TERMS WITH MULTIPLE MEANING

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because
the evidence does not show that defendants guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but
dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid
or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is
commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after
the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal
and the court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal
is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution
fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it
were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent
jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case the defendant may again be
prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-56028 : July 30, 1981.]
NILO A. MALANYAON, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. HON. ESTEBAN M. LISING, as Judge of
the CFI of Camarines Sur, Br. VI, and CESARIO GOLETA, as Municipal Treasurer of Bula,
Camarines Sur, Respondents-Appellees.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The question which is presented to Us for resolution in this petition for review concerns the
interpretation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act which stipulates:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and
to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
The facts are stated in the Order dated October 3, 1980, of the respondent judge:
The late Mayor S.B. Pontanal is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. P-339 for
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Upon the filing of the case
against him in court and after hearing, he was suspended from office and during his
incumbency he died. Due to his death the charge against him in Criminal Case No. P339 was dismissed. Petitioner now contends that any disbursement of funds by the
respondent, Cesario Goleta, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer in favor of the heirs
of the late Mayor for salaries corresponding to the period he was under suspension
and other benefits will be illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 13 because
said late Mayor S.B. Pontanal was not acquitted of the charge against him.
Nilo A. Malanyaon, the petitioner, was formerly a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula,
Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Cesario Goleta
as Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur, to Venancia Pontanal, widow
of the late Mayor S.B. Pontanal, in the amount of P5,000.00 representing a portion of the salary
of the late Mayor as such mayor of said municipality during the period of his suspension from
August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979, and to restrain or prevent respondent Cesario
Goleta as such Municipal Treasurer of the aforementioned municipality from further paying or
disbursing the balance of the claim. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Par. 1 of the Order, supra.)
However, the respondent judge dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case
against the late Mayor S.B. Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.

Respondents invoke Art. 81, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that Death of the
accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal and civil liability. We do not see the relevance
of this provision to the case at bar. For one thing the case against Mayor Pontanal was not on
appeal but on trial. For another thing the claim for back salaries is neither a criminal nor a civil
liability. It is in fact a right provided the conditions of the law are present.:onad
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be well-taken, the same is hereby granted, the order of the
court a quo is hereby set aside and another one is entered declaring illegal the payment of
municipal funds for the salaries of the late Mayor S.B. Pontanal during his suspension from
office and ordering the respondent treasurer to retrieve payments so far disbursed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE OF ASSOCIATED WORDS OR NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19650

September 29, 1966

CALTEX
(PHILIPPINES),
INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondentappellant.

We grant the petition and set aside the Order of the court a quo.

Office
of
the
Solicitor
General
for
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being acquitted it means
that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the
suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal. As aptly stated
in People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722, 732-733[1949]:

CASTRO, J.:

respondent

and

appellant.

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and
laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil
products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to
estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its
advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open
indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to
participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station
where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer
Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by
the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the
next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle
and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with
batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be
qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the
qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize,
second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners
will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their
respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional secondprize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the
national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed
can from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be
made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second;
Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were
made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing,
having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
pertinent provisions of which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the
following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into
the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the
Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau
of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner
pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or
chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of
any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or
company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of
any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may

instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the
person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or
stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class mailed by
or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such
person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer
service.The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any
person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for
the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment
by any postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or
company or to the agent of any such person or company, whether such agent is acting
as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may
provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money
orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31,
1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to
justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the
purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its
counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand,
stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest
was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion
rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217,
Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned
by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails
for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a
fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief
against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its
'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to
allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After
issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered
judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules
marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether
the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the
proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in
seriatim.

1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the
applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to
any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction
or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now
section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to
established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to
wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs.
The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R.
No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition herein
states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases
thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of
significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of
some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means,
and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its
products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal
Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof particularly
thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative
Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee
laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible
difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it
was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However,
likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the
Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly
declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the
applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their
respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its
position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this
impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the proposed
contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it and all its
representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's
insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge
thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly
spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other,
concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or issue. The contenders are as real as
their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of
views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To
the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law
he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the
contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders
are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their
differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of
the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires
are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others" which admittedly does not confer a
cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in

the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West
Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of
construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given
set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory
relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the
circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the
matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is
the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the
scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.
To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand
can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to
a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed.
Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has
taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate
resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the
necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper,
animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing
the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited
in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it
has been cast, would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot
obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest
and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened
with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if
the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed
censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is
constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit
of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object
(section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law we can
see in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our
intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand
down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a
declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But
more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines).
In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also
of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that
our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not
without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a
corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its
proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales
promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held
that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county
prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis
vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc.
vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical
terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely nonmailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise
deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue
posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc.
vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal
authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for
this jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having
to do with the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery"
extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing,
gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The
three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third,
chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne
[1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen
and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel
Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too
obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant
himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of
consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in
the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the
gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or
indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes
in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the
chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in
which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus

No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have
to buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with
the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from to , and win valuable
prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought,
any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A
prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is
available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction,
"look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and
pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra,
p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a
gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex
products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege
to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the
use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly
needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of value.1awphl.nt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would
naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged
to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The
required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the
contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.)
788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether
those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the
prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that
of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does
receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing;
does not supply the element of consideration.Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex.
Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with
under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money,
or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally
prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of
consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to
achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive justice. Recalling
that the appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series
1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for
want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not
essential, the determination of whether or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration
as we have found it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.

While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit
words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the
term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market
value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850;
34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with
Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs.
Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs.
State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot
embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed
within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think
that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings
there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of
the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs.
States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E.,
88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114
Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a
lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite
elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113
Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.,
2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S.,
1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga.
App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is
explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some
cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used
interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of
consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing
Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra).
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every
case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with
the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle
of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although
only insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature
of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration,
so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the
slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to
the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud
orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for
disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As
applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized
necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals
(Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that
something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that

where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can
hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is
not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly
or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated
or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25
Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are
persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have
heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the
contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the
appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

FIRST DIVISION
NIXON T. KUA, G.R. No. 159410
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ.
ROBERT DEAN S. BARBERS, Promulgated:
Respondent.
January 28, 2008
X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court are the May 30, 2003 Decision [1] and August 7, 2003 Resolution [2] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74136, which dismissed the quo warranto petition filed against respondent
for assuming the office of the General Manager of Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).

Malacaang
November 12, 2002
Sir:

The facts are uncontested.

On November 7, 2000, petitioner Nixon T. Kua, who was then one of the three non- ex
officio part-time members of the PTA Board of Directors, was appointed as PTA General
Manager by former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. The text of his appointment read:

Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby

appointed GENERAL
MANAGER/CHIEF
EXECUTIVE
OFFICER,
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (PTA), DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM
(DOT), for a term of six (6) years expiring on October 3, 2008, vice Nixon T.
Kua.

Office of the President

of the Philippines
Malacaang

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the
duties of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission
with copies of your oath of office.

7 November 2000

(Sgd) Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

Sir:
Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed
GENERAL MANAGER, PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY vice Angelito
T. Banayo.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the
duties of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission
with copies of your Oath of Office.
(Sgd) Joseph Ejercito Estrada
MR. NIXON KUA
Thru: The Office of the General Manager
Philippine Tourism Authority
City of Manila[3]

On the same day, petitioner took his oath of office before Associate Justice Teodoro P.
Regino of the Court of Appeals.[4] For ceremonial purposes, he again took his oath on December
12, 2000 before the President at Malacaang.

Two years after petitioners appointment, on November 12, 2002, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Robert Dean S. Barbers as General Manager/Chief
Executive Officer of the PTA. Stated in the letter of appointment, which was transmitted by the
Executive Secretary to the Department of Tourism (DOT) Secretary,[5] are as follows:
Office of the President
of the Philippines

Hon. ROBERT DEAN S. BARBERS

Thru: The Secretary
Department of Tourism
DOT Building, T.F. Valencia Circle
Ermita, Manila[6]
Thereafter, respondent took his oath of office and assumed the position.
Contending that his position as PTA General Manager has been usurped and
unlawfully assumed by respondent, petitioner filed a Petition for Quo Warranto with Damages
and Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction before the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002.[7]
Petitioner alleged that Section 23-A of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 564 (otherwise
known as the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority), as added by Sec. 2 of P.D.
No. 1400, provides that the PTA General Manager shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless
sooner removed for cause.[8] Hence, there was no vacancy in the said office at the time of
respondents appointment since his term has not yet expired; he has not resigned or accepted
any incompatible office and that neither has he abandoned the position nor been removed
therefrom for a cause. Petitioner argued that the term of office of the PTA General Manager is
fixed and should not be equated with a situation where the law contemplates a regular rotation
or cycle in the membership like in the appointment and filling of vacancy of the three non- ex
officio part-time members of the PTA Board of Directors, which is governed by Sections 15 and
16 of P.D. No. 564.[9] He contended that these sections must be interpreted separately and
distinctly from Sec. 23-A of the same law. This is as it should be since, according to him, it is
well-established in this jurisdiction that a newly appointed or elected public officer will only be
made to serve the unexpired portion of the term when it is so expressly provided; the clear intent
of the creating power is that the entire board of an agency should not go out of office at once but
that different groups should retire at regularly recurring intervals (citing Republic v. Imperial[10]);
and the beginning or end of the fixed term has been provided (citing Boynton v.
Heart[11]).Petitioner, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered:
1.

OUSTING AND EXCLUDING respondent Robert Dean S. Barbers

from the position of PTA General Manager which he unlawfully holds,
restoring petitioner to the possession thereof, and issuing a final
injunction against said respondent under Section 9, Rule 58,
perpetually restraining respondent from usurping the position of PTA
General Manager;

2.

DECLARING that petitioner Nixon T. Kua is the one lawfully entitled to

hold the aforesaid position; and

3.

ORDERING respondent to pay petitioner the following damages: (1)

Actual damages in the amount of One Thousand Three Hundred Fifty
Eight Pesos (P1,358.00) per day from the time petitioner was
unlawfully deprived of his office until he has reassumed the same; (2)
Moral damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00), and (3) Attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the
amount of P500,000.00.[12]

On the other hand, respondent countered that he was validly appointed as PTA
General Manager since the position was legally vacant at the time of his appointment. He
averred that the term of office of petitioner had already expired at the time, the latter being
merely appointed for the duration of the unexpired portion of the term of his predecessor. In
support thereof, respondent stated that while Sec. 23-A of P.D. No. 564 clearly specifies the
duration of the term of office of the PTA General Manager it is silent as to the date of the terms
commencement and termination; hence, it is understood to start from the date of the first
appointment and end after the expiration of the period.Following this argument, he claimed that
the term of the persons subsequently appointed to the office of the PTA General Manager is to
be reckoned from the date when P.D. No. 1400 took effect, which was on October 3, 1978, since
P.D. No. 564 does not contain any provision regarding its duration, thus:

1st Term 3 October 1978 2 October 1984

2nd Term 3 October 1984 2 October 1990
3rd Term 3 October 1990 2 October 1996
4th Term 3 October 1996 2 October 2002
5th Term 3 October 2002 2 October 2008

As petitioner was appointed on November 7, 2000, respondent asserted that it falls within the
4th term, which filled the unexpired term of the 4 th term that ended on October 2, 2002. Moreover,

On May 30, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, [13] the decretal
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, for want of any leg in law to stand on, the instant
petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[14]

In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals reasoned:

Under P.D. No. 1400, taken in relation to P.D. No. 564, the terms
of office of the general manager and the part-time members were uniformly
fixed at six (6) years but following the initial staggered set-up, their terms
have been made rotational in the sense that they were not to end at the
same time, and while the appointments of the three (3) part-time board
members have been mandated to be made at an interval of two (2) years,
the appointment of the general manager has been designated to coincide
with one of the three (3) part-time members, particularly the one whose
initial term was four (4) years. To elucidate, the terms of office of the first set
of board members, exclusive of the ex officio chairman, who were appointed
in 1974 were to expire in this order:
Indefinite - General Manager
1980 - 1st part-time member (initial
6-year term)
1978 - 2nd part-time member (initial
4-year term)
1976 - 3rd part-time member (initial
2-year term)
But after 1978, with the term of the general manager having been pruned
down to six (6) years from that same year, the expiration of his fixed term
was to be factored in along with that of the second set of part-time
members, all of whom by then already had uniform six (6)-year terms, in this
way:

respondent alleged that the wording of petitioners appointment that is, vice Angelito T. Banayo

1986 - 1st part-time member

contradicts the theory that the latters appointment was for a complete term of six

1984 - General Manager and 2nd parttime member

years. As vice means in lieu of, instead of, and in place of in legal parlance, he asserted that
petitioners tenure as PTA General Manager was only to complete the remaining two years of the
4th term which was left vacant by his predecessor.

1982 - 3rd part-time member

Every two (2) years thereafter, new appointments were to be made, with the
general manager being appointed together with a part-time member (the
second part-time member); hence, for the third, fourth and fifth sets of
appointees, the sequence of the expiration of their respective terms would
be as follows:
(a)

Third set:

1992 - 1st part-time member

1990 - General Manager and 2nd parttime member

chairman, to furnish us the desired documents. From the List of Succession,

Date of Appointment and Tenure of the General Manager of PTA submitted
by the Secretary, we found out that no permanent appointment of a general
manager had been made prior to April 6, 1990.
On August 20, 1974, Col. Rodolfo Cacdac was merely
designated acting general manager by President Marcos; and he held
office as such until July 19, 1978.

1988 - 3rd part-time member

(b) Fourth set:

On July 20, 1978, Engr. Bernardo Vergara was likewise

designated acting general manager also by President Marcos; and he
manned the post until April 6, 1986.

1998 - 1st part-time member

1996 - General Manager and 2nd parttime member
1994 - 3rd part-time member

(c)

Fifth set:
2004 - 1st part-time member
nd

2002 - General Manager and 2 parttime member

On April 7, 1986, Ramon P. Binamira was designated, this time

by Tourism Minister Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, but his designation was, by
its nature, only temporary and eventually recalled on January 4, 1990 by
Her Excellency, Corazon C. Aquino, who ascended to the presidency by
virtue of the EDSA I people power revolution, and who designated Tourism
Secretary Peter D. Garrucho as concurrent General Manager until she could
appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.
It was only on April 6, 1990 that President Aquino appointed Jose
A. Capistrano, Jr. permanent general manager. Consequently, this
date April 6, 1990 should be the reckoning point in determining the first six
(6)-year term of the office of the PTA general manager. It was to end
on April 5, 1996.

2000 - 3rd part-time member

The coincidence of the terms of the general manager and the
second part-time member of the board could have been calculated to
assure the continual presence of a quorum, together with the concurrent
chairman, and to forestall the impairment of the power of the board to
execute the functions of the Authority under Section 18 of P.D. No. 564 x x
x.
And the provision of Section 16 of the same Decree x x x insures
no break in the six (6)-year terms of the general manager and each of the
part-time members of the board.
These features of P.D. No. 564, as amended by P.D. No. 1400, fit
to-a-tee into the x x x pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Republic vs.
Imperial [96 Phil. 770 (1955). Cf. Gaminde vs. COA, 401 Phil. 77 (2000)] x x
x which is applicable four-square to the case at bar, contrary to the stance of
the petitioner.
Examining the appointment of petitioner Kua in the case before
us, we readily see that it is expressly tied up to the appointment of Angelito
T. Banayo, his predecessor x x x.

The reckoning point cannot be October 3, 1978, the date of

effectivity of P.D. No. 1400, following its publication in the Official Gazette on
October 2, 1978, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Taada
vs. Tuvera, as posited by the respondent, because no permanent
appointment to the position had been made prior to April 6, 1990, and the
law (P.D. No. 1400) cannot operate in a vacuum or before the factual
situation it is meant to govern has arisen.
But Capistrano did not exhaust his full six (6)-year term as he
stayed in the position only until July 31, 1992.
On July 8, 1992, President Fidel Ramos appointed Eduardo T.
Joaquin who succeeded Capistrano on July 31, 1992.
The unexpired portion of Capistranos term assumed by Joaquin
was to end on April 5, 1996 but Joaquin remained as PTA general manager
in a hold-over capacity until June 29, 1998, by virtue of Sec. 23-A of P.D.
No. 564, as amended by P.D. No. 1400.

In light of x x x Sections 15 and 16 of P.D. No. 546, we are called

upon to determine when Banayos term had begun and ended to be able to
decide when his successors, i.e., petitioners[,] own term commenced and
expired.

On June 30, 1998, President Estrada appointed Angelito T.

Banayo whose six (6)-year term to be reckoned from April 6, 1996, the end
of the term of his predecessor, including the period spanned by Joaquins
hold-over tenure, was to expire on April 5, 2002, conformably with Section
15 of P.D. No. 564 which commands that, a successor to a member whose
term has expired shall be appointed for the full term of six years from the
date of expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed.

Although the parties, particularly the respondent, made reference

to previous appointments to the position of PTA general manager, neither of
them submitted authenticated copies thereof. Hence, to give us a complete
picture of the situation, we required the Secretary of Tourism, being the PTA

Accordingly, when petitioner Nixon T. Kua was appointed

on November 7, 2000, the unexpired portion of Banayos term which he
assumed ended on April 5, 2002 in consonance with Section 16 of the
same P.D. No. 564 which directs that any member appointed to fill a

vacancy prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was
appointed shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term of his
predecessor.
The position, therefore, became vacant on April 6, 2002. That the
petitioner continued to sit in the position and even afterwards could not, as it
did not, bar its being filled up by a new appointee as his prolonged stay was
already on borrowed time as a mere hold-over general manager, pursuant
to Section 23-A of the same P.D. No. 564, as added by P.D. No. 1400, which
states that, upon the expiration of his (general manager) term, he shall
serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified.
Hence, respondents appointment on November 12, 2002 cannot but be
valid as the position was then already very much vacant and the petitioner
had no more security or guarantee of tenure that could be transgressed, or
even merely to speak of. But respondents term is up to April 5, 2008 only,
and not October 3, 2008 as stated in his appointment.[15]

Petitioner moved to reconsider the Decision.[16] He insisted that Sections 15 and 16 of

P.D. No. 564 apply only to the three non-ex officio part-time members of the PTA Board while
Sec. 23-A of the same decree governs the term of office of the PTA General Manager. Petitioner
refused to concede to the Court of Appeals interpretation because, according to him, the logical
consequence is that the term of office of the DOT Secretary, who is also an ex officio member of
the PTA Board, would have to be governed by Sections 15 and 16 of P.D. No. 564. He stressed
that since the positions held by the DOT Secretary and General Manager in the PTA are
practically the same, in the sense that both are ex officio members of the PTA Board, the court
must not distinguish or make an interpretation that does not appear or is not intended or
reflected in the very language of the statute.

because prior to the amendment it was only they who had fixed terms of office staggered at six,
four and two years for the initial appointees and a uniform term of six years for the succeeding
ones while the PTA General Manager had none. When P.D. No. 1400 took effect, however, the
term of office of the PTA General Manager was fixed also at six years. Consequently, reading
together with the amendatory law, Sec. 16 of P.D. No. 564 should likewise be applicable to the
position of PTA General Manager, who is undeniably a member of the PTA Board.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the DOT Secretary and the PTA General
Manager are both members of the PTA Board in an ex officio capacity, Sec. 16 of P.D. No. 564
cannot be applied with respect to the latter. It noted that the difference lies on the issue of
security of tenure: unlike the PTA General Manager who could sit in the position for six years
unless removed for a cause, the DOT Secretary does not enjoy the same protection since as an
alter ego of the President he holds office at the latters pleasure.
Lastly, the appellate court rejected the applicability of the DOJ Opinion cited by
petitioner, observing that Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 172 does not contain a provision that an appointed
member of the ERB shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term of his predecessor if a
vacancy in the board occurs prior to the expiration of the latters term.
Now before us, petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
1.

Whether the term of office of petitioner expired on April 5, 2002 and not
on November 7, 2006.

2.

Whether the rotational scheme of appointments, laid down in Republic v.

Imperial and in Gaminde v. Commission on Audit should apply to the case of
petitioner in determining his term of office.[22]

The CA ruling is sustained.

Furthermore, petitioner disputed the Court of Appeals application to the present case
of this Courts rulings in Republic v. Imperial[17] and Gaminde v. Commission on Audit.[18] He
explained that, compared with the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, the
office of the PTA General Manager is not a constitutional body composed of commissioners
appointed on a rotational basis in order to prevent the President of the Philippines from
appointing more than one commissioner during his or her term to ensure and
maintain their independence. Invoking a Department of Justice (DOJ)

On May 11, 1973, P.D. No. 189 renamed the Department of Trade and Tourism as the
Department of Trade and created the DOT with the PTA attached to it. After more than a year,
on October 2, 1974, the decree was revised by P.D. No. 564. On this point, relevant for our
consideration are Sections 15 and 16 thereof, which are quoted again for clarity:

Opinion dated March 16, 2001 (Opinion No. 18, Series of 2001),[19] which ruled on the
inapplicability of the rotational scheme of appointment enunciated in Imperial andGaminde to the
case of the Chairman and Members of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), petitioner advanced
the argument that, applying the rule of noscitur a sociis, Sec. 16 of P.D. No. 564 should be
construed as limited only to the non-ex officio part-time members of the PTA and should not be
read or incorporated with Sec. 23-A thereof as the latter section merely fixes the term of office of
the PTA General Manager at six years without expressly stating that such term is subject to the
rotational system of appointment.Accordingly, the term of office of the PTA General Manager
should start from the date of acceptance of the appointment and expire six years thereafter. He
added that in Binamira v. Garrucho,[20] wherein the office of the PTA General Manager was
likewise contested, this Court never mentioned the rotational scheme laid down in Imperial to
determine the terms of office of the PTA Board members.

SEC. 16. Vacancy Before Expiration of Term. Any member

appointed to fill a vacancy in the Board occurring prior to the expiration of
the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall serve only for the
unexpired portion of the term of his predecessor.

In denying petitioners motion, [21] the Court of Appeals opined that P.D. No. 1400, as an
amendatory law, should be viewed in conjunction with P.D. No. 564. Particularly, it held that Sec.
16 of P.D. No. 564 referred only to the non-ex officio part-time members of the PTA Board

SEC. 15. Term of Office. The term of office of the part-time

members of the Board shall be six years. Of the part-time members first
appointed, one shall hold office for six years, one for four years, and the last
one for two years. A successor to a member whose term has expired shall
be appointed for the full term of six years from the date of expiration of the
term for which his predecessor was appointed.

Later, on June 5, 1978, P.D. No. 564 was amended by P.D. No. 1400. Among the
modifications introduced was the addition of Section 23-A to the existing decree, stating:
Section 23-A. General Manager Appointment and Tenure. The
General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and
shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for

cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as
such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified.
Essentially, the bottom line of the issues raised by petitioner is whether Sections 15
and 16 of P.D. No. 564 should be read in relation to Sec. 23-A such that the PTA General
Manager may also be required to hold office only for the unexpired portion of the term of his
predecessor, if appointed to fill a vacancy in the Board which occurred prior to the expiration of
the latters term.
Petitioner maintains his submission that Sections 15 and 16 of P.D. No. 564 are
applicable only to the three non-ex officio part-time members of the PTA Board. Aside from
reiterating his arguments in the court below, he adds that there is a marked difference between
the tasks of the PTA General Manager and the part-time members: the powers and duties of the
PTA Board are enumerated in Sec. 22 of P.D. No. 564 which are alleged to be circumscribed
solely to participating in the exercise of the corporate powers and functions of the PTA, while
those of the General Manager are found in Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the same law. Also, the
principal function of the PTA General Manager is to act as PTAs Chief Executive and to direct,
manage, and supervise its day-to-day operations and internal administration in accordance with
the policies set by the Board. He is furthermore said to be vested with additional authority and
functions in the event of extraordinary emergencies.
The argument is not tenable.

In Estrada v. Caseda,[23] this Court held:

An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original
statute had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended
form had been adopted in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so
far as regards any action after the adoption of the amendment, [it is] as if
the statute had been originally enacted in its amended form. The
amendment becomes a part of the original statute as if it had always been
contained therein, unless such amendment involves the abrogation of
contractual relations between the state and others. Where an amendment
leaves certain portions of the original act unchanged, such portions are
continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they had before the
amendment x x x .[24]

The Court is, therefore, in full accord with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
provisions of P.D. No. 1400, particularly Sec. 2 thereof which added Sec. 23-A, should be
considered as part and parcel of P.D. No. 564 as if it had always been contained in the latter at
the time it took effect. On the other hand, the portions of the original act left unchanged by the
succeeding law are continued in force, bearing the same meaning and effect that they had
before the amendment.
But what exactly then is the proper construction of Section 16 of P.D. No. 564?
The significant provisions of P.D. No. 564, which were unaltered by P.D. No. 1400,
would reveal that petitioners resolute insistence is to no avail. Sections 17 to 21 of P.D. No. 564
provide, thus:
SEC. 17. Per Diems. Unless otherwise fixed by the President of
the Philippines, the members of the Board shall receive for every meeting

attended as per diem of not to exceed two hundred pesos (P200); Provided,
That such per diems shall not exceed one thousand pesos (P1,000) during
any month for each member. Members of the Board shall be reimbursed
by the Authority for actual expenses (including traveling and subsistence
expenses) incurred by them in the performance of their duties for the
Authority as may be specifically authorized by the Board.
SEC. 18. Quorum; Effect of Vacancies. The presence of three
members of the Board, including the Chairman or the Vice Chairman, shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of the Board.
Vacancies in the Board, as long as there shall be three
members in the office, shall not impair the powers of the Board to execute
the functions of the Authority.
SEC. 19. Withdrawal from the Meeting of a Member Having
Prohibited Interest. Whenever a member of the Board has a personal
interest of any sort on a matter before the Board, or any of his business
associates, or any of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or second degree of affinity has such interest, he shall not
participate in the discussion or resolution of the matter and must retire from
the meeting during the deliberations thereon. After the Board has resolved
the matter, the fact that the member concerned or any of his business
associate, or his relatives within the prohibited degrees has a personal
interest in it, is to be made available to the public and the minutes of the
meeting shall note the withdrawal of the member concerned.
SEC. 20. Removal or Suspension for Cause. A member of the
Board may be suspended or removed by the President for cause, such as:
mismanagement, grave abuse of discretion, infidelity in the conduct of
fiduciary relations, gross negligence in the performance of duties,
dishonesty, corruption, or any act involving moral turpitude.
SEC. 21. Meetings of the Board. The Board shall meet as
frequently as necessary to discharge its duties and responsibility properly,
but shall meet regularly at least once a month. The Board shall be convoked
by the Chairman or upon the written request of a majority of its members.
Except when otherwise provided for in this Decree, the vote of a majority of
the members constituting a quorum shall be sufficient for the adoption of
any rule, resolution, decision or any act of the Board. (Emphasis ours)[25]

Upon analysis of the afore-quoted sections, specifically of the emphasized words and
phrases, one obvious fact is manifest: that Sections 17 to 21 of P.D. No. 564 speak
ofmember/s in a generic sense; no particular allusion whatsoever is made on the DOT
Secretary, the General Manager or the three part-time members of the PTA Board. Said
provisions equally apply to them all without distinction or qualification. Necessarily, the logical
consequence of this would be to construe Sec. 16 of P.D. No. 564 in light of the company of
words where it is found, that is, Sections 17 to 21 thereof. Perforce, the words any
member mentioned in Sec. 16 should be understood to refer not just to the part-time members
of the PTA Board but to its General Manager as well.
The foregoing declaration is but sensible since it is a basic rule in statutory
construction "that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute
must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever

possible."[26] Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the
latter.[27]

GANCAYCO, J.:

Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, which even petitioner himself recognizes but
appears to have misapplied, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of the words in which it is found or with which it is associated. [28] Stated
differently, the obscurity or doubt on a particular word or phrase may be removed by reference to
associated words.[29]

On October 28, 1980, the vessel M/V "P. Aboitiz" took on board in Hongkong for shipment to
Manila some cargo consisting of one (1) twenty (20)-footer container holding 271 rolls of goods
for apparel covered by Bill of Lading No. 515-M and one (1) forty (40)-footer container holding
four hundred forty- seven (447) rolls, ten (10) bulk and ninety-five (95) cartons of goods for
apparel covered by Bill of Lading No. 505-M. The total value, including invoice value, freightage,
customs duties, taxes and similar imports amounts to US$39,885.85 for the first shipment while
that of the second shipment amounts to US$94,190.55. Both shipments were consigned to the
Philippine Apparel, Inc. and insured with the General Accident Fire and Life Assurance
Corporation, Ltd. (GAFLAC for short). The vessel is owned and operated by Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation (Aboitiz for short).

Moreover, the lawmaking body is presumed to know the meaning of the words
employed in the statute and to have used them advisedly.[30] It is recognized that the Legislature
is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and that in the absence of any
express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision is deemed enacted pursuant to the
legislative policy embodied in the prior statutes which should all be construed together.[31]
To conclude, Section 23-A, as well as all other amendments made by P.D. No. 1400,
should be read in connection with the provisions of P.D. No. 564 as if all had been enacted at the
same time in the said decree, and, as far as possible, effect should be given to them all in
furtherance of the general design of the statute.[32]
On the basis of the above disquisition alone, this Court finds no necessity to further
dwell on our rulings in Imperial and Gaminde, which deal with the rotational scheme of
appointment, to bolster the correct position of respondent affirmed by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 30, 2003 Decision and August 7,
2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The extent of the liability of a carrier of goods is again brought to the fore in this case.

On October 31, 1980 on its way to Manila the vessel sunk and it was declared lost with all its
cargoes. GAFLAC paid the consignee the amounts US$39,885.85 or P319,086.80 and
US$94,190.55 or P753,524.40 for the lost cargo. As GAFLAC was subrogated to all the rights,
interests and actions of the consignee against Aboitiz, it filed an action for damages against
Aboitiz in the Regional Trial Court of Manila alleging that the loss was due to the fault and
negligence of Aboitiz and the master and crew of its vessel in that they did not observe the
extraordinary diligence required by law as regards common carriers.
After the issues were joined and the trial on the merits a decision was rendered by the trial court
on June 29, 1985, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay the former actual damages
in the sum of P1,072,611.20 plus legal interest from the date of the filing of
the complaint on October 28, 1981, until full payment thereof, attorney's
fees in the amount of 20% of the total claim and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 1

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 89757 August 6, 1990
ABOITIZ
SHIPPING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND GENERAL ACCIDENT FIRE AND LIFE ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, LTD.,respondents.

Not satisfied therewith, Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a
decision was rendered on March 9, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision, with costs
against defendant Aboitiz . 2
A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by Aboitiz was denied in a resolution dated
August 15, 1989.
Hence the herein petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in
accordance with law when

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for petitioner.

Dollete, Blanco, Ejercito & Associates for private respondent.

1. The Court of Appeals held that "findings of administrative bodies are not
always binding on court . This is especially so in the case at bar where
GAFLAC was not a party in the BMI proceedings and which proceedings
was not adversary in characther." This ruling is contrary to the principle
established in Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals (138 SCRA 559), where it was
held that since the BMI possesses the required expertise in shipping

matters and is imbued with quasi-judicial powers, its factual findings are
conclusive and binding on the court. Likewise, the case of Timber Export
Inc. vs. Retla Steamship Co. (CA-G.R. No. 66143-R) also established the
rule that decision of BMI must be given "great materiality and weight to the
determination and resolution of the case."
2. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court did not err when it fixed
the liability of Aboitiz not on the basis of the stipulation in the bills of lading
at US$500.00 per package/container but on the actual value of the
shipment lost notwithstanding the long line of cases decided by this
Honorable Supreme Court holding a contrary opinion, as shown below.
3. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting GAFLAC's motion for execution pending appeal
notwithstanding the absence of reasonable and justifiable grounds to
support the same. 3
Under the first issue petitioner state that the sinking of the vessel M/V "P. Aboitiz" was the
subject of an administrative investigation conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI)
whereby in a decision dated December 26, 1984, it was found that the sinking of the vessel may
be attributed to force majeure on account of a typhoon. Petitioner contends that these findings
are conclusive on the courts.
In rejecting the evidence offered by the petitioner the appellate court ruled
But over and above all these considerations, the trial court did not err in not
giving weight to the finding of the BMI that the vessel sank due to a
fortuitous event. Findings of administrative bodies are not always binding on
courts. This is especially so in the case at bar where plaintiff was not a party
in the BMI proceedings and which proceeding was not adversary in
character. 4
As a general rule, administrative findings of facts are not disturbed by the courts when supported
by substantial evidence unless it is tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. 5 Even in Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, 6 which is cited
by petitioner, this Court ruled that We nevertheless disagree with the conclusion of the BMI
exonerating the captain from any negligence "since it obviously had not taken into account the
legal responsibility of a common carrier towards the security of the passengers involved."
This case was brought to court on October 28, 1981. The trial court was never informed of a
parallel administrative investigation that was being conducted by the BMI in any of the pleadings
of the petitioner. It was only on March 22, 1985 when petitioner revealed to the trial court the
decision of the BMI dated December 26, 1984 (one day after Christmas day). 7 The said
decision appears to have been rendered over three (3) years after the case was brought to
court.
Moreover, said administrative investigation was conducted unilaterally. Private respondent
GAFLAC was not notified or given an opportunity to participate therein. It cannot thereby be
bound by said findings and conclusions of the BMI.

The trial court and the appellate court found that the sinking of the M/V "P. Aboitiz" was not due
to the waves caused by tropical storm "Yoning" but due to the fault and negligence of petitioner,
its master and crew. The court reproduces with approval said findings
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful examination of the evidence, the Court is convinced in the
plaintiffs claim that the M/V "Aboitiz" and its cargo were not lost due to
fortuitous event or force majeure.
To begin with, paragraph 4 of the marine protest (Exh. "4", also Exhibit "M"),
which is defendant's own evidence, shows that the wind force when the illfated ship foundered was 10 to 15 knots. According to the Beaufort Scale
(Exhibit "I"), which is admittedly an accurate reference for measuring wind
velocity, the wind force of 10 to 15 knots is classified as scale No. 4 and
described as "moderate breeze," small waves, becoming longer, fairly
frequent white horses. Meteorologist Justo Iglesias, Jr. himself affirms the
above description of a wind force of 10 to 15 knots and adds that the
weather condition prevailing under said wind force is usual and forseeable.
Thus Iglesias, Jr. testified:
Q. In the marine protest of the master of the vessel of
Aboitiz, there is reference to wind force from ten to 15
knots. In this Beaufort Scale, will you be able to clarify
what this wind force of 10 to 15 as stated in the marine
protest?
A. It will be under Force 4 of the Beaufort Scale.
Q. What is the basis of your answer?
A. 10 to 15 falls within this scale of the Beaufort Scale,
Force 4.
Atty. Dollete:
May I read into the records, Your Honor. Force 4,
descriptive term moderate breeze. Near velocity in
knots 11-16 meters per second, 5.5-7.9 in kilometers
per hour to 20 to 28 kilometers per hour and 13 to 18
miles per hour. Sea the description of this will be small
waves becoming longer fairly frequent white horse (sic).
Q. In the layman's language how do you interpret this
white horses?
A. It means white forms. At the top of the crest they
were beginning to form white foams.

Q. How about this moderate breeze as described under

this Force 4 of the Beaufort Scale, how will you interpret
that?

Q. How far were you from this depression or weather

disturbance on October 30, 1980?
A. Two hundred miles.

A. Moderate breeze will only give winds of 29

kilometers per hour which is equivalent to just
extending your hand out of a running car at that speed.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. In other words, this depression was far from your
route because it took a northern approach whereas you
were towards the south approach?

Q. This weather condition between October 28 and

November 1, 1980, will you classify this as
extraordinary or ordinary?

A. As I have said, I was 200 miles away from the

disturbance.

A. It was ordinary.
Q. When you said ordinary, was it usual or unusual?
A. It is usual.
Q. When you said it is usual it is foreseeable and
predictable?
A. For an experienced meteorologist like a ship captain,
it is foreseeable.
Q. When it is foreseeable, necessarily it follows that the
weather could be predicted based on the weather
bulletin or report?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And usually the bulletin states the condition in other
words, this weather condition which you testified to and
reflected in your Exhibit "7" is an ordinary occurrence
within that area of Philippine responsibility?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And in fact this weather condition is to be anticipated
at that time of the year with respect to weather
condition which is reflected in Exhibit "7"?
A. It is a regular occurrence.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, Capt. Racines again admitted in Court that
his ill-fated vessel was 200 miles away from the storm
'Yoning when it sank. Said Capt. Racines:

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that the vessel M/V
"Aboitiz" and its cargo were not lost due to fortuitous event or force majeure.
In accordance with Article 1732 of the Civil Code, the defendant common
carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers transported by it according to all the
circumstances of each case. While the goods are in the possession of the
carrier, it is but fair that it exercise extra ordinary diligence in protecting them
from loss or damage, and if its occurs the law presumes that it was due to
the carrier's fault or negligence; that is necessary to protect the interest of
the shipper which is at the mercy of the carrier (Article 1756, Civil Code;
Anuran vs. Puno, 17 SCRA 224; Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., 30
SCRA 69; Landigan vs. Pangasinan Transportation Company, 88 SCRA
284). In the case at bar, the defendant failed to prove that the loss of the
subject cargo was not due to its fault or negligence. 8
The said factual findings of the appellate court and the trial court are finding on this Court. Its
conclusion as to the negligence of the petitioner is supported by the evidence.
The second issue raised to the effect that the liability of the petitioner should be fixed at
US$500.00 per package/container, as stipulated in the bill of lading and not at the actual value of
the cargo, should be resolved against petitioner.
While it is true that in the bill of lading there is such stipulation that the liability of the carrier is
US$500.00 per package/container/customary freight, there is an exception, that is, when the
nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and
inserted in the bill of lading. This is provided for in Section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act to wit
(5) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for
any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in
an amount exceeding $500 per package of lawful money of the United
States, or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight

unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other currency,unless the nature and
value of such goods have been inserted in the bill of lading. This
declaration, if embodied in the bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence,
but shall not be conclusive on the carrier.

(1927), it was held that a stipulation limiting the carrier's liability to $500.00
per package of silk when the value of such package was P2,500.00 unless
the true value had been declared and the corresponding freight paid was
"void as against public policy." That ruling applies to this case.

By agreement between the carrier, master or agent of the carrier, and the
shipper another maximum amount than that mentioned in this paragraph
may be fixed: Provided, that such maximum shall not be less than the figure
above named. In no event shall the carrier be liable for more than the
amount of damage actually sustained.

Moreover, by the weight of modern authority, a carrier cannot limit its liability
for injury or loss of goods shipped where such injury or loss was caused by
its own negligence. (Juan Ysmael & Co. v. Gabino Barreto & Co., supra)
Here to limit the liability of Aboitiz Shipping to $500.00 would nullify the
policy of the law imposing on common carriers the duty to observe
extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods.

Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in any event for loss or
damage to or in connection with the transportation of the goods if the nature
or value thereof has been knowingly and fraudulently mis-stated by the
shipper in the bill of lading. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case the description of the nature and the value of the goods shipped are declared and
reflected in the bills of lading. Thus, it is the basis of the liability of the carrier as the actual value
of the loss.
Moreover, it is absurd to interpret "container," as provided in the bill of lading to be valued at
US$500.00 each, to refer to the container which is the modern substitute for the hold of the
vessel. 9The package/container contemplated by the law to limit the liability of the carrier should
be sensibly related to the unit in which the shipper packed the goods and described them, not a
large metal object, functionally a part of the ship, in which the carrier used them to be
contained. 10 Such "container" must be given the same meaning and classification as a
"package" and "customary freight unit."
The appellate court in disposing this issue quoted its decision in Allied Guarantee Insurance Co.
Inc. vs. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, CA GR. CV No. 04121, March 23, 1987, viz;
Third. Still it is contended that the carrier's liability is limited to $500.00,
pursuant to section 8 of the Bill of Lading which provides that 'The liability of
the Carrier for any loss or damage to the goods shall in no case exceed the
sum of U.S. $500.00 per package/container/customary freight unit, unless
the value of the goods has been correctly declared and extra freight paid,
prior to the shipment and a signed declaration to this effect appears in the
bill of lading, duly confirmed by the Carrier. ... It is contended that the Bill of
Lading does not indicate the value of the goods. Nor was the corresponding
freight ... paid prior to shipment.
Generally speaking a stipulation, limiting the common carrier's liability to the
value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or
owner declares a greater value, is valid. (Civil Code, Art. 1749). Such
stipulation, however, must be reasonable and just under the circumstances
and must have been fairly and freely agreed upon. (St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. vs. Macondray Co., 70 SCRA 122, 126-127 (1976) In
the case at bar, the goods shipped on the M/V "P. Aboitiz" were insured for
P278,530.50, which may be taken as their value. To limit the liability of the
carrier to $500.00 would obviously put it in its power to have taken the
whole cargo. In Juan Ysmael & Co. vs. Gabino Barreto & Co., 51 Phil. 90

Indeed, it is even doubtful whether the word "container" in section 8 of the

Bill of Lading includes containers which are a substitute for the hold of a
vessel. This provision limits the carrier's liability to "the sum of US$500.00
per package /container customary freight unit." By the rule of noscitur a
sociis the word "container" must be given the same meaning as package
and customary freight unit and therefore cannot possibly refer to modern
containers which are used for shipment of goods in bulk. 11
In the same light, the third issue questioning the order of execution pending appeal of the trial
court must be resolved against petitioner as well.
The averments in the motion for execution pending appeal dated December 8, 1985 are as
follows
Aside from the fact that petitioner can easily post a supersedeas bond to
stay execution, still other circumstances are present peculiar in the incident
of the sinking of M/V P. Aboitiz which would justify the issuance of execution
pending appeal. There are other decided cases adjudging petitioner liable in
the lower court in the same incident. Other cases are on appeal, upcoming
and about to be decided. The value of cargo loss caused by the sinking of
petitioner's vessel is in the tune of no less than fifty million pesos inclusive
of interests fees and all claims. Its insurer has gone bankrupt and petitioner
alone must face and answer for all these claims. In one branch of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila alone there are twenty five (25) cases
pending against petitioner involving the same loss of cargoes aboard M/V
"P. Aboitiz" as per certification herewith attached as Annex "A". This claim
do not include others, pending in various courts in Metro Manila which
would have to be satisfied ultimately by petitioner, it being a common carrier
which failed to exercise extraordinary diligence over the goods lost. The
judgment sought to be enforced may indeed be rendered imminently
ineffectual in the ultimate analysis.
The purpose of Sec. 2 Rule 39 would not be achieved or execution pending
appeal would not be achieved if insolvency would still be awaited. The
remedy is available to petitioner under Sec. 3 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
but to place insolvency as a condition to issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal would render it illusory and ineffectual.

Justice and equity therefore dictates, that as a consequence of the bond

posted by private respondent and there being several other cases against
petitioner, decided as well as pending, the totality of which claims may
render the appealed decision imminently ineffectual and the further fact that
the appeal being interposed is evidently for delay as a consequence of the
several adverse decisions against it as a common carrier in the lower court,
a reconsideration of the decision dated November 25, 1985 of the
Honorable Court will be in consonance with law, jurisprudence and equity.

Indeed, the decision of the Board was based simply on

its finding that the Philippine Coast Guard had certified
the vessel to be seaworthy and that it sank because it
was exposed later to an oncoming typhoon plotted
within the radius where the vessel was positioned. This
generalization certainly cannot prevail over the detailed
explanation of the trial court in this case as basis for its
contrary conclusion. (Rollo, at p. 42)

In order to erase all apprehensions that the aforesaid judgment award will
wind up ineffectual when not immediately executed, it is most respectfully
prayed that herein respondent be required to post a supersedeas bond. The
statutory undertaking of posting a bond will then achieve a three-pronged
direction of justice, (1) it will cast no doubt on the solvency of the herein
petitioner; (2) it will not defeat or render phyrric a just resolution of the case
whichever party prevails in the end or in the main case on appeal, since
both of their claims are secured by their corresponding bonds; and (3) it will
put to equitable operation Sec. 3 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. 12

We find no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the

appellate court and rule that the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction is not applicable in the case at bar.

The foregoing allegations which were not traversed that petitioner is facing many law suits
arising from said sinking of its vessel involving cargo loss of no less than 50 million pesos, in
some cases of which judgment had been rendered against Aboitiz, and considering that its
insurer is now bankrupt, leaving Aboitiz alone to face and answer the suits, which may render
any judgment for GAFLAC ineffectual, that the appeal is interposed manifestly for delay and the
willingness of GAFLAC to put up a bond certainly are cogent bases for the issuance of an order
of execution pending appeal.
Finally, in a similar case for damages arising from the same incident entitled Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and Allied Guaranteed Insurance Company, Inc.,
G.R. No. 88159, this Court in a resolution dated November 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. Therein this Court held in part
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court based on its
findings that the cause of sinking of the vessel was due to its
unseaworthiness and the failure of its crew and the master to exercise
extraordinary diligence.
The petitioner, however, contends that the appellate court erred on this
matter and insists that the contrary findings of the Board of Marine Inquiry
(BMI), which conducted a separate investigation to the effect that the
proximate cause of the sinking of the vessel was due toforce majeure and
that the officers and crew had exhausted all preventive measures to save
the vessel and her cargo but to no avail, should prevail. This, according to
the petitioner is based on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction.

The other issue raised is whether or not the carrier's liability is limited to
$500.00 pursuant to section 8 of the Bill of Lading. The petitioner claims that
the appellate court erred in disregarding the limitation of liability stipulated in
the bill of lading. It argues that the consignee agreed to this amount (and)
therefore is bound by this rate and that there is no basis for the appellate
court's finding that the rate is unreasonable.
The argument is not well-taken. As aptly stated by the appellate court:
Generally speaking any stipulation, limiting the common carrier's liability to
the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or
owner declares a greater value is valid. (Civil Code, Art. 1749) Such
stipulation, however, must be reasonable and just under the circumstances
and must have been fairly and freely agreed upon. (St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Macondray & Co., 70 SCRA 122, 126-127 [1976] In the
case at bar, the goods shipped on the M/V "P. Aboitiz" were insured for
P278,536.50, which may be taken as their value. To limit the liability of the
carrier to $500.00 would obviously put in its power to have taken the whole
cargo. In Juan Ysmael & Co. v. Gabino Barretto & Co., 51 Phil. 90 [1927], it
was held that a stipulation limiting the carrier's liability to P300.00 per
package of silk, when the value of such package was P2,500.00, unless the
true value had been declared and the corresponding freight paid; was void
as against public policy. That ruling applies to this case.
As argued by the respondent, a limitation of liability in this case would
render inefficacious the extraordinary diligence required by law of common
carriers. 13
The motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed by petitioner was denied with finality in a
resolution dated January 8, 1990. Said resolution of the case had become final and executory,
entry of judgment having been made and the records remanded for execution on March 22,
1990.

This argument is untenable.

Said case is now the law of the case applicable to the present petition.
A cursory reading of the decision and resolution of the appellate court
shows that the same took into consideration not only the findings of the
lower court but also the findings of the BMI. Thus, the appellate court stated:

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It
prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3, 1970,
with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in behalf of
respondent.

EJUSDEM GENERIS
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO
R.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

MUTUC, petitioner,

Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.

Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the
validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for
campaign purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any
express power granted to respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the
bar to any such implication arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the
principle that a statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords
the utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes.
On November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing,
with the election barely a week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of
prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth
his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent
to him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course
but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud
speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom
of speech." 1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he
would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the
very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to
file an answer not later than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for
Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the
answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the
petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or
distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." 3It was its contention
that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and

This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being
barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the
writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to
impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine ofejusdem generis as well as the principle that the
construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious
doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its
concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on
Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding
compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This
resolution is immediately executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of
power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition
imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional
Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes
unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters,
fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and
cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last
three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done
cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the
distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable
vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to
manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to
assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or
prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which
should be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of
removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has
always commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert
any collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective
is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice
Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional,
but also grave doubts upon that score. 9
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such
a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited,
then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language,
the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant
holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be
curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of
suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an
evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify
its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free,

either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional
guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court
were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a
previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in
express terms assures. 10
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the
criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the
lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the
rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy.
The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted
have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on
its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of
the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as
found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the
coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that
the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its
mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed
up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department
although independent of the President to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive
charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the
power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'"11 It has been
the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent
Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no
higher law than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are
precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to
insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification
then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect
of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as
was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.

CONCEPCION
PARAYNO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE JOVELLANOS and the MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIAO, PANGASINAN, * respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court questioning
the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a preliminary and mandatory injunction, filed by
petitioner Concepcion Parayno against respondents Jose Jovellanos and the Municipality of
Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some
residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure
or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer,
Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation.
Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of
location of petitioner's gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared:
a) xxx the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law
to wit:
The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44,1 the nearest school
building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances
are less than 100 meters. No neighbors were called as witnesses when
actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22
June 1989.
b) The gasoline station remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential
buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety
of the people in case of fire. Moreover, additional selling and storing of several LPG
tanks in the station (sic).

WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is

permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance
with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to
costs.

c) The residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline
most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents especially
children to frequent colds, asthma, cough and the like nowadays.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

d) xxx the gasoline station violated Building and Fire Safety Codes because the
station has 2nd floor storey building used for business rental offices, with iron grilled
windows, no firewalls. It also endangers the lives of people upstairs.

of

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 148408

July 14, 2006

the

Philippines
COURT

e) It hampers the flow of traffic, the gasoline station is too small and narrow, the
entrance and exit are closed to the street property lines. It couldn't cope situation (sic)
on traffic because the place is a congested area.2
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was denied. Hence, she filed
a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Dagupan City, Branch 44 against respondents. The case, docketed as SP Civil Case No. 9903010-D, was raffled to the sala of Judge Crispin Laron.
Petitioner claimed that her gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning
Code since it was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by
Section 21 thereof. She added that the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB),3 in a previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor
(Dennis Parayno), barred the grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50.
In the HLURB case, respondent Jovellanos opposed the establishment of the gas station on the
grounds that: (1) it was within the 100-meter prohibited radius under Section 44 and (2) it posed
a pernicious effect on the health and safety of the people in Calasiao.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other motor
vehicles with gasoline and oil only.7
xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises where gasoline oil, grease,
batteries, tires and car accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail and
where, in addition, the following services may be rendered and sales and no other.
a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor parts;

After the hearing on the propriety of issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction, the trial court ruled:

b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;

There is no basis for the court to issue a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction. Albeit,Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of respondent
municipality does not mention a gasoline filling station, [but] following the
principle of ejusdem generis, a gasoline filling station falls within the ambit of
Section 44.

c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts, brake
fluids, light bulbs, fuses, floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and
wiper blades, grease retainers, wheel, bearing, mirrors and the like;
d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;

The gasoline filling station of the petitioner is located under the establishment
belonging to the petitioner and is very near several buildings occupied by several
persons. Justice dictates that the same should not be allowed to continue
operating its business on that particular place. Further, the gasoline filling
station endangers the lives and safety of people because once there is fire, the
establishment and houses nearby will be razed to the ground. 4(emphasis
supplied)

e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and polishing

materials;
f. Grease and lubricating;
g. Emergency wiring repairs;

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied by the trial court.
h. Minor servicing of carburators;
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus,5 with a prayer for injunctive relief. She ascribed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of Judge Laron who dismissed her case.

i. Adjusting and repairing brakes;

j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase,
or raising the motor.8

After the CA dismissed the petition, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied. Hence, this appeal.
Before us, petitioner insists that (1) the legal maxim of ejusdem generis did not apply to her
case; (2) the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an
invalid exercise of the latter's police powers and (3) it was the principle of res judicata that
applied in this case.6
We find merit in the petition.
The Principle of Ejusdem Generis
We hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between
"gasoline service station" and "gasoline filling station." The pertinent provisions read:

xxx

xxx

xxx

It is evident from the foregoing that the ordinance intended these two terms to be separate and
distinct from each other. Even respondent municipality's counsel admitted this dissimilarity
during the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction. Counsel in fact admitted:
1. That there exist[ed] an official zoning code of Calasiao, Pangasinan which [was] not
yet amended;
2. That under Article III of said official zoning code there [were] certain
distinctions made by said municipality about the designation of the gasoline

filling station and that of the gasoline service station as appearing in Article III,
Nos. 21 and 42, [respectively];
3. That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as
defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station
as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code;
4. That under Section 44 of the official zoning code of Calasiao, the term filling
station as clearly defined under Article III, Section 21, [did] not appear in the
wordings thereof;9(emphasis supplied)
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party
making them.10Respondent municipality thus could not find solace in the legal maxim of ejusdem
generis11 which means "of the same kind, class or nature." Under this maxim, where general
words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will
apply only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those
enumerated.12 Instead, what applied in this case was the legal maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alteriuswhich means that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
others.13 Hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the
zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service station" under Section 44
necessarily included "gasoline filling station" under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken
in a "gas service station" did not automatically embrace those in a "gas filling station."
The Exercise of Police Powers
Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of
petitioner's gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, 14 the power to take actions and enact
measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due
deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive.15 The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the
due process clause of the Constitution.16
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution
No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters
from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to
measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether
there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent
municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent
municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement
of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station
is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, 17 hence,
it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.

As a rule, this Court does not pass upon evidence submitted by the parties in the lower
courts.18 We deem it necessary, however, to recall the findings of the HLURB which petitioner
submitted as evidence during the proceedings before the trial court, if only to underscore
petitioner's compliance with the requirements of law before she put up her gasoline station.
Another factor that should not be left unnoticed is the diligence exercised by
[petitioner] in complying with the requirements of the several laws prior to the actual
implementation of the project as can be attested by the fact that [petitioner] has
secured the necessary building permit and approval of [her] application for authority to
relocate as per the letter of the Energy Regulatory Board xxx.19
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people
of Calasiao, we again note:
Relative to the allegations that the project (gasoline station) is hazardous to life and
property, the Board takes cognizance of the respondent's contention that the project
"is not a fire hazard since petroleum products shall be safely stored in underground
tanks and that the installation and construction of the underground tanks shall be in
accordance with the Caltex Engineering Procedures which is true to all gasoline
stations in the country. xxx
Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life
and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station
Commander, after studying the plans and specifications of the subject proposed
construction, recommended on 20 January 1989, "to build such buildings after
conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185." It is further alleged by the
complainants that the proposed location is "in the heart of the thickly populated
residential area of Calasiao." Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the
allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per
the Zoning Ordinance. xxx20 (emphasis supplied)
The findings of fact of the HLURB are binding as they are already final and conclusive vis-vis the evidence submitted by respondents.
The Principle of Res Judicata
Petitioner points out that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed against her predecessor
(Dennis Parayno) by respondent Jovellanos had effectively barred the issues in Resolution No.
50 based on the principle of res judicata. We agree.
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on
all points and matters determined in the former suit. 21 For res judicata to apply, the following
elements must be present: (1) the judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment must be on
the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
of subject matter and of cause of action.22

Respondent municipality does not contest the first, second and third requisites. However, it
claims that it was not a party to the HLURB case but only its co-respondent Jovellanos, hence,
the fourth requisite was not met. The argument is untenable.

The case: This is a petition for mandamus to require the respondent judge of first instance to
give due course to, and hear the petitioners' appeal from the decision of a justice of the peace
which he dismissed believing it had not been perfected in due time.

The absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to apply.23 A shared
identity of interests is sufficient to invoke the application of this principle. 24 The proscription may
not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional party. 25 Res judicata may lie as
long as there is a community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the
second case although the latter may not have been impleaded in the first.26

The facts: Sued on a promissory note in the peace court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Enrique S. Manabat
and his wife, denied liability, alleging usury. Having failed to appear and present evidence at the
hearing, they were ordered to pay the amount of P1,261.74 plus interest, upon the proofs and
introduced by the plaintiffs, Alejandra L. de Roxas and her husband Claudio Roxas.

In the assailed resolution of respondent municipality, it raised the same grounds invoked by its
co-respondent in the HLURB: (1) that the resolution aimed to close down or transfer the gasoline
station to another location due to the alleged violation of Section 44 of the zoning ordinance and
(2) that the hazards of said gasoline station threatened the health and safety of the public. The
HLURB had already settled these concerns and its adjudication had long attained finality. It is to
the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject
matter already fully and fairly adjudged. Furthermore, an individual should not be vexed twice for
the same cause.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the
Appeals isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed
to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to
close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Notified of the decision on September 7, 1951, the Manabats sent on September 22, 1951 their
notice of appeal by registered mail together with a postal money order payable to the justice of
the peace for P16 as docket fees and a surety bond in the sum of P30 as appeal bond. These
papers were actually received at the peace court of Tarlac, Tarlac, on September 24, 1951.
Forwarded to the court of instance, the appeal was docketed as civil case No. 638.
Subsequently, however, the Roxas couple submitted a motion to dismiss the appeal of the
Manabats on the grounds: (a) that the appeal documents had been received by the inferior court
of Tarlac, on September 24, i.e., two days after the expiration of the time prescribed by law for
appeals from that court and (b) because the appeal was frivolous, interposed obviously for delay.
Noting that the 15-day period expired on September 22, and that the appeal papers were
actually received on September 24, the judge of first instance declared the appeal was late and
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. He expressly refused to apply section 1 Rule 27 of the Rules
of Court on which the Manabats relied to sustain the timeliness of their move. That section
provides that "the date of the mailing" of the court papers "as shown by the post-office registry
receipt shall be considered as the date of their filing" in court. His honor opined that this section
does not regulate inferior courts, since it is found only among rules governing courts of first
instance, and, unlike other rules, it is not extended to inferior courts and therefore excluded
by section 19 Rule 4, which for convenience is quoted hereunder:

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS RULE

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

Hence this petition for mandamus, appeal being inadequate, because the defendants in the
case, (petitioners herein) have not introduced evidence.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5558

April 29, 1953

ENRIQUE
D.
MANABAT
and
RUFINA
S.
MANABAT, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. BERNABE DE AQUINO, Judge of First Instance of Tarlac, and ALEJANDRA L.
DE ROXAS and CLAUDIO ROXAS, respondent.
Luciano
V.
Ruben
L.
Bernabe de Aquino in his own behalf.
BENGZON, J.:

SEC. 19. Application of certain rules. Rules 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 28, 29, 30, and 39
are applicable in inferior courts in cases falling within their jurisdictions and in so far as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this rule.

Bonicilio
Roxas

for
for

petitioners.
respondents.

The question is whether the appeal had been perfected within fifteen days as required by
section 2 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. If it was, this petition should be granted. 1 Otherwise it
will be denied. That question, in turn, depends upon the issue whether the appeal papers are
deemed filed in court on September 22 when they were deposited in the mails by registered
mail, or on September 24 when they were actually received. If the first, the appeal was timely;
otherwise it was belated.
Discussion: If section 1 Rule 27 is applied, the appeal papers would be deemed filed on
September 22, and therefore the appeal would have been seasonably perfected. His Honor,
however, and the other respondents, maintain that Rule 27 is not applicable because it is not
mentioned in section 19 Rule 4 hereinbefore quoted, andinclusio unius est exclusio alterius,
enumeration of certain rules, excludes others.

That legal maxim is well-known, and respondents' position seems at first blush tenable. But the
maxim is not more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other
circumstances indicate the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive.
Now, if section 19 Rule 4 is exclusive, justices of the peace may disregard, (a) the principles of
evidence prescribed in Rule 123, (b) Rule 131 as to costs and (c) the fundamental principles
about splitting or joinder of causes of action in Rule 2, and the theories about parties in interest,
necessary parties, married women etc. in Rule 3.
These undesirable consequences could not have been overlooked by the framers of the Rules.
They could not have intended, therefore, to make the enumeration in section 19 Rule 4 as allinclusive and exclusive.
As a matter of fact this Court applied to litigations in inferior courts Rules other than those
enumerated in Rule 4, section 19. Thus in Viola Fernando vs. Aragon,* 43 Off. Gaz., 145 we
applied Rule 17 to a municipal court saying "Although Rule 17 has not been made applicable to
justice of the peace courts, such omission (from the enumeration in section 19 Rule 4), can not
be interpreted as a prohibition to apply it."
In Beltran vs. Cabrera (73 Phil., 666), Rule 124 was considered applicable to the Manila
municipal court.
In Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil., 672), Rules 8, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, and the appendix of forms
after Rule 133 were deemed binding on inferior courts, over the objection that they were
excluded by section 19 Rule 4.
Consequently, there can be no legal obstacle to the application of Rule 27 section 1 to the
justice of the peace court of Tarlac. And it should be applied, to uphold the uniform principle that
"the date of deposit in the post-office by registered mail" of court papers is "the date of filing" not
only in the Supreme Court, the appellate court, and the superior courts but also in inferior courts.
Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify procedure (Cf. Henning vs. Western Equipment,
62 Phil., 886).
Conclusion: Hence, this Court's opinion is that the Manabats appealed on time.
The Roxas spouses interpose here two other points: (a) instead of delivering a certificate of the
municipal treasurer showing deposit of the docket fees, the Manabats sent only a postal money
order payable to the justice of the peace; and (b) the appeal was unmeritorious and merely for
delay.
The first objection was not raised in the court of first instance, wherein the time of the appeal
not the form was discussed. Any way there was substantial compliance of the deposit
requirement. 2
The second point was ignored by the respondent judge. Rightly, we believe, because at this
stage we are not prepared to deprive the Manabats of their day in court, usury being contrary to
the policies of our system of legislation.

Judgment: Wherefore, the writ will be issued for the respondent judge to hear and thereafter
decide the appeal interposed by herein petitioners. Costs against the Roxases. So ordered.
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994
MARTIN
CENTENO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Santiago V. Marcos, Jr. for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:
It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were moved by their desire to devote
their remaining years to the service of their Creator by forming their own civic organization for
that purpose, should find themselves enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from
a community member allegedly without the required permit from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.
The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic
organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for
the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin
Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that
the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information 1 was filed against
petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion
to quash the information 2 on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an
offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable
or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction
of a chapel. This was denied 3 by the trial court, and petitioner's motion for reconsideration
having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.
On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment 4 finding accused Vicente Yco
and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine
of P200.00. Nevertheless, the trial court recommended that the accused be pardoned on the
basis of its finding that they acted in good faith, plus the fact that it believed that the latter should
not have been criminally liable were it not for the existence of Presidential Decree
No. 1564 which the court opined it had the duty to apply in the instant case.
Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 10. However, accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the case
proceeded only with respect to petitioner Centeno. On May 21, 1993, respondent Judge Villalon-

Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but modified the penalty, allegedly because of
the perversity of the act committed which caused damage and prejudice to the complainant, by
sentencing petitioner Centeno to suffer an increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months and a
fine of P1,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 5 The motion for
reconsideration of the decision was denied by the court. 6

in statutes wherein these two terms are likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for
instance, Sections 26 (e) (corporations exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from
gross income) of the National Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for the organization
of
non-stock
corporations)
of
the
Corporation
Code;
and
Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government Code.

Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the judicial hierarchy
eventually reached this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of whether solicitations for
religious purposes are within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the
financial sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a question of principle, it is not a trifling matter.
This Court is gratified that it can now grant this case the benefit of a final adjudication.

That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare
purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it
would not have so stated expressly.

Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for
contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious
purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not
include,
it
excludes;
(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused;
and (3) to subject to State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute
an abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.

All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since
religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. 8 However, "religious
purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that
there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not
equally true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of
the term. 9 Although the term "charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it is a
broader term and includes matters which are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a
distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose," except where the two terms
are obviously used synonymously, or where the distinction has been done away with by
statute.10 The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is capable of different
significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a very
wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given
such a broad application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners.

Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the
Solicitation Permit Law), provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to
solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall
first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social
Services and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization
Plan. Upon the filing of a written application for a permit in the form
prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and
Development, the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative
may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or disapprove
the application. In the interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew
or revoke any permit issued under Act 4075.
The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be
construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negative.
I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited
to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned. 7
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words
"charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word
"charitable" is only one of three descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides that "charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all
lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions

To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer.
However, there are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for "religious purposes" have
been liberally construed as covered in the law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes."
Thus, the term "charitable purposes," within the meaning of a statute providing that the
succession of any property passing to or for the use of any institution for purposes only of public
charity shall not be subject to succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes. 11A gift for
"religious purposes" was considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as regards exemption
from inheritance tax.12
On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation within the concept of
"charitable"
purpose
which
under
Presidential
Decree
No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services and Development,
under paid of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly,
the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious"
purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal
legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused.
For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications,
intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction
to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it
with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and
admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party
accused under its provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves
innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal

expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not plainly within the
provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment. 13
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through
a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 14 The word "charitable" is a
matter of description rather than of precise definition, and each case involving a determination of
that which is charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances. 15 The
law does not operate in vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by circumstances in the
abstract.
Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above, the
enumerations therein given which include the words "charitable" and "religious" make use of the
disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating
an alternative. It often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either.
When "or" is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken
separately. 16 Accordingly, "charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration
using the disjunctive "or" should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no
compelling consideration why the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made
applicable to the questioned provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the
law for, otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause
guaranteed under the Constitution.
It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and,
consequently, solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare.
Prefatorily, it is not implausible that the regulatory powers of the State may, to a certain degree,
extend to solicitations of this nature. Considering, however, that such an activity is within the
cloak of the free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the
Constitution, it becomes imperative to delve into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the
power to regulate the exercise of this constitutional right and the allowable restrictions which
may possibly be imposed thereon.
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the
one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two
concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible
end,
as
not
to
unduly
infringe
on
the
protected
freedom. 17
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order
that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him
publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the
cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner
of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. 18

It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that
everything which may be so called can be tolerated. 19 It has been said that a law advancing a
legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free
exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents
of one or more religion. 20 Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation,
which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the
collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a
religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the
free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. 21
Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are
carried on by persons and associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of
benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous public. It is in fact
amazing how profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to people who manipulate
them. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or not
there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for
fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and
benevolent purposes is grossly abused is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the
solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but
somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from
the unworthy. 22 The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy
and proper charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for
the raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed. 23 Some regulation of public solicitation
is, therefore, in the public interest. 24
To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State
in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations
intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as
earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.
As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent judge for increasing the penalty
imposed by the trial court, premised on the supposed perversity of petitioner's act which thereby
caused damage to the complainant. It must be here emphasized that the trial court, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, even recommended executive clemency in favor of petitioner
and the other accused after finding that the latter acted in good faith in making the solicitation
from the complainant, an observation with which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a
doubtful and difficult question of law can be the basis of good faith, especially for a layman.
There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge which would indicate, impliedly or
otherwise, that petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. This could be
reflective upon her objectivity, considering that the complainant in this case is herself a judge of
the Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City. It bears stressing at this point that a judge is required
to so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, 25 should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert its independence, and must resist
any pressure from whatever source. 26
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
petitioner Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.