REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.

185091
REPRESENTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
DIVISION OF LIPA CITY (FOR
PANINSINGIN PRIMARY SCHOOL),
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
PEREZ,** and
MENDOZA, JJ.

PRIMO MENDOZA and

MARIA LUCERO,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
August 8, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment suit
against the Government for its failure to acquire ownership of a
privately owned property that it had long used as a school site
and to pay just compensation for it.
The Facts and the Case
Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated
by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) through
the Department of Education. PPS has been using 1,149 square
meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But
the property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were registered in

** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.

Nachura, per raffle dated July 28, 2010.
**** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta, per raffle dated July 28, 2010.

the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the

Mendozas) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-11410. 1[1]
On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and
1925 to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots, as follows:
Lot 1 292 square meters in favor of Claudia Dimayuga
Lot 2 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas
Lot 3 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio Ronquillo; and
Lot 4 1,149 square meters in favor of the City Government of
Lipa2[2]
As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially
cancelled TCT T-11410 and issued new titles for Lots 1 and 3 in
favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in
the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the
name of the City Government of Lipa for Lot 4. 3[3] Meantime, PPS
remained in possession of the property.
The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the
name of the City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had
relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by
the consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had
long been tax-declared in the name of the City Government and
PPS built significant, permanent improvements on the same.
These improvements had also been tax-declared. 4[4]
The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought
permission from them to use the property as a school site, they
never relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy
the property since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it
has remained registered in their name under the original title, TCT
T-11410, which had only been partially cancelled.

1[1] Rollo, p. 46.

2[2] Id. at 48.
3[3] Id. at 46-48.
4[4] Id. at 49-50; Tax Declaration (TD) 00491 issued in 1989, cancelled by TD 01914
(for the lot) and TD 0915 (for the buildings), and further cancelled by TD 00748
issued in 1995.

On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding

that it vacate the disputed property. 5[5] When PPS declined to do
so, on January 12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case
0002-99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. 6[6]
On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing
the complaint on ground of the Republics immunity from suit. 7[7]
The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa
City which ruled that the Republics consent was not necessary
since the action before the MTCC was not against it. 8[8]
In light of the RTCs decision, the Mendozas filed with the
MTCC a motion to render judgment in the case before it. 9[9] The
MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over
the case had passed to the RTC upon appeal. 10[10] Later, the RTC
remanded the case back to the MTCC, 11[11] which then dismissed
the case for insufficiency of evidence. 12[12] Consequently, the
Mendozas once again appealed to the RTC in Civil Case 20010236.
On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas
and ordered PPS to vacate the property. It held that the Mendozas
had the better right of possession since they were its registered
owners. PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any document
5[5] Id. at 53.
6[6] Id. at 52-56
7[7] Id. at 57-59.
8[8] Id. at 60-67.
9[9] CA rollo, pp. 74-77.
10[10] Id. at 49-51.
11[11] Rollo, pp. 68-70.
12[12] Id. at 71-74.

to prove the transfer of ownership of the land in its favor. 13[13]

PPS moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were
barred by laches from recovering possession of the school lot; (2)
sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas relinquished
ownership of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa City
for use as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long been declared
in the name of the City Government since 1957 for taxation
purposes.14[14]
In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision.15[15] Upholding the Torrens system, it emphasized
the indefeasibility of the Mendozas registered title and the
imprescriptible nature of their right to eject any person occupying
the property. The CA held that, this being the case, the Republics
possession of the property through PPS should be deemed merely
a tolerated one that could not ripen into ownership.
The CA also rejected the Republics claim of ownership since
it presented no documentary evidence to prove the transfer of the
property in favor of the government. Moreover, even assuming
that the Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in 1957
in the governments favor, the latter never took steps to have the
title to the property issued in its name or have its right as owner
annotated on the Mendozas title. The CA held that, by its
omissions, the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim that the
Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its action.

13[13] CA rollo, pp. 58-63. Penned by Judge Jane Aurora C. Lantion.

14[14] Id. at 2-21.
15[15] Rollo, pp. 24-36. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and
concurred in by Associate Justices Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok and Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr.

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the

Republic has taken recourse to this Court via petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic
from the subject property that it had used for a public school.
The Courts Ruling
A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons,
including the Government of the Republic and all its branches,
whether or not mentioned by name in the application for
registration or its notice.16[16] Indeed, title to the land, once
registered, is imprescriptible.17[17] No one may acquire it from the
registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious possession. 18
[18] Thus, to a registered owner under the Torrens system, the
right to recover possession of the registered property is equally
imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of
ownership.
Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas title
over the property has not been disputed. While the consolidation
and subdivision plan of Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149
square meter lot had been designated to the City Government,
the Republic itself admits that no new title was issued to it or to
any of its subdivisions for the portion that PPS had been
occupying since 1957.19[19]
16[16] Amending and Codifying The Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for
Other Purposes, Presidential Decree No. 1529, [P.D. No. 1529], 31, 2.
17[17] Section 47 of P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.
18[18] Id. at 47.
19[19] Rollo, p. 11.

That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property

and its improvements in its name cannot defeat the Mendozas
title. This Court has allowed tax declarations to stand as proof of
ownership only in the absence of a certificate of title. 20[20]
Otherwise, they have little evidentiary weight as proof of
ownership.21[21]
The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from
the property that it had held as government school site for more
than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the Mendozas
intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa
permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property
in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought in 1962 to
have the bigger lot subdivided into four, the Mendozas earmarked
Lot 4, containing 1,149 square meters, for the City Government of
Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the
Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the
government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the
Republic, way back but never got around to do so and the
Republic itself altogether forgot about it. Consequently, the
Republic should be deemed entitled to possession pending the
Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just
compensation.
The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to
the taking of his property by the government for public use, he
thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal
expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as the
Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis,22[22] the failure for a long time
of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings
20[20] Republic of the Philippines v. Catarroja, G.R. No. 171774, February 12, 2010.
In this case, the tax declaration could stand as evidence of ownership because the
certificate of title was never reconstituted after its loss and no proof that it had ever
been issued by a valid land registration court; and in Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas
Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 855, 861-862, only tax
declarations were presented to prove ownership along with actual possession.
21[21] Arbias v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173808, September 17, 2008,
565 SCRA 582, 593-594.

covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a

waiver of his right to gain back possession. The Mendozas remedy
is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,23[23] the
Court affirmed the RTCs power to award just compensation even
in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It held that
the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence
presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of
possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time
when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where
property was taken without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of
possession before the commencement of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking
that is controlling.24[24]
Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the
Republic from the land it had taken for public use or to hear and
adjudicate the Mendozas right to just compensation for it, the CA
should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer
dismissed without prejudice to their filing a proper action for
recovery of such compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition,
REVERSES the February 26, 2008 decision and the October 20,
2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604, and
ORDERS the dismissal of respondents Primo and Maria Mendozas
action for eviction before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lipa
City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to their filing an
action for payment of just compensation against the Republic of
the Philippines or, when appropriate, against the City of Lipa.
SO ORDERED.
22[22] G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 576, 584.
23[23] 494 Phil. 494 (2005).
24[24] Supra note 22, at 586.

Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25141
January 31, 1969
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff,
vs.SYLVIA
DE
KALINTAS,
ET
AL.,
claimants,
RICARDO
DEQUITO,
ET
AL.,
petitioners-appellants,
HEIRS OF SALVADOR LOPEZ, oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing a petition for
review of a cadastral decree in Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cadastral Record No. 235, BL
Cad. 286, Case 3 (Republic of the Philippines vs. Sylvia de Kalintas, et al.)
The background facts gleaned from the record are the following:
On 5 December 1963, Ricardo Dequito and 33 others, residents of Pagsilaan, Limot,
Municipality of Limot, Province of Davao, filed a motion in the above-mentioned case, seeking
to set aside a decision of 28 February 1959 awarding Lot No. 1285, Mati Cadastre, to the
Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao, Philippines, subject to the condition that the same
be exclusively used as an agricultural school site, and if within four years from this date of
adjudication such is not the actual use devoted to it, the same would revert to the owners,
the heirs of Salvador Lopez.
The decision had been rendered by the then Justice of the Peace Court of Mati, Davao, sitting as
a Cadastral Court upon assignment by the district judge, pursuant to Section 88 of the Judiciary
Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613. The latter act provides:
... Provided, however, That justices of the peace may, with the approval of the Secretary
of Justice, be assigned by the respective district judge in each case to hear determine
cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or
opposition, or contested lots the value of which does not exceed five thousand pesos such
value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective
claimants, if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of real
property.
The movants claimed to be adverse possessors under claim of title of the cadastral lot in
question, since time immemorial, who had introduced considerable permanent improvements in
said lot, which the Bureau of Lands intended to subdivide in their favor. They averred that the
decision of the Justice of the Peace Court was null and void for want of jurisdiction, because (a)
Lot 1285 (Cad. 286) was a controverted lot, the value of which exceeded Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00); (b) the heirs of Salvador Lopez had not filed any answer in the Cadastral case
claiming any title or interest in said lot; (c) that the said lot, at the time the case was heard by the
Justice of the Peace of Mati, was the subject of another land registration case, No. 273, LRC
Record No. 51858, as the Land Registration Commission had advised the Court of First Instance
in September of 1963; and (d) that while on 12 October 1963 the latter court had set aside
whatever decision had been rendered in the ordinary registration case and ordered the Land
Registration Commission to proceed with the issuance of a decree conformable to the decision of
the cadastral case in favor of the heirs of Salvador Lopez, said directive was, like the basic
adjudication, also null and void.

The motion to set aside was opposed by the Lopez heirs, and at the hearing movants Dequito, et
al. were apprised that, as ordered, the Registration Commission had already issued a decree on
14 October 1963. In view of this development on 23 March 1964, they moved to he allowed to
withdraw their motion to set aside and that the present petition be amended to include an
alternative petition for review under section 38 of Act No. 496, which was filed on the same date.
The petition for review realleged and reproduced the jurisdictional defects pleaded in the
motion to set aside the judgment, and added that the heirs of Lopez, though they had filed no
answer nor made any claim to the lot in question, succeeded in procuring the decision in their
favor through fraud and connivance with the Justice of the Peace of Mati, Davao, by whom the
lot was adjudicated; and the property had not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
The petition for review prayed that the decision and the decree be annulled and set aside, and
that after a new trial the controverted lot be adjudicated and decreed in favor of the petitioners.
The motion to withdraw the original petition and to give due course to the petition for review
was objected to by the Lopez heirs. The Court of First Instance allowed the withdrawal of the
petition to annul the judgment, but refused to give due course to the petition for review,
reasoning that as the latter constituted an amendment to the original motion, petitioners could not
be allowed to change their theory or cause of action; that the petition for review can not be
entertained in the same proceedings, because "the original which it is intended to supplement has
already been withdrawn". It ruled further that the petition had to be filed as a separate action.
Unable to have the court change its resolution, the movants, Dequito, et al., appealed directly to
this Court.
We agree with appellants that the order under review is erroneous and must be set aside. In the
first place, the petition for review is not properly an amendment to the previous motion to set
aside the judgment in the cadastral case, for the objectives are distinct. The review is aimed at the
decree entered by the Land Registration Commission, while the motion to set aside is against the
decision of the court of first instance. While the decree is a consequence of the judgment, it has a
virtuality all its own. It is the basis for the issuance of the certificate of title by the Register of
Deeds, a result that the judgment can not produce. Hence, not being a mere amendment, any
change of theory is irrelevant.
In the second place, even if the petition for review were taken as an amendment of the motion
to set aside, the court a quo's view that it changed the cause of action or the theory of the case is
not justified. A comparison of both pleadings shows that the theory of the action remains
unaltered, for the petition for review restates and reproduces the grounds stated in the motion to
set aside the judgment, to wit, the lack of jurisdiction of the court that decided the cadastral case.
While the petition for review adds, as further ground, the fraudulent connivance between judge
and the respondents Lopez, to the prejudice of appellants, such allegations are not incompatible
with the preceding ones, 2 and the aim pursued is still the nullification of the cadastral
proceedings and award. Considering further that neither the motion to set aside nor the petition
for review have been as yet heard or decided on the merits, the action taken by the court below is
certainly unwarranted.
Nor is the ruling that the petition for review can not be filed in the same proceeding before the
court any more tenable. Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (made applicable to Cadastral
proceedings by section 11 of Act 2259) requires that all petitions and motions after original
registration "shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was
entered", the purpose being to avoid confusion and difficulty in tracing the origin of the entries in
the registry (Cavan vs. Wislizenus, 48 Phil. 636).

Appellees contend that the lot at issue was really uncontested and that the petition for review is
belated. These matters were not passed upon by the court below, and we feel that the same
should be threshed out there, since a correct determination of the same can only be made by
referring to and scrutinizing the record of the cadastral case, and that record is not before this
Court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing
appellant's petition for review is hereby set aside, and the records are ordered remanded to the
said court for further proceedings conformable to this opinion. Costs against appellees, heirs of
Salvador Lopez.

FIRST DIVISION
DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD
MONDIGUING, JOSE VALDEZ,
JR. and Heirs of AGUSTIN KITMA,
represented by EUGENE KITMA,
Petitioners,
- versus -

G.R. No. 173021

Present:
CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
October 20, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DEL CASTILLO, J.
There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the proceedings,
of a possible jurisdictional objection, and has every opportunity to raise said objection,
but fails to do so, even on appeal.
This is a Petition for Review25[1] assailing the March 30, 2006 Decision26[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 as well as its May 26, 2006
25[1] Rollo, pp. 11-24.
26[2] CA rollo, pp. 124-133; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos and
concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag.

Resolution27[3] which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The dispositive

portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the judgment dated January 8, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in Civil Case No. 4140-R is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.28[4]

Factual antecedents
This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel
of land, denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square meters. The property is
located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an
area of 186,090 square meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1,
respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from
petitioners.
According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her familys
ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late
grandfather, Ap-ap.29[5] Upon Ap-aps death, the property was inherited by his children,
who obtained a survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which
included Lot No. 1.30[6] On the same year, they declared the property for taxation
purposes in the name of The Heirs of Ap-ap. 31[7] The 1964 tax declaration bears a
notation that reads: Reconstructed from an old Tax Declaration No. 363 dated May 10,
1922 per true of same presented.32[8]

27[3] Id. at 153.

28[4] CA Decision, p. 10; id. at 133.
29[5] Records, p. 100.
30[6] Id. at 276.
31[7] Id. at 277.
32[8] Exhibit B-1; id. at the back of p. 277.

The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, for a P500.00 consideration, a Deed of

Quitclaim33[9] on February 26, 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margaritas
father).
Sometime between 1976 and 1978,34[10] Gilbert Semon together with his wife
Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a
portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families. 35[11] They were allowed to
erect their houses, introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo
Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners
Delfin Lamsis (Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions
of Lot No. 1. Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied
5,000 square meters thereof.36[12] Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the
acts of their first cousins.
When Gilbert Semon died in 1983,37[13] his children extrajudicially partitioned
the property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita.38[14]
Since then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 39[15] and occupied and
improved the property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her
first cousins occupation of portions of the same lot.
This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began
expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof. 40[16]
33[9] Id. at 100 and 297.
34[10] Id. at 101.
35[11] Id.
36[12] Id. at 102-103.
37[13] Id. at 99.
38[14] Id. at 102 and 300-301.
39[15] There were two tax receipts in the name of Margarita Semon available in the
records. One is dated 12-20-1990 (id. at 293), while the other is dated 4-22-1991
(id. at 292).

Delfin allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard41[17]
Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez
(Jose).42[18]
With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint 43[19] for recovery of
ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot No.
1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4140-R and raffled to Branch 59. The complaint prayed for the annulment of
the sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to vacate the portions of the property
which exceed the areas allowed to them by Margarita.44[20] Margarita claimed that, as
they are her first cousins, she is willing to donate to Delfin and Agustin a portion of Lot
No. 1, provided that she retains the power to choose such portion.45[21]
Petitioners denied Margaritas claims of ownership and possession over Lot No. 1.
According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by the heirs of
Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case).46[22] The Smiths gave their permission for Delfin
and Agustins parents to occupy the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also presented
their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as well as their respective
parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents.

40[16] Id. at 103-104.

41[17] Sometimes spelled as Menard in some parts of the records.
42[18] Records, p. 105.
43[19] Id. at 99-109. Upon petitioners motion (id. at 62-64), the original complaint
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the value of the property (at P500 and
improvements valued at P200) did not meet the jurisdictional amounts for the RTC
(Order dated February 3, 1999; id. at 69-70). The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and to admit the amended complaint (id. at 71-87), which motion
was granted by the trial court (id. at 98).
44[20] Id. at 107-108.
45[21] Id. at 103.
46[22] TSN Folder, pp. 116-117 and 140.

Delfin and Agustin also assailed the muniments of ownership presented by

Margarita as fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid. It was pointed out that the Deed of
Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-aps children, failed to include two Rita
Bocahan and Stewart Sito.47[23] Margarita admitted during trial that Rita Bocahan and
Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not explain why they were excluded from
the quitclaim.
According to Maynard and Jose, Delfin and Agustin were the ones publicly and
openly in possession of the land and who introduced improvements thereon. They also
corroborated Delfin and Agustins allegation that the real owners of the property are the
heirs of Joaquin Smith.48[24]
In order to debunk petitioners claim that the Smiths owned the subject property,
Margarita presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office
denying the Smiths application for recognition of the subject property as part of their
ancestral land.49[25] The resolution explains that the application had to be denied because
the Smiths did not possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of the property x x x. The
actual occupants (who were not named in the resolution) whose improvements are visible
are not in any way related to the applicant or his co-heirs.50[26]
To bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as
evidence an unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral
Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
acting favorably on her and her siblings ancestral land claim over a portion of the
186,090-square meter property.51[27] The said resolution states:
The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein
applicants. Well-established is the fact that the land treated herein was first declared for
47[23] Records, pp. 142-146.
48[24] Id. at 138-141.
49[25] Id. at 309-310.
50[26] Id. at 309.
51[27] The Heirs of Ap-ap applied for a certificate of ancestral land claim over the
186,090 square meters but the CSTFAL approved their claim over 110,342 square
meters only (id. at 505).

taxation purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the applicants grandfather
Ap-Ap (one name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost
during the war. These tax declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of
Tuba, Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the
said municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the
tax declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City assessors
office of Baguio.
The land consisting of four (4) lots with a total area of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, is covered by
Psu-198317 duly approved by the Director of Lands on October 4, 1963 in the name of
Ap-Ap (one name). In 1964, the same land was the subject of a petition filed by Gilbert
Semon, as petitioner, before the Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio in the
reopening of Judicial Proceedings under Civil Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 for the
registration and the issuance of Certificate of Title of said land. The land registration case
was however overtaken by the decision of the Supreme Court declaring such judicial
proceedings null and void because the courts of law have no jurisdiction.
It has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that prior to and at the time
of the pendency of the land registration case and henceforth up to and including the
present, the herein applicants by themselves and through their predecessor-in-interest
have been in exclusive, continuous, and material possession and occupation of the said
parcel of land mentioned above under claim of ownership, devoting the same for
residential and agricultural purposes. Found are the residential houses of the applicants as
well as those of their close relatives, while the other areas planted to fruit trees, coffee and
banana, and seasonal crops. Also noticeable therein are permanent stone and earthen
fences, terraces, clearings, including irrigation gadgets.
On the matter of the applicant[s] indiguinity [sic] and qualifications, there is no
doubt that they are members of the National Cultural Communities, particularly the
Ibaloi tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along
the Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita ApAp, married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert
Semon, a former vice-mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of
their father Semon, as it is the customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x
On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to
state [that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole heir in
1964, by way of a Deed of Quitclaim executed by the heirs in his favor. As to the
respective share of the applicants[] co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989
with the execution of an Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of Estate with Waiver of
Rights.
With regard to the overlapping issue, it is pertinent to state that application No.
Bg-L-066 of Thomas Smith has already been denied by us in our Resolution dated
November 1997. As to the other adverse claims therein by reason of previous

conveyances in favor of third parties, the same were likewise excluded resulting in the
reduction of the area originally applied from ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX
THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, more or less to ONE
HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO (110,342)
SQUARE METERS, more or less. Considering the foregoing developments, we find no
legal and procedural obstacle in giving due course to the instant application.
Now therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the application for Recognition of
Ancestral Land Claim filed by the Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito
Semon, be granted [and] a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) be issued to the
herein applicants by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, through the Regional Executive Director,
DENR-CAR, Diego Silang Street, Baguio City. The area of the claim stated herein above
is however subject to the outcome of the final survey to be forthwith executed.
Carried this 23rd day of June 1998.52[28]

The resolution was not signed by two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that the
signing of the unnumbered resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the Republic
Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA
removed the authority of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and
transferred the same to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). 53[29]
The Ancestral Land Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of Gilbert Semon was
transferred to the NCIP, Cordillera Administrative Region, La Trinidad, Benguet and redocketed as Case No. 05-RHO-CAR-03.54[30] The petitioners filed their protest in the
said case before the NCIP. The same has been submitted for resolution.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court55[31]

52[28] Id. at 504-506.

53[29] Testimony of Guillermo S. Fianza (Chairman of CSTFAL), p. 263; testimony of
Alfonso P. Aroco (Member of the CSTFAL), pp. 297-306.
54[30] In the Matter of Application for Recognition of Ancestral Land Claim over a
Parcel of Land Located at Res. Sec. L Km. 5, Asin Road, Baguio City: Heirs of Gilbert
Semon, represented by Juanito Semon, applicant, Delfin Lamsis, et al. Protestants,
Peter Sito, Protestant-Intervenor (rollo, pp. 169-173).
55[31] Records, pp. 644-653. Penned by Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes.

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found
that it preponderates in favor of respondents long-time possession of and claim of
ownership over the subject property.56[32] The survey plan of the subject property in the
name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter
issued to the respondent and her siblings all support her claim that her family and their
predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the property to the exclusion of
others. The court likewise gave credence to the documentary evidence of the transfer of
the land from the Heirs of Ap-ap to respondents father and, eventually to respondent
herself. The series of transfers of the property were indications of the respondents and her
predecessors interest over the property. The court opined that while these pieces of
documentary evidence were not conclusive proof of actual possession, they lend
credence to respondents claim because, in the ordinary course of things, persons will not
execute legal documents dealing with real property, unless they believe, and have the
basis to believe, that they have an interest in the property subject of the legal documents x
x x.57[33]
In contrast, the trial court found nothing on record to substantiate the allegations of
the petititioners that they and their parents were the long-time possessors of the subject
property. Their own statements belied their assertions. Petitioner Maynard and Jose both
admitted that they could not secure title for the property from the Bureau of Lands
because there were pending ancestral land claims over the property.58[34] Petitioner
Agustins Townsite Sales Application over the property was held in abeyance because of
respondents own claim, which was eventually favorably considered by the CSTFAL. 59
[35]
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the [respondent] and against the [petitioners]
(1) Declaring the transfer of a portion of Lot 1 of PSU 198317 made by the
[petitioner] Delfin Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr. null and void;
56[32] Decision, p. 5; id. at 648.
57[33] Id. at 6; id. at 649.
58[34] Id. at 6-7; id. at 650-651.
59[35] Id. at 9-10; id. at 652-653.

(2) Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin Lamsis, Agustin Kitma, Menard

Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they are presently occupying that is
within Lot 1 of PSU 198317 belonging to the [respondent] and to surrender possession
thereof to the [respondent];
(3) To pay [respondent] attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and
(4) To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.60[36]

It appears that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the trial court.
Nevetheless, the trial court issued an Order61[37] allowing the petitioners Notice of
Appeal.62[38]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals63[39]
The sole issue resolved by the appellate court was whether the trial court erred in
ruling in favor of respondent in light of the adduced evidence. Citing the rule on
preponderance of evidence, the CA held that the respondent was able to discharge her
burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Her documentary evidence
were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her witnesses.
In contrast, petitioners only made bare allegations in their testimonies that are
insufficient to overcome respondents documentary evidence.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration64[40] of the adverse decision but the same
was denied.
60[36] Id. at 10; id. at 653.
61[37] Records, p. 656.
62[38] Id. at 655.
63[39] CA rollo, pp. 124-133.
64[40] Id. at 134-144.

Hence this petition, which was initially denied for failure to show that the CA
committed any reversible error.65[41] Upon petitioners motion for reconsideration, 66[42]
the petition was reinstated in the Courts January 15, 2007 Resolution.67[43]
Petitioners arguments
Petitioners assign as error the CAs appreciation of the evidence already affirmed
and considered by the trial court. They maintain that the change in the presiding judges
who heard and decided their case resulted in the appreciation of what would otherwise be
inadmissible evidence.68[44] Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their petition from the
general rule that a trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great
respect on appeal.
To support their claim that the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of
respondent, they assailed the various pieces of evidence offered by respondent. They
maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed by the Heirs of Ap-ap is spurious and lacks
the parties and witnesses signatures. Moreover, it is a mere photocopy, which was never
authenticated by the notary public in court and no reasons were proferred regarding the
existence, loss, and contents of the original copy.69[45] Under the best evidence rule, the
Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence and should have been disregarded by the
court.
Respondent did not prove that she and her husband possessed the subject property
since time immemorial. Petitioners argue that respondent admitted possessing and
cultivating only the land that lies outside the subject property.70[46]
Petitioners next assail the weight to be given to respondents muniments of
ownership, such as the tax declarations and the survey plan. They insist that these are not
65[41] Resolution dated August 23, 2006 (rollo, p. 153).
66[42] Id. at 159-167.
67[43] Id. at 179.
68[44] Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 18-19; id. at 233-234.
69[45] Id. at 19-20; id. at 234-235.
70[46] Id. at 27; id. at 242.

indubitable proofs of respondents ownership over the subject property given that there
are other claimants to the land (who are not parties to this case) who also possess a survey
plan over the subject property.71[47]
Petitioners then assert their superior right to the property as the present possessors
thereof. They cite pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code which presume good faith
possession on the part of the possessor and puts the burden on the plaintiff in an action to
recover to prove her superior title.72[48]
Petitioners next assert that they have a right to the subject property by the
operation of acquisitive prescription. They posit that they have been in possession of a
public land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in the concept of owners for more than
30 years. Respondents assertion that petitioners are merely possessors by tolerance is
unsubstantiated.73[49]
Petitioners also maintain that the reivindicatory action should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the NCIP.74
[50] They assert that the customary laws of the Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet Province
should be applied to their dispute as mandated by Section 65, Chapter IX of RA 8371,
which states: When disputes involve ICCs/IPs,75[51] customary laws and practices shall
be used to resolve the dispute.
In the alternative that jurisdiction over an accion reivindicatoria is held to be
vested in the trial court, the petitioners insist that the courts should dismiss the
reivindicatory action on the ground of litis pendentia.76[52] They likewise argue that
NCIP has primary jurisdiction over ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere
when the dispute demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
71[47] Id. at 27-30; id. at 242- 245.
72[48] Id. at 34-35; id. at 249-250.
73[49] Id. at 38-41; id. at 253-356.
74[50] Id. at 14; id. at 229.
75[51] Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
76[52] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 14; rollo, p. 229.

special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal x x x In cases

where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.77[53] The courts should stand
aside in order to prevent the possibility of creating conflicting decisions.78[54]
Respondents arguments
Respondent opines that the appellate court did not commit any reversible error in
affirming the trial courts decision. The present petition is a mere dilatory tactic to frustrate
the speedy administration of justice.
Respondent also asserts that questions of fact are prohibited in a Rule 45 petition. 79
[56] Thus, the appreciation and consideration of the factual issues are no longer
reviewable.
The issue of lack of jurisdiction is raised for the first time in the petition before this
Court. It was never raised before the trial court or the CA. Thus, respondent insists that
petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial courts jurisdiction over the
case. Citing Aragon v. Court of Appeals,80[58] respondent argues that the jurisdictional
issue should have been raised at the appellate level at the very least so as to avail of the
doctrine that the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal.
Respondent maintains that there is no room for the application of litis pendentia
because the issues in the application for ancestral land claim are different from the issue
in a reivindicatory action. The issue before the NCIP is whether the Government, as
grantor, will recognize the ancestral land claim of respondent over a public alienable
land; while the issue in the reivindicatory case before the trial court is ownership,
possession, and right to recover the real property.
Given that the elements of lis pendens are absent in case at bar, the allegation of
forum-shopping is also bereft of merit. Any judgment to be rendered by the NCIP will
not amount to res judicata in the instant case.
Issues
The petitioners present the following issues for our consideration:

77[53] Id. at 15; id. at 230.

78[54] Id. at 17; id. at 232.
79[56] Id. at 8; id. at 205.
80[58] 337 Phil. 289 (1997).

1. Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in

affirming the trial courts decision;
2. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription;
3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the
effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the
complaint was instituted;
4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction, whether the ancestral land claim pending
before the NCIP should take precedence over the reivindicatory action.
Our Ruling
Whether the appellate court disregarded
material facts and circumstances in affirming
the trial courts decision
Both the trial and the appellate courts ruled that respondent has proven her claims
of ownership and possession with a preponderance of evidence. Petitioners now argue
that the two courts erred in their appreciation of the evidence. They ask the Court to
review the evidence of both parties, despite the CAs finding that the trial court committed
no error in appreciating the evidence presented during trial. Hence, petitioners seek a
review of questions of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition. A
question of fact exists if the uncertainty centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.81[63] Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded
probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the proofs on one
side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue,
are without doubt questions of fact.
Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be
dismissed for it is settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by
certiorari.82[65] There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. Questions of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the
probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. 83
[66] The instant case does not present a compelling reason to deviate from the foregoing
rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent had proven her
claim of ownership as against petitioners claims. Their factual findings, supported as they
are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect.
81[63] New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., G.R. No. 168800, April 16, 2009,
585 SCRA 329, 335.
82[65] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, 451 Phil. 368, 377
(2003).
83[66] New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., supra.

In any case, even if petitioners arguments attacking the authenticity and

admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor of respondents father are welltaken, it will not suffice to defeat respondents claim over the subject property. Even
without the Deed of Quitclaim, respondents claims of prior possession and ownership
were adequately supported and corroborated by her other documentary and testimonial
evidence. We agree with the trial courts observation that, in the ordinary course of things,
people will not go to great lengths to execute legal documents and pay realty taxes over a
real property, unless they have reason to believe that they have an interest over the same.
The fact that respondents documents traverse several decades, from the 1960s to
the 1990s, is an indication that she and her family never abandoned their right to the
property and have continuously exercised rights of ownership over the same.
Moreover, respondents version of how the petitioners came to occupy the property
coincides with the same timeline given by the petitioners themselves. The only difference
is that petitioners maintain they came into possession by tolerance of the Smith family,
while respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave permission to petitioners.
Given the context under which the parties respective statements were made, the Court is
inclined to believe the respondents version, as both the trial and appellate courts have
concluded, since her version is corroborated by the documentary evidence.
Whether petitioners have acquired the subject
property by prescription
Assuming that the subject land may be acquired by prescription, we cannot accept
petitioners claim of acquisition by prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had
occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission,
they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can
prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership,
must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in
the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership
by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and
such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of
acquisitive prescription. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts,
no matter how long performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of
repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most, we can
find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to
petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly before
respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the
operation of acquisitve prescription had yet to be attained.

Whether the ancestral land claim pending

before the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over
the reivindicatory action
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending
before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition
of ones claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for
the purpose of officially establishing ones land as an ancestral land. 84[69] Just like a
registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership 85[70] upon
the applicant but only recognizes ownership86[71] that has already vested in the applicant
by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interests possession of the property since time
immemorial. As aptly explained in another case:
It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate
of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title
because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely
an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.
Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a
separate suit x x x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties
will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties
to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x87[72] (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise apropos is the following explanation:

The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not
operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create
or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the
[respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial
action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their
84[69] Section 7 (c), Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
85[70] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, supra note 64 at 377;
Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., G.R. No. 142766, June 15, 2007, 524 SCRA 641, 653-655;
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 283, 295 (2000);
Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 114, 126 (2004); Heirs of
Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 652, 660-661 (1998).
86[71] Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 107, 118 (1999); Spouses Rosario v.
Court of Appeals, 369 Phil 729, 748 (1999); Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of
Appeals, supra.
87[72] Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 70 at 126-127.

respective names. x x x Certificates of title do not establish ownership.88[73] (Emphasis

supplied)

A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if

it is later on found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated)
that the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance
case and have the title transferred to his name.
Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is
not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a
reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership.89[75] For litis pendentia to be a ground
for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.90[76] The third element is
missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be
conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no
litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed
in favor of the certification case.
Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners
contention that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to
decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA
8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 at the time that the complaint was
instituted
88[73] Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 70.
89[75] An accion de reivindicatoria x x x is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of
land as an element of ownership. It is an action whereby the plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. The
judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property and the awards
the possession of the property to the lawful owner. Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., supra note
70 at 653.
90[76] City of Caloocan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145004, May 3, 2006, 489
SCRA 45, 55-56.

For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial
courts alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity 91[78]
of the IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under
the IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous
cultural communities and indigenous peoples.
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time
of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested
by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,92[79] the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a
party from raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.93[80] Wisely, some
cases94[81] have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases
where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial
court but failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed
pleadings, other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached
the appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their pleadings
therein. It was only after receiving the appellate courts adverse decision that the surety
awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for
reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled that the
surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.
In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the
presence of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for
raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in
the instant case who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court.
91[78] Effective November 22, 1997.
92[79] 131 Phil. 556 (1968).
93[80] Id. at 563.
94[81] Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 63; Calimlim v.
Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25 (1982).

At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in
effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the
jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into
consideration.
When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised
the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the
time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination 95[82]
conducted by petitioners lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the
cross-examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR,
through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the
enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring
respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus officio under the
IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial courts jurisdiction.
When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the
trial courts appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In
their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFALs resolution as having been rendered
functus officio by the enactment of IPRA.96[83] But nowhere did petitioners assail the
trial courts ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the
trial court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits,
after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners
have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts that
petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and
resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be allowed.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners theory about the effect of IPRA is
correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches from
raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The
March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May
26, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
95[82] TSN Records, pp. 234-286.
96[83] Appellants Brief, p. 17; CA rollo, p. 63.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 155080
February 5, 2004
SOLEDAD CALICDAN, represented by her guardian GUADALUPE CASTILLO,
petitioner
vs.
SILVERiO CENDAA, substituted by his legal heir CELSA CENDAA-ALARAS,
respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the April 4, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266, 1 which set aside the November 12, 1996 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. D-10270.2
The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of unregistered land located in
Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The land was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died
intestate on November 4, 1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and three children,
namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan.3
On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the
land to respondent Silverio Cendaa,4 who immediately entered into possession of the land, built
a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime in
1949, where he resided until his death in 1998.5
On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint
for "Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages" against the respondent, alleging that the
donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land;
and that she merely tolerated respondents possession of the land as well as the construction of
his house thereon.6

In his "Answer with Motion to Dismiss", respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses,
that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been publicly, peacefully,
continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover, he
argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special proceedings for the
"Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where the court decreed the
exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the petitioner.7
On November 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering defendant Silverio Cendaa to vacate the land in question and surrender
ownership and possession of the same to plaintiff; and
2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P10,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and other litigation expenses,
plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and
declared that the donation was valid. Furthermore, it held that petitioner lost her ownership of the
property by prescription.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
(1) whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid; and
(2) whether or not petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription.
As a rule, our jurisdiction in cases brought from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and
revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. This is because its findings
of fact are deemed conclusive and we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below.9
The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting;
(5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of the
case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts or
when it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly taken into account,
will justify a different conclusion;
(7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence upon
which they are based; and
(8) when findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but are contradicted by the evidence on record.10
In the case at bar, the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are conflicting;
thus, we are constrained to review the findings of facts.
The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not the owner thereof,
considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents. Thus, the land was not part of the
conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil
Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct
only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently, respondent, who derived his rights

from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could
convey.
After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals ruling that the
donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof. Respondent himself admitted during
the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact
purchased the subject land from Felomino Bautista. Pertinent portions of his testimony read:
Q. And Sixto Calicdan inherited this property from his parents?
A. No, sir.
Q. What do you mean by no?
A. To my knowledge and information, Sixto Calicdan bought the property from his
cousin, I think Flaviano or Felomino Bautista.
Q. So, in other words, you have no personal knowledge about how Sixto Calicdan
acquired this property?
A. I think it was by purchase.
Q. According to information, so you have no actual personal knowledge how Sixto
Calicadan acquired this property?
A. Yes, because when the property was bought by my uncle, I was not yet born, so
information only.
Q. So when you were born, you came to know already that Sixto Calicdan is the owner of
this property?
A. Yes, thru the son of Felomino Bautista who is now, I think, in Baguio.
Q. You have not seen any document to show that Sixto Calicdan purchased the property
from one Felomino Bautista?
A. None, sir.11
In People v. Guittap,12 we held that:
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception;
otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of
what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." The hearsay rule bars the
testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in
writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly
told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar
and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based on respondents bare hearsay testimony as
evidence of the donation made by Fermina.
Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that respondent has become the rightful
owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted
and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary
prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need of title or of good faith.13
The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. 14 For purposes of

prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights,
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.15
Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing in the case at bar as it
demands that the possession be "in good faith and with just title," 16 and there is no evidence on
record to prove respondents "good faith", nevertheless, his adverse possession of the land for
more than 45 years aptly shows that he has met the requirements for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription to set in.
The records show that the subject land is an unregistered land. When the petitioner filed the
instant case on June 29, 1992, respondent was in possession of the land for 45 years counted
from the time of the donation in 1947. This is more than the required 30 years of uninterrupted
adverse possession without just title and good faith. Such possession was public, adverse and in
the concept of an owner. Respondent fenced the land and built his house in 1949, with the help of
Guadalupes father as his contractor. His act of cultivating and reaping the fruits of the land was
manifest and visible to all. He declared the land for taxation purposes and religiously paid the
realty taxes thereon.17 Together with his actual possession of the land, these tax declarations
constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by him. As we said in the case of
Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano Santiago:
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against
the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to
the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been executed by one who was
not the owner of the property donated, may still be used to show the exclusive and adverse
character of respondents possession. Thus, in Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of
Appeals,19 we held:
Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal
requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With clear and convincing
evidence of possession, a private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of
ownership. In Pensader v. Pensader we ruled that while the verbal donation under which the
defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands in question is not
effective as a transfer of title, still it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse and
exclusive character of the possession. (Underscoring ours)
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. D-10270 before
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, and declared respondent the rightful owner
of the subject property, not on the basis of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which is hereby
declared void, but on extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 4, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266, which ordered the dismissal of Civil
Case No. D-10270 before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Davide,
Jr.,
C.J.,
(Chairman),
Azcuna, J., on official leave.

Panganiban,

and

Carpio,

JJ.,

concur.

THIRD DIVISION
ROSARIO P. TAN,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 158929

Present:
-

versus -

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD, and
ARTEMIO
G.
RAMIREZ, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
MOISES
G.
RAMIREZ,
RODRIGO
G.
RAMIREZ,
DOMINGO G. RAMIREZ, and Promulgated:
MODESTA
RAMIREZ August 3, 2010
ANDRADE,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the petition for review on certiorari97[1] filed by petitioner
Rosario P. Tan (petitioner) who seeks to reverse and set aside the decision98[2] dated January 28,
2003 and the resolution99[3] dated June 19, 2003 of the former Seventh Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66120. The assailed CA decision declared Roberto Ramirez,
** Designated additional Member of the Third Division, effective May 17, 2010, per
Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
97[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
98[2] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate
Justices Ruben T. Reyes (former member of this Court) and Edgardo F. Sundiam
concurring. Rollo, pp. 117-130.

father and predecessor-in-interest of respondents Artemio G. Ramirez, Moises G. Ramirez,

Rodrigo G. Ramirez, Domingo G. Ramirez, and Modesta Ramirez Andrade (respondents), as the
lawful owner of a 86,433-square meter parcel of land in Mahaba, Apid, Inopacan, Leyte, known
as Cadastral Lot No. 3483, Case 12, CAD 637-D, Inopacan Cadastre (subject property). The
assailed CA resolution denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.
On August 11, 1998, the petitioner, representing her parents (spouses Crispo and
Nicomedesa P. Alumbro), filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of HindangInopacan, Leyte a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession and/or quieting of title
of a one-half portion of the subject property against the respondents.100[4]
The petitioner alleged that her great-grandfather Catalino Jaca Valenzona was the owner
of the subject property under a 1915 Tax Declaration (TD) No. 2724. Catalino had four children:
Gliceria,101[5] Valentina, Tomasa, and Julian; Gliceria inherited the subject property when
Catalino died; Gliceria married Gavino Oyao, but their union bore no children; when Gliceria
died on April 25, 1952, Gavino inherited a one-half portion of the subject property, while
Nicomedesa acquired the other half through inheritance, in representation of her mother,
Valentina, who had predeceased Gliceria, and through her purchase of the shares of her brothers
and sisters. In 1961, Nicomedesa constituted Roberto as tenant of her half of the subject
property; on June 30, 1965, Nicomedesa bought Gavinos one-half portion of the subject property
from the latters heirs, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, 102[6] evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Agricultural Land;103[7] on August 3, 1965, Nicomedesa sold to Roberto this one-half portion in a
Deed of Absolute Sale of Agricultural Land;104[8] and in 1997, Nicomedesa discovered that since
1974, Roberto had been reflecting the subject property solely in his name under TD No. 4193.
The respondents, on the other hand, traced ownership of the subject property to Gavino
who cultivated it since 1956; Roberto bought half of the subject property from Nicomedesa on
99[3] Id. at 139.
100[4] Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, expanded the
MCTCs jurisdiction to include other actions involving title to or possession of real
property where the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or
P50,000.00, for actions filed in Metro Manila). The assessed value of the subject
property is P2,770.00. Id. at 34-39.
101[5] Spelled as Gleceria in other parts of the records.
102[6] Inherited by right of representation of Emiliano Oyao, Gavinos nephew. Rollo,
p. 42.
103[7] Ibid.
104[8] Id. at 43.

August 3, 1965,105[9] and the remaining half from Gavinos heirs, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, on
October 16, 1972.106[10] On January 9, 1975, a certain Santa Belacho, claiming to be Gavinos
natural child, filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Baybay, Leyte against Roberto,
Nicomedesa, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, docketed as Civil Case No. B-565, for recovery of
possession and ownership of two (2) parcels of land, including the subject property; 107[11] on
September 16, 1977, Roberto bought the subject property from Belacho through a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Land; and on October 5, 1977, Roberto and Nicomedesa entered into a
Compromise Agreement with Belacho to settle Civil Case No. B-565. Belacho agreed in this
settlement to dismiss the case and to waive her interest over the subject property in favor of
Roberto, and the other parcel of land in favor of Nicomedesa in consideration of P1,800.00.
THE MCTC RULING
In a Decision dated April 2, 2001, the MCTC found that Catalinos 1915 TD No. 2724
was not the source of Gavinos 1945 TD No. 3257 because it involved the other parcel of land
subject of Civil Case No. B-565. It noted that the subject property was the conjugal property of
Gavino and Gliceria; Glicerias death in 1952 dissolved the conjugal partnership and entitled
Gavino to a one-half portion as his conjugal share, while Glicerias one-half share should be
equally divided among Gavino and Glicerias brothers and sisters or their children. It held that
Roberto was entitled to only three-fourths, as this was Gavinos entire share, while the petitioner
was entitled to one-fourth of the subject property, and gave the parties sixty days to effect the
partition.108[13]
The MCTC brushed aside the respondents argument that they acquired the subject property by
ordinary acquisitive prescription, noting that bad faith attended their possession because they
were well aware of Nicomedesas claim of ownership over a one-half portion of the subject
property, long before the property was tax declared solely in Robertos name in 1974. It observed
that the required thirty-year period for extraordinary acquisitive prescription was not met because
the respondents had only twenty-four years of adverse possession, counted from 1974 until the
filing of the complaint in 1998.109[14]
THE RTC RULING
On appeal, Judge Abraham B. Apostol 110[15] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
18, Hilongos, Leyte, rendered a two-page Decision dated June 29, 2001, which we quote in full:
105[9] Id. at 54.
106[10] Id. at 56.
107[11] Entitled Santa Belacho v. Roberto Ramirez, Nicomedeza P. Alumbro, Crispo D.
Alumbro, Wilfredo Oyao and Ronito Oyao; CA rollo, pp. 38-41.
108[13] Rollo, pp. 58-70.
109[14] Ibid.
110[15] Optionally retired on July 15, 2001.

I.

The Case
THIS IS A COMPLAINT FOR Recovery of Ownership And Possession
And/Or Quieting of Title With Damages filed by Plaintiffs against defendants on a
parcel of land located at Mahaba, Apid, Inopacan, Leyte presently described as
follows:
A parcel of land situated at Mahaba, Inopacan, Leyte, bounded on
the NORTH by Camotes Sea; EAST by Camotes Sea; SOUTH by
Lot 3478, 3476, 3473, WEST by Lot 3480 covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4193 in the name of Roberto Ramirez.
After a full blown hearing, a DECISION was rendered, the decretal
portion being:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered the court hereby
decrees:
1. That plaintiff and defendants are lawful co-owners of Lot
3483 as afore-described;
2.

That the shares of the parties shall be divided and

apportioned in the following manner: plaintiff shall own
one-fourth (1/4) of Lot 3483 and defendants shall
collectively own three-fourth (3/4) of Lot 3483;

3.

That the parties are hereby given sixty days from receipt
hereof within which to effect the actual partition among
themselves
observing
the
foregoing
proportion,
proportionately sharing the expenses therefor and to submit
to the court for final approval the project of partition
including the proposed subdivision plan prepared by a
geodetic engineer;

4.

That should the parties be unable to voluntarily agree to

make the partition, they shall so inform the court within
thirty days from receipt hereof.

5. That the parties equally share the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.
II. Facts of the Case:
a.

Version of the Plaintiffs is extant on the rollo of the case summarized

on Appeal by a MEMORANDUM but negligently forgetting to
enumerate their PRAYERS.

b. Version of the Defendants is also extant on the records of the case and
clearly expanded via a MEMORANDUM.
III. Court Findings/Ruling:
THIS COURT adopts in toto the DECISION of the Court a quo, slightly
correcting no. 2 of the same to conform to the fallo of the DECISION which
stated a proportion of 1:3[.]
No. 2 shall therefore read as follows:
2. That the shares of the parties shall be divided and apportioned in
the following manner: plaintiff shall own ONE-THIRD
(1/3) of Lot 3483 and defendants shall collectively own
TWO-THIRDS (2/3) of Lot 3483.
SO ORDERED.

The respondents elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, insisting that the lower courts erred in finding that
the petitioner is a co-owner since they have already acquired the entire area of the
subject property by ordinary acquisitive prescription.
THE CA RULING
The CA decided the appeal on January 28, 2003. It set aside the Decisions dated April 2,
2001 and June 29, 2001 of the MCTC and the RTC, respectively, and declared Roberto as the
lawful owner of the entire area of the subject property. The appellate court found that the October
5, 1977 Compromise Agreement executed by Belacho gave Robertos possession of the subject
property the characters of possession in good faith and with just title; the respondents twenty-one
years of possession, from execution of the compromise agreement in 1977 until the filing of the
case in 1998, is more than the required ten-year possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription.
The CA also noted that Roberto also enjoyed just title because Belacho executed a contract of
sale in his favor on September 16, 1977.111[17]
After the CAs denial112[18] of her motion for reconsideration,113[19] the petitioner filed the
present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE PETITION
The petitioner contends that the CA misappreciated the legal significance of the
compromise agreement and the contract of sale, both executed by Belacho, and thus concluded
that the respondents were possessors in good faith and with just title and could acquire the
subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription. She argues that the parties merely
111[17] Id. at 117-130.
112[18] Resolution of June 19, 2003; id. at 139.
113[19] Id. at 131-137.

entered into the compromise agreement to settle the case. She further argues that Roberto entered
the contract of sale in bad faith because the sale took place during the pendency of Civil Case
No. B-565.
The respondents submit that they are possessors in good faith and with just title because
Roberto bought the subject property from Belacho in a contract of sale dated September 16,
1977, and the compromise agreement, executed on October 5, 1977, recognized Robertos
ownership of the subject property.
THE ISSUE
The core issue is whether the CA erred in relying upon the compromise agreement and
the contract of sale to conclude that the respondents had been possessors in good faith and with
just title and could acquire the subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription.
OUR RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
This Court is not a trier of facts. However, if the inference drawn by the appellate court
from the facts is manifestly mistaken, as in the present case, we can review the evidence to allow
us to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record.114[20]
Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership
Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property, 115
[21]
is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely,
that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and
adverse.116[22] The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of
the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.117[24] Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. 118[25] In
extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or of good faith.

114[20]Heirs of Flores Restar v. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon, G.R. No. 161720,

November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 731, 739; Casol v. Purefoods Corporation, G.R. No.
166550, September 22, 2005, 470 SCRA 585, 589; Carpio v. Valmonte, 481 Phil.
352, 358 (2004).
115[21]Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5,
2007, 532 SCRA 391, 404; Calicdan v. Cendaa, 466 Phil. 894, 902 (2004).
116[22]Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon, supra.
117[24]Article 1117 of the Civil Code.
118[25]Article 1134 of the Civil Code.

Possession in good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the
thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. 119[27] There is just
title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right.120[28]
Compromise agreement not a valid basis
of possession in good faith and just title
We find that the CA mistakenly relied upon the compromise agreement, executed by
Belacho to conclude that the respondents were possessors in good faith and with just title who
acquired the property through ordinary acquisitive prescription.
In Ramnani v. Court of Appeals,121[29] we held that the main purpose of a compromise
agreement is to put an end to litigation because of the uncertainty that may arise from it.
Reciprocal concessions are the very heart and life of every compromise agreement. 122[30] By the
nature of a compromise agreement, it brings the parties to agree to something that neither of
them may actually want, but for the peace it will bring them without a protracted litigation.123[31]
In the present case, to avoid any conflict with Belacho, Roberto and Nicomedesa paid
P1,800.00 in consideration of Belachos desistance from further pursuing her claim over two (2)
parcels of land, including the subject property. Thus, no right can arise from the compromise
agreement because the parties executed the same only to buy peace and to write finis to the
controversy; it did not create or transmit ownership rights over the subject property. In executing
the compromise agreement, the parties, in effect, merely reverted to their situation before Civil
Case No. B-565 was filed.
Contract of sale cannot support claim of good faith and just title
Neither can the respondents benefit from the contract of sale of the subject property,
executed by Belacho in favor of Roberto, to support their claim of possession in good faith and
with just title. In the vintage case of Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson,124
[32]
we explained good faith in this manner:
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title
in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as
against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must
119[27]Article 1127 of the Civil Code.
120[28]Article 1129 of the Civil Code.
121[29]413 Phil. 194, 207 (2001).
122[30]Spouses Miniano v. Court of Appeals, 485 Phil. 168, 179 (2004).
123[31]Alonso v. San Juan, 491 Phil. 232, 247 (2005); Litton v. Hon. Court of Appeals,
331 Phil. 324, 332 (1996).
124[32]37 Phil. 644, 651 (1918).

be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon
such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the
defects in the title of his vendor.125[33]
Good faith, or the want of it, can be ascertained only from the acts of the one claiming it,
as it is a condition of mind that can only be judged by actual or fancied token or signs.126[34]
In the present case, no dispute exists that Roberto, without Nicomedesas knowledge or
participation, bought the subject property on September 16, 1977 or during the pendency of Civil
Case No. B-565. Roberto, therefore, had actual knowledge that Belachos claim to ownership of
the subject property, as Gavinos purported heir, was disputed because he (Roberto) and
Nicomedesa were the defendants in Civil Case No. B-565. Roberto even admitted that he bought
the subject property from Belacho to avoid any trouble. 127[35] He, thus, cannot claim that he acted
in good faith under the belief that there was no defect or dispute in the title of the vendor,
Belacho.
Not being a possessor in good faith and with just title, the ten-year period required for
ordinary acquisitive prescription cannot apply in Robertos favor. Even the thirty-year period
under extraordinary acquisitive prescription has not been met because of the respondents claim
to have been in possession, in the concept of owner, of the subject property for only twenty-four
years, from the time the subject property was tax declared in 1974 to the time of the filing of the
complaint in 1998.
Based on the foregoing, the CA erred in finding that the respondents acquired the
petitioners one-fourth portion of the subject property through acquisitive prescription. As aptly
found by the MCTC, the respondents are only entitled to three-fourths of the subject property
because this was Gavinos rightful share of the conjugal estate that Roberto bought from Ronito
and Wilfredo Oyao.
RTC Decision did not conform to the
requirements of the Constitution and
of the Rules of Court
Before closing, we cannot close our eyes to the failure of the RTC decision to measure up
to the standard set by Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule
36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, that a decision, judgment or final
order determining the merits of the case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on
which it is based. Our Administrative Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988 reiterates this
requirement and stresses that judges should make complete findings of facts in their decisions,
scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid
the tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced.
125[33]Id. at 651.
126[34]Id. at 652.
127[35]MCTC Decision dated April 2, 2001, p. 6; rollo, p. 63.

In Yao v. Court of Appeals,128[36] we emphasized:

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play.
It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties
to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of
the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court
cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just
leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party
is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted,
should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the
parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review
by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing
him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the
Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing
judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must
ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the
justness of his decision.129[37]
The RTC decision did not distinctly and clearly set forth, nor substantiate, the factual and
legal bases for its affirmance of the MCTC decision. It contained no analysis of the evidence of
the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions. Judges must inform the
parties to a case of the legal basis for their decision so that if a party appeals, it can point out to
the appellate court the points of law to which it disagrees. Judge Apostol should have known the
exacting standard imposed on courts by the Constitution and should not have sacrificed the
constitutional standard for brevitys sake. Had he thoroughly read the body of the MCTC
decision, he would have clearly noted that the proportion of 1:3, stated in the penultimate
paragraph of the decision, meant that the petitioner was entitled to one-fourth, while the
respondents were entitled to three-fourths, of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the decision dated January 28, 2003 and the resolution dated June 19, 2003 of the
former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66120. The decision
dated April 2, 2001 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Hindang-Inopacan, Leyte in Civil
Case No. 196 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

128[36] 398 Phil. 86 (2000).

129[37] Id. at 105-106.