Asian Affairs: An American Review, 40:2036, 2013

C 2013 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

Copyright
ISSN: 0092-7678 print / 1940-1590 online
DOI: 10.1080/00927678.2013.759479

From Military Rule to Electoral

Authoritarianism: The Reconfiguration
of Power in Myanmar and its Future

ADAM P. MACDONALD

Abstract: In 2011, after more than 20 years of direct rule, the Tatmadaw transferred formal authority to a nominally civilian government following Myanmars
first multi-party election since 1990 as part of a transformation of the political
system to a presidential republic. Within this new arena, though, electoral manipulations and constitutional stipulations have brought to power a government
consisting mostly of former military officers who are closely aligned to the Tatmadaw. These reforms, therefore, have changed the nature and organization of
the ruling regime from that of a military one to an Electoral Authoritarian form.
Elections now have become the main conduit to accessing power. Despite the
maintenance of authoritarian rule (and the unclear motivations promoting such
system change) the opening of the political realm and civil society creates avenues for new actors, identities, interests, and relationships to be constructed. A
number of developments over the past few years are tentatively positive signs
that Myanmar is undergoing a fundamental political change distinct from the
years of military rule. In particular, the interactions of actors within and across
civil-military, central-regional, and foreign relations will come to define the future trajectory of these reforms. Ultimately, the willingness of the Tatmadaw to
abandon its praetorian ethos of directing the political process, specifically over
security policy areas, will determine whether the system remains primarily in the
Address correspondence to Adam P. MacDonald, 512-3260 Barrington Street, Halifax, NS,
Canada, B3K 0B5. E-mail: Adampmacdonald@gmail.com

20

From Military Rule to Electoral Authoritarianism

21

service of regime maintenance or becomes an arena of increasingly diverse, free,

and fair political discord with the possibility of power being assumed by those
that are non-military.
Keywords: Myanmar, political reform, electoral authoritarianism, USDP Government, Tatmadaw
The Tatmadaw (the Myanmar Armed Forces) is the most resilient military regime
of the contemporary era. Defined by strong personalist rule, the Tatmadaw has
been the central political actor in Myanmar for the last half-century. The transfer
of formal authority to a nominally civilian government in 2011, however, indicates
a distinct transformation in the organization of the state including the Tatmadaws
role in politics. The creation and ratification of a new constitution in 2008 followed
by parliamentary elections in the fall of 2010 and the opening of Parliament
(The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) in January 2011 has transformed Myanmars1 political
landscape from a military junta of exclusive jurisdiction within a closed system to
that of a presidential republic with a parliamentary system characterized by multiparty elections. These changes have been explained by the military as supporting
the creation of a disciplined democracy, itself an ambiguous concept with serious
skepticism pertaining to the real purpose of this political project. Most importantly
while there has been a dramatic change of the political system defined by a new
institutional arrangement for the access and wielding of power, these military-led
reforms have ensured the primacy of the old order.
Through constitutional protection, the Tatmadaw exists beyond government
oversight and has a significant representative body in Parliament. The ruling
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government consists primarily
of former military/junta officials whom control all key government positions. This
new reality is best described as a change in but not of the ruling regime. While
power has become more diffused with the introduction of new actors and institutions, the present configuration still favours the military establishment and their
allies. These two interdependent developments-the change of the political system
and the resultant change in the organization of the regime- have created a new
structure of power away from a military regime to that of Electoral Authoritarianism (EA). Elections have become the central conduit to achieving and maintaining
power, but authoritarian practices such as electoral manipulations, constitutional
stipulations. the close patrimonial links between the new government and military,
and an understanding of motivating interests behind these measures explain how
this new system is primarily in the service of regime maintenance.
Investigation into potential factors leads to no one definite rationale but safeguarding exclusive authority over security issues and protecting themselves from
prosecution appear to be driving forces in the Tatmadaws new position in the political architecture. Regardless, the dispersal of power through a new institutional

22

Asian Affairs: An American Review

arrangement and the entrenchment of a multi-party electoral system legalizing

opposition allow the potential over time for changes of the regime to occur. With
this in mind, attention should not only be focused solely on the deficiencies inherit
and obvious within this system but equally toward developments and influences
that are creating alternate trajectories which may move this process away from the
creators original intent.
It is obvious Myanmar is moving away from direct military rule, but what it is
moving toward or has become is not clear and heavily contested by various agents
involved.2 Regardless, this political project opens pathways for new actors, identities, interests, and relationships to be constructed. Three relational dynamics, and
the interplay of actors within and between them, shall be the main arenas shaping
the future of the ruling regime and the political system: civil-military, centralregional, and foreign relations. The overarching influencing factor impacting the
direction and intensity of where these relationships evolve is the sturdiness of the
Tatmadaws praetorian ethosthe justification of their involvement in politics in
the name of security and integrity of the state. Without a reconfiguration of their
role and purpose in the polity any sort of substantial reform will be impossible. The
success of furthering a democratic society characterized by constitutional rule of
law, independent state institutions, an open civil society and marketplace, free and
fair political processes, and most importantly the ability of elected government to
rule independent of military tutelage is yet to be seen.3
From Military Regime to Electoral Authoritarianism
Over the last two decades a strong authoritarian undercurrent has become a major feature of what is termed the Third Wave of Democracy, specifically in developing states.4 This relatively new phenomenon of the introduction of democratic
structures, specifically multi-party elections, into a system whose actual functionality is determined via authoritarian practices has largely escaped previously
typologies of undemocratic regimes.5 Analytical focus of these cases has too often
been informed and bounded within the democratic transition paradigmthat
these states were moving from authoritarian to democratic governing systems,
completing neglecting the fact that in many cases these changing characteristics
were designed to maintain rather than undermine authoritarian rule.6 With the
virtual elimination of most types of closed authoritarian regimes (China being a
large exception) there now exists an analytical gap the foggy zone between
liberal democracy and more traditional forms of authoritarianism. Within this area
a number of new models have been developed, including the concept of Electoral Authoritarianism (EA), which attempt to explain how these regimes achieve,
wield, and maintain power;7 EA is an important distinction from other new typologies such as electoral democracy or delegative democracy which investigate
the deficiencies in the continued implementation of democratic institutions and

From Military Rule to Electoral Authoritarianism

23

practices within states which are already perceived to be democratic.8 As Andreas

Schedler argues EA does not assume these regimes are genuinely moving towards
democratization but are authoritarian in maintaining their rule.9
A major feature of most authoritarian regimes in the contemporary era is the
movement away from the absence of representative institutions toward their inclusion in governing structures, and from their suppression toward manipulation
as regime survival strategies.10 For EA regimes, the most important aspect in this
regard is the centrality of elections as the conduit through which power is accessed.
The electoral process becomes the main political arena for acquiring power, thus,
consent from the populace (even fabricated and distorted) becomes the legitimate
avenue to government. While other regimes may have an electoral process in EA
regimes they acquire a greater importance both to the government and opposition
parties which increasingly take them seriously, as there is some level of competition. Despite their introduction, though, governing regimes apply authoritarian
practices to ensure victory, which deprives them of their democratic substance.
While usually not restricting the franchise and allowing for organized dissent
through political parties, the electoral process is controlled via voter fraud; legal
instruments designed to exclude opponents; disproportionate resource availabilities such as media coverage and revenues between the governing and opposition
parties; and bribing and/or intimidating voters under the surveillance of regimebacked election monitoring.11 A fixation with the electoral arena, however, can
inhibit analysis into other extra electoral factors pertaining to the motivating
interests and methods employed to ensure the system is regime perpetuating.12
These aspects move away from the functionality of the system in terms of elections to include processes, actors and relationships that construct such a system
(for example, through constitutional changes and patrimonial networks) characterizing the organization and interests of the regime. These analyses further focus
on the manipulation of other aspects, including the judiciary, legislative/executive
relationship, the media, and civil society.
The reconfiguration toward EA regimes can stem from many causes such as
international pressure, state weakness, and elite fragmentation, but the inclusion
of representative structures and practices present a double-edge sword. Their manipulation in support of regime maintenance may be effective in creating new
sources of legitimacy and elite counterbalancing,13 but it potentially offers opposition elements tools and avenues to challenge and defeat them and also entice
elites to defect, especially if they perceive the regime is finished.14 New arenas for
competition and promotion of alternative political trajectories such as elections,
the media, social mobilization, and legislative process combined with potential
restrictions placed on the regime to use other sources of power (i.e. constitutional
limits and judicial rulings) can place governments in a tough position when pressed
to either accept their erosion of power or use illegitimate (i.e. open forms of
coercion) means to remain in power. This is not to suggest all EA regimes are in

24

Asian Affairs: An American Review

such precarious situations, but the democratization of them should not be based on
the assumption that this is the original intent of their creators but equally probable
that these processes have developed a life of their own beyond their direct control.
Despite legitimate criticisms of the EA typology,15 the model is a useful tool
in investigating the current transition of Myanmars political system and ruling
regime. Since 1988, Myanmar has been ruled by a military regime controlled by an
executive council (junta) of military officers with exclusive jurisdiction in a closed
political system which eliminated the Constitution following the overthrow of the
BSPP government. Organizing the 1990 multi-party elections, which were generally free and fair, however, demonstrate perhaps even then an attempt to construct
an EA regime with the inclusion of representative institutions and the legalization
of political opposition. With the crushing defeat of the governing parry, though,
SLORC (the State Law and Order Restoration Council) moved quickly toward
reverting to a military regime void of representative institutions and outlawing
all forms of opposition. The regime ruled by fiat with little direct contact with
society, ensuring a monopolization of the political process by employing a variety
of measures along a coercion continuum to compel compliance. Politics became
the exclusive domain of the military. In 2003, however, the regime introduced
its seven-step roadmap to democracy,16 beginning a process that was completely
military led with little to no involvement of other entities.
Significant reform commenced after the 2008 referendum (which was undoubtedly manipulated by Naypyidaw with a supposed 94% approval rate)17 where a
new constitution was adopted to establish a genuine disciplined multi-party democratic state. Myanmar was reorganized into a Presidential Republic based on a
bi-cameral parliamentary system populated with members elected from regular
multi-party elections. The President is elected from the Parliament and appoints a
cabinet to oversee government ministries. The Cabinet and the President then must
resign their seats in the Parliament. While these new constitutional configurations
have reformed the arrangement of power they also ensure the rule of the military
establishment and its allies.
The Tatmadaw is constitutionally protected as a separate and autonomous
entity from the government (Article 20b) and has exclusive jurisdiction over the
ministries of Defence, Interior and Border Affairs via appointing all three ministers
(Article 232b). The establishment of the National Defence and Security Council,
as well, as the most important executive body is in effect ruled by the Tatmadaw
due to its weighted membership on the committee (Article 201) ensuring their
monopoly on security affairs to the exclusion of civilian input.18 This fencing off
of policy areas is a common tool employed by EA regimes to retain critical areas
of decision-making within a new political system of greater diffusion of power.19
The requirements, as well, that 25% of parliamentary seats are reserved for the
military (Article 109b and 141b) in effect gives them a veto over any attempts to
alter the Constitution.20

From Military Rule to Electoral Authoritarianism

25

While power has been transferred to a civilian body politic, Chapter XIthe
Provisions of State Emergenciesdoes allow in a declared state of emergency
for the National Security and Defence Council to impose martial law, disband
Parliament and rule the state directly; the Commander of the Tatmadaw, as well,
can be given via the President complete authority over state resources, including
Article 340the Peoples Militia allowing conscripting from any segment of
society. Through these provisions, therefore, the military has constructed a system,
which entrenches its independence, maintains influence over the Cabinet and
Parliament, and establishes legal channels to return to direct rule if desired. The
military, therefore, has moved from a hegemonic to a veto player in the new
polity; while not directing the day to day administration they retain control over
any future changes to the Constitution (most importantly their privileged position)
and with exclusive control over security matters. While officially retiring, there
are reports that Senior Generals Than Shwe and Maung Aye may be heading an
extra-constitutional body called the State Security Council, consisting of the senior
military leadership and the President, which has final approval over any policy
pertaining to security and the configuration of the state.21 While these reports are
unsubstantiated, these leaders retain large influence over some members of the
new regime and there are reports they have been approached to re-enter politics
but so far have declined.22
The Tatmadaw, however, has transferred formal control to civilian authorities,
but who has taken the reins? In October 2010, step 5 of the Roadmap began with the
first multi-party election in 20 years. Months before a number of senior officers
retired to join to USDP deepening the relationship between the two with the
opposition arguing they are the civilian facade perpetuating military rule. During
the elections, many internal and external observers viewed them as deeply flawed
with systemic vote rigging and biased election laws guaranteeing the USDP would
win a commanding majority. When the results were promulgated, the USDP had
as predicted won a sizable majority in both Houses59% in the Lower House
(The Peoples AssemblyPyithu Hluttaw) and 58% in the Upper House (House
of Nationalities- Amyotha Hluttaw).23
On the reverse side, a number of laws and regulations ensured the exclusion
of any serious contenders in the election. The banning of prisoners from being
able to vote or run in effect excluded many opposition leaders from participating.
Members of religious orders, as well, were not allowed to participate, including
Myanmars large Buddhist monk community, which had been a critical element in
the Saffron Revolution (Article 392). Ethnic parties were allowed to participate but
those promoting independence have been barred (Articles 404407). The exclusion of these opposition groups, the privileged access to state resources including
revenues, organization structure and media coverage, and the numerous electoral
irregularities ensured the USDP victory. When Parliament opened in early 2011,
Thein Sein (former Prime Minister of the State Peace and Development Council

26

Asian Affairs: An American Review

(SPDC)) was elected President by the Parliament due to the commanding voting
bloc of the USDP and Tatmadaw representatives. Furthermore, both Vice Presidents, the Speakers of the Upper and Lower House, and all speakers and deputy
speakers in local legislatures are USDP (many former SPDC including a number
of generals), giving them commanding control over the new political organization.
The vast majority of Cabinet, also, are serving or former military officers or SPDC
ministers, establishing a tight link between them and the Tatmadaw.24
The establishment of the new political architecture, combined with the flawed
electoral process have, therefore, been designed primarily to ensure the institutional interests, specifically a key role in the body politic, of the Tatmadaw. There
has, though, been a change of the regime away from concentrated power in the
military onto a plethora of institutions, specifically within the Parliament, which
has led to the rise of an EA form replacing direct military rule. While the senior leadership of the SPDC has retired, other (former) leading members have
been dispersed into a number of positions and organizations in the new political
system. It is reported that Than Shwe single-handedly decided when elections
would be held, who would be included in government, and the new leadership
of the Tatmadaw.25 The inclusion since then, however, of an increasing number
of technocrats, evident in the ministries of Social Sciences, Development, and
Healthcare, has broadened the membership of this new authoritarian elite away
from strictly military members.26 The Tatmadaw, in many respects remain the
critical political actor but now exists in a system of multi-polarity increasing the
challenges of ensuring their interests and activities will be supported. It is obvious
the old order wishes to remain in power, but the inclusion of opposition forces
via political parties in Parliament further tentatively opens up new pathways for
political opposition and dialogue away from simply taking to the streets which
has historically been the only real avenue of dissent.27
It is uncertain the exact configuration of factors shaping the militarys decision
to implement these reforms, but efforts to ensure their status as an autonomous
entity with significant influence and legal immunity for past deeds were the main
motivational interests in designing the current political architecture. Why even
such reforms were begun still is puzzling given the level of cohesiveness and
unity of the Tatmadaw over the last few years with the simultaneous destruction
of any real opposition within the country. The most important factor, regardless
of the inability to pinpoint the exact motivation(s), is the decision by Senior
General Than Shwe to reform the state. The SPDC, like previous Burmese military
regimes, was defined by patrimonialism, particularly the exclusive power of the
big man in directing all areas of governance. The regime reformed because Than
Shwe decided. These changes, however, bringing about this new EA regime, have
opened up space politically, socially, economically, and internationally for new
actors, interests, and relationships to emerge, which leave the possibility of many
potential future trajectories of political transformation; trajectories not foreseen or

From Military Rule to Electoral Authoritarianism

27

desired perhaps by the departing General. With this in mind, Myanmar has entered
a dynamic transition phase where the tools and apparatuses initially employed by
the Tatmadaw to ensure their influence over the system may turn into ones acting
against them.
The Future Trajectory
The establishment of Parliament and multi-party elections has allowed the inclusion of opposition entities into the political process; while their influence and
representation is presently small, their presence in and of itself is a significant
change from a military regime that allowed absolutely no political pluralism just a
few years ago. With a comfortable majority in Parliament, the USDP government
has introduced a number of reforms that have further loosened the reins of its
authoritarian grip questioning the intentions, willingness, and determination to
further liberalize and democratize the state. The legalization of labor unions and
protests, the re-establishment of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyis increasing
participation politically, the release of a number of political prisoners (including military prisoners such as former intelligence Chief Khin Nyunt, prominent
ethnic leaders, student demonstrators and monks from the 2007 uprising), and
re-engagement with Western states diplomatically have been major developments
that further open the political space to pluralities of opinions, loosens government oversight of civil society and point towards their removal of pariah status
internationally. These changes are significant steps and should not be discredited.
One should not assume, on the other hand, that the original intent of these
measures was designed to enlarge the political arena for outside actors to become
influential entities that could eventually supplant the current regime. As Schedler
argues, however, with respect to EA regimes, new institutional arrangements
usually characterized by greater power diffusion may over time alter reforms
from regime maintaining to those of regime subverting.28 Such processes are
evolutionary developments where the original intents, interests, and even identities
of actors can over time be reconfigured; contestation between entities, including
new methods of competing, can become battlegrounds that over time cause the
demise of ruling regimes. Institutional developments should not just be interpreted
as controlled and predetermined configurations of existing elites to service their
interests; they can develop along pathways that empower others, creating new
relationships between actors and ultimately come to undermine the privileged
position of current elites.
The degree, however, to which these reforms will continue toward building a
democracy characterized by independent state institutions, specifically the judicial system, free and fair elections and the safeguarding of individual liberties is
uncertain. What are the possibilities of the Tatmadaw reintroduction in politics
and a return to more overt forms of authoritarian power? How will actors come to

28

Asian Affairs: An American Review

identify and relate to one another to shape and mould the overall trajectory of this
novel political project? The situation is a malleable one where competition exists
on two levels, which Larry Diamond describes as the substantive contests over
power and policies within the system and constitutional contests to define the systems rules and procedures.29 The means and intensity with which actors come to
promote their interests within these two interrelated fields will come to define
the nature of their relationships with one another and ultimately the ability of the
current configuration of power to survive. To this end, there exist three relationship
dynamics that are the critical arenas defining Myanmars new political system
civil-military relations, central-regional relations, and foreign policy relations.
Civil-Military Relations
Presently, the ruling government is comprised mostly of former military officers, but the introduction of other political actors, specifically the NLD, which
had been persecuted for decades, will challenge the regimes willingness to work
with these entities. Between the military and opposition members, there exists a
deep history of distrust; the former unconvinced of civilian politicians ability to
run the state and the latter pessimistic of the militarys preparedness to retrench
from politics. The head of the Tatmadaw has made it clear their role in politics is
essential and will remain influential into the indefinite future.30 While presently
outside of direct influence over many processes, the willingness of the Tatmadaw
to allow greater participation, influence, and perhaps rule of civilian parties without military membership is uncertain. A key test, therefore, will be the willingness
to accept election results, which propel civilian parties, specifically the NLD, into
power given the tense historical relationship between the two. The April 2012 byelections, where the NLD nearly won all the seats it contested, may tentatively be
a sign that the current regime is serious about continued reforms (or their inability
to manipulate elections), which allow greater roles and influence of the opposition
in the system.31
For the opposition, while recognizing the un-free nature of competition which
presently defines the system, the ability to participate and promote gradual reform
instead of aggressive calls for change will further create amicable conditions to
redefine their relationship with the military.32 The NLDs initial refusal to be sworn
into Parliament over the wording of the Oath of Office, specifically declaring to
safeguard the Constitution, but subsequent acceptance after a weeklong protest
is demonstrative of the give and take relationship which will need to develop
with the USDP and Tatmadaw to voice opposition without being perceived as
obstructionist.33 Another key concern will be the degree to which the NLD promotes the prosecution of former regime members for past crimes; currently the
NLD has said it will not do such action, conceding this point (for now) in order
to continue to participate and influence further reforms. The working relations

From Military Rule to Electoral Authoritarianism

29

in Parliament between civilian and military members, however, may lead toward
ameliorating their relationship, including appreciating their institutional interests
and relation to one another. Furthermore, the increasing role of Aung San Suu Kyi
in the political process, including discussions with President Thein Sein, liaison
with foreign governments, and granting her a passport to travel abroad (including
finally accepting her 1991 Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo) is the clearest example of
where new relationships appear to be underway between former adversaries.
An important aspect of the new Constitution is the delineation of powers and
responsibilities between the elected government and the military, in which many
aspects of the political discourse have been carved out of the national security
rhetoric, allowing for the inclusion of civilian technocrats in the government,
specifically in neglected policy areas such as health and economic reform. These
aspects are now becoming areas of increasingly open and free discourse free from
military oversight.34 As an example of such a separation of responsibilities, General Hlaing has kept his formal interactions with the government and Parliament
solely focused on security matters and his foreign trips have been restricted to
visiting his military counterparts leaving economic and political matters up to
government representatives. The diffusion of power, furthermore, in the political
system makes it difficult for the rise of a new hegemonic figure, which has characteristically defined all post-independence governments; within such a system
the effects of patrimonialism may be reduced, allowing for the development of a
sphere of ideas and policies to be debated without fear of repercussions.35 A challenge, therefore, for both the military-backed government and the opposition is to
further develop strong impersonal state institutions ensuring powerful personalities (both military and non-military) do not create any new form of neopatrimonial
system.
The distinction, furthermore, between the military and the civilian parties has
largely become parsimonious based on inaccurate assessments of these entities
as monolithic and diametrically opposed. Within both camps there exists subgroups along a spectrum of hardliners and softliners; for the (former) military, this
is between those concerned that reforms have been too fast and military needs
to remain involved and those which believe power needs to be further handed
over to the executive and legislature while the Tatmadaw focuses on becoming a
professional force; for civilian parties, particularly the NLD, the divide is between
those who believe a gradual pace of reform and engagement is needed to build
new relationships with the military in allowing further democratization and those
who argue for more aggressive advocacy and protest over the militarys continued
political influence.36 The challenge, therefore, is for likeminded entities in both
camps to identify one another and build a political pact committed to reform,
recognizing one anothers interests and concerns.37
Already it appears more moderate elements are becoming dominant in the
USDP government with the latest Cabinet shuffle,38 perhaps allowing new and

30

Asian Affairs: An American Review

stronger ties to be developed between the regime and the opposition. Such an
example is the new appointment of the Vice President, Navy Chief Admiral Nyan
Tun, someone regarded as a political moderate who will not inhibit the reform
process. On this point, a number of former military and senior government officials,
furthermore, such as President Thein Sein are in poor health and will most likely
not compete in the 2015 elections, which will accelerate this new generation
of military and former military members to assume the senior leadership.39 Even
amongst perceived former hardliner military officers such as Speaker of the Lower
House Shwe Mann have taken on a more reform minded agenda; such an apparent
role reversal may in part be a product of their reconfiguration of their identity
to the new, and growing, centres of power they control. The diffusion of power,
originally designed to ensure regime maintenance but block the rise of a hegemonic
figure, may eventually lead to the demise of the regime as former allied elites now
compete within these new arenas. One important example is the growing friction
between USDP dominated Parliament and the Executive, which originally came
from the USDP.
For civilian politicians, however, large obstacles remain in working with these
entities to ensure the system truly becomes free and fair, allowing for their possible
ascension to power. While many in the regime state they have no issue working
with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, it may be another matter entirely working
under her; the Tatmadaw and the USDP have led this entire process with opposition
assistance, but would they be willing to have the roles reversed? Constitutional
change, in this respect, remains a critical priority which will require working and
compromising with the government and equally important the military. For the
USDP regime common ground may be found in reconstructing the electoral system
as many in the Party are concerned, if the April 2012 by-elections are a reliable
indicator, they will be heavily defeated by the First Past the Post system in the
2015 elections. In their relations with the Tatmadaw, guaranteeing immunity for
past deeds, negotiating budget allocations and relevance in security areas needs
to be addressed to encourage reformist elements in the military to become the
dominant partners they engage with.40

Central-Regional Relations
Another critical relationship will be between the central government and the
inclusion of ethnic parties (some affiliated with armed groups) in the political
system. Myanmar, even before independence, has been racked with numerous
ethnic insurgencies living in the border areas demanding political autonomy if
not outright independence. There are renewed attempts by the regime to bring all
conflicting parties to the negotiating table as part of the wider reform agenda.41
Conflict, however, remains in many areas, specifically Kachin, Shan, and most

From Military Rule to Electoral Authoritarianism

31

recently Arakan State, which presents real obstacles threatening to derail the process and demonstrate deep cultural and ethnic differences in the country. Despite
the continued violence, in the 2010 election, a number of ethnic parties competed
and did reasonably well compared to the degree of electoral fraud involved. Ethnic parties are slowly but increasingly becoming an embedded component of the
new political architecture. In further bringing these entities into the fold, the government has enacted a three-stage agenda to address ethnic conflict centered on
creating cease fires, establishing preliminary dialogue with each of these various
entities and finally a national dialogue to further address their relationship with
Naypyidaw.42 The political system will have to be flexible enough to allow ethnic
representation, including elements promoting not only greater regional autonomy,
but perhaps independence in a manner which does not threaten current cease fires
and political stability.43 The USDP has been active in trying to recruit and include
ethnic members to maintain control over regional legislatures which shall depend
on ethnic populations perception of their underlying motives;44 are they ready
to legitimately negotiate over the autonomy of these entities or simply trying to
co-opt local elites in the maintenance of the unitary state?
These matters of nation and state building in constructing a narrative of national
identity in generating the populaces support for the creation of a functioning state
have unfortunately been underappreciated by outside observers more critically
engaged in the promotion of democratization as the fundamental problem facing
the country. While previous military regimes engaged (and in some areas continue
to employ) a variety of measures, including martial law, human rights abuses, involuntary evacuations and forced labor which has led to the suffering of thousands
and generated animosity from these groups, these ethnic matters exist in a wider
social context. Defining citizenship in particular is a major issue confronting all
political participants. The starkest facet of this matter is the recent outbreak of
communal violence in Arakan State, particularly against the Rohingya population
demonstrating deep societal divides pertaining to which ethnic groups constitute
part of the Burmese state. Moves toward a federal structure, furthermore, is an
issue that any future government, military or civilian, will have to face and could
become the next major political reform. As the official opposition, the NLD,
while not directly involved in the negotiations between the government and ethnic
entities, will have to further develop and promulgate its position of exploring a
potential federal union to address these matters as well.45
Measures to reform the security services, specifically the development of a border service comprised mostly from ethnic groups will be a challenge to redefine the
historical relationship of conflict between these entities and the largely ethnically
Barman Tatmadaw. Resources will, also, have to be directed toward resettling
thousands of displaced persons and begin reconciliation to ensure a willingness to
continue to participate in this political project. Ongoing ethnic conflict represents
a real hurdle to the reform efforts and the degree to which the government can

32

Asian Affairs: An American Review

ensure the military supports these measures will be tested, including controlling
frontline commanders. The inability to accommodate these matters may potentially lead to instability and the reintroduction of the Tatmadaw forcefully into the
political system in defence of protecting the national integrity of the state.
Foreign Relations
While many states denounced the 2010 elections as marred by fraud and critical
of the militarys sincerity to allow civilian government to operate independently,
the following through on a number of pledges have begun to thaw relations
with the West. Most notably the United States is in the process of restoring full
diplomatic ties with Naypyidaw following the release of a number of prominent
political prisoners; the visit, as well, of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in 2011,
specifically her meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, shows a willingness to open
the political space to foreign representatives which would have been unthinkable
under the militarys rule. While Western states repeat their position that further
diplomatic and economic relations will be conditional upon continued reforms,
Myanmars political transition has quickly catapulted them out of a pariah status.
Already, the United States, Canada, and the EU have all scaled back their sanctions
as well as lifting travel bans on hundreds of former Burmese military officers.
Relations within ASEAN continue to improve as well, with Myanmar set to host
the Asian Games in 2013 and Chair the ASEAN summit in 2014, both events
directing international attention toward them. Sanctions, though, continue to be
applied to the Tatmadaw and related defence industries, as well as any entities
involved in human rights abuses or actors that obstruct these reforms processes;46
employing mechanisms to ensure foreign investments abide by such rules shall be
difficult though due to the heavy involvement of the military and former regime
members in the economy. Saying this there are cautious first steps being taken by
the US military to establish relations with the Tatmadaw such as their invitation
to be observers to the annual military exercise Operation Cobra Gold.47
Relations with Myanmars traditional partners, China and India, continue to
develop, and while noting some areas of conflict with Beijing, this should not
immediately be viewed as a moving away from them towards the West, as their
relations have always included tensions including ethnic matters on the border
lands and economic projects.48 The decision, furthermore, by President Thein
Sein to make his first official state visit to China symbolizes the importance of
Beijing in their foreign, specifically trade, relations.49 The halting of the Myistone
Damn project, a joint China-Myanmar endeavour, however, may be demonstrative
of the increasing power of public opinion (in this case protest) to influence policy
making. Myanmars geographical position combined with its resource wealth has
increasingly made it a sought after partner by China, India, and increasingly the
West. The rapidity with which, therefore, Washington has re-engaged Naypyidaw

From Military Rule to Electoral Authoritarianism

33

may in part be motivated by geostrategic interests with supporting reforms a

convenient condition to better relations. The easing of tensions with the West, also,
mitigates concerns of the Tatmadaw about foreign intervention, a key rationale
that underpinned their legitimacy to rule.
The new regime appears determined to open new avenues of foreign relations
leading to a potential competitive arena developing between Myanmars traditional
partners India and China and newly emerging players. Whether the nature of
these relations, and their influence on the new regime, will be primarily based
on governance and human rights standards or more so driven by concerns of
spheres of influence, particularly between Washington and Beijing, remains to be
seen. For example, despite concerns about ensuring money does not go toward
sanctioned entities, the targeted easing of investments in Myanmar announced
by Washington came after increasing pressure from US companies concerned
they were falling behind their competitors in this opening market, demonstrative
that economic priorities may be coming into conflict with supporting reform
measures. The potential benefits through economic trade, political interaction
and security guarantees appear to be a growing self-motivating force to ensure
continued reforms are pursued.
The main variable in all of these relationship dynamics that will determine
ultimately if the political system remains, despite a number of reforms, primarily
in the service of regime maintenance or evolves into a structure separate from its
originators control is the degree to which the Tatmadaw retrenches from the political sphere. The maintenance of the militarys praetorian ethos -their involvement
in not only protecting the interests of the state but actively engaged in defining
them appears to be softening due to the inclusion of previously defined threats into
the political process. The representation of democracy parties, primarily the NLD;
allowing Aung San Suu Kyi into public office; renewed attempts to sign cease fires
with remaining insurgent groups; and a thawing of relations with Washington have
mitigated the Tatmadaws traditional concern over these forces as destabilizing
to the state. Their inclusion points towards new arenas within which differences
may be addressed and policy developed in a more commensurate manner further
eroding the legitimacy of any return of military rule and the use of coercion. The
litmus test of the militarys willingness to allow this new political structure to
operate will be their acceptance of civilian inclusion in defining state interests,
specifically security, and how the military should be employed to protect them.
While the current political structure has insulated these matters to the military
and the military backed USDP, how further reforms and the potential of growing
opposition influence and perhaps governments will alter the perceptions of the
relationship between the government and the military remains to be seen. One
thing is certain, however, the Tatmadaws inclusion will most likely continue into
the indefinite future, but presently they have to an unprecedented level allowed
the political system to function without their interference.

34

Asian Affairs: An American Review

Conclusion
Over the last half decade, Myanmar has been undergoing a rapid and multidimensional transformation of its political landscape, moving away from an autocratic military regime to that of a semi-pluralist Presidential Republic with a
parliamentary system holding multi-party elections. Authoritarian practices, including electoral fraud and constitutional stipulations have ensured the system,
though, first and foremost it protects the position and power of the military establishment. These changes have created a new configuration of authoritarian rule
in the form of an EA regime, which has opened the political arena up to an unprecedented degree. Formerly banned and marginalized actors are now officially
permitted to participate in the political process. The new configuration of the access to power-elections opens room potentially for new possibilities of political
representation, action and governance. Already a series of reforms demonstrate
a softening of the regimes position toward traditional opponents, which has also
thawed relations with much of the international community, most notably the US.
Understanding the rationale(s) behind these current changes is hard to discern,
but these military-led reforms have insulated the Tatmadaw away from any sort
of civilian oversight while maintaining their dominance in areas of security and
constitutional change. These measures, thus, point toward regime maintenance
as the main motivation behind the contemporary political transition. Why power
has been diffused beyond the exclusive control of the military eludes a firm
understanding, but this should not be understood as originally designed toward
the establishment of a liberal democracy. These changes, however, have begun a
process for new actors, identities, and relationships to be constructed, which may
over time turn the system from that of regime maintaining to regime subverting.
Changing norms and institutions are bringing about new arenas for competition
and resulting legitimacy, which moves away from the creators original intents.
While not assuming this path is inevitable, for the Tatmadaw has shown itself
quite willing in the past to move back into the political sphere aggressively (such
as the 1988 coup and the dissolution of the 1990 election results) three relational
dynamics-civil-military, central-regional, and foreign-and the interplay of actors
within and between them will largely come to define the future trajectory of
Myanmars new multi-polar political world.
Over time the preparedness of the military to allow the potential of opposition
parties gaining greater influence and possibly power will be the ultimate test of their
willingness to retrench as a political actor. Without a fundamental transformation
of the Tatmadaws praetorian ethos, Myanmar will not be allowed to move away
from the threat of its reintroduction as political actors and/or persistent tutelage.
After more than fifty years of direct or indirect control, this transformation will not
take place overnight but the allowing of former opponents to operate within the new
system is an encouraging sign that new relationships may be being constructed.

From Military Rule to Electoral Authoritarianism

35

While the militarys establishment of a multi-party system has been designed to

maintain authoritarian rule, now better defined as an EA regime than a military
one, this move is a significant step which may continue to lead to their further
retrenchment of politics, opening up new pathways for thinking of governance in
Myanmar.
NOTES
1. In 1989, the Military Junta changed the official state name from Burma to Myanmar along with a
number of other nomenclature changes. While recognized by many states and the United Nations, some
like the United States (US) and Great Britain continued to use the term Burma as an act of diplomatic
opposition to the militarys rule. For the purpose of this paper, the internationally recognized name of
Myanmar shall be used. For more, see Lowell Dimmiter, Burma vs Myanmar: Whats in a Name?
Asian Survey 48 (2008): 8858.
2. Larry Diamond, The Opening in Burma: The Need for a Political Pact, Journal of Democracy
23 (2012), 138.
3. These characteristics stem from Dahls minimalist democratic criteria. See Robert A. Dahl,
Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
4. The Authoritarian Challenge to Democracy: Selected Data From Freedom Houses Annual
Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, Freedom House (2011).
5. Geddes typology of undemocratic regimes consisting of military, One-Party, and Personalist
categories has become the basis from which many have attempted to build new classifications to
account for the increasing use of elections in authoritarian politics. See Barbara Geddes, What Do
We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years? Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999):
11544.
6. Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, Journal of Democracy 13 (2002):
18.
7. Other typologies developed include Levitsky and Ways Competitive Authoritarianism.
8. See Guillermo ODonnell, Delegative Democracy, Journal of Democracy 5 (1994): 5569.
9. See Andreas Schelder, The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism, in Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schelder (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).
10. See Andreas Schedler, Authoritarianisms last line of Defense, Journal of Democracy 21
(2010): 6980.
11. See Andreas Schedler, The Menu of Manipulation, Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 3650.
12. See Richard Synder, Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The spectrum of non-democratic
regimes, in Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schelder
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).
13. See Barbara Geddes, Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes? Revised paper
originally presented at the 2005 annual meeting of American Political Science Association, March
2006.
14. See Yonatan L. Morse, The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism, World Politics 64 (2012):
16198.
15. For example, see Matthijs Bogaards (2009) How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective
Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism, Democratization 16 (2009): 399423.
16. Some argue that this announcement was influenced by international outrage after the attack of
Aung San Suu Kyis motorcade earlier in the year. Robert H. Taylor, Myanmar: From Army Rule to
Constitutional Rule: 2312.
17. Morten B. Pederson, The Politics of Burmas Democratic Transition, Critical Asian Studies
43 (2011): 54.
18. Myanmars Post-Election Landscape, International Crisis Group (2011): 5.
19. Schedler, Menu of Manipulation, 42.
20. Marco Brunte, Burmas Transition to Disciplined Democracy: Abdication or Institutionalization of Military Rule, GIGA Working Papers (2011), 17.

36

Asian Affairs: An American Review

21. Than Shwe to Head Extra-Constitutional State Supreme Council, The Irrawadday, February
10, 2011.
22. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Understanding Recent Changes in Myanmar, Contemporary Southeast
Asia 34 (2012): 204.
23. If one includes the guaranteed 25% membership of the Tatmadaw in both Houses these percentages jump to 80% and 77% respectively.
24. Myanmars Post-Election Landscape, 24.
25. Hlaing, Understanding Recent Changes in Myanmar, 204.
26. Myanmars Post-Election Landscape, 4.
27. Pederson, The Politics of Burmas Democratic Transition, 60.
28. Schedler, The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism, 12.
29. Diamond, The Opening in Burma: The Need for a Political Pact, 138.
30. Burmas Top General Defends Armys Role in Politics, BBC News, March 27, 2012.
31. David I. Steinberg, The Significance of Burma/Myanmars By-Elections, The East-West
Center, April 2, 2012.
32. Steinberg, The Significance of Burma/Myanmars By-Elections.
33. Aung San Suu Kyi to take Burmese parliamentary oath, The Guardian, April 30, 2012.
34. Mary Callaham, The Generals Loosen Their Grip, Journal of Democracy 23 (2012): 122.
35. Myanmars Post-Election Landscape, 9.
36. Hlaing, Understanding Recent Changes in Myanmar, 2057.
37. See Larry Diamond, The Opening in Burma: The Need for a Political Pact.
38. Callaham, The Generals Loosen Their Grip, 125.
39. Callaham, The General Loosen Their Grip, 127.
40. Tin Maung Maung Than, Burma/Myanmars By-Elections: Will Personalities Trump Institutions? The East-West Center, April 20, 2012.
41. Brunte, Burmas Transition to Disciplined Democracy, 22.
42. Burmas ethnic conflicts see slow progress to resolution, BBC News, May 25, 2012.
43. See Marie Lall Ethnic Conflict and the 2010 Elections in Burma, Asian Program Paper,
Chatham House (2009).
44. Myanmars Post-Election Landscape, 7.
45. Than, Burma/Myanmars By-Elections: Will Personalities Trump Institutions?
46. Karen DeYoung, Ban on US Investment in Burma is lifted, The Washington Post, July 11,
2011.
47. Myanmar to be invited to major US-Thai military exercise, Reuters, October 19, 2012.
48. See Hak Yin Li and & Yongnian Zheng (2009) Re-interpreting Chinas Non-intervention
Policy Towards Myanmar: Leverage, Interest and Intervention, Journal of Contemporary China 18
(2009): 61737.
49. C. S. Kuppuswamy, C.S., Burma: President Theins Visit to China-Analysis, South Asian
Analysis Group (2011).

Copyright of Asian Affairs: An American Review is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may
not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.