OTH 93 415 DEVELOPMENT OF WALKDOWN PROCEDURES AND PILOT STUDY FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF TOPSIDES EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO BLAST INDUCED VIBRATIONS Authors I Sharrock and S Wong EQE International Limited EQE House 500 Longbarn Boulevard Birchwood Warrington Cheshire WA2 OXF HSE BOOKS Health and Safety Executive - Offshore Technology Report '© Crown copyright 1995 Applications for reproduction should be made to HMSO First published 1995 ISBN 0-7176-0994-4 ‘Thisreportis published by the Health and Safety Executiveas part of a series of reports of work which has been supported by funds provided by the Executive. Neither the Executive, or the contrac- tors concemed assume any liability for the report nor do they necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Executive, Results, including detailed evaluation and, where relevant, recommendations stemming from their research projects are published in the OTH series of reports. Background information and data arising from these research projects are published in the OTI series of reports.CONTENTS SUMMARY GLOSSARY 1. INTRODUCTION 2, WALKDOWN IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Safety Related Systems 2.8 Walkdown Team Composition 2.4 Quality Assurance 3. WALKDOWN PROCEDURES 31 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 Introduction Familiarisation 3.2.1 Review of drawings and relevant documents 3.2.2 Exploratory walkdown Planning 3.3.1 Walkdown routes 3.3.2. Resource planning and schedules Walkdown Documentation Preparation Screening Verification and Walkdown Post Walkdown 4, WALKDOWN PILOT STUDY 4. 42 43 introduction Selected Installation Application of the Walkdown Procedures 43.1 Familiarisation 43.2 Planning 43.3 Walkdown documentation preparation 43.4, Screening evaluation and walkdown 43.5 Post walkdown assessment Page vi w& RRO ao xa 14 14 14 14 16 17 195. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Mechanical Items Pipework Electrical Items Cabling Assessment Summary 6. CONCLUSIONS 7. REFERENCES 8 RRRRe FIGURES APPENDIX I : Determination of Safety Related Equipment APPENDIX IT : Detailed Walkdown Procedures APPENDIX IIT : Walkdown SheetsSUMMARY This report documents a study performed by EQE International for the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) on the assessment of offshore platform topsides equipment for blast induced vibration loading. In this study, a methodology was developed for assessing equipment relying on “walkdown” techniques. The walkdowns are methodical, on-site, visual evaluations of the equipment considering its as-installed condition. A procedure _ hhas been produced for this methodology by developing screening criteria for performing the walkdown review. ‘The methodology was then proven by use in a pilot study of a mid 1980's vintage North Sea platform. Two critical safety related systems with representative mechanical and electrical equipment were selected for demonstration purposes. This report documents the methodology and the pilot study walkdown of the platform. Conclusions are presented which show the feasibility of this method, along with the key points required for its correct implementation, limitations to its use, and potential further applications (eg vibrations resulting from ship impact or earthquakes),Inclusion Rules (Caveats) Secondary Damage Differential Displacements Spatial Interactions GLOSSARY ‘These are rules which are designed to screen out feauures that perform badly under blast induced vibration loadings. Damage resulting from the failure of adjacent equipment or structures. Relative displacements between two objects resulting from the blast induced vibration loads. As adjacent items of equipment oscillate due to the applied blast induced vibrations, they may itmpact against each other.1, INTRODUCTION HISE-OSD are concerned with the effects of vibrations on safety related equipment induced through the structure from blast loads. It is known that such vibrations led to the failure of safety related equipment, and hence contributed to the escalation of the Piper Alpha disaster (Reference 1). Recommendations 64, 65 and 68 of Reference 1 state that the effects of such vibrations should be addressed in the platform Safety Cases. Given the complexity of the problem, the HSE are seeking methods that can be applied in a cost effective manner to address these concerns. This scope of work was performed to determine the feasibility of the application of walkdown procedures to the qualification of topside equipment when subjected to blast induced vibrations. ‘This roethod is not intended to be used to address the direct effects of blast or fire, nor does it attempt to determine the different blast scenarios. A separate study should be performed to evaluate these scenarios for the platform under consideration, the output from which would be the levels of vibrations on the platform. These would then be used as the loading input for this method. The work was divided into two tasks, the first of which was to develop the walkdown procedures to assess the vulnerability of plant and equipment to vibration, for the specific needs of the offshore industry, The second task was to perform a walkdown of an offshore installation to demonstrate the use and applicability of these procedures. ‘Walkdown procedures involve the use of skilled and experienced engineers who understand vibration induced failures. The walkdown is not just a physical inspection performed for an installation, but it encompasses all the steps necessary to demonstrate the adequacy of the components under assessment. This involves the determination of the set of safety related equipment to be assessed; whether the component and its anchorage are able to withstand the applied loads; whether the component and its support system have ductile behaviour under extreme loading; and whether there are likely to be any interactions with nearby equipment or structures. Walkdowns assess the current condition of the platform. Any significant deterioration following the walkdowns would have to be controlled by a maintenance program which would be influenced from the walkdown findings. Also, modifications would have to be assessed on an individual basis to ensure that they do not affect the performance of existing equipment. The work performed for this study is demonstrated by the flow chart shown in Figure 1, which shows three distinct phases. The first phase determines the requirements prior to performing a walkdown, which include the determination of the set of equipment to be assessed, the selection of a qualified and experienced team, and the provision for quality assurance. The second phase involves the determination of the procedures and criteria to be employed, and the third phase employs these procedures for the assessment of equipment. These phases are described in Sections 2 to 4 respectively.‘The method has been used extensively in the nuclear industry to address seismic issues. It is a pragmatic but systematic approach that offers significant financial advantages over other qualification methods such as analysis or testing. The adequacy of equipment is verified by knowledge of the performance of the equipment under vibration loadings. While the conservatisms inherent in analysis and testing techniques may be appropriate for a new design, this method will provide the offshore industry with an invaluable tool for assessing the topsides equipment on existing platforms.2. WALKDOWN IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS 2.1. INTRODUCTION This section describes the three basic requirements prior to applying the walkdown procedure as shown in Figure 1. 2.2. SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS In order to qualify an individual system, each of its components must be assessed. ‘Therefore the first step is to identify the complete list of components: for each safety system which requires assessment. It is also necessary to determine the relative importance of these components in relation to the overall safety case, the consequences of failure, and of any diversity or redundancies built into the systems, This information would be used to determine the minimum list of components, assuming that this list is not already known. ‘The topsides installation typically has a number of essential safety systems which employ different items of equipment according to the system function. A brief description of the functions of typical topside safety systems is given below: © Emergency Shutdown Systems - used to shutdown part or all of the process depending on the level of shutdown requited. These systems also comprise the blowdown valves and headers which are used to remove any excess hydrocarbons. © — Emergency Power Supplies - used as a back up should the normal topside power supply fail. These typically contain both diesel generator sets and uninterruptible power supplies. © Emergency Communications - used both locally to inform personnel of any incident and also to contact the outside world. © Fire Protection Systems - usually divided into a deluge system and a fire water ring main system. @ Fire & Gas Detection Systems - essential to the successful control of the emergency shutdown systems and the fire protection systems. © HVAC systems - essential for the integrity of the temporary safe refuge which houses the main control and radio rooms. © Escape Routes, Muster Areas and Lifeboats - essential for the safe evacuation of personnel. A more complete description of these systems and their components is given in Appendix 1.2.3. WALKDOWN TEAM COMPOSITION To ensure a complete and systematic study, the walkdown is organised and carried ‘out by using walkdown teams comprising experienced engineers and project managers. The walkdown team leaders and team members will possess knowledge in: © Performance of equipment, plant and structures in industrial process and power plants which are subjected to induced vibrations. ® ~~ Conduct of walkdowns of facilities. © Applicable design codes and standards. ‘© Design, analysis and test qualification practices for equipment to be assessed for vibration induced loads. © Typical vibration induced failure modes. All team members must be degreed engineers or equivalent with significant experience in dynamics of structures and equipment. They should also possess experience of performing walkdowns for the purpose of qualifying plant and equipment. 2.4 QUALITY ASSURANCE The objectives of the project documentation are to demonstrate completeness, traceability and repeatability in all aspects of the work undertaken. This is to be achieved by the assessment being performed under a QA programme to the requirements of BS 5750, and to the ISO 9000 series of standards appropriate to the activities. For the walkdowns, the QA programme shall: (@) Define the organisational structure for the project, including the principal team members, and the responsibilities at all levels. (b) Identify the lines of communication within the project team and with other concerned parties. © Identify the work instructions and procedures. (@) Establish project-specific documentation control. (©) Define the requirements and schedule for general .QA auditing and independent technical quality review. Project personnel shall be selected on the basis of experience and training, according to the requirements stated previously. Throughout the project, documentary evidence shall be established to demonstrate the fulfilment of the stated requirements, The records shall consist of: 4@ (b) © Formal education and qualifications. Appropriate knowledge of vibration induced failures and walkdown experience. Training received at each phase of the project. ‘A document control system shall be established at the start of the work for the control of all project records. Each project activity shall be fully recorded to provide an auditable trail of documentation. The records shall consist of: @ ) © @ Evaluation guidelines and screening criteria. Walkdown sheets, including supporting labelled photographs. Calculations, including the assessment and resolution of any items that are not acceptable when assessed against the screening criteria. Technical input and relevant references, including manufacturers’ literature, : The logical and systematic control of these documents will ensure ease of maintenance, retrieval and continuous updating of the project records. ‘The project manager shall select an independent technical reviewer to sample the project documentation. The reviewer shall confirm the technical aspects of the Project such as screening guidelines, walkdown activities and findings, and subsequent assessments. The QA audit personnel shall establish the correct implementation and effectiveness of the QA programme for the project by regular audits. Any non- conformities shall be resolved on a timely basis.3. WALKDOWN PROCEDURES BL INTRODUCTION ‘The walkdown method refers to the whole process of verification of the adequacy of plant and equipment when subjected to the loading under consideration, ie blast induced vibrations in this scope of work. It is more than just a physical walkdown on the platform, but incorporates the whole verification process of plant and equipment. It can be conveniently divided into five separate phases: © — Familiarisation, This phase will review the general arrangement drawings and perform an exploratory walkdown. It should identify all the necessary safety systems and its components, as well as providing information for the planning of walkdowns. © — Planning. This phase will develop appropriate walkdown schedule plans to ensure completeness whilst optimising the time spent on the facility. © Walkdown documentation preparation. Inthis phase, appropriate screening evaluation forms and checksheets will be developed. These will be used to guide the walkdown team and provide documentary evidence of completeness, © Screening evaluation and walkdown, During this phase the mechanical and electrical equipment, piping systems, cable trays, relays and tanks are assessed for their adequacy under the applied loads. The procedures include a review of the input loads and the application of the screening criteria. © Post-walkdown assessment. This phase processes all the information collected from the facility walkdown. This will include checks for completeness, drawing reviews and analytical reviews as necessary, and identifies all items which will requite further justification. The detailed procedures for each of these stages are presented in the following sections. 3.2 FAMILIARISATION The objective of this phase of the assessment is to become familiar with the systems to be qualified, the safety implications of each of the components, the general layout of the facility, the location of the safety-related equipment and their auxiliary supplies. This part of the study requires the walkdown team to work together with safety engineers and plant operators. ‘The familiarisation phase is divided into two phases, the first of which is to review drawings and relevant documents, and the second is to perform an exploratory walkdown. These two phases are described in detail in the following sections.3.2.1 Review of drawings and relevant documents This review is conducted on a system-by-system basis for all systems identified as being essential to safety. For a successful and systematic study, the review of drawings and documents will be carried out to meet the following objectives: (a) Understand system and safety implications. The members of the walkdown team will be assisted in their task by having a good understanding of the system to be qualified and its relevance to the overall safety case, While a walkdown can be carried out for any particular system without an understanding of how it fits into the safety case, it does not take advantage of the experience of the walkdown team to tailor their approach to the specific needs of the system, For example, is the system needed to operate during the event of blast or only after the event? Answers to questions like this will help the walkdown team to provide an optimum approach. (b) Identify the essential components of the system. Each safety system will be analysed to determine the essential components that need to be operational either during or after the event of blast. For example, a deluge system may be divided up into pumps, valves, pipework, and tanks. If redundancy exists in the essential components, then the items whose adequacy are easier to verify will be selected. This process would be generally performed with the assistance of the safety case personnel, to be confirmed by the platform operators. (©) Identify auxiliary and backup systems. A safety system may require the functioning of auxiliary systems to remain operational eg power supplies for deluge pumps, All auxiliary systems will be identified and included in the assessment of the system. (d) Tabulate all components to be qualified. The results of (b) and (c) above will be combined to provide a table of all components for each of the systems to be qualified. Some components may be common to more than one system, These will be identified in the table as they may influence the organization of the walkdown packages. (©) Agree all selected items with safety case personnel. As a final check for completeness and to ensure that the selected components are sufficient to meet the safety requirements, agreement will be sought with the staff who are responsible for the preparation of the safety cases for the facility. 3.2.2 Exploratory walkdown As part of the familiarisation exercise, an exploratory walkdown may be carried out by a walkdown team accompanied by a systems safety engineer and/or a plant operator. This could be done on a system-by-system basis or on a area-by-area basis depending on the layout of the facility and other logistical considerations. The tasks that may be carried out in the exploratory walkdown are as follows: © Confirm details obtained from drawings and other documents. The purpose of this task is to confirm that the details obtained from the review of the drawings and other documents correspond to the present as-built conditions. In some cases this will be difficult because of inaccessibility.For this reason, it is important to have access to the plant operators who are generally familiar with the systems and can provide important details. © — Compile information on locations of critical components. This will help in the planning of the platform walkdowns and also provide locations where the blast induced vibrations are required. © Identify obvious vulnerabilities and undesirable features. While the purpose of the exploratory walkdown is not to assess the adequacy of the systems under review, it does allow the opportunity to identify any obvious concerns. If these are highlighted early on, it may be possible to commission special studies or alter the direction of the safety case so that these plant items are not on a critical path. © — Assemble data relevant to the walkdown organisation. The efficiency of the platform walkdown depends on the logistic arrangements with the platform. Certain areas may not be accessible at certain times because of planned shutdowns, maintenance etc. Also key platform operators may not ‘be available at certain times. This information is needed to plan the walkdown schedules and minimise logistic problems. 3.3. PLANNING Planning for the platform walkdowns is necessary if the walkdowns are to be systematic and efficient. Sufficient data should have been collected in the familiarisation phase of the walkdown procedures to facilitate the planning. With this data, and experience from previous walkdowns, the walkdown routes can be planned, the resource requirements can be determined and detailed schedules can be developed. 3.3.1 Walkdown routes Planning of the walkdown routes will be dictated by the criterion of achieving as much as possible on the platform in as short a period as possible. Minimising time on the platform also reduces any disruption of schedules for the platform operators. Optimising walkdown routes will consider a combination of area-by-area walkdown and system-by-system walkdown. There are no significant technical reasons why one should be preferred over the others. The best combination will be selected on: ‘The basis of efficiency. The availability of plant operators. The accessibility of specific areas. Plant shutdown and maintenance schedules. Platform logistics. Experience from previous walkdowns. eovcee In general, a system-by-system walkdown will be favoured when systems are confined to small separate areas, whereas the area by area walkdown is preferable when large numbers of components are located in the same area.This part of the planning stage will culminate in a number of planned walkdown packages each with their own specific objectives of verification of adequacy. 3.3.2 Resouree planning and schedules The inspection requirements and walkdown packages already identified will be reviewed to determine the commensurate level of effort that will be required to meet the project milestones. It would be necessary to develop a resource plan in which cognisance will be taken of resource avaiiability and project deadlines. It would also at this stage be appropriate to select the walkdown teams and nominate team leaders. Detailed schedules will be developed to encompass all of the walkdown packages as well as the post-walkdown tasks to be carried out. The final schedules are to be agreed with appropriate platform personnel to ensure as little disruption as possible to platform schedules. 3.4. WALKDOWN DOCUMENTATION PREPARATION This section of the document describes the elements of walkdown documentation preparation which will be carried out to optimise the detailed platform walkdowns. ‘These guidelines may be extended or adapted to fit in with the requirements for the specific platform as identified during the familiarisation phase. Screening criteria may be developed in order to optimise analytical evaluations such as the demand versus capacity comparison, The demand is quite simply the applied loading to a component resulting from in this instance blast induced vibrations. The magnitude of these vibrations should be detetmined at a number of appropriate locations, possibly from finite element analysis. The capacity is defined as the allowable loading for the component and its anchorage, taking into consideration any acceptable failure modes. This capacity may be determined from any of a number of methods, such as analysis, testing, or from knowledge of equivalent applied loads (possibly wind or earthquake induced vibrations). Screening criteria may also be used to group components depending on typical details such as height, size, and anchorage arrangements. These generic screening criteria are determined from a combination of experience, simple hand calculations and engineering judgement. By nature, the screening procedure is conservative and is therefore used as a first pass, and any predicted failures at this stage may be resolved by refined analysis. Some criteria for screening charts are given- below for typical categories of equipment: © — Equipment Anchorage - Screening criteria will be based on allowable stresses for either bolted or welded connections determined from applicable design codes. The criteria will be typically developed as a function of component type, size, mass, centre of gravity position and anchorage arrangement.© — Pipework - Screening criteria will be developed based on displacements and stresses as a function of parameters such as support types, pipe diameters and spans. Screening criteria for cable trays will be developed on a similar basis. ‘* Relays - A functional screen may be applied to eliminate relays that are not essential for the safety case. Physical screening criteria will be based on shake-table test results and knowledge of vibration induced failures (uch as brittle support arrangements). © Spatial Interactions and secondary damage - Potential spatial interactions and secondary damage may result from excessive displacements of the item under assessment or adjacent items and structures. These may be screened out based on maximum expected displacements and verification of anchorages. This may be achieved on a similar basis to that described for piping above. To ensure that the walkdowns are complete and systematic, a number of discrete walkdown packages will be developed. The packages will identify quite cleatly the items to be considered in the walkdown and provide appropriate screening evaluation worksheeis. The worksheots serve the purpose of guiding the walkdown team through a systematic evaluation and provides documentary evidence of completeness. The worksheets will be developed following the familiarisation phase when the appropriate screening criteria will be determined. Further worksheets will be developed to correspond to the appropriate screening criteria, For example, once the anchorage or spatial interaction screening criteria have been determined, appropriate sheets will be developed to guide the walkdown team through the verification assessment. On the platform, the walkdown teams will ensure that the sheets are completed properly. These sheets will be checked and verified and will form an esst ‘part of the documentary evidence needed to demonstrate completeness and consistency with the quality requirements, The information in the worksheets will be supplemented wherever possible with photographic evidence to allow traceability, auditability and verification. . 35 SCREENING VERIFICATION AND WALKDOWN Jn previous phases, the scope of the walkdowns and the sequence in which the work is to be conducted was determined. The walkdown teams would have been selected and been assigned specific walkdown packages to be completed. In this next phase the platform walkdowns will be carried out by the walkdown teams, properly equipped with the appropriate walkdown and screening sheets, as well as other documentation media like cameras, videos etc. Platform walkdowns will be performed either on an area-by-area basis or on a system-by-system basis, as determined in the preparatory phases of the walkdown. During the walkdown, the verification of the adequacy of the following categories of plant items will be performed: 10mechanical and electrical components cable trays and conduits piping systems tanks relays eeooee For each of these categories, the main activities performed during the platform walkdown are described in Appendix II. The intention of the platform walkdown is to gather data and evaluate the adequacy of equipment when subjected to the blast induced vibration loads. The process requires the walkdown team members to have knowledge of vibration induced failure modes, and also have experience of applying walkdown procedures. A brief summary of the walkdown activitis is given below: © The capacity must be demonstrated to be greater than the demand. The demand would usually be defined from studies to determine blast induced vibrations at relevant locations throughout the topside structures. The capacity would be determined from either analysis of the as built components, testing or experience. This process should also bear in mind the effects on the capacity of a component arising from any modifications or deviations from the original design. © The component must be evaluated against inclusion rules or caveats identified through experience and test data bases. These caveats are designed to exclude features that perform badly under vibration loadings. © The anchorage of the component must be verified, Inadequate anchorage is a common cause of equipment failing to function properly during and following vibrational loading. In addition to the capacity versus demand comparison for the anchorage, itis also necessary to inspect the anchorage for poor design ot defects. © — Spatial interactions must also be evaluated. It is necessary to demonstrate ‘that nearby equipment or structures will not fail so that the integrity of the ‘component under review is threatened. 3.6 POST-WALKDOWN The platform walkdown would provide a substantial amount of information that needs to be processed and approved. This phase of the procedure will also screen out all the items that have satisfied the demand and identify those items that require further assessment. The necessary tasks are set out below. (@) Review documentation from walkdowns for completeness A review of the completeness of the walkdown documentation will be carried out. All screening and walkdown sheets will be reviewed. This will ensure that all issues have been addressed and that none of the critical items of equipment have been omitted.©) Verify and approve walkdown documentation To ensure that the quality assurance requirements are met the documentation has to be checked, verified and approved. It is usually good practice to ensure that approximately 10% of the walkdown packages are independently reviewed for completeness and accuracy. () Identify all items that meet the demand A systematic evaluation of the walkdown results will be carried out to identify all components whose adequacy can be verified with no further assessment requirement. These “success” items will not be considered further in the assessment. For an item to be considered a “success” there must be no caveats or other concerns identified from the walkdown sheets. ( —_dentify all items requiring further assessment All items that cannot be demonstrated to meet the success criteria from the walkdown fall into this category. There are three reasons why this may happen: i) Sufficient information is not available at the time to verify the adequacy. Such a situation would arise if a particular item was not fully accessible for inspection during the walkdown or if valuable details for the item are not available eg manufacturer’s specifications. ii) The information required to determine the demand is not available for a specific location. iti) According to the screening and walkdown criteria the demand exceeds the capacity of the item. All items in this category will be tabulated stating whether i), apply. (e) Resolve outstanding issues Items in i) or ii) above will be resolved by obtaining the necessary information and revisiting the platform if necessary. Following this, all of the items will be as “success” items or items for which their adequacy has not yet been. Satisfactoriiy demonstrated. Items would be in this latter group because one or more failure modes are possible according to the simplified screening criteria. It is recognised that the screening criteria that are used in the walkdown are conservative because of their generic nature, as the demand is usually determined using simplified hand calculations. There is benefit to be gained by performing more refined analysis specific to the items in question. This would be performed for worst or bounding cases to limit, the amount of time required for this task. These would be selected using judgement to determine the cases with, for example, the highest demand, or the lowest apparent capacity, or the least ductility. If the margin of failure is not too large there is good chance that this approach would resolve this issue. nIf the refined analysis still predicted the item to fail, then the final option would be to design and implement modifications that would increase the capacity of the item. oO Review safety case strategy Having determined the "successes" and “failures”, on a system-by-system basis, it will be appropriate to review the safety case strategy which may need to be modified to reflect the conclusions of the assessment. The walkdown team will meet with the safety case engineers to provide an input to ensure a satisfactory safety case strategy.4. WALKDOWN PILOT STUDY 4.1 | INTRODUCTION The walkdown procedures developed in Section 3 were applied in a pilot study. The aim of the study was to determine whether it is feasible to apply the walkdown method for the assessment of topside equipment subjected to blast induced vibrations. Only a limited sample of essential items were considered in this study so that the method could be demonstrated. In order to provide sufficient evidence for a Safety Case, all essential items would be included in the walkdown assessment. 4.2. SELECTED INSTALLATION The platform selected for this study is in the UK sector of the central North Sea. A single fixed platform is provided for drilling, production, utility and accoramodation facilities. These are housed in modules supported by an eight leg, piled, steel jacket and a module support frame. ‘The platform is not large by North Sea standards with a maximum topsides operational weight of 20000 tonnes, and was commissioned in the 1980's. The platform is and of relatively modern design. The production facilities have sufficient capacity to produce an annual average of approximately $0000 barrels per day. 4.3 APPLICATION OF THE WALKDOWN PROCEDURES This section describes the application of the procedures developed in Section 3 to the walkdown of a North Sea platform described above. The method as previously described is divided into five separate phases, cach of which is treated in turn as follows. 4.3.1 Familiarisation The objective of this phase of the assessment was to become familiar with the systems to be considered in this study. This includes the understanding of the safety implications for each of the components; knowledge of the layout of the topsides; and the locations of the safety related equipment and their auxiliary supplies. During discussions with the platform operator, it was apparent that no one system in isolation contained a broad enough range of components in order to demonstrate the procedure, Two systems were identified which contained a number of types of mechanical and electrical component, these being the fire fighting and the auxiliary power systems. It should be noted that this study did not intend to look at the complete component list of these systems, but concentrated on a number of the major components which are applicable to this technique. 14‘The familiarisation is divided into two tasks: a) Review of drawings and documents b) An exploratory walkdown. The first of these two tasks was performed by reviewing the documents provided by the operator, These documents were the relevant sections of the ‘Operating Procedures Manuals’ for the platform, and also sections of the ‘Platform Safety Case’ giving descriptions of the platform and its systems. These documents provided a knowledge of the selected systems so that we could generate a list of components. The full component list of items for assessment produced from this review is given in Table 1, and a summary of the types of component are given below: Diesel Generator Tanks Control Panels Switchgear Cables ‘Valves Piping This is a representative list of some typical topsides equipment, and is considered to be ideal to demonstrate the application of the walkdown procedures. It is accepted that this is not a comprehensive list of items, but it is considered to be adequate for the purpose of this smdy. During a full walkdown study of a complete platform however, a full list of equipment would be compiled and agreed with the safety case personnel, to be confirmed by the platform personnel. It is anticipated that this stage of the work would be performed largely by, or with ‘much assistance from the platform operator. Due to logistical considerations and the limited scope of this pilot study, the exploratory walkdown was not conducted. It is therefore not possible to achieve the full requirements of the familiarisation phase prior to the full walkdown as it was not possible to: confirm details obtained from drawings and documents identify the component locations identify obvious vulnerabilities assemble all data relevant to the walkdown planning. ‘The compilation of the above data is very useful during the planning phase of the work, and would be essential for a full walkdowa of a complete platform. However for the scope of work in this pilot study it was not so critical, and was integrated into the walkdown. It was also known that platform operators would be accompanying the walkdown team, thus aiding us to locate the items. 15Table 1 ‘Compouents assessed during the topsides walkdown ‘Component type Identification mumber Location Auxiliary Power System Diesel Generator 65101 Module 4 Diesel Day Tank - Module 4 Essential Services MCC 15201 Module 4 Switch room ‘Accommodation Switchboard 194203 ‘Module 4 Switch room ssential) Electrical Control Panel Lpa201 Module 4 Associated Cabling : Module 4 (Samples) Fire Fighting System Firewater Pump ABIOLA Module 15 Diesel Day Tank - Module 15 Valves, Swiot, swi02 Seawater Header WOOI, WEO02, WFOl4, Firewater Ring Main WRITS, \WFO68, WPO72, WFO73, WEO23, WP06S, WF066, WFO67, WFO22 Piping (Samples Including - Module 15 MIS Deluge System) 43.2 Planning Following the familiarisation process, it was necessary to prepare for the walkdown in order to ensure that it was both systematic and efficient. The data collected in the familiarisation process was used to aid this process, and the list of the items evaluated is given in Table 1. From this information the equipment was divided into five separate work packages for the walkdown, these being the mechanical equipment (ie the generator, pumps and associated equipment); valves; electrical equipment; cabling; and piping, This was the most logical way of arranging the walkdown packages given that the scope of this pilot study was relatively small. The walkdown was scheduled over a three and a half day period, with the walkdown team consisting of two engineers from EQE, with an HSE offshore inspector in attendance as an observer. The planned programme prior to the walkdown is given in Table 2. This prograrame was expected to change due 10 platform logistics and the availability of platform operators, but gave a general 16idea of the length of time required for the individual walkdown packages. Table 2 Planned Programme for the Walkdown Packages Day and date Morning Afternoon ‘Thursday 1/7/93 Outward Flight Induction and familiarisation with platform layout Friday 2/7/93 Diese] Generator - G5101 ‘Valves SW101, SW102, WFOO1, and Diesel Day Tank WEOO02, WFO14, WFO76, ‘WEO68, WFO72, WFO73, Firewater Pump - ASIO1A. WR023, WF065, WF066, and Diesel Day Tank WRO067, WFO22 Saturday 3/7/93 Essential Services MCC LS5201 ‘Cable Routes Accommodation Switchboard Essential) 154208 Electrical Contcol Panel LP4201 Sunday 4/7/93 Piping Samples Piping Samples and Drawing Search Monday 5/7/93 Return Flight - 4.3.3 Walkdown documentation preparation Analytical screening criteria would normally be developed for the full walkdown, but for this pilot study it was not appropriate to do so for the following reasons: © — The magnitude of the vibrations were not specified at the time of the study, and therefore could not be applied to determine the loading levels of anchorage, stresses in pipework, or displacements of the items under assessment. © Typical arrangement details of anchorages, sizes of pipework and configurations of the equipment were unknown prior to the pilot study walkdown, © The sample of equipment was not large enough to group components with generically similar details. The documentation preparation therefore concentrated on the development of standard worksheets which would be used for the evaluation of the components during the walkdown, Three sets of worksheets were developed, one each for equipment, piping and cabling. Each set of worksheets contained two sheets, the first of which was to record general details of the item under assessment, and the second was used to evaluate the items likely performance when subjected to vibration loads. Continuation sheets were also provided for additional notes, sketches or photographs. 7The sheets developed for items of equipment are given in Appendix IN. They were intended to be as general as possible so that they could be applied to both electrical and mechanical equipment. To ensure that a thorough and systematic evaluation was performed for all items, not all of the prompts on the sheets were meant to be applicable for every type of component (eg electrical relays were not expected to be found on tanks). The first sheets of the set were designed so that general details and observations could be recorded. These included the following: © — General detaiis to include the item identification; location; description © Specific details recorded for equipment included manufacturer and model, material, mass and centre of gravity; and for piping included contents, operating conditions and size. © — General observations are also recorded on the first sheet. Each of the three sheets for the equipment, piping and cabling contain prompts specific to each of three groups. Generally however, they are to ensure that the key details for each item are recorded, these being details of the configuration, condition, load path to supports, anchorage, differential displacement and secondary damage concerns. Continuation sheets are provided to record these details as required. The second sheet in each set was developed to perform an evaluation of the items when subjected to vibration loads. Generally, the walkdown assessment included evaluation of the effects of inertia loads resulting from the vibrations, the likely displacements of the items, and any secondary damage effects, In assessing inertial Joads, the strength of the item and any attached components was considered, as was the load path and anchorage to the supporting structure. The displacements are assessed to ensure that they are not sufficient to result in impact with adjacent ‘equipment and structures, or that they result in failure of attached lines (cables or piping) with inadequate flexibility. The secondary damage assessment is used to screen out any potential loss of integrity arising from the failure of adjacent equipment and structures. As the level of loading was unknown, the evaluation was based on a classification system to determine the potential behaviour of the items. The assessment of the items was to be performed for each of these vibrational effects, and were classified into the following categories: Low An item with a ‘low' classification for any of the evaluations would be judged to perform badly under vibration loads. For example, if an item of equipment is free standing and not anchored to the supporting structure, it would be very likely to fail. Medium An item with a ‘medium’ classification would be expected to perform moderately well under vibration loads. This classification would result where the item under evaluation is not ideal when subjected to vibrational loading (eg anti vibration mountings which reduce shear capacity of support system,” and also allow largedifferential displacements to occur), or possibly where a good feature has deteriorated (eg corrosion in a weld) High A ‘high’ classification would be assigned to an evaluation item where it would be expected to perform very well under vibration loadings, (eg piping made from ductile materials) Further Evaluation In some circumstances, it may not be possible to classify items during the walkdown due to lack of information. Where this is the case, the item would be recommended for further evaluation. These sheets would require some slight modification if the vibration loadings and the capacity of the items were known, as the heading on classification would not be required. However, the thought process in assessing the items would be similar, the main difference being that the assessment would determine whether the item is adequate when subjected to the applied blast induced vibration loading. 4.3.4 Screening evaluation and walkdown The screening evaluation and walkdown was scheduled to take place over a three and a half day period spent on the platform. The morning of the first day was spent travelling to the platform, and on arrival a short safety induction course was attended by the walkdown team. The rest of the day was set aside for familiarisation with the platform layout and also the systems to be assessed. This petiod was also used for introduction to the platform personnel who would provide invaluable assistance over the following three days. An exploratory walkdown would normally be performed prior to the walkdown, but for this pilot study was incorporated into the walkdown itinerary. This formed part of the familiarisation phase of the walkdown, and was used to confirm details previously obtained from the review of documents, locate the items to be assessed, and to note any obvious vulnerabilities. The main components of the systems to be evaluated were located and briefly examined, although piping and cabling Toutes were not followed. The remaining three days was spent evaluating the equipment listed in Table 1 using the worksheets developed in Section 4,3.3. For each of the items assessed, the walkdown team were initially accompanied by members of the platform staff familiar with the item. Once the walkdown team were familiar with the item to be assessed, and all relevant information had been provided, they could perform the rest of the assessment unaccompanied. The amount of time that the platform staff were required for this study was around 25% of the total walkdown time, although for a full study where the walkdown team would become much more familiar with the platform layout and the operation of its systems, this requirement would be drastically reduced. This would be of obvious advantage in reducing the disruption to the daily routine of the platform operations. In addition to the completion of the worksheets, photographs were taken to record and demonstrate the observations recorded. The camera used had the facility to put the time and date on the photograph taken, and the detailed notes would also record this data. This procedure ensures that the correct photograph is associated 19with the relevant note. It should be noted that the use of the camera required the issue of a permit, and the fire protection systems had previously been tested to ensure that they are not susceptible to camera flashes. To satisfy quality assurance requirements, the sheets were completed by one engineer in the team, and the information recorded is confirmed by the second. Alll sheets are signed by both engineers to ensure that this procedure has been followed. Few problems were encountered in the execution of the walkdowns as accessibility to the items was generally good. The compactness and good layout resulting from the relatively modern design of the platform undoubtedly helped in this respect. 4.3.5 Post walkdown assessment This part of the assessment would usually involve simple calculations to determine the adequacy of anchorages and other selected items, with other respects of the verification process having already been performed in the main walkdown. During the main walkdown, the engineers would use judgement to select worst (bounding) cases for which the calculations would be performed. However, in this pilot study the selection process was not performed as only a relatively small number of each type of component were assessed. Calculations were not performed as the vibration loads were not available. It would be at this, stage that detailed drawing information may be required in order to perform these calculations. It should be noted that only a limited number of the steps described in Section 3.6 were appropriate for this pilot study. The walkdown documentation was reviewed for completeness, although because of logistical considerations could not be independently reviewed. The further steps required to review the adequacy of the items were not performed, because it was not possible to perform the verification process in previous phases of the work.5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS This section summarises the key findings from the walkdown and its assessment of the equipment listed in Table 1, The findings for each type of component are discussed, although not all of the items are discussed individually. The completed walkdown notes are inchided in Reference 2. It can be seen that during the three day period of the walkdown, a large number of components have been assessed in spite of additional documentation performed to demonstrate the process of walldown. The man time required for each component will depend upon a number of factors including the experience of the engineers, the condition, complexity and access to the item. 5.1 MECHANICAL ITEMS ‘The items falling within this category include the firewater pump and auxiliary diesel generator set and their diesel storage tanks. The assessment of these items was performed using the sheets developed in Section 4.3.3 for mechanical equipment. The findings for each of these items are summarised in the following sections Auxiliary Diesel Generator ‘The auxiliary diesel generator assessed was one of two identical units which provide a backup to the normal power supplies. The unit is automatically controlled and is designed to start immediately after the loss of normal power. The engine is started by an electric motor supplied by batteries, and should this fail then a manual operated start may be performed with a hydraulic starter motor. The generator has its own diesel day tank which provides fuel for 27 hours running at full load. The unit consists of a diesel engine and a 440V three phase generator unit with a rating of 1250kVA, both mounted on a common skid. The skid is mounted to the module floor via six vibration isolators. The majority of auxiliary equipment is mounted diteetly off the unit or its skid, with the exception of the batteries, diesel tank and exhaust systems. Attached lines are generally given flexibility via flexible couplings to allow for potential differential displacements resulting from the movement of the unit on its vibration isolators. ‘The tank and the battery supply are treated separately from the assessment of the diesel generator, and are discussed in later sections. The findings from the assessment are as follows: © The condition of the unit was good and appeared to be well maintained. It is tested weekly for 1 hour, and is started alternately by electric or hydraulic methods. © The welds becween the vibration isolators and the floor were beginning to show signs of deterioration due to corrosion. The rubber in these isolators also show signs of cracking and in some cases were peeling away 21from the top plate (Figures 2 and 3). This would have to be considered ‘when determining the lateral load capacity of the mounting arrangement (manufacturers or drawing information would be required for the isolators). The significance of these defects is dependant on the level of vibration loading. © The hydraulic accumulator is secured to a channel section support. The base plate of the support is bolted to the skid by four closely spaced bolts (Figure 4). The capacity of this anchorage may be low for lateral loads, and would have to be assessed against the known demand. © — Displacements resulting from the use of vibration isolators would have to be determined to ensure that adequate flexibility exists in the attached lines, The electrical cables from the battery box had little flexibility and are able to accommodate only limited differential displacements (Figure 5). © No secondary damage concerns were noted from proximity or falling. In summary, the diese! generator set in its current condition would be expected to perform fairly well under vibration loads, and is given a “medium" rating. It was given a moderate rating due to deterioration of the rubber in the vibration isolators, corrosion in the anchorage welds, the arrangement of the hydraulic accumulator, and the lack of flexibility in the battery leads. Calculations would normally be performed to either eliminate these as an area of concern, or to confirm that remedial action is required. Diesel Generator Day Tank The diesel generator day tank provides storage for the fuel supply to the auxiliary generators. The findings from the assessment of the tank are given below: © The tank itself is supported by a steelwork frame at a level above the generators. The tank itself is of substantial welded steel construction with a number of wall stiffeners. The base plate of the tank is welded to the support frame beams which are in tum welded to steelwork columns. These columns are supported from the generator house roof beams. © All attached lines are judged to have sufficient flexibility to allow for any potential differential displacements. © The welded connections between the support columns and roof beams ‘were not visible, but it was assumed that there are no problems based on the fact that other welds are of high standard, the weld is permanently (proof) loaded due to gravity, and the overhead weld should have been easily accessible during construction. © No secondary damage concerns were noted from proximity or falling. © The lever for a hand valve ona drain line is close to a small cable tray resulting in potential impact (Figure 6). However, both drain line and cable tray have flexibility which would suggest that damage would be minimal.In summary, no concerns were noted for the tank, and it was given a "high" rating. Diesel Generator Battery Supply The battery cells are contained within a steel box supported on channel sections welded to the generator house floor. A local control panel through which the power cables pass is suspended from one end of the box. The findings from the assessment of these batteries is given below: © The batteries fit snugly in the box, but no restraint is given vertically. © The supporting structure consists of two channels bolted together with one welded to the floor, and the other welded to the bottom of the box. This arrangement exists at two locations either end of the box. The top channel only is gusseted, so the longitudinal motion of the box is resisted only by the weak way bending of the lower channel web (Figure 7). © As discussed for the diese! generator set itself, there is little flexibility in the power cables between the battery box and unit skid. This does not allow for significant differential displacement effects. In summary, the performance of this item is considered to be moderate once the above points have been taken into consideration, and it is given a “medium” rating. Calculations would be performed to determine the level of vibrations are acceptable before these features would cause problems. Emergency Fire Pump The emergency fire pump assessed was one of three identical units, two of which are available at any one time. Starting the diesei engine is facilitated by one of two independent sets of batteries, with the second set as backup. The starting procedure is initiated automatically when the water pressure in the firewater ring main drops below a preset value which would result from the activation of sprinkler or deluge systems. (The ring main is normally purged by the sea water lift pumps). As for the diesel generator, each pump has its own diesel day tank providing enough fuel for 12 hours continuous running. The fire pump is a four stage vertical centrifugal pump rated at 1250m°/h driven by a diesel engine through a gearbox. The engine is mounted through vibration isolators to a skid attached to the module steelwork. The pump is mounted independently from the engine, and differential displacements between the two units is provided by universal joints in the drive shaft. Lines to the engine are also given flexibility to allow for movement on the vibration isolators. ‘The findings from the assessment are summarised as follows: ® ~The vibration isolators had a less than ideal arrangement as they provide Jateral but not vertical restraint (Figure 8). This arrangement would have to be checked to ensure that the diesel engine would not lift off the Mounts due to combined effects of vertical motions and overturning due to lateral motions. Strength checks would also be required for the isolator to ensure that it is adequate to restrain lateral motions. 23© The welded connections at the base of the pump and diesel engine skid were submerged in standing water at various locations and showed signs of corrosion (Figure 9). The adequacy of these connections would have to be checked allowing for some reduction factors at the welds, © Differential displacements between the diesel engine and pump would have to be evaluated to ensure that they can be accommodated by the drive shaft with universal joints, © The diesel day tank supporting frame and welded connections showed signs of deterioration due to corrosion. The adequacy of this support system would have to be checked allowing for the corrosion. © One of the cooling water pipes was dented (Figure 10) resulting from impact damage, and also rippled possibly resulting from stress related problems. These defects would result in stress concentrations which would have to be evaluated. © It was not possible to determine whether the local control pane! mounted ‘on the diese! engine skid contained relays, This would have to be determined and the effects of vibrations on any electrical relays would have to be evaluated, In summary, further evaluation would be required to determine the performance of any relays before the firewater pump could be rated. Assuming there is no problem however, the unit would be expected to perform moderately well under vibration loads. This rating results from the defects noted, such as corrosion and damage to pipework, and also due to the use of vibration isolators offering no vertical restraint, plus the differential displacement concerns resulting from independent mounting of the pump and engine. Calculations would normally be performed to either eliminate these as an area of concern, or to confirm that remedial action is required. 5.2 PIPEWORK The pipework considered for this assessment was part of the firewater ring main from the firewater pump discussed previously to the deluge set for one of the modules. The pipework was fabricated from Cunifer and was approximately 14" diameter. The ring main is normally supplied from the seawater lift pumps, the water being treated with hypochlorite to restrict marine growth. The pipes are constantly purged at a pressure of 10 bar. The valves on the ring main were hand operated and all of similar design. These were included as part of the pipework assessment. The pipework considered in this study was divided into four segments in order to make the walkdown more manageable. The two extremes of the pipework section assessed were fixed to the module support frame steelwork. From these two points, the pipework rises vertically to pass over the fire pump house and potable water tank. The horizontal sections of pipework above the pump house and tank 24was supported for gravity Joads at regular intervals, with lateral support provided at a few locations. The findings from the assessment are given below: © = The general configuration of piping was considered to be good, with no hardspots, and fabricated from a ductile material. © The member supporting one of the fixed supports is not designed for torsional loads which would result from lateral (vibration) loading on the pipework. This member would have to be checked to determine its adequacy for the applied loads. © A large number of hypochlorite storage drums were sited adjacent to the pipework. There is potential for these to fall against the pipework, but little damage would be expected to result. © At one location, the end of a hoist rail is directly above the pipe. The hoist rail is supported between two modules which appeared to have some flexibility in their mounting arrangement (Figures 11 and 12). This could lead to differential displacements between the modules causing the rail to drop onto the pipe. The possibility of this differential displacement would have to be assessed. In summary, the pipework would be expected to perform well when subjected to vibration loads, with the possible exception of two areas. The support with little torsional resistance would have to be addressed by further evaluation, as would the hoist rail suspended between two modules. By eliminating these concerns, the classification for the piping would be “high”. 5.3. ELECTRICAL ITEMS A number of control panels were assessed during the walkdown relating to the auxiliary power generation system, these being the control panel for the generator, and also the switchgear cabinets. The findings from these assessments are given below: © The cabinets are of standard design arranged in banks of a larger number of cabinets bolted together. These cabinets in turn are mounted on support frames consisting of channel sections bolted or welded to the floor. The use of shims is required to level the cabinets on uneven floors (Figure 13). © The relays within these cabinets were not evaluated, as for this study it ‘was not possible to screen out the non-essential relays due to lack of time available from the platform and systems staff. These would have to be evaluated as a separate exercise, and this would generally be the case for a full study. @ Some of the cabinets were not bolted together other than at the top and bottom (Figure 14). This could possibly allow impacting at the centre of the cabinets, thus affecting any sensitive relays that may exist. 25© The support arrangement for some of the cabinets may have a weak link due to the use of shims between channel sections connected to the floor and cabinet base, The strength of this arrangement would have to be assessed. In summary, the effect of relay chatter on the power system would have to be evaluated. Otherwise, the cabinets would be expected to perform moderately due to the arrangement of the supports, and they were given a "medium" rating. 5.4 CABLING The cables from the auxiliary diesel generator to the essential supplies switchboard were assessed in this study, the findings from which are given below: © The cables are tied to ladder type cable trays which are supported by “unistrut’ type frames (Figure 15). © — The trays are connected io supports at regular intervals with clips. © Various pieces of equipment were stored on top of the cable trays, although nothing of a size to cause concern was noted (Figure 16). It is normal good ‘housekeeping’ practise to ensure that cable trays are not used for the storage of items which could lead to overloading and potential failures. © The configuration of the trays was good, with regular supports, no hard spots, and no overloading of the trays existed. Tn summary, the cable trays were considered to be of “high” classification, and no causes for concem were noted. This would be likely to be confirmed by performing a limited analytical review for the cabling. 5.5 ASSESSMENT SUMMARY ‘An overall summary of findings from the assessment of the items described above is given below: ‘© — Generally, the standard of the equipment and its installation was high. © Some welded connections were showing signs of deterioration due to corrosion. This is expected to be more of a problem as the platform age increases. © The vibration isolators used in mounting of equipment may have inadequate load carrying capacity, and also could result in large lateral displacements, Calculations would determine whether these are of concern, particularly as the attached lines for some equipment appeared to have little flexibitity.‘The mounting arrangement for some of the modules appeared to have some flexibility, and potential differential displacements between these and adjacent modules may occur. This could lead to failures where equipment is anchored to two separate modules and cannot accommodate differential motions. Subsequent discussions suggested that no flexibility exists. To rule this out as a concern altogether, a review of drawings would determine the exact mounting details. Some anchorage details, although being adequate for dead loads appear to have limited capacity for lateral loads, which would result from blast induced vibrations. The capacity for these items would have to be determined by calculation, Damage was noted to some cooling water pipework on the fire pump which would result in stress concentrations, hence reducing its ultimate capacity. 276. CONCLUSIONS The purpose of this work was to develop procedures for the assessment of topsides equipment subject to blast induced vibrations using the walkdown method, The procedures were proved and shown to be both practical and effective by employing them in a pilot study involving the walkdown of a 1980's North Sea platform. The procedures developed ate for the verification of equipment. However, it should be noted that the pilot study was used to demonstrate the use of these procedures rather than perform the verification. ‘The following key conclusions have resulted from this study; Evaluations using the walkdown techniques are practical and cost effective compared to other methods of equipment qualification. Walkdown techniques are an especially effective method of evaluating current conditions, including effects such as corrosion or modifications since installation, Assistance from the platform operators was invaluable to the success of the pilot study. This cooperation would be essential for the success of any walkdown, It is essential that walkdown evaluations be performed by experienced engineers in an organised, methodical method, The walkdown evaluations should include a limited analytical study. These would assess worst (or bounding) cases for equipment installations by performing calculations to consider the demand load. This would include a limited amount of drawing and specific review in order to determine details which cannot be visually obtained. Certain system related functions are not readily techniques. For example, the effects and probabilit best performed in a separate review. iewed by walkdown of relay chatter are Although the review was performed to assess the effects of blast induced vibrations, the walkdown technique is also an effective method of assessing equipment for other vibration loadings, such as from boat impact or earthquakes.The pilot study was performed on a relatively modern platform, and it is anticipated that its application to an older platform would present more difficulties, For example, documents and drawings were readily available for the platform considered in this study, which might not be the case for an older platform, Accessibility to items may also be more difficult, and the platform may have been subject to modifications, Although an older platform would test the implementation of the procedure more fully, the method is ideal for this application because it accounts for any defects and modifications that exist at the current time. 2930 REFERENCES ‘The Public Enquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, The Hon Lord Cullen, November 1990. EQE International Limited Report 45-05-R-02, ‘Pilot Study For the Assessment of Topsides Equipment Subjected to Blast Induced Vibrations ~ Walkdown Records’, Draft issue dated 27 August 1993.13. 14, 15. 16. LIST OF FIGURES Flow Chart Showing Work Performed for this Study Cracked Rubber Insert Found in the Diesel Generator Vibration Isolator Rubber Peeling from Top Plate of the Diesel Generator Vibration Isolator View of Diesel Generator Hydraulic Accumulator and Mounting Arrangement Blectrical Cables Between Fixed Support (Battery Box) and Flexible Support (Diesel Generator Skid) Close Proximity of Hand Valve Lever on Diesel Generator Day Tank Pipework to Cable Tray Support Arrangement for the Battery Supply Enclosure View of Fire Pump Diesel Engine Vibration Isolator Fire Purp Welded Connections Submerged in Standing Water Dents in Fire Pump Diesel Engine Cooling Water Pipework View of Module Mounting Arrangement Showing Flexible Pad Between Module Support Frame and Module Hoist Rail Suspended Between two Adjacent Modules Shims Used to Level Electrical Cabinets ‘View Showing Bolt Hole Location but no Bolts Typical View of Cable Trays Storage of Some Equipment on Top of the Cable Trays 31‘WALKDOWN ASSESSMENT OUTCOME. ~ Verify ea many items as possible their adequacy wo autisty ‘pre-determined criteria. + Identity equipment with obvious vulnerabilities and ‘undesirable features, + Recommend resotution methods to items which are ‘ot readily verised during she walkdown, ~ Review the safety implications ofthe sclecisd equipment and their aasoclated oystoans with regpect to the overall aety case, Figure 1 Flow chart showing work performed for this studyFigure 2 Cracked rubber insert Found its the diesel generalar vibratien isolator 44 Rubber peeling from tap plate of enerator vihration isolatorbuttery supplyFire pump welded con werged in standing water re pump die ooling water pipeworkHoist rail suspended jacent mundulesFigure 13 Shins used to level electrical cabinets¢ * | 0 as n g | 4 é | Figuve 14 View showing bole le location but no bolts alFiguee 15 ‘Typical siow nf cable trays Figure 16 Starage of sone equsipment ot tap of the cable trays 42APPENDIX 1 SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS There are a number of criteria to be considered in relation to explosions on topsides facilities, OF primary concern is the protection and escape of personnel following an explosion. In order to achieve this objective, it is important to: ‘© minimise the potential damage to process plant and structures in order to reduce the risk of escalation © ensure that the temporary refuge (TR), emergency escape routes and lifeboats remain functional irrespective of the event and escalation that has taken place. It is known that vibrations resulting from the blast event led to such catastrophic escalation on Piper Alpha, It is therefore necessary to identify and address vulnerable features in order to reduce the risk of escalation which in turn could affect the integrity of the TR and escape routes. ‘The topsides installation typically has a number of essential safety systems which are made up of the individual items of equipment. In order to qualify an individual system, each of its components must be assessed, in addition to any interactions from other systems. To perform a complete and systematic assessment, it is necessary to define the complete set of components required for the safety case. The following is a summary of the essential safety related systems and the equipment contained within them. Emergency Shutdown Systems These systems are used to shutdown part or all of the process depending on the level of shutdown required. There are four levels of shutdown depending on the severity of the event: © Level 1 shutdown closes down the process local to the failed item of kit only © Level 2 shutdown closes down the total platform process @ Level 3 is a total shutdown of the platform so that all ignition sources are removed @ ~~ Level 4 closes down the well totally These systems comprise mainly of valves to control the individual processes and pipes. These are either single or double acting valves which may be controlled by pneumatics or hydraulics. They are usually fully automatic with manual override. Therefore in addition to the assessment of the valves, the associated controls should be assessed, i.e. signal lines, airlines and hydraulics. Obviously the contents in the pipes may be variable (liquid or gas) and all leaks are considered dangerous but not essential to prevent. The most critical control valves in the process lines are the ESD riser valves which cut off the supply to the 45APPENDIX I SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS There are a number of criteria to be considered in relation to explosions on topsides facilities. Of primary concern is the protection and escape of personne! following an explosion. In order to achieve this objective, it is important to: ® — minimise the potential damage to process plant and structures in order to reduce the risk of escalation © ensure that the temporary refuge (TR), emergency escape routes and lifeboats remain functional irrespective of the event and escalation that has taken place. It is known that vibrations resulting from the blast event led to such catastrophic escalation on Piper Alpha. It is therefore necessary to identify and address vulnerable features in order to reduce the risk of escalation which in turn could affect the integrity of the TR and escape routes. ‘The topsides installation typically has a number of essential safety systems which are made up of the individual items of equipment. In order to qualify an individual system, each of its components must be assessed, in addition to any interactions from other systems. To perform a complete and systematic assessment, it is necessary to define the complete set of components required for the safety case, The following is a summary of the essential safety related systems and the equipment contained within them. Emergency Shutdown Systems These systems are used to shutdown part or all of the process depending on the level of shutdown required. There are four levels of shutdown depending on the severity of the event: © Level I shutdown closes down the process local to the failed item of kit only © Level 2 shutdown closes down the total platform process @ Level 3 is a total shutdown of the platform so that all ignition sources are removed © Level 4 closes down the well totally These systems comprise mainly of valves to control the individual processes and pipes. These are either single or double acting valves which may be controlled by pneumatics or hydraulics. They are usually fully automatic with manual override ‘Therefore in addition to the assessment of the valves, the associated controls should be assessed, i.e. signal lines, airlines and hydraulics, Obviously the contents in the pipes may be variable (liquid or gas) and all leaks are considered dangerous but not essential to prevent. The most critical control valves in the process lines are the ESD riser valves which cut off the supply to the 45platform. These are essential to prevent further fuel being supplied to a fire, and once they are closed the inventory is allowed to burn off. In addition to the riser valves, the blowdown valves are also essential to aid the removal of the inventory. ‘These valves release this inventory to the flare stack. Fire Protection and Gas Detection Systems In addition to the process control systems described above, the fire protection and gas detection systems are of vital importance. These systems are essential in order to monitor and to prevent escalation of an incident. The fire & gas detection systems are also essential to the successful control of the emergency shutdown systems. The fire protection systems are usually divided into two separate systems, usually fed by the same supply. These are: © = The fire water ring main which supplies fire hydrants and sprinkler systems typically runs around the perimeter of the topsides. This system is used to extinguish small localised fires. Obviously the main leak where blast has occurred will be left to burn off the leaking hydrocarbons and hence reduced the dangerous build up of explosive mixtures. © = The deluge systems are split into process areas and are activated to prevent any escalation of an incident. This is achieved by keeping areas adjacent to a fire cool by the application of water. Both these systems are controlled by fire and gas detection panels. ‘These systems are typically comprised of the following components: © — Water pumps which supply the deluge and fire water ring main systems are sited below the TR. They are usually powered by diesel generator sets, and the diesel fuel is stored in tanks. The pumps are fed by pipelines from the sea, © The fire water ring main is controlled by valves and feeds the sprinkler systems and hydrants. © — The deluge systems are similar in make up to the fire water ring main, but is split into smaller systems to serve individual process areas. @ Fire and gas detection panels are located at appropriate tocations around the topsides, These incorporate the appropriate detection equipment. @ — Signal lines for control of the systems. Temporary Refuge In addition to providing sanctuary for personnel, the TR also houses other important functions, ie the main control room and communications room. Within the TR, the HVAC systems are essential for its integrity during an incident in order to exclude gases and smoke.‘The essential equipment for these functions are as follows: © Emergency Communications used both locally to inform personnel of any incident and also to contact the outside world. They typically consist of stroboscopes, claxons, public address systems, radio equipment and radio mast, and associated cabling. © — The control room contains all essential instrumentation and control. Its integrity is essential in order to maintain control of the main safety functions on topsides. As well as the instrumentation and control panels, there are the associated signal lines. © The HVAC is essential for gas integrity. During an incident the inlet dampers would be closed by a signal from the fire and gas panels. Escape Routes Escape Routes, muster areas and lifeboats should be operable for the safe evacuation of personnel. The integrity of these areas is dependant on maintaining the structural integrity. For each area there should be at least one escape route reuired to be kept free of any biackage. Emergency Power Supplies Emergency Power Supplies are used as a back up should the normal topside power supply fail. These typically comprise both diesel generator sets and uninterruptable power supplies (ie batteries), The emergency power supply systems comprise mainly the following: © Diesel generator sets and auxilliary systems © Cabling and switchboards © = Batteries 47APPENDIX II Detailed Walkdown ProceduresCONTENTS A2,1 INTRODUCTION 2.2. ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT 2.2.1 Comparison of Capacity versus Demand A2.2.2 Similarity and Inclusion Rules 2.2.3 Anchorage Adequacy A2.2.4 Spatial Interaction and Secondary Damage 2,3 CABLE TRAYS AND CONDUITS 42.4 TANES 2.8 PIPING AND SUPPORTS A2.6 RELAYS FIGURES Page ‘33 53 33 33 54 56 7 58 58 59 5152A2.1 INTRODUCTION This section of the document describes in general terms the procedures and methods to be adopted for the screening verification and walkdown for: Electrical and mechanical components Cable trays and conduits Tanks Piping systems Relays ‘The guidelines set out next below represents a first level of screening. Items of equipment not screened out at this stage will be subject to further assessment. A2.2 ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ‘The procedure for the verification of the electrical and mechanical equipment is divided into four phases: © Comparison of capacity versus demand © Assessment of inclusion rules © Anchorage verification © Assessment of spatial interactions and secondary damage A2.2.1 Comparison of Capacity versus Demand ‘The first phase is to determine the input motion (demand) resulting from the blast event to be applied to the item under assessment. This demand will then be compared to the known capacity of the component under the vibration loading. This procedure is as follows: © Compute the "in-stracture" response spectra, These spectra will be developed from analysis using “best estimate” values for stiffness, mass and damping parameters. © — Compare the “in-structure" response spectra with the known capacity of the component. A2.2.2 Similarity and Inclusion Rules The adequacy of an item of electrical or mechanical equipment will be verified by confirming that: © — The item is generically similar to those of known performance under vibration loading contained within a database. 53® Inclusion rules relating to the type of equipment are satisfied. These rules would have been identified through knowledge of vibrational failure modes during tests and real life situations, and are used to screen out features which could cause failure. Once the item has been selected, a check will be carried out to demonstrate that it has the same general characteristics as the equipment in the database. If further Justification is needed reference will be made back to the databases. The next step is to check that the item conforms to the inclusion rules. This is to ensure that the item of equipment has no undesirable features which would reduce its adequacy under vibration loadings. If any of the tules is not met, this will be treated as an item requiring further assessment (outlier). Recognising that the of rules is not necessarily complete, the walkdown team will in addition use thei judgement and experience to identify any suspicious details or uncommon situations which may make the item vulnerable. A2.2.3 Anchorage Adequacy The adequacy of equipment anchorages will be carried out in four steps: (a) Inspection of anchorage installation (b) Determination of anchorage capacity (©) Determination of demand @) Comparison of capacity and demand ‘The following sections describe the procedures for each of these four steps. It must be noted however, that the walkdown team may choose to by-pass some of the requirements if their experience indicates a large margin of capacity over demand for any particular anchorage. Inspection of Anchorage Installations Two factors will influence the number of anchorages inspected: ® = Uniformity and generic similarity © = Access difficulties The walkdown team will decide whether there is sufficient evidence of uniformity and similarity that checks can be done on a sampling basis. In cases of access difficulties, the walkdown team will make a judgement based on the general evidence gathered from the rest of the inspection programme for those bolts not accessible for inspection. The inspection of anchorage installation, will be carried out as part of the site walkdown and will in general provide information on: (@) Equipment characteristics (je estimation of mass, centre of gravity location, natural frequency, damping and equipment base overturning moment centre of rotation) (b) Type of anchorage(© Size and location of anchorage (a) Installation adequacy (©) Embedment length (f) Gap size between equipment base and floor (g) Spacing between anchorages (h) Edge distance () Essential relays in cabinet @ Equipment base stiffness and prying action (k) Equipment base strength and structural load path The capacity of the anchorage will be determined from relevant design codes or manufacturers data. Demand Determination ‘The loads on the anchors will be determined from equivalent static analyses as follows: (a) Determine appropriate input accelerations This will be obtained from the appropriate in-structure response spectrum corresponding to the equipment location, equipment damping and frequency. The accelerations will be computed for three directions of motion. (®) Determine inertiat equipment load An equivalent static method with a static coefficient of 1.0 will be used to compute the inertial loads, The loads will be computed for three directions, oO Determine inertial anchor loads This will be done by applying the inertial equipment loads to the centre of mass to determine the pull out and shear loads on the anchors. Care will be taken to include torsional effects if significant. @ Combine loads The anchor loads will be combined using the square root sum of squares (SRSS) method for the three directional components of loading. © Calculate total anchor loads ‘The vibrational loads will be combined with the dead loads and other five loads like pipe reaction loads. 55Comparison of Capacity and Demand This is the last step in the evaluation of the anchorage adequacy. Anchorage for which demand exceeds capacity will be subject to further assessment. A2.2.4 Spatial Interaction and Secondary Damage Interactions are concerned with damage to essential equipment resulting from: © Displacement interaction Structural failure and falling © Flexibility of attached lines and cables © Effects of fire, flooding and sprays Displacement Interaction The walkdown team will investigate the possibility of blast induced vibrations on , Faceways, ductwork, electrical and mechanical items and any other items causing impact on essential items as a result of blast induced vibrations. For piping and ductwork, the concern is potentially large displacements because of flexible hanging systems, especially if the safety related equipment is ificantly smaller than the piping or ductwork. A maximum credible acement will be calculated for the piping and ductwork, and this figure will be used in the first instance as the screening out potential interactions. ‘This calculation will be done using simple hand calculations for a simply supported span. Potential impact from vibrations induced from electrical and mechanical equipment will be assessed by the walkdown team, For example the potential for banging of cabinets that contain relays or the potential for overturning of tanks on to essential equipment will be identified. These concerns will be screened out using engineering judgement or simple hand calculations. Structural Failure and Falling ‘The concern is the structural failure of overhead or adjacent systems or structures onto safety related equipment. Most of the concerns for electrical and mechanical equipment, piping, raceways, HVAC, ceilings, light fixtures, platform gratings, overhead cranes, fire protection, storage tanks, etc. will be etiminated by anchorages checks. Flexibility of Attached Lines and Cables The walkdown team will identify distribution lines such as small bore piping or cable connected to safety related equipment. ‘The vulnerability of such lines from any itent to its first support point will be reviewed as part of the walkdown. Fire, Flooding and Sprays The walkdown team will identify and review the vulnerability of all source of sprays, fire and flooding that would adversely affect safety related equipment. This includes: 56© — Hazardous/flammable material stored in unanchored drums. © = Non-ductile fluid carrying systems such as cast iron on PVL. © Unanchored and poorly anchored tanks with non-flexible attached piping. A2.3 CABLE TRAYS AND CONDUITS The evaluation of the adequacy of cable trays and conduits will be carried out applying walkdowns and limited analytical reviews. Walkdowns ‘A walkdown of cable trays and conduits will be performed to: © Evaluate the systems against inclusion rules identified through experience and test data bases. . Select representative, worst case samples of sections of cable trays and conduits for a limited analytical review. ‘The inclusion rules to be used concern: Cable tray span Conduit span Raceway member tie downs Channel nuts Rigid boot connection Beam clamps Cast-iron anchor embedment eoeecccs The walkdown will also identify and review other vibrational performance concerns, These include: Anchorages Cracks in concrete Corrosion Sag of conduit and cable trays Broken and missing components Restraint of cables Aging of plastic cable ties Hard spots (stiff supports) Spatial and interaction eoorccere Limited Analytical Review During the walkdown, the walkdown team will select representative, worst-case samples for the limited analytical review. This review will determine how rugged the cable trays and conduits are to the blast loading.A2.4 TANKS Tanks will be reviewed for those features which experience has shown to be vuinerable to vibration loadings. The features are: © Buckling of large, flat boomed vertical tanks. © Thadequate anchor bolts and their embedments, © Weak anchorage connection between the anchor bolts and tank shell. © Inadequate flexibility of attached piping. ‘The walkdown team will identify and note all of the information necessary to perform the assessments of the vulnerable features, and use their experience to identify any other vulnerable features or potential failure modes. A2.5 PIPING AND SUPPORTS The walkdown techniques that are adopted for cable trays and conduits can be used. Wherever possible, walkdown procedures will be applied to piping systems. To facilitate this, screening criteria will be developed based on displacements and stresses as a function of parameters like support types, pipe diameters and spans. Examples of such criteria are shown in Figures 1 and 2. The screening criteria will be based on allowable values from appropriate design codes. The walkdown team will: (1) Apply appropriate screening criteria to eliminate piping configurations of insignificant concern, The screening criteria will consist of piping system and pipe support attributes that may lead to failure and falling as evidenced by past experience. A support failure usually does not result in piping failure unless multiple supports fail. (2) Inspect and review the adequacy of the anchorage of components to which the piping is attached. This is because any such unanchored, unrestrained or inadequately anchored item may result in excessive displacement of the piping anchor point. (3) Assess the implications of any significant equipment or large valves attached to the piping, including the effects of the eccentricity of the mass. 4) Review the adequacy of fittings such as bellows, expansion joints and flexible hoses that cannot accommodate blast induced motion if the line is not properly restrained to prevent excessive motion. 586) © a @) @) (10) (a Identify potential brittle joints which are vulnerable to vibrations, or any undesirable pipe support, details. Identify any significant visible rast or corrosion deterioration in piping and supports. Review span length between pipe supports and identify those heavily loaded supports based on dead load consideration, Determine the adequacy of any identified short fixed end rod hangers that may be subject to fatigue vibration motion. Assess the adequacy of the presence of any visible damage to piping and supports. Identify inflexible piping systems which ate vulnerable to vibrations because of differential building movements or anchor point movement. Provide a finalised list of vulnerable piping configurations for analysis. 42.6 RELAYS The verification of relays will be in two stages: aw Q) The first stage is not considered here further as During the site walkdown, the walkdown team wil Develop the list of essential relays for all identified safety-related electrical citcuits. This requires systematic documetitation of the identified relays, including their location, mode of operation, as- designed logic requirement, and their potential implications should they malfunction. The intention is to successively screen down the relays to those essential ones which are associated with the essential safety related equipment list. Verify the adequacy of the identified essential relays, based on the appropriate screening criteria. Identify any obvious vulnerable features associated with the refays such as use of brittle material and inadequate mounting methods. ‘The outcome of this failure modes and effects analysis is to provide a reduced list of vulnerable relays for which chatter is not acceptable with respect to plant safe shutdown. is not part of the watkdown. Verify the adequacy of the anchorage of the cabinets or enclosures which support the essential relays (see Section A2. 1.3). Spot check mountings of essential relays.. Spot check the essential relays to verify their types and locations including checks for vulnerable relays. © Assess the adequacy of the essential relays. ‘erification This will be carried out as part of the anchorage verification walkdowns as in Section A2.1.3 of this document. Mountings of Essential Relays A representative sample of relays will be checked to identify abnormat or atypical relay mounting techniques. Adequacy of the mounting of relays can be verified by simple indicators like snugness of the relay fit in its mounting bracket and that, mounting bolts are in place and tight. Relay Types and Locations This check is done on a sample set of relays to verify the electrical drawings used in the selection of essential relays.Flexibility Chart - Carton Stee! Piping i 3 i biscraceneas cao Figure 1- Example of Acceptable Deformations for Connecting Pipes Def lection criter ta tea Hun Pipe - Geen Gounery Co os Ble 515m os 8 | LE] en Gua oie am |) to, 2 L. | as om [4 oom eo oe et be om Morin Ost tect lon Cm Figure 2 - Example of Acceptable Displacements for Rod Hangers 61APPENDIX III ‘Walkdown SheetsProject No: Walkdown No: Rquipment Auembly Maimrenanee/Condiion Aschorage Lond Pate (oReeationisobtors, 2) Suporing Severe sched Lines Dien Dipacones ViraionSesine — Geto ee)Project No: Walkdown No: Sheet of _ Eraluation Due to Inertial Loads Maia Vat Casing, wouning unenbly, Spent Coundiess ants ac) Anachad Weights ©) Supporied Camgooeats 4) Supportiog Siveture Anchorage Bealuation Lond Pat 0 Supporting Structure 1b) Anchorage Sireagth Displacement Ertution 2) ilferet! dipacereats 8) Eftectson ViraonSestive Bau > Giaigesiselog Favlpmat Secondary Darnege Eraluation ©) OverbedrAducat Equpmet or Structures oben (Other Conceren 9) MaintestneetCoatition » Ober © OVERALL CLASSIFICATION | |_| Further Action Evatuated By: Dawe:Project No: Walkdown No: Sheet of _ ‘SkereiPhotographa/Notes 67Project No: ‘Walkdown No: Sheet of Prinanry Cabte Support ‘Connection Dewalt ‘System Supports (eays, condi Cortesion ‘AvehorageLous Path Differential Displacement Maine nance/Condton Secondary Damage Configuration (ead spo, ‘og spans ec) erProject No ‘Walkdown No: Sheet of _ Systems Supports ‘Load Pech ‘Anchorage Connections Configuration Diffecatil Displacements Secondary Damage Evaluation ‘Overhead’ Adjacea Equipment ot SteucraesProject No: Walkdown No: Sheet of __ 70Project No: Watkdown No: Sheet of Configuration —— Maer ‘Support System Hi Spo ‘Anaches Welghts __ Dilferemiat Displacement ‘Components _— Secondary Damage Evaluated By: 7Project No: ‘Walkdown No: Sheet of _ WALKDOWN SUMMARY Piping Configuration Assessment 9 Suppor Syxem Matec Hard Spoe ‘Supported Coraponents ‘Auached Weights Lond Path to Supporting Structure “Aneborage by Ditfereatial displacements ‘Secondary Damage Evaluation 1) Qvarhend/Adjscent Bquipawat or Structures Others ‘Other ConcernsSheet of ‘SketvPhotographu Notes