Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Stepan, Alfred C.
Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, Number 4, October 2000, pp.
37-57 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2000.0088
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Alfred Stepan
39
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Alfred Stepan
41
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42
RELATIVELY STABLE
PATTERNS
NONSECULAR, BUT
FRIENDLY TO
DEMOCRACY
Established church
receives state subsidies,
and some official
religion taught in state
schools (but
nonreligious students do
not have to take
religious courses).
Official religion
accorded no
constitutional or
quasiconstitutional
prerogatives to mandate
significant policies.
Citizens can elect to
have church tax sent
to a secular institution.
Nonofficial religion
allowed full freedom
and can receive some
state monies.
SOCIOLOGICALLY
SPONTANEOUS
SECULARISM
Society largely
disenchanted and
religion not an
important factor in
political life.
Democratically elected
officials under no
significant pressures to
comply with religious
dictates concerning
their public policy
decisions.
RELATIVELY
UNSTABLE PATTERNS
VERY UNFRIENDLY
SECULARISM LEGISLATED
BY MAJORITY, BUT REVERSIBLE BY MAJORITY
Antireligious tone in most
state regulations (for
example, teaching of
religion forbidden in state
and nonstate-supported
schools; no chaplains of
any religion allowed in
military organizations or
state hospitals).
Significant percentage of
believers semiloyal or
disloyal to regime.
Religious groups
allowed full participation
in civil society.
All religious groups can
participate in civil
Organizations and
society.
parties related to
religious groups allowed All religious groups can
to compete for power in compete for power in
political society.
political society.
Alfred Stepan
43
Right of
private worship
is forbidden or
highly
controlled.
Right of religious groups to
participate in
civil society
denied.
Virtually unamendable
Right of organizations or parties
constitution declares
related to religious groups to compete official religion.
Right of relifor power in political society
gious groups to constitutionally denied.
Official religion
compete for
receives state subsidies.
Relatively competitive elections
power in
normally
held.
Competitive elections
political
society denied. Right of private worship is respected. regularly held.
Right of private worship
No competitive
is respected.
elections held.
Demos cannot
participate in
selection of highest
religious authorities
(and thus the
highest political
authority does not
emanate from, and
is not responsible
to, democratic
procedures).
No permissible
area of private or
public life allowed
that does not
conform to dominant religion.
Fusion of
religious and
political power
under religious
control.
More Misinterpretations
Building upon our reading of the empirical context of such phrases
as separation of church and state and secularism, we are in a
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47
must not be relativists. Any country, in any culture, must meet the same
institutional and behavioral requirements. Yet we must also recognize
that within the world of democracies there are many subtypes with
distinctive secondary characteristics: Some have a large state, some do
not; some accept individual values and reject collective values; some
accept individual values but also espouse collective values. Many of the
secondary values that differentiate Korean and Taiwanese democracy
from U.S. democracy (higher saving rates so that the family can look
after their own aged, a somewhat more robust role for the state in the
economy, and somewhat greater respect for legal authority) draw upon
Confucian values, but none of these Asian values are necessarily
antidemocratic. Indeed, as Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Lee Teng-hui
repeatedly and correctly assert, they are part of the distinctive strength
of their own subtype of democracy.
Let me close this section on Confucianism with some illustrations of
the multivocality of its doctrine and the political struggle to appropriate
its meaning. Simon Leyss new translation of The Analects of Confucius,
with 100 pages of valuable annotations, correctly points out that state
Confucianism repeatedly stressed the Confucian precept of obedience
while obliterating the symmetrical Confucian duty of disobedience to a
ruler if the ruler deviates from The Way. Leys stresses other, less
hierarchical sayings: Zila asked how to serve the Prince. The Master
said, Tell him the Truth even if it offends him. Dissent is supported
by the Confucian injunction, A righteous man, a man attached to humanity, does not seek life at the expense of humanity; there are instances
where he will give his life in order to fulfil his humanity. Xun Zi, one
of the great followers of Confucius, built upon the above injunction when
he defined a good minister as one who follows the way, he does not
follow the rules.11
Since rulers in the Confucian world strove for centuries to foster
acquiescence by selectively emphasizing those elements of the Confucian
corpus favoring obedience, the authoritarian legacy of state Confucianism will be diffusely present in new democracies such as Korea and
Taiwan for decades to come. Yet this legacy has not prevented the emergence of democratic rule in these countries. Indeed, as we have seen,
some of the most important political leaders in the new democracies of
Taiwan and Korea have used components of the Confucian legacy in
support of their struggle to deepen democracy.
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51
Islamic law. There was also some curtailment of the reach of Islamic
law as the electoral performance of Islamic fundamentalist parties
weakened.
Until the October 1999 military coup, there had been five consecutive
elections in Pakistan since 1988. Did the results strengthen or weaken
the thesis of an Islamic free-election trap? In increasingly competitive
elections, the largest revivalist or fundamentalist Islamic party, the IJI,
came in second in 1988 and won a plurality in 1990 and 1993. In 1996
and 1997, however, the total vote for all the Islamic fundamentalist
parties combined fell to less than 15 percent. In the 1997 election, which
observers considered the freest and most open of Pakistans recent
elections, Islamic fundamentalist parties only won two seats in the
National Assembly. In an excellent analysis of the relationship of Islamic
revivalist parties and competitive elections in Pakistan since independence, S.V.R. Nasr contends that competitive politics, far from being a
trap, actually encourages the flowering of the diversity of Muslim
political expression and prevents the reduction of the political discourse
to revivalism versus secularism.15 Violent and fundamentalist Islamic
groups are still active in Pakistan, to be sure, but their strength owes
more to secret subsidies they receive from Pakistans notorious Interservices Intelligence Agency (ISI) than to the votes they receive in
elections.16
Thus Huntingtons implication that elections in predominantly Islamic
countries will lead to fundamentalist majorities who will use their
electoral freedom to end democracy gets no support from our analysis
of electoral and political behavior in the worlds three largest Islamic
countries. Even in Iran, the free-election trap thesis has recently been
refuted by events. Although the theocratic hard-liners continue to control
state television and to close opposition newspapers, and the Council of
Guardians still vets all candidates, the antifundamentalist opposition
won at least 70 percent of the vote in the 1997 presidential election, the
municipal elections of 1999, and the parliamentary elections of 2000.
Iran is thus becoming increasingly multivocal.
Let me conclude my reflections on Islam and democracy by briefly
considering the case of Turkey and the questions it raises regarding
secularism and democracy. From June 1996 to June 1997, Turkey had
its first prime minister representing a de facto Islamic party, Necmettin
Erbakan of the Welfare Party. Soon after Erbakan took office, the Welfare Party was accused of violating Turkeys secular constitution. In
the face of these charges and of pressure from the military, Erbakan
resigned, and the Constitutional Court subsequently outlawed the Welfare Party.
Leading Western scholars have spoken as if there were a Westernstyle separation of religion and state in Turkey, sometimes suggesting
that the policies promoted by Turkeys founder Kemal Atatrk were
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was under authoritarian military rule. What was the role of the Orthodox
church vis-a-vis the military dictatorship and the democratic transition?
Three points are worth highlighting. First, there were two military juntas,
one established in 1967 and one established in November 1973. Within
months of coming to power, each junta had managed to arrange the
appointment of a new archbishop to head the Greek Orthodox Church.
This would have been impossible in Poland. Second, no scholarly work
on the Greek dictatorship accords any significant formal or informal
role to Orthodox church resistance to the dictatorship. Third, once
democracy was instituted in 1974, the church (except for efforts to
preserve some minor church prerogatives) did nothing significant to
oppose, resist, or stall the eventual consolidation of democracy, and it
has been broadly supportive of the democratic government. Indeed, the
Greek Orthodox Church has been much less critical of left-wing
democratic governments in Greece than the Catholic Church has been
of left-wing democratic governments in Poland.
Greece has an established church. But as we have seen, so do Iceland,
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and England. The democratic task in Greece
after 1974 required not the disestablishment of the church, but the
elimination of any nondemocratic domains of church power that restricted
democratic politics. Greek democrats have done this and the Greek
Orthodox Church has accepted it. Not only does democracy not require
a disestablished church, it requires that no constraints be put on the rights
of Eastern Orthodox Christians to argue their case in the public arena.
Greek democracy has respected this area of legitimate autonomy of
religion. There have been some changes both within state-society
relations and within the Orthodox church that have made the twin
tolerations easier to sustain. The constitution crafted in 1975 is
somewhat clearer than the previous Greek constitutions had been about
democratically appropriate areas for state action vis-a-vis religion, and
for the established churchs action vis-a - vis other religions and the
elected government. Moreover, there is growing sentiment within the
Orthodox church that it would be religiously more robust and better
able to play an independent role in civil society if it were less dependent
on the state.17
Unfinished Business
All the worlds major religions today are involved in struggles over
the twin tolerations. For Hinduism in India and Judaism in Israel,
religion-state conflicts are now especially politically salient. In the first
two decades of their independence after World War II, India and Israel
were under the political and ideological hegemony of secular political
leaders and parties. By the 1990s, however, both these secular political
traditions were challenged by opposition movements that drew some of
Alfred Stepan
55
their support from forces seeking to redraw the boundaries of the twin
tolerations to accomodate more fundamentalist and less tolerant visions
of the polity.
In Israel, the state was originally a nationalist state for the Jewish
people, but there are growing demands for it to be a religious state as
well. There are also demands to make citizenship for the Arab minority
less inclusive, and even to amend the Law of Return so as to give
Orthodox rabbis the authority to determine whom the state of Israel
recognizes as a Jew.
In India, after the 1998 and 1999 general elections, the Hindu revivalist
BJP formed the government, in alliance with regional parties. Although
it also contains more moderate elements, the BJP is pressured by its
associated shock troops in uncivil society, such as the neofascist RSS,
who want eventually to utilize the majority status of Hindus to make
India a state that would privilege Hindu values as they interpret them.
A major force opposing the BJP and the RSS is the GandhianNehruvian strand of Hinduism, which insists that both India and
Hinduism are multivocal and that the deepest values of Hinduism must
respect the idea of India as a diverse, tolerant state rather than a nationstate of Hindus. Gandhi and Nehru knew that since India was a
multicultural, multireligious, and multicommunity state, nation-state
building would make it harder, not easier, to build democracy.
India is 17 times poorer than any OECD democracy. The support for
democracy in India under such difficult conditions cannot be understood
without an appreciation of the tremendous strength that Gandhi drew
from some traditional Hindu religious values and styles of action in his
peaceful struggles for independence, democracy, an end to
untouchability, and respect for Muslims.
If India, with 600 million non-Hindi speakers, 14 languages that are
spoken by at least 10 million people, and a minority population of about
120 million Muslims, is to remain a democracy, the voices of those who
wish to make India a Hindu and Hindi nation-state must be countered
by an ever stronger Gandhian voice speaking for India as a multireligious
home to a billion people.
A more complete study of the themes raised in this brief essay would
not only discuss religions I have omitted, but would analyze in much
greater detail the emergence of the twin tolerations in the West. The
establishment of state-sponsored churches in Scandinavia and Britain,
while initially a way of securing political control of the church, eventually
led not only to the twin tolerations, but also, in the long run, to the
sociologically spontaneous secularization of most of the population.
Why?
Liberal scholars might also want to reconsider how liberal the
anticlerical movements in France and Spain really were. What was the
political effect of this liberalism from above? In Spain in the early 1930s,
Journal of Democracy
56
did liberal and socialist anticlericalism justify the tearing down of walls
separating civil cemeteries from Jewish cemeteries? If the 1905 French
liberal model of expropriating Jesuit property had been followed in the
United States, Georgetown and many other Jesuit universities would
have been expropriated. Would this have contributed to the strengthening
of liberalism in the United States?
Another important area for further research is the role of the state in
generating religious toleration. Scholars, especially sociologists of
religion, have focused their attention on society-led movements toward
tolerance, but at some critical moments state-led policies, such as those
structured by Emperor Ferdinand I at the Peace of Augsburg of 1555,
were crucial for ending society-led religious conflicts. Likewise, it was
the Ottoman state that crafted the millets, with their extraordinary
tolerance for religious self-government by minority national religious
communities. There are many more examples of state-led tolerance, as
well as state-led intolerance, that we need to study.
Finally, even the separation of church and state originally mandated
by the U.S. Constitutions First Amendment (Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof) is misunderstood today by many U.S. citizens. The
amendment did not prohibit the 13 original states from having their own
established religions. It merely prohibited the Congress from establishing
one official religion for the United States as a whole. In fact, on the eve
of the revolution, only three of the 13 coloniesRhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Delawarehad no provision for an established church.
Even after the revolution, the South Carolina constitution of 1778
established the Christian Protestant Religion. Four New England states
continued for some time to maintain state-subsidized, largely Congregational, churches. The eventual political construction of the Wests strongest wall separating church and state, along with the social emergence of
one of the Wests most churchgoing, and most fundamentalist
populations, is yet another crooked path of toleration and intoleration
that needs further study and reflection.
NOTES
1. Confucianism is actually a cultural and philosophical tradition, not a religious
tradition, in that it is this-worldly rather than other-worldly and has no priests or
church. Nonetheless, many observers, from Max Weber to Samuel P. Huntington, treat it
as one of the worlds major religious-civilizational traditions, and I will do so in this
essay.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 70.
3. Quotations come from Ibid., pp. 70, 217, 238, 28, and 158, respectively.
4. See Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1971), 13.
Alfred Stepan
57
5. For a much more extensive discussion and for references concerning these additional
criteria, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), ch. 1.
6. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 151.
7. For Max Webers discussion of caesaropapism, see Max Weber, Economy and
Society, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1978), 115963.
8. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Talcott Parsons,
trans., (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1958). Weber, however, is careful not to
commit this fallacy himself.
9. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism; and Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in
the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).
10. For this exchange, see Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with
Lee Kuan Yew, Foreign Affairs 73 (MarchApril 1994): 10929; Kim Dae Jung, Is
Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asias Anti-Democratic Values, Foreign Affairs 73
(NovemberDecember, 1994): 18994; and Lee Teng-hui, Chinese Culture and Political
Renewal, Journal of Democracy 6 (October 1995): 38. The quote from Kim Dae Jung
is from p. 192 of his article in Foreign Affairs.
11. The Analects of Confucius, Simon Leys, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
For Leys discussion of state Confucianism, see p. 108; for state Confucianisms
obliteration of the symmetrical duty of disobedience, see pp. 13436. The quotations are
from pp. 136, 75, and 193, respectively.
12. Adrian Karatnycky, The 1998 Freedom House Survey: The Decline of Illiberal
Democracy, Journal of Democracy 10 (January 1999): 121.
13. For examples of these voices, see the expanded version of this essay, The Worlds
Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the Twin Tolerations, in Alfred Stepan,
Arguing Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2001).
14. See Yasmeen Murshed and Nazim Kamran Choudhury, Bangladeshs Second
Chance, Journal of Democracy 8 (January 1997): 7082.
15. S.V.R. Nasr, Democracy and Islamic Revivalism, Political Science Quarterly
110 (Summer 1995): 279.
16. See, for example, Sumit Ganguly, Pakistans Never Ending Story: Why the
October Coup Was No Surprise, Foreign Affairs 79 (MarchApril 2000): 27. To be
sure, there have been many unfortunate events in Pakistan, such as Pakistani covert support
for the Taliban fundamentalist revolution in Afghanistan, but it would appear that the
major source of such support was from the military and intelligence systems acting
somewhat autonomously. Recent conflicts with India in Kashmir have a similar origin.
17. For a spirited analysis of how Orthodoxy, contra Huntington, is consistent with
democracy and capable of politically significant internal change, see Elizabeth H. Prodromov, Paradigms, Power, and Identity: Rediscovering Orthodoxy and Regionalizing
Europe, European Journal of Political Research 30 (September 1996): 12554.
S y m p o s i u m : Ta l k i n g P e a c e w i t h G o d s , P a r t 2
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
Prospects for Islamic Societies
Religion, secularism, and human rights are interdependent, and the apparent
tensions between any or among all of them can be overcome by their conceptual
synergy. Given the obviously problematic features of their relationships, however,
the interdependence of the three should be deliberately reinforced and stressed
now; indeed each of the three should undergo an internal transformation to
strengthen the already existing synergy. I am using the term synergy to indicate
that the internal transformation of each paradigm or discourse (religion, secularism, human rights) is not only necessary for promoting relationships among the
three but is also facilitated by it: each of the three tends toward transformation in
favor of the other two. Each needs the other two to fulll its own rationale and
to sustain its relevance and validity for its own constituency.
I hasten to add that I am not suggesting the collapse of all related ideas,
institutions, and policies into the framework I am describing. My purpose here
is to highlight the dynamics of one complex process that might contribute to
individual freedom and social justice. Moreover, while I believe that what I am
proposing is potentially applicable to various religious and political contexts, my
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Ta l k in g P e a c e w i t h G o d s : P a r t 2
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primary concern as a Muslim is the prospect for this approach in Islamic societies. That is, I would like to encourage the determined promotionthe strengtheningof this synergy in the interest of legitimizing human rights, regulating
the role of religion in public life, and afrming the positive place of secularism in
Islamic societies. Being from Sudan myself, I am acutely aware that hundreds of
thousands have died, and millions continue to endure untold suffering, because
of widespread confusion over just these issues. Some politicians manipulate that
confusion for their own purposes and thus we require a framework that minimizes it.1 While attempting to outline a theoretical framework that could be of
use in Islamic societies, I hope that others may seek to use it in their own religious
and political contexts.
Working Definitions
The term human rightss is often used, in a rough and intuitive way, to signify the
objectives or the implications of historic struggles for freedom and justice. But
the term can also refer, more particularly, to the conception of individual free1. One such politician is Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi who led
the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan from 1964
until 1999, when he lost an internal struggle for power.
The NIF took control of the state in the military coup of
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COMMON KNOWLEDGE
dom and social justice articulated in the UDHR and further specied in subsequent treaties that enable its implementation. In this latter sense of the termthe
sense in which I use it herehuman rights are due to all human beings by virtue
of their humanity, without distinction on grounds such as race, sex, religion,
language, or national origin. The key feature of human rights, by this denition,
is universality.2 When the denition was rst made in the wake of World War II,
it was viewed by some and opposed as a pretext for imposing the values of one culture on others, and the denition continues to be opposed from this and related
perspectives.3 The idea of overlapping consensus that I will explore takes into
account the conceptual and practical difculties associated with universality and
seeks to resolve them.
The working denition of religion that I use here must focus, obviously, on
those aspects of religion that have special relevance to human rights and secularism. For this limited purpose, religion can be dened as a system of beliefs,
practices, institutions, and relationships within a community that distinguishes
itself from other communities. The key feature of religion in this sense is the
exclusivity of any community of believers, but that is not to say that understanding some religious traditions in more inclusive terms is impossible. In fact, I am
counting on just that possibility to enable an overlapping consensus about universal human rights. But initiatives like the one I am proposing should be founded
on a realization that some form or degree of exclusion (at least moraland often
materialexclusion) seems necessary for vindicating the faith of one religious
community and distinguishing it from that of all others. The denial of other
views, as William Paden has written, is typically a consequence of the need to
protect or afrm ones own. We reject other views when the truth of our own
does not appear to be acknowledged in them.4 In contrast, human rights, by the
UDHR denition, are by nature inclusive of all human beings, irrespective of
membership in any social group.
For the limited purposes of this discussion, secularism may be dened as
a principle of public policy, applied variously in distinct contexts, for organizing the relationship between religion and state. Historical experience shows that
religious exclusivity tends to undermine solidarity and even peaceful coexistence
among differing communities of belief, and secularism apparently evolved as a
means of encouraging pluralism in the state. In any case, my concern with secu-
4. William E. Paden, Interpreting the Sacred: Ways of Viewing Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), 126.
While initially limited by Western experience, the rights that have emerged since
1948 are broader in scope than those guaranteed under the constitutional system of any Western country. The Western origins and immediate antecedents
of human rights have been overtaken by developments reecting the experiences
and expectations of other peoples of the world.
Given that they are intended to protect individuals and groups against the
contingencies of national politics, human rights are supposed to be the product
of international agreement. But the claim of the international community to
act as arbiter in safeguarding minimum standards is not plausible without the
corresponding commitment of each member state to encourage and support
each other in the process. That encouragement and support is crucial in view of
signicant differences in degrees of political will and in institutional capacity
and material resources for the application of these rights in different parts of the
world. It thus follows that one cannot rely on a horizontal enforcement mechanism for human rights among states without a broader cooperative framework of
implementation among a variety of actors. The universal recognition of a single
set of rights is not likely to be useful in practice without international cooperation in implementing it.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that, since the vast majority of African and Asian peoples still suffered under European colonialism in 194648, the
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A n - N a im
larism here is its ability to safeguard political pluralism, though I will argue that
the principle can be applied differently under various regimes of government.
process by which the UDHR was drafted and adopted was not globally inclusive
and so the universality of the rights it proclaimed was contingent on subsequent
developments.6 It can be argued that genuine universality was to some extent
attained through the afrmation of the UDHR by African and Asian states upon
5. Hilary Charlesworth, The Challenges of Human
Rights Law for Religious Traditions, in Religion and
International Law, ed. Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999), 40115.
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COMMON KNOWLEDGE
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Ta l k in g P e a c e w i t h G o d s : P a r t 2
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claims of Christianity and Islam, for instance, call for all human beings to accept
the one true faith. In contrast, the universality of human rights represents, or
is meant to represent, a convergence of differing traditions on a set of universal commitments to all human beings without regard to particularities of (for
example) religion. The former is premised on the superiority of one religion; the
latter, on the equality in principle of differing religious (and cultural) traditions.
In other words, the rationale of religious solidarity is an exclusive one, while that
of human rights is inclusivethough the potential for universality of the latter
remains to be fully realized. The premise of equality requires that no religious or
cultural tradition claim to be the sole foundation for the universality of human
rights. Accordingly, when the foundations for human rights differ across cultures,
we should view them as interdependent and mutually supportive, not antagonistic
and mutually exclusive. The existence of varying foundations for human rights is
intrinsic to the enterprise.
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COMMON KNOWLEDGE
perhaps spirit of the age. Later, secularr came to mean of this world (a conception presuming more than one world), and eventually the distinction between
secular and religious came to overlap with that between the temporal and the
spiritual.8 In the European context, secularization initially meant privatization
or nationalization or conscation of church lands, but eventually the gerund was
applied to politics and then to art and economics.9 This evolution is reected in
the common denition of secularism as indifference to or rejection or exclusion
of religion or religious considerations.10 Equally common is the de nition of
secularism as the doctrine that morality should be based solely on regard to the
well-being of mankind in the present life, to the exclusion of all considerations
drawn from belief in God or in a future state.11
Larry Shiner has identied, and distinguished among, ve denitions of
secularism as (1) the decline of religion, (2) conformity to the norms of the present
( ) transworld, (3) disengagement and differentiation of society from religion, (4
position of religious beliefs and institutions (the shift in focus, for example, from
divine to human power and creativity), and (5) the desacralization of the world
and the sacralization of rationality.12 Yet all these views are at best reections of
how the concept has evolved in various European and North American settings.
Secularism is multidimensional and reects elements of the historical, political,
social, and economic landscape of individual nations.13 In the United States today,
secularism requires a wall between church and state (a permeable wall, albeit:
sessions of the Supreme Court open with the proclamation, God bless this honorable Court). Mexican secularism requires a separation of religion and politics
so strict that Catholic priests are not allowed to vote, and secularism in France is
if anything even more jealously guarded (Islamic and Jewish headcoverings are,
as of this writing, to be proscribed in public schools). But in the secular Republic
of Ireland, the Catholic Church wields so much power politically that abortion
remains illegal on the grounds that it violates church doctrine. Essentially, as
Asghar Ali Engineer has argued, each country has its own specicity as far as
the concept of secularism is concerned. This specicity depends on its historical
evolution as well as on contemporary social conditions.14
Secularism in Islamic societies will not succeed if based on preconceived
8. Uday Mehta, Secularism, Secularization, and Modernity: A Sociological Perspective of the Western Model,
in State Secularism and Religion: Western and Indian Experience, ed. Asghar Ali Engineer and Mehta (Delhi: Ajanta,
1998), 2425.
9. Hugh McLeod, Secularisation in Western Europe, 1848
1914 (New York: St. Martins, 2000), 1.
10. Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., s.v.
secularism.
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Ta l k in g P e a c e w i t h G o d s : P a r t 2
fusion to that of absolute separation between religion and state. The question
is therefore which forms are more consistent with the rationale of secularism
adopted here. Drawing on the premise that secularism is dynamic and deeply
contextual, a recent study of the relationship between religion and state in Britain,
Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and Australia has concluded that
the minimum requirement for a positive relationship is neutrality: that people
are neither advantaged or [sic
[ c] disadvantaged by their adherence to their secular
16
or faith-based tradition. The state should neither favor nor disfavor one particular religious tradition over another.17 The problem with this minimum requirement, however clearly it is necessary, is that no public policy is ever completely
neutral: citizens are always believers (in something). The question, then, is how
people can exercise free democratic choice in accordance with their own beliefs
(religious or otherwise) while the neutrality of the state is maintained. Again, my
conclusions are that (a) the possibility exists only if belief systems are internally
transformed and that (b) belief systems will be transformed only where the interdependence of religion, secularism, and human rights is well established.
But belief systemsreligionsare not the only paradigm that requires
transformation in this dynamic. Secularism suffers from a basic limitation or,
rather, a need for limitation: it must conne its normative content to a minimum
if it is to achieve its purposesafeguarding political pluralism in heterogeneous
societies. In other words, secularism is able to unite diverse communities of belief
and practice into one political community precisely and only because the moral
claims it makes are miminal. All secularisms, it is true, prescribe a civic ethos on
the basis of some specic understanding of the individuals relation to the com-
possible, nor in my view desirable, because religion is not separable from politics.
How can citizens be prevented from acting politically according to their most
basic beliefs? Even were such a requirement established, how could it be enforced
in a way consistent with the integrity and legitimacy of the political process?
There is, theoretically, a continuum of secularisms from the extreme of
A n - N a im
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COMMON KNOWLEDGE
munity. But my point here is that the content of most varieties of secularism is
so narrow that it cannot serve as an interreligious and cross-cultural foundation
for human rights as a universal norm. From a pragmatic or political viewpoint,
this limitation is serious because religious believers will fail to be inspired by the
doctrine of human rights if founded solely on secular grounds. It may be necessary, indeed, to seek a religious justication for the principle of secularism itself.
I am not saying that a serious engagement of religion is essential for either human
rights or secularism to be legitimized (everywhere and always) but rather that
that engagement is necessary to obtain the consent of most religious believers.
And religious adherents constitute the clear majority of all human beings.
A related concern is that secularism is unable to address the objections
or reservations that religious believers may have about particular standards of
human rights or specic principles of secular governance. For instance, since
discrimination against women is often justied on religious grounds (in many
societies throughout the world), these systematic and gross violations of human
rights cannot be eliminated without addressing their allegedly religious rationale.
To do so, however, risks violating freedom of religion, a fundamental human
right as well. A purely secular discourse can be respectful of religion in general,
but its rebuttal of one religions justications for discrimination against women
is unlikely to convince that religions adherents. In other words, the minimal
normative content that makes secularism conducive to interreligious coexistence
diminishes its capacity to support human rights as a universal principle without
reference to some other moral source. Likewise secularism by denition fails to
address the need of religious believers to express the moral implications of their
faith in the public domain. Secularism alone, then, is a necessary but insufcient
condition for realizing the political stability that forms part of its own rationale.
But secularism can be enhanced by insisting on a contextual understanding of the
rationale and functioning of secular government in each location.
their case and for the body of believers to hear and make up their own minds
without fear of retaliation. Those conditions are more likely to be guaranteed
from outside than from inside any given traditionguaranteed, that is, by the
principles of human rights. Again, each element in the tripartite relationship I
have been describing can be called upon to support the other two. They paradoxically, but reliably, depend upon one another.
2.
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Ta l k in g P e a c e w i t h G o d s : P a r t 2
practice. While such claims can only be challenged from within the given tradition of belief and practice, and while there are always believers able to play that
role, the process requires a level of security and stability for dissidents to make
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follow as a matter of course. The agency of some actors will tend to diminish the
social and political space for the agency of others, and moreover the outcome
of every act is likely to be objectionable from some other actors point of view.
Each negative result of human agency will need to be ameliorated by further acts
on the part of individuals.
Most people will consider taking such steps only when conditions enable
them to believe in the possibility of deliberate change. When religious doctrines
(and, for that matter, the doctrines of secularism) are open to free interpretation
and thus renewal, those conditions ourish best. Human agency is always integral
to the interpretation and implementation of every doctrine. Yet the guardians
of orthodoxy everywhere claim eternal validity for their own interpretation and
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COMMON KNOWLEDGE
3.
4.
5.
6.
Human rights need secularism to provide the political stability and peace
among communities of believers and nonbelievers that are necessary for
the protection of those rights.
Secular governments need human rights for normative guidance in the
daily protection of people against the abuse of state power.
Secularism needs religion to provide a widely accepted source of moral
guidance for the political community, as well as to help satisfy and
discipline the nonpolitical needs of believers within that community.
Religion needs secularism to mediate relations between different
communities (whether religious or antireligious or nonreligious) that share
the same political space.
However reasonable and clear these and other possible dimensions of interdependence may seem, one should not expect them to be appreciated or acted upon
readily. Once again: human agency is crucial. It is individuals who must address
the challenge that faces each of the three paradigmsthe challenge to remain
true to its own purposes. The overall advantage of each paradigms remaining
true is that those purposes make benecial change inevitable for all three. Examples follow.
evolution in the meaning and implications of each right would make the UDHR
relevant and useful for the majority of the peoples of the world, not only for privileged elites, and would thus make human rights at last universally human.
It is also accepted by now that the so-called individual human rights can
be achieved only in the context of family and community. This consensus is
clearly reected in the text of more recent UN treaties like the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), as well as in regional documents
like the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1981) and its subsequent
development in other instruments. Even for so-called traditional human rights,
it is clear that respect for freedom of expression is dependent on a contextually
appropriate education that draws on the cultural traditions of a community. Language is obviously fundamental to freedom of expression as well as to education,
but language is anything but individual and private. Thus it would be useful
to transcend the conventional distinction between so-called civil and political
rights, on the one hand, and economic, social, and cultural rights, on the other
hand. It would be equally wise and useful to accept at least the possibility of collective or group rights as integral to the protection of individual rights. If human
rights are about protecting human dignity, and human dignity is dened for some
in their relation to others, then human rights may also be about protecting collective dignity.18 I am not suggesting that every claim to a collective right should
be accepted, but rather that such claims should be given serious consideration
rather than dismissed as simply inconsistent with the individual focus of human
rights doctrine.
I have already indicated that the main challenge for human rights law is to
18. See Rhoda Howard, Dignity, Community, and
Human Rights, in Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, ed. An-Naim (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 81.
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Ta l k in g P e a c e w i t h G o d s : P a r t 2
expression. The state would implement this right by providing educational and
other public facilities enabling all segments of the population to pursue knowledge, exchange information, and formulate independent views. But the people
for whom that education, that expansion of the right to free expression, would
be most meaningful tend to be those who lack shelter and food or are ravaged
by disease. It is therefore sensible and imperative to abandon efforts to classify
human rights or to establish some categories as superior to others. Moreover, this
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to the extent that they are understood as means for realizing higher claims upon
the state. For example, freedom of expression has traditionally been understood
as a negative freedom: the state should refrain from action that infringes on the
right of people to express their opinions. But taken as an afrmative obligation,
this right would do more than allow for the passive consumption of others free
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COMMON KNOWLEDGE
reconcile the international respect for state sovereignty with the international
commitment to protect human dignity. Even a state that refuses to commit to
a positive obligation, as embodied in a treaty, may still in international law be
bound to uphold that obligation if it is held to be jus cogens, an overriding general
principle. These principles include proscriptions of slavery, genocide, torture, and
apartheid. State sovereignty is subordinated to jus cogenss in these instances; but
with respect to most human rights, sovereignty takes precedence in international
law. It is principally this problem that mandates transformation of the UDHR
paradigm for human rights: if state sovereignty is regarded in international law
as above most concerns for rights, then human agency must operate resourcefully
to ensure enforcement of the UDHR within recalcitrant states. I do not believe
that sovereignty should be minimized and human rights enforced by the international community. While intellectuals and governments alike are beginning
to regard human rights enforcement as the humane side of globalization, there is
also evidence that powerful states will further their own foreign-policy objectives
by claiming to enforce human rights in developing countries. Still, the dynamics associated with globalizationeconomic and security interdependencecan
be used to redress these drastically negative consequences. The global nature
of political coercion and economic deprivation calls for correspondingly global
strategies of response, and these are facilitated by the same mechanisms and technologies that make the negative consequences possible.
I do not mean to suggest that human rights provide the answer to all problems of differential power relations, whether locally or beyond. Rather, my point
is that human rights need to be owned by different peoples differently, otherwise they will be perceived as simply another mode of Western coercion. In
other words, legitimating human rights in local cultures and religious traditions
is a matter of vital importance for the survival and future development of the
human rights paradigm itself. Religions must also be encouraged, from within,
to provide moral underpinnings for fresh development of the paradigm in order
to address emerging issues in differing contexts. The contribution of secularism to these critical developments must be to provide the political stability and
communal security essential for negotiating a unique and dynamic relationship
between human rights and religion in every setting internationally.
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while it could dominate the government of the day by majority will, would be
unable (at least in theory) to threaten the essential interests of any segment of
the population.
I hope it is clear that I am not urging the development of liberal or liberation theologies within the framework of each major world religion. What I
am saying is that problems of authority and representation often frustrate the
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Ta l k in g P e a c e w i t h G o d s : P a r t 2
idea of religion.19 Politics and religion do not operate in distinct realms; the one
continually informs and is informed by the other. The concept of the secular
lacks motivating power and lives off that of the religions it checks and balances.
As Harold Berman puts it: people will not give their allegiance to a political and
economic system, and even less to a philosophy, unless it represents for them a
higher, sacred truth. People will desert institutions that do not seem to them to
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with neighboring non-Islamic communities that share their ethnic and cultural
afliations, historical experiences, economic resources, and political and security
concerns than they have in common with other Islamic communities (say, in
sub-Saharan Africa). In other words, Muslims understanding and practice of
Islam are conditioned more by what may be regarded as extra-religious factors
than they are by any abstract, settled, and in whatever way divinely sanctioned
conception of the religion.
Second, there has always been a signicant diversity of theological and jurisprudential viewsand of political opinion and practicewithin and between
Islamic communities. Profound political and theological differences have divided
Muslims from the beginning in the Arabia of the seventh century, leading to civil
wars over issues of political power within three decades of the Prophets death in
632. Serious disagreements over the interpretation and implementation of Islamic
doctrine have long since resulted in the distinctive religious factions and schools
of jurisprudence called madhahib (singular madhhab), as well as in wide differences
of opinion within each school. Muslim scholars and communities at large routinely cite this diversity of opinions and beliefs as a positive feature of their faith.
This diversity is likely to become more intense and widespread under modern
conditions of education and communication. There are now greater opportunities
for disagreement (as well as consensus) as more Muslims, women included, are
educated enough to assess the Quran, Sunna, and Islamic history for themselves
and to communicate with others around the world about theological and political
issues of common concern. Disagreement is logically integral to religious experience because human beings do not truly believe where disbelief is not an option.
This proposition may sound modern and liberal but is made in 114 verses of the
Quran (and is rooted in Islamic theological and philosophical discourse since the
eighth century). Verse 18 of chapter 29, for example, reads: Tell them that Truth
is revealed from God, and let those who wish to believe, do so, and those who wish
to disbelieve, do so. But as I have argued elsewhere, the real issue is the framework of interpretation and not simply the presence of texts that can be variously
understood.22 In other words, it is human agency that determines which texts are
relevant to the issue at hand and how they should be interpreted.
Islamic life today is not guided solely by Muslim principles, and religious
views within the Islamic world are and always have been very diverse: it is in light
of these two recognitions that Islamic communities need to consider the relationship between Islam (under its various interpretations) and the global doctrines
of secular government and human rights. First, it must be recognized that any
ral, secular concerns of human beings and have practical relevance only because
those responses are believed to be practically useful in the daily lives of the people
they address. Some Muslims think that these propositions undermine belief in
the divine source of Islam. They fail to appreciate, however, that the Quran
and Sunna are not manifestations of divinity in the abstract; they are directed at
human beings living human lives.
The presumed incompatibility of Islam and secularism derives from terminological as well as substantive confusions, and clarifying matters of denition
should help frame the substantive issues in more precise terms. The main problem, from this perspective, is the tendency to limit understanding of secularism to
the Western experience with Christianity since the eighteenth century. Whether
viewed as separation of church and state or disestablishment of religion, such
denitions are specic to given settings and do not address the continuing social
and political role of religion in public life even in those settings. For instance,
efforts to sever institutional links between religion and the state cannot apply to
the role of religion in politics: there is no way of knowing, much less disallowing, the motives of an individuals political action. It is also problematic to equate
secularism with disregard for religion, or with a diminishing role for religion in
public life, as some scholars have done.23 To say that religion has no inuence in
societies with secular governments is obviously false, so the question becomes
what sort of inuence and, if the inuence is diminishing, in what ways? It is time
that we rethink secularism as a kind of relationship between religion and state
that varies, religion by religion and state by state. The form that this relationship takes in a given setting is the product of organic development over time and
needs, if it is to succeed, to be accepted as legitimate by the population at large; it
cannot be expected to drastically change a political and religious situation instantaneously via constitutional enactment or political rhetoric.
23. See notes 1012 and related text, above.
73
Ta l k in g P e a c e w i t h G o d s : P a r t 2
A n - N a im
sharp distinction between the sacred and the secular in the Islamic world itself is
misleading. Muslims believe that the Quran is the literal and nal word of God
and that Sunna is the second divinely inspired source of Islam. But the Quran
was revealed in Arabic, a human language that evolved historically, and many
normative parts of the Quran address situations in Mecca and Medina specic
to the time that the Prophet conveyed them. Sunna, moreover, responded to
immediate concerns that emerged in speciable contexts, whatever the broader
implications that Sunna may have for later times and different places. Human
agency, in other words, was integral to the revelation, interpretation, and practice of Islam from its beginning in the seventh century. In any case, the Quran
and Sunna cannot be understood except as applied by human beings temporally
and in particular contexts. Religious precepts necessarily respond to the tempo-
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75
Ta l k in g P e a c e w i t h G o d s : P a r t 2
are bound to face. What follows, accordingly, are three very brief case studies to
highlight this perspective.
A n - N a im
be, but (3) that these two needs cannot be satised without transformation of the
standard ways of understanding Islam. These three points make my theoretical
case for the synergy and interdependence of Islam, secularism, and the modern
doctrine of human rights. But the synergy I propose is already developing in a
variety of Islamic societies, and what is needed are ways of facilitating these processes and overcoming the limitations and difculties that such developments
76
COMMON KNOWLEDGE
gious traditions in order to do so. And the Western origin of human rights doctrine does not prevent these women from claiming UDHR rights for themselves
or from seeking to reevaluate and adapt those norms to suit their own cultural,
religious, and political situations (14248). Freedom of religion, a norm of human
rights doctrine, gives these women the power to choose, among Islamic traditions, those most compatible with their own belief in other UDHR rights. Invoking global norms of human rights enables Muslims like these Egyptian women to
challenge dated and regressive understandings and practices. Thus, human rights
and secularism help such Muslims avoid the difcult choice of either rejecting
their religion entirely or abandoning their own human dignity.
At the same time, the invocation of human rights, and also secularism,
enables those who feel more completely alienated to leave the Muslim religion
altogether, as some members of the secular womens movement in Egypt have
indeed chosen to do. It is critical for the moral integrity of the religion itself that
people be free to stay or leave the community at willthat they not be forced
or intimidated into the pretense of belief and hypocritical practice. The relative
neutrality of the Egyptian state in religious matters is important in maintaining
peace and stability in a country that has a signicant Christian minority as well as
the usual diversity of beliefs among its Muslims.27 Unfortunately, in attempting
to respond to the threat of militant Islamic fundamentalism, the present Egyptian government tends to limit freedom of religion and other human rights for all
segments of its population.28 For example, in 1992 private mosques in Egypt were
nationalized so that sermons promoting violent extremism could be censored.
Ironically, while this state control of Islamic discourse tends to inhibit the exercise of human rights among the majority of Muslims, it is not always successful in
suppressing Islamic militancy. The fact that the mosque has become a contested
political arena undermines the secular nature of the state and its role as guardian of human rights. A better appreciation of the interdependence of religion,
secular government, and human rights would enable the state and civil society to
cooperate in upholding the integrity of all three paradigms as the foundation of
political pluralism.
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Ta l k in g P e a c e w i t h G o d s : P a r t 2
belief that the removal of Islam from public life in Sudan is not an option.31 On
the other hand, the notion of an Islamic state is obviously untenable in view of the
profound religious and cultural diversity of the country as a whole.32 The impo-
A n - N a im
human rights and religion throughout the Islamic world. Recent developments
in Sudan illustrate how ambiguities about the relationship between Islam and
the state have gured in the political instability and retarded socioeconomic
development of the country since it gained independence from colonial rule in
1956. These ambiguities are also among the causes of the civil war waged in the
southern part of the country, rst from 1955 to 1972, then again from 1983 to the
present.29 The main political parties in the northern part of the country, which
is predominantly Muslim, are unable to dispute claims made by the National
Islamic Front that the country must be governed by an Islamic state and Sharia
enforced as the law of the land.30 This situation has given the National Islamic
Front a grossly exaggerated inuence in the country and has promoted a general
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right to freedom of belief and dissent.36 Sudan is thus a clear case of the need
for usfor the individuals involvedto nurture the existing synergy of Islam,
religiously neutral governance, and UDHR rights.
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I have tried to underscore that peoples and individuals need make no choice
among religion, secularism, and human rights. The three can work in synergy.
But there is a related choice that does need to be made: whether or not to attempt
mediating tensions among the three paradigms. I would myself urge both scholars and policymakers to take responsibility for that mediation rather than permit
further damage to be done by belief in the incompatibility of religion with secular
government and human rights. Whether we should adopt, develop, and implement any given approach to this mediation (the one that I have outlined here or
any other approach) is not a foregone conclusion, imposed by impersonal forces.
It is a human choice and will be made by individuals.
Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and
Secular Democracy
Author(s): Murat Somer
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 7 (2007), pp. 1271-1289
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20454998 .
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Moderate
Opposition
Islam
Routiedge
and Secularist
in Turkey:
implications
and
secular
democracy
MURAT SOMER
ABSTRACT Developing an argumentbased in theoriesof democraticconsolida
tion and religious competition,and discussing the reasons for the secularist
opposition to thegovernment,thisarticle analyses how governmentby a party
rooted inmoderate Islamismmay affectTurkey's peculiar secular democracy,
developmentand external relations and howMuslims in theworld relate to
modernization and democracy.Arguing that secularism in advanced democ
raciesmay be a product of democracyas much as it is theotherway around, the
articlemaintains thatdemocratic consolidationmay secure furtherconsolida
tionof Turkish secularism and sustainable moderation of Turkish political
Islam. Besides democratic Islamic- conservative actors and other factors,
democratic consolidation requires strong democratic- secularist political
parties so that secularist and moderate Islamist civilian actors check and
balance each other.Otherwise,middle class value divisionsandmistrust inareas
like education and social regulationmay jeopardise democratisation and
economicmodernisation and continuingreconciliationof Islamismwith secular
democracy and modernity.
The main goal of this article is to examine what the current divisions in
Turkey over political Islammay implyfor theway we envision the relation
ships between religion, Islam and modernisation, especially the relationship
between democratic consolidation and secularism.
Following its landslide electoral victory in July2007, Turkey's governing
AKP (Justiceand Development Party), a party rooted in Islamism, has been
solidified as a leading political actor and given a historical opportunity to
reshape Turkey's social and political mainstream. How will this affect
Turkey'smodernisation, secular democracy and external relations,and what
Murat
Somer
is in the Department
of International
Relations,
College
of Administrative
Sciences
and
Economics,KojcUniversity,
RumeliFeneriYolu, Sarlyer,34450 Istanbul,Turkey.
Email: musomer(@,ku.edu.tr.
? 2007 ThirdWorldQuarterly
ISSN 0143-6597print/ISSN1360-2241online/07/071271-19
DOI: 10.1080/01436590701604888
1271
MURAT SOMER
does all thismean for the world in regard to Muslims' relations with
modernity and secular democracy? At first,the answers to these questions
seem to depend on the nature of the AKP itself:whether it is a secretly
Islamist,moderate Islamist, or Islamic-conservative democratic party, and
how sincere its commitments are to secular democracy. Alternatively one
may ask to what extent Islamic principles, or, for thatmatter, religious
principles, can be compatible with secular democracy in the long run, a
critical question throughout theworld.
A more complete analysis reveals that the party's legacywill depend as
much on theparty's own nature and decisions as itwill on the nature and
decisions of the secularist political actors. There are no fixed answers. The
AKP as a party and ideology, and moderate Islamism in general, are dyna
mic. Religious politics is a product of both itsown roots and itsdomestic and
internationalpolitical and economic milieu. One can foreseedifferent
AKPs,
and thus differentprospects forTurkish secularism, depending on various
factors such as Turkey's political system,economic development, external
support, and social divisions over values. The key interveningvariable is
democratic consolidation.
The establishment and, so far, performance of the AKP forms a major
example of the 'moderation' of political Islam through the embrace of
democracy,modernity and liberal global economy, as opposed to 'radical'
Islamism,which pursues an Islamic state, as in Iran or Saudi Arabia.1 The
party defines itselfas conservative democratic, and its record in government
since 2002 'has been markedly moderate'.2 It has achieved path-breaking
reformsin democratisation, and continuous economic stabilityand growth.
It secured thestartof Turkey's EU accession talks in 2005. It became the first
governingparty since 1960 to have thecourage to stand up to themilitary's
interferencein politics by publicly denouncing themilitary's criticismof the
government.3
1272
SECULARIST OPPOSITION
IN TURKEY
world.
1273
MURAT SOMER
overtones.
In this case Turkey and theworld would face a hard choice between
two authoritarian forces: one secular-nationalist and the other Islamic
conservative nationalist. Neither forcewould be able to deepen democratic
modernisation because competitive nationalist agendas would produce
inward-looking economic policies and would exacerbate the Kurdish
conflict by deepening the resentmentsof Turkish Kurds. Sunni Muslim
nationalism would also alienate theAlevi Muslim population. Because of
theirweak democratic credentials, both forceswould also face problems
in deepening relations with the EU and the USA. Relations with the
USA might also be undermined more directly because Turkey may
venture to invade northern Iraq, despite US disapproval. All in all,
Turkey would remain a flawed democracy and a failed economic miracle
at best, and a case of democratic reversal and a semi-developed economy
at worst.
The third and most promising scenario could occur if the AKP is
checked and balanced by strong secularist political parties thatmanage to
translate secularist and nationalist concerns into political programmes
combining modernisation with furtherdemocratisation. Thus, henceforth,
by strong secularist parties, I will be referringto voter support as well as
ability to produce well thought-out social and economic programmes,
minimise corruptionwithin party ranks, and to build long-term linkswith
constituencies. In this case pragmatists within the AKP would remain in
control in order to appeal to mainstream voters. Both Turks and the
world would have a healthy choice between two projects of democratic
modernisation in Turkey, one Islamic- conservative but largely secular,
and one secularist. Secularist voters would no longer look to themilitary
as a guarantor of secularism because the AKP's project of moderate
Islamisation would be checked by democratic secularist forces. Islamic
conservatives would not need to capitalise on religious nationalism or
Islamic radicalism because theywould have a fair chance of coming to
power through democratic processes and implementing some of their
agenda. This scenario would also have a good chance of sustaining
rapid economic development and deepening relationswith theEU and the
USA.
To accurately gauge the likelihood of each scenario and the consequences
for 'secularism',we need a closer look at the secularist grievances and the
theoretical links between secularism and democracy.
1274
SECULARIST OPPOSITION
IN TURKEY
society.
The rallies, however, indicated a more complex riftwhich was hard for
outside observers to describe.Was the riftabout piety versus non-piety?
Secular enlightenmentversus religious revivalism?Class conflict?The mass
participation in the rallies contradicted the framework of 'secular elites
versus Islamic masses', with which outside observers are accustomed to
analysing conflicts over secularism inMuslim societies. Some journalists
wrote about 'secularized Turks aspiring to a Western lifestyle'.11Some
described a 'chasm between the secular and the pious', implying that
piousness, a matter of faith,and secularism, an ideology or set of values of
separating faithand worldly affairs,exclude each other. 2Others referredto
'urban, secular Turks' versus 'the broad base of devout Turks from the
country's heartland'.13
Secularism and moderate Islam as middle class phenomena
The new religious- conservative elite are challenging the status of the
secularist state elite.The new elite ascended to power by challengingold-style
Islamists of theErbakan traditionand culturallyMuslim -conservative yet
secularist politicians of theDemirel tradition.Economically competition is
occurring between the secularist big business elite and the recentlyemerged
Islamic- conservativebusiness elite.'4After all, theAKP came to power when
both thepolitical centre and part of the economic centre collapsed in 2001
following financial crises.Most Turks correctlyblamed the corruption of
political and economic elites for the crises.
However, more than an elite struggle,thecurrentbattle isoccurring in the
socio-cultural realm between twomiddle classes: the secularistmiddle class
1275
MURAT SOMER
shortly.
1276
SECULARIST OPPOSITION
IN TURKEY
1277
MURAT SOMER
Thus the fact that the AKP has not changed 'a single law that directly
challenged the secular constitution' is little comfort to the party's
opponents.22 The new breed of moderate Islamic parties in theworld has
fewer ideological and state-centred,and more cultural and society-centred
goals.23 Arguably Islamism could not produce political projects
envisioning Islamic states and political spheres with indigenously Islamic
rules and goals.24Thus its focusmight have shiftedto creating Islamic social
spheres.
1278
SECULARIST OPPOSITION
IN TURKEY
investments.
1279
MURAT SOMER
Democratic consolidation
Democratic consolidation is a theoretical construction often described as
democracy becoming 'theonly game in town'.32More specifically,it can be
conceptualised as the strengtheningof democracy such that it becomes
unthinkable for the great majority of the political actors to reverse
democraticallymade decisions, curtail basic freedoms and employ coercive
means to pursue political gain, even during severe political and socio
economic crises. This definition only defines an ideal outcome which in
practice can only be approximated. It is not an absolute state. Any
democracy can revertto authoritarianismunder certain circumstances.
Arguably, however, in an advanced democracy itwould requiremajor
upheavals in circumstances fora reversal to become imaginable. By contrast,
inunconsolidated democracies such reversalsare easily 'thinkable',creatinga
vicious circle.Knowing thatoverall commitment to democracy is low,people
invest in authoritarian safeguards,which furtherdiminish overall commit
ment to, and quality of, democracy.
Thus, democratic consolidation requires that themajor political actors
build a certain degree of trustamong each other.Actors must believe that
other actors will not use democracy to pursue goals that are fundamentally
threateningto them.Otherwise theywill keep authoritarianpractices such as
supporting military interventionswithin their portfolio of thinkable
practices. They will do so as a credible threat to deter their 'rival' actors
from actions they see as unacceptable. They will also be willing to limit
democratic freedoms to prevent other actors frompursuing theirunaccep
table agenda.
From the secularists'perspective, theemergenceof such trustrequires that
Islamic- conservative actors embrace secularism fully,ienot only instrumen
tally but as a long-termcommitment.According to this view, democratic
consolidation hinges upon the consolidation of secularism. This view is
prevalent among Turkish secularists.Former president Sezer and thechiefof
staffhave accused theAKP of embracing secularism 'inwords only'.33 In
other words, secularists accuse Islamists of 'preference falsification':
embracing secularism publicly but not privately.34
Democratic consolidation and secularism
Some preference falsification prevails among Turkish Islamists because
politicians who dare to question secularism publicly face vicious public
campaigns from the secularists. It is rational for partymembers to keep
certain thoughts to themselves.
However, what theykeep inprivatemay not necessarilybe an opposition to
secularism altogetherbut adherence to a more Islamic version of secularism.
Secularists and Islamic - conservativeshave differentconceptions of secular
ism, emphasising differentaspects of it. Islamic - conservatives highlight the
aspect of freedomof religion.Secularists emphasise the separation of religion
and state.35
1280
SECULARIST
OPPOSITION
IN TURKEY
religion.
1281
MURAT SOMER
are created by the political system as a whole, ie its laws and institutions,
customs and norms, political parties, and voters. For twin tolerations, these
checks and balances should also be flexibleenough to keep religious actors
within thedemocratic game.
By comparison the AKP and its constituency now display a stronger
rhetorical commitment to democracy. Western-style democracy, Turkey's
EU prospects and open economy provide freedoms that aid the pursuit of
more religious freedoms and a revised secularism.However, whenever the
EU integrationseemed towork toprotect secularist interestsor to undermine
an Islamic agenda, the AKP turned critical of the EU processes. This
happened, forexample,when theEuropean Court of Human Rights turned
down a Turkish woman's application against the headscarf ban, and when
theEU pressured theAKP towithdraw itsproposal to criminalise adultery.37
The strengthof theAKP'S commitment to democracy is as yet insufficiently
clear when it requires the upholding of the freedoms of secularists and of
disadvantaged groups such as ethnic Kurds, women, gays, or the Alevi
minority who are demanding the same privileges as the Sunni Muslims.
Importantly, it is also unclear what the party's reformedsecularismwould
look like.
Such examples do not necessarily imply that theAKP's Western outlook
and democratic commitments are insincere.The AKP'S ideology should be
seen as an ongoing project. The party's constituency includes Islamic
conservative, and, partially, secular-liberal business groups and middle
classes,who stand to gain fromeconomic integrationwith theworld, which is
made possible by a democratic system.38Furthermore, a large literatureon
the ideological moderation of religious parties suggests that ideological
If Turkey's democratisation can
moderation follows political moderation.
be sustained, theAKP's moderation can also be sustained.
The path to sustained moderation is still a difficultprocess, however.
Democratic consolidation will requirecontinuing economic development and
external support,andmajor ideological adaptation, fromboth secularistsand
Islamists, to be achieved and become sustainable. In particular, themilitary,
which continues to enjoy high public prestige,will have to shed its long
traditionof interferinginpolitics.40
While a coup isunlikely, themilitary now
to
seems prefer 'softer'methods to influencepolitics, such as announcements
criticisingthegovernmentand the involvementof the retiredmilitary officers
in civil society organisations and themedia. A military conflictwith Iraqi
Kurds may increase themilitary'sweight inpolitics.41The riseof pan-Kurdish
nationalism in the regionposes a great threat toTurkish democracy.
A solid EU commitment to Turkey's EU prospects would greatly benefit
democratic consolidation. Simultaneously, democratic consolidation itself
would increase the Europeans' support of Turkey's membership, while
reducing the public's support of themilitary's political role.
From the perspective of creating inter-actor trust,one weakness of the
Turkish case is that the AKP does not call itself Islamist, or, for that
matter,Muslim - democratic. This raises questions about theAKP's ability
to speak for Islamists and to make long-term commitments in their
1282
SECULARIST
OPPOSITION
IN TURKEY
streets.
1283
MURAT SOMER
1284
SECULARIST OPPOSITION
IN TURKEY
1285
MURAT SOMER
relations?
forces.
reduced.
1286
SECULARIST OPPOSITION
IN TURKEY
Notes
The author would like to thank Ziya Oni?, Peter Skerry and the participants in the international workshop
and Democratization',
on 'Islamist Parties and Constituencies,
Domestic
and External Mechanisms,
and Talha ?st?ndag
25-26 May 2007, Ko? University, Istanbul, for comments. H?nde ?zhabes,
provided
valuable
research assistance.
Journal of
'The rise of Muslim
Islamism, see, among others, V Nasr,
democracy',
of Turkish political
16 (2), 2005, pp 13-27. On the moderation
Islam, see N G?le,
Democracy,
East Journal,
of elites and counter-elites', Middle
'Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making
in Turkey: toward a reconciliation?', Middle
'Islam and democracy
51 (1), 1997, pp 46-58; M Heper,
'Political Islam at the crossroads: from hegemony to co
East Journal, 51 (1), 1997, pp 32-46; Z ?ni?,
'From the ashes of
and RQ Mecham,
existence', Contemporary Politics, 7 (4), 2001, pp 281-298;
virtue, a promise of light: the transformation of political Islam in Turkey', Third World Quarterly,
1 On moderate
2004, pp 339-358.
25(2),
2 JF Hoge, Jr, 'Turkey at the boiling point', International Herald Tribune, 22 May 2007. For the party's
ve
see Y Akdogan,
AK Parti
to formulate
its ideology of conservative
democracy,
attempts
Istanbul: Alfa, 2004.
Demokrasi
(AK Party and Conservative Democracy),
Muhafazakar
3 S Tavernise,
'Government of Turkey warns army', New York Times, 29 April 2007; 'Government hits
'Who
interference in election process', Today's Zaman, 28 April 2007; and G G?kt?rk,
in the face of military's warning', Turkish Daily News, 5May 2007.
4 HB Kahraman,
Turk Sagi ve AKP (Turkish Right and the AKP), Istanbul: Agora, 2007. The party's
Islamist Fazilet
founders split from the more conservative
(Virtue) Party when they lost in 2000 the
election for that party's presidency by a close margin. The AKP won the 2002 elections when Turkish
back at military
acted how
to destroy themainstream parties, which they blamed for the financial crises of 2000 and
'A new path emerges', Journal of
the party's emergence, see Z ?ni? & EF Keyman,
Yavuz
and HM
(ed), The Emergence
of A New Turkey:
14(2), 2003, pp 95-107;
Democracy,
and the AK Parti, Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2006.
Democracy
in 2000, see Yeni ?afak,
27 March
G?l
5 For two informative interviews with Abdullah
2000, and
voters decided
2001.
For
5 June 2000.
Radikal,
see F Ahmad,
The Making
6 On Turkey's
secular modernisation,
Turkey, New York:
of Modern
and National
& R Kasaba
1993; S Bozdogan
Identity in
(eds), Rethinking Modernity
Routledge,
'Turk Modernle?mesi,
of Washington
Press,
1997; ? Mardin,
University
Turkey, Seattle, WA:
'Turkish Islamic
Makaleler
4' (Turkish Modernization,
Essays 4), Istanbul: iletisjm, 2003; and Mardin,
in operational
codes',
yesterday and today: continuity, rupture and reconstruction
exceptionalism
Turkish Studies, 6 (2), 2005, pp 145-165.
7 Among others, JL Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, New York: Oxford University Press,
'The rise ofMuslim democracy'. For a recent critical account, see J Schwedler, Islamist
1995; and Nasr,
Parties in Jordan and Yemen, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
8 Among others, 'Secularists stage mass protest in Turkey', International Herald Tribune, 13May 2007.
9 In August 2002, Abdullah G?l became Turkey's eleventh president.
10 In Turkey, there is a ban on the wearing of headscarves by government employees and by students and
professors on university campuses. The proponents of the ban claim that its object is its use in a specific
Islamic style, which they call 'turban' and claim that it is used as a political symbol. The opponents of
the ban prefer the term 'headscarf, argue that the ban targets the students' personal religious choices,
and highlight the fact that in effect the ban restricts any type of headscarf.
International Herald
11 'Stability doubts despite early elections move',
Tribune, 3 May
2007, emphasis
added.
12 'Secularism versus democracy', The Economist,
3May 2007.
'Turkish presidential candidate withdraws, as voting stalls again', New York Times, 1May
13 S Tavernise,
2007.
14 Among others, see A Bugra, 'Political islam in Turkey in historical context: strengths and weaknesses',
inN Balkan & S Savran (eds), The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey,
Science Publishers, 2002, pp 107-144; EF Keyman & B Koyuncu,
New York: Nova
'Globalization,
of Turkey', Review
and the political
alternative modernities
economy
of International Political
and European
12 (1), 2005, pp 105-128;
Stability Initiative, Islamic Calvinists: Change and
Economy,
in Central Anatolia, Berlin/Istanbul:
Conservatism
Stability Initiative, 2005.
European
'TurkModernle?mesi, Makaleler
15 For competing accounts of Turkish secularism, seeMardin,
4'; and N
in Turkey, New York: Routledge,
1998. For accounts
of
Berkes, The Development
of Secularism
see
of Turkish religious markets,
'laicism vs secularism', and 'objective and subjective secularisation'
South Atlantic Quarterly,
A Davison,
state? The challenge of description',
'Turkey, a "secular"
a view based on the
M
'Turkish religious market(s):
102 (2-3),
2003, pp 333-350;
Introvigne,
and EF Keyman,
The Emergence
of a New Turkey, pp 23-48;
religious economy theory', inYavuz,
1287
MURAT SOMER
secularism and Islam: the case of Turkey', Theory, Culture & Society, 24 (2), 2007,
'Modernity,
pp 215-234.
16 See J Fox, 'World separation of religion and state into the 21st century', Comparative Political Studies,
39 (5), 2006, pp 537-569;
and A Stepan,
and the twin tolerations',
in
'Religion, democracy,
L Diamond,
MF Plattner & PJ Costopoulos
Baltimore, MD:
(eds), World Religions and Democracy,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005, pp 3-23.
& B Toprak, Degi?en Tiirkiye'de Din, Toplum
17 For empirical evidence on these points, see A ?arkoglu
ve Siyaset (Religion, Society, and Politics in a Changing Turkey), Istanbul: TESEV Yaymlan,
2006.
et al, World Religions
'Muslims and democracy',
in L Diamond
18 Among others, see A Filali-Ansary,
and Democracy.
'A fatwa free-for-all in the
19 For a recent commentary based on other Muslim
countries, seeM Sackman,
Islamic world', International Herald Tribune, 11 June 2007. The 'moderate center in Turkish religious
markets'
could prevent a conservative outcome.
p 41.
Introvigne, 'Turkish religious market(s)',
20 On
deregulation
'Deregulation
pp 350-364.
21 See T Kuran,
see LR Iannaccone,
R Finke & R Stark,
leading to 'vitality' in religious markets,
of religion: the economics
of church and state', Economic
Inquiry, 35 (2), 1997,
23 Nasr,
'The rise of Muslim
democracy'.
see O Roy, The Failure of
24 For the argument that Islamism has failed to create a political model,
Political Islam, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
& Toprak, Degi?en Tiirkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset.
25 ?arkoglu
'Presidential pick in Turkey is sign of a rising Islamic middle class',
26 Among
others, see S Tavernise,
New York Times, 25 April 2007.
International Herald
27 See 'Turkey calms markets with appointment',
Tribune, 18 April 2006. For a
critical account, see Y Kanli,
'Eligibility or ideology', Turkish Daily News, 2 April 2006.
836 Nakil',
'Diyanetten MEB'e
(836 transfers from Religious Affairs to Education Ministry) Radikal,
13May
2007.
29 'The AKP government's attempt to move Turkey from secularism to Islamism (Part 1): the clash with
2005.
Turkey's universities', memri Special Dispatch Series, 1014, 1November
1 June 2007; and 'Prayer scandal at
30 See 'Parents reveal scandal at high schools', Turkish Daily News,
'A secular Turkish city feels
15 June 2007. See also S Tavernise,
Bagcilar High School', Today's Zaman,
28
Islam's pulse beating stronger, causing divisions', New York Times, 1 June 2007.
31 Statistics from the Turkish Treasury.
Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South
32 JL Linz & A Stepan, Problems of Democratic
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. See also
America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, MD:
G O'Donnell
A Przeworski,
'The games of transition', in S Mainwaring,
& JS Valenzuel
(eds), Issues in
IN: University of Notre Dame
Democratic
Transition, Notre Dame,
Press, 1992.
to Northern
33 Among
others, 'Top general calls for a cross-border
Iraq', Turkish Daily
operation
14 April
13 April 2007; and 'System faces its greatest threat since 1923', Turkish Daily News,
News,
2007.
Islam and Mammon.
34 For preference falsification, see Kuran,
35 Among
others, see 'Sezer: definition of secularism clear', Turkish Daily News, 6 February 2007; and
F Dish,
1 February 2007.
'Sezer stokes secularism debate', Today's Zaman,
36 Stepan, 'Religion, democracy, and the twin tolerations', p 8.
37 See H Smith, 'Turkey split by plan to criminalize adultery', Guardian, 6 September 2004; F Zakaria,
27 August 2004; and V Boland,
'Mutual incomprehension
'How not to win Muslim
allies', Newsweek,
between Turkey and EU', Financial
38 See references in note 13.
Times,
27 August
2006.
in T Kselman
'Unsecular politics and religious mobilization',
& JA Buttigieg
(eds),
Notre
IN: University
of Notre
Christian
Dame
Dame,
Press,
2003,
European
Democracy,
pp 293-320.
40 HW Lowry, 'Betwixt and between: Turkey's political structure on the cusp of the twenty-first century',
inM Abramowitz
(ed), Turkey's Transformation and American Policy, New York: Century Foundation
the Turkish case in
and T Demirel,
'Lessons of military regimes and democracy:
Press, 2000, pp 61-93;
a comparative perspective', Armed Forces & Society, 31 (2), 2005, pp 245-271.
39 SN Kalyvas,
41 An
unsuccessful
society.
42 Kalyvas,
promise
43 Stepan,
1288
military
'Unsecular
of light'.
'Religion,
adventure
politics
democracy,
and
and
in Iraq may
also
religious mobilization';
the twin tolerations',
decrease
the military's
and Mecham,
p 8.
'From
prestige
and
the ashes
status
in
of virtue, a
SECULARIST OPPOSITION
IN TURKEY
'Muslims and
the importance of philosophical
such as these, see A Filali-Ansary,
questions
in D Potter, D Goldblatt, M Kilch & P Lewis
and NH Ayubi
'Islam and Democracy',
democracy';
The Polity Press, 1997, pp 345-366.
(eds) Democratization,
Cambridge:
45 Among others, H Smith, 'Fury at Turkish ban on bikini ads', Guardian, 22 May 2007.
in Turkey, Boulder, CO:
46 Among others, see S Sayan & Y Esmer (eds), Politics, Parties, and Elections
Lynne Rienner, 2002.
47 However,
since 1961 voter preferences have roughly been stable between 'left' and 'right' parties, with
some shift to the right during the 1990s. For a recent contribution, see Y Hazama,
Electoral Volatility
44 For
49 Lowry,
'Betwixt and between', p 24.
50 Ibid. See also Sayan,
'The changing party system'.
51 Among others, S Tepe, 'A pro-Islamic party? Promises and limits of Turkey's Justice and Development
The Emergence
Party', inYavuz,
of a New Turkey, pp 107-135.
52 M Heper,
'The consolidation
of democracy versus democratization
in Turkey', Turkish Studies, 3 (1),
2002, pl41.
53 Lowry, 'Betwixt and between', p 39.
in Turkey', New York Times, 1May 2007.
54 'Secularism and democracy
JA Cheibub
& F Limongi
'What makes
democracies
in
Przeworski, M Alvarez,
endure?',
L Diamond, MF Plattner, Y Chu & H Tien (eds), Consolidating
the Third Wave Democracies:
Themes
and Perspectives, Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997; also see DL Epstein, R Bates,
I Kristensen & S O'Halloran,
J Goldstone,
'Democratic Transitions',
American Journal of Political
Science, 50 (3) 2006, pp 551-569. All figures are in purchasing power parity US dollars. Nominal GNP
per capita was $5477 in 2006.
55 A
56 E
pp
?zbudun,
179-196.
'Democratization
reforms
in Turkey,
1993-2004',
Turkish
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(2),
2007,
1289