1wpp

Employee siya not corporate officer

Employment of GALERA with private respondent WPP became

effective on September 1, 1999 solely on the instruction of the CEO and upon
signing of the contract, without any further action from the Board of Directors of private
respondent WPP.

An examination of WPPs by-laws resulted in a finding that Galeras appointment as a

corporate officer (Vice-President with the operational title of Managing Director of
Mindshare) during a special meeting of WPPs Board of Directors is an appointment to
a non-existent corporate office. WPPs by-laws provided for only one Vice-President.
At the time of Galeras appointment on 31 December 1999, WPP already had one
Vice-President in the person of Webster. Galera cannot be said to be a director of

Four months had passed when private respondent WPP filed before
the Bureau of Immigration an application for petitioner GALERA to receive a
working visa, wherein she was designated as Vice President of WPP. Petitioner
alleged that she was constrained to sign the application in order that she could remain
in the Philippines and retain her employment.1[24]

WPP also because all five directorship positions provided in the by-laws are already
occupied. Finally, WPP cannot rely on its Amended By-Laws to support its argument
that Galera is a corporate officer. The Amended By-Laws provided for more than one
Vice-President and for two additional directors. Even though WPPs stockholders voted
for the amendment on 31 May 2000, the SEC approved the amendments only on 16
February 2001. Galera was dismissed on 14 December 2000. WPP, Steedman,
Webster, and Lansang did not present any evidence that Galeras dismissal took effect
with the action of WPPs Board of Directors.

The law and the rules are consistent in stating that the employment permit must be
acquired prior to employment. The Labor Code states: Any alien seeking admission to
the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who
desires to engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an
employment permit from the Department of Labor.2[25] Section 4, Rule XIV, Book 1 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides:

The appellate court further justified that Galera was an employee and not a
corporate officer by subjecting WPP and Galeras relationship to the four-fold test: (a)
the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the
power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employee with respect

Employment permit required for entry. No alien seeking employment, whether as a

resident or non-resident, may enter the Philippines without first securing an
employment permit from the Ministry. If an alien enters the country under a nonworking visa and wishes to be employed thereafter, he may only be allowed to be
employed upon presentation of a duly approved employment permit.

to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.

2 century canning
Wlang apprenticeship agreement
Alien siya walang benefits la permit e
This is Galeras dilemma: Galera worked in the Philippines without a proper work
permit but now wants to claim employees benefits under Philippine labor laws.

In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into between the parties
before petitioner filed its apprenticeship program with the TESDA for approval.

1
2

Petitioner and Palad executed the apprenticeship agreement on 17 July 1997 wherein

the government, specifically states that no enterprise shall be allowed to hire

it was stated that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end

apprentices unless its apprenticeship program is registered and approved by

approximately in December 1997.3[17] On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for

TESDA

approval its apprenticeship program, which the TESDA subsequently approved on 26

September 1997.4[18] Clearly, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced even

Illegal ang dismissal,bigyan mo ksi 2nd chance

before the TESDA approved petitioners apprenticeship program. Thus, the

apprenticeship agreement is void because it lacked prior approval from the TESDA.

Indeed, it appears that the Labor Arbiters conclusion that petitioner validly terminated
Palad was based mainly on the performance evaluation allegedly conducted by
petitioner. However, Palad alleges that she had no knowledge of the performance
evaluation conducted and that she was not even informed of the result of the alleged

The TESDAs approval of the employers apprenticeship program is required before the

performance evaluation. Palad also claims she did not receive a notice of dismissal,

employer is allowed to hire apprentices. Prior approval from the TESDA is necessary

nor was she given the chance to explain. According to petitioner, Palad did not receive

to ensure that only employers in the highly technical industries may employ

the termination notice because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work after being

apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations.5[19] Thus, under RA 7796,

informed of the result of the evaluation.

employers can only hire apprentices for apprenticeable occupations which must be
officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved for apprenticeship by the TESDA.
This is to ensure the protection of apprentices and to obviate possible abuses by
Under Article 227 of the Labor Code, the employer has the burden of

prospective employers who may want to take advantage of the lower wage rates for
apprentices and circumvent the right of the employees to be secure in their

proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.6[28] Petitioner failed

employment.

to substantiate its claim that Palad was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the NLRC
found that petitioner failed to prove the authenticity of the performance evaluation
which petitioner claims to have conducted on Palad, where Palad received a
performance rating of only 27.75%. Petitioner merely relies on the performance

The requisite TESDA approval of the apprenticeship program prior to the hiring of

evaluation to prove Palads inefficiency. It was likewise not shown that petitioner ever

apprentices was further emphasized by the DOLE with the issuance of Department

apprised Palad of the performance standards set by the company. When the alleged

Order No. 68-04 on 18 August 2004. Department Order No. 68-04, which provides the

valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the

guidelines in the implementation of the Apprenticeship and Employment Program of

law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.7

3
4

Furthermore, Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a
performance evaluation on Palad, petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor
performance.

evidence, except the testimony of Engineer Eugenio Morales who, however, did not
confront the private respondent, much less, present the persons from whom he
allegedly demanded or received money.

3. nitto

Hindi siya apprentice

Walang apprenticeship

The above communication to Engineer Morales for him to assess the capabilities of
private respondent is not sufficient to show that he was taken in as an apprentice.
There was no written agreement that his services had been engaged as an
apprentice. On the contrary, every circumstance would indicate that he was accepted
on the basis of his credentials that he had been an employee for several years as a
surveyor in the Bureau of Lands. He was given a salary of P450.00 a month and, on
June 1, 1976, was sent to Surigao del Sur to perform the work of a surveyor, with
seven men under him to supervise. For all intents and purposes, he comes within the
meaning of a regular employee "to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employees." (Article 281 of the Labor
Code). In short, if it was really the intention of petitioner to employ private respondent
as an apprentice only, it should have so stated the same clearly and in writing.

In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an
apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship
program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and
Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990.
Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and
Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
So employee siyaa
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program
duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as
an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence
Illegal dismissal
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter
only three days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such
resignation was not voluntary and deliberate.

Thus, as a regular e employee, private respondent cannot be terminated except for a

just cause or when authorized under Article 283 of the Labor
5pptc
In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting
married women for employment.
Suspension lng

Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery

boy ("kargador" or "pahinante").
He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned
resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof.
Petitioner made it clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice. 13
Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by
orchestrating the latter's alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim
and Release. A judicious examination of both events belies any spontaneity on private
respondent's part.

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been
dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent. 30 However, as she had undeniably committed
an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an
unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by respondent
NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be
condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without
any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified. Thus, her
entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time her compensation
was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting
therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months suspension.

4 rolando

Bfoq rule

Wala basis

Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against
married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but
not against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful. 36 Upon

We find no merit in this petition. In the first place, the claim that private respondent
asked money from people whose lands were being surveyed is not supported by

the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could
be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular
requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general
principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of
that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule
applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since
the restriction was not related to the job performance of the flight attendants.

It was thus physically impossible for Belga to report for work and explain her absence,
as ordered.
Tropical avers that Belgas job as Treasury Assistant is a position of responsibility
since she handles vital transactions for the company. It adds that the nature of Belgas
work and the character of her duties involved utmost trust and confidence.

6. belga
Walang trust

Buntis
In the instant case, the alleged misconduct of Belga barely falls within the situation
contemplated by the law. Her absence for 16 days was justified considering that she
had just delivered a child, which can hardly be considered a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty; much less does it imply wrongful intent on the part of Belga.
Tropical harps on the alleged concealment by Belga of her pregnancy. This argument,
however, begs the question as to how one can conceal a full-term pregnancy. We
agree with respondents position that it can hardly escape notice how she grows bigger
each day. While there may be instances where the pregnancy may be inconspicuous,
it has not been sufficiently proven by Tropical that Belgas case is such.

Belgas failure to formally inform Tropical of her pregnancy can not be

considered as grave misconduct directly connected to her work as to constitute just
cause for her separation.

The charge of disobedience for Belgas failure to comply with the

memoranda must likewise fail. Disobedience, as a just cause for termination, must be
willful or intentional. Willfulness is characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental
attitude rendering the employees act inconsistent with proper subordination.[11] In the
instant case, the memoranda were given to Belga two days after she had given birth.

Belga was an assistant cashier whose primary function was to assist the cashier in
such duties as preparation of deposit slips, provisional receipts, post-dated checks,
etc. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, these functions are essentially
clerical. For while ostensibly, the documents that Belga prepares as Assistant Cashier
pertain to her employers property, her work does not call for independent judgment or
discretion. Belga simply prepares the documents as instructed by her superiors
subject to the latters verification or approval. Hence, her position cannot be
considered as one of responsibility or imbued with trust and confidence.
7. dmpl
Buntis pak ganern
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the condition of asthmatic bronchitis
may be intermittent, in contrast to pregnancy which is a continuing condition
accompanied by various symptoms and related illnesses. Hence, as to the former, if
the medical certificate or other proof proffered by the worker fails to correspond with
the dates of absence, then it can be reasonably concluded that, absent any other
proof, such absences are unjustified. This is the ruling in Filflex which cannot be
applied in a straight-hand fashion in cases of pregnancy which is a long-term condition
accompanied by an assortment of related illnesses.
In this case, by the measure of substantial evidence, what is controlling is the finding
of the NLRC and the CA that respondent was pregnant and suffered from related
ailments. It would be unreasonable to isolate such condition strictly to the dates stated
in the Medical Certificate or the Discharge Summary. It can be safely assumed that
the absences that are not covered by, but which nonetheless approximate, the dates
stated in the Discharge Summary and Medical Certificate, are due to the continuing
condition of pregnancy and related illnesses, and, hence, are justified absences.
Justified e
Second. The petitioner stresses that many women go through pregnancy and yet
manage to submit prior notices to their employer, especially if "there is no evidence on
record indicating a condition of such gravity as to preclude efforts at notifying

petitioner of her absence from work in series."12 But it must be emphasized that under
petitioners company rules, absences may be subsequently justified. 13 The Court finds
no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC and the CA that the respondent
was able to subsequently justify her absences in accordance with company rules and
policy; that the respondent was pregnant at the time she incurred the absences; that
this fact of pregnancy and its related illnesses had been duly proven through
substantial evidence; that the respondent attempted to file leaves of absence but the
petitioners supervisor refused to receive them; that she could not have filed prior
leaves due to her continuing condition; and that the petitioner, in the last analysis,
dismissed the respondent on account of her pregnancy, a prohibited act.
8.capin

"State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all."50 The Labor Code of the Philippines, meanwhile, provides:
Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require
as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason
of her marriage.
Bfoq rule

Di immoral
The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily equate to disgraceful and
immoral conduct. Brent's Policy Manual and Employee's Manual of Policies do not
define what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a ground for
disciplinary action. Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary
definition of fornication as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that
Cadiz's acts fell under such classification, thus constituting immorality.39

While a marriage or no-marriage qualification may be justified as a "bona fide

occupational qualification," Brent must prove two factors necessitating its imposition,
viz: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential
operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that
all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job.54 Brent has not shown the presence of neither of these
factors. Perforce, the Court cannot uphold the validity of said condition.
9 santos

Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be
gauged - it is public and secular, not religious.40 Whether a conduct is considered
disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing norms of
conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which are proscribed
because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. The fact that a particular act does not conform to the
traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to
qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular
standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish that
premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or
immoral.41
doctrine of management

prerogative not applicable

The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right to "regulate,

according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work
supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and
recall of employees."48 In this case, Brent imposed on Cadiz the condition that she
subsequently contract marriage with her then boyfriend for her to be reinstated.
According to Brent, this is "in consonance with the policy against encouraging illicit or
common-law relations that would subvert the sacrament of marriage."49
Statutory law is replete with legislation protecting labor and promoting equal
opportunity in employment. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that the

Valid ung regulation

The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant controversy, was
issued by the Secretary of Education pursuant to BP 232. Section 7029 of BP 232
vests the Secretary of Education with the authority to issue rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of BP 232. Concomitantly, Section 5730 specifically
empowers the Department of Education to promulgate rules and regulations
necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the educational system
in accordance with the declared policy of BP 232.
Pero di sapat
The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is
disgraceful and immoral considering that she is employed in a Catholic educational
institution. In arriving at such conclusion, the labor tribunals merely assessed the fact
of the petitioners pregnancy vis--vis the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
same.
However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the aforementioned
conclusion arrived at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioners pregnancy out
of wedlock, without more, is not enough to characterize the petitioners conduct as
disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed
considered disgraceful or immoral.
How to determine

Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a twostep process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis--vis the
prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and
respectable.
That the petitioner was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not
absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral.
There is still a necessity to determine whether the petitioners pregnancy out of
wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms
of conduct.
The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious
x x x. Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public
order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular
terms. Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a compelled religion, anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would
tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive
religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of religion;
governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.
10. barcenas
Ang haba e haha
Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be categorized as
mere domestic work. Thus, We find that petitioner, being proficient in the Chinese
language, attended to the visitors, mostly Chinese, who came to pray or seek advice
before Buddha for personal or business problems; arranged meetings between these
visitors and Su and supervised the preparation of the food for the temple visitors;
acted as tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as liaison with some goverment offices;
and made the payment for the temple's Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these
tasks may not be deemed activities of a household helper. They were essential and
important to the operation and religious functions of the temple.

In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return to
Bicol in May, 1982 to await the birth of her love-child allegedly by Su The records do
not show that petitioner filed any leave from work or that a leave was granted her.
Neither did she return to work after the birth of her child on October 12, 1982, whom
she named Robert Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The NLRC found that it was only in
July, 1983 after Su died that she went back to the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioner's
pleadings failed to rebut this finding. Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a
resumption of her old position which she had already abandoned. Petitioner herself
supplied the reason for her return. She stated:
. . . (I)t was the death-bed instruction to her by Chua Se Su to
stay at the temple and to take care of the two boys and to see to it
that they finish their studies to become monks and when they are
monks to eventually take over the two temples as their inheritance
from their father Chua Se Su. 4
Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Su's
mistress who is bent on protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her son and
nephew. In her pleadings, the petitioner claims that they were forcefully evicted from
the temple, harassed and threatened by respondents and that the Poh Toh Buddhist
Association is a trustee corporation with the children as cestui que trust. These claims
are not proper in this labor case. They should be appropriately threshed out in the
complaints already filed by the petitioner before the civil courts. Due to these claims,
We view the respondents' offer of P10,000.00 as indicative more of their desire to
evict the petitioner and her son from the temple rather than an admission of an
employer-employee relations.
Anent the petitioner's claim for unpaid wages since May, 1982 which she filed only in
1986, We hold that the same has already prescribed. Under Article 292 of the Labor
Code, all money claims arising from employer-employee relations must be filed within
three years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall forever be
barred.
Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to work in the temple after Su
died, there is, however, no proof that she was re-hired by the new Head Monk. In fact,
she herself manifested that respondents made it clear to her in no uncertain terms that
her services as well as her presence and that of her son were no longer needed. 5
However, she persisted and continued to work in the temple without receiving her
salary because she expected Chua and Dee to relent and permit the studies of the
two boys. 6 Consequently, under these circumstances, no employer-employee
relationship could have arisen.
11yap
Hala ang hirap

In the meantime, while this case was pending before this Court, we declared

The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include

overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE
Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard
Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is
understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave
pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation
for all work performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and
holiday pay is compensation for any work performed on
designated rest days and holidays.11[32]

as unconstitutional the clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 in
the case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.8[21] on March 24, 2009.

Apparently, unaware of our ruling in Serrano, petitioner claims that the 5 th

paragraph of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, is violative of Section 1, 9[22] Article III and
Section 3,10[23] Article XIII of the Constitution to the extent that it gives an erring
employer the option to pay an illegally dismissed migrant worker only three months for
every year of the unexpired term of his contract; that said provision of law has long
been a source of abuse by callous employers against migrant workers; and that said

A close perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of

US$130.00 was not categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in the basic
salary clause, hence, forming part of the basic salary of petitioner.

provision violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution because, while
illegally dismissed local workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of
reinstatement with full backwages computed from the time compensation was
withheld from them up to their actual reinstatement, migrant workers, by virtue of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, have to waive nine months of their collectible backwages
every time they have a year of unexpired term of contract to reckon with. Finally,
petitioner posits that, assuming said provision of law is constitutional, the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it reduced petitioners backwages from nine months to
three months as his nine-month unexpired term cannot accommodate the lesser relief
of three months for every year of the unexpired term
Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included in the
aforementioned exception. After all, it was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job
due to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents. To rule otherwise would
be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal
that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs
security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from
such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.

12 mcbernie
Ito lng tlga yung kelangan haha
First, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee
relationship must first be established.122 Although an employment agreement forms
part of the case records, respondent Ganzon signed it with the notation "per my
note."123 The respondents have sufficiently explained that the note refers to the letter124
dated May 11, 1999 which embodied certain conditions for the employments
effectivity. As we have previously explained, however, the said conditions, particularly
on the successful completion of the project financing for the hotel project in Baguio
City and McBurnies acquisition of an Alien Employment Permit, failed to materialize.
Such defense of the respondents, which was duly considered by the NLRC in its
Decision dated November 17, 2009, was not sufficiently rebutted by McBurnie.
Second, McBurnie failed to present any employment permit which would have
authorized him to obtain employment in the Philippines. This circumstance negates
McBurnies claim that he had been performing work for the respondents by virtue of an
employer-employee relationship. The absence of the employment permit instead
bolsters the claim that the supposed employment of McBurnie was merely simulated,

Tanker allowance

10

11

or did not ensue due to the non-fulfillment of the conditions that were set forth in the
letter of May 11, 1999.

14apex
Di siya househelper

Third, besides the employment agreement, McBurnie failed to present other

competent evidence to prove his claim of an employer-employee relationship. Given
the parties conflicting claims on their true intention in executing the agreement, it was
necessary to resort to the established criteria for the determination of an employeremployee relationship, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2)
the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
employees conduct.125 The rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on the
claimant to establish or substantiate the claim by the requisite quantum of evidence.
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her
right thereto.126 McBurnie failed in this regard.1wphi1 As previously observed by the
NLRC, McBurnie even failed to show through any document such as payslips or
vouchers that his salaries during the time that he allegedly worked for the respondents
were paid by the company. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship
between McBurnie and the respondents, McBurnie could not successfully claim that
he was dismissed, much less illegally dismissed, by the latter. Even granting that there
was such an employer-employee relationship, the records are barren of any document
showing that its termination was by the respondents dismissal of McBurnie.
13. jose
Immoral
On the outset, it must be stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of
each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the
prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws.i[12] American jurisprudence has
defined immorality as a course of conduct which offends the morals of the community
and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to
elevate,ii[13] the same including sexual misconduct.iii[14] Thus, in petitioners case, the
gravity and seriousness of the charges against him stem from his being a married
man and at the same time a teacher.
We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to the
sanctity of marriage, which is a basic institution of society. Even our Family Code
provides that husband and wife must live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity.iv[15] This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.v[16] Our laws, in implementing this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family underscore their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.vi[17]
As a teacher, petitioner serves as an example to his pupils, especially during their
formative yearsvii[18] and stands in loco parentis to them.viii[19] To stress their
importance in our society, teachers are given substitute and special parental authority
under our laws.ix[20]

Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms
"househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term
"domestic servant" and shall refer to any person, whether male or female,
who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services
are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment
thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of
the employer's family.3
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant
who is employed in the employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal
comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family. Such definition covers family drivers,
domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar
househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in
staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's
guest and other persons availing of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be
considered to extend to then driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the
company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as within the
meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined by law.
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the
home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a
househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company
staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the
former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it
is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other
agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the
premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the
company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.

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