Professional Documents
Culture Documents
By Dr Bob March Chinese haggling tactics and bargaining can result in foreigners making
costly concessions.
Overview
K. G. Marwin Inc. developed a particular technology in the 1980s, called the Trilliamp
Process that the Chinese government sought to integrate into an ethylene facility in Lanzhou,
the capital of Gansu province. It signed a contract with Marwin, which in 1985 invited
inquiries from U.S. and Japanese manufacturers for production of the machinery. Marwin
recommended the Japanese company Auger-Aiso as most capable of producing the turbines,
while the Chinese invited two U.S. companiesFederal Electric and Pressure Inc., which
manufactured through the large Japanese trading company Mitsuboto compete for the
multi-million-dollar contract. The Scene to undertake the negotiations with the three
prospective suppliers, six Chinese officials and three representatives from the Bank of China
were selected. The Auger-Aiso chief negotiator was Todman Glazer, the companys Japan
branch manager from the United States who resided in Tokyo and was assisted by his
Japanese colleagues. Glazer remembered the tight deadlines he had faced on previous trips to
China; now positions had been reversed, with the Chinese facing the pressures and deadlines.
He realized the value of thinking like ones opponentseeing things as they do. This was the
first potential deal with China in the ethylene market, and Auger-Aiso faced stiff competition
from Mitsubo, which had already cornered the Chinese oil-processing market.
At the first negotiation meeting in Beijing, the Chinese insisted that custom required the
visitorGlazerto make the first presentation. This he did, even though he was accustomed
to allowing his opponents to speak first. Glazer began by addressing the excellence of AugerAiso technology, explaining that the manufacturing would all be done in Japan to ensure
product excellence. When the Chinese offered no indication of their position or price, Glazer
felt obliged to quote an upper-range price that would allow flexibility. The Chinese still made
no comment.
In the afternoon, the Chinese heard offers from the combined Mitsubo-Pressure team, then
Federal Electric. By the end of the day, Federal Electric had dropped out of the race,
accepting that it could not compete. Revolving Doors, Changing Moods During the first week
of negotiations, a pattern emerged. The Chinese would meet with Glazer and his colleagues
in the morning and ask for a price, saying that their competitors had already bid such-andsuch a price, which was invariably lower than the last Auger-Aiso bid. They would meet with
Mitsubo-Pressure in the afternoon and use the same approach, causing the latter to drop its
price. Moreover, each meeting would end with the Chinese saying, We will call you
tomorrow. But, because they never called, both prospective vendors became panicky and
visited the Chinese office without notice to present an even lower bid. As the Chinese kept
the vendors guessing and in the dark, Glazer understood how the Chinese had earned a
reputation as master negotiators. At the second meeting, tactics changed and there were
different people representing the Chinese side. An antagonist would suddenly burst out in
loud Chinese and harangue the Auger-Aiso side for some fifteen minutes, complaining about
the quality of the machines they were offering. A protagonist would then intervene and,
apologizing for his colleague, would say he had been upset about the current situation. Glazer
regarded these outbursts as no more than arranged role playing, designed to make the
protagonist (the good guy) appear more trustworthy to the foreigners. But, Glazer realized, all
the participants were play-acting.
Then there was yet another change. The Chinese located the Auger-Aiso and MitsuboPressure teams near the meeting room, in adjacent rooms. Mitsubo-Pressure would be called
in and asked for its best price. After the team had returned to its room, Auger-Aiso would be
called in, told the latest price, and asked if it could beat this. When the prospective vendors
could drop their price no lower, they would add something to the package. Auger,
for example, added oil gauges for its turbines, effectively a three-percent add-on. Even so, the
Chinese still would not commit to placing an order. When the Price Is Right Glazer could
hardly believe that he had lowered his price twenty per-cent that week; to do so would have
been out of the question in the United States. On the final day, Auger-Aiso made another offer
and, for the first time, the Chinese made a counter offer. Auger-Aiso accepted, and
agreement was reached. A few hours later, Mitsubo-Pressure came back with an even lower
price, but the deal had already been struck. Glazer spoke later about how difficult it was to
compete with Japanese trading companies, explaining that U.S. companies had so many
factors to bear in mind, including insurance and a variety of liabilities. Meanwhile, Japanese
trading companies, which had vastly different legal parameters [within which] to operate
within, could more easily focus on getting contracts and closing deals. He believed that
Auger-Aiso had been awarded the contract because it had been the preferred supplier right
from the start.
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me. It was clear they knew nothing about designing breweries. Benjamin also understood
the sensitivities in pointing out the shortcomings of the Chinese plans. He had spoken with
Chinese Australians (including two on his staff who had become the key members of his team
in China) and read widely on Chinese culture, so he recognized the risk of causing the
Chinese to lose face. To avoid doing so, he offered to work with the Chinese on developing
the competitive brief using the latest technology. This would allow him to begin building
relationships with the Chinese before the tendering process had begun. It would also give the
Chinese lead negotiator face with his bosses (and the Chinese government officials), as he
would be able to develop a better business brief using foreign technology. It also gave
Benjamins business a head start in the tender competition. Uncommon Tactics Before
tendering began, we were working with the client to develop the brief while the other
companies were sitting around, he said. The Chinese arranged the accommodation for the
tendering companies. Each foreign teamthe French, Germans, Belgians, and Australians
was lodged by the Guangdong government at the same hotel. We would go and have a
meeting with the Chinese. When we got back to the hotel, the other businesses would always
be waiting in the lobby to be picked up for their meetings. It was made pretty clear that we
were competing against each other, Benjamin said. Working in such specialized field
brewery designmeant that the foreign negotiating teams knew each other, and they used
this to their advantage. We knew the Chinese were trying to pit us against each other, so we
turned their tactic around. We met every afternoon in the hotel bar and compared notes. We
could then work out together whether this negotiation was about price, technology,
reputation, or some other driver. Of course it was about price and technologyit always is,
he said. The negotiations took place over several weeks, during which each of the foreign
companies met with the Chinese team almost daily. We talked about the price and
technology constantly. We were always discussing the scope of the project, to fit it in with a
budget with which they were happy, but which still delivered excellent technology. There
were perhaps thirty Chinese, and every time we met, there would be different people talking.
Youd think you had an agreement, and then one of the Chinese would suddenly pull you
aside and tell you the complete opposite. It was very confusing. Shoring Up Advantage To
ensure he was not misunderstanding the negotiations, which were being conducted through
an interpreter with the Chinese team, Benjamin had brought from Australia two of his Chinaborn staffa chemical engineer and an accountant. I decided I needed to use my two
Chinese team members as my interpreters, because the Chinese language is often not explicit:
The meaning of what they were saying was often only implied. It was the best decision I
made, because I got the chance to log onto real feedback. Benjamin also began to see the
language barrier as an advantage. Not knowing the language gave me carte blanche to
completely change my mind on things I already had said, because I could use the excuse that
I had not properly understood. They kept changing the negotiations on me, so it gave me the
chance to do the same back and get away with it. Benjamin had great respect for his
competitors. They were professional managers, corporate people. But they also had superior
attitudes toward the Chinese, and indeed also toward Benjamin and Australia. They refused to
believe that a world-class brewery designer could be found in Australia. After several weeks,
the French and Belgian businesses pulled out, frustrated at the drawn-out negotiating process.
They had offered their best price when first challenged and had left themselves no room to
manoeuvre. Between them, the French and Belgian negotiators had two other problems. First,
they were both professional managers involved in a number of projects, so it was easy for
them to give up and go home to take up other projects waiting on their desks. Second, no one
on the French team liked Chinese cuisine, so returning home looked very attractive to them.
Benjamin, however, was a specialist chemical engineer who owned his own business, had
already invested $350,000 in preparation, and was not inclined to walk away.
Patience Pays
I went in suspecting we were going to spend ninety percent of the time arguing price,
particularly since the Chinese started negotiating by crying poor. They kept saying they had a
limited budget, so I started high and kept shaving off the smallest amount, but never near my
limit. I knew from my initial questionnaire and research they could afford to pay what the
technology and I were worth. Even though this represented a great opportunity to enter the
Chinese market, I also needed to get properly rewarded, he explained. When I first got to
China I was told of a Chinese sayingChina has 5,000 years of history, so whats an extra
hundred years? This basically means that they are patient and will wait for the right deal. We
had invested a lot of money to go to China, and we were not about to turn around and come
home just because it was taking longer than we wanted. The Chinese team tried to use
Benjamins planned return date as leverage, in abide to pressure him into agreeing to their
price terms on the basis that he was leaving the country. But he recognized the ploy. I
realized they were dragging negotiations out until my departure, so I told them my date was
flexible and Id just stay until we finished. I acted as though I no longer had a deadline, and
politely pointed out they were the ones who had to build a brewery within ascertain time
frame. Benjamin spent every evening with his Chinese negotiating team, analysing each day
and trying to figure out the Chinese strategy. They would probe and explain to him Chinese
cultural perceptions, which Benjamin found invaluable for understanding the Chinese tactics.
Being Tested There was one meeting in which one of the Chinese team became very angry
and distressed. That night one of my interpreters told me that the individual had probably
been testing my reaction. He explained that Chinese dont do business with people they dont
know, and that sometimes they will use different emotions to see how the other party reacts
under pressure. Chinese culture is so different that you need that local Chinese input. You
can never have intuitive understanding of everything that influences and drives themthat
would take fifty lifetimes. The next best thing is to have local contacts to guide you.
Benjamin found other confusing elements about the negotiating process. We would have
in-principle agreement on issues, and then they would just change their mind. We have since
learned this is standard. Even if you have something in writing, it is only ever a discussion
document. The Chinese expect you to be like bamboo and bend with the wind. With the
negotiations down to just two companies, Benjamin tried a new tactic. He pitched the
environmental benefits of his brewery design, explaining how his technology could make the
Chinese brewery a world leader in waste management. His technological solution would
diminish environmental waste while ensuring maximum capacity and building up the Chinese
companys reputation as a world leader. Meanwhile, the Chinese team had also done its
homework and was secretly favouring Benjamins company based on its reputation for
delivering on time and to specifications. In the end, the specialist technology Benjamin could
offer ostensibly won him the contract. But Benjamin believes it was more about relationships
and face. I put effort into helping them look good. I designed the brief with them using the
latest technology. I helped solve other problems they had not considered, such as
environment management that would save them money. I suggested my solutions would
make their business a world leader. It was about giving them an opportunity to shine.
The Last Round of Negotiations
Before agreement was reached, and after the last of three proposals had been delivered and
considered, nine separate negotiations were held to discuss:
* Payment terms and advance payments
* Currency decisions
* Inspections policy
* Warranties
* Delivery of overseas and local components
* Commissioning and training of the Guangzhou Companys personnel Penalties
* Performance requirements
* Capacity to deliver
By this time, the Chinese team was reduced to twelve people. While Benjamin and his team
were in China on the last occasion, the Chinese team split in half and each went abroadto
Europe and Australiato evaluate Benjamins suppliers (and through them, him) of pump
valves, electronic equipment, stainless steel, and laser welding. His suppliers all appear to
have given him a pass mark, but one subjective problem remained. While Benjamins team
was well ahead of the other teams on all criteria, some members of the Chinese team
remained opposed to the Australian teambecause it was Australiansaying they wanted,
on the basis of image and reputation, a brewery designer and builder from Europe. The vice
governor of Guangdong province finally stepped in, we understand, and made the decision
inflator of Benjamins company. Within forty-five minutes of his decision, the negotiation
leader was on the phone to Benjamin at his hotel. We want you to sign the contract, he said
out of the blue and with no preamble. Come to the office now. Also bring $2,000 to pay for
the celebration banquet at lunchtime. Benjamin and his team went directly to the provincial
office. Before he signed the contract, he said to the team leader, Thank you very much for
your agreement to commission us to build your brewery. In consideration of that, we wish to
present you with a five percent discount. The step was artful. Bringing the project in five
percent under budget gave facet everyone on the Chinese team, including the vice governor.
They would not forget this.
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through their own choice. In other matters, the Indonesian gained many of their other
objectives, but the overall aid they could have procured was considerably diminished. U.S.
objectives were watered down in the ensuing agreement because in the end, Indonesia held a
stronger hand due to their indifference to the influence of foreign aid as an inducement to
comply with the U.S. position.
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This case study reveals how different negotiation tactics can be employed to negotiate and conclude a
better international agreement. The completion of the Panama Canal is one of the worlds great
engineering feats. The negotiations to complete and build this vital connector between two oceans
spans decades. The cost in human lives, suffering, and capital staggers the imagination. It all began in
1847 when the United States entered in a treaty with New Granada (later to be known as Columbia),
and which allowed the U.S. a transit passage over the Isthmus of Panama. The treaty guaranteed
Panamas neutrality and recognized that Columbia would have sovereignty over the region. Nothing
really occurred with this development and ultimately, a French company called the Companies
Nouvelle du Canal de Panama acquired the contract to build the canal in 1881. By 1889, the
Companies had gone bankrupt and had lost roughly around $287 million U.S. along with
approximately 20,000 lives in the process. It is also in 1889 that the U.S. has become convinced that
the canal passage was absolutely vital to their interests. They appointed Rear Admiral John Walker to
head the Commission and to choose the most viable route. Naturally, the U.S. was interested in the
Panama route already started by the French. The French company which had been heading for
bankruptcy, and seeing the writing on the wall before their bankruptcy in 1889, had entered into
negotiations with the U.S. The French company was eager to extricate themselves from the project. At
the time, their holdings were extensive and included land, the Panama Railroad, 2,000 buildings, and
an extensive amount of equipment. They felt their total holdings should be valued around 109
millions. but Rear Admiral Walker estimated them to be not greater than about 40million U.S., a
significant difference. As negotiations progressed, the Americans began to hint that they were also
interested in the possibility of building an alternative canal in Nicaragua. The French countered with
the ploy by claiming that both Great Britain and Russia were looking at picking up the financing to
complete the canals construction. It was subsequently leaked to the U.S. press, much to the French
companys pique, that the Walker Commission concluded that the cost to buy out the French company
was too excessive and recommended the Nicaraguan route. A couple days later after this news, the
president of Companies Nouvelle resigned. The resulting furore caused the stockholders to demand
that the company be sold to the U.S. at any price they could get. The Americans became aware that
they could now pick up all the French holdings for 40 million dollars. However, the Walker
Commission had not just been a ploy by the Americans because the Nicaraguan route was actually a
serious proposal that had a lot of backing in the U.S. Senate. President Roosevelt had to engage in
some serious political manoeuvrings to get everybody on board of the Panama passage. The Walker
Commission changed its recommendation to favour Panama as the canal route. But the story doesnt
end there. Next, the U.S. signed a new treaty with Columbias charge affairs which gave the U.S. a six
mile area across the Isthmus and agreed to financial remuneration that was to be paid to Columbia.
The Columbian charge affairs had signed the treaty without communicating with his government. The
treaty was rejected by Columbia. In the meantime, revolution against Columbian authority was afoot
in Panama. Since they believed they had signed a legitimate treaty, Roosevelt sent warships to the
area to negate the Columbians, and thus secured U.S. interests, and offered aid to the Panamanians in
their quest to separate from Columbia. Panama succeeded in their revolt and became a republic. In
1914, the Panama Canal was opened.
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11
The Fixed Pie Syndrome in Union Negotiation
This case study shows how a limited fixed pie distributive negotiation style can damage
negotiations with labour unions. The mythical fixed pie syndrome is one of those bizarre
anomalies that still persistently seep stealthily into the minds of the largest corporations. It is
not unlike a virulent pestilence that paralyzes its host into a rigid mind set, blurring the hosts
vision into a fixed stare where its hapless victim can see nothing more than what sits on the
negotiation table. Many agreements fail to materialize because of this limited vision. The
resulting loss of potential trade-offs forces the opposing parties to squabble over a single
bone while dozens more lay scattered about them. They are missed opportunities. In late
1985, Frank Bormann, the former renowned astronaut, was the acting president of Eastern
airlines, based in the U.S... The airline was struggling through tough and trying economic
times. Labour costs were a critical issue that Mar. Bormann sought to address.Imperiously,
Mar. Bormann tossed an ultimatum at the three unions like a gauntlet.Either they were to
agree to give the airline hefty wage concessions or he wouldsell the airline. The union leaders
were not impressed by the threat as they all had binding contracts that were not to be
renegotiated for some time to come. They believed that the threat to sell off the airline had a
hollow ring to it and called what they perceived to be a bluff. To add weight to his edict, Mar.
Bormann began to initiate talks with Frank Lorenzo, an industry heavy weight who had
previously crushed the unions at Continental airlines. Mar. Lorenzo was known as being
ruthless. This obviously made the union become jittery. What the unions didnt know was that
Mar. Bormann was bluffing as he really didnt intend to sell the airline. Lorenzo however,
and not aware of Bormans sleight of hand tactics, submitted such a significant proposal to
the Board of Directors of Eastern Airlines, theybegan to seriously look at the offer with raised
eyebrows and considerableinterest. The unions, in the meantime, began to re think their
position. As the negotiations progressed, Mar. Bormann began to make some grudging but
significant headway with his negotiations with two of the three unions. Both the flight
attendants and pilots unions agreed to a 20% wage claw back. However, the machinists
unions, which were run by the hardnosed Charlie Bryan, would only agree to a 15% slash in
wages. Bormann didnt accept their position. They argued voraciously over the dispute 5%,
and both of them took the position that if either side were to fail to make a concession over
the disputed amount, the airline would be ruined. Like two drivers aiming head on at each
other, eyes fixated and jaws squared, they steeled themselves, waiting for who would blink
first. Neither did and they crashed headlong into each other, stubborn to the end as the
ominous deadline for Lorenzos offer arrived. The Board of Directors for Eastern Airlines
accepted Lorenzos offer. As a result, Bormann was tossed, and out of a job. In the bitter end
that followed, Lorenzo forced huge wage cuts on the hapless unions and eliminated so many
jobs that Eastern Airlines was soon to go the way of the Dodo bird just another extinct
species. It filed for bankruptcy in March of 1989.
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allowing their disgruntlement to fester. Never dismiss the importance and impact that a good
line of communications can have on your business relationships, whether it be a domestic or a
foreign relationship.
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13
Negotiation Style and Frameworks
By Steven Roberts A case study that shows how important it is to consider whether or not to
accept concessions by taking a reasonable perspective and framework. On a scorching
summer day in August, 1990, the citizens of Kuwait stared in puzzlement at the encroaching,
dusty streams of what appeared to be a pending desert sandstorm, creeping ominously
towards them from across the forbidding dessert. To their dismay and horror filled eyes, the
quaking citizenry had become helpless witnesses to the advancing units of Saddam Husseins
Iraqi army, relentlessly engaged in the illegal invasion of their homeland. There had been no
warning of this pending disaster. Kuwaiti resistance was swept aside much like one casually
brushes away a crumb from ones lapel. After six days, Hussein declared that he had annexed
Kuwait. The world was stunned by Husseins audacity, and the Middle East became very
anxious about what the future may hold for this unsettled region. By August 30, the Arable
ague, called by President Mubarak of Egypt, attempted to defuse this potentially explosive
crisis through deft negotiation. The Arab League proposed to Hussein that if he would
withdraw his troops, they were prepared to offer him several concessions. Through several
negotiations, the Arab League eventually framed a very generous negotiation proposal that
they attempted to present to Hussein in a packaged offer. The three major negotiation
concessions offered to Iraq were as follows;.1) Iraq would take control of the Ramallah
oilfields, which Hussein claimed had been stolen from Iraq in their ongoing border dispute
with Kuwait.2) Iraqis would take possession of Bubiyan Island, which was an island located
in the Persian Gulf, and which abutted closely to the Iraqi shoreline.3) The third concession
entailed the wiping out or renegotiating of a $14 billion war debt that Iraq held with Kuwait
since the Iran-Iraq war. This last concession was still open to considerable negotiation,
allowing plenty of latitude for pending discussions. Hussein had two ways to view how he
could frame the Arab Leagues proposal. He could look at it from the viewpoint of what he
would win if he did withdraw his troops, or he could consider what he might stand to lose if
he withdrew his troops two very different perspective frameworks of the same situation. In
the end, he chose unwisely. Hussein chose to take the perspective of what he would lose. The
princely concessions presented by the Arab League were disdainfully refused by the arrogant
Hussein with little consideration. He decided that since he already occupied all of Kuwait,
anything else would be seen as a loss to him as he was now in possession of all of Kuwait and
its incumbent resources anyway. He could have viewed it from the alternative position of all
that he would have won for just a few weeks work, and would have received as concessions
from the Arab Leagues proposal. The Iraqi leader might have been thinking about his
decision as a powerful coalition of allied forces dogged his beleaguered and battered army
which was retreating deep into the heartland of Husseins native Iraq, leaving its charred
carnage in its wake. It was costly lesson to learn. Is the glass half or is it half full? How you
view it can mean everything
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Power Negotiation
This case study shows how a weaker negotiating partner can successfully use power
negotiation to win a good agreement with a stronger negotiating partner. There are many
occasions when a smaller company will want to form partnership with a larger organization
to further their business objectives. There are two hurdles that the smaller company might
have to overcome to succeed in the negotiation process. The first problem is to get the larger
organizations attention as they may express little or no interest in the partnership. The second
problem revolves around the prickly issue of negotiating from a much weaker power base.
There exists the danger that the smaller partys business goals arent overwhelmed by the
more powerful negotiating partner during the negotiation process. Although the following
case study entails a similar problem faced by two countries, the lessons learned can be
applied to any similar business negotiation model. On October 3, 1987, The Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) was signed by representatives of Canada and the United States after two
strenuous years of intense negotiations. Canada could be described as a medium sized
economy. Its population is 1/10ththe size of the U.S. which is considered an economic
superpower in comparison. Canada is economically dependent on the United States. The
reason is mainly due to its small domestic market, scattered over a vast geographical locale.
More than 75% of its exports go to the U.S. making the U.S. Canadas prime trading partner.
By contrast, the U.S. was exporting less than 20% of its products to Canada. In the 1970s,
Canadas economic health rose and fell like the proverbial yo-yo. It was too resource based
and needed to add some meat to its manufacturing industry to stabilize the economy. A Royal
Commission concluded that Canadas only means to achieve this stability was to engage in an
open free trade partnership with the United States. The problem was that the United States
wasnt especially interested in such free trade partnership agreement. The U.S. was in
addition also becoming increasingly protectionist during this same time period. The result
was that Canada was facing a whole host of penalties and countervailing actions against
Canadian goods. Canada clearly needed a plan. The first step that Canada took was in the
form of preparation by developing succinct plan. A chief negotiator, Simon Riesman, was
appointed by the Canadian Prime Minister himself. He established an ad hoc organization
called the trade negotiations office (TNO) which reported directly to the Canadian
Government Cabinet and had access to highest levels of bureaucracy. It established in no
uncertain terms their negotiation goals and objectives which included a strong dispute
resolution mechanism that the Canadians felt were vitally important to their success. In
contrast, the United States did not consider the FTA to be especially important and let Canada
do all the initial work. The only reason why the U.S. Congress even considered the FTA
proposal was that they liked the idea of a bilateral approach to trade and were tired of the
previous mechanism that failed to settle a host of trade dispute irritants between the two
countries known as GATT. It would also allow freer access to other segments of the Canadian
economy. President Ronald Reagan decided to fast track the negotiations and appointed
Peter Murphy to represent their interests. The U.S. was also concerned about the growing
hegemony of the European economy. Strong differences in interests and approach dogged the
negotiations. The Canadians used every advantage available including the use of Summit
meetings between the leaders of both countries to emphasize their concerns at every
opportunity. Yet, the political powers in the U.S. dragged their feet to such an extent that the
Canadian negotiators walked away from the talks to express their displeasure. This put some
heat on the U.S. administrators to the extent thetas. Treasury Secretary Baker took over the
negotiations. As a consequence, the talks between the two countries were successfully
concluded. Several concessions were made by both countries. The U.S. opened up a larger
investment segment in the Canadian economy and removed some of the more time
consuming trade irritants. The Canadians achieved their main goals of getting freer access to
the U.S. economy, while implementing a strong trade dispute resolution method. The Free
Trade Agreement between the two countries created the largest bilateral trade relationship in
the world. Canada achieved its objectives because of its detailed planning and the intense
focus of its negotiating team despite the asymmetry in power between the two nations.
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