1. Valiao v.

Republic
G.R. No. 170757: November 28, 2011
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of
his co-heirs LODOVICO, RICARDO, BIENVENIDO, all
Surnamed VALIAO and NEMESIO M. GRANDEA,
Petitioners,
v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA,
and MANUEL YUSAY, Respondents.
FACTS:
On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC
an application for registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog,
Negros Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their
Motion to Dismiss the application on the following
grounds:
(1) the land applied for has not been declared
alienable and disposable;
(2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for
registration; and
(3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application

for registration.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private
oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter
ensued.
In support of their application for registration,
petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject
property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle
Basilio who purchased the land from a certain
Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated
May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish
language. Basilio possessed the land in question
from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947.
Basilio's possession was open, continuous,
peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in
the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the
applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land
until 1966, when oppositor Zafra unlawfully and
violently dispossessed them of their property,
which compelled them to file complaints of Grave
Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995,
granted petitioners' application for registration of
the subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors
and the Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor

Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which

reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision
dated June 23, 2005.
. The CA ruled that the classification of lands of the
public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the
executive department of the government and in the
absence of such classification, the lands remain as
unclassified until it is released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,

which was denied by the CA. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the piece of land in question
is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
HELD: Petition denied.
Under Rule 45, the principle is well-established
that this Court is not a trier of facts and that only
questions of law may be raised. This rule,
however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of
these is when the findings of the appellate court
are contrary to those of the trial court. Due to the
divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC,
the Court will now re-examine the facts and
evidence adduced before the lower courts.

Under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No.

(PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, petitioners need to prove
that:
(1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and
(2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona
fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners
to show that the land in question has been
classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. In the absence of
incontrovertible evidence to prove that the
subject property is already classified as
alienable and disposable, we must consider the
same as still inalienable public domain. Verily, the
rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply unless and until the land subject thereof is
released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.

Valiao v. Republic

Issues

May 23, 2016

VALIAO V. REPUBLIC

1. Whether Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and

disposable land of the public domain.
2. Whether they and their predecessors-ininterest had been in an open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation under a claim of ownership.

G.R. No. 170757, 28 November 2011

Facts:
The petitioners (Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico
Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea) filed
with the RTC of Kabankalan an application of a
parcel of land with an area of 504, 535 square
meters in Barrio Galicia, Ilog, Negros Occidental
under the conditions of PD 1529. They claim that
they have acquired the property in 1947 after the
death of their uncle Basilio Milliarez who
purchased the land from Fermin Payogao through
a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916, entirely
handwritten in Spanish. Upon their uncles death,
they have possessed the land until 1966 when
oppositor Macario Zafra disposed them of their
property compelling them to file complaints of
Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against him.
The petitioners submitted a Tax Declaration No.
9562[6] dated September 29, 1976 under the
names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTCs decision to grant the
petitioners application for registration.

Ruling:
The petitioners application under PD 1529 should
be denied.
The petitioners failed to prove that the subject
property was classified as part of the disposable
and alienable land of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain. Unless public land is shown to
have been reclassified as alienable or disposable
to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the commerce of man
and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the
concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen

into ownership and be registered as a title. The

burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established
that the land subject of the application (or claim)
is alienable or disposable.
In addition, there must be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government.
The petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in an open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
There is nothing in the records that would
substantiate petitioners claim that Basilio was in
possession of the property during the period of
possession required by law.
Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of

such a nature as a party would actually

exercise over his own property.
As regards petitioners possession of the land in
question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only
support the same with a tax declaration dated
September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only
prove possession since said date.
Tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land when not supported
for other evidence. It does not necessarily
prove ownership.

2. Republic vs. Vega

G. R. No. 177790: January 17, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs.
CARLOS R. VEGA, MARCOS R. VEGA, ROGELIO R.
VEGA, LUBIN R. VEGA, HEIRS OF GLORIA R. VEGA,
NAMELY: RACISCO L. YAP, MA. WINONA Y.
RODRIGUEZ, MA. WENDELYN V. YAP and
FRANCISCO V. YAP, JR. Respondents
SERENO, J.:

FACTS:
Respondents Vega sought to register a parcel of
land, claiming that they inherited the same from
their deceased mother. Respondent-intervenors
Buhay claimed a portion of the lot in question.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, opposed the claim. The Republic
maintains that the parcel of land is public domain,
and that respondents failed to substantiate that
such was alienable.
Respondents presented as witness an officer from
CENRO who testified that the land in question is
indeed alienable.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and
ordered titles to be issued in favor of Vega and
Buhay.
The Republic appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the findings of the lower
court.

Respondent-intervenor Buhay challenged the

petition as it raises a question of fact, which is
outside the scope of Rule 45, a Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the parcel of land in
dispute is part of public domain.
2. Whether or not the issue at hand is a question
of fact.
HELD: Petition is denied.
Remedial Law: A question of fact requires the
reexamination of the evidence on record. What
the current question involves is a determination of
the correctness of the appreciation of the facts. Is
the court correct, in light of law and recent
jurisprudence, in assessing the land to be
alienable? It does not seek for the presence of
facts. The issue is the application of law, to the
facts.

The Republic files a Petition for Review on

Certiorari.
Civil Law:
The Republic claims that respondents were unable
to prove that the parcel of land in question is not
part of the public domain.

The rule for registration of government land is

that there must be open, continuous, exclusive

and notorious possession and occupation of

alienable government land. The fact of occupation
and that the land is alienable government land
must be proven. Here, the Republic does not
question the fact of occupation, but that of the
alienability of the land. They also contended that
the testimony of the CENRO officer is insufficient.

Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong

to the State, which is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.

It has been held in Jurisprudence that a

CENRO certificate is inadequate proof that
the land is alienable. There must also be
certification from the Secretary of Natural
Resources.

To
overcome
this
presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.

However, in light of a recent ruling, the CENRO

certification is held to be substantial
compliance to the needed proof. Since
respondents sought certification from the CENRO
before, they are in good faith in claiming the land.
The proof that they presented may be considered
as competent and sufficient proof. It is to be
noted, however, that this ruling applies pro hac
vice.

To prove that the land subject of an

application for registration is alienable,
A. an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such
as:
1.
2.
3.
4.

a presidential proclamation or
an executive order;
an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and
5. a legislative act or a statute.
B. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the lands
applied for are alienable and disposable.

3. Aranda v. Republic (August 24, 2011)

Under the Regalian doctrine which is
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987

4. REPUBLIC vs. RIZALVO

G.R. No. 172011 March 7, 2011VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P.
Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La
Union, acting as a land registration court, an
application for theregistration of a parcel of land,
located in Bauang, La Union. Respondent alleged
thathe is the owner in fee simple of the subject
parcel of land, that he obtained title over theland
by virtue of a Deed of Transfer
5
dated December 31, 1962, and that he is
currentlyin possession of the land. In support of
his claim, he presented, among others,
TaxDeclaration for the year 1994 in his name, and
Proof of Payment of real property taxesbeginning
in 1952 up to the time of filing of the
application.On April 20, 2001, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition.
TheMTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land
registration court, rendered its Decision,approving
respondents application. The Republic of the
Philippines through the OSGfiled a Notice of
Appeal. However, the CA found no merit in the
appeal and promulgatedthe assailed Decision,
affirming the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent have shown
indubitably that he has complied with all the
requirements showing that the property,

previously part of the public domain, has

become private property by virtue of his
acts of possession in the manner and length
of time required by law.
HELD:
NO. Under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, applicants
for registration of title must sufficiently establish
first, that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; second, that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same; and third, that it is
under a
bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.The first requirement was satisfied in this
case. The certification and report dated July17,
2001 of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La
Union, states that the entire land areain question
is within the alienable and disposable zone,
certified as such since January21, 1987.
Respondent has likewise met the second
requirement as to ownership and possession. The
MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has
presented sufficienttestimonial and documentary
evidence to show that he and his predecessors-ininterestwere in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of theland in

question.However, the third requirement, that

respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be
inopen, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subjectproperty
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been
satisfied. Respondent onlymanaged to present
oral and documentary evidence of his and his
mothers ownershipand possession of the land
since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of
AbsoluteSale dated July 8, 1958 between
Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo.
Hepresented Tax Declaration for the year 1948 in
the name of Eufrecina Navarro and realproperty
tax receipts beginning in 1952. Even assuming
that the 1948 Tax Declarationin the name of
Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts
could be taken in thiscase as proof of a claim of
ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of
occupation andpossession beginning June 12,
1945 or earlier. What is categorically required by
law isopen, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation under a bonafide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the
DENR-CENRO certification and report isenough to
signify that the land is no longer intended for
public service or thedevelopment of the national
wealth, respondent is still not entitled to
registrationbecause the land was certified as
alienable and disposable in 1987, while

theapplication for registration was filed on

December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13)
yearsafter and far short of the required thirty (30)
years under existing laws on prescription.

Rizal vs. Rizalzo

Wednesday, January 21, 2015
Facts:
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P.
Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La
Union an application for the registration of a
parcel of land referred to in Survey Plan Psu200706,4 located in Bauang, La Union and
containing an area of 8,957 square meters.
Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee
simple of the subject parcel of land, that he
obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of
Transfer (he alleged he bought the property from
his mother) dated December 31, 1962, and that
he is currently in possession of the land.
In support of his claim, he presented a tax
declaration under his name and a Proof of
Payment of real property taxes from 1952 up to
the time of his filing of the application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that

neither respondent nor his predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier and
that the tax declarations and tax payment
receipts did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of ownership.
The OSG also asserted that the subject property
was a portion of public domain and hence not
subject to private acquisition.
The Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) submitted a verified
record stating the technical description of the
property, that the land was in an alienable &
disposable zone and that Rizalvo was in an actual
occupation and possession of the land.
The MTC approved the application of Rizalvo.
The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling. Hence,
this petition.

Held:

Issue: WON respondent and his

predecessors-in-interest were in open,
continuous, adverse, and public possession
of the land in question in the manner and
length of time required by law as to entitle
respondent to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.

The first requirement was satisfied

The certification and report dated July 17, 2001
submitted by Special Investigator I Dionisio L.
Picar of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La
Union, states that the entire land area in question
is within the alienable and disposable zone,
certified as such since January 21, 1987.

NO.
Applicant failed to comply with PD 1529
Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an
applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
must prove compliance with Section 14 of PD No.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree.
Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of
title must sufficiently establish:
1. that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain;
2. that the applicant and his predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the
same;
3. that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v.

Republic,20 we have ruled that a certification and
report from the DENR-CENRO enjoys the
presumption of regularity and is sufficient proof to
show the classification of the land described
therein.
The third requirement was satisfied
The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent
has presented sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence to show that he and his
predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question. Said findings
are binding upon this Court absent any showing
that the lower courts committed glaring mistakes
or that the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.
The second requirement was NOT satisfied
Rizalvo merely presented a certification and report
from the DENR-CENRO dated July 17, 2001
certifying that the land in question entirely falls
within the alienable and disposable zone since
January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked
for public use; and that it does not encroach any
area devoted to general public use.
Unfortunately, such certification and report is not
enough in order to commence the thirty (30)-year

prescriptive period under Section 14 (2). There is

no evidence in this case indicating any express
declaration by the state that the subject land is no
longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth. Thus, there
appears no basis for the application of the thirty
(30)-year prescriptive period in this case.
Even if the DENR-CENRO report was enough,
Rizalvo would still not be entitled to the
registration of the land
Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENRCENRO certification and report is enough to signify
that the land is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth,
respondent is still not entitled to registration
because the land was certified as alienable and
disposable in 1987, while the application for
registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a
mere thirteen (13) years after and far short of the
required thirty (30) years under existing laws on
prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

6. VICTORIA VS. REPUBLIC

*Registrable Properties*
NatividadVictoria vs Republic and the Hon. C.A., 8
June 2011.
Facts:
Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria applied to have a
1,729-square meter lot (Lot5176-D, Mcadm-590-D
of the Taguig Cadastral Mapping) in Bambang,
Taguigregistered in her name on 2 November
2004 before MeTCTaguig City. The Officeof the
Solicitor General (OSG) which represents Republic
of the Philippines,opposed her application. Victoria
testified and offered documentary evidence
showing the subject lot is aportion of a 17,507-sq.
m.parcel of landoriginally owned by her father
GenaroSta. Ana and previously declared in his
name for tax purposes. Upon herfathers death,
Victoria and her siblings inherited the land and
divided it
via
a deed of partitionamong themselves. The
Conversion/Subdivision Plan that Victoria
submitted as documentaryevidenceshowed that
the land is inside the alienable and
disposableareacertified by the Bureau of Forest
Development on 3 January 1968 (underProject 27B as per L.C. Map 2623). She also testified that
she and herpredecessors-in-interest possessed

that property continuously,uninterruptedly,

openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of
owners sincethe early 1940s (or for more than 30
years) and have been declared as ownersfor
taxation purposes. The Republic did not present
any evidence in support ofits opposition. The
MeTCTaguig City granted Victorias application via
its 25 January 2006decision, finding that Victoria
sufficiently established her claim and rightunder
the land registration law to have the property
registered in her name. The Republic appealed the
MeTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), as
theypointed out that Victoria failed to: first,
establish continuous, uninterrupted,open, public,
adverse possession in the concept of owner;
second, the subjectproperty is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. The CA
reversed and set aside the judgment of
MeTCTaguig via its 19 June2007 decision. The
Appellate Court upheld the second argument/point
of theOSG, as Victoria failed proving the property
as alienable and disposable land. They said that
she could notrely on the notation in the
Conversion/SubdivisionPlan submitted before the
MeTC
Issues:
1.Whether Natividad Victoria amply proved
the subject lot is alienable anddisposable
land of the public domain?

2.Whether she has amply proved her claim

of ownership?
Legal Provisions:
Section 14 (1)of the Property Registration Decree
hasthree requisites for registration of title: (a) that
the property in question isalienable and
disposable land of the public domain; (b) that
theapplicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
andoccupation; and (c) that such possession is
under a
bona fide
claim ofownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Held and Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the MeTCTaguig Citys
decisionand granted Natividad Victorias petition.
The Court ruled that Victoria wasable to establish
establishcontinuous, uninterrupted, open, public,
adversepossession in the concept of owner since
the early 1940s. More so, she hasalso submitted
tax declarations way back in 1948 in her fathers
name coveringthe said land, contrary to the OSGs
contention.Moreover, the Court said that to prove
that the land subject of the applicationfor
registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of apositive act of the

government such as a presidential proclamation

or anexecutive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau ofLands
investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may secure a certification from the
government that the landsapplied for are
alienable and disposable, but the certification
must show thatthe DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the landof the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and
that the land subject ofthe application for
registration falls within the approved area per
verificationthrough survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. The applicant must also present acopy of
the original classification of the land into alienable
and disposable, asdeclared by the DENR Secretary
or as proclaimed by the President. The Court also
ruled that the certification obtained by Victoria
from the DENRCENRO declared the land to be
alienable and disposable

7. DCD CONSTRUCTION, INC. v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179978, 31 August 2011Villarama, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On January 19, 2001, petitioner DCD Construction,
Inc., through its President and CEO Danilo D.Dira,
Jr., filed a verified application for registration of a
parcel of land situated in Taytay, DanaoCity with
an area of 4,493 square meters. It was alleged
that applicant which acquired the property by
purchase, together with its predecessors-ininterest, have been in continuous, open, adverse,
public, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property for
more than thirty (30) years. Thus, petitioner
prayed to have its title judicially confirmed.
Based on petitioners documentary and
testimonial evidence, it appears that the approved
technical description is allegedly identical to that
of another lot consisting of 3,781 square meters.
712 square meters of said lot can be segregated
as salvage zone pursuant to DENR Administrative
Order No. 97-05.On August 22, 2002, the trial
court declared that the applicant DCD
CONSTRUCTION INC., has a registerable title to
subject lot.On appeal by respondent Republic of

the Philippines, the CA reversed the trial court.

The CAruled that the evidence failed to show that
the land applied for was alienable and
disposableconsidering that only a notation in the
survey plan was presented to show the status of
theproperty. It was further noted that the earliest
tax declaration submitted was issued only in1988.
It was also held that petitioner did not prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession
under a
bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject lot is indeed
alienable and disposable.
RULING
No. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title
must prove the following: (a) that the land
formspart of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain and (b)
that theyhave been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the
same under a
bona fide
claim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since June 12, 1945.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,

which embodies the
Regalian doctrine
, all landsof the public domain belong to the State

the source of any asserted right to ownership of

land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumptively belong to
theState. Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienableand
disposable agricultural land or alienated to a
private person by the State remain part of
theinalienable public domain. Incontrovertible
evidence must be presented to establish that
theland subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.In support of its contention the land is
alienable and disposable, petitioner contends that
theDENR-Lands Management Services itself had
approved and adopted the notation made by
acertifying officer on the survey plan as its own.
Such approval amounts to a positive act of
thegovernment indicating that the land applied for
is indeed alienable and disposable.However, the
testimony of the officer from DENR-LMS, Rafaela
Belleza, did not at all attest tothe veracity of the
notation made by a certifying officer, Ibaez, on
the survey plan regardingthe status of the subject
land. Hence, no error was committed by the CA in
finding that thecertification made by DENR-LMS

pertained only to the technical correctness of the

surveyplotted in the survey plan and not to the
nature and character of the property surveyed.In
the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the
notation inserted in the survey plan hardlysatisfies
the incontrovertible proof required by law on the
classification of land applied forregistration.The
CA likewise correctly held that there was no
compliance with the required possessionunder a
bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public,
peaceful and in concept of owner, are mere
conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support
and substantiation. The burden of proof is onthe
applicant to prove by clear, positive and
convincing evidence that the alleged
possessionwas of the nature and duration required
by law.
The bare statement of petitioners witness,
Andrea Batucan Enriquez, that her family had
been in possession of the subject land from
thetime her father bought it after the Second
World War does not suffice.
Moreover, the tax declaration in the name of
petitioners father
was issued only in 1994, whilethe other
in its own name was issued in 2000. Petitioners
predecessors

-in-interest were ableto submit a tax declaration

only for the year
1988
, which was long after both spouses Vivencioand
Paulina Batucan have died. Although tax
declarations or realty tax payments of propertyare
not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good
indicia
of possession inthe concep
t of owner. And while Andrea Batucan Enriquez
claimed knowledge of their familys
possession since she was just ten (10) years old

although she said she was born in 1932 --there

was no clear and convincing evidence of such
open, continuous, exclusive and
notoriouspossession under a
bona fide
claim of ownership. She never mentioned any act
of occupation,development, cultivation or
maintenance over the property throughout the
alleged length of
possession. There was no account of the
circumstances regar
ding their fathers acquisition of
the land, whether their father introduced any
improvements or farmed the land, and if

theyestablished residence or built any house

thereon.We have held that the bare claim of the
applicant that the land applied for had been in
thepossession of her predecessor-ininterest for 30 years does not constitute the well
-nigh
inconvertible and conclusive evidence required
in land registration.
The law speaks of possession and occupation.
Since these words are separated by
theconjunction and, the clear intention of the law
is not to make one synonymous with the
other.Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession.
When,therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the allencompassing effect of constructive possession.
Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive andnotorious, the word occupation
serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, hispossession must not be a mere fiction.
Actual
possession of a land consists in the
manifestationof acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his ownproperty.

8. Republic v. T.A.N. Properties

Inc.
(555 SCRA 477)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.G.R. No.
154953; June 26, 2008
Facts:
In 1999, T.A.N. Properties filed in the RTC of
Batangas an application for theregistration of a
land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an
area of 56.4007hectares. To support its
application, it submitted two certificates, issued
by CENROand FMS-DENR and both certifying that
the land applied for was alienable anddisposable.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Director of Lands,opposed the application on
the ground that T.A.N. Properties did not prove
that theland was alienable and disposable.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the applicant proved that,
the land is alienable anddisposable.
Ruling:
No. It is the burden of the applicant to prove that
the land subject to registration is alienable and
disposable and for such the applicant must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land

classification and released the land of the public

domain as alienable and disposable. In the
present case, T.A.N. Properties did not provide the
needed proof. For the documents provided by the
company, the Court cited DENR Administrative
Order No. 20 (DAO No. 20) and DAO No. 38; DAO
No. 20 proves that FMS-DENR has no authority to
issue certificates, classifying lands to be alienable
and disposable; and DAO No. 38 provides that
CENRO can issue certificates of land classification
for lands having a maximum area of 50 hectares.
The land applied for in the case has an area of
56.4007 hectares, thus CENRO has no jurisdiction
over it. It is clear from the aforementioned DAOs
that the documents submitted by T.A.N. Properties
did not prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.

10. Union Leaf Tobacco

Corporation v. Republic of the
Philippines
UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORPORATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENTMR. HILARION P.
UY,Petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. G.R. No. 185683; March 16, 2011

Facts:
In December 1, 2004, the Corporation filed before
the RTC of Agoo, La Unionfour applications for land
registration covering various parcels of land. The
Republicopposed the applications, citing Article
XII, Section 3 of the Constitution. The corporation
presented testimonial evidence as well as
documentary evidence,particularly the Advance
Plans and Consolidated Plans, which all noted that
thesubject lands are "inside alienable and
disposable area as per project No. 5-A, LCMap No.
2891," to support its claim.After the trial, the RTC
granted the application of the corporation by
relyingon the testimonies offered by the witnesses
of the latter. On appeal by the Republic,the CA
reversed the trial courts decision, holding that the
corporation presented noevidence to show that
the subject parcels of land have been reclassified
by theState as alienable or disposable to a private
person. The corporation in its answer,insisted that
the Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans it
presented proved that theparcels of land are
alienable.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the parcels of land are proven
alienable and disposable.
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the Advance Plans
and Consolidated Plans are hardly thecompetent
pieces of evidence that the law requires. The

notation by a geodeticengineer on the survey

plans that properties are alienable and disposable
does notsuffice to prove the lands classification.
Further, the Court cited the case
Republicv. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
where It
directs that:
x x x x The applicant for registration must present
a copy of the originalclassification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by thelegal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable

11. Yu Change vs. Republic

G.R. No. 171726 : February 23, 2011
VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG,
Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in
representation of her brother and co-petitioner,
Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petition for registration

of title over a piece of land. In their petition, they

declared that they are the co-owners of the
subject lots; that they and their predecessors-ininterest have been in actual, physical, material,
exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the
above described parcels of land for more than 100
years; and that allegedly, they have
continuously, peacefully, and adversely possessed
the property in the concept of owners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court

erred in dismissing their application for
registration of title on the ground that they
failed to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act.

HELD:
The trial court rendered a Decision granting
petitioners' application. The CA reversed the trial
court's decision and dismissed petitioners
application for land registration on account that
the land is classified as forest land and is thus not
subject to appropriation and alienation. The CA
considered the petition to be governed by Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the
Public Land Act, as amended, and held that
petitioners were not able to present
incontrovertible evidence that the parcels of land
sought to be registered are alienable and
disposable.
Petitioners insist that the subject properties could
no longer be considered and classified as forest
land since there are buildings, residential houses
and even government structures existing and
standing on the land.

The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: Forest land
Petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the
effect that the lots subject of their application are
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Instead, petitioners contend that the
subject properties could no longer be considered
and classified as forest land since there are
building structures, residential houses and even
government buildings existing and standing on
the area. This, however, is hardly the proof
required under the law.
A forested area classified as forest land of the
public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Unless and until the

land classified as forest land is released in an

official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
DENIED.
CA AFFIRMED.

12. Republic of the Philippines v.

Candido Vergel De Dios
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ,petitioner, vs.
CANDIDO, DEMETILA, JESUS, ANGELITO, and
TERESITA, all surnamed VERGEL DE
DIOS,respondents.G.R. No. 170459; February 9,
2011
Facts:
Candido filed with the RTC of Bulacan a petition
for reconstitution of theburned Original of TCT No.
T-141671 and issuance of a new owners duplicate
copyin lieu of the destroyed one. Attached with his
petition are the Kasulatan, Plan, Technical
Description and Tax Declaration of the land. The
RTC granted the petitionbut the Republic appealed

the ruling to CA arguing about the sufficiency to

order areconstitution of the lost title of those
presented by Candido. The CA also held a
insufficient evidence the Kasulatan, which was
executed only in 1996, long after theoriginal TCT
was burned and the owners duplicate title was
lost but it also affirmedthe RTCs order regarding
the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy in
lieu of the destroyed one.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the issuance of a new
owners duplicate copy of theCertificate of
Title in lieu of the destroyed one is proper.
Ruling:
No. The reconstitution of a certificate of title
denotes restoration in the originalform and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting the title of a personto a piece of land.
The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to
have, afterobserving the procedures prescribed by
law, the title reproduced in exactly thesame way it
has been when the loss or destruction occurred.
When reconstitution isordered, this document is
replaced with a new onethe reconstituted title
thatreproduces the original. After the
reconstitution, the owner is issued a duplicatecopy
of the reconstituted title.

In the present case, it is clear that the CA

cancelled the order of reconstitution, which was
previously granted by the lower court, thus, it
shouldfollow that no new owners duplicate copy
of certificate of title should be issued.Without the
order for reconstitution, the order to issue a new
owners duplicate titlehad no leg to stand on.

22. Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Court

of Appeals
[G.R. No. 170732, October 11, 2012, 684 SCRA
55]
DOCTRINE:
Liquidated damages The parties to a contract
are allowed to stipulate on liquidated damages to
be paid in case of breach. It is attached to an
obligation in order to ensure performance and has
a double function: (1) to provide for liquidated
damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive force
of the obligation by the threat of greater
responsibility in the event of breach. As a precondition to such award, however, there must be
proof of the fact of delay in the performance of
the obligation.

Effect of default As long as the contractor fails to

finish the works within the period agreed upon by
the parties without justifiable reason and after the
owner makes a demand, then liability for damages
as a consequence of such default arises.
FACTS:
Respondent Herbal Cove Realty Corporation
(Herbal Cove) wanted to build a a subdivision
project somewhere in Tagaytay City. It hired
petitioner Atlantic Erectors Inc. (Atlantic) to build
the project. The Construction Contract indicated a
contract price of almost P16.7Million and to finish
building within 180 days. To secure payment in
case of non completion of the project, the contract
also provides:
ARTICLE IX
FAILURE TO COMPLETE WORK
Section 1: The CONTRACTOR acknowledges that
the OWNER shall not suffer [loss] by the delay or
failure of the CONTRACTOR to finish and complete
the works called for under this Contract within the
time stipulated in Section 6, Article IV. The
CONTRACTOR hereby expresses covenants and
agrees to pay to the Owner liquidated damages
equivalent to the One-Tenth of One Percent (1/10
of 1%) of the Contract Price per calendar day of
delay until completion, delivery and acceptance of

the said Works by the OWNER to a maximum

amount not to exceed 10%.
Atlantic was asked to commence construction on
July 8, 1996, but eventually, it asked for an
extension citing bad weather and delayed
turnover of project sites which Herbal Cove
granted but ultimately, Atlantic failed to deliver.
Herbal Cove terminated the contract on October
3, 1997 and demanded liquidated damages.
Herbal Cove also hired another contractor to finish
the job. It filed a case with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). The CIAC
found in favor of Herbal Cove but did not award
liquidated damages for failure to comply with 15day notice of termination (provided for in its
contract.). The CA awarded liquidated damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is liable for
liquidated damages.
HELD:

Yes. The CIAC disallowed liquidated damages

because Herbal Cove failed to comply with the
rule on notice. However, the contract is the law
between the parties and there are provisions in
the same contract which provide "the Contractor
shall be required to pay the Owner the liquidated
damages in the amount stipulated in the Contract
Agreement, the said payment to be made as
liquidated damages, and not by way of penalty.
The Owner may deduct from any sum due or to
become due the Contractor any sums accruing for
liquidated damages as herein stated." also,
"Neither the taking over by the Owner of the work
for completion by administration nor the re-letting
of the same to another Contractor shall be
construed as a waiver of the Owners rights to
recover damages against the original Contractor
and/or his sureties for the failure to complete the
work as stipulated." Thus, under the contract,
Herbal Cove's right to liquidated damages is
distinct from the right to terminate contract.