G.R.No.

202414:June4,2014

Case Digest: Wee vs. Mardo

JOSEPHINEWEE,Petitionerv.FELICIDADMARDO,Respondent.
MENDOZA,J.:
FACTS:
RespondentFelicidadMardowasgrantedaregisteredFreePatentNo.(IV2)15284,datedApril26,1979,
coveringtheLotNo.8348,situatedinPuttingKahoy,Silang,Cavite.
OnFebruary1,1993,respondentallegedlyconveyedtopetitionerJosephineWee,throughaDeedof
AbsoluteSaleaportionofthesaidlotknownasLotNo.8348B,foraconsiderationofP250,000.00which
wasfullypaid.Respondenthoweverrefusedtovacateandturnoverthesubjectpropertyclaimingthatthe
allegedsalewasfalsified.
PetitionerfileanApplicationforOriginalRegistrationofaparceloflandclaimingthatsheistheownerof
saidunregisteredlandbyvirtueofadeedofabsolutesale.
RespondentfiledaMotiontodismisstheapplicationallegingthatthelanddescribedintheapplicationwas
differentfromthelandbeingclaimedfortitling.Themotionwashowever,denied.Amotionfor
reconsiderationandsecondurgentmotionforreconsiderationweresubsequentlyfiledbyrespondent,but
bothweredeniedbytheRTC.
Uponpresentationofevidencebytheparties,theRTCgrantedtheapplicationofthepetitioner.Respondent
filedamotionforreconsiderationwhichwasdeniedbytheRTC,hence,respondentappealedtotheCA.
TheCAheld,amongothers,thatpetitionerwasnotabletocomplywiththerequirementofpossessionand
occupationunderSection14(1)ofP.D.No.1529.Heradmissionthatthesubjectlotwasnotphysically
turnedovertoherduetosomeobjectionsandoppositionstohertitlesuggestedthatshewasnotexercising
anyactsofdominionoverthesubjectproperty,anessentialelementintherequirementandoccupation
contemplatedunderSection14(1)ofP.D.No.1529.
Hence,thispetition.
ISSUE:WhetherPetitionerisentitledtothesubjectproperty.
HELD:CourtofAppealsdecisionissustained.
CIVILLAW:registrationoftitle
Basedonthelegalparamaters,applicantsforregistrationoftitleunderSection14(1)mustsufficiently
establish:(1)thatthesubjectlandformspartofthedisposableandalienablelandsofthepublicdomain;(2)
thattheapplicantandhispredecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotorious
possessionandoccupationofthesame;and(3)thatitisunderabonafideclaimofownershipsinceJune
12,1945orearlier.Republicv.Manimtim,G.R.No.169599,March16,2011
TheCAdeniedtheapplicationontheissueofopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionand
occupationofthesubjectland.Itwasoftheviewthatshecouldnothavecompliedwiththerequirementof
possessionandoccupationunderSection14(1)ofP.D.No.1529consideringthatsheadmittedthatitwas
notphysicallyturnedovertoher.

Amoreimportantconsideration,however,isthatthesubjectlandisalreadyregisteredunderOCTNo.OP
1840(PatentNo.042118036111)oftheRegistryofDeedsofCavite,underthenameofrespondent
FelicidadMardo.
ThePetitionisDENIED.
REPUBLIC v. SPS. CASTUERA G.R. No. 203384; (WTF THIS DIGEST IS TOO BASURA)
January 14, 2015
FACTS: Valiente sold a parcel of land to Sps. Castuera. Spouses Castuera filed with the RTC an
application for original registration of title over the property which was granted by the RTC for
they have shown preponderantly that they are the lawful owners in fee simple and thus entitled to
judicial confirmation of their imperfect title on said land, but was opposed by the Solicitor General
alleging that CENRO certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
CA affirmed RTCs decision on appeal, subsequent MR was denied.
ISSUE: WON the advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the
alienable and disposable character of the property.
HELD: The petition is meritorious. The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient
proofs of the alienable and disposable character of the property. The Spouses Castuera, as
applicants for registration of title, must present a certified true copy of the DENR Secretarys
declaration or classification of the land as alienable and disposable.
Top Management Programs Corp. v. Luis Fajardo and the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City | GR 150462 |
June 15, 2011 | J. Villarama, Jr.
FACTS: Emilio Gregorio filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1 to 4 of Plan Psu-204785 situated at Magasawang Mangga, Las Pias, Rizal, before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal; said court issued an order
declaring as abandoned the reserved oppositions of Jose T. Velasquez and Pablo Velasquez.
Meanwhile, Jose T. Velasquez filed an application for registration of title over six lots before the same court. The CFI
rendered a decision declaring Gregorio to be the absolute owner of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 described in Plan Psu204785. On March 9, 1966, an order was issued by said court for the issuance of the decree of registration.
The LRA called the attention of the Director of Lands regarding the overlapping of several lots awarded to Velasquez,
with lots adjudicated to Gregorio, and requested that portions of these lots that are not in conflict be segregated. LRA
informed the CFI that Lots 1 and 7 had been amended by the Bureau of Lands to exclude therefrom portions covered
by Lot 2, Psu-64894, Psu-96904, and Lots 1 to 4, Psu-204785 of Gregorio. Velasquez petitioned the CFI to set aside
the award earlier made in favor of Gregorio. The CFI issued an Order declaring that the application of Velasquez be
given due course insofar as Lots 1 and 7 of Ap-11135 which are identical to Lots 1 to 4, Plan Psu-204785 in favor of
Gregorio respecting the same lots as null and void. Certificates of Title were issued in favor of Velasquez. Gregorio
appealed the decision of the CFI to the CA.
Sometime after this, he entered into an agreement with Tomas Trinidad (Trinidad) and Luis Fajardo (Fajardo) entitled
Kasunduan na may Pambihirang Kapangyarihan. By virtue of this agreement, Fajardo would finance the cost of the
litigation and in return he would be entitled to one-half of the subject property after deducting twenty per cent (20%) of
the total land area as attorneys fees for Trinidad if the appeal is successful. Fajardo and Trinidad filed Civil Case
before the RTC of Pasig to enforce their agreement with Gregorio. The court rendered judgment in their favour.
Meanwhile, herein petitioner Top Management Programs Corporation sought the annulment of the CFI orders on the
ground of extrinsic fraud. Petitioner claimed that by virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, the heirs of Gregorio sold
to it a parcel of land and a TCT covering the said property was issued in its name. The CA rendered its decision
dismissing the petition for annulment.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may quiet title and order the cancellation of the TCT in favor of Luis Fajardo.
HELD: No. In an action for quieting of title, the plaintiffs must show not only that there is a cloud or contrary interest
over the subject real property, but that they have a valid title to it. The court is tasked to determine the respective rights
of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant,
who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so
that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly
introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit.
The TCT in the name of the heirs of Emilio Gregorio, on its face showed badges of irregularity in its issuance. First,
the technical description. Second, the decree number and date of issuance, as well as OCT number clearly indicate
that the original decree pertained to Velasquez and not Gregorio. Third, the name of the registered owner in the
original certificate is not Velasquez or Gregorio but Delta Motor Corp. And fourth, the certificate from which TCT No.
107729 was supposedly a transfer should have been the OCT (of Gregorio) and not those unfamiliar TCT numbers
indicated therein.
There are serious discrepancies in the registration process. In fact, it is not far-fetched that the erroneous entries could
have been intended to create the impression that TCT No. 107729 was a separate and distinct title from the previously
issued TCT No. S-91911 even if they pertain to one and the same lot adjudicated to Emilio Gregorio. Such conclusion is
reinforced by the unexplained inaction or failure of the heirs of Gregorio to rectify the alleged errors in their title before
selling the property to petitioner. The heirs of Gregorio knew that their TCT bore encumbrances in favor of third parties,
notably the notice of pending litigation (Lis Pendens) involving the property covered by said title before the CFI of Pasig,
Metro Manila in Civil Case, which Trinidad caused to be annotated thereon. The issuance of a new certificate with exactly
identical entries would mean that the aforesaid annotations had to be carried over to such new certificate.
Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the decision of the RTC of Pasig in Civil Case had become final and
executory, it is bound by the said judgment which ordered the heirs of Emilio Gregorio to convey the lots in favor of
private respondent and Trinidad. As such buyer of one of the lots to be conveyed to private respondent pursuant to the
courts decree with notice that said properties are in litigation, petitioner merely stepped into the shoes of its vendors
who lost in the case. Such vested right acquired by the private respondent under the final judgment in his favor may
not be defeated by the subsequent issuance of another certificate of title to the heirs of Gregorio respecting the same
parcel of land. For it is well-settled that being an involuntary transaction, entry of the notice of lis pendens in the
primary entry book of the Register of Deeds is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons
of such claim.
Manotok Realty v. Tecson | GR L-47475 | August 19, 1988 | J. Gutierrez, Jr.
FACTS: In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession against defendants, Court of First Instance of
Manila ruled declaring respondent Nilo Madlangawa a builder in good faith. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the
Supreme Court dismissed for lack of merit.
The petitioner filed with the trial court, presided over by respondent Judge Tecson, a motion for the approval of
petitioner's exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment, praying that the court issue an order: a) approving the
exercise of petitioner's option to appropriate the improvements introduced by the private respondent on the property; b)
thereafter, private respondent be ordered to deliver possession of the property in question to the petitioner.
However, since there is a pending case involving the expropriation of the land in question it is better to suspend the
current case until after the outcome of the expropriation proceedings is done. After a denial of its motion for
reconsideration, the petitioner filed the present petition for mandamus alleging that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, a fire engulfed the Tambunting estate covering the disputed area of the land. The
expropriation case was not granted and the law that provided for such was declared unconstitutional. The petitioner is
contending that the execution of the decision must now involve the delivery of possession due to the fire.
ISSUE: Whether or not the execution of the decision must now involve the delivery of possession by the respondent to
the petitioner due to the fire

HELD: Yes. When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it becomes incumbent upon the
respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. There is, therefore, no basis for the
respondent judge to deny the petitioner's motion to avail of its option to appropriate the improvements made on its
property. Settled is the rule that after a judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto, and nothing can
be done therewith except its execution, otherwise there would be no end to legal processes.
The repairs and improvements introduced by the said respondents after the complaint was filed cannot be considered
to have been built in good faith, much less, justify the denial of the petitioner's option. Since the improvements have
been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent's right to retain the premises has already been
extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the
premises and deliver the same to herein petitioner.

Heirs of Labanon v. Heirs of Labanon | GR 160711 | August 14, 2004 | J. Velasco, Jr.
FACTS: Constancio Labanon settled upon a piece of alienable and disposable public agricultural land situated in
Kidapawan, Cotabato. He cultivated the said lot and introduced permanent improvements. Constancio asked his
brother, Maximo, who was better educated to file a public land application under the express agreement that they will
divide the said lot as soon as it would be feasible for them to do so. During the time of the application it was
Constancio who continued to cultivate the said lot. The Homestead Application was approved and an Original
Certificate of Title over said lot was issued in favor of Maximo Labanon.
Maximo Labanon executed a document denominated as Assignment of Rights and Ownership to safeguard the
ownership and interest of his brother Constancio Labanon. Later on, Maximo executed a sworn statement reiterating
his desire that his elder brother Constancio, his heirs and assigns shall own the eastern portion of the Lot.
After the death of Constancio, his heirs executed an [e]xtra-judicial settlement of estate with simultaneous sale over
the aforesaid eastern portion of the lot in favor of Alberto Makilang, the husband of Visitacion Labanon, one of the
children of Constancio. Subsequently, the parcel of land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Alberto.
The defendants heirs of Maximo caused to be cancelled from the records of the defendant Provincial Assessor of
Cotabato the aforesaid tax declaration and the latter, without first verifying the legality of the basis for said cancellation,
cancelled the same. The heirs of Constancio demanded the owners copy of the certificate of title covering the
aforesaid Lot to be surrendered to the Register of Deeds.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the OCT issued the name of MAXIMO LABANON be now considered indefeasible and
conclusive; and
2. W/N the Trust Agreement allegedly made by Constancio Labanon and Maximo Labanon prescribed
HELD:

1.

2.

No. Section 32 of PD 1529 does not totally deprive a party of any remedy to recover the property fraudulently
registered in the name of another. It merely precludes the reopening of the registration proceedings for titles
covered by the Torrens System, but does not foreclose other remedies for the reconveyance of the property to its
rightful owner. While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes
incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability
of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners. The action for
Recovery of Ownership before the RTC is indeed the appropriate remedy.
No. Maximo Labanon maintained the title over the property while acknowledging the true ownership of Constancio
Labanon over the eastern portion of the land. The existence of an express trust cannot be doubted nor disputed. In
the case at bar, Maximo never repudiated the express trust instituted between him and Constancio. And after
Maximos death, the trust could no longer be renounced; thus, respondents right to enforce the trust agreement
can no longer be restricted nor prejudiced by prescription. In addition, petitioners can no longer question the validity

of the positive declaration of Maximo Labanon in the Assignment of Rights and Ownership in favor of the late
Constancio Labanon, as the agreement was not impugned during the formers lifetime and the recognition of his
brothers rights over the eastern portion of the lot was further affirmed and confirmed in the subsequent Sworn
Statement.

SPS CARPO vs. AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED G.R.

No. 166577, February 3, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: Spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title
against Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI) claiming that they are the owners of a parcel of
land coveredby Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued in their names. They further
alleged that ALI was claiming to have titles (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T4368) over the property covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463.
In its Answer, ALI pointed out that the areas covered by TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do
not overlap with the Carpos claimed property and the dispute pertained only to the
land covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Pias
Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala Corporation.
It appeared that Ayala Corporation contributed the property to LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also
merged with ALI. Further, ALI alleged that it is the true owner of the property covered by TCT No.
T-5333 as it traces back its title to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950 while
the Carpos title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued only in 1970. ALI also claimed the
Carpos complaint was barred by res judicata in view of the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v.
San Pedro which upheld the ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico over the subject property as
Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over the claim of a certain Florentino Baltazar who was asserting ownership
of the same under his plan, Psu-56007.
The RTC ruled that the Carpos title is superior to that of ALI. The CA reversed RTCs decision.
The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA. Hence, the
instant petition for review.
The Carpos contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that their cause of action has
been barred by prescription and laches. According to them, since the OCT from which
ALI derived its title is void for want of a duly approved survey plan, their cause of action did not
prescribe.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Carpos cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches.
HELD: YES. OCT No. 242 of ALIs predecessor-in-interest was issued on May 7, 1950, or fortyfive (45) years before the Car[pos filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the
Courts firmly held view that the Carpos claim is barred not only by prescription, but also by
laches.
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year
from the time a decree of registration was issued, any action for reconveyance that the Carpos
could have availed of is also barred. Although the Carpos complaint was for quieting of title, it is
in essence an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, considering that
the Carpos were alleging in said complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the

issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of ALIs predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-settled that an
action for reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name, must be filed within ten years from
the issuance of the title, since such issuance operates as a constructive notice. Since ALIs title is
traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year prescriptive period expired in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to
the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or
unfair to permit. In the instant case, the Carpos, as well as their predecessor-in-interest, have not
shown that they have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALIs title
was derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if successful, would be
clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on the validity of said OCT, the innocent
purchasers for value, who are protected by P.D. 1529.