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not exceed three-fold that which is required under this Circular for the most severe
offense.
Issue:
Whether or not the three-fold rule under Art. 70 of the Revised Penal
Code and Circular No. 29 can be applied in the reduction of liability under its bail
bonds.
Held:
No. The three-fold rule, on the other hand, has absolutely no bearing on the
confiscation of the bond and the amount to be forfeited. It has reference only to the
maximum duration of the sentence to be served where three or more offense been
committed. It has, therefore, no relevance at all when the accused absconds to
become a fugitive from justice and makes a mockery of the judicial process,
designed to protect society in general and particular members thereof directly
offended. Considerations of liberality as have inspired the rulings relied upon by
petitioner cannot be said to equally exist in the case at bar where there is not a
mere delay in the presentation of the accused, but a total failure to produce him to
be tried and sentenced accordingly if found guilty.
By its own terms and phraseology, the circular of the Secretary of Justice
also invoked by petitioner, is clearly not applicable. It explicitly excludes complex
crimes from its benign effects, the kind of crime with which Nestor Evangelista is
charged in all the seven counts of estafa with falsification of commercial
documents. They likewise do not arise from the same incident, which is one of the
conditions required in the circular for its application in a given situation.
Furthermore, the circular sets a rule for the determination of the amount of bail in
the situation contemplated, certainly a different matter from the amount to be
forfeited to the State of bail bonds confiscated for violation of the terms and
conditions thereof.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the order complained of,
much less grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge, the
instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v PRIETO
G.R. No. L-46542 July 21, 1978
Fernando, J.
Facts:
Respondent Judge Hermenegildo A. Prieto, Sr., of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela, issued an order to forfeit the accused Dario Gamayaons bail
bond due to his continuous failure to appear in Court or in trial, in compliance with
the Rules of Court. Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza, meanwhile,
correctly pointed out that in the bond posted by the accused, there was the usual
undertaking that the accused would appear and answer the charge, hold himself
amenable to the orders of the court, and, if convicted, would appear for
judgment. After the issuance of such order by respondent Judge, there was a
motion for reconsideration. The respondent judge ruled to set aside his previous
In the case of Cea, Et. Al. v. Cinco, Et Al., (96 Phil. 131) this Court held that
where the judgment is one of acquittal. "reading in the presence of the defendant"
may be substituted by giving a copy of the decision to him, and such actdelivery
of copyamounted to promulgation. There is nothing however in the decision
which invalidates the promulgation of a judgment of acquittal where the defendant
is not furnished a copy of the decision. On the contrary, Section 6 Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court does not require that a copy of the judgment be served on the
parties (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p.340).
Lastly, the Court held that the rule that certiorari does not lie when there is
an appeal is relaxed where, as in the present case, the trial court had already
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution (Omico Mining & Industrial
Corporation v. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285; Vda de Saludes v. Pajarillo and Bautista, 78
Phil. 754).
COMMENDADOR v DE VILLA
G.R. No. 93177. August 2, 1991
Feliciano., J.
Facts:
These are four consolidated cases. The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and
96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup detat. They are charged with Mutiny (Article of
War 67), Conduct of Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman (Article of War 96)
and Various Crimes (Article of War 94) in relation to Murder (Article 248 of the
Revised
Penal
Code).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
petitioners are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel
constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the General
Court Martial (GCM) convened to try them. In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners,
besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling
denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com.
Act No. 408. In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no
jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying
bail to the private respondents. In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas
corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections
are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation
(PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14,
1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel
issued a uniform subpoena. On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged
receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death
and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing,
the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI
Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing. This
was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal. In a resolution dated February
27, 1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from
notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses. Then, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the
foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their
motion to writing. The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-tial
investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71.
Petitioners further contended that:
initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no
prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits;
they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved
against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits;
GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the
Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened
the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.;
in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, since the private respondents are officers of
the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the
respondent courts have no authority to order their relea.se and otherwise
interfere with the court-martial proceeding
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners as Armed Forces officers may invoke their
right to bail.
2. Whether or not the petitioners denial to pretrial investigation is tantamount
to non-compliance with Article of War 71.
3. Whether or not the petitioners are denied of their right to due process.
4. Whether or not the petitioners right to preemptory challenge remained
withdrawn under P.D. No. 39.
Held:
1. No. The Court find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents
in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available
in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of
Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the
right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right
to
bail
does
not
exist."
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor
General as follows: The unique structure of the military should be enough
reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right
to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous
soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the
fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties
and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people.
All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against
the existing political system. The argument that denial from the military of
the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable.
This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is
substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they
are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot
say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the
same right that is extended to civilians.
2. No. The Court ruled that there was a substantial compliance with Article of
War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to
conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of
jurisdiction."
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial
investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether
irregular; but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction.
Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in
the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does
not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings.
As declared in Kapunan v De Villa, The Court finds that, contrary to the
contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners
and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer,
were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he
had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records,
including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was
convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record.
3. No. On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they
had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding
is that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due
process
and
the
right
to
a
speedy
trial.
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment
and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be
based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted
with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof
will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not
sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
4. We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to
peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for
emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be
considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new
dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the
"iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime."
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This
principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of
the law is its soul. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the
right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the
apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation
No. 2045. As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No.
408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to preemptory
challenge.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not
acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify
the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the
petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find
that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R.
Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been
ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are
DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge
under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions
are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the
private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No Costs.
ASWAT v. GALIDO
YUSOP v SANDIGANDYAN
G.R. No. 138859-60 - February 22, 2001
Panganiban. J.
Doctrine:
The right of a person to preliminary investigation is recognized by the law
and is governed by the Rules of Court. However, the failure to accord this right
does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of the information; the case is merely
suspended, and the prosecutor directed to conduct the proper investigation
Facts:
In a Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, the
prosecution of Benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo,
Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City as respondents was
recommended for violating Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code (unlawful arrest)
and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended.
Petitioner Alvarez Yusop was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted,
although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in the Order of
September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
remand the case to the inferior court so the preliminary investigation may be
conducted."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Orders are
REVERSED, and the Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED to conduct
forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of violation of Section 3-a of RA
3019 against Petitioner Alvarez Aro Yusop. The trial on the merits of Criminal Case
No. 24524 shall be SUSPENDED in regard to petitioner until the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.