 extinguisher and then stood back. His colleague contacted
the control room. One tech. Isolated the auxiliary and battery supplies to the 6.6kv board. The panel reignited and was again extinguished with a co2 extinguisher. The breaker was removed to
ensure there was no risk of further ignition. The oim was called to the ccr and the general alarm was initiated, no plant shutdown was required as the plant was already shutdown and fully isolated
for a planned turnaround. The ert were mustered and released to deal with the incident. The ert team arrived, donned breathing apparatus and confirmed that there were no electrical fires,

Whilst the drill and wire-line crew were rigging up the <...> wire-line, the handle on a wire-line sheave parted, which resulted in approximately 145 feet of utility winch line to spool down to the
drill floor in an uncontrolled manner. There were no injuries sustained and no damages to equipment other than the sheave handle breakage.
The assistant driller was preparing to run a stand out of 5 1/2" drill pipe with a rope. The driller activated the ddm top drive link tilt towards the monkeyboard, but was unable to extend it fully.
The driller asked for the stand to be pulled back so he could lower the top drive to check the link tilt. The stand was pulled back and an attempt to install the chain and hook around the stand was
made. The driller disengaged the top drive link tilt before the chain was installed, the stand was still being held by the rope. The floorman placed the utility winch line (swl 5 tonnes) around the
stand of drill pipe and back onto the 1 tonne swl sling (weak link) to assist pulling back the stand towards the assistant derrickman. This operation failed and the stand of drill pipe fell against the
ladder platform, causing the utility winch weak link to part, which in turn sent the winch line up the crown sheave and the slack therein fell to the drill floor. No personnel were injured and the
line was recovered with no damage to equipment or line.
During routine weekly checks on the <...> crane located on the <...> platform, the crane operator was raising the boom to approximately 80 degrees to test the boom upper-limit mechanical safey
device. As the boom neared its upper most position, the boom control lever in the crane cab dropped suddenly to the floor (in the opposite direction to the its normal operation) and the boom
continued to rise in an uncontrolled manner towards the vertical at an accelerated speed. The lower section of the boom travelled to its maximum position whilst the top section continued
backwards (due to its momentum) resulting in the boom of the crane failing at a bolted section approximately 20 ft along the boom length. The crane operator was not injured. The initial
investigation suggests a malfunction of the boom upper-limit mechanical safety device.
As part of preparation for coiled tubing operation the installed BOPs for this operation were being pressure tested. Four tests had been completed when the test bar was propelled out of the BOP,
struck the coiled tubing reel situated on the pipe deck. The bar was deflected from the reel and landed on the skid deck. The operation was immediately suspended and an investigation
commenced. A full report will be issued on completion.
Whilst carrying out a WIT (well integrity test) on <...> the area technician heard the sound of escaping gas, investigations revealed the source to be the upstream flange joint on <...> gas lift gliss
valve <...>. The area technician immediately isolated and depressurised the gas lift flowline. The gas release could be seen from close up and there was also a small amount of icing on the flange
joint. There was no indication of gas on any of the module fixes gas detectors, a hand held gas meter was held approx. 6" from the leak and registered 3% LEL. The area tech has been working on
<...> which is in close proximity to the leak at 13.00hrs and the joint was secure, the techincian returned to the well at 15.00hrs when the leak was then detected. The isolation was in place and the
gas lift flowline depressured at 15.15hrs. As a precaution the module was cleared until the line was isolated and depressurised. At the time of the release the gas lift system was at 130 bar. <...>
had been closed in at 13.35 on the <...> and it is believed that the flowline cooling will have been a contributory factor.
<...>. Drilling operations were in progress on well <...> at a depth of 4330m MD. The well had recently penetrated the top of the <...> main sand reservoir formation at a depth of 4326m MD. At
4330m MD a 7 bbl pit gain was observed by the driller so drilling was stopped and the well was closed in on the BOP. After a period of stabilisation the shut in drill pipe and casing pressures
were recorded at 980 psi and 1500 psi respectively. The mud weight at the time of taking the influx into the well was 1.46 sg. A plan was developed to perform a well kill operation and the reserve
mud was weighted to 1.72 sg. The well kill operation was then performed using the wait and weight method to remove the influx from the well and restore primary well control. On completion of
circulating the well to the 1.72 sg mud, the drill pipe and casing pipe was reduced to zero. The BOPs were opened and the well flow checked and found to be static. After a period of additional
circulation to condition the mud, normal drilling operations were resumed. The higher than expected reservoir pressure encountered at this well location is currently being investigated but thought
possibly to be a high permeability sand formation in pressure communication with a nearby water injection well. <...> continuation received <...>. Placed in incident file. Not entered onto <...> or
The platform has been shutdown for planned maintenance for >7 days. All system had been isolated, drained and purged. The operation being carried out was further cutting and dressing open
ended 3" stainless steel drain pipe with a grinder. There was a loud bang resulting from the ignition in the pipe work. The flame immediately blew itself out.
On the <...> at 06:25 smoke detector <...> <...> came into alarm. Two operators were dispatched to check the LCR in module 03. They radioed the CCR confirming smoke. Prod tech elect went to
assist. The cause of the smoke was traced to an instrument cubicle. On opening the cubicle a small fire was discovered and extinguished.
As part of peeldown activity on <...>, work was given to peel down team no. 2 to commence work located on the west side of the main deck. After briefing the team they met at the work location
to survey the area. While doing this a piece of unistrut support steel fell from module <...> where peeldown team no. 1 were working and landed some four metres from the team (no. 2).

The incident involved maintenance activies on a pressure vessel. A nitogen purge complete, isolation in place and the vessel manway removed. A non electric fan (air mover) was place and the
vessel for ventilation. Vapour ignited at atmospheric pressure causing a flash. This activated the fire and gas detection causing the platform to shutdown. All personnel were on the <...> were
called to muster. The shutdown systems and procedures all fuctioned as designed. No personnel were injured requiring treatment. An independent team has been sent to the platform to investigate
this incident. TIR rec'd <...> Vapour ignited causing flash during maintenance work on pressure vessel in <...> mobile. Person nearest did not see source - facing other way. Coupled nitro purge,
not under pressure. IF system set off, causing automatic shutdown of <...>. <...> was shut down manually as a precautionary measure. <...> POB called to muster, production restarted later and
muster stood down. <...> investigation team due.
During operation of a temporary 37 tonne <...> Crane installed for removal/replacement of the gas Compressor Bundle as part of the <...> shutdown programme, the free chain & clump weight
fell approx 20ft landing on scaffold below, damaging a scaffold board. The estimated weight of the chain & clump block that fell is 150kg. The area had been cleared of all personnel prior to the
operation taking place. An internal investigation is ongoing at this moment in time to find root cause.
While lifting the Drilling BOPS (blow out preventer) and Drilling Risers (30 ton), one of the <...> Lifting cylinders rates at 15 tonne each (60 Tonne total) failed. The BOP had been 4" off the
wellhead at this point. The failure lead to the hydraullic system bleeding off causing the BOP to make a slow decent back onto the wellhead. On inpection it was discovered that the lifting padeye
on the bottom of the lifting cylinder piston had broken away from the welded connection at the connection to the piston rod. The padeye shaft fits inside the piston by a push fit and is then welded
into place. This is an original design. Communication is being conducted with the supplier/manufacture about failure and failure mode analysis will be conducted onshore. All findings from the
investigation will be used to prevent reoccurrence.
<...>-WELL No. <...>. During inflow test of abandoment cement plug, in 7" liner, well was observed to be flowing. Well closed in on BOPs pressure allowed to stabilise. Well was circulated to
kill mud using drillers method.
During a routine clean up, three 1-1 1/2? blank flanges had been stacked at the side of the Generation deck beside a kick plate/handrail. A short time later the flanges were dislodged (although it is
not known how) and one slipped through the gap between the kick plate and the deck. This fell to the laydown area 10-15 m below although it bounced off various cable trays during the descent.
Personnel working in the area of the laydown platform heard the flange falling although the flange hit no one and no injuries nor damage sustained. Flange weight is around 1-2 kg, weather
conditions described as fair, dry with little wind. Platform was in normal operating conditions and no unusual vibrations were noted that may explain why the flanges shifted. Following the event
the whole platform has been inspected to ensure recurrence cannot occur and whole workforce have discussed the event to highlight the potential of this near miss in what was an apparently
routine tidy up operation.
Supply Vessel Operations ongoing: <...>. Environmental conditions: Wind/Speed E.S.E 12 kts. Supply. At approximately 20:00 hrs whilst lifting a bundle of casing off the deck of the supply
vessel, the crane overhoist alarm sounded. The crane operator immediately ceased operations with the tubulars suspended over the vessel. The Crane Tech. was called and after initial inspection
deemed it safe to lower them. Subsequent investigation indicate the whip line had "stranded" and fouled the boom chandelier whilst lowering the M/T hook. When the load was raised from the
vessel's deck, the stranding of the whip line caused the overhoist safety chain to become detached and fall to the deck. As a result of Safe Operating procedures being observed on the vessel's
deck, no personnel were in a position of danger from the dropped object. The East Crane activities were immediately suspended and investigation initiated. The whip line was replaced in <...>
and will be sent ashore for analysis.
Flexible hydraulic hose feeding hydraulic fan <...>, supplying fire pump room 3, ruptured. The rupture was at the neck of the crimped section on the external end of the hose. The 200 litres of
hydraulic oil within the system was lost. Due to location of hose the hydraulic oil sprayed overboard to sea.
Man-riding ops were being carried out on the drill floor to carry-out mtce to a pipe handling machine (PHM). Following completion of this work, the man-rider wire was secured to its anchor
point. During this process, the anchored wire became inadvertantly snagged in the upper part of the PHM. When the PHM was subsequently moved to its set position, the wire parted at an
elevation of 23m (ie at height of upper arm), and fell to the drill floor. No one was injured as there was no one positioned in the vicinity of the rotary table. The total weight and length of the
dropped wire was 13 kg and 23m respectively. A Time-Out-For-Safety was held to ensure all relevant facts and information was gathered. The man-rider was taken out of service and will be sent
to the manufacturer for inspection. The crown sheave will be changed out and the corresponding pad-eye will be inspected.

At 01:00 a diesel leak was reported to the CRO by the area technician. The area techincian had performing watch keeping duties and had discovered diesel leaking from a fitting on <...> generator
<...>. His immediate action was to isolate the diesel line and shut the machine down. The diesel was contained within the bunded area in the bottom of <...> housing. Approx. 50-60 kgs of diesel
had leaked from a 1/8" brass bleed fitting on the diesel fuel line to the suction of the fuel pump. The line pressure was 29 psi. No excessive vibration on this line was noted. the source of the leak
was from the bonnet thread on the bleed fitting.
On responding to an oil sheen report by the afternoon helicopter flight the <...>'s daughter craft was requested to investigate (location <...>, <...>). On arrival at the location hydrocarbon bubbling
was observed. Samples of the hydrocarbon and a video were taken by the <...> (SBV). The <...>, <...> and <...> wells were isolated and vented and all well pressures were monitored. The <...>
was mobilised and identified a leak with the ROV under the rock dump on the main line to the <...>o approx 520 metres from the <...> template. These wells remain isolated and depressurised
pending further investigation.
Process plant being brought back on line after shutdown. Wind 20 knots, direction 295 degrees, sea state 1.0m. Prior to the event condensation in the Slugcatcher vessel V1620 had been manually
drained to the closed drains sump tank vessel V1530 using a 3" drainline. During start up, pressure in the cold vent system resulted in oil escaping from the cold vent stack on the flare bridge,
approximately 20 litres escaping to sea. The plant was immediately shut down, the drains sump tank pumped down and the vent depressurised. The 3" drain line isolation valve was checked and
locked closed. PON1 has been submitted and all agencies informed. The plant was subsequently restarted with no pressure build up in the cold vent system.
Technician was walking through module carring out routine checks (he had been through the same route 10 mins previous, and there were no problems). On passing the area, he discovered
water/crude oil leaking from a hole in a 3/4" stub piece on the B train manifold. This was reported back to the control room and the 'B' train process was shutdown. As an additional precaution,
the A train process was also shut down to eliminate the chance of any passing valve allowing additional hydrocarbons to reach the leak. At no tiime had the fixed gas detection within the module
indicated a level of hydrocarbons. The leak was from a 3/4 stub peice that had failed at a weld, due to internal corrosion. A temporary repair is being installed, approved by onshore technical
authority. This will then be NE/Helium sensitive leaked checked prior to start up.
<...>. A 2-phase hydrocarbom escape occurred from an over-pressurised pressure guage on well D08. The guage was employed to monitor pressure on the 9-5/8" annulus. The release was noted
by a production operator who manually isolated the guage. The platform safety system also registered the release via a low level alarm from a gas detector in the vicinity of the release.
Supply Vessel Operations ongoing:Vis. Misty/Fog at times: Wind /Speed. S.E. 09kts. At approximately 03:15hrs whilst lifting a mini container off the deck of the supply vessel, the Crane
overhoist alarm sounded. Bearing in mind a similar incident <...>, the operator immediately ceased lifting and placed the container back onto the vessel 's deck by booming down. The<...>'s
Crane Op. was called, and after initial inspection placed the boom across the pipe deck for investigation. The whip line was noted to be badly damaged and initial investigation indicated that the
overhoist support chain had been picked up by the moving line and jammed between the sheave and the moving rope, causing the damage noted on the whip line. The switch trigger chain had
broken and part of the support chain was missing. Some of this chain had fallen onto the supply vessel's deck. The overhoist switch arrangement was a new safety modification fitted 10 days prior
to the incidents and is thought to be the primary cause of this incident. These will be removed prior to reinstatement. Safe Operating procedures were observed on the vessel's deck ensuring vessel
crews were in a safe position.
Whilst the Supply Vessel <...>, which was alongside the East side of the platform, was receiving back load cargo, a bolt fell from the installation and landed on her deck. All vessel-loading
operations were stopped and examination of the East Crane boom lighting gantries revealed that the bolt had been dropped from one of the East Crane boom lights. On closer examination it was
found that the remaining three retaining bolts had also lost their nuts and were working themselves loose. In addition, the safety chain had been wrongly attached and would not have prevented
the light unit falling had the remaining bolts come out. All the boom lights on both platform cranes had been replaced. Therefore all the crane operations were stopped and both crane lighting
gantries were checked. More loose bolts were found on the East Crane, however all the boom lighting bolts on the West Crane were found to be correctly torqued up. Investigation ongoing.
It was during a crane load. They were backing a lubricator onto a well the load fell approx. 3 feet. There has been no classification of the incident as yet but a full investigation is underway.

A fracture occured on the upstream orifice flange take off for the Train minimum flow control <...>. Crude Oil was released and contained in the module. Prior to incident problems had been
experienced with the control of the LCV in normal operation. To prevent the system from becoming unstable a fixed manual input signal had been applied to the LCV keeping it about 35% open
with control being maintained on the recycle FCV back to the separation train. This flow rate was within normal operation parameters. Considerable time and effort had been spent checking the
operation of the LCV to ensure that any down stream pressure fluctutions from the export PVC did not result in any reactive movement in the LCV. The plant was running for approx. 1hr when
the MOL pump <...> tripped on low flow. It is believed the instability of movement in the LCV caused a sudden value movement which resulted in breakage in the feedback linkage to the LCV
positioner. This would have induced severe vibration in the process pipeing that resulted in the 3/4" orifice take off line fracture. Since the prvious incident associated with this system the LCV
internals has been charged as recommended by Unival. the HC released was contained within the module going to platform hazardous drains. The platform did not change status and gas heads
At 1520 on <...>, a scaffolder working around the MP sep in mod 03 mezz inadvertently moved a ball-valve handle on a 3/4" sample line into the open position. Immediately aware of escaping
gas, he closed the valve and alerted the CCR. Two gas heads came into high alarm, and an automatic level 3 shutdown initiated. Gas levels were seen to drop rapidly, and heads were reset within
5 minutes. Full POB mustered. ERT checked mod 03 and found sample line with outlet ball-valve closed, upstream gate valve open.
A smell of burning wood was noted at the high level walkway across the top of John brown power generation turbine. No one was working in the vicinity on the investigation scaffold boards on a
load bearing scaffold across the turbine enclosures were observed to be burning due to heat impinging from adjacent exhaust stack. This safe area. The board was dowsed with portable
extinguisher the GPA was manual activated and the fire team mobilised to apply water to prevent further smouldering. The potential hazard of heat from the exhaust has been recognised
previously and metal board was used for the first three rows ajacent to the exhaust. The reason for enough heat to cause burning to impinge on the board has not yet been established. As a
precaution all wooden scaffold boards have been removed from the veracity of the exhaust. Weather at time was good with warm still conditions.
C' turbine was started on diesel fuel at 16:35 and ran up to sync idle to ensure there were no problems after previous maintenance, During routine post start checks on 'C' turbine, the utilities
technician found the Power Turbine enclosure to be full of smoke (smoke is thought to be from exhaust stack). At this point the turbine was put through a shut down sequence which took
approximately 8 minutes for the machine to come to a full stop. With the aid of the <...> technician the Utilities technician proceeded to investigate the source of the smoke, and after pulling back
a section of lagging in the enclosure noticed a small flame emanating from the area around the base of the exhaust. The Utilities technician took a CO2 extinguisher from the main area and
proceeded to extinguish the flame. Once this was done he contacted the platform OIM and informed him of the situation. The Fire Team Leader and Safety Officer along with two fire team
members were despatched to the area to assess the situation further. Upon examination it was found that fibrous lagging material in the area of the bottom exhaust support was still smouldering.
This was extinguished and then removed and on inspection the area was declared safe. No fixed fire and gas detection was activated during this incident. The enclosure systems comprise two
During watch keeping activities one of the <...> operations team heard and observed a hydrocarbon gas release from a small bore connection on the PM jacket. On closer investigation it was
observed that a 3/8" tube connection had come loose and was venting gas. This was isolated and the leak stopped. Further investigation found the nut had become loose and was being held on
with a couple of turns on the fitting thread, which caused the leak path. This fitting was tightened up correctly and pressure tested, proved leak tight and returned to service. The fitting was on an
impulse line to a differential pressure transmitter <...>. This transmitter measured the pressure diff accross the Train 5 Low Pressure Compressor suction valve.
At 22:58 on <...> two consecutive gas alarms, activated within area P05 West on the Upper Mezzanine Deck of the platform. These gas alarms are situated within 0.2 metre from the point of gas
release. This caused an ESD2 Shutdown of the platform and a manual blowdown of P05 module area was initiated. On investigation it was found that the leak emanated from an open vent point
on the cooling water side of an isolated heat exchanger E101. This cooler had been isolated to establish water loss from the cooling system. Further investigation revealed that the bursting disc
isolation valve on E101 was passing and that the bursting disc was defective. Downstream of the bursting disc connects to the flare system, this allowed gas from the flare system to pass through
the bursting disc and valve into the cooling water bundle and out through the open vent. The plant was depressured to allow the spading of this line to allow normal operations to progress. Details
goven in part b: Module P05 West. Upper Mezz Deck Platform.

At approx. 09:54 Electricians working at the 77meter level in the utility leg, reported a water leak against the inside of the utility leg above them. They were immediately withdrawn from the leg,
and exited the leg at 09:57. Two opreations pesonnel entered the leg at 10:06, down the stairs following all recognised procedures, and carrying the prerequisite equipment. They identified the
leak to be at the produced water take-off point from the seawater header standpipe. A hole approx. 15mm was evident, and produced water which was released. Produced water which was
displaced when oil production enters the storage cells; for cell balance, the system operates under a positive seawater head pressure. The two personnel exited the leg at 10:23; returned to the
control room, at after further discussion and assessment, the decision was taken to shutdown the process in a controlled manner, to maintain stability and control. shutting down the process
resulted in cessation of produced water production, however, the leak continued due to the positive seawater head pressure, but by this stage was fresh seawater only. the precess remains
shutdown, until a repair can be effected on the pin hole leak.
At 0123hrs on the <...> a minor leak was noted coming from a pin hole in pipework from the D101 separator. Production from the <...> and <...> Wells was manually shutdown at 0125hrs from
the Control Room. No gas dection was activated. This incident is currently under investigation.
Environmental Conditions: Wind 220 degrees @ 25 knots. Barometer 1002, Temp 11C, 7/8 Cloud Cover. During injection operations a small leak was detected from the stern valve of train 1 <...>
inter-stage vent valve, which vents directly into the HP vent system. No high level gas detection signal was received so there was no requirement for a platform general alarm or muster. There
were no injuries or ingestion of gas/condensate as a result of this incident.
<...> Drill 6 1/2" - 7 1/2" hole to 15804ft. Drilling break at 15799ft. Flow check well on trip tank, stable. Circ bottoms up - 3.6% gas on bottoms up. Cont drill hole to 15856ft. Perform
connection at 15856 ft. Gain in trip tank of 10 bbl during connection. Shut in well at 23:08 hrs. Monitor well for pressure build up. SICP at 24.00 = 535 psi. No SIDPP, floats in string. Cont.
monitor well for pressure build up. SICP increased to 550 psi. Circ out influx by drillers method. Hold constant SICP at 550 psi to pump at kill rate 20 spm. DPP: 750 psi - 350 psi SCR = 400 psi
SIDPP: Continue circulate out influx, DPP at 850 psi(incl 100 psi overbalance). Weighted up to 15.9 ppg. Down hole losses 10 bbls. Maximum Gas after MGS 24%. Lost another 10 bbls when
gas boiling out at surface. Cont circ to reduce gas levels in mud to 10% prior to pump kill mud. DPP at 850 psi while circulating - 14% gas. Cllose in well keeping casing pressure constant. SICP
477 psi - SIDPP 525 psi. No losses recorded. Line up on kill mud at 15.9 ppg. Start pumping kill mud. Initial circulating pressure 1273 psi (includes 100 psi safety factor). Shut in well with kill
mud at bit - SIDPP 0 - SICP 700 psi. No losses recorded. Max gas during circulation 17.3%.
Well service crew whilst approaching their pumping unit located on west Skid deck noticed a section of sub base windwall had dislodged from its fixings and dropped to the skid deck.(no
personnel in the area at the time). Weather conditions were calm and no other work parties in close proximity. Cladding sheet measured approx. 4X1. and approx 20kg. Height dropped approx
4m. Remaining panels to be checked and secured by scaffolding bracing.
Well servs personnel working on West Skid deck mixing chemicals in batch tank for annulus top up programme. Scaffolders had been working erecting scaffolding along westside of derrick in
preparation for removal of windwall. Well sevs requested scaffolders to vacate area during mixing operations which they did. Approx 10 minutes later an angle iron backing plate dropped
(approx35 feet) from drill derrick structure, deflected of scaffold kick plate and bounced across the skid deck and brushed off the WSS lower leg. He immediately reported the incident to the OIM
and OS. Angle iron backing plate dimensions: 7x7x24 cm and weight 2.2kg. Weather conditions were calm.
Running in 13 3/8" Casing; weather Conditions good: Visibility, good; Whilst carrying out operations on well <...>, personnel were running in 13 3/8" casing. A hydraulically operated Stabbing
Arm was being utilised for this task. The function of this was to hold the Casing in position whilst it was being screwed onto the previous section for inserting down hole. Whilst working at the
drill floor "V" door, a drilling hand heard a noise and turned to see an object fall to the floor in the region of a narrow access to the dog house. The man retrieved the object and reported it to his
supervisor. The job was stopped an the orgin of the object investigated. This was subsequently found to be a small extension piece from one of the claw fingers of the Stabbing Arm, the drop
distance was approx 25'. Following testing of the remaining two fingers extensions as a safety precaution, it was decided to remove these, after consultation with the vendor. Work was then
restarted and futher investigation initiated. No personnel were injured or equipment damaged.
At 17:10 there was a sounding of the General Alarm and automatic Emergency Shutdown of Gas Compression Unit K300. All personnel mustered. The Emergency Response Team was mobilised.
The Team confirmed the origin of the gas release and the location was made safe by the closing of additional block valves upstream of the affected equipment. Subsequent investigation
determined the cause as a failed fitting within the <...> cab enclosure. The fitting was installed somw time ago (<...>). It was incorrectly made up when installed. The fitting has been replaced and
the unit returned to service.

Due to loss of the main platform generators, the Emergency Generator (EG2) had been operational, but tripped during black-start operations. Technicians managed to start EG1 and synchronise to
the board. Technicians then commenced restart checks on EG2 (adjacent to EG1). During these checks it was noted that there was a flickering light under EG2 hood at the exhaust. This was
investigated and it was identified that lube oil was seeping into the exhaust lagging contacting the hot exhaust & dropping into the bunded area. A small fire described as a "lazy flame" was
identified. The fire was extinguished immediately by the technician using a locally sited portable CO2 extinguisher. The Machine was allowed to cool down and the area ventilated. The unit
remains shutdown pending a full investigation.
During normal operations KO2 Gas compressor had been running for approximately 20 minutes after changing from k01. During checks a fire was seen inside the hood of the turbine enclosure.
The Central Control Room was informend and the platform went to muster. The fine water spray fire suppressant was activated manually by a operator at the scene. The area was checked by the
emergency response team and declared safe. The fire was extinguished within seconds of it starting. Subsequent investigation reveled that a joint on the lube oil drain pipe was missing and
evidence of "hylomar sealant visible. It is like;y that the pipe flanges were sealed with jointing compound only during the turbine rebuild in. The contractor is being asked for an explanation.
The subsea tree and upper completion had been run. The well was being flowed back to the rig for clean up purposes. The well fluids were sampled routinely throughout clean up operations. A
maximum quantity of 70 ppm of Hydrogen Sulphide in the well fluids was recorded. The quantity was only once seen over 50 ppm. Monitoring regularly showed the level down to 20 ppm by the
end of the flow period. Testing the well fluids was performed by personnel wearing breathing apparatus equipment. Although there is H2S present in the field, none was anticipated in this well.
During stable production gas was detected in analyser house which caused automatic shoutdown, blowdown and gerneral alarm. Platform mustered. Source of the leak was found to be one of the
hydrogen suphide analysers. The faulty analyser was isolated prior to restart.
Whilst in the process of back-loading the supply vessel '<...>' using the North Crane, a mud cuttings skip snagged the vessels starboard side, main steel safety protection barrier door, at the same
time as the vessel was on a downward pitch. This subsequently introduced a shock loading in excess of the SWL of the 8t crane pennant, resulting in the failure of the master lifting link of the
pennant. Sea state, 20-24 knots, 3.0-3.5m. Vessel sitting into wind. Vessel deck crew were within fully enclosed safety tunnel, running full length port & starboard.
<...> (NUI). At 08.10 hrs on the <...> the <...> B platform went into Total Platform Shutdown (tps). One consequence of a TPS is that the wire line or tubing retrievable surface controlled sub
surfaced safety valves (wr/tr-sc-sssv) close. As coincidence would have it a visit to the location, a normally unmanned installation (NUI) had been arranged for the same day. Upon arrival on the
location a production operator observed ice had formed on the exterior of the c/line pressure regulator. Gas was observed to be escaping to the surface via the c/line. The c/line was isolated at the
isolation valves on the tubing bonnet and the well was isolated from production. The well has not produced gas since the TPS. Subsequent investigations by a production found that it was not
possible to close either the lower or the upper master gate valves on the xmas tree. Further investigations by a <...> Representative indicated beyond all reasonable doubt that the wr-sc-sssv had
been ejected from the landing nipple within the completion at 1027 ft ahbsv & that it resided in the xmas tree, probably sitting on the insert string hangar. Operations by <...> to rectify the
situation will take place as soon as reasonably practicable.
Pinhole leak in oil booster pump recycle line to <...>. Line Nos <...>. Quantity of Crude oil leak = 3ltr (approx).No spillage to sea. Immediate action: Pipework isolated an drained down. No
production shutdown. No Platform alert.
At approx 05:00 it was observed in the control room that gas detectors <...> and <...> had gone into low level alarm on the PW east wellbay. The PW platform was isolated after pressure testing
with N2 and was reading a pressure of less than 1 bar. On investigation by an Operations Tech, no audible gas leak could be heard but in the area of the gas detectors a gas odour could be smelt.
The PW platform was subsequently SPS and vented. On detailed investigation by dayshift ops personnel, it was found that there was a faint audible leak of N2/Ch4 from the PW-02 sand filter lid.
These sand filter lids utilise a 'Bandlock' locking and sealing mechanism which historically leak at low DP across their seats.

The <...> was in combined operation with the <...> Platform. <...> had just comlpeted an operation on Well <...>, (a gas re-injected well) to inject Methanol into the well to clear a suspected
hydrate. Five Barrels of methanol were injected into the well by pumping some 15000 standard cubic feet of N2 into th well thereby proving the removal of the restriction. At Operations request,
the well was then lined up to the injection header with the intention of proving well injectivity with injection gas. Following this test it was intended to hand the well back to Operations. The flow
line valves were opened in sequence. With the spool tree production wing valve open last. Coincident with the operation of this valve, there was a gas release which involved 11 flammable gas
detectors alarming, thereby initiating an automatic emergency shutdown. Other operations were ongoing on the <...> at the same time, principally the pressure test of flow lines for a well
intervention programme on well L5. Wind at the time of the incident was Southerly, 7 knots. Wave height 0.25m, visibility 10 miles+. Subsequent investigation and inspection involved venting
and purging to well L9 with nitrogen. A pressure test with low pressure nitrogen was able to confirm that the releas was from a stem seal in a choke valve. A failure mode investigation is ongoing.
Scaffolders arriving at the 82m level in the utility shaft to recommence their job were aware of a smell of H2S. They immediately vacated the shaft and reported this to the CRO. Two operations
personnel entered the shaft to check the area following all the recognised procedures and carrying all the prerequisite equipment. They found the cause of the H2S was from a previously know
produced water leak that had been temporarily repaired.
The <...> platform, which is a normally unmanned platform operated from <...> control room, was operating normally until 03:15 on the <...> when the platform tripped and shutdown. At 09:50
the <...> team arrived and completed the routine checks. Nothing untoward was found so power was reestablished to the platform. At this time no valves were open. A request was made by <...>
Control to start flowing <...> well. After checking the differential pressures the main ESD valve was opened. The operator heard a loud hiss so he immediately closed the Methanol ESD valve and
investigated. He discovered that one of the stainless steel 12mm small bore methanol pipes had fractured. This was reported to the <...> Control Room. All adjacent instrument pipework has been
replaced and the damaged piece has been sent for analysis.
An area technician detected a hydrocarbon leak. On investigation he found that an instrument 5-way manifold assembly had a leak from a valve stem (<...>Type <...>). This manifold is rated to
276 bar @ 260 deg. The system instrument was on the <...> seal gas line. The compressor was running at the time of the gas leak. The pressure in the line was 130 bar. The isolation valves on the
manifold were closed, the source of the leak was from the equalisation valve stem. Once isolated the leak stopped. No fixed gas detection operated.
At 0330 hrs on <...> while running the south fire pump in DC1 a small lube oil section of pipework fitting parted. This small pipework is located near the top of the fire pump engine. The oil
discharged from the pipe caused heavy smoke when it made contact with the hot sections of the pump. A very small fire was also observed and this was extinguished with a portable dry powder
extinguisher. There was no activation of the two flame detectors in the fire pump enclosure. Inspection of similar pipes on other three fire pumps complete. Investigation ongoing.
During routine operational checks around <...> compression jacket operations noticed an audible leak on BC1 compressor discharge cooler header. The machine was shut down and the system depressurised immediately. The hole is believed to be in excess of 0.1mm, this cannot be confirmed until professional advice has been taken by the platform from qualified personnel.
On <...> platform the intervention team were reinstating the wells after being shut in for several days, the well production Wing Valve for well <...> was opened and it was noticed that an audible
leak was coming from the well choke valve. The operator identified the leak as coming from a flange upstream of the choke. The TL was informed and the well was shut in. Production had not
started from the well and it was depressurised and isolated after taking a gas reading using a portable gas detector reading approx. 20% LEL at 12" from the source. It was a calm day, wind speed
under 5 knots and the fixed F&G system never picked up the leak. The leak was present for approx. 2 minutes until the operator isolated and depressurised, there was no risk to personnel working
in the area, there was no intrusive maintenance in the area or hot work. There will be a visit planned to repair the leak and pressure test. An incident report will be raised using traction system and
any findings reported.
Ongoing activity at time of incident was pulling out of hole (POOH). At approximately 15:30 the drill crew were racking a stand of 5 1/2" drill pipe on to the racking board (drillers side). During
this operation the driller slackened off the travelling block too far allowing contact to be made between the DDM torque wrench and the stand of drill pipe in the elevators. On contact, a
protection bracket (weight 662 gms) guarding the HP hose on the lower ram was broken off and fell approximately 97 feet to the drill floor. The bracket landed approximately 1 foot in front of a
deckcrew member. New protection bracket welded on to torque wrench. There are two similar brackets, both of which have been secured with lanyards to prevent them becoming dropped objects
in future. Procedures have been highlighted at toolbox talks re. communication between Derrickman and Driller. Several areas have been identified by the investigation team as requiring further
study and resolution as below. Review the existing procedure which involves communication between Driller and personnel at monkey board. Review suitability of existing CCTV equipment.
Review possible communication enhancements to the talkback system. Review suitability of protection brackets on rig equipment.

<...> report faxed <...>: A fire occurred at <...>this morning at 00:25hrs in a fan module in D3 East. There was a full muster and shut down, cross overs were shut down but not depressurised
(<...> & <...>). Stand down occurred @ 02:00hrs, deluge @ 76m set off due to low pressure and is being dealt with. <...>: <...> east supply fan which is located in <...>100 went into alarm. Two
ops technicians were deployed from the control room to investigate. On approaching <...> from the north east the techs reported black smoke coming from the module, both techs entered the
module and advised of flames emerging from <...> fan belt housing. The <...>/<...> initiated GPA and a <...>. It is suspected that the drive belts failed, they were then caught in the drive pulley
and the resultant friction generated sufficient heat to cause the fire. A full onshore investigation to be conducted.
A fishing vessel was seen on radar to be on a collision course with the <...> Installation. Standby Vessel,<...>, was unable to make radio contact with the fishing vessel to warn it off. Platform
Emergency Response procedures initiated. The vessel changed course from an Easternly course passing the platform within the 500 metres exclusion zone.
At approx.13.14 hrs a low level gas was indicated on a single head in the vicinity of the NGL pumps in P1. 2 x Area technicians were dispatched to investigate. Further gas heads x 3 indicated
low level gas at approx.13.15 hrs. At approx 13.17 the area technicians approaching from a safe distance reported a gas leak and requested that the HP NGL pump (Train 2) be SD which was
carried out by the CRO. At 13.18 High level gas was indicated on two of the gas heads in the NGL pump area and an SPS initiated. The platform proceeded to muster and the process continued to
SD and blowdown. At 13.25 was confirmed that the gas heads had returned to below LEL. This was then confirmed by the ERT using portable gas detection. Note at no time did the gas migrate to
another area but was retained in the immediate vicinity of the NGL pump skid. The ERT confirmed that leakage had occured from one of the HP NGL pumps via the mechanical seal vent line. No
further leakage was evident at this time. The ERT were requested to and proceeded to mechanically and electrically isolate both HP NGL pumps to allow a RCA to be completed and to secure the
area. Platform was returned to normal status and personnel stood down from muster.
Normal production operations were ongoing. A gas detector was activated in Mod 06. On investigation a reflux pump seal was observed to be leaking hydrocarbon. The pump was isolated. As the
isolation process was completed a second detector came into alarm. The release depleted following completion of the isolation, and gas detection reset. Investigations are ongoing.
During a post weld heat treatment on <...> line pipework, the <...> operator saw flames inside the pipe in the region of the heat treatment. The operator activated a Manual Alarm Call Point and
the CCR initiated the GPA. The platform is undergoing a maintenance shutdown and the platform is gas and hydrocarbon free. The Emergency Response team was deployed. When the GPA
sounded the fire watch cut power to the heating pads and no trace of flames were found when the Emergency Response team arrived at the scene. An investigation has been initiated. Meantime,
all future heat treatment operations will be conducted using a continuous Nitrogen purge.
The crane on the platform is an articulated lifting arm electro/hydraulically powered manufactured by <...>. The crane operator was working a supply boat and had lifted on eloan from the boat
onto the lay-down area. he lifted the second load and had swung the load over the lay-down area and was lowering it onto the deck when the winch started to release the load. The load had
dropped approximately 1 metre when the crane operatorstopped the fall by operating the main hoist lever, which applied the brake. The load being lifted was well within the crane capacity. The
environmental conditions were good. The crane has been removed from service and an investigation into the failure has started.
During routine operations on Well <...>, a wireline operation to perforate and set a DHBV was nearing completion. The final depressurisation was ongoing following the valve set downhole. The
fluid route was into the Production Manifold and through the 1" valve to the Closed Drain System on the Platform. At approx 03:26 hours, some low gas alarms were recorded on the F&G panel
in the Main Control room. Checks by onshift Production Operations found leaks on the drain lines and Tilt plate Separator on the Cellardeck. The leaks quickly diminished following isolation of
the Well wing valve. The volume within the leaking pipework was assessed at no more than 112 Ltr. The leaking pipework and vessel was isolated and removed from service with alternative
routes open to Closed Drain Sump Tank. No platform personnel were in the vicinity of the leaking pipework prior to the incident.
<...> - A leak was detected on the 9 5/8" annulus of this water injection well. The leak was at the flange where a 2 1/16" valve meets the body of the wellhead. The water injection was
immediately stopped to the well and the pressure was bed down to zero . This well has communication between the A annulus and the tubing and so the annulus sees full injection pressure. The
annulus pressure is monitored continuously and has remained at zero. The annulus will be plugged and depending on the outcome of a risk assessment, the leak will be repaired after the removal
of the 2 1/16" valve.

The object of the operation was to lower the wireline riser back down onto the Xmas tree following repairs to the UMGV and LMGV. The driller took the weight of the riser and the safety clamp
was removed. He then raised the riser slightly in order to remove the slips and at this point the 5ton swivel parted allowing the riser to fall approx. 5 inches back into the slips. As there was
insufficient room to re-install the safety clamp an air winch line and sling were attached to the riser for security and the OIM was informed. On further investigation it was discoved that the cutter
valve gearbox housing had come into contact with the bell nipple housing causing two 6.4 tonne shackles to deform and the swivel to fail. TIR; AFTE placing 2 Plugs in water injection well
CA31, an attempt was made to lift the riser and lubrecator. As the lift started the shackle failed below the eye-bolt dropping the load 8 inches back into the slips.
The platform was in production following post-shutdown restart on <...>. At 06:35 on <...>, the Platform GPA activated when 4 (<...> <...>, <...>, <...>, <...>) flammable gas detectors on the DD
cellar deck went into alarm. Platform went to muster stations and plant was de-pressurised. The emergency response team was deployed once the gas levels had returned to zero. No leaks or
further traces of gas were found. All personnel were instructed to remain on the accomodation platform (DA) and the plant remained flat until the leak source had been identified. After pressure
tests and further investigations, the leak was traced to the upstream flange of PSV 29808, a 3/4" cavity relief valve on a dual seal isolation valve on the <...> Condensate metering skid. After the
PSV had been refitted & leak tested, production resumed on <...>. Further investigations into the cause of the release are ongoing. Environmental conditions: Wind: 15kts, 284 degrees,
Barometer: 1012 mbar, Air temp: 15.8 deg C, Visibility: 8-10 miles, cloud: overcast 1200ft
At 01:00 a lube oil leak was reported to the CRO by the area technician. The area technician had been performing watch keeping duties and had discovered the leak. The machine was shut down
and the lube oil system pump stopped. The lube oil was contained within the bunded area in the bottom of <...> housing. The turbine had been running for 4 hours after a pump start. It is
suspected that the leak started then but not confirmed. Approximately 50kgs of lube oil had leaked from the control oil pump supply flexi hose. The line pressure was 30 bar.
The rig was being skidded, when the north west gripper failed, spraying hydraulic oil onto the skid deck. Spill kits were already in place and a needle valve is in place to isolate this system in the
event of such failure. Hence only about 10 litres was spilled and it was contained on deck. None was spilled to sea. (The gripper is hydraulically operated ram mechanism to push or pull the rig
about the skid beams).
A leak from insulated drain line pipework was spotted by an Operator during routine checks. Leaking medium was a crude oil/water mixture coming back from the inlet separator. The leak was
contained in the area while the leak was being assessed & corrective actions determined. Approx 10ltrs spilled into the area, being contained with bunding & spill pads. The insulation was
removed and underlagging corrosion caused by water ingress identified as the reason for the leak. This incident is currently under investigation.
An Instrument Technician observed some crude oil on the deck plate on the cellar deck west landing area. The operator contacted the control room. This was traced to be coming from a pin hole
leak on a 6" close drain collection header above the walkway. The fine mist coming from the leak was a mixture of crude oil, water and a small amount of gas. Leak was found during a normal
operations. The weather at the time was good with 15knts wind at 350 degrees, Following an assessment of the leak production was shutdown in a controlled manner. The adjacent pipework was
found to be in good condition. A straubcoupling was fitted to the pinhole leak and all systems returned to nomal service and coupling monitored. Thorough examination is currently in progress to
assess the remaining system pipework. In the interim onshore integrity have been informed and are reviewing inspection histories on the system. B5=5" close drain collection header, above
captures west walkway.
At 09:02 on the <...> during routine checks on the gas trains a gas leak was noted from the body of valve <...> on train 2. This is a discharge valve operating at 1500 psi. It is believed that a body
'O' ring has failed. The platform was shut down and the valve is being removed for detailed examination. The gas release was extremely small. CSL full investigation report requested and further
investigation <...>.
Oil leak from 2" hydrocarbon line, <...> partners densitometer skid inlet in M3W. At 14:43 the F and G system indicated a gas head (<...>) in LLG alarm, two area technicians were sent to
investigate, on investigation there was found to be an oil leak (export quality crude oil) from the pipework under the insulation on the inlet line to the <...> densitometer system in module M3W.
The platform was placed on GPA by the OIM. The Partners crude oil export was shutdown manually and a manual valve isolation was applied. The leak then stopped, estimated duration of leak
was 6 minutes. The platform then returned to normal status. A minor environmental spill occurred to the sea and this has been reported to the relevant authorities.

<...>. While pulling out of hole with guns after perforating, a discrepancy was seen in the trip displacement figures. Well was shut in and observed for pressure build up. No pressure increase
seen. Well was opened again and was seen to be flowing at 3 to 4 bbls/hr. Brine weight increased and circulated into well bore.
A double block and bleed isolation was applied to gas import metering stream 5 to allow routine maintenance. During the testing of this isolation, it was discovered that the downstream block
valve was passing very slightly. (This actuated block valve is air-fail open, so to ensure that it remained closed, a N2 supply was fed to the actuator, via a regulator from a N2 bottle). The vent was
therefore left open to relieve any possible pressure build up, and a 1/2" nylon line was connected to the vent and passed over the side to atmosphere. During the night, the N2 pressure bled off,
and the valve began to travel open. This allowed an increased volume of gas to pass through the plastic line, and an increased pressure in the cavity between the valves. At some point, the flow of
gas reached a level where the line began to whip about, and this plastic line subsequently failed. The remains show signs of embrittlement, caused by low temperature. At some later point, the line
separated from the vent, allowing the gas to release directly into the module. This is believed to have caused the detection to operate, giving a muster and auto shutdown and blowdown. From
evidence we know that the valve moved from the closed position 69 seconds before the SPS and blowdown.
During normal operations, a voted smoke alarm in the accommodation, level 1 laundry, initiated a general alarm and tripped the accommodation. The source of the smoke was traced to a tumble
drier in the laundry.
At approximately 0215 hrs on the <...> the contractor's team were in the process of removing 9 5/8 casing from slot 22 using the hydraulic work over tower located on the skid deck over slot 22.
There was a requirement to move the pipe back into the hole, as they were doing this wire rope cable (10mm, SWL 2T) on the HWO control balance winch failed at the gin pole crown, this
resulted in the wire rope free falling to the work basket some 50 feet below missing personnel who were working in this area at the time. Operations remain shut down until a full investigation is
carried out to identify all learning and all arrangements are in place to prevent a reoccurrence. The contractor's Safety Manager is being mobilised to <...>to lead the investigation.
On the <...> during Hydraulic workover operations, while running in hole with 5" drill pipe the counterbalance winch wire parted approximately 26' above the elevators. One section of the wire
fell rearwards to the winch package. No personnel were injured.
Platform operating with normal production, compression and export systems. During the change-over of fuel from diesel to fuel gas on the P6A Main Oil Line Pump, the unit began surging. The
operator decided to shut the unit down in order to protect it from damage. Soon after the unit was stopped, smoke was seen to be emanating from the combustion air inlet external to the north side
of the module. A gas head also initiated on the air inlet ducting, although this is now believed to have been poisened by smoke. Another operator raised the alarm using a manual alarm callpoint,
and released a cylinder of carbon dioxide extinguishant into the the air intake. The platform production systems were shutdown and the GPA sounded. The watermist was manually released within
the enclosure as a precaution. An hour later, diesel was seen on the surface of the sea. Once the diesel supply to the main oil line pumps had been isolated the sheen dispersed. The P6A pump was
allowed to cool, and further diesel was identified in the sump of the turbine enclosure. At no point were flames seen, but it is believed that combustion took place within the engine housing. The
investigation continues. <...>
Normal platform operations were ongoing at the time of the incident and the wind was Westerly at 22 knots. At 23:00hrs an operations tech found a vistor light fitting (model 39L/400) lying on
the walkway next to the SWcrane pedestal. The bulb and outer protective lens had broken on impact with the deck. He immediately called the area authority and electrical technician and the
fitting was isolated and made safe. The fitting, which weighed 35kg, had been attached to the safety fencing on SW crane pedestal and had fallen 3.5 meters on the walkway directly below. The
light fitting fell due to one of the securing bolts failing due to corrosion. One of the actions from the investigation report will be to carry out checks of similar fittings to ensure their integrity.
Release of Hydrocarbons from offshore installation. Still weather conditions, 2 knots window maximum. Approximately 16.17 hours on the <...> following the opening of installation pig launcher
(V1001) door for routine intergrity inspection the platform fore 7 gas detection system situated at low level, detected coincident gas release above 20% LEL, although persons carrying out the
task did not detect anything. The initiated a platform status, deluge release and surface process shutdown. A full muster of all personnel was completed. The gas detector indications returned to
normal in less than 5 minutes. Once the automated fore & gas indicated 0% LEL the area around the pig launcher was checked and deemed clear of any further hydrocarbon release. The platform
returned to normal status.

An Operations Supervisor had been conducting a routine area authority check of module 1 prior to other planned work scopes progressing. During his tour, he observed (1625 hrs) a gas leak from
the corrosion inhibitor injection isolation valve downstream flange (1?) onto slot 02?s gas lift flowline. The mechanical supervisor, who was nearby, was contacted to witness the severity and
location of the leak. When he arrived he observed the flange was totally frozen up and there was a gas leak emitting from the flange joint to a distance of approximately 2-3 feet. The gas lift
flowline was manually isolated and blown down (1630 hrs) by the Operations department. Arrangements were made to carry out repairs, and an investigation started. Note: Mod 1 is a well
ventialed module, and the F&G system did not activate any alarms, GPA?s or any automatic shutdowns. There was no immediate risk to personnel or platform integrity, hence only a local manual
isolation & blowdown of the area was effected. There was no work ongoing in the immediate area, and no work was required to be suspended, although there was a slight delay in commencing
other planned work scopes.
During normal operations an inspection engineer thought he could smell a faint trace of gas. On investigation a small pinhole leak was discovered in an impulse line to a PDI transmitter on TEG
contractor No2. A controlled stop was initiated and permits withdrawn until the situation was resolved and an isolation could be achieved.
<...>. Preparing to perform the hydraulic fracture of well <...> on the <...> platform with stimulation vessel, <...>. The fracture stimulation was through the existing production string. The frac
programme was to be performed in two phases; initially a data frac would be pumped with fluid only to determine the pressure required to break down the formation. While the data frac was
being performed, 4000 psi was to be held by the tubing by 9 5/8 casing annulus. A proppant plug had been placed in the well with coil tubing to isolate the lower perforations and to control where
the hydraulic fracture would initiate. This had been displaced with 8.5 ppg KCl brine. Gauges were then run into the well on wireline and the final preparations for the frac made. Pressuring up of
the casing by tubing annulus commenced. At 3900 psi there was a sudden pressure drop which bled down to 0 psi concurrent with a loss in weight on the wireline. The casing by tubing annulus
valve was closed and a pressure test performed to 4000 psi to confirm surface integrity. On picking up with the wireline, the full original toolstring weight was confirmed. It was decided to
retrieve the gauges prior to commencing any investigative work. However the wireline hung up at 5516ft. MD with no further progress possible. It was believed the gauges had been pulled into
Small fire in telecoms battery room on unmanned <...> installation, believed to have been caused by a single cell failure in a battery initiating a progressive failure of adjacent cells, and
subsequent arcing and fire. Detected by alarm systems on <...>. Emergency response team members mobilised from <...> to <...>, effected electrical isolations and extinguished fire using dry
powder and co2 extinguishers. There was no suspension of normal production of oil.
<...> - At approximately 21:30 hours on the <...> the <...> team performing the hydraulic work over on well <...> were retrieving the packer to the surface. During this operation fluid gains were
experienced in the brine pits. The annular was sealed round drill pipe and the well was bull-headed with a further quantity of brine. A team has been appointed to investigate the incident, and
specialist input requested from onshore technical authority.
Single gas head in the East separation module indicated low level gas reading 20% LEL. Two technicians investigated and discovered a pinhole leak in the 2" drains line from <...> Solar gas
turbine filter separator. The vessel was offline at the time and the inlet valve was closed although the vessel remained at working pressure circa 14 barg. On detection of the leak they manually
depressurised the vessel from circa 8 bar to atmospheric pressure via the closed drains system and vacated the area. This event occurred immediately following a platform blackout and it is not
believed that the two events are connected. As only one head detected low level gas no executive actions occurred.
Platform was in full production. Train 2 Export Gas Compressor had been shut down for maintenance and a new engine fitted. It was handed back to Operations at 2030hrs <...>. At 0330hrs <...>
the compressor was started and at 0345hrs it tripped on high turbine temperature spread across the thermocouples. It was restarted at 0415hrs and at 0439hrs GP754402 inside the turbine
enclosure went into high alarm. Fuel gas leakage. 0431hrs GP754401 also in the enclosure went into high alarm. This sequence shutdown the compressor and initiated the general platform alarm
design. All personnel mustered, the gas indications inside the turbine hood were monitored. At 0446hrs gas indications were reading zero and all personnel were stood down. The machine was left
to cool down and maintenance entered the enclosure to investigate.
The platform was operating under normal conditions. A prover run was being completed on the crude oil stream 1 meter. This is a routine operation for proving that the system is functioning to
the correct parameters. During the prover run an error was reported. On arrival at the metering skid the technician quickly determined that a 4 way valve seal had failed. As a result the the residual
oil, approx 10 gallons overflowed from the reservior within the prover purge panel. The leak was contained by use of local spill kits and isolated from the 4 way valve by the removal of
instrument tubing and fitting of a capped instrument valve.
When removing lubricator rack from between the shaker house and the derrick, a small section of the link walkway handrail was dislodged by the crane hook counter weight. This resulted in a 1
foot wide section of handrail dropping approximately 36 feet to the skid deck. The handrail section weighed 11 kilos and caused puncture damage to fibreglass wellbay hatch cover. All personnel
associated with the lift had withdrawn to a safe location prior to the lift and therefore weren't in any danger from the dropped object.

The piece of lifting equipment that failed was an overhead gantry crane and it was being moved into position to carry out a lift. There was no load attached to the crane at the time of failure. The
gantry crane was being moved into position by a technician using the remote hand held operating uni. The motive power for this crane is air via an air motor and gearbox and as the crane was
traversing the gearbox fell off the motor. The gearbox only fell a few inches as it was restrained by its own air hoses and a piece of rope. An investigation showed that the gearbox mounting
bracket was broken. The only implication to the task in hand was the fact that the gantry stopped moving. Even the rope had not been attached the air hoses would have prevented the gearbox
from falling to the deck. The gearbox is of an aluminium tpe of construction and is very light.
The gas lift anulus of slot 14 oil production well was being depressurised in preparation for a period of planned maintenance activity. All wells had previously been shut in, and other platform
inventories had already been depressurised. The normal route for depressurising the gas lift anulus to HP flare was unavailable, and a temporary connection was established to the LP flare via a
maintenance drain. During this operation, a gas leak occured from the maintenance drain near the LP separator. The leak was detected by personnel in the area and by fixed sensors. The well
anulus was isolated. The crew was mustered and kept within the TR until it was apparent that all the gas had dispersed. There was no ignition and nobody was injured. Upon initial investigation it
was found that a valve was closed in the maintenance drain - it appears that the pressure rating of this system may have been exceeded. A <...> investigation team headed by an independent senior
manager has been mobilised, and the local HSE office has already been notified by phone.
Routine production and maintenance operations underway. GPA sounded as a level 4 shutdown had initiated. This resulted in the shutdown and blowdown of all plant and the isolation of a large
number of electrical supplies. Emergency lighting, internal and some external communications systems remained on line. Personnel made their way to the TR and a full muster was completed
within 12 minutes. All personnel were retained within the TR until lighting, deluge, essential services, fire and gas systems were returned to full functionality. Initial findings indicate that the
activation of the level 4 shutdown was the direct result of the failure of a <...> unit. Investigations are progressing. Confirmation of the failure mode will be made at a later date.
At approx. 10:50, a small fire occurred at a temporary oxy/acetylene location outside the tinsmiths workshop, the cylinders were isolated and the fire extinguished in a couple of minutes, No one
was injured and this incident is currently under investigation. <...> <...> - Workman carrying out burning in Area 1 outside the tinsmiths shop as part of general shutdown work for gas turbine
9160 overhaul. Flash back from oxyacetylene torch resulted in small fire, lasting 2 minutes. No persons hurt, platform investigating incident. HSE to be advised of outcome. <...> being raised.
Routine production and maintenance operations underway. GPA sounded at 22:43 hours as the result of two ionising smoke detectors being activated within the DPLER. The smoke came from
the production transformer ET 5102B which had sustained a fault whilst being energised on the remote closing of the primary side breaker. The transformer was isolated. Personnel made their
way to the TR and a full muster was completed within 11 minutes. The fire team were mobilised to the scene of the incident and after assessing the situation were given permission to enter the
space utilising BA. The team encountered light, high level smoke. The space was subsequently vented and inspected. All personnel were retained within the TR until it was confirmed that the
incident was closed out. The unit was formally isolated and the breakers racked out. A visual inspection of the transformer was undertaken through the air vents on the enclosure, this highlighted
scorch marks and carbon deposits on the northerly (phase) transformer in the area of the joint on the resin casing. Onshore electrical engineering support was mobilised to assist in determining the
root cause of the fault and subsequent remedial actions. (<...>: Actual Resonse should read:- Drilling and Production Platform, local equipment room, level 2 south.)
<...>.During a planned intervention on well <...> the BHA was pulled to surface and the well closed in. Due to a production problem with the drains we were unable to vent the riser and it
remained pressurised. The shear seals were then closed due to a small lead being noticed on the lower combi BOP. The riser was then vented to the <...> Degasser.
TIR - A gas release occured in a blow-down header which normally has no flow. Platform remains shutdown following muster. <...> technicians mobilised to check condition of the header.
Investigation team sent out. Size of release not yet known. OIR/9B - During normal production operations, a low level gas event was detected by the fixed Fire & Gas detection systems. This
rapidly increased in a confirmed high level gas detection (three gasheads in alarm) and the installation GPA and SPS were automatically initiated. All platform personnel were mustered and
accounted for. NB: All automatic systems functioned as per design. On completion of blowdown of pressurised systems, the gas was allowed to disperse through natural vantilation before
members of the operations team were able to enter the area to search for the source of the leak. The source was confirmed to be a hole, apparently caused by internal corrosion, on a 3" blowdown
line from the (<...>) gas export compressor outlet. The platform remains shut down to enable further investigations.
During 26 weekly ESD full closure tests on <...> platform on the commencement of the platform annual shutdown, it was observed that a minor gas leak was eminating from the top of the main
pipeline riser valve <...>. The leak was identified to be eminating from the joint between the top bonnet of the valve and the bottom of the actuator adapter plate. Pipeline between <...> and <...>
being depressurised to cease leakage and allow repair. <...>.

A technician working in the Turbine Hall on the Seawater Injection Turbine in Module 5 noticed a strong smell of diesel. On investigating further it was noticed that diesel was leaking from <...>
Turbine Generator #2. The CCR was informed immediately and an operator arrived on scene and performed a controlled shutdown from the local control panel. On investigating further it was
found that instrument tubing on the discharge Parker AN fitting of the high pressure diesel pump had cracked circumferentially underneath the fitting. This allowed diesel to escape, under
pressure of 200-300psig, into the enclosure. Approximately 10 litres of diesel was cleared up from the enclosure. The fitting and tubing will be replaced prior to the machine being returned to
service. Similar fittings in the other Turbine enclosures will be examined in turn for signs of cracking.
At approximately 21:00 hrs on the <...> diving operations were taking place on the SW face of the<...> platform. The task underway was the installation of a sacraficial anode on a vertical
diagonal member. The task was being carried out in conjunction with the <...> platform winch team, who were operating platform winch No 3 (External Walkway Module 9 SW face). Anode #6
had just been disconected from the DSV crane and the whole weight (approx 2Te) of the anode and installation frame was transfered to the platform winch #3. The winch operator noticed that the
brake was not holding and reported this fact to the DSV Dive control. At this time the operator was unable to control the load on the brake alone and was utilising the winch motor to assist. The
winch was now slowly rendering uncontrolled. The anode slid down the vertical member approximately 2m. Divers secured the load to the jacket with static rigging to prevent further movement.
At no time were the divers under the load and no injury resulted from the incident.
Event: Vacuum Breaker (3 kilo) for P-4201 (Sea Water Left Pump) parting from parent pipework (dropped object) found on C4 deck by Area Technician during watch-keeping duties. The Vacuum
Breaker is located approximately 6m above deck level. Instantaneous event, no build up to the failure in that no sea water leak was evident prior to the event. Operations: Platform process systems
in normal operation at reduced rates due to <...> restrictions. Weather conditions: Calm, wind speed @ 6 knts. Substance: Seawater. People: Not involved at the time of the event. Initial
investigations have suggested material incompatability as the cause of the incident.
The pipe handler was lowered over a length of drill pipe in the rotary table.When this was completed the Top drive was lowered over the pipe handler to connect the two units together. To assist in
the location of the pipe handler a 1 ton chain block was used to line up the hanging arm with the top drive, It was during this process that the hook of the chain block snapped/failed . At the time
the pull on the chain block which was attached to a 1 ton sling was firm, but not excessive. The incident is under investigation and the chain blok will be sent onshore for analysis, to ascertain the
failure mode.
Two technicians smelt gas coming from the fuel gas skid on the production platform on <...> at 14:30. The platform was shutdown and made safe. Fuel gas was found from a pressure control
valve body on the field gas system to the platform generators. The system was running at 8 bar. The valves body nuts was found loose, which allowed gas to leak from the body gasket. The valve
was inspected and torqued back up. No defect was found. The system was pressure tested for further leaks and a pressure build survey completed on the system. The plant was brought back on
line.
At 13:17, 2 gas heads went off in area 6A causing a class 2B shutdown and a GPA. During investigation, a small leak was detected on a cap on an impulse line. This incident is currently being
investigated.
Fire fighting nozzle dropped overside whilst carrying out tests on a fire hydrant. Highlighted to all personnel and currently reviewing engineering solutions for this particular hydrant. Separate test
nozzle to be fitted with restraint wire to prevent future occurence whilst carrying out maintenance.
Sea state 1.5 m Wind SE 16 knots during routine production activities. A leak of oily water was immediately observed from the open drains pipework adjacent to T71 (LP Open drain tank). The
vessel has a dump line which allows it to be emptied into the sea sump and this was opened to remove the inventory and thus stop the leak from the line. A tannoy announcement was made to stop
any draining or washing down operations, and Hot Work Spark Potential permits in the immediate area were suspended. It is thought that approx 5 litres of oil was lost into the sea. The standby
vessel collected a sample for examination and the coastguard and regulatory bodies were informed of the incident. It was classified as a Tier 1 response, (Requiring no external assistance within
our spill guidelines). The pipework was examined and it is thought that external corrosion was the cause. A temporary patch was put in place on the day of the leak. A service test was conducted
and as the drains system runs at milibar pressure the system was placed back on line. An operational risk assessmenrt was raised to maintain monitoring until a permanent repair is effected.

Event: At 02:30hrs LL gas indication was detected on 2 gas heads in LCR (Local Control Room). After monitoring the situation in the Central Control Room, 2 Technicians were dispatched to
investigate. The LCR was checked, no gas indication picked up on portable gas monitors. The area around the air intake was checked, no gas indication picked up on portable gas monitors. The
vent stacks on the gas compression roof was checked and gas was detected emanating from the vent stacks. The LCR was in the process of being re-checked for gas at 02:56 when the F&G
detectors went into high alarm and the GPA and SPS/Blowdown was automatically initiated. All personnel immediately withdrew from the area. Operations: Platform process including gas
compression in operation after maintenance S/D earlier the previous day. Weather conditions: Calm, wind speed
During the instalation of a contingency pump in the utility leg, the method of installation involved use of four chain blocks. Two of the chain blocks were "Prolift" 3 tonne, 3 metre fall units.
( Serial Numbers <...> and <...>). During the installation, one of the chain block failed in free fall. After the failed chain block was changed out, the other block also failed in free fall. There was
no danger when these failures occurred either to personnel or equipment, as a LOLER plan was being followed ensuring that the load was secured at all times. Because of the location of the
activity, additional contingency chain blocks were being utilised. Incident has been reported and is being investigated under <...>Report <...>
During a routine gas test of the <...> Hydraulic Power unit panel, the panel enclosure was found to contain gas.
At 13:52 <...> the platform went to GPA status and the process was automatically shut down and blown down. The cause was smoke ingress from the exhaust of the 3rd fire pump into C leg
HVAC supply in the still air conditions. The platform returned to normal status at 14:30. Attempts were made to restart platform blackstart generation.
Following the incident reported above (13:52) At 15:00 a single head in B leg came into LLG alarm. Whilst investigating further heads came into LLG alarm. These heads were on different
voting circuits and OIM made the decision to manually initiate GPA. A precautionary down man of non essential personnel was initiated. Power to equipment B leg was isolated apart from
monitoring systems.The isolation was confirmed as in place at 16:10. The import export lines to and from storage were isolated external to the leg (at 174m level).
At approx.06:30hrs a worker who was part of a vessel entry team was about to enter the 2nd stage separator vessel in M5 when a spanner fell from a scaffold platform 3 metres above the work
party and landed 1 ft away from the worker. The job was immediately stopped and the incident reported to the platfrom supervisor where a investigation commenced.
<...>. Workover Operations on A39 well. While milling operations were taking place on a fish in the wellbore, it was observed a 5% increase in flow, gas increased from 0.08% to 0.4% and an
active pit volume increase of 5 bbls. The driller spaced out, stopped pumping and performed a flow check on the well. Observed well flowing and gas bubbles. Closed annular BOP and choke.
Monitor pressures, annulus at 20 psi, drill pipe at 0 psi. Circulate one bottoms up through choke. Flow check well, well static. Cause was thought to be trapped gas. Continue with operations. This
occurrence is highlighted in our procedures for milling operations. Primary well control was kill weight fluid, 8.6 ppg seawater (EMW) is 5.6 ppg), secondary well control was the BOPs. Primary
was re-established through the use of the secondary. This event is under investigation. (2nd similar influx taken on <...>).
1. ESD 0 confirmed gas detection (08:37hrs); caused by activation of gas heads at <...> load gearbox compartment air intake resulting in confirmed gas detection and executive actions. <...>
turbine was in the process of being started to reduce <...> gas line pressure. The first two attempted starts failing due to diesel engine low lube oil pressure. Investigation revealed the cause to be
fuel gas passing through the fuel gas supply valve migrating through the turbine and escaping into the load gearbox compartment via a leak in the exhaust flexible seals. Pending further
investigation the <...> fuel gas supply is currently isolated until advice from onshore received. Incident reported via telephone (09:45hrs) to <...> duty officer.
During commissioning of an <...> Gas Generator on Power Generation Set 'B', a fuel gas release/detection occurred causing machine shutdown. On inspection, a flexible hose connection to one
of the burners was found to be inadequately tightened. The issue is being addressed with the engine suppliers.
During normal operations of Central Control Room (CCR) identified alarm and deployed 2 operators to investigate, operators related back to the CCR that they could see lube oil on the deck and
a spray mist in the area. CCR contacted the OIM who in turn activated the manual alarm, shut down Gas Turbine 'C' and allowed it to cool down. Further investigation ongoing.

An operator noticed fumes originating from the enclosure ventilation exhaust on P801B. On looking into the enclosure he observed heavy fumes, the unit was immediately manually shutdown.
After a cool down period the enclosure was entered and found swamped with diesel. Investigations revealed that small bore pipework on the diesel spillback had spilt close to a compression
fitting. Diesel loss which was contained within the enclosure was 150l. P801B is one of four tubrine power generation machines. The unit will remain shutdown until the pipework and adjacent
fitting are replaced. A check of the status of the other machine's associated pipework will be carried out.
G8000 was shutdown for a maintenance Pitstop at Approx 03:00 <...>. This left G8020 (<...>) and G8040 (<...>) as the source of main generation. At 06:50 there was confirmed indication of gas
within the G8000 enclosure (Mod P2) which resulted in a change in platform status and via the logic, shutdown of G8020. Production shutdown occurred due to the loss of both gas compressors
etc via the prismic loadshed philosophy. Immediate investigation by the RPE found the source of the leak to be eminating from a fischer self regulating pressure control valve PCV-8011. The
source of the leak was isolated and the leak ceased almost immediately.
The platform experienced a General Platform Alarm due to indicated high level gas inside the turbine enclosure of generator GT1. The generator was not running at the time. Investigation found
that there were 3 valves with leaks from their stem packings.
A tonne chain hoist was being utilised to lower a 335kg valve onto a trolley. The height was approx 1 metre. When the rigger was lowering the load, the chain carrying the weight slipped through
the pawl mechanisim allowing the load to free fall a distance of about 15cm. This occurred with about 60cm left for the valve to reach the trolley bed. The chain hoist was visually examined at
this stage and no obvious problem noted. The rigger again started to lower the valve and again slippage of the pawl mechanisim re-occured allowing a further 15cm drop. By this time the valve
was about 3cm from sitting on the trolley bed so he continued using the chain block to finally lower the valve onto the trolley. No-one was injured during this procedure and the valve was not
damaged. After completing the operation, the chain hoist was removed from service, quarantined and is being returned to onshore for examiniation. The chain hoist was visually examined by the
rigger before he locked it into the working position above the load and the unit was correctly colour coded (green) for usage.
<...> while on routine ROV inspection of pipelines reported a small gas leak coming from the <...> to <...> 6" Gas Lift (<...>) flexible line(pipe code <...>). The location is at <...>. The end Jtube flange is <...>, ie the leak is 182 metres along the line, out from the platform. Straight line distance due east from the North East leg of the platform is estimated at 128 metres. Actual coordinates are <...><...>. Gas bubbles are percolating from under rock dump at a rate of 1 bubble per second (approx 1/2 litres per minute). A satellite well had been producing from <...>. Gas lift
line to well closed in and monitoring is ongoing.
At 21.28 hours on <...>, the platform experienced a General Platform Alarm (GPA) due to coincident low level gas in module C5. Operations were ongoing to blow down various subsea risers
and flowlines via the High Pressure (HP) flare header in preparation for the platform annual maintenance shutdown. 2 Separate fire zones cover module C5, Fire Zone 1 West. The highest reading
in FZ1 East was GD66109 which recorded 50% LEL at 21:34 hours. The lines being blown into the header were closed in, and shortly thereafter the gas levels in the module began to drop. By
21:38 hours the readings on all heads had dropped to below the low alarm level (20% LEL). An initial investigation by 2 Operation Technicians using Crowncon Triple Meters in the area after the
gas levels had reduced to below 20% LEL did not reveal the source of the leak, as the gas had dissipated due to the natural ventilation in the module (open module). Subsequent investigation
revealed a hole of approximately 25mm by 10mm in the wall of the HP Flare Header opposite the tie in point for the blowdown line from Riser 33, which was one of the lines which was being
blown down when the GPA occurred. Examination of trends from the <...> TDC system showed that the maximum pressure recorded in the HP Flare Header prior to the GPA was approximately
At 10:10 on <...> the F & G alarms activated in the MCR Highlighting Hi Hi gas within the exhaust ducting and air intakes of P801A. The M/C automatically shutdown as per design and the
alarms cleared. After a cool down period the enclosure was entered and an investigation carried out. The source of the gas release was traced to a small bore pipe coupling (15mm swagelok) on
the fuel gas supply line which, when examined, had not been secured correctly. This allowed the pipe to release from the coupling olives resulting in an uncontrolled release of fuel gas. The unit
will remain shutdown until the pipework and adjacent fitting is replaced. P801A is one of four turbine power generation machines. All other small bore fittings and couplings within the enclosure
of P801A are to be checked and where necessary renewed. The other three M/Cs will also be given the same checks as they become available during maintenance routines.
A redundant line-of-sight communication dish cover detached from a dish falling 20 metres onto a cellar deck walkway. The cover is 1.85 metres in diameter and weighs 12 kg. No one was in the
vicinity or injured. All other redundant line-of-sight communication dishes on the survey have been surveyed.

BC3 compressor had undergone an 800 hour service by the vendor. On the initial run up after the service, gas was detected in the engine enclosure; the automatic gas detection system activated,
shutdown the machine and sounded the GPA. On investigation, it was found that an instrument tapping on the fuel gas system, had not been reconnected correctly following the maintenance, and
gas was released during the start up cycle. Complete survey of pipework undertaken and BC3 compressor successfully returned to service.
Release of trapped pressure from the <...> HP water injectio pump when commencing invasive maintenance- see attached The <...> field high pressure water injection pump had been shutdown
on <...> due to operating problems. The pump was formally isolated, depressurised and drained on <...> in preparation for invasive maintenance. Work was delayed until <...> when a permit to
work was issued for preparatory work. This was to allow the equipment and site to be reviewed by the Technician and the Vendor's Engineer. On <...> a second permit to work was issued to
commence the workscope on the pump. On commencement of the dismantling of a flange on the pump a release of water under high pressure occurred. Since preparing the pump for maintenance
activities [<...>] the isolated section of pipework/equipment had become pressurised. The source of the pressure being the <...> water injection pumps, via the 'crossover' joining the <...> and
<...> water injection systems, and due to passing isolation valves. The requirement identified on the permit to work for 'Area Technician to demonstrate to members of the work party immediately
prior to invasive work that the equipment is drained, vented and hydrocarbon free' as appropriate] had not been requested just prior to dismantling the flange.
2 Instrument Technicians were preparing to install hydraulic tubing to a new actuator which had been fitted to an existing manually operated valve HCV7345 in column 4, level 1. On arrival at
the worksite in column 4 level 1 the workparty observed hydrocarbon vapour coming from the upper flange on HCV7345. They raised the alarm with the control room after making their way out
of the leg. No increased levels of hydrocarbons were detected by the fixed gas detection systems either at the level below or those situated in the roof of the column. No gas was detected on either
of the local gas detectors carried by the technicians at the valve. A gas leak was detected coming from the upper flange on HCV7345 at the 10-2 o'clock position. The gas leak was visible as a
haze and light audible noise.
The platform fire and gas system indicated a single smoke head detection within the accommodation plant room. Two technicians were dispatched to investigate the smoke indication as per
procedure. On investigation no smoke was observed within the plant room but a relief valve on the air conditioning system was found to have lifted. The relief valve had released R22 refrigerant
gas into the plant room. The technicians shut down the unit and vacated the area. Both the technicians felt nauseous on leaving the area and reported to the medic to be checked out. A refrigerant
engineer is currently on board investigating the reason for the relief valve lifting.
At 23:15 hrs the platform was called to GPA status, initiated from ICS 2000 fire and gas detection system. Initial indications were of a smoke alarm generically within the Wellbay West level three
but on further interrogation of the F&G system it was identified that the alarm was due to two smoke detectors being triggered within the acoustic hood of "B" gas compressor (<...>). Integrated
deck level three module N1 north - followed by a low then a high gas alarm also within the package. Production was automatically shut down (secondary B shutdown on confirmed smoke) and
"B" gas compressor manually blown down and made safe. A catastrophic mechanical failure of the "B" gas compressor female rotor non-drive end journal bearing temperature probe (instrument
had sheared from its connection to the pipewrok to which it is still installed.) Gas detectors had picked up gas within acoustic hood and smoke detectors had been triggered by the lubeoil/gas mist
released when the instrument failed. The fitting is on the return line to the unit, which returns lube and small amounts of entrained gas back into the compressor . The release of gas was estimated
at 0.3kg. Amount is so small because of the failure mode leaving most of probe still in the line limiting the escape path at the fracture point.The instrument has been removed for further
Coincident smoke detection occurred within the Fan Plant Room in Module 25 (Living Quarters) resulted in control action and electrical isolation of PLQ power supplies. Initial investigation
revealed the Extract Fan CX5503X (Laundry) shaft bearing had failed.
Platform had commenced a planned shutdown period - systems were depressurised and flushing/purging had been completed. A spectacle blind on the MP Separator (Mod 03) mezzanine level,
was in the process of being swung for local isolation purposes, when there was a release of residual condensate. Multiple gas detectors activated and the GPA sounded. Investigation continues.
20:30 The platform was shutdown due to a problem at CATS gas terminal. (Platform still under pressure). 22:30 Low level gas alarm (31%) indicated GTM main deck. 22:40 Operator confirmed
glycol dripping from heat exchanger. 22:42 Production supervisor at scene. 22:50 Prod Supv instructs control room to initiate a RED ESD. 22:50 GPA sounded all personnel mustering and
platform being blowdown. 22:54 Platform full muster, all personnel requested to stay at muster point until further notice. 23:12 Platform pressure below 5 barg, personnel sent to investigate leak.
23:20 Leak confirmed, heat exchanger leaking. 23:21 All personnel stood down. Investigation commenced to determine root cause of exchanger failure.

The plant was in normal production. The weather was dry, wind speed was 8 knots easterly (300 degrees). Approximately 0.3 litres of crude oil leaked from a faulty pump mechanical seal. Pump
Tag No <...> within the Export Oil Fast Loop Sampler Cabinet (<...>). The pump is centrifugal manufactured by <...> Model No <...>, 50Bar. The seal failed, oil dripped from the seal on to the
cabinet floor. Gas was liberated from the oil. The cabinet is provided with 4 gas detectors (2 flammable gas detectors and 2 toxic). Both flammable detectors regsiter gas 30%LEL and 6%LEL.
The gas detection resulted in automatic GPA. All POB were mustered, pump operation was stopped and gas levels monitored. External isolations were applied to the cabinet. An Investigation is
ongoing.
<...> - During watchkeeping operations it was noticed that gas was escaping from the grease nipple connection on the manual block valve for the gas lift entry into the A annulus of well <...>. The
annulus pressure at time was approx120 bar(G). The annulus was depressured using a blowndown hose to approximately 65 bar where the leak reduced considerably. This was a known problem
with the well. However previously the leak rate was such that the LFL was less than 20% at a distance of 0.1m and classed as a weep. Plans were being put in place to rectify the problem, since
the deterioration of the leak these plans have been accelerated
Whilst tranfering two section of temporary flexible ducting from the platform skid deck to the top of B leg the lower section became detached and fell to sea (approx weight 45kg) The temporary
ducting was being deployed to extract gas from B leg due to the unavailability of the normal extract ducting which was submerged due to flooding operations within the shaft as a result of the loss
of containment on <...>.
Near Miss - Dropped Object. a full cola can was found on the bottom landing of the internal stairs inside the platform living quarters, from the damage observed to the can it appears the object
has fallen from some height. (Max Height of Fall = 20m). There was potential for injury to personnel if the can had fallen onto an individual. There were no witnesses to this event. The can was
discovered on the landing area by a member of the platform crew. An internal incident investigation is currently underway (internal case number: <...>). Taken from B5: Level 1 Internal
Stairwell/Landing Area inside platform living quarters.
<...> - While pumping out of the hole, the drilling crew stopped to flow check at the 9 5/8" casing. The well was found to be flowing at 2.8 BPH. The annular was closed in and a SICP was
observed at 40 psi. This was bled off and the assembly was run back to bottom. The well was then circulated and on bottoms up we found that we had taken a water ingress which had put the mud
weight back to 11.6 ppg from 12.5 ppg. The chlorides, alkalinity and oil/water were also lower. The well was then circulated to a 13.0 ppg MW, flow checked "static" and preperations were then
made to continue the trip out of the hole.
Dropped object event. Work party removing installation in preparation for changing out an ultrasonic gas export meter from gas export metering stream 3 when something was heard to hit the
deck below. The production shift supervisor was in the vicinity and heard the sound of something striking the deck. He discussed the possible sources of the object/sound with the work party.
They were unaware but assisted with a search of the area and completed removal it became apparent that a pipe support bracket which had been enclosed in the installation and was free to move
laterally on the support beam. The gas export meter has been rigged up for lifting but had not been moved. The removal of the installation from the pipe had caused the support to fall over and off
the beam. The pipe support in question is approx 150 x 150 200mm weighing approx 3.5kg dropped a distance of approx 12" to an area not normally visited by personnel.
At approx 01:47 a GPA process shutdown and blowdown was initiated automatically from the fire and gas detection system on a confirmed fire in the A PGT 10 turbine enclosure. In addition
Inergen was automatically released into the enclosure. Following a full muster of personnel, the turbine enclosure was checked and found to be clear. No evidence of combustion was detected.
However , a significant quantity of lub oil was found in the base of the enclosure. The machine was being taken off load at the time of the incident, in preparation for maintenance work on an
associated compressor. The turbine was operating within normal parameters. The machine s to be left down until the source of the lub oil leak is identified and repaired. B5- A PGT 10 gas turbine
enclosure
At approx. 11:00 a production technician discovered a gas leak emanating from the pilot vent port of PZV-492575 on train 2 compressor unit, that is located on the BP11 compression module. He
radioed this information into control and was shortly joined at the scene by the Operations Team Leader. It was immediately decided to shut down train 2, which was unloaded, cool stopped and
then vented. This operation was completed by 11:50. The only gas head that came into alarm was area AC detector G11 that indicated a low level gas alarm at 11:36. There were no injuries due to
this incident and no damage to property or equipment. The weather at the time of the incident was: Wind 7 knots at 300 degrees. Barometric pressure 1002 mbar. Visability 3 miles. Overcast with
light rain.

During normal production operations, at 22.56 a low level gas alarm was reported in po5 mezz by the safety system (low alarm activation point 20% lel gd15009 max trend showed 22.7% lel).
This alarm cleared soon after. A check was made of the area by the ops team. On arrival in the area a smell of gas was evident however the source was not obvious. At 23.10 approx the leak was
identified, approx 4 metres above deck level, on the 14" inlet line to e101 at the side of a 2" weldolet point, which forms part of the nitrogen purge point. As the nature of the leak was obvious all
personnel were requested to evacuate the area, an esd2, a local po5 blowdown, platform shutdown and general platform alarm was manually initiated. The system has been isolated from the
process and purged of hydrocarbons. The platform has been restarted following secure isolation of the effected system. Investigation is ongoing into the exact cause of the leak.
During a routine change out of a PSV for recertification, an isolation valve was wrongly isolated and the PSV was removed without the required checks having been made. This resulted in the
Sour flare line being left with an open end and men working in the area. Gas detection was operable in the area and did not register above 5ppm (the alarm point) hence awareness to the problem
was instigated by other platform personnel reporting a smell of H2s in the general area. The system is at atmospheric pressure and expected to contain around 2-4ppm H2s in normal operation as
prevailed at that time. Initial investigation confirmed an open end and all personnel vacated the affected areas. A response team reinstated the valve that had been removed using SCBA. A full
investigation has been conducted and communicated to HSE inspectors that were on board at the time of the incident.
Lifting operations of a cover from a Gas Turbine had commenced after the necessary preplanning and toolbox talk with all concerned in this operation, this included the risk assessment the lifting
plan and LOLER assessment. Communications were maintained between the Specialist Field engineerand the Services/ Rigging Supervisor throughout the lift. Whilst attempting to remove the
Inlet Guide Vane top casing (2250Kg) using a gantry crane (SWL 10-ton). Rigging consisting of 2 x 5 Ton round slings and 2 x 1.5 tonne pull lifts secured to the casing in a four point lift were
centred on the C of G. As the load was taken up, this was balanced on the chain lifts, the rigging team stood clear prior to applying more load to the crane. The loading applied should have been
sufficient to break the seal and any stiction in the joint. At this point one of the 1.5 tonne pull lifts failed at a link in the chain. Subsequent investigation concluded that the lift failed as the
equipment specialist vendor had failed to recognise the correct disassemble procedure. A second cover still retained the first by way of an internal spigot. Overload of the gantry crane did not
occur and the overload cut out is confirmed as operational. The site is well protected and weather is not a factor in this event.. Full Talisman investigation is available on report No 8671/2004
On carrying out routine checks in Wellhead area (Module 1 Mezzanine Level) The oil tech discovered a crude oil trickle eminating from the valve stem of an <...>" <...> assembly. On
investigation it was discovered that a scaffold which had been errected for maintenance had come into contact with the valve handle/stem of the <...> valve resulting in lateral movement damaged
the stem seal. The valve handle and stem were found to be loose and the decision was taken to shut-in the welll and depressurise the flowline. Once isolated the leak ceased. The scaffold was then
modified to remove the possibilty of further impacts with the well and associated equipment. Repairs to the sample point have since been carried out, pressure tested and the well is now reopened.
Using Steelwork coverage and location of open grating it is estimated that no discharge over and above average Tern produced water discharges were evident on the surface of the water.
ABRIDGED REPORT:<...> The <...> (ROV)was being recovered to deck. At 07:50, with the TMS & Vehicle at a depth of 9m a loud bang was heard from the LARS (Launch & Recovery
System). It was also noticed by the winch operator that something had come off the crane slewing ram as there was a piece of hard pipe that was no longer connected. None of the crane functions
were being operated at this time purely the winch. The Crane jib then slowly slewed to the right (Vessel Fwd) coming to rest against the outer side of the hanger door way. The Recovery was
stopped and the bridge informed. The crane jib was secured in the position it came to rest. An emergency recovery plan was established by the Offshore Manager and a risk assessment then took
place to evaluate the process of recovering the vehicle.The crane was then operated (No Left Slew Function) with the aid of rigging and the TMS & Vehicle was recovered into the Hanger without
incident. The crane was then taken out of service (It will remain in that state until the failure mode has been established). The crane has another three welded components (Piston Covers) which
all function in the same way as the one that failed. All four piston covers have been removed and have been sent to <...> for an engineering assessment. Once the assessment has been made then
The following sequence of events lead to a hydrocarbon release. Radiography in Module 8 interfered with instrumentation on separator vessel FA 1806. Automatic systems initiated a production
shutdown. The hydraulic master valve on well CP50 failed to close. CP50 was on-line to production header two which pressured up to 60 bar. A compression fitting on the adjacent well manifold
sample point (Also on line to header two) leaked into the module. The total loss was estimated at 2 litres.
<...> Platform. When operating the wingvalve on well B2 it was noticed that a leakage of hydrocarbons was present alongside the stem of that valve. The well was shut in until the valve was
repaired and leak tested.

During high winds (45 knots) one of the bandage repairs on the exhaust of g8002 turbine generator dislodged and fell to the pipe deck. This was witnessed by well services personnel who were
working in the wire line on the pipe deck. Blanket weights 6.3kg (2.55mm x 0.79m) and was fitted in <...> to arrest emission release from the exhaust stack. Other bandages were inspected. One
that was found slightly detached was removed.
During the start up of the tank water system after the annual shutdown, a leak occured below nozzle number N5 on T2610. The tankwater pump P3300 had been started at 14.12 and tripped on
low level at 14.15. At 14.15 the toxic gas detector detected 10 ppm H2S around about the area of T2610 and two Area Techinicians were despatched to investigate. Another Area Technicians was
sent to M1C to identify the levels that were being indicated from the Toxic gas monitoring panel. The two Area Technicians in CD1 reported back to the control room that they had seen produced
water spilling from the hole onto the module floor. The system was then made safe. The oily water spilled onto the module floor and no liquids were spilt into the sea.
<...> chainblocks were recalled following an incident on <...>. As part of the change/actions, there were more <...> chainblocks sent out as replacements. The LOLER focal point upon receiving
the new chain blocks, randomly chose a <...> 1500 kg chain block, <...>, and used the block to lift a small fan motor of approx 70 kg, he lifted motor approximately 0.5 metres from floor level
and the load slipped back. He took the chain block to the rigging store and subjected the chain block to a low load test of between 50 & 70 kg. The chain block chain ran through the block failure
as <...>.
During normal production operations at 23:25 a hi hi gas alarm was reported in P01 at C200 by the safety system. An operator who was working in the area was contacted and observed a gas leak
issuing from the Daniel Orifice Carrier top cover. The equipment was immediately shutdown and depressurised, the leak stopped and the alarm cleared at 23:27. It should be noted that no further
gas heads were activated into alarm and no further executive actions taken. Further investigation highlighted that the gas had leaked out via the top cover clamping bar, as no leak path is evident
on the sealing bar gasket it is assumed that the clamping bar may not have been sufficiently tightened. The orifice carrier has been rebuilt, gaskets replaced and leak tested prior to putting back in
service.
During high winds a bag of general waste fell from the Upper Deck Level to the Main Deck Level coming to rest at the side of the walkway in front of Lifeboat No.12. The weight of the bag was
2.5kg, and on investigation it was found that the waste skip that the bag had fallen from was full and had not been netted over. The waste skip was covered over with a net to secure other items
within the skip. All platform personnel have been made aware of the consequences of overfilling and not securing skips during periods of high winds.
Ongoing scaffold construction for drilling generator exhaust change out. Although the scaffold was mainly an overside construction, the first part involved working inboard on the west side of
Module 6 external walkway. During this operation, a scaffold clip weighing .5kg fell onto the deck below and landed outside Module 2 mezzanine west access door. The clip narrowly missed a
production operator who was exiting the door at the time. Work was stopped and safety barriers relocated. A number of other activites were ongoing in the same area. All these tasks were stopped
and reassessed for clashes and any requirement for additional precautions. After assessment the tasks were allowed to continue with no further precautions being required.
<...>. 12:23 on <...> the platform changed to GPA status via in indication of high levels gas in module M3C wellhead area. Very shortly afterwards coincident high level gas was detected and the
platform shutdown and lost power generation. Process blowdown was also automatically initiated. Multiple gas heads in M3C upper and lower quickly rose to high levels and above. All personnel
inculding the Emergency Response Teams were recalled to and held within the TR. Although the process blowdown was complete, the situation within M3C was not improving, as indicated by
the module fixed gas detection. There was a probability therefore that the source of the gas escape may have been associated with a well annulus. At 13:44 the decision was taken to downman
non-essential personnel to adjacent installations. The downman from 100 to 30 POB was completed at 16:30. The situation was monitored on the platform and also onshore with the emergency
co-ordination team for the next several hours. M3C Module gas detector readings were taken manual meter redings were taken at regular intervals to monitor for improving trends. The incident
remained contained within module M3C and no other area confirmed gas levels were indicated in other area. at 23:20 it was see <...> TIR; <...> a <...> reported a gas release at the rig wellhead

Whilst walking round the platform during production, Operations Technician noticed grating lifted at one corner, this was due to them sagging at the opposite side. The area was secured and the
Normally Unattended Installation called. Together there were unsure to the condition of the grating support integrity, so before attempting to move the grating it was kicked from a safe location
ensuring there was no others in the area or below (spider deck area has restricted access). When kicked the support suffered a catastrophic failure with 3 gratings attached falling. One was
recovered as it had only dislodeged, another dropped to the spider deck and another to the sea. N.B. the grating themselves were in good condition. Our initial beliefs were that this issue would
not be RIDDOR reportable as the situation was noticed and stopped beforea dangerous situation occurred. However at a planned meeting with the local HSE Inspector (<...>) the information was
shared, this <...> form has been raised following this consultation with him.
An Instrument Technician was carrying out routine metering checks to ensure that the system was functioning correctly after the platform had been brought back online. Part of this activity
involved the removal of liquids from the catch pots into a container. Whilst doing this the 1/2" drain valve had been opened and closed several times. On the final closure the vlave blew off the
line inclusive of ferrule and cover nut. The technician immediately closed the line at the primary isolation point, thus stopping any further release of hydrocarbons. The isolation of the system took
approximately 1 minute. The platform pressure at the time of the incident was 340 psig. The pipe itself was seen to be in good condition and a new fitting was installed without any remedial work
being carried out on it. Upon dismantling the fitting, it was noted that there was staining on the back ferrule which sits on the shoulder of the 1/22 nuts. This had been due to water ingress over
time as the fitting sits in the vertical position. Due to the nature of the fittings, it is very unlikely that a fitting could part from the pipework in this way unless the fitting was incorrectly made up
initially. The failure has been put down to poor workmanship/competency during initial installation when the platform was built.
Class 2 ESD occurred - loss of process drives and <...> Reports received of a bang in main switch room. Two persons working near substantiated this. Smoke evident on entering switch room and
physical damage to one of electrical cubicles.Area made safe and and room ventilated of smoke ingress. Limited investigations revealed 13.8KV P10 cubical (bus bar A) external panel had
experienced over pressurization damage, also <...> had evidence of voltage restrained over-current protection operating. Until cause and potential damaged asessed bus bar?A? was isolated and
<...> unavailable until onshore assistance arrived to determine mode of failure. Initial investigation team arrived <...> with others , expertise arriving <...> to conduct testing and assessments to
determine mode of failure. Inintial offshore investigation concluded electrical failure confined to electrical cubicle P10 bottom section, damage emulating from Surge arrestor failure.The initial
prognosis for the events appears the failing of water injection pump ?C? motor to earth increasing the current to Bus bar ?A? which caused the surge arrestor to fail with the resulting damage.
Water injection pump ?C? motor is to be returned onshore for investigations. Findings are expected to take some time.
Wind 195 / 30-32 kts, Vis 8nm Sea 3.0 ? 3.5 m, Cloud 7/8 @ 800 (E), QNH 1004.1 mbs, Temp +12c, Weather overcast with occasional rain. Unplanned Production shutdown caused by separator
pressure control valve malfunction. Thermal relief valve associated with 8inch block valve body cavity discharged hydrocarbon condensate to atmosphere. Release was noticed during
watchkeeping duties by Operator who noticed discharge fron relief valve to atmosphere and immediately closed a manual valve to shut off the flow of condensate which was immediately washed
away to the surface drains. The size of the leak was insufficient to activate the gas detection in the area.
At 10:18 on <...>, two <...> insulators were about to install lagging to level instruments on V-2110 Amine Inlet Scrubber. The instrument to be worked was LZLL-21014, Condensate section ESD
low level transmitter. As the insulators approached the instrument, they could hear a sound coming from the area of the bridle. They confirmed they could hear and smell gas and both technicians
reported these details and their location to the CRO. After checking the Fire & Gas display and finding no indication of gas in the area, the CRO dispatched two Operations Technicians with gas
meters to investigate. The dayshift <...> was advised. On investigation, the technicians reported back to the Control Room, via radio, that they could hear a gas escape from around LZLL-21014.
The gas meter in use was registering a reading of 12% LEL and rising, approximately 6 to 8 inches from the bridle. Snoop was used to clearly identify the source of the leak. It was found to be
coming from the top flange on the bridle, where the level instrument is screwed into the flange. The bridle was then isolated from the process and vented to atmospheric pressure via the leak at
10:37hrs. Atmospheric monitoring was continued throughout by the Technicians on site and via the fire and gas screens.
Oil leak from the lid of the <...> Pig launcher. The platform was in normal operation. In preparation for pig launching operations as per <...> (<...> pig launching operation). The <...> pig trap was
pressurised utilising the LP kicker valve. As the trap pressurised, the area technician positioned at the launcher lid observed no problems until the trap reached full pressure (approx 25 bar) when
he noticed a slight amount of gas at the lid and immediately heard a "pop", the result being an oil leak from the seal. The technician immediately called for the pressurisation valve to be closed
and for the drain to be opened to depressurise the trap. This action was carried out by the 2nd technician and this stopped the leak. In response to the leak, absorbent matting was used to contain
any oil spilling from the lid to prevent it from dripping down to the level below. The leak was approx.5 litres in total. This was contained in the bunded area around the pig launcher with no oil
going to sea. No gas detection either local or fixed was activated. No change of platform status occurred. pig trap was pressurised, the area technician position at the launcher lid observed no
problems unit the trap reached full pressure (

A <...> electrician was making his way back to the accommodation along the East walkway when he spotted a piece of unistrut lying in the walkway external of the RPLQ Level One (by
emergency generator enclosure). He moved the offending item as it was a potential tripping hazard and brough it to the attention of the Operations Supervisor. The unistrut measured 940mm x
40mm x 20mm and weight 4lbs. High winds in excess of 50 knots were experienced the previous night, and it was still quite windy on the morning that the offending item was found. Upon
investigation to find where it came from, it was noticed that a vertical hanger was missing from cable tray support directly above telephone kiosk (to the side of the walkway and not directly
above). The hanger would have fellen approx 20 feet onto the kiosk. An indentation was found on top of the kiosk which the piece of unistrut must have impacted as it fell, before deflecting into
the walkway. this is not a main walkway hence it is not possible to determine when this incident occurred. No personnel witnessed any falling object. This incident is detailed in <...> report No.
<...> Location is: external of the RPLQ Level One (by emegency generator enclosure)
Potential incident involving dropped object. Incident has been recorded under classification 1 (failure of lifting equipment and associated equipment) as the closest possible category. Object was
length of wood 4 feet long weighing 10.5 lbs, which fell a distance of 12 feet. Nobody was in the vicinity, but as the object had the potential for serious injury/fatality under the dropped object
calculator, an internal report has been submitted aswell as the OIR9B.
A gas release occurred from a connection on the wireline riser rig up on well A37. Two gas heads registered gas in the low range. Strip down and replacement of the seal in the area concerned did
not rectify the situation. Components returned onshore for investigation.
Routine steady state operations. Wind 210 / 45-50 gusting 55Kts at times Vis 10nm Sea 4.0-5.0m SWH, Max 6.5 Cloud 4/8 @ 1500? (E) QNH 994.7mbs Temp11.5c. Weather Partly cloudy
mixture of Hydrocarbon Condensate and water. Aromatic recovery unit (ARU) system piping. A leak was spotted by a technician during routine duties, he contacted the central control room. The
leak was on the ARU pump discharge line 2" <...>. The report was received by the control room who subsequently shutdown the total production system from the control room. The operators
isolated the line for investigation. The production fire team covered the area with foam and cleaned up the spill. There was no gas detected by the field detectors.
<...> control room operator reported to <...> that following routine platform checks it was noted that an active smoke heat and fire protection system was alerting them of a condition within the
generator room on the <...> Satellite platform, which is normally an unmanned installation.
During start up after 5 weeks shutdown, gas was detected in the analyser house. It was only at low level on one detector so a team was sent to investigate. As they approached the levels increased
and a second detector indicated gas at which level, which caused a platform shutdown and blow down (coincident low gas detection causes this, the levels never increased above 30% let at any
time). Platform mustered. Source of leak is still under investigation, however two similar incidents have occurred, firstly on 25th June and again a few days later (no shutdown). In both cases
small seeps of gas were thought to have been found and accounted for the detection. Problem is yet to be resolved.
Whilst raising the stabbing board from the horizontal position to the vertical stow position, a piece of scaffold tube, (23" long and weighing 5.7lbs), fell to the drill floor. Neither of the two
persons present on the floor at the time were hit by the tube.
The Equipment Improvement Team (EIT) personnel were completing visual checks on TEG booster pump P49680 in preparation for a test run folowing a recent overhaul. A team member then
observed a fire from the adjacent online TEG booster pump P49685. The Cogent trainee, who was a member of the EIT, contacted the CRO by radio to infrom operations regarding the fire. (A
manual GPA status was initiated from the CRO by radio to inform operations regarding the fire. (A manual GPA status was initiated from the CRO) the Cogent trainee then asked everyone to
vacate the area. Two Operations Technicians arrived at D4C and observed small flames and sparking around the shaft and pump seal cover plate. Following on site discussion, it was agreed not to
stop the pump, as this may have been detrimental to the sealing arrangement and possibly result in loss of containment. after infroming the CRO a CO2 extinguisher was used to extinguish the
flame and cool the pump shaft area, 3 members of the ERTarrived in D4C to and monitor by the pump. Th pump was subsequently monitored by the ERT and operations until a controlled
shutdown was affected. There was no detection or automatic initiation of the platform fixed Fire & Gas detection system during the incident.
Routine steady state operations. Wind 350 / 22-24kts. Vis 10nm. Sea 2.0 ? 2.5 m. Cloud 4/8 @ 1500? (E). QNH 1024.1mbs. Temp +8/8c. Weather partly cloudy. Hydrocarbon condensate. Main
Condensate Export Pump 'C' mechanical seal and vent header piping. A metering technician on a routine vist to the north end of the main deck observed a discharge of liquid with a strong smell
of condensate flowing out of a 2? vent header above the condensate metering skid. The vent header piping drained down and the pump formally isolated. The pump was on standby duty at the
time of the incident.

During the afternoon of the <...>, the <...> were engaged in crane lifting operations, transferring containers and equipment from the skid deck to other locations on <...>. This was to clear the skid
deck in preparation for setting down the<...> equipment due to arrive on a supply vessel on <...>. At 14.25 an empty open topped container<...>, approx 2.5 wide x 3.0 long x 3.0 metres high, had
been landed at the South East corner of the pipe deck. In order to detach the crane lifting pendant from the container sling set without climbing up to the container top it was necessary to jib back
the crane and lower the hoist wire. This stops the sling set from lowering into the open topped container. During this manoeuvre the crane hook and "headache ball" contacted hand railing on the
roof of Module 12 and is thought to have rested on the top rail. The pendant ring then rode up the hook, hit against the partially opened opinned and sprung safety jaw and was forced underneath,
allowing it to be released. The pendant, assembly, now released from the crane hook, fell approximately 6 metres to the deck below.
Minor gas release. 20-25kts heading 300deg. Gas/water vapour. Manual/Automated choke. Plant was shutdown, well was shut in and the choke closed. Gas/Vapour cloud local to the choke only.
High water content well (91%). Gas volume released too small to be picked up by local gas detectors. No injuries. Isolated well from production header, depressurised.
Hydraulic leak from the iron roughneck on the drillfloor caused hydrolic oil to be sprayed onto the turbine exhaust for the water injection pump P-4001. This oil ignited where it had collected on
part of the support structure. No automatic detection was initiated, the incident was reported by phone and verbally. The water injection pump was shutdown & the small fire was extinguished by
the initial response team.
At the time <...> was in normal production mode. An operator was using a barrel pump to remove oil from the lube oil sump of J-01 GT and dump it to the closed drains. It would appear that the
oil found its way back up to the bearing housing external to the exhaust of J-02 where it flashed off against the hot external surface of the exhaust. The operator advised the CRT that smoke was
emanating from the turbine enclosure, and this was confirmed by the AEP who had been called to the area; he also observed flames through the observation window at the end of the hood. J-02
turbine was remotely shut down and a general alarm was called at 0806. No alarms came up from the fire and gas system and the emergency response team who went to investigate extinguished
the residual fire inside the exhaust end of the turbine hood with a foam branch. At this point the ERT became aware that there was actually a second fire burning in the similar location inside the
hood of J-03. This fire rapidly burnt itself out without further intervention. A full investigation was initiated to understand the cause of the fire. Specific to the incident an alternative disposal route
has been identified for the waste oil. The drain has been checked and is actually clear, the back pressure that occurred was due to the viscosity of the cold oil. Review in progress of work controls
<...> was in normal production mode. The <...> was working alongside the north face of the platform taking backload of material. The platform CRT was unaware of a collision until at 14.42 the
<...> advised him that it was taking on water in its steering compartment and that it may have impacted the platform at around 14.00. Initial investigation of the platform structure revealed that a
timber fender on the diagonal brace between the 44ft level of the NW leg and the 17ft level of the north central vertical member had been badly splintered and steelwork fixing the fender to the
brace severely deformed. It was observed that the <...> had a gash in the stern towards the port quarter at approx waterline level (it may have been below waterline initially but it is understaood
that after the impact , the vessel had been deballasted aft to lift the gash above the water.) A written statement was obtained from the master of the <...> confirming that no failure of any control or
propulsion system had taken place and that all navigation systems and aids to manoeuvering were functional. On this basis further work in the field was permitted. A detailed visual inspection has
been completed by means of rope access and initial assessment is that no damage has been sustained by the diagonal member itself other than a graze to the surface. The report has been submitted
On <...> the nightshift Mechanics were fitting suction & discharge pipework on KT01 gas compressor when they noticed a smell of gas. A technician (<...>) proceded to the CCR and reported
this to the Operations Supervisor (<...>). The Operations Supervisor asked the Area Operator (<...>) to investigate. He went to the site and confirmed a smell of gas. He suspended work and
contacted the Operations Supervisor. There was no gas detected by either platform fixed detection equipment or the portable gas detector at the worksite. Further investigation found that the HP
flare vent manual valve and EBDV 27 were in the open position (no frig) and a new spool had been fitted allowing flow from the HP Flare Vent line to percolate through the compressor system.
On <...> at 0331 hrs the platform suffered a production shutdown due to the pipline riser valve closure at <...>. After the riser valve was reopened, reinstatement of the plant commenced at 0546
hrs. During start up operations a gas leak was spotted by an Area Operator in Module B1. The plant was not fully up to pressure at this time. The leak was emanating from vessel C90 manway
door. There was no gas detection from fixed systems. The gas leak was minimal. A manual shutdown and depressurisation was initiated at 07:25, with the plant being depressurised by 07:35 hrs.
All permits were suspended. A tannoy announcement from the OIM informed all personnel of the reason for the shutdown. Remedial work is planned to be carried out today.
During routine operations, an operator noticed a smell of gas around the gas compressor after coolers. During this investigation it is believed that a leak developed into a hole that became quickly
visible. Once identified, the operator instructed the MCR to immediately shutdown the compressor, this was acted upon immediately and the compressor subsequently isolated to prevent any
further escape of gas. Weather was windy at the time and no gas heads picked up the release of gas that was being effectively dispersed.

A leak was reported from a pipe on the Main Deck. On investigation it was revealed the leak was from a 2" line form the <...> Produced Water Flash Drum to the closed drain drum.The fluid was
from a 8mm hole at an elbow bend, and was 5% oil in prduced water. The <...> process was tripped manually, and the leak decayed as the level in the pipe fell.The leak was onto gratings which in
turn allowed the fluid to reach the sea. It is estimated that the leak duration was 10-20 minutes from event starting to stopping. The pressure in the system was approx 1 barg.
A crew member while on an inspection smelt gas in P2 - wellbay area. On testing with a gas meter, gas was confirmed to be coming from the flow transmitter on well <...> gas injection line. Well
was closed in and gas lift line depressurised. Leakage occurred in an open module with wind speed above 50 knots. No readings were picked up on the fixed gas detection.
During normal operations a slight drip of produced water was observed on closed drain run down line ( line number <...>) in CC1. The leak was found to be next to a registered temporary repair
(unique reference number <...>). The line is of GRP construction. The area tech via control room instruction monitored the leak, which worsened to a steady spray when the reclaimed oil pump
and degasser pump was runnig. No fire and gas detection operated, no gas was measured adjacent to the leak)% Level at less then 10cm, from the leak point. No hydrocarbons leaked from the
defect. The oil process system was shut down in a manual controlled fashion and the closed drain line P-046 isloated to inspect the defect and to effect a repair.
<...> - Drilling operations were in progress on well <...>-<...> (<...>). The 8-1/2 section had been drilled through the top reservoir at 4,576m MDBRT to 4,586m MDBRT. At this point the
drillstring was picked up to 4,575m MDBRT and the well flow checked as per the programme. During this check a 3bbl gain was observed. The well was shut-in using the annular preventer.
Initial SIDPP was 220psi and initial SICP was 135psi. Whilst allowing the pressures to stabilise 1.40sg kill weight mud was prepared. The well was killed using the wait & weight method at
50spm. With the kill complete the drillpipe & casing pressures had been reduced to zero. The BOPs were opened & the well flow checked & found to be static. After a period of additional
circulation to condition the mud, normal operation were resumed. Although the reservoir pressures was higher than anticipated, due to the the nature of <...> wells being supported by water & gas
injection, procedures were in place to take extra precautions upon entering the reservoir . Additionally, drill crew were suitably aware of the risk & reacted accordingly. Although the nature of the
high reservoir pressure is currently being investigated, it is likely that the pressure is due to direct pressue communication across a fault with a nearby water injection well.
While the PN crane was lifting one of the new plastic corrosion inhibitor tanks from its external transportation frame using the attached lifting eyes, the plastic welds holding the external tank fell
to the deck. The new tanks are "double skinned" and fabricated from a plastic material. The external tank is plastic welded to the internal tank via 4 supporting braces. When lifting the vessel from
the transit skid 3 of the 4 welds failed causing the structure to fall apart - one side dropping to the deck and upsetting the centre of gravity. The tank fell from a height of approx. 2 metres and from
drawings weighed approx 584kg. These braces look only to be designed to be structural support braces and not designed to take the entire weight of the structure, however the lifting eyes are
located on the internal tank and the entire weight of the external tank and the entire weight of the entire tank is born by the plastic welds on the support braces.
During wireline operations on well <...>, whilst attempting to free a stuck toolstring, the slickline wireline parted at surface at the stuffing box. The surface portion of the wire recoiled to the
wireline winch, remaining inside the catwalk barriers. The downhole portion of the wire was found to have dropped below the xmas tree valves. The xmas tree valves were then closed. It was then
noticed that part of the wireline wheel guard (weighing 3 lbs) on the top of the lubricator had fallen approximately 36 ft to the rig floor. The rig floor was already barriered off. Wireline operations
have been suspended until it can be established if the dropped object caused the wire to break or vice versa. There were no personnel in the vicinity at the time. The rig floor was barriered off.
<...>. Whilst carring out wellhead maintenance in <...>, a slight smell of gas was noted in the area. Checks were made using liquid Snoop and a slight gas leak was found at the tie-down bolts of
the tubing head assembly. This leak was not picked up by platform fixed detection and using portable detection, the sensor head had to be held directly on the leak point in order to measure any
hydrocarbons. The wellbay is located in an enclosed module with positive pressure forced ventilation. The well had been shut in for 21 days prior to these maintenance works, which had allowed
it to cool down from its normal operating temperature of 180 DegF to 59 DegF. The 'A' annulus was vented to the closed drain header and the tubing hanger void depressurised down to 3 psi.
Noted that with 6 psi in the 'A' annulus no leaks were evident. Upon further discussion with the <...>, the well was brought online to reduce the closed in tubing head pressure and to increase the
wellhead temperature. Once warmed up the leak to atmosphere ceased. The annulus pressure is being kept low and wellhead being monitored closely. Urgent preparations are being made for a
well intervention programme.

On the evening of the <...> at approximately 16:18 the GPA was activated by 3 fire detectors initiating on the A gas turbine. As a result of the fire detection activating the machine protection logis
shut the unit down and activated the Inergen fire suppression unit within the engine enclosure. The unit is located on Level 5 East of the Utilities and Quarters platform. At the time of the incident
normal operations were going (on?) oil production interventions maintenance and vendor activities. No work was being progressed on the A turbine at this time, it was in fact on line electrical
power load sharing with the B turbine.
During normal operations at 11:30 a gas leak was reported verbally by telephone to the main control room on the <...>. Whilst grit blasting various sections of process pipework in preparation for
coating repairs, the grit baster, following stopping of the operation, noticed a smell of gas. He immediately shutdown the operation and identified a leak which he requested a colleague to report
via the local telephone to the operations control room. An operator was dispatched to investigate and immediately identified the leak as coming from the 2" fuel gas line<...> on the <...> end of
the bridge. The leak of gas was confirmed with a portable monitor which did not alarm until close to the leak . The system was isolated, depressured and blown down. It should be noted that the
wind direction was 335 degrees at 25 knots which was blowing away from any gas heads. The portable gas monitor on location and the gas alarms in adjacent areas were not activated by this gas
leak and no platform alarm was initiated. Further investigation highlighted that the leak had been coming from a 10mm x 4mm approx hole in the underside of the 2" pipe which had been grit
blasted.
P3030 is an oil export pump on the <...> Which has been spaded off for repairs. Following oil export start up a minor oil leak was found on the spaded suction line to P3030, this was a minor leak
approx. 1.5. litres which was contained within the module. The system was shut down and depressurised. All the bolt torque settings in the flange were checked by maintenance. Environmental
conditions: Wind speed: 20 knots.Direction: 270 degrees. Visibility: Clear.
Operators were draining oil from pig traps. A leak was spotted on a 2" closed drain line. The lost oil was contained within the platform structure. The closed drain system has been isolated to
prevent any further loss pending survey and repair.
For operational reasons the gas supply was being switched from stream one to stream two. During this process gas was detected in the module and automatic systems initiated a general alarm,
process shutdown and blowdown. The source of the gas release was quickly traced to a block valve, on a drain line, which had not been correctly closed. Meantime all platform personnel were
mustered and accounted for.
Slight smell of gas near the HP compressor was reported to Operations & Maintenance personnel. On investigation, a very small gas leak was discovered on a joint on the HP compressor 3?
balance line. On further investigation, another bigger gas leak was discovered on the 8? discharge nozzle/flange on the HP compressor. This later gas leak could be described as a ?blow? of gas
felt on your hand, and was considered minor, albeit required immediate repairing. No gas alarms in the area were activated. The gas compression plant (including the HP compressor) was
manually shutdown in a controlled manner, and plans immediately put in place to carry out repairs.
The '<...>' export compressor was started following a previous trip on high vibration. Shortly after that, the GPA was automaticaly initiated due to two line of sight (LOS) flammable detectors
(<...>) registering low levels of gas on the DD aftercooler deck. The CROs linked the gas detection with the start-up of '<...>' export compressor and the CROs immediately, manually shutdown
the 'Alpha' export train and in turn manually initiated a train blow down. The platform went to muster and all personnel were accounted for. The gas levels very quickly returned to zero following
the blow down of the '<...>' export compressor. The emergency response team was deployed to investigate. No leaks or further traces of gas were found. The <...>' compressor remained shutdown
for investigative leak testing with nitrogen, which identified some leakage from the compressor's primary and secondary seals. An investigation is continuing. The weather was generally fair with
occasional heavy rain; wind speed was 25 knots, direction South Westerly (270 degrees)
While setting a SSSV using wireline equipment, the wire parted at the surface. The SSSV had been set and the operator was in the process of shearing off the tool. The loose end of the wireline
reciled and was caught in the lower hay pulley. Wireline toolstring was then confirmed as free and the free end reconnected to the wireline unit. The toolstring was then retrieved. No one was
injured in this event.
Whilst attempting the second lift from the supply vessel, the <...>, the east crane was in the process of lifting a food container from the vessel up to the galley landing area. The lift was raised
from the vessel deck (manifested weight 4.5 tonnes, actual reading on crane 4.3 tonnes) and began to be raised to the level of the galley landing area (approx 45 metres above LAT). On approach
of the galley landing elevation, the crane operator stopped raising the load, and began booming-in to position the load for landing on the deck. As booming-in commenced, but whilst the load was
still positioned overside, the main hoist rope jumped the drum and wrapped around the drum shaft. As a consequence the load dropped 5-10ft due to the slack cable, before coming to rest. After
consultation between management, <...> onshore and the deckcrew, a recovery plan for the suspended load was agreed and put in place. The crane was slewed to the North and the load was
recovered and landed safely using abseil techniques and chain blocks onto the skiddeck area. The crane remains out of service until completion of investigation and repair. A<...> representative is
being mobilised to the platform on <...> to add technical input to the incident investigation.

During preparation for maintenance on one of the main power turbines the fuel system was swopped from gas to diesel supply. Shortly afterwards, the installation Control Room Operator received
reports of "smoke" at area M1. Investigations by the area technician revealed the source to be the turbine enclosure of GT2 (GT1 was off-line at the time). The technician immediately initiated a
manual shutdown of the machine. At no time were any flames observed within the enclosure. Further investigations identified that one of the diesel supply lines had become detached at the ring
injection manifold, enabling diesel to spray on to the hot engine. It was confirmed that evaporating diesel had been the source of the suspected smoke. An estimated 60 litres of diesel escaped
during the event, although it was retained within the enclosure and none was lost to the environment in liquid form. Installation mechanics, assisted by a package vendor, were able to confirm that
all other supply fittings were torqued correctly. The offending fitting was undamaged and was able to be re-torqued; subsequent testing revealed no further leakage and the package has been
returned to service.
Normal operations in progress. A Production Tech observed smoke, sparks and a small flame coming from the 'C' Seawater lift pump couling, located on the MSF. The unit was shutdown and
extinguisher applied by the operator. Investigation into the failure is ongoing.
Whilst replacing , an existing 5 tonne rated winch rope with a new 10 tonne rated rope, using a connecting "sock" system, the sock released its grip on the 5 tonne rope as it passed between crown
block sheaves, enabling both ropes to drop to the drill floor. In line with procedures, the drill floor was clear of all personnel not directly involved in the task and failing rope ends did not cause
injury. <...> refers.
There was a gas detectors observed from the control room reading between 0/9%LEL. A response team confirmed gas release on investigation from compressor K1602 casing drain pipe work.
PM:- Controlled shut down of equipment instated followed by manual depressurization
1:04 Platform raised to "General Platform Alert" status by detection of 2oo3 high level gas in turbine generator <...>. Machine shutdown automatically. On investigation, no evidence of gas was
present, the platform returned to normal status and the machine was left shut down. While further investigations were being carried out to identify the cause of the alarm, at 01:25 the same
indication was obsereved, and again the platform was automatically up on General Platform Alarm status. At this time, 2 x area techichians were already present at the machine, inspecting the
machine with the hood doors open. again no sign of the gas which had caused the alarm could be found locally by the technicians. The machine's fuel gas supply was isolated and depressurised
prior to further investigation. Further investigation found an instrument fitting disconnected. The cause of the disconnection is yet to be resolved and a "root cause analysis" exercise will be
carried out with relevant actions to prevent recurrence. mACHINE SHUTDOWN AUTOMACTICALLY. oN INVESTIGATION, NO ECIDEANCE OF GAS WAS PRESENT, THE PLATFORM
RETURNED TO NORMAL STATUE
At 19:04 hrs 20% common gas detection was activated. This reset automatically within a few seconds. A second 20% common gas alarm was activated and the relative GSE was identified as GSE
1016. This GSE is located beside vessel C104 [Condensate stabilizer feed drum] and pumps G104A/B. The GSE is low level in module X2. The area operator went to investigate the cause and
identified that condensate pump G104B was leaking at the seal between the gearbox and pump bowl. The pump was cavitating. Whilst investigating the leak a 60% LEL was identified by GSE
1016. The area operator contacted the Operations Supervisor who on witnessing the leak instructed the CCR operator to manually initiate a level SD2 production shutdown and depressurisation.
A tannoy announcement was made informing all personnel of the events. The G140B pump will be replaced.
The cooling water caisson has severe cracking below a permanent clamp. The bottom section of this caisson is now held in place by remaining steel work around the area of the crack and two
temporary steel strops which have been in place for some months whilst a replacement GRP is constructed and installed. Installation of this replacement caisson is near completion. Water flow
through this caisson has been reduced by 50% and the restraining strops are being monitored. Planning is underway to remove the damaged caisson.
At 11:26 hrs a mechanic and production operator were working in module X2 on condensate pump G104B when they noticed that a leak had developed on the adjacent condensate pump G104A.
Their immediate response was to contact the Production Supervisor and the pump was stopped. The production operator closed the suction and discharge valves. There was no activation of gas
detection due to the leak. The leak was at the seal between the pump gearbox and the pump bowl. The original G140A pump impellor will be refitted. This pump had recently been fitted with a
reesigned impellor. This pump had recently been fitted with a redesigned impellor.

Routine platform operations were ongoing, with a <...> meter stream being put on line following receipt of a pig from the <...> platform. An ESD1 + blowdown was initiated automatically at
11.17 by 2 hi-hi gas heads located at low level. The gas levels reduced very quickly and on investigation a quantity of oil (estimated 0.08 m3 ) was found to have sprayed out onto the metering
skid (spillage was contained within the skid). The leakage was traced to a <...> differential pressure switch (Model 224) associated with the <...> metering stream outlet valve. When the valve was
opened, differential pressure (approx 29 bar) was introduced to the switch and 2 of the 4 tie bolts holding the switch castings together failed. As the valve seated, the leakage stopped. (The failed
unit is rated for 1500 psi) The other units of this type on the metering skid have been isolated. The failed unit has been removed for onshore inspection to confirm the root cause of the failure.
<...>. Wireline crew were engaged in pulling plug following replacement of stuffing box sheave. Crew had difficulty in passing PBR at 17866 ft and were trying to work through the obstruction.
While pulling at 1300 lbs bind, the wire broke at counter head on winch and fell down hole. The swab valve was closed and the system bled down.
The plant had been in a downgraded situation for two days prior to the incident, due to a series of ESD 0 shutdowns caused by a PSU failure in the FGDS, with subsequent loss of main electrical
power. The plant was being restarted when the gas release occurred. At some point during the power loss during the previous 2 days, ESD level indicator - L18351 on C405 Produced Water Flash
Drum - failed, resulting in a continuous healthy reading from the transmitter to the ESD logic. This transmitter would normally activate on low liquid level in the vessel and shut the outlet ESDV
8354 thus preventing gas blowby. The vessel is connected to the LP flare system and operates at flare pressure. When the ESD was reset and the liquid outlet Emergency Shut Down Valve
( ESDV 8354) from the vessel was opened, the level dropped resulting in complete loss of liquid, resulting in a gas release from an analyser drain point and from the produced water caisson
vent/vac breaker- both situated on the downstream pipework. ESDV 8354 failed to close automatically on liquid low level due to the faulty transmitter reading healthy. The valve was closed
manually from the control room via the PCS.
The <...> platform was producing gas normally. At 08.00 hrs on the <...> the Management team on <...> were made aware that the Gas in Water alarm had activated. This was immediately
investigated and diagnosed as a failure of 'B' Compressor Intercooler ('A' Intercooler online at the time). The outcome of this failure is that gas entrained in the water discharges overboard and
constitutes a hydrocarbon release. The Platform was shutdown in a controlled manner and then Intercooler isolated pending further investigation.
Operation - Cargo operations onto standby boat. Sea state - 1.5 to 2M, wind 15-20 knots. No substances involved. Standby boat - <...>. 13.21 Vessel enters 500m zone 13.25 Vessel set up 50
metres off platform 13.40 Vessel settled alongside platform, portside to commence work 13.43 First lift landed on vessel 13.43-13.55 Vessel moved heading and settled 10m off platform. Now
lying stern on to platform for comfort and to give water 13.58 2nd lift landed half way up deck with other WSB cargo 13.58/13.59 approx. Impact with protruding structure (bumper) on leg. 14.10
OIM stops job. Crane driver called down from crane by OIM
Following up a report of a leak in Mod 6 SE, a small leak was found on a dead leg on the inlet line to atmospheric separator - <...>". A manual GPA and the area deluge were manually activated.
On further inspection a 1" long split was found below an elbow. a repair plan is presently being worked and the incident is under investigaton. There was no gas heads activated and no oil escaped
to sea.
During the lifting operation of a container a cable drum lifting axle was observed to have been caught onto the undersider of the container, the lift was stopped and the container was being
lowered back into position, however the axle became detached and fell into a viod space 4 metres below. The area of this operation was barriered off for the duration of the lift and as such no
personnel were injured. The cable drum axle should not have been stored in this area as this is a dedicated laydown area. Notices were issued to highlight the fact.
During normal oil export operations a LLG alarm was initiated by the F&G panel indicating gas in the vicinity of main oil export pump P3020. The pump was immediately shut down. The area
technician isolated and drained the unit within 5 minutes. A GPA was not initiated on this occasion. The module was ventilated and gas levels quickly returned to zero. All released oil was
contained in the module and disposed of in open hazardous drains. The cause of the release was a drive end seal failure on the pump.
Preparing beam trolley for inspection prior to lifting of AGT No. 2 engine. Whilst moving a 5T beam trolley on the runway beam between AGT 1 & 2 for inspection, the trolley moved only 15cms
and then split open and fell off the runway beam, and dropped 5.6mtrs onto the deck below. Weight of trolley is 43kg. The area of the incident was barriered off and made safe.

Key events. In an earlier incident reported on<...> the overboard process cooling water caisson had cracked and parted form its permannent lower support. This had been temporarily restrained
and tied to the platform steelwork pending a weather window to start the planned work for its removal and replacement. At 05:00 hours on the <...> during this scheduled work period it was
reported to the OIM that the restraining straps had loosened. At 09:20 hours one of its two steel wire supports failed, leaving the caisson suspended and moving freely with the wave and tide
action, with the potential risk to the platform sub sea structure and gas risers and emergency response was actioned. ICR manned. The platform was shutdown and made safe and the sealine
pressure reduced. Work commenced to capture and secure the damaged caisson. Two thirds of the caisson has been removed and the remaining piece raised up and restrained under the deck. The
new replacement caisson is now operational. A full internal investigation is underway.
An oil mist was detected in KO1 Turbine hood and initial investigation identified some smoke/mist visible down the west side of hood, also, emitting from gaps in the panels of the hood. The
cause could not be firmly established, however it was surmised that it originated from the vicinity of the Turbine Engine and was related to the Lube Oil system as it appeared to be an oil mist
circulating around the hood. Machine shut down, and allowed to cool before inspection, no leaks revealed. Decision made to start machine to check for leak while in operation mode.Started on
"dry crank" mode or unfired run, this again did not reveal leaks or malfunction. Machine then run to minimum speed and observed closely. Machine had gone through the initial start up sequence
and was spinning on the starter motor with ignition of the diesel burners occurring. Initially run to 4000 revs per minute, no evidence of leak or malfunction. Run again at 5000 revs and a loud
bang was heard and an emergency stop was initiated by means of the local emergency stop button. The Lube oil tank had ballooned and both Lube Oil and Fuel Gas pipe-work was buckled and
damaged.
The platform had lost main power generation the previous evening and steps had been taken to reinstate power using the Blackstart Procedure. The emergency generators were started (EG1 & 2),
and subsequently main generation power was restored at 23:45, but tripped at 01:20. Blackstart procedure instigated once again (using EG1), and power restored at 01:55. System steady until
08:15. EG1 & 2 brought into service once again, however EG1 was manually shutdown due to diesel fuel filter blockage (09:30). The Mechanical Technician completing the filter changeout
noted a faint burning smell as he completed the task. Initially he checked EG2 (as it had tripped), but confirmed ok. However upon returning to EG1 it was noted that there was small flame
around the lagging at the bottom of the turbine gas generator section. The flame was extinguished immediately using a portable CO2 extinguisher (on site as standard practice). The area was
allowed to cool and ventilate as the technician stood by. Note that no fixed detection systems activated (heat detection fitted under hood), and that the unit remains shutdown pending
investigation. <...> Module (Emergency Generator Room) under turbine hood of EG1 at unit exhaust end.
Normal platform operations were ongoing at the time of the incident. Wind was NNW at 20 knots. During the start up of the 'B' Ruston generator turbine the F&G system, within the turbine
enclosure, detected a confirmed gas release and automatically shut down as per the design. The high gas alarm annunciated in the control room, initiated the GA and the platform went to muster.
Following investigation, the release was found to be from a pressure switch vent port. This was due to; a) The block/bleed manifold was incorrectly piped (as supplied by original manufacturer).
b) Following maintenance the previous week a technician omitted to replace the vent cap. Checks of all block/bleed valves within both 'A' and 'B' Turbines have been checked for similar piping
errors and missing vent caps. All instrument technicians have been reminded of the importance of replacing caps following maintenance.
The outside operator, <...>, noticed a liquid leak from the suction boot on K100 compressor.<...> immediately reported this to the Operations Team Leader who had the sight glass isolated. On
further investigation it was seen to be coming from a small crack in a weld on the sight glass mounting leg. The suctions boots of the remaining three compressors were all checked for signs of
leaking but none were found.
A fire was detected in the natural gas liquids (NGL)control room. At the time of the incident, production was shutdown and the platform was in the process of restarting following a shutdown of
both main power generation units at approx 0200 hrs. The platform went to muster and a fire team was mobilised to investigate smoke in the NGL control room. The fire team identified the
source of the smoke which was due to an electrical fire in some electricl cubicles located in the control room. The fire which was confined to the NGL control room was brought under control and
extinguished at apprx 0615 hrs, and platform stood down from muster at approx 0630 hrs. No one was injured. A full investigation into this incident has been conducted and the actions from this
are being finalised.
While carrying out routine maintenance (function testing) on the high level fire monitor north west side of the upper deck on the Riser Platform, the jet/spray nozzle became detached from the
firewater supply line and fell to the deck. The distance from where it was sited to the deck is approximately 4 metres and the nozzle weighs 5kg. The hydraulic nozzle is an <...> type <...> material is Pyrolite. The conditions of the remaining nozzles were checked with one other showing some signs of corrosion. A full investigation to determine the root cause is underway. Weather
conditions were good with wind speed of 13 knots at 174 degrees. The dropped object didn't strike anyone.

Wireline crew were engaged in retrieving broken wire and toolstring, which had been lost down hole during a previous incident (ref <...>). Although the same wire was used during this second
run, a Wrap Test was carried out to check that the wire was still within manufacturer's specifications. The counter head was visually inspected and no defects were found. During the wireline
operation an obstruction was encountered. While tryng to clear this obstruction, the wire broke at the counter head, but did not fall down hole.
Routine platform operations were ongoing. Duty Operations Supervisor was making routine tour of process area when he found ? A? Test Separator Booster Pump suction pipework leaking
processed oil. Closer inspection revealed the suction pipework was leaking from a weld on the 2 flushing connection. The Test Separator was immediately shutdown and isolations were applied. A
quantity of oil (estimated 10 litres) was found to have sprayed amd gathered below the pump. (Spillage was localised around the skid). This was cleaned up using local spill kits. Note:- the leak
rate wasn't enought to activate the fixed gas detection systems. The spool that failed will be removed for onshore inspection to confirm the root cause of the failure. A similar pipework
configuration exists on ?B? Test Separator Booster Pump; this will be inspected and tested before it is brought into service. At the time of the incident the wind speed was 27 knots blowing from
WNW (300 degrees).
During a controlled process shutdown, gas was observed venting from the hazardous open drains, displacing the water seals as it did so. It also activated low level combustible gas detectors in the
area. Advance warning had been given that a neighbouring platform was about to shut down, due to the loss of export oil flow path. The decision was made to swap the main GTs from gas to
liquid fuel in a controlled manner before we lost production. The gas supply lines to the GTs contain two slam shut valves, with a bleed to the miscellaneous vent between them. It is thought that
the first of the slam shuts did not close, thus the GT supply vented through the bleed to the misc. vent. The hazardous open drains also have tie-ins to the miscellaneous vent. Platform brought to
precautionary muster, gas levels in Module returned to zero and investigation commenced. Platform will remain shut down until cause of gas release identified.
During routine watchkeeping, an operations technician noticed a smell of gas in the vicinity of an Enclosure ventilation exhausts on RB211 gas generator <...>. He then checked the levels on the
fixed gas detectors at the ventilation exhausts, these showed a reading of 3% & 5% LEL on the two detectors, below the alarm level of 10% LEL. A controlled shutdown of the gas generator was
carried out by the operations crew from the compressor panel. All fuel gas supplies to the gas generator was closed in and depressurised. Investigation of the source of the leak was carried out
during the following dayshift and identified to be from 2 flexible braided hoses, that supply fuel gas to the burners on the gas generator. These had come into contact with part of the casing of the
Gas Generator, which had caused a small hole to be worn through the brading and hose. Hole size is estimated to be approx 1-2mm. Checks have been carried out on the similar equipment on
<...> and information passed to <...> platform who have similar equipment
Interruption of electrical supply to the accommodation was noted along with observation of smoke in the LV Switchroom. Breaker for normal accommodation feeder had short circuited and all
electrical protection systems functioned as design to prevent escalation. Short circuit contained within the cubicle. POB brought to muster, by manual activation of GA, whilst initial make safe
achieved. Emergency power uninterrupted. Full investigation being carried out and temporary supply to accommodation being reinstated. No injury sustained.
At about 17.15 hrs <...> the <...> team were running in Slot 34 with 5" drill pipe, at joint 217 both sets of hydraulic slips (Heavy and travelling sets) were engaged to grip the joint, the tean then
attached the tongue to the joint to make up next section. At this point the string slipped through both sets of hydraulic slips (approx 15") because the tongues were engaged they were dragged
down to the floor causing the chain block supporting the tongue to break. No personnel were injured. All operations were suspended on the Hydraulic Workover Tower until initial investigation
findings were completed,immediate actions identified and implemented to allow safe re-start. This was carried out and operation re-started at 2100 hrs on <...>. Full investigation report is being
completed to identify further recommendations.
Whilst carrying out inspection work on 28" cell fill line an area of blistering paint was removed. Immediately on removal a leak occurred in that area of the line. The person immediately vacated
the area and reported to the control room. All platform safety systems were on line at the time and none of the fixed fire and gas detection systems detected any gas hence no shutdown systems
were called upon to operate. A temporary clamp was installed over the leaking area after agreement received from the appropriate authority onshore.

ICC Summary- During a routine ROV underwater survey of the platform caissons, it was discovered that a section of approximately 12-14 metres long was missing from the <...> jacket East
Water Pump <...>. This was reported to the OIM at 07.10hrs. The ROV survey continued and located the lost section resting on the sea bed. On close up visual inspection of the dropped section it
appeared to have no holes or substantial damage or fresh marks showing signs of collision damage on route to the sea floor. The platform tubular sections in the vicinity of the path of the fallen
caisson were further inspected. The caisson guide at -5.4 lat appears in tact. There are signs that the dropped caisson had struck an unused guide at -36.4 lat, this initially appears to have cracked
around the top section. The unused west side guide appears undamaged. The broken caisson is now laid on the sea bed as per attached drawing. The caisson dropped as predicted by an assessment
conducted by <...>.
Normal operation, with wind @ 263 degrees, 10 knots. Platform automatically shutdown on gas detection when gas was released from the closure on one of the test separator sand filters. The
filter is a <...> type, with O ring seal within the lid of the closure. The system was under 39 bar operating pressure. Inventory was blown down, all personnel mustered, drilling activity on the
neighbouring rig <...> was stopped and personnel mustered. Emergency response personnel remained inside the temporary refuge until the system pressure was below 2 bar before proceeding to
the incident site to investigate. The system was isolated and drained down. Upon opening the filter the O ring seal was seen to have failed. Further inspection is to be undertaken to determine the
reason for failure, and any remedial work undertaken before the filter may be returned to service. Separation Area, Integrated Deck upper deck, north.
The reinjection gas compressor primary suction valve <...> had an existing leak from the sealant injection port which was being monitored and controlled as per <...> 1.015. An operational risk
assessment was put in place to manage the interim period until materials and a suitable repair plan could be put in place.The platform shutdown, and the sealant injection nipple was successfully
replaced on <...>. A preliminary process engineering calculation was completed on <...>, giving an estimated average daily leak rate of 0.002 kg/s over a <...> day period. The total estimated
release volume over this period is 10060 kg.
The Maintenance Supervisor had completed a test of <...> (auxiliary) braking system and was raising the TDS towards monkey board level when the stationary Wesr drill floor tugger wire was
snagged (exact snagging mechanism TBC) and parted. Both sections of the parted tugger wire fell to drill floor within a short period of time. No one was present on the drill floor at the time of
the incident. The <...> Toolpusher was notified immediately.
At 10:56 the paltform GAP was sounded and a muster initiated. At the same time the CRO was alerted to low gas indication in the Train 5 LP compressor GG enclosure which instantly shut down
and vented the compressor and fuel gas supply to the engine. On investigation it was found that one of the flexible fuel gas hoses from the engine fuel gas ring to the burner can on the engine had
failed. The flexible hose has failed at the nut connecting the hose to the fuel gas ring. It was observed that the nut had split in half causing the gas release
Drilling casing was being run. During pick up by blocks to lift one section of casing from the vee doors, the top of the casing got caught in the A frame just inside and above the vee doors. The 3
ton strops parted and the casing fell down and back out of the vee doors. No injuries resulted. Amended risk assessments have been implemented.
Normal platform operations were ongoing at the time of the incident. Gas was released from a caisson at the North end of the platform. Gas subsequently entered the platform HVAC systems, and
modules. Non essential personnel were downmanned from the installation. Isolations have been put in place whilst investigations continue.
The operation consisted of disassembly of a Grayloc blind hub on a 12" section of line following Nitrogen/Helium leak testing. As a result of residual pressure within the line, the grayloc blind
hub was ejected from its location when one half of the clamp was removed. As a result of this a member of the work party suffered a first aid injury to his knee. Note this report is submitted due to
the dangerous occurrence and NOT the first aid injury. There was no restricted work, or lost time as a result of this event. Minor injury
A 3 tonne 6 metre chain block weighing 100kg was being transferred from <...> to <...> via <...> standby boat. The chain block was successfully lowered to deck of <...> by the <...> Deck Crew
using the chain block hook, and wire sling as an anchor point for the crane hook, and wire sling as an anchor point for lowering. On arrival to <...>, the deck crew lowered the crane hook to the
<...>. Weather was gale force 5, wave height 3 mtr sig, Upon lifting the chain block to the <...>, using the same slinging method as had been used from <...> to the SBV, the 3 tonne chain block
became detached, and fell approx 5m onto the deck of the SBV. As per procedure, the deck crew of the SBV were clear of the lift when the lift commenced, and the chain block fell. There was no
injury as a result of the incident. The 3 tonne chain block was quarantined, and sent onshore for examination.

Routine operations ongoing. 16:30hrs blustery conditions with winds gusting at 35 knots. Scaffolding foreman working in the area checking certification on ladders when he heard a flapping
noise coming from ?D? turbine exhaust cladding. He contacted the HSE Advisor and the area was cordoned off and PA announcements were made advising personnel to stay clear and obey signs
and barriers. A section of cladding was lying on the walkway between ?C? and ?D? turbines, but due to the time of day it was impossible to determine where it came from. The area was left
overnight and an inspection was carried out at first light the following day. Upon inspection it was obvious that the section of cladding had fallen from ?C? turbine exhaust onto the walkway
(30ft) Also it was noted that there was loose cladding on the south west corner of?D? turbines exhaust. All of the loose cladding on both turbines has been removed or has been temporarily
secured whilst plans are underway to complete a full inspection and a permanent repair. ?A? and ?B? turbines exhaust cladding has been inspected.
Wireline intervention into the pressurised wellbore. Fine weather conditions. No substance involved. ASEP. 125" diesel driven wireline unit with a standard wireline intervention package.
Wireline became stuck in the wall after being blown up the hole with a toolstring. It was decided to incrementally increase the pull on the wireline (2830 lbs min breaking strain) in an attempt to
free off the toolstring. Operation was risk assessed to highlight the potential of the wire breaking outside the lubricator i.e. in the open deck area. Wire broke between the unit and the bottom
sheave. No damage to property or personnel reported. All personnel involved took part in the risk assessment and the toolbox talk prior to the operation commencing. The operation was planned
to give a controlled break of the wire in order to allow the tree valves to be closed and the wall made safe this was achieved.
A night ship Ops Tech was en-route to the Turbine Hall at approx 20.00hrs and found a 2.5m long scaffold board lying on the walkway on the North Side of the PLQ (Permanent Living Quarters).
Subsequent check by the scaffold foreman revealed that the board had come from scaffold erection due to be used by the dayshift painters underneath the helideck. The board appears to have been
prised away from its tie-down point by high winds which were gusting to 63 knots at a time and then had fallen some 20m to land on the walkway without causing damage or injury to personnel.
The following day when the winds abated the scaffold men checked the scaffold platform and confirmed the board had been located in the most NE position of the construction which had been
taking the brunt of the gale force. He confirmed also that the board had been lashed down with a scaffold wire but concluded that it had been vibrating in the fierce wind, inched its way toward a
free position and eventually had fallen.
Decision made to downman nonessential personnel until such time normal accommodation/gallery facilities are operational. The accommodation drains system backed up creating approx 1" of
dirty water to be present in the gallery cooking area and laundry floors due to blockage in drain pipework (initial cause thought to be solidified cooking fat deposits). Immediate response was to
barrier off the areas to restrict access. PTW raised to unblock drain to prevent further ingress of dirty water. Communication of incident and precautionary measures to all personnel.
Diesel leak inside GT1 Turbine Hood - machine shut down and investigation ongoing into source of leak. Site visited by HSE Inspector who was carrying out a routine inspection at the time. Due
to instability in the fuel has system on line generators, G-0810 and G-8030, automatically changed to diesel fuel. Approximately 45 minutes later a mist smelling of diesel was seen between G8010 and G-8020. The platform load was reduced by tripping the Sales and Flash compressors and an emergency stop initiated on G-8010. After an initial cooling period a visual examination
inside G-8010 enxlosure showed evidence of diesel around the burner pigtails and underneath the machine. However, it was not possible to identify the source of the leak. A clean up of the area
was completed prior to checking the tightness of the fittings in the diesel fuel system. All the fittings in the diesel system were checked and found correct. The diesel fuel system was pressurised
with air to check for gross leaks, no leaks found. The machine was run up on diesel and the load slowly increased whilst constantly monitoring the fuel system. At 15MW a leak appeared on the
supply line to the fuel rail underneath the engine.
Under normal operations at 19:30 a gas leak was identified. Following routine plant checks on C111, <...>, smell of methane gas was noted, on investigation the Area Operator discovered that
there was a gas leak from PCS transmitter LT25123. Further investigation revealed the leak was on the top cover flange on the level transmitter. When the insulation covering the leak area was
removed the leak could be heard and felt by hand. An attempt was made to isolate the transmitter from the vessel, but because of passing isolation valves, this was not possible. The vessel was
blown down. The isolation valves were greased, closed and the top cover of the transmitter was removed. On investigation the gasket did not appear to be badly damaged but there was evidence
of slight pitting and corrosion on the flange face of the displacement tube. The flange faces were cleaned, a new gasket fitted and the level transmitter was leak tested. The vessel was returned to
service without further incident. Further investigation revealed that no gas detection activated in this area, wind direction was 230 degrees at 30 knots and estimated gas release=0.42kgs.

At 15:30hrs on <...> the wireline lubricator was required to be fitted to the BOP on Well <...> on the <...> Wellhead Platform. The wireline mast used to assist in this activity was already erected
and in position. The top of the lubricator assembly, which includes a wireline sheave, was hooked onto the mast hoist while the bottom part was hooked onto the <...> WHP Crane. While hoisting
up the lubricator assembly the wireline sheave wheel on the top of the lubricator struck or got stuck against one of the mast joints. The sheave wheel broke off and fell down from a height of
approximately 40ft to the weatherdeck. The sheave impacted the weather deck at a distance of 3 metres, from where the person who was operating the winch mast was standing. The sheave
remained attached to the wireline cable because the protective wireline guide remained intact. The sheave wheel weighs 13.5kgs. All activities were suspended and the site made safe. The sheave
impacted the Wind Direction at the time 25-30 knots. Incident investigation in progress.
During completion of plant checks, the production Lead Operator reported discovery of 5-of pinhole leaks/weeps on the waterside bridles & associated spools on <...> separator. The leak points
were not new, as there was evidence of salt/wax deposits on the pipework in each case, which is typical for produced water (note that HC was not leaking in any great quantity from these points,
although some were noticed as damp). Upon discovering the pinholes the Lead Operator informed the Ops Supv, and further checks were made immediately by the OIE. The vessel was then
shutdown in a controlled manner, and preparations made to fully isolate , flush and purge to allow further detailed inspection and subsequent replacement of the affected pipe spools. The other
pipework associated with V2's undergoing close UT inspection, and the findings of this may require additional spools to be replaced. These weeps do not appear to be new, and the leak rate is of a
very minimal nature (in some cases it had stopped due to the external deposits on the pipe). No fixed detection activated in this case, and the location of the pipework is part way up the vessel ,
accessed only by ladder.
As part of normal operations, the P9 closed drain tank pumps started due to the level of recovered slop oil in the tank. Slop oil are transferred to V6 export oil separator. Part of the Ops Team
were working in Module A at V2 separator and saw oil dripping from high in the module roof. This was quickly confirmed to be the P9 discharge line to V6. The P9s were shutdown and a water
flush initiated to the pipework prior to isolating. The deck was cleaned with absorbant pads and washdown to the open hazardous drains (to pumped pile V87). Estimated quantity of drains slop
oil released is 10 litres. No fire & Gas activated due to this incident, and it was confirmed that there was no gas in the area as a result of the spill. The P9 pumps discharge at 60 psig, with V6
operating at 40 psig. Module A is fully enclosed & has forced ventilation.
The heads of the two fixing bolts of a 4 foot light fitting pulled through its unistrut fixing bracket, allowing the light fitting and its unistrut bracket work to fall to the deck below from a height of
approx 8 feet.
<...>. During the abandonment operations on the <...> well, a 13 3/8" cleanout run was being performed prior to the setting of a whipstock assembly at +/_4,177ft. Close to full circulation, the
mudloggers registered 45ppm H2S within the mud returns, (entrained within the mud), and the rig picked up +/- 11 ppm in air at the upper flowline. The well was shut in on the annular. All
personnel were mustered inside the accommodation. BA kits were donned and H2S monitored whilst the well was opened and circulated conventionally. On bottoms up, the maximum reading
was 98ppm within mud and 11 ppm in air. Circulation of the annulus continued until 0ppm was measured by either rig sensors or the mudloggers sensors. Operatons continued with no further
H2S detected. The source of the H2S is believed to have come from the remnants of OBM and drilled cuttings in the annulus that have been disturbed by the circulation.
Gas was discovered eminating from a pressure gauge located on compressor K-1602 discharge pipework. The compressor had just been returned to service after maintenance. The pressure gauge
in question had not been part of the maint. workscope. The leak is believed to have occured at an instrument fitting. On discovery of the leak by 1 of 2 operations staff present at the time of the
leak the OIM instructed the compressor be shut down immediately. The pressure gauge was isolated and made safe before the equipment was put back into service. No gas detection was activated
as a result of the leak. The exact cuase of the leak is currently under investigation.
<...> - At 08:12, <...> <...> well <...> flow wing valve (FWV) & upper master gate valve (UMGV) failed to travel fully closed upon receipt of a demand - to - close signal from shearwater's
emergency shut-down (ESD) system. The valves travelled to within 5mm of their fully closed position. There are no environmental concerns due to this incident & no hydrocarbons or hazardous
substances were released. There was also no harm incurred to people. Both valves were subsequently fully closed & tested following flushing of the valve cavity. It is suspected that the mixture of
shale & rock, produced from this well, may have entered the valve's gate/seat cavity, and may have become trapped between the gate & seat whilst operating the valve and thus preventing full
closure. In addition, a build up of solids behind the backseat taper of the valve stem may have prevented full valve stroke. A well intervention programme has been initiated & is currently in
progress. See further deatails on wells IT or in well file.

<...> is a normally unattended installation (NUI) tied back to and operated from the <...> platform. On <...>, it was noted that the pressure in the nitrogen supply to the wellhead fusible loop was
decaying. Should this reach the low pressure trip the <...> platform would shut down. Arrangements were made to visit <...> on <...>, to investigate and rectify the situation. The wellhead control
system includes a fusible loop. Due to the fact that there is no air supply on <...> the pressure is maintained by nitrogen gas. The fusible loop is part of the wellhead control system and is partially
contained in a weather protection enclosure. This enclosure is approx 6'x20'x8' and has personnel access doors along one side. To investigate the drop in the nitrogen pressure the 3 man technician
team entered the enclosure.During their investigation they detected that the PSV on the nitrogen system had lifted. The relief from this PSV is directly into the enclosure. Upon discovering the
condition of the PSV the team returned to the control room to discuss the forward plan. After approx 20 mins, two of the technicians complained of headaches and one felt unwell. One technician
recovered quickly but the other required to be given oxygen. The third memeber of the team did not report any of these symptoms. The IP made a full recovery and in accordance with <...>
A line sight of gas detection window was on deck by the visiting NUI crews when they manned the installation on the morning of <...>. The reflector had had maintenance carried out on it 3 days
earlier, the item was not deemed to be insecure at this point in time. The cause of the failure was a combination of fatigue and corrosion. The reflector panel weighs approx 4kg and fell approx 4
metres. The OIR form has been raised and submitted as prudent operators understanding in the unlikely event of the reflector making contact with somebody injury would have been caused. It is
not considered that this would have been the likely outcome as the reflector. This is based on the assessment that the cause of the fatigue was high wind. These conditions have been experienced,
2 bracket failing simultaneously is unlikely thus any noise of the unit "flapping in the wind" would have alerted personnel if in the area allowing safe egress or possibly correction before failure.
Change in platform status at 0719 on <...> due to confirmed LLG from RPM level 2, Zone 262. 2 gas detectors were found to be above alarm point - <...>. Highest levels seen by technicians was
41% and 32% on gas detectors<...> & <...> respectively. Process was shut down to investigate and rectify source, and causes, of leak. During a process upset (PSV pilot valve on RPM roof
malfunctioned which significantly increased volume to flare), the HP compressor second stage recycle valve moved rapidly (17% open to 42% open) to compensate for the process change and to
protect the HP compressor from surging. During this rapid movement, a small quantity of gas escaped from the gland packing on the recycle valve. The scouring fan ventilation nozzle directly
above this recycle valve, designed to rapidly dissipate any such release, had been shut off, hence the gas release was then pushed by the ventilation system onto the fixed gas detection heads in the
module. The HP2 recycle valve had been changed out during a shutdown in <...>. It is extremely likely that the scouring fan nozzle was switched off then by the work party as it would have been
blowing cold air directly at them. Thus, it is a reasonable assumption that it was not switched back on when the work was completed and operations recommenced. PSV pilot valve replaced, gland
Normal platform operations were ongoing at the time of the incident. Wind was NNW 332 deg at 16 knots. During routine plant monitoring a large amount of liquid was noticed on the deck
around the methanol pumps. On investigation it was found that the vent valve had failed on PI 19047 instrument block & bleed manifold, on the discharge side. This resulted in methanol flowing
in to the bund, which in turn drains to the hazardous open drains caisson. Due to the volume of methanol the drain could not cope and overflowed on to the deck and through the open grating to
the sea. The pump was stopped and the PI isolated for further investigation. Checks of all block and bleed valves, on both 'A' and 'B' pumps, were carried out. Review the size of the drains
pipework from the bund to the drains system.
<...> has restarted after a previous pipeline shutdown. All the ESP wells were online and it was decided to start up the Gas Plant and to pressurise the NGL area prior to the shift change. During
the re-sets and lining up the plant, the Glycol Re-boiler was overlooked and was not re-set or switched on until later that evening. The NGL plant was started up and plant pressures were
established. As already stated, the Glycol heater was not re-started until later that evening. At approx 23.00 hrs it was identified that a build up of condensate/gas/glycol mix had developed in the
glycol system, this was identified when frosting was observed around the glycol skid and also at the LLP flare KO pot (V54), this was due to the low temperature in the system. It was
subsequently put back online to heat up the system and clear the frosting. At approx 01:20 an alarm was picked up indicating low levels of water within V28 (Water Injection Holding Tank).
Whilst this was being investigated, at 01:43 High levels of gas levels were picked up in Package 5 on G5341 followed 5 seconds later again by High Gas on the same head which triggered the F&
G activated YSD and GPA. All platform personnel were mustered, and the well was made secure at 01:47. At 02:53 a debrief of the incident was held within the CCR and all other non relevant
At approx 08.15 hrs a leak was reported on the train 2 compressor discharge ESD valve to the control room by an electrician working on the BP11 compression module top deck. The on duty
team leader immediately off-loaded the compressor prior to initiating the normal shutdown sequence which included the automatic venting of the compressor. The shutdown was initiated at 08.17
hrs. The leak reduced by virtue of the reducing pressure within the train 2 compressor. The compressor was confirmed as vented to 0 psig at 08.40 hrs. An investigation team was formed which
included platform staff and safety representatives and a containment isolation applied to the compressor. The area was barriered off pending possible investigation of the leak by the HSE and CSL
onshore management. There was no automatic fire and gas detection by the fixed fire and gas system and there was no requirement to muster all personnel as any potential escalation of the leak
had been eliminated.

<...> - Drilling operations had been completed on well <...> on <...>. The well was TD'd with a 6" hole at 16040ft. Mud weight was 685pptf. Whilst circulating bottoms up at the 7" casing shoe at
15683ft, after performing a wiper trip, mud returns were becoming increasingly gas cut and the mud weight had reduced to 640ppft. The driller closed the well in using the BOP in order to
monitor the well. SICP increased over an hour to 540psi and SIDPP increased to 480psi. The rate of increase indicated that the increase was most likely due to gas migrating in the annulus.
Preparations were made to circulate the well under controlled via the choke manifold, to evacuate the gas cut mud and restore the original mud well weight. At the time of reporting, circulation is
ongoing to achieve an even mud weight of 685ppft and the forward plan is to further increase the mud weight to 705ppft. The cause of the gas cut mud is considered to be the result of swabbing
in a small amount of gas whilst tagging TD with the pumps off, prior to pumping out of the hole to the shoe. This could indicate that the current 685ppft mud is just balancing the formation
pressure.
During normal operations smoke detectors were activated within the Gas turbine Enclosure resulting in the sounding of the Platform GPA, a level 2 shutdown of all process plant, Gas Turbines
and the starting of Emergency Power diesel generation. Further to this the F and G logic determined that a fire was evident within the space due to the number of smoke detectors being activated
and subsequently released the Fire Supressant into the gas turbine engine enclosure. Once it was confirmed that a fire had not started within the space and that smoke had set off the alarm, the
turbine and its ancillaries were made safe, the space vented and an entry into the enclosure made. The smell of overheated insulation was evident as was some smoke surrounding the cooling air
vents from the alternator cooling ducts. Tests were carried out on the winding to determine if they had been damaged, early indications in conjunction with the alarm print- out appear to indicate
that there may be a fault with the windings. Vendor assistance is being mobilised <...> to progress the investigation and determine the root cause.
Routine platform operations were ongoing with productions steady. At 0242 one high gas alarm activated in the WD1 area and was immediately investigated. A small hole was observed in the
production flowline, and the well manually shut in and depressurised. The same gas detector went to high alarm at 0249 with the adjacent gas detector in high alarm seconds later. Further
investigations revealed a hole of approx 2 mm diameter and developed a greyloc hub adjacent to the well immediately down stream of the Northern return valve on the flowline to the pipe
separator. This line is a 6" 900 pound rated duplex, this was operated at approx 9 bar and had a water cut of approx 92%. The spool is to be removed for full examination on shore to determine the
failure mechanism.Checks on the other flowlines are being carried out.
Normal domestic operations were ongoing in the galley. One of the Chefs reported a strong electrical burning smell to the MCR. At this time the Baker's ovens tripped out electrically. A member
of the platform electrical department was called to inspect the Baker's ovens. No problems were apparent and the power to the ovens was reset. Approx 1230 hrs the same chef noticed smoke
coming from the left side of another galley appliance, the cooking range, so he turned the hot plate off. He then noticed smoke coming from the bottom of the cooking range oven and observed
small flames coming from the bottom of the cooking range oven vent area. He switched the power off while another of the catering crew staff unplugged the range from the mains. Another
member of the catering crew extinguished the flames using a CO2 extinguisher by directing the jet into the air vents where the ovens electrical fuses are located. On investigation by the electrical
department it was found that there had been a flash over of the fuses. None of the fixed Fire and Gas protection systems were activated and no one was injured during this incident. The cooking
range was immediately taken out of service. The notifier confirmed that work was not suspended.
A fibreglass protection lid for the platform <...> was blown from the pipedeck south side down onto the east side of the gas export compressor deck between gas export compressor A &B, approx
height between modules is 50 feet. A Production Technician who was completing routine operational checks discovered this object and reported it to the CCR for further investigation. The wind
speed at the time of discovery was approx 60 knots.
During normal oil export operations single LLG was initiated from the F&G panel, indicating gas in the area of the main oil export pump P3020. The pump was immediately manually shut down
from the main control room area technicians isolated the drained pump. The oil released into the module was contained within the hard deck area and disposed of into the open hazardous drians.
The cause of the release was the failure of the DE mechanical seal on P3020.
The operations supervisor noticed water spray eminating from the top of <...> Water Injection Riser J Tube during walk around platform. The pipeline was operating at 40 bar at this time with
Water Injection water being injected into <...> Wells. The decision was taken to isolate the pipeline by closing topside and subsea valves. On doing this the leakage subsided. It therefore appears
that the riser pipeline has developed a leak within J tube casing and the casing was overflowing with de-oxygenated injection water. Further investigation is being planned by AHL and the pipeline
remains closed in.

On the dayshift of <...> the platform inspector infromed the <...> scaffold foreman that there had been damage to scaffolding on the North leg. The scaffold structure is an extension of the
underdeck walkway. The scaffolding forman went straight down to the worksite but as the weather was out-with limits to gain access to the scaffolding, he erected a barrier thus stopping access.
On the dayshift of the 16th, upon inspection of the damage it was noticed that the damage seemed to be restricted to one section of scaffolding boards and to a few tubes. There were boards
missing and the remaining boards were either broken or lying loose on the structure. The damage tubes were visiblily bent. It was also noticed that although the board lashings were missing from
other sections, that the boards had not become dislodged but were lying on the scaffolding structure intact. The scaffolding had not collasped the main damage was to the scaffolding boards of the
structure. The boards on the north south run west side were broken and loose with the lashing broken, and either lost or hanging loosely from the remaining scaffold. The scafolding had been
inspected and found to be in acceptable condition on the <...>. Scaffold damage between last inpection on <...> and discovery on <...>. There had been a period of adverse weather winds gusting
<...>. During wireline fishing operations on well <...>, the wire was being held in the lubricator and across the lower rams of the wireline BOP with circa 600 psig pressure in the lubricator
assembly. When the rams were released the wire parted and the combined wire and drift tool assembly dropped back down the well. The top part of the 'cut' wire was then extruded through the
small 0.125" diameter hole in the top of the stuffing box resulting in approx 3.4kg of crude oil being vented to atmosphere on drill floor. The BOP rams were immediately closed and the stuffing
box top seal was pressurised shut by on site well services personnel. No one was injured. The spillage was contained locally. The programme methodology has been adjusted so that the
lubricator/BOP pressure will be vented to the Auk production train BEFORE the lower BOP rams are released. This will ensure that the lubricator contains minimal pressure should the wireline
break again and prevent any further release of crude oil.
At approx. 08:30 on <...> the operations technician doing his wellhead routines noticed a leak from the 6" RV header line in the East Wellhead. The leak appeared to be produced water. There was
no indication of gas on the platform fixed gas detection or on the portable gas meter. Access to the module was restricted. The decision was made to manually shutdown the process to effect an
isolation. Once shutdown the sepatation train was depressurised to stop the leak. At 09:25 the leak was verified as having stopped. Wind conditions were WSW 30kt.
The <...> platform was producing gas normally. At 16.55 hrs on <...> a person walking past the fuel gas lines heard the noise of escaping gas and immediately informed the control. No gas heads
were activated. The control room operator tried to change the generation over to diesel but the generator tripped causing a level 2 shutdown making the platform safe. Due to the platform status,
all personnel were requested to cease work and return to the accommodation.
A routine 4-hour test run was being performed on C firepump set (this is a diesel-driven alternator set in a dedicated sound and fireproof enclosure within Module 16, a non-process module). A
fire in the enclosure was detected by activation of POC's and UV detectors. Operator on site observed flame via viewing port in enclosure and manually activated the halon release - this
extinguished the fire. However as design of set is to continue running, a few minutes later the fire re-ignited and was extinguished by Fire team using dry powder once the diesel supply to engine
had been isolated and the engine stopped. During course of events, GPA was sounded and platform went to muster stations, process and turbines were left running as this was deemed at time to
give best power and firewater cover given location of incident within the firepump enclosure.
Normal platform operations in progress, production trains and gas - lift compressors in commission. At 06:50 a single gas detector in Module 8 went into alarm at 20% LEL then reset, an
Operator was sent to investigate. At 07:05 the same detector alarmed at 20% LEL and again reset, no further activation of any fixed gas detection occurred after this. The Operations team with
portable gas monitors and 'Snoop' leak detection fluid continued searching module but it was not until 10:00 that the source of the leak was found - a pinhole leak in spool 08-3570 -10
(condensate return from gas -lift compression & fuel -gas scrubber to B 1st stage separator). This information was relayed to CCR, Op's Supv & OIM - the OIM instructed that the platform
process be shutdown and depressurised. Shutdown and depressurisation was completed by 10:30 and isolations commenced on the affected section of pipework.
An electric motor which was located in the Water Injection area of Level 1 had been disconnected and being removed from the bedplate to be transported out of the module. The estimated weight
of the motor was 500 kgs, and a 1 tonne swl lifting chain block was used. Whilst lifting the motor to transfer it to a barrow the load dropped approximately 18 inches to the deck. The broken link
was recovered and there was visual discolouration that indicated that there had been a flaw in the chain link. This will be held for furher examination. Similar chain blocks on the platform were
quarantined and the occurence was shared with other Forties platforms.
During normal operations a gas leak was detected inside the gas turbine driver of the gas export compressor enclosure that led to a unit shutdown. CCR/Supervisor/OIM informed. Investigation
found a small weep from a fuel gas flange connecting to the fuel governor control valve. This was repaired: the gas detector calibrated to confirm activation and the unit was restarted without
incident. Gas export recommended.

At approximately 1300hrs a high pitched noise was heard during routine platform operations. At the time a shutdown valve for the TEG separator was in operation ie. moving from the open to
closed position, and gas was detected coming from the valve actuator tell tale. It was assumed that the gas was coming from the valve via the valve stem. When the valve reached its fully closed
position the leak stopped. The gas was not detected by the platform gas detection system due to its dispersal rate through the small hole. The pressure in the pipework is 72 bar and the leak
duration was approximately 10 minutes. It was established, by moving the valve, that the leak was only present when the valve was travelling and not when it was at either end of its limit. The
platform remains depressured until a repair can be effected. The valve in question is 12" TK ball valve.
Upon completion of bunkering chemicals from a vessel the bunkering hose was drained and flushed. The hose was in the process of being stowed on the installation when it fell to the deck and
landed approximately 3 metres from the deck crew. At the time of the incident the hose was drained empty and flushed and suspended from the platform crane approx 30 metres above the deck.
The hose was a 4 inch diameter hose coupled together in 18 metre sections. The hose was correctly supported by a load rated part of the lifting arrangement at the time of the incident. The hose
itself failed just below the top coupling arrangement at the time of the incident. The hose itself failed just below the top coupling arrangement. (Note the coupling did not fail) 2 x 18 metre hose
sections and 1 coupling fell to the deck. An investigation is underway to establish the cause of the failure. Weather - Wind: 20 knots, direction 011, gales 1.5, metre swell. People involved: Crane
Operator, Banksman, 2 Deck Crew. Machine Involved: Platform Crane. No substances involved.
At 05:50 hrs on <...> a smell of gas around <...> compressor was reported to the control room. On arriving to investigate the technician could also smell the gas and traced it to a migration of gas
from the 'Clean Gas' take off on the compressor casing. At the time of the report the compressor casing was pressurised to 60 bar but offline. At 05:57hrs the compressor was depressurised by the
CRO. The joint in question has been re-made and is part of an ongoing investigation.
SPS (Surface Platform Shutdown) alarm initiated 02:30 hrs <...> coincidence low gas detection in <...> turbine enclosure. Investigation team detected no indication of gas using portable monitors
in or around enclosure. Gas detectors had returned to steady zero readings. At the time of the alarm the turbine was off line. Further integrity tests were carried out on the fuel gas system within
the enclosure, a leak path was located from a small bore fitting which is believed to be the source of the SPS alarm. With the turbine shutdown the enclosure fans stop after 2 hours. The weep of
gas is thought to have accumulated in the enclosure activating the alarm at 10% LEL.
As part of a power generation renewal project a new J 2000 generator had been lifted into position. The next part of the build up was to install the generator cooler which bolts onto to the top of
the generator. A protective transit plate had been fitted for protection and required removal. Lifting equipment was correctly fitted to the 4 eye bolts in the plate and the plate unbolted.It was not
possible to see the eyebolt fixing method at this time although the bolts appeared secure. The plate was then lifted clear without any problems inside of Pkg 7. When lifted clear of the Pkg 7 it was
being slewed round to the top deck landing area for disposal. It then began to oscillate as it came in contact with the wind which applied more loading to the eyebolts. The deck crew and crane
operator then saw two of the eyebolts pull through the plate leaving the weight on the other two which then failed in the same manner. Seeing the impending failure the crew all moved to a safe
location out of the drop zone. The load was then lowered off when it failed at a height of about 10 mtrs. The weight of the plate has been calculated at 170 kgs. At the time of the incident the wind
speed was 22-24 knots within the crane operating limit of 31 knots. The area has been correctly barriered off.
Mechanical seal on hot oil pump 'A' in Module 06 failed leading to leakage of hot oil onto the lagging. Follow up revealed smoking of the lagging. It was sprayed with water and then removed.
An LPG leak occurred in Mod 03 from the LPG metering skid filter. A secondary B shutdown was initiated by the OIM and personnel were mustered. Upon completion of blowdown and Module
03 was confirmed gas free, LPG Stream 1 was then isolated from the system. Investigations have shown that the plenty filter seal had leaked due to insufficient pressure to retain a seal which
allowed condensate to drip out onto the deck. This was a known design flaw in this type of seal and a new design filter had been ordered some months prior to this incident. The filter has been
replaced with a pipe spool until delivery of the new design filter which will be fitted during the forthcoming shutdown.
At 0930hrs a core crew member reported to the control room that he could see oil on the sea around the platform. Upon investigation it was found that crude oil was dribbling onto the sea from
the produced water overboard dump line situated on the SE cornor of the platform. The HYDROCYCLONE unit, our normal for the produced water overboard, was shutdown at the time meaning
that nothing should have been flowing from the pipe. A southerly light breeze of 12 knots was blowing the oil patch under the platform and thence in a northerly direction for some 600m where
the sheen then became very patchy and broken, The duty standby vessel was called to assist in determining the extent of the oil spill and to take a sample from the sea surface for future analysis if
required. An estimated volume of 0.0072 tonnes of crude oil was leaked to the sea. The most likely source of the crude oil is a passing NRV located in the Reclaimed Oil line of the Hydrocyclone
which was allowing crude to migrate back, under pressure, from either the LP separator or the MP separator. This blackflow would have eventually overcome the static head of pressure on the
outlet line of the hydrocyclone and flowed to the overboard dump line. When the Hydrocyclone water outlet valve and the Reclaimed Oil line valve were closed the dribble of oil to sea stopped.

At 05:47 hrs on <...> confirmaed gas detection annunciated in <...> Main Control Room for <...> and the <...> platform automatically shutdown (level 3 ESD). Upon investigation a half inch
stainless steel impulse line to slot 5 flowmeter was found to be sheared. The section of pipework was replaced and investigation initiated.
Platform on production, with gas compression and water injection online. A smell of gas within the module was identified to be originating from the tube sheet flange on the E7A LP Gas Cooler.
The CCR was alerted, and a controlled shutdown of the compression facilities was carried out. The releases of gas subsequently stopped, and the smell dispersed. On investigation it was found
that the tube sheet connection bolts had slackened off since the exchanger bundle had been changed out in <...>. The bolts were re-torqued and the exchanger was successfully leak tested using
nitrogen. The system is currently being prepared for re-start, while further investigation is ongoing into the root cause of the slackening of the compression bolts. At no point in the proceedings
was any gas detection activated in the module.
A member of the crew noticed oil water leaking/spraying forn <...> pump. The pump was stopped and isolated. The pump discharge flange was found to have been leaking slightly, and the
retaining studs were not fully torqued. The pump body was also leaking, from the joint between the two halves. The fluid was approx 10 percent oil and about 15 litres was spilled. It was dead
crude, with no associated gas.The spillage was contained in the pump bund and was cleaned up without any spill to sea.
On the <...>, while walking between Turbine 'B' enclosure and the Offgas compressors, two production technicians heard a distinct sound, similar to an instrument air leak, coming from the
direction of Offgas / Injection Compressor 'A'. The technicians investigated the sound and found it to be coming from a gantry located above the discharge of the Injection Compressors. On closer
investigation along the gantry, one of the technicians could feel the gas leak. Initially the leak appeared to be coming from a 1.5" flange on one of three thermowells located on the Injection
Compressor 'A' discharge 8" pipework. The technicians immediately reported the leak to the Central Control Room and the machine was shut down and blown down. The pipe spool was then
isolated and purged for inspection. On subsequent inspection a crack was found on a 3/4" branch for a pressure tapping. The discharge of the Offgas / Injection Compressor was operating at
111bar and 176c prior to the machine being shutdown on discovery of the leak. The injection gas can contain up to 20,000 ppm H2S. The wind conditions at the time of the incident were 45 knots
gusting to 55 knots WSW (235-240)
Fluid used for pit cleaning which had been retained in the mud pits for future injection was transferred between pits. On transferring the fluid H2S was released, which was detected by the gas
heads in the mud pit room extraction system. This event initiated a muster and plant shut down.
A hydraulic hose failed during operation of the east crane. Around 75 litres of hydraulic oil spilled, some of it went to sea.
An operator conducting active monitoring tasks discovered a gas leak on the 6" fuel gas line. Main compression was shut-down and lagging removed where a pin-hole area of corrosion was
discovered (approx 1mm). Non destructive testing is underway to determine the full extent of the corrosion.
Two non destructive testing technicians were completing radiography on the small bore pipework associated with the offgas compressor A discharge pipework that had cracked in the previous
month. Their intention, once the examination was completed, was to examine the same pipework on the B machine. At a natural break in the radiography on the A pipework the technicians
climbed on to the access gantry so that they could assess the arrangements for radiography of the B. Whilst on the gantry assessing the work, the personnel H2S monitor on one NDT technician
alarmed. Both technicians left the area and informed the CCR. Two operations technicians then investigated the leak. When on top of the ladder, both technician's personnel H2S monitors
alarmed and they left the area. The CCR shut the compressor down and blew the system down to enable further investigation. Investigation ongoing. The weather was dry with a slight breeze 16
knots.
Weather conditions: wind 15 Kts, visibility 10 Nm, conditions good. During routine wireline operations on well F6, the toolstring was in hole and attempting to pull the SSSV. A load of 1100 lbs
was showing on the load indicator when the wire snapped at surface causing the broken end to whip back into the winch unit hitting the window, shattering an area approx 4" diameter on the
outside and 1" diameter on the inside. The other end stayed at surface and was hanging at approx the bottom of the outside of the lubricator stack. The only person in the immediate vicinity of the
wire was the winch operator who was inside the winch unit controlling the operation, all other personnel were outside the erected barriers. There were no injuries.

At 20:25 an indication of Fire in D1EN module alarmed on the platform Fire and Gas panel. 2 Technicians were sent to investigate. On arrival at the module an oil fire on the emergency generator
diesel engine was confirmed. The engine was shutdown immediately and the fire was extinguished by the Technicians using portable Dry Powder fire extinguishers. The Emergency Response
Team was dispatched to the area by the OIM to attend the scene and secure the area. The area was confirmed as secure within 8 minutes of the indication of fire. On investigation an engine lub oil
supply fitting into one of the turbos was found to have sheared and sprayed lub oil onto the hot tubo, which led to ignition. The platform had experiened a main generation power loss 75 minutes
prior to the incident and the Emergency Generator had been on line for this time to provide back up/ancilliary power to the platform. Submain generation had been restored at the time of the
incident so the platform did not experience total power loss. The platform Hydrocarbon process had already been shutdown on a Surface Process Shutdown due to the main generation power loss
so no action was required to be take to secure the process further. The Emergency Generator is powered by <...> <...> Diesel Engine.
During HWO operations running 9/58 casting, the winch level failed at the ferrel/eyelight. 320 feet of 5/8 casing had already been lowered into the hole during this part of the operation. The last
joint had been lowered approx. 15 feet when the wire failed.
A release of gas/water vapor was reported emanating from a small hole in the side of the "flare pilot feed line" located in the flare boom. This was investigated and the line isolated. Due to its
location there was no potential for fire or explosion. However, the rate of the release could have the potential to have measured at 20 % Lel at 0.1 meter. Due to the location of the leak, only
remote visual inspection has been carried out.
2 x smoke detectors activated level 1 HVAC plant room. Accommodation shutdown. Problem found to be a sheared lube oil pipe on the chiller unit releasing an oil mist into the local area.
1) The closed drain system on <...> was overfilled by a liquid handling process upset to the point where condensate was carried over into the LP vent knockout drum. This liquid accumulation
resulted in 16 psi of back pressure being developed within the drain system. We have commissioned an internal investigation into this event. 2) The pressure in the closed drain system
subsequently revealed a holed pipe where this pressure was escaping in the form of a gas leak. This leak is on a 1/2" threaded tapping on a 1" drain line associated with the inlet scrubbers. The
leak has ceased since the vent system has been cleared of liquids and the back pressure allowed to dissipate. The leak is at high elevation and well clear of any other (electrical) equipment. It is
well ventilated. (less than 5% LEL 12" from leak point). A belzona wrap repair is programmed for <...> with plans for more permanent solution during summer shutdown.
The platform was in normal operational status. A team of rope access technicians were rigging up in B1/C1 module when they noticed a smell of gas. They immediately reported this to the control
room. There was no detection of gas from fixed detection systems. The area operator was sent to the scene to investigate. On investigation he identified a minor gas leak from the inboard flange
on cooler C124. (3rd stage cooler of KT -01 Gas Compressor). The compressor was manually shutdown. All permits in the area were suspended. A permit was raised for retorquing of the flange.
This was completed. A service test was conducted at 60 psi, pressure was increased in 10 psi increments to achieve this pressure. No leak was evident. The machine was restarted with the cooler
being monitored for possible leakage, no leakage was evident.
At 10.00 hrs on <...>, a worker noticed icing on the outside of a welded joint on the suction header high pressure vent line. A portable gas detector was used to confirm the gas release, resulting in
immediate isolation and venting of associated pipework.
Following the planned maintenance shutdown of <...> production process, the <...> Subsea Well was in process of being brought into service. Confirmed coincident gas detection resulted in an
automatic shutdown and blowdown of the facilities. Investigation confirmed the source of leak to be the vent valve associated with an Oliver valve double block and bleed arrangement to a
pressure gauge. The vent valve on this arrangement had been left in the open position following the shutdown. Location of the gauge is on the <...> Topside Manifold downstream of ESDV <...>.
Whilst preparing the platform for shutdown a general alarm sounded and the platform mustered. A coincident low level gas had been detected in the <...> Production module. As such a low level
had been detected the Fire Team Leader attended the scene and ascertained that the leak was from a 1" body bleed valve on the downstream isolation of the condensate separator PSV. The valve
was closed and blinded and was not being worked on. Further investigation will be carried out as to the cause after the valve has been replaced. The gas detection occurred duing blockdown
operations as we prepared for a 3 day shutdown. No shutdown work had begun as yet. The leak was very small and may have been apparent for a while but the 'still' conditions on that afternoon
enabled the detectors to pick it up.

At 22:27 on the <...>, a gashead, G313 in Wellhead module, M3C mezzanine, came into LLG condition. This was followed at 22:29, by gashead G66239 M3C lower level alarming LLG and
gashead G313 going to HLG.The platform status changed at this point. Well Services operations on well <...> were being conducted at the time of the incident. The <...> crew had taken
possession of Well <...> earlier in the morning of the <...> to carry out operations that included reperforating <...>. At the time of the incident the Nighshift <...> crew had completed the loading
of the perforating guns in the lubricator. The next task was to equalise across the Swab valve and open the swab valve. This was done and just after the task the 1st gashead (G313) came into
alarm. It was discovered that gas vapour was coming from the <...> pump unit (this is a volume/pressure pump unit used in the wellhead by both <...> and Operations Technicians) which was
connected to the pressurisation system for the valve equalising of <...>. (The gashead G313 in the roof above the pump unit and gashead G66329 floor mounted on the lower level) Immediate
investigation revealed that the 1/2" needle valve on the Tee'd pressurisation assembly was not fully closed and the vent value on the <...> pump unit had been left open. This is not in line with
The <...> standby vessel reported that the 10" blow down line had ignited on <...>. The platform was unmanned. At the time of the ignition the area was receiving large snow storms which
probably contributed to the ignition. <...> control was informed and the platform was then s/d. The blow down had a reported 1-2m3 flame coming from the vent tip. The flame dissipated when
the platform was shutdown. <...> control room reported that the Seperator export line to the export ESDV slowly lost pressure when the platform was shut-in. This has indicated that HV2081 is
passing.
During crane lifting operations at <...>, a wooden pallet to which Grayloc clamp sections were secured, failed resulting in the clamps being released from the pallet and falling. At the time of the
failure, the load was positioned over the sea, hence the clamps fell into the sea without damage to plant or injury to personnel. Initial actions include issue of instruction detailing limitations on
this type of slinging arrangement and reviewing guidelines for task risk assessment. Investigation is ongoing.
Gas Compression Train running under normal, steady operating condition (160bar) - no alterations were being made to the Process at the time of the incident. Wind WNW'ly 20-25 knots. Leak
identified by Mechanic working in vicinity when his attention was drawn by the sound of gas escaping. He immediately contacted the CCR who dispatched the Area Operator. After assessment, a
controlled shutdown and depressurisation was initiated on the Compression Train. The leak was observed to have ceased after 5 mins. of venting the inventory. No personnel were injured. An
investigation is underway.
Normal operations. High water level observed in the vessel which was observed as a small leak from the vessel stripping gas outlet: Vent. On investigation it was discovered that the vent line had
been constructed close to an 'I' Beam which has caused erosion to the line and there was also severe surface corrosion. Inspection confirmed that there was a hole in the line. RA carried out and it
was decided to shut down the installation to effect a repair.
An 18m long section of 16" diameter overboard caisson (seawater dump line) parted from a clamp at approx 6m above sea level. The section has fallen below the sea's surface and as yet we have
still to ascertain it's exact current position in relation to the platform structure. It is estimated to weigh 3 tonnes. The platform was already shutdown when this incident occurred. The platform will
remain shutdown until an ROV survey is performed to determine the location of this 18m long section, any damage to the export line to <...> or jacket structure. The export pipeline to <...> is
closed at both ends and pressure being monitored from the <...> end. Structural engineering (onshore) have advised the platform that it is unlikely that any structural damage would have occured
to the jacket. Currently mobilising rope access technicians to determine condition of caisson still in place, before we commit an ROV to the water. Cause of incident still to be investigated.
<...>, dual fuel gas generator no. 2 in module C1C was in normal operation using diesel fuel and was the only gas generator available at the time. One of the operations team noticed a sheen on
the surface of the sea and observed that the cause of this was drips of what appeared to be diesel. The person investigated the source of the diesel and discovered that there was diesel escaping
from somewhere in the turbine enclosure for gas generator GT2 and was going through the open drain to sea. The person contacted the control room and the gas generator was shutdown in a
controlled manner as was the oil production of the platform and a platform black out situation occurred. The investigation into the diesel leak revealed that a small bore instrument tube on the
diesel supply had been wearing against a nearby small bore pipe and the rubbing over a period of time had caused the leak of diesel fuel. The pipework was replaced and the generator restarted
with no further problems.

A section of curved steel insulation cladding from B GT exhaust elbow was found lying on the main (lower) walkway underneath the generator air intakes outside module 10. Its fall was
approximately 10m (ie the height of the module). The rectangular cladding plate was 1630mm. long by 630mm wide and weighed approx. 5Kg. It was evident that it had come clear of its edge
retention to the next plate sections still in place. It was not captive on the other side due to that section being missing previously. It is not known when exactly this fell to the walkway, as the route
is used very infrequently. In this case it was spotted lying by a team of painters who made the connection with the exhaust insulation panels above. It is estimated it may have fallen any time in the
past 3 days. The walkway below has been barriered off until such time as the area and equipment is deemed to be in a safe condition. An offshore investigation has been initiated with an
investigation team leader.
Electrical Short Circuit. Minor Fire In electrical switchroom put out by ERT. Incident started at 09.50 and finished 10.13
Due to an earth failure of P4203 motor, a decision was made to pull the seawater pump/riser assembly in preparation for installing a replacement motor due to arrive on the <...>. This activity
requires assembly of a lifting frame on level 1 deck that the air hoist is attached to which pulls up the pump/riser assembly from jacket/deck level. Lifting work on the riser had commenced (<...>)
with the first pull to enable a restraining clamp to be fitted to allow removal of top riser support plate. Riser assembly was raised to allow removal of top cable banding to allow the fitting of the
restraining clamp. Banding removal was carried out successfully. At this point it was noticed that riser assembly had actually lowered . The riser assembly was raised again and a decision made to
continue fitting the restraining clamp whilst the riser being raised, (to make job safe) before advising supervision of the problem. The <...> representative tested hoist and confirmed that load was
lowering at a rate of 3 " every 15-20 secs with no demand signal. Supervision was advised at 14:30hrs and a new hoist requested from onshore. Investigation ongoing.
At 11:19 hrs the production area operator was putting Gas Import stream 2 on line for Planned Maintenance tests on SSV1 , SSV2 and ESDV71. The stream was already pressurised to 500 psi
and holding pressure. The operator raised the pressure to the normal working pressure of 1480 psi. The CCR operator contacted the area operator and informed him that the gas detection had
activated in the area. Low level gas detection was indicating 20%. The area operator quickly identified that the slight leak was from the lid seal of the orifice plate carrier on Gas Import stream 2
in module x 3. The area operator isolated the stream and vented the gas in stream 2 to flare. The gas detection automatically reset to zero within 3 minutes. The system has been isolated and the
orifice carrier will be inspected asap.
Work had been completed on a 24" spool section to access and replace the taperlock jointing. A 2 tonne chain block had been used to support the spool pieces as part of the task and was left
attached to the section. It was reported during the night shift that a link in the chain block failed. The spool section could not have fallen, as it rested on the support at each end. No one was in the
area or injured.
Two gas heads within the gas generator enclosure of the 'B' Power generation set went into alarm condition. The power gen unit had been on diesel fuel for routine load testing. This had been
completed and load reduced prior to fuel change over. Immediately on change over to fuel gas, both gas heads went into alarm. Inspection revealed a hole in a flexible hose located between the
fuel gas ring and one of the burners. Investigation into the cause of hose failure has been initiated.
Skipping and shipping of drill cutting was ongoing on the west side of the skid deck. To facilitate this operation the crane operator in the West crane needs to move away mud skips when they
become full, to allow empty skips to be out in their place. The crane operator needs to pick up the skips then slew left approx 270 degrees to access the pipedeck where the skip is landed. As he
slews left the helideck sits at approx 180 degrees from where he picks the skip on the skid deck on instruction from the deck crew on the west skid deck, and the protruding steelwork of the
derrick. When the crane operator reached his clearance height , he began to slew left. During the process of slewing left , the mud skip he was moving collided with the helideck. This caused two
of the sections contained to the helideck perimeter netting to jump out of their retaining sockets. One section landed on the helideck. The other section, approx 3ft x 4ft weighing 70 kg fell approx
42 metres onto the level 1 west side of the platform.
Clear night. Wind 15 knots @322 degrees. Air temp 4.0 degrees. Sea state 1.4 mean 1.4 metres. The leak was identified by platform personnel and reported to the control room. The leak was
coming down from a breather vent on the pilot actuator of the relief valve fitted to pump AP-P-2901-A. The pump was switched off and the stand-by pump started. From identification to stopping
the leak was approximately five minutes. The total leak volume was approx five litres.
Failure of two chain blocks, (a) CBA72 SWL 500KG & (b) CBB224 SWL 1 tonne, whilst being utilised for two independent activities.
Whilst re-instating the <...> Leg Gas Pipeline after a process shutdown, a minor hydrocarbon gas leak was observed in module CC8 from a pig alert on the pipeline, by the Area Technician at
05.40 on the <...>. The minor leak was reported to the Control Room and the <...> Leg ESD Valve <...> was closed and the line was blown down to the flare by 05.52. The leak has now stopped
and plans are being put in place to carry out a repair.

Failure of two chain blocks, CBA 72 SW1 500kg and CBB224 SW1 1 tonne, whilst being utilised for two independent activities.
Whilst removing valve lagging from valve W038 for inspection, underlagging corrosion was found to be present on the 2" globe valve. Due to the smell in the close proximity, personal gas
protection was held at the stem packing and a very minor stem leak was detected. No fixed gas detection had triggered and the degree of emission, being considered only a fugitive emission, did
not necessitate executive action however the decision was made to vent & isolate the affected pipework and arrange a valve replacement. The HSE Inspectors on board concurred that it was only
a fugitive emission of gas and that shutting & venting was a precautionary step only to allow valve inspection and replacement.
At 07:25 hrs <...> a single gas head within M3 deck went to low level gas. The CRO requested oil tech to investigate. At 07:30 hrs a 2nd head also went into low level alarm resulting in a change
to platform status. The oil tech was on location at this time and reported a very slight smell of hydrocarbon gas, The smell very quickly disappeared. Both gas heads dropped to zero rapidly.
Decision taken to use acoustic leak detector to attempt to find from where any potential leak was emanating. At this time the platform was returned to normal status 07:48 as no further readings
were indicated either on the F+G system or locally using gas meters. The wind conditions at this time was calm approx 6 knots. The acoustic detector pinpointed that the leak was emanating from
some lagging fitted on the dump line pipework from the fuel gas drum boot vessel. This line is a boot dump line which has alternative routings either to the IP compressor suction scrubber of train
2 via which this leak appeared to be on or it can dump via to the cold flare header. It appeared that the smell came and went each time the boot vessel dumped on off control. Decision taken to
isolate this line until further investigation could be carried out.
This event was investigated on the <...>. At that time the investigation focused on the Loss of 50ltr of diesel to sea and a PON 1 was completed and submitted. Upon further investigation it is now
realised that approx 28 tons of diesel (38 M3) was lost from the filter drain point to the non hazardous drains caisson. Diesel overflowed from GT1 diesel supply LP filter into enclosure and into
non hazardous caisson. On realising there had been a loss of diesel from bulk storage, CRT requested OpsTech to investigate and determine reason for losing diesel. Ops Tech found diesel spilling
onto M7 from M2 main deck (below GT 1). Upon close inspection he found diesel flowing through the atmospheric vent tubing into enclosure housing. Supply was immediately isolated and
spilling stopped; spilled diesel onto Module 7 (cellar deck) was then cleaned up. The OIM instigated an investigation. Loss of containment of approx. 28 Tons of diesel (38 cubic metres) from
bulk storage to Non Haz Caisson. Estimated that approx. 50 lt got into the sea from spilling onto M7 deck as well as overflowing from GT1 enclosure area into the sea below. Estimated that the
non hazardous caisson is approx. 117 cubic metres, so 1/3 the capacity of the caisson is required to contain this quantity of diesel and prevent it from escaping to sea. Therefore no diesel from the
Normal operations were ongoing at the time of the release. Failure of a bellows on a fuel gas PSV resulted in gas release from the body tell tale, which is piped to deck level. Local gas detection
was activated and a Level 3 depressurised shutdown resulted. In line with design, automatic deluge also occurred. Investigation continues.
The Utility Shaft has both stair and lift access to the 81m level. The main equipment on the 76m level are the oil import/export manifolds with Rotok valves, HVAC extract ducting, bilge and
contingency pump pipework. Access to the 72m level is restricted and hard barriers in place. Work in the shaft is all controlled by the ISSOW WCC and OCOP 2.012. A rope access team were
carrying out a load test of the 72m level access platform gratings in the Utility Shaft. One member of the team was on the 72m level access platform working off ropes. The remaining team
members were on the 76m level assisting. An 8 tonne load test water bag had been partially filled with water to 2 tonnes. The test had been successful and the load test bag was drained of almost
all fluids. The weight of the bag will be calculated as part of the investigation. When trying to reposition the bag the remaining fluid shifted and caused a section of the bag overhanging the
platform to fill with water. The weight of this then caused the bag to fall from the platform onto the top of the mini-cell concrete, approximately 15 metres below. The person performing the task
stood clear and made no attempt to hold the bag or stop it falling and was in no danger of being pulled over. There were no personnel working under the dropped object. Access restricted, only 1
After the planned internal inspection of the test separator, the test separator was partially de-isolated to carry out a pressure test with Helium and Nitrogen. This test was successful. The separator
was then fully de-isolated and gas was introduced to the separator using well D21. Two fixed gas detectors in the separator area went into alarm and the separator was immediately shutdown and
blown down manually initiated by the CRR operator. Helium and Nitrogen was then introduced to source the leak and this was located as pt26737 3-way valve manifold where the vent valve was
found missing. This PT is fully lagged and the vent port not vissibly accessible. System reinstated and on brought online.
During topsides re-comissioning activities following a workover on production well <...>, the well electrical submersible pump (ESP) electrical drive was de-isolated, inline with procedures. As
the 11k V drive energised, smoke began to accumulate in the VSD module. The RPE, who was on site monitoring the activity, immediately shut down the supply, initated an instalation alarm, and
isolated the system. Smoke continued to emanate from the transformer area of the drive so the installation emergency response team was dispatched to extinguish a small fire in the rear of the
transformer enclosure. The area affected is situated in a non-hazardous and is enclosed in a dedicated transformer/drive module. <...> Refers.
A leak of hydrocarbon gas was reported from the gland packing on control valve <...> returns from HP gas compressor B. The leak was reported by the laboratory technician who was in the area
collecting samples. The compressor was manually shut down and the leaking valve isolated.

At approx. 21.29 hours 3 x Gas heads in M3 deck level in the vicinity of the Gas Compressor Scrubbers rapidly raised to High level. At this point the platform SD and changed to GPA Hazard
status. The platform SDand BD systems operated correctly. Non emergency power supplies were isolated to the area. Within approx. 9 minutes the gas heads had returned to normal levels.
Subsequent detailed site inspections did not identify any remaining hydrocarbon gas levels. During the site inpection it was observed that a hose on the Methanol injection ringmain had failed.
This had resulted in Methanol being discharged in the immediate vicinity of the gas heads that indicated high levels. It is suspected that this Methanol discharge in the form of vapour/fine mist
has caused the gas detection to activate (IR gas detector units). Note: This is being reviewed by technical safety. The Methanol hose was isolated and has been removed from service. This will be
sent onshore for detailed failure analysis. Once emergency power was reinstated the platform was stood down from muster. Detailed checks of the process equipment indicated no additional
problems. A staged reintroduction of low pressure gas was then conducted under controlled conditions - this proved the remaining process to be fully secure. The process was then restarted again
Hydrocarbons seen spurting intermittently from the cold vent, this vents from Hydrocarbon drains sump tank and caissons. Platform had suffered a full process shutdown due to a blown fuse, this
happened just prior to the spill. It appears the drains sump tank had an increase level due to the trip, also a cooling water line burst at the same time, which followed into the deck drains dumping
a copious amount of water into the caissons, this we believe caused the increase in backpressure into the system and forced some of the oil out of the vent.
Small fire in North fire pump room due to heat generated by the fialure of the starter motor. Electrical work on the South Fire Pump was ongoing this created a pump on demand signal which
caused the North fire pump to start and run. The North fire pump ran for several hours without any problems. When the work on the South fire pump was complete the Operations Dept was
contacted to confirm the "pump on demand" signal was no longer present so that the North fire pump could be shutdown.The operator was contacted by the control room and requested to shut
down the fire pump. On entering the fire pump room he noticed light smoke coming over the top of the engine and attempted to shut down the pump, however this was immediately followed by
the pump attempting to re-start. The smoke level was also noticed to have increased and on closer inspection smoke was found to be coming from the starter motor. The operator immediately put
the pump into the manual mode and the pump was shutdown. The starter motor cables were found to be glowing red hot and heavy smoke was now being emitted from the area of the motor,
shortly after this the motor cable caught fire. The control room was informed immedately of the incident. The fire was initially tackled by the use of a dry powder fire extinguisher however the
Oil spill to sea from Cold Vent Header, spill due to corrosion of the line, spill source was crude oil from produced water settling tank vent and /or drains sump tank vent, getting into the vent line,
line does not normally contain fluids. Plant upset caused the ingress of oil, this is still under investigation. Oil spilled was approx, 0.5 tonnes leak has stopped and area is safe with no residual
hydrocarbons evident.
At approx 03:10 hrs whilst carrying out wireline operations on well <...> the wireline operator picked up the tool and the wire parted and released from the top of the lubricator. Water glycol was
noted to be released from the lubricator stuffing box. The box was immediately pumped up tp 200 psi and the master gate value was closed. There was no release of hydrocarbons. The job was
immediately stopped and the incident reported and an investigation commenced.
Gas detection was picked up within M3 mezz which caused a level three production shutdown. An earlier loss of air pressure had allowed a backflow of hyraulic oil into a returns tank from
DHSV control lines. Subsequent investigation has shown that some internal damage to the control lines has allowed gas to flow up through the control lines to the returns tank. This small pocket
of gas was released into the module and was enough to set off two gas dectors within the module. The well (M48) and control lines have been isolated.
During restart of 'C' Power generation gas turbine, gas was detected in the localised area of the fuel gas wing. The set was shutdown, and the release investigated. No source was found. The
system was repressurised, and found to be secure. Investigation continues.
During depressurisation of a wireline riser following wireline operations, a gas release occurred from a connection in the riser. The assembly was in the final stages of depressurisation. Inspection
of the components revealed no obvious fault, but full technical investigation is ongoing.
A workover prgramme on Well <...> was ongoing. The system was being lined up to allow the well to be topped up with fluid using the mud pumps via the wireline riser as per the procedure for
the workscope. On opening the manual valve at the wireline riser to line up the mud pump, the operator heard gas passing back from the well and the valve was immediately shut again. However,
the gas passed into the standpipe manifold and then to the trip tank where it activated the fixed gas detection resulting in a platform ESD1 + Blowdown. Prior to restarting the well intervention
workscope, the equipment hook up and work programme were reviewed to confirm they are sufficient. A Non return valve has been fitted on the line to the standpipe manifold to prevent any
backflow and the manifold configuration has been modified to isolate the well from the trip tank.

<...> was in combined ops with the <...> Modu completing a workover prog. Weather was dry. Wind 10knots, direction 220 deg. At around 0700 hours a fuseable link on <...> Blow Down Valve
(tag LD BV 34002) failed on the Injection Pig Launcher/Receiver. The resultant loss of hydraulic pressure initiated the blowdown sequence. Manual intervention prevented full blowdown, the
inventory retained by closure of manually operated valves downstream of the blowdown valve. At 0758 hours the <...> OIM sounded a precautionary GPA following complaints of pungent
odour,nausia and sickness from crew on the rig deck. All crew were returned to the TR. 'Tight' shutoff of blowdown valve LD BV 34002 took sometime due to hydrate formation&the need to wait
on a favourable wind on which to vent. It was finally acheived aournd 1830hours on <...> & combined operations resumed. no H2S gas detector, either fixed on <...> or <...> alarmed. No
personal H2S detector sounded. The fixed detectors alarm at 10ppm and personal detectors alarm at 5ppm. A 'total safety' specialist engineer continued to take reading for the duration of the event
with a hand held detector. H2S was not detected. The fuseable link has been repaired, and preventative measures are being investigated to prevent reoccurence. The <...> gas detectors are being
fully tested on a monthly PM routine. As a precautionary measure the fixed detectors on the <...> have been tested & confirmed as fully functional after the event.
Stabbing board damaged by top drive system. Activity in Progress: During rigging down of wireline equipment from BD-26, the blocks were lowered to remove a sheave hanging from them
(approx 2330hrs <...>). The blocks hit the stabbing board, damaging it. A latch weighing approx 1kg fell from a height of 27ft to deck. The stabbing board had not been used during wireline
operations. Wireline personnel had been cleared from the area of the rig floor before this task began. Environmental Conditions: Weather was mild and there was no precipitation. Name and Type
of Machine Involved: Stabbing board on Drilling Derrick. Events that led to the incident: The HGT had been tied off at the stabbing board. After this was untied, the driller lowered the blocks so
that the sheave was just over the level of the line wiper, so the cable could be pulled through at the lowest level over the floor. The blocks were lowered again to remove the top sheave, but during
descent hit the stabbing board.
At 02.30 during watchkeeping operations the area Technician noticed a gas leak from BB31 downstream gas lift isolation valve grease nipple. Both isolation valves at the gas lift manifold were
already in the closed position as was the isolation valve at the xmas tree as per procedure. No fixed gas detection systems activated or detected any gas. Two Technicians checked the leak with a
portable gas detector and it was found to be 100% LEL at 0.1 meter. A vent was installed between the upstream and downstream isolation valves and the cavity was vented down which stopped
the leak at the grease nipple.
Approximately 1 hour after manual drain down of the <...> compression interstage and discharge scrubbers it was noticed that a spurt of liquid (condensate/water) vapour was being intermittently
omitted from the <...> LP vent. This was immediately brought to the attention of the Operations Engineer who surveyed the scene and noted the same event recurring . Correction action was
immediately taken to prevent further occurrences by reducing the liquid levels in the LP knock-out vessel and the Slop Oil vessel. The liquid control system was stabilised. Initial investigation
indicates that all systems and alarms functioned correctly, however, due to this event coinciding with the operations crew change period, and that the urgency of the alarms had not been
recognised this caused enough time to elapse to allow liquid levels to build above the HL alarm in the Slop oil vessel allowing overflow to the LP knock-out vessel and thereby causing liquid
pick-up and emission to occur from purge gases through to the LP vent. Environmental conditions were good at the time of the incident.
At 00:55 the Drilling Dept deck crew were landing a replacement fire water mains spool piece 3m long at the BOP sub base of M5 drill derrick. The East crane was used and after releasing the
load from the hook the banksman requested the crane operator to remove the whip line. As the line was pulled up the headache ball brushed against a section of access stairs descending from the
drill floor entrance door. The catwalk and lower section of the stairs had been removed to allow rebuild of the BOP stack on the sub base make up stump. Scaffold tubes had been fitted at the
bottom of the remaining stair section as a barrier to prevent personnel falling. A loose 0.5kg security fitting on the outside of one of the tubes was dislodged and fell approx 8 metres causing a
glancing blow to the left shoulder of the banksman before falling to the decking. No injury was sustained due to the degree of padded clothing the banksman was wearing. Corrective measures:
Counsel all personnel involved in rigging , slinging, banksmen duty to stay well clear of suspended loads and crane lines/pennants. Counsel scaffolder to ensure that all fittings are thoroughly
secure when erecting scaffolding and barriers. Review and revise <...> Risk Assessment <...> -Crane lifts around platform -to include instruction to deck crews regarding standing well clear of
Platform was in production with preparations being made in Module B for wet deluge testing. Environmental conditions were, wind 352 deg, 45 knots, sea state 9 metres. An operator was in the
module completing plant checks. When descending the stairs from the upper level of the module, he heard a "crash like noise" to his left hand side. Upon checking the area, a water injection well
coflexip support clamp was observed to be lying on the walkway grating. On investigating further it was confirmed that the clamp weighing 8kg, had fallen approx 5 metres from its previously
installed position. The area of impact is a well traversed route in the wellbay. In this instance there was no damage to plant or injury to personnel. Following the incident, the area was made
secure, and checks completed on other overhead brackets & fixings. An investigation into the incident has commenced.
During start up after a process trip a pinhole leak was repoted in the 8" <...> crude oil export line external to M3/M4 Module.The leak was identified by passing maintenance technicians who
raised the alarm. No gas was decteted. The platform was manually shutdown and blowdown.

P-3010 is fitted with oil cyclone separators on the pump in M1W. following the shift change, the area technician, during his watchkeeping duties, spotted a pin hole leak of crude oil, on the NDE
cyclone separator. The pump was stopped immediately and the pump isolated to stop the leak. All liquids were contained within the bed plate approx 0.5 ltr oil.
The occupant of cabin <...> awoke to a strong smell of ammonia in his cabin. He evacuated the cabin to a safe area. Upon investigation it was discovered that a fridge located in the cabin was
leaking ammonia gas. The fridge was unplugged and the area was ventilated. Once it was safe to do so the fridge was removed to an external area to await backload and disposal. It is estimated
that less than IKg of ammonia was released to the atmosphere.
On the <...> a heat detector in Hydraulic package in module D2W operated initiating a SPB.The detector was reset from the control room and two technicians were sent to the area to investigate
the alarm. The area was subsequently found to be clear of any fire or heat. The platform was returned to normal status. The techicians were then asked to go and reset the three blowdown valves
on the Northern/Western Leg crossover. They reset two of these valves and while resetting the third they noticed gas leak emanating from two pinpole leaks in the common blowdown header, after
instruction from the control room when fixed detection started to show gas in the area. They closed the blowdown valve and returned to the control room.The technicians were upwind and
carrying portable gas detection monitor. Investigation into the cause of the leak is ongoing, However, initial inspection would indicate surface corrosion and pitting. <...> production, Northern and
Western Leg pipeline operations have remained shutdown since the initial SPB.
Whilst reeving new drill floor winch wire, the snake hung up, causing the wire to come out of snake. The new and old winch wires had been connected together, using a Lewis snake. The
operation commenced and the winch operated to pull the new wire from it's storage drum. The operation continued with an observer monitoring the passage of the snaked connection past the
monkey board and onward through the crown block sheave. The connection was observed further on it's downward path past the monkey board sheave. At this point the snake appears to be past
any potentially hazardous obstructions. However, at this point the snake appear to have become fouled on the derrick cross member beam, causing old wire to become parted from the snake, with
the result that both ends of the winch wire fell to the drill floor. All personnel involved in the operation retreated to safe areas when the snake parted. The winch wire weighed approx.2lbs/ft. The
end of the old wire fell approx 20 metres to the drill floor. The end of the new wire unreeved itself back through the crown sheave and fell approx 50 metre back to drill floor.
During routine operational checks the area techincian entered M1W Export Pump module to discover a weep of crude oil from the stem of a valve located on common supply to main oil line
pumps. The leak was on to the deck area. Estimated leak quantity of 1 litre, no escape to sea. The export system was shutdown to prevent further release.
A GPA was initiated by gas heads located in the drilling BOP and shaker areas. A workover was being carried out on well <...>. During completion pulling operations the production packer was
unseated with the annular preventer closed. The A annulus pressure was monitored and 40 psi build up observed. The choke and poor boy degasser were lined up to bleed off the 40 psi annular
well pressure trapped under the closed Annular BOP. The remote operated drilling choke was opened by the driller and the fluids directed by the choke manifold to the atmospheric degasser. No
one was injured. An investigation is ongoing to determine how the gas was released to atmosphere and set off the platform gas alarms in the BOP and shaker house area.
The crane was being used to move drilling equipment (flush mounted slips) from the catwalk to the drill floor through V door. The wood protection on the crane boom came into contact with the
bumper bar around wind wall at monkey board level of drilling derrick. The wood protection on the underside of boom (main block protectors) split on contact and a small section (the largest
being 300g) of the wood fell to rig floor. No one was injured. An investigation is ongoing to identify the root causes of this incident and implement corrective actions to prevent a reoccurrence.
Routine liferaft charge out was taking place outside module CD8 on the East side of <...> on <...>. A member of the deck crew was postitioned over a liferaft, attaching a lifting strop. During this
work, the man fell several metres overboard, and was restrained by his fall arrester. The deck crew member was recovered, within 3-4 minutes to the platform. He was checked by the platform
medic, and was uninjured, but was stood down for the remainder of the day as a precautionary measure. The lift-raft fell to the sea, and was recovered by the Stand By Vessel. The incident is
reported as a category 77b dropped objecr, although the above description is of more importance. Full overside precausions were in place for the work, including overside cover radio man, fast
rescue craft watch, fall arrestor and lift jacket. The weather was 12 kts.195 wind.10+km viz and 0.8 wave height. a full independent investigation has been initiated.

Incident happened on <...> an NUI attached to <...> - <...> At 07:35 hrs a shutdown occurred . Although a gas detector, <...> went into alarm the cause was put down to the foggy weather which
was affecting a number of gas detectors at the time. Due to the weather conditions we were not able to visit <...> until 12:25 on the <...>. On initial inspection nothing untoward was found,
however upon introducing gas in a controlled manner, a small leak was detected on the gas lift system from the gland packing on FV174541. Although in close proximity, the fixed gas detection
did not register. Packing was replaced and leak tested successfully and the platform brought on line.
Plant start up in progress, main crude oil line pump P3410 on line. Smell of burning witnessed by a section operator in the area and on investigation noticed a flame at the non-drive end of the
pump. He went to fetch a fire extinguisher to prevent escalation and on return noticed that the flame had grown to approx 18". The flame was subsequently extinguished. CCR was informed and
the pump was shut down. Platform management were informed and the plant was then requested to be shut down to make the area safe and to allow for an investigation of the incident.
During normal operations smoke was detected in P4 Switchroom by the fire and gas detection system. This resulted in a platform blackout through the ESD system. Two personnel were present in
P4 switchroom at the time of the occurrence. They reported a strange sound and on investigation noted greyish smoke in the module. A full muster was initiated by the change of platform status.
Once the fixed Fire and Gas detection indicated the area was clear, the Emergency Response team were despatched to carry out an initital investigation. No visible evidence of any damage or
source of the smoke was apparent was observed by the Emergency Response Team and once the area confirmed as clear, further visible checks of cubicles by the Electrical Technicians provided
no further evidence of the source. The switchgear and switchboards in the area remain powered down until insulation resistence, integrity and visual inspections are carried out.
D398 Diesel Generator coolant loss test run. Generator started offload. Running condition established. Flames visible from alternator. Mech Tech raised alarm. Fire detected, GA generated. Elec
Tech stopped generator. Mech Tech extinguished fire. Instigated emergency response. All POB accounted for. Area made safe. All parties stood down. Affected generator isolated. Documentation
completed. Incident reported.
At the time of the incident a drilling operation was ongoing on well <...> involving the installation of an upper telescopic riser on the BOP. The upper riser was pulled up into the flow nipple and
10 Tonne over pulle applied. Once satisfied that all operations had been carried out safely and properly, the driller "backed off" the over pull to ensure that the locking mechanism had engaged
between the upper riser and flow nipple. Proper engagement had not been made and the riser telescoped back inside its external section, sliding down approx 3 meters and, in so doing, it struck
the 2 "half moon" protection hatches as it passed the level of the diverter deck. One of these hatch covers was pushed through the deck by the riser, and fell onto the BOP deck 13 meters below.
No persons were on the BOP deck at the time, there were no injuries to persons, nor any damage to any equipment other than the hatch covers.
A 'pre-slung' pallet of structual steelwork was removed form a half height for transportation by crane to the pipedeck to the laydown area at the NW corner of the cellar deck. The 1 metre square
pallet and steelwork were shrink wrapped and already slung for transit using two wire sling in a 'double wrap' formation. When the pallet was lifted from the half height it was noted that one of the
'slats' of the pallet was dislodged which must have happened when it was lowered into the container. The load was checked for security, that the slings were tight, and that no loose steelwork was
visible. The load was lifted vertically by the west crane and slewed in an anti- clockwise direction across the pipedeck and EALQ roof. When above the middle of the EALQ roof 4 pieces of
structural steelwork fell approx. twenty feet to the roof module. The largest pieces being a 150mm x75mm channel section 1.5 metres long. There were no personnel in the vicinity of the
transiting lift. Slight damage was caused to handrail and a section of metal insulation.
Personnel were preparing to install a transportation protection frame around the WHRU bundle lifting plate. Various shims were located at the fixing points before installation of the frame. When
other personnel were passing around to the west side for inspection of the unit, the edge of the shim that was located on the lube oil cooler caught the leg of someone's coveralls and slipped
between the 30mm gap at the edge of the cooler plinth and grating. The shim fell 2.5 meters to a 12" insulated spool heating medium spool below. The shim was retrieved from the pipe spool to
prevent it from falling to the weather deck. The shim size was 465mm x 200mm x 5mm and weighs 3.35 kg. Reported in <...>.

A member of a work party on the cellar deck reported the smell of gas in the area, he reported the matter immediately to the control room who alerted the safety technician. The safety technician
checked out the area and recognised there was a smell of gas emanating from the compressor enclosure extract ducting of KT03 gas compressor. This was measured at 5% LEL by a hand-held
monitor. The safety technician along with the gas compression area operator checked the enclosure of the compressor and after investigation found a very minor gas leak on the third stage barrel
end cover of the compressor. There was no gas detection within the enclosure from the fixed protection system. The machine and leak were monitored for a period to allow preparation of the
stand by compressor K202 to be brought into service. K203 was down at 1620 hrs and KT02 was brought on line. There was no further deterioration in this leak for the period that it was
monitored. KT03 is now unavailable for service, an electrical isolation is currently in place on the unit.
<...> - Well-<...> being worked over (using a hydraulic workover unit) to replace production tubing and a failed electric submersible pump. As part of the progranme, the production tubing packer
was unseated by stripping the tubing through a closed annular BOP with a closed safety valve on top of the tubing string, allowing communication between the tubing bore and the "A" annulus of
the well. After observing no pressure for 30 minutes, the annular BOP was opened to allow retrieval of the tubing and the well was monitored for a further 30 minutes. Shortly after this, the
annulus was observed to be flowing, which resulted in an overflow of water, crude oil and hydrocarbon gas release to the rig floor. In response to the flow the annular BOP was closed and the well
circulated out. Total volume of crude oil released is estimated at 45 litres. AA-01 is sub hydrostatic and has been proven to be incapable of self flow since the electric submersible pump failed.
The anticipated BHP (P85) = 3159 psi. With a BS&W of 90% the full fuid column hydrstatic head = 0.433 (90% x 0.455 psi/ft + 10% x 0.35psi/ft) x 7600ft = 3290 psi (i.e. overbalanced). The
well is plugged at 5177ft (2.125" HFH wireline plug) and has been pressure tested to 1500 psi x 15 minutes (<...>). Prior to suspending the well it was not bullheaded to sweep hydrocarbons into
At 13:49 hrs during routine start up operations on BB36 gas lift system, a small hydrocarbon gas leak was identified from the stem packing flow control valve FCV-420364. On identification of
the leak, two technicians checked the area with a gas detector and a reading of 40% LEL was observed at a distance of 10cms from the leak source. The blowdown, once blowdown was complete
the leak stopped. The leak was stopped at 14:00hrs, the duration of the release being 11 mins. There were no indications, during the incident, on any of the fixed gas detection systems in the area
concerned.
<...> summary: Immediately reported that there was a small fire and that one of the Enclosure doors (The east engine closure door), had been blown open. Two engine flexible pipes of approx
75mm diameter noted to have been damaged. These are engine vent lines and contain hot engine gases.
Two operators were preparing well <...> in egg box 5 to have the Christmas tree removed before pulling the completion. Downhole packer had been set earlier. Lower master gate valve was
opened . When wing valve was opened hydrocarbon was released (oil and gas) under pressure. Valve closed by operators - no one injured and investigation underway.
<...> was in normal stable production operation. At approx 0115 hours on <...>, a gas alarm from Module 38 was received in the Main Control Room. The onshift module operator was contacted
and during his check, he noted a leak from the running intermediate Compressor GB 3801 "S" DP switch PDSH8468. This switch measures the differential pressure across the clean gas filters.
The leak was coming from the base of the switch body. He immediately isolated this switch using nearby valves. The leak reduced to zero. Investigations revealed that 1 gas head had activated
and gone to high gas. Another 2 in the same vicinity had gone to low gas mode. All fell back to normal following the isolation of the switch. Later examination of the switch showed that 4 out of
the 6 securing set screws had parted . Future specialist analysis should indicate cause of failure. The failed unit is being returned via <...> for the attention of Maintenance Instrument Engineer.
Vessel V1120, Train 2, 2nd stage gas scrubber was being manually drained to the drains sump tank. During this operation, a high pressured alarm for the caisson vent system was activated,
pressure was noted to be 3.7psig at this point. The operator was asked to close in the V1120 drain valve at this point, which was completed. The pressure was noted at 5psig and continued to rise.
the pressure continued to rise so the CCR operator initiated a manual shut down of the whole plant. High pressure and high water level alarms came in for the produce water flotation cell V1200.
Oil and water were noted coming from V1200 hatch seals at this point. This was contained locally. An oil leak was reported on the cellar deck by scaffolders working in the area, which was
identified as coming from the cold vent header. This was found to be due to a hole of approximately 12mm in the pipework. Approximately 500 litres of dead crude oil spilled to sea. The supply
vessel <...> was alongside.

Oil leak from the lid of the <...> Pig launcher. The platform was in normal operations. In preparation for pig launching operations as per SOP 90 (<...> pig launching operation). The<...> pig trap
was pressurised utilising the HP kicker valve. As the trap pressurised, the area technician postioned at the launcher lid observed no problem until the trap reached full pressure (approx 25 bar)
when he noticed a jet of oil escape from the launcher door seal. The drain to be opened to depressurise the trap. This action was carried ot by the 2nd techician immediately and this action stopped
the leak. In response to the leak, absorbent matting was used to contain any oil spilling from the lid to prevent it from dripping down below. The leak was approx. 20 litres in total. This was blown
across onto the platform (<...>), where it was cleaned up using absorent pads. A dribble of oil escaped through the launcher enclosure to sea, which has been reported via <...>. (0.6 litres). No gas
detection either local or fixed was activated. No change of platform status occurred.
The DHSV in A13z(C2) failed to shut during the DHSV test conducted as part of WHM campaign. On completion of a "Well Operations Local Dispensation To Operate outwith Well Policy" and
Risk Assessment the well was put back on production. An intervention to reinstate the DHSV is currently being planned. The well has a gas rate of 0.34mcm, an oil rate of 104 mcm/d oil and a
boe equivalent rate of 3.1 Mboe/d.
During normal processing operations a technician passing through PC compressor deck are a heard an audible escape of pressurised fluid. He investigated and identified that the release was
coming from the valve spindle stuffing box on fuel gas system PCV - 2570. No gas was detected on the fixed gas detection system in the area. A controlled shutdown was carried out on the HP
gas compression system and the leaking valve isolated. The initial escape was discovered at 14:10 and the leak was fully isolated at 14:55. The weather was fine and clear with light winds. The
area is visited several times per shift. No escape was noted during earlier visits on the 15th.
Platform in steady state of operation. At approx 0510 UV flame detector (No F3014) located external to module H was activated. Operations personnel investigating the alarm observed a small
flame on top of the E11 exchanger ducting. One of the operators activated s manual call point which initiated the platform GPA, updated the control room by radio and extinguished the fire using
a portable dry powder extinguisher. Platform personnel went to muster stations. The control rooms action was to initiate a full shutdown and blowdown of the platform production systems. On the
arrival of the ERT at the exchanger no flame was visible. The team applied firewater cooling to the exchanger duct to reduce the temperature. Personnel were stood down from the muster stations
at 0655 hours. This incident is under investigation currently and further details will be made available via the investigation report findings.
The incident occurred whilst lowering a section of hydraulic workover unit (Slip access window, approximate weight 13.5mT) from within the derrick, through the V-door. No one was injured.
The top of the load was suspended from the travelling block in the derrick and the lower end was being tailed-out using one of the platform cranes. Although not used to lift the load, a 4.5mT rig
utility winch line, being used as one of the two guide lines, became severed as it bent around the top of the slip access window being lowered. One end of the severed guide line dropped approx
three feet to the catwalk, the other free end came to rest on the rig floor at the top of the V-door. The lift was left in place whilst a plan to complete the list using both cranes was completed.
During that time photographs were taken. Both platform cranes were then used to place the lift onto the catwalk before operations were shut down and an incident investigation commenced.
Weather conditions - wind 18 knots from 300 degrees. The pipedeck and drill floor were barriered off at the time of the incident. Rigging down operations remain suspended.
At approx 1100 hrs alarm system in east fire pump room and auto fire system activated. Platform now shut in all persons accounted for. Situation being investigated. 1540hrs <...> confirmed
situation safe - first impressions are the diesel engine overheated, created smoke and initiated fire system. A diesel specialist to go to rig tomorrow to inspect root causes. Platform remains shut
down till then.
During steady plant operations three single pont gas detectors went into high alarm (G5231, G5233 & G5234), this initiated an automatic yellow plant shutdown and full depressurisation of the
process plant. During this process all blow-down functions operated correctly. The CRT on investigation of the alarmed gas heads, indicated on the Control Room Fire & Gas panel followed
emergency procedures, initiating a GPA. POB mustered in a timely manner and muster was confirmed as correct and complete. On further investigation it was found that FCV 8190 condensate recycle valve gland was leaking. This valve was subsequently repaired and the process plant brought back on-line and closely monitored both onsite and via Fire & Gas panel in CCR. No further
problem occurring.
During technician walkabout in Module 5, it was noticed that oil was leaking from a section of 2" closed drains pipework. The local valves were immediately isolated, however the leak continued.
The full test separator was then isolated, and the leak ceased. The leak source was then identified as a pin hole which has formed diametrically opposite, and directly below a tapping point,
coming from level transmitter bridle. The leak was contained, and nothing went to sea. Approx.5 litres of oil was leaked in total.

Dresser Rand Toolbox (1m x 1m x0.75m) was stored on Compressor Level 2. Two metal plates had been used to secure a tarpaulin on top of the box and had been in place for some time. These
metal plates fell from this level through a cable transit to the rear of the box. One plate weight 21.2 kg fell 9.2m onto the deck below. The other plate weight 14.16 kg fell 19m onto the SE
stairway. Reason for plates moving from the top of the box & falling through cable transit has still to be determined. No personnel in the immediate vicinity of the dropped objects, however the
noise of the plates falling was heard & investigated. Safety stand down held for all personnel. BP investigation team mobilized to platform.
Supply vessel (<...>) struck the underside of NW corner at the 70' level extended deck of platform at midnight. The vessel sustained damage to its radar/comms dome. There was no damage to the
platform. Marine & Logistics co ordinator will be interviewing the vessel master when he is next in port with the contracting company management. Due to the damage sustained to the vessel
communications are limited. It is not thought there was any failure of equipment and the vessel was still able to hold its position and supply platforms throughout the field. The HSE Manager,
Logistics Manager and OIMs have been informed of the incident and they have agreed to let the vessel remain in the Forties field whilst the investigation is ongoing. Weather at the time: from log
in CCR Wind 18, Sea 1.0 -3.5, Bearing 156, Vis lo.
Instrument Tech was carrying on with task from previous day -flushing offline separator VO1 level bridle (LT 245). The tech opened a bleed valve on the level bridle, and nearby "low" gas
detection occurred almost immediately, which then went straight to "high" gas. The platform had an immediate automatic full process shutdown, GPA was sounded, and all personnel went to
muster. The Tech, who had isolated the source within ten seconds, contacted the CCR to confirm that his operation was the cause of the release. The alarms quickly cleared and were reset, and the
muster was stood down after 15 minutes.
At approxomately 03:15 hours during normal watch keeping activities, an Operations Technician identified an oil leak from the suction relief valve line on the crude oil booster pump P1101.The
leakage was occurring on the 2" relief line just below the deck transtition to the module above. It appeared initially that the leak was from a pin hole causing oil to spray onto other pipework in
close vicinity to the leak point and them cascade to the deck area below. The area technician immediately requested that the pump be shutdown which was carried out. On shutdown the pump is
automatically isolated and this immediately suspended the leak source. The technician then proceeded to fully isolate and secure the booster pump. approximately 50 litres of crude oil was
discharged from the leak itself (it is estimated that the leak had lasted approximately 15-20 minutes prior to discovery). It is estimated that 45 litres were discharged and contained on the platform
decks/hazardous deck drains with 5 litres discharged to sea. Total dicharge 42.5 kg. at no time during the release did any of the platform fixed gas detections indicate/ alarm. At the time of the
release there were no ignition sources in the dispersal area. Due to the requirement for a scaffold tower to access the leak area a full inspection has still to be carried out to detrmime the exact
Manual activation of GP, smoke coming from Col 3 doorway. Smoke head in alarm on fire and gas panel, no indication of heat or gas. 2 off service water pumps running, increase in bearing
temperature noted on P4030. Shutdown both pumps (P4020 and P4030). Manually released deluge and monitored situation, no evidence of escalation, smoke dissapated over time. Once site clear
of smoke and after a time period to allow 6 air changes in column, emegency team team in BA entered column to identify source of smoke was P4030 bearing lock nut had backed off.
Assumption made that the source of was P4030 bearing, however, this inconclusive and further investigation is required. A sample of lub oil from the pump bearing housing appears to suggest it
was subjected to high tempertures, sample with the investigation team.
The scoll automatic fire and Gas system was activated by entrained gas when 2" flexible hose carrying oily water failed under pressure. The hose was part of a temporary arrangement installed to
replace the closed drains pump which was off line for maintenance. The cause of the hose failure is still under investigation.
An Operator was carrying out watchkeeping in module P1 Mezz when he observed ice forming on the gland packing on gas export discharge PCV-20040. The process was manually shut down
and blowndown. The valve was isolated, the stem packing tightened and the process restarted. The leaking as reading 100% LEL at the stem and 13% LEL 50cm down wind of the valve. The
fixed detection was reading 0%.
At 14:30 the sphere launcher connected to main export gas line was being vented. The associated knock-out pot filled with liquid and an estimated 6 litres of liquid (water/condensate mix) was
carried up the vent stack and released to atmosphere. Droplets of water/condensate fell on to the northern half of the main deck on <...> platform, the adjacent helideck and into the sea. Three
persons in the vicinity had their clothing contaminated with condensate. They were immediately sent to shower, change their clothing and were then examined by the medic. No ill effects were
observed. The condensate contamination on the deck and helideck was lifted using fire fighting foam. It is estimated that up to 3 litres of condenstae landed in the sea, and a PON/1 form has been
submittde to the CG.

A 25 ft basket had been lowered to the cellar deck laydown area and cable tray and unistrut unloaded. As it was lifted from the laydown the bottom of the basket contacted the top of the hand
rails. The handrails stanchions snapped off where they were welded to the deck and the handrails fell off into the sea. A programme was underway to replace the handrails on the North side
platform with a new heavy duty type. The handrails on the mezzanine deck above had been changed out a few days earlier. Scaffolding preparations to facilitate replacing the cellar deck lay down
area hand rails had commenced. Note: Supply vessels never position themselves under the lay down area. An investigation is on going to identify the root cause of this incident and implement
corrective actions to prevent a recurrence.
Platform shutdown construction activities: weather - not contributory. Whilst in the process of locating a new 5 metre section of 6" closed drain pipework, part of the rigging, which had been
positioned on an H-Beam, slipped from its position and fell to the grating from a height of approx 5m. This rigging consisted of an angle beam clamp and 1 t chain block. Incident not attributable
to a failure of lifting equipment . The unsupported end of the pipe fell 1 m before being restrained by other rigging. As the pipe fell, one of the rigging personnel received a glancing blow from the
equipment to a finger and knee. These were minor injuries which required no treatment. No damage to equipment was sustained. The task was immediately suspended, made safe, reassessed, rerigged and then progressed safely to completion. As a result of this incident, all the installation rigging personnel were addressed and availed of the details of the event. A platform/company
investigation was instigated and a Root Cause Analysis is currently underway.
<...> During a well workover on a platform well <...>, the well flow was noted after pulling the lower crown plug to surface. The well was shut in at the annular BOP (SIWHP 50 psi noted) and a
full open safety valve (FOSV) installed in the drill pipe through the rotary table. Approximately 0.5bbl of fluid spilled from the pipe before closing the FOSV, but this was contained. Well was
bullheaded with treated seawater and the monitored while shut in. Open up the well, with no fluid level apparent at surface. Commenced pumping into well through killline and gas detected at
surface. Shut in well at annular. Bullhead a further 200bbls of treated seawater. Monitor well. Open up annular. Recommenced operations after meeting betwenn drill reps and rig managers. No
one was injured. An investigation is ongoing to identify the root causes of this incident and implement corrective actions.
Smoke was detected in M3 electrical switch room. The general alarm was sounded and the platform mustered . The switch room was isolated, and when this was confirmed a 3 man fire team was
sent to the area to confirm there was a fire. They reported that smoke was present in the switch room. Arrangements were made for further fire team members to attend and for the area to be made
safe and ventilated. At 04.25 the area was clear and electricians were sent into the area to investigate. The cause was found to be a failure of the 11kv breaker, cubicle 9 MOL booster pump. At the
time of the incident normal operations were ongoing.
<...> - After nippling and testing BOP a 5.524" mill was run to clean out the 7" and 6 5/8" tubing. Milling commenced at 7150' to 8502' where at this point an under balance was detected and the
BOP was closed in. The well was monitored and sufficient brine was blended to overcome the under balance and the bullhead method was used to put the brine down to the perforations. The well
was again monitored and confirmed that the under balance had been overcome. Enviromental: n/a subsistence involved: brine equipment involved: BOP Event led that led to incident: insufficient
brine weight below the obstruction in tubing. Operations were discussed prior to the operation and all indicators were in place. The driller followed and acted in accordance with his competence
and training in detecting an under balance and closing of the BOP. Sufficient brine weight has been put in place and constant monitoring as programme continues has been put in place to prevent
a similiar incident.
Whilst carrying out routine watchkeeping duties, the area technician noticed the smell of gas around the area of <...>. On further investigation the source was traced to a fitting on a flexible hose
on <...> "A" annulus, where a "golf ball" sized hyrate ice ball was observed. Isolation valves were identified, and the section of pipe vented down, and the leak stopped. The fitting identified as
the source of the leak was then inspected, and the fitting was found to be slack, being held in place by less than one thread. The fitting was removed, and replaced by a new fitting, when the
system was reinstated, the fitting was leak tested using a gas meter/ultraprobe 3000 and snoop liquid.
During routine lifting operations by the deck crew a 300 KG spool was in the process of being lifted using a 1 Tonne wire sling using the NW crane, when it came into contact with an adjacent
skid. The sling parted and the spool fell to the deck causing minor damage to the rail. No one was in the vicinity and the area was barriered off in accordance with lifting policy. The subsequent
investigation established that the load became lodged under the top rail of the Schlumberger skid (weighing 27 tonnes) and the forces exerted on the sling, exceeded the SWL of 5000 kgs causing
the sling to fail. Several failings in lifting procedure were identified including 1) Materials should not be placed or enclosed in a position on the deck where safe removal will be difficult. 2) Had
the NW crane been used for the lift then the crane driver would have had a better view of the load as it was being lifted. 3) Had the longer pennant been used then the crane driver may not have
had to jib up to avoid the crane rest and would have been able to see the load before having to jib up. 4) The adjacent containers could have been moved to allow better access to the load,
allowing the load to move out of the area in a safer direction. 5) Tag lines could have been fitted to the load to keep it away from the <...> unit while being lifted clear. The crew have since been

Weather condition: windspeed 35 knots, 185 degrees, visibility 2 miles. Sea state 3 to 4.5 meters. An oil slick to the west side of the platform was reported to the day shift CRO by telephone.
Technicians were sent to investigate and found oil leaking from the Cormorant Alpha pig launcher door. Oil expert was immediately shut down and the CA pig launcher is sitauted externally on
the West side upper module deck. Technicians islolated, depressurised the pig launcher and oil spill kits were promptly deployed to reduce further spillage into the sea. Access adjacent to the
pigging platform and to the lower decks directly below the piggin platform were restricted using cahin barriers until the areas were cleaned and safe to use. 150 litres of dead crude is estimated to
have been spilled into the sea.
While lifting out the Christmas Tree from well <...> using the west gantry crane, the 8 tonne air hoist failed to move further up. The load was taken using the east gantry crane and then lowered
onto the production deck. Investigations are ongoing into the cause of the crane failure.
At the time of the incident the job consisted of rigging up the whipstock as per program: i.e RIH with whipstock. In order to prevent any damage to the whipstock packer, a protective sleeve (1.5m
length, 9.5" OD, 110lbs) is attached to the base of the whipstock. In order to secure this protective sleeve onto the whipstock body 2 x 3 allen key grub screws are fitted on the top at the bottom of
the protective sleeve. The whipstock was lifted horiz up to the V door by the crane and rested onto the top of the conveyor. After this operation was successfully carried out, the Drill Floor Tugger
was attached to the catline of the Whipstock. Then in tandem, the whipstock was lifted up horiz by both the crane and tugger. Once high enough to prevent the base of the whipstock touching the
Drill Floor, the operation then moved onto the next stage which consisted of positioning the whipstock vertically in order to RIH. Upon lifting the Whipstock up to a 40-50 degree angle, the
protective sleeve slipped, became unattached to the whipstock and dropped down approx 8 meters onto the weather deck below.
During normal production operations watchkeepering duties at 2110hrs, an Operations Technician noticed a pinhole leak in a section of the pipe feeding partially dewatered oil from the
production separators to a Free Water Knock Out Vessel. On observing this, the technician contacted the control room and requested a controlled shutdown and blowdown of the process, which
was achieved by 2125hrs. A total of approx 5 litres of stabilised crude oil plus some associated produced water had leaked onto the floor and wall of the module and nearby pipework. There was
no discharge to sea. The oil at this point in the process is stabilised and contains no gas.
Plant start up from a three week outage. Operator in the area of the vessel was contacted to inform him a gas head was rising in his immediate area, he heard the gas escaping anyway and
immediately closed off a 1/2" valve which had been left open. This immediately stopped the gas leak. Gas head which was close to the leak climbed to 60% tripped the plant. Valve and fitting was
a point used for an overpressure device for pressure/leak testing post shutdown. The valve had been left open when the equipment was removed and had not been blanked off or reported as open.
Investigation ongoing.
At approx 20:50 a Production Technician found gas/vapour emanating from a fireproof enclosure surrounding <...> wells <...> and <...> riser valves (RESDVs). The two wells were immediately
shut in and RESDV upstream block valves closed. Pipework was depressurised to the test separator. During the depressurisation process a small volume of crude oil (< 25 ltrs) drained from the
enclosure directly to the sea (PON 1 raised). The enclosure was removed and nitrogen applied to both flowlines. The valve cavity vent plug was found to be leaking on B3 RESDV. The vent plug
has been replaced, the valve pressure tested and returned to service.
As part of the reinstatement requirements for the gas lift pipework to well <...> a service test utilising Nitrogen was required at a pressure of 175 bar; the source of the Nitrogen being cylinders.
The hook-up of the cylinders to the pipework being a flexible hose attached to the cylinder valve/pressure gauge assembly that was then connected to a short section of 12mm stainless steel
instrument tube (+/- 75mm long, with compression fittings at each end). This section of instrument tube was connected to an instrument style valve on a blank flange/valve assembly on the
pipework. The test equipment had been prepared in advance of the operation and was on site ready for use. As each cylinder equalised in pressure with the pipework the cylinders were changed in
order to raise the pressure in the piping system. Pressures were being monitored on site and in the Central Control Room. Description of the accident: On an occasion when it was necessary to
change a cylinder, the isolation valve on the pipework side of the arrangement was closed by the production technician carrying out the task. As he did so, the instrument tubing assembly failed.
The section of 12mm instument tubing was ejected at the connection point to the valve on the pipework. The compression fitting ferrules and securing nut remained attached to the valve. He was
<...> - Following a second perforating run on Well <...> the guns became stuck across the Xmas Tree. A hydrate was suspected and Methanol was pumped into the system, however, the guns
remained stuck in hole. Subsequently problems were experienced with the wire line equipment and the operator had reached a point where it was required for him to take a rest period. The well
was left overnight. At about 06:00 hours on the <...> a leak was reported on the wire line lubricator connection joint at the BOP deck level. Crude oil was seen to be emanating from the joint.
Note: The SSSV was sleeved in the open position. It is estimated that over a 3 hour period +/- 30 litres of oil leaked from the joint. This oil was contained locally with none reaching the sea.
Contingency plans to bull head the well with sea water were implemented to kill the well. Shortly after pumping operations were commenced the leak appeared to diminish and then cease. Also at
this time an attempt was made to retrieve the perforating guns into the lubricator. With about 700 lbs of over pull the guns were retrieved to the lubricator. The swab valve and master valves on
the Xmas tree were then closed (at 10:00 hours) and the well secured.

<...> was in the process of a planned shutdown and blowdown when gas detectors in module PS2 detected an indication of low level gas. The platform went through a change of status. All
personnel were mustered and the platform continued to blowdown normally. Time line as follows: 0935 planned process shutdown and depressurisation initiated. 0938 GPA, LLG in PS2.
Blowdown continues.0947 all gas detectors cleared. 0950 Full muster achieved. 1008 SWR RTNS. Work on the platform has currently been suspended whilst a review of the area is carried out.
Shearwater remains shutdown pending further investigations.
During normal operations , a Technician involved in watchkeeping duties observed a leak of crude oil emanating from the mechanical seal of a metering pump (P1310). The technician raised the
alarm (contacted the Central Control Room by radio) and shut down the pump manually before isolating the leak. The volume of crude spilled was estimated to be in the region of 50 litres. The
complete volume was retained with the bunded area around the pump and no liquid escaped to the sea or surrounding areas. It is believed that the leak had commenced immediately prior to being
observed by the Technician. This is corroborated by the annunciation at the same time as the Technician on site reported the leak.
On <...> @ 20:06, a UV detector went into alarm in B power gen engine enclosure (UV 9899). Enclosure was checked and a small fire was found on the burner ring. The generator was
immediately shut down. Investigation is ongoing.
A 1.5L plastic water bottle (full) weighing 1.5kg fell approx 11.5m from a landing area (between LV5 and LV4) in the platform living quarters coming to rest at the bottom of the stair well on
level 1. Nobody was injured, some minor damage to a guard was observed. Internal investigation currently in progress.<...>
Operations Technician received message by radio from the Control Room to investigate a level control problem with V44500 fuel gas drum. The Control Room had an 100% open signal to the
valve but the valve was fully closed [valve is air fail closed]. Valve was worked on during the shutdown and had a disturbed joint tag, red section only and had a section of tape used by the BJ
squad [N2 test contractor] to indicate a test point. The positioner cover was removed to check that the nozzle/ flapper were intact and set up. Believing that the joint had been put back together
correctly as the yellow section of the broken tag was removed the Technician operated the flapper/nozzle and the valve opened. Immediately a liquid was observed spraying out of the gland
packing, approx 2 litres of condensate was discharged until depressurised. The Technician released the nozzle/flapper which caused the valve to close and immediately shut the upstream EZV,
EZV 44505, which is approx 30cm upstream. This caused the leak to stop once depressurised. On further investigation, it was found that the gland packing had not been tightened. The gland
packing was then tightened up and the upstream EZV was re-opened to check for any leaks.
Extract fan housing from GTG 2 was found to be separated from the lip seal and hanging towards the access way. The area of fall is an access way between GTG1 and GTG2. The GTG was shut
down for a temporary repair to be completed. Note no injuries occurred but the potential existed report.
<...> - Well <...> kicked back while pulling out of hole with clean out string used to displace well with completion fluid, well was observed to be flowing. Initial 4 bbl gain, shut well n (Annular
BOP closed). (Total 10 bbl gain). Shut-in-Drill pipe = 1100psi.Shut in casng = 1150 psi. Circulate at present depth of 5420' well control. This is an attempt to reduce surface pressures by
removing any hydrocarbons which might have migrated to surface. After circulation is complete well will be secured. Kill fluid is to be heavy brine and will be circulated to kill well.
<...> - The marine CRO noticed a burning smell coming from the vicinity of the Inmarsat panel within the mains comms panel of the CCR. On investigation a small amount of smoke was seen
coming from the inverter at the bottom of the console. Electrical supply was isolated and inverter pulled out where a small flame was seen. This was immediately extinguished using a CO2
extinguisher. There were no injuries to personnel. In line with company procedures, a full investigation is ongoing to identify the root causes and implement any corrective actions required.
During the photographic analysis after a routine flare inspection an object was noted lying on the flare deck. The object was identified as one of the covers from a toolbox permanently sited on the
deck. The cover is made of incalloy and weighs approximately 121kg. It is most likely that the fastening mechanism at one end of the cover became loose allowing the prevailing wind to get
under the cover. The cover would then have been lifted, snapping off the fastening at the other end, and thrown approximately 20ft across the flare deck. Area immediatelyl below the flare has
been barriered off and personnel movements on the upper decks limited. Ambient weather conditions are being closely monitored, particularly wind speed and direction. Intervention work
requiring a full Platform shut down will be conducted as soon as possible to make safe the flare deck.

During wireline operations on well slot <...> to replace the sub surface safety valve (SSSV) the Team rigged up the wireline lubricator and tested the same to 3000psi against the closed Swab
valve with no leaks observed. The hydraulic master valve was opened and a leak was observed by the Operator from the stem packing tell-tale on the Swab valve. No portable or fixed detection
was activated and the hydraulic master was closed from the wireline remote control panel isolating the leak. This took approximately one minute. The worksite was secured and the job was
suspended pending investigation. The stem packings have since been replaced and the new SSSV has been set and integrity tested.
<...>. The well <...> was sidetracked from a whipstock - where it became called <...> - failed to kick off and instead drilled down the side of the casing showing strong magnetic interference. At
4950m there was an increase in the amount of metals in returns and drilling was stopped as it was suspected that the two well bores had touched. The well was static and well above hydrdocarbon
bearing zones (<...>). The touch point is also well above the top abandonment plug. Inclination at this point is circa 76 degrees. Remedial Action 1: A second whipstock ran a well successfully
sidetracked away from D22. Remedial Action 2: In future we will not be using an Autotrak system to kick-off from uncemented casing. The lack of support of the reacting blades is not sufficient
and as it requires a 15m pocket to be drilled with the milling assembly, it is uncertain as to which azimuth the tool is pointing in when starting to kick-off.
A short stand (90ft) of HWDP had been racked in the derrick on top of a 10" high piece of timber to enable it to slot into the derrick fingers. In order to lay out the stand, the Derrickman latched
the it with the racking arm at monkeyboard level. The Driller attempted unsuccessfully to latch the air operated elevators round the pipe. Using the racking arm, the Derrickman tried to
manoeuvre the stand over to one side to aid the closing of the elevators. In doing this, the stand of pipe slipped off the supporting timber, the stand dropped several inches (10") causing the
racking arm to clash with the elevators and drilling bails. Part of the guide plate on the racking arm was bent downwards causing a guide piece from the plate to drop from 85ft to the drill floor.
One person was standing in the rig floor and the guide piece, weighing 300g, landed 3ft away from him. The area was cleared of personnel and barriered off. A TOFS was held and the equipment
involved was inspected for potential of further dropped objects.
During a plant upset where the SOLAR export compressor had tripped to minimum speed, the Condy Separator (V1090) duty PSV (PSV 10803) is suspected to have lifted for a short duration.
During this time, the flare system would have seen an increase in pressure, possibly as much as 2bar back pressure. During the SOLAR upset, the CRO reported a low gas detection above the
Condy Separator (24%LEL). An Ops Tech was in attendance and reported the source of the leak to be from a bellows tell-tale on PSV 10804 (sister PSV to PSV 10803). It is suspected that PSV
10804 has a damaged bellows and process gas was allowed to escape to atmosphere when the downstream side of the PSV experienced some back pressure on the flare line when PSV 10803 was
suspected of lifting for a short duration during the plant upset. Further investigation into the root cause of bellows failure will be determined when the valve is stripped for repair.
Operations Technician reported iced v/v on Nleg Pig Launcher Vent, indication of an abnormal gas flow through the conecting double bloock v/v. COnfirmed by visual and accoustic inspection.
Two techs investigated the leak. Outer block v/v was tightened and leak ceased. Investigations were carried out in order to identify the path between the NLeg and the Piglauncher, the leaking v/v
and the leak rate. Concluded the the Kicker line, with no possibility of isolation from the NLeg. Due to the range limitation of the Pressure Indicator on the Pig launcher(10 bar max, indicating 10
bar) the only indication available was a trapped presure in excess of 10 bar. The Pig launcher was then vented to the flare, but the pressure kept above the 10 bar limit. Subsequent inspection
revealed a small leak at the Pig Launcher Trap Cover Seal with peak readings of 30% LEL. No significant accumulation could be measured at 30 cm.
A valve handle on VP058 weighing approximately 800g became loose from its mount and descended 55' directly to an active worksite below, landing close to one of the personnel. On
investigation it was revealed that the PSV 825 downstream Block Valve VPO58 had been shut for another un-associated task on the <...>, and left in that position. Then during the destruct and
removal of the De-Oxy Tower V27 in <...>, the redundant PSV 825 was physically removed and blanked off. The investigation concluded that the VPO58 had not been operated since <...> and it
was found that the cause of the handle to fall was that the securing bolt had been corroded through time to the extent that it eventually allowed the handle to fall to the deck below. The
investigation team were unable to source the securing bolt in question. The investigation team concluded that if feasible, all redundant valve handles should be removed in order to mitigate
dropped object hazard.

<...> At approx 11.08, there was a monor gas release from well <...> during well operations which activated two gas heads causing a platform gpa. The events leading up to the GPA are as
follows: 10.30 Hanger unsteady. 10.45 Commenced pumping treated seawater downtide in order to displace gas. 10.55 Pump was shutdown gradually to prevent sudden pressure dip. 11.00 Kill
line was closed and choke opened to mud gas separator until pressure read 0 psi. 11.07 Choke valve closed and annular opened. 11.08 Single gas head activated. 11.08 GPA initiated due to 2 gas
heads being activated. No one was injured. On review and information from platform personnel, there was no potential for escalation into a fire or explosion. In line with company procedures, an
investigation is ongoing to identify the root cause of this incident and implement corrective actions as required.
A valve on the spill back line from the diesel system was closed though it indicated open in the CCR. The diesel in circulation could not return to storage so the day tanks on fire pumps and Em
Gen's backed up and overflowed to the drains tank, the pump on the drain tank was manual and so did not cut in causing the drains tank to overflow discharging diesel in the sea below.
Generator P801C was shutdown at approx 05.30hrs on <...> prior to isolating for 4000hr mechanical PM. During routine checks it was noticed that the GG lube oil supply pressure on P801A was
reading low. A decision was made to restart P801C for security while checking the P801A lube oil problem. At 08.38hrs, generator P801C start was initaited on 30 minute start up. At 09.16 hrs
P801C shut down and C02 fired coinciding with flame detection in the gearbox enclosure (FD05187 and FD05186). The area operator who was in the area attended the location and reported no
visible sign of fire. At 10.27hrs CO2 was switched to manual. Subsequent investigations highlighted that the labyrinth seal was found to be degraded.
After unloading 31 pieces of freight consignment from the aircraft, the large heavy items of freight were placed in the nearest corner of the helideckand the smaller lighter items were placed in the
monitor bay. On take off the aircrafts rotor backwash blew over a cardboard carton causing it to bounce off the safety net and fall approx 15' to the deck below. The carton was 2.5 ft sq and
marked as heavy at 17.5 kilos. It landed behind pipe work adjacent to a walkway that is barriered of during flying operations. There was no damage to the freight or plant and there were no
personnel in the immediate area at the time.
At approx 22.15 hrs while braking out the <...> sub above the well services BOP 30 to 40 litres of crude and produced water was released upwards from the riser onto the drill floor. The release
lasted approx 3 seconds. No remedial action was required to stop the flow. Well services activities were ongoing on <...> well with a PES plug was stored in the riser having been pulled from the
well. The swab and upper master gate valves were closed and the tree was isolated from the process via the manifold and kill wing valve. The riser was blown down and physically confirmed
depressurised prior to splitting the Cromar sub.
Preparation work for the commissioning of the new MLC compressor was taking place.The main activity was preparing for the mechanical spin test of the compressor. Process isolations were
being lifted in readiness to pressure up the compressor and line it up for the test. During this de-isolation a back pressure of gas built up in the compressor seal vent pipework and there was a
subsequent leak to atmosphere of an estimated 8kg (9.3sM3) of gas from a compressor casing flanged joint. NOTE - There was no over pressurisation involved. The compressor skid had been
cleared of non essential personnel for the start-up activity and controlled area established. Personnel monitoring the skid for unusual occurrences identified the leak immediately and
communicated the fact to the control room. The control room operator on receipt of this information and a coincident DCS indication of a bursting disk operation initiated a manual shutdown and
blowdown of the plant. The compressor skid is situated on the main deck and is a naturally ventilated area. Wind was approx. 14knts at 020deg.
Operations were notiied of a smell of gas around the BC Celler Deck. On investigation the leak was pinned down to 350 - SDV-101, control value on BC1 Compresser train. The leaking
Hydrocarbon (Nateral Gas) was coming through the valve stem packing, up through the actuator body vent and out to atmosphere.
At 2215 hrs a gas release was noticed coming from the top of the lubricators situated on the drill floor. The PA informed t stuffing box was pumped in an attempt to stop the leak. However this did
not work and the decision was taken to close the BOPs which were located on the drill floor. On closure of the BOPs the gas release was seen to stop. Well operation shut down and investigation
ongoing. OIR12 to follow. The gas release was evident for around 5 mins as a white mist from the top of the lubricator. Wind was from the West at 23 knots.
Normal oil export operations. During routine watch keeping a Shell technician noticed a slight oil leak from the NDE mechanical seal n P3020 main oil line pump. The CRO was informed, who
proceeded to shut down the pump in a controlled manner. The area technician isolated, de-pressurised & drained the pump. No fixed F & G detection indicated during the event. The NDE
mechanical seal on P3020 main oil line pump had failed allowing crude oil to leak into the module.

During diesel bunkering, a spray leak developed from the <...> connection. This was quickly spotted by the vessels crew, (<...>) and pumping was stopped. It is estimated that perhaps 50 litres
spilled onto the deck, of which perhaps 5-10 litres escaped to sea. Prompt action and good practice limited the amount released. 76 tonnes had already been bunkered before this leak developed.
The connection had been visually checked before bunkering began. Weather was 7 knots, 301 degrees, 1.3 metre sea.
Whilst carrying out TATs testing as part of the Platform shutdown workscope, the Operations Staff initiated a pre-planned level 3 shutdown. The level 3 shutdown, as designed, caused a
controlled vent of hydrocarbon via the platform vent system. At this point personnel carrying out valve position checks on BD Jacket observed a volume of gas around the <...>Well. The platform
GPA sounded and personnel sent to muster. Upon investigation it was discovered that the vent system pipework in the vicinity of the <...> Well had failed releasing vent gas to the surrounding
area. OIR12 raised in support.
<...>. During a planned isolation of a section of the fire main the chain operated hand wheel assembly became detached from the valve hand wheel and fell off while operating valve. The
assembly which fell weighed 6kgs including the 4 metre fall chain. The technician was approximately 1 metre from the bulkhead, facing the bulkhead while operating the valve. He had managed
to close the valve and stated that the valve was not hard to operate. This was confirmed during the investigation when the valve was returned to the open position by using the local valve hand
wheel. The risk of the chains potentially failing and falling had been discussed at the shift briefing with the isolating technician and while operating these chain valves he should not stand directly
under the valve. The hand wheel failing had not been anticipated however the fact that the technician had been standing to the West and North of the valve meant that when he was pulling the
chain to operate the valve and it became detached it fell directly to the deck next to where he was operating the valve. Note the valve did not collide with anything when it fell.
Assembly of an 11 section 42 caisson unit for the tweed muir project riser was in progress. Caisson contains 4 pipeline sections that are welded to the next level of caisson as the riser assembly is
progressed. At the time of the incident 1345, 9 by 20 ton sections of the caisson had been successfully welded and lowered through the drill floor. The tenth joint was laid into the B door waiting
to be picked up by the elevators and suspended in place for the next welding operation. A certified steel lifting frame in the shape of a cruciform weighing 270 KG plus sheaves and wires was
attached to the top drive sub assembly and provided a lifting point for 4 tugger wires. These controlled the height of the individual pipes within the caisson, lateral orientation to the correct
position was achieved by turning the top drive and hence the cruciform. As the cruciform position was being altered it detached from the top drive sub assembly and fell striking a ball grab
connector on top of the caisson section suspended in the drill floor before landing on the drill floor approx 25 feet. Prior to the operation taking place personnel working on the operation were
moved away from the area working on the top drive. Nobody was hurt and as far as we are aware there is minimal damage. Investigation is ongoing with support provided by onshore specialists
Dropped object. Whilst removing a valve from mud mainfold on rig floor a piece of debris fell to the floor and landed approx 2ft away from the technician. Debris was identified as a piece of
compacted rust 225mm x 90mm x 10mm weighing approx 0.75kg and had fallen from a bracket supporting the mud mainfold at a height of approx 8mts above rig floor level. Job was stopped and
area barred off to prevent general access to rig floor. Rig owners (<...>) informed of situation - no further work to take place on rig floor until appropriate assessment and remedial action is
undertaken.
Plant on line recovering from start up, gas heads indicating 20% in the CCR F&G panel. Operators in the area checking out the source second head registering gas then rose to 60% tripping the
plant and annunciating GPA. Leaks from <...> top access lids which had not been disturbed during the shutdown. Investigation ongoing.
During drilling work-over operations on well <...> gas was released to drill floor, BOP deck and Egg boxes 1,2,& 3. High gas indication on CCR Fire and Gas panel led CRT to immediately
initiate manual activation of Yellow shutdown (YSD) and General platform alarm (GPA) Drilling operation at time involved running in hole with 5 1/2" internal tubing cutter assembly. The cutter
was at required depth and prior to cutting 5 1/2" tubing well was closed in because of known gas in wellbore below dual packer. As production confirmed test separator was immediately
unavailable at that time the decision was taken to divert returns to choke manifold and poorboy degasser. Initial gas release to the choke manifold once the tubing was cut unloaded the liquid seal
in the poorboy degasser fluid trap allowing gas to escape out of the bottom of the degasser below the drill floor as well as the designed route out of the vent line in the top of the poorboy degasser.
While carrying test run on mud pump motor no. 1 a valve was opened to allow fluids to circulate through the pump. When this valve was opened it allowed gas trapped in the section of pipework
to vent into the mud pump circulation tanks. This was picked up by the local gas detection immediately above the mud pump circulation tanks. The drilling mechanic immediately closed the valve
stopping any further release of gas. High gas indication was shown on CCR fire and gas system. CRT followed emergency procedure manually activating platform shut down systems and
sounding general alarm (GPA)

On <...> notification <...> was raised in relation to <...> suction strainer Hi pilot needle valve not working when trying to blow down the transmitter. This was put up on the CCR opportune
shutdown task list. On <...> at 09.32, an ESD 2 occurred and K103 was fully depressurised. This provided the opportunity for the needle valve to be changed out as per the opportunistic
shutdown job list. The task was completed at 14.00hrs. The team member who worked on the needle valve states quite clearly in his statement that he did not function any other valves on the
transmitter. In order to carry out the repair he verified from the PCS that the machine was effectively depressurised. The valve was cautiously loosened to check for gas or trapped pressure, then
removed and replaced with a new one. The plant was brought back up and at 17.32hrs, pressurisation begins - K103 cold start (no service test carried out on K103 suction strainer up stream
needle valve changed out). At 22.08 GD 05443 comes into alarm. The wind direction at this time is 200 degrees @ 15 knots (from radio room graph). Note the <...> stated that he thought the
wind had dropped at about this time. The area operator was sent to the scene and on arrival detects low levels of gas in the area of K103. The Area Authority, who had knowledge of work being
A gas leak was discovered on the split ring door seal on the fuel gas filters supplying the main gas compressor. Leak was measured at 20% LEL at 11cm. Controlled shutdown carried out on the
compresssor and seals replaced in both filters. Report submitted as a precaution although quantity is borderline on reporting guidelines. Investigation team is in place and investigation root cause.
Early indications suggest faulty joints in the viton seals.
Normal platform operations. Weather: N/A. The platform crane Mech/OP was undertaking work on the <...> West crane when he observed that the counterweight end cap was missing from the
end of the counterweight pin.The end cap was found on the pipe deck which is 19' below normal location. The Mech/Op checked the end cap on the other side of the pin and this was in place, he
also went and checked the platform East crane and found that both end caps were in place. He reported the matter to platform management. The East crane was immediately taken out of service
for checks. A team was formed by platform management to thoroughly investigate the circumstances of the incident and a <...> Help report has been raised. <...> onshore support, the crane
maintenance contractor and manufacturer have been notified of the incident and will assist in the investigation.
<...> at around 13h50. Weather conditions : Seastate 2.5m, wind direction 0 deg, strength 26 knots at 50m level. The supply vessel <...> had been worked on the east side (weatherside) of the
platform for about 20mn when she went astern and made contact with the steel structure off the South Eastern Leg of the platform. The vessel's bridge came under the crane pedestal and her
antenna made contact with the underside of the pedestal. As soon as they noticed the supply vessel coming abnormally close to the platform the crane driver and deck foreman alerted the <...> to
the situation.The <...> immediately changed the platform status to GPA, setting off a platform muster. All personnel were stood down after a full muster and the vessel having been able to pull off
to a zone of safety. The impact had been of slight strength, but perceptible. A full report has been requested from the vessel Master. The damage on the platform structure was investigated. No
visible damage at the crane pedestel could be found. At 21" level off southern eastern Leg of platform, a jump off platform and stairway were found kinked, indicating a point of contact with
platform structure. No visible damage could be observed on the platforms main structure. The vessel bounced off the jump off platform which absorbed the shock. Two impacts could be observed
Platform GA initiated by low Level Gas detector <...> (10%) in 070 turbine enclosure. Automatic shutdown systems operated shuting down the unit & initiating unit vent. All personnel mustered
and accounted for. On initial investigation no gas was evident in the enclosure, however it was suspected that this was because the unit had auto shutdown & vented as it should in such
circumstances. Under controlled conditions the unit was restarted to demonstrate / prove as to whether a leak had been detected or not. Investigations proved that a leak had taken place, this leak
has initially been identified as coming from one of the flexible hoses on the fuel gas supply ring on the burner assembly. The leak was on the coupling which attaches the hose to the burner can.
Initial investigations suggest that the coupling seal has failed. The hose has been sent ashore for further investigation.
Deck crew were transferring <...> containers (The construction of them is a plastic container enclosed in an aluminium frame. Size 1m3 volume 1000 litres) from a 10ft open top half height on
the main deck to East side level 1. The banksman stopped the lift approximately 40ft from the landing area to enable him to give further instructions to the crane operator. At that moment the
frame failed and liquid cascaded from the plastic container on level 1 landing area. The banksman who was positioned on level 1 attended the medic after spray from the dropped contrainer made
contact with him. He returned to work after a shower and change of clothing with no injury to himself or any other personnel.
Combined operations with the <...> were on going. <...> at <...> South completing ROV subsea inspection. Wind direction was 052deg, wind speed 10knots. douglas was in normal production.
Both turbines were on line. The replacement engine in Turbine B was undergoing a load trail at 10 megawatts. The turbine exhaust diffuser is thermally insulated with <...> system (Calcium
Magnesium Silicate) blanket which had reinstated, At 20:55 hours during load trail a report of visual smoke and flame was made by technicians in attendance at the turbine inspection window.
Emergency response taken: The fixed CO2 system was manually activated to extinguish the fire, the GPA was sounded and all personnel mustered. The plant was manually stopped and
blowndown (Level 1 shutdown) initiated. Folllowing risk assessment and toolbox talk, the fire team was deployed to extinguish any smouldering and cool the lagging with portable fire (Water)
extinguishers. Equipment damage is limited to the insulation. No person was injured during the event. Investigation into the cause of the fire continues.

At the time of the incident the operation was running in hole with dril pipe. This operation started at approx 19:30. As per normal procedure, circulation was required every 15 stands. To do so,
the Pipe Handling Machine (PHM) was put in 'singles mode of operation and at well centre. In parallel the travelling block was lowered in order to be connected to the stands to recommence
circulation. The upper arm of the PHM did not fully retract (not visible by the work parties) while the lower one did. When the Top Drive System (TDS) was lowered, it hit the upper arm and
broke a part of the spinning jaw resulting in two dropped objects (weight - 2kg and 5kg) from approx 16 meters. No personnel were injured. Investigation ongoing.
Production Supervisor on walkabout noticed vapour emanating from the insulation covering a 4" fuel gas feed line to <...> turbines. The fuel gas package was shut in and the insulation removed
for examination. No gas alarms were activated and the gas vapour observed was minimal. Initial finding indicates this to be an under-insulation corrosion issue. Investigation ongoing.
<...>, The drillstring became stuck in the 8 1/2" hole at 9425 ft. It was not possible to release it mechanically and therefore the mud weight was reduced to help alleviate any possible differential
sticking forces. On completion, the well was seen to be flowing and the well was shut in on the annular BOP. In line with company procedures, an investigation is ongoing to identify the root
causes of this incident and implement corrective actions as required. Minor injury
At 1920 hrs on the <...> during a worksite visit, an operations technician suspected that there was a hydrocarbon leak at the 76 metre level. Area was checked using portable monitors but no
indication noted. F & G system was checked at the control room but again no indication on any of the fixed gas detectors. On further checks the technician noted a small spray below the 76 metre
level, but could not identify exact position of pipework leak due to scaffolding. Individuals then evacuated the shaft. <...> was then instigated as to actions taken on identification of leak on cell
fill line below 81 metre level in the utility shaft. A risk assessment was carried out and after authorisation from the OIM and Operations Manager, two technicians were sent into the utility shaft to
positively identify leak source. On confirmation of leak source as per the procedure the cell fill line was lined up so that the gross liquids through the line were approximately 95% water. The leak
was checked again 10:00 and had improved to a dribble at the same approximation of 95% water. A plan of action Shutdown/Flushing Procedure is being discussed with onshore support at
present. <...> will follow after further investigation.
An Operations Technician, was working in module C4 laying out a hose to the hazardous drains. While manoeuvering the hose through the east side of the module, he noticed a low velocity wisp
of vapour approx 15cm in length emanating from the top cover of a 3" NRV. This valve was installed in the condensate outlet line from the third stage suction scrubber. It was evident that there
was a pin hole leak in the top cover, therefore the line was isolated and depressurised, and the gas compression system shut down in a controlled manner.
An Operations Technician, was working in Module C3 monitoring the annular pressures on well <...>, having just shut the well in . When Passing well <...> he noticed what appeared to be a
slight wisp of steam emanating from the area of the weld of the flange connection to the HP production header. As he looked at it, the emission increased to a very fine jet of produced fluids. He
immediately informed the control room, had well <...> shut-in, and arranged for the isolation and depressurisation of all live connections to the HP header (<...> and first stage separator). <...> is
a crude oil producing well with a last known water cut of 92% and H2S concentration of up to 600ppm. The header was subsequently drained to the hazardous drains system.
During wire line operations with slickline using a LIB, the tool string was being pulled out of the hole with a constant 280lb on the weight indicator. Without any warning of a over pull on the
weight indicator or any signed of the winch engine starting to labour, the wire snapped at the bottom sheave on the drill floor. The parted wirerecoiled and struck the safety glass of the winch unit,
breaking the glass but the glass remained intact, some glass splinters went over the wrench operator who was wearing safety glasses at the time. Barriers were erected around the worksite and no
personnel were on the workfloor. The weight indicator returned to zero once the wire parted. The broken wire remained at surface and no lass of well control occurred. The well unperforated and
contains base oil only. The wire was clamped at surface after the incident. Currently investigating the source of the wire failure checking the load calibration, condition of the sheave etc, section
of wire sent on shore for analysis. The SWL of the wireline is 1536lb and the breaking strain is 2560lb.
Whilst carrying out a routine module check, an Area Technician discovered a section of Sheet Metal on D3EE Module Floor. The metal sheet measures approximately 72cm x 100cm x 1mm thick
and weighed approximately 3kg. The damaged ducting had fallen a height of 7ft to deck level. The sheet of metal had been used to repair previous damage to the ductwork and had become
detached due to a combination of corrosion/vibration damaging the pot rivets used to secure it in place. The affected system is the East Hazardous Supply fan ducting providing ventilation to the
wellheads. The Area Technician immediately barriered the area off to prevent personnel access to the affected area of duct work. Maintenance has been scheduled to inspect the damage and effect
a repair.

Platform was operating under steady conditions. The HSE advisor was walking through PR1 when he observed oil dripping onto the deck from the mezzanine above. The Control room was
informed immediately and 2 operators attended. A fine spray of oil was observed to be coming from the body of the recycle valve on Piper Booster pump ?B? recycle valve (3? 300# control
valve). The pump was immediately shut down and isolated and the small amount of oil released was removed with soak pads. The size of the leak was too small to activate the gas detection. The
valve is to be removed for inspection onshore to establish the cause of the failure. The recycle valves on the other booster pumps have had U/T checks completed by the Offshore Inspection
Engineer to confirm their integrity.
Normal operation of the GT2 was taking place using liquid fuel (Diesel). Operations had changed over GT2 from Gas to diesel fuel at 1900 the previous evening. Initial investigation suggests that
diesel fuel was weeping from a connection onto the pilot burner no.9 which ignited. GT2 shut down and fuel isolated. Plant shutdown and muster of personnel. The residual fire was extinguished
quickly by on board fire team using a hand held CO2 extinguisher. No injuries to personnel. Minimal damage was sustained in the local area of the pilot burner No.9 Investigation is on-going to
determine the root causes and checks have been made by the <...> on GT1. No faults were found, machine remains on-line.
Whilst working on the skid deck a person from the workparty heard the sound of something impacting the deck, this turned out to be stud bolt and nut 4 feet away. On closer inspection he
discovered a total of 4 studs bolts and five nuts (weight 0.25kg) had fallen a height of 5 meters from a flange on the end of the flexihose which had been disconnected and secured sometime back
following a colied tubing campaign. The nuts and stud bolts had been loosely fitted into the flange in order to retain for future use. Over a period of time these had vibrated such that the had
worked down the threads to the point where the stud fell out. Using the Drooped objects calculator which accounts for the height and weight to give a probablility of injury indication, the
conclusion is in the instance is a slight injury could be sustained.
During routine operations the Operations Supervisor observed well fluids coming from a pinhole leak on the downstream side of the choke on the flow line well <...>. The well was immediately
closed in by the Operations Supervisor on its wing valve from the local push-button station. Production Operators then effected isolation from both the Christmas tree and the separator inlet
manifold. No fixed detection systems were activated. The well was in service when the leak was observed with a flowing tubing head pressure of 545psi. Upstream of the choke and a
flowline/manifold pressure of 153psi. It is estimated that the duration of the leak was for less than one hour at a rate of 2 lit/min (total = 120 litres). No fluids entered the sea, the fluids were
contained on top of G9 leg. Further investigation found that the ring type joint had developed a pinhole leak, the 2 joints were changed out, the system leak tested and put back on line.
This incident occurred whilst carrying out operations to set liner hanger on the drill floor. This resulted in the shearing of the side entry connection on the rop drive cement head. The cement hose
was connected to the cement head at the time and resulted in the release of substantial amount of oil based mud under pressure at 1,000psi. Investigations are ongoing.
At approx 2030 hrs on the <...> an Operations Technician and a work party entered the Utility Shaft under a valid CSE and work permit, to carry out apermit validation site visit. At 2130 hrs the
Operations Technician reported that hehad identified a leak from an existing repair clamp below the 76m level on a cell fill line. The work party including the Operations Technician then
immediately evacuated the leg, the leg was confirmed to be clear at 2142 hrs. At the time there were no local readings of gas on fixed or portable monitors at the 76 m level. TheOIM was
informed of the situation and all work permits were withdrawn. At 0105hrs after checking fixed gas detection readings in the leg including below 76m level, the Operations Supervisor and an
Operations Technician entered the leg to confirm the source of the leak, this was confirmed to be from cell 15 fill line [cell group 3]. Cell group 3 was then lined up to import produced fluids
[95% water] and the leg was then vacated again as per Supplementary Operating Procedure 33 [SOP33]. The situation was then monitored for the remainder of the nightshift, at 1000 hrs on the
<...> after discussion with onshore management, the decision was taken to carry out a controlled shutdown of the production process and rig up seawater flushing lines from the crude oil coolers
Platform was operating in steady state production mode. During routine watchkeeping an area tachnician observed a minor leak from a vertically downward stub piece of 2" class 300 pipework on
the 10" oil outley line from V2220 1 stage B production separator (operating at 19 bar G). The leak was immediately reported to suspended further investigations carried out in accordance with
OCOP 1.015. A fluid rate of 240 mls/hour was established. The fluid recorded was noted to be of a high produced water content - > 95%. At no point throughout the situation was any
hydrocarbon gas registered on any of the modules fixed detection or on the <...> portable meters carried out by the technician. The onshore support team were duly consulted and an action plan
formulated. Separation train B was manually shutdown on a controlled manner at 14:25. At this point the leak was reported as stopped. Ultrasonic testing is scheduled to be carried out on the
spool to determine corrosion extent.

During backloading operations to supply vessel <...> with NE crane, and while NE crane was in parked position facing North, NW crane came into contact with stationary NE crane. The crane
driver slewed left to clear NE crane boom and at this time the navigation light from boom tip of NW crane fell to supply vessel deck, narrowly missing boat deck hand. The navigation light
(approx 8 kg) fell (approx 250 ft), two further objects thought to be parts of damaged terminal sheave from NW crane boom (approx 3 kg & 1kg) also fell to the deck of supply boat from same
height. To prevent a recurrence of this incident the NE crane will be de-commissioned and removed from the platform as soon as reasonably practicable. Until the above decommissioning takes
place, for each operation of the NW crane the parking of the NE will be risk assessed in order to determine the most appropriate parking position and thus reduce the risk of collision to ALARP.
Further controls including the use of an additional watchman, where appropriate, have been introduced.
At 08:50 the <...> Engineer noticed flames emanating from the rotating shaft bearing of the centrifuge unit in M8 Shaker Module. He used a nearby dry powder extinguisher to quickly extinguish
the fire and the unit was then locally isolated. The rig Supervisor was informed, attended the area and requested further isolation at the main switch room. The unit was allowed to cool before
investigation into the cause. Immediate action taken: extinguished with dry powder extinguisher; unit isolated locally; further electrical isolation at main switch room; unit allowed to cool for
inspection. Findings and conclusions: dismantling of the unit showed the bearing on the rotating shaft to be worn. The heating of the bearing caused lubricating grease to ignite resulting in a small
local fire. The fire was quickly extinguished and the unit shut down and isolated.
Backloading 45' basket (12.7t) from pipedeck to "<...>". When approximately 10' from deck of vessel, the west crane experienced a hydraulic system fault which resulted in fail mode lowering of
the load on to the vessel. Crane ops on west crane were suspended and specialist vendor mobilised to investigate causes.
The MOL booster pump had been out of service for a non drive-end-bearing change out. On completion of the workscope the pump was restarted. Shortly after the restart crude oil was observed
issuing from the drive-end of the pump. As per startup procedures the pump was closely monitored during this period and was immediately stopped using the emergency stop button adjacent to
the machine. Approximately 350 litres of crude oil and 30 litres of seal oil lost to hazardous open drain - no spill to sea. Cause not yet confirmed, however it is likely that catastrophic failure of
the drive-end seal has occurred. From part <...> Module 3, main deck.
The supply vessel <...> was sitting on the NW corner of the <...> platform, prior to carrying out backload operations. There was a moderate breeze with good visibility with a moderate sea state,
with a current between 0-3 knots. The distance from the vessel to the platform reduced to 7-8 meters and, during manouvering operations to increase this distance, the vessel hit the NW leg
fender, causing damage to the wooden fender on the leg of the installation and also damage to the vessel. The cause of this incident may be attributed to the rudder not being to midships, when the
poscon was engaged.
Normal domestic operations were ongoing in the galley, with the Chef preparing the food for the nightshift personnel. Approx. 00:16 hrs, the Chef observed flames coming from the deep fat fryer
appliance. He immediately raised the alarm by calling the platform emergency telephone number to inform the main control room of the incident. He attempted to place a fire blanket over the
appliance before leaving the area. The fixed fire protection systems were activated resulting in the platform GPA being initiated with all personnel called to muster. The fire, which was restricted
to the deep fat fryer, was quickly dealt with and extinguished by the Platform Emergency Response Team. No injuries were sustained by personnel as a result of the incident. All personnel were
stood down at 01:07 hrs. The incident is currently being investigated.
Dropped Object incident: Whilst crane lifting a cable spoller (<...> permanent downhole gauge cable drum) across the pipe deck, a Collector Adaptor (weighing 2.9 kg) fell off the drum's shaft
and dropped 5' to the deck. The spooler was being re-positioned on the pipe deck and was only 5' off the deck when the dropped object occurred - the maximum height the spooler had been lifted
was 5' off the deck. The Collector adaptor is a sleeve which is grub screwed onto the end of the shaft of the drum. <...> have only 3 of these spoolers - long term they are to be phased out. As an
interim measure the Collector adaptor is to be driled and bolted to the end of the shaft, as opposed to being just grub screwed to it. (These grub screws are just a friction fixing, they don't locate in
a groove).
Uncontrolled release of nitrogen. Please see attached investigation report and photos fro incident details and subsequent actions. ICC Summary - The <...> shutdown work had reached the stage
of Mechanical Completion 1 (MC1) and nitrogen leak had commenced on various systems. Nitrogen leak testing of the contractor vessel had been completed and the nitrogen was vented via the
platform vent system. During venting, nitrogen was released to atmosphere in an uncontrolled manner from an open ended 10" pipe. The system was made safe and venting ceased. No one was
injured however, there was potentail for fatalities or major injuries. The objective of this investigation is to make recommendations to prevent reoccurence.

Production was being restarted after an unplanned shutdown. Wells were being brought back into first stage separator when liquid was observed from a pinhole leak in the oil outlet pipework
upstream of the level control valves. This liquid was water with some crude oil although no sheen could be seen on the liquid on the deck. No liquid entered the sea and no fixed detection
annunciated or alarmed. Leak was observed by production tech during routine start up activities. B first stage separator was manually shutdown and the line isolated.
<...> - Whilst pulling out of hole on <...> oil well, during a coil tubing descale of the well and whilst at 1442 feet the coiled tubing partially sheared at a weld on the reel at the rear of the drum. At
this particular stage in the programme, the CT was being used to jet chemicals at the scale region of completion thus the coil was pressurised with scal disolver (<...> - 50/50 dilution with potable
water) to 3250 psi. The released chemical sprayed from the breach onto adjacent equipment and deck area (approx 1bbl spillage). No hydrocarbons were released from the system as the 2 x safety
NRVs on the set up held as per design. Personnel made are safe and OIM was called out. Residual chemicals with the coil were flushed through at low rate using water to clear the chemical
hazard and the full area was decontaminated following all laid down emergency procedures. The coil has been made safe and the remaining within the well before is being recovered at this time,
During raising this <...> I realised that as well as reporting it under No. 13, it may well have been necessary to report under a failure of a pressurised system or a spillage of chemicals but I
thought that 13 was most applicable.
At 0430 hrs on <...> G8000 was shutdown as planned to allow an isolation to be put in place in preparation for planned maintenance during dayshift. At 0638 hrs the CRO reported a single LL
GH had initiated on the CSS system. The power Tech was informed of this and was on his way to investigate with another Tech. At 0640 hrs the platform changed status due to co incident LL
indication of gas within the turbine enclosure [<...> the shutdown machine]. The power Tech who was now on scene and identified that the gas was percolating slowly from the <...> regulator
valve position indicator stem. On opening the turbine door the small concentration of gas was quickly diluted and the gas heads returned to zero. The manual isolation valve within the enclosure
was also closed by the power Tech and the area secured. The gas percolating from the <...> valve was extremely small and the main issue was identified as the fact that the HVAC system was
shutdown as part of the isolation. A similar incident occurred about 12 months ago and an outcome was to change out the <...> valve on a higher frequency. This valve had been changed 3 weeks
ago and it would appear a design weakness around the indicator stem sealing arrangement which needs further investigation.
<...> wireline hand informed Operations Technician he could see diesel in the bunding area of M1E Turbine Hall. He placed absorbent pads to stem the flow of diesel towards the drain system.
On investigation of the area by the Power Technician, the hood door of GT2 solar generator was opened, diesel was found to be leaking from a Test Point's pressure gauge. Machine was manually
shutdown and oil spill kit was deployed to contain leakage within save all preventing spillage to the sea via the drains system. Approximately 200 litres of diesel leaked from the failed component
which was all contained within the machine bund with the aid of soak-up pads and a spill kit. There was no spill to sea at any time with this incident. The pressure gauge was found to have a
failed bourbon tube. The gauge was ranged 0 25 bar but the maximum available pressure at the test port is 60 barg. Personnel who work on process plant and machinery have been reminded of the
requirement to record such instruments fitted for test purposes and the requirement to remove such instruments before returning a unit to normal service.
Wind speed 30 knots, 36 degrees and sea state 3m. During normal watch keeping operations, a section of HVAC louvred ducting was discovered lying on the module floor. It was apparent that it
had dropped from module HVAC above. Dropped section was approx 1.5m by 1m by 0.3 m. Estimated weight of HVAC louvre 5kg. Estimated drop height was 5m.
Steelwork was being transferred from the Fabshop to the East crane boom rest. The 14ft load was secured using 2 x 1 tonnes slings double wrapped. During the lift the load snagged on the
platform steelwork [adjacent to the production laboratory] and one of the slings parted. The lift was correctly slung and the preparation for the job found to be adequate for the routine lift. During
the execution of the lift the Banksman directed the Crane Operator to lift the load. At this point the load was clear of the platform but due to the slowly rotating load when the lift was passing the
overhang at the laboratory laydown area the end of the load snagged on the overhang resulting in the parting of the sling. This was witnessed by the Banksman who immediately stopped the lift
and made secure by lowering in a controlled manner down on the walkway. From the investigation carried out actions to prevent a recurrence are: 1. To consider using tag lines for similar
activity; 2. Coach the deck crew on the good techniques which should be in place; 3. Where possible the crane should be configured to single fall to give the Crane Operator a better feel for
smaller loads [the crane was configured as 2 fall during this lift as other platform lifts had warranted this].
Fuel gas scrubber vessel <...>. Level control/sight glass bridle leak. Date - <...>, time - 13.30 hours, wind direction - 183 deg, wind speed - 17 knots, sea state - 1.5 meters. An operations
technician walking through module z2 smelled hydrocarbon gas in thr vicinity of the fuel gas scrubber VL-360. On further investigationb the gas leak was confirmed to be emanating from under
the lagged 3" level control and sight glass bridle. A gas meter reading of 10% LEL at a distance of 0.1m was confirmed. The leak was located on the dead leg at the base of the bridle where it
reduces to the 3/4" bridle drain valve. The release of the dry fuel was insufficient to activate the platform fire and gas detection system. The control room operator was informed immediately and
instructed to shutdown and depressurise the process, fuel gas and Norpipe systems in a controlled manner. The fuel gas scrubber vessel <...> was operating at the normal pressure of 19.5 barg.

A minor gas release occurred at Mod 16 mezzanine level, during Nitrogen purging operations, resulting in an automatic platform shutdown. A flange was being removed and residual trapped
pressure gas was released. Investigation is ongoing.
A hydrocarbon release on board the <...> platform has occured this morning at 02:27hrs, the platform mustered (no missing or injured persons) and the muster has been stood down at 03.08 hrs.
The platform is currently shut-in and depressurised and the initail investigations have indentified a pin hole leak on a wall on a vertical piece of 2" pipe from the 96 suction scrubber to the MP
separator - line reference <...> (LD Nos: <...> and <...>). For further information this line would appear to be original line and was not modified by the shutdown activities.
TIR rec'd at 13:30 from Safety Co ordinator; gas release occurred at 11:18 hrs, and down manning is being carried out to other platforms in the vicinity.
Section of windwall cladding fell from derrick to pipe deck. Whilst the east crane was being boomed down to the west side of the skid deck, a section of corner cladding from the derrick windwall
(south west corner) was dislodged and fell approx. 90', coming to rest on the pipe deck. The section of aluminium cladding was 8' 2" long, was a right angled section and weighed 27 lbs. The
dimensions of the right angled section of cladding is 17 cm x 17 cm x 3 mm thick. An inspection of the south west corner of the derrrick windwalls was carried out soon after the event. All
windwalls were found to be secure. East crane has been thoroughly inspected for damage. It was noted that there was some paint damage to the boom approx. halfway up the boom at the lower
right hand cord.
An Operations Technician went to start condensate pump P-7411. During the prestart checks he observed liquid dribbling from the pump suction flange. On closer investigation he identified that
3 of the 4 studbolts securing the suction flange had broken. He made the pump safe and contacted the Installation Control Centre. The liquid leaking from the flange was gas condensate at
atmospheric pressure. The leakage rate was very low and the spillage was captured in the equipment bund and routed to drain. there was no detection by the automatic Fire & Gas System. The
platform status was unaffected by the incident.
<...>. The 81/2" hole section weli C-82 (CHG) had been drilled and cased of a depth of 10300ft. During the cementing of the casing with 12.0ppg. OBM there was considerable mud losses. The
casing was successfully cemented and preparations made to drill and final 6" reservoir section to the planned toal depth. The new drilling BHA was run in the hole and the shoe track drilled out
with 9.5ppg OBM. After drilling iout the previously drilled pump below the shoe a pit gain of 8 Bbls was noted by the driller who then identified a positive flow and immediately close in the well
via the BOPS. The senior drilling supervisor was informed at this time. WEll bore pressures were allowed to stabvilise an it was noted that the sut in causing pressure (SICP) was lower than the
shut in drill pipe pressure (SIDPP) . Indicating a heavier mud weight fluid in the annulus. Refer to attached document 10130 - OIR9B.doc. Ad discussion was held with the platforms
superindentant and it was agreed to bleed back the annulus pressure in incremental stages under controlled conditions and to further observe well bore pressures. At 04.00 hours, <...> the well
bore pressures had been reducued to a manageable level and circulation commenced using the Driller's Method of well control to displace the heavier mud weight fluids from the annulus. Mud
A team member observed liquid coming from a section of pipework as he passed through module 8, he immediately informed his supervisor who was in an adjacent module. They informed the
control room who in turn requested an operator to investigate. The leak was identified as coming from the produced water outlet of the 2nd stage separator. The vessel was imediately shutdown
and isolated. The water outlet line was isolated at this point to reduce the pressure in the affected line. There was no gas detected on the fixed fire & gas systems, there is a fixed beam detector
directly above the leak, which would have automatically shut down all process at 60% LEL. It is considered unlikely that sufficient gas could be generated from a leak of this nature on the
produced water system to cause a potential fire or explosion. Investigation raised to capture learning and actions to prevent reoccurrence.
During wireline intervention on <...> oil well, the travelling block brake system failed to hold, causing the block assembly to descend to the drill floor approximately 56 feet, striking the lubricator
and shearing off the lubricator manifold. The travelling block descended until it hit the dolly track stops where it came to rest, but whilst descending it collided with the stuffing box of the
lubricator , where it proceeded to push the lubricator and riser assembly from the vertical towards a southerly direction. The draw works were not being used at the time for any lifting activity, but
were in the process of being run up with the intentention of using to break out the lubricator to remove a wireline tool string. At the time of the failure the travelling block was being held on the
parking brake. At the time of the incident the lubricator was depressurised and had been flushed clear of any residual gas, therefore there was no release of hydrocarbon gas or fluid. There had
been 2 personnel on the drill floor with 1 person in the dog house at the time of the failure. No persons were injured during the occurrence. The well was already closed in on the swab and
UMGV at the time of failure due to the point of operation the crew were at, and shortly after the incident the OIM ordered the LMGV to be closed to provide a 3rd barrier for envelope integrity
A leak occurred on a fuel gas purge hose associated with a jet engine. Gas escaped into the enclosure, activating two gas heads, and tripping the Power generation set. The cause was an
incorrectly secured braided hose allowing it to chaff against steel work resulting in mechanical damage. The hose was replaced, and correctly secured, and all other sets were checked and found to
be OK.

During an attempt to start 'C' Powe rGen, gas was detected in the fuel gas wing. A leak was found on a 1/2" instrument fitting. The root cause of the leak was determined to be the 1/2" fitting
being inadequately tightened. Investigation ongoing.
brief details of the incident: Monday <...> 08:30 hours weather visibility good - wind 150 at 10 knots temp 17C - overcast. During crane operations on the <...> platform, while transferring a 3ft*
3ft* 3ft wooden crate of studbolts weighing 2.9 tons from the <...> top deck, down over the sea to the lower <...> deck laydown area. When the crane stopped slewing the load, it continued to
swing striking a cable support tray. The thin metal edge of the cable tray sliced through the polyester lifting strap causing the load to drop into the sea where it disintergrated on striking the surface
releasing it's contents to the seabed.
During plant operations phase for the <...> <...> turnaround a nitrogen hose was connected directly between a platform nitrogen point and a valve on the gas lift system. The nitrogen hose was
lined up to the gas lift system and the hose immediately ruptured causing a minor gas release and damage to lagging on the prover loop. The valve on the gas lift system was immediately closed
by the operator in the area. Four gas heads in the area spiked into alarm which was noted by CRT, they then cleared ina couple of seconds and this was investigated by the Offshore Team Lead.
The release was export specification gas, with instantaneous duration. The area was made safe and a root cause inestigation was initiated followed by a time out for safety for the operations team.
There were no injuries sustained to the operator in the area. The root cause will be subject of the current investigation.
<...> - The <...> platform drilling rig tripped out of hole from a depth in the Lower <...> Reservoir of 2151m after a failure of the L/MWD suite. A water based 1.21sg mud weight was in use with
a 1.03 sg reservoir pressure (480psi overbalance). tight hole was encountered at 1563m and 1424m In trying to circulate, the hole attempted to packoff, but was circulated clenan with xcess
cuttings observed at surface. Due to continued overpulls, the rig pumped out of hle from 1424m to 1256m, then ciculated bottoms up at surface. Due to continued overpulls, the rig pumped out of
hole from 1424m to 1256m, then circulated bottoms up at the 13-3/8" casing shoe before POOH to surface. A new BHA was made up and RIH. Due to greater stiffness of the new assembly, the
rig reamed in hole from the 13-3?8" casing shoe at 1259m to 1770m. After breaking through a stringer at 1770m, the rig backreamed the interval from1791m to 1764m, then reamed to 1871m at
which point a 22% gas peak was observed at surface with a flow indication of gas bubbles observed in the well. The well was closed in on the annular preventer but no SICP of SIDDPP was
w=observed. The well was then circulated bottoms up through the choke and poor boy degasser at 175gpm and again no SICP or SIDPP was observed. Gas readings had reduced to 1.8% and fell
The platform was increasing production to full capacity. At 1508pm a production tech was investigating a gas point detector that had come into alarm, separation main deck. He heard a noise and
on closer inspection observed hydrocarbons leaking from the stem of PV 56003B on the gas export line. He contacted the control room informing them of the leak and indicating the leak seemed
to be increasing. The OIM gave instructions to sound the GPA to have everyone muster. The platform was shut down and blown down. Personnel remained in the accommodation until the
platform was blown down. With fixed gas point detectors indicating zero, the emergency fire team made their way to the scene with a portable gas detector. No indications of gas monitored by the
team, area declared safe. PV 56003B was then isolated from main process. 1545hrs all personnel back to normal duties. Repairs to PV 56003B carried out before platform production
recommenced.
In Preparation for removing and replacing a corrosion damaged lifeboat davit, it was necessary to remove the lifeboat from the davit. As the crane was unable to reach this lifeboat to sea on its fall
wires and use seamen in the standby vessel fast rescue craft to disconnect it from the fall wires, tow the lifeboat to the East side of the platform and attach pennants on the lifeboat pennants to
pennants on the lifting spreader beam which was suspended from the East crane. There were no personnel in the lifeboat during this operation. An additional 3 metre strop had been inserted
between the lifeboat fall wires and the <...> release hooks to make it easier and safer for the FRC crew to release the boat from the fall wires - this method was selected to avoid the need for
transfer of a crew member from the FRC to lifeboat. The weather limit for the operation was considered to be 2 metre seas, and was actually taking place with significant wave height of
1.2metres, max wave height 1.8metres. When the lifeboat landed on the surface of the sea, the wave action transmitted a jarring force to the lifeboat davit which was sufficient to dislodge the
rubber bumpers from the davits and allow them to drop to sea. This is thought to have been due to the retaining fasteners either being inadequate design or corroded.
The NW crane was lifting a container off the supply vessel <...>. The container weighed approx 10 tonnes. The container was lifted to approx deck level and the crane had slewed round to the NE
when without any warning the load started to drop from the main hoist . The driver attempted to stop the load using his brake etc. but the load continued all the way into the sea. The hook
disconnected itself due to damage of the BK and the container was blown away from the platform going North, with a strong northerly wind. The container continued for approximately 300
metres before beoming fully swamped with water and sinking to the bottom of the sea. The supply vessel was in the process of leaving the 500m zone and monitored the container from a safe
distance. Weather conditions at the time were: wind 35 knots - wave height 3.5 metres - Cloud cover overcast.

Following planned maintenance work on the platofrm fuel gas system and during the reinstatement testing of the fuel gas supply to gas compressor Z3150, a minor HC emission occurred on a 2"
flange that was being "witness tested". The release was contained within the turbine enclosure and picked up by the local gas detection. The actual release volume has still to be determined but the
system pressure is 12 Bar and the venting was stopped within a matter of seconds (
Normal operation was in progress with good weather. During de-isolation of the <...> Export Pump <...> after maintenance , lack of sequence valve operation allowed the suction piping to be
overpressured. A joint gave way and released 450kgs of stabilised Erskine condensate onto the intermediate deck. The alarm was raised by the Technician carrying out the de-isolation and the
platform was shutdown. and depressured and the crew called to muster. The nature of the <...> condensate is such that it gels at ambient so the release was contained on the deck.
Whilst offloading a bundle (9 lengths) of 5" Drill Pipe from PSV <...> up to Platform a failure of a wire sling occurred. Witness statements to the incident confirmed that the load was not seen to
foul or snag on any part of the ships structure. The sling failed as the slack was being taken up before the full weight of the load was seen by the crane. The load never fully came off the deck. The
crane operator immediately paid out slack on seeing what was happening and the crew released the other sling to allow the crane operator to retrieve his line. The operator shut down his crane and
reported incident to the SHE Advisor without undue delay. As per procedure the deck crew had retreated to a safe distance away once the load had been hooked on, therefore were never in a place
of danger. The sea state at the time was SSE swell (approx. 4m) - vessel pitch was moderate and wind speed 25 kts.
Following completion of shutdown workscope on a third party platform there was a requirement to line up a through-route to the export pipeline for the 3rd party. During the re-pressurisation of
pipework, with HC gas from the third party import line, a low gas alarm annuciated in the control room. Checks carried out by Operations tech in the area established taht there was the sound of
gas releasing from within export riser valve enclosure (MGL) - this was reported back to the control room and the line was depressured. When the line depressured the leak ceased and the alarm
cleared. Further investigations into the leak have determined that it was coming from a sphere detector indicator located adjacent to ESV 261 (MGL isolation valve). Preparations are ongoing to
address/repair the leak. Weather conditions at the time of the incident were; Wind 220 deg at 25 knots
Two gas detectors came into low alarm in the Main Power Gas Generator fuel gas wing during start-up of "C" power-gen. The machine was immediately shut down. The release was identified as
coming from a leaking <...> seal on the throttle valve. The seal was replaced. Investigation is ongoing.
<...>. At the time of the incident, well <...>was starting circulation operations to establish the source of a known annulus communication. During this operation the presence of a gas bubble was
detected by the drilling crew and steps were immediately taken to secure the well. The well was secured by fuirst closing the Annular Preventer followde by the Hydraulic Control Valve. Spaceout
was confirmed and the upper variable pipe rams were subsequently closed. At 11.55 hrs, Gas dector <...> which is located on the drilling sub structure went into High Alarm. The alarm
immediately cleared after the well was secured. A single gas alarm was activated and there was no GPA or emergency actions taken.
Two deck personnel were working on the East side level one carrying out lifting operations when they heard something strike the top of one of their stationery containers in their work area. On
looking on the other side of the container they observed a large piece of crumpled lead. They immediately reported this. The medic Safety Advisor and Service Delivery Co-ordinator attended the
scene and located the origin of the lead to be a section of shielding from the helideck stairs used to shield the stairs from potential leaks from the radioactive sources in the bomb pit area. Early
rough estimates would suggest the fallen piece to weigh 70+ kg. The lifting operations in that area were halted and the area barriered. Contact with a Radiation Protection Advisor advised that the
hazard from radiation to the stairway was insignificant , however to completely mitigate any hazard the adjacent source was moved out of range of the stairway. An investigation is to follow.
Operation: starting "B" Gas Comp. Env. Conditions. N/A . Whilst in the process of running up "B" gas compressor, line of sight detection initiated a platform level 1 shut down as a result of
detecting an oil mist, generated from a lubricating oil leak during start up. The platform GPA was sounded and platform personnel were called to muster stations. Following the evaluation of the
circumstances, conditions and instrument readings, Technicians from the platform emergency response team were despatched to the scene of the event and confirmed there was no risk to platform
asset's, machinery or personnel. At 18:15hrs, the platform was stood down from muster stations, personnel returned to normal duties. No injuries, damage or environmental contamination
occurred as a result of the event. The cause is under investigation.

IP was a member of a work party which was manouevring a pipe spool to be installed within Module 9 at the mezzanine level. He was apprxoimately 8 hours into a 12 hour shift on the day and on day 12 of a 14 day
offshore trip. Environmental conditions at the time were: Lighting - artificial, good. Temperature - ambient, within module. Noise - relatively quiet as installation production plant was shut down. The work party was in
the process of moving the spool piece from ground leve to its final location at mezzanine level within Module 9. The spool had been raised to a vertical position with the aid of rigging equipment and had to be
manouevered into a hotizontal position for installation. The spool was suspended from rigging whilst some additional rigging was being attached to facilitate installation. IP was located at the top end of the spool piece
when without warning the spool piece rotated and a flange on the spool piece struck him on his right forearm. It has not been established why the spool piece rotated. IP was advised by his work colleagues to attend the
medic for assessment and treatment but chose not to do so. He finished his shift and that of the next day before leaving the installation as scheduled on <...>. He left the installation without attending the medic or
reporting the incident to any member of the installation management team. He attended his local hospital upon his return home <...> and was diagnosed with a fracture

Operation involved applying bind on wireline while settling a straddle on well <...>(<...>) as per well intervention programme. Environmental conditions were normal and dry. Wireline parted at
surface resulting in breakage of safety glass in wireline cab. Wire remained sealed at stuffing box and there was no release of hydrocarbons. Broken wire was then re-attached and retreived from
the well as per wireline procedures.
When moving RB211 engine within "B" enclosure, the engine was lifted to the bomb door area. The load was lifted to its required height and was to be left suspended to allow the bomb doors to
be opened. At this point it was noted that the block was not locking and was freely allowing the load to lower. The gypsy chain was secured and two pull lifts were immediately set up and attached
to the crucifix to secure the load. Investigations are ongoing.
Platform operating under steady conditions. Supply vessel <...> engaged in cargo operations, positioned 30 metres off the north side of the <...> [platform 08:15am. A member of the vessel deck
crew observed an object falling from the platform. The fallen object was observed to be a piece of metal (weight 1.5 kgs) which had bounced off the top of a container and came to rest inside a
twenty foot open top container at the forward end of the vessels deck. No injuries were sustained by personnel as a result of this incident. Cargo operations were suspended and the vessel
relocated to the south side of the platform. The incident is currently being investigated . Initial findings indicate the piece of metal was ejected from a turbine exhaust stack due to failure of an
exhaust baffle.
On Friday the <...>, at approximately 0908hrs a gas release occurred in Mod16 which resulted in three gas detectors in Lo-alarm. "A" injection had been started for diagnostic purposes. Twelve
minutes after the start up, the fixed gas detection picked up gas in Mod 16 Mezz. The source of the leak was identified as coming from the valve stem on XXV1364 in the upper Mezz. The
compressor was shut down and depressurised. A root cause analysis has been carried out and the valve stem seal will be investigated for damage and adequacy for operation at current operating
conditions.
500 Metres Infringment of <...> Platform <...> at 2125 hrs.I observed the cargo vessel <...> call sign <...> mmsi no <...> 4 miles NW of <...> platform on a course of 160 degrees true. It appeared
by his course vector that they were going to infringe the 500 metre zone of the platform so I attempted to make contact with the <...> on ch 16, 13 & 6 to inform them of this & ask them to alter
there course to starboard to clear the platform & W cardinal buoy adjacent to the platform. By 2135 I could not get any response from the <...> as I informed the <...> control room of the
situation. The <...> turned on the fog horns on the <...> to try and attract the <...> attention & we tried everything we could to attract the <...> attention including shining my searchlight on to the
<...> bridge. On doing that I could not see anyone in the bridge of the <...> & I stayed alongside the <...> calling them all the time until they were past & clear of the <...> which w s 2200hrs
whereupon I informed <...> coastguard of the situation & the <...> took over trying to contact the <...> & followed them in the hop of attracting their attention. The <...> went inside of the <...>'s
500 metre zone @ 2149 hrs & was 300 metres off the platform @ its closes point of approach. Weather conditions on scene. Wind 180 degrees @ 8 knots. Sea state calm. Visibility 3 to 4 miles.
Miller. The 5 1/2" Camco tubing retreivable Down Hole Safety Valve, in well A26 (slot 8) was being tested by the well services crew. The valve failed its 6 monthly leak off test. The valve
completely failed to close, the acceptable limit for the valve in question was 16 psi in 15 minutes. We are assessing forward plan for the well and intervention options.
The Utility Shaft Extract Fan required to be repaired. A valid WCC was in place for this operation complete with an agreed LOLER lifting plan. The work was being carried out inside process
module D1 WS and as such as was dry and well lit. The removal of the [3 ton] fan housing K-40093 was pre rigged to allow the weight of the unit to be fleeted and supported on 4 [4 ton rated]
chain blocks at all times from North to South of the module, until clear of the fan support frame, then be lowered vertically on two chain blocks to the deck. All the chain blocks were suspended
from inside the module roof, approx 8/9 metres high, the load was suspended 5 metres from the floor. The fleeting operation was on the last set of 4 chain blocks, prior to the transfer to the final 2
blocks that would lower the fan housing to the deck, the Rigger taking the weight on the outboard chain blocks noticed that the blocks were not holding the weight [the chain was running through
the block]. He then immediately stopped taking the weight and asked his colleague to take the weight on the inboard chain block again. The load was now safe. The load remained supported
throughout the operation and did not lose height. One of the two final chain blocks was attached to the fan housing to take the weight in place of the faulty block. The load was safely transferred
A technicain was approaching the southern end of the platform on the walkway at U4E when rusty debris fell from above and shattered on impact on the walkway grating in front of him. The rust
pieces, falling less than 3m and weighing approx 0.4 kg in total, did not strike the technicain. The debris had fallen from the outer bulkhead of the East side Reserve Pit which rises adjacent to the
walkway.

<...>. POOH with a 9 5/8" casing fish secured with a spear on 5" drill pipe. The well was not taking the correct fluid volume from the trip tank, a flow check indicated a small gain (0.23m3), the
annular preventer was closed, a 1.5 bar increase on the SICP was recorded. The well was circulated through the rig choke and over the poor boy until the gas was evacuated. Subsequent flow
check indicated the well was stable again and operations re-commenced.
<...>. Whilst tubing was lifted from tubing hanger on well slot 2, oil and gas released from the top of the bell nippled on top of the BOP stack. Hydraulic work over crew had control of the well at
this time and they closed the annular on the BOP stack and contained the escape of the oil and gas. Investigation is ongoing at this time.
An operator reported a "bang" noise coming from the module containing the open drains hydrocarbon slops tank. It soon became apparent that the tank had been subject to some sort of
overpressure as the tank was visually damaged. Investigations into the incident are ongoing by a team of personnel. Initial but unconfirmed findings point to an ignition of hydrocarbons inside the
tank. Equipment and potential ignition sources are currently being examined. A full root cause analysis and complete investigation report will be completed in due course.
At 02:10hrs during normal operations, 2 technicians were isolating <...>metering stream 1 in preperation for maintenance. When the 10" metering stream outlet valve(VPX-3330-18) was being
closed they could hear gas being suddenly released from the valve body drain plug at the base of the valve. They fully closed the valve and the leak stopped. It is an open module and no gas levels
were detected by local gas heads. Weather was fine with very light wind.
Due to pressure instability in the service water system, the duty Fire pump P7003 started on demand following a low fireman system pressure. The unit is a diesel driven hydraulic pump that sits
within a dedicated caisson below the South MSG. When the pump actually started the hydraulic return line failed and approximately 800 litres of NUTO 32 hydraulic oil was spilled on to the
MSF deck. A short spool on the return line from the 2nd stage hydraulic motor was found to have a hole approximately 5mm in diameter on its inner radius. The working pressure in this line is
estimated at circa 70Bar. As there was a painting swuad working in the civinity the defect was reported, isolated and contained very quickly using oil soak matting and the local floor bunding. All
of the oil was contained and nothing was spilled to sea. The weather conditions at the time were: wind ENE max gust of 10knots, significant wave height 1.9m
After a successful water mist ppm test on G160 compressor the N2 system required that a new N2 cylinder be installed in skid K153 area 7 internal. This requires that the valve handles on the old
firetrace valve be transferred to the new N2 cylinder. During this task N2 escaped from the discharge port at 200 bar causing the cylinder to fall over. The cylinder struck steelwork and the
firetrace valve assembly parted from the neck of the cylinder. This released a jet of N2. The IP fell backwards as the cylinder fell to the floor. The jet caused him to be rolled approx. 5m down a
walkway causing injury, swelling and bruising of left elbow and cut to head. The area was made safe and he was taken to the medic, stabilised and sat down. He was sent to <...> where no
uderlying fractures were found. An investigation is currently in progress, interim measures have been taken which will prevent a repeat of the incident, safety stand downs have commenced for all
personnel to raise awareness of the incident and those leanings known to date.
During changeout of XZV1015, Oil Export ESDV, the work party were in the process of removing the actuator from the top of the valve assembly, when the actuator - weighing approx 100kg toppled, trapping the IP's right arm between the actuator and the edge of the open access hatchway of the flameproof cabinet. After being initially assessed by the platform medic, the IP was
medevac'd to <...>, where X-rays confirmed that the crush had not caused any fractures, only bad bruising. The IP was kept in hospital overnight for observation and discharged the following
morning. The immediate cause of the incident was that the actuator had not been secured with rigging prior to the removal of the bolts which fasten the actuator to the valve assembly.
Investigation into the root cause(s) of the incident is ongoing.
The injury was sustained when he was struck on the foot by dislodged 202cm long x15cm wide spreader beam weighing 60 kgs of half rendered section which was stored on top of another beam
with the flat sections downwards. The IP was landing the second of two nitrogen quads (2200 kgs each) suspended by the east crane on to the deck at module 1 deck mezzanine, when the spreader
beam which was insecurely stacked on a raised storage platform (228 cms x 100 cms x 43 cms high) adjacent to where the nitrogen quads where being landed, fell onto his left foot causing the
injury.The beam fell 43 cms. Time into shift 1.5 hours and days into tour was 7. Remedial action- arrangements made to ensure equipment was securely stacked.

IP was 6 hours into shift and arrived onboard on <...>, and has over <...> years experience offshore with <...> years in current position. Operation at the time of incident was running 9 5/8" casing.
A bundle of three joints had been landed from the casing rack on to the catwalk. The bundle had been landed off-centre. The lead roustabout (IP) and banksman, instructed the crane to raise the
bundle a couple of inches off the deck in order to square it up. At this point he was standing on top of an adjacent bundle, 1.5' off the deck. As the bundle was lifted the IP slipped from his
position, the suspended bundle swung round pinching his foot between the two bundles. The suspended bundle was lowered, the IP's foot was not trapped. The job was stopped and the IP went to
the platform medic for evaluation. Since the incident, toolbox talks have been held with deck crews re-enforcing the hazards of working on deck.
Fire and gas system indicated confirmed gas within localised area in Fire area 33G, PUQ process area SW, above and adjacent to LP compressor. Four heads in alarm. Automatic GPA/muster
initiated and blowdown /ESD systems effected depressurisation of plant. All personnel accounted for at 2148. Plant blowdown complete by 2155 to approximately one bar. Muster stood down at
2213 - all personnel confined to accommodation. Invetigations commenced to identify source of leak.
While POOH with a venturi junk sub clean out assembly c/w string magnet, from a high inclination water injector well at 15000ft (containing sea water). High levels of string vibration were
noticed. The high frequency vibration manifested itself only when the string was pulled out of the hole. The pipe pulling speed was decreased to redeuce the vibration. While the floor crew were
racking on a stand on the set back platform, the next stand was being pulled. When the elevator was about 60ft above the drill floor, a small clevis pin (20g) dropped down and bounced off the
front of the hard hat of one of the crew members that was racking the previous stand. The individual involved was not injured. A TOFS was immediately called and stand was RIH again to inspect
the TDS pipe handler and the elevator. it was confirmed that the clevis pin belonged to the elevator latch operation piston. The split pin retaining the clevis was never found
While POOH on well <...>. A lock nut, weighting 34 grammes, fell from the derrick. The nut landed three feet from a floorman. The operation was stopped and a full derrick inspection. A locknut
fell from the topdrive bail arm clevis pin, to the drill floor. Actions to prevent recurrence: 1. Carried out derrick inpection. 2. Replaced split pin from clevis pin 3. Replaced all split pins on bail
arm clamps 4. Contact to be made with <...> the manufacturer to investigate redesign of retention method. 5 Discuss with all four crews, highlighting floormen to carry out visual checks, on link
tilt chain retaining devices, when blocks are at rotary table.
1. Local release of dead crude on deck area 2 metres below covering 2 square meters. No release to sea. 2 The jet mix pump was not operating at the time of release because the pump station was
shut down. An area tech was in the area on watch keeping duties when he noted the release. He immediately contacted the control room and obtained permission to isloate the instrument locally.
This action stopped the release.
<...> - <...> Well had two cement plugs and a bridge plug installed prior to preparing to sidetrack. The 9 5/8" casing was being cut and a quantity of gas came back with returns causing the
initiation of 4 gas heads and subsequent GPA.
A test run was being carried out on gas compressor K200 following a previous vibration problem. The compressor was started and all vibration indications were normal. The machine was allowed
to warm up and when complete the machine was loaded. As the machine was loaded the gearbox high speed shaft vibration alarm very rapidly increased and shut the machine down. At the same
time the platform ESD and blow down were activated due to several gas alarms in the area around K200 activating.The crew immediately went to muster stations and following the dispersal of
gas the fire team entered the area and made safe the immediate area. There was a loss of oil from the compressor but no fire. It is worth noting that there was a lot of oil mist around the
compressor when the incident happened and as the gas detectors will pick up any hydrocarbon there is more than a possibility that the gas detectors reacted to this as well as any gas that may have
been present. Environmental conditions at the time were slight wind and rain.
Release of crude oil/produced water from failed drive end mechanical seal on PM210 crude oil booster pump. An estimated 12 litres of crude oil was released onto the surrounding area. The
release was noted during watch keeping duties and the pump was manually stopped and the area cleaned immediately. No process shutdown was initiated or gas registered. Investigation into
reason for seal failure in progress.

Level 3 S/D caused by coincedental gas low levels in the GT "C" enclosure. Initiated while pressurising fuel gas system for GT "C" start on gas. Gas levels dissipated immediately and Inergen was
not activated. All gas heads in the GT "C" exhaust where the gas detected have been checked and all are operating within specification. Pressure and N2 leak test conducted on the on-skid gas fuel
vent lines. The 1/2" pipefitting which connects to the gas FMV seal vent was disconnected to install a test rig with Nitrogen. The vent pipe work and fittings were pressure checked to the off-skid
vent valve at 40 bar. 2 leaks were detected during the pressure test. A 1/2" NPT elbow (at the skid edge) was leaking, along with one 1/2" swagelock straight through coupling. Both leaks were
repaired and a further N2 pressure/ leak test were conducted with the aid of snoop solution. No further leaks were detected.
<...> is a normally unattended (NUI) gas production platform. On <...> it was manned by a team of 3 persons from the adjacent <...> platform. The purpose of the visit was to bring <...> platform
into production following a period of shutdown. Production operations were commenced at approxd 1120hrs. At 1220 the NUI OIM heard an unusual noise from the production wellbay. On
investigation he identified a loss of hydrocarbon containment from the vicinity of the production choke valve on Well <...>. He initiated a surface process shutdown (SPS) and mustered the
personnel in the TR. Following shutdown the rate of leakage decayed quickly. Close inspection showed that the body of the production choke on Well <...> was perforated by a hole approx
25mmx5mm. Before demobilising from the platform the OIM ensured that sufficient manual isolation valves were shut to prevent any further leakage. The platform remains shutdown until further
notice. A full investigation will be carried out by <...> to establish the cause of the failure.
A part of the <...> crane structural and hoist test the 5 tonne whip line is required to undertake a 6.25 tonne (25%) water bag overload test applied, the water bag was transferred to the whip line
and applied as detailed above. During this test the load could not be raised. The problem was suspected to be LML bypass not operating on the whip line. To overcome the problem a relay was
momentarily tested. During this testing the whip line descended about 40ft to sea level, stopping above the sea. The bag was emptied and a thorough check carried out of the crane ane ropes with
no faults found. Data has been down loaded to inspect system status.
Platform to Hazard status via confirmation Fire indication inside acoustic enclosure for P 4002 Gas turbine driver. Main fire and gas panel in <...> CCR indicates 4 infra-Red fire deectors in
alarm state and Fine Water spray system has released into the enclosure. Personnel to muster stations, P4002 automatically shut down via ESD system and fuel systems vented. The FWSS
extinguished the flames immediately and on investigation by the is ongoing to find the root cause of the incident.
Weather clear; good visibility. Completion tubing being removed from the well. Whilst carrying out tubing removal from a well using the platform drilling rig, one of the top drive dolly track
rollers suffered a material failure resulting in a fracture of the roller bearing casing in 4 places. 2 pieces of the metal casing fell to the deck from approx. 18' height. Weight of each was 1 @ 3llbs,
1 @ 2 1/2 lbs. Neither of these pieces struck or injured any personnel or caused any other equipment damage. As a result of the above, operations on site were suspended and the area made safe.
A Root Cause Analysis team was established and a platform/Company investigation into the event initiated. Immediate action taken was to withdraw the top drive from service, and remove all 31
remaining roller bearings for examination and replacement. The failed bearing will be the subject of a metallurgical examination.
Preparations were being made to start a routine will integrity test on <...> a dead well that had been closed in for months. One technician was at the tree and one at the hydraulic skid in the M3W
as the UMGV started to open, the technician at the tree noticed gas coming from the swab valve stem collar area. He immediately contacted by radio the area technician at the hydraulic skid
asking him to trip the UMGV closed, which was done promptly. The tree was depressurised and isolated. No fixed gas detection alarmed during event. The incident happened in the wellhead
module D3E which is an enclosed module on 3 sides with an open grating roof leading to an open mezzanine module. On closer inspection it was noted that there was an hole in the cover on the
swab valve stem collar arrangement. A tell tail for stem seal leakage. A notification has been raised to investigate the fault and rectify as necessary. There has also been a OIR 12 raised for this
incident.
Following start up of the MP gas compressor an Ops. Tech detected a minor gas leak from a screwed fitting on a pilot operated pressure relief valve on the compressor discharge. This was
confirmed using snoop & a gas monitor. Ambient conditions were a NW wind at 12 knots. There was insufficient gas released to register on the area gas detectors. The gas plant was shutdown in
a controlled manner & the fitting was tightened up. Similar fittings on the same assembly were also checked for tightness. The compressor was then re-started and the fittings checked in service
and proved to be leak tight at normal operating conditions.

When rigging up velocity string on well <...> the wiring cable head parted at surface. The wire parted due to a fault with the power pack, whereby the upward travel did not stop when the neutral
control position was selected. Following failure, the wire line components were contained within the lubricator/riser, and the disconnected wire fell to the drill floor. The power pack had been
returned on shore for investigation of the fault.
A lift using chain blocks was being carried out on a gearbox cover on K200 compressor. As the lid was being lifted it suddenly dropped about 20 mm. The lift was stopped and the situation
assessed. The load had only dropped on side (there were 2 chain blocks in use). The lifting tackle was inspected and there was nothing obviously wrong. As the gearbox cover could be swung to
the side it was decided to do this and lower it to the deck. After the operation was over the chain blocks were removed and sent ashore for testing. All chain blocks of the same make have been
quarantined until the outcome of the test is known. There were 2 one tonne chain blocks in use and the gearbox cover weighed 1.1 tonnes. Weather was not an issue as the lift was carried out in
the middle of the compressor hall which is weather protected.
During crane operations the crew working on the pipe deck/main deck heard what sounded like an object striking the deck. The work party immediately informed the crane op who stopped the
job. A search for anything that may have fallen was made, but nothing was found. It is surmised that the object bounced off the deck and cannot be located. The crane was shut down pending a
further investigation which commenced at first light. Once the boom was lowered to the helideck it was evident that one of the bolts (approx 250mm and weighing 1kg) had fallen from the top of
the main two- fall block. The dome nut had obviously fallen off previously, although it is not possible to asceratin when this occurred. Discussions with onshore support and the crane
manufacturer have confirmed that studding and double nutting would be an acceptable measure to make the crane safe for use (single -fall block use only) This has now been completed. The
manufacturer representative is being mobilised to the platform to participate in investigation.
Re-commissioning work on the <...> <...> well. The well had not been signed off as handed back to <...> from <...> although the <...> had attained control of the well during function testing
activity. A DSV vessel the <...> was located in the field with an ROV within the 500m zone of the wellhead. At 1000 hrs on the <...> during the ROV commissioning works the DSV vessel crew
aobserved gas bubbles from the template subsea and bubbles were also evident on the surface. The <...> OIM was informed and instruction provided to the vessel to move out of the <...> 500m
zone. The <...> control room consequently shut-in the <...> well and withdrew the permits for function testing of the <...>. The as bubbles were observed to disappear on shutting in the well. The
subsea valves were isolated shut. The <...> ECR was informed along with the <...> and <...> (verbally). Investigation of the loss of gas is being co-ordinated with <...>.
Another smaller trolley was being used on this beam which might not have been designed for its use. It appears that end stops/ buffers were not large enough to stop the smaller trolley (15Kg
+block=chains). When the 3 ton trolleys reached the end of the lifting beam, they came against the 1 ton trolley and pushed it passed the lifting beam end stops. It fell off the end approx 15 feet
and struck the IP a glancing blow on his helmet. The IP was bending slightly forward at the time. It is considered the 1 ton beam trolley (5.4Kg) was part of the total assembly (15.4Kg) that struck
a glancing blow on the hard hat of the IP. It stunned the IP and knocked him to his knees. His hard hat had fully protected him from an impact injury, prior to being dislodged in his fall. Area was
cordoned off, IP medivaced with spinal/neck brace to <...>. X-rayed and no injuries. Walking around no sign of concussion. Consultant will examine <...> for discharge. Investigation conducted
on the installation included Safety Rep. Trolley is being held in OIM Office . Photographs taken of incident area, <...> the certifying authority for lifting equipment are on installation. The
investigation found the end stops to be narrower than the width of the beam trolley buffers/wheels. Incompatible
Normal platform operations. At approximately 10.35hrs the 'A' Stripping Gas Compressor (SGC) had stopped initiating a level 2B (total oil shutdown) shutdown. The unit remained shutdown. At
approximately 11.45 hrs the GPA was initiated by a single gas detector, <...> enclosure. Shortly following the initial detector in alarm, a second detector, <...> came into low alarm. A manual
shutdown of the platform was initiated followed by precautionary blowdown. SGC 'A' has been isolated. A full investigation will be completed. Weather on the day was: Dry, visible, 10KM+
Temperature 11deg C. Wind speed 21. Wind direction WSW. Sea State 1.4.
Equipment: Lever Operated Pul Lift 1.5T Incident Description: Taken from <...> Report No <...> after coming to surface with coil tubing c/w drift, the injector head was broken from the stack at
the coromar sub and lifted into the air to allow for the drift tool string to be rigged down. The tools were disconnected from the coil and the injector head was pulled forward with the use of a
tugger from the front and was steadied with another tugger from behind. When the injector head was pulled enough forward the front tugger was replaced by a come-along so the tugger could be
utilised for pulling the tool string, the tugger was re-attached to the injector head and the majority of the slack in the line was taken up. After putting the swich on the come-along to the pay ut
position, he started to work the handle to pass the tension to the tugger line. The come-along slacked off slightly when working the handle then suddenly paid out the chain uncontrolledably until
there was no tension on it at all. The injector head moved approx. 1 ft before the tugger line had full weight. There were no personnel in the area of movement of the injector head as this had been
discussed at the <...> as potential hazardous area. Immediate Acttion. Come-along was removed from service.

In the early stages of a planned annual shutdown and during flushing / purging / draining operations, the platform change status due to high level coincident gas in leg C4. Automatic shutdown
initiated (albeit the process was shutdown and blown down at the time). The gasheads that came into alarm are on the gas tight floor(GTF). On investigation, the normal routing valve to platform
storage was open and final draining on a rundown line was taking place. The rundown fluids (mainly flushing water and nitrogen drive at 2.5 bar) flow into an import manifold. From this
manifold there was valve found in the open position that connected the import manifold to the vent line from the GTF. It is assessed that the draining drive fluid found its way into the oil manifold
vent line and ultimately down below the GTF. The liquid caused the water level below the GTF to rise and this rise agitated the space below the GTF evolving hydrocarbon gas from below the
GTF into the leg. The platform went into GPA status and all personnel called to Muster. Following the initial GPA, the draining operation was stopped and the situation quickly came back into
control.
<...>During wireline fishing operations at <...> production well, jarring operations were ongoing in attempt to release stuck toolstring downhole. After 12 hours of attempting to release the tool,
the wire parted at surface with 1400lbs shown on the weight indicator. The task was suspended, BOP's closed, the well closed in & the CCR informed. There was no indication of gas release. This
operation was being completed at the pipedeck/drill floor area, and environmental conditions were good. Response to the wire breakage was as per procedure and the crew quickly shut in &
secured the well. There were no injuries and no damage to equipment. This incident is currently being investigated and is subject to a <...> Report, with assistance from <...>.
A pin hole methane gas leak was identified by an operations Technician carrying out his watch keeping duties. Normal compression operations were being carrie dout. the gas leak was blown up
through the coolers by the main fin fans taking the leak up and away from the installation. Wind conditions were 23knots and at 334 degrees. The unit was shut down and vented immediately. The
unit will remain isolated until the failure has been identified and isolated.
TIR-10.41am GPA given in response to detection head - high level gas alarm from the 22, lower deck module (Open module). This is thought to be a major gas release as it took from 10.41am to
11.31am for Gas Detection readings to fall back to zero. Gas leak has been isolated to the area but not to specific pipework or plant. It is suspected to be a section of pipework in the Gas
crossover on the export system. (Congested area). Nitrogen testing to be undertaken to detect source of leak.
Environmental conditions were good but cold. Wind speed approx 8kts and direction 240deg. A intervention team was visiting the <...> platform in order to investigate the reason for an ESDV
closure (which was caused by loss of hydraulic pressure). During this visit and whilst the platform inspection was being carried out, the sound of gas or air escaping could be heard coming from
the flowline area on the <...> main deck. Further investigation highlighted that gas was escaping from a corroded area of Well <...> orifice plate carrier box. The Well flowline was immediately
isolated and vented to make the area safe and a closer visual inspection was completed. The well has been left isolated and vented through to the HP vent. The gas release occured for an estimated
period of 15 minutes at an assumed pressure of 230 psig reducing to zero. Investigation is ongoing into the root cause and the OIR12 will follow on completion.
A person was walking along the eastern walkway adjacent to the train two glycol regeneration skid when he heard an object falling down behind him, which landed on the walkway about two feet
behind him. The object was a steel pipe support bracket that weighed 7.2kg. Later investigation revealed that it had come from a height of four metres and was a pipe support bracket. This bracket
was tack welded to an upright support and appears to have been in place since the platform was first built. Work had been conducted on the pipelines it was supporting in the last two years and
this may have contributed to its failure. At the time that the object fell, no work was being conducted on that skid, although the area is subject to vibration from the operating plant. The wind
speed had dropped to twenty knots from the previous days mean of forty five knots.
A collar latch finger was knocked 90' from the derrick finger board weighing 14kg and landed between the South drill floor winch and the man ridding winch. Operation at the time was to locate
the 8 1/4" drilling collar into the fingers board and close the latch; this could not be achieved because the stand was slightly out of position. When they tried to reposition the pipe handling
machine it went into reverse and collided with the latch which was partially in the closed position causing it to tear off and fall to drill floor.
Whilst commisioning the fuel gas to B turbine, gas was detected in C turbine enclosure causing an automatic Level 3 shutdown and GPA.
The 'A' gas export compressor was undergoing commissioning checks having just had a new LM5000 engine fitted. The machine had been running at idle and was just ramped up to minimum
governor speed, when the conrol room panel indicated gas detection (2 detectors at 9% lel and one at 5% lel) within the extract systems of the turbine enlosure. This sounded the general platform
alarm automatically. This level of detection does not perform an executive action. Subsequently the platform was given a manual level 3 shutdown (at 12:19 hrs). The weather was wind @ 8-10
knots, NW. 1 metre swell. 10 miles visibility.

Drill crew were attempting to remove diverted packer from housing using a drill floor tugger through a series of sheaves. During this operation the tugger line parted, no personnel injuries and
investigation ongoing to determine reason for failure.
Plant was operating normally when 2 gas detectors indicated high gas levels on the NGL roof. Plant was shutdown, all risers closed in and all personnel mustered. Incident is currently being
investigated.
Normal platform operations. At approx. 17:32 hours an automatic GPA and power outage were initiated. High level gas was detected via <...> on DD Cellar deck north. At the time of the GPA a
nitrogen utility house was being disconnected from a utility hose point that was used to purge the offgas condensate pump. This hose had previously been used to purge and isolate condensate
pump A for remedial work. The hose was required for an additional task elsewhere on the installation. Weather on the day was dry, visibility 10KM. Temperature 11deg C. Wind speed: 8 knots,
wind direction: WSW, sea state: 1.4. The incident is currently under investigation.
Whilst running in the hole in single mode, the latch handle (1.47kg) of the top drive system rotary head, fell from approx 5 metres to the rig floor. Landing close to the mousehole. At the time
their was up to six personnel present on the rig floor. The ongoing operation ws the picking up of 3 and a half dril lpipe, utilising the deck conveyor to transport singles to the rig floor, thereafter
running into the hole for the purpose of drilling out the cement bottom hole assembly. The subsequent investigation and simulations carried out, indicated that potentially the following may have
occurred. 1 - the drill pipe hit the handle or 2 that this event most probably occurs when 3 and a half drill pipe is being handled. Because of the small upset which existed below the tool joint, a
small dimension drill pipe could becaome stuck in the elevators, if this happens and the elevator jams on the drill pipe, the balls will travel upwards. Likewise the solid bowls will ride up to the
top of the torque arrestor. As such is the elevators are subsequently released, this can result in a jarring action impacting the (TDS).
Whilst carrying out supply vessel loading operations using a 30Te rated pennant and hook the hook self released from the load after it was landed on the deck of the <...>. On testing it was
discovered that operation of the safety release catch was not required to release the load, investigations continue.
This form is to report a fuel oil (diesel) spill. The source of the leak is a temporary <...> generation package. The <...> installation is "normally unattended", during a visit to the installation on
<...> a 3000lts temporary diesel tank was filled to approx 2800lts, the generation S/D at 1050 hours on <...> during this time circa 1000lts diesel can be accounted for as being used. Thus the leak
occurred between 1800hrs <...> (platform departure) and 1050hrs<...>(generation failure). The total loss is estimated at 1800lts, of that an estimated 860lts has been held in a bund with the
remainder lost to sea.
During the nightshift watch keeping duties they identified a small drip of oil from a 1/4" impulse line connection to a pressure switch (lube oil filter differential pressure - high shutdown) on unit
050 GG lube oil system. They placed some absorbent matting to control the small pool that had formed. They then contacted the gas scehdulers to inform them that the machine would have to be
shutdown to affect a repair. They also raised the neccessary permitry for the work. This was then communicated to the day shift at the morning and handover meeting. The dayshift then proceeded
to the unit to shut it down and carry out the repair. However, before they arrived, unit 050 tripped. Upon arrival they discovered that the impulse line had parted form the fitting, resulting in
localised spillage of approx 100 litres of Aeroshell Turbine 560 oil. they were able to quickly contain the spill and prevent further escalation by use of the adjacent spill kit. There was no spill to
sea due to rapid containment exercise. Initial visual examination of the pipe shows it to have sheared at the compression fitting, reason unknown at this time though it will be sent onshore for
analysis. Weather: Overcast, wind 290 degrees @ 15 knots, visability 10 miles, no significant weather.
While working on the drill floor, crew heard a sound that indicated that something had fallen on to the drill floor. No one had seen anytging falling. On checking the top drive, which was at
approx 60ft, in the derrick, it was found that a die (approx 350g) was missing from the torque wrench. This was found on the drill floor. In line with company procedures, an investigation is
ongoing to identify the root causes of this incident and implement corrective actions as required.
Drift Run on Well <...> with .125 slickline and 2.725" drift to tag ICV [in closed position] pre MPLT run - depth at time of incident 7000ft Wire parted, ted, between winch unit and sheave,
during "hanging and pulling" operation [normal operation to determine no excessive over pulls] - Unit juddering during this operation. Wire downhole, BOP's closed in, Swab valve and Master
valve closed in. No Hydrocarbon release occurred. BOP's have subsequently been re-opened and lubricator and stuffing box have been laid down [BOP's capped]. Well will remain in present
condition until "fishing" programme and equipment available for retrieval of wire and tool.

Fuel gas Scrubber vessel <...> 2" outlet line at tee piece small pin hole leak discovered. Date <...> Time 21.53 hrs. WInd direction 183 Deg Wind Speed 22 knts Sea state 1.5 mtrs A Radiographer
Technician was positioned in the Module Z2 near the vicinity of the fuel gas scrubber VL-360. He noticed a few drops of clear liquid emanating from under the lagged 2? tee section. The leak
was located in the centre on the under side of the 2" tee piece. The drop rate was measured at 3 per minute. The control room operator was informed immediately and instructed to shutdown and
depressurise the fuel gas system in a controlled manner. The fuel Gas scrubber vessel FA-VL-360 was operating at the normal pressure of 19.5 barg. The vessel has been isolated, nitrogen purged
and defective spool removed to be replaced by new one. On removal of lagging it would appear that a pin hole leak developed due to internal corrosion
Gas weep from impulse line 3 way valve on the seal gas rack. Small gas weep from instrument block valve on the impulse line to the low instrument. <...> import compressor seal gas instrument
tag no <...> found to be weeping. Operations personnel were alerted to the smell of gas and on investigation found one of the instrument block valves screwed into the instrument body was
leaking slightly. The valve has since been tested with no further problems. Examined all the joints in the seal gas rack for integrity - full checks to see if everything else is ok in the area.
Employee was using tools down well, personnel detector went into alarm when brought to surface. A precautionary muster was held, drill crew continued to work for a further 90 mins. Continued
reading, carbon monoxide upto 190 ppm. No injuries.
7" seal Lock completion tubing was being pulled from S-31 Water Injection well. 21 full joints had been recovered since releasing the spear from the previuosly cut joint. The condition of the
tubing was poor, with holes eroded in the joints at irregular intervals & of various lengths, up to 2" in width. Joint 147 had been positioned in the mouse hole & the 150T BVC slip-type elevators
were latched around joint 148 waiting in the rotary slips. It had been noticed that there was erosion close to the coupling of the joint. The string weight was 160Klb (MD reading 210 Klb). As
joint 148 was pulled from the slips, the Driller & Roughnecks close to the joint remarked on its poor condition, believing the condition of the joint appearing through the rotary as it was raised,
could be even worse, possibly parting in two. Because of this belief, the rotary slips were left in place to "ride" the pipe in case the tubing did part, the slips thus preventing the lower piece of the
parted joint from falling down hole. One of the roughnecks who was stood in front of the drawworks, rested his foot on top of the slips to stop them from lifting out as the joint was slowly raised.
The remainder of the Roughnecks retreated from the rotary. As the elevators reached approx. 25ft the coupling pulled free from the threads on the joint. It then fell from the top of the elevator to
Leak from a flange on the seal gas system for the export compressor on the <...> production module. When lagging was removed bolts holding flange for 1" line where found not to be tensioned
correctly. Bolts were re-torqued and flange was leak tested.
On <...> at 05:54, whilst coming off line from production, the plant was in the process of being shutdown, which including isolated & venting. As part of this process, an operations technician
was in the immediate vicinity & heard a whispering sound that he identified as a gas leak emandting from the production train 1 outlet ESD Cort Valve, valve stem plug (xzv42003). Following
testing with a portable gas tester it was determined that the leak was 30% LEL at a distance of 150mm. Venting of the train continued th installed vent system & once this was completed,
strategies for repair considered. It was decided in consultation with the vendour (Valvecare Ltd) that the valve should be injected with <...> grease manufactured by <...>, <...>. A <...> engineer
was mobilised to the platform on <...> and the operation to inject the grease, that included fitting a double block & bleed to the valve body cavity, was completed that afternoon under work order
<...>. The production train was then re-pressurised slowly to 1200psig with no leaks found. See continuation sheet.<...> Attachment. The valve is now being monitored as part of the platform leak
management process & is recorded under the number <...>. The valve has been signed 'do not operate'. The valve will also be leak schecked it it trips closed & occurences documented.
While line operation on well <...>. Well <...> was closed in and no breach of integrity occurred. <...> lift wire line mast unit serial <...>. Whilst laying down the lubricator from well <...> using
the <...> mast, the mast started twisting and toppled towards the deck. The extended mast came to rest against the cross beams of the BOP deck roof structure, travelling a distance of
approximately 10-15 feet. 1 outrigger had been manually depinned and the outrigger leg moved manually by approximately 6 inches, to aid the laydown of the wire line lubricator. This action
reduced the stability of the structure allowing the mass to topple. No injury to personnel involved in this incident.
A member of the platform crew reported to operations department that he could smell diesel in the generator module. On investigation it was found that the diesel fuel filter inside the hood of
generator <...> had developed a leak on the lid seal. The fuel was quickly isolated and the leak stopped. The machine was not running at the time of the discovery. It is estimated that approx 25
litres of diesel was spilt all of which was contained within the bund of the machine and has now been cleaned up. It is unknwon how long the leak had been present before discovery, however it is
noted that the generator had been shutdown at 11:05 to conserve fuel stock and no leak had been observed at that time. The seal has now been replaced and the generator subsequently put back in
service. Similar filters on <...> Ref: <...>

Well services technicians had completed repairs to the UMGV on <...> Well <...> and were returning Well to <...> Control. When the FWV opened it was observed that a small gas release
occured from a tell tale on the body of the FWV actuator. The Well services technician in the Wellhead area immediately had the Well closed to stop the leak. The duration of the leak was 1
minute.
Well <...> drilling programme was ongoing; the final completion phase being progressed. Wire line operations to set a prong had been curtailed due to problems with the "<...>" wire line ubnit.
The tool had been retrieved to surface to allow investigations into the underperformance of the unit. The tool was stored on the drill floor at the position of the rotary table. It was still attached via
the wire-line and sheave to the <...> unit; the sheave situated some 62 ft. above the rotary table. The operating problems with the <...> unit were discussed with onshore and it was decided to
mobilise an operator to the platform to investigate. In the meantime advice was received as to potential causes of the malfunctioning. On the basis of this information initial fault finding was
progressed. It was identified that one hydraulic hose needed to be connected, which hadn't been at the time of the initial assembly of the power pack to the unit. Having connected the hydraulic
hose the winch mechanism of the <...> wire line unit began to move without commands from the operator; the unit was unmanned at the time. SAs a result of the uncontrolled movement of the
winch mechanism the parked tool on the drill floor was raised. Its movement was arrested when it came into contact with the sheave; the over pull experienced by the contact of the tool with the
During wireline operations the toolstring had become snagged with the wire round the top section. Whilst the string was being broken down the lower section parted from the string (1.5" dia. and
15' long) striking the operator on the shoulder.
At approx 14:20 on <...>, the <...> control room indicated via gas detection, a leak of hydrocarbon at <...> jacket well bay. This detection resulted in the automatic shutdown and vent of the <...>
Platform. The crew mustered due to activation of general alarm. When the area was confirmed clear of gas and in safe condition, an investigation team was sent to <...> jacket to determine the
source of the gas release. Investigation found a small bore needle valve in the open position on slot 3 flowline isolation. Further investigation is underway to determine root cause and corrective
action.
The reason for reporting this incident is because the event that took place was potentially life threatening. A team of personnel had been involved in the installation of a refurbished generator
package prime mover. After completion of the installation and mechanical coupling to the alternator, the engine was started. During this phase of the work it was noted that the engine was
labouring, this was soon followed by smoke coming from the alternator therefore the engine was immediately shutdown. On investigation it was noted that the feed cables from the alternator had
been disconnected and left in an unsafe condition (creating a short circuit to traywork). These cables had been disconnected to allow connection of a temporary generator, however, the additional
disconnections had not been noted on the Isolation Certifcate therbey allowing test of the engine without the realisation of the danger. (The isolations were performed by a different work party).
Investigation is ongoing into the root cause.
During the change out of the fuel gas flexi pipe on the D power generator fuel gas system a small volume of gas was released when the line was broken. Two gas heads (<...> and <...>) in the
enclosure reached high alarm and reset within 2 minutes
During Tri-ethylene glycol transfer from bulk tank into the cooling medium process system, a purpose installed ' <...>' pump was being used to carry out the operation. At one point in the
operation the '<...> ' pump stalled.The operator cycled the air supply off then in an attempt to restart the pump. At this point the air supply relief valve, <...>. distintegrated. The bonnet of the value
was projected a distance of 600mm where it hit a grating above the valve then fell to the deck. The operator immediately cut off the air supply to the pump skid and made the area safe before
reporting the incident to his supervisor. No persons were injured nor was there any loss of glycol in this incident. Initial examination shows that the bonnet of the valve which retains the setting
spring has become detached from the body of the valve and the boss on the valve which has the bonnet retaining thread is broken. The valve is a <...> type <...>" relief valve which according to
records is set at 7.8barg. The valve is of a die-cast aluminium type construction. The work air supply system is regulated at 6barg.and has a releif valve set at 6.5barg. The air system was operating
normally at the time of the incident. An investigation into this incident is in progress on the installation. <...>
<...>. Running in hole with cement stinger displaced and figures show 12 barrels increase. Floor checked and well flowing 24 barrels per hour. Closed in well - no pressure build up observed.
Circulated well over choke, increase mud weight to give 200 psi over balance. Continued top run cement stinger.
A stinger tool was used to check the integrity of the lower master gate valve. It was attached to the LMGV bleed port and to an elmar pump unit. The LMGV was not fully closed and the isolation
valves between the stinger and the elmar pump were open. Hydrocarbon flowed from the well via the stinger to the elmar tank and was released to atmosphere.
At 09.00 an Area Technician spotted a small leak of liquid hydrocarbons from a small hole on the <...> 3rd stage separation relief line. A controlled platform shutdown was then carried out. At no
time was the leak detected by fixed gas detection. Repair options are currently being assessed.

Whilst changing out the west drill floor 19mm winch wire the snakes (pulling grips) connecting the old and new wires became separated at the main connector. The new wire had passed through
the crown and monkey board sheaves and the snake was approx 5ft below the monkey board and 80ft above the drill floor. The old wire fell to the drill floor and the new wire back spooled, falling
onto the rig floor becoming entangled in the travelling block and top drive drilling systems. As part of the pre task toolbox talk, the positioning of people was considered, so if any failure occurred
no major injury could occur. The two snakes were joined by a standard link,which appears to have failed. The link is constructed of two sections, joined by a pin. One part of the link was
subsequently found and it is likely that the pin has sheared, allowing the two sections of the link to part. The snakes themselves did not become detached from the wires. A safety alert will be
produced to inform other users of this potential.
During normal operations on <...> (circulating fluids in liner), drilling engine number 3 caught fire. This was picked up by fixed detectors, IR and smoke, and all the generators were shut down.
Power to the module was also killed. The fixed fine water spray system in the module activated and largely extinguished the fire. The platform went to full muster, and the Emergency Response
Team extinguished the last remnants of the fire using hand held dry powder extinguishers. On examination afterwards, there is evident physical damage to the supercharger outlet system. It
appears that there has been catastrophic internal failure somewhere within the engine, which has caused the event. The oil process remained running, as there were no threat to safe operations,
and the circulation of fluids has resumed with the other two engines. A full strip down of the engine by specialists will be required to determine the cause of the failure.
Workparty were working down Leg C. The winch was lowered with some instrument equipment to carry out the work. On retrieving the basket the winch operator commanded the winch to stop.
The winch continued to move in an upwards direction. Before the air could be isolated the winch cage struck the hatch cover. Winch cage was retrieved and maintenance work order was raised to
investigate fault. Fault was traced to the Hand Interlock Solenoid supplied by <...>. Solenoid has been changed and the winch is back in operation.
GT1 (<...> Titan Gas Turbine) undergoing replacement of burners by <...>rep. Following replacement of burners on GT1 the machine was started & had reached 98% NGP when the enclosure
exhaust gas detection was activated & shut down the unit. Upon inspection of the GT it was found that the half clamp on pilot gas flexi pipe had not been torqued & the leak of fuel gas had
originated from there. The leak was downstream from the fuel gas supply valve. The environmental conditions did not affect the leak as it was in an enclosure.
A programme of replacing recycle valves on three <...> oil booster pumps was ongoing. The valve on the "B" pump had been replaced the previous day and the pump returned to service. The new
recycle valve had just been installed on "A" pump and leak tested with N2. The pump was returned to service at 15.45 and closely monitored for approximately 2 hours. At 18.41 a low level gas
detector was activitated and immediately investigated. It was found that the gland packing on the newly fitted valve had failed resulting in spillage of crude oil onto the deck around the booster
pumps. The pump was shut down to prevent the further leakage of hydrocarbon. The failed valve was a 3 300# globe valve manufactured by <...>. The valve had been fully hydrotested and N2
gas tested by the supplier (<...>) prior to shipping to <...>. The valve will be removed and replaced with a spool piece and the failed valve returned to the supplier for a full investigation of the
failure.

Code (Chain1-5)

Type of event

Explanation

AN

Anchor failure

BL

Blowout

CA
CL

Capsize
Collision

Problems with anchor/anchor lines, mooring devices, winching equipment or fairleads (e.g. anchor
dragging, breaking of mooring lines, loss of anchor(s), winch failures).
An uncontrolled flow of gas, oil or other fluids from the reservoir, i.e. loss of 1. barrier (i.e.
hydrostatic head) or leak and loss of 2. barrier, i.e. BOP/DHSV.
Loss of stability resulting in overturn of unit, capsizing, or toppling of unit.
Accidental contact between offshore unit and/or passing marine vessel when at least one of them is
propelled or is under tow. Examples: tanker, cargo ship, fishing vessel. Also included are collisions
with bridges, quays, etc., and vessels engaged in the oil and gas activity on other platforms than the
platform affected, and between two offshore installations (to be coded as CN only when intended for
close location).

CN

Contact

Collisions/accidental contacts between vessels engaged in the oil and gas activity on the platform
affected, e.g. support/supply/stand-by vessels, tugs or helicopters, and offshore installations (mobile
or fixed). Also are included collisions between two offshore installations only when these are
intended for close location.

CR

Crane accident

Any event caused by or involving cranes, derrick and draw-works, or any other lifting equipment.

EX
FA

Explosion
Falling load

FI
FO
GR
HE
LE

Fire
Foundering
Grounding
Helicopter accident
Leakage

LG

Spill/release

LI
MA
PO

List
Machinery failure
Off position

Explosion
Falling load/dropped objects from crane, drill derrick, or any other lifting equipment or platform.
Crane fall and lifeboats accidentally to sea and man overboard are also included.
Fire.
Loss of buoyancy or unit sinking.
Floating installation in contact with the sea bottom.
Accident with helicopter either on helideck or in contact with the installation.
Leakage of water into the unit or filling of shaft or other compartments causing potential loss of
buoyancy or stability problems.
Loss of containment. Release of fluid or gas to the surroundings from unit's own
equipment/vessels/tanks causing (potential) pollution and/or risk of explosion and/or fire.
Uncontrolled inclination of unit.
Propulsion or thruster machinery failure (incl. control)
Unit unintentionally out of its expected position or drifting out of control.

ST

Structural damage

Breakage or fatigue failures (mostly failures caused by weather, but not necessarily) of structural
support and direct structural failures. "Punch through" also included.

TO
WP

Towing accident
Well problem

OT

Other

Towline failure or breakage

Accidental problem with the well, i.e. loss of one barrier (hydrostatic head) or other downhole
problems.
Event other than specified above

Code (Type of Unit)

Type of Unit

Explanation

AC
CO
DP

Accommodation
Compression
Drilling&production

Accommodation platforms
Gas compression platforms
Traditional (manned) production platforms, steel jackets or GBSs.
Included are also platforms with drilling, production, and
accommodation facilities

DR
PR

Drilling
Production

PU
RI
WS

Pumping
Riser/injection
Wellsupport/wellhead

Drilling platforms with the only purpose of perform

(Manned) production platforms with no drilling facilities, but with
accommodation
Pumping platforms
Water or gas injection and riser platforms
Wellhead platforms (normally unmanned) with no processing
facilities, serving as well support. Often linked to the main
production platforms.

Note: Both DP and PR

type of units are
referred to as
'Production' in the
report

Code (Operation Mode)

Operation mode

Explanation

AB
AC
CS
DD

Construction
Development drilling

EV
PR
WO

Completion
Production
Well workover

Unit under construction (inshore/offshore) and commissioning until production start

Development and production drilling; incl. concurrent drilling and production and drilling
of injection wells
Completion or abandonment of ongoing drilling operation
Production
Well workover (light or heavy), e.g. wireline operation

Code (Event Category)

Event Category

Explanation

Accident

Incident

Hazardous situation which have developed into an accidental situation. In addition, for all
situations/events causing fatalities and severe injuries this code should be used
Hazardous situation not developed into an accidental situation. Low degree of damage, but
repairs/replacements are required. This code should also be used for events causing minor
injuries to personnel or health injuries.

Near-Miss

Unsignificant

Events that might have or could have developed into an accidental situation. No damage and
no repairs required
Hazardous situation, but consequences very minor. No damage, no repairs required. Small
spills of crude oil and chemicals are also included. To be included are also very minor
personnel injuries, i.e. "lost time incidents".