Ralph Lillie Synthesis

The Problem of Synthesis in Biology
Author(s): Ralph S. Lillie

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan., 1942), pp. 59-71
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
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The Problem of Synthesis in

Biology'
BY
RALPH S. LILLIE
HE problem of synthesis in biology ma

reference to the evolutionary origin of
organisms in past time, a process not di
)) observable but conceivably reconstruct
broad outline: thus to the biochemist this evolu-
tion may appear as the evolution of the special
biological compounds, to the psychologist as the evolution of

"mind"-or at least of types of behavior. Or the problem may
refer to the synthesis of the individual animal or plant, a process
of construction which typically starts from a detached portion of a
parent organism, such as an egg or seed; this is the problem of

individual development or ontogeny and is not essentially different from the general problem of growth. But it is clear that the
processes of phyletic evolution and of ontogeny must be considered together, since evolutionary history is in reality the history
of a succession of individual organisms, each developing from its
germ, i.e. of ontogenies; and the ontogenetic process, so faithfully
repeated in each individual as it comes into existence, is itself a
product of evolution, having originated (apparently by slow and
tentative efforts) in the remote past. The succession of individuals has undergone progressive diversification, culminating in
1 Paper contributed to a Symposium on Philosophic Procedures in the Arts and Sciences,
at the Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration of the University of Chicago, September 24, I94I.
59
60 Synthesis in Biology
the present condition. We may describe our problem, then, as
the problem of the factors underlying the synthesis of a highly
special process, that by which the diffusely distributed nonliving materials and energies of nature are brought together in a
special kind of unification and transformed into a living organism.
The naturalist is interested in the question: how far are scientific methods competent to give a true account of the factors
underlying the origin of the living world and its evolutionary
diversification? The answer to this question would involve a
critical examination of the nature of scientific procedure, a somewhat special field of human activity which may be considered as a
sub-department of philosophical procedure, having the aim of
determining those methods of observation, thought and action
which have a proved reliability in the ascertainment of truth.
Probably most scientists would define truth as a body of con-
ceptions which have a dependable correspondence with the

actualities of experience. Such a definition might not satisfy
everyone, since it seems clear that not all reality is experienceable

by human beings; yet it is a special characteristic of science that
its appeal is always to experience, actual or possible; atoms and
the other side of the moon are conceived in visual images. The
scientist may or may not be aware of the deficiencies inherent in
any symbolic representation of nature, yet he is committed to such
representation and tries honestly to do his best by it. Only in
his case the symbols, verbal, mathematical, or other, stand for
something experienceable and verifiable.
There is one feature of the scientific representation of nature
which is often overlooked by scientific thinkers and practitioners.
Immediately experienced events or facts are in scientific description divested of their individual character, their peculiar and often
disconcerting uniqueness or particularity, and are exhibited in
their generic aspect, as illustrating or exemplifying persistent or
stable conditions, factors, or principles. The emphasis is on

constancy, i.e., on stability. Briefly we may say that the en-
deavor is to resolve single facts into constant factors and their

combinations; the singular and transient quality of the individual
event is disregarded, and attention is focused on the stable or
R. S. Lillie 61
recurrent2 conditions and facto

which make it possible. Scienti
specialists in universals; they
Platonists. Thus in the scientif
phonographic record, the radio
consists in the exact description

of the constant factors which u
possible their indefinite repet

able factors include the specia
constant physical conditions de
intensity of sounds, the general
so on. But we are aware that

instance of synthesis; its very
stancy or invariance of the fa
on the quantitative exactitude
combined. It is this exactitu
mathematical formulation. Ac
repeated occurrence of single
perhaps the most conspicuous f
existence of language shows-is
(or "subsistence") of a stable sy
determining conditions and fac
aims at giving an account.
But if we are realists we cann
thus repeated has its own un
though science, as science, may
particularity. An importan
considering the problem of synt

it is necessary to bear in mind th
a highly individualized, even c

under appropriate circumstan
2 Repetition implies the persistence or sta
event of the class considered. Verifiabilit

uance) is possible only for persistent facts
by stable factors). Single transient event
not directly verifiable. But any such si
deposit of more or less permanent conditio

type, even though, individually or histori
stable conditions; and these conditions, having once arisen, may
then by virtue of their persistence impart a common character
to an indefinite number of subsequent single events. In such a
case the constant or generic character has its origin in individual
action. The originating activities or factors may have been
special, unique, or arbitrary, yet if they give rise to conditions

which are permanent they must be considered as factors in all
later events into which those conditions enter; and as such they
become subject-matter for science. This general principle may
be illustrated from human history as well as from natural sciences
like geology or astronomy; one man may make his impress on a

whole historical epoch, as Augustus did in Rome; the activity
of a creative genius may determine the character of an art or
science through a long subsequent period, as Newton did in

physics or Bach in music. The adjective Shakespearian has had
its definite meaning since the i8th century. In psychoanalysis
various stable characteristics of patients are referred to accidental
events of early life. Such considerations are of fundamental

importance in relation to our general problem of synthesis;
actually we find present or established in the natural world many

conditions which can be accounted for only as the products of
highly special types of individual action. If these conditions are
stable, they become factors in all subsequent cases of natural
activity whenever and wherever they are present, and science
must then take account of them. In general, whatever is permanent is subject to scientific formulation; and any permanent
factor, no matter how it originates, may furnish a foundation for
later synthesis. The relations between individuation and synthesis are seen to be intimate and reciprocal.
Science is usually regarded as nothing if not logical; and in fact
logic (which may be unconscious) forms an essential part of its
procedure. The scientific world is a law-abiding world; the aim
of the scientist is to discover the laws of nature, and the essence
of a law is its constancy. Scientific laws when given numerical
expression are called "constants"; the quantum constant, the

gravitational constant, the radiation constant c, are examples.
The logical quality of science is seen in its effort to describe
R. S. Lillie 63
phenomena in terms of constants; scien

individual case into constant componen
interconnected in constant (i.e., mathem
These interconnections may be static or
be active or causative, as seen in the
pendence of successive contiguous even
distinguish in science between static

familiar examples are the equilibrium
constants of chemistry. Science may no

origin of these constants; it is intereste
strable actuality in present nature and
determine the special character of singl
isms we meet with many constant char
account for completely; such (e.g.) as th
odor of a particular flower. We regard
evolved; their special detail is referred
this process, being in the past, is now

complex constants,'as stable facts in pr
accepted as actualities and formulated i
as possible. Since synthesis depends
many constants have their origin in in
connection between individuation and sy

Natural science is a realism. Natural constants of all kinds
are regarded by the naturalist as having their own independent

existence in nature; it is only secondarily (as in their formal or
other representation) that they are creations of the human mind.
Empirically ("operationally") we find that the natural world,
while its detail is continually changing, is pervaded by certain
conditions and factors that do not change-at least not appreciably. These furnish a constant support or substratum to everything that happens; in science they are the fundamental con-
stants. Even mathematical constants are referred by the
naturalist to observation; certain constant properties of everything that is extended in space or time, as well as of the extended
medium in which external things are set, are described and

formulated in geometry. Such geometrical characters, since
they are always present, form the basis for a large part of extra-
64
Synthesis in Biology
polation, including prediction, which assumes the stable continuance of present conditions in the future. Purely spatial
characters would thus correspond to static constants of the most
general type. Analogously, certain universal constants of
change must be regarded as determining the rate of all special
instances of change; these would be the fundamental kinetic
constants, such as the velocity of light and the quantum constant,

which control and limit the rate at which all natural events
happen. The fundamental constants underlie all cases of evolu-
tion or synthesis, and the innumerable secondary or derived
constants of nature have these primary constants as a basis.

Synthesis, then, including biological synthesis, has, like other
natural processes and transformations, its basis in constant conditions. Any durable fact in nature, including life, must be based
on durable foundations; living and non-living systems are alike
in this respect. But we find in living organisms many constant
physical conditions which are absent in non-living systems, e.g.,
constant features of chemical activity or metabolism, by which
special compounds, such as proteins, are continually being formed.
These and many other stable characters of living beings are the
products of a steadily maintained physiological activity the
physical basis of which is synthetic chemical action. Such considerations show that biological constants are based on a complex
sequence or hierarchy of interdependent physical constants; they
are derived or composite constants; nevertheless, in their property
of stability or invariance, they have the general character of

physical constants and may be treated as such. As I have indicated, these secondary constants are products of synthesis and
may form the basis for novel instances of synthesis.
Much of biological investigation is analytical and is conducted

in the same manner as physical investigation, with a similar regard for quantitative exactitude and mathematical representation.
By many physiologists living organisms are regarded simply as
physical systems occurring in external nature and presenting
material for physical and chemical investigation-complex in
their character, it is true, but not otherwise essentially different

from non-living systems. Nevertheless, we all feel that there is a
R. S. Lillie 65
profound difference between living and
contrast cannot be explained away, a
referred to something deep-seated in na
physical characterization. Human bein
isms, and we know from direct experien
themselves sources of determination which are not describable
in physical terms; these are the conscious, volitional, psychological

factors in vital action which, although associated with physical
action, have their own peculiar qualities and characters. Accordingly in biology there are psychological as well as physiological
sciences. In the purely physical sciences nature is considered

as a system of phenomena distributed in an external space and
time. But the living organism, at least man, has psychical as
well as physical characters; and in recognition of this fact it would
seem more scientific to describe such an organism as a psychophysical system rather than a purely physical system. Psychol-
ogy, equally with physiology, is a biological science. Feeling
and volition are facts, observed introspectively it is true, although
they may have physical criteria which are the special concern of
the physiologist. These physical characters appear to the
behaviorist to account for a large part of animal activity; hence

to attribute psychic characters to lower animals, or to plants, may
seem to many biologists an unjustifiable extrapolation. It may

even be regarded as scientifically meaningless to do so, since a
science based on verification requires demonstration to many
impartial observers. Yet science must face the problem of
accounting, so far as possible, for the actually existing characters
of living beings. This problem has both scientific and philo-
sophical aspects. How is it best to be attacked with the hope of

progress, if not of complete solution? (We are assuming that we
know what we mean by the words "problem" and "solution"

when thus applied.)
We return to the problem of synthesis in nature, with special
reference to the synthesis of living beings. Since this problem
is a highly general one, attention should first be directed to the
most general features of living organisms, more especially in their
relation to the general features of non-living nature, from which
the living part of nature is regarded as having evolved. It is
easy to lose oneself in detail; the existing detail, however, has
arisen in a nature having certain definite permanent characters.
Living organisms represent detail of a highly special kind; they
are products of a prolonged evolution, apparently confined to
special localities and epochs. In the broad physical view, in
which nature is regarded as an externality, continuous in space

and time, the living organism, like everything else, appears as a
differentiation inside this continuum. It arises locally within an
environment, and observation shows that it is a product of accretion, of a coalescence and integration of elements originally distributed without settled order in that environment. Empirically
each living being appears as a highly organized arrangement or
synthesis of natural materials and energies. But its material
components, down to atoms and beyond, are also accretions; the

same may be said of the ultimate subatomic units (electrons,
etc.) which physically represent local concentrations of energy.
In the most general view, then, the living organism is to be regarded as an accretion or concrescence, formed by synthesis from
other accretions. Each component accretion has its own stable
structure or organization; in the mode of expression introduced by
Professor Whitehead, there is organism within organism. This

conception emphasizes the unified and stable character of each
component unit entering into the total accretion; philosophically
it corresponds to a monadism.
Physiological analysis, when carried to its furthest extreme,
resolves the living organism into an arrangement of constant
physical units which interact in constant ways. But the problem
of "why" and "how" the units in the course of evolution have
coalesced to form living beings does not appear to be solved by
purely analytic methods. We return to our special biological
problem of synthesis and we ask again the question: how far can
scientific method aid us in solving such a problem of synthesis or
creation? Put in general terms, this question has reference to
the factors of orderly integration in natural process. These factors are demonstrably physical in part. Observation shows the
living germ collecting material and energy from its surroundings,
R. S. Lillie 67
and from these and their transformations
of constant structure and activities. P
partial account of the process, and this

true, i.e., verifiable, so far as it goes. Ju
assembly line in a factory synthesizes a
materials fed into it (note the biologica
(a piece of living machinery), if given t
thesizes a living animal or plant true
the constancy of the outcome is referred

components and of their interactions. I
properties are brought together in co

ordination, a constant product inevit
statement offer, in principle at least, a c

problem of organic development? Does
simply on the discovery of finer and fin
detail and its elucidation ?
We may grant that underlying organic development there is a

definite sequence of interlocked physical processes; but why has
this sequence such a character as to give an eventual product with
the characteristics of (say) a human being? I have just referred
to the analogy between natural creation and human creation. If
we are realistic we note that while synthesis in the human arts
requires constancy in the physical processes involved, it also

requires a pre-existent design or stable pattern of some kind.
Integration depends on the character of that design, which constitutes a stable controlling or regulative factor; and an account
of the origin of the design is required. Now in our experience,
i.e. empirically, a design is an essentially mental construction or
unification; undeniably it has its physical side also, without which
it fails both in its inception and its realization, but it does not
appear possible to account for its special character as design on
the basis of its physical side alone. A living organism, such as a
man, is not merely a physical but a psychical system; each human
being is highly individualized, and hence only partly characterizable in general terms; he is also the seat of consciousness and
directive activity or will. If the essential characters of such a

higher organism are in fact characters of living organisms in
general, a fully developed general biology would require an
account of the living organism as a psychical, as well as physical,
entity or system. Physical science would give only a partia
view of the factors determining its properties and activities, but

so also would a purely psychical science; a unification of the two
would be required.
The phrase, the place of life in nature, may stand as defining
the fundamental problem of biology; an alternative expression
would be the place of the psychophysical in the natural world, or

of the psychic in the physical world. Each living portion of the
external world, made evident to our conscious perception chiefly
through vision-a function activated by physical radiation and

based on photochemical reactions-, would on this view have
a correlative side or background not externally perceptible, but
of which each higher biological individual has a direct awarenes
through his feeling and his volition.
It is of course, a serious question how far we can generalize

on the essential or intimate character of a widely distributed
natural process such as vital action from our experience as human

beings, i.e., as conscious centers attached to a physical organism
of highly special type. At first sight physical science (which
includes physiology) would seem to offer a more secure basis for

general biology than psychology, and in fact many psychologists
are at present frankly physical and physiological in their pro-
cedure and outlook. The world of physics has the advantage
of being open to exact experimentation; results are demonstrable

to many observers; and because of this basis in collective experi-
ence there is relative freedom from bias and consensus is easier.
No one questions the validity and value of physical procedure in

biology. Yet much has been written, especially in recent years,
of the abstract character of physics; as a portrayal of nature it is
incomplete; while it is a realism, it is not the whole of realism.
The impartial study of living organisms from all sides gives
access to a field of natural activity and determination which is

only partly describable in physical terms. If we view the world
in the traditional manner of physics, as a publicly displayed

system of objects seen from the standpoint of a localized observer,
R. S. Lillie
69
we see everywhere in its general constitution evidence of both

casual activity and directed (i.e., integrated) activity. In physi-
cal science the random or hap-hazard motions of molecules
(summed statistically) are regarded as the condition underlying

the thermodynamic laws; and in human experience (at the other
end of the scale) we find that even our most carefully considered
voluntary actions are continually being marred or thwarted by
the intrusion of accidental factors. The casual is the enemy
of the vital. Yet in spite of the omnipresence of random activity,

nature has in fact achieved a high degree of diversification; it
contains innumerable integrated systems of many grades, which
include living organisms. The presence of a steadily acting
directive element in natural process seems to be thus indicated,

manifesting itself in synthesis, individuation, creation of all kinds,
which are just as truly facts as are the purely fortuitous events
of nature. It is evident that each separate center of natural
activity has its own individual or internal factors of determination, as distinguished from the external or environmental factors;
and the contrast of the vital with the casual seems to be somehow
connected with this fact of individuation and inner determina-
tion. Many theoretical biologists, from Aristotle on, have seen

in the characteristic integration of living organisms, as exhibited
in their development and their maintenance of constant character
during a lifetime, the expression of factors of the same essential
kind as those of which we are directly aware in conscious or mental
life. In mental activity integration is the characteristic feature;

the apperception of Kant and the Gestalt of the modern psychologists have reference to the same essential fact of conscious or
psychic unification.3 Mental integration is closely associated

with neural or physiological integration, as we are aware in
performing any feat of skill that requires attention. General
facts of this kind may be considered as evidence of the existence
of special factors of integration in nature, active through the
physical and yet having a status of their own not entirely refer3 The term "prehension" (or "apprehension"), as applied to the mental unification of
separate conscious elements, has its physical parallel in "concretion" or "concrescence,"
terms with many applications in biology.
able to the physical. It is true that many physiologists refer
the biological integration to purely physical factors; these factors

are always present and are accessible to controlled experimentation and demonstration. It has even been maintained by serious
scientific men that in conscious purposive integration the physica
is primary and determinative, the mental secondary and "epi

phenomenal"; but this view seems now immature and outdated.
We must admit that the integration observed in many natural
activities and products is quite unintelligible apart from mental
control; take the case of a work of art or any other highly integrated human creation; in such a case the mental synthesis
demonstrably precedes and determines the physical synthesis.
Can we reason from conscious human synthesis to other types
of biological synthesis? There is no question here of infringing
physical conditions; this is not done by the artist; both his medium
and his own activity are subject to definite physical conditions,

to which he must adjust himself. Such considerations explain
why any natural creative action when examined scientifically
presents to the abstract physical view the appearance of a closely
interwoven network or sequence of physical causation. Un-
doubtedly this aspect is a partial index of the reality; but it also

seems clear from direct or inner experience that such an account
of the creative process would be an incomplete one. And it would
be unscientific as well as unphilosophical to regard it as complete.
If, then, we regard the integrative processes of living organisms

as highly evolved instances of a type of process which everywhere
pervades nature, and consider special acts of human creation as
having their foundation in factors common to all instances of
natural integration, we reach the conclusion that the sharp
separation of physical and psychical is not possible to a comprehensive theoretical biology. Such a separation is a feat of the
abstracting intellect, and does not correspond to the natural
reality, where factors of both kinds exist and act in a unity. In

many natural activities the physical appears to act automatically
in complete independence of the mental; but in others the psychic
factor is dominant; the latter group would include the cases

classed as teleological. In biological synthesis physical action
R. S. Lillie 71
takes on special forms which in man
ground and direction. For the so
problems of biology it seems necess

the psychological study of living or
in hand. But a more detailed consideration of the theoretical
implications of such an outlook would outrun the limits of our

present discussion.
University of Chicago.

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The Problem of Synthesis in Biology

Author(s): Ralph S. Lillie

The Problem of Synthesis in

HE problem of synthesis in biology ma

tion may appear as the evolution of the special

biological compounds, to the psychologist as the evolution of

parent organism, such as an egg or seed; this is the problem of

diversification? The answer to this question would involve a

ceptions which have a dependable correspondence with the

everyone, since it seems clear that not all reality is experienceable

stable conditions, factors, or principles. The emphasis is on

deavor is to resolve single facts into constant factors and their

event is disregarded, and attention is focused on the stable or

recurrent2 conditions and facto

phonographic record, the radio

consists in the exact description

possible their indefinite repet

so on. But we are aware that

combined. It is this exactitu

thus repeated has its own un

though science, as science, may

considering the problem of synt

a highly individualized, even c

2 Repetition implies the persistence or sta

event of the class considered. Verifiabilit

by stable factors). Single transient event

not directly verifiable. But any such si

deposit of more or less permanent conditio

action. The originating activities or factors may have been

special, unique, or arbitrary, yet if they give rise to conditions

like geology or astronomy; one man may make his impress on a

science through a long subsequent period, as Newton did in

various stable characteristics of patients are referred to accidental

events of early life. Such considerations are of fundamental

actually we find present or established in the natural world many

expression are called "constants"; the quantum constant, the

phenomena in terms of constants; scien

be active or causative, as seen in the

pendence of successive contiguous even

distinguish in science between static

constants of chemistry. Science may no

this process, being in the past, is now

connection between individuation and sy

are regarded by the naturalist as having their own independent

stants. Even mathematical constants are referred by the

medium in which external things are set, are described and

general type. Analogously, certain universal constants of

change must be regarded as determining the rate of all special

instances of change; these would be the fundamental kinetic

constants, such as the velocity of light and the quantum constant,

happen. The fundamental constants underlie all cases of evolu-

tion or synthesis, and the innumerable secondary or derived

constants of nature have these primary constants as a basis.

products of a steadily maintained physiological activity the

of stability or invariance, they have the general character of

Much of biological investigation is analytical and is conducted

material for physical and chemical investigation-complex in

their character, it is true, but not otherwise essentially different

profound difference between living and

contrast cannot be explained away, a

referred to something deep-seated in na

physical characterization. Human bein

isms, and we know from direct experien

themselves sources of determination which are not describable