Blanchot Heidegger

Penn State University Press
The Gaze of Blanchot through the Lens of Heidegger

Author(s): Temenuga Dencheva Trifonova
Source: Interdisciplinary Literary Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Fall 2000), pp. 21-48
Published by: Penn State University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41209060
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The Gaze ofBlanchotthrough

theLens ofHeidegger
TemenugaDenchevaTrifonova
StateUniversity
ofNew Yorkat Buffalo
Maurice Blanchot's writingmust be approached with Paul de Man's cautionarywords in mind: "the conception of literature(or literarycriticism) as
dmystification[is] the most dangerous mythof all, while grantingthatit forces
us, in Mallarme's terms,to scrutinizethe act of writing 'jusqu'en l'origine'"
(Blindness 14).1 Blanchot inventshis own modern mythsand regards them as
dmystificationsof our habitual way of thinkingabout literature.A typically
Blanchotianreversal: mystifying
devices, such as metaphorsand reworkingsof
classical myths,are used to demystifythe obvious, the habitual, the real. We
must refrain,however, frombelieving too easily that the habitual is indeed in
need of "dmystification"or thatBlanchot's supposedly innocent- because selfaware and too obvious- rhetoricof mythscan be taken at face value. De Man
argues thatthe validityof myths"depends on the existence of a privilegedpoint
of view, to which the method itselfdenies any status of authenticity"(10-11).
Blanchot's writing,a mythologyin its own right,depends on this paradox, too.
The mythof the distinctionbetween book and work,3forexample, depends on a
privilegedpoint of view (the notion of selfhood, or, more precisely, the belief
thatthere is a self), from which the loss, the dispossession of the self by the
work is declared and to which the method itself- the pure impersonalityof
Blanchot's discourse- denies any credibility. Blanchot's mythologizationof
literatureas an authentic language beyond being and non-being, beyond affirmationand negation, constitutesanother aspect of this suspect privileged
pointof view or what Levinas calls "the Excluded Third Term" (55).4 The difficulties in writingabout this excluded thirdterm,the neuter,are the same difficulties the criticencounterswhen tryingto writeabout Blanchot. Edmond Jabes
notes that "Nothingnesscan only be thoughtby reducing all thoughtsto nothing" (The Little Book 66).5 Similarly,one can writeabout Blanchot only by reducing one's criticallanguage to Blanchot's. Blanchot's criticmustact in a way
contraryto the essence of literarycriticism- assuming a detached point of view
and looking at the text- and, instead,proceed fromthe veryheartof Blanchot's
text,looking throughthe texttoward the outside ratherthan looking infrom the
outside.
Blanchot's criticfindsit simply impossible to writeabout Blanchot outside
- not quite the noble "plural speech" Blanof Blanchot's language. The latter
- is so oppressive thateven if one
chot dreams of in The InfiniteConversation0
wantsto criticizeit, one inevitablyfindshimselfentangledin the lack of clarity,
cumbersomestyle,and nebulous, too eager to be incomprehensiblediction that
one wishes to attack. Language and style are such an importantpart of Blan21
cho s thinkingthat occasionally one wonders if some of his images or key

termsare coined only because they sound intriguingto a poetic ear. To tryto
explicate or just read "The Gaze of Orpheus," for instance, one cannot remain
outside the essay and apply one's own critical language but is instead brutally
and uncompromisingly"sucked" intoBlanchos language. Victimized, the critic
can only repeat,against his will, as thoughhypnotized,Blanchotian mantras,the
overfamiliarmantrasof postmodernism,which predicate,now almost mechanically, death, absence, or loss to any object of inquiry or, if the postmodern
"thinker"happens to be in an unexpectedlyaffirmativemood, turnevery object
of inquiry into a "dangerous" supplement. Blanchos writingengenders the
worsttype of criticism:a mere paraphrasingof the original text,an involuntary
aping of the author's style. Since Blanchos images or ideas do not have parallels in the critic's language, the critic is forced not only to write in Blanchos
termsbut even to thinkin these terms.My criticismof Blanchot cannot, therefore,but be as elusive as the original text.And since in most cases the criticis
not as good a poet as the artisthe is writingabout, the original textsafely keeps
the upper hand in this not quite "infiniteconversation" between text and criti- even when it earnestlytries to be open-mindedand excism. Since criticism
aims
at revealing the unityof the text it analyzes, a poetic
perimental always
formof criticismsuch as Blanchos will appear to the critic to be filled with
inconsistencies. The text condemns the critic to petty quibbling about what
mightjust as well be, fromBlanchos own point of view, really insignificant
points. (I am not sure if this is a feeble attemptat self-justificationor a sound,
factual observation.) The difficultyBlanchos critical writingposes is further
exacerbated by the fact that however poetic it is, it is still a work of criticism,
not a fictional work. The uncertain status of Blanchos critical work- suspended between art and criticism- is problematicforthe critic,who cannot decide how much and what kindof authorityis to be given to the text.In a workso
densely rhetorical,the critic has a hard time distinguishingthe parts thatreally
make an argumentfrom those that are pure rhetoric,especially considering
Blanchos almost pathological obsession with paradoxical formulations,which
oftenappear as beautifullywroughturnsratherthanas criticalstatements.
So, thecritic,now turnedinto a patheticlinguisticweakling,who can do no
betterthanplagiarize Blanchos language and thinkingeven when he most passionatelydisagrees with them and wants to resist them,finds himselfexiled in
theTower of Tautologies and Impotence.What can he do? How can he preserve
his dignityin the face of the Blanchotian avalanche of mythologizednegation,7
absence, and death? One way is to diverthis attentionfromBlanchot and introduce anothertext,one less despotic, and, preferably,related to Blanchos work.
Luckily, thereis Heidegger, traces of whom can be foundin almost all of Blanchos centralclaims about literature.8On one side, then,thereare Heidegger's
questions: the question of the nothing,the ontic-ontologicaldifference,Dasein' s
22
relationshipto the nothing,the distinctionbetween mere negationand the originarynot,the distinctionbetween mere thingand the work of art,the idea of the
work as truthsettingitselfto work,the idea of concealment as the very lighting
where thingscome into being. On the otherside, parallel to these questions, are
Blanchos: the question of the origin (inspiration,infinity),the "application" of
the ontic-ontologicaldifferenceto the relationshipbetween the writingsubject
and the work,the dispossession of the writerby the work,9the attemptto bypass
both negationand affirmationthroughthe metaphorof the absolutely other,the
distinctionbetween book and work, the transcendenceof the work beyond the
realm of being, truth,and language,10and, finally,the impossibilityof the Heideggerian truthas un-truthsuggested in a modernrereadingof the mythof Orpheus.
A comparativeanalysis of these points of intersectionproduces what might,
at firstglance, appear to be an unlikelyconclusion: despite the factthatHeidegger's metaphysicsis rootedin the question of the nothing,the implicationsof his
metaphysicsand aestheticsare farfrompessimistic,especially when set against
Blanchos bleak aestheticvision. Heidegger's metaphysicsand Blanchos transcendental theoryof art proceed froma common concern, the concern for the
unthinkable,which Heidegger calls "the nothing" and Blanchot "the work."
However, the project of preservingthe unthinkablefollows differentpaths in
both discourses and nowhereis this more evident thanin the two authors' views
of language. Wishing to distinguishhimself from Heidegger's notion of lana language that,in its asserguage as the saying of being or the work of truth,11
tiveness and affirmation
contains the potentialthreatof tyranny,Blanchot takes
shelterin the language of aporia and indeterminacywhere, he seems to believe,
language is still "a powerless exchange" (The Sirens' Song 50)12 or "plural
speech."13 Presumably,metaphorical language, like Blanchos, is more indeterminate,hence more respectfulof the unthinkable,than a philosophical language like Heidegger's. I have already questioned the "powerlessness" of Blanchos language and suggested thatit is in fact extremelyoppressive in its very
indeterminacyand elusiveness. More important,however, are the implications
of Heidegger's and Blanchos differentviews of language, and, accordingly,
theirapproaches to the unthinkable.Whereas Heidegger preserves the question
of the nothingby calling attentionto it in his radical claim thatthe work of art
(and we mustrememberthatby "work of art" he means, firstand foremost,poetry)poses the question of the nothing,i.e., the question of being, Blanchot, on
the otherhand, preservesthe indeterminate(literature)not throughrevealing its
relation to being but throughexcluding itfrom the realm of being, presentingit,
instead, as that which does not call, does not compel (evidently,for Blanchot,
being is always associated withpower and is, thus,potentiallythreatening).The
demand of the work is the most rigorousand super-moralone precisely because
it does not demand anything,just as Blanchos metaphors(of the other night,
23
etc.) are the most transcendentalsince they do not belong to being. However,
there is a point of saturationwhere transcendencebecomes so elusive that it
loses its meaning as such. However marvelous the desire to make room for the
- whetherit is called "the nothing"or "literature"is, finally,not imunthought
- i.e., to leave margins in our thinking,these margins are repeatedly
portant
closed by a naturalreversal: our thought,even as it withdrawsrespectfullybefore the indeterminate,cannot help making the margin itselfinto its object, so
thatwhile we ought to be thinkingagainst our usual way of thinking(which is
thinkingabout something),we begin thinkingabout the margins. Thinkingthe
unthinkableturns into thinkingthat there is an unthinkable,which, in turn,
makes Heidegger's truthas un-truth
no longerpossible.
Insofaras the centralquestion in Blanchot's criticalwriting,the question of
literature,is a reworkingof the centralquestion in Heidegger's metaphysics,the
question of the nothing,Blanchot's theoryof literatureis metaphysical:it asks
the question of the origin. In the essay "The Song of the Sirens" Blanchot
writes:"in [the Sirens'] region of source and originmusic itselfhad disappeared
more completely than in any other place in the world" (The Gaze 105).14 The
question of the origin of literaturein Blanchot- which is also the question of
- harks back to Heidegger's analysis of the Nothing.
inspirationand infinity
Blanchot's idea of the origin of literatureas its own failure to originateposes
anotherquestion, of which Blanchot is himselfaware: "is thereever a work?"
{The Space 174).15 If the origin of writingis the search for thatorigin,writing
never really begins. Then it makes no sense to ask "What is literature?"given
that we do not even know whetherliteratureis. The same paradox operates in
Heidegger's investigationof the nature of the nothingin "What Is Metaphysics?" Heidegger writes:"Interrogating
the nothing- asking what and how it, the
nothing,is turnswhat is interrogatedinto its opposite. The question deprives
itselfof its own object" (98). Similarly,interrogatingliteratureturnsliterature
into its opposite, into somethingthat is accessible to the understanding,somethingthatis. Heidegger's warningthatthe nothingmustbe leftunthought,pure,
that it cannot be interrogatedwithoutbeing compromised, turnedinto a mere
something,cannot avoid the paradox that even to say that the nothingis unthinkableis already to thinkit as such, as unthinkable.Heidegger is certainly
aware of the insurmountableobstacle the nothing puts before thinking:"For
thinking,which is always essentially thinkingabout something,must act in a
way contraryto its own essence when it thinksof the nothing"(99). The only
way to get around thisobstacle is to regardit as a formal problemand ignore it.
Once "we do not let ourselves be misled by the formal impossibilityof the
question of the nothing,"we must accept that "it must be given beforehand"
(100). Reasoning retrospectively,
Heidegger concludes that if "[t]he nothingis
the complete negation of the totalityof beings," then this totalityof beings
"mustbe given in advance so as to be able to fall prey straightawayto negation"
24
(100). By the same logic, if literatureis its own failure to originate,the origin
mustbe given in advance so as to fall immediatelyto negation
The question of the nothingis the question of the origin,which, in turn,is
the question of inspiration.Inspirationis the unconcern for the destiny of the
work,forits law. The law says thatthe truthof the work mustbe pursued forits
own sake, since it does not come forthby itselfbut is revealed throughits concealment in the work: "The depth does not surrenderitselfface to face; it only
reveals itselfby concealing itselfin the work" (The Gaze 99). The artistis called
upon to respond to an impossible demand: he must search for the truthsince it
won't reveal itselfon its own but,at the same time,he mustlet the truthconceal
itself in the work. He must look for the truthof the work in order to miss it.
Moreover, he is not the one who can conceal it but merelylets it conceal itself.
No, not even that for thatwould mean that he had already found it and generously lets it slip back into self-concealment.Then, if he has no power over it, it
mustbe thatwhat conceals itselfdoes so absolutely independentlyof him and of
his search. But why is the law of the work in opposition to the call of inspiration? Why is inspirationa lack of concern forthe work? It is because inspiration
is an impulse toward unconcealment whereas the work is constitutedas concealment. It is not,however,thatthe formerconceals the latterbut,rather,inspiration presumes to unconceal concealment as such, thus compromising the
work. Orpheus's desire to bringEurydice back into the daylightis the desire to
bringconcealmentas such- Eurydice as the veil ratherthanas what is veiledinto the daylight. Inspirationand the work do not share the same object- although their formally similar operations of concealment and unconcealment
mightsuggest that- but, instead,inspirationhas the work's law as its object, an
object it triesto negate. The problemposed by Orpheus's gaze is how to negotiate the mutuallyexclusive demands of inspirationand the work.16But theyare
mutuallyexclusive only because of the assumption that they must be logically
connected in a causal relationshipbetween an origin and a subsequent development. It mightbe useful to thinkthe banal relationshipbetween origin and developmentin termsof the (perhaps equally banal) relationshipbetween subject
matterand medium. The artistdesires the object of his desire (subject matter)
but he can only speak/write/sing
about it. Strictlyspeaking, what he desires can
never be the object of his desire but merelythe object of a certain artisticmedium (language). Thus, language as desire is only a mediated version of a more
primarydesire which is not aestheticdesire. Blanchot acknowledges the artist's
power over the object of his desire only withinthe limitsof the song, but,at the
same time,withinthe song, the object is already lost: it has already been transformedfroman object of an originary,pre-linguisticdesire into the object of the
mediated aesthetic desire. Orpheus has power only over a surrogateobject of
desire or over the object of a surrogatedesire. He has power over the lost object
of desire, the power to mourn the lost object. Yet, it is precisely because the
25
object is lost thattherecan be a workto mournthe loss. In this sense, Orpheus's

transgressionis "a correctimpulse" (101). Blanchot falls into a circular argument:Orpheus cannot possess Eurydice and thatis why he mournsher loss and
thus engenders the work, and, on the other hand, there would not have been a
work had therenot been a loss. The artist'spowerlessness consists in his inability to possess the object of desire whereas his power consists in being able to
mourn the loss of the desired object. Perhaps this mourningconstitutesBlanchot's desired powerlessness as opposed to the violence of a language that
would be capable of possessing its object. However, how would Blanchot rec- to say "this woman" is to
oncile his belief that language is a formof murder
kill her- with his notion of the work as mourning?The paradox of the limitis
relevanthere. In "The NarrativeVoice" Blanchot argues thatlanguage as suchwhile it exists only of sentences,not yet makingup a recit- runs the risk of obthe limitas limitationof meaning since it tends to privilege
scuringor forgetting
the power of the language to un-limitthe limit. Supposedly, when such sentences are made partof a recit,both aspects of the limitare preserved:its power
to un-limitand its powerlessness to resistthe limitationof meaning.Language is
violent only on the level of sentences,on the level where no work is yet produced. Language becomes mourningin the work.Naming things,when it occurs
outside the work, is murder,which implies that,in this case, language actually
possesses the thing it names/kills,for otherwise why would it be considered
murder?Naming withinthe work is powerlessness, failure,the loss of the object. But is this a real loss or an imposture?How can one view the work as
mourningif the work is defined as a "neutralization"(The Gaze 134) of the
world? Neutralizationand mourningare mutuallyopposed insofaras neutralization implies power, mastery,ability to do withoutthe world, while mourning
implies pure powerlessness, failure.What was a loss, then,is not really a loss
since it becomes the main- and perhaps only- justificationof the artisticact. It
- Orpheus's "infinitesojourn in death"
is a fortunateloss as it makes mourning
(101) or the work possible.
In a sense, this mourningis voluntary.The artistpretendsto mourn(to lose
Eurydice) so as betterto kill her. He chooses the absent object so as to kill it
once again, to make it even more absent, which is achieved by revealing it as
absence, disclosing its concealment. Mourning (writing) merely repeats the
original death: in mourning,as in the other night,death appears as such. The
work's need of self-justification
becomes obvious in Blanchot's language when
he explains why the work does notjudge Orpheus's transgression:"And everythinghappens as if,by disobeyingthe law, by looking at Eurydice Orpheus was
only yieldingto the profounddemands of the work,as though,throughthis inspiredgesture,he really had carriedthedark shade out of Hell, as thoughhe had
unknowinglybroughtit back into the broad daylightof the work" (101; italics
added). Everythingtakes place as if Orpheus's desire for the impossible object
26
were in factnecessaryforthereto be a song at all. Althoughthis ties in withthe

precedingdiscussion of the circularityof Blanchos argumentabout the artistic
act as a formof ritualizedmourning,the as /fandas thoughseem to undermine
the absolute necessity of the loss or of the transgression,a necessity- hence,
- this statementtries to prove. Supposedly, the statementsuggests
authenticity
that Orpheus's transgressivedesire to render concealment visible is necessary
forthereto be a work at all, i.e., forthereto be concealment. But Orpheus's error conceals a double gesture.His failure to make concealment visible exposes
concealment:the failuremakes it visible thatconcealment cannot be made visible. Concealment is unconcealed, thoughin an indirectway, throughOrpheus's
veryfailureto unconceal it. Blanchot cannot step out of the optical realm, which
is also the realm of tautologies. He cannot avoid the paradox that the fact that
concealmentcannot be revealed signifiesor reveals thatconcealment cannot be
made visible. Yet a curious reversal now takes place: whereas before it seemed
thattheas ifunderminedthe absolute necessityof Orpheus's error,now it seems
thatthe as if underminesthe idea thatconcealment is made visible precisely in
the movementwhich insists on the impossibilityof making it visible (unfortunately,though not surprisingly,a typical Blanchotian circularityaffectslike a
virus the presentanalysis). If this is the case, we would have to say that Orpheus's gaze only seems necessary for the revelation of the impossibilityof
making concealment visible, whereas, in fact, the essence of concealment remains concealed at all times, never becoming the object of Orpheus's gaze,
never revealing its own resistenceto unconcealment.But this would renderOrpheus's gaze absolutely superfluous,which would, in turn,run counterto Blanchos argumentthatwithoutthe gaze thereis no work. So, whicheverof the two
we choose, Orpheus's gaze will always appear somewhat suspect
interpretations
as a justificationof the work's existence.17
If the workof art,forBlanchot, cannot disguise itselfas mourningbut is, as
we have suggested, a second murder,the work of art in Heidegger's account
appears somewhat simpler.It is suffusedwith the work of truthand with a certain kind of materiality.Its truthis intimate,warm, almost cozy like the earth.
Whatevernegative aspects it has, theyconcern it only formally:truthis unconcealment,which,forHeidegger, is a refusal,but a refusalthatmakes affirmation
possible, a refusal that is the very luminosityof being. There is no mourning
since, if the origin of the work is art and if art is the unconcealment of truth,
therecan be no loss. Moreover, dissimulation,illusion, and appearance are subsumed under truthand treatedas manifestationsof the nature of truthas untruth,i.e., as merely temporarydelays in unconcealment,delays which are, in
fact,welcome since theysuggest thattherewill be more to be unconcealed, that
- or
truthwill never be exhausted: a great Promise. Because of this, mourning
even the pretenseof mourning is impossible. What is concealed what would
- will be unconcealed because this is the nabe a potentialcause for mourning
27
tureof Heideggerian truth.Heidegger's metaphysicsand aestheticsare oriented

toward a brightfuturepromisingnew unconcealments,an inexhaustiblereservoir of truth.
Justas Heidegger has to ignore the formalimpossibilityof the question of
the nothing,Blanchos writingreveals the question of Orpheus's gaze as a
metaphordramatizingthe formalimpossibilityof the question of the origin of
literature.Heidegger does admit the formal impossibilityof situatingthe unthinkablebefore thoughtjust as Blanchot has to admit thatthe failureof literatureto originatecannot precede a certainorigin or the thoughtof a certainorigin. This thoughtalready compromises the "failure" so thatthe failureitselfbecomes an equally valid origin.Literaturelacks origin,but not in the usual sense
of lack, which presupposes the opposite alternativeof having an origin, but
ratherin the sense in which time's absence is not "a purelynegativemode," but
"a time withoutnegation"(The Space 30). In his desire to escape the strongpull
of dialectic,to disallow the thoughtof the originas lacking,Blanchot makes that
lack itselfindependentof what it lacks (of its object) and thusturnslack into an
origin itself.The impossibilityof an origin becomes the originjust as "the impossibilityof makingany presence real" is itself"an impossibilitywhich is present" (31; italics added).
It mightseem thatHeidegger is privilegingthe totalityof being over its negation in the nothingbut his positing of the totalityof beings as given beforehand is only the result of logic, an effectof "the formal impossibilityof the
question of the nothing"(100). He insiststhatthe nothingprecedes any kind of
formallogic: "We assert thatthe nothingis more originalthanthe 'not' and negation" (99). On the otherhand, to reach the conclusion thatthe nothingis not
an operationof the intellect,thinking(negation) was required.We deny thatthe
nothingobeys the logic of the intellect,yet the denial depends on thisverylogic.
Heidegger himselfsuggests that the nothingis possible only as an imaginary
nothingor "a formalconcept," at which we arrivethrougha negationof our idea
of a totalityof beings, which suggests thatthe nothingis not more originarythan
the totalityof beings: "But the nothingis nothing,and if the nothingrepresents
no distinctioncan obtain between the imaginedand the
totalindistinguishability,
And
the
'genuine' nothingitself- isn't this the camouflaged
'genuine' nothing.
but absurd concept of a nothingthat is?" (101). The nothingis imaginarybut
thisin no way compromisesit since to say thatthereis a "genuine" nothingis to
sacrifice the nothingto our habitual way of thinking(perhaps our only way of
thinking)in termsof being and non-being.In the same way, Blanchot can deny
the idea of the originof literatureonly throughthe idea of the origin.In orderto
argue that literatureis a response to the infinite,to what cannot be exhausted
(The Gaze 101), Blanchot has to posit the infiniteand thus make it into a limit,
giving it a certaindegree of definitiveness.For the habitual notionof the origin
as somethingstationary,stable, and singular,Blanchot substitutesthe notion of
28
infinity,which,thoughit seems to be a negationof origin,is merelya metaphor

substitutedfor it. Blanchot can thinkthatthis changes our understandingof lit- infinityas signieratureonly because he conflates the meaning of "infinity"
the
and
limitlessness
with
of
function the notion of infyinginexhaustibility
finityas it is used in his system,where infinityhas a strictlydeterminedrole not
really differentfromthe role of the origin in the systemof thinkingBlanchot is
tryingto overturn.To claim thatthe origin of literaturecannot be named- be- does not mean thatit cannot be named qua origin,i.e., as
cause it is infinity
thatwhich plays the role of origin. But just as in the case of Heidegger's nothing, the fact thatall we can have is a "formalconcept" of it does not make this
nothing,as it were, "inauthentic,"so in the case of Blanchot's infinityas origin,
- i.e., we can only talk about an
the fact thatwe can only point to its function
we
not
mean
that
does
cannot
consider it as the "formalconimaginaryorigin
of
and
Blanchot's
Both
discourses originatein a hycept"
origin.
Heidegger's
pothesis,the hypothesisthatthe formalimpossibilityof the centralquestions in
- can
theirdiscourses- the question of the nothingand the question of literature
be bypassed, perhapspreciselybecause it is a formalimpossibility,i.e., a logical
one, whereas neitherbeing nor literatureare subject to any kind of formallogic
since theyare both transcendent.
In both discourses, the question of the origin is always connected to the
question of essence, thoughit is developed in significantlydifferentways. Paul
de Man mighthave been talkingabout Blanchot's notion of the origin-essence
relationshipwhen he examines the work of Ludwig Binswanger on the "pathological" natureof the poetic personality.De Man notes thatforBinswanger "the
thematiccontentof a workof artmustreveal the stateof consciousness to which
the author has been broughtby the very act of inventingthe work" (Blindness
47). This remarkshould be situatedin the contextof de Man's general critique
of a certainarrogance in the deconstructiveapproach to the work of art, a critique especially poignantin de Man's reading of Derrida's reading of Rousseau.
What is intriguing,however, is that Blanchot may be guilty of Binswanger's
error.By arguingthatthe artistcannot but betraythe call of inspirationand thus,
by opposing inspirationto the work,Blanchot suggests thatthe work exists only
as a sacrifice of an originary,authentic(because imprudent)impulse, i.e., the
work becomes a kind of false consciousness fromthe point of view of inspiration, a fall fromauthenticity.Blanchot creates an irreversiblesplit between the
originof literature(inspirationas transgression)and the work's essence, a split
underscoredby Blanchot's idiom of the as if (The Gaze 101). On one hand, the
as if connectinginspirationto the work can be interpretedto mean thatinspiration (the transgressionof the work's law) is not, in fact,obeying the work's law
but is instead really transgressiveand only appears to be the artist'sresponse to
the work's demand. On the otherhand, however, the as if can be interpretedto
mean that inspirationactually serves, though indirectlyor discreetly,the needs
2
of the work,and howevertransgressiveit may appear, it is actually necessaryfor

thereto be a work at all. Its transgressivenesswould be revealed as purposeful,
lawful,obeying the law of the work,and in factconstitutiveof thatlaw (by the
same logic as thatof the supplement).The firstinterpretation
is what creates the
split mentionedabove. Orpheus's gaze- the origin of the work or inspiration
is associated with the inessential: "under [Orpheus's] gaze, the essence of the
nightreveals itself to be inessential" {The Gaze 100). On the other hand, the
work is associated withessence, particularlyin the notion of the essential solitude of the work. The origin does not coincide with the essence of the work18
because the former,belonging to the realm of the inessential,is isolated from
being and truth.Thus, Blanchot problematizesHeidegger's major claim in "The
Origin of the Work of Art": "The origin of somethingis the source of its essence" (149).19 For Blanchot,theoriginof the work of art is not art,but the inessential,the inhuman,indeed what is not art at all (but not in the sense of that
which is not yet art,i.e., an unactualized potential).In the work of art,then,art
itselfis at stake.20(Lyotard develops this point at length in The Inhuman: Reflectionson Time.21)At the originof the work of art is the question "What is a
work of art?" In Heidegger, too, art is at the origin of the work but not in the
formof a question. Artis here already defined,a known entity:it is truthsetting
itself to work. The essence of art is already given in the origin, whereas for
Blanchot the essence is at stake in the veryoriginof the work of art. How is this
split between origin and essence manifestedin Blanchot's central metaphors
such as the metaphorof the other night?In each of these dichotomouspairs, the
termassociated withabsence (whetherit is the absence of place, fromwhich one
could be exiled or of a self thatcould be solitary)is thoughtas the originof the
otherterm,which is, in turn,associated with the plenitude of essence. Unconcealmentof concealment (the absence of self, place, etc.) precedes concealment
(self, place, etc.), compromisesit and compromisestruth,which appears now as
an exhausted reservoir,a finitething.
Blanchot's dichotomies- the firstnightand the other night,exile and exile
fromexile, solitude and essential solitude- echo Heidegger's ontic-ontological
differenceas manifested,forexample, in Heidegger's oppositions of "genuine"
or "profoundboredom" and ordinaryboredom (101) or fundamentalanxietyand
mere anxiousness (102). What distinguishesanxiety frommere anxiousness is
thatthe latteralways has a specific object; it is always anxiousness "for this or
that"(103). Blanchot's essential solitude is an elaborated versionof Heidegger's
anxiety,22both of which do not belong to or proceed from the subject: "We
'hover' in anxiety.. . . [W]e - men who are in being- in the midstof being slip
*
away fromourselves. At bottomthereforeit is not as though 'you' or feel ill
at ease; rather it is this way for some 'one'" (Heidegger 103; italics added).
Blanchot's theoryof literatureattributesto writinga statussimilarto thatwhich
Heidegger attributesto Dasein. The ground of the essence of Dasein is tran30
scendence: "Dasein is being held out into the nothing"(105). This "being held
out into the nothing"is what makes possible all relationships,including thatto
oneself, selfhood: "Without the original revelation of the nothing,no selfhood
and no freedom"(106). The transcendenceof Dasein holds it suspended in the
abyss between the originarylack of relation- what Blanchot calls "naked correlation" (The Sirens' Song 50) - and the possibilityof relations. Similarly, in
Blanchos theoryof literature,the possibilityof selfhood is locked precisely in
the deprivationof the subject of any relationto himselfor to the work. Writing
dispossesses the subject, holding it out into the nothing,and at the same time,
withoutthis dispossession, no self-possession would ever be possible, no subject. In dispossessing the subject, literaturebringsit back to what has made it a
subject in the firstplace. The loss of subjectivityis selfhood par excellence, the
self reduced to its immanence. Accordingly, in "Two Versions of the Imagi- and we can substitutehere
nary"Blanchot makes the point thatthe imaginary
as
the
work
of
the
"writing"
imaginaryand, therefore,as the dispossession of the
the
in
fact "seems to deliver us profoundlyto ourselves
subject by
imaginary
...
the
intimate"
is
[for]
(The Space 262; italics added).
image
The work's solitude is not an absolute isolation fromthe self but actually
delivers the self back to its pure immanence. The self is not negated but merely
purified.The notionof the work's essential solitude is similar to Georg Lukacs's
idea of the work as "a windowless monad." In Blindness and Insight Paul de
Man summarizes Lukacs's view, explaining that the monadic structureof the
work "is not due to the objective natureof the aesthetic entitybut ... to the
subjective intentthat stands at the outset of its elaboration," the intentof "the
constitutiveself to reduce itself to its own immanence" (42). Perhaps this accounts forBlanchos inabilityto do away with the notion of selfhood, a failure
de Man does not fail to notice. What he says about Poulet is equally applicable
to Blanchot. The central paradox in Blanchos writingabout the origin of literatureis thatit denies the subject access to the origin despite the fact thatlanguage itselfhas access to it if only to negate its possibility:"what is ... claimed
to be an originalways depends on the priorexistence of an entity[the work] that
lies beyond the reach of the self [and that 'for all its impersonalityand anonymity,still tends to be designated by metaphorsderived from selfhood'], though
not beyond the reach of a language that destroys the possibility of origin"
(Blindness 105). Justas withthe work of art,the self is defined as thatin which
the self is at stake. In all these cases, the essence of a "thing" is precisely the
puttingintoquestion of essence, and, forBlanchot, what puts essence into question is the origin.However, this puttingessence into question is not a mere negationof essence.
Heidegger insists on a distinctionbetween "mere negation" and a more
originary"not" (108). Mere negation is a kind of "nihilative behavior" (108),
which is merelya symbol of the originarynothing:"The saturationof existence
31
by nihilative behavior testifies to the constant though doubtlessly obscured

manifestationof the nothingthat only anxiety originallyreveals" (108). Blanchot's distinctionsbetween the two types of exile, silence, and solitude have to
be put to a Heideggerian test in order to determinewhethertheyare manifestations of a mere negationor of an originarynot. The loaded termin each of Blanchos pairs has the othertermof the pair for its object. Thus, all loaded terms
constitutea separate language, which is meant to say somethingabout the other
group of terms,somethingwhich cannot be said in the idiom of the otherterms.
This is not reason enough for Blanchot to stop with the metaphorof the other
night.In "Wittgenstein'sProblem," he himselfadmits thattherecannot be one
final,absolutelyotherlanguage but thatthereis always an infiniteseries of languages forsaying what cannot be said in a particularlanguage: "the Otherof all
speech is never anythingbut the Other of a given speech or else the infinite
movementthroughwhich one mode of expression . . . forgetsitself,exalts itself,
challenges itself or obliteratesitself in some other mode" (The Gaze 130-31).
There cannot be one wber-language,which would not need anotherlanguage to
contextualize it. Obviously, Blanchos series of dichotomies are based on this
logic. The question is this: why does Blanchot stop withthe notion of the other
night(the other solitude,etc.)? Is he justified in suggestingthatthe other night
does not need an otherother nightas a framework?Radicalization of difference
requires an essential similarityto be given in advance. The incommensurability
between the level of world and work is possible preciselybecause of what, allegedly,is presentin one (world) but not in the other(work)- the subject.
Speaking about the dispossession of the subject, Blanchot cannot but speak
in metaphorsof selfhood, thus undermininghis own argument.The shadow of
the subject remains even at the level of essential solitude and it has to remain
because the subject's absence can be signifiedonly throughthe presence of absence. Blanchot turnsthe work into a kind of monstrous,tyrannicalpresence (or
ratherabsence, since Blanchot revels in negativityand findsit hard to writeat
least one somewhataffirmativesentence) which sucks into it both the reader and
the writer.The writercannot read his own work,but if the reader has the same
status as the writer(the writerdoes not occupy a privilegedposition in relation
to the reader), then is therea reader for the work? Blanchot gets himself into
as a resultof his "radical" claims: the writeris "dismissed"
self-contradictions
(The Space 21) by the work but,at the same time,he "belongs to the solitude of
that which expresses nothingbut the word being" (22). Thus, he belongs most
trulyto the essence of the work precisely in his dismissal fromit. To use Blanchos terminology,the writeris dismissed fromdismissal. He is rejected on one
level but happily welcomed and affirmedon another,even more essential level.
Although Blanchot wishes to establish the work's solitude as somethingabsolutelyforeignto the notionof selfhood,he can only reinstatethe rejected self.23
Thus, the solitude of the work is defined as "the absence of any definingcrite32
ria" (22) or as infinity,

but this infinityis "just the mind's infiniteness"(22). Or
else, "work" becomes interchangeablewith "writer"since both belong to being.
The dismissal of the self is not its destructionbut the overcoming of the forgetfulnessof being in the self. The writeris dismissed to salvage the being of the
writer:the act of "rightingthe wrong," of rehabilitatingthe forgottenbeing, is
attainedat the expense of alienating being fromthe subject and thus repeating
the gesturethatwas supposed to be exposed. But even this rehabilitationis suspect since the work does not say being but only the word being (22). Blanchos
painstakingeffortsto distinguishbetween two types of solitude are unjustified.
De Man observes that"it follows fromthe rhetoricalnatureof language thatthe
cognitive functionresides in the language and not in the subject" (Blindness
137). In the context of this already overfamiliarpoint, Blanchos distinction
becomes superfluous.Blanchot startsfromthe nave assumptionthatthe difference between the two types of solitude must be proved, whereas, in fact, the
rhetoricalnatureof language, having already evacuated the subject, allows only
for one solitude, what Blanchot calls "essential solitude." Blanchos notion of
the dispossessed subject mightturnout to be just an act of bad faith,a fear to
admit thatthe self is irrevocablydivided, a reluctance to see poetic consciousness as "an essentiallydivided, sorrowful,and tragicconsciousness" (Blindness
- in order to
241). Afterall, it is easier to declare the loss of self in literature
it
at
least
literature
outside
than
to
a
face
divided
self.24
preserve
tragically
The worldlysolitude of the smug ego, the mere exile thatis not yet the absolute absence of place, the merelyessential firstnight- all of these presented
- are necessarypointers,withoutwhich it would be impossible to
as impostures
understandRimbaud's renunciationof poetryor Kafka's exile fromexile. The
question is this: is the impostureoutside these distinctionsor withinthem? Are
Rimbaud's renunciationof poetryand Kafka's exile fromexile impostures,examples of mere "nihilativebehavior," or originary,ontological acts? If the work
is an originaryact, if it has Dasein' s transcendence,if its essence is the originas
the unconcealmentof truth(according to Heidegger), is it possible for the subject to renounce the work? For Blanchot this is possible because the origindoes
not coincide withthe essence of the work,and so, to renouncethe work is not to
renounce essence. But is it not arrogantto claim that he who has no mastery
over the workand can never attainthe work can neverthelessturnaway fromit?
Blanchot asserts thatmastery"consists in the power to stop writing"(The Space
25), thusgrantingthe subject power over the work. It mightbe objected thatto
stop writinginvolves only the book, not the work. However, Blanchos analysis
of Rimbaud's gestureinsiststhatthe empirical negation (stopping writing)con- not the book. If the
cerns the work- which is, supposedly, transcendental
workdispossesses the self,if in the essential solitude of the work,the "I" cannot
finditself,thenthe renunciationof the work would announce the restorationof
the "I," its coming into self-possession again. Death would then become possi33
ble (it was impossible in the work), which means thatdeath would belong to the
- an act of negation- would restorethe possisubject (25). Thus, renunciation
bilityof the / to die. But since it is the subject who consciously renounces the
work,it appears thatthe subject precedes negation,i.e., it is a question of a mere
nihilativebehavior, not an essential not. It is a question of negation as an intellectual faculty,not as an originaryground (such as Heidegger's nothing).Anotherproof of the merely nihilativenatureof Rimbaud's gesture25is found in
Blanchos idea of the relationshipof silence to writing.In writing,the writer
who writessilences that,which precedes language in order to draw attentionto
it. But thereis anothertype of silence- thatof the writerwho stops writingand
thissilence Blanchot calls "the source of [the writer's]mastery"(The Space 27).
But if writing,as silencing,bears witness to being by expressing the forgetfulness of being, then the decision to stop writingis not masterybut a betrayal,a
of forgetfulness.26
forgetfulness
Blanchos distinctionsbetween the ontic and the ontological rely precisely
on the claim thatthe other in each of his pairs of oppositions (or rathersupplements)is a scandal of negation,a trulytranscendentalnegation,a special kind of
power thatonly Rimbaud's renunciationpossesses, a special kind of doom that
is proper only to Kafka's exile. Thus, the sheer impossibilityof bypassing the
- shattersthe poles of
notion of self- a linguisticand ontological impossibility
Blanchos metaphorical system. Blanchos other terms (which are always
meant to reveal somethingabout the origin) are merelya "nihilativebehavior"
namely because in Blanchos aesthetic the origin is not identical with the essence of the workand, therefore,renunciationor exile do not- cannot- concern
theessence of the work.
In his analysis of the originof the work of art,Heidegger constructsa hermeneuticcircle: the originof the work of art is art but art is itselfan origin,the
originor the unconcealedness of truth.Both the artistand the work are preceded
by somethingmore originarythan eitherof them: art (Heidegger 149). By the
time Heidegger reaches a sort of definitionof art, he has already fallen into a
series of inconsistenciesand self-contradictions.
First,he triesto distinguishthe
work as a being from what he calls "mere things." A mere thing "designates
whateveris not simply nothing"(152): a mere thingis ratherthan not. (Curiously enough, thisis Lyotard's definitionof the sublime object- which is hardly
a "mere thing"forhim- in The Inhuman.) The work,by contrast,has "the mode
of being of a work," not "the mode of being of a thing" (152). In "What Is
Metaphysics?" Heidegger had argued thatthe basic question of metaphysicsis
the question of the nothing:"Why are there beings at all, and why not rather
nothing?"(112). Are we to assume, then, that- since the work is not a mere
thingand we cannot say of the workthatit is ratherthannot- the work of artis
not the province of metaphysicssince it does not pose the question of the nothing? Is artoutside metaphysics?No, because in "The Originof the Work of Art"
34
Heideggercomes back to thispointand in factaffirmsthatthe creatednessof the

work,which,unlike Blanchot, he does not deny, consists exactly in this "somethingis ratherthannot": "a work is at all ratherthanis not" (182). He goes on to
distinguishit from a mere thing by arguing that the quod of the work differs
fromthatof mere things in that the quod of the latterhas fallen into oblivion
whereas the work of artbringsit forthand preservesit. What makes the work of
is thatthe more stronglyit emphasizes its own event character,
artextraordinary
- and eventually impossible- it is for us to establish a relathe more difficult
tionshipto it, "the more strangeand solitarythe work becomes" (183). A curious paradox: the more the work bears witnessto being by bringingit forthfrom
its oblivion, the more it makes presence present,the less able are we to relate to
it. The more it is, the less it is for us. Lyotard will develop this line of thought
intothe claim thatthe work of art makes man present,but in Heidegger thereis
yet no trace of such a bridge between the being of the work- the rehabilitation
of its forgottenbeing- and man's own being/presence.The work is a mere thing
in thatit is ratherthan not,but it is also more thana mere thingin thatthe quod
is not forgottenin it and in thatwe cannot access the work. The paradox in this
formulationis obvious: how can the Being of a being be forgottenif the subject
has no access to thatBeing in the work: "the artistremains inconsequential as
compared with the work, almost like a passage way that destroysitself in the
creativeprocess"? (167). If artis the settingto work of truthor the unconcealedness of Being, the coming forthof the origin,if this is an event in the course of
which the artistdestroyshimself,we must situate the time of forgetfulnessof
Being beforethe work and thus also beforethe artist.But then whose forgetfulness is it? It cannot be the artist'ssince he belongs to a "later" time,thatof conservationand rehabilitationof Being. Heidegger wishes to talk about concealedness and unconcealedness as such, apart from a subject, but is bound to fall
back,just like Blanchot, into anthropologicalmetaphors.
Blanchos distinctionbetween book and work is a rewritingof Heidegger's
distinctionbetween "mere thing" and "work," with the same pejorative connotationsof "mere thing"now applied to "book." For Heidegger, the thinglycharacterof a work is always guaranteedwhereas its worklycharactercan be threatened and even destroyed,as, for instance,by the art industry(168). Heidegger
writes: "the most immediate realityof the work, its thinglysubstructure,does
not belong to the work" (165), and "[a]s soon as we look forsuch a thinglysubstructurein the work, we have unwittinglytaken the work as equipment, to
which we thenalso ascribe a superstructure
supposed to contain its artisticqualin
Blanchos
(165-66).
Similarly,
interpretationof Rimbaud's gesture of
ity"
renunciation,the work is not merely an aesthetic object but encompasses the
artist's entire life: "what Rimbaud asks of poetry: not to produce beautiful
works,or to answer to an aesthetic ideal, but to help man ... to be more than
himself... to make literaturean experience thatconcerns the whole of life and
35
the whole of being" (The Work of Fire 154-55).27 Heidegger's argumentthat

"the road toward the determinationof the thinglyrealityof the work leads not
fromthingto workbut fromwork to thing"(166) is reflectedin Blanchos idea
thatthe artistaims at the work but writesonly a book as well as in the notionof
the workas a road towardinspirationratherthanthe inspirationas a road toward
the work (The Space 186). For Heidegger, the work is not merely an object to
which aestheticvalues are predicated,nor is it a piece of equipment(created and
useful) but is the very happening of truth.The work says being: "Poetry is the
saying of the unconcealedness of beings" (185). By contrast,Blanchos work
says only "the word being" (The Space 22). To write is to silence the "giant
murmuringupon which language opens" (27). To give voice to that originary
silence which is being, one must silence it. Justas to communicate one's solitude is to compromise it, so to say being one must make it into what it is not.
Being is thatwhich makes silence possible. The only way to say being- which
is before silence- is to silence it.28The act of writingis an act of concealment
which aims at the unconcealmentof being. Writingcannot really say being, but
it can, throughconcealing being, unconceal the forgetfulness
of being, the being
"which language shelters by concealing it" (22). For Blanchot, literaturecan
only say thatbeing is- the word being- i.e., thatbeing is concealed, but it cannot unconceal it. Heidegger's view of art as the work of truthis clearly more
optimistic.Blanchot, on the other hand, wishes to separate the work fromany
acsort of relation.His list of "enemies" is long and includes: history,truth,29
tion, self, time,reason, even language. The work is a sort of death: where the
work is, I am not,and vice versa. Where the work is, language is not,forit "disappears intothe silentvoid of the work" (22). The presence of language signifies
merelythe presence of the book. Levinas captures the bleakness of Balnchot's
vision when compared withHeidegger's: "The Neuter of Blanchot is foreignto
the world- witha strangenessbeyond all strangeness.. . . Completely different
fromthe being (sein)- itselfalso anonymous- of Heidegger, which ... is the
very luminosityof the world, the place, the landscape, and peace" (55-56). In
thecontextof whatJabes writesin The LittleBook of UnsuspectedSubversion"What we don't see is what allows us to see" (61) - Blanchos belief thatwhat
we cannot cease seeing is the invisible implies that we are deprived of that,
which makes vision possible, deprived of the possibilityof concealment,which
- possible. If concealment itself is made
is what makes unconcealment- truth
visible, we do notreally see, because vision demands depth.Blanchos aesthetic
hollows out any notionof depth with the unconcealmentof concealment in Orpheus's gaze.
However, the work is not identical with or exhausted by language. Since
language belongs to the thing or the book, it is only one aspect of the work:
Rimbaud's renunciationis not just the renunciationof language but more than
that.In contrast,Heidegger sees language as truthsettingitselfto work: "All art
36
... is as such, in essence, poetry"(184). Language is identifiedwith the work,

and "the linguisticwork,poetryin the narrowersense, has a privilegedposition
in the domain of the arts" (185). Language is not a thinglything,is not a material thatis used, and used up, in the artisticact. The work of art "does not cause
the material to disappear, but rathercauses it to come forthfor the very first
time" (171). Heidegger wants to preventthe work fromdoing violence to itself
by disparaging itselfas mere use of its material,and thus disparaging language
as well by treatingit merely as material: "[n]owhere in the work is there any
trace of a work-material"(172). Heidegger is optimistic:forhim the great work
of art is capable of inventingits material. Literaturefor Heidegger is a sort of
auto-affection:literaturewonders at itself,language wonders at its own possibility.Althoughinherentin this wonder is the threatof impossibility,Heidegger
seems to emphasize the possibility. In contrast,Blanchot stresses the threatof
impossibility,the fragilityof the work's existence. Despite this difference,however, Heidegger and Blanchot think of possibility and impossibility,respectively,in a strikinglysimilarway, as an essentiallymoral law. Blanchos idea of
the work as that which "requires no attentionbe paid to it" (The Sirens* Song
47), which "possesses him [the artist]entirelyand rejects him entirely,requires
of him more thanit is possible forany moral code to requireof any man, and yet
does not compel him in any way" (49), recalls Heidegger's argumentin "What
is that we are still not thinking"
Calls for Thinking": "Most thought-provoking
to the extent that "[everything thought-provoking
gives us to think" (346).30
for
what
is
most
is
that
which does not demand
Blanchot
Similarly,
demanding
from
does
not
call
us.
us,
anything
upon
Heidegger's understandingof the origin of the work of art must be situated
withinthe context of his metaphysics,in which being, essence, and truthare
always double gesturesof concealment and unconcealment.His notion of truth
as un-truth
restson the double gestureof concealment as a refusaland a dissembling (176). The origin is both a limit and an openness of a possibility: "Concealment as refusal is not simply and only the limit of knowledge in any given
circumstance,but the beginningof the lightingof what is lighted. But concealment,thoughof anothersort . . . also occurs withinwhat is lighted. . . . Here
concealment is not simple refusal.Rather,a being appears, but it presentsitself
as other than it is" (175-76). The limit of the work is already contained in its
origin,and this limitis exactly its possibility,its coming forthinto the lighting.
It may appear thatHeidegger's notion of truthis not really a radical departure
from classical metaphysics,especially given the conventional terminologyof
truthand un-truth.The idea of truthas unconcealment,the idea that "denial in
the mannerof concealmentbelongs to unconcealedness as lighting"(176) is not
particularlyoriginal or challenging. What is radically new in Heidegger is the
second movement within truthas unconcealment, that of dissembling. Error,
illusion,or appearance are not situatedoutside truthbut withinit: "Truthoccurs
37
precisely as itself in that the concealing denial, as refusal,provides the steady

provenance of all lighting,and yet,as dissembling,metes out to all lightingthe
indefeasibleseverityof error"(177). Dissembling belongs to truth,but it is not
and this un-truthitselfis not falsehood (176).
thatwhich makes truthun-truth,
Truthis un-truthin the sense thatit is never fullyand finallyunconcealed. The
refusal as both the limit and the possibility of lightingdeterminestruthas uninsofaras therebelongs to it the reservoirof the not-yettruth:"truthis un-truth
revealed, the un-covered,in the sense of concealment" (180). This should not be
understoodin the negative sense- somethingis not yet unconcealed- but in the
positive sense of a possible future,an openness (hence the word "reservoir"),an
infinitepossibilityfortruthto set itselfto work. Because Heidegger incorporates
dissemblinginto truth,forhim therecan be nothingelse but truth.All thingsare
concealed (and thus unconcealed since concealment as refusal is the very lighting into which the Being of beings comes forth),and although some may be
(un)concealed as othersthan theyare, theystill are (true). Impostureor appear- of all thingsto be
- to put it bluntly
ance is merelya resultof the impossibility
unconcealed to exactly the same degree and at the same time. Heidegger decisively warns against the conflationof truthas un-truthwith the idea of truthas
inherentlyfalse or of truthas containingits dialectical opposite (176).
Blanchot, on the other hand, is not so clear in the distinctionshe makes
between his nebulous key terms.Blanchot's discourse obeys a certaineconomy
of thinking,the economy of giftand sacrifice,limitand limitlessness.It is as if
he cannot tolerate vacancy but must always move fromemptiness to fullness,
balancing out his series of extremetermsso that,in the finalanalysis, even what
appear to be mutuallyexclusive ideas or statementsare happily reconciled. The
paradox of Blanchos writingis precisely this: a purely metaphorical,highly
personalized formof writingand thinkingconstitutesan extremelyelaborate and
well regulatedsystem,which functionsin accordance withone basic law, thatof
substitution.Blanchos key termsare constructedthroughalternativesubstitution of possibilitywith impossibilityand vice versa.31He defines the valorized
termin each pair as the other of the otherterm.Since this would make it very
easy forus to argue thatanythingwhich is not solitude could be called the other
of solitude,we mustassume a certainintimateconnectionbetween the opposing
terms.The absolutelyotherin everypair of termsis the particularabsence of the
mostcharacteristicfeatureof thebasic (first)term.The solitarysubject is not yet
solitarysince he can still referto himselfas an "I." The firstnightis not yet the
real nightsince it does not reveal the impossibilityof death. Exile is not yet real
exile since it is still a place. In each case, the loaded term- toward which Blanchot is biased- is defined as the absence of the condition of possibilityof the
basic term:essential solitude is the absence of a subject, which,however,is exactly what determinesthe essence of solitude; the other nightis the absence of
death; Kafka's exile is the absence of place fromwhich one can be exiled. The
38
other,in each case, is not merelythe intensificationof the basic termbut its absolute impossibility.
- are determined,in Blanchot, throughnegation. Is this
Essence- and truth
- the same as Heidegger's concealment as
essence
as
negation
impossibility
refusal?Not quite. Heidegger's concealment as refusal is an openness; it is necessary forpossibilityto emergeas such. Blanchos impossibility,however,does
not open up space.32 It is not clear if it is an ontological one or merelya failure
of the subject. The latterseems more likely since all of Blanchos writingon the
subject of literatureproceeds fromthe assumption thatthe origin of things- of
art- must be searched for, that it will not reveal itself. Orpheus's gaze as a
metaphorforthe artisticact turnson this assumptionas well: the work is sacrificed in the search for the origin. For Heidegger, on the otherhand, truthis not
cast as a search for truth.Rather,truthhas always already exposed us to the
lightingso thateven if we decide to search for the origin of the work, as Heidegger does, the search is protectedand its success guaranteed by the unconcealedness of things: "With all our correct representationswe would get nowhere . . . unless the unconcealedness of beings has already exposed us to,
placed us in that lighted realm in which every being stands for us and from
which it withdraws"(174; italics added).
The book belongs to the firstnight,the work to the other night.The book's
connectionto the artistis an intimateone. The book is the night,into which the
artistexiles himselffromthe world. The book is a nightsince in it the world has
disappeared. In the work, the disappearance of the world appears. The work is
the impossibilityof the world ever disappearingabsolutely,the impossibilityof
concealment to remain invisible. The night- death- appears exactly in the disappearance of the world. In the work, death is, and thereforeit is never, "dead
enough" (163). For Heidegger the possibilityof somethingis a functionof an
originaryconcealment,a refusal which is also a coming forthinto the lighting.
For Blanchot, however, everythingseems already unconcealed, including concealment itself.There is no originaryrefusal as reservoirof truthas un-truth;
instead, "the invisible is what one cannot cease to see" {The Space 163). The
visible and the invisible collapse into each other. The work, in Heidegger, is
solitarybut it is not completely dissociated fromthe subject: "The attemptto
definethe work-beingof the work purelyin termsof the work itselfproves to be
unfeasible"(179). AlthoughHeidegger distinguishesbetween techneas "a mode
of knowing"(180) and the mere act of making,he still keeps the notionof a self.
He suggests a kind of progressionof the solitude of the work where "[t]he more
solitarythe work . . . and the more cleanly it seems to cut all ties to human beings, the more simply does the thrustcome into the open thatsuch a work is"
- consists in the won(183). The privilegedstatusof art- of poetryin particular
der art provokes at its sheer being. However, thereseems to be, in this progression of increasingdegrees of solitude, a point beyond which the wonder at the
39
work's quod is no longer possible. Heidegger never reaches thatpoint since for
him the possibility of the work is at least as much as its impossibility.But
should the impossibility start outweighing the possibility, the work can no
longer be defined in terms of privation. This is what happens in Blanchos
writing.His other nightcarries to the extremethe Heideggerian solitude of the
work,to the point where the work becomes so absolutely other,so solitarythat
the idea of a reservoirof truthcan no longer be sustained.The othernightis the
as a marginof posimpossibilityof concealment,and thus,of truthas un-truth,
sibility,as a remainder,a possible future.For Blanchot, everythingis already
given, out in the open, unconcealed. The othernight,althoughit seems to be an
ontological depth,is in fact the flatteningout of depth. Blanchot deprives himself of the Heideggerianconcealmentas the conditionof possibilityof truthand,
thus,of art. If thereis no originarylimitor horizon (Heidegger's refusal), there
is no guarantee that there is something asking, calling, waiting to be unconcealed. Blanchot cannot define the work of art- like Heidegger and like Lyotard- in termsof privation,as pure wonder,as the rememberingof Being, since
being can be rememberedonly fromthe point of view of an originaryconcealment, which, however, is lacking in Blanchot. If everythingis already given,
nothingcould have been forgottenor, if somethinghas indeed been forgotten,
this forgetfulness
has itselffallen into oblivion: "this othernightis ... the forgetfulnesswhich gets forgotten"(The Space 164). The othernight,as the impossibilityof concealment, is also the impossibilityof origin. Blanchos bias toward the other nightmakes the impossibilityof the work greaterthan its possibilityand thus cannot allow the Heideggerian optimisticdefinitionof the work
as therememberingof Being. Blanchot's /if
m nightis a corollaryof Heidegger's
truthto the extentthatthe firstnightis negationas pouvoir in the same sense, in
which Heidegger's originaryrefusalor concealment is actually a reservoir.The
firstnightstillobeys the day's laws; it is a productivenegation,one thatleaves a
meaningfulremainder,one still "permeated with humanity"(The Space 165).
The firstnightis the possibilityof death, death servingas an appropriatebackground,against which the day shines even brighter.This nightrepeats Heidegger's movementof unconcealedness as the origin of truth:"In the firstnightit
seems that we will go- by going furtherahead- toward somethingessential"
(168). The other night,however,does not have any parallels in Heidegger. It is
almost as if Heidegger's metaphysicsis too positivisticto even allow forsuch an
absolute and inexpressible negativityas is found in Blanchos notion of the
othernight.
While both Heidegger and Blanchot startfromthe common necessityto ignore the formal impossibility of the central questions of their metaphysBlanchot takes the question of literaturenot only beyond the point
ics/aesthetics,
of its independencefromformallogic, but beyond the realm of ontology itself,
implyingthatthe question of the originof literatureis even more originarythan
40
- thequestionof thenothHeidegger'squestion(thequestionof metaphysics)

in what
However,Blanchotfailsto presentthisradicalclaimconvincingly
ing.33
can be consideredhiscentralessay on theoriginof theworkof art,Orpheus's
fortheoriginof thework
Gaze," in whichthemythof Orpheus,as a metaphor
a strongcase fora pre-ontological,
of art,does notconstitute
trans-metaphysical
existsas thesilencingof its origin.What
notionof theworkof art.Literature
is whatprecedesits essence,and thatis theorigin,not,as
precedesliterature
Blanchotwouldhave us believe,something
beforetheorigin,beforethequod,
the
Because
of
between
theoriginand theessenceof the
beforeontology.
split
- Blanchot's meta- thesplitbetweenthequod and thequid of thework
work
the
cannot
have
an
for
other
but are gesturesof
originarysignificance
phors
"merenegation,"34
in Heidegger'sterms,whichdo notconcerntheessence of
difference.
theworkofartbutaremereperversions
oftheontic-ontological
Notes
]See Paul de Man's Blindnessand Insight:Essays in theRhetoricof ConCriticism.
temporary
"a metaphorical
"SarahLa wall also notesBlanchot's peculiarmethodology,
or allusiveapproach[which]. . . takesabstractexistentialnotionsand gives
thememotionalimpactas 'death,' 'absence,' or 'space.'" See "NegativeConsciousness"243.
3Thedistinction
betweenbook and workraisesa lotof questionsthatBlanbechotdoes notreallyanswer.If the writerknowsthatthereis a difference
tweenbook and work,on thebasis of whatcriteriadoes he judge thathe has
fallenshortof thework?Failurepresupposesknowledgeof thestandard(of the
and of whichone falls
work)afterwhichone is striving
supposedlyunattainable
fromtheworkas thesolitudeof thework?
short.Is theworkas an aimdifferent
If whatthewriter
affirms
"is deprivedof self (The Space 26), doesn'the thus
attaintheworkunintentionally?
Could it be thattheonlyreasonhe doesn'tarriveat theworkis thathe deceiveshimselfthathe's written
thebook?Perhapsit
- he doesn'tknowthathe is dispossessedbutpreis just a matter
of ignorance
ciselyin his ignorancehe has alreadyarrivedat thework,at solitude.Isn't the
does notknowof hisdispossession,
worksolitary
i.e., he
onlybecausethewriter
doesn'tknowthattheworkis solitary?
4See EmmanuelLevinas's"AboutBlanchot:An Interview"
54-57.
See EdmondJabes'sTheLittleBookof Unsuspected
Subversion.
Conversation.
See Blanchot'sTheInfinite
See Levinas56. Levinasnotesthat"one can't talkof an 'experienceof literature'"in Blanchot,"where,literally,forBlanchot,thereis no longeranything.Excepttheveryvoid of absence and theprolongedyawningof its gap-
41
becomesautomatically
suspectgiventhathiskeyterms
ing."Blanchoswriting
fashionablediscourseof nihilismand
too willinglyin thecurrently
participate
Blanchos view of
privation.On the otherhand,Bataille would characterize
of "innerexperience"insofaras "in experience,
literature
as a manifestation
ifnota meansand even,as muchas a means,an obstawhatis statedis nothing,
of wind,butthewind."See Georges
cle; whatcountsis no longerthestatement
Bataille'sInnerExperience13.
of Heidegger's,BlanJustas manyof Blanchos ideas are reworkings
chos writing
is "plagiarized'byJabesin thelatter'sThe LittleBook of UnsuspectedSubversion.Jabesrepeatsall of Blanchos key images,and sometimes
his languagedoes noteven makean effort
to disguisethedebt:"Nothingness,
oureternalplace of exile,theexileof Place" (17; italicsadded),"The writer's
despairis notthathe cannotwritea book, butthathe mustforeverpursuea
bookhe is notwriting"
(29; italicsadded),"Could we thenmaintainthatcertain
solitudesare pledgedto thenight,others,to theday" (31; italicsadded),"Solitudecannotbe utteredwithoutimmediately
ceasingto be" (32), "Solitudeof a
of
the
the
solitude
word
before
word,of thenightbeforenight"(34;
word,then,
italicsadded),"Thequestioncreates,theanswerkills"(37).
See TimothyClark'sDerrida,Heidegger,Blanchot:SourcesofDerrida's
voice
Notionand PracticeofLiterature
65. ClarktracesBlanchosimpersonal
nonback to the Romanticnotionof poetic voice, whichalso "incorporated
namely,
subjectiveelementsof a sortnow morecloselyassociatedwithwriting,
a relationto thedaimonicor non-human
elementin poetry."
l0SeeJosephLibertson'sProximity:
Levinas,Blanchot,Bataille,and Communication138. Libertson"derives"Blanchos notionof artas "existing"befroma Levinasianreadingof Blanchos"The
yondtherealmofbeingand truth
of the oeuvreis a
Gaze of Orpheus."Libertsonarguesthatthe impossibility
in an ontologicalsenseandreads
function
oftheimpossibility
ofcommunication
a failure
withalterity,
Orpheus's gaze as a failureto enterintocommunication
whichtakesplace in theverydesireto possesstheOther(Eurydice),i.e., even
beforeOrpheus's descentintotheunderworld.
87. Hill,too,remarks
See Leslie Hill's Blanchot:ExtremeContemporary
betweenDichtungand Bethat"Blanchotrefusesthemomentof reconciliation
12SeeBlanchosTheSirens'Song,
as opposedto HeidegFor a comparisonof Blanchos idea of "writing"
see
Clark
64-107.
ger'sDichtung,
14SeeBlanchosTheGaze ofOrpheus.
15SeeBlanchosTheSpace ofLiterature.
42
16Foran insightful
analysisof the paradoxesof Orpheus'smyth,see MichaelNewman's"The TraceofTrauma,"fromMauriceBlanchot:TheDemand
153-73.
of Writing
- intentionally
Certainpassagesin The StepNotBeyondconfirm
or uninBlanchot
tentionallythe suspectstatusof Orpheus'sdesireas transgression.
writes:"The hopeoftransgressing
thelaw was tiedto thedeceptionthat,in the
led him to pose an equal law, althoughof a
verymomentof transgression,
anew,without
any hope of being
higherpower,whichhe thenhad to transgress
able to do so exceptbyposinga newand alwayshigherlaw,whichmadeofthis
infinite
to
and fromthistransgression
passage fromthelaw to itstransgression
anotherlaw theonlyinfraction
thatupheldtheeternity
his
desire"
(23-24;
of
italicsadded). Transgression
has alwaysalreadyoccurredinsofaras desiredesires"onlyin view of theprohibition"
(24), and has, therefore,
alwaysalready
crossedtheline.The onlytransgression
is theartist'spersistent
self-deception
thatthereis yetanother,
i.e., thatdesireis infinite.
higherlaw to be transgressed,
However,Orpheus'sdesirecannotbe infinitesince it is a desireforthe lost
attainableinsofaras theloss
Eurydice,whereasthelostEurydiceis guaranteed,
oftheobjectis theraisond'treofart.
18See Paul Davies's "The Work and the Absence of the Work,"from
MauriceBlanchot:The Demandof Writing
to
91-107. Davies drawsattention
Blanchot'sproblematization
of Heidegger'saesthetic,observingthataccording
to Blanchot(especiallyin Blanchot'sreadingof Hlderlin),"theworksilences
thequestion4whatis thework?'by alwaystransposing
it intothelogicallyderivative'whereor whenis thework?'"(105).
I9SeeHeidegger'sBasic Writings:
fromBeingand Time(1927) to The Task
(1964).
ofThinking
See Hill 60. Hill seemsto thinkalongsimilarlineswhen,analyzingBlanchot's"Orphiclogic,"he comments
thattheobjectof artis themost(im)proper
that
which
art
itself
into
object,
puts
question:"accordingto thisOrphiclogic,
is
ever
a
function
of
and an objectonlyever
possibility only
priorimpossibility,
at
the
of
moment
its
ineradicable
the
unnameable
loss,
very
grasped
nightbefore
constitutes
the
absence
of
that
literature
(or
only(im)properobject
night
object)
to be remayclaimas its veryown,even thoughforit to do so is forliterature
mindedall thewhilethatwhatcountsas itsown is also thatwhichis irrepressiblvaliento it."
21SeeJean-Franois
on Time.
Lyotard'sTheInhuman:Reflections
22Heidegger's
anxietyas theontologically
privilegedstateofmindis thebasis forBlanchot'snotionofdreadas thewriter'soriginary
implulseto language,
an idea developedin TheGaze ofOrpheus.
43
23Blanchotwants to abolish the work of artas an intentionalobject since for

him intentionality
necessarilypresupposes a self. However, de Man has argued
is neitherphysical nor psychoconvincinglythat "the concept of intentionality
logical in its nature,but structural"and that intentionalityactually makes the
created object autonomous: see Blindness 25-28. Blanchot tries the make the
work intoa natural object trustingthatonly this way its autonomycan be guaranteed. However, the act of creationdeterminesthe work's mode of being and,
therefore,cannot be bypassed. Perhaps Blanchot's resistance to consider the
workas an intentionalobject is promptedby whatde Man calls the New Critics'
reluctanceto admit the intentionalityof a work for fear of compromisingthe
work's "integrity"or "organicky."
"
See Maureen DiLonardo Troiano' s New Physics and the Modern French
Novel: An Investigation of InterdisciplinaryDiscourse 189-97. Troiano approaches the issue of selfhood and experience from an interesting,scientific
point of view, arguingthatexpression in Blanchot is a "propertyof the entropy
of [the linguistic]system."In this context,the essential solitude of the work becomes an aspect of "the positive functionof entropy"ratherthan a solitude still
dependenton the notionof selfhood.
Rimbaud's renunciationis suspect for the same reasons that Rousseau's
decision to write and thus denounce life, is suspect to Derrida. Paul de Man
summarizes Derrida's argumentin his essay on Derrida in Blindness and Insight: "The writer'renounces' life, but this renunciationis hardlyin good faith:
it is a ruse by means of which the actual sacrifice,which would implythe literal
death of the subject, is replaced by a 'symbolic' death thatleaves intactthe possibilityof enjoying life, adding to it the possibilityof enjoying the ethical value
of an act of renunciationthatreflectsfavorablyon the person who performsit"
(113). Rimbaud's gesture becomes meaningfulbecause Rimbaud must believe
in the validityand worthof what he renounces.In addition,he mustalso believe
thathe is already writingsomethingmore thana book- the work- if his gesture
is to have any seriousness.
Georges Bataille suggests various reasons for Rimbaud's renunciationof
poetryand although he never really takes a clear stand on whetherRimbaud's
act was an impostureor an act withontological significance,he seems to suggest
thatthisact is not really radical and fails to attainthe extremelimitinsofaras it
is an essentially ascetic gesture whereas, Bataille asserts, "the extremelimit is
accessible throughexcess, not throughwant [asceticism, renunciation]"(21).
Not only does Rimbaud fail to attainthe extremelimit,but his act of renunciation is probablypromptedby sheer vanity,which, Bataille argues, is intricately
connected to the extreme limit: "Men are such- so wretched- thateverything
- unless it surpasses. . . . And at times . . . one tears oneself
seems worthless
44
apart with the sole aim of satisfyingthis pride: everythingis ruined in an allabsorbingvanity"(44). Rimbaud's gesture,afterall, has only a personal significance: "Rimbaud having by his flightextended the 'possible' forhimself,at the
same time . . . suppressedthis 'possible' forothers"(148), i.e., his act is merely
"original."
"'See Blanchot's The Workof Fire.
See Rodolphe Gasche's "The Felicities of Paradox," fromMaurice Blanchot: The Demand of Writing34-70. Gasche points out the tragic natureof the
essence of literatureas thatwhich is at stake in literature,the attemptto discover
"what had been put to death for language to come to life," a "quest forthe momentanteriorto language." This is a tragic quest, Gasche asserts,because even
if literaturemanages to isolate that which was excluded, thus discovering the
meaningless,what remainsfromthisphenomenological reductionis not, finally,
a transcendentalsignifiedthat escapes significationbut the very possibility of
significationas such, "an inescapable degree zero of meaning to which even the
meaninglessmustbend."
See Clark (64-107) for a detailed analysis of Blanchot's divergence from
Heidegger's notionoaletheia.
30Thisis made explicit in Blanchot's essay "The Power and the Glory" in
The Gaze of Orpheus: "In our 'intellectual poverty,' then, there is also the
wealth of thought,thereis the indigence thatgives us the presentimentthat to
thinkis always to learn to thinkless thanwe think"(120).
The problematicnatureof the other termscomes to the frontin a remark
Blanchot makes in "The Absence of the Book," The Gaze of Orpheus, concerning the relationof the absence of the book to the book, a relation which is the
same as thatbetween the two termsin Blanchot's pairs of oppositions. Blanchot
writes: "The 'absence of the book' . . . does not forma concept any more than
the word 'outside' does, or the word 'fragment,'or the word 'neuter,' but it
helps conceptualize the word 'book'" (154). The statementcan be read in the
contextof anotheressay by Blanchot, "Wittgenstein'sProblem" insofar as the
two terms- the absence of the book and the book- relateto each otherprecisely
as two "languages." Each of the other termsrepresentsa non-conceptual,metaphorical language, whose aim is to conceptualize the basic term(solitude, exile,
night,etc.). The problemis thatit is unclear whetherthe metaphorsconceptualize the non-metaphoricalterms(can they?) or the non-metaphoricalterms (the
concepts) serve to express the otherwise inexpressible,absolutely other metaphorical terms.
And yet,in a certainsense the impossibilityto satisfythe demand of the
in
law, Blanchot,can also be thoughtas a kind of "reservoir,"a perverse prom-
45
ise of indefiniteimpossibilitystructurallysimilar to Heidegger's notionof truth

as un-truth,
a "reservoir"of truth.
Gasche believes thatindeed forBlanchot literaturehas a privilegedontological significanceinsofaras "it is in literaturethatdeath asks thisquestion [the
question of an always otherpossibility,a question thatmakes death an affirmation],the silentquestion of thepossibilityof literature"(66). By puttingthe possibilityof nothingnessand the possibilityof literatureon the same plane, Gasche
seems to suggest thatthe question of the nothingis the question of literature.I
in
think,however,thatthese two questions are formulatedsomewhatdifferently
and
The
the
of
is
Blanchot,
Heidegger
respectively.
question
nothing "Why is
there somethingratherthan nothing?" Asked this way, the question concerns
only the possibilityof something;it does not concern the relationshipbetween
the originand the essence of thatsomethingonce its possibilityis affirmed.The
question of literatureBlanchot asks, however, concerns not only its possibility
but, "within" that possibility,the question of the split between origin and essence. Blanchot himselfdraws attentionto this split in "Literatureand the Right
to Death," fromThe Gaze of Orpheus: "How can I recover it [the origin],how
can I turnaround and look at what exists before, if all my power consists of
making it into what exists after" (46). See also ChristopherFynsk's "Crossing
the Threshold," fromMaurice Blanchot: The Demand of Writing70-90. Fynsk
reaches a differentconclusion about literature'sattemptto recover that,which
precedes language. Fynsk argues thatfor Blanchot, literature'shope for recovering what has been excluded from language "lies in the materialityof language," "in the physical characterof the word." However, Fynsk's readingdoes
not tie in withBlanchos own readingof the Orpheus myth,which distinguishes
the followingparallels: the day is associated with the world; the nightwith the
disappearance of the world and thus with the materialityof language; the other
nightwith the appearance of the disappearance of the world, with the relation
word-world and, thus,as Gasche rightlynotes, withthe general law of signification. The Eurydice thatOrpheus desires is not the night(the materialityof language), as Fynsk suggests,but the other night(Gasche' s "degree zero of meaning").
34See, however, Steven Shaviro's Passion and Excess: Blanchot, Bataille,
and LiteraryTheory 143. Shaviro reads Blanchos penchantfor indeterminacy
as a formof affirmation:"The oxymoronicintensityof a language thaterases its
own postulates,problematizesits own conclusions, and therebyasserts nothing
- thisis not the undecidable suspension of affirmation
and denies nothing
but its
and
necessarycondition."
positive
46
WorksCited
Bataille,Georges.InnerExperience.Trans.Leslie Ann Boldt.Albany:StateU
ofNew YorkP, 1992.
NY:
Blanchot,Maurice.The Gaze of Orpheus.Trans.Lydia Davis. Barrytown,
StationHill, 1981.
. TheInfinite
Conversation.
Trans.Susan Hanson.Minneapolis:U ot MinnesotaP, 1993.
. TheSpace ofLiterature.
Trans.Ann Smock.Lincoln:U of NebraskaP,
1982.
. The Step Not Beyond.Trans.LycetteNelson. Albany:StateU of New
YorkP, 1992.
. The Workof Fire. Trans. CharlotteMandeli. Stanford:StanfordUP,
1995.
Clark,Timothy.Derrida,Heidegger,Blanchot:Sources of DerridaysNotion
and PracticeofLiterature.
Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1992.
Davies,Paul. "TheWorkandtheAbsenceoftheWork."Gill 91-107.
De Man, Paul. Blindnessand Insight:Essays in theRhetoricof Contemporary
Criticism.2nd. ed. Ed. Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis:U of MinnesotaP,
1983.
Fynsk,Christopher.
"CrossingtheThreshold."Gill 70-90.
"The
FelicitiesofParadox."Gill 34-70.
Gasche,Rodolphe.
London:
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Gill, CarolynBailey, MauriceBlanchot:The Demandof Writing.
1996.
Routledge,
Martin.Basic Writings:
FromBeingand Time(1927) to The Taskof
Heidegger,
Ed.
David
Farrell
Krell. New York: Harperand Row,
(1964).
Thinking
1977.
London:Routledge,1997.
Hill,Leslie. Blanchot:ExtremeContemporary.
Jabes,Edmond.The LittleBook of UnsuspectedSubversion.Trans.Rosmarie
Stanford
UP, 1996.
Waldrop.Stanford:
Lawall, Sarah. Criticsof Consciousness:The ExistentialStructures
of Literature.Cambridge:HarvardUP, 1968.
SubStance14 (1976): 54Levinas,Emmanuel."AboutBlanchot:An Interview."
57.
Levinas,Blanchot,Bataille,and Comunication.
Libertson,Joseph.Proximity:
The Hague:Nijhoff,1982.
The Inhuman:Reflectionson Time. Trans. Geoffrey
Lyotard,Jean-Franois.
andRachelBowlby.Stanford:
Stanford
UP, 1991.
Bennington
Newman,Michael."TheTraceofTrauma."Gill 153-73.
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Shaviro,Steven.Passion and Excess: Blanchot,Bataille,and LiteraryTheory.

Tallahassee:FloridaStateUP, 1990.
Troiano,MaureenDiLonardo.New Physicsand theModernFrenchNovel:An
Discourse.New York:PeterLang,1995.
Investigation
ofInterdisciplinary
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Penn State University Press

The Gaze of Blanchot through the Lens of Heidegger

The Gaze ofBlanchotthrough

cho s thinkingthat occasionally one wonders if some of his images or key

object is lost thattherecan be a workto mournthe loss. In this sense, Orpheus's

were in factnecessaryforthereto be a song at all. Althoughthis ties in withthe

tureof Heideggerian truth.Heidegger's metaphysicsand aestheticsare oriented

infinity,which,thoughit seems to be a negationof origin,is merelya metaphor

of the work,and howevertransgressiveit may appear, it is actually necessaryfor

by nihilative behavior testifies to the constant though doubtlessly obscured

ria" (22) or as infinity,

Heideggercomes back to thispointand in factaffirmsthatthe creatednessof the

the whole of being" (The Work of Fire 154-55).27 Heidegger's argumentthat

... is as such, in essence, poetry"(184). Language is identifiedwith the work,

precisely as itself in that the concealing denial, as refusal,provides the steady

- thequestionof thenothHeidegger'squestion(thequestionof metaphysics)

23Blanchotwants to abolish the work of artas an intentionalobject since for

ise of indefiniteimpossibilitystructurallysimilar to Heidegger's notionof truth

Shaviro,Steven.Passion and Excess: Blanchot,Bataille,and LiteraryTheory.

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