KARLA MARIE T.

TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

1. MAGALLONA v. ERMITA (Baseline Law)

G.R. No. 187167
August 16, 2011
Facts:
The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic Act
3046 in 1961. The laws purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago. RA 3046 stood unchallenged until
2009, when Congress amended it and passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened
one baseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. More so, it has
identified the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of
islands", generating their own maritime zones.
The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. To their opinion,
the law has effectively reduced the maritime territory of the country. With this, Article
I of the 1987 Constitution will be violated. The petitioners also worried that that
because of the suggested changes in the maritime baselines will allow for foreign
aircrafts and vessels to traverse the Philippine territory freely. In effect, it steps on the
states sovereignty and national security. Meanwhile, the Congress insisted that in no
way will the amendments affect any pertinent power of the state. It also deferred to
agree that the law impliedly relinquishes the Philippines claims over Sabah. Lastly,
they have questioned the normative force of the notion that all the waters within the
rectangular boundaries in the Treaty of Paris. Now, because this treaty still has
undetermined controversies, the Congress believes that in the perspective of
international law, it did not see any binding obligation to honor it. Thus, this case of
prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is filed before the court, assailing the
constitutionality of RA 9522.
Issue:
WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:
RA 9522 IS CONSTITUTIONAL; IT MERELY DEMARCATED THE COUNTRYS
MARITIME ZONES AND CONTINENTAL SHELVES IN ACCORDANCE WITH
UNCLOS III.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral
treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12
nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine
areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coasts.

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States

parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are
drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth
of the maritime zones and continental shelf. The baselines laws are nothing but statutory
mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights. UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines
laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution
of territory.
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "Regime[s]
of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" of UNCLOS
III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III.
NB: What are Regime of Islands under UNCLOS?
- Under Art. 121 of UNCLOS, any naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide (such as portions of
KIG), qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands
generate their own maritime zones.
Issue:
Does RA 9522 violate Art. II of the 1987 Constitution?

Ruling:
RA 9522 DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. II of the 1987 Constitution SINCE THE
PROVISIONS ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTORY
Difference between Archipelagic Waters and Internal Waters

ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS

INTERNAL WATERS

Waters enclosed by the archipelagic Waters around, between, and connecting the
baselines drawn in accordance with Art. archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
47 (UNCLOS), regardless of their depth dimensions
or distance from the coast

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

Issue:
Does RA 9522 unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters,
hence subject these waters to the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage
under UNCLOS III?

Ruling:
THERE IS NO NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS vs.
INTERNAL WATERS.
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are NOT incompatible with the Constitutions delineation of
internal waters because under current norms of international law, the right of innocent
passage is recognized over archipelagic waters or internal waters however they may
be denominated. Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of
the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the
Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.

2. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (Philippine v China)

July 12, 2016
Issue:
WON China has historic rights to resources in the South China Sea beyond the limits
of the maritime zones that is entitled to pursuant to UNCLOS (nine-dash line)
Ruling:

Chinas claim to historic rights to resources was INCOMPATIBLE with

the detailed allocation of rights and maritime zones in the UNCLOS:
That China had historic rights to resources in South China Sea waters, such
rights were extinguished when the Convention entered into force to the
extent that they were incompatible with the Conventions system of maritime
zones.
Historical navigation and fishing by China in the waters of South China see were an
exercise of high sea freedoms RATHER than a historic right; there is no evidence
that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters of the
South China Sea or prevented other States from exploiting their resources.
Between the Philippines and China, there was NO LEGAL BASIS FOR CHINA
TO CLAIM HISTORIC RIGHTS TO RESOURCES, IN EXCESS OF THE RIGHTS

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

PROVIDED BY THE CONVENTION, within the sea areas falling within the 9dash line.

Issue:
WON certain coral reefs claimed by China are or are not above water at high tide?
Ruling:
Features that are above water at high tide generate 12-nautical mile territorial sea;
features that are submerged at high tide generate no entitlement to maritime zones
Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef are
HIGH-TIDE FEATURES. Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second
Thomas Shoal were SUBMERGED AT HIGH TIDE IN THEIR NATURAL
CONDITIONS
Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef are HIGH-TIDE FEATURES.

Issue:
WON any of the features claimed by China could generate an entitlement to maritime
zones beyond 12 nautical miles?
Ruling:
Islands generate an entitlement to an EEZ of 200 nautical miles and to a continental
shelf; but rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life shall have no
EEZ or continental shelf.
Temporary us of features (as in by small groups of Chinese fishermen and from other
states in the Spratly islands and Japanese fishing and guano mining enterprises did
not amount to inhabitation by a stable community and that all historical
economic activity had been extractive in nature.
ALL

HIGH-TIDE FEATURES OF SPRATLY ISLANDS ARE LEGALLY

ROCKS THAT DO NOT GENERATE AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OR
CONTINENTAL SHELF.
Convention does not provide for a group of islands (Spratly Islands) to
generate maritime zones collectively as a unit.

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

Issue:
WON the Chinese activities in the South China Sea are lawful under UNCLOS?
Ruling:

Because Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are submerged
at high tide and are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China, THEY
FORM PART OF THE EEZ AND CONTINENTAL SHELF OF PHILIPPINES
China had VIOLATED THE PHILIPPINES SOVEREIGN RIGHTS WITH
RESPECT TO ITS EEZ AND CONTINENTAL SHELF; China had (a) interfered
with Philippine petroleum exploration at Reed Bank, (b) purported to prohibit fishing
by Philippine vessels within Philippines EEZ, (c) protected and failed to prevent
Chinese fishermen from fishing within Philippines EEZ at Mischief Reef, and Second
Thomas Shoal, and (d) constructed installations and artificial islands at Mischief Reef
without the authorization of the Philippines.
========
Scarborough Shoal is above water at high tide so it generates an entitlement to a
territorial sea, its surrounding waters do not form part of the EEZ, and traditional
fishing rights were not extinguished by the Convention.

China had VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO RESPEC THE TRADITIONAL FISHING

RIGHTS OF THE PHILIPPINE FISHERMEN BY HALTING ACCESS TO THE
SHOAL AFTER MAY 2012
Chinas large scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at 7
features in the Spratly Islands has CAUSED SEVERE HARM TO THE CORAL
REEF ENVIRONMENT.

3. REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA v. VINZON (State Immunity)

Issue:
WON the Republic of Indonesia has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued
as a party-defendant in the Philippines
Ruling:
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA WAS ACTING IN PURSUIT OF A SOVEREIGN
ACTIVITY WHEN IT ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT WITH RESPONDENT;
applying the Restrictive Theory of State Immunity, it cannot be sued without
its consent.

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

Restrictive Theory of State Immunity: immunity of the sovereign is recognized

only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii but not with regard to private acts
or acts jure gestionis.
The establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. It encompasses its
maintenance and upkeep. Hence the State may enter into contracts with private
entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and living
quarters of its agents and officials.

4. CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY v. SANTAMARIA (State Immunity)

Issue:
WON CNMEG can claim state immunity
Ruling:
CNMEG IS NOT A STATE, it is a private corporation engaged in proprietary
activity THEREFORE IT CANNOT INVOKE STATE IMMUNITY
The agreement to submit disputes to arbitration in a foreign country is construed as
an implicit waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no similar law in the
Philippines, there is reason to apply legal reasoning behind the waiver in this case.
Since the Contract Agreement explicitly provides that Philippine law shall be applicable,
the parties have effectively conceded that their rights and obligations thereunder are
not governed by international law.
Issue:
WON the contract is an Executive Agreement
Ruling:
CONTRACT AGREEMENT DOES NOT PARTAKE OF THE NATURE OF AN
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT; 1st and 3rd requisites are not complied with in the
case at bar
Requisites for an Executive Agreement:
a. agreement must be between States
b. it must be written
c. must be governed by international law

The Contract Agreement was not concluded between the Philippines and China, but
between Northrail and CNMEG. By the terms of the Contract Agreement, Northrail is a
government-owned or controlled corporation, while CNMEG is a corporation duly
organized and created under the laws of the Peoples Republic of China. Thus, both
Northrail and CNMEG entered into the Contract Agreement as entities with

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

personalities distinct and separate from the Philippine and Chinese governments,
respectively.
Since the Contract Agreement explicitly provides that Philippine law shall be applicable,
the parties have effectively conceded that their rights and obligations thereunder are
not governed by international law.
It is therefore clear from the foregoing reasons that the Contract Agreement does not
partake of the nature of an executive agreement. It is merely an ordinary commercial
contract that can be questioned before the local courts.

5. VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROMULO (Comfort Women)

Facts:
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort
women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined
to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with
the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Issue:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan?
Ruling:
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN NOT ESPOUSING THE CLAIMS OF THE COMFORT WOMEN
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. It is
well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe political
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government

should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is

a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.
In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to
the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of
such decision is not for the courts to question.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals

to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the
individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals
behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic
action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting
its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own
right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it
is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy
in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available,
with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain
within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not
alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes
committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at
the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been
used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of
states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

6. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA (Extradition)

G.R. No. 153675
April 19, 2007

Facts:
The instant case is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the two Orders issued by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila. The former allowing Juan Antonio Munoz ,
private respondent, to post bail while the other denying the motion to vacate the said
first Order filed by Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, petitioner. The petition alleges that both orders
were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a
potential extradite.
Issue:
WON a potential extradite is entitled to post bail?
Ruling:
A POTENTIAL EXTRADITEE IS ENTITLED TO POST BAIL.
The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental
law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings
where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must
be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that
the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a
right to due process under the Constitution.

Issue:
Is extradition a criminal proceeding?
Ruling:
EXTRADITION IS NOT A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING BUT IT BEARS ALL THE
EARMARKS OF A CRIMINAL PROCESS.
It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an

extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for
a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.
It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor
is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in

character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a

crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial
or punishment.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following:
(a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the
means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal
law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if
such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows
the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the
accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a
request for extradition is received subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all

earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to
a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of

extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

7. PIMENTEL v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (Ratification of Rome Statute)

G.R. No. 158088
July 6, 2005

Issue:
WON the President is bound under treaty law and PIL to ratify the Rome Statute after
it was signed by the Philippine Mission to the UN?
Ruling:
PRESIDENT IS NOT BOUND TO RATIFY THE ROME STATUTE

The President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the
Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The President,
being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external
relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations.
It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in
the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify
it.

8. BAYAN MUNA v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROMULO (Validity of RP-US Non Surrender

Agreement)
G.R. No. 159618
February 1, 2011

Issue:
WON the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void for contracting obligations that are
either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of
international law?

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would
put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering
an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.

Ruling:
RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is NOT IMMORAL/ NOT AT VARIANCE WITH
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The

agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the

country's judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and
dispense justice fairly and judiciously.
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement
would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern
to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who

may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be
prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the
consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce,
that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome
Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually
prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like
the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the
crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral
or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense
considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

Agreement NEED NOT BE IN THE FORM OF A TREATY

A view is advanced that the Agreement amends existing municipal laws on the States
obligation in relation to grave crimes against the law of nations,i.e., genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes.Relying on the above-quoted statutory proviso, the
view posits that the Philippine is required to surrender to the proper international

 KARLA MARIE T. TUMULAK

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUMMARY DIGESTS

tribunal those persons accused of the grave crimes defined under RA 9851, if it does
not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute them.
We are unable to lend cogency to the view thus taken. For one, we find that the

Agreement does not amend or is repugnant to RA 9851.For another, the

view does not clearly state what precise principles of law, if any, the Agreement alters.
And for a third, it does not demonstrate in the concrete how the Agreement seeks to
frustrate the objectives of the principles of law subsumed in the Rome Statute.
Far from it, as earlier explained, the Agreement does not undermine the Rome
Statute as the former merely reinforces the primacy of the national
jurisdiction of the US and the Philippines in prosecuting criminal offenses
committed by their respective citizens and military personnel, among others.
The jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to the Rome Statute over high crimes indicated
thereat is clearly and unmistakably complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction
of the signatory states.