Malacampo Sin vs.

Sin
GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001
FACTS:

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987.
Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.
On June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the
proceedings.
While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion
between the parties, he did not actively participated therein.
Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the
proceedings.
HELD:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for
the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition.
The records are bereft of evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded
for proper trial.
The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well.

Ancheta v. Ancheta
GR 145370
March 4, 2004
FACTS:

Marietta and Rodolfo were married in 1959. They had 8 children.

In 1992, Rodolfo left the conjugal home and abandoned Marietta and their children.

Two years after, Marietta filed a complaint for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial separation of
property with a plea for support and support pendente lite.

The parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein their property located in Carmona, Cavite was adjudicated to
Marietta and her children.

The court rendered judgment based on the compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, Marietta and her children
occupied the said property.

In 1995, Rodolfo, filed a case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Marietta on the ground of psychological
incapacity for the purpose of remarrying

Rodolfo alleged in his petition that Marietta was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes,
Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, even though he knew that Marietta and the children were occupying the property in
Cavite

The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on the the parties son, Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.

Marietta failed to file an answer and was declared in default and Rodolfo was allowed to adduce evidence ex-parte.

On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab
initio. The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.

On July 7, 2000, the Marietta filed a verified petition against the Rodolfo with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC.

Marietta, alleged, among others, that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the Rodolfos marriage was null and
void for the court a quos failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion
between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.

ISSUE: W/N the declaration of nullity of the marriage was valid

HELD: NO

The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section
3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an action
for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in
order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases
for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (Art. 48, FC)
If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. (Rule 18, Sec. 6, 1985 Rules of Court)
The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation
of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested.
The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family
members alone.
Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims and
caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill
his or her marital duties and obligations

Republic v CA and Quintos (G.R. No. 159594)

FACTS:

Eduardo and Catalina were married in civil rites and they were not blessed with a child because Catalina had a
hysterectomy following her second marriage.

Eduardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the round of psychological incapacity

He alleged that Catalina:

o always left the house without his consent
o engaged in petty arguments with him
o constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs

o spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for their adopted daughter
o gambled away all his remittances as an overseas worker
o abandoned the conjugal home with her paramour
Eduardo also presented the results of a neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that
Catalina exhibited traits of a borderline personality disorder that was incurable
Catalina did not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity and denied flirting with different men and
abandoning the conjugal home.

ISSUE: Whether or not Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital duties
Held: NO. Marriage remains valid.

Psychological incapacity is an incapacity/inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and it is
not the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations

In Republic v CA(Molina), the Supreme Court has established guidelines involving the nullity of marriage based on the
ground of psychological incapacity and in this case, they were not met because they were not sufficiently proven

Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the house without Eduardo's consent, refusal to do household chores,
and take care of their adopted daughter were not established. Eduardo presented no other witness to corroborate these
allegations.

RTC and CA heavily relied on Dr. Reyes' evaluation despite any factual foundation to support this claim.

The report was vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of the incapacity.

Even the testimony of Dr. Reyes stated a general description of borderline personality disorder which did not explain the
root cause as to why Catalina was diagnosed as such

They did not specify the acts or omissions or the gravity which constituted the disorder.

It was only established that Catalina was childish and immature.

Furthermore, Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina. This lacks the depth and objectivity of an expert
assessment.

From the scant evidence presented, it can be adduced that Catalina's immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her
marital obligations do not constitute psychological incapacity alone.

It must be shown that such immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

Yuk Ling Ong vs CA

FACTS:

Yuk Ling Ong (Ling), a British-Hongkong national married to Benjamin Co, a Filipino, received a summons from the
Bureau of Immigration for her to appear because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation
proceedings.

she furnished copies of the following documents:

o petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. CV-01-01777,
o petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. 02-0306,
o Decision dated December 11, 2002 by the RTC Paranaque City declaring her marriage void in Civil Case No.
02-0306, and
o copy of her marriage certificate, with the decision annotated therein.

From the documents, she learned that Benjamin first filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, without any
inkling as to what happened to the first petition

Civil Case No. 02-0306 was again filed by Benjamin, indicating her address as 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa
Garden Homes, Quezon City

A substituted service of summons was allegedly delivered by the Sheriff

RTC proceeded to hear the case without her participation, and rendered the decision annulling her marriage with
Benjamin on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Ling filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals, averring that she was never notified of the
proceedings in the case, thus there was extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction and that Benjamin purposely indicated a
wrong address so she could not participate in the proceedings

No valid service of summons was made upon her because there was no explanation that personal service was
impossible before substituted service was effected thereto

The summons was received only by the security guard, and she was not psychologically incapacitated to enter into
marriage with Benjamin
CA denied the petition the service of summons upon Ling was valid as it was customary in her townhouse that the
security guard would first entertain the visitors or receive communication on behalf of its residents so it would be
impossible for the Sheriff to personally serve the summons

ISSUE: W/N the facts proven by the petitioner constitute extrinsic fraud within the purview of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
HELD: YES

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no
available or other adequate remedy.

Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders
and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment: extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction.

Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a
judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to
a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.

In the present case, petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her person because there was an invalid
substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendants voluntary appearance in court[5]. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be
acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, which state:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous requirements of a substituted service
of summons, to wit: xxx
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
xxx
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two
different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly
narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to
locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other
acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

xxx
The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of
legal age, what the recipients relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least
notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the
Return of Summons. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The summons in this case was issued on July 29, 2002. In his servers return, the process server resorted to substituted
service of summons on August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately opted for substituted service of
summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons
The servers return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the
summons on petitioner.
The servers return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It simply
stated that the summons was received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer
thereat. It did not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not inclined to uphold the CAs denial of
the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because there was an invalid
substituted service of summons.
The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address [t]he numerous claims of irregularities in
substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and
appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses.

Jocson vs. Robles

February 10, 1968
FACTS:

On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action for the
annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles, on the ground that it was bigamous.

It was alleged in the amended complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles had
contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same
defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that
during their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature birth of
their first child, who died three days later.

In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage.

But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that marriage
with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a married man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly
persisted until January, 1963 when he was finally able to get away and live apart from the plaintiff.

ISSUE: W/N the plaintiffs claim of bigamy is valid against the defendant, while the defendant is a married man, who contracted
previous marriage.
HELD: NO.

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.

The court of domestic relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of article
88 and 1011 of the Civil Code that expressly prohibits the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgement.

The affidavit annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the
Civil Code

G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974

ROMULO TOLENTINO v. HELEN VILLANUEVA
FACTS:

Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to Helen Villanueva.

Despite the fact that Helen was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive
pleading

Romulo filed a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence.

The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila declared Helen in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles
88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal for investigation to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties.

Romulo submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint and the fiscal issued a subpoena to Romulos counsel
requiring him to bring Romulo with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case

Romulos counsel informed the fiscal that he could not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his
evidence.

Tolentinos counsel prayed to set the date for the reception of his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not
submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty (60) days when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the
complaint.

Respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of Romulo unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal
to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.

Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that Romulo is not willing to submit himself for
interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the New Civil Code.

Romulo filed a petition to annul said order and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the order of the respondent judge dismissing the complaint due to the fact that the plaintiff is not willing to submit
himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal is valid.
HELD: YES the order of the respondent judge is valid.

Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for
annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in
case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of
evidence for the plaintiff.

Institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the
spouses.

The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence.

The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by nonappearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for
this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for
the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.

Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. No. 157649, November 12, 2012

Facts:

Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got married while Arabelle was eight months pregnant.
They lived together but depended on their parents for financial support.
Arabelle had different jobs to support the needs of the family.
When Dominic got employed for Toyota in Bel-Air Makati in 1994, he spent his first salary celebrating with his friends.
September of the same year, Arabelle found out of Dominics illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee.
Communication between them became rare and they started sleeping in separate rooms.
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a car as a birthday present only to find out that he did not pay for it, forcing her to
rely on her father-in-law for the payment of the car.

Dominic eventually got fired from his job because of he ran away with P164,000 belonging to his employer.
He was charged with estafa. Petitioner also found out that he swindled many of his clients some of them threatening her
and their family.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for time and space to think
things over.
A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. She and her family
immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic
based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity which are gravity, antecedence and incurability,
were attendant, establishing Dominics psychological incapacity.
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominics personality traits either constituted
psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the
Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court, and that the real reason for the
parties separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against
Dominic.
CA reversed the decision of RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N psychological incapacity of Dominic was established

HELD: No.

Findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation
by petitioners expert. He also did not participate in the proceedings.

And that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based the testimonies of the
petitioner.

The OSG is required to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings and to require the OSG to appear as counsel
for the state in the capacity of a defensor vinculi to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of, declarations
of nullity of marriage under article 36 , ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages
based on psychological incapacity those sufficiently evidenced

AURELIO V. AURELIO G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]

FACTS:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two
sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and
complying with their respective essential marital obligations.

In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of
the marriage ceremony.

Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

It alleged among others that said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband;
his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife.

The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance
and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family.

On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely.

Her feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her
tolerance for boredom was very low.

She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs.
She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants.

Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity
to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage.

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed
to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and
implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void?
HELD: Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.

This Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint.

The family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their
psychological incapacity. A competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.

The petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for
them to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features and the
petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.

The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

The essential marital obligations that were not complied with

Respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Chan v. Chan

GR 179786

July 14, 2013

FACTS:

Feb 6, 2006 - Josielene Lara Chan filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of ther marriage to
respondent Johnny Chan, the dissolution of their CPG and award of custody of their children

Petitioner alleges that:

o respondent failed to care and support their family
o the psychiatrist diagnosed him to be mentally deficient due to drinking and drugs
o she even convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation

respondent resisted and claimed that it was petitioner who failed to do her duties as a wife

to save their marriage, johnny agreed to undergo a marriage counseling

when they got to the hospital, 2 men forcibly held the respondent and another gave him an injection

marriage relation got worse

during trial, the Philhealth claim form, pre-marked by petitioner, carried a physicians handwritten note stating that
respondent suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol abuse

petitioner filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City,
accompanied by a motion to be allowed to submit it in evidence

respondent opposed the motion and argued that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege

RTC sustained the opposition

petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration to the CA denied, that if courts allow the production of medical records,
then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians
would be kept confidential, and that although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so - he attached that form to
his answer for the intended purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in the ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient
communications
HELD: NO

Sec. 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court - Disqualification by reason of privileged communication - The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
c. A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery, or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of
the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity,
and which would blacken the reputation of the patient

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while
professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patients consent
this rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records - the results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him - would be to allow
access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patients consent
Disclosing matters between the physician and the patient would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify
on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latters consent

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent. G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.
FACTS:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.

After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the regional trial court
alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license.

Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.

The trial court granted her petition.

ISSUE: Is the action of the husband tenable?
HELD: NO.

Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as bar by prior judgment or estoppels by verdict, which is the
effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.

In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept as conclusiveness of judgment or the rule of
auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.

Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed
to have waived any defects therein.

The Court finds then that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license
is barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Failure to raise the absence of a marriage license in a petition for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 is res judicata
and one can no longer question the validity of the marriage

Valdes vs. RTC 260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.

Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which
was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity.

Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they
prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in unions without marriage.

During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD: YES

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
are governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly
if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by either Article 147 or 148

Dio v. Dio
FACTS:

January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married.

On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent citing psychological
incapacity under article 36.

Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the
family assets.

Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court
declared their marriage void ab initio.

The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

It later altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
HELD: YES.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code.

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1.
The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2.
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3.
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
***All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared
void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by
the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under
Article 40 or 45.
Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership.
In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership.
Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration
of nullity of marriage.

YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU G.R. No. 189207, [June 15, 2011]

DOCTRINE:

It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each partys psychological
incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations.

If the Court eventually finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious
on the basis of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued.

Pending such ruling on the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to
proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations, since these are mere
incidents of the nullity of the parties marriage.
FACTS:

Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig.

Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Erics partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be
submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked.

But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and Caroline.

On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations (incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties
marriage.

Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without presentation of
evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations.

Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously
resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Erics opposition.

Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another branch presided by Judge
Reyes-Carpio.

While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation
by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
and that the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not
simultaneously.

Eric opposed this motion.

Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the declaration of nullity of the
marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents thereto.

Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under
Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES/HELD: Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) NO.

RATIO:

It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been exercised with grave abuse of
discretion, are interlocutory orders.

An interlocutory order is one which does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court.

Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently
erroneous.

Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have
not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of
the trial court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations.
It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody,
support, and property relations. And the trial judges decision was not without basis.
Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes. Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry
of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations but
merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is
already at hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition.
And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly
consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of
the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations.
The trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree
of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the
assailed orders.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yus assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the
subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence,
contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
It cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical manner, much less in a way that is
patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody,
support, and property relations.
This decision is left to the trial courts wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be
said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding
an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.

Barrido v. Nonato
GR 176492
Oct. 20, 2014
FACTS:

1996 - Leonardo and Mariettas marriage was dissolved by reason of psychological Incapacity

Leonardo filed a complaint for partition over their property of a house and lot since there was no more reason to maintain
their co-ownership.

Marrieta claimed that the property had been sold to their children Joseph Raymond and Joseph Leo.

She also moved for dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC Bacolod City

MTCC ruled in favour of Marrietta and adjudicated the land to her, being the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain

Leonardo appealed to the RTC reversed the MTCC ruling and ordered the partition of the property

Marrieta appealed the RTC decision to the CA by petition for review CA denied Mariettas appeal, ruling that since the
assessed value of the property is only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC jurisdiction.

Though the RTC applied Art. 129 instead of Art. 147 thereof, it still correctly ordered the partition of the property.
ISSUE: W/N Art. 147 of the FC shall govern the property relations of marriages that are declared void ab inito
Held: YES

Art 147 - When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owed by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of the contrary, properties acquired while they live together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by them in equal shares. For purposes of this article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household

Nonato and Barridos marriage had been declared void for psychological incapacity under article 36 of the FC During
their marriage, the CPG governed their property relations. Although art. 129 provides for the procedure in case of
dissolution of the CPG, art. 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages

For art. 147 to apply, the man and the woman: (a) must be capacitated to marry each other, (b) live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife, (c) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void in this case, all
are present

The former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their marriage; thus, it
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in
equal shares

the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido which should be divided in accordance with
the rules on co-ownership

YASIN V. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT (G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995)
FACTS:

On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of
maiden name.

The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance
Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly
indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known.

Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103
of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of
her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former
husband to another woman.

The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it
would result in the resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname.

ISSUE: Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname,
is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: NO.

When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing
the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name.

The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in
the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek
judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former
husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her.

When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to
secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it.

The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the
husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.

The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a
superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to
another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Case Doctrines:

A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husbands surname upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name
but only her civil status.

Once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her
maiden name, except in cases of: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicants constitutional right to
travel.

However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel
documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is
merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.
FACTS:

Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza.

Her Philippine passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as
her given name, and Remo as her middle name.

While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs
office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.

When her request was denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husbands name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in
previous application.

The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of
1996, a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of
the husband.

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretarys ruling. The CA also affirmed the
ruling.

Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Remo argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996)
conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her
maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court [311 Phil. 696,
707 (1995)]

ISSUE: Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her
maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.
HELD: NO. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists.

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court
(supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husbands surname upon marriage.

She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change
her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle.

RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden
name in her passport.

In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a
passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husbands surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her
maiden name.

If she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate.

Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from
continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of
her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2)
divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.

Since Remos marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.
Otherwise stated, a married womans reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of
the marriage.

Yasin case not in point

o Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former
husband is already married to another woman, Remos marriage remains subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve
a request to resume ones maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume ones maiden
name in view of the dissolution of ones marriage.

Special law prevails over general law

o Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is
the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over
a general law.

Implied repeals are disfavored

o Remos theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The
apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each
shall be effective.
o For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. This, Remo failed to establish.

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport

o Remo consciously chose to use her husbands surname in her previous passport application. If her present
request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her
husbands surname.
o Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other
official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of
passport holders will arise.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicants constitutional right to
travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel
documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is
merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.

HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO G.R. No. 157537, [September 7, 2011]

FACTS:

Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go)
who purchased the said property.

Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to herein respondent Ester
Servacio.

On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand;
hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property.

The contention of the petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property;
and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr.
and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code.

Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to
the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to
the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that
what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.

The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of
Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the
way up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
HELD: The appeal lacks merit.

Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any disposition of theconjugal property after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon Martas death
in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary coownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of
the conjugalpartnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership,
could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas
share.

Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.

Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio)
a co-owner of Martas share.

Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of
the conjugal partnership is without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing
owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the
DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra]

In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that
might not be validly sold to her.

Ninal vs Bayadog 328 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid
and Archie, petitioners.

Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal.

1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.

They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage
license.

Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license.
They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed.
Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law.
Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after
the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

Moe v. Dinkins
SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Plaintiffs were prevented from entering into marriage because a New York law required minors to obtain parental consent
prior to marriage. Plaintiffs brought suit claiming the law violated the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Because of the unique position between minors and marriage, the law is examined under a
rational relationship test rather than strict scrutiny.
FACTS:

A New York Domestic Relations Law provided that all male marriage license applicants between 16 and 18 and all
female applicants between 14 and 18 must obtain written consent from both parents (that are living).

Section 15.3 of the law requires women between the ages of 14 and 16 to obtain judicial approval of the marriage in
addition to parental consent.

Plaintiff Raoul Roe, 18, and Plaintiff Maria Moe, 15, had a one year old son, Plaintiff Ricardo Roe. Plaintiffs live together
as a family unit and desire to be married to cement their family unit and remove the stigma of illegitimacy from their son.

Maria requested consent from her widowed mother to marry Raoul, but she refused, allegedly because she wished to
continue receiving welfare benefits for Maria.

Proposed plaintiff-intervenors Pedro Doe, 17, and Christina Coe, 15, reside in the home of Pedros father and stepmother.

Christina is eight months pregnant with Pedros child. Christinas mother refused a Christinas request to marry Pedro,
and arranged for Christina to have an abortion.

Christina refused to do so, and consequently her mother told her she wished to have nothing more to do with her and
was leaving the country to return to the Dominican Republic.
ISSUE: Does the law requiring parental consent to marry deprive Plaintiffs of the liberty guaranteed them by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution?
HELD: NO

The law is constitutional because the State has a legitimate interest in protecting minors from immature decision making.

Previous case law has recognized a constitutional liberty interest in marriage, but has not addressed the marriages of
minors. The constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with adults for three reasons: a) the peculiar vulnerability
of children; (b) the inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature matter; (c) the importance of the parental
role in child-rearing.

This law should not be examined under a strict scrutiny standard, but rather it must be determined if there is a rational
relationship between the means chosen and the legitimate state interests advanced.
The parent consent requirement ensures that at least one mature person will participate in the marriage decision.
Because of this and minors lack of experience, perspective, and judgment, the law is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.
Plaintiffs also allege that the courts as a non-interested party would be in a better position to judge than parents that are
potentially biased.
However, the law assumes that parents will act in the best interests of their children. Plaintiffs also claim that this law
should be analogized with contraception and abortion laws, and that the law denies them the means with which to
legitimize their children.
However, this ignores the fact that the law is only a postponement to the right to marry.
Discussion. The court applied a rational relationship test to the New York law rather than strict scrutiny because the rights
involved were those of minors.