18 Second Jeopardy Be For Same Offence - Bill of Attainder

2.
THE 2nd JEOPARDY MUST BE FOR THE SAME OFFENSE

G.R. No. L-3580
March 22, 1950
CONRADO CARMELO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, respondentappellees.
Jose A. Fojas for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on December 27, 1949, with
frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with
intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a
period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same
period of time. On December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged, and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds.
Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the following day,
January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide.
The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was
denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court
from further entertaining the amended information.
Brushing aside technicalities of procedure and going into the substance of the issues raised, it may
readily be stated that amended information was rightly allowed to stand. Rule 106, section 13, 2d
paragraph, is as follows:
If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of
a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in
double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a
new one for the treason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place
the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense.
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense," according to article III,
section 1 (20) of our constitution. The rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction at
the time our Constitution was promulgated. It meant that when a person is charged with an offense and
the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded
upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the maxim of the civil law non bis in
idem, in the common law of England, and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence, and instead of
having specific origin it simply always existed. It found expression in the Spanish Law and in the
Constitution of the United States and is now embodied in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental
rights of the citizen.
It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for
the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been
construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first
information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is identity between the two offenses when
the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the
other. This so called "same-evidence test" which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by
the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is identity between two
offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. (Rule 113, sec. 9; U.S. vs. Lim Suco,
11 Phil., 484; U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., vs. Martinez, 55 Phil., 6.) In this connection, an offense may be
said to necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the
information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in
another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter (Rule
116, sec. 5.) In other words, on who has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the
same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. "As the Government
cannot be with the highest, and then go down step to step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every
dereliction included therein, neither can it begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely
the same result." (People vs. Cox, 107 Mich., 435, quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil.,
484; see also U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431 and People vs. Martinez, 55 Phil., 6, 10.)
This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the time of
the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during
the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused
was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide
against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. This is the ruling laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Philippines case of Diaz vs. U. S., 223 U. S. 442, followed by this Court
in People vs. Espino, G. R. No. 46123, 69 Phil., 471, and these two cases are similar to the instant case.
Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the fact
existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said
to be in second jeopardy if indicated for the new offense.
This is the meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by our constitution for was the one prevailing in
jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was promulgated, and no other meaning could have been intended
by our Rules of Court.
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another
offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in
existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then
inexistence, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently a
subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of things there
can be no double jeopardy under such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to
recognize the existence of a condition where such condition in reality does not exist. General terms of a
statute or regulation should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an
absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that exceptions have been intended to their
language which would avoid results of this character. (In re Allen, 2 Phil., 641.)
When the Rules of Court were drafted, there was absolutely no intention of abandoning the ruling laid
down in the Diaz case, and the proof of this is that although the said Rules were approved on December
1939, yet on January 30, 1940, this Court decided the Espino case reiterating therein the Diaz doctrine.
Had that doctrine been abandoned deliberately by the Rules of Court as being unwise, unjust or
obnoxious, logically it would have likewise been repudiated in the Espino case by reason if consistency
and as a matter of justice to the accused, who should in consequence have been acquitted instead of
being sentenced to a heavy penalty upon the basis of a doctrine that had already been found to be wrong.
There was absolutely no reason to preclude this Court from repealing the doctrine in the Espino case, for
as a mere doctrine it could be repealed at any time in the decision of any case where it is invoked, is a
clear proof that the mind of the Court, even after the approval of the Rules, was not against but in favor of
said doctrine.
For these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling laid down in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil., 260, as followed
inPeople vs. Villasis, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1), p. 268. Such ruling is not only contrary to the real
meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by the Constitution and by the Rules of Court but is also
obnoxious to the administration of justice. If, in obedience to the mandate of the law, the prosecuting
officer files an information within six hours after the accused is arrested, and the accused claiming his
constitutional right to a speedy trial is immediately arraigned, and later on new fact supervenes which,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a more serious offense, under the Tarok ruling, no
way is open by which the accused may be penalized in proportion to the enormity of his guilt.
Furthermore, such a ruling may open the way to suspicions or charges of conclusion between the
prosecuting officers and the accused, to the grave detriment of public interest and confidence in the
administration of justice, which cannot happen under the Diaz ruling.
Before closing, it is well to observe that when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an
offense, is charged with a new and greater offense under the Diaz doctrine herein reiterated, said penalty
may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.
For all the foregoing, the petition is denied, and the respondent court may proceed to the trial of the
criminal case under the amended information. Without costs.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONINE B. SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B.
SALEY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some "illegal recruiters" who would even go to
the extent of issuing forged tourist visas to aspiring overseas contract workers. These unsuspecting job
applicants are made to pay exorbitant "placement" fees for nothing really since, almost invariably, they
find themselves unable to leave for their purported country of employment or, if they are able to, soon find
themselves unceremoniously repatriated. This Court once described their plight in a local proverb as
being naghangad ng kagitna, isang salop ang nawala.[1]
In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 10,[2] appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the Revised Penal Code and
six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.
Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(1),
of the Revised Penal Code. The cases (naming the complainants and stating the amounts therein
involved) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 [3] (Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00); (2)
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 (Victoria Asil P33,000.00); (3) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 (Cherry
Pi-ay P18,000.00); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 (Corazon del Rosario P40,000.00); (5) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1428 (Arthur Juan P24,200.00); (6) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644 (Alfredo C. Arcega
P25,000.00); (7) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 (Brando B. Salbino P25,000.00); (8) Criminal Case
No. 93-CR-1647 (Mariano Damolog P25,000.00); (9) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649 (Lorenzo Belino
P25,000.00); (10) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651 (Peter Arcega P25,000.00) and (11) Criminal Case
No. 93-CR-1652 (Adeline Tiangge P18,500.00).
Except for the name of the offended party, the amount involved and the date of the commission of
the crime, the following information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 typified the other informations for
the crime of estafa:
That in or about the month of December, 1991, and sometime prior to or subsequent thereto, at
Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud ADELINE
TIANGGE y MARCOS and by means of deceit through false representations and pretenses
made by her prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS, by then and
there representing herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter for overseas employment,
when in truth and in fact she was not, thereby inducing the said ADELINE TIANGGE y
MARCOS to give and deliver to her the total amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P18,500.00), Philippine Currency, for placement abroad and after having
received it, she appropriated and misappropriated the same for her own use and benefit and
despite repeated demands made upon (her) to return the same, she refused, failed, neglected,
and still refuses, fails and neglects to comply therewith, all to the damage and prejudice of
ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to law.[4]
For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code, five separate informations
were also instituted against appellant on various dates. These cases (with the names of the
complainants) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396 (Francisco T. Labadchan); (2) Criminal Case
No. 92-CR-1413 (Cherry Pi-ay); (3) Criminal Case No. 92- CR-1416 (Victoria Asil); (4) Criminal Case No.
92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario) and (5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 (Arthur Juan). The typical
information in these indictments read:
That sometime in the month of April, 1991 and subsequent thereto at Buyagan, Municipality of
La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit one
ARTHUR JUAN for overseas employment, by then and there ably misrepresenting herself as a
duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she fully knew it to be false but by
reason of her said misrepresentations which were completely relied upon by Arthur Juan, she
was able to obtain from the latter the total amount of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P24,200.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of Arthur
Juan in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to Law.[5]
The information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale under Article
38, paragraph 1, of Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, filed on 16 April 1993, read:
That in or about the months of August and September, 1992, in the Municipality of La Trinidad,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit the following:
PETER ARCEGA, LORENZO BELINO, MARIANO DAMOLOG, FIDEL OPDAS, BRANDO B.
SALBINO, DEMBER LEON and ALFREDO C. ARCEGA for overseas employment, by then and
there misrepresenting herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact
she was not and by reason of her said misrepresentation which was completely relied upon by
the said complainants whom she recruited, either individually or as a group amounting to illegal
recruitment in large scale causing economic sabotage, she was able to obtain and received from
them the aggregate total amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P175,000.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of the foregoing
complainants in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to law.[6]
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa. The criminal cases
filed were raffled off to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet; later, however, the cases
were consolidated at the instance of the prosecution.
Parenthetically, appellant jumped bail pending trial but she was soon arrested by agents of the
Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS").
The Evidence for the Prosecution. In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
Francisco Labadchan, a 25-year-old employee in the Navy Base in Pacdal, Baguio City, was
introduced to appellant by Crispin Perez. In September 1991, the two went to the house of Conchita
Tagle at Kilometer 3, La Trinidad, Benguet, who was known to be recruiting workers for abroad. After
Labadchan had expressed interest in applying for a job in Korea, Tagle told Labadchan to
prepare P45,000.00, P30,000.00 of which was to be paid that month and the balance of P15,000.00
before his departure for abroad. Labadchan paid Tagle the amount ofP30,000.00 on 23 September
1991. Appellant, in turn, received that amount when she went to La Trinidad to "brief" him. She told
Labadchan that his flight would be on the 9 th of October 1991 and that he should have paid by then the
balance of P15,000.00 of the fees. He paid Tagle theP15,000.00 balance on 05 October 1991. When he
requested her to make a receipt, Tagle included the amount in the old receipt for the P30,000.00
previously given. Appellant handed over to Labadchan some papers to fill up and gave last-minute
instructions before she boarded a green-colored aircraft.
On 08 October 1991, Labadchan and his wife went to Manila and stayed, as so instructed by Tagle,
at the Prince Hotel near the terminal of the Dangwa bus company in Dimasalang, Manila. There, he met
other people, among them, his co-complainant Arthur Juan. In the morning of 09 October 1991,
Labadchan and the others were told to go to the airport with Tagle, where appellant was supposed to give
the travel papers including passports and plane tickets for Korea. At the airport, however, appellant told
the group that their flight had been re-scheduled for 11 October 1991. Labadchan returned to Baguio
City.
On 11 October 1991, Labadchan returned to the airport only to be told this time, however, that his
passport was still with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Appellant told her husband to accompany
Labadchan to the Foreign Affairs office. When Labadchan received the passport, he saw that while his
picture appeared on it, the passport was made out in the name of a person from Negros
Occidental. Labadchan had to imitate the signature on the passport just so he could get it. Back at the
airport, he was allowed inside the terminal but only to be later sent out because the ticket he had was one
intended for passage from Korea and not to Korea. Asserting that he and company were mere "chance
passengers," appellant sent them all home with a promise that another departure date would be set. She
also took back the show money of US$1,000.00.
Appellant would repeatedly schedule a departure date but nothing tangible came out of her
assurances. Finally, Labadchan was able to get appellant to promise that the money he had given her
would be refunded. When this promise neither materialized, Labadchan finally reported the matter to the
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"). In that office, appellant executed a promissory note stating that
she would return the amount of P46,500.00, which included the amount of P1,500.00 allegedly used for
getting a passport, to Labadchan.[7]
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416

Victoria Asil, a 40-year-old housewife from Imelda Village, Roxas Street, Baguio City, heard from her
elder sister, Feling Derecto, that appellant was recruiting workers for abroad. During the second week of
January 1992, she, along with her husband Gabriel, went to appellants house in Buyagan, La
Trinidad. Appellant assured her that she could have a job in a factory in Korea. Appellant asked for an
advance fee of P25,000.00 of the P40,000.00 agreed fee. Victoria gave appellant the "advance fee" on
13 January 1992 at her (Victorias) shop in Shoppers Lane, Baguio City which appellant acknowledged
by issuing a receipt for the amount. She told Victoria to be at appellant's house in Buyagan after three
weeks.
When Victoria went to appellants house as so directed, appellant told her that her flight had been
postponed supposedly because prior applicants had to be accommodated first. Victoria met appellant
seven more times only to be ultimately told that the latter had been allegedly fooled by the main office
in Manila. Appellant, nevertheless, demanded an additional P5,000.00 from Victoria so that she could
leave on 18 April 1992. Victoria gave appellant the amount ofP5,000.00 at her shop on 31 March 1992
for which appellant gave a corresponding receipt.
When on 18 April 1992 still nothing happened, Victoria demanded from appellant a
refund. Appellant gave her an advance of P15,000.00. An acknowledgment receipt with appellants
signature affixed thereon would evidence that payment. Appellant, however, failed to return the rest of
the promised refund.[8]

Cherry Pi-ay, a 26-year-old nursing student from Acop, Tublay, Benguet, was visited once in March
1991 by appellant who encouraged Cherry to apply for work in a textile or a plastic factory in Korea with a
monthly salary of US$800.00. Appellant told Cherry that the moment she would pay the amount
of P45,000.00, she could be deployed in Korea. Cherry prepared her bio-data and gave it to appellant at
the latter's residence during the first week of April 1991.
Cherry was able to leave the country on 04 July 1991 after having paid the total amount
ofP45,000.00. Appellant told her that a certain Ramil would meet her at the airport in Korea. When she
arrived, a Filipina, named Marlyn, instead met her. Marlyn introduced herself as appellants friend and
accompanied Cherry to a certain house owned by a Korean. There, Cherry met, among other
compatriots, Corazon del Rosario and Jane Kipas. Cherry soon realized that she was not going to have a
job in the factory promised by appellant. Instead, she was made to work for the Korean applying rugby on
and folding leather jackets. About a month later, men from the Korean Immigration accosted her and the
others. Brought in for questioning by Immigration officials, Cherry and her companions were informed
that they were illegal workers. After the investigation, Cherry and her group were allowed to go but on 08
August 1991, all were deported.
Back to the Philippines, the deportees were assured by appellant that they would get a refund of
their money. Cherry executed a sworn statement narrating her experience in Korea. [9]
Ayson Acbaya-an, Cherrys "boyfriend" who later was to become her husband, corroborated Cherrys
testimony that appellant first received P18,000.00 from Cherry. Thereafter, appellant also
received P27,000.00 from Cherry, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) of which amount came from
him. In both instances, appellant signed receipts for the payments. The receipts were among Cherry's
papers confiscated in Korea.[10]

Corazon del Rosario, a 34-year-old housemaid from 48 Happy Homes, Baguio City, had known
appellant, an acquaintance, since 1980. One day in December 1990, she happened to chance upon
appellant at a PLDT telephone booth in Kilometer 4, La Trinidad, Baguio City. Appellant, representing
herself to be an authorized recruiter, tried to persuade Corazon to work abroad. Corazon showed
interest. From then on, appellant would visit Corazon in her brothers house in Kilometer 4. Ultimately,
appellant was able to convince Corazon that, for a fee ofP40,000.00, she could be sent to
Korea. Corazon gave appellant the amount of P15,000.00. She paid the balance of P25,000.00 in May
1991. The payments were both made in the presence of Cherry Pi-ay and Jane Kipas. Appellant issued
the corresponding receipts for these amounts.
Corazon took the flight for Korea on 28 June 1991. Appellant had instructed Corazon, upon landing
in Korea, to call up a certain Ramil. At the airport, Corazon, including her companions among them Jane
Kipas, kept on dialing the number but each time only a Korean woman would answer the call. Later, that
evening, a certain Marlyn, who introduced herself as appellants friend, took them to a hotel. There,
Marlyn took their show money of US$1,000.00. The group stayed overnight in the hotel and the
following morning, a Korean took them to a house proximately two hours away by car from the
airport. For about a month, they did nothing but apply rugby on leather jackets, for which they were not
paid, until a policeman arrived and took all ten of them to the airport. All that the immigration and airport
personnel would tell them was that they should be thankful they were only being repatriated
home. Immigration and airport authorities confiscated everything that they had.
At home, appellant promised to return Corazons money. Not having received the promised refund,
Corazon went to the CIS stationed at Camp Dangwa where, on 28 July 1992, she executed her sworn
statement.[11]
Avelina Velasco Samidan, a friend of Corazon and in whose house the latter would stay whenever
she was in Baguio, corroborated the testimony of Corazon that she gave to appellant the amount
of P15,000.00, ten thousand pesos of which amount Corazon borrowed from Avelina, and that some time
in April 1991, Corazon withdrew P25,000.00 from the bank which she likewise paid to appellant. [12]

Arthur Juan, a 30-year-old farmer from Dumulpot, Tublay, Benguet, first met appellant in her house
at Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet, when he, together with Maxima Gomez, Tirso Gomez and Francisco
Labadchan, went to see appellant who was said to be recruiting workers for Korea. Juan promptly
submitted his bio-data form after being told that he could work in a factory in Korea at US$400.00 a
month. Appellant quoted a processing fee of P40,000.00. Juan initially paid the amount of P6,500.00 in
April 1991. On 09 October 1991, the scheduled date of the flight, Juan went to the airport and gave
appellant another P15,000.00; the final balance of the fees were, by their agreement, to be remitted to
appellant on a salary deduction basis. Appellant then told Juan that he could not leave on that day (09
October 1991) because the airplane was already full. Appellant took back Juans passport, telling Juan
that he should be able to depart in a few days. Appellant, however, kept on rescheduling the flight for
about five more times until it became clear to Juan that he had been deceived. Juan paid out a total
amount of P24,200.00, including the US$100.00 that would have been his pocket money, to
appellant. The latter executed receipts for the amounts.
Juan executed a sworn statement narrating the unfortunate incident. [13]
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
Adeline Tiangge, a 43-year-old housekeeper from Bangao, Buguias, Benguet, learned that appellant
was recruiting workers for abroad. Adeline, accompanied by her sister, went to see appellant at her
house in Buyagan some time in December 1991. There were others, like her, who also went to see
appellant. When she produced the required identification pictures andP1,500.00 for passport processing,
appellant told Adeline that she could be a factory worker in Korea with a monthly salary of
US$350.00. Appellant agreed to be paid by Adeline the additionalP35,000.00 balance by
installment. The first installment of P17,000.00 was paid on 15 February 1992, evidenced by a receipt
signed by Antonine Saley, with the remaining P18,000.00 being payable before getting on her flight for
abroad.
Adeline waited in Baguio City for word on her departure. Adeline, together with some other
applicants, thrice went to appellants office at the Shoppers Lane to check. She also went to
Dimasalang, Manila, in front of the Dangwa terminal, for a like purpose. Appellant informed her that she
just had to wait for her flight. Adeline, exasperated, finally demanded a refund of the amount she had
paid but appellant merely gave her P100.00 for her fare back to Benguet.[14]
-0The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large
scale had been submitted to likewise constitute the evidence to establish the People's case, respectively,
in -
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644

Alfredo Arcega, a 42-year-old hotel employee from 16 Q.M. Subdivision, Baguio City, heard from a
former co-worker, Fidel Opdas, that appellant was recruiting workers for overseas
employment. Interested, he, in the company of his nephew, Peter Arcega, went to appellants house in
Buyagan, La Trinidad. There, he met job applicants Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog and Brando
Salbino. Appellant assured the group that they could get employed in Taiwan for a monthly salary
of P12,000.00 to P15,000.00. She told them that the processing and placement fees would amount
to P40,000.00 each. Arcega and his companions agreed.
On 17 August 1992, Arcega paid appellant P10,000.00 in Dimasalang, Manila. Appellant issued a
cash voucher for the amount. She told Arcega to just wait for the results. On 30 September 1992,
appellant asked Arcega for another P15,000.00 which amount he paid. With him at the time were his
nephew Peter Arcega, as well as Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog, Lorenzo Belino and Brando
Salbino. Appellant issued a receipt and affixed thereon her signature. Appellant told Arcega that with the
payment, his employment abroad was assured. She stressed, however, that the balance of P15,000.00
should be paid before his departure for Taiwan. After following up the matter with appellant in October
1992 and then in December 1992, he finally gave up. Arcega went to the POEA office in Magsaysay
Avenue, Baguio City, and when he learned that appellant had pending cases for illegal recruitment, he
also filed his own complaint and executed an affidavit before Atty. Justinian Licnachan. [15]

Brando Salbino, a 36-year-old resident of East Quirino Hill, Baguio City, used to be a "forester" of
the DENR. In July 1992, he met appellant at her Buyagan residence after his brother-in-law, Fidel Opdas,
had said that she was recruiting workers for abroad. Appellant told him that she could help him get
employed in Taiwan with a P12,000.00 monthly salary. Salbino submitted various documents required by
appellant. On 11 August 1992, Salbino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang
"temporary office" so that, according to her, his travel papers could be processed. The payment was
receipted. On 30 September 1992, he paid her another P15,000.00, for which appellant again issued an
acknowledgment receipt.
Appellant told Salbino to merely wait in Baguio City. When she failed to show up, he went to
appellants house in Buyagan to verify. She was not there. The following week, he went to Manila with
Fidel Opdas hoping to see her. Appellant's whereabouts could not be determined. Having failed to locate
her, Salbino and his companions went to the POEA office in Magsaysay, Baguio City. It was at the POEA
office that they were to learn that appellant was not in the list of licensed recruiters. He, along with the
others, then executed an affidavit-complaint before Atty. Licnachan. [16]

Mariano Damolog, a 33 year-old farmer from 26 P. Burgos Street, Baguio City, went to appellants
residence in Buyagan in July 1992 when informed by Fidel Opdas, his co-worker at the MIDO Restaurant,
that appellant was recruiting workers for Taiwan. Appellant herself later told Damolog that she was
licensed to recruit workers. He forthwith applied for a position at a factory in Taiwan with a salary of
between US$400.00 and US$500.00 a month. He, after being required to pay a processing fee, paid the
amount of P10,000.00 to appellant at her Manila office. Appellant gave him a cash voucher. Damolog
was then supposed to just wait in Baguio City for a telegram.
When he did not receive word from appellant, Damolog went to Manila to see what had happened to
his application. Appellant was again told to simply stand by in Baguio City. After several days, Opdas,
who had meanwhile gone to Manila, told Damolog to see appellant in Manila. In Manila, appellant told
Damolog to sign a bio-data form for screening purposes. Like Peter Arcega, Fred Arcega, Brando
Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, he was also asked to pay another P15,000.00. The group went back to
Baguio City to raise the amount of P15,000.00 each. On 30 September 1992, he, together with Fred and
Peter Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, returned to Manila. Damolog handed over
his P15,000.00 to appellant who issued an acknowledgment receipt, signed by Annie Saley which,
according to appellant, was her name. Appellant assured him that he would be among the first to go to
Taiwan by December 1992.
December 1992 came but no word was received prompting Damolog and his companions to repair
to appellants house in Buyagan. She was not home. Damolog proceeded to Manila where appellant told
him to wait a few more days. When still nothing happened, Damolog and his companions went to the
POEA office where Atty. Licnachan issued a certification stating that appellant was not authorized to
recruit workers. Damolog and his companions filed a joint affidavit-complaint executed before Atty.
Licnachan[17] against appellant.

Lorenzo Belino, a 37-year-old farmer from Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet, was in Manila in August
1992 looking for employment. Fidel Opdas, a companion in his trip to Manila, mentioned that perhaps
appellant could help. Belino saw appellant who then told him about the prospect of getting employed in
Taiwan. Appellant invited him to see her on 20 September 1992 in Buyagan.
On the appointed date, Belino found Mariano Damolog, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert
Leon, Alfredo Arcega and Peter Arcega already in appellants residence in Buyagan. Appellant
asked P10,000.00 from each of them if they wanted her to be responsible for representing them to get
themselves employed in Taiwan with a monthly income of P15,000.00. When the group agreed, appellant
made them fill up and sign a bio-data form. Appellant also made them understand that they would each
have to pay her the total amount of P40,000.00,P10,000.00 of which was to be forthwith paid and the
balance to be paid as and when everything would have been arranged for their flight to Taiwan.
On 23 September 1992, Belino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang
office. Appellant issued a cash voucher therefor. Belino returned to Baguio City. Five days later, Belino
went down to Manila after appellant had sent word that he had to come to Manila. On 30 September
1992, Belino paid in Manila the amount of P15,000.00 demanded by appellant. Appellant signed her
name as Annie Saley on the receipt. Appellant informed Belino that he should wait for her telephone
call regarding the schedule of his flight. He waited but when no calls came, Belino and Opdas decided to
visit appellant in her house in Buyagan. Appellant asked to be given until January to deploy them in
Taiwan. February 1993 came, and still there was no news from appellant. In March 1993, Belino and
others, namely, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega, [18] decided to file a
complaint against appellant with the POEA in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, where their sworn
statements were taken.

Peter Arcega, a 27-year-old cashier from 317 Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, also paid the amount
of P10,000.00 to appellant for a promised job overseas. A cash voucher was signed by appellant to
acknowledge the payment. Peter, subsequently, also paid the amount of P15,000.00 to appellant for
which the latter issued a receipt signed by Annie Saley. He was among those who signed the affidavitcomplaint before the POEA.
Testifying in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645,[19] as a corroborative witness, Dembert Leon, a 25year-old unemployed from 52-F Tandang Sora Street, Baguio City, said that he, desiring to get an
employment abroad, likewise went to see appellant at her residence in Buyagan. Accompanied by Fidel
Opdas, Leon was told by appellant to complete the necessary papers, including his biodata, barangay clearance, ID and NBI clearance. Leon applied to be a factory worker in Taiwan. He was
assured a monthly salary of P12,000.00, but first, appellant told him, he should commit to pay a
placement fee of P40,000.00 of which amount P10,000.00 had to be paid forthwith. Leon paid and a cash
voucher, dated 08 September 1992, was issued by appellant. On 30 September 1992, he paid appellant
another P15,000.00 for which another acknowledgment receipt was issued. The remaining P15,000.00
was agreed to be paid at the airport before his flight to Taiwan. No further word came from
appellant. Finally, in December 1992, when he and the others called her up, appellant informed them to
wait until January 1993. January came and still nothing happened. In March 1993, Leon and the others
went to the POEA office to lodge a complaint against appellant. [20]
Jose B. Matias, an Attorney II at the POEA Regional Station Unit in Baguio City, received a request
for verification on whether or not appellant was a licensed recruiter. In response, he advised that
appellant was not authorized to recruit in the City of Baguio and in the region from 1989 to the present.
Atty. Matias issued a certification to that effect.
-0-
The Case for the Defense. The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the complainants in applying for
overseas employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and from which she derived a commission.
[21]
According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the liaison officer of the Friendship
Recruitment Agency from 1983 to 1986. In that capacity, she would submit to the POEA contracts for
processing job orders for applicants and assist applicants prior to their departure at the airport. When
the licensed agency closed in 1986, she went to Baguio where she engaged in the purchase and sale of
vegetables and flowers. Even then, however, she would not hesitate extending help to applicants for
overseas employment by recommending licensed agencies which could assist said applicants in going
abroad. She named the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings International as such licensed
agencies. She had, in the process, been able to help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay, Corazon del Rosario,
Arthur Juan and Francisco Labadchan to name some, sent abroad. [22]
Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry went to see her again, this time asking
for assistance in getting an employment in Korea. She accompanied Cherry to the Dynasty Travel and
Tours in Manila that enabled her to get a tourist visa to Korea. Appellant herself later gave Cherry her
tourist visa. For Cherrys visa and plane ticket, appellant received from Cherry P15,000.00 and
US$250.00. Appellant issued a receipt therefor and delivered the amounts to the Dynasty Travel and
Tours which, in turn, issued her a receipt. The CIS men who arrested her in Manila confiscated that
receipt. In August 1991, Cherry came back and asked her to look for another travel agency saying she did
not like the work she had in Korea.[23]
Norma Bao-idang, a former client of the Friendship Recruitment Agency, introduced Corazon del
Rosario to appellant. Since the agency had already been closed, appellant referred Corazon to Mannings
International in Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila. Corazon was able to leave for Abu Dhabi where she worked
as a domestic helper. In 1991, Corazon again sought appellant's assistance in getting an employment in
Korea. Appellant introduced her to Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, helped Corazon get a
tourist visa for Korea. She did ask for P15,000.00 and US$250.00 from Corazon but these amounts,
being for Corazons ticket and hotel accommodation, were turned over to Dynasty Travel and Tours. She
also knew that Corazon was able to leave for Korea because she herself handed over to Corazon her
tourist visa and ticket. Appellant received P2,000.00 from Dynasty Travel and Tours by way of
commission. She was also issued a receipt by that travel agency showing that she had turned over to it
the amounts received from Corazon but the CIS men took the receipts and other documents from her.
When Corazon returned home in 1991 after going to Korea, she again sought appellants help in looking
for a travel agency that could assist her in going back to that country.[24]
Appellant came to know Arthur Juan through a vegetable vendor named Maxima Gomez. He asked
her for help in securing a tourist visa. Appellant was able to assist him and others, like Francisco
Labadchan, Tirso Gomez and Romeo Balao, by referring them to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant
asked from them the amounts of P15,000.00 and US$250.00 which she turned over to the travel agency.
Again, she was issued a receipt by that agency but that, too, was confiscated by the CIS agents who
arrested her. Of the men who sought her help in going abroad, seven "were able to leave. The others
had been re-scheduled to leave but they failed to arrive at the airport.
Labadchan and Juan met appellant during the first week of January 1993. She gave them back the
plane ticket and the amount of US$250.00 so that they could ask for a refund from the travel agency. The
next time she saw Labadchan was at the NBI office when NBI Director Limmayog invited her for
questioning. Appellant tried her best to look for a job for Labadchan but the transaction she had with Fast
International failed to push through.[25]
Appellant helped Victoria Asil secure a tourist visa. The latters sister was a former client at the
Friendship Recruitment Agency who was able to work in Saudi Arabia in 1985. She introduced Victoria to
the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked Victoria to advanceP15,000.00 and US$250.00 for her
ticket and hotel accommodation. Victoria gave appellant the amount, and the latter issued corresponding
receipts. She turned over the amount to the travel agency which, in turn, issued a receipt to
appellant. The CIS, however, confiscated all the documents in her attache case.[26] Appellant was able to
process Victorias visa for Korea but when someone informed the latter that she could have a visa for
Taiwan, Victoria opted to change her destination. Appellant told Victoria that her visa and ticket for Korea
had already been obtained but Victoria insisted on a refund of her money. Appellant returned to
herP15,000.00 that was supposed to be the amount to be exchanged into dollars for her show money.
Victoria issued a receipt for the amount but appellant entrusted it to her former lawyer. Appellant handed
over the plane ticket to Victoria.[27]
Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to Adeline Tiangge. When Adeline said that she
was interested in securing a tourist visa for Korea, appellant took her to the Dynasty Travel and Tours.
Appellant asked from Adeline the amount of P17,000.00 for her plane ticket. Appellant was able to buy a
plane ticket and to get a passport for Adeline. The latter, however, later said that she was no longer
interested in going to Korea and that her passport application should, instead, be diverted to Hongkong.
In fact, Adeline was able to leave for Hongkong. Adeline filed a case against appellant because when
Adeline sought a refund from Dynasty Travel and Tours, the agency only gave her P5,000.00 or just a half
of the P10,000.00 she wanted.[28]
Fidel Opdas was appellants client at the Friendship Agency who was able to leave for Saudi Arabia.
He asked her if she could find a job for him in Taiwan. When appellant told him that she knew someone
who could help, Opdas brought along Mariano Damolog. Appellant introduced them to Marites Tapia and
Carol Cornelio of Dynasty Travel and Tours who told Opdas and Damolog to submit the necessary
documents for their application for work in Taiwan. In May 1993, Opdas returned with Brando Salbino who
also talked to Marites and Carol. Opdas submitted to appellant the documents required by Marites and
Carol. Appellant, in turn, gave the papers to Marites and Carol. When, later, Opdas went to see
appellant, he brought along Dembert Leon and Lorenzo Belino. Appellant requested Opdas to
accompany the two to Marites and Carol with whom they discussed what would be necessary "for their
application for Taiwan. Still later when Opdas came back with Peter and Alfredo Arcega to see appellant,
she again referred them to Marites and Carol. The job applicants each gave appellant P10,000.00 which
the latter turned over to Marites and Carol. The two gave her receipts but these were in the
sameattache case that was seized by the CIS agents and never returned. The group subsequently
withdrew their applications although it was only Opdas who received a P15,000.00 refund.[29]
In a bid to prove that CIS agents indeed took away her attache case containing documents that
could bail her out of the charges, appellant presented Danilo A. Deladia, one of the three policemen who
arrested her. Equipped with a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Luis Dictado of Branch 8, the policemen
went to the house of appellants cousin at 2320-B San Antonio, Sampaloc, Manila at 3:00 p.m. of 25
August 1993. According to Deladia, however, they did not get anything from appellant because their
mission was only to arrest her. At the counter intelligence branch of the CIS, he did not even hear
appellant requesting for the return of a brief case. [30] Apparently because of what had turned out to be
Deladias adverse testimony, the defense presented George Santiago who claimed to be at the boarding
house when appellant was arrested. Santiago said that he had allowed the CIS agents to enter the
boarding house. Santiago did not see what might have happened in appellant's room but what he did see
was that when the agents all came out, they had with them an attache case. Santiago, accompanied by
his cousin Atty. Lomboan, went to the CIS in Camp Crame where one of the men askedP50,000.00 for
the release of appellant. Santiago did not see any brief case in the office but one of the men told them
that they would "produce" appellant and the attache case if they could "produce" the amount
of P50,000.00.[31]
On cross-examination, however, Santiago admitted that the P50,000.00 was meant for bonding
purposes and that they did not make a formal request for the release of the brief case. [32]
The defense next attempted to shift, albeit unsuccessfully, the responsibility for the crime from
appellant to Maritess and Carol. Presented at the witness stand was Oscar Gaoyen, a 30-year-old
farmer, who testified that appellant had failed to assist him in going to Korea to work because it was
difficult. While following up his application in Manila, he met Marites and Carol in front of the Dangwa
station in Dimasalang and he was told that they knew someone who could "transfer his application to
Taiwan." He said that even after he had paid appellant P50,000.00, nothing happened constraining him
to file charges against her. Appellant returned P15,000.00 of the money to him.[33]
Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its decision, a Motion to Reopen Trial with an
urgent motion to defer promulgation on the ground of newly discovered evidence. [34] In its order of 03
March 1995, the trial court, noting that the newly discovered evidence consisted of affidavits of
desistance of seven complainants, found no merit in the motion. It held that presentation of the same
does not give valid ground for possible amendment of the decision as the private complainants had
already testified. It agreed with the prosecutor that the affidavits of desistance only (had) the effect of
satisfying the civil liability.[35]
The Judgment of the Trial Court. On 03 March 1995, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged. It found implausible appellants claim that she was merely an agent of
Dynasty Travel and Tours and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If what she claimed were true, said
the court, appellant could have presented her principals; instead, that failure exposed her to the adverse
inference and legal presumption that evidence suppressed would be adverse if produced. It also found
hard to believe, the "self-serving" claim of appellant that her brief case, supposedly containing receipts
of her remittances to the travel agencies, was confiscated by the CIS and remained unaccounted for. The
trial court concluded:
In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit false, that she had the ability to send the
complainants abroad for work deployment, thereby employing false pretenses to defraud them.
This was despite her knowing very well that she was not legally authorized. The complainants
willingly parted with their money in the hope of overseas employment deceitfully promised them
by the accused. What makes matters worse is that these amounts given to the accused come
from hard-earned money, or worse, could have been borrowed from money lenders who have no
qualms about collecting usurious interest rates. Complainants who faithfully relied on the
accused did not hesitate to painstakingly raise or even beg or borrow money just so they could
give a decent future to their families even to the extent of leaving them for far-off lands. But now,
all their dreams are gone, their hopes shattered. Some may not have even been able to pay
back what they borrowed nor recoup their losses. Now, more than ever, their future appears
bleaker. But this time, a glimmering light appears at the end of the tunnel as the Court steps in to
lay down the iron fist of the law so as to serve the accused a lesson, a bitter one, with the hope
that those who are trekking or those who are about to trek the same pilfered path that the
accused took will reconsider their pursuits before it would be too late, and in the end, this form of
fraud which invariably victimizes the poor will forever be stopped. [36]
All given, the trial court then decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in all the above-mentioned cases, the Court finds accused Antonine B. Saley,
also known as Annie B. Saley, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the corresponding crime as
charged in the informations and hereby sentences her in each case, except in Criminal Case
NO. 93-CR-1645 where an indeterminate sentence is not applicable, to suffer an indeterminate
sentence for the duration hereunder given, and to pay the costs, as well as the damages due the
private complainants, to wit:
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to
pay Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
"Imprisonment from Three (3) Years, Six (6) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Seven (7) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1)
Day ofprision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.
pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual
damages, plus costs.

ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral
pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
pay Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Seven (7) Months and Eleven (11) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
ofprision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for moral
pay the costs.
ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay the costs.
ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo C. Arcega P25,000.00 for actual
"To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. She shall also pay Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each to Peter
Arcega, Lorenzo Belino, Mariano Damolog, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo
Arcega for actual damages, plus costs.
ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando B. Salbino P25,000.00 for actual
ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog P25,000.00 for actual
ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino P25,000.00 for actual
ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega P25,000.00 for actual
ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge y Marcos P17,000.00
for actual damages, plus costs.
"With respect to accused Conchita Tagle in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-CR-1396 and 92-CR-1397,
let these cases be sent to the files without prejudice to their revival as soon as she shall have
been arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.
"In order that Conchita Tagle may not escape the clutches of the law, let Alias Warrants of Arrest
issue addressed to the PNP Chief of Police, La Trinidad, Benguet and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Manila and in Baguio City. Further, the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID), Manila is ordered to include her name in the its Hold-Departure List.
"SO ORDERED.[37]
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that the trial court had erred in
giving credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty of the crimes
charged despite the "failure" of the prosecution to fully establish the elements of the crimes beyond
reasonable doubt.[38] Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court, on 03 April 1995, denied a
reconsideration of its decision.[39] The following day, appellant filed a notice of appeal. [40] The trial court
gave due course to the appeal on 17 April 1995.[41]
The Instant Appeal. -
Appellant continues to profess before this Court her innocence of the accusation. She reiterates her
assertion that the trial court has erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses
and in finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the various offenses she has been charged with by
the prosecution.[42] She avers that her transactions with the complainants have been limited to her
assisting them secure their respective travel visaspecifically for tourist and that her assistance to them
(has been) only to refer them to travel agencies such as the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings
International. She insists that she has remitted the amounts solicited from the complainants to the travel
agencies, or to Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio, earning only the commissions for bringing in clients
interested in getting tourist visas.[43]
At the outset, it might be explained that this appeal involves the conviction of appellant not only for
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale for which the penalty of life imprisonment is imposed but also
for other offenses for which lesser penalties have been meted by the trial court upon appellant. This
Court has appellate jurisdiction over ordinary appeals in criminal cases directly from the Regional Trial
Courts when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.[44] The Rules of Court, allows,
however, the appeal of criminal cases involving penalties lower than reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment under the circumstances stated in Section 3, Rule 122, of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Thus (c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment,
or where a lesser penalty is imposed but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or
arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death or life imprisonment is imposed shall be by filing a notice of appeal in
accordance with paragraph (a) of this Section.
In giving due course to the notice of appeal filed by appellant, the trial court has directed that the entire
records of the seventeen cases should be forwarded to this Court. [45] It might be observed that this
appeal, which has been assigned only one docket number, involves cases, although spawned under
different circumstances could be said to somehow be linked to the incident giving rise to the case for
illegal recruitment in large scale. The cases have thus been correctly consolidated and heard jointly
below. The appeal made directly to this Court of the seventeen cases, each of which incidentally should
have been assigned a separate docket number in this Court, is properly taken.
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment activity undertaken by nonlicensees or non-holders of authority. Recruitment is defined by Article 13, paragraph (b), of the same
Code as referring x x x to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:
1)
That the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
2)
That the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment
and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34.[46]
Any person who commits the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code shall be liable
under Article 38(a) thereof.[47] The proviso in Article 13(b) lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is
collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the
individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement.[48] The article also provides that recruitment includes the act of referral or the act of passing
along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for
employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau. [49]
The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed, violated the law against illegal
recruitment.
The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that appellant did represent herself as
being in a position to get for the aspiring overseas contract workers good-paying jobs abroad. Appellant
was thus able to demand and receive various amounts from the applicants. The latter would then be
briefed by appellant on the requirements for employment overseas. Appellant herself testified, thus:
Q From 1986 when separated from Friendship Recruitment Agency and before you were put to jail
did you have any occupation?
"A
Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to Manila for resale.
"Q
Aside from buying and selling vegetables down in Manila did you have any other source of
income?
"A
Sometimes I helped some applicants who are interested to go abroad and asked if I know some
agencies who can assist them to go abroad.
"Q
Were you able to assist some people to look for an agency to assist them to go abroad?
"A
Yes, sir.
"Q
Were you being paid when you assist these people applying for overseas employment?
"A
Yes, sir.
"Q
By whom?
"A
The travel agencies give me some amount of commission.
"Q
What are the names of these agencies which you know?
"A
Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International.
"x x x
xxx
x x x.
"Q
Do you know also if this Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International is duly licensed
by the government to recruit applicants abroad?
"A
Yes, sir.
"Q
Do you have any document to prove that it is registered?
"A
Yes, sir.
"Q
Where is that?
"A
Mannings International is a licensed agency and Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue
tickets for applicants to go abroad.
"Q
You said that Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets for applicants going abroad
what do you mean by applicants going abroad?
"A
Those applicants to work as a contract worker and who are ready to leave for abroad and they
are being issued tickets.
"Q
Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas worker-applicants?
"A
Yes, sir.
"Q
Do you remember some of them?
"A
Cherry Piay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan, Francisco Labadchan and others.
(Underscoring supplied.)[50]
Appellant at one point claimed that she had helped complainants only in acquiring for them plane tickets
and tourist visas. On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she had made referrals of job
applicants to recruitment agencies. [51] She evidently knew all along that the persons she was dealing with
were applicants for employment abroad.
The law requires that the above activities of appellant should have first been authorized by the
POEA.[52] Rule II, Book II, of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment
provides:
SEC. 11. Appointment of Representatives. Every appointment of representatives or agents of
licensed agency shall be subject to prior approval or authority of the Administration.
"The approval may be issued upon submission of or compliance with the following requirements:
"a.
Proposed appointment or special power of attorney;
"b.
Clearances of the proposed representative or agent from NBI;
"c.
A sworn or verified statement by the designating or appointing person or company

assuming full responsibility for all acts of the agent or representative done in connection
with the recruitment and placement of workers.
"Approval by the Administration of the appointment or designation does not authorize the agent
or representative to establish a branch or extension office of the licensed agency represented.
"Any revocation or amendment in the appointment should be communicated to the
Administration. Otherwise, the designation or appointment shall be deemed as not revoked or
amended.
The claim that appellant did not categorically represent herself as a licensed recruiter, or that she
merely helped the complainants secure tourist visas, could not make her less guilty of illegal
recruitment,[53] it being enough that he or she gave the impression of having had the authority to recruit
workers for deployment abroad.[54]
The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving Cherry Pi-ay and Corazon del Rosario, only
the complainant in each of the cases, have testified against appellant in the illegal recruitment cases does
not thereby make the case for the prosecution weak. The rule has always been that the testimony of
witnesses is to be weighed, not that the witnesses be numbered, and it is not an uncommon experience
to have a conclusion of guilt reached on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. [55] Corroborative
evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness has perjured
himself or that his observations have veered from the truth. [56]
The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee in a criminal case for illegal recruitment
does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's cause. As
long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the accused has
involved himself in an act of illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can very well be justified. [57]
Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any discernible shadow of doubt
that appellant is indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on various counts. Being neither a licensee nor a
holder of authority to recruit, appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00
nor more than P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. In imposing
the penalty, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the application of the circumstances that could
modify the criminal liability of an accused cannot be considered, these provisions being inapplicable to
special laws.[58]
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[59] whenever the offense is punishable by a special law, the
court shall impose on the accused an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same."[60] Accordingly, in imposing the penalty of four (4) years to six (6) years on
appellant for each of the five cases of illegal recruitment, the trial court has acted correctly.
Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is perpetrated against three or more persons
"individually or as a group." Its requisites are that: (1) the person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities as so defined by law, (2) the same person does not have a license or
authority to do that, and (3) the questioned act is committed against three or more persons. [61] The
prosecution has been able to successfully show that, for a fee, appellant, not being authorized to recruit
workers for abroad, did so in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 against seven complainants. For this
offense, Article 39(a) of the Labor Code imposes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). This penalty was thus likewise aptly meted out upon appellant
by the trial court.
Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the
offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the accused
is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to warrant
conviction.[62] Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), [63] of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person.[64] Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been shown in the cases under review.
The penalty for the crime is prescribed by Article 315, first to fourth paragraphs, of the Revised Penal
Code as follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of
the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
"4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos,
provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following
means: x x x."
In the case of People vs. Gabres,[65] the Court has had occasion to so state that "Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be `that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed' under the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum shall be `within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed'
for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code
for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without
any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
"The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be
so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the
full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws
should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for
the estafacharge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision

mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional minimum to
medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six
(6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months x x x." [66]
The Court reiterates the above rule; however, in fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty
of prision correccional maximum period to prision mayor minimum period should be divided into "three
equal portions of time," each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period; hence Minimum Period
From 4 years, 2 months
and 1 day to 5 years,
5 months and 10 days
Medium Period
Maximum Period

and 11 days to 6 years,
and 21 days to 8 years
8 months and 20 days -
in consonance with Article 65,[67] in relation to Article 64,[68] of the Revised Penal Code.
When the amount involved in the offense exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty prescribed in Article 315
of the Code "shall be imposed in its maximum period," adding one year for each additional P10,000.00
although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. The maximum penalty
should then be termed as prision mayor or reclusion temporal as the case may be. In fine, the one year
period, whenever applicable, shall be added to the maximum period of the principal penalty of anywhere
from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed by the complainants who individually charged
appellant with illegal recruitment, the applicable penalties would, respectively, be, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 where appellant defrauded Francisco T. Labadchan in the amount
of P45,000.00, two years for the additional amount of P23,000.00 in excess ofP22,000.00 provided for in
Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years). As such, aside from paying Labadchan the amount ofP45,000.00 by way of actual
damages, the Court deems it proper to sentence appellant to the indeterminate penalty of three (3) years,
six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium to eight (8) years, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor medium.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, appellant defrauded Victoria Asil in the amount
ofP15,000.00. Hence, aside from paying Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual
damages, appellant shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 where appellant defrauded Cherry Pi-ay in the amount
ofP18,000.00, appellant, besides paying Cherry Pi-ay that amount by way of actual damages, shall also
suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 where appellant defrauded Corazon del Rosario in the amount
of P40,000.00, appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional medium to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 where appellant fraudulently solicited the amount ofP24,200.00
from Arthur Juan, appellant shall pay him actual damages in that amount and shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days (imposed by the
court a quo) of prision correccional minimum period to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652 where appellant defrauded Adeline Tiangge the amount
ofP18,500.00, appellant shall pay her the same amount as actual damages and shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645, the prosecution has successfully established its case against
appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale. Evidently banking on her reputation in the community as a
job recruiter, appellant was able to make the seven complainants believe that they could land various jobs
in Taiwan. Confident of her assurances, each complainant parted with P25,000.00 for supposed
processing and placement fees.
It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal recruitment in large scale, only five [69] of
them filed separate charges of estafa against appellant. Accordingly, appellant was only and could only
be held liable for five counts of estafa arising from the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since
appellant collected the amount of P25,000.00 from each of the five (5) victims, she must be held subject
to the penalty in its maximum period or prision mayor in its minimum period (not any higher on account of
the fact that the amount in excess ofP22,000.00 provided for by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is
less than P10,000.00).[70]Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no attending
circumstances, appellant shall bear, the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium as minimum penalty to six (6) years, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum penalty for each offense. In
addition, appellant should pay the five (5) victims the amount of P25,000.00 each as actual damages.
The actual damages awarded here shall be subject to diminution or cancellation should it be shown
that appellant had already paid the complainants.
WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment, illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications
hereunder specified, and only to the extent thereof, in the following cases:
1)
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of from three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccionalmedium period as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor medium period as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan the amount
of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages.
2)
from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as
MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum period
as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages.
3)
as MAXIMUM.
4)
imprisonment of from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium
period as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayorminimum period as MAXIMUM.
5)
MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period
as MAXIMUM.
6)
as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
7)
as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando Salbino the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
8)
as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
9)
as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
10) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
11) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge the amount of P17,000.00 by way of actual damages.
The awards of damages in Criminal Cases No. 92-CR-1396, No. 92-CR-1413, No. 92-CR-1416, No.
92-CR-1425, and No. 92-CR-1427, all for illegal recruitment, as well as No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal
recruitment in large scale, except for the award of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages to Dember Leon
(no estafa case having been instituted), are DELETED, either because similar awards have already been
provided for by the trial court, or for insufficiency of proof, in the estafa cases aforenumbered.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
JUANITO T. MERENCILLO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES April 13, 2007

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review[1] assails the June 18, 1999 decision [2] of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case
Nos. 004-005 affirming[3] the omnibus decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City,
Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9482-83 finding petitioner Juanito T. Merencillo guilty of violating
Section 3(b) of RA 3019[5] and Article 210[6] of the Revised Penal Code.
The information charging petitioner for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 in Criminal Case No.
9482 read:
That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being then a public official connected with the Bureau of Internal Revenue as
its Group Supervising Examiner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and with intent of personal gain, directly demand and extort from a certain Mrs. Maria
Angeles Ramasola Cesar the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00),
Philippine Currency, in connection, in consideration and in exchange for the release of
the certification of her payment of the capital gains tax for the land purchased by the
Ramasola [Superstudio] Inc. from one Catherine Corpuz Enerio, a transaction wherein
the aforesaid accused has to intervene in his official capacity, and to which the said Mrs.
Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly agreed but upon prior consultation with the
military authorities particularly the elements of the 702nd Criminal Investigation
Command [CIC] who set up the accused for a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his
being caught in the act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) but consisting only of four (4) marked one
hundred peso bills and the rest all bogus (paper) monies, to the damage and prejudice
of the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in particular and the public and the
government in general in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019. [7]
On the other hand, the information for direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 9483 charged:
That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995 in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
being then a public official connected with the performance of official duty as its Group
Supervising Examiner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with
intent of personal gain, demand, extort and agree to perform an act constituting a crime,
an act which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, that is that the
certification for payment of the capital gains tax relative to the land purchased by the
Ramasola Superstudio Incorporated from Catherine Corpus Enerio be released by him
only upon payment of an additional under the table transaction in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, which Mrs. Maria Angeles
Ramasola Cesar reluctantly agreed, but upon prior consultation with the military
authorities particularly the elements of the 702 nd Criminal [Investigation] Command (CIC)
who set up the accused for a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught in the
act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P20,000.00) but, consisting only of four (4) marked one hundred pesos bills and
the rest all bogus (paper) monies, an act performed by the accused in his official capacity
as Group Supervising Examiner of the BIR, to the damage and prejudice of Mrs. Maria
Angeles Ramasola Cesar in particular and the public and the government in general in the
amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
of the Philippines.[8]
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. Thereafter trial ensued and the
cases were tried jointly.
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED

BY THE PROSECUTION
In the morning of September 13, 1995, Lucit Estillore went to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) office in Tagbilaran City to ask for the computation of taxes due on the sale of real property to
Ramasola Superstudio, Inc. and to apply for a certificate authorizing registration (CAR). [9] At the BIR
office, she was entertained by revenue examiner Lourdes Fuentes who computed the documentary stamp
tax (P37,500) and capital gains tax (P125,000) due on the transaction. The computation was approved by
petitioner in his capacity as group supervisor. Estillore paid the taxes in the bank and returned to apply for
a CAR. She submitted the application together with relevant documents to Fuentes for processing.
Fuentes prepared the revenue audit reports and submitted them together with the application for the CAR
to petitioner for preliminary approval. [The application was to be forwarded thereafter to the Revenue
District Officer (RDO) for final approval.] Fuentes advised Estillore that the CAR would be released after
seven days.
At around 10:00 a.m. of the same day, private complainant Maria Angeles Ramasola
Cesar[10] (Cesar) received a call from Estillore. She was told that petitioner wanted to see her for some
negotiation. She proceeded to petitioners office where the latter demanded P20,000 in exchange for the
approval of the CAR. Cesar replied that she needed to confer with her two brothers who were her
business associates.
The following day, on September 14, 1995, Cesar received a call from petitioner who was
following up his demand. Later that day, Cesar received another call from petitioner who told her that she
could get the CAR after four or five days.
Cesar was able to return to the BIR only on September 20, 1995. When petitioner saw her, he
repeated his demand for P20,000 although the CAR had in fact been signed by RDO Galahad Balagon
the day before, on September 19, 1995, and was therefore ready for release. On Cesars inquiry, the
releasing clerk, Susan Cabangon, informed Cesar that she (Cabangon) was still waiting for petitioners go
signal to release the document.
On September 22, 1995, Cesar visited RDO Balagon and complained about petitioners refusal to
release the CAR unless his demand was met. RDO Balagon assured Cesar that he would look into her
complaint. Subsequently, Cesar received a call from petitioner informing her that she could get the CAR
but reminded her of his demand. He told her that he was willing to accept a lesser amount. It was at this
point that Cesar decided to report the matter to the authorities. She sought the help of the Provincial
Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Bohol, Senior Superintendent Dionaid Baraguer.
The following day, Sr. Supt. Baraguer referred Cesars complaint to the chief of police of
Tagbilaran City who coordinated with Cesar for the entrapment of petitioner. Cesar was instructed to
prepare two bundles of bogus money by putting a one-hundred peso bill on each side of each of the two
bundles to make it appear that the two bundles amounted toP10,000 each or a total of P20,000. After the
serial numbers of the four one-hundred peso bills were recorded, the entrapment was set for September
28, 1995.
On the appointed day, Cesar called petitioner and pleaded for the release of the CAR as well as
for the reduction of petitioners demand. Petitioner cautiously told Cesar not to talk about the matter on
the phone and asked her to see him instead. Cesar went to petitioners office with the two bundles of
bogus money inside a white envelope.
Petitioner was entertaining a lady visitor when Cesar arrived. The members of the PNP
entrapment team were already in petitioners office posing as civilians. On seeing Cesar, petitioner
handed the CAR to her and, as she was signing the acknowledgment for the release of the CAR, he
informed her that he was going down to the second floor. Cesar took this as a cue for her to follow.
As petitioner left his office, he held the door open for Cesar to follow. On reaching the third floor
lobby, petitioner uttered Here only. Cesar handed the envelope containing the two bundles of marked
money to petitioner who, upon receiving it, asked Why is this thick? Before Cesar could answer, a
member of the PNP entrapment team photographed petitioner holding the envelope. Petitioner panicked,
hid the envelope behind his back and turned towards the window at the back of the BIR building. On
seeing that the window was closed, he turned around towards the open window facing the street. He
threw the envelope towards the window but it hit the ceiling instead, bounced and fell to the first floor of
the BIR building.[11] The PNP entrapment team then introduced themselves to petitioner and invited him to
go with them to their headquarters.
Charges were filed against petitioner. During the trial, petitioners evidence consisted of nothing
more than a general denial of the charges against him. He claimed that he never asked for money and
that the allegations of demand for money existed only in Cesars mind after she was told that there was a
misclassification of the asset and additional taxes had to be paid. He was surprised when policemen
suddenly arrested him as soon as Cesar handed him a white envelope the contents of which he
suspected to be money.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Juanito T.
Merencillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation,
defined and penalized by Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for eight (8) years and one (1) month as minimum to fifteen (15) years
as maximum, there being aggravating circumstances considered under Section 3(e)
and Section (f) of [RA] 3019 in relation to Article 14(1) and (11) of the [RPC] in the
sense that the offender have taken advantage of his public position, and that the crime
was committed in consideration of a price or promise, without any mitigating or
extenuating circumstances to neutralize or offset any of the aggravating
circumstances, with perpetual disqualification from public office, and the Court further
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation,
for the crime of Direct Bribery defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum and a
fine of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos, all as mandated by law. The accused
Juanito T. Merencillo likewise is ordered to indemnify private complainant [Cesar] to
pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos. Costs shall also be taxed against the accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan, however,
denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification reducing the penalty of imprisonment
for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 to an indeterminate sentence of six years and one month
of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor, as maximum.[13] Thus, this petition.
Petitioner basically raises two points: (1) the Sandiganbayans refusal to believe his evidence
over that of the prosecutions and (2) the Sandiganbayans failure to recognize that he was placed in
double jeopardy.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for affirming the RTC decision and disregarding his evidence.
He claims that, had the RTC and the Sandiganbayan not ignored the inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the prosecutions witnesses,[14] he would have been acquitted. He also asserts that he was placed twice in
jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.
Petitioner is wrong.
TRIAL
COURTS
EVALUATION
EVIDENCE WILL NOT BE DISTURBED
OF
Both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses (that
petitioner demanded and received money from private complainant Cesar for the release of the CAR)
sufficient and credible enough to sustain conviction.
This notwithstanding, petitioner now asks this Court to review the entire evidence anew, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses and make another factual determination of the case a course of
action clearly improper given the nature of the instant petition. [15] Questions of fact cannot generally be
raised for the consideration of this Court.
The calibration of evidence and the relative weight thereof belongs to the appellate court. [16] Its
findings and conclusions cannot be set aside by this Court unless there is no evidence on record to
support them.[17] In this case, however, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan, affirming the factual
findings of the RTC, were amply supported by evidence and the conclusions therein were not against the
law and jurisprudence. There is no reason to disturb the congruent findings of the trial and appellate
courts.
Moreover, findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy the
respect of appellate courts because trial courts have the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor of
witnesses as they testify.[18] In the absence of any arbitrariness in the trial courts findings and evaluation
of evidence tending to show that it overlooked certain material facts and circumstances, its findings and
evaluation of evidence should be respected on review. [19] The presiding judge of the trial court had the
opportunity to actually observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses on the witness stand on direct
examination by the prosecution, cross-examination by the defense as well as during clarificatory
questioning by the trial judge himself.[20] Between the trial judge and this Court, the former was
concededly in a better position to determine whether or not a witness was telling the truth. [21] Based on the
records, we find no reason to disagree with the trial courts assessment and to discredit the prosecutions
witnesses.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the RTC and the Sandiganbayan considered the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Both courts, however, ruled that the
inconsistencies referred only to minor details that did not detract from the truth of the prosecutions
testimonial evidence. We agree.
Witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent in each and every detail.
Differences in the recollection of the event are inevitable and inconsequential variances are commonly
regarded as signs of truth instead of falsehood. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their
declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony.[22] In fact, such minor flaws may even enhance
the worth of a testimony for they guard against memorized falsities. [23]
Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecutions
evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses honesty. [24] The test is whether the testimonies agree on
essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other
so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. [25] Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal.
[26]
The RTC and the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner
were neither material nor relevant to the elements of the offenses for which he was charged. For instance,
whether or not it was petitioner himself who handed the CAR to private respondent was immaterial. The
fact was that petitioner demanded and received money in consideration for the issuance of the CAR.
PETITIONER WAS NOT PLACED
IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Section 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement:

Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following [acts] shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx
xxx
xxx (emphasis supplied)
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised Penal
Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony
under the Revised Penal Code. [27] There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or
successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.[28] The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit
it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. [29] An offense charged necessarily
includes that which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of
those constituting the latter.[30]
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that there is
neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses.
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared unlawful:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share

percentage or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The elements of the crime penalized under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 are:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2)
he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit;
(3)
he made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person;
(4)
the request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or transaction with
the government and
(5)
he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in connection
with a contract or transaction has the right to intervene. [31]
On the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential elements:
(1)
the offender is a public officer;
(2)
the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or

through another;
(3)
such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public

officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of
an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do and
(4)
the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected
with the performance of his official duties.[32]
Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of
direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are
included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a
gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019,
acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the
ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving
monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law. Direct
bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a
crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or
refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do.
Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act
gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance
between the elements of the offenses charged. [33] The constitutional protection against double jeopardy
proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one. [34]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 18, 1999 decision of the
Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
October 12, 2009 CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,

Petitioner,
- versus SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,
Petitioner,
- versus SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner
Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief. In the first petition for mandamus and/or certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside the August 5, 2005 Order, [1] as
reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005, both issued by the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division,
which effectively denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for
forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines against the petitioner and her immediate
family. The second petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the
November 9, 2005 Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss and/or quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture case involving the
same parties but for different properties.
The Facts
To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP
143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian
Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed and acquired, the
Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 1379, [3] filed
with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. This
petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the Fourth Division of the anti-graft
court.
Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP
202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled also to the Fourth Division of the
SB. For convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be also referred to as Forfeiture I
and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the
Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated April 5,
2005 which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed
as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The plunder
charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in
both forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen.
Garcia at his place of detention. Per the Sheriffs Return[4] dated November 2, 2005,
the summons were duly served on respondent Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29, 2004,
the SB issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic, an issuance which Gen.
Garcia challenged before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
SBs lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with
a motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias in default. To the OMBs motion, the
Garcias interposed an opposition in which they manifested that they have meanwhile
repaired to the Court on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of
attachment SB issued in which case the SB should defer action on the forfeiture case as
a matter of judicial courtesy.
(2) By Resolution[5] of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss;
declared the same motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to
answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias in default.
Another resolution[6] denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to
admit answer, and set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005,
pursuant to the prohibited pleading rule.
(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and
consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending in
different divisions of the SB, contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA
8249.[7]
On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the
forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the criminal case of plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to
quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case
ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the
consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements.
By Order[8] of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants
having been declared in default which has yet to be lifted.
It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her first special
civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion x x x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005 and
August 26 2005 that merely Noted without action, hence refused to resolve
petitioners
motion
to
dismiss and/or to quash by virtue of petitioners prior default in that:
A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4th Division
could not have acquired jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her childrens] x x
x persons, much less make them become the true parties-litigants,
contestants or legal adversaries in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not validly
acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners [and her childrens] x x x persons,
they could not possibly be declared in default, nor can a valid judgment by
default be rendered against them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from
challenging the [SB] 4th Divisions lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of forfeiture I as the same can be raised anytime, even after final judgment.
In the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and all proceedings
before the [SB] are null and void.
C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the first challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction
raised therein had already been passed upon by [the SB 4 th Divisions]

resolution of May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the grounds relied
upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss and/or to quash dated July 26,
2005 were entirely different, separate and distinct from the grounds set forth
in petitioners manifestation and motion [to consolidate] dated April 15, 2005
that was denied by it per its resolution of May 20, 2005.
D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of forfeiture I upon the filing of the main plunder case against
petitioner that mandates the automatic forfeiture of the subject properties in
forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct of any conviction for plunder.
E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly
repealed by the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture
mechanism.
F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the
USA, any penal conviction for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced
outside of the Philippines x x x.
G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is
imperative that the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder
case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements, and to avoid possible
conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the [SB] on the matter of forfeiture as a
penal sanction.[9] (Emphasis added.)
With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were taken after
the petition for Forfeiture II was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his
return of July 13, 2005, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the
OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen.
Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the
other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following
qualifying note: Im receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but
these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic).
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of
counsel, filed a motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of
jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter thereof which is now covered by
the plunder case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for alternative
service of summons. The motion for alternative service would be repeated in another
motion of August 25, 2005.
(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioners
motion to dismiss and/or to quash and the Republics motion for alternative service of
summons.
On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioners motion for partial
reconsideration.[10]
From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via the instant petition
for certiorari, docketed as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the SB 4th Division acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated November 9,
2005 and its Resolution of January 24, 2006 denying petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash in
that:
A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on petitioner, the
[SB] ought to have dismissed forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction over petitioners person x
x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates the
automatic forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the [SB] Fourth
Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture.
C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by
the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that
the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible
double jeopardy entanglements and worse conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the
Sandiganbayan on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction. [11] (Emphasis added.)
Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No. 171381 were
consolidated.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly meritorious.
The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the question of
jurisdiction and may thusly be couched into whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitionerand her three sons for that matterconsidering that, first, vis-vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have been
ineffectively or improperly served and,second, that the plunder caseCrim. Case No. 28107has
already been filed and pending with another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of the SB.
Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb
the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196
Petitioner maintains that the SB 4 th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the plunder case against the
Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case No.
28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4 th Division of its
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the
plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double jeopardy entanglements and
colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of
discretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the two forfeiture petitions
and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing ground.
Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of her
pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA
1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. We said so inGarcia v.
Sandiganbayan[12] involving no less than petitioners husband questioning certain orders issued in
Forfeiture I case.
Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus
depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions
holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4 th Division in its May 20,
2005 Resolution,[13] the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal
offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to
recover unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a public
officer or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x
x.[14] Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired.[15] Thus if the respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction
of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the
property aforesaid shall become property of the State. [16] x x x (Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the
jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family and
business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 3 [17] the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will
proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
[18]
interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential Commission on Good Government to file
independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in
Nature while the Latter Is Criminal
It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause
of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder
charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is
sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of illgotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth]. On the other
hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the
disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he
acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the
properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act
committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth. [19]
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy
entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double
jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, [20] suggesting
that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are,
to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded
against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings between the
plunder case and the subject forfeiture cases, petitioners apprehension about the likelihood of conflicting
decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft court on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction is
specious at best. What the SB said in this regard merits approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the
division where the plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be
in conflict with the decision by this division on the forfeiture case. They refer to a situation
where this Courts Second Division may exonerate the respondents in the plunder case
while the Fourth Division grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor of
the state or vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give
rise to a conflict. After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts
and circumstances separate and distinct from that in the forfeiture case. Between the two
(2) cases, there is no causal connection in the facts sought to be established and the
issues sought to be addressed. As a result, the decision of this Court in one does not
have a bearing on the other.
There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for
the forfeiture of the subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder
case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not recovered by the forfeiture case and
vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption that the information on plunder and the petition
for forfeiture cover the same set of properties.[21]
RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379
Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing Forfeitures I
and II with her assertion that RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are not convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or
impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any
public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379
is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his
incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate
income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which were not lawfully
acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts
should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same subject. To be
sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be harmonized. The Court perceives no irreconcilable
conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over
the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in
petitioners contention.
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the
requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant],
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its
decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the
Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person. [22]
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally
on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged
receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both
Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the
PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular
and defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,[23] we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the
sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being so much time as is necessary under the
circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty
requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other
party.[24] Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service
of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the
facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendants house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place
of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was
made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with
the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the
third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at
petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained,
even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was
made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief. [25] In the instant case, the Republic asserts that
petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of summons since the improvident service of
summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary
appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by petitioner and
her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republics views.
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction
Is Not Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the
court. What the rule on voluntary appearancethe first sentence of the above-quoted rulemeans is
that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is
deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of
summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she
voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a)
motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for
reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and
(b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely
for special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person
and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident substituted
service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned
when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for
damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of lack
of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the
foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not
voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals [26] applies to the instant
case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the
courtchallenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes
other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction
over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to
cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of
jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the
subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for
lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as
petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is,
thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias summons on the petitioner and her three
children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and her
three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over
their persons. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of
the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12
August 1976 and 8 November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft filed against private
respondent Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas
Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched
and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated
by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and
"architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" 1owned by the private respondent. These
electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or
decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and
cold storage] plant." 2 During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written
statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the
readings of his electric meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas
City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas
City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos
(P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the
discretion of the court." 4 This information reads as follows:
The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of
Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S.
1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and penalized by the said
ordinance, committed as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud the
City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit
from the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the
consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this
city and as a result of such unathorized installations of electric wirings and devices made
by the accused, the City Government of Batangas was damaged and prejudiced in the
total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN
CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974
to February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in
the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed
a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed
and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City
Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on
the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two
months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the
fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of
electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This
information read as follows:
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft,
defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of
February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric current
valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND
SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Government of
Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash,
dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second
information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By
Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered
the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:
The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded
by the accused in the motion to quash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution "accuses
Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10
Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City Government of
Batangas, etc. " (Emphasis supplied). The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of
illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount of P41,062.16 which the
accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud, deprived the city government of
Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric installations only, it could have alleged
illegal connections which were done at one instance on a particular date between
November, 1974, to February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that from
November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove-named accused with intent to defraud the
City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit
from the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices, etc." (Emphasis supplied), it
was meant to include the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the
city government. The information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21
February 1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations.
When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the City Court, he
had already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed to consequences of what allegedly
happened between November 1974 to February 21, 1975 which had allegedly resulted in
defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16. (Emphases and
parentheses in the original)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the petitioner was denied by the
respondent Judge in an Order dated 18 November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed in this Court by the
Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the People.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is protection against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses
that the first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized
installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City
Government of Batangas. Only two elements are needed to constitute an offense under this City
Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation; and (2) no authority therefor had been obtained from
the Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the District Engineer. The petitioner urges
that the relevant terms of the City Ordinance which read as follows:
Section 3.-Connection and Installation
(a) x x x
(b) The work and installation in the houses and building and their connection with the
Electrical System shall be done either by the employee of the system duly authorized by
its Superintendent or by persons adept in the matter duly authorized by the District
Engineer. Applicants for electrical service permitting the works of installation or
connection with the system to be undertaken by the persons not duly authorized therefor
shall be considered guilty of violation of the ordinance.
would show that:
The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure that electrical installations on
residences or buildings be done by persons duly authorized or adept in the matter, to
avoid fires and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. It is primarily a regulatory
measure and not intended to punish or curb theft of electric fluid which is already covered
by the Revised Penal Code. 5
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's argument continues, is the installing of
electric wiring and devices without authority from the proper officials of the city government. To constitute
an offense under the city ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the part of the
offender generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to appropriate and steal electric fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code filed
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential
elements. These elements are:
1. That personal property be taken;
2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things. 6
The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity can be effected even without
illegal or unauthorized installations of any kind by, for instance, any of the following means:
1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;
2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not register the actual electrical
consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down the rotation of the same.
The petitioner concludes that:

The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the
same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is
not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is
not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first inforrnation 8
The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. This is clear both from the express
terms of the constitutional provision involved which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis supplied; Article IV (22), 1973
Constitution) 9
and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be
examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but
rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the
general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection,
against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different
from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal
Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime
ago in Yap vs. Lutero. 11
In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of the Municipal Court of Iloilo
City, with violation of Article 14 of Ordinance No. 22, Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15,
Series of 1954, of the City of Iloilo. The information charged him with having "wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]" an automobile "recklessly and without reasonable caution thereby
endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing in said street." Three months later, Yap was again
charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same Municipal Court, this time with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. The information charged him with violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law (Act No. 3992 as amended by Republic Act No. 587) committed by driving and operating an
automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result thereof inflicting injuries upon an
unfortunate pedestrian. Yap moved to quash the second information upon the ground that it placed him
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act. This motion was denied by the respondent municipal
judge. Meantime, another municipal judge had acquitted Yap in Criminal Case No. 16054. Yap then
instituted a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to set aside the order of the
respondent municipal judge. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo having reversed the respondent
municipal judge and having directed him to desist from continuing with Criminal Case No. 16443, the
respondent Judge brought the case to the Supreme Court for review on appeal. In affirming the decision
appealed from and holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy was available to
petitioner Yap, then Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote:
To begin with, the crime of damage to property through reckless driving with which
Diaz stood charged in the court of first instance is a violation of the Revised Penal
Code (third paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile Law (Act No. 3992, as amended
by Republic Act No. 587). Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a violation of the same
law. Secondly, reckless driving and certain crimes committed through reckless driving are
punishable under different provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence from the view
point of Criminal Law, as distinguished from political or Constitutional Law they
constitute, strictly, different offenses, although under certain conditions, one offense may
include the other, and, accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double
jeopardy may be in order as regards the other, as in the Diaz case. (Emphases in the
original)
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of
clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (Emphasis in the original) The
second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment of the same act provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the
offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include, the crime charged in
the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the
same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a
violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the
other. 12 Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea
of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached
under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the
other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor
acquittal in either case.
The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the information in
case No. 16443, petitioner could if he failed to plead double jeopardy be convicted
of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in which he has already been acquitted. The
information in case No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the date and in the place
therein stated, petitioner herein had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and
operated "recklessly and without reasonable caution" an automobile described in said
information. Upon the other hand, the information in case No. 16443, similarly states that,
on the same date and in the same place, petitioner drove and operated the
aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent manner at an excessive rate of
speed and in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992), as amended by
Republic Act No. 587, and existing city ordinances." Thus, if the theories mentioned in the
second information were not established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in
case No. 16443 of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No.
16054, unless he pleaded double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred eventually sustaining the theory of
petitioner herein.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity
of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the
two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections of
the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one
offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the
second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction or
acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from
an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense having been
promulgated by different rule-making authorities though one be subordinate to the other and the
plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention
show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first
sentence. 13
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements
of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions
of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability
both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by
examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two
informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken
place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a
continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an
integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a
municipal ordinance and a national statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City Ordinance and serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from the
same act or sets of acts that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner. The additional
technical element of serious physical injuries related to the physical consequences of the operation of the
automobile by the accused, i.e., the impact of the automobile upon the body of the offended party. Clearly,
such consequence occurred in the same occasion that the accused operated the automobile (recklessly).
The moral element of negligence permeated the acts of the accused throughout that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to
February 1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of
electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from
the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized
installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from
the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the
unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the
corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current was
integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to
a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The
Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may
be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the
technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second
offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or
overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras
cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, it
seems elementary that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for
several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may
give use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to
imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by
simply adding or subtracting essential elements. Under the theory of appellant, the crime
of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by force and
intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88 Phil. at
53; emphases supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a
common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and
sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or
statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the
Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an
acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the
crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense. 15
It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case. It
is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing
from the community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an Assistant City
Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he should have
known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the protection
of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private respondent in this case.
The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action was made by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action both before
the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of criminal
liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case, as we noted earlier, 16 accused Manuel
Opulencia freely admitted during the police investigation having stolen electric current through the
installation and use of unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not
guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power.
However, there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated
by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations having been dismissed both by the City Court and by the
Court of First Instance (from which dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could not have
appealed 17) before trial could begin. Accordingly, the related civil action which has not been waived
expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for reception of
evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia
and rendition of judgment conformably with such evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related civil
liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated
above. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SAME ACT
ANTONIO DIAZ v DAVAO LIGHT, MANUEL M. ORIG,, and ELISEO BRAGANZA Jr.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 68709, which affirmed the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City,
Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 21,655-92.
Antecedents
Antonio G. Diaz was the president of Diaz and Co., Inc. He was also vice-president of Diaz Realty
Inc. which, in turn, owned the Doa Segunda Hotel, [3] formerly known as the Davao Imperial Hotel
(Imperial Hotel Building),[4] located along C.M. Recto Avenue,Davao City. Davao Light and Power Co.,
Inc. (DLPC), on the other hand, is a public utility duly franchised to provide light, heat and power to its
customers in Davao City and the municipalities of Panabo, Santo Tomas and Carmen, in Davao del
Norte.[5] Manuel Orig was the resident manager/vice-president for Administration of DLPC, [6] while Eliseo
R.
Braganza
was
its
in-house
lawyer.[7] DLPC
supplied
the Doa Segunda Building (ImperialHotel Building) with electricity service[8] under Account No. 08710669 and with Meter No. 36510.[9]
On July 25, 1983, DLPC sent a Notice of Disconnection [10] to Diaz and Co., Inc. informing it that,
as of June 13, 1983, the hotels unpaid electric consumption bill amounted to P190,111.02.[11] It also
warned that if the amount was not paid, DLPC would be impelled to discontinue its service. Since Diaz
and Co., Inc. ignored the letter, Meter No. 36510 was disconnected on July 29, 1983.[12]
DLPC then filed a complaint for collection before the RTC, Cebu City, which case was docketed
as Civil Case No. CEB-1049.
Meanwhile, in 1984, the National Food Authority (NFA) established its KADIWA [13] store
at C.M. Recto Avenue, Davao City.[14] It
leased
a
portion
of
the
ground
floor
of
the Imperial Hotel Building from Diaz and Co., Inc. [15] NFA/KADIWA also applied for electricity service with
DLPC, and a contract[16] was later executed between the parties. On March 15, 1984, DLPC connected
the area leased by NFA/KADIWA to its electric grid [17] under Account No. 091-12643,[18] and installed
Meter No. 84738[19] to measure NFA/KADIWAs monthly electric consumption.
In August 1986, the Kadiwa Center IV closed, and NFA/KADIWA vacated

the DoaSegunda Building.[20] In a letter[21] dated August 11, 1986, NFA/KADIWA Provincial Manager,
Roberta R. Melendres, informed DLPC that the light and power connection of NFA/KADIWA would be left
behind; its right to the connection would be transferred to Diaz. [22] She also informed DLPC that
the P1,020.00 deposit of NFA/KADIWA for the power connection had been refunded to it by Diaz. [23]
In a letter[24] dated September 2, 1986, Diaz informed respondent Manuel Orig that he had leased
the untenanted portions of the Doa Segunda Building from Diaz and Co., Inc., and requested that a new
electrical connection for the building in his name be installed, separate from the one assigned to him by
NFA.[25]
On September 15, 1986, DLPC denied the request on the ground that since Diaz and Co., Inc. is a
closed family corporation whose stockholders are the immediate members of the Diaz family, the lease in
favor of Diaz could be simulated. [26] DLPC, however, reminded Diaz that it would be too happy to grant
his request if he and/or Diaz and Co., Inc. would pay what is due and owing to it. [27]
Diaz and Co., Inc. sent a letter [28] to DLPC dated September 17, 1986 declaring that it had
assumed the electrical bills of NFA/KADIWA under Account No. 091-12643, and requested that the
monthly bills/statements be sent to it. In its reply, DLPC rejected the request and declared that it was not
aware that Diaz and Co., Inc. had refunded the NFA/KADIWA its P1,020.00 deposit.[29]
On September 26, 1986, Diaz filed a petition for mandamus [30] before the RTC,Davao City. He
alleged that as a holder of a certificate of public convenience, DLPC is mandated by law to provide him
with electric service; the grounds relied upon by respondent Orig in denying his application are anchored
on bias and prejudice, since he (Diaz) is one of the stockholders of Diaz and Co. Inc., the owner of the
Davao Imperial Hotel; and the civil case filed by DLPC is against Diaz and Co., Inc. and not personally
against him.[31] The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 18,288.
Meanwhile, on September 23, 1986, the portion of the building formerly leased by NFA/KADIWA
was leased to Matias Mendiola.[32] Because he needed more electricity than what could be provided by
the existing electrical wirings, Mendiola opted to change the electrical installation from a one-phase meter
to a three-phase meter connection.[33] Mendiolas application was approved by DLPC. On December 19,
1986, DLPC and Mendiola executed a service Contract [34] for electricity service.
On January 7, 1987, Diaz filed an application for preliminary injunction in Sp. Civil Case No.
18,288[35] to enjoin DLPC from disconnecting the electric connections to Meter No. 84738 under Account
No. 091-12643. Also, an Inter-Office Memo[36] dated January 7, 1987, signed by Officer-in-Charge,
Rebecca Madrid, was issued to all security guards of the Doa Segunda Building who were ordered to
prevent anyone from disturbing Meter No. 84738. [37] Because of this, DLPC failed to substitute its singlephase meter with a three-phase meter. DLPCs linemen thus installed the three-phase meter without
removing the single-phase meter.[38]
On March 12, 1987, the RTC in Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288, denied the motion for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction[39] filed by Diaz. He moved for a reconsideration, which was, however,
denied in the Order[40] dated August 20, 1987. DLPC then removed its single-phase meter on November
20, 1987, which rendered almost half of the building without power.[41] That same day, Diaz went to the
DLPC building and threw stones at it, breaking four glass windows in the process. [42] He then bought his
own electric meter, Meter No. 86673509, [43] had it calibrated by the Board of Energy, and unilaterally
replaced Meter No. 84738. The electricity in the building was then restored.[44]
On November 24, 1987, Diaz filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory
and Mandatory Injunction and Restraining Order [45] before the RTC, Davao City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 18,855-87. In the said complaint, Diaz claimed that DLPC arbitrarily and illegally removed Meter No.
84738 in violation of their business franchise and Article 19 of the New Civil Code, and had threatened to
remove Meter No. 86673509.[46]
DLPC, for its part, filed a counter-application for preliminary mandatory injunction [47] in the same
case to compel the removal of Meter No. 86673509 which Diaz had installed without DLPCs consent and
authority.[48] The RTC issued an Order[49]dated March 30, 1988 denying Diazs application for prohibitory
and mandatory injunction, and granting DLPCs counter-application for preliminary mandatory
injunction. The RTC ordered Diaz to immediately remove Meter No. 86673509 and disconnect the
electrical wirings he had unilaterally connected to the upper floor rooms. Diaz filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. On June 13, 1998, the sheriff, with the aid of DLPC personnel, caused
the removal of Meter No. 86673509.[50]
Aggrieved, Diaz assailed the orders via petition for certiorari before the CA. The petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14909. On October 19, 1988, the CA rendered a Decision [51] granting
Diazs petition, to wit:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted and the
orders of the lower court dated March 30, 1988 and June 1, 1988 are set aside. Private
respondents are thus ordered to maintain the status quo ante which existed before the
issuance of the orders complained against, or else to connect its own electric meter to
the premises, on the understanding, of course, that petitioner pays his electric bills and
without prejudice to the continuance of the collection case against Diaz and Company.[52]
DLPC elevated the decision before this Court, via petition for review on certiorari. The petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 85445.[53]
Meanwhile, on December 19, 1998, the parties in Civil Case No. CEB-1049[54]executed a
Compromise Agreement,[55] wherein they stipulated the following:
1. Plaintiff-appellee hereby reduces its total claims in the complaint to

onlyP385,000.00 and further waives any claim in excess of said amount in the same
case, and the defendant-appellant shall pay said amount in full immediately upon the
execution of this agreement. The latter also waives its counterclaims against the former
in the above-entitled case.
2. Upon receipt of the payment of the aforesaid sum, plaintiff-appellee shall

immediately grant and install in favor of defendant-appellant or Antonio G. Diaz electric
service for the Doa Segunda Building, popularly known as Imperial Hotel Building, or for
portions thereof designated by either including the tenants or lessees occupying the
same, upon proper application therefor and the presentation of the requisite electrical
permit.
3. the parties agree to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 18,288 of

the Regional TrialCourt of Davao City, pending in Branch XVI thereof, entitled Diaz vs.
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. and Manuel Orig. for Mandamus inclusive of the counterclaim therein, the same having become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court approves

the foregoing compromise agreement and render judgment based thereon, and enjoin
the parties to comply strictly with the terms thereof.
The RTC, in Civil Case No. CEB-1049, rendered a Decision[56] approving the compromise
on January 5, 1989.
In Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288, the parties also filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss [57]based on the
Compromise Agreement, and the RTC thereafter ordered the dismissal of the case. [58]
On April 17, 1989, this Court in G.R. No. 85445, issued a Resolution,[59] denying the petition for
review on certiorari questioning the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 14909for being moot and
academic. The resolution reads:
After deliberating on the allegations made, the issues raised, and the
arguments advanced in the Petition, the Comment and the Reply, and it appearing that
petitioner is now providing electrical service to private respondents entire building, the
Court RESOLVED to DENY the petition for having become moot and academic. The
Court makes the admonition, however, that connections of electrical service and
installations of electric meters should always be upon mutual contract of the parties, and
that payments for electrical consumption should also be made promptly whenever
due. Contracts lay down the law between the parties and obligations arising therefrom
should be complied with.
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[60] in Civil Case No. 18,85587 dismissing the case filed by Diaz.[61]
Diaz appealed the decision with the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 63236,[62] which appeal is still pending
before the appellate court.
Based on the aforestated facts, on July 11, 1988, DLPC filed a complaint for theft of electricity
against Diaz with the City Prosecutors Office, Davao City; respondent Braganza submitted an
Affidavit[63] to support the charge. In defense, Diaz alleged the following: (1) that the complaint was
intended to harass him; (2) he was entitled to electric service by virtue of his subrogation to the right of
NFA/KADIWA; (3) the installation of Meter No. 86673509 was made with the knowledge and consent of
DLPC; (4) there is a pending case between the parties regarding Meter Nos. 84738 and 86673509; and
(5) the filing of the action is premature. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 593.
On March 21, 1989, Lolito O. Evangelino, 4 th Asst. City Prosecutor, City Prosecutors Office of
Davao City, issued a Resolution[64] recommending the dismissal of the charge. He opined that the
correspondence to DLPC Manager Orig negated DLPCs claim of lack of consent and knowledge, and
since the issue is still pending litigation in court, the determination of whether there is theft of electricity is
premature (Sp. Civil Case No. 18288 and Civil Case No. 18,855-87).
DLPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration [65] which the City Prosecutor denied on the ground that
DLPC failed to establish the elements of unlawful taking and intent to gain. DLPC appealed the dismissal
to the Secretary of Justice,[66] who, however, dismissed the appeal in a letter [67] dated August 2, 1990. The
Motion for Reconsideration[68] filed by DLPC was likewise denied in the letter[69] dated September 6, 1990.
Undaunted, DLPC filed a criminal complaint [70] against Diaz

for Violation of P.D. 401,[71] as
[72]
[73]
amended by B.P. Blg. 876 with the City Prosecutors Office, Davao City. The complaint was docketed
as I.S. No. 92-4590. In his counter-affidavit datedSeptember 19, 1992, Diaz alleged that a similar
complaint (I.S. No. 593) had been filed by DLPC against him. [74] In a Resolution[75] dated October 23,
1992, Calixto A. Esparagoza, 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor, dismissed the case. The Public Prosecutor
likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of DLPC on November 26, 1992.
Meanwhile Diaz, Ramos, and Arguellas, as complainants, filed a criminal complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Davao del Norte charging the officers of DLPC with estafa through
falsification of public documents. They also alleged that the officers of DLPC exacted additional and
illegal profits from its consumers by devising a deceptive Varying Discount Formula; based on the alleged
misrepresentation of said officers, the Board of Energy (BOE) granted DLPC provisional authority to apply
the formula, thereby resulting in losses of more or less P300,000.00 to Diaz, Ramos, and Arguelles.[76] As
regards the charge of falsification, the complainants alleged that DLPC had its properties appraised by
the Technical Management Services, Philippines, Inc. (TAMSPHIL), and included non-existent properties
that did not belong to it; it also recorded the TAMSPHIL appraisal in its books of account even before it
had been approved by the BOE; and submitted financial statements containing the appraisal to the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the BOE.[77]
The Investigating Prosecutor found probable cause against the respondents. An Information was
filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tagum, Davao del Norte, docketed as Crim. Case
No. 5800. Respondents appealed the resolution of the public prosecutor finding probable cause against
them. The appeal was granted. On motion of the Prosecutor, the RTC dismissed the case in an Order
dated July 13, 1983.[78]
On August 9, 1983, the officers of DLPC, Eduardo J. Aboitiz, Luis Aboitiz, Jr., Roberto E. Aboitiz,
Jon R. Aboitiz, and Edson H. Canova, as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint against Diaz, Isagani T. Fuentes
(Provincial Fiscal of Davao del Norte), Petronilo D. Ramos (Municipal Mayor of Carmen, Davao del
Norte), Gabriel Arguelles (Municipal Attorney of Panabo, Davao del Norte) before the RTC, Cebu City, for
damages and attorneys fees against the defendants for malicious prosecution. [79]
The case was docketed as CEB Case No. 1055. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a
Decision[80] on April 30, 1992, dismissing the complaint. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs complaint and defendants

counterclaim are hereby DISMISSED for lack of cause of action with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[81]
Both parties appealed the decision before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41399.
Diaz, et al. relied on the following grounds:
I
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (SIC) EVIDENCE OF
CONSPIRACY AMONG ALL DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS (SIC) AND IN MAKING NO
FINDING THAT THERE WAS A CONSPIRACY TO PROSECUTE PLAINTIFFAPPELLANTS (SIC) CRIMINALLY FOR USE AS LEVERAGE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
CONCESSIONS FROM DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO.
II
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (SIC) HAVE NO
CAUSE OF ACTION BY COMMITTING THE FOLLOWING ERRORS:
(a)
IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO PROSECUTION AND NO

ACQUITTAL;
(b) IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS (SIC) CHARGE OF ESTAFA THROUGH
FALSIFICATION;
(c)
BY IGNORING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE

LINKING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (SIC) TO THE CRIME CHARGED;
(d) BY IGNORING THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MANY ALLEGATIONS

IN THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS (SIC) ARE
INADMISSIBLE;
(e)
BY IGNORING THE FACT THAT DAVAO LIGHTS USE OF THE

VARYING DISCOUNT FORMULA WAS ADMITTEDLY PROVISIONALLY
AUTHORIZED BY THE BOE WHICH AUTHORITY WAS IN FORCE
DURING THE FILING AND PENDENCY OF THE CHARGE;
(f)
BY IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE VARYING DISCOUNT

FORMULA WAS A FORMULA TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF
DISCOUNT DEDUCTIBLE FROM THE RATES EARLIER FIXED BY
THE BOE RESULTING FROM THE COST SAVINGS REALIZABLE
FROM THE CHEAPER COST OF ELECTRIC POWER SOLD BY NPC
TO DAVAO LIGHT, AND ITS NEGATIVE ASPECT WAS MERELY AN
INCORPORATION INTO SAID FORMULA OF THE FUEL CLAUSE
ADJUSTMENT ALREADY AUTHORIZED IN THE DECISION OF SAID
BOARD IN CASE NO. 73-146;
(g)
BY BEING OBLIVIOUS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THERE WAS

NO FRAUD OR DECEIT IN SECURING SAID PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY, AND THE BOARD MADE NO SUCH FINDING;
(h)
BY IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT

FUENTES DISOBEYED THE DIRECTIVE OF HIS SUPERIOR, THE
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IN I.S. NO. 82-115, AND THAT HE FILED AN
INFORMATION CHARGING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (SIC) WITH AN
OFFENSE
DIFFERENT FROM THAT SUBJECT OF
HIS
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
(i)
IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS (SIC) DID NOT ACT

WITH MALICE AND HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN FILING SAID
CHARGE.
III
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS
(SIC).[82]
For their part, DLPC, et al. alleged the following:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS APPELLANTS
COUNTERCLAIMS HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS
FEES.[83]
On October 30, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision[84] affirming the decision of the RTC.
Diaz, et al. appealed the decision before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 154378. On November
13, 2002, this Court resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit. [85] OnApril 15, 2003, as per Entry of
Judgment,[86] the resolution of this Court became final and executory.
On June 10, 1992, DLPC instituted a civil action for Damages, [87] before the RTC,Cebu City,
against Diaz for defamatory and libelous remarks and for abuse of rights. The plaintiff alleged that Diaz,
motivated by malice and ill-will, had taken it upon himself to find fault in DLPCs acts and oppose all its
application with the BOE, using the media to assault its good name by circulating or publishing libelous
and false statements in the newspapers. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11843.
DLPC further alleged that Diaz published and disseminated a handbill claiming that there was
something irregular and anomalous regarding the Energy Regulation Boards approval of the appraisal of
the properties and equipment of DLPC, because of which the customers of DLPC could expect a P5.00
per kilowatt charge in the future. Diaz allegedly gave identical interviews with the Mindanao Daily
Mirror and the Ang Peryodiko Dabawreiterating what he said in the handbill. [88] In addition, Diaz, in an
interview with thePeoples Daily Forum, claimed that the National Power Corporation sold two (2)
generating sets to DLPC for only P1.00 each.[89] Consequently, DLPC suffered besmirched reputation
and public humiliation, and damage to its business standing. The complaint contained the following
prayer:
1)
Immediately issue a temporary restraining order ex-parte precluding

defendant from committing further acts of tort or libel against plaintiff, and
after the hearing of plaintiffs application for preliminary injunction, issue such
writ after posting of the required injunction bond;
2) After trial, render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Antonio
Diaz making the injunction permanent, and ordering the latter to pay the
former
a) The sum of P10,000,000.00 as moral damages anddamages to its

business standing;
b) The sum of P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) The sum of P500,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation;
d)
The cost of suit.[90]
After trial, the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-11843 rendered a Decision[91] in favor of DLPC and
against Diaz, awarding more than
P1,500,000.00 in damages to DLPC and dismissing the
counterclaim of Diaz. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises above set-forth, the Court hereby renders judgment in

favor of plaintiff Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. and against defendant Antonio Diaz
ordering said defendant:
1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,500,000.00 by way of moral damages for

besmirched reputation, loss of business standing and goodwill;
2. To pay plaintiff the amount of P300,000.00 in exemplary damages by way of

example or correction for the public good; and
3. To pay plaintiff the amount of P500,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation

expenses and to pay the costs.
Defendant takes nothing from his counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.[92]
Both parties appealed the decision to the CA in CA-G.R. CV

pending.
No. 65082, which appeal is still
On October 30, 1992, Diaz, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for Damages, Injunction with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, Plus Attorneys Fee [93] against DLPC before the
RTC, Davao City; the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 21,655-92. Diaz alleged that DLPCs filing of
criminal cases, I. S. No. 593 for theft of electricity and I.S. No. 92-4590 for violation of P.D. 401, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 876), were intended to harass and humiliate him before the public and government
authorities and ruin his image;[94] he was seriously prejudiced by the filing of an P11.6 Million damage suit
in Civil Case No. CEB-1055 and a P10.8 Million damage suit in Civil Case No. CEB-11843;
[95]
defendants, by their common and joint acts, were motivated by evident bad faith and intentionally
caused injustice to his person in violation of Article 19 of the New Civil Code. [96] Diaz thus prayed:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed of the

Honorable Court:
a)
Before notice and hearing to issue a temporary restraining

order enjoining defendants from committing any unlawful, illegal,
tortiuous (sic) and inequitable act which may affect the individual
rights of plaintiff, and after hearing to issue writ of preliminary
injunction for the same purpose upon posting of the bond;
b)
After trial on the merits, to make the writ of injunction as

permanent;
c)
To order defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, moral

damages in the amount of
P10,000,000.00, attorneys
fee in the amount of
P500,000.00, litigation expenses in the
amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary damage in the amount
of P100,000.00; and,
d)
To grant to plaintiff such other relief proper and equitable under

the premises.[97]
On November 4, 1992, the RTC issued a TRO[98] in favor of Diaz, directing DLPC or any person
acting for and in its behalf, to desist and refrain from committing any unlawful, tortuous and inequitable
conduct which may affect the former for a period of twenty (20) days.
During the pre-trial, the parties limited the issue to whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
damages by virtue of the filing of the criminal cases against him for theft of electricity and violation of P.D.
401, both of which were already dismissed. Due to the pendency of various actions before several courts,
the trial court opted to segregate the issues. It focused only on the alleged malicious prosecution with
regard to the filing of the criminal action for theft, I. S. No. 593, and for Violation of P.D. 401, as amended
by B.P. Blg. 876, I.S. No. 92-4590. The RTC reasoned in this wise:
The records show that plaintiffs first cause of action, which is damages for
defendants refusal to grant him electric service, has become moot and academic by
virtue of the compromise agreement executed by the plaintiff and the defendant in the
mandamus case docketed as Civil Case No. 18288 of this Court. The parties filed a Joint
Motion to Dismiss based on the Compromise Agreement which was granted by this Court
and which led to the eventual dismissal of the case with prejudice.
In summary, plaintiff asks for damages for defendants alleged malicious
prosecution of a criminal case of theft of electricity against him, for plaintiffs filing of a
charge of violation of P.D. 401 as amended after dismissal of the theft case, the filing of a
damage suit against him before the RTC of Cebu City which was dismissed and the filing
of another damage suit before the same Cebu RTC which is still pending. Damages are
also being sought for defendants removal of Electric Meter No. 847328 ( sic). But this is
a subject matter of a case pending before Branch 13 of this Court and therefore said
court retains jurisdiction over the said cause of action. x x x [99]
On May 22, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[100] dismissing the complaint. Thefallo reads:
In view of all the foregoing, finding no merit in plaintiffs complaint,

judgment is hereby rendered dismissing said complaint with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.[101]
The RTC held that while the City Prosecutor, and later the Secretary of Justice, concluded that
there was no probable cause for the crime of theft, this did not change the fact that plaintiff made an illegal
connection for electricity.[102] A persons right to litigate should not be penalized by holding him liable for
damages.
Diaz appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WHEN

THE DEFENDANTS FILED THE CASES OF THEFT, THEY DID SO IN
HONEST BELIEF THAT PLAINTIFF IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AT

BAR AND WITHOUT GRANTING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.[103]
On October 1, 2003, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. [104] It concluded that the evidence on
hand showed good faith on the part of DLPC in filing the subject complaints. It pointed out that Diaz had
been using the electrical services of DLPC without its consent. As to the effect of the compromise
agreement, the CA ruled that it did not bar the filing of the criminal action. Thus, under the principle
of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a persons right, even if it causes loss to another,
does not automatically result in an actionable injury.[105]
Diaz, now petitioner, comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following errors:
a) Proof of moral suffering must be introduced, otherwise the award of moral

damage is not proper. In this case, the evidence presented by the appellant is insufficient
to overcome the presumption of good faith. (Decision, p. 10)
b) In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the subject complaints were filed so as
to protect appellee DLPCs interest. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that no
person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate. (Decision, p. 12) [106]
The issues raised in the present action can be summarized as follows: (1) whether or not the
compromise agreement entered into between DLPC and Diaz barred the former from instituting further
actions involving electric Meter No. 84736 or 86673509; (2) whether or not DLPC acted in bad faith in
instituting the criminal cases against Diaz; and (3) whether or not Diaz is entitled to damages.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner insists that the compromise agreement as well as the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 14909 already settled the controversies between them; yet, DLPC instituted the theft case against
Diaz, and worse, instituted another action for violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876. Thus,
the only conclusion that can be inferred from the acts of DLPC is that they were designed to harass,
embarrass, prejudice, and ruin him. He further avers that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No.
CEB-1049 completely erased litigious matters that could necessarily arise out of either Electric Meter No.
84736 or 86673509.[107] Moreover, Diaz asserts that the evidence he presented is sufficient to prove the
damages he suffered by reason of the malicious institution of the criminal cases.
We do not agree.
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The purpose of
compromise is to settle the claims of the parties and bar all future disputes and controversies. However,
criminal liability is not affected by compromise for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and
punished by the Government on its own motion, though complete reparation should have been made of
the damages suffered by the offended party. A criminal case is committed against the People, and the
offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission
of the offense.[108] Moreover, a compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the extinction of criminal liability.[109]
As can be inferred from the compromise agreement, Diaz and DLPC merely agreed to (1) reduce
the latters total claims to only P385,000.00; (2) for DLPC to waive its counterclaims against Diaz; and
(3) upon receipt of the amount, for DLPC to immediately install the necessary electric service to the
building. The parties likewise agreed to the dismissal of Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288 for being moot and
academic. Nowhere in said agreement did the parties agree that DLPC was barred from instituting any
further action involving electric Meter No. 84736 or 86673509.
We find that petitioner is not entitled to damages under Articles 19, [110] 20[111] and 21,[112] and
Articles 2217[113] and 2219(8)[114] of the New Civil Code.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. [115] Thus, malice
or bad faith is at the core of the above provisions. [116] Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.[117] Good faith is presumed and he who alleges
bad faith has the duty to prove the same. [118] Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad
judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of
fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. [119]
The evidence presented by respondents negates malice or bad faith. Petitioner himself alleged
in his complaint that he unilaterally installed Meter No. 86673509 to replace Meter No. 84738 after it was
removed by DLPC. No less than this Court, in G.R. No. 85445, admonished petitioner and reminded him
that connections of electrical service and installations of electric meters should always be upon mutual
contract of the parties, and that payments for electrical consumption should also be made promptly
whenever due.[120] Based on these established facts, petitioner has not shown that the acts of respondent
were done with the sole intent of prejudicing and injuring him.
Petitioner may have suffered damages as a result of the filing of the complaints. However, there
is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage
is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the resultof a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which
does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
[121]
Whatever damages Diaz may have suffered would have to be borne by him alone since it was his
acts which led to the filing of the complaints against him.
On the other hand, malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by or
against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously
and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of
the defendant therein.[122] It is an established rule that in order for malicious prosecution to prosper, the
following requisites must be proven by petitioner: (1) the fact of prosecution and the further fact that the
defendant (respondent) was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal;
(2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor
was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is, by improper or sinister motive. [123] The foregoing are
necessary to preserve a persons right to litigate which may be emasculated by the undue filing of
malicious prosecution cases.[124] From the foregoing requirements, it can be inferred that malice and want
of probable cause must both be clearly established to justify an award of damages based on malicious
prosecution.[125]
The Court notes that respondents initiated two separate criminal actions, one for theft of
electricity, Inv. Sheet No. 593 July/1988, and the other, for Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 876, I.S. No. 92-4590. It must be stressed that theft of electricity is a felony defined
and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, while Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg.
876, is an offense punished by a special law. What generally makes the former a felony is criminal
intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter a crime is the special law enacting it. [126] In
addition, the elements of the two (2) offenses are different from one another. In theft, the elements
are: (1) intent to gain; (2) unlawful taking; (3) personal property belonging to another; (4) and absence
of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. [127] On the other hand, the crime of
Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, is mala prohibita. The criminal act is not inherently
immoral but becomes punishable only because the law says it is forbidden. With these crimes, the
sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary.[128]
While the institution of separate criminal actions under the provisions of P.D. 401, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 876, and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on theft may refer to identical acts
committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense because a single criminal
act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses; and where there is variance or difference between the
elements of an offense in one law and another law, as in the case at bar, there will be no double jeopardy
because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses.
Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited; what is forbidden is prosecution for the
same offense.[129] Hence, no fault could be attributed to respondent DLPC when it instituted the two
separate actions.
As earlier stated, a claim for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the
three elements aforecited are shown to exist. We find that none of the requisites are attendant here.
First. Although respondent DLPC initiated before the prosecutors office Inv. Sheet No. 593
July/1988 for theft of electricity, and I.S. No. 92-4590 for Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg.
876, no information was ever filed in court. The cases were eventually dropped or dismissed before they
could be filed in court. Ultimately, both actions could not end in an acquittal.
Second. It cannot be concluded that respondent DLPC acted without probable cause when it
instituted the actions. The events which led to the filing of the complaints are undisputed, and respondent
DLPC cannot be faulted for filing them. In the early case ofBuchanan v. Esteban,[130] this Court had
already stressed that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution
where he acted with probable cause. As Justice Moreland explained in that case:
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie
only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. And
the reason for the rule as stated by Blackstone, is that it would be a very great
discouragement to public justice if prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of suspicion,
were liable to be sued at law when their indictments miscarried.
Thus, the element of malice and the absence of probable cause must be proved. [131]There must be
proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it
was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless to entitle the victims to
damages.[132] The two elements must simultaneously exist; otherwise, the presence of probable cause
signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.[133] In the instant case, it is evident that
respondent DLPC was not motivated by malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass petitioner,
but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect its rights. Respondent DLPC cannot therefore be faulted in
availing of the remedies provided for by law.
In a free society, controversies are heard and settled under the rule of law in the forum of the
courts of justice. It is one of the virtues of our system of government that a person who feels aggrieved
does not have to take the law into his or her hands or resort to the use of force for the vindication of injury.
The courts are there to hear and act on the complaint. The right to litigate is an escape valve to relieve the
pressures of personal disagreements that might otherwise explode in physical confrontation. It is
necessary not only for upholding ones claims when they are unjustly denied but also for the maintenance
of peace, if not goodwill, among incipient antagonists. Without the right to litigate, conflicting claims cannot
be examined and resolved in accordance with one of the primary purposes of government, which is to
provide for a just and orderly society.[134] Hence, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he or she be unsuccessful,
for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. [135]
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68709 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECTION 22 EX POST FACTO & BILL OF ATTAINDER

a. EX POST FACTO
G.R. No. L-4221
August 30, 1952
MARCELO D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GEN. MARIANO CASTAEDA, and COLONEL EULOGIO BALAO, respondents-appellees.
Felixberto M. Serrano and Honorio Ilagan for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellees.
BENGZON, J.:
The purpose of this appeal from the Court of First Instance of Quezon City is to test the validity of
Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A few months ago the same proclamation came up for discussion in connection with the request for bail of
some prisoners charged with rebellion.1 The divided opinion of this Court did not squarely pass on the
validity of the proclamation; but, assuming it was obligatory, both sides proceeds to determine its effect
upon the right of which prisoners to go on bail.
This decision will now consider the points debated regarding the aforesaid residential order.
The facts are few and simple: About five o'clock in the morning of October 18, 1950, Maximino
Montenegro was arrested with others at the Samanillo Bldg. Manila, by agents of the Military Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for complicity with a communistic organization in the
commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition. So far as the record discloses, he is still under
arrest in the custody by respondents. On October 22, 1950, The President issued Proclamation No. 210
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. On October 21, 1950, Maximino's father, the
petitioner, submitted this application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the release of his son.
Opposing the writ, respondents admitted having the body of Maximino, but questioned judicial authority to
go further in the matter, invoking the above-mentioned proclamation.
Petitioner replied that such proclamation was void, and that, anyway, it did not apply to his son, who had
been arrested before its promulgation. Heeding the suspension order, the court of first instance denied
the release prayed for. Hence this appeal, founded mainly on the petitioner's propositions:.
(a) The proclamation is unconstitutional "because it partakes of bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law;
and unlawfully includes sedition which under the Constitution is not a ground for suspension";
(b) Supposing the proclamation is valid, no prima facie.
(c) "There is no state of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof," the only situations
permitting discontinuance of the writ of habeas corpus; showing was made that the petitioner's son was
included within the terms thereof.
Proclamation No. 210 reads partly as follows:
WHEREAS, lawless elements of the country have committed overt acts of sedition, insurrection
and rebellion for the purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted authorities and in pursuance
thereof, have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security
of the state;
WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection, and rebellion consisting of armed raids, sorties,
and ambushes and the wanton acts of murder, rape, spoilage, looting, arson, planned destruction
of public and private buildings, and attacks against police and constabulary detachments, as well
as against civilian lives and properties as reported by the Commanding General of the Armed
Forces, have seriously endangered and still continue to endanger the public safety;
WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion have been perpetrated by various
groups well organized for concerted actions and well armed with machine guns, rifles, pistols and
other automatic weapons, by reason whereof there is actual danger of rebellion which may
extend throughout the country;
Whereas, 100 leading members of these lawless elements have been apprehended and the
presently under detentions, and strong and convincing evidence has been found in their
possession to show that they are engaged in the rebellious, seditious and otherwise subversive
acts as above set forth; and
Whereas, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken to insure the peace
and security of the population and to maintain the authority of the government;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, ELPIDIO QUIRINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by article VII, section 10, paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all others
who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of sedition, insurrection or rebellion, and or
on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.
A. It is first argued that the proclamation is invalid because it "partakes" of a bill of attainder or an ex post
factolaw, and violates the constitutional percept that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed. The argument is devoid of merit. The prohibition applies only to statutes. U.S. vs. Gen. El., 80
Fed. Supp. 989; De Pass vs. Bidwell, 24 Fed., 615. 2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial. (16 C.J.S. p. 902; U.S. vs. Lovett (1946) 328 U.S. 303). Anyway, if, as we
find, the stay of the writ was ordered in accordance with the powers expressly vested in the President by
the Constitution, such order must be deemed an exception to the general prohibition against ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder supposing there is a conflict between the prohibition and the
suspension.
On the other hand there is no doubt it was erroneous to include those accused of sedition among the
persons as to whom suspension of the writ is decreed. Under the Constitution the only grounds for
suspension of the privilege of the writ are "invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof."
Obviously, however, the inclusion of sedition does not invalidate the entire proclamation; and it is
immaterial in this case, inasmuch as the petitioner's descendant is confined in jail not only for sedition, but
for the graver offense of rebellion and insurrection. Without doing violence to the presidential directive, but
in obedience to the supreme law of the land, the word "sedition" in Proclamation No. 210 should be
deemed a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole.
B. In his second proposition appellant insists there is no state of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or
imminent danger thereof. "There are" he admits "intermittent sorties and lightning attacks by organized
bands in different places"; but, he argues, "such sorties are occasional, localized and transitory. And the
proclamation speaks no more than of overt of insurrection and rebellion, not of cases of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof." On this subject it is noted that the President
concluded from the facts recited in the proclamation, and the other connected therewith, that "there
is actual danger rebellion which may extend throughout the country." Such official declaration
implying much more than imminent danger of rebellion amply justifies the suspension of the writ.
To the petitioner's unpracticed eye the repeated encounters between dissident elements and military
troops may seem sporadic, isolated, or casual. But the officers charged with the Nation's security,
analyzed the extent and pattern of such violent clashes and arrived at the conclusion that they are warp
and woof of a general scheme to overthrow his government vi et armis, by force and arms.
And we agree with the Solicitor General that in the light of the views of the United States Supreme Court
thru, Marshall, Taney and Story quoted with approval in Barcelon vs. Baker (5 Phil., 87, pp. 98 and 100)
the authority to decide whenever the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension belongs to the
President and "his decision is final and conclusive" upon the courts and upon all other persons.
Indeed as Justice Johnston said in that decision, whereas the Executive branch of the Government is
enabled thru its civil and military branches to obtain information about peace and order from every quarter
and corner of the nation, the judicial department, with its very limited machinery can not be in better
position to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the Archipelago.
But even supposing the President's appraisal of the situation is merely prima facie, we see that petitioner
in this litigation has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which the judiciary accords to acts
of the Executive and Legislative Departments of our Government.
C. The petitioner's last contention is that the respondents failed to establish that this son is included within
the terms of the proclamation.
On this topic, respondents' return officially informed the court that Maximino had been arrested and was
under custody for complicity in the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection and sedition against the
Republic of the Philippines. Not having traversed that allegation in time, petitioner must be deemed to
have conceded it.
. . . In the absence of a denial, or appropriate pleading avoiding their effect, averment of facts in
the return will be taken as true and conclusive, regardless of the allegations contained in the
petition; and the only question for determination is whether or not the facts stated in the return, as
a matter of law, authorizes the restraint under investigation. (39 C.J.S., 664-655.)
D. An interesting issue is posed by amici curiae. The Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus except when the public safety requires it, in cases of (1) invasion (2)
insurrection or (3) rebellion.
Article VII Section 10 authorizes the President to suspend the privilege, when public safety requires it, in
cases of (1) invasion (2) insurrection or (3) rebellion or (4) imminent danger thereof.
"Imminent danger," is no cause for suspension under the Bill of Rights. It is under Article VII. To
complicate matters, during the debates of the Constitutional Convention on the Bill of Rights, particularly
the suspension of the writ, the Convention voted down an amendment adding a fourth cause of
suspension: imminent danger of invasion, insurrection of rebellion.
Professor Aruego a member of the Convention, describes the incident as follows:
During the debates on the first draft, Delegate Francisco proposed as an amendment inserting,
as a fourth cause for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus imminent danger of the three
causes included herein. When submitted to a vote for the first time, the amendment was carried.
After this motion for a reconsideration of the amendment was approved, Delegate Orense spoke
against the amendment alleging that it would be dangerous to make imminent danger a ground
for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. In part, he said:
"Gentlemen, this phrase is too ambigous, and in the hands of a President who believes himself
more or less a dictator, it is extremely dangerous, it would be a sword with which he would
behead us.".
In defense of the amendment, Delegate Francisco pointed out that it was intended to make this
part of the bill of rights conform to that part of the draft giving the President the power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus also in the case of an imminent danger of invasion or rebellion. When
asked by Delegate Rafols if the phrase, imminent danger, might not be struck out from this
corresponding provisions under the executive power instead, Delegate Francisco answered:
"Outright, it is possible to eliminate the phrase, imminent danger thereof, in the page I have
mentioned. But I say, going to the essence of referring exclusively to the necessity of including
the words, of imminent danger of one or the other, I wish to say the following: that it should not be
necessary that there exists a rebellion, insurrection or invasion in order that habeas corpus may
be suspended. It should be sufficient that there exists not a danger but an imminent danger, and
the word, imminent, should be maintained. When there exists an imminent danger, the State
requires for its protection and for that of all the citizens the suspension of habeas corpus."
When put to vote for the second time, the amendment was defeated with 72 votes against and 56
votes in favor of the same. (I Aruego's Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 180-181)
Nevertheless when the President's specific powers under Article VII, were taken up there was no
objection to his authority to suspend in case of "imminent danger". (At least we are not informed of any
debate thereon.) Now then, what is the effect of the seeming discrepancy?
Is the prohibition of suspension in the bill of rights to be interpreted as limiting Legislative powers only
not executive measures under section VII? Has article VII (sec. 10) pro tanto modified the bill of rights in
the same manner that a subsequent section of a statue modifies a previous one?
The difference between the two constitutional provisions would seem to be: whereas the bill of
rights impliedly denies suspension in case of imminent dangers of invasion etc., article VII sec.
10 expressly authorizes the President to suspend when there is imminent danger of invasion etc.
The following statements in a footnote in Cooley's Constitutional limitations (8th Ed.) p. 129, appear to be
persuasive:
It is a general rule in the construction of writings, that, a general intent appearing, it shall control
the particular intent; but this rule must sometimes give way, and effect must be given to a
particular intent plainly expressed in one part of a constitution, though apparently opposed to a
general intent deduced from other parts. Warren V. Shuman, 5 Tex. 441. In Quick V. Whitewater
Township, 7 Ind. 570, it was said that if two provisions of a written constitutions are irreconcilably
repugnant, that which is last in order of time and in local position is to be preferred. In Gulf, C. &
S. F. Ry. Co. v. Rambolt, 67 tex. 654, 4 S.W. 356, this rule was recognized as a last resort, but if
the last provision is more comprehensive and specific, it was held that it should be given effect on
that ground.
And in Hoag vs. Washington Oregon Corp. (1915) 147 Pac. Rep., 756 at p. 763 it was said:
It is a familiar rule of construction that, where two provisions of a written Constitution are
repugnant to each other, that which is last in order of time and in local position is to be
preferred. Quick v. White Water Township, 7 Ind., 570; G., C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Rambolt, 67 Tex.
654, 4 S.W. 356. So, even assuming the two clauses discuss are repugnant, the latter must
prevail.
Wherefore in the light of this precedents, the constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case
of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under article VII may not correctly be placed in
doubt.
E. The petitioner insisted in the court below that the suspension should not apply to his son, because the
latter had been arrested and had filed the petition before the Executive proclamation. On this phase of the
controversy, it is our opinion that the order of suspension affects the power of the court's and operates
immediately on all petitions therein pending at the time of its promulgation.
A proclamation of the President suspending the writ of habeas corpus was held valid and efficient
in law to suspend all proceedings pending upon habeas corpus, which was issued and served
prior to the date of the proclamation. Matter of Dunn, D.C. N.Y. 1863, 25 How. Prac. 467, 8 Fed.
Cas. 4,171.
F. Premises considered, the decision of the court a quo refusing to release the prisoner is affirmed,
without costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
[G.R. Nos. 61776 to 61861. March 23, 1984.]

REYNALDO R. BAYOT, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Renato J. Bihasa for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EX POST FACTO LAW; LAWS PROVIDING FOR
SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE OF PUBLIC OFFICERS PENDING TRIAL, NOT IN VIOLATION OF
CONSTITUTION. There is no merit in petitioners contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from
office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the
enactment of ex post facto law.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS; SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE
PENDING TRIAL; APPLICABILITY THEREOF TO ANY OFFICE WHICH THE OFFICER CHARGED MAY
BE HOLDING CASE AT BAR. The claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is
presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The
amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by
the use of the word "office" the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and
not only the particular office under which he was charged.
DECISION
RELOVA, J.:
Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one hundred (100)
counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges
stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit assigned to
the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the
Bureau of Treasury and the Teachers Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of
fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the Teachers Camp resulting in damage to the
government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25, 1978.
In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections
held in January 1980. He was elected.
On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein petitioner and some of
his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases filed against them. Whereupon, appeals were
taken to this Court and the cases are now pending review in G.R. Nos. L-54645-76.
However, on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section
13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The said section, as amended, reads
"Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
had been filed against him."
Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the
accused, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused-public officers pendente lite from their
respective offices or any other public office which they may be occupying pending trial of their cases.
On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order directing the suspension of all the accused including
herein petitioner "from their public positions or from any other public office that they may be holding . . ."
(p. 26, Rollo).
Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the provision of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection
against an ex post facto law" (p. 28, Rollo). The motion was denied by respondent court in a resolution
dated September 6, 1982. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
It is the submission of petitioner that respondent court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in suspending petitioner from office as
Mayor of Amadeo, Cavite, pendente lite because
1. Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, is a penal statute in which case the provision of said Act must be strictly construed in
favor of the accused and against the State;
2. A close perusal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, as well as the proceedings therein of the Batas
Pambansa is absent of the legislative intent to have said Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 applied retroactively;
3. In the supposition that Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is to be applied retroactively, its application would
violate the Constitutional provision against enactment of ex post facto law; and,
4. Petitioner cannot be suspended to the position of which he was duly elected by the people of Amadeo,
Cavite, based on an act which has nothing to do with his present position.
We find no merit in petitioners contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among
the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from office pending action in
court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post
facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the
employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as
penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if
acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24
are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore, the
suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the
amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex
post facto law. Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently
occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory
provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the
word "office" the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he was charged.
ACCORDINGLY, instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19328 December 22, 1989
ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, EPIFANIO VILLEGAS, ARTURO XAVIER, PONCIANO FERNANDO,
ROSENDO DOMINGO and LEONARDO LUCENA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19329 December 22, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK defendants-appellants.
Augusto Kalaw for plaintiffs-appellants.
NARVASA, J.:
These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for resolution on appeal, 1 since the
central issue involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in
Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or
Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor. 2As posed by the referral resolution, 3 the question
is whether or not said statute.
...en cuanto autoriza la confiscacion en favor del Estado de las propiedades ilegalmente
adquiridas por un funcionario o empleado del Gobierno antes de la aprobacion de la
ley ... es nula y anti-constitutional porque:
(a) es una Ley ex-post facto que autoriza la confiscacion de una
propiedad privada adquirida antes de la aprobacion de la ley y obliga el
funcionario o empleado publico a explicar como adquirio sus
propiedades privadas, compeliendo de esta forma a incriminarse a si
mismo, y en cierto modo autoriza la confiscacion de dicha propiedad sin
debido proceso de la ley; y
(b) porque autoriza la confiscacion de inmuebles previamente
hipotecados de buena fe a una persona.
The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes Katigbak.
In their complaint they prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing a complaint against
them for forfeiture of property under the above mentioned R.A. No. 1379; (2) said statute be declared
unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval, or,
alternatively, a new preliminary investigation of the complaint filed against Alejandro Katigbak by NBI
officers be ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak when he was out of the government
service be excluded from forfeiture proceedings; and (4) the NBI officers and the Investigating Prosecutor
(Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay damages.
The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition 4 filed by the Republic of the
Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture
in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by him illegally, in accordance
with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired while Katigbak was holding various positions
in the government, the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau of Customs; and title to some of the
properties were supposedly recorded in the names of his wife and/or son.
The cases were jointly tried. The judgment thereafter rendered 5 (1) dismissed the complaint and the
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 30823, the first action; and (2) as regards Civil Case No. 31080, ordered
"that from the properties (of Katigbak) enumerated in this decision as acquired in 1953,1954 and 1955,
shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in the sum of P100,000.00. 6 The judgment also
declared that the "impatience of the Investigating Prosecutor" during the preliminary inquiry into the
charges filed against Katigbak for violation of R.A. No. 1379 did not amount to such arbitrariness as would
justify annulment of the proceedings since, after all, Katigbak was able to fully ventilate his side of the
case in the trial court; 7 that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its objective not being the enforcement
of a penal liability but the recovery of property held under an implied trust; 8 that with respect to things
acquired through delicts, prescription does not run in favor of the offender; 9 that Alejandro Katigbak may
not be deemed to have been compelled to testify against his will since he took the witness stand
voluntarily. 10 The Katigbaks moved for reconsideration and/or new trial. The Trial Court refused to grant a
new trial but modified its decision by reducing the amount of "P 100,000.00 in the dispositive portion ... to
P80,000.00." 11
Appeal was taken from this verdict of the Court of Appeals by the Katigbaks which appeal, as earlier
stated, was certified to this Court.
No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to the Court a quo. 12 They concern mainly
the character of R.A. No. 1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the penalty of
forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of said R.A. No. 1379
at a time when that law had not yet been enacted. 13
Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on the issue of the learned Trial Judge in
1961, the fact is that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962 clearly and categorically
pronounced by this Court in Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. 14 Citing voluminous authorities, the Court in that case
declared that "forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such ... and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property ... has been held ... to partake of the nature of a penalty"; and that "proceedings for forfeiture of
property although technically civil in form are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be witnesses against, themselves is applicable
thereto.15 The doctrine was reaffirmed and reiterated in 1971 in republic v. Agoncillo. 16 And germane is
the 1977 ruling of the Court in de la Cruz v. Better Living, Inc. 17 involving among others the issue of the
validity and enforceability of a written agreement alleged to be in violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices-Act to the effect that "the provisions of said law
cannot be given retro active effect."
The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and it
being axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be
applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision
condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder.18 But this is precisely what has been done in the case
of the Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be illegal
under R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon "in
favor of the Government in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is, quite obviously,
constitutionally impermissible.
As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal, Leonardo Lucena, should be made answerable
for damages because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080, resulted from a
preliminary investigation which was allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an arbitrary and highhanded
manner, suffice it to state that the trial court found no proof of any intention to persecute or other ill motive
underlying the institution of Civil Case No. 31080. The trial court further found that during the preliminary
investigation by Fiscal Lucena on September 13, 19, 24, 25 and 26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak was
assisted by reputable and competent counsel, Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez and Atty. Antonio Carag. The
mere fact that the preliminary investigation was terminated against the objection of Katigbak's counsel,
does not necessarily signify that he was denied the right to such an investigation. What is more, the Trial
Court's factual conclusion that no malice or bad faith attended the acts of public respondents complained
of, and consequently no award of damages is proper, cannot under established rule be reviewed by this
Court absent any showing of the existence of some recognized exception thereto.
The foregoing pronouncements make unnecessary the determination of the other issues.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo, in so far as it pronounces the acquisitions of property by
the appellants illegal in accordance with Republic Act No. 1379 and imposes a lien thereon in favor of the
Government in the sum of P80,000.00 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, but is AFFIRMED in all
other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994
PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI, M.M.
and HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents.
Rodrigo E. Mallari for petitioner.
Aurora Salva Bautista collaborating for petitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not surrender any individual for
any offense not included in a treaty of extradition. This principle arises from the reality of extradition as a
derogation of sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the host State and a
delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own territory. 1 The act of extraditing amounts to
a "delivery by the State of a person accused or convicted of a crime, to another State within whose
territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive, it was committed and which asks for his surrender with a view
to execute justice." 2 As it is an act of "surrender" of an individual found in a sovereign State to another
State which demands his surrender 3, an act of extradition, even with a treaty rendered executory upon
ratification by appropriate authorities, does not imposed an obligation to extradite on the requested State
until the latter has made its own determination of the validity of the requesting State's demand, in
accordance with the requested State's own interests.
The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising from
treaty. 4 Pursuant to these principles, States enter into treaties of extradition principally for the purpose of
bringing fugitives of justice within the ambit of their laws, under conventions recognizing the right of
nations to mutually agree to surrender individuals within their jurisdiction and control, and for the purpose
of enforcing their respective municipal laws. Since punishment of fugitive criminals is dependent mainly
on the willingness of host State to apprehend them and revert them to the State where their offenses
were committed, 5 jurisdiction over such fugitives and subsequent enforcement of penal laws can be
effectively accomplished only by agreement between States through treaties of extradition.
Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government of the Philippines in
the suppression of crime, 6 the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March
1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty
(30) days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into
force of the Treaty have been complied with. 7
The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of
extraditable offenses between the two countries and (which) embraces crimes punishable by
imprisonment for at least one (1) year. Additionally, the Treaty allows extradition for crimes committed
prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the
requesting State at the time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite. . . "persons

. . . wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an
extraditable offense." 8 A request for extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the
furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the
person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited. 9
In defining the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both
Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least one (1) year, or by a more severe
penalty." 10 For the purpose of the definition, the Treaty states that:
(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting
States place the offense within the same category or denominate the offense by the
same terminology;
(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is
requested shall be taken into account in determining the constituent elements of the
offense. 11
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable crimes in his country.
Extradition proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision
ordering the deportation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence,
petitioner came to this Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation.
Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty
amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. He assails the
trial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in the court below failed
to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the
petitioner before this Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the government
against him.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,
12
are undisputed:
On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign
Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February
19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney
General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of
Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the following indictable crimes:
1. Wright/Orr Matter one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section
81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and
2. Wright/Cracker Matter Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception
contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; one count of attempting to
Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958;
and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which
crimes were allegedly committed in the following manner:
The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section
81 (1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and
co-offender, Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonesty in obtaining $315,250 from
Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round Solicitors (MM7R), secured by a
mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven
Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by

falsely representing that all the relevant legal documents relating to the
mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell.
The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to
Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr.
Wright's and co-offender Mr. John Carson Craker's receiving a total of
approximately 11.2 in commission (including $367,044 in bonus
commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., depending on the volume of
business written, by submitting two hundred fifteen (215) life insurance
proposals, and paying premiums thereon (to the acceptance of the
policies and payment of commissions) to the Australian Mutual Provident
(AMP) Society through the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, of
which respondent is an insurance agent, out of which life proposals none
are in existence and approximately 200 of which are alleged to have
been false, in one or more of the following ways:
( i ) some policy-holders signed up only because they were told the
policies were free (usually for 2 years) and no payments were required.
(ii) some policy-holders were offered cash inducements ($50 or $100) to
sign and had to supply a bank account no longer used (at which a direct
debit request for payment of premiums would apply). These policyholders were also told no payments by them were required.
(iii) some policy-holders were introduced through the "Daily Personnel
Agency", and again were told the policies were free for 2 years as long
as an unused bank account was applied.
(iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist.
The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to
Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr.
Wright's and Mr. Craker's attempting to cause the payment of $2,870.68
commission to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by
submitting one proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society, the policyholder of which does not exist with the end in view of paying the
premiums thereon to insure acceptance of the policy and commission
payments.
The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act
of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr. Craker's signing and swearing
before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the
Legal Profession Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to
the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP
Society and containing three (3) false statements.
Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded
between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on September 10, 1990, extradition
proceedings were initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of
Justice before the respondent court.
In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the petitioner to appear
before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his answer within ten days. In the same order, the
respondent Judge ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of the
petitioner.
The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by
NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the petitioner was arrested
on April 26, 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI
detention cell where petitioner, to date, continue to be held.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.
In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to a Filipina,
Judith David, with whom he begot a child; that he has no case in Australia; that he is not
a fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses charged against him; that he
arrived in the Philippines on February 25, 1990 returned to Australia on March 1, 1990,
then back to the Philippines on April 11, 1990, left the Philippines again on April 24, 1990
for Australia and returned to the Philippines on May 24, 1990, again left for Australia on
May 29, 1990 passing by Singapore and then returned to the Philippines on June 25,
1990 and from that time on, has not left the Philippines; and that his tourist visa has been
extended but he could not produce the same in court as it was misplaced, has neither
produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary working visa.
The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition requested by the
Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet
the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were
sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover,
held that under the provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the
offense in relation to the extradition was committed, provided that the offense happened to be an
offense in the requesting State at the time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed. 13
Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals assigning the
following errors:
I. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT THE
ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED
TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA.
II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING
RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST
FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
III. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE
EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED DO NOT SHOW THAT PETITIONER IS WANTED FOR PROSECUTION IN
AUSTRALIA.
IV. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN MISINTERPRETING THE EXTENDED
STAY OF PETITIONER AS EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S DESIGN TO HIDE AND
EVADE PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
V. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE
EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT SPECIFYING IN HIS ORDER OR
DECISION THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS TO STAND TRIAL
IN AUSTRALIA.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on September 14, 1993 and denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 1993. 14 Reiterating substantially the same assignments of
error which he interposed in the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenges in this petition the validity of the
extradition order issued by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals under the Treaty. Petitioner
vigorously argues that the trial court order violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws. He avers that for the extradition order to be valid, the Australian government should show that
he "has a criminal case pending before a competent court" in that country "which can legally pass
judgement or acquittal or conviction upon him."
Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited, which are relevant to our
determination of the validity of the extradition order, reveals that the trial court committed no error in
ordering the petitioner's extradition. Conformably with Article 2, Section 2 of the said Treaty, the crimes for
which the petitioner was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were
undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been committed. From
its examination of the charges against the petitioner, the trial court correctly determined that the
corresponding offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on
swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively. 15
The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required for extradition are
sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The warrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof,
a statement of each and every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which were alleged
against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to show that a person is wanted for
prosecution under the said article. All of these documentary requirements were dully submitted to the trial
court in its proceedings a quo. For purposes of the compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, the
signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the
documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself. 16 In
conformity with the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, the appropriate documents and annexes were
signed by "an officer in or of the Requesting State" 17 "sealed with . . . (a) public seal of the Requesting
State or of a Minister of State, or of a Department or officer of the Government of the Requesting
State," 18 and "certified by a diplomatic or consular officer of the Requesting State accredited to the
Requested State." 19 The last requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine
Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.
The petitioner's contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a "criminal case pending
before a competent court in the Requesting State which can legally pass judgement of acquittal or
conviction" 20 stretches the meaning of the phrase "wanted for prosecution" beyond the intended by the
treaty provisions because the relevant provisions merely require "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the
warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited." 21 Furthermore, the 'Charge and Warrant of
Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that petitioner is not only wanted for prosecution but has, in fact,
absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is
required only when appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the
Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required
if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. As the Court of
Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to person charged with an
information or a criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the
purpose of evading arrest and prosecution. 22
This brings us to another point raised by the petitioner both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals.
May the extradition of the petitioner who is wanted for prosecution by the government of Australia be
granted in spite of the fact that the offenses for which the petitioner is sought in his country were allegedly
committed prior to the date of effectivity of the Treaty.
Petitioner takes the position that under Article 18 of the Treaty its enforcement cannot be given retroactive
effect. Article 18 states:
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION
This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting
States have notified each other in writing that their respective requirements for the entry
into force of this Treaty have been complied with.
Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it
shall cease to be in force on the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which
notice is given.
We fail to see how the petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive enforcement from this
provision. The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity; the second paragraph
pertains to its termination. Absolutely nothing in the said provision relates to, much less, prohibits
retroactive enforcement of the Treaty.
On the other hand, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that:
4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when
the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was committed, provided that:
(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions
constituting the offense; and
(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the
Requested State at the time of the making of the request for extradition, have constituted
an offense against the laws in force in that state.
Thus, the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly extraditable under Article 2
of the Treaty. They were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were committed, and,
irrespective of the time they were committed, they fall under the panoply of the Extradition Treaty's
provisions, specifically, Article 2 paragraph 4, quoted above.
Does the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws? Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application,
whether civil or criminal. 23 However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist
and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs. Bull 24 concluded that the concept was limited only to
penal and criminal statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that
make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which,
while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes
greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to
make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. 25 "Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has
held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the
accused." 26 This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the
lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the
Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense
or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was
ratified." 27
In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is within its interests to
enter into agreement with the government of Australia regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for
criminal offenses in either country. The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a
Resolution dated September 10, 1990. Having been ratified in accordance with the provision of the 1987
Constitution, the Treaty took effect thirty days after the requirements for entry into force were complied
with by both governments.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, we hereby
AFFIRM the same and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
b. BILL OF ATTAINDER
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch
I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias
"Taba,"respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion

Act, 1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations," and
punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or
remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C.
de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the
Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province
of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government
of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal
means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing
the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New
People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are
present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the
respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an
information was filed, which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the
Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the
Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes
alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA,
MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN
DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the
Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the
Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized,
joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that
BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and
by over acts joined and/or remained as a member and became an officer and/or ranking
leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's
Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the abovenamed accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive
organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by
inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and
take up arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots
to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit,
subversion and/or other illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings
and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the
people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward
this end, the said accused organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or
promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies,
and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and to established in the Philippines a Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with
FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive
and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's
Army, and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose
of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed
revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the
Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a)
aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise
was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is
a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof;
and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared
the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and
dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its
appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be
enacted." 2A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. 3 Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. 7 History in
perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and
it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the
imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder
because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the
freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the
Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and
assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards
of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not
the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly
created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist
Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to
declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of
the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term
"Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not
only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same
purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore
unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
Party ... shall serve
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing
body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee
performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its members.
Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a
member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States
pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses
power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions
affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about
political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it
by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing
that any person who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and
characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall
not hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons
have committed the specified acts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it
designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and
therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal liability members of the
Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S

CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order
by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action
organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC
sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action organization" which the
Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed, dominated, or
controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world
Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to
advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec.
782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder,
reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations
setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although
the Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action
organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that
the Party would always come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its
conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages,
comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon
these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate
means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the
Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under
the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of
proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which
has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are
liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership
devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically
required that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of
the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown
to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to pursue
the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes an element of
"membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to
the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough
to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms
from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the
persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national
economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oathbound society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who
becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared
valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file
with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the
Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of
a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion
against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising
their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further compensation to individuals named in the
Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for
a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been
invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be
"judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to
make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring every
secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person
who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the
Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the
claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound
organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court
relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the
conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two classes of
associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest
tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and
membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare,
and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out
this difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the
included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions
largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated
to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and later said of the other class: "These
organizations and their purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence
for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint
against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others."
Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the association or
organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises activities tending to
the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not
confined to this society;" and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a
recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders
Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges
so that the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies."
The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and
observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated,"
meaning in that state, said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities
have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the
whole justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available
including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of
Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of
the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised putting aside controverted evidence that the
order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features
borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its
memberships was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its
constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence
to the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of its member an oath to
shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively
opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and
an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade
against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race
prejudices; that it was striving for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship
over the administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at times it was taking
into its own hands the punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this
Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we
again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed
struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet
Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the
Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing
the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men
who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of
the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past
conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt.
As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of
its ex post factofeatures. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of
attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that
it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter
of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the
service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective or
appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised,
advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a
member of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which
advises, advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised,
advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United
States of America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein,
thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it
purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We assume
that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it
bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941,
advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or
become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively
were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an
employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were
removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively
operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its
terms it prohibited any further payment of compensationto named individuals or
employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the
statutewas held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them
it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the
penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S.
Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct
which it regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few
organizationswill come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour
which they regard as harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is found to be
engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that
the persons who engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape
regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own present activities, there can be no
complaintof an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly
statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those
who "knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or remain members of the
Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after June 20,
1957, are punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive associationat the
time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability
byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that
such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed by
the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the
Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the
basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the proscription
spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that they
are thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional
values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a substantive
evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in question Congressconducted careful
investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact
an organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal
means, for the purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to
alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines
constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in scope
but international in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to
the freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these findings in
enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed to
takeproper account of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund
elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol
would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable
relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of
intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by rulemaking)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is
intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action
imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan
ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing
them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts those facts which are relevant to the
legislative judgment will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a
rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts those which tie the
legislative enactment to the litigant are to be demonstrated and found according to the
ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if
laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control
Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the
worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives of such world
Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject
them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over
morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We
certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept
them, as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich
Communist organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the United States, but
to the United States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that
thepower of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion
Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require
elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other
value, "forif a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value
can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion
against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing structure of
government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of
governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, which principle,
carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot
within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by
force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof),
Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as
distinguished from nominalmembership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a
subversive organization. 43 For, as has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and
when membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is
engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such
knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks of
"overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the
function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative
declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in
section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must
be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe
overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and
other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight
rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a
metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not
speak in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a
metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely,
"establishing in the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under thecontrol and
domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The
language used by the appellant clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it
should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood.
The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of
the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the
Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the
mild interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force,
violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of association is
infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so
indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerationsof
national security and the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the membership
provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly of
persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any such
governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such
society, group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both,
and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any department or
agencythereof, for the five years next following his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further established that a combination to
promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is
not such association as is protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason
why membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group
engagingin this same forbidden advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection
from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies of selfpreservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the
legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative
judgment as to how that threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis
not to be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have chosen other
methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an
effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order and individual freedom,and when the
legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom
the conflict and its resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which
reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its political
subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of
placing such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any
lien power, shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with allthe
accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or
any local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a
democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but
under an alien democratic power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even an anticommunistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and
SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1
providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally indicates that
the subject matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a
foreign totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by
Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the details of the
Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the
proposed lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the statute will
be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion
Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the
needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive area of
freedom of expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any
prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition to proving such circumstancesas may affect
liability, must establish the following elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the
Philippinesor any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that
thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish
in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the accused joined
such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the
objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a foreign power;
(b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the Communist
Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave this matter to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are
herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Under then Minister ERNESTO R. MACEDA; and Former Government
Officials CATALINO MACARAIG, FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, ANGEL C. ALCALA, BEN
MALAYANG, ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, MARIANO Z. VALERA and ROMULO SAN
JUAN, petitioners, vs. ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PEDRO
DEL CONCHA, andALEJANDRO and RUFO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of the law under which it is granted is
void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending
the due process and the non-impairment clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the
public interest.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the May
29, 2001 Decision[2] and the September 6, 2001 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 46878. The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[4]
The questioned Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
On the other hand, trial courts Decision, which was affirmed by the CA, had disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring that the cancellation of License No. 33 was done without jurisdiction and in gross
violation of the Constitutional right of the petitioners against deprivation of their property rights
without due process of law and is hereby set aside.
2. Declaring that the petitioners right to continue the exploitation of the marble deposits in the
area covered by License No. 33 is maintained for the duration of the period of its life of twenty-
five (25) years, less three (3) years of continuous operation before License No. 33 was cancelled,
unless sooner terminated for violation of any of the conditions specified therein, with due process.
3. Making the Writ of preliminary injunction and the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
issued as permanent.
4. Ordering the cancellation of the bond filed by the Petitioners in the sum of 1 Million.
5. Allowing the petitioners to present evidence in support of the damages they claim to have
suffered from, as a consequence of the summary cancellation of License No. 33 pursuant to the
agreement of the parties on such dates as maybe set by the Court; and
6. Denying for lack of merit the motions for contempt, it appearing that actuations of the
respondents were not contumacious and intended to delay the proceedings or undermine the
integrity of the Court.
No pronouncement yet as to costs.[5]
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
The four (4) petitioners, namely, Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la Concha, Alejandro De La
Concha, and Rufo De Guzman, after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in
the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high
quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain
range.
Having succeeded in discovering said marble deposits, and as a result of their tedious efforts and
substantial expenses, the petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences
Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.
xxx
xxx
xxx
After compliance with numerous required conditions, License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines
in favor of the herein petitioners.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the Department of Energy and
Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners License No. 33 was cancelled by him through his letter to
ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION dated September 6, 1986 for the reasons
stated therein. Because of the aforesaid cancellation, the original petition was filed and later substituted
by the petitioners AMENDED PETITION dated August 21, 1991 to assail the same.
Also after due hearing, the prayer for injunctive relief was granted in the Order of this Court dated
February 28, 1992. Accordingly, the corresponding preliminary writs were issued after the petitioners filed
their injunction bond in the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00).
xxx
xxx
xxx
On September 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the herein questioned decision. [6]
The trial court ruled that the privilege granted under respondents license had already ripened into a
property right, which was protected under the due process clause of the Constitution. Such right was
supposedly violated when the license was cancelled without notice and hearing. The cancellation was
said to be unjustified, because the area that could be covered by the four separate applications of
respondents was 400 hectares. Finally, according to the RTC, Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the
cancellation of the license, was an ex post facto law; as such, it violated Section 3 of Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioners asked whether PD 463 or the Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974 had been violated by the award of the 330.3062 hectares to
respondents in accordance with Proclamation No. 2204. They also questioned the validity of the
cancellation of respondents Quarry License/Permit (QLP) No. 33.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the trial court in toto, the CA held that the grant of the quarry license covering 330.3062
hectares to respondents was authorized by law, because the license was embraced by four (4) separate
applications -- each for an area of 81 hectares. Moreover, it held that the limitation under Presidential
Decree No. 463 -- that a quarry license should cover not more than 100 hectares in any given province -was supplanted by Republic Act No. 7942,[7] which increased the mining areas allowed under PD 463.
It also ruled that the cancellation of respondents license without notice and hearing was tantamount
to a deprivation of property without due process of law. It added that under the clause in the Constitution
dealing with the non-impairment of obligations and contracts, respondents license must be respected by
the State.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration:
(1) [W]hether or not QLP No. 33 was issued in blatant contravention of Section 69, P.D. No. 463; and
(2) whether or not Proclamation No. 84 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is valid. The corollary
issue is whether or not the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law applies to Proclamation No.
84[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has merit.
First Issue:
Validity of License
Respondents contend that the Petition has no legal basis, because PD 463 has already been
repealed.[10] In effect, they ask for the dismissal of the Petition on the ground of mootness.
PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources through licenses, concessions or leases. [11] While these arrangements were provided
under the 1935[12] and the 1973[13] Constitutions, they have been omitted by Section 2 of Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.[14]
With the shift of constitutional policy toward full control and supervision of the State over natural
resources, the Court in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr. [15] declared the provisions of
PD 463 as contrary to or violative of the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution. The said provisions
dealt with the lease of mining claims; quarry permits or licenses covering privately owned or public lands;
and other related provisions on lease, licenses and permits.
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the new constitutional mandate. It has
repealed or amended all laws, executive orders, presidential decrees, rules and regulations -- or parts
thereof -- that are inconsistent with any of its provisions. [16]
It is relevant to state, however, that Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply
retroactively to a license, concession or lease granted by the government under the 1973 Constitution or
before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. [17] As noted in Miners Association of
the Philippines v. Factoran Jr., the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission [18] emphasized the
intent to apply the said constitutional provision prospectively.
While RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with its own, it
nonetheless respects previously issued valid and existing licenses, as follows:
SECTION 5.
Mineral Reservations. When the national interest so requires, such as when there
is a need to preserve strategic raw materials for industries critical to national development, or certain
minerals for scientific, cultural or ecological value, the President may establish mineral reservations upon
the recommendation of the Director through the Secretary. Mining operations in existing mineral
reservations and such other reservations as may thereafter be established, shall be undertaken by the
Department or through a contractor: Provided, That a small scale-mining cooperative covered by Republic
Act No. 7076 shall be given preferential right to apply for a small-scale mining agreement for a maximum
aggregate area of twenty-five percent (25%) of such mineral reservation,subject to valid existing
mining/quarrying rights as provided under Section 112 Chapter XX hereof. All submerged lands within
the contiguous zone and in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines are hereby declared to be
mineral reservations.
x x x
xxx
xxx
SECTION 7.
Periodic Review of Existing Mineral Reservations. The Secretary shall periodically
review existing mineral reservations for the purpose of determining whether their continued existence is
consistent with the national interest, and upon his recommendation, the President may, by proclamation,
alter or modify the boundaries thereof or revert the same to the public domain without prejudice to prior
existing rights.
SECTION 18.
Areas Open to Mining Operations. Subject to any existing rights or reservations
and prior agreements of all parties, all mineral resources in public or private lands, including timber or
forestlands as defined in existing laws, shall be open to mineral agreements or financial or technical
assistance agreement applications. Any conflict that may arise under this provision shall be heard and
resolved by the panel of arbitrators.
SECTION 19.
Areas Closed to Mining Applications. -- Mineral agreement or financial or technical
assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed:
(a)
In military and other government reservations, except upon prior written clearance by the
government agency concerned;
(b)
Near or under public or private buildings, cemeteries, archeological and historic sites, bridges,
highways, waterways, railroads, reservoirs, dams or other infrastructure projects, public or private works
including plantations or valuable crops, except upon written consent of the government agency or private
entity concerned;
(c)
In areas covered by valid and existing mining rights;
(d)
In areas expressly prohibited by law;
(e)
In areas covered by small-scale miners as defined by law unless with prior consent of the smallscale miners, in which case a royalty payment upon the utilization of minerals shall be agreed upon by the
parties, said royalty forming a trust fund for the socioeconomic development of the community concerned;
and
(f)
Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness areas, mangrove
forests, mossy forests, national parks, provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and
bird sanctuaries as defined by law and in areas expressly prohibited under the National Integrated
Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under Republic Act No. 7586, Department Administrative Order No. 25,
series of 1992 and other laws.
SECTION 112.
Non-impairment of Existing Mining/ Quarrying Rights. All valid and existing mining
lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases pending renewal, mineral production-sharing agreements
granted under Executive Order No. 279, at the date of effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid, shall not
be impaired, and shall be recognized by the Government: Provided, That the provisions of Chapter XIV
on government share in mineral production-sharing agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this
Act shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or contractor unless the mining lessee or
contractor indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of said provisions: Provided,
further, That no renewal of mining lease contracts shall be made after the expiration of its term: Provided,
finally, That such leases, production-sharing agreements, financial or technical assistance agreements
shall comply with the applicable provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
SECTION 113.
Recognition of Valid and Existing Mining Claims and Lease/Quarry Application.
Holders of valid and existing mining claims, lease/quarry applications shall be given preferential rights
to enter into any mode of mineral agreement with the government within two (2) years from the
promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing this Act. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 3(p) of RA 7942 defines an existing mining/quarrying right as a valid and subsisting mining
claim or permit or quarry permit or any mining lease contract or agreement covering a mineralized area
granted/issued under pertinent mining laws. Consequently, determining whether the license of
respondents falls under this definition would be relevant to fixing their entitlement to the rights and/or
preferences under RA 7942. Hence, the present Petition has not been mooted.
Petitioners submit that the license clearly contravenes Section 69 of PD 463, because it exceeds the
maximum area that may be granted. This incipient violation, according to them, renders the license
void ab initio.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the license was validly granted, because it was covered
by four separate applications for areas of 81 hectares each.
The license in question, QLP No. 33, [19] is dated August 3, 1982, and it was issued in the name of
Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation. The terms of the license allowed the corporation to extract
and dispose of marbleized limestone from a 330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel, Bulacan. The license
is, however, subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463, the governing law at the time it was granted;
as well as to the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. [20] By the same token, Proclamation No.
2204 -- which awarded to Rosemoor the right of development, exploitation, and utilization of the mineral
site -- expressly cautioned that the grant was subject to existing policies, laws, rules and regulations. [21]
The license was thus subject to Section 69 of PD 463, which reads:
Section 69. Maximum Area of Quarry License Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 hereof, a
quarry license shall cover an area of not more than one hundred (100) hectares in any one province and
not more than one thousand (1,000) hectares in the entire Philippines. (Italics supplied)
The language of PD 463 is clear. It states in categorical and mandatory terms that a quarry license,
like that of respondents, should cover a maximum of 100 hectares in any given province. This law neither
provides any exception nor makes any reference to the number of applications for a license. Section 69 of
PD 463 must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Where the law is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. [22]
Moreover, the lower courts ruling is evidently inconsistent with the fact that QLP No. 33 was issued
solely in the name of Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, rather than in the names of the
four individual stockholders who are respondents herein. It likewise brushes aside a basic postulate that
a corporation has a separate personality from that of its stockholders. [23]
The interpretation adopted by the lower courts is contrary to the purpose of Section 69 of PD
463. Such intent to limit, without qualification, the area of a quarry license strictly to 100 hectares in any
one province is shown by the opening proviso that reads: Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14
hereof x x x. The mandatory nature of the provision is also underscored by the use of the
word shall. Hence, in the application of the 100-hectare-per-province limit, no regard is given to the size
or the number of mining claims under Section 14, which we quote:
SECTION 14.
Size of Mining Claim. -- For purposes of registration of a mining claim under this
Decree, the Philippine territory and its shelf are hereby divided into meridional blocks or quadrangles of
one-half minute (1/2) of latitude and longitude, each block or quadrangle containing area of eighty-one
(81) hectares, more or less.
A mining claim shall cover one such block although a lesser area may be allowed if warranted by
attendant circumstances, such as geographical and other justifiable considerations as may be determined
by the Director: Provided, That in no case shall the locator be allowed to register twice the area allowed
for lease under Section 43 hereof. (Italics supplied)
Clearly, the intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented by ruling that a license may cover an
area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing several applications. Such ruling would
indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by the law.
Second Issue:
Validity of Proclamation No. 84

Petitioners also argue that the license was validly declared a nullity and consequently withdrawn or
terminated. In a letter dated September 15, 1986, respondents were informed by then Minister Ernesto
M. Maceda that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that
there was no more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter
reason, they added, was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public
interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to
the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.
They also contend that Section 74 of PD 463 would not apply, because Minister Macedas letter did
not cancel or revoke QLP No. 33, but merely declared the latters nullity. They further argue that
respondents waived notice and hearing in their application for the license.
On the other hand, respondents submit that, as provided for in Section 74 of PD 463, their right to
due process was violated when their license was cancelled without notice and hearing. They likewise
contend that Proclamation No. 84 is not valid for the following reasons: 1) it violates the clause on the
non-impairment of contracts; 2) it is an ex post facto law and/or a bill of attainder; and 3) it was issued by
the President after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
This Court ruled on the nature of a natural resource exploration permit, which was akin to the present
respondents license, in Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation v. Balite Portal Mining
Cooperative,[24] which held:
x x x. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences
a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest
so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys
natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining
exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the
non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its allencompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of
the general welfare.[25]
This same ruling had been made earlier in Tan v. Director of Forestry [26] with regard to a timber
license, a pronouncement that was reiterated in Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary,[27] the pertinent
portion of which reads:
x x x. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And
it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]. [28] (Italics supplied)
In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents license may be revoked or rescinded by
executive action when the national interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. [29] Respondents themselves acknowledge
this condition of the grant under paragraph 7 of QLP No. 33, which we quote:
7. This permit/license may be revoked or cancelled at any time by the Director of Mines and GeoSciences when, in his opinion public interests so require or, upon failure of the permittee/licensee to
comply with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, as well as with the terms and conditions specified herein; Provided, That if a
permit/license is cancelled, or otherwise terminated, the permittee/licensee shall be liable for all unpaid
rentals and royalties due up to the time of the termination or cancellation of the permit/license[.] [30] (Italics
supplied)
The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as owner of all
mineral resources. That determination was based on policy considerations formally enunciated in the
letter dated September 15, 1986, issued by then Minister Maceda and, subsequently, by the President
through Proclamation No. 84. As to the exercise of prerogative by Maceda, suffice it to say that while the
cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in the director of mines and geo-sciences, the latter is
subject to the formers control as the department head. We also stress the clear prerogative of the
Executive Department in the evaluation and the consequent cancellation of licenses in the process of its
formulation of policies with regard to their utilization. Courts will not interfere with the exercise of that
discretion without any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. [31]
Moreover, granting that respondents license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by the State in the
exercise of police power.[32] The exercise of such power through Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord
with jura regalia, which reserves to the State ownership of all natural resources. [33] This Regalian doctrine
is an exercise of its sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and of the patrimony of the
nation, the mineral deposits of which are a valuable asset. [34]
Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. As pointed
out earlier, respondents license is not a contract to which the protection accorded by the non-impairment
clause may extend.[35] Even if the license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws and a
reservation of police power are deemed read into it, because it concerns a subject impressed with public
welfare.[36] As it is, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. [37]
We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative
act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. [38] Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity [39] is
certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment within the
purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. There are six
recognized instances when a law is considered as such: 1) it criminalizes and punishes an action that
was done before the passing of the law and that was innocent when it was done; 2) it aggravates a crime
or makes it greater than it was when it was committed; 3) it changes the punishment and inflicts one that
is greater than that imposed by the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; 4) it alters the legal
rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon a less or different testimony than that required by the
law at the time of the commission of the offense; 5) it assumes the regulation of civil rights and
remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or a deprivation of a right as a consequence of
something that was considered lawful when it was done; and 6) it deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he or she become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or an acquittal or the proclamation of an amnesty. [40] Proclamation No. 84 does not fall under
any of the enumerated categories; hence, it is not an ex post facto law.
It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.
Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by
canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal in character.
[41]
Finally, it is stressed that at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987,
she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. [42] Section 1
of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative
power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is
also explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. [43]
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby GRANTED and the appealed Decision of the Court of
Appeals SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

18 Second Jeopardy Be For Same Offence - Bill of Attainder

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18 Second Jeopardy Be For Same Offence - Bill of Attainder

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2.

THE 2nd JEOPARDY MUST BE FOR THE SAME OFFENSE

March 22, 1950

CONRADO CARMELO, petitioner-appellant,

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415

The Instant Appeal. -

Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to Manila for resale.

The travel agencies give me some amount of commission.

What are the names of these agencies which you know?

Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International.

Do you have any document to prove that it is registered?

Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas worker-applicants?

Do you remember some of them?

Proposed appointment or special power of attorney;

Clearances of the proposed representative or agent from NBI;

A sworn or verified statement by the designating or appointing person or company

the estafacharge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision

From 5 years, 5 months

JUANITO T. MERENCILLO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES April 13, 2007

THE FACTS ESTABLISHED

Section 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement:

xxx (emphasis supplied)

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share

he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit;

the offender is a public officer;

the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or

such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public

October 12, 2009 CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,

raised therein had already been passed upon by [the SB 4 th Divisions]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

The petitioner concludes that:

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

In August 1986, the Kadiwa Center IV closed, and NFA/KADIWA vacated

1. Plaintiff-appellee hereby reduces its total claims in the complaint to

2. Upon receipt of the payment of the aforesaid sum, plaintiff-appellee shall

3. the parties agree to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 18,288 of

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court approves

Undaunted, DLPC filed a criminal complaint [70] against Diaz

WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs complaint and defendants

Diaz, et al. relied on the following grounds:

IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO PROSECUTION AND NO

(b) IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR

BY IGNORING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE

(d) BY IGNORING THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MANY ALLEGATIONS

BY IGNORING THE FACT THAT DAVAO LIGHTS USE OF THE

BY IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE VARYING DISCOUNT

BY BEING OBLIVIOUS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THERE WAS

BY IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT

IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS (SIC) DID NOT ACT

For their part, DLPC, et al. alleged the following:

Immediately issue a temporary restraining order ex-parte precluding

a) The sum of P10,000,000.00 as moral damages anddamages to its

The cost of suit.[90]