IMMIGRATION AND THE PARADOX OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Katharine Betts
Paper presented to the conference on Citizenship in a Globalised World, Perspectives From The Immigrant
Democracies, HarvardUNSW Conference, UNSW Sydney, 13-15 July, 2010

What are the implications for a liberal democracy if political elites continue to allow (and pursue) high
migrant intakes which many, perhaps most, voters do not want? To explore an answer to this question we
need first to pause to consider the nature of liberal democracy, a polity based on the principles of freedom
and universalistic rights for all citizens. But paradoxically it is based on largely illiberal principles of
membership. Would it be possible to maintain a liberal polity with different membership rules, with or
without the consent of the voters? And how is it that the consent of the votes can be so readily evaded
when immigration-fuelled population growth is concerned?
The idea of open borders and the idea that growth can be imposed on citizens by subterfuge both offer
challenges to democracy. This essay explores these ideas and the way in which they can help us
understand the current politics of population growth in Australia.

Liberal democracy: Can it exist? Should it?

Liberal democracy is a system of government characterised not just by majority voting but rule of law and
separation of powers. The executive rules within limits set by a constitution and with ultimate
accountability to the people in regular and fair elections.
Can a true democracy in which the rule people themselves exist in complex societies? Can the kinds of
conflicts over goals and resources that such societies face ever be settled by consensus alone? Perhaps
not. Elite theories see the idea of democracy as a faade. The state is not run by the people in any sense
but by the men and women who occupy the commanding heights of firms, departments and executive
governments.1 But these theorists distinguish between the type of ruling elite according to the way in
which its members relate to one another and argue that the distinction is crucial. They describe three main
types: consensually unified elites, disunified elites, and ideologically unified elites (such as occurred
under communism and fascism)a type not further considered here.
Consensually unified elites behave in an accommodating way towards each other. They compromise and,
unlike members of the other two types of elites, trust each other in the sense that they do not fear that loss
of power will lead to prison or execution. While they may have supporters among mass publics they do
not mobilise these supporters in all-out struggles against other elite factions, as happens in countries
governed by disunified elites. In contrast, disunified elites are highly distrustful of each other. They form
cliques and factions and mobilise non-elite groupings for support.2 Disunified elites produce authoritarian
regimes and illiberal democracies and are the most numerous type. They have been the rule historically
[and] are likely to remain so.3 If a person had a choice they would opt to be ruled by a consensually
unified elite, not because such a regime is truly democratic but because it means the rule of law, peace
and predictability.
Indeed elite theorists claim that the sine qua non of a liberal democracy is a consensually united
elite.4 While this is not the real democracy of rule by the people for the people, it offers our best hope of
a peaceful, law-abiding society, where individuals can care for their families and do their best to live the
kinds of lives they want to live.
We can call the men and women who fill the roles in the kinds of elites described above the power elite.
This distinguishes them from cultural elites.5 The latter are more broadly dispersed, run cultural
institutions and play a significant role in no-government organisations and the legal system.6
While theorists who focus on the power elite say real democracy cannot exist (all politics, whether
autocratic or democratic are elitist in character),7 some members of the cultural elite think it does exist
but should not. Ordinary voters are too easily manipulated: its the experts and judges who know best. In
particular they know how to protect minorities from electoral majorities. Michael Kirby, a former High
Court judge, says that:

2
The modern notion of democracy is more subtle than the primitive idea of according full power to the transient
majorities of Parliament by a transient vote in a periodic election, accompanied by media jingles and superficial
electoral slogans. Democracy now requires respect for minorities and protection of basic constitutional
principles: such as the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and regard for fundamental human rights.8

Of course democracy means more than voting, but is voting so marginal to it? One Australian judge
described democracy to the American scholar, Jason Pierce, as a majoritarian autocracy and a form of
dictatorship as far as minorities and individuals are concerned. A High Court judge described it as an
elected dictatorship softened by spin doctors and alienated from the people. And as for voters who did
not agree with some of the High Courts decisions on land rights, as in the Mabo and Wik cases, this
judge went on to say that a lot of the criticism comes for those elements in the community who have no
sympathy for liberalism. A lot of these people are vociferous red-neck people.9
Other cultural elites do not condemn democracy as an elected dictatorship, though when it produces
outcomes contrary to their own values they do decry it as populism. For example, how could it be that the
electorate turned against the Hawke/Keating Governments policies of active multiculturalism? There are
a number of answers to this question, one of which is the politics of populism.10 Populism is hard to
define. Is it too much democracy exercised by the wrong sort of people, the vociferous red-neck sort?
Voting for John Howard can be evidence enough: populism has come to define the heart of Australian
conservatism under the leadership of John Howard.11 An American academic says that: running against
the political elite is, of course, the essence of populism everywhere.12 This may be a bad thing or good
thing depending on which side of the elite/non-elite divide you stand. For Christopher Lasch populism is
the authentic voice of democracy.13
But the real foundations of liberal democracy may be less important than voters expectations. Whether or
not a real democracy can or should exist, most voters in countries such as Australia expect it to exist.
They are disappointed if they see evidence that it does not, or that it does, but its foundations are being
eroded. They may not know much about the separation of powers and its role in supporting the rule of
law but they expect fair and equal treatment and that governments will put the interests of the people first.
They become enraged if they are exploited by corrupt police, lawyers, judges or politicians.
Government is meant to be by the people for the people, not by and for vested interests or shysters on the
take.
This paper will argue that immigration which is unwanted by a large segment of the electorate may erode
democracy in two different ways. It can do so by demonstrating all too clearly that power elites rule (and
that cultural elites, in this instance, are often there to help them do so), and it can undermine the sense of
shared peoplehood on which the peaceful society that we now enjoy depends. A consensually unified elite
may be essential for the rule of law but such an institution requires a people who feel that they belong
together.14 It cannot be imposed on societies divided by intensely felt ethnic, religious or tribal
differences. Even in nations blessed by consensually unified elites, mass publics set limits to what those
elites can do.15

Liberal democracy and the paradox of membership

The liberal democratic nation state is a paradox. Many of its laws and values were shaped by
enlightenment principles of universalism. Accidents of birth or upbringing such as lineage, wealth, and,
later, religion, sex and race, should not detract from the rights of citizens, rights which expanded from the
civil to the political to the social.16 Some privileged groups objected to this expansion but, for many, it
seemed reasonable, especially to the ever expanding circles of subjects who were being transformed into
citizens, people who enjoyed equal dignity with one another. Proponents of social justice used the
language of universalism to support the extension of rights to their fellow citizens. But at some point such
reformers are faced with the paradox of membership. Why should rights and social justice stop at the
national borders?17
The paradox of citizenship is clear when we look at citizenship, not just as a set of evolving and
expanding rights for people who are already members of a nation state, but as the principle of
membership itself. People born in Australia with at least one parent who is either a citizen or a legal

permanent resident are Australian citizens.18 People who, by the accident of parentage or birth, do not fit
this rule are not. Citizenship by birth is an ascriptive status. If people who do not fit the rule want to
become residents and citizens they face an arduous process of application in which they may easily fail
(especially as far as gaining permanent residence is concernedonce this hurdle is passed citizenship can
follow relatively easily).19
The representatives of those who are already Australians make the rules governing this process and these
rules can and do change from time to time. The rules have acquired aspects of universalism; ethnicity and
religion are no longer legitimate grounds for denying applications for residence.20 But other ascriptive
statuses, such as age and family relations are applied, as are skills and education. Universalistic rights do
not include a right to immigrate; national boundaries are based on particularism.21
Why should an accident of birth entitle one person to the opportunity of a secure and healthy life and
deny it to another? To restrict an individuals access to economic opportunity, physical security, and
freedom on the grounds of such an accident runs against the grain of universalism, especially in a world
where the initial distribution of these goods is so unequal. Once citizenship is attained universalism
applies. But gaining it is another matter. An older, more particularistic order manages the borderline.
Citizens of liberal, national, democracies think that their nations are founded on universalistic principles
but the problem of membership forces us to confront the paradox behind these principles. Is it
unavoidable?22 Could we have a nation that at least seemed democratic and liberal to its citizens but
which was not based particularistic criteria of membership?
Peoplehood, liberal democracy and proceduralism
Here the work of a British political scientist, Margaret Canovan, is relevant.23 She argues that a sense of
being part of a national people is crucial for any nation, but especially for a liberal democratic one.24 She
begins from the premise that in a democracy the people rule. That is what popular sovereignty means. (So
she side steps the elite theorists problem and moves on to her key question.) If the people are meant to
rule then the question of who are the people and who they should care about in managing their political
affairs becomes crucial.
Nations combine a sense of community with political power; they are communities which fuse the
political and familial to produce a sense of trust and quasi kinship between members.25 Members of a
nation need not share a common ethnic origin in any biological sense, but most of them have a sense of
being the product of a common history and almost all have a sense of having a common future.
Members feel themselves to be part of a people, a sense which allows them to use the pronouns we and us
in talking of their collective hopes and plans (and duties and obligations). It is this feeling which allows
Australians to say We should intervene in East Timor or We should help the bush fire victims or We
should reform the mental health system or we should support the sick and destitute. As Canovan puts
it:
A polity that seems like the family inheritance of an entire population is actually a very unlikely artifact,
but where nationhood exists, it looks natural, and as a result we fail to notice what a remarkable political
phenomenon it is. The fusion of the political and the familial creates an enduring we that can form the
basis of a strong and stable body politic and give the state unity, legitimacy and permanence because it is
our state.26

Where this sense is lacking, collective action may not be possible, potential volunteers will stay at home
and support for taxation to fund national projects may evaporate.
Canovan argues that some theorists do not value or even see this sense of common peoplehood. This gap
in their vision is dangerous. For example, it is common today to find reformers arguing about what
society should do to protect the rights of minorities, or about what the rights of this or that sub-group
might be. When advocates do this they can take the national community which ought to act, which ought
to protect the rights concerned, for granted.

Some may even see the national community as the source of minority oppression and argue that it should
be eroded, even erased. But our rights to protection, freedom, and welfare do not come from Father
Christmas. They come from the commitment of our fellow citizens to protect them, by supporting the law,
paying their taxes and not assaulting us in the street and by unpaid work visiting hospitals, protecting
others from fires and other emergencies, and by donating blood.
Canovan argues that it is hard to run even a nightwatchman state. It requires honest officials and the
absence of organised gangs. Why should officials play by the rules? The sad history of illiberal polities
shows that many officials do not; they enrich themselves at the expense of those whom they are meant to
protect. A sense of public service and the extension of the norms of honesty from private to public life
requires a sense of peoplehood. This is one way in which a persons sense of honour comes to include
behaving decently in public life among strangers.
Members of a national community who think of themselves as a people belong to a group that includes
the long dead and the unborn; their conception of the bonds between each other is founded on the sense of
a common home and a trans-generational society.27 This means they have encumbered selves. Most are
born into the national group and accept the obligations (and privileges) which flow from this without
much question. For example, Australians agree that we have an obligation to support war veterans even
though most of us personally ask them to go to war; and some of us werent even here when they left.
The sense of peoplehood that Canovan describes is a kind of hybrid between the ethnic and civic ideas of
the nation, though she would claim that all nation states which are democracies, and which work, are
characterised by it. Shes being descriptive not normative. Peoplehood is not an option: its essential.
Is she right? The term procedural democracy denotes a different model. If Canovan thinks it dangerous to
overlook the concept of the people, advocates of proceduralism think it dangerous to emphasise it. The
quasi-ethnic elements of peoplehood (the elements of identification, belonging and commitment ) could
become too strong; a national democracy could become simply an ethnic nation and people of different
ethnicities could be marginalised or excluded. (Hence the concern about minorities expressed by some
critics of popular democracy.) Best to keep the emotional temperature low, concentrate on the rules we
agree to share, and make the overriding value not one of belonging and commitment but one of
tolerance.28
In a procedural democracy citizens have unencumbered selves; they have no obligations that they have
not freely agreed to undertake themselves.29 Unencumbered selves do not enter the world burdened with
duties to family and compatriots. They may chose to undertake these duties if they wish, but they cannot
be held to any obligations that they have not chosen. They have no pre-existing duties to the East
Timorese or to veterans of previous wars or, indeed, to disabled siblings or any other pre-existing
relatives.
The polity to which unencumbered citizens belong is sometimes called a procedural democracy, one
where citizens are loyal to a set of rules rather than a set of people.30 This polity does not offer any
particular concept of the virtuous life to its members and says nothing about the idea that bonds of history
and commitment might in some sense tie citizens to their fellows.
The core values are tolerance and abstract justice. Proceduralists do recognise that rights depend on an
institutional structure which guarantees that obligations will be met, but they hold fast to the principle that
the state should not express a preference for any particular set of cultural values 31 and the do not seem to
worry about why some people should commit themselves to establishing and enforcing the rules, nor why
citizens should obey the rules even when these are not to their own advantage.
Proceduralists do not necessarily advocate open borders (though some do)32 but they tend to be much
more accommodating to the rights of would-be immigrants than are the less numerous, active proponents
of a sense of peoplehood.33 Their position on national politics also accords well with a penchant for
cosmopolitanism, as opposed to the more parochial patriotism of Canovans model.34
The virtue of procedural democracy is that it looks as if it is compatible with liberal universalism; its fatal
drawback, I believe, is it that it cannot work. Along with Canovan, I find the idea of an enduring liberal

democratic polity devoid of emotional ties and commitment impossible. Who would devote themselves to
the task of establishing this state and to running it for the common good, rather than for private gain?
How could we motivate people to consent to political settlements which advance the common good but
leave them personally less well off, or to care about others in a huge society of strangers? How could we
do this without a sense that there is something special in our membership of a shared nation? Most
important of all, how can we keep a sense of being a people who should care for each others welfare if
any stranger has the right to enter the charmed circle and, possibly, take advantage of our concern?
The historical reality that rights have expanded within the nation can blind us to the fact that they expand
much less readily beyond the nation. This is because rights depend on rights providers. People who feel
put upon by waves of new applicants for rights, applicants who have not yet demonstrated a commitment
to becoming rights providers, may start to withdraw; they may hunker-downpull in like a turtle to
use Putnams phrase.35 Tax revolts will grow, and society become less civil.
If the rights-provider, the nation state, ceases to have any coherence because its boundaries have
dissolved, the obligations to rights-holders will probably not be met and, if this happens, the rights will go
the same way as the borders.
There is a body of evidence showing that support for social welfare decreases as immigration increases.36
Some promoters of neo-liberalism know this and promote high immigration as a means of shutting down
the welfare state:
One reason for advocating more relaxed immigration polices more openness to people who what to move to
wherever there are opportunities is that it is impossible to sustain a wealth redistribution welfare state with
open immigration. So, if one wants to get rid of the welfare state, one ought to be promoting an open
immigration policy.37

Or as Chris Berg puts it:

...immigration puts pressure on governments to reduce their redistributionist goals [and] migration pushes
back against the welfare state.38

Proceduralists do not necessarily argue for selfish individualism but their beliefs offer few challenges to
those who do. A stable and civilised society depends on a safety net of care for those who need it.
Overload the net and it will break.
At base, the nation, even a liberal democratic one, is a particularistic institution. It may not be possible for
such an institution to co-exist with ideals shaped by liberal universalism when these ideals spread to the
sphere of immigration policy.39 And it may be impossible for liberal democracy to survive within a nation
if it cannot practice particularistic principles when it comes to membership. This is because the greatest
enemy of altruism is not selfishness but fear of exploitation.

The example of immigration: client politicsvested interests and the power elite
Gary Freeman, an American immigration scholar, has developed a general theory of high immigration in
liberal democracies.40 He argues that immigration policies in liberal democracies tend to be more
expansionist than the majority of the people would prefer. This is generally true in Australia. (See Figure
1 on attitudes to immigration from 1954 to 2010 in the appendix. Attitudes to population growth have
been less consistently tracked but these show even more strongly that a large majority do not think that
the country needs more people and that only 20 per cent want growth that involves immigration. See
Table 1. Yet Figure 4 shows that current trends and policy settings total fertility rate close to 2.0 and
net overseas migration well over 220,000 per year are on track to produce considerable growth.)
Australia is a democracy and a large segment of the electorate does not want immigration-fuelled
population growth. So why and how do these expansionary policies happen? Freeman says that this is
partly because citizens know very little about immigration and its demographic implications. This
ignorance is understandable. Debate is constrained, information is not readily available and the cost, in

time and effort, of seeking it out is high. Also politicians do not voluntarily consult the public about
immigration policy, so Governments usually come to office with no binding commitments.
Australians saw this all too well after the election of the Rudd Government in November 2007. One of its
first acts was to increase the formal immigration program for 2008-09 to a record 203,800 (though this
number was reduced in March 2009, to 185,230 as the economy weakened).41 See Figure 2 in the
appendix. But even so it was still a record high for the official program. The Rudd Government also, as
Figure 3 shows, presided over the increasing numbers of net overseas migrants: the total topped 300,000
in 2008 and 278,000 in 2009.42 Nothing was said about this during the election campaign. Indeed Rudd
was careful not to mention immigration and reputedly told his shadow minister to do likewise.43
But the core of Freemans argument concerns what he terms client politics. Immigration is a public
policy which produces concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. There are groups which benefit from
immigration-fuelled population growth and they lobby politicians behind the scenes to make sure that
migrant intakes stay high and to thwart attempts to reduce them. The number of people in these groups is
small and as most of the benefits of immigration flow to them, time and money spent lobbying for growth
pays off. (Benefits? Cheap labour; more customers for housing and other goods; more members of ones
own ethnic or religious group.)44
In contrast, the costs of immigration are diffuse. As the population grows, the majority experience greater
crowding, rising housing costs, lower wages, increased pressure on the infrastructure of their cities, more
competition for education, health and welfare services, and reduced environmental amenity. But these
costs are thinly spread. For each individual they are relatively low and usually accumulate slowly.45
Consequently, any one individuals motivation to devote resources to trying to reduce immigration is less
than the motivation of members of the organised groups who want to keep the numbers coming.
However under the recent Australian Labor government led by Kevin Rudd the pace of growth quickened
and its immediate costs in traffic congestion and strained infrastructure in the major cities became more
obvious.46 So one of the premises of Freemans argument that the majority do not actually know what
is happening started to break down. Certainly ever since Treasurys projection of a population growing
from 22.2 million in 2010 to 35.9 million in 2050 was released in September 2009, public opposition to
growth became quite vocal.47
Freemans client-politics explanation for high migration was published in 1995 and has attracted widespread support. Christian Joppke argues that it should be supplemented by an understanding of the role of
the courts and the judiciary. Democracies have constitutional and legal rules which protect individual
rights. These rules are interpreted and enforced by the courts and they limit the sovereignty of parliaments
and executives. He argues that once nation states develop these judicial restrictions, it is hard for them to
expel those foreigners who make their way into the national territory and then appeal to the courts for the
right to stay.
Joppke has a point. For example, in Australia the role of the courts in affecting immigration decisions has
grown more important over the last thirty years.48 This is partly because there are more foreigners onshore who want to gain permanent residence and can access the courts, and partly because the laws have
changed in ways that make this access easier for them. The values of the judiciary have also changed.
Judges and lawyers (along with other members of the cultural elite) are now more favourably disposed to
the needs of foreigners anxious to claim residence in Australia than they were in the 1960s and early
1970s.49
Of course push factors also make a difference. Once Australia had to work hard to recruit migrants. Now
there is an embarrassment of applications, with many applicants onshore, on temporary or bridging visas,
trying to obtain permanent residence through what ever avenue they can find.
Nevertheless, Freemans client politics sets the stage. The courts are an increasingly important detail, but
they may still be only a detail. This qualification probably depends on which country and which system
you are looking at. As Jason Pierces book on the Australian judiciary makes clear,50 because Australia
does not have the equivalent of a bill of rights, judges here are much more influenced by prevailing values
among their colleagues and less empowered by the institutional setting. Australian courts became key

players in immigration policy after the passage of the new administrative law in the late 1970s and early
1980s.51 And from 1989 to the early 2000s much of the drama of immigration policy and law making was
played out in the context of a battle for supremacy between the executive and the legislature on the one
hand and the courts on the other.52 [add smh piece 3/9/10?]
But Freemans model of concentrated benefits and diffused costs suggests that Governments might not
want to try very hard to control immigration. The executive does not want the judiciary to manage the
process. However, provided the electoral politics do not get too difficult, it may well be happy to oblige
its clients by accepting as many migrants as possible, and the clients will oblige in return by contributing
to election campaign funds.53
A prominent Australian business man with a strong record of community service, Dick Smith, has taken
up the cause of population stability.54 The Liberal/National Party Coalition voted down a recent
proposition for a senate inquiry into population growth put forward by the Greens. All of these parties are
in opposition but, if they had voted together, they would have had the numbers to set up the inquiry.
Smith dismissed the Coalitions ostensible reason (that such an inquiry would have had too great a focus
on global population growth) and accused them of bending to developers and businesses. It was not
saying what the Coalition was trying to make out, which was just rubbish Big business (and)
developers, which are their primary donors, would have objected.55 Elsewhere he writes:
The ones in favour [of population growth] are property developers and the people who work for them, including
most of our politicians. Little wonder. I've made more money out of Sydney real estate in the past 20 years than I
ever did from electronics and publishing. Why grow a real business that employs people when you can sit back
and let population growth make profits for you?56

In Australia the private-sector growth lobby consists of property developers, and now some employers
who are experiencing a genuine skills shortage and are not keen on investing in local training. But it also
includes media organisations which, like other merchants selling to a domestic market, profit from the
growth of that market.57 However, private sector interests do have allies in the public sector. Treasury, for
example, also supports population growth, probably because it boosts GDP (though not necessarily per
capita GDP)58 and state governments, even though they bear the infrastructure costs, appear to support it
for similar reasons,59 and of course they too have close relations with the growth lobby.60
The federal election held on 21 August 2010 saw both major parties say that they would try to moderate
growth (though offering little detail about how they would achieve this).61 After an election with no clear
winner, the Labor Party, led by Julia Gillard, eventually managed to form a government. It remains to be
seen whether this government will be able to withstand the pressure for growth from those who benefit
from it.
For the most part we are looking at focused concentrated, selfish vested interests. Crispin Hull, a senior
journalist and former editor of The Canberra Times has written on the growth lobby. He puts it bluntly:
What can be done? It would be good to ban large donations to political parties, so they don't get driven by
minority interests that benefit from higher population. But the major parties have long showed themselves to be
prisoners of what amounts to little better than bribery.62

If the people come to see the situation this way, that their future has been eroded because their politicians
have effectively been taking bribes, then our belief in the story about Australian democracy will take a
knock.

Conclusion
Australias immigration policies conform all too closely to Freemans model of client politics. They
demonstrate not just that power elites rule but that some of them may be taking national decisions for
corrupt reasons. The paradox of liberalism means that policy makers cannot maintain a liberal state and
manage its borders according to liberal principles, that is they cannot support a right it immigrate. But
they can respond to vested interests and keep the borders half open. And in so doing they by-pass the
principle of democracy. It may well be true that the elite theorists are right when they say that real

democracy is not possible, but history shows that they are right to claim that consensually unified elites
can only flourish in societies favoured by a sense of unity and belonging. The faade can come with an
orderly society and a degree of social welfare, so it is in our interests not to make it too clear that elites
are indifferent to the interests of the majority.
Many citizens would probably be happy to live with the paradox of liberalism. Yes, illiberal restrictions
on membership arent fair, but borders are not fair and cannot be made to be so. But clear breaches of
democracy which pander to selfish interests at the expense of the common good are another matter. This
is a tangible problem, once it becomes evident (whereas the paradox of liberalism exists at a more
esoteric level). A continuing influx of large numbers of immigrants accompanied by high levels of
population growth, in the face of a clear public preference for stability, could have disagreeable political
consequences. It would fuel popular distrust of political elites could have unfortunate consequences for
the Australian sense of being a people. The neo-liberals dream of the end of welfare could come true,
and we could also see a Hansonite revolt re-emerge. But what is most likely is that Australians will
become more individualistic and withdrawn, not flying to the barricades but retreating to the shelter of
their turtle shells. Fear of exploitation can have this effect.

Appendix
Figure 1: Attitudes to immigration, July 1954 to July 2010
Question format: Last year X number of migrants came. In your opinion is this number about right, too many or
too few?

Sources: Morgan Gallup Poll (MGP), 1022-1035 (No. 105) July 1954; MGP, 1103-1115 (No. 112), July
1955; MGP, 1171-1182 (No. 118) May 1956; MGP, 1698-1710 (No. 164), August 1963 (polls for 1954
to 1963 are from Goot, 1999, cited in endnote 26); MGP, 1776-1788 (No. 171) August 1964; MGP,
2921-2039 (No. 195), December 1967; MGP (No. 200), 19 Oct. 1968; MGP (No. 212), August 1970;
Age Poll, 12 July 1971; McNair Anderson, March 1977; ANOP, National Times, 13-19 September
1981; MGP (No. 589) May, and then June, 1984; Saulwick/Age Poll, 9 February 1988; Saulwick/Age
Poll, 14 May 1990; Saulwick/Age Poll, 4 November 1991; AGB McNair poll, 14-16 June 1996;
Newspoll, The Australian, 3 May 1997, 2001; AC Nielsen poll, The Age, 4 September 2001; 2002 is an
Irving Saulwick poll commissioned by Job Futures; the sample is restricted to people in the workforce;
2007 is the first Scanlon survey (Data as published in A. Markus, Mapping Social Cohesion 2010: The
Scanlon Foundation Surveys, Summary Report, Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements,
Melbourne, 2010, p. 21); the first 2009 poll is June/July from second Scanlon survey (Markus 2010, op.
cit.); the second 2009 poll is an AC Nielsen poll, 5-7 November 2009; the first 2010 poll is an AC
Nielsen poll, 15-17 April 2010; the second taken in June is the third Scanlon survey (Marksu 2010 op.
cit.), and the third taken in July is an internet-based poll by S. Iyengar and S. Jackman, Australian and
American attitudes to illegal immigration, The United States Studies Centre at the University of
Sydney, Sydney, 2010, 14-22 July,
<http://ussc.edu.au/s/media/docs/publications/1008IllegalImmigrantsSurvey.pdf>.
Notes: From 1984 to June 1996, and in 2010 (except for April) the data refer to voters only; the other
polls are based on all adults. Up to 1973 adult normally meant aged 21 plus; from 1974 on it means
aged 18 plus. Where respondents had the option of choosing far too many or somewhat too many or
somewhat too few or far too few these responses have been collapsed into too many and too few.
The about right response category is not shown; neither is dont know.
.

10

Table 1: Voters, Attitudes to population growth, 1977, 2001, and Dec. 2009 to Feb. 2010, per cent
1977 Do you think that over the next few years we should
Not be concerned
[Responses Total Encourage couples Encourage
Encourage both
if growth slows
mentioning
to have larger
more migrants
migrants and
down
growth]
families
to come
larger families
50
49
100
22
10
17
2001 Should Australia increase, maintain or reduce its population?
Maintain or reduce Increase
Total
65 (58%
36
100
maintain, 7%
reduce)
2009-2010 Do you think Australia needs more people? (Yes or no) If yes how would you like the
population to grow?
No
Yes
Total Encourage people
Encourage
Encourage both
to have more
more migrants
migrants and
children
to come
larger families
72
28
100
7
5
15
Note: The questions asked were as set out in above. Method: 1977, face-to-face interviews (not clearly stated in the
records but one of the questions asked was whether the respondent was on the telephone27% were not) (N=2000);
2001, telephone interviews (N=1000); December 2009 to February 2010 mailout questionnaire (N=3052). For
further details see K. Betts, 'Population growth: what do Australian voters want?' People and Place, vol. 18, no. 1,
2010, pp. 49-64; K. Betts, 'A bigger Australia: opinions for and against', People and Place, vol. 18, no. 2, 2010, pp.

Figure 2: The permanent immigration program, 1990-91 to 2010-11

Sources: Population Flows, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA)/Department of

Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), various issues. Data for 2009-2010 and 2010-11 are planning figures only and
come from media releases.

11

Figure 3: Net migration to Australia, 1947 to 2009, calendar years

Sources: Demography Bulletin, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, for immigration figures 1946-1958 (various years);
Overseas Arrivals and Departures, Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Canberra, Catalogue no. 3404.0 (various
years); Australian Demographic Statistics, ABS), Canberra, Catalogue no. 3101.0, (various years).
Note: From 1947 to 1981 the data are net total migration figures. These include all movement in and out of the country:
permanent, long-term (trips of 12 months or more) and short-term. From 1982 to 2009 the data are what the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS) terms net overseas migration (NOM). This represents the net permanent and long-term data adjusted for
category jumping (for example, people arriving short-termfor less than 12 months but in fact staying longer). In September
2006 they changed the way in which they calculated NOM; this change inflated the recorded figures by around 22,000. See B.
Birrell and E. Healy, Net overseas migration: why is it so high? People and Place, vol. 18, no. 2, 2010, Table 1, p. 58.

Figure 5: Australias population from 1901 to 2006, with five different ABS projections to 2101 (life
expectancy medium)

Sources: for 1901 to 2006, Australian Historical Population Statistics, spreadsheet, catalogue no. 3105.0.65.001, ABS, 2008; for
the projections, Population projections, Australia, 2006 to 2101, Catalogue no. 3222., series 71, 54, 59, 29 and 5
(spreadsheets downloaded from www.abs.gov.au).
Notes: TFR stands for total fertility rate; Nom stands for net overseas migration; Medium life expectancy stands for the
expectation that life expectancy at birth will rise from the 2007 levels of 79 years for males and 83.7 years for females to 85 for
males and 88 for females.

12

References
1
J. Higley and M. Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham (USA), 2006,
p. 16. See also G. L. Field and J. Higley, Elitism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980; J. Higley, D. Deacon
and D. Smart, Elites in Australia, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979.
2
Field and Higley, 1980, op. cit., p. 35
3
Higley and Burton, 2006, op. cit., pp. 3, 202
4
Higley and Burton, 2006, op. cit., pp. 1-2; cf Field and Higley, 1980, op. cit., p. 37
5
Higley and Burton want to restrict the term elite to persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in
powerful organisations and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially; they do not
accept broader definitions such as all those in a society who enjoy high occupational, educational, or cultural
status. Higley and Burton, 2006, op. cit. pp. 7-8
6
Given their roles in the media and higher education they are also partly able to define what may and may not be
discussed, and how it should be discussed in the media, publishing, the arts, and the education system.
7
Higley and Burton, 2006, op. cit., p. 202
8
M. Kirby, A Bill of Rights for Australia But do we need it? Briefing: Australian Institute of Jewish Affairs, no.
32 (December), 1995, p. 5
9
Quoted in J. L. Pierce, Inside the Mason Court Revolution: The High Court of Australia Transformed, Carolina
Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina, 2006, pp. 121, 123, 188. In 1997 Piece interviewed 82 senior legal
figures in Australia including 10 High court judges (4 current and 6 retired, including Mason), numerous other
appellate judges and 12 senior legal officials and QCs (see pp. 293-295, 300).
10
G. Gallop, Freedom based on tolerance, The Australian, 4 April 2007, p. 36. Geoff Gallop is the former premier
of West Australia.
11
M. McKenna, No mandate to silence dissent, The Age, 18 April 2002; Mark McKenna is a research fellow in
history at the Australian National University in Canberra.
12
I. Buruma, Fear and loathing in the EU, The Australian, 10 October 2008, p. 12. Ian Buruma is professor of
human rights at Bard College in the US.
13
C. Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, Norton, New York, 1995, p. 106
14
Higley and Burton make this point forcefully when they analyse the insuperable difficulties of creating a liberal
democracy in Iraq. See Higley and Burton, 2006, op. cit.,1-2, 201
15
Field and Higley, 1980, op. cit., pp. 19, 21-32; Higley et al., 1979, p. 15
16
See T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and social class in Class, Citizenship and Social Development: Essays by T. H.
Marshall, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1964.
17
Shuck writes that in the United States Prior to the 1980s the courts had been content to accept the decisions of
Congress and the bureaucracy. The Constitution stopped at the waters edge or, as one Supreme Court
judgment put it, Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned. P. H. Schuck, Immigration law and the problem of community, N. Glazer (Ed.), Clamor at
the Gates: The New American Immigration, Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, San Francisco, 1985, p. 293
and note 16.
18
Children born overseas to with at least one parent an Australian citizen are eligible to apply for Australian
citizenship, an application which will normally be granted. See
</www.citizenship.gov.au/applying/how_to_apply/born_overseas/>
19
For an overview of changes to rules governing applications for Australian citizenship see K. Betts and B. Birrell,
Making Australian citizenship mean more, People and Place, vol. 15, no. 1, 2007, pp. 45-61.
20
See C. Joppke, Selecting by Origins: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
MA, 2005.
21
This has been challenged. The notion of sovereignty, and the right of a country to decide who it lets in to its
border, is premised on a belief in that countys right to determine its own membership. The relevance of this
nation is arguably outdated. K. Rubenstein, Citizenship in Australia: unscrambling its meaning, Melbourne
University Law Review, vol. 20, 1995, p. 522.
22
For an analyst who concludes that it is, and that because of this liberal theory is incoherent, see P. Cole,
Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh,
2000, pp. 5, 202-3
23
M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 1996
24
Canovan argues that the prior existence of the nation state is a tacit premise in almost all contemporary political
thinking about democracy, social justice, rights and the rule of law. But theories, and advocacy, about these
concepts usually do not acknowledge this premise. See Canovan, op. cit., pp. 1, 11, 13-14, 29-34, 44, 68. See also
D. Miller, On Nationality, Clarendon, Oxford, 1995, p. 93. Smith argues that, once the power of the monarch was
eroded and transferred to the sovereign people, the question of who are the people became unstoppable. He says
that nations are a way of answering this question and that, at the moment we have no other. National identity is

13
therefore the basis of our social cohesion. See A. D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Polity Press,
Cambridge, 1995, pp. 154-155.
25
See Canovan, 1996, op. cit., pp. 59, 69, 70, 109. There are of course other ways of defining a nation. Anderson,
for example famously described a nation as an imagined community albeit one that is imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism (second edition), Verso, London, 1991, p. 6. Miller defines nations as communities of obligation, in
the sense that their members recognize duties to meet the basic needs and protect the basic interests of other
members, D. Miller, On Nationality, Clarendon, Oxford, 1995, p. 92. Smith says nations have become what
ethno-religious communities were in the past: communities of history and destiny that confer on mortals a sense of
immortality through the judgment of posterity, rather than through divine judgment in an afterlife, Smith, 1995,
op. cit., pp. 158-9. None of these definitions depend on biological kinship and all draw on the notions of
community, boundaries, feeling, and continuity through time. Most draw analogies between nations and ethnic
groups. For example a national identity may feel very like an ethnic identity and nations do often grow out of
ethnic groups. But point out that nations are different from ethnic groups: they have a history, a territory, and they
do not necessarily depend on the myth or reality of biological relatedness. Many incorporate ethnic minorities or
accept immigrants from various backgrounds; nevertheless successful nations generate a sense of community and
identity while failed nations (such as the former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union) do not.
26
Canovan, 1996, op. cit., p. 71
27
See R. Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat, Continuum, London, 2002, p. 61.
28
Examples of the two different approaches? For the peoplehood model (though he doesnt use the term) see J.
Hirst, A core culture is vital to our success story, The Australian, 14 February 2001, p. 13. For the procedural
model see D. Horne, Celebrating our differences, The Australian, 9 February 2001, p. 13
29
See for example M. J. Sandel, Democracys Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996, pp. 116, 293, 331, 341-3. As Bellah et al. put it, for most Americans the
only real social bonds are those based on free choices made by authentic [that is unencumbered] selves. R. N.
Bellah, R. Madsen, W. M. Sullivan, A. Swidler and S. M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and
Commitment in American Life, Harper and Row, New York, 1985, pp. 107, 130, 139, 240, 276, 290.
30
Donald Horne refers to these ideas under the heading of a civic culture. See D. Horne, Celebrating our
differences, The Australian, 9 February 2001, p. 13.
31
See M. J. Sandel, Democracys Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1996, p. 28
32
See M. Bagaric, Migration can end worldwide poverty, The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 April 2010, p. 15; C.
Berg, Open the borders, Policy, vol. 26, no. 1, 2010, pp. 3-7; R. Blackford, 'Racism and refugees', Quadrant, vol.
no. 2002, September, pp. 7-14; G. Kitching, Seeking Social Justice through Globalization, Pennsylvania State
University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 2001, pp. 277, 320. See also F. Salter, The misguided advocates
of open borders, Quadrant, vol. LIV, Number 6, no. 467, 2010, June, pp. 4-8.
33
Orwell writes that, in England, the vast majority of the people feel themselves to be a single nation and are
conscious of resembling one another more than they resemble foreigners but their sense of patriotism is
unconscious and not often put into words. G. Orwell, England Your England,
1941<www.orwell.ru/library/essays/lion/english/e_eye> accessed 10 August 207; see also Canovan, 1996, op. cit.,
p. 75. Miller also argues that patriotic values are difficult to articulate in British culture. D. Miller, In defence of
nationality, P. Gilbert and P. Gregory (Ed.), Nations, Cultures and Markets, Avebury, Aldershot, 1994, pp. 15-16,
25.
34
These ideas are explored further in K. Betts and B. Birrell, Making Australian citizenship mean more, People
and Place, vol. 15, no. 1, 2007, pp. 45-61.
35
R. D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first centuryThe 2006 Johan Skytte
Prize Lecture, Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 2007, p. 149
36
On social capital and ethnic diversity see Putnam, 2007, op. cit., pp. 137-174, A. Leigh, Trust, inequality and
ethnic heterogeneity, The Economic Record, vol. 82, no. 258, 2006, pp. 268-280; E. Healy, Ethnic diversity and
social cohesion in Melbourne, People and Place, vol. 15, no. 4, 2007, pp. 49-64; G. Freeman, Migration and the
political economy of the welfare state, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol.
485, no. May, 1986, pp. 51-63. See also chapters in F. Salter (Ed.), Welfare, Ethnicity and Altruism: New Findings
and Evolutionary Theory, Frank Cass, London, 2004
37
Jerry Jordan was then president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. He is quoted in G. Lindsay
and J. Jordan, They Say: Immigration will help dismantle the welfare state, The Australian Financial Review, 7
March 2000, p. 20
38
C. Berg, Open the borders, Policy, vol. 26, no. 1, 2010, p. 4
39
See Joppke, 2005, op. cit., pp. 12, 37, 173
40
G. Freeman, Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states, International Migration Review,, vol.
29, no. 4, 1995, pp. 881-901
41
See Government cuts migration program, 16 March 2009 <www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/mediareleases/2009/ce09030.htm> accessed 16 March 2010.

14
42

Demographic Statistics, December 2009, Catalogue no. 3101.0, ABS, June 2010
[On immigration and multiculturalism] Kevin Rudd has, as on other issues, kept a low profile and told his
shadow immigration minister to do the same. A. Wood, Multiculturalism becomes poison for social capital, The
Australian, 26 September 2007, p. 16
44
Ethnic groups lobbying for expanding family reunion were a key part of the growth lobby in Australia from
around 1978 to 1996 but the core of lobby is developers and others selling to a domestic market. See the K. Betts
and M. Gilding, The growth lobby and Australias immigration policy, People and Place, vol. 14, no. 4, 2006,
pp. 40-52.
45
Some argue that ordinary people benefit from per capital economic growth but the benefits are small. In 2006 the
Productivity Commission undertook a study of the economic impact of migration and population growth. To
assess the effect of skilled migration, modelling was conducted to estimate the economic impact of a simulated
increase in skilled migration of about 50 per cent on the level in 2004-05.
By 2024-25, the increase in income per capita, on average, is projected to be about $400 (or about 0.7 per cent),
compared with a base case scenario. Economic Impacts of Migration and Population Growth: Media release <
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/migrationandpopulation/docs/finalreport/mediarelease> accessed 25 June 2010
46
While distances traveled to work have remained relatively stable since the mid 1990s, or have even declined, there
is evidence that the time spent commuting has increased for Brisbane, Sydney and Adelaide. See State of
Australian Cities 2010, Major Cities Unit, Infrastructure Australia, Canberra, 2010, p. 104. For media reports and
commentary see: S. Lunn, The daily commute keeps getting longer, The Australian, 4 June 2009, p. 3;
Crowding out a way of life, Daily Telegraph, 18 May 2010, p. 20; A. Ferguson, Congestion to cost region $3bn
a year, The Australian, 29 August 2009, p. 7; J. Dowling and C. Lucas, Bursting at the seams, The Age, 11
November 2009, p. 15; J. Gordon, Congestion the ultimate cost of people ingestion, The Sunday Age, 28
February 2010, p. 17.
47
See K. Betts, Population growth: what do Australian voters want? People and Place, vol. 18, no. 1, 2010, pp.
49-64
48
J. McMillan, Federal Court v Minister for Immigration, Australian Administrative Law Forum, vol. no. 22,
1999, pp. 1-25; J. McMillan, Controlling immigration litigation a legislative challenge, People and Place, vol.
10, no. 2, 2002, pp. 16-29. See also K. Betts, Judicial activism, immigration and the one-child case, People and
Place, vol. 5, no. 3, 1997, pp. 19-28 and The Character Bill and migration rights, People and Place, vol. 6, no. 3,
1998, pp. 39-53. For a recent update see J. Walker, Courts crack down on asylum appeals, The Australian, 5
January 2010, p. 3.
49
For interviews with Australian judges on a range of social questions see: Pierce, 2006, op. cit.
50
See Pierce, 2006, op. cit.
51
See G. Freeman and K. Betts, The politics of interests in immigration policymaking in Australia and the United
States, G. Freeman and J. Jupp (Eds), Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the United States, and International
Migration, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1992; K. Betts, Immigration policy under the Howard
Government, Australian Journal of Social Issues, vol. 38, no. 2, 2003, pp. 169-192.
52
See McMillan, 1999, op. cit.; P. Ruddock, Narrowing of judicial review in the migration context, Australian
Administrative Law Forum, vol. no. 15, 1997, pp. 13-21; J. Power, The executive, the judiciary, and immigration
appeals in Australia, C. N. Tate and T. Vallinder (Ed.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, New York
University Press, New York, 1995; S. Cooney, The Transformation of Migration Law, Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995
53
See J. Dowling, Developers gave Labor $1.2m in a decade, The Age, 19 June 19 2010, p. 3; M. Owen,
Lobbyists the price you pay: developer, The Australian, 23 July 2009, p. 7; R. Millar, Big property developers
help line the pockets of ALP, The Age, 3 February 2009, p. 6; L. Wilson, Parties cool on donations inquiry, The
Australian, 7 April 2008, p. 6; R. Millar, Political donations linked to developers, contractors, The Age, 7 July
2008, p. 1
54
See <http://dicksmithpopulation.com/>.
55
A. Priestley, Well have home but no yard, says Smith, North Shore Times, 29 May 2010
56
D. Smith, Dick Smith: the people have spoken, halt population growth, Crikey, 1 April 2010
57
See Betts and Gilding, 2006, op. cit. Harold Mitchell writes: The debate rages about how big Australias
population should become. if we get to the fabled 36 million by 2050, Australia will be a different place, and if
we plan it properly, a better place. For marketers, it means more goods and services and more profits. For the
media, more people and therefore more profits. H. Mitchell, Important to get population right, The Age, 23
April 2010, p. 7. John Stone writes: In short, immigration does not improve average Australians' living standards,
and that long-standing argument for it has no substance. Our corporate chieftains-including importantly those
controlling our media-find that conclusion unacceptable. More immigrants mean more demand for their products,
whether widgets or newspapers. See J. Stone, 'Immigration policy: our self-inflicted wounds', Quadrant, vol. LIV,
no. 9, 2010, September, p. 32. (Stone is a former head of the Department of Treasury.)
See also J. Hildebrand, Rupert Murdoch urges Aust to open door to migrants, Brisbane Courier Mail, 6 February
2009 <www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,23739,25015115-953,00.html> accessed 6/6/2009.
43

15
58

See S. Parnell, Treasury push for big migration boost, The Australian, 3 June 2010, p. 5. In 2006 the Australian
Productivity Commission found that a simulated increase in skilled immigration of 50 per cent would increase
annual per capita income in 2024-25 by a mere A$383 (around 0.71 per cent), and that most of this increase would
go to the migrants themselves. See Economic Impacts of Migration and Population Growth, Position Paper,
January, Productivity Commission, Melbourne, 2006, pp. xxxii-xxxiii.
59
Wells writes that The Victorian economy is increasingly reliant on population growth to drive growth and
prosperity. Without population growth Victorias economic performance would be substantially less healthy.
Population growth has been described by Access Economics in its September Quarter 2009 report as
underpinning the States growth. It does this by basically fuelling demand in the construction industry and the
housing industry in particular, as well as household demand. K. Wells, Victorian Budget 2010: The legacy of
John Brumby after 11 years: failure of basic services and infrastructure, Pre-Budget Summary Edition, Victorian
Liberal Nationals Coalition, Melbourne, 2010 (April), p. 14
60
For its influence on the state government in South Australia see M. Owen, 'Lobbyists the price you pay:
developer', The Australian, 23 July 2009, p. 7; in New South Wales see L. Wilson, 'Parties cool on donations
inquiry', The Australian, 7 April 2008, p. 6; D. Box and T. Condon, 'Egg-box developers too powerful: Keating',
The Australian, 31 October 2006, p. 5; J. Norrie and A. Davies, 'Cut the political cashflow', The Sydney Morning
Herald, 2 November 2006, p. 1; for Queensland see S. Prasser, 'Sunshine state hasn't shaken its shady past', The
Australian, 17 July 2009, p. 12; B. Hoffman, 'MPs gagged on growth', Sunshine Coast Daily, February 13 2010, p.
12.
61
T. Colebatch, 'Population: focus turns on middle ground', The Age, 19 July 2010, p. 4; A. Davies and R. Olding,
'Gillard population policy a fraud of the worst order, says Latham', The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 July 2010, p.
7; M. Franklin, 'PM cagey on cutting migration', The Australian, 22 July 2010, p. 6; C. Alexander and P. Caruana,
'More babies, fewer immigrants: Abbott', AAP Bulletins, 25 July 2010. Stone points to contradictions in the Gillard
Governments position (just before the 2010 election result was finalised) and doubts that the Liberal Party-led
opposition would be very much better. See Stone, 2010, op. cit., pp. 34, 37.
62
C. Hull, Watch this space of ours, or we may just populate and perish, The Canberra Times, 30 January 2010, p.
19. This supported by Kelvin Thomson, labor MHR for Wills (Victoria) who is reported as saying that
governments support the idea of a big Australia because they have been lobbied by self-interested big business.
[He says] Some business entities, and property developers in particular, are in the ears of politicians, day in, day
out, seeking high population They regard population growth as the yellow brick road to easy profit. See J.
Drape, ' PM's support for big Australia confusing: Labor MP', Australian Associated Press General News, 29
November 2009. See also K. Betts and M. Gilding, 'The growth lobby and Australias immigration policy', People
and Place, vol. 14, no. 4, 2006, pp. 40-52.