E.

Object of Succession
Articles 776, 781, 1311, 1429, 1178, 1347
Article 108 RPC
CC Article 776. The inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person which
are not extinguished by his death. (659)
Article 781. The inheritance of a person includes
not only the property and the transmissible rights
and obligations existing at the time of his death, but
also those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession. (n)

Article 1311. Contracts take effect only between

the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not
liable beyond the value of the property he received
from the decedent.
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor
of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the
obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental
benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The
contracting parties must have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
(1257a)

Article 1429. When a testate or intestate heir

voluntarily pays a debt of the decedent exceeding
the value of the property which he received by will
or by the law of intestacy from the estate of the
deceased, the payment is valid and cannot be
rescinded by the payer.
Article 1178. Subject to the laws, all rights
acquired in virtue of an obligation are transmissible,
if there has been no stipulation to the contrary.
(1112)

Article 1347. All things which are not outside the

commerce of men, including future things, may be
the object of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy may
likewise be the object of a contract. (1271a)

RPC Article 108. Obligation to make restoration,

reparation for damages, or indemnification for
consequential damages and actions to demand the
same; Upon whom it devolves. - The obligation to
make restoration or reparation for damages and
indemnification for consequential damages devolves
upon the heirs of the person liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation, and
indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of the
person injured.
Reyes v CA (1954)
Petitioners: Mariano Reyes, Cesar Reyes, Leonor
Reyes and Paciencia Reyes
Respondents: CA, Ismaela Dimagiba
Summary: The natural children of the deceased in this
case are questioning the intrinsic validity of the will on
the ground that his compulsory heir cannot be one, as
theirs was an illicit relationship. SC held that as a
general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited
to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated. There are, however, notable
circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first
determined as when the defect of the will is apparent
on its face and the probate of the will may become a
useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The
intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because
practical considerations demanded it as when there
is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions
are doubtful legality. In this case however, There was
never an open admission of any illicit relationship.
Thus, there was no need to go beyond the face of the
will.
Facts
Benedicta had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the a 16,240 sq. m.
unregistered parcel of agricultural land, located at
Barrio Pintog, Plaridel, Bulacan, under a bona fide claim
of ownership since 1910.
Benedicta sold the said property to Ismaela Dimagiba,
her niece, manifested by allegedly two deeds of
conveyance: in 1943 and 1944.
After the death of Benedicta delos Reyes, Ismaela
Dimagiba submitted to the CFI a petition for the
probate of the purported will of her late aunt.
The will instituted Dimagiba as the sole heir of the
estate.
The petition was set for hearing, and in due time,
Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes,
and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and
Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be the
heirs of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate
asked.
Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery,
vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of
the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds
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of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made

by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and
1944.

Medina denied the material averments, and argued

that he has been in possession of the lot since 1921.
The Justice of the Peace ordered Medina to vacate.

They alleged that the property sold prior to Benedictas

death should form part of what they should inherit.
The Court ruled that said property is no longer part of
the inheritance. CA affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
Issues
Did the properties form part of the inheritance, of
which the heirs are entitled to? YES
Was it proper for the heirs to question the intrinsic
validity of the will, on the ground that her compulsory
heir cannot be one, as theirs was an illicit relationship?
NO

Medina appealed to the CFI.

While the case for forcible entry was pending trial,
Guinto instituted reconveyance proceedings.
Santiago Medina died during the pendency of the
original appeal.
The Court ruled in favor of Guinto, but refused to
render judgment sentencing the Medinas to pay him
damages.

Ratio
FIRST Even if they are sold, they still form part of the
object of succession, and of the estate.

Guinto contends that his claim for damages is one that

survived after the death of Santiago, and could be
prosecuted against the latters heirs, who are
substituted in his place in both cases.

In the case at bar, the sale cannot be considered as

valid as the purpose for entering into such contract is
to deprive the heirs of their legitimes.

Issue:
WON Guinto is entitled to recover damages, despite
the death of Medina YES

No consideration whatever was paid by Dimagiba on

account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even
more doubtful whether in conveying the property to
her legatee.
The testatrix merely intended to comply in advance
with what she had ordained in her testament, rather
than an alteration or departure therefrom.

Held:
An action for forcible entry gives rise to two remedies:
recovery of possession and of damages, but subject to
only one action.
Both cannot be subjected of 2 separate actions, for to
do so would be tantamount to splitting up a single
cause of action.

SECOND As a general rule, courts in probate

proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated.

Such action survives despite defendants death.

There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the

intrinsic validity was first determined as when the
defect of the will is apparent on its face and the
probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if
it is intrinsically invalid.

As they are merely substituted in the place of Santiago

upon his death, their liability is only to the extent of the
value of the property, which they might have received
from the original defendant.

The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon

because practical considerations demanded it as
when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary
provisions are doubtful legality.
In this case however, there was never an open
admission of any illicit relationship. Thus, there was no
need to go beyond the face of the will.
Guinto v Medina (1953)
Petitioners: Leon Guinto
Respondents:
Santiago
Dominador Medina, et al.

Medina

(deceased),

Facts
Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry against
Santiago Medina.

The heirs of Medina are liable to pay the damages.

F. Opening of Succession
Articles 777, 2263, 2253, 533, 1347, 1461, 130,
132, 390, 391
Articles 84, 86, FC
Article 777. The rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. (657a)
Article 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person
who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by
the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who,
with or without a will, die after the beginning of the
effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and
distributed in accordance with this new body of laws
and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary
provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may
be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes,
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betterments, legacies and bequests shall be

respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if
in no other manner can every compulsory heir be
given his full share according to this Code. (Rule
12a)
Article 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other
previous laws shall govern rights originating, under
said laws, from acts done or events which took place
under their regime, even though this Code may
regulate them in a different manner, or may not
recognize them. But if a right should be declared for
the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at
once, even though the act or event which gives rise
thereto may have been done or may have occurred
under prior legislation, provided said new right does
not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right,
of the same origin. (Rule 1)

Article 533. The possession of hereditary property

is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption and from the moment of the death of
the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.

referring to testamentary succession. (1331a)

Article 132. A donation by reason of marriage is not

revocable, save in the following cases:
(1) If it is conditional and the condition is not
complied with;
(2) If the marriage is not celebrated;
(3) When the marriage takes place without
the consent of the parents or guardian, as
required by law;
(4) When the marriage is annulled, and the
donee acted in bad faith;
(5) Upon legal separation, the donee being
the guilty spouse;

One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed

never to have possessed the same. (440)

(6) When the donee has committed an act of

ingratitude as specified by the provisions of
this Code on donations in general. (1333a)

Article 1347. All things which are not outside the

commerce of men, including future things, may be
the object of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.

Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it

being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.

No contract may be entered into upon future

inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the

purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age
of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall
be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened. (n)

All services which are not contrary to law, morals,

good customs, public order or public policy may
likewise be the object of a contract. (1271a)

Article 1461. Things having a potential existence

may be the object of the contract of sale.
The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope or
expectancy is deemed subject to the condition that
the thing will come into existence.
The sale of a vain hope or expectancy is void. (n)

Article 130. The future spouses may give each

other in their marriage settlements as much as onefifth of their present property, and with respect to
their future property, only in the event of death, to
the extent laid down by the provisions of this Code

Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead

for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a
sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has
taken part in war, and has been missing for
four years;

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(3) A person who has been in danger of

death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.
(n)

FC. Article 84. If the future spouses agree upon a

regime other than the absolute community of
property, they cannot donate to each other in their
marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their
present property. Any excess shall be considered
void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by
the provisions on testamentary succession and the
formalities of wills. (130a)

FC Article 86. A donation by reason of marriage

may be revoked by the donor in the following cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or
judicially declared void ab initio except
donations made in the marriage settlements,
which shall be governed by Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without
the consent of the parents or guardian, as
required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the
donee acted in bad faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being
the guilty spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the
condition is complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of
ingratitude as specified by the provisions of
the Civil Code on donations in general.
(132a)
Requisites for the transmission of successional
rights
1. Express will of the testator or provision of law
2. Death of the person whose property is the
subject of succession Article 43;
Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or
more persons who are called to succeed each other,
as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the
death of one prior to the other, shall prove the
same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that

they died at the same time and there shall be no

transmission of rights from one to the other. (33)
Survivorship Rules [Rule 131, Section 3(kk)]
RULE 131
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The
following
presumptions
are
satisfactory
if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two
or more persons who are called to succeed
each other, as to which of them died first,
whoever alleges the death of one prior to
the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, they shall be considered to
have died at the same time.

3. Acceptance of the inheritance Articles 10411057

Article 1041. The acceptance or repudiation of the

inheritance is an act which is purely voluntary and
free. (988)
Article 1042. The effects of the acceptance or
repudiation shall always retroact to the moment of
the death of the decedent. (989)

Article 1043. No person may accept or repudiate

an inheritance unless he is certain of the death of
the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his
right to the inheritance. (991)

Article 1044. Any person having the free disposal

of his property may accept or repudiate an
inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated
persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the
inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor
shall belong to the persons designated by the
testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute
the property, or in their default, to those mentioned
in article 1030. (992a)
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Article
1045. The lawful representatives of
corporations, associations, institutions and entities
qualified to acquire property may accept any
inheritance left to the latter, but in order to
repudiate it, the approval of the court shall be
necessary. (993a)

Article 1046. Public official establishments can

neither accept nor repudiate an inheritance without
the approval of the government. (994)

Article 1047. A married woman of age may

repudiate an inheritance without the consent of her
husband. (995a)

Article 1048. Deaf-mutes who can read and write

may accept or repudiate the inheritance personally
or through an agent. Should they not be able to read
and write, the inheritance shall be accepted by their
guardians. These guardians may repudiate the same
with judicial approval. (996a)

Article 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit.

(2) If the heir renounces the same, even

though gratuitously, for the benefit of one or
more of his co-heirs;
(3) If he renounces it for a price in favor of
all his co-heirs indiscriminately; but if this
renunciation should be gratuitous, and the
co-heirs in whose favor it is made are those
upon whom the portion renounced should
devolve by virtue of accretion, the
inheritance shall not be deemed as
accepted. (1000)

Article 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance

shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or
by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction
over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.
(1008)

Article 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance

to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may
petition the court to authorize them to accept it in
the name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an
extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.
The excess, should there be any, shall in no case
pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to
the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules
established in this Code, it may belong. (1001)

An express acceptance must be made in a public or

private document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by
which the intention to accept is necessarily implied,
or which one would have no right to do except in the
capacity of an heir.
Acts
of
mere
preservation
or
provisional
administration do not imply an acceptance of the
inheritance if, through such acts, the title or capacity
of an heir has not been assumed. (999a)

Article 1050. An inheritance is deemed accepted:

(1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his
right to a stranger, or to his co-heirs, or to
any of them;

Article 1053. If the heir should die without having

accepted or repudiated the inheritance his right shall
be transmitted to his heirs. (1006)

Article 1054. Should there be several heirs called

to the inheritance, some of them may accept and
the others may repudiate it. (1007a)

Article 1055. If a person, who is called to the same

inheritance as an heir by will and ab intestato,
repudiates the inheritance in his capacity as a
testamentary heir, he is understood to have
repudiated it in both capacities.
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Should he repudiate it as an intestate heir, without

knowledge of his being a testamentary heir, he may
still accept it in the latter capacity. (1009)

Article 1056. The acceptance or repudiation of an

inheritance, once made, is irrevocable, and cannot
be impugned, except when it was made through any
of the causes that vitiate consent, or when an
unknown will appears. (997)

Article 1057. Within thirty days after the court has

issued an order for the distribution of the estate in
accordance with the Rules of Court, the heirs,
devisees and legatees shall signify to the court
having jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate
the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are
deemed to have accepted the inheritance. (n)
Uson v Del Rosario (1953)
Petitioners: Maria Uson
Respondents: Maria del Rosario, Concepcion,
Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, all surnamed
Nebreda.
Summary: Uson wants to recover her dead husbands
lands from the common law wife and children.
Defendant claims that the NCC gave successional
rights to illegit children, therefore her children have a
right over the lands. Held: Husband died in 1945,
before effectivity of NCC = rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (657 OCC) =
Uson is the only heir. The retroactive provision (2253)
in the NCC cant take effect since it will impair the
already vested right of Uson.
facts of the case
An action for recovery of ownership and possession
of 5 parcels of land in Labrador, Pangasinan, was filed
by Uson (lawful wife of Faustino) against del Rosario
(common-law wife) and her 4 children (Nebredas, all
minors) before the CFI Pangasinan. Faustino, the owner
of the lands, died in 1945, and left no other heir except
his widow, Uson. Uson claims that upon Faustinos
death del Rosario took possession illegally of said
lands.
Defendants defense: on 21 Feb 1931, Uson and
Faustino executed a public doc whereby they agreed to
separate as husband & wife, and in consideration of
their separation, Uson was given a parcel of land by
way of alimony, and in return, she renounced her right
to inherit any other property that may be left by her
husband upon his death.
CFI: Defendants to restore to Uson the ownership
and possession of the lands in dispute.

issue
WoN the children are entitled to a share in the lands.
NO.
ratio
Faustino died prior to the effectivity of the NCC.
Thus, by virtue of Art. 657 OCC, from the moment
Faustino died, the lands passed to his only heir, Uson,
his widow. The claim that Uson relinquished her rights
over the lands cannot be entertained since future
inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can
it be renounced.
Defendants more relevant defense: Under the NCC
illegitimate children are given the status and rights of
natural children and are entitled to successional rights
which the law accords to them (Arts. 2265 and 287,
NCC). Since these rights were declared for the first
time in the NCC, they shall be given retroactive effect
even though the event which gave rise to them may
have occurred under the prior legislation (Art. 2253
NCC).
SC: 2253 takes effect only when the new rights
do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of
the same origin. Usons right of ownership over the
lands became vested in 1945 upon Faustinos death.
The new right recognized by the NCC in favor of
the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the
vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in
dispute.
Another defense: While Faustino was dying, Uson,
in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign
the lands to the illegit children for the reason that they
were acquired while Faustino was living with their
mother, and that Uson wanted to assuage somewhat
the wrong she has done to them.
SC: The assignment would partake of a nature of a
donation of real property, since it involved no material
consideration, thus requiring a public doc to be valid,
and must be accepted either in the same doc or in a
separate one (Art. 633 OCC). This was not followed;
hence donation has no valid effect.
De Borja v De Borja (1972)
Petitioners:
(1) TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE
BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA,
as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA,
MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA
(deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco,
appellees,
(2) TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE
BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, special
Administratrix appellee,
(3) TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
Respondents:
(1) TASIANA
VDA. DE
DE
BORJA,
Special
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco
de Borja, appellant. .
(2) JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
(3) JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendantappellant.
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Summary: After the death of Francisco, his second

wife and his children entered into a compromise
agreement where Franciscos son, Jose, agreed to pay
a certain amount of money to the second wife on the
condition that the latter withdraws all her claims and
suits against the former. The agreement was brought
to the CFI. The second wife opposed saying that the
heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without
first probating the will of Francisco de Borja. The
Supreme Court did not agree. According to Article 777,
NCC, since the hereditary share in a decedent's estate
is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment
of the death of such causante or predecessor in
interest, there is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if
the actual extent of such share is not determined until
the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course,
the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to
what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
facts of the case
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of
the will of his wife, Josefa Tangco. The will was
probated on April 2, 1941. Francisco was appointed
administrator in 1946, his son, Jose, as coadministrator in 1952. Jose became sole administrator
when Francisco died 1954.
After the death of Josefa, Francisco, allegedly
married Tasiana Ongsingco. When Francisco died, she
initiated testate proceedings in the CFI of Nueva Ecija
and was subsequently appointed special administratix.
There was a series of proceedings over the
administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and
distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the
estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. In
these proceedings it was Tasiana versus the children.
A compromise agreement made in October 1963.

The parties agreed to sell the Poblacion portion

of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala,
Rizal, presently under administration in the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco.

Jose also agreed to pay 800k to Tasiana as full

and complete payment and settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late
Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of
Josefa Tangco.

Tasiana was also obligated to withdraw all

claims and suits against Jose De Borja,
specifically this land which was to be sold.
The agreement was brought to the CFI of Rizal and
Nueva Ecija for approval. Tasiana opposed in both
instances on these grounds: (1) the heirs cannot enter
into such kind of agreement without first probating the
will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a
compromise on the validity of the marriage between
Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that
even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and
effect.
Tasiana also relies on this Court's decision in
Guevara vs. Guevara where the Court held the view
that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory
and that the settlement and distribution of an estate
on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will,
is against the law and public policy.

issue
WON heirs can enter into such kind of agreement
without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja?
[YES]
ratio
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara is not
applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an
examination of the terms of the agreement between
Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of
said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of
P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco shall be
considered as full complete payment settlement
of her hereditary share in the estate of the late
Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or
devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by
Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the
ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or
distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of
his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and
all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other
claimant, creditor or legatee.
According to Article 777, NCC, since the hereditary
share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such
causante or predecessor in interest, there is no legal
bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course,
the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to
what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
However, the aleatory character of the contract
does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither
does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous
litigations between the parties are to be considered
settled and should be dismissed, although such
stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the
contract the character of a compromise that the law
favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to
avoid a multiplicity of suits.
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under
article 995 of the present Civil Code. Wherefore,
barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her
successional interest existed independent of Francisco
de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even
if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the
prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as
established in the Guevara and analogous cases,
cannot apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja.

Bonilla v Barcena (1976)

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Petitioners: ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION

BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their
father) who represents the minors
Respondents: LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS
BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,
AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO
Summary: Fortunata Barcena, mother Rosalio and
Salvacion Bonilla, and wife of Ponciano filed an action
to quiet title over certain parcels of land. During the
pendency of the case, Fortunata died. Defendants filed
a motion to dismiss. When counsel for plaintiff asked
for the substitution of Fortunata but Court dismissed
the case.Court ruled that while it is true that a person
who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be
substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its
completion. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died
her claim or right to the parcels of land, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her
heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired
interest in the properties in litigation and became
parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no
reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased
plaintiff.

facts of the case

In 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors

Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of
Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action to quiet
title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
o Defendants filed a written motion to
dismiss the complaint.
o Before the hearing of the motion to
dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint in order to include
certain allegations therein. Motion to
amend the complaint was granted.

Defendants filed another motion to dismiss the

complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is
dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue.
o Counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the
death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for
substitution by her minor children and her
husband, the petitioners.
o Court after the hearing immediately
dismissed the case on the ground that a
dead person cannot be a real party in
interest and has no legal personality to
sue.

Counsel moved to set aside the order of the

dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3
of the Rules of Court.

Court denied the motion for reconsideration filed

by counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit.
o Council for deceased plaintiff filed a written
manifestation praying that the minors
Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be
allowed to substitute their deceased
mother, but the court denied the counsel's
prayer for lack of merit.
issue
(1) Was the court correct in dismissing the action?
NO

While it is true that a person who is dead cannot

sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs
in pursuing the case up to its completion.
o When the complaint was filed, Fortunata
Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the
court had acquired jurisdiction over her
person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of
Court prescribes the procedure whereby a
party who died during the pendency of the
proceeding can be substituted.
o Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court:

"whenever a party to a pending

case dies ... it shall be the duty of
his attorney to inform the court
promptly of such death ... and to
give the name and residence of his
executor, administrator, guardian
or other legal representatives."
o This duty was complied with by the counsel
for the deceased plaintiff when he
manifested before the respondent Court
that Fortunata Barcena died and asked for
the proper substitution of parties in the
case.
o The respondent Court, however, instead of
allowing the substitution, dismissed the
complaint on the ground that a dead
person has no legal personality to sue. This
is a grave error.

Article 777 of the Civil Code

provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the
decedent." From the moment of the
death of the decedent, the heirs
become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and
obligations of the decedent, and
they cannot be deprived of their
rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law.
o The moment of death is the determining
factor when the heirs acquire a definite
right to the inheritance whether such right
be pure or contingent. The right of the
heirs to the property of the deceased vests
in them even before judicial declaration of
their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings.
o When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died
her claim or right to the parcels of land in
litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was
transmitted to her heirs upon her death.
Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became parties
in interest in the case. There is, therefore,
no reason for the respondent Court not to
allow their substitution as parties in
interest for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
"after a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to

ratio
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appear and be substituted for the deceased, within

such time as may be granted ... ."
o The question as to whether an action
survives or not depends on the nature of
the action and the damage sued for.

In the causes of action which

survive the wrong complained
affects primarily and principally
property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of
action which do not survive the
injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental.

Following the foregoing criterion

the claim of the deceased plaintiff
which is an action to quiet title
over the parcels of land in litigation
affects primarily and principally
property and property rights and
therefore is one that survives even
after her death.
o Under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the
court, if the legal representative fails to
appear, to order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased.

In the instant case the respondent

Court did not have to bother
ordering the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased
because her counsel has not only
asked that the minor children be
substituted for her but also
suggested that their uncle be
appointed as guardian ad litem for
them because their father is busy
in Manila earning a living for the
family.
Cruz v Cruz (2010)
Petitioners: Memoracion Cruz, represented by
Edgardo Cruz
Respondent: Oswaldo Cruz
Summary: Memoracion filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages
against her son, Oswaldo. The latter and his wife
caused the registration of Memoracions property in
their
names
through
fraud,
forgery
and
misrepresentation. Memoracion died, however, after
presenting her evidence and chief and before the RTC
could decide on the case. Oswaldo claims that
reconveyance is a personal action and should not
survive petitioners death. RTC and CA both dismissed
the case.
If the case affects primarily and principally property
and property rights, then it survives the death of the
plaintiff or petitioner. If the action survives despite
death of a party, deceased may be substituted by his
heirs in the pending action. It is the duty of the
deceased's counsel to inform the court of such death,
and to give the names and addresses of the
deceaseds
legal
representatives.
If
a
legal

representative is not named or fails to appear, it is the

duty of the court to appoint an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased.
facts of the case
On October 18, 1993, Memoracion Cruz filed with
RTC Manila a Complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages against her son Oswaldo
Cruz.
Memoracion claimed that during her union with her
deceased common-law husband, she acquired a parcel
of land located at Tabora corner Limay Streets, Bo.
Obrero, Tondo Manila. The lot was registered in her
name . Sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the
title to the said property was transferred by Oswaldo
and his wife in their names in August 1991 by virtue of
a Deed of Sale dated February 12, 1973. She claims
that the deed was executed through fraud, forgery,
misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void.
On October 30, 1996, Memoracion died after
finished presenting her evidence in chief. Through a
Manifestation, Memoracions counsel, Atty. Roberto T.
Neri, notified the trial court on January 13, 1997 of the
fact of such death, evidenced by a certificate thereof.
Oswaldo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
that (1) the reconveyance action is a personal action
which does not survive a partys death, pursuant to
Section 21, Rule 3 ROC and (2) to allow the case to
continue would result in legal absurdity whereby one
heir is representing the defendant [and is a] co-plaintiff
in this case.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss in the
assailed Order dated 2 June 1997. CA affirmed the
RTC.
On October 17, 1997, Memoracions son-heir,
Edgardo Cruz, manifested to the trial court that he is
retaining the services of Atty. Neri for the plaintiff.
issue
Whether or not a Petition for Annulment of Deed of
Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a purely personal
action which did not survive Memoracion Cruz death.
NO.
ratio
The question as to whether an action survives or
not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which
survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily
and principally property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in
the causes of action which do not survive, the injury
complained of is to the person, the property and rights
of property affected being incidental.1
SC has held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to
property and property rights, and therefore, survives
the death of the petitioner. 2 Hence, present case for
annulment of sale of real property merits survival
despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Cruz.

1 Bonilla v. Barcena
2 Sumaljag v. Literato
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If the action survives despite death of a party, it is

the duty of the deceased's counsel to inform the court
of such death, and to give the names and addresses of
the deceaseds legal representatives. The deceased
may be substituted by his heirs in the pending action.
As explained in Bonilla:
x x x Article 777 CC provides
that the rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent. x x x
When [plaintiff], therefore, died[,]
her claim or right to the parcels of
land x x x was not extinguished by
her death but was transmitted to
her heirs upon her death. Her heirs
have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became
parties in interest in the case.
There is, therefore, no reason for
the respondent Court not to allow
their substitution as parties in
interest for the deceased plaintiff.
CA erred in affirming RTCs dismissal of the Petition.
What the RTC could have done was to require Edgardo
Cruz to appear in court and substitute Memoracion as
party to the pending case, pursuant to Section 16, Rule
3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and
established jurisprudence.
On 17 October 1997, Edgardo Cruz filed with the
RTC a Manifestation, stating that he is retaining the
services of Atty. Roberto T. Neri. Consistent with the
ruling in Heirs of Haberer v. Court of Appeals, SC
considered the Manifestation a formal substitution of
deceased Memoracion by her heir, Edgardo Cruz.
Oswaldo Cruz, although also an heir of Memoracion,
should be excluded as a legal representative in the
case for being an adverse party therein.
Procedure per Rule 16.3 ROC:
1. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
2. The court shall order legal representative(s)to
appear and be substituted within 30 days from
notice.
3. If no legal representative is named by the counsel
for the deceased, or if the one named shall fail to
appear within the specified period, the court may
order the opposing party, within a specified time,
to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and
the latter shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the deceased. (Reason: to protect all
concerned who may be affected by the intervening
death, particularly the deceased and his estate.)
Court charges in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.
Bough v Modesto (1954)

Petitioner: Bough
Respondents: Modesto, Anapol
Summary: Modesto, Bough and Anapol executed a
private document where Modesto agreed that he would
share with Anapol and Bough whatever property he
might inherit from his deceased wife. Modesto and
Anapol instituted an action to enforce the contract but
Modesto alleged that the contract was contrary to law,
morals and public policy.
The SC held that the contract is valid and binding
between parties even if the object of which is
Modestos inheritance. The right by inheritance are
acquired and transmitted upon the death of the
decedent. As such, it must necessarily follow that it is
perfectly legal for an heir to enter into a contractin
this case, with the understanding that the contract
would be effective only if and when he is really
declared an heir and only as regards any property that
might be adjudicated to him.
facts of the case
- On March 4, 1936, MODESTO, BOUGH and ANAPOL
executed a private document where Modesto agreed
that he would share with Anapol and Bough whatever
property he might inherit from his deceased wife.

It was provided in the document that the

property was to be divided and proportioned 1/8
each provided that Anapol pay the expenses to
be incurred in connection with the litigation that
Modesto was facing.
- Bough and Anapol instituted the action to secure
judgment ordering to divide the properties left by his
wife, in the manner and form provided in the private
document.
- Modesto alleged:

That Bough failed to comply with the terms and

conditions in the contract, and

That the contract was contrary to law, morals

and public policy.
issue
Whether the contract, the object of which is Modestos
inheritance, is valid and binding between the parties.
YES.
Ratio
- It is settled that rights by inheritance are acquired and
transmitted upon death of the decedent. As such, it
must necessarily follow that it is perfectly legal for an
heir to enter into a contractin this case, with the
understanding that the contract would be effective
only if and when he is really declared an heir and
only as regards any property that might be
adjudicated to him.
- It cannot be said that the disputed contract deals and
interferes with properties in custodia legis because
the reasonable interpretation that must be given to it
contemplates and provides for the partition only of
such property as may be adjudicated to Modesto if
and when he is declared to be an heir of his
deceased wife, or when it is declared through the
probate court.
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- The present action should not be construed strictly as

an action for partition but only as an action intended
to determine the right of the parties under the terms
of the contract.
Borromeo-Herrera v Borromeo (1987)
Petitioner: Patronicio Borromeo-Herrera
Respondents: Fortunato Borromeo and Hon. Francisco
P. Burgos, Judge of CFI Cebu Branch II
Summary: Vito Borromeo, a widower, died without
forced heirs but leaving extensive properties. A probate
of his will, devising all his properties to Tomas,
Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal
and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as
executor thereof, was filed by Junquera. CFI denied
probate holding that the document presented as the
will of the deceased was a forgery. The testate
proceeding was converted into intestate proceeding.
Several parties came before the court filing claims or
petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo. CFI declared 9 persons/groups
as the intestate heir of Vito. Fortunato filed a motion
before the trial court praying that he be declared as
one of the heirs of the deceased Vito, alleging that he
is an illegitimate son and he was omitted by the trial
court in the declaration of heirs. This was denied. Upon
MR, he changed his basis and put forward an Waiver
allegedly executed by 5 of the 9 heirs in his favor.
Fortunato also contends that under Art. 1043 of the
Civil Code, there is no need for a person to be first
declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an
inheritance. What is required is that he must first be
certain of the death of the person whom he is to inherit
and that he must be certain of his right of inheritance.
SC: the properties included in an existing inheritance
cannot be considered as belonging to third persons
with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue
the personality of the former. Nor do such properties
have the character of future property, because the
heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of
the death of the deceased, by principle established in
article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code,
according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by
the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse
from the moment of the death of the deceased until
the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary
property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to
the moment of the death, in accordance with article
989 of the Civil Code. In this case however, the
intention of the heirs to waive their rights was not
clearly established.

Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident

of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in
Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without
forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in
Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with CFI Cebu
a petition for the probate of a one page document
as the last will and testament left by Vito.

In the document, Vito devised all his properties

to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed
Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and
designating Junquera as executor thereof.

The document, drafted in Spanish, was

allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the
deceased in the presence of 3 witnesses who
acted as witnesses.

On May 28, 1960, the probate court held that the

document presented as the will of Vito was a
forgery. The decision of the probate court was
affirmed by SC.

The testate proceeding was converted into an

intestate proceeding.

Several parties came before the court filing claims

or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the
intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.

When the petitions and claims were heard jointly,

the following facts were established:
o

Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan,

husband
and
wife
(the
latter
having
predeceased the former), were survived by
their eight (8) children, namely: Jose Ma.
Borromeo,
Cosme
Borromeo,
Pantaleon
Borromeo, Vito Borromeo, Paulo Borromeo,
Anecita Borromeo, Quirino Borromeo and,
Julian Borromeo

Vito Borromeo died a widower, without any

issue, and all his brothers and sisters
predeceased him. (Vitos brothers and sisters
are survived by their respective heirs; See
illustration in last page)

On April 10, 1969, CFI Cebu, invoking Art. 972 of

the Civil Code, issued an order declaring the
following, to the exclusion of all others, as the
intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo: Jose
Cuenco Borromeo, Judge Crispin Borromeo,
Vitaliana Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera,
Salud Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Marcial
Borromeo, Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and the
heirs of Canuto Borromeo

The court also ordered that the assets of the

intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided
into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal
and equitable shares among the 9 declared
intestate heirs.

facts of the case

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On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with

the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an
agreement of partition of the properties of the
deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by
the trial court, in its order of August 15, 1969.

On August 25, 1972, Fortunato Borromeo, who had

earlier claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a
motion with the CFI praying that he be declared as
one of the heirs of Vito
o

The court dismissed the motion. Ground: motion

already barred by the order of the court dated April
12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as
the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo,

because it is not a money claim against the

decedent but that it may be likened to that
of a creditor of the heirs which is improper.

that the claim of Fortunato under the

waiver agreement was filed beyond the
time allowed for filing of claims as it was
filed only sometime in 1973, after there
had been a declaration of heirs (April 10,
1969), an agreement of partition (April 30,
1969), the approval of the agreement of
partition and an order directing the
administrator to partition the estate
(August 15, 1969).

that the document entitled " waiver of

Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967,
aside from having been cancelled and revoked
on June 29, 1968, is without force and effect

because there can be no effective waiver

of hereditary rights before there has been
a valid acceptance of the inheritance the
heirs intend to transfer.

Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code,

to make acceptance or repudiation of
inheritance valid, the person must be
certain of the death of the one from whom
he is to inherit and of his right to the
inheritance.

Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were

not certain of their right to the inheritance
until they were declared heirs, their rights
were, therefore, uncertain.

Fortunato filed an MR. Fortunato changed the basis

for his claim to a portion of the estate.
o

Fortunato alleged that he is an illegitimate son

of Vito and that in the declaration of heirs
made by the trial court, he was omitted. As an
acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that
he was entitled to a legitime equal in every
case to four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child.
o

the trial court had no jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the claim of Fortunato

Fortunato asserted and incorporated a Waiver

of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967,
supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria
B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo,
Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio BorromeoHerrera,
Marcial
Borromeo,
Asuncion
Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B.
Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B.
Talam
In the waiver, 5 of the 9 declared heirs
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the
disputed estate.

On December 24, 1974, the trial court declared

Fortunato as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito
Borromeo.

issue
WoN the court has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity
of the waiverYES.
WoN the heirs validly waived their rightsNO.
Ratio

TC concluded that the five declared heirs who

signed the waiver agreement assigning their
hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had
lost the same rights,

In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to

annul and set aside the trial court's order declaring
Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of
Vito Borromeo

The petitioner argues that

The trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the

validity of the waiver agreement.
It must be noted that the lower court disallowed the
probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon
appeal, this Court affirmed. Subsequently, several
parties came before the lower court filing claims or
petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to
the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the
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said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of

the trial court extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate.

The heirs could waive their rights in 1967 even if

the order to partition the estate was issued only
in 1969
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary
rights is that "the properties included in an existing
inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to
third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction
of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do
such properties have the character of future
property, because the heirs acquire a right to
succession from the moment of the death of the
deceased, by principle established in article 657 and
applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to
which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere
fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the
moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs
enter into possession of the hereditary property, but
the acceptance in any event retroacts to the
moment of the death, in accordance with article 989
of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although
conditioned
upon
the
adjudication
of
the
corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio
and Ynchausti Steamship Co.).

In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of

Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be
effective.
For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential:
(1) the existence of a right;
(2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and

The circumstances of this case show that the

signatories to the waiver document did not have the
clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights,
(1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and
Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled
"Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal
for the amicable settlement of the case. In that
Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the
eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all
properties, personal and real, including all cash
and sums of money in the hands of the Special
Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not
contested or claimed by them in any action then
pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In
turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them
all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the
respondent recognizes and concedes that the
petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver
document, is an heir of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This
shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was
never meant to be what the respondent now
purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise,
there would not be any reason for Fortunato,
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs
in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer
to concede to them parts of the estate of the
deceased;
(2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the
declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the
estate shall be distributed. This Agreement of
Partition was approved by the trial court on
August 15, 1969;
(3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others,
signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment"
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the
respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all
her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and
participation as an intestate heir in the estate of
the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated
consideration
for
said
assignment
was
P100,000.00;

(3) an intention to relinquish such right.

The intention to waive a right or advantage must

be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the
only proof of intention rests in what a party does,
his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the
particular right or advantage that no other
reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.

(4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the Tomas, and
Amelia
Borromeo
(assignees
in
the
aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn
executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of
the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of
assignment. The stated consideration was
P50,000.00;
(5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of
Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo
and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while
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Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on

March 24, 1969.

Federico
Marisol
Canuto, Jr.
Exequiel
Canuto(i
n 1959)
Maximo
Matilde
Jose Ma.

Jose
Consuelo
Pilar
Salud
Patronicio B.
Herrera
Maria B. Atega
Luz

Andres

Hermenegilda B.
Nonnenkamp
Rosario

Maximo
Borromeo and
Hermenegilda
Galan

Cosme

Marcial

Fe b. Queroz

Carlos

Amelinda

Asuncion
Florentina

Amilio
Carmen
Ismaela

Pantaleon

Teofilo

VITO

Crispin

Paulo
Anecita
Quirino
Julian

Aurora

Atty. Jose
Anecita
Ocampo
Castro
Ramon
Ocampo
Lourdes
Ocampo
Elena Ocampo
Antoniett
Jose Barcenilla,
a
Jr.
Ocampo

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G. Kinds of Succession
Art. 778. Succession may be:
(1) Testamentary;
(2) Legal or intestate; or
(3) Mixed. (n)
1. Testamentary
Art. 779. Testamentary succession is that which results
from the designation of an heir, made in a will
executed in the form prescribed by law. (n)
2. Legal or intestate

Art. 752. The provisions of Article 750 notwithstanding,

no person may give or receive, by way of donation,
more than he may give or receive by will.
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may
exceed this limitation. (636)
FC. Art 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime
other than the absolute community of property, they
cannot donate to each other in their marriage
settlements more than one-fifth of their present
property. Any excess shall be considered void.

Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or
one which has subsequently lost its validity;

Donations of future property shall be governed by the

provisions on the testamentary succession and
formalities of wills.

(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or

dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In
such case, legal succession shall take place only with
respect to the property of which the testator has not
disposed;

5. Compulsory

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the

institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or
if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the
inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of
accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding,
except in cases provided in this Code. (912a)
3. Mixed
Art. 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by
will and partly by operation of law. (n)
4. Contractual
Art. 130. The future spouses may give each other in
their marriage settlements as much as one-fifth of their
present property, and with respect to their future
property, only in the event of death, to the extent laid
down by the provisions of this Code referring to
testamentary succession. (1331a)
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the
commerce of men, including future things, may be the
object of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy may likewise be
the object of a contract. (1271a)

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESION
II. Wills
A. Definition
Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of this estate, to take
effect after his death. (667a)
B. Characteristics
Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of this estate, to take
effect after his death. (667a)
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases:
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or
the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person;
Art. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any
time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this
right is void. (737a)
Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited
by law may make a will. (662)
Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of
age cannot make a will. (n)
Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the
testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.
(n)
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)
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Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will

jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
(669)
Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act;
it cannot be left in whole or in part of the discretion of
a third person, or accomplished through the
instrumentality of an agent or attorney. (670a)
Art. 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of
heirs, devisees or legatees, or the determination of the
portions which they are to take, when referred to by
name, cannot be left to the discretion of a third person.
(670a)
Art. 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the
distribution of specific property or sums of money that
he may leave in general to specified classes or causes,
and also the designation of the persons, institutions or
establishments to which such property or sums are to
be given or applied. (671a)
Art. 787. The testator may not make a testamentary
disposition in such manner that another person has to
determine whether or not it is to be operative. (n)
C. Interpretation of wills
Art. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of
different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be
operative shall be preferred. (n)

Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an

interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy. (n)
Art. 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions
contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of
the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been
made. (n)
Art. 793. Property acquired
shall only pass thereby,
possessed it at the time of
expressly appear by the
intention. (n)

after the making of a will

as if the testator had
making the will, should it
will that such was his

Art. 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover all the

interest which the testator could device or bequeath in
the property disposed of, unless it clearly appears from
the will that he intended to convey a less interest. (n)
Art. 930. The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to
another person is void, if the testator erroneously
believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the
thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator
when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by
whatever title, the disposition shall take effect. (862a)

Solla v Ascueta
Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or
when no person or property exactly answers the
description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected,
if the error appears from the context of the will or from
extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of
the testator as to his intention; and when an
uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the
will, taking into consideration the circumstances under
which it was made, excluding such oral declarations.
(n)
Art. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their
ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear
intention to use them in another sense can be
gathered, and that other can be ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their
technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a
contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears
that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.
(675a)

petitione
Julian Solla et al
rs
responde Ursula Ascueta et al
nts
Summary: Maria Solla died, leaving some legacies
and appointing her grandson, Leandro Serrano as the
universal heir. Her orders were for Leandro to deliver
the legacies during his lifetime as well as to give
sufficient amounts of money to the church for prayers
and novenas every year. Said will also contained orders
to Leandro to order the latters heirs to fulfill her orders
as well. Leandro occupied the properties left by Maria
without any of the legatees filing a case for partition or
distribution for such a long time (39 years to be exact).
Leandro died, stating in his will that his heirs should
still fulfill Marias orders. Now the relatives of some of
the legatees filed a case for delivery of their ancestors
legacies. The RTC sided with them, holding that the
action has not prescribed and that Leandros orders to
his relatives to comply with Maria Sollas order meant
that they should deliver the legacies. SC reversed the
RTC. 1st, the RTC clearly disregarded an Exhibit (which
the counsels of both sides agreed to submit) showing
that the legatees renounced their rights to the estate.
Add to that the fact that Leandro was occupying to the
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exclusion of the whole world, in the concept of an

owner, the properties for 39 years= action prescribed.
Lastly, the Court held that the provision in Leandros
will pointing to Maria Sollas will about the relatives
complying with her order must be interpreted to mean
only those orders which Leandro could not do during
his lifetime. In interpreting a will, to determine the
intention of the testator, her circumstance during the
time she made the will must be taken into
consideration. Lastly, when the intention of the testator
is manifest in writing but the words are ambiguous,
then the words have to give way to the intention such
that the courts should limit the words to make way for
intention.

shouldve done on his own and those

which his heirs are still obligated to do
issue
Whether weather yes or no question. YES OR NO
PARA KITA AGAD.

ratio
1st and 2nd arguments:
-

While Exhibit A did in fact contain some lands

which are proven to be Leandro Serranos own,
it does not mean that the other parcels in said
Exhibit are not those left by the deceased

FACTS:
-

Dona Maria Solla died in June 1883 in the

municipality of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, leaving a will
executed in accordance with the laws in force, but
which has not been probated. It named as
legatees:
o Sergio Solla
o Cayetano Solla
o Josefa Solla
o Jacinto Serna
o Roesnda Lagmay
o Silvestra Sajor and Matias Seveda
o Leandro Serrano (her grandson) as
universal heir
The legatees did not claim their legacies during the
lifetime of Serrano, who was taking possession of
the properties (June 11 1883 to August 5 1921).
Neither was there any testamentary proceeding
instituted for the settlement of the estate left.
Serrano on the other hand did not deliver anything
Plaintiffs Julia Solla, Ambrosio Lagmay, Lucia Solla
etc are the heirs of some of the original legatees
(Silvestra Sajor and Rosenda Lagmay)
Defendants on the other hand are heirs of Leandro
Serrano. The facts as stated above are because of
the stipulation of facts signed by the parties
RTC rendered a judgment, ordering the partition of
the land being held by the Serranos in order that
the legacies may be delivered. It also ordered the
delivery of cash and other property. Thus this
appeal, raising:
o 1) Lack of appropriate description of
each parcel of land claimed is a bar to
the action
o 2) The RTC made a mistake in allowing
the attorneys of both parties t0 agree
about Exhibit A (statements of the
estate left by Maria) when it did not
even state a description of the land
being claimed by plaintiffs
o 3) The action has already prescribed
o 4) Paragraph 3 of Leandro Serranos
will did not order the delivery of the
legacies left by Maria Solla in her will.
RTC
erred
in
applying
Leandro
Serranos will to mean that every
legacy found in Maria Sollas will is
ordered delivered. A distinction should
be made between those which Leandro

3rd Issue
-

First off, the SC found it error on the part of the

trial court to disregard the other exhibitis which
the parties agreed to submit to the court. Most
relevant of these is Exhibit 4 which is the
record of proceedings in the municipality of
Cabugao where, upon the instance of Leandro
Serrano, a formal renunciation of the legacies
was made by the legatees in Maria Sollas will
In addition to that, Leandro was in possession
of the property from June 11 1883 to August 5
1921. He even obtained a possessory
information, registered in the Registry of
Deeds, exclusively enjoyed the products of the
properties
without
anyone judicially or
extrajudicially claiming a title to anything
In one of the possessory information filed by
Serrano, one of the legatees even testified in
support of the petitions
Thus, under Articles 1940 and 1957 of the Civil
Code, in addition to the Code of Civil
Procedure, the plaintiffs have lost by
prescription whatever right of ownership they
have had to the same because of Serranos
exclusive, open, peaceful and continuous
possession which was adverse to all the
world for a period of 39 years under claim
of ownership.

5th issue
-

Maria Solla, in her will, ordered her grandson

Leando Serrano to beher universal heir and to
strictly comply with her orders and requests in
her will.
In his last will on the other hand, Leandro
Serrano ordered his son, as executor to
separate all of his property that came from his
grandmom and to comply with her orders.
What are the requests that Maria Solla wanted
to be complied with?
o 1st there is the distribution of the
legacies
o 2nd is the delivery of a sufficient sum of
money to the parish of Cabugao for the
annual novena
o 3rd that Leandro order his heirs to
comply as well with her orders

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Now, all that Leandro could have and should

have done was to deliver the legacies and
order his relatives to comply with the wishes of
his grandmother.
What then are Leandros heirs liable for? It is
not logical to conclude that Maria Solla
intended that all the orders should be complied
with by the heirs of Leandro. That was why she
chose Leandro, because the trusted him to do
her wishes during his lifetime. The only
obligation left for the heirs to do is to regularly
give money to the parish of Cabugao.
In order to determine the testators intention,
the court should place itself as near as possible
in his position. Where the language of the
will is ambiguous or doubtful, the court
should take into consideration the
situation of the testator and the facts and
circumstances surrounding him at the
time the will was executed.
Where the testators intention is manifest
in his will but is obscured by the mode of
expression,
the
language
will
be
subordinated to the intention and in
order to give effect to such intention, the
court may depart from the strict wording
Thus, in this case, it clearly appears that
Maria Solla meant that Leandro Serranos
heirs only comply with the pious orders.
Her statement in the will therefore all
that I have ordered as well as the
statement in Leandros will saying all
her orders must be limited to the pious
orders.

III. Testamentary capacity and intent

A. Who may make a will
Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited
by law may make a will. (662)
Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of
age cannot make a will. (n)
Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the
testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.
(n)
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that
the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time
of making the will to know the nature of the estate to
be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and
the character of the testamentary act. (n)
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of
sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound

mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the
person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the
testator, one month, or less, before making his will was
publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains
the validity of the will must prove that the testator
made it during a lucid interval. (n)
Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate an
effective will, nor is the will of an incapable validated
by the supervening of capacity. (n)
Art. 802. A married woman may make a will without
the consent of her husband, and without the authority
of the court. (n)
Art. 803. A married woman may dispose by will of all
her separate property as well as her share of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
(n)
B. Supervening incapacity
Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate an
effective will, nor is the will of an incapable validated
by the supervening of capacity. (n)
Baltazar v Laxa
FACTS:
1. Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made
her last will and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o
Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala in the Pampango
dialect .
2. Antonio Baltazar is Pacencias nephew.
3. The will was executed in the house of retired Judge
Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to
Paciencia twice.
4. Paciencia expressed in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses that the document is her last
will and testament. She thereafter added her signature
at the end of the said document on page s and then on
the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
5. The witnesses to the will were Dra. Maria Lioba A.
Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and
Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to
the wills due execution by affixing their signatures
below its attestation clause and on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, in the presence of Paciencia
and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as
notary public.
6. Childless and without any brothers or sisters,
Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa
and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross
Laxa.
7. The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia
remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew
whom she treated as her own son.
8. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated
Paciencia as his own mother. Paciencia lived with
Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she
who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six
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days after the execution of the will or on September

19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of
America. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his
family until her death on January 4 1996.
8. In the interim, the will remained in the custody of
Judge Limpin. More than four years after the death of
Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of
Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of letters of
administration in his favour.
9. Petitioners filed an amended opposition asking the
RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias will on the
following grounds:
a. the will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
b. Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a will at
the time of its execution.
c. she was forced to execute the will under duress or in
fluence of fear or threats
d. the execution of the will had been procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo
or by some other persons for his benefit
e. signature of Paciencia on the will was forged
f. assuming the signature to be genuine, it was
obtained through fraud or trickery and;
g. that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her
will.

10. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an opposition and

Recommendation reiterating their opposition to the
appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the
properties and requesting for the appointment of
Antonio in his stead.
ISSUE:
Whether Paciencia was not of sound mind at the time
the will was allegedly executed.
RULING:
The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make
a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound
mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that
the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at
the time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

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