120 ETHOS

The Narrative Organization of Collective

Memory
James V. Wertsch

Abstract Collective memory is analyzed from the perspective of narrative organization. Specifically, narratives provided by a sociocultural context, especially the modern state, are examined
in their capacity to serve as cultural tools for members of a collective as they recount the past. The
power of these tools to shape collective remembering is examined with the help of a distinction
between specific narratives and schematic narrative templates. The former include information about
specific dates, places, actors, and so forth, whereas the latter are abstract forms of narrative
representation and typically shape several specific narratives. The utility of these notions is assessed
by examining the expulsion-of-foreign-enemies schematic narrative template that shapes much of
Russian collective memory, both during the Soviet period and post-Soviet periods. [collective memory,
narrative, schematic narrative template, Russia]

Collective memory is a representation of the past shared by members of a group such as a

generation or nation-state. The modern study of this topic is usually traced to the writings
of the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (18871945), who argued in the early part of
the twentieth century that remembering is shaped by participation in collective life and that
different groups generate different accounts of the past (Halbwachs 1980).
In the 1920s and 1930s Halbwachss ideas about collective memory were considered by
some as interesting, but incomplete, and by others as fundamentally flawed. Partly as a result
of criticism by figures such as Frederic Bartlett (1995), these ideas received relatively little
attention for several decades. More recently, however, collective memory and related
notions such as public memory (Bodnar 1992) have re-emerged in academic disciplines
such as anthropology (Cole 2001), history (e.g., Novick 1999), sociology (e.g., Alexander
2002), and psychology (e.g., Pennebaker et al. 1997). An interest in collective memory is also
to be found in popular culture with its debates about memory for the Vietnam War, the
Holocaust, and other such topics.

Strong and Distributed Accounts of Collective Memory

Collective memory is often understood in terms of loose analogies with memory in
the individual. Many discussions of Americas memory about Vietnam, for example, seem
ETHOS, Vol. 36, Issue 1, pp. 120135, ISSN 0091-2131 online ISSN 1548-1352. & 2008 by the American Anthropological
Association. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1352.2008.00007.x.

NARRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 121

to presuppose that America is some sort of large organism that has intentions, desires,
memories, and beliefs just as individuals do, something reflected in assertions such
as: Americas collective memory of Vietnam makes it reluctant to accept combat
deaths.
Assumptions about this issue are often not well grounded and have been the object of
legitimate criticism. Bartlett was critical of the more or less absolute likeness [that] has
been drawn between social groups and the human individual (1995:293), and he warned
that collectives do not have memory in their own right. As Mary Douglas (1980) and
James Wertsch (2002) have noted, Bartlett may have misinterpreted Halbwachs in this
debate, but the general cautionary note he sounded deserves attention. Bartlett himself
argued that memory of individuals is fundamentally influenced by the social context in
which they function. Indeed, a central point of his argument is that social organisation
gives a persistent framework into which all detailed recall must fit, and it very powerfully
influences both the manner and the matter of recall (1995:296). In short, he espoused
a position that recognized memory in the group, [but] not memory of the group
(1995:294).
Claims about memory of the group constitute a strong version of collective memory
(Wertsch 2002), and when made explicit, they have usually been rejected. An alternative that
recognizes memory in the group without slipping into questionable assumptions about
memory of the group is a distributed version. From this perspective, memory is viewed as
being distributed: (1) socially in small group interaction, as well as (2) instrumentally in
the sense that it involves both people and instruments of memory (Wertsch 2002). In the
case of social distribution, for example, Mary Weldon (2001) has examined the collaborative remembering that occurs when groups of individuals work together to recall
information or events from the past.
Instrumental distribution, the focus of what follows, involves agents, acting individually
or collectively, and the cultural tools they employ, tools such as calendars, the Internet, or
narratives. An important transformation of memory in human cognitive evolution occurred
with the emergence of various forms of cultural tools, thus allowing for external symbolic
storage (Donald 1991). This does not mean that such memory somehow resides in texts or
records, but it does mean that with the rise of new forms of external symbolic storage such as
written texts or the Internet, the possibilities for remembering undergo fundamental
change.
Such change has both psychological and social dimensions. Or to borrow the formulation of
Jerome Bruner it involves mind as somehow inside and subjective [as well as] culture as
outside and superorganic (this issue). An implication of this is that by becoming skilled at
using a certain set of cultural tools, new mental habits and schemata emerge that shape
remembering for members of a collective (Bartlett 1995).

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Narratives as Textual Resources for Collective Memory

Borrowing from Bruner (1990, 2002), Mikhail Bakhtin (1986), and Lev Vygotsky (1987), I
formulate a distributed version of collective memory by examining how it is fundamentally
organized by the textual resources it employs, especially textual resources in the form of
narratives, both spoken and written. From this perspective, collective remembering involves
an irreducible tension between active agents and textual resources, and it calls for the
analysis both of textual resources and the specifics of how they are used by active agents.
An account of collective memory grounded in these notions emphasizes the power of
narrative to shape representations of the past. As Bruner notes, the implications of such an
approach are sometimes surprising in that they go against the common sense that stoutly
holds that the story form is a transparent window on reality, not a cookie cutter imposing a
shape on it (2002:67). Bruner goes on to argue that narrative is our preferred, perhaps
even our obligatory medium for expressing human aspirations and their vicissitudes, our
own and those of others. Our stories also impose a structure, a compelling reality on what
we experience, even a philosophical stance (2002:89).
The definitions of narrative and collective memory are notoriously contested, and my task in
what follows is not to provide an overview of either. Instead, I focus on the more limited task
of examining how a few aspects of narrative play a role in organizing collective memory. One
issue I take up is a distinction between two levels of narrative analysis, specific narratives
and schematic narrative templates.
I also examine the issue of narrators voice. Bruner notes that narrative requires something
approximating a narrators perspective: it cannot, in the jargon of narratology, be voiceless (1990:77). My particular interest is in how more than one voice is reflected in narrative
performance. What I have in mind derives from the fact that the textual resources used to
produce narratives invariably have a history of use by others. Paraphrasing Mikhail Bakhtin
(1981:293), this means that narratives are always half someone elses, and it leads to questions about how narrators can coordinate their voice with those of others that are built into
the textual resources they employ. I shall be especially concerned with how the perspective
of the modern state is manifested in collective memory about events such as wars and
political movements.

Specific Narratives and Schematic Narrative Templates

When speaking of the narrative organization of collective memory, we usually have in mind
items from a stock of stories (MacIntyre 1984) about the past. The items in this cultural tool
kit (Bruner 1990) typically are narratives having to do with specific events, which means that
they qualify as what I call specific narratives. The events involved in specific narratives are
uniquely situated in space and time, and they may have occurred during ones own lifetime or in
earlier periods.

NARRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 123

In what follows, however, I argue that the study of collective memory requires taking into
account a second level of narrative organization, one concerned with general patterns rather
than specific events and actors. This level of narrative organization is grounded in what I call
schematic narrative templates. These narrative templates can produce replicas that vary in
their details but reflect a single general story line. In contrast to specific narratives, these
templates do not deal with just one concrete episode from the past. Instead, each takes
the form of a generalized schema that is in evidence when talking about any one of several
episodes.
The notion of a schematic narrative template can be traced to a variety of sources. One of
the most important of these is the Russian folklorist Vladimir Propp. In developing his line
of reasoning about Russian folk tales, Propp focused on recurrent constants (1968:20) that
can be found across many narratives. Because a tale often attributes identical actions to
various personages, Propp believed it possible to study the tale according to the functions
of its dramatis personae (1968:20).
This focus on abstract functions means that each of several specific events and actors meets
the criteria of a generalized function in a narrative. In Propps view, Functions of characters
serve as stable, constant elements of a tale, independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled (1968:21). He identified an extensive network of generalized functions such as THE
VILLIAN RECEIVES INFORMATION ABOUT HIS VICTIM (1968:28) and THE
VILLIAN IS DEFEATED (1968:53).
For my purposes the value of Propps ideas about narrative functions derives from his
general line of reasoning rather than detailed claims about particular functions, claims that
were developed in connection with Russian folk tales. Specifically, I am concerned with the
notion that a generalized narrative form may underlie a range of narratives in a cultural
tradition. This means that the focus in analyzing the narrative organization of collective
memory changes from a list of specific narratives to an underlying pattern that is
instantiated by each of several specific narratives.
Switching from folklore to psychology, an analogous line of reasoning may be found in the
writings of Bartlett (1995). His classic book Remembering spawned a host of research efforts
that continue to this day in the psychology of memory. In Bartletts view human cognitive
functioning is usually more of a constructive process (1995:312) than a product of stimuli,
and this led him to examine the generalized patterns or schemata brought to this process
by the agent doing the constructing.
Bartlett took as a starting point for his inquiry the assumption that one can speak of every
human cognitive reactionperceiving, imagining, remembering, thinking and reasoning
as an effort after meaning (1995:44). This effort is grounded in tendencies which the subject
brings with him into the situation with which he is called upon to deal (1995:44). Bartlett
discussed these tendencies in terms of schemes that are utilised so as to make [the

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subjects] reaction the easiest, or the least disagreeable, or the quickest and least obstructed
that is at the time possible (1995:44).
The writings of figures like Propp and Bartlett contribute different points to an understanding of schematic narrative templates. Drawing on both of them, the point is that
narrative templates are schematic in the sense that they concern abstract, generalized
functions of the sort that Propp discussed in his structural analysis of folk tales or that
Bartlett discussed under the heading of schemalike knowledge structures. They are
concerned with narrative, a point that is explicit in Propps writings and consistent with what
Bartlett proposes. And the notion of template is involved because these abstract structures
can underlie several different specific narratives, each of which has a particular setting, cast
of characters, dates, and so forth.
Before going further, it is worth noting that schematic narrative templates are not some sort
of universal archetypes. Instead, they belong to particular narrative traditions that can be
expected to differ from one cultural setting to another. Another attribute they share is
that they are not readily available to consciousness. As Bartlett noted, they are used in an
unreflective, unanalytical and unwitting manner (1995:45).

A Natural Laboratory for Collective Memory Studies: Russian Accounts

of WWII
To develop the distinction between specific narratives and schematic narrative templates, I
turn to a natural laboratory for the study of collective memory, namely, Russia during its
transition from Soviet to post-Soviet times. This setting has witnessed a transition from
strict, centralized control over collective memory to open, if not chaotic public debate and
disagreement, and the result is that it provides examples of an unusually wide range of
collective memory forms. At the same time, many aspects of this natural laboratory illustrate
state control of memory that can be found anywhere in the world.
My focus on the state control of collective memory is not meant to suggest that states are
the only social entities concerned with memory. Clearly, groups of all types are routinely
concerned with the past, and for a variety of reasons. However, the state is an obvious focus
of study since it has engaged in the largest single effort to control collective memory
in modern times (Wertsch 2002). Its capacity to control the production, and often the
consumption, of the narrative resources employed in understanding the past is unmatched
by any other collective.
The specific episode of Russian collective memory that I examine is WWII. In contrast to
events such as the Russian Revolution and the Russian Civil War, events that have been
fundamentally reemplotted in post-Soviet official history (Wertsch 2002), WWII has
undergone less of a transformation in Russian collective memory. The most plausible reason

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for this is that it serves as a dominant myth (Weiner 1996) that played a central role in
Soviet life and continues to be positively viewed in post-Soviet Russia.
In many respects Russian collective memory for WWII has undergone striking change
during the transition from Soviet to post-Soviet times. These changes have been noted by
many, often with great concern. Older generations in Russia have been alarmed at what they
see as the loss of memory for the war, especially among the generation that came of age after
the breakup of the Soviet Union.
To understand this generational difference, I present three essays that were written in 1999
or 2000 by Russians of different ages in response to the request: Please write a short essay
on the theme: What was the course of the Second World War from its beginning to its
conclusion? These essays were drawn from a larger study involving 38 adults ranging from
22 to 78 years of age. All of these adults had received their primary and secondary education
during the Soviet period. In addition, 139 younger subjects who had finished high school in
the post-Soviet era were included. These essays were part of a larger study based on the
analysis of history textbooks and of essays and interviews from Russians of various ages
(Wertsch 2002). The three narratives reflect a transition from a highly regimented and
officially sanctioned collective memory, to a more critical form, and finally to an account of
the past that retains only the skeleton of previous versions.
The first essay I examine comes from a 55-year-old man in the first group who was from
the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. It was written in 1999 in Russian. The following is my
translation.
The Second World War began September 1, 1939 with the seizure of Poland by Fascist
Germany. The goal of this invasion was to bring their forces to the border of the Soviet
Union for a future attack on it. For this the general headquarters of Hitler worked out
the so-called plan Barbarossa, which indicated the direction of the main strike by Germany and the further conduct of the war on the territory of the USSR. According to the
intention of Hitler and his brothers-in-arms, this war had to be flash-like (a Blitzkrieg) and unexpected. This was realized on June 22, 1941. German forces crossed our
western borders and began attacks along the entire front from Barents Sea to the Black
Sea. But the main attack was toward Moscow, which they approached in the fall of 1941.
Lacking success there, the Germans changed tactics and decided to force their way
through to the Volga in the area of Stalingrad and make their way to Moscow from
there. But they also experienced failure there. The war took on a long, drawn-out
character. The basic turning point occurred after the Battle of the Kursk salient, where
the back of the Fascist beast was broken. The Red Army went over to the attack and
began to liberate the Soviet land, a task that was finished in 1944. Then began the liberation from the Fascist yoke of the countries of Eastern Europe, where our army was
welcomed as liberators. In May of 1945 Germanys capitulation was accepted, and May
9 was declared the day of victory. In 1946 the Nuremberg Trials were begun, where the
Fascist ringleaders were judged.

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At many points in this essay, the voice of the Soviet state comes through so clearly that
readers might be tempted to ask: Who is really doing the speaking? Expressions such as
Fascist Germany and the Fascist beast are striking in this regard. As is the case for any
narrative, the Bakhtinian answer to this question is: At least two voices. In this case there
are elements in the text that belong to this 55-year-old man producing a text in 1999 in
Novosibirsk. At the same time, however, it is possible to hear the voice of the Soviet state
and the MarxistLeninist-inspired history teaching that was so closely controlled by its
central authority.
In this connection it is also worth noting what was not mentioned in this essay. Consistent
with late Soviet official history of WWII, Stalin has been discretely left out of the picture. In
contrast to earlier Soviet accounts of this episode from the 1940s or the beginning of
the 1950s, accounts that would have extolled the deeds of the Great Leader, and also,
ironically, in contrast with post-Soviet accounts that once again recognize Stalins role in
WWII, there is no mention made of him in this essay. During much of the time this man was
learning about WWII in Soviet schools, Stalins picture and name had been airbrushed out
of history textbooks and the media. Also in keeping with the voice of official history from the
late Soviet period, there is no mention of embarrassing episodes such as the secret protocol
in the MolotovRibbentropp Pact.
In addition to the expressions used in this narrative, the voice of the Soviet state is reflected in
how events are emplotted. The basic structure of official Soviet narratives about WWII was
built around a small set of events. These appeared in Soviet textbooks and other official
accounts, as well as in Soviet-educated subjects essays and interviews about WWII. This
standard narrative could be extended or elaborated, but it was inconceivable to those who had
mastered it that any one of a core of basic events could be missing. These events, all of which
are included in the account provided by this subject provide the basic plot structure of the
Great Patriotic War from this perspective. They are:
1. the German invasion of USSR on June 22, 1941
2. the Battle of Moscow, winter of 194142
3. the Battle of Stalingrad, winter of 194243
4. the Soviet victory over the German army and the march to Berlin and victory on
May 9, 1945
In actuality, this is the basic plot structure for the Great Patriotic War that Soviet and
post-Soviet Russians consider to be the main act of WWII. From this perspective, events in
places like Poland, Holland, Denmark, and Great Britain before the German invasion of
the Soviet Union, as well as events in the Pacific following Germanys surrender in 1945,
provide surrounding material for events on the central stage of this great struggle.
Reviewing this 55-year-olds essay, some events are familiar to U.S. or western European
perspectives. For example, the beginning of the war in 1939 is an obvious candidate in this

NARRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 127

regard, but even this is re-emplotted in this subjects essay as being a preliminary chapter to
the invasion of the Soviet Union. Other events are not likely to be so familiar, however. In
particular, taking the Battle of Stalingrad or the Kursk salient as the major turning point in
the war is not something that is part of the story line most likely to be known in the West.
Furthermore, the fact that any mention of events such as the attack of Pearl Harbor or
D-Day is missing provides a reminder that the textual resources around which the Soviet
narrative was constructed are different from those commonly employed in the West.
In addition to controlling the selection of events included in specific narratives about
the past, official state accounts usually involve a particular level of description of these
events. Namely, they are presented as mid-level events (Wertsch 2002). In general, events
can range from being narrowly defined and concrete, involving particular, identifiable
individuals acting in a limited, local setting to vaguely defined happenings involving
unspecified actors and settings. Events of the former sort can be termed concrete and
those of the latter sort abstract. For example, Hitlers committing suicide would qualify as
a concrete event if it is not situated in a larger political setting. In contrast, the suffering
inflicted in WWII concentrations campsat least when described in these vague terms
counts as an abstract event since it does not specify the agents involved or the setting in
which they acted.
The notion of a mid-level event falls between concrete and abstract events. In state sponsored collective memory, midlevel events such as the Battle of Stalingrad typically involve
groups operating in an extended, but clearly identified setting. Individuals can also be the
actors in midlevel events as long as they are presented as acting on behalf of, or as leaders
of collectives, especially political groups. As was the case for virtually all Soviet-educated
subjects in a larger study (Wertsch 2002), this 55-year-old organized his account of WWII
around midlevel events. This reflects the textual resources he was required to master in
Soviet history education, resources such as history textbooks that focused on events such as
wars, revolutions, and other political happenings.
In sum, there are several indications that the narrative resources used in this essay were
provided by central authorities of the Soviet state. One can detect the voice of this state in
the expressions used, in the events that were and were not included, in the emplotment
of these events, and in their level of description. Of course these narrative resources are
strikingly different from those likely to be used in Western Europe or North America, and
this provides a reminder of why and how collective memory is socioculturally situated and
hence a relevant topic for the sort of cultural psychology envisioned by figures such as
Bruner (this issue).
The second essay about WWII that I examine was written by a 15-year-old boy in 2000, also
from Novosibirsk. This is a student who has lived almost entirely in the post-Soviet period
and whose education has been carried out completely in that context. Again the original is in
Russian and translated by me. He wrote:

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After its defeat in the First World War, Germany wants revenge, but at that time it was
weak, with massive unemployment. Then Krupp, the well-known arms producer, looks
for a person who would lead Germany to victory. This person turned out to be Hitler,
whose election campaign Krupp organized. Hitler becomes chancellor and is guided by
ultrarightist, nationalistic ideas. In a short while he brings order to Germany through
criminal means and executions. Then the output of the massive military technology
sector increases: Germany is prepared for war.
In August of 1939 German forces invade Poland. The USSR and Germany conclude a
pact and agree not to attack one another. The Germans seize many countries in Europe,
bomb England, and in 1941 (June 22), attack the Soviet Union. Stalin orders that all
strategically important factories be moved from the eastern regions of the USSR to
Siberia and behind the Urals. Only in 1943 did the output of arms in the relocated
factories rise to its former levels. Since there were many more factories than in
Germany, we gained the advantage. In the course of several battles (the Kursk salient,
Stalingrad, Moscow) Soviet forces mounted a massive blow on the Germans and went
over to the offensive. In this manner they got to Berlin from the east. At the same time,
the USA and England, in order to receive the laurels of victory attained by the USSR,
launched an attack from the west and also marched to Berlin.
On May 9, 1945 Germany capitulated, but the war still went on with its ally Japan. Then
in an agreement between the victorious parties Germany was divided up.

This students essay has some similarities, as well as some important differences with that of
the 55-year-old examined earlier. He made at least a passing mention of all four of the items in
the basic plot structure of the Great Patriotic War outlined above. In contrast to the older
subjects essay, however, there are several indications here of the loss of centralized state
control over collective memory. For example, this young student organized a good deal of his
essay around the movement of Soviet industry beyond the Urals, an episode that probably
reflects the local perspective of the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. The 55-year-old who wrote
the first essay above was also from Novosibirsk and probably knew much more about this
chapter of the Soviet war effort than did the 15-year-old. However, the narrative resources the
older subject employed when writing his essay, resources that had been much more closely
controlled by centralized state authority during his socialization than was the case for the
15-year-old, did not accord great importance to this episode, and this is probably why it did
not appear in the older subjects account.
Other differences between the two essays emerge in terms of the level of description of
events. In several instances the student presented events as growing out of the motives of an
individual such as Krupp, Hitler, or Stalin. It is certainly possible to encounter the names of
these three individuals in accounts of WWII provided by older subjects. However, in such
accounts they would be mentioned in connection with a wider set of specific events rather
than as isolated individuals who are guided primarily by their own motives.
This tendency to focus on concrete, as opposed to midlevel events, is characteristic of many
of the younger subjects who participated in the larger study from which this example is
drawn (Wertsch 2002). Instead of bringing individuals into the picture because they reflect

NARRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 129

the motives and actions of larger groups, they were often presented as being guided by
individual, self-centered motives. Hence this 15-year-old attributed Hitlers rise to Krupps
decision to hand pick someone who could lead Germany in ways that would be of direct
personal interest to him and, perhaps, his familys company. In contrast, the only mention of
Hitler by the 55-year-old was in connection with large-scale collective action of a nation.
The two essays I have outlined differ in some interesting ways. The older subject produced
an account that was constrained by the voice of centralized state authority in a fairly standard way. In the larger study from which his case was selected, Soviet-educated subjects
generally produced accounts that were quite similar to his, reflecting the efficacy with which
the Soviet state controlled the production and use of narrative resources in collective
memory. In contrast, while the 15-year-old did include the four basic events that would be
obligatory for older subjects (something that is not true for many other younger subjects in
the larger study), his essay also includes local information that was not part of the standard
account provided by the central Soviet government, and he did not represent events at
the midlevel as they were typically presented in official state history during the late Soviet
period. In short, this younger subject was apparently less constrained by the rigid form of
official history provided by the state, instead using a mixture of his and others interpretations and perspectives.
While recognizing these differences, it is important to keep in mind the overall similarities
between these two essays, at least compared to what many of the younger, post-Soviet
subjects produced. In many cases the responses of these younger subjects barely qualify
as essays at all. They were characterized by their brevity and lack of content and by the
appearance of the individual writers voice in the form of critical, even dismissive comments.
Such responses are often viewed by members of the Soviet-educated generation as shocking,
if not blasphemous. On reading these accounts, their response was one of anger, or sometimes resigned laughter. In this connection, the 15-year-olds essay presented above is an
exception rather than the rule.
As an example of what many of the younger subjects in this study produced when asked to
write about WWII, consider the following essay written by a 15-year-old from Moscow
in 2000:
The beginning [of the war] was very unexpected for the whole world except for Hitler.
Also unexpected was the massive amount of bloodshed, the human losses, the Fascist
concentration camps. The emergence of a second Napoleon, Adolf Hitler, was also
unexpected and strange. The course of the war was hard for the countries of the
defenders. Terrible, hard, bloody.

This sort of essay is considered shocking, humorous, or pathetic by Soviet-educated

Russians. It is difficult for them to accept the idea that memory for an event that is such an
important source of Russian pride and identity could have disappeared so completely, and it

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is what lies behind dismissive statements about younger Russians knowing nothing
about history. Such assessments are problematic, however, because they leave little more than
an account of what younger Russians are not doing and no insight into how the collective
memory of this generation might be taking shape. While it may be true that members of this
younger generation are less capable of providing details about events such as WWII, they
clearly do have ideas and strong opinions about the past, and there is a need to specify what
these are.
To begin with the negatives, however, this last essay includes only an indirect reference to
only one of the midlevel events usually mentioned by Soviet-educated subjects (the beginning of the war). Instead of constructing an essay around events like the battles of Moscow
and Stalingrad, this subject used information about Hitler as an individual, hence relying on
information that places the agency for events in a concrete individual rather than in midlevel
entities such as German forces or Hitlerites. In addition, he included information
about other issues at such an abstract level that they hardly qualify as events at all (e.g., the
massive amount of bloodshed, the human losses, the Fascist concentration camps). These
are what I earlier called abstract events, which contrast with midlevel events in that they
are not specific as to time and place.
In short, this third essay is largely devoid of specific, midlevel event descriptions. This is one
indication that the voice of centralized state control has been diminished to the point of
disappearing and is in the process of being replaced by whatever members of the younger
generation can come up with. At least during the years immediately following the break-up
of the Soviet Union, an important fact about Russia seems to have been the loss of state
control of collective memory (Wertsch 2002).
It may appear at first glance that this students essay is simply devoid of coherent information
or is simply the product of his unique imagination and voice. Again, however, such a
characterization only says what the student was not providing in the way of an account of
WWII. In what follows, I argue that others voices and textual resources are still very much
part of the picture. The key to understanding what these are lies in a particular schematic
narrative template.

The Russian Expulsion of Foreign Enemies Narrative Template

The particular organizational device that can provide insight into all three essays I have
provided, but is particularly useful when trying to make sense of the third one, is what I term
expulsion of foreign enemies schematic narrative template. This template may be
instantiated using a range of concrete characters, events, dates, and circumstances, but its
basic plot remains relatively constant and contains the following items:
1. An initial situation (Propp 1968:26) in which Russia is peaceful and not interfering
with others.

NARRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 131

2. The initiation of trouble in which a foreign enemy viciously and wantonly attacks
Russia without provocation.
3. Russia almost loses everything in defeat as it suffers from the enemys attempts to
destroy it as a civilization.
4. Through heroism and exceptionalism, and against all odds, Russia, acting alone,
triumphs and succeeds in expelling the foreign enemy.
To some it may appear that there is little that is peculiarly Russian about this narrative
template because it may be found just about anywhere. For example, by replacing Russian
with American, it would seem to provide a foundation for American collective memory of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. My point is not that this narrative template is
available only to members of the Russian narrative tradition or that this is the only schematic narrative template in this tradition. Indeed, this is a cultural tool employed by many
people around the world, and there are other items in the cultural tool kit of the Russian
narrative tradition. However, there are some points that suggest this template plays a
particularly important role and takes on a particular form in the Russian narrative tradition
and hence in collective remembering.
The first of these concerns its wide use. Whereas the United States and many other
societies have accounts of past events that fit this narrative template, it is my experience
that it is employed much more widely in Russia than in many other places. It forms the
basic plot line for several of the most important events in Russian history including
the Mongol invasion in the 13th century, the Swedish invasion in the 18th century,
Napoleons invasion in the 19th century, and Hitlers invasion in the 20th century. Indeed,
many would say this narrative template is the underlying story of Russian collective
remembering, and hence contrasts with items that people from other nations might
employ. For example, it contrasts with American items such as the mystique of Manifest
Destiny (Lowenthal 1992:53) or a quest for freedom narrative (Wertsch 1994; Wertsch
and OConnor 1994).
An obvious reason for the ubiquity of this narrative template in Russian collective
remembering is that it reflects actual experience. Over its history, Russia clearly has been
the victim of several invasions and other acts of aggression, and I do not wish to
argue that this narrative has no foundation in actual events. Instead, my intent is to
examine how this narrative template serves in what Bartlett called the effort after
meaning that shapes remembering everywhere. As Bruner (2002:67) has put it, this
narrative template is a cookie cutter imposing a shape on peoples understanding of
the past.
When trying to make sense of the third essay presented above, the triumph-over-alienforces narrative template can provide especially useful insight. For example, the comments
about bloodshed and human loss reflect item 3 in this narrative template. And the emphasis
on the unexpected nature of the attack suggests that Russia was peaceful and non-threaten-

132 ETHOS

ing as specified in the initial situation or first element of the narrative template. Perhaps
most striking in this regard, however, is this subjects comment about Hitler as a second
Napoleon. This comment suggests that he viewed the two figures as being essentially
similar and that in his view the story of Hitler and WWII is basically the same as the story of
Napoleon and the invasion of Russia in the early 19th century. These two stories appear to
be stamped out of the expulsion of foreign enemies template, and for all practical purposes
can be reduced to it.
To some it may appear that this students use of the parallel between Napoleon and
Hitler grew out of some original (although simple) analogy that he came up with
himself. However, Hitler as a second Napoleon is a notion with which at least a substantial
number of young people in Russia are familiar. Although this parallel was seldom drawn
in such a blatant way as in the case of this young man, the younger subjects in this study were
generally less likely to give details of specific narratives and more likely to rely
on generalities from the schematic narrative template than the older, Soviet-educated
subjects.
In short, the expulsion-of-foreign-enemies schematic narrative template is consistent with
all three of the essays presented above. In the first two cases, it can be viewed as providing an
underlying narrative form that is fleshed out with a set of events, the difference being that in
the first essay these were midlevel events, whereas in the second some actors and episodes
were presented at a more concrete level.
In contrast, the third essay contains very little information about events at any level. Instead,
it is largely devoid of specific information. One response to this might be simply to dismiss
this and many other members of this young generation in post-Soviet Russia as revealing no
collective memory for WWII. However, there are indications in this young mans essay
that he was a member of a collective with a memorya memory specific to his national
perspective, however devoid his account may have been of the details found in the essays of
older subjects who had been educated in the Soviet period.
The key to this is to examine his essay for things that are included rather than listing all the
items that are not. His mention of Hitler as a second Napoleon, something that was not
found in older subjects essays, provides insight into what he was doing. Instead of providing
a set of midlevel event descriptions that instantiates a specific narrative version of the schematic narrative template in this case, he simply gestured toward this narrative template with
the mention of Hitler as a second Napoleon. In short, he came about as close as possible
to representing the past in terms of little other than a schematic narrative template and had
very little to say at any level that would constitute a specific narrative about WWII. While
this tack appeared only rarely, and only among subjects of the post-Soviet generation, its
appearance at all is revealing of a particular underlying structure that can be found in most
subjects effort after meaning.

NARRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 133

Conclusion
In this article I have argued that understanding the narrative organization of collective
memory may require invoking more than one level at which this organization exists. Specifically, I have identified two levels of analysis: specific narratives and schematic narrative
templates. Although much of what we would call collective memory for an event such as
WWII involves the first, and by implication the second as well, there may be instances
where there is little evidence for narratives at any level of specificity. In the absence of specific narratives, it may be tempting to conclude that all representation of the past has simply
disappeared, but such an assessment brings with it some serious drawbacks. Specifically, it
provides an account only of what subjects are not doing and provides little insight into the
transformations that give rise to new forms of collective memory.
The striking absence of specific information about actors and events in the third essay presented above certainly does suggest that collective memory has undergone important change
in post-Soviet Russia. However, what this 15-year-old did include in his essay indicates that
some organized version of collective memory for WWII is still very much intact.
The paucity of detailed information in his account probably reflects the temporary loss of
state control over collective memory in post-Soviet Russia. This was manifested in the
chaotic situation of history instruction in Russian schools in the 1990s (Wertsch 2002).
However, what he did include in his account is coherent to at least some degree and differs
markedly from what anyone in North America or Western Europe would be likely to
recognize, let alone produce.
This coherence almost certainly reflects the continuing influence of spontaneous Russian
nationalism rather than state control. Hence even in the absence of such control a recognizable perspective continues to exist thanks to the functioning of a schematic narrative
template, and the narrative remains half someone elses, just as was the case for the first two
essays examined above.
JAMES V. WERTSCH is Marshall S. Snow Professor in Arts and Sciences at Washington
University in St. Louis.

Note
Acknowledgments. The writing of this article was assisted by a grant from the Spencer Foundation. The statements made and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

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