Torres v Court of Appeals

Spouses Isidro Sierra and Antonia Magtaas sold a parcel of land in favor of
Marta Chivi and attested that the said parcel of land was not registered under
the Land Registration Act and the Spanish Mortgage Law. They admitted that
it was previously subject to a patent but the same patent hadnt been
approved and that no patent was issued. They reassured Marta Chivi of these
circumstances as Marta stated that she was unwilling to buy the land if it
were patented, for the reason that the said parcel of land will be subject to
repurchase. They agreed that the amount of 10,800 pesos will not be fully
paid pending registration of the land.
Marta initiated the registration of the said land before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Pending the registration, she sold her rights to herein
petitioners Spouses Laico who in turn bought the same at the amount of 26
thousand pesos with a stipulation that if she fails to surrender the title, Marta
Chivi would have to pay double the amount of the selling price to the Laicos.
Spouses Sierra, to induce Sps Laicos to proceed with the sale, showed them
their petition to withdraw free patent.
Eventually, Marta and Sps Laicos discovered that Isidro Sierra was issued a
free patent title so Sps Laicos decided to meet with the Sierras and convey
another deed of sale. Sps Laicos withdrew their application for registration
and filed a petition for reconstitution of title issued to Isidro Sierra.
Regional Trial Court
Isidro Sierra and Antonia Magtaas filed before the Court of First Instance
a complaint against Marta Chivi, assisted by her husband, and Spouses
Laicos, with prayer to allow them to repurchase said land.
Marta Chivi and the Spouses Laicos instituted an answer and counterclaim
with damages against the Sierras. Sps Laicos filed a cross-claim against
Chivis for collection of twice the amount of the selling price of the land.
During the pendency of the case, Spouses Laicos and Sierras had a
compromise concluded in the following terms:
Spouses Laicos would:
1. Be the owner of the said
land
2. Will pay 10 K for the transfer
of title to their favor
3. Will pursue the cross-claim
against Marta Chivi (or Chivi
Spouses)
4. And if they win the said
case, will pay Spouses
Sierras half of the said
awards of the court

Spouses Sierra would:

1. Withdraw their action with
respect
to
that
which
concerns Spouses Laicos;
and
2. Would convert their action
from repurchase to recovery
of balance of the sale
against Marta Chivi
3. Transfer Patent to Laicos

The compromise agreement was recognized by the Regional Trial Court

without the knowledge of the Chivis.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE:
1. Complaint Against Laicos;
2. Counterclaim of Laicos against Sierras
PRE TRIAL (of pending case against Chivis)
Even when duly notified, only the counsel for Spouses Laicos appeared and
eventually led the court to declare Chivis in default and allowed Laico to
present evidence before Deputy Clerk of Court.
RTC Ruled in favor of Laicos, awarding 15 K and ordering the attachment of
the properties of the Chivis.
COURT OF APPEALS
Spouses Chivis, in due time, filed a petition for certiorari before the court of
appeals questioning the following:
1. Order of the court authorizing Laicos to adduce the evidence ex parte
against Chivis
2. Decision on Cross-claim;
3. Order directing writ of execution against her properties
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION:
1. Ruled in favor of Chivis, issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
Auction of attached property of the Chivis
2. Declared null and void decisions issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal concerning this case
ISSUE:
Could the cross-claim stand after complaint in action was dismissed with
prejudice?
Held:
No. A crossbill, strictly speaking, is one brought by a defendant in an equity
suit against other defendants in the same suit, touching matters in question
in the original bill. It is considered as an auxiliary suit dependent upon the
original bill, and can be sustained only on matters growing out of the original
bill. There is a well-defined distinction between a crossbill merely defensing in
character, and one seeking affirmative relief. The dismissal fo the original bill
carries with it a purely defensive cross-bill, but not the one seeing affirmative
relief.
Cross-claim in this case was purely defensive in nature it arose entirely out of
the complaint and could prosper only f the plaintiffs succeeded. Hence, under
the principle mentioned, it could not be the subject of independent
adjudication once it lost the nexus upon which it s life depended.

Under the circumstances above set forth the dismissal of the cross-claim
should have followed the dismissal of the complaint as a matter of course,
without further proceeding; and in setting the said cross-claim for pre trial
and receiving evidence thereon there is grave abuse of discretion correctible
by certiorari.