G.R. No.

179594

September 11, 2013

process right of the petitioners. On appeal, there

was no new issue of fact that arose in connection
with the question of prescription, thus it cannot be
MANUEL UY & SONS, INC., Petitioner,
said that petitioners were not given the opportunity
vs.
to present evidence in the trial court to meet a
VALBUECO, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
factual issue. Equally important, petitioners had the
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure opportunity to oppose the defense of prescription in
their Opposition to the Supplemental Motion for
provides:
Reconsideration filed in the appellate court and in
41
Section 1. Defense and objections not pleaded. - their Petition for Review in this Court.
Defenses and objections not pleaded whether in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed In this case, petitioner raised the defense of
waived. However, when it appears from the prescription for the first time before this Court, and
pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the respondent had the opportunity to oppose the
subject matter, that there is another action pending defense of prescription in its Comment to the
between the same parties for the same cause, or petition. Hence, the Court can resolve the issue of
that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by prescription as both parties were afforded the
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the opportunity to ventilate their respective positions on
the matter. The Complaint shows that the
claim.37
Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed on
November 29, 1973, and payments were due on
38
In Gicano v. Gegato, the Court held:
both Conditional Deeds of Sale on November 15,
1974. Article 114442 of the Civil Code provides that
x x x (T)rial courts have authority and discretion to
actions based upon a written contract must be
dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when
brought within ten years from the time the right of
the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show
action accrues. Non-fulfillment of the obligation to
it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles,
pay on the last due date, that is, on November 15,
Feb, 15,1954; Sison v. Mc Quaid, 50 O.G. 97;
1974, would give rise to an action by the vendor,
Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961;Cordova v.
which date of reckoning may also apply to any
Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb.
action by the vendee to determine his right under
28, 1958;32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136
R.A. No. 6552. The vendee, respondent herein, filed
SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a
this case on March 16, 2001, which is clearly beyond
motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court),
the 10-year prescriptive period; hence, the action
or an answer which sets up such ground as an
has prescribed.
affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule16), or even if the
ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in
a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 Sablas v. Sablas, G.R. No. 144568, July 3,
2007, 526 SCRA 292, 298
SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been
asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is
Petitioner correctly points out that the rule is
found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA that a defendant's answer should be admitted where
250;PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; it is filed before a declaration of default and no
Chua Lamco v.Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821);
prejudice is caused to the plaintiff. Indeed, where
the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period
the defendant is declared in
or where a defendant has been declared in default but before
(PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, default and there is no showing that defendant
to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse intends to delay the case, the answer should be
of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently admitted.
and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in
October 11, 2012
the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or G.R. No. 194122
otherwise established by the evidence.39
HECTOR HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
40
Moreover, Dino v. Court of Appeals held:
SUSAN SAN PEDRO AGONCILLO, Respondent.
Even if the defense of prescription was raised for the
first time on appeal in respondent's Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court's
decision, this does not militate against the due

the MeTC denied due course to petitioner's Answer

on the ground that the Motion for Extension was not
seasonably filed and that the Answer was filed
beyond the period requested in the Motion for

Extension, thus, justifying the order of default. Thus, REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT BY
the principle enunciated in Sablas is not applicable DEFAULT PREVAILING PARTY NOT AUTOMATICALLY
in the present case.
ENTITLED TO RELIEF; CASE AT BAR. Nowhere in
the aforequoted provision nor in the summons
In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA in its issued by the respondent court is it stated that the
ruling that procedural rules are not to be ignored or petitioners are automatically entitled to the relief
disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.
prayed for, once the respondents are declared in
default. Favorable relief can be granted only after
Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the the court has ascertained that the evidence offered
adjudication of cases.25 Courts and litigants alike and the facts proven by the presenting party,
are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.26 While in petitioners in this case, warrant the grant of the
certain instances, the Court allows a relaxation in same. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to require
the application of the rules, there is no intention to presentation of evidence if everytime the other
forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the party is declared in default, a decision would
rules with impunity.27 The liberal interpretation and automatically be rendered in favor of the nonapplication of rules apply only in proper cases of defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor
demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the Rules
circumstances.28 While it is true that litigation is not nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause. In the
a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every instant case, from the evidence presented ex-parte
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the by the petitioners and from their very own
prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and allegations, the only judgment that is warranted is
speedy administration of justice.29 Party litigants the dismissal of the complaint. It is barred by the
and their counsel are well advised to abide by statute of limitations.
rather than flaunt procedural rules for these rules G.R. No. 151098
March 21, 2006
illumine the path of the law and rationalize the
pursuit of justice.30
ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO GAJUDO, JR.,
ESTELITA GAJUDO, BALTAZAR GAJUDO and
Moreover, while the Court frowns upon default DANILO ARAHAN CHUA, Petitioners,
judgments, it does not condone gross transgressions
vs.
of the rules.31 The Court is duty-bound to observe
1
its rules and procedures and uphold the noble TRADERS ROYAL BANK, Respondent.
purpose behind their issuance. Rules are laid down
for the benefit of all and should not be made Being declared in default does not constitute a
dependent upon a suitors sweet time and own waiver of rights except that of being heard and of
bidding.32
presenting evidence in the trial court. x x x.
Petitioner's negligence in the present case is
inexcusable, because aside from the belated filing of
his Motion for Extension to File His Answer, he also
failed to file his Answer within the period requested
in his Motion without offering any justifiable excuse.
Moreover, as observed by the MeTC in its Order
dated February 8, 2008, petitioner also failed to
appear
during
the
scheduled
hearing
on
respondent's Motion to Declare Him in Default.
Furthermore, petitioner did not deny respondent's
allegation that he also failed to appear during his
requested date of hearing of his Motion to Set Aside
the Order of Default. From these circumstances, the
Court finds no compelling ground to depart from the
findings of the CA that petitioner is guilty of
deliberately employing delay in the prosecution of
the civil case against him.
G.R.

No.

L-39047.

April

30,

1985.]

ALBERTO PASCUA, CRISPINA PASCUA, SOTERA

PASCUA, and EDUARDO MOLINA, Petitioners, v.
HON. ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, CFI of Cagayan,
CLEMENTE CASTRO, and JULIANA O. CASTRO,
Respondents.

"In other words, a defaulted defendant is not

actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it may
be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the
mercy of the court, the rules see to it that any
judgment against him must be in accordance with
law. The evidence to support the plaintiffs cause is,
of course, presented in his absence, but the court is
not supposed to admit that which is basically
incompetent. Although the defendant would not be
in a position to object, elementary justice requires
that only legal evidence should be considered
against him. If the evidence presented should not be
sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the
complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable
judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in
amount or be different in kind from what is prayed
for in the complaint."25
In sum, while petitioners were allowed to present
evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they
were not excused from establishing their claims for
damages by the required quantum of proof under
Section 1 of Rule 133. Stated differently, any

advantage they may have gained from the ex parte

presentation of evidence does not lower the degree
of proof required. Clearly then, there is no
incompatibility between the two rules.

fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and

that he has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)

G.R. No. L-63397 April 9, 1985

b) If the judgment has already been rendered when

the defendant discovered the default, but before the
same has become final and executory, he may file a
motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;

ALEX
LINA,
petitioner,
vs.
THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS;
HONORABLE GREGORIO PINEDA, as Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXI at Pasig; and NORTHERN MOTORS, c) If the defendant discovered the default after the
INC., respondents.
judgment has become final and executory, he may
file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38;
and
We are in agreement with respondent appellate
court's affirmance of the questioned order of the
trial court. The granting of additional time within
which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter
largely addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. "While trial courts are persuaded, as a matter
of policy, to adopt a basically flexible attitude in
favor of the defendant in this area of our adjective
law, the defense should never be lulled into the
belief that whenever trial courts refuse a second
request for extension to file an answer, the appellate
courts will grant relief (Naga Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 41 SCRA 105)."

In the case at bar, it was on May 5, 1982 or two (2)

days before the expiration of the fifteen-day
reglementary period given to defendant to file his
responsive pleading when petitioner moved for an
extension of twenty (20) days from May 7 within
which to file his answer. Upon motion of private
respondent and over the objection of petitioner,
respondent judge issued an order declaring
petitioner in default.

d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered

against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)

Petitioner in this case did not avail himself of any of

the above remedies. Instead, he went to the
appellate court on certiorari/prohibition. On this
point, respondent appellate court aptly said:
REBECCA T. ARQUERO, Petitioner, - versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner insists that respondents could not have
appealed the RTC decision having been declared
in default. She explains that the only issue that
could have been raised is a purely legal question,
therefore, the appeal should have been filed with
the Court and not with the CA.

In Martinez v. Republic, the Court has clearly

discussed the remedies of a party declared in
default in light of the 1964 and 1997 Rules of
Court and a number of jurisprudence applying and
interpreting said rules. Citing Lina v. Court of
Under the Rules of Court, the remedies available to
Appeals,[38] the Court enumerated the abovea defendant in the Court of First Instance (now mentioned remedies, to wit:
Regional Trial Court) are:

a) The defendant in default may, at any time after

discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default
on the ground that his failure to answer was due to

a)
The defendant in default may, at any time
after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of
default on the ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses;
(Sec. 3, Rule 18)

b)
If the judgment has already been rendered
when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory,
he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1
(a) of Rule 37;
c)
If the defendant discovered the default after
the judgment has become final and executory, he
may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of
Rule 38; and
d)
He may also appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence
or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the
order of default has been presented by him. (Sec.
2, Rule 41)
The Court explained in Martinez that the fourth
remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2,
Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Even after the deletion
of that provision under the 1997 Rules, the Court
did not hesitate to expressly rely on the Lina
doctrine, including the pronouncement that a
defaulted defendant may appeal from the
judgment rendered against him. Moreover, in
Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the
Philippines,[40]
the
Court
provided
a
comprehensive restatement of the remedies of the
defending party declared in default:
It bears stressing that a defending party declared
in default loses his standing in court and his right
to adduce evidence and to present his defense.
He, however, has the right to appeal from the
judgment by default and assail said judgment on
the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the
judgment is excessive or is different in kind from
that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove
the material allegations of his complaint, or that
the decision is contrary to law. Such party
declared in default is proscribed from seeking a
modification or reversal of the assailed decision on
the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the
Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would
thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce
evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court
when he was declared in default, and which he
failed to have vacated. In this case, the petitioner
sought the modification of the decision of the trial
court based on the evidence submitted by it only
in the Court of Appeals.
Undoubtedly, a defendant declared in default
retains the right to appeal from the judgment by
default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
prove the material allegations of the complaint, or
that the decision is contrary to law, even without
need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the
order of default except that he does not regain his
right to adduce evidence.[42] The appellate court,

in turn, can review the assailed decision and is not

precluded from reversing the same based solely
on the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.
The next question to be resolved is whether
petitioner has the right to the contested public
office and to oust private respondent from its
enjoyment. We answer in the negative.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal
remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office and to oust the holder from
its enjoyment. It is brought against the person
who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office. It
may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines
or by the person claiming to be entitled to such
office.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action
in his name must prove that he is entitled to the
subject public office. In other words, the private
person suing must show a clear right to the
contested position. Otherwise, the person who
holds the same has a right to undisturbed
possession and the action for quo warranto may
be dismissed. It is not even necessary to pass
upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of
his appointment, continues in the undisturbed
possession of his office.
On the basis of the evidence presented solely by
petitioner and without considering the arguments
and attachments made by respondents to rebut
petitioners claims, we find that petitioner failed to
prove that she is entitled to the contested
position.
It is undisputed that petitioner was appointed as
the principal of the PNS. In addition, she was
designated as the OIC of the PINS. Said
designation was, however, withdrawn. Private
respondent was, thereafter, designated as the
new OIC. This prompted petitioner to file the quo
warranto petition before the court a quo.
A. M. NO. 02-11-10-SC[MARCH 4, 2003].
Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Artemio
Panganiban to this Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Voide Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages
A. M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
MARCH 4, 2003

RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF

ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES.
Sec. 8. Answer. (2) If the respondent fails to file
an answer, the court shall not declare him or her
in default.
A. M. NO. 02-11-11-SC
MARCH 15, 2003
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON LEGAL SEPARATION
Sec. 5. Answer.
(b) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court
shall not declare him in default.
(c) Where no answer is filed/or if the answer does
not tender an issue the court shall order the public
prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists
between the parties.