PERKINS VS.

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING CO 342

U.S. 437, 72 S. CT. 413 96 (1952)

1.

FACTS:
Perkins, a non-resident of Ohio, filed two in personam cases in
an Ohio court. Among those he sued is Benguest Consolidated
(Benguet), a sociedad anima organized in the Philippines
where it owns and operates gold and silver mines. Perkins s ued
to collect an amount in dividends and damages she claimed to
be due her as a stockholder of Benguet.

2.

RULING:
1.

Benguet has been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and

systematic, but limited, part of its general business. Its
president, while engaged in doing such business in Ohio,
has been served with summons in this proceeding. Benguet, for
its part, sought to quash the summons served upon their
president. The courts have sustained the motions to quash.
ISSUE: Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States precludes
Ohio from subjecting a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of
its courts in this action in personam

IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE TO INITIATE

A
SEPARATE
ACTION
OR
PROCEEDING
FORENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IS THAT THERE IS OPPORTUNITY
TO CHALLENGE THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT, INORDER
FOR THE COURT TO PROPERLY DETERMINE ITS
EFFICACY.
This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to
ACTIONS IN PERSONAM, as distinguished from actions
in rem, a FOREIGN JUDGMENT MERELY CONSTITUTES
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE JUSTNESS OFTHE
CLAIM OF A PARTY AND, AS SUCH, IS SUBJECT TO
PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.

PHILSEC. INVESTMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS, 274 SCRA

102 (1997)

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners

were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment
of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or
conclusive of the rights of private respondents.

FACTS
Ducat obtained two separate loans from Ayala and Philsec in the
sum of $2.5M secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.

The
proceedings
in the
trial
court were
summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate
court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the
U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented
thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether
the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were
exactly the issues raised in this case such that the
judgment that might be rendered would constitute res
judicata.

In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, 1488 Inc.

undertook the obligation to pay by virtue of a Warranty Deed
with a Vendors Lien. Through the latter, 1488 Inc. sold to
Athona Holdings (Athona) a parcel of land in Texas while
Philsec and Ayala extended a $2.5M loan to Athona to partially
cover the value of the $2.8M lot.

Athona failed to pay the $.3M promissory note.

1488 Inc. sued Athona, Philsec and Ayala for the payment of the
$.3M.
The case was filed in Texas. While the Texas case was pending,
Philsec filed a complaint to recover a sum of money with
damages in a Makati RTC against Ducat.
Ducat, on the other hand, filed and was granted a MTD on the
basis of litis pendentia and forum non-conveniens.
The trial court also held that it had no jurisdiction over 1488 Inc.
because the action was neither in rem nor quasiin rem,
accompanied by the fact that the said defendant was a nonresident.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUES

It depends. The FOREIGN JUDGMENT CANNOT BE

GIVEN THE EFFECT OF RES JUDICATA WITHOUTGIVING
THE ADVERSE PARTY AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPEACH IT
ON GROUNDS STATED IN RULE 39, 50 of the Rules
of Court, to wit: WANT OF JURISDICTION, WANT OF
NOTICE TO THE PARTY, COLLUSION, FRAUD, OR CLEAR
MISTAKE OF LAW OR FACT.
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to
foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the
partiesopposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under
the law.

RULING: No. Ohio is free to decline or take jurisdiction over the

corporation. To begin with, Benguet is a foreign corporation
according to Ohio law. The Federal Constitution does not compel
Ohio to open its courts to such a case, even though Ohio
permits a complainant to maintain a proceeding in personam in
its courts against a properly served nonresident natural person
to enforce a cause of action which does not arise out of
anything done within the State. As a matter of federal due
process, the business done by the corporation in Ohio was
sufficiently substantial and of such a nature asto permit Ohio to
entertain the cause of action against it, though the cause of
action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in
Ohio.

Athona executed a promissory note in favour of 1488 Inc.

worth $.3M to complete the payment for the lot. After allthese
transactions, Ducat was released by Philsec and Ayala of his
loan.

Does a judgment in a US court bar actions to be

instituted in Philippine courts? (i.e. Can the foreign
judgment constitute res judicata?)
Did CA err in dismissing the case based on the
principle of forum non conveniens?

2.

Yes. First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule

16, 1, which does not include forum non-conveniens.
The propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is
more properly considered a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this
ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established,
to
determine
whether
special
circumstances require the courts desistance.
In this case, the TRIAL COURT ABSTAINED FROM
TAKING JURISDICTION SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF
THEPLEADINGS FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PHILSEC IS A DOMESTIC
CORPORATION AND DUCAT IS A FILIPINO, AND THAT IT
WAS THE EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE LATTERS DEBT
WHICH WAS THE OBJECT OF THE TRANSACTION UNDER
LITIGATION.

The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after

finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case
BENSUAN RESTAURANT CORPORATION VS. RICHARD B.
KING, DOCKET NO. 96-9344, (SEPTEMBER10, 1997)
Bensusan Restaurant Corporation, the plaintiff, owned the Blue
Note jazz club in New Yorks Greenwich Village, and owned a
federal trademark registration for the mark THE BLUE NOTE.
The defendant, Richard King, operated The Blue Note, a small
club in the college town of Columbia, Missouri, and had used
that mark on a local basis since 1980 several years prior to
use of Blue Note by the now-famous New York club. Although
the New York jazz club had obtained a federal registration for
the Blue Note mark in1985, the Missouri club could continue to
use the name within its local area based on the Missouri club's
prior use of the name.
In April 1996, the Missouri club began operation of a website
(http//www.throughport.com/cyberspot) that offered general
information about Kings club, including a calendar of events
and ticketing information. Tickets could not be ordered via the
Internet; instead, one could order tickets for an advertised
event by telephone and then pick-up the tickets in person at a
box office in Columbia, Missouri. The Missouri clubs website
also included a hyperlink to the website for Greenwich Villages
Blue Note club, while also offering a disclaimer that "The Blue
Notes Cyber spot should not be confused with one of the
worlds finest j azz clubs, the Blue Note, located in the heart of
New Yorks Greenwich Village. If you should find yourself in the
Big Apple give them a visit.
The New York jazz club viewed the Missouri club's website on
the Internet as an expansion of use of the Blue Note name
outside of the local area, and raised this objection with King. In
response, King removed the second sentence of the
disclaimer and the hyperlink from his website.
The operator of the New York jazz club sued the operator of the
Missouri jazz club for trademark infringement in New York.
Trial Court Proceedings Edit
Looking to New Yorks long - arm statute, the court inquired
whether Kings operation of a website on a server in Missouri
represented the commission of a tort in New York. Although
a New
York user could access the Missouri Clubs website to obtain
event ticket information, a purchase of tickets required calling
the Missouri club via its website-advertised telephone number
and picking up the tickets at the Columbia, Missouri box office.
The court stated that "[t]he mere fact that a person can gain
information on the allegedly infringing product is not the
equivalent of a person advertising, promoting, selling or
otherwise making an effort to target its product in New York."
Consequently, the district court concluded that any tortious
action of trademark infringement would arise in Missouri rather
than in New York.
In examining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over King
would satisfy due process, the court asserted that creating
a site, likeplacing a product into the stream of commerce, may
be felt nationwideor even worldwide but, without more, it is
not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state. The
court distinguished the CompuServe v. Patterson case based
on the observation that the facts in CompuServe v. Patterson,[1]
were vastly different from the present action. Unlike the
software developer in CompuServe, King did not direct any
contact to or have any contact with New York, nor did he intend
to avail himself of the benefits of New York.

Thus, the court held that King's operation of the website was
not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of New York long-arm
statute, and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would
violate the precepts of constitutional due process. Significantly,
the court found that the owner of the Missouri club was only
trying to attract local patrons by the club's operation of its
website, and dismissed the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs Court of Appeals

November 21, 2012
FACTS:
Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia
Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and some co-workers were
in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to
rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry
for help and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and
detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to
work in their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia
Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in
Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi
court where she was interrogated and eventually sentenced to
5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated
Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah
got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she
was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and
sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on
dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for
damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia
Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law should
be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other
reliefs under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines contention is correct.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia
Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismiss with petition
for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked
the court to make a determination of Saudia Airliness rights
hence a submission to the courts jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case
because as alleged in the complaint of Morada, she is bringing
the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and
not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in the
QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect
whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the place
where she resides or where the defendant resides. Obviously, it
is well within her right to file the case here because if shell file
it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of
course, again, Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a
case, if there is a foreign element involved, is the so called
locus actus or where an act has been done. In the case at bar,
Morada was already working in Manila when she was
summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a
Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was going
to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into
appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful
conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was
committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and
suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the
SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort
(the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).