1203957

Terrorism Studies

CR6014

Critically assess why it is that terrorist organisations have different

structures. Answer with reference to at least two examples.

Student Number: 1203957

CR6014
Terrorism Studies

1203957

Terrorism Studies

CR6014

Terrorist organisations exist in many forms ranging from highly centralised and hierarchical groups to
loosely connected decentralised networks with no particular affiliation other than a similar objective
that are motivated by a shared belief or ideology (Terrorism-Research). In order to determine why it is
that terrorist organisations have different structures, one will first study the different structures utilised
by past terrorist group in order to comprehend their strength and weakness. One will also take into
account the particular objectives and ideologies that motivated these various terrorist groups to
determine what structure they considered appropriate for their operations and the underlying reasons
behind their selection.
According to terrorism-research, there are two general structures of a terrorist
organisation; hierarchical and networked. The level of an organisation is one of the factors that
determine what structure a terrorist group may operate within. Terrorist groups that are linked with a
political movement or organisation like the IRA would require a hierarchical organisation, in order to
conduct acts of terrorism with political involvement. It can also be necessary for a politically linked
group to find solutions and avoid unnecessary violence to achieve political objectives. This can be
difficult to administer in networked organisations as there is less supervision and control among the
various group operating in different locations in a network model (Terrorism-Research). Newer groups
tend to arrange and adapt towards the possibilities inbuilt in the networked structure. Ideology also
plays a significant role in the formation of an organisational structure such as Leninist or Maoist
groups moving towards centralised control and hierarchical structure (Terrorism-Research). Within a
larger organisation, nearly all groups use variations of cellular networks at the tactical level to
enhance security and organise tasks for operations. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) articulated that in
order to understand what kind of network a group may operate within; one must take into account the
various inner structures of network model. These inner structures could range from simple chain or
line networks, to less simple hub or star design to complex all channel design, any and all of which
may be combined into expanding multi-hub and spiders-web networks (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999).
Due to the complexity and flexibility of network models, various criminal groups around the globe are
already evolving in this direction (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). This also includes non-terrorist
groups who are transforming their organisational structure and strategies to take advantage of the
networked model. For instance, black-market proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),

1203957

Terrorism Studies

CR6014

drug and other criminal groups, intellectual property pirates and immigration and refugee smugglers
(Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004).
There are mainly three types of structures a network group can adapt to. This includes a chain or line
network, the hub or star network and the all-channel or full-matrix network. According to Arquilla and
Ronfeldt (1999), a chain or line structure, members are positioned in a chain of nodes along which
information travels. Thus, members are not aware of the main body in command of the organisation.
They take commands from one member and pass it on to another without receiving any internal
details about the workings of the network. In the hub network, all orders come from the body located
at the centre, and all information must pass through that node (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). Thus,
one body oversees all other nodes, while all other members are subordinated to that central body. In
the all-channel network on the other hand, information flows freely in a fully collaborative manner
Mishal and Rosenthal (2004). Thus, no single member has control or authority over the others
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, 78). Each type of network is suited for different settings and objectives.
For instance, the chain in smuggling operations, the hub in terrorist and criminal organisations and the
all-channel network among militants a group that is highly decentralised and interconnected (Arquilla
and Ronfeldt, 1999). Mishal and Rosenthal (2004) underlines that the smallest features of terrorist
networks are the cells that serve as building blocks for the active terrorist organisation. This can be
seen in the structure of the hub or star network model that terrorist groups usually adapt towards for
organising and conducting acts of terrorism. One of the key factors why terrorist groups function within
a hub network model structure is enhanced security and flexibility. The loss of one cell should not
compromise the identity, location, or workings of other cells (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). A cellular
organisational structure makes it harder for authorities to infiltrate and capture the entire organisation.
Individuals within one cell are often unaware of the existence of other cells and, therefore, cannot
disclose sensitive information to infiltrators (Terrorism-Research).
Arquila and Rondfeldt, in their analysis on terrorist organisations, describes a network as a set of
diverse, dispersed nodes that share a set of ideas and interests and are arrayed to act in a fully
intermitted all-channel manner (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). They claim that networks have very
little to no hierarchy or central authority. Decision making and operations can be planned and carried
out locally without a leading figure or clear leadership (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, 7). Terrorist groups

1203957

Terrorism Studies

CR6014

can exist on different phases of development in terms of capabilities and structural complexity. Newer
groups with limited resources will typically operate in permissive areas or under the instructions of
more skilled organisations to develop proficiency. Also, groups linked with ethnic or nationalist
agendas and mission locations limited to one country or region, tend to require fewer resources
(Terrorism-Research).
This can be seen in the case of Al-Qaeda when the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
According to Mishal and Rosenthal (2004), Al-Qaeda was fairly centralised and hierarchical when it
started out in 1989 because its main focus was in Afghanistan. The objectives then required a more
local supervision since the conflict took place on their local land. However, after the withdrawal of
soviet forces, Al-Qaeda managed to change its organisational structure in order to meet new
objectives. After the September 11th attacks, Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups intensified these
structural changes in their organisation in response to government pressure. The consensus finding is
that global counterterrorism policies forced Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups and to adopt a
decentralized, less hierarchical, more networked organizational forms (Terrorism-Research). Mishal
and Rosenthal (2004) also argued that Al Qaeda started out as a hierarchical organization, converted
into a network system and after the 2001 attack in Afghanistan, transformed into a Dune organization.
Their actions were based on a fundamental ideology, political ambitions and operational
sophistication.
Mishal and Rosenthal (2004) addresses how the Al-Qaeda movement started when Osama bin Laden
and his major delegate, the head of The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, voiced
their vision regarding their global Jihad missions and global targets in clear terms: the overthrow of
Arab rulers that do not follow the Islamic Sharia rules (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). However, Al
Qaeda and its allied Islamic groups declared to first eliminate the JewishCrusader alliance in the
western countries. Thus, Al Qaedas fundamental objective is to hurt America, Russia, and Israel so
as to free the Islamic world from western control (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). According to Al
Qaedas global jihad awareness, the United States supports Israel with its continuous attacks on
Palestine and challenges anti-American Arab systems. Therefore, Al Qaeda needs to fight the United
States through acts of global terrorism (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004).

1203957

Terrorism Studies

CR6014

Mishal and Rosenthal (2004) indicate that contrary to Al Qaedas global Jihad, Hizballah, Hamas, and
the Palestinian Islamic Jihads political ambitions includes both immediate goals as well as long-term
broader objectives. The short-term objective of these groups is the armed struggle against Israeli
forces in order to liberate all of Palestine and regions in Lebanon (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). The
more long-term objective and aspiration is to replace the current non-Islamic social and political
orders in the Arab nations with an Islamic state ruled by the Islamic law. Mishal and Rosenthal (2004)
points out that each of these groups have declared their current objectives and priorities across the
nation and they are gradually strengthening their position to ensure their influence grows over key
developments and decision-making processes in their own region (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). Al
Qaeda on one side, and Hizballah, Hamas, and the HHJ on the other size, share the same long-term
objectives, their strategies are different: lacking territorial or nationalistic ambitions (Mishal and
Rosenthal, 2004). That is, Al Qaeda developed their agenda on a global scale whereas HHJ remained
engaged in local and nationally oriented battles. (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004)
The difference in their respective strategies is demonstrated by the evolutionary organisational shifts
Al Qaeda experienced since started out in 1989. Al Qaeda gradually changed its structure from being
a hierarchical centralised model to a range of network structuresleading up to its current highly
dispersed and multi-structured organisational design. (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004)
Shapiro (2005) addresses how Al Qaeda was created in 1989 as a group devoted to fighting the
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Its originators came to fight, under the banner of Islam against a
superpower determined to oppress an Islamic nation at that time (Shapiro, 2005). According to Mishal
and Rosenthal (2004), Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri arrived at the recruitment base in Pakistan, along
with many other Arab Afghans, who flew in from all over the Arab world to join this Jihadist movement.
The return to Afghanistan allowed bin laden to consolidate his grip on jihadi activities worldwide
(Sageman, 2004). During this time, Mishal and Rosenthal (2004) underline how the organisation
followed the principles of a hierarchical structure, so to empower its involvement in the anti-Soviet
war. Al-Qaeda wanted to set an example for future conflicts against the non-believers under a
cohesive ideological orientation (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). Each unit was categorised in a
pyramid-like structure to the organisations leadership, headed by bin Laden. This structure provided
troops and support into Afghanistan, and later on, for purposes of committing acts of terrorism in the

1203957

Terrorism Studies

CR6014

Western countries (Hoffman, 1998). Following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan,
changes in Al Qaedas objectives led to a shift in the organisational structure. According to Mishal
and Rosenthal (2004), Bin Laden now declared the organisations international connections and his
willingness to fight for multiple causes. Between 1998 and 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda largely
managed a network mode of organisation. Mishal and Rosenthal, (2004) highlights the formation of
World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders (IIF) by Bin Laden In February 1998,
which basically constituted a network of Islamic leaders and organisations operating on the state level
(Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). Al Qaedas success in the 9/11 attacks is a clear example of the
network system. Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004 points out how the terrorists were originally trained in Al
Qaedas camps in Afghanistan, where jihadists were recruited from the Arab world, especially Egypt
and Saudi Arabia and received logistical assistance through Al Qaedas sleeper cells in Europe and
Southeast Asia in order to enter the United States undetected (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). It
appears that much of these actions were carried out according to the hub-network principle. As
highlighted by Mishal and Rosenthal (2004), Al Qaedas central node saw the big picture and the
other participants such as recruits and logistical assistants received only limited information regarding
specific parts of the operation. Mishal and Rosenthal (2004) highlight the practicality of networks for
ongoing low-intensity conflict, but argue that they have a critical disadvantage: they can be broken. By
identifying the primary members in a network and getting them to cooperate with authorities, the
network can be broken down completely (Farely, 2003). Thus, when the U.S.Al Qaeda conflict turned
intense and the United States decided to turn Al Qaedas network its chances for survival were
reduced.
Mishal and Rosenthal (2004) highlights how Al-Qaeda transformed its organisational structure after
the 2001 U.S.-led assault on Afghanistan and managed to turn the strategic limitations and military
intervention set up by the United States into strategic advantages. Al Qaedas actions challenged two
principles of the conventional organisational structures, found in both the hierarchical and the network
models (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). According to these principles, the manner of organisations
relies on an imminent affiliation with an explicit territorial rational and a permanent institutional
presence (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004). In the case of Al Qaeda, although it may continue to rely on
these two principles for some of their objectives, the main structural changes in Al-Qaeda were
disappearance rather than institutional presence, as they experienced in Afghanistan with the Soviet

1203957

Terrorism Studies

CR6014

forces and de-territorialisation, instead of affiliation with definite territorial location. These two
structural modifications have developed as the unique operational principles that have guided Al
Qaedas actions and formed its strategy since the attacks of 9/11 (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004).
An example of a centralised and hierarchical organisation would be the IRA. Horgan and Taylor
(1997) proclaim that the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is one of the most highly organised
and sophisticated terrorist groups in history. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has had the longest
running revolutionary movement the modern world has yet witnessed. The 'IRA' was born in
December 1969, following a split in the ranks of the older, original IRA, a group with a long historical
tradition of militancy against Britain. This largely ideological division saw the rise of the Provisional
IRA (PIRA), and the Official IRA. The Provisionals have since followed a much more violent
operations aligned with political struggle than their occasional counterparts (Horgan and Taylor, 1997).
Horgan and Taylor (1997) describes the PIRA, allied with their political affiliate, Provisional Sinn Fein
(PSF) as an openly nationalist organisation seeking an end to British rule in Northern Ireland, and
specifically, as stated in the PIRA Constitution, it aims: a) to guard, honour and uphold the sovereignty
and unity of the Republic of Ireland. B) To support the establishment of an Irish Socialist Republic
based on the 1916 Proclamation. C) To support the establishment of, and uphold, a lawful
government in sole and absolute control of the Republic (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). These are the
PIRA's long-term goals. However, its close range objective is to seek the removal of the British
military presence in Northern Ireland. The PIRA has tried to accomplish this mission through a
prolonged movement of rural and urban terrorism against British forces in Northern Ireland throughout
the past 27 years (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). To some extent, its operation proximity has extended to
the Irish Republic, Great Britain, mainland Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the United
States (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). The PIRA's method of operation has incorporated bombings,
shooting attacks, high-profile assassinations, kidnappings and beatings. The campaign has been
heavily involved in extortion and armed robberies, and manages a sophisticated financial network
unlike any large business. PIRA targets have included members of the security forces in Northern
Ireland [i.e. the British Army, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) - the Ulster police force, the Ulster
Defence Regiment (UDR) and Royal Irish Regiment (RIR)] as well as government and private-sector

1203957

Terrorism Studies

CR6014

individuals such as senior British government officials and British military personnels in the mainland
United Kingdom and in western Europe (Horgan and Taylor, 1997).
Since early 1977 the PRIA have reformed their organisational structure in a number of stages. The
purpose has been to counter the resistance which they have experienced from Security Forces and in
particular to improve their security and co-ordination (Trends in Paramilitary Activities). Another
analysis by Shapiro (2005) shows that terrorist groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA) and others changed their network structure, reduced their communications between members,
and strengthened their hierarchy in response to government pressure. The PIRA now maintains a
cellular-based, hierarchically-organised authoritarian structure ensuring both operational and nonoperational efficiency. The active membership of the movement does not exceed a few hundred at
any one time, but this merely conceals a much larger support network consisting of thousands
(Horgan and Taylor, 1997).
A review of the structural development of past terrorist organisations and an assessment of the
growing academic literature on terrorism studies indicates the key dimensions to consider are the
interconnectedness of an organization, the level of hierarchical control in that organisation, and the
degree of specialisation in that organisations smallest functional units (Shapiro, 2005).
Contemporary writings fail to distinguish correctly between these dimensions, perceiving terrorist
groups like they are either Centralised and hierarchical or highly interconnected and networked.
Carley (2004) compares Hamas and Al Qaeda on a number of factors including their organisational
structure (hierarchy), nature of connections among cell leaders (interconnectedness), and the
distribution of skills within cells (specialisation).The easiest way to explain interconnectedness in
organisations is to use the terminology of social network analysis (Shapiro, 2005). In the most highly
interconnected organisation members are positioned into an all-channel network in which every
members is linked to every other individual and no one member has authority over other members. In
the least interconnected organisation, every member is connected to only two others. Shapiro (2005)
also highlights that the most common structure used in covert organisations is the cellular structure in
which small groups of 4-6 members all know each other, forming a cell but only one cell member
communicates with other cells. (Shapiro, 2005)

1203957

Terrorism Studies

CR6014

In conclusion, these various sophisticated structures in terrorist organisations and a strong emphasis
on networking models creates particularly difficult challenges for governments and intelligence
agencies to locate and identify the threats and prevent acts of terrorism. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999)
stressed that there has been an increase in the number of network-based conflict and crime occurring
globally and argued that network-based organisations will become a major threat in the near future.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) pointed out that the information revolution is changing the nature of
conflict across the globe. This revolution is strengthening the network forms of organisation and giving
them advantage over hierarchical forms in terms of flexibility and security. The rise of the networks
means that that power is shifting from hierarchical centralised groups to highly interconnected
decentralised groups because they are able to organise and formulate sprawling multi-networks more
readily. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) concluded that this shift in organisational structure means that
conflicts may increasingly be waged by networks rather than hierarchical organisations. Mishal and
Rosenthal (2004) also emphasised that globalization, the information revolution, and technological
developments have raised the threat of global terrorist movements to the state order.

1203957

Terrorism Studies

CR6014

Bibliography

Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. 1999. The Advent of Netwar: Analytical Background. Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism 22:193-206.
Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, eds. 2001. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and
Militancy. Rand Report.
Carley, K. 2004. Estimating Vulnerabilities in Large Covert Networks Using Multi-Level Data. In
Proceedings of the 2004 International Symposium on Command and Control Research and
Technology, San Diego, CA.
Farely, Jonathan D. 2003. Breaking Al Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism
Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making), Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26,
pp. 399411.
Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.
John Horgan & Max. Taylor (1997) The provisional Irish republican army: Command and functional
structure, Terrorism and Political Violence, 9:3, 1-32, [Online] Available at
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546559708427413> [Accessed 2 December 2015]
Mishal, S. and Rosenthal, M. (2004) Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic
Terrorist Organizations. Routledge. [Online] Available at < http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?id=46602> [Accessed 1 December 2015]
Mishal, Shaul and Avraham Sela. (2000). The Palestinian Hamas. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Sageman, M. 2004, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press
Shapiro N. Jacob, 2005, Organizing Terror: Hierarchy and Networks in Covert Organizations. [pdf]
Stanford University. Available at < <http://www.teachingterror.net/resources/Shapiro%20organizing
%20Terror.pdf.> [Accessed 28 November 2015]
Terrorist Research, 2002, Terrorism Groups, [Online] Available at < http://www.terrorismresearch.com/groups/> [Accessed 26 November 2015]
University of Ulster, 1999, Trends in Paramilitary Activities. [pdf] Cain Web Service. Available at
<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/proni/1980/proni_ENV-19-1-2A_1979-02-19.pdf> [Accessed 3 December 2015]

10