Reynaldo R. Badulis Jr.

BINAY v SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 120681-83
Facts: : On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan
three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of
the RPC, 6 and two for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. The informations all alleged
that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioner's incumbency as
Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the
informations. He contented that the six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the
Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the
Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to due process.
Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion to
quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before petitioner could
file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, the prosecution filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite." The
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for 90 days from
receipt of the resolution. Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, 9 to set
aside the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due
process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite before he could file a
reply to the prosecution's opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying
the motion to quash.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed a Petition praying that, should this Court hold that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed
just the same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the
Ombudsman prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and
that, moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners right to speedy disposition has been violated by the inordinate
delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the Ombudsman. (Article 3, Section 19)
Decision: The constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice.
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been

denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of
the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. 43 In
the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In petitioner Binay's case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the
subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the Tanodbayan, and later with the
Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the delay: 1) That on July 27, 1988
Brillante filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan an affidavit-complaint charging, defendants of
the following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple Falsification of
Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d) Violation of Election Law; and (e)
Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. 2) After securing machine copies of the voluminous
documents supporting the COA findings, Prosecutors issued the corresponding subpoena
directing the respondents to submit their respective counter-affidavits.
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA); it
must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable cause. Accordingly,
the prosecution had to conduct its own review of the COA findings. Judging from said findings,
we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for their
resolution.
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his suspension pendente lite
is unwarranted since the informations charging him were not valid. This contention, however,
must fail in view of our pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution of the subject
cases in violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in question are
valid and petitioner's suspension pendente lite must be upheld.