G.R. No.

95237-38 September 13, 1991

DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY WATER DISTRICT,
METRO CEBU WATER DISTRICT, ZAMBOANGA CITY WATER DISTRICT, LEYTE
METRO WATER DISTRICT, BUTUAN CITY WATER DISTRICT, CAMARINES
NORTE WATER DISTRICT, LAGUNA WATER DISTRICT, DUMAGUETE CITY
WATER DISTRICT, LA UNION WATER DISTRICT, BAYBAY WATER DISTRICT,
METRO LINGAYEN WATER DISTRICT, URDANETA WATER DISTRICT,
COTABATO CITY WATER DISTRICT, MARAWI WATER DISTRICT, TAGUM WATER
DISTRICT, DIGOS WATER DISTRICT, BISLIG WATER DISTRICT, and
MECAUAYAN WATER DISTRICT, petitioners,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Rodolfo S. De Jesus for petitioners.
Evalyn H. Itaas-Fetalino, Rogelio C. Limare and Daisy B. Garcia-Tingzon for CSC.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
Whether or not the Local Water Districts formed and created pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, are government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter falling under the Civil Service Law
and/or covered by the visitorial power of the Commission on Audit is the issue which
the petitioners entreat this Court, en banc, to shed light on.
Petitioners are among the more than five hundred (500) water districts existing
throughout the country formed pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
198, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 768 and 1479, otherwise known as
the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973."
Presidential Decree No. 198 was issued by the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
by virtue of his legislative power under Proclamation No. 1081. It authorized the
different local legislative bodies to form and create their respective water districts
through a resolution they will pass subject to the guidelines, rules and regulations
therein laid down. The decree further created and formed the "Local Water Utilities
Administration" (LWUA), a national agency attached to the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA), and granted with regulatory power necessary to
optimize public service from water utilities operations.

The respondents, on the other hand, are the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the
Commission on Audit (COA), both government agencies and represented in this case
by the Solicitor General.
On April 17, 1989, this Court ruled in the case of Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton, et
al. (G.R. No. 63742, 172 SCRA 253):
Significantly, Article IX (B), Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters.
Inasmuch as PD No. 198, as amended, is the original charter of the
petitioner, Tanjay Water District, and respondent Tarlac Water District
and all water districts in the country, they come under the coverage of
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. (Sec. 35, Art. VIII and Sec.
37, Art. IX of PD No. 807).
As an offshoot of the immediately cited ruling, the CSC. issued Resolution No. 90575, the dispositive portion of which reads:
NOW THEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Commission
resolved, as it hereby resolves to rule that Local Water Districts, being
quasi-public corporations created by law to perform public services and
supply public wants, the matter of hiring and firing of its officers and
employees should be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations. Henceforth, all appointments of personnel of the different
local water districts in the country shall be submitted to the
Commission for appropriate action. (Rollo. p. 22).
However, on May 16, 1990, in G.R. No. 85760, entitled "Metro Iloilo Water District v.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al.," the Third Division of this Court ruled in
a minute resolution:
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that PD 198 is a general legislation empowering and/or
authorizing government agencies and entities to create water districts,
said PD 198 cannot be considered as the charter itself creating the
Water District. Public respondent NLRC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in holding that the operative act, that created the
Metro Iloilo Water District was the resolution of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of Iloilo City. Hence, the employees of Water Districts are
not covered by Civil Service Laws as the latter do (sic) not have
original charters.

In adherence to the just cited ruling, the CSC suspended the implementation of
Resolution No. 90-575 by issuing Resolution No. 90-770 which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Commission
resolved to rule, as it hereby rules, that the implementation of CSC.
Resolution No. 575 dated June 27, 1990 be deferred in the meantime
pending clarification from the Supreme Court are regards its conflicting
decisions in the cases of Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton and Metro
Iloilo Water District v. National Labor Relations Commission. (p. 26,
Rollo)
In the meanwhile, there exists a divergence of opinions between COA on one hand,
and the (LWUA), on the other hand, with respect to the authority of COA to audit the
different water districts.
COA opined that the audit of the water districts is simply an act of discharging the
visitorial power vested in them by law (letter of COA to LWUA dated August 13,
1985, pp. 29-30, Rollo).
On the other hand, LWUA maintained that only those water districts with subsidies
from the government fall within the COA's jurisdiction and only to the extent of the
amount of such subsidies, pursuant to the provision of the Government Auditing
Code of the Phils.
It is to be observed that just like the question of whether the employees of the
water districts falls under the coverage of the Civil Service Law, the conflict
between the water districts and the COA is also dependent on the final
determination of whether or not water districts are government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter. The reason behind this is Sec. 2(1), Article IX-D of
the 1987 constitution which reads:
Sec. 2(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority,
and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government,
or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,
and on a post audit basis. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners' main argument is that they are private corporations without original
charter, hence they are outside the jurisdiction of respondents CSC and COA.
Reliance is made on the Metro Iloilo case which declared petitioners as quasi-public

corporations created by virtue of PD 198, a general legislation which cannot be

considered as the charter itself creating the water districts. Holding on to this ruling,
petitioners contend that they are private corporations which are only regarded as
quasi-public or semi-public because they serve public interest and convenience and
that since PD 198 is a general legislation, the operative act which created a water
district is not the said decree but the resolution of the sanggunian concerned.
After a fair consideration of the parties' arguments coupled with a careful study of
the applicable laws as well as the constitutional provisions involved, We rule against
the petitioners and reiterate Our ruling in Tanjay case declaring water districts
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter.
As early as Baguio Water District v. Trajano, et al., (G.R. No. 65428, February 20,
1984, 127 SCRA 730), We already ruled that a water district is a corporation created
pursuant to a special law P.D. No. 198, as amended, and as such its officers and
employees are covered by the Civil Service Law.
In another case (Hagonoy Water District v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81490, August 31, 1988,
165 SCRA 272), We ruled once again that local water districts are quasi-public
corporations whose employees belong to the Civil Service. The Court's
pronoucement in this case, as extensively quoted in the Tanjay case, supra, partly
reads:
"The only question here is whether or not local water districts are
governmkent owned or controlled corporations whose employees are
subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law. The Labor Arbiter
asserted jurisdiction over the alleged illegal dismissal of private
respondent Villanueva by relying on Section 25 of Presidential decree
No. 198, known as the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973" which
went onto effect in 25 May 1973, and which provides as follows:
Exemption from Civil Service. The district and its
employees, being engaged in a proprietary function, are
hereby exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service
Law. Collective Bargaining shall be available only to
personnel below supervisory levels: Provided, however,
That the total of all salaries, wages emoluments, benefits
or other compensation paid to all employees in any month
shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of average net
monthy revenue. Said net revenue representing income
from water sales and sewerage service charges, less prorata share of debt service and expenses for fuel or energy
for pumping during the preceding fiscal year.

The Labor Arbiter failed to take into accout the provisions of

Presidential Decree No. 1479, which went into effect on 11 June 1978,
P.D. No. 1479, wiped away Section 25 of PD 198 quoted above, and
Section 26 of PD 198 was renumbered as Section 25 in the following
manner:
Section 26 of the same decree PD 198 is hereby amended to read as
Section 25 as follows:
Section 25. Authorization. The district may exercise all the powers
which are expressly granted by this Title or which are necessarily
implied from or incidental to the powers and purposes herein stated.
For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Act, a district is
hereby granted the power of eminent domain, the exercise thereof
shall, however, be subject to review by the Administration.
Thus, Section 25 of PD 198 exempting the employees of water districts
from the application of the Civil Service Law was removed from the
statute books:
xxx xxx xxx
We grant the petition for the following reasons:
1. Section 25 of PD No. 198 was repealed by Section 3 of PD No. 1479;
Section 26 of PD No. 198 was amended ro read as Sec. 25 by Sec. 4 of
PD No. 1479. The amendatory decree took effect on June 11, 1978.
xxx xxx xxx
3. The BWD is a corporation created pursuant to a special law PD No.
198, as amended. As such its officers and employees are part of the
Civil Service (Sec. 1, Art. XII-B, [1973] Constitution; PD No. 868).
Ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute, PD 198 is a special law
applicable only to the different water districts created pursuant thereto. In all its
essential terms, it is obvious that it pertains to a special purpose which is intended
to meet a particular set of conditions and cirmcumstances. The fact that said decree
generally applies to all water districts throughout the country does not change the
fact that PD 198 is a special law. Accordingly, this Court's resolution in Metro Iloilo
case declaring PD 198 as a general legislation is hereby abandoned.
By "government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter," We mean
government owned or controlled corporation created by a special law and not under

the Corporation Code of the Philippines. Thus, in the case of Lumanta v. NLRC (G.R.
No. 82819, February 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 79, 82), We held:
The Court, in National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No 69870, promulgated on 29 November
1988, quoting extensively from the deliberations of 1986 Constitutional
Commission in respect of the intent and meaning of the new phrase
"with original character," in effect held that government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charter refer to corporations
chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized
under our general incorporation statute the Corporations Code. In
NASECO, the company involved had been organized under the general
incorporation statute and was a sbusidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation (NIDC) which in turn was a subsidiary of the
Philippine National Bank, a bank chartered by a special statute. Thus,
government-owned or controlled corporations like NASECO are
effectively, excluded from the scope of the Civil Service. (emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has been excluded from the
coverage of the CSC are those corporations created pursuant to the Corporation
Code. Significantly, petitioners are not created under the said code, but on the
contrary, they were created pursuant to a special law and are governed primarily by
its provision.
No consideration may thus be given to petitioners' contention that the operative act
which created the water districts are the resolutions of the respective local
sanggunians and that consequently, PD 198, as amended, cannot be considered as
their charter.
It is to be noted that PD 198, as amended is the source of authorization and power
to form and maintain a district. Section 6 of said decree provides:
Sec. 6. Formation of District. This Act is the source of authorization
and power to form and maintain a district. Once formed, a district is
subject to the provisions of this Act and not under the jurisdiction of
any political subdivision, . . . .
Moreover, it must be observed that PD 198, contains all the essential terms
necessary to constitute a charter creating a juridical person. For example, Section
6(a) provides for the name that will be used by a water district, thus:

Sec. 6. . . . To form a district, the legislative body of any city,

municipality or province shall enact a resolution containing the
following:
a) The name of the local water district, which shall include the name of
the city, municipality, or province, or region thereof, served by said
system, followed by the words "Water District."
It also prescribes for the numbers and qualifications of the members of the Board of
Directors:
Sec. 8. Number and Qualification. The Board of Directors of a district
shall be composed of five citizens of the Philippines who are of voting
age and residents within the district. One member shall be a
representative of civic-oriented service clubs, one member of
representative of professional associations, one member a
representative of business, commercial or financial organizations, one
member a representative of educational institutions and one member a
representative of women's organization. No public official shall serve as
director. Provided, however, that if the district has availed of the
financial assistance of the Administration, the Administration may
appoint any of its personnel to sit in the board of directors with all the
rights and privileges appertaining to a regular member for such period
as the indebtedness remains unpaid in which case the board shall be
composed of six members; (as amended by PDs Nos. 768 and 1479).
the manner of their appointment and nominations;
Sec. 9. Appointment. Board members shall be appointed by the
appointing authority. Said appointments shall be made from a list of
nominees, if any, submitted pursuant to Section 10. If no nominations
are submitted, the appointing authority shall appoint any qualified
person of the category to the vacant position;
Sec.10. Nominations. On or before October 1 of each even
numbered year, the secretary of the district shall contact each known
organization, association, or institution being represented by the
director whose term will expire on December 31 and solicit
nominations from these organizations to fill the position for the ensuing
term. One nomination may be submitted in writing by each such
organization to the Secretary of the district on or before November 1 of
such year: This list of nominees shall be transmitted by the Secretary
of the district to the office of the appointing authority on or before
November 15 of such year and he shall make his appointment from the

list submitted on or before December 15. In the event the appointing

authority fails to make his appointments on or before December 15,
selection shall be made from said list of nominees by majority vote of
the seated directors of the district constituting a quorum. Initial
nominations for all five seats of the board shall be solicited by the
legislative body or bodies at the time of adoption of the resolution
forming the district. Thirty days thereafter, a list of nominees shall be
submitted to the provincial governor in the event the resolution
forming the district is by a provincial board, or the mayor of the city or
municipality in the event the resolution forming the adoption of the
district is by the city or municipal board of councilors, who shall select
the initial directors therefrom within 15 days after receipt of such
nominations;
their terms of office:
Sec. 11. Term of Office. Of the five initial directors of each newly
formed district, two shall be appointed for a maximum term of two
years, two for a maximum term of four years, and one for a maximum
term of six years. Terms of office of all directors in a given district shall
be such that the term of at least one director, but not more then two,
shall expire on December 31 of each even-numbered year. Regular
terms of office after the initial terms shall be for six years commencing
on January 1 of odd-numbered years. Directors may be removed for
cause only, subject to review and approval of the Administration; (as
amended by PD 768).
the manner of filling up vacancies:
Sec. 12. Vacancies. In the event of a vacancy in the board of
directors occurring more than six months before expiration of any
director's term, the remaining directors shall within 30 days, serve
notice to or request the secretary of the district for nominations and
within 30 days, thereafter a list of nominees shall be submitted to the
appointing authority for his appointment of a replacement director
from the list of nominees. In the absence of such nominations, the
appointing authority shall make such appointment. If within 30 days
after submission to him of a list of nominees the appointing authority
fails to make an appointment, the vacancy shall be filled from such list
by a majority vote of the remaining members of the Board of Directors
constituting a quorum. Vacancies occurring within the last six months
of an unexpired term shall also be filled by the Board in the above
manner. The director thus appointed shall serve the unexpired term
only; (as amended by PD 768).

and the compensation and personal liability of the members of the Board of
Directors:
Sec. 13. Compensation. Each director shall receive a per diem, to be
determined by the board, for each meeting of the board actually
attended by him, but no director shag receive per diems in any given
month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diems of four
meetings in any given month. No director shall receive other
compensation for services to the district.
Any per diem in excess of P50.00 shall be subject to approval of the
Administration (as amended by PD 768).
Sec. 14. Personal Liability. No director may be held to be personally
liable for any action of the district.
Noteworthy, the above quoted provisions of PD 198, as amended, are similar to
those which are actually contained in other corporate charters. The conclusion is
inescapable that the said decree is in truth and in fact the charter of the different
water districts for it clearly defines the latter's primary purpose and its basic
organizational set-up. In other words, PD 198, as amended, is the very law which
gives a water district juridical personality. While it is true that a resolution of a local
sanggunian is still necessary for the final creation of a district, this Court is of the
opinion that said resolution cannot be considered as its charter, the same being
intended only to implement the provisions of said decree. In passing a resolution
forming a water district, the local sanggunian is entrusted with no authority or
discretion to grant a charter for the creation of a private corporation. It is merely
given the authority for the formation of a water district, on a local option basis, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of PD 198.
More than the aforequoted provisions, what is of important interest in the case at
bar is Section 3, par. (b) of the same decree which reads:
Sec. 3(b). Appointing authority. The person empowered to appoint
the members of the Board of Directors of a local water district,
depending upon the geographic coverage and population make-up of
the particular district. In the event that more than seventy-five percent
of the total active water service connections of a local water districts
are within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing
authority shall be the mayor of that city or municipality, as the case
may be; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the governor of
the province within which the district is located: Provided, That if the
existing waterworks system in the city or municipality established as a
water district under this Decree is operated and managed by the

province, initial appointment shall be extended by the governor of the

province. Subsequent appointments shall be as specified herein.
If portions of more than one province are included within the boundary
of the district, and the appointing authority is to be the governors then
the power to appoint shall rotate between the governors involved with
the initial appointments made by the governor in whose province the
greatest number of service connections exists (as amended by PD
768).
The above-quoted section definitely sets to naught petitioners' contention that they
are private corporations. It is clear therefrom that the power to appoint the
members who will comprise the Board of Directors belongs to the local executives of
the local subdivision units where such districts are located. In contrast, the
members of the Board of Directors or trustees of a private corporation are elected
from among the members and stockholders thereof. It would not be amiss to
emphasize at this point that a private corporation is created for the private purpose,
benefit, aim and end of its members or stockholders. Necessarily, said members or
stockholders should be given a free hand to choose those who will compose the
governing body of their corporation. But this is not the case here and this clearly
indicates that petitioners are definitely not private corporations.
The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, We are, however, not unaware of the
serious repercussion this may bring to the thousands of water districts' employees
throughout the country who stand to be affected because they do not have the
necessary civil service eligibilities. As these employees are equally protected by the
constitutional guarantee to security of tenure, We find it necessary to rule for the
protection of such right which cannot be impaired by a subsequent ruling of this
Court. Thus, those employees who have already acquired their permanent
employment status at the time of the promulgation of this decision cannot be
removed by the mere reason that they lack the necessary civil service eligibilities.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioners are declared
"government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter" which fall
under the jurisdiction of the public respondents CSC and COA.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 95275-76 July 23, 1991
SIXTO DE LA VICTORIA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HEIRS OF GENOVEVA S. MEDINA represented
by FAUSTINO MESINA, JR., JUAN ALAO and VICTOR S. MESINA, respondents.

Constante P. Pimentel, et al. for petitioner.

Regulo M. Bantasan for the Intervenor Aquilino Cantiga, Jr. Sixto, Brillantes, Jr. for
Heirs of Genoveva S. Mesina.
Evergisto B. Escalon for respondents Juan Alao and Victor S. Mesina.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p
This petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order assails
the order of the Commission on Elections En Banc (COMELEC, for short) which
allowed the substitution of the heirs of a deceased candidate as protestee in the
election protest filed by her rival for the office of municipal mayor of Albuera, Leyte,
in the local elections on February 1, 1988, and allowed the same heirs to appeal the
decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring her rival (the protestant and herein
petitioner), as the actual winner in that election.
The contenders for the mayorship of Albuera, Leyte in the special local elections
held on February 1, 1988 were petitioner Sixto De la Victoria who obtained 5,093
votes, the late Genoveva S. Mesina who obtained 5,103 votes, and Loly C. Fian who
garnered 982 votes. On February 3, 1988, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Mesina as the duly elected municipal mayor of Albuera, Leyte. Elected
and proclaimed vice-mayor was her running-mate, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr.
In due time, the defeated mayoral candidate, De la Victoria, filed two preproclamation cases (SPC Nos. 88-560 and 88-614) in the COMELEC but even while
they were still pending in the commission, he filed on October 21, 1988 in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte, an election protest Ex
Abundante Cautela against Mesina (docketed as Election Protest No. B-44) with
claims for damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Mesina filed an Answer with
counterclaims for damages and attorney's fees.
On July 22, 1989, Mesina died and was substituted as protestee by her Vice-Mayor,
Aquilino Cantiga, Jr., who assumed the mayorship by operation of law. Neither
Mesina's heirs (the private respondents herein), nor her counsel informed the trial
court about her death.
On May 16, 1990, De la Victoria withdrew from the COMELEC En Banc, his preproclamation complaints (SPC Cases Nos. 88-560 and 88-614). The COMELEC
granted his motion.

On June 18, 1990, the incumbent Mayor, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr., filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) a verified "Petition to Intervene" in the election protest of De la
Victoria.
On June 20, 1990, De la Victoria filed a "Manifestation/Motion" waiving his claim for
damages and costs against the deceased protestee, Mesina. The trial court granted
the motion (p. 389, Rollo).
On June 22, 1990, counsel for Mesina filed a Notice of Death and Motion for
Substitution of the deceased protestee by her heirs, and requested that his motion
be set for hearing on July 2, 1990.
De la Victoria opposed the motion for substitution on the ground that the heirs of
Mesina are not the "real party in interest" and that since he (De la Victoria) had
waived his claim for damages against the deceased, her heirs have no more right to
intervene in the case or have been "erased from the picture altogether"
(Lomugdang vs. Javier, 21 SCRA 402 and Vda. de Mesa vs. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533).
On July 2, 1990, the trial court noted the Motion for Substitution filed by the heirs of
Mesina and ruled that De la Victoria's waiver of his claim for damages against the
said protestee rendered the Motion for Substitution without basis in law, or moot
and academic.
On July 17, 1990, the trial court promulgated a decision in the Election Protest No.
B-44, declaring the protestant, De la Victoria, as the duly elected Mayor of Albuera,
Leyte, by a margin of 134 votes over the deceased protestee, Genoveva S. Mesina.
Two days later, on July 19, 1990, the heirs of Mesina appealed to the COMELEC by a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the trial
court from rendering a decision in Election Protest No. B-44 or conducting further
proceedings therein.
On July 20, 1990, the heirs of Mesina filed in the trial court a Notice of Appeal. De la
Victoria filed an "Urgent Motion to Disregard Notice of Appeal" on the ground that
the heirs had no standing in the case as they failed to appeal the July 2, 1990 Order
of the trial court denying their motion for substitution. The trial court in its Order of
July 23, 1990, denied the Notice of Appeal and ordered its expulsion from the record
of the case. It held that the intervenor, Vice-Mayor Cantiga, who succeeded the
deceased protestee by operation of law, not the "heirs" of the deceased, is the "real
party in interest" in the continuation of the election protest after the demise of the
protestee. Moreover, upon the waiver by De la Victoria of his claim for damages
against Mesina, the latter's heirs had no more legal interest to defend in her behalf.

On July 24, 1990, De la Victoria filed a motion for execution of the trial court's
decision. It was granted by the court on July 25, 1990. Promptly, on the same day,
De la Victoria was sworn into office as the duly elected Mayor of Albuera.
As earlier mentioned, the heirs of Mesina appealed that decision to the COMELEC by
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction (SPR No. 9-90). In his Comment on the petition, De la Victoria
adverted to the decision dated July 17, 1990 of the trial court which became final
and executory when no appeal was taken therefrom.
On the same date, the COMELEC denied the heirs' application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO), but set the case for hearing before the COMELEC En Banc
for "preliminary determination of the sufficiency of the allegations in the main issue
raised by said respondents-heirs."
De la Victoria opposed the petition.
On August 6, 1990, the heirs filed in the COMELEC another petition for certiorari and
mandamus (SPR No. 11-90), praying that the execution of the decision of the trial
court in Election Protest No. B-44 be stopped.
On August 8, 1990, De la Victoria assumed office as Mayor of Albuera, Leyte.
On August 13, 1990, the COMELEC issued a status quo Order directing De la Victoria
to answer the petition in SPR No. 11-90, and setting the petition for preliminary
injunction for hearing on August 23, 1990.
On September 27, 1990, the COMELEC set aside the trial court's Order dated July 2,
1990 denying the motion for substitution of the heirs of the deceased protestee,
and the Order dated July 23, 1990 which denied due course to the Notice of Appeal
of the heirs from its decision dated July 17, 1990. It declared the writ of execution
null and void and ordered the elevation to it of the records of the case pursuant to
Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (on appeal from election protest
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction).
De la Victoria has come to us for relief through this petition for certiorari with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) where the main issues
raised are: (1) whether the heirs of the deceased protestee in an election protest
may be considered as real party-in-interest even if the vice-mayor has been allowed
to intervene and the protestant had waived his claim for damages and costs in the
proceedings; and (2) whether said heirs may appeal the decision in the election
protest (EPC No. B-44).

After careful deliberation, the Court is persuaded that the answer to both questions
is no.
The late Genoveva Mesina's claim to the contested office was not in any sense a
transmissible right that devolved upon her surviving spouse and her children (herein
private respondents) after her death. "Public office is personal to the incumbent and
is not a property which passes to his heirs" (Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA
848). Private respondents' only interest in the outcome of the case is limited to no
more than their interest in defending her against the protestant's claim for damages
and costs (which the protestant, herein petitioner, has already waived). They may
no longer prosecute her own counter-claim for damages against the protestant for
that was extinguished when death terminated her light to occupy the contested
office of mayor of Albuera, Leyte.
In the case of Vda. de Mesa vs. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533, 545, we ruled:
The same cannot, however, be said of the protestee's widow or of the
local Liberal Party chapter of Muntinlupa. The protestee's claim to the
contested office is not in any sense a right transmitted to his widow or
heirs. Said widow's remaining interest in the outcome of the case is
limited to no more than the possible award of costs against the
deceased protestee. Besides not being such an interest as would
justify her substitution for her deceased husband as an indispensable
legal representative, the right to such an award if eventually made has
already been waived by protestant Argana. This effectively withdraws
the widow from the picture altogether. Much less has the local Liberal
Party Chapter any claim to substitution. Not being duly incorporated as
a juridical person, it can have no personality to sue or be sued as such.
And while it conceivably may derive some indirect benefit consequent
to the resolution of the contest in favor of the deceased protestee,
neither the chapter itself nor the officers thereof would become
entitled thereby to any right to the contested office in case of a
favorable judgment, nor, for that matter, do they stand to sustain any
direct prejudice in case of an adverse one. No basis therefore exist
upon which to predicate their claim to substitution. (Emphasis
supplied).
This ruling was not a mere obiter as the COMELEC erroneously supposed.
Vice Mayor Aquilino Cantiga's accession, by operation of law, to the position of
Municipal Mayor upon the death of Mesina on July 22, 1989, automatically made
him the real party-in-interest in the election contest for his right to hold the office of
municipal mayor is in jeopardy of being lost should De la Victoria win Ms protest.
Thus did this Court hold in Lomugdang vs. Javier, 21 SCRA 403:

The vice-mayor elect has the status of a real party-in-interest in the

continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to intervene therein. For
if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor
succeeds to the office of mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly
elected cannot assume the post.
This ruling was reiterated in Unda vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 94090, October 19, 1990):
Now under the Local Government Code, the vice-mayor stands next in
line of succession to the mayor in case of a permanent vacancy in the
latter's position. Upon the death of the protestee mayor in the case at
bar, petitioner, as then incumbent vice-mayor, succeeded by operation
of law to the vacated office and is ordinarily entitled to occupy the
same for the unexpired term thereof. The outcome of the election
contest necessarily and primarily bears upon his right to his present
position and he is the person directly concerned in the fair and regular
conduct of the election in order that the true will of the electorate will
be upheld. His status as a real party-in-interest in the continuation of
said case cannot thus be disputed. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the procedural aspects of the case, we find the following observations of the
Solicitor General in his Consolidated Comment dated January 8, 1991, to be well
taken:
. . . respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving
due course to the [private respondents'] petitions for certiorari filed in
SPR Nos. 9-90 and 11-90 filed on August 6, 1990 to set aside the final
and executory decision of the trial court promulgated on July 18, 1990,
far beyond the 5-day period allowed by [Section 22, Rule 35] Comelec
Rules of Procedure, (p. 410, Rollo.)
Respondent COMELEC further gravely abused its discretion by issuing a
"permanent" and final injunction to prevent the execution of said final
and executory Decision dated July 17, 1990 of the trial court, without
the required bond contrary to its own Rule 30, Section 4, COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. (p. 411, Rollo.)
However, these issues have been rendered moot and academic by the COMELEC's
order of January 23, 1991 dismissing the "reinstated" appeal of the private
respondents (p. 447, Rollo), for failure to file their Appellant's Brief on December 9,
1990, the last day for filing the same, their Motion for Extension of Time to File said
Appellant's Brief having been previously denied by the COMELEC for being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1(c) of Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure, in relation to Section 9(b) Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,

The COMELEC's dismissal order reads:
Consequently, the dismissal of the herein appeal case pursuant to the
Comelec Rules of Procedure renders the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Leyte, Branch XIV dated July 17, 1990, as FINAL AND
EXECUTORY. (pp. 459-460, Rollo.)
On January 28, 1991, petitioner De la Victoria reassumed the office of Mayor of
Albuera, Leyte (p. 460, Rollo).
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition for certiorari, the same is hereby
GRANTED, with costs against private respondents. The proclamation of Sixto de la
Victoria as mayor of Albuera, Leyte, is upheld.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122197 June 26, 1998
ZOSIMO M. DIMAANDAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the Commission on
Audit dated September 7, 1995, 1 the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:
Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal cannot be given due
course. Accordingly, the disallowance in question in the total amount of
P52,908.00 is hereby affirmed. Considering that the claim for the RATA
differential in the amount of P8,400.00 is devoid of any legal basis, the
same is also disallowed. Hence, appellant Zosimo M. Dimaandal is
hereby directed to refund the salary and RATA differential in the
amount of P61,308.00 he had received from the Provincial Government
of Batangas. 2
The undisputed facts:
On November 23, 1992, petitioner Zosimo M. Dimaandal, then holding the position
of Supply Officer III, was designated Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer for
Administration by then Governor Vicente A. Mayo of Batangas. Pursuant to the

designation, petitioner filed a claim for the difference in salary and Representation
and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of Assistant Provincial Treasurer and Supply
Officer III for the whole year of 1993 in the total amount of P61,308.00.
However, the Provincial Auditor disallowed in audit P52,908.00 of the claim. What
was allowed was only the amount of P8,400.00 which corresponds to the difference
in the allowances attached to the designation and the position occupied by the
appellant. The disallowances was premised on the following reasons:
1. The provisions of Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative Code is
not applicable in the instant case as the power to fill the position of
Assistant Provincial Treasurer rests on the Secretary of Finance.
2. The designation is temporary in nature and does not amount to the
issuance of an appointment as could entitle the designee to receive
the salary of the position to which he is designated (Opinion of the
Director, Office for Legal Affairs, Civil Service Commission dated
January 25, 1994).
On August 3, 1994, Governor Mayo wrote to the Provincial Auditor requesting
reconsideration of the subject disallowance, interposing the following reasons:
1. That Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative Code is applicable
in the instant case as the same provides that the Governor General or
the officer having the power to fill-up a temporary absence or disability
in the provincial office has the power to order or authorize payment of
compensation to any government officer or employee designated or
appointed temporarily to fill the place;
2. That the budget containing an appropriation for the position of
Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration was already approved
by the Provincial Board; and
3. That Mr. Dimaandal at the time of his designation as Acting
Provincial Treasurer for Administration was no longer performing the
duties and functions of Supply Officer III.
The Provincial Auditor, however, denied the request for reconsideration. Appellant
was required to refund the amount of P52,908.00 which was disallowed.
Petitioner appealed to the respondent Commission on Audit which sustained the
stand of the Provincial Auditor of Batangas as valid and proper. The respondent
Commission was of the view that the petitioner was merely designated as an
Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration in addition to his regular duties. As

such, he is not entitled to receive an additional salary. The Commission further

opined that petitioner was likewise not entitled to receive the difference in RATA
provided for under the Local Budget Circular issued by the Department of Budget
and Management considering that the party designating him to such position is not
the "duly competent authority," provided for under Section 471 of the Local
Government Code. Notably, petitioner was appointed as Assistant Provincial
Treasurer for Administration by the Secretary of Finance only on July 8, 1994.
Thus, the respondent Commission not only affirmed the disallowance of the amount
of P52,908.00 but likewise disallowed the claim for the RATA differential in the
amount of P8,400.00, for being devoid of any legal basis. Petitioner was, therefore,
directed to refund the salary and RATA differential in the amount of P61,308.00.
Hence, this petition.
The issue here is whether or not an employee who is designated in an acting
capacity is entitled to the difference in salary between his regular position and the
higher position to which he is designated.
Petitioner avers that the respondent Commission's decision is "probably not in
accordance with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court." 3 He cites the cases of
Cui, et. al. vs. Ortiz, et. al., 4 April 29, 1960; and, Menzon vs. Petilla, May 20, 1991, 5
which laid down the rule that de facto officers are entitled to salary for services
actually rendered. Petitioner contends that he may be considered as a de facto
officer by reason of services rendered in favor of the Province of Batangas. He then
posits the view that to disallow his compensation and in the process allow the
Province of Batangas to keep and enjoy the benefits derived from his services
actually rendered would be tantamount to deprivation of property without due
process of law, and impairment of obligation of contracts duly enshrined in the
Constitution.
On the other hand, the respondent Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, maintains that decisions cited by petitioner do not find application in
petitioner's case. In the case of Menzon, what was extended was an appointment to
the vacant position of Vice-Governor. Here, what was extended to petitioner was not
appointment but a mere designation. Thus, the nature of petitioner's designation
and in the absence of authority of the Governor to authorize the payment of the
additional salary and RATA without the appropriate resolution from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan does not make the ruling on de facto officers applicable in this case.
We find the petition to be without merit.
We are not persuaded by petitioner's insistence that he could still claim the salary
and RATA differential because he actually performed the functions pertaining to the

office of Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer and, therefore, entitled to the salary
and benefits attached to it despite the fact that the Governor of Batangas had no
authority to designate him to the said position.
The law applicable is Section 471(a) of RA 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code which mandates that:
Sec. 471. Assistant Treasurers. (a) An Assistant treasurer may be
appointed by the Secretary of Finance from a list of at least three (3)
ranking eligible recommendees of the governor or mayor, subject to
civil service law, rules and regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
In fact, the appointing officer is authorized by law to order the payment of
compensation to any government officer or employee designated or appointed to fill
such vacant position, as provided under Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative
Code which states that:
Sec. 2077. Compensation for person appointed to temporary service.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of the temporary absence or disability of a provincial officer or
in case of a vacancy in a provincial office, the President of the
Philippines or officer having the power to fill such position may, in his
discretion, order the payment of compensation, or additional
compensation, to any Government officer or employee designated or
appointed temporarily to fill the place, but the total compensation paid
shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled.
Undoubtedly, the aforecited laws do not authorize the Provincial Governor to
appoint nor even designate one temporarily in cases of temporary absence or
disability or a vacancy in a provincial office. That power resides in the President of
the Philippines or the Secretary of Finance.
Necessarily, petitioner's designation as Assistant Provincial Treasurer for
Administration by Governor Mayo Being defective, confers no right on the part of
petitioner to claim the difference in the salaries and allowances attached to the
position occupied by him.
Moreover, what was extended to petitioner by Governor Mayo was merely a
designation not an appointment. The respondent Commission clearly pointed out
the difference between an appointment and designation, thus:

There is a great difference between an appointment and designation.

While an appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office,
designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually
by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an
earlier appointment (Santiago vs. COA, 199 SCRA 125).
Designation is mere imposition of new or additional duties on the
officer or employee to be performed by him in a special manner. It
does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the
person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the
position (COA Decision NO. 95-087 dated February 2, 1995). As such,
there being no appointment issued, designation does not entitle the
officer designated to receive the salary of the position. For the legal
basis of an employee's right to claim the attached thereto is a duly
issued and approved appointment to the position (Opinion dated
January 25, 1994 of the Office for Legal Affairs, Civil Service
Commission, Re: Evora, Carlos, A. Jr., Designation). 6
This Court has time and again ruled that:
Although technically not binding and controlling on the courts, the
construction given by the agency or entity charged with the
enforcement of a statute should be given great weight and respect (In
re Allen, 2 Phil. 630, 640), particularly so if such construction, as in the
case at bar, has been uniform, and consistent, and has been observed
and acted on for a long period of time (Molina vs. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167;
Madrigal vs. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 414; Philippine Sugar Central vs.
Collector of Customs, 51 Phil.
143). 7
We see no justifiable reason to sustain petitioner's argument that non-payment of
his salary differential and RATA would be a violation of his constitutional right
against deprivation of property without due process of law and the non-impairment
of obligation of contracts clause in the Constitution.
The right to the salary of an Assistant Provincial Treasurer is based on the
assumption that the appointment or designation thereof was made in accordance
with law. Considering that petitioner's designation was without color of authority,
the right to the salary or an allowance due from said office never existed. Stated
differently, in the absence of such right, there can be no violation of any
constitutional right nor an impairment of the obligation of contracts clause under
the Constitution.

The nature of petitioner's designation and the absence of authority of the Governor
to authorize the payment of the additional salary and RATA without the appropriate
resolution from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not make him a de facto officer.
A de facto officer is defined as one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. It is likewise defined as one who is in possession of
an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the
incumbent be not a mere volunteer. 8 Then a de facto officer is one who is in
possession of an office in the open exercise of its functions under color of an
election or an appointment, even though such election or appointment may be
irregular. 9
Petitioner invokes in his favor the ruling in Menzon vs. Petilla, 10 that a de facto
officer is entitled to receive the salary for services actually rendered. However, his
reliance on the Menzon case is misplaced. In Menzon, what was extended was an
appointment to the vacant position of Vice-Governor, in petitioner's case, he was
designated. The appointment of Menzon had the color of validity. This Court said:
And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the
Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint the
petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled
to compensation. There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the
Office of the Vice-Governor under a color of a known appointment. As
revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than
the alter ego of the President, The Secretary of Local Government,
after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in
the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director Res
Salvatierra. Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity.
Likewise, the doctrine in Cui, et. al. vs. Ortiz, et. al.
case. In Cui, this Court held:

11

does not apply in petitioner's

Petitioners' appointment on December 1 and 12, 1955 by the then

mayor of the municipality were legal and in order, the appointing
mayor still in possession of his right to appoint. For such appointment
to be complete, the approval of the President of the Philippines is
required. The law provides that pending approval of said appointment
by the President, the appointee may assume office and receive salary
for services actually rendered. Accordingly, therefore, in that duration
until the appointment is finally acted upon favorably or unfavorably,
the appointees may be considered as "de facto" officers and entitled to
salaries for services actually rendered.

Finally, the appointment signed by Finance Undersecretary Juanita D. Amatong is

dated July 8, 1994. Petitioner's claim that the appointment retro-acts to his
assumption of office is not confirmed by the express phraseology of the
appointment itself, which states:
Kayo ay nahirang na ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL TREASURER FOR
ADMINISTRATION na may katayuang PERMANENT sa OFFICE OF THE
PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS sa pasahod na ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY (P121,620.00) P.A.
piso. Ito ay magkakabisa sa petsa ng pagganap ng tungkulin subalit di
aaga sa petsa ng pagpirma ng puno ng tanggapan o appointing
authority. 12
The subsequent appointment of petitioner to the position on July 8, 1994, cannot
justify petitioner's retention of the excess amount of P61,308.00, which corresponds
to the amount disallowed and ordered refunded by COA representing the salary and
RATA in excess of what was due him in 1993.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,
vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public
officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other
accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision

mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to
jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50
representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently
affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion
was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting
that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same
was still vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in
view of the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of
appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th
Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier
than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city
treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had
required to be indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the
litigation, be satisfied. 1
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on
April 17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted
and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for
the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50. 2
The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the
President for further review and action. On April 15, 1986, said Office, through
Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held:
We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner
because, as borne out by the records, petitioner was convicted of the
crime for which she was accused. In line with the government's
crusade to restore absolute honesty in public service, this Office
adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v. Lising,
Crim. Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985, that acquittal, not absolute
pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement

to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries,

benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a
reappointment before he can reassume his former position. ...
Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly
provides that "a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence."
(Sec. 36, par. 2).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A.
Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of
the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to
her former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon,
she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous
conviction. 3
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition in her behalf We gave due course on October 13, 1987.
Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her
case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her
conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final
judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could
not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that final
judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach
and the status of her employment remained "suspended." More importantly, when
pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there
was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of the
crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same. 4
It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four
years, two months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten years
and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the
principal penalty. 5 Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public
office or employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. 6
Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory
penalties remain unless the same have been expressly remitted by the pardon. 7

The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties,

suspension from public office. 8
The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate
understanding of the nature of pardon and its legal consequences. This is not totally
unexpected considering that the authorities on the subject have not been wholly
consistent particularly in describing the effects of pardon.
The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of
the King's wrath. But Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has been largely
influenced by American case law.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from
the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private,
though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose
benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a
deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete
without acceptance." 8-a
At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power
was governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite.
The pertinent provision reads:
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. 9
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be
extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even
before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her
appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987
Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it
may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.
Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal
and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of
finality.
Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full
and absolute pardon in relation to the decisive question of whether or not the
plenary pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code.

In Pelobello v. Palatino, 10 We find a reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by

the courts on the various consequences of pardon: "... we adopt the broad view
expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940, that subject
to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots
out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction. ... (W)e are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the
constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the
power of the Chief Executive who, after an inquiry into the environmental facts,
should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
completely the party ... concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of
criminal conviction.
The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases, 11 and several others 12
show the unmistakable application of the doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland, 13
whose sweeping generalizations to this day continue to hold sway in our
jurisprudence despite the fact that much of its relevance has been downplayed by
later American decisions.
Consider the following broad statements:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and
the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of
the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores
him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity. 14
Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or approved. 15
The modern trend of authorities now rejects the unduly broad language of the
Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has been
made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic approach.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed
the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is
forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the
moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. 16
The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the
offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of

his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of
guilt. 17 But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is
a "new man", and "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to
ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty
of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more
dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it places no
restraints upon him following his conviction." 18
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. 19 It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." 20 This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive
declared her not guilty of the crime for which she was convicted. In the case of
State v. Hazzard, 21 we find this strong observation: "To assume that all or even a
major number of pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not
only to indict our judicial system, but requires us to assume that which we all know
to be untrue. The very act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that
wrong has been established by the most complete method known to modern
civilization. Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant
upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been
definitely fixed. 22
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to
concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment
if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the
fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is
absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been
the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such
"moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one
who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts
which, despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon,
"ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the
actor." 23

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on
the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 24 This must be constantly kept in mind lest we
lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege.
Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we
are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso
facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited
by reason of the conviction 25 although such pardon undoubtedly restores his
eligibility for appointment to that office. 26
The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to
favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken
notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be
grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from
the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by
her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner
may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post,
the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into
account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply
and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising
from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding
service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment,
loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation. 27

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary

Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140335

December 13, 2000

THELMA P. GAMINDE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAUL C.
FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is a special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set aside two
"decisions" of the Commission on Audit ruling that petitioners term of office as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11,
1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as set forth in her appointment paper.
The Facts
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P.
Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office
on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the
Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the
appointment. We quote verbatim her appointment paper:
"11 June 1993
"Madam:
"Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed, ad interim,
COMMISSIONER, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, for a term expiring February 2,
1999.
"By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of
the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of
your oath of office."1

However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the
President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 2 opined that
petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02,
1999.
Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02,
1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the
Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P.
Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the
expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion
that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as
stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent." 3
Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued
notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and
emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February
02, 1999.4
On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit
en banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision No. 99-090
dismissing petitioners appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of
the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of office may be
properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the
expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to
recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the
Office of the President.5
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the
Commission on Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99-129. 6
Hence, this petition.7
The Issue
The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11,
1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on
February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
The Courts Ruling

The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows:
"Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold
office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity." 8
The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular rotation or cycle in
the membership of the Civil Service Commission. The provision on the 1973
Constitution reads:
"x x x The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the Prime
Minister for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of the Commissioners
first appointed, one shall hold office for seven years, another for five years, and the
third for three years. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor." 9
Actually, this was a copy of the Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935
Constitution of a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman and
members of the Commission on Elections. The Constitutional amendment creating
an independent Commission on Elections provides as follows:
"Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and two other Members to be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years
and may not be reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first appointed,
one shall hold office for nine years, another for six years, and the third for three
years. The Chairman and the other Members of the Commission on Elections may
be removed from office only by impeachment in the manner provided in this
Constitution."10
In Republic vs. Imperial,11 we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires
two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first
three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy
due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only
be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term."12
Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common
date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications

of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and
three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between
the expiration of the terms.13
Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate
starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date
of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or
qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification
of the appointee must be counted against the latter. 14
In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and
"tenure." "[T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the
incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent."15
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of
office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3
year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article
IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that
uniformly prescribed a seven-year term of office for Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees terms of seven,
five and three years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to
expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to coincide
with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987).
On the other hand, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions, 1987 Constitution provides:
"SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission
on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall continue in office for one year after
the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new
term thereunder. In no case shall any Member serve longer than seven years
including service before the ratification of this Constitution." 16
What the above quoted Transitory Provisions contemplate is "tenure" not "term" of
the incumbent Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, who "shall continue in office
for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner

removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or
appointed to a new term thereunder." The term "unless" imports an exception to the
general rule.17 Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members
of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the
ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the discretion of
the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal from
office for cause; (2) their becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office, or (3) their appointment to a new term thereunder, all of which events may
occur before the end of the one year period after the effectivity of the Constitution.
However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX,
providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees
under this Constitution.
At the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the incumbent Chairman and
members of the Civil Service Commission were the following: (1) Chairperson
Celerina G. Gotladera. She was initially appointed as OIC Chairman on March 19,
1986, and appointed chairman on December 24, 1986, which she assumed on
March 13, 1987. (2) Atty. Cirilo G. Montejo. On June 25, 1986, President Corazon C.
Aquino appointed him Commissioner, without any term. He assumed office on July
9, 1986, and served until March 31, 1987, when he filed a certificate of candidacy
for the position of Congressman, 2nd District, Leyte, thereby vacating his position as
Commissioner. His tenure was automatically cut-off by the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. (3) Atty. Mario D. Yango. On January 22, 1985, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos appointed him Commissioner for a term expiring January 25, 1990. He
served until February 2, 1988, when his term ended in virtue of the transitory
provisions referred to. On May 30, 1988, President Aquino re-appointed him to a
new three-year term and served until May 31, 1991, exceeding his lawful term, but
not exceeding the maximum of seven years, including service before the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution. Under this factual milieu, it was only Commissioner Yango
who was extended a new term under the 1987 Constitution. The period consumed
between the start of the term on February 02, 1987, and his actual assumption on
May 30, 1988, due to his belated appointment, must be counted against him.
Given the foregoing common starting point, we compute the terms of the first
appointees and their successors to the Civil Service Commission under the 1987
Constitution by their respective lines, as follows:
First line : Chairman seven-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 01, 1994. On
January 30, 1988, the President nominated Ms. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas Chairman, Civil
Service Commission. On March 02, 1988, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination. She assumed office on March 04, 1988. Her term ended
on February 02, 1994. She served as de facto Chairman until March 04, 1995. On
March 05, 1995, the President appointed then Social Welfare Secretary Corazon

Alma G. de Leon, Chairman, Civil Service Commission, to a regular seven-year term.

This term must be deemed to start on February 02, 1994, immediately succeeding
her predecessor, whose term started on the common date of the terms of office of
the first appointees under the 1987 Constitution. She assumed office on March 22,
1995, for a term expiring February 02, 2001.
This is shown in her appointment paper, quoted verbatim as follows:
"March 5, 1995
"Madam:
"Pursuant to the provisions of Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2, of the
Constitution, you are hereby appointed, ad interim, CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, for a term expiring February 2, 2001.
"By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of
the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of
your oath of office.
"(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"
Second line : Commissioner Five-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 02,
1992. On January 30, 1988, the President nominated Atty. Samilo N. Barlongay
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. On February 17, 1988, the Commission on
Appointments, Congress of the Philippines, confirmed the nomination. He assumed
office on March 04, 1988. His term ended on February 02, 1992. He served as de
facto Commissioner until March 04, 1993.
On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner,
Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 1999. 18 This terminal
date is specified in her appointment paper. On September 07, 1993, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment. She accepted the
appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She is bound by the term of the
appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In this connection, the letter
dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona 19 clarifying
that her term would expire on February 02, 2000, was in error. What was submitted
to the Commission on Appointments was a nomination for a term expiring on
February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of her successor 20 must be deemed to start on
February 02, 1999, and expire on February 02, 2006.
Third line : Commissioner Three-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 02,
1990. Atty. Mario D. Yango was incumbent commissioner at the time of the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution. His extended tenure ended on February 02, 1988. In May,

1988, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed him Commissioner, Civil Service

Commission to a new three-year term thereunder. He assumed office on May 30,
1988. His term ended on February 02, 1990, but served as de facto Commissioner
until May 31, 1991. On November 26, 1991, the President nominated Atty. Ramon P.
Ereeta as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. On December 04, 1991, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination. He assumed office on
December 12, 1991, for a term expiring February 02, 1997. 21
Commendably, he voluntarily retired on February 02, 1997. On February 03, 1997,
President Fidel V. Ramos appointed Atty. Jose F. Erestain, Jr. Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 2004. He assumed office on
February 11, 1997.
Thus, we see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2) years, namely, February
02, 1994, for the first Chairman,22 February 02, 1992, for the first five-year term
Commissioner,23 and February 02, 1990, for the first three-year term
Commissioner.24 Their successors must also maintain the two year interval, namely:
February 02, 2001, for Chairman;25 February 02, 1999, for Commissioner Thelma P.
Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for Commissioner Ramon P. Ereeta, Jr.
The third batch of appointees would then be having terms of office as follows:
First line : Chairman, February 02, 2001 to February 02, 2008; Second line:
Commissioner, February 02, 1999 to February 02, 2006; 26 and, Third line:
Commissioner, February 02, 1997 to February 02, 2004, 27 thereby consistently
maintaining the two-year interval.
The line of succession, terms of office and tenure of the Chairman and members of
the Civil Service Commission may be outlined as follows: 28
Chairman Term Tenure
(7-year original)
Sto. Tomas 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to Mar. 04, 1988 to
Feb. 02, 1994 March 08, 1995
De Leon 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1994 to March 22, 1995 to
(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2001 Feb. 02, 2001
_______ - 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 2001 to

Feb. 02, 2008

2nd Member Term Tenure
(5-year original)
Barlongay 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to March 04, 1988 to
Feb. 02, 1992 March 04, 1993
Gaminde 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1992 to June 11, 1993 to
Feb. 02, 1999 Feb. 02, 2000
Valmores 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1999 to Sept. 08, 2000 to
(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2006 Feb. 02, 2006
3rd Member Term Tenure
(3-year original)
Yango - 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to May 30, 1988 to
Feb. 02, 1990 May 31, 1991
Ereeta 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1990 to Dec. 12, 1991 to
Feb. 02, 1997 Feb. 02, 1997
Erestain, Jr. 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1997 to Feb. 11, 1997 to
(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2004 Feb. 02, 2004
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by
President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However,
she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus
entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.
Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and
other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.

ACCORDINGLY, we REVERSE the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar as

they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and
her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 02, 1999,
until February 02, 2000.
This decision shall be effective immediately.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ROME JAPSON,

G.R. No. 189479

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus -

PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondent.

April 12, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1[1] dated June 8, 2009 and the Resolution 2[2]
dated September 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104865.
1
2

The CA affirmed the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), finding
petitioner Jerome Japson (Japson), former Senior Member Services Representative
assigned at the Social Security System (SSS) office in Baguio City (SSS Baguio City),
guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service, and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal. 3[3]

The antecedent facts, as found by the CSC and adopted by the CA, are as
follows:

Records show that Japson became the subject of a series of

inquiries conducted by the SSS linking him to a profiting venture
involving the processing of claims for SSS death and funeral benefits
while he was assigned at SSS Baguio City from 1997 to May 1998. The
inquiry was spurred by an affidavit dated October 6, 1999 of Mina
Balanag, who happened to assist her illiterate mother, Cat-an Paanos,
in claiming, as beneficiary, the SSS death benefits of her deceased
father, Kitos Paanos. She alleged that because she knew nothing of the
steps for processing of claims for death benefits, a village mate
referred her to spouses Boyet and Shirley Abuan [(Spouses Abuan)]
who have been frequenting their village. The [S]pouses Abuans (sic)
assured that her mother will receive the benefits in due time since
Shirley has a relative working at the SSS Baguio City who also
happened to be their neighbor at (sic) Baguio City. Later, she learned
that this neighbor-relative turned out (sic) to be Shirleys cousin Japson.
In exchange for their help, the [S]pouses Abuan demanded a
share equivalent to 10% of the SSS death benefits that will be awarded
to Balanags mother. She reposed her full trust on the Spouses Abuan
that even her mothers address in the claim form reflected that of the
Spouses Abuans home at P-2-36 Gabriela Silang Brgy., Baguio City,
although her mother really lives in Bila, Bokod, Benguet. After the
claim was approved, the SSS issued a check in the amount of
Php183,472.72. After it was cashed (sic), the spouses Abuan allegedly
received more than what was originally agreed (sic) since aside from
the P[hp]15,000.00 corresponding to their commission, they demanded
Php83,000.00 more, purportedly the asking fee of Japson and a certain
Atty. Reynaldo Rodeza, who were instrumental for the release of the
benefits. Reluctantly, they gave the amount for fear that the benefits
awarded them might be withdrawn. An affidavit dated January 26,
3

2000[ ] was executed by Balanags mother, Cat-an Paanos, to

corroborate her allegations.
On the other hand, in his affidavit dated January 27, 2000, as
well as in his testimony relative thereto, Erano F. Gaspar (Ireneo in the
Transcript of his Testimony taken on June 6, 2000 before the SSS)
alleged that he came to know Japson through Shirley Abuan after she
convinced him to transfer his claim for his fathers death benefits then
pending at SSS Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, to SSS Baguio City, intimating
that Japson, who is her cousin, could guarantee its prompt release
since he was assigned at the claims section there. A meeting with
Japson was then arranged by Shirley after which she filed the claim on
October 10, 1997. Sometime on (sic) November 1997, Japson informed
Gaspar by telephone that a check in an amount of Php74,000.00 was
already issued to him. On the same day, he went to Baguio City,
where, accompanied by Japson, he retrieved (sic) the check at the
Baguio Post Office. After opening an account at PNP (sic) Baguio and
withdrawing a sum, Japson informed him that a machine error in the
computation of his benefits resulted in an overpayment as he was
supposed to receive Php54,000.00. Gaspar handed over the excess
P[hp]20,000.00, which Japson promised to deliver personally to SSS
Baguio City. In addition, he paid Japson Php2,000.00 for the assistance
he (sic) rendered.
In response to the above complaints, the SSS conducted a series
of investigation (sic) on the official transactions of Japson and
uncovered details that raised its suspicion. First, the address of
claimants to the death benefits of deceased SSS members Kitos
Paanos, Warlito Costales and Adriano Castillo as well as the pension
form of SSS retiree Jovita Resquer bore a common address: P-2-35
Gabriela Silang Brgy., Baguio City[,] which is the address of Japson.
They found out, too, that Japson signed and acknowledged the receipt
of checks which were issued to the beneficiaries of Paanos and Castillo.
It was further disclosed that Japson committed lapses in procedure,
namely, his failure to stamp received on the claim of funeral benefits of
Costales; his having attested to the fact of death of Kitos Paanos even
though he has no personal knowledge of the same and with apparent
conflict of interest due to his assignment at the claims section; and the
discovery that by (sic) as late as February 2000, he has yet to mail a
check issued by the SSS way back on (sic) December 24, 1999. The
investigators received reports, too, that he took P[hp]17,000.00 from
the benefits awarded to one Minda Balucas.
Upon the recommendation of the investigating unit which found
prima facie case to support the complaints, the SSS, through Carlos A.
Arellano, then Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
formally charged Japson with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and placed him
under preventive suspension of ninety (90) days. After the parties
submitted their respective pleadings, the formal hearings were held on

June 6 and 7, 2000 and November 9, 2000, where Japson testified for
his defense.
In his testimony which amplified his Counter-Affidavit/Answer to
the Formal Charge, Japson who assisted claimants for death, disability
and retirement claims when he was first assigned to the (sic) SSS
Bangued[,] refuted the allegation that he took a hefty share from death
and funeral benefits awarded to beneficiaries of SSS members referred
to him by the [S]pouses Abuan or that he worked in concert with
[S]pouses Abuan to profit from the claimants. First, in response to the
allegation of Erano P. Gaspar, he recalled that his cousin, Shirley
Abuan, who also happened to be his neighbor, told him that Gaspar
was having difficulty in claiming the SSS benefits of his father when he
filed his claim at SSS Solano branch in Nueva Vizcaya. Assessing that
some documents required by [the] SSS Solano Branch are not
necessary, he brought the papers instead to SSS Baguio City in order
to speed up the processing of Gaspars claim. Eventually, a check in the
amount of Php74,000.00 was issued by the SSS after which he
accompanied Gaspar to claim the check at the Baguio City Post Office.
After Gaspar cashed (sic) the check, Japson told him matter-of-factly
that due to machine error, the SSS overpaid him by Php20,000.00,
producing a copy of the encoding sheet prepared by the Benefits
Section which showed the correct computation. Gaspar gave him the
excess amount for him to turn over to the SSS. Afterwards, they retired
to Japsons house at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City where they had a
few rounds of drinks as it was his cousins birthday. Gaspar insisted on
giving him Php2,000.00 but he refused, saying that he does not expect
any payment for his help more so as they are brothers of faith as both
belong to Iglesia ni Cristo. Instead, Gaspar just spent the sum to buy
food for their drinks. As to the Php20,000.00, Japson produced a (sic)
SSS Special bank receipt dated February 16, 2000 as proof of
remittance by Gaspar of the P[hp]20,000.00 excess amount and a
Miscellaneous Payment Return Form bearing an identical date to show
that Japson turned over the amount intact to the SSS.
With respect to the allegation that a number of applications for
benefits suspiciously bore his address even though the applicants were
not from Baguio City but in (sic) outlying provinces with SSS branches
of their own, he explained that the [S]pouses Abuan, who were
authorized by the claimants to file their application[s] and to follow-up
their claims, might have placed the wrong information since they
almost have an identical address (sic). He did not notice the error since
he was accustomed to his old address which he wrote as Lower
Hillside, Kennon Road, Baguio City. As to the case of Resquer, he
pointed out that their address in the application clearly showed P-2-45
Brgy. Gabriela Silang and not P-2-35 as claimed in the investigation
report. He also denied that he kept the Php17,000.00 from the benefits
awarded to Balucas. He insisted that the sum was only entrusted to
him for safekeeping since Balucas was afraid to carry such amount
when she traveled to Abra, showing as proof thereto a letter dated

September 15, 1999 by Balucas acknowledging that Japson already

returned the amount to her[,] coupled by a Certification dated
September 15, 1999 from Abelardo Yogyog, Branch Head of the Abra
Provincial Post Office, that the check corresponding to the benefits
awarded to Balucas was delivered to Balucas by mail at her address
[on] Harrison St., Zone 7, Bangued, Abra. Japson backed up his
counter-allegations by producing affidavits both dated February 14,
2003 executed by Balucas and Resquer clearing him of any wrongdoing
and lauding him for the invaluable assistance rendered them. 4[4]

A case for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service was filed against Japson before the SSS. On February 4, 2003,
the SSS promulgated a decision finding Japson guilty on all counts. 5[5]

The SSS said that while there was nothing wrong per se with petitioner letting
claimants use his home address for their claims, a perception of material gain is
nonetheless indubitable. It pointed out that it was highly improbable for claimants
from Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya, where there are also SSS branches, to file their
claims in Abra. The most logical conclusion, the SSS said, is that they made their
claims through the Spouses Abuan on the latters assurance that these would be
processed at the soonest possible time. Petitioner should have been wary of the
number of claims brought to him by the Spouses Abuan, the SSS said, and he
should have avoided these claims or referred them to the proper branch offices. 6[6]
The SSS held that it is not necessary to show concrete proof of receiving
consideration therefor, following the principle of res ipsa loquitur.7[7]
4
5
6
7

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated May 12,
2003. He then appealed to the CSC.

In a resolution dated August 31, 2006, the CSC affirmed the SSS decision. The
CSC underscored the link between petitioner and the Spouses Abuan, who were
suspected of being fixers in the SSS and who allegedly ran a venture where they
earned cuts or commissions from death, disability, and retirement benefits that
were awarded to the SSS beneficiaries. The CSC found that the common link to the
evidence ranged against Japson is the fact that he processed the various claims.
The CSC also found credence in the following pieces of evidence: the statements
under oath and testimonies of the principal complainants; the appearance of
petitioners address in the Death, Disability, and Retirement Forms of claimants;
petitioners attestation to the fact of death of several members, whose death
benefits he himself processed; the fact that the claimants whom petitioner assisted
were not from Baguio City; and the fact that these claimants were referred to him
by the Spouses Abuan.8[8]

The CSC held that while there is no strong evidence showing that Japson received,
collected, or took a share of the benefits awarded to the claimants, he was still
liable for the charges against him because his irregular conduct and indiscriminate
judgment relative to the handling of the claims caused a serious breach in the
integrity of the system observed by the SSS, as well as his having endangered the
welfare of the public at large.9[9]

8
9

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a resolution dated
June 23, 2008.10[10]

Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court before the CA. The CA, on June 8, 2009, promulgated a Decision denying the
petition and affirming the CSCs August 31, 2006 and June 23, 2008 resolutions. 11
[11]

The CA ruled that the CSC resolutions were anchored on substantial evidence. 12[12]
The CA held that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for
that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence and the credibility
of witnesses, and its findings may only be set aside on a showing of grave abuse of
discretion. The CA also noted that, on the face of the substantial evidence
presented against him, petitioner proffered only denials and presented himself as
sole witness during the administrative proceedings. 13[13]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated September 9, 2009.

Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court on
October 29, 2009. In a Resolution dated June 22, 2010, the Court dismissed the
10
11
12
13

petition for failure of petitioner to obey a lawful order of the Court. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution, which the Court granted, and the
petition was reinstated.

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding that he was an employee of the
SSS, and not of a private corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense
referred to in Gaspars complaint. He further argues that where there are conflicting
findings between the SSS and the CSC, the Court may make a review of the facts of
the case.14[14]

Petitioner claims that, at the time of the alleged recovery of P20,000.00 from
Gaspar, he was still employed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
Service Corporation, although he was detailed at the SSS. Thus, for that offense, the
most that the SSS could have done was to refer the matter to DBP for the proper
disciplinary action.15[15]

Petitioner emphasizes that he had no hand in filling out the forms for the claims
subject of the case.16[16] He points out that the Spouses Abuan did so. Moreover,
there is no evidence to show that he specifically authorized the Spouses Abuan or
any of the claimants involved to use his address.

14
15
16

Petitioner also highlights the CSCs finding that there was less than substantial
evidence that he financially benefited from the Spouses Abuans transactions. Thus,
he argues that the imposition of the penalty is unfounded. 17[17]

Petitioner also harps on the SSS standing file anywhere policy to counter the
allegation of irregularity in the filing of claims of non-Baguio City residents before
the SSS Baguio City branch where petitioner was assigned. 18[18] Likewise, he
contends that there was no prejudice to the SSS since all claimants turned out to be
qualified dependents/beneficiaries.19[19] He posits that since the CSC found that he
had not financially benefited from the transactions, he should not be penalized or
administratively held liable and dismissed from the service. 20[20]

In its Comment, the CSC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that the
CA correctly upheld its (CSCs) findings. The CSC maintains that petitioners irregular
conduct left the SSS vulnerable to swindlers who may use the office as an unwitting
instrument to foist their deceit on the hapless public. 21[21] It said that petitioners
irregular and indiscriminate judgment relative to the handling of claims caused a
serious breach in the integrity of the system observed by the SSS, as well as his
having endangered the welfare of the public at large.

17
18
19
20
21

As to the question of whether there was financial gain, the CSC argues that
the same is irrelevant.22[22] Petitioner is guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service whether or not he gained
from such acts, the CSC said.23[23]

The CSC also insists that petitioner was already an employee of the SSS at
the time of the commission of the offenses, since he was absorbed as a regular
employee on May 27, 1998.24[24] His failure to refer the matter to his superiors and
keeping the money in his possession even after he was already absorbed as a
regular employee of the SSS caused prejudice to the integrity of the agency, the
CSC emphasized.25[25]

The Court finds the petition bereft of merit; hence, the same is denied.

Factual findings made by quasi-judicial bodies and administrative agencies

when supported by substantial evidence are accorded great respect and even
finality by the appellate courts. 26[26] This is because administrative agencies
possess specialized knowledge and expertise in their respective fields. 27[27] As
such, their findings of fact are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of
22
23
24
25
26
27

grave abuse of discretion, or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at
arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. 28[28]

The Court notes that, although there is some variance in the conclusion arrived at
by the SSS and the CSC, their findings as to the facts of the case are the same. Both
agencies found the evidence for the complainants credible and proved that
petitioner committed the acts complained of. Moreover, the CA sustained these
factual findings. The Court finds no reason to disturb these findings, and therefore
adopts the same.

Petitioner makes much of the CSCs finding that he did not financially benefit
from the transactions. However, whether or not petitioner gained any financial
benefit is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the government did not actually lose
money through incorrect disbursement of public funds.

When an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the

punishment of such officer or employee, but the improvement of the public service
and the preservation of the publics faith and confidence in the government. 29[29]

In administrative cases, the injury sought to be remedied is not merely the

loss of public money or property. More significant are the pernicious effects of such
action on the orderly administration of government services. Acts that go against
the established rules of conduct for government personnel bring harm to the civil
service, whether they result in loss or not.
28
29

Petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct

Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of

fact relevant to ones office or connected with the performance of his duty. 30[30] It
implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness.31[31]

On the other hand, misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite

rule of action, is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. 32[32] More particularly, it is
an unlawful behavior by the public officer. 33[33] The term, however, does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. 34[34]

Petitioners acts clearly reflect his dishonesty and grave misconduct. He was less
than forthright in his dealings with the complainants. He allowed the Spouses Abuan
to use his position to make their clients believe that he could give them undue
advantage over others without the same connection by processing their claims
30
31
32
33
34

faster. Likewise, his acts imply malevolent intent, and not merely error in judgment.
He was aware of what the Spouses Abuan were doing and was complicit in the
same. At the very least, he failed to stop the illegal trade, and that constitutes
willful disregard of the laws and rules.

Taken together, all the circumstances, as found by the SSS and the CSC, show
that petitioner committed acts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

Prejudice to the service is not only through wrongful disbursement of public

funds or loss of public property. Greater damage comes with the publics perception
of corruption and incompetence in the government.

Petitioner is reminded that a public servant must exhibit at all times the
highest sense of honesty and integrity. The Constitution stresses that a public office
is a public trust and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. These constitutionally-enshrined
principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or
idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the public
service.35[35]

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.

35

SO ORDERED.

GOVERNMENT
SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in
his capacity as President and
General Manager of the
GSIS,

G.R. No. 191218

Present:

Petitioners,
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus

PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,

ARWIN T. MAYORDOMO,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ

Respondent.
Promulgated:
May 31, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and its then President
and General Manager, Winston F. Garcia (Garcia), assail and seek to modify the July
31, 2009 Decision36[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105414,37[2]
as reiterated in its February 5, 2010 Resolution 38[3] denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof for lack of merit.

The Facts:

36
37
38

Respondent Arwin T. Mayordomo (Mayordomo) was employed as Accounts

Management Specialist of the GSIS Fund Management Accounting Department
(FMAD), responsible for the preparation of financial statements, from October 2,
2000 until his dismissal on August 31, 2007.39[4]

Sometime in September 2004, Ignacio L. Liscano (Liscano), then GSIS

Information Technology Officer (ITO) III called the attention of Joseph Sta. Romana
(Sta. Romana), another ITO, about a network conflict in his personal computer. Sta.
Romana conducted a network scan to identify the source of the problem. During the
scan, he discovered that another personal computer within the GSIS computer
network was also using the internet protocol (IP) address 40[5] of Liscanos computer.
This other computer was eventually identified as the one assigned to Mayordomo
with username ATMAYORDOMO.

Sta. Romana immediately restored the correct IP address assigned to

Mayordomos personal computer. Until this restoration, Liscano was deprived of
access to the GSIS computer network and prevented from performing his work as
ITO. Mayordomo was verbally reminded that he had no authority to change his IP
address and warned that doing so would result in network problems. 41[6]

On February 9, 2005, in the course of another network scan, Sta. Romana

again encountered the username ATMAYORDOMO. This time, an IP address,
belonging to the range of the GSIS Remote Access Server (RAS), 42[7] was simulated
39
40
41
42

and used. Knowing that the RAS would provide an exclusive external trafficking
route to the GSIS computer system and realizing that Mayordomo could have gained
access to the entire GSIS network including its restricted resources, Sta. Romana
lost no time in reporting the matter to Rolando O. Tiu (Tiu), Vice-President of the
Resources Administration Office. Before the IT network personnel could take any
action, however, Mayordomo restored his assigned IP address.

The next day, the username ATMAYORDOMO appeared again in the scan, this
time using two (2) IP addresses of the RAS (143.44.6.1 and 143.44.6.2). With notice
to Tiu, Mayordomos personal computer was pulled out to have the glitches caused
by the unauthorized use of the said IP addresses fixed.

According to GSIS, [t]he unauthorized changing of IP address gave freedom to

respondent to exploit the GSIS network system and gain access to other restricted
network resources, including the internet. It also resulted to IP address network
conflict which caused unnecessary work to and pressure on ITSG personnel who had
to fix the same. Further, as a consequence, Mayordomos simulation of the RAS IP
addresses caused disruption within the GSIS mainframe on-line system affecting
both the main and branch offices of the GSIS. His actions likewise prevented
authorized outside users from accessing the GSIS network through the RAS IP
addresses he simulated.43[8]

In his Memorandum44[9] dated February 11, 2005, Tiu reported Mayordomos

acts to Esperanza R. Fallorina and Maria Corazon G. Magdurulan, 45[10] with
emphasis on the danger of changing IP addresses as a channel for virus proliferation
43
44
45

that could result to loss of critical files for all those infected and render said users
unproductive. Tiu also reported that Mayordomo changed his IP address to gain
access to the internet as shown by downloaded programs in his computer that were
not allowed or unnecessary for his work.

In his written explanation46[11] of the same date, Mayordomo admitted the

acts imputed to him and offered no excuse therefor. He nonetheless explained his
side and claimed that the IP address assigned to him could not access the network
due to a conflict with another IP address. Despite several verbal notices to the
Information Technology Services Group (ITSG), he was simply told that the conflict
would eventually disappear. The network conflict, however, persisted and resulted
in the disruption of his work constraining him to use another IP address to use an
officemates laser printer which was only accessible thru the Local Area Network
(LAN). In his desperate need to print a set of financial reports which were
considered a rush job, Mayordomo decided not to request formal assistance in
accordance with the proper procedure. He apologized and promised not to change
his IP address again, acknowledging the hazards of such careless use of the system.

On February 21, 2005, Human Resource Office Vice-President J. Fernando U.

Campana issued a memorandum47[12] strictly enjoining Mayordomo not to repeat
such actuations, and to follow standard office procedures or exercise prudent
judgment and obtain the necessary clearance before engaging in any extraordinary
measure. In the same memorandum, it was noted that Mayordomo did not heed the
46
47

earlier warning by the ITSG on the effects brought about by the changing of his IP
address to the entire network system. Further, despite absence of intent to harm
the system, his act of changing his IP address to facilitate the printing of rush
accounting reports was unsanctioned/illegal because he lacked the authority to
access the network. Thereafter, Mayordomos personal computer was returned to
him.

On May 3, 2006, or more than a year later, Mayordomo received a ShowCause Memorandum from the Investigation Department in connection with his
previous acts of changing his IP address. 48[13] In reply, Mayordomo admitted that
he changed his IP address because the one given to him by the ITSG was in conflict
with some other IP addresses. The ITSG was not able to address this problem,
prompting him to change his IP address to be able to perform his work.

In June 2006, President and General Manager Garcia issued a formal

administrative charge49[14] against Mayordomo, for Grave Misconduct and/or
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. In his July 3, 2006 Answer, 50
[15] Mayordomo admitted that he changed his IP address but he denied having
violated any policy or guideline on the subject because no policy, regulation or rule
pertaining to changing of IP address existed at the time of its commission. It was
only on November 10, 2005 when the GSIS adopted a policy against unauthorized
changing of IP addresses. Hence, he could not be held liable in view of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

48
49
50

On August 6, 2006, Mayordomo submitted his Supplemental Answer with

Manifestation,51[16] attaching affidavits of his co-workers stating that he indeed
reported the problem with his IP address but this was never fixed by the ITSG. He
also averred that he had previously used a username and password of an officemate
with the blessing and explicit approval of the latter. He then waived a formal
investigation and agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of the
evidence on record.

On March 7, 2007, the GSIS rendered its Decision 52[17] finding Mayordomo
guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal, with
forfeiture of benefits, loss of eligibility and disqualification from government service.
In said Decision, the GSIS discussed the significance of an IP address, viz:

An IP address is an identifier for a computer or device on a

TCP/IP network. Networks using the TCP/IP protocol route messages
based on the IP address of the destination. The format of an IP address
is a 32-bit numeric address written as four numbers separated by
periods. Each number can be zero to 255. For example, 1.160.10.240
could be an IP address. Within an isolated network, one can assign IP
address at random as long as each one is unique.
It is clear from the above that no two (2) PCs can have the same
IP address. And in the event where two (2) PCs end up having the
same IP address, both PCs would not be able to access the network
xxx When the respondent changed his PCs IP address to that of Mr.
Liscanos PC, both the respondent and Mr. Liscano were not able to
access the GSIS network. To the respondents bad luck, the IP address
he used was assigned to the PC of an ITSG personnel, thus, the same
was immediately investigated and his actions discovered.
xxx

51
52

On the other hand, the RAS is a server that is dedicated to

handling users who are not on a Local Area Network (LAN) but need
remote access to it. And owing to its function, no restrictions are
imposed on the IP address of the RAS. Thus, in the instances when the
respondent simulated the IP address of the RAS, he not only
jeopardized the accessibility of the GSIS network to outside users, he
also gained access to the entire GSIS network and its other resources,
including the internet, which would have otherwise been prohibited to
him. Simply put, the respondent breached the barriers that were put in
place to protect the network and its other resources from unauthorized
incursions when he simulated the RAS IP address.

xxx.

Mayordomo moved for reconsideration of the decision against him arguing

against the unfairness and severity of his dismissal. 53[18] He argued that his act of
changing his IP address was in no way a flagrant disregard of an established rule,
not only because no policy penalizing the act existed at that time he committed it,
but because his reason for doing so even redounded to the benefit of the GSIS.
Simply put, absent were the elements of corruption and the clear intent to violate a
law on his part and only the motivation to accomplish his task reigned upon his
judgment.

In its Resolution dated July 18, 2007, 54[19] GSIS denied the motion for lack of
merit. It explained that the nonexistence of a policy prohibiting the unauthorized
changing of IP addresses might relieve Mayordomo from an administrative offense
of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, his actions and its effects on
the GSIS network system fall within the ambit of grave misconduct xxx [T]he
53
54

assignment of, alteration or changing of IP addresses is vested solely on the ITSG.

Respondent not being a member of the ITSG clearly had no authority to alter his IP
address, whatever may have been his justification for doing so.

On September 14, 2007, Mayordomo filed an appeal 55[20] with the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) which dismissed it in Resolution 080713, 56[21] for failure
to comply with the indispensable requirements under Section 46 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. 57[22] On reconsideration,
however, the CSC ruled on the merits of the case and affirmed the findings of the
GSIS, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Arwin T.

Mayordomo, Accounts Management Specialist, Fund Management
Accounting Department, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 08-0713 dated April 21, 2008
STANDS.58[23]

The CSC rejected Mayordomos defense of good faith in view of the previous
verbal warnings he received. By changing the IP address of his personal computer
for the second time, after notice of its hazardous effects to the system, Mayordomo
committed an act that was inherently wrong. According to the CSC:
55
56
57
58

A perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration shows that

Mayordomo did not present new evidence which would materially
affect the subject Resolution. xxx Movant has the repetitive averments
that there was no existing company policy that prohibited GSIS
employees from changing their IP addresses, and as such, there was
no clear-cut penalty for the said offense; that by changing his IP
address, he was in good faith and meant no harm to the GSIS; that his
acts do not constitute Grave Misconduct.
To these, the Commission emphasizes that in the first place, the
act which Mayordomo committed was one that is inherently wrong.
Moreover, the express warning and prohibition given by the GSIS
officials when he was first caught changing his IP address is and
constitutes the rule that obviously made the act he committed,
prohibited.
xxx
Further, since the same act/s undoubtedly caused undue
prejudice to the government, in the sense that it exposed the GSIS
system to immense risk, movant is correctly found likewise guilty of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. But since this
second offense has a lighter penalty, such is subsumed under the more
grievous offense of Grave Misconduct, which is punishable with the
supreme administrative penalty of dismissal.59[24]

Undaunted, Mayordomo elevated the case to the CA by way of a petition for

review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Mayordomo argued that the above CSC
Resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. He reiterated his arguments before the GSIS and the CSC, as
follows: that he did not commit so grave an offense to warrant his dismissal from
service; that the GSIS miserably failed to present evidence showing illwill or bad
faith on his part; that his act of changing his IP address was not punishable because
no existing company policy was in effect at that time and, in fact, it was only nine
months after his act was complained of, when the GSIS issued a policy/guideline on
the matter; that the Memorandum issued earlier by the Vice-President of the Human
Resource Office sufficiently served as his penalty for his careless acts; and that
59

granting that he should be penalized anew, his length of service and work
performance should be considered for him to merit a lighter penalty than that of
dismissal.

On July 31, 2009, the CA partly granted the petition. 60[25] According to the
appellate court, while Mayordomo failed to exercise prudence in resorting to
changing his IP address, it could not be said that this act was characterized by a
wrongful use of station or character to procure personal benefit contrary to duty and
rights of others. GSIS failed to prove that Mayordomo acted out of a sinister motive
in resorting to such acts or in order to gain a personal benefit therefrom. The
records would only show that Mayordomo did so when he was faced with the
conflict of his own IP address with others and the urgency of his office tasks. In
meting out this penalty for Simple and not Grave Misconduct, the CA took into
consideration Mayordomos length of service in the government and his fairly clean
record prior to the incident. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision thus reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Resolution No.

080713 and Resolution No. 081524 of the Civil Service Commission are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Finding petitioner Arwin T.
Mayordomo guilty of simple misconduct this Court hereby imposes
upon him the penalty of suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day.
SO ORDERED.61[26]

On reconsideration, the CA rejected Mayordomos prayer for payment of

backwages corresponding to the period of his preventive suspension. In its
60
61

Resolution dated February 5, 2010, the CA emphasized that Mayordomo was not
completely exonerated from liability for the act complained of. The offense was
merely downgraded from grave misconduct to simple misconduct. Therefore,
Mayordomos dismissal is deemed a preventive suspension pending his appeal.
Thus, he was not entitled to the payment of backwages and other benefits during
the said period.

Hence, this recourse by the petitioners ascribing serious errors on the part of
the CA in modifying the penalty imposed on Mayordomo:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN
DOWNGRADING THE OFFENSE TO SIMPLE MISCONDUCT AS IT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT ALTERED
HIS ASSIGNED IP ADDRESS NOT ONLY ONCE BUT FOUR (4)
TIMES, DESPITE WARNING.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

ACCORDING RESPECT AND CREDIT TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
PETITIONERS AND THE CSC, WHICH WERE SUPPORTED BY
MORE THAN THE REQUIRED SUSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The petitioners contend that Mayordomo, from the outset, had full knowledge
of the nature, purpose, and importance of an IP address and the dire consequences
of changing the same. In committing computer identity and capacity theft, 62[27]
Mayordomo is guilty of Grave Misconduct, and even Dishonesty, as shown by
62

substantial evidence. Hence, the CA erred in giving credence to his assertion that
his act of changing his IP address was not attended by corruption and sinister
motive, considering that he freely chose to traverse a tortuous path of changing his
IP address, to simply print a document for his alleged rush work. While the latter
task is simply akin to the goal of reaching Tibet from Nepal, 63[28] Mayordomo took
the most difficult route, that of changing his IP address, and worse, into the most
powerful IP address in GSIS. For petitioners, Mayordomos dubious motive is shown
by his desire to get to the top, with all the privileges, advantages and practically
limitless vista of taking that topmost perch.64[29]
For his part, Mayordomo reasons out that during the time when the GSIS
FMAD was in the peak of activities, he was constrained to alter his IP address
because of the failure of the ITSG to fix a conflict which effectively disrupted his
work. He claims to have no reason to cause harm to the system and to the GSIS in
general, because in the first place, he was not informed of the hazards of changing
IP addresses. It was only by November 10, 2005, or nine months after the incident,
when the GSIS issued a policy/ guideline 65[30] on the matter.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding
of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Well-entrenched is the rule that
substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond
reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action
upon the employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the
employer, has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and
confidence demanded by his position.66[31]
63
64
65
66

In this case, the attending facts and the evidence presented, point to no
other conclusion than the administrative liability of Mayordomo. The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees 67[32] enunciates
the state policy to promote a high standard of ethics in public service, and enjoins
public officials and employees to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility,
integrity and competence. Section 4 of the Code lays down the norms of conduct
which every public official and employee shall observe in the discharge and
execution of their official duties, specifically providing that they shall at all times
respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, and public interest. Thus, any
conduct contrary to these standards would qualify as conduct unbecoming of a
government employee.68[33]
Here, Mayordomos act of having repeatedly changed his IP address without
authority, despite previous warnings, shows that he did not exercise prudence in
dealing with officework and his officemates. After the first warning he received from
the ITSG, Mayordomo should have realized that his unauthorized act brought
inconvenience, not only to a fellow employee, Liscano, but to the entire GSIS, which
was actually deprived of service from a paid employee. As if he did not understand
the repercussions of his act, he again toyed with his IP address and deliberately
ignored

the

importance

of

necessary

clearance

before

engaging

in

any

extraordinary measure. Worse, he chose the RAS and gained access to the entire
GSIS network, putting the system in a vulnerable state of security. When
Mayordomo was alerted by the hazardous effects of using an IP address other than
his, he should have realized that, a fortiori, using a RAS IP address would expose the
GSIS system into a more perilous situation.
Indeed, prudence and good sense could have saved Mayordomo from his
current tribulation, but he was unfortunately stubborn to imbibe advice of caution.
His claim that he was obliged to change his IP address due to the inaction of the
67
68

ITSG in resolving the problem with his own IP address, cannot exonerate him from
responsibility. Obviously, choosing the RAS IP address to replace his own was way
too drastic from sensible conduct expected of a government employee. Surely,
there were other available means to improve his situation of alleged hampered
performance of duties for failure to access the system due to IP conflict. Certainly,
gaining access to the exclusive external trafficking route to the GSIS computer
system was not one of them.
The Court neither loses sight of the undisputed fact that Vice-President J.
Fernando U. Campanas Memorandum stated that the ITSG discovered unauthorized
and unnecessary downloaded programs in Mayordomos personal computer when it
was pulled out. Hence, despite his insistence that exigency was his sole reason in
altering his IP address, sheer common sense and evidence to the contrary belie this.
Mayordomo likewise fails to convince the Court to adhere to his position that
the lack of official policy and guidelines at the time of commission makes the act of
unauthorized alteration of IP addresses exempt from punishment. While official
policy and guidelines apprise covered employees of offenses carrying specific
penalties, the Court may not close its eyes from the fact that actual notice of the
dangers of changing his IP address was made known to Mayordomo, right after the
first incident. The CSC was correct in holding that subsequent to the first warning,
Mayordomo was fully aware that changing his IP address without acquiescence from
the ITSG, was inherently wrong.
In the same vein, proof of the alleged damage caused by Mayordomos act to
the GSIS system and its use by the general public, is not necessary. The
inaccessibility, unnecessary interruption, and downtime to the GSIS network as may
be

experienced

by outside

users,

is obvious.

Proof

that the

public was

inconvenienced in using the GSIS website is not necessary in order to conclude that
the unauthorized changing of IP address can produce pernicious effects to the
orderly

administration

of

government

services.

It

is

well-settled

that

in

administrative cases, the injury sought to be remedied is not merely the loss of
public money or property. Acts that go against the established rules of conduct for
government personnel, [in this case, that of resorting to unauthorized and radical

solutions, without clearance from appropriate parties] bring harm to the civil
service, whether they result in loss or not. 69[34] This rule is in line with the purpose
of administrative proceedings, which is mainly to protect the public service, based
on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. 70[35]
Albeit different in degree, both the CSC and the CA agree that Mayordomo is
guilty of misconduct in office. A long line of cases has defined misconduct as a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. 71[36] Jurisprudence has
likewise firmly established that the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. 72[37]
To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.73[38] Corruption as an element
of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or employee who unlawfully or
wrongfully uses her station or character to procure some benefit for herself or for
another, at the expense of the rights of others. Nonetheless, a person charged with
grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does
not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.
Grave misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct. 74
[39]

69
70
71
72
73
74

Based on the foregoing rule, the CA designated Mayordomos offense as

Simple Misconduct, on the ground that the elements particular to Grave Misconduct
were not adequately proven by the GSIS on which the burden of proof lay. There
being no clear and convincing evidence to show that Mayordomo changed his IP
address for personal or selfish needs, the CA found that his act could not be said to
have been tainted with corruption.
The Court is inclined to disagree with the CA not only in downgrading the
offense from Grave Misconduct to Simple Misconduct, but on the nature of the
offense charged itself. The Court indeed finds Mayordomo administratively liable,
but modifies the designation of the offense and the penalty imposed by the CA.
The Court has come to a determination that the administrative offense
committed by the respondent is not misconduct. To constitute misconduct, the act
or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of
official duties.75[40] The duties of Mayordomo as a member of the GSIS FMAD surely
do not involve the modification of IP addresses. The act was considered
unauthorized, precisely because dealing with the GSIS networks IP addresses is
strictly reserved for ITSG personnel who are expectedly knowledgeable in this field.
In Manuel v. Calimag, Jr.,76[41] the Court emphatically ruled:
In order to be considered as misconduct, the act must have a
direct relation to and be connected with the performance of
his official duties amounting either to maladministration or
willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of
the office. Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by
Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in these words: "Misconduct in office
has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal
definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his
duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a
private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is
necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of
the officer x x x x It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or
malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer must have
75
76

direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official

duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office x x x More
specifically,
in Buenaventura
v.
Benedicto, an
administrative
proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance, the present
Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring to a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. [Emphasis
ours, citations excluded]

In Cabalitan v. Department of Agrarian Reform,77[42] the Court sustained the

ruling of the CSC that the offense committed by the employee in selling fake Unified
Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during office hours
was not grave misconduct, but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. In Mariano v. Roxas,78[43] the Court held that the offense committed by a
CA employee in forging some receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations,
was not misconduct but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
because her acts had no direct relation to or connection with the performance of her
official duties.
Accordingly, the complained acts of respondent Mayordomo constitute the
administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
which need not be related to or connected with the public officers official functions.
As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her
public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or
employee.79[44] Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete
description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service. Jurisprudence, however, is instructive on this
point. The Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation of public
funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice,
77
78
79

failure to safe keep public records and property, making false entries in public
documents and falsification of court orders.80[45] The Court also considered the
following acts as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, to wit: a
Judges act of brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants during a traffic
altercation; a court interpreters participation in the execution of a document
conveying complainants property which resulted in a quarrel in the latters family. 81
[46]

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service is classified as a grave

offense under Section 22(t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, with a corresponding penalty
of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense,
and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense.

As this is Mayordomos first case, he should be meted the penalty of six (6)
months and one (1) day.

As a final word, the Court makes clear that when an officer or employee is
disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of that officer or employee, but
the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith and
confidence in the government.82[47] The respondent is reminded that the
Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
80
81
82

integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are
not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as
working standards by all in the public service. 83[48]

WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 105414 affirming with modification Resolution No. 080713 and Resolution No.
081524 of the Civil Service Commission, finding the respondent guilty of simple
misconduct is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Arwin T. Mayordomo is
declared GUILTY of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and is
suspended from service for six (6) months and one (1) day.

SO ORDERED.

83