Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59551 August 19, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL NAVOA y MARTINEZ and BERNARDO LIM
y RAMIREZ alias "Jack Robertson," alias "Lim
Ming Tak," alias "Christopher Kelly," defendantsappellants.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial District,
Branch XXX convicting defendants-appellants Manuel
Navoa and Bernardo Lim of the crime of Arson. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused Manuel
Navoa y Martinez and Bernardo Lim y Ramirez, also
known as Jack Robertson, Lim Ming Tak and
Christopher Kelly, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
arson, as charged in the information and hereby
sentences them to suffer the penalty of death, to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the building and
theater owners, N. de la Merced & Sons, Inc. and
Universal Management Corporation, in the total
amount of P774,550.29, and to pay the costs.
In an information dated June 29, 1979, defendantsappellants Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim were
charged with the crime of arson as follows:
The undersigned accused MANUEL NAVOA y MARTINEZ
and BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ, alias 'Jack Robertson'
alias 'Lim Ming Tak,' alias 'Christopher Kelly' of the
offense of Violation of Article 320, paragraph 4, in

relation to Article 326-A, of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, (ARSON) committed as follows:
That on or about July 9, 1978, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together with others whose true names,
Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown,
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately, with the use of
gasoline, set fire to and burn the MANILA CINEMA
BUILDING, a commercial building where commodities
of value were kept and which housed the Manila
Cinema 1 and 2 Theatres, among others, located at
the corner of Claro M. Recto Avenue and N. Reyes, Sr.,
St., this City, owned by the N. de la MERCED & SONS,
INC., and which building was near and adjacent to
other commercial buildings thereat, and therefore was
a populated place, thereby causing as a consequence
the said MANILA CINEMA BUILDING to be totally
destroyed and burned, thus inflicting damage and
destructions to the said building and its contents
amounting to six (6) million pesos, to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner thereof in the same sum of
six (6) million pesos, Philippine currency; that as a
further result thereof, the hereunder named persons
sustained fatal injuries which were the direct cause of
their death immediately thereafter:
1. Elmer Red Rebadavia, Lot 15, Blk. 86 Velvet St., SSS
Village, Marikina, Rizal
2. Remedios C. Gayo, 204 Manila Times Village,
Pamplona, Rizal
3. Gina Estela Montiel, 1709-B M. Hizon St., Sta.Cruz,
Manila
4. Ricardo Acordon, 142 Binangonan St., Maypajo,
Caloocan City

5. Alex Ibasco y Saldivar, 1659 Kundiman St.,

Sampaloc, Manila
6. Elmer Guidilla, 19 Examiner St., Bo. West Triangle,
Quezon City
7. Magdalena Aparis Benares, 1444 4th St., Fable
Estate, Paco, Manila
8. Nenita a, 255-E dela Paz Sto. Nino, Marikina, Metro
Manila
9. Leovegildo D. Vicedo, 1164 E. San Andres, Malate,
Manila
10. George M. Riego, Buenmar Subdivision, Mangahan,
Pasig, Metro Manila
11. one (l) unidentified female of about 20 years old
12. and three (3) others unknown/unidentified persons.
On July 9, 1978, at about 2:30 and 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, the Manila Cinema Building housing the
Manila Cinema 1 and 2 theaters located at the corner
of M. Recto Avenue and Nicanor Reyes, Sr., Streets,
Manila was burned, causing damage and destruction
to the said building. In addition, fourteen (14) persons
died in the fire, eleven of whom were Identified. All
died because of asphyxia due to suffocation (Exhs. "B",
"B-1," "B-2", "B-3", "C", "C-l," "C-2," "D," "D-l," "D-2,"
"E", "E-1," "E-2," "F," "F-l," "F-2", "G,", "G-l," "G- 2,"
"H," "H-1," "H-2," "I," "I-1," "I-2," "J," "J-l," "J-2", "K","Kl," "K-2," "L," "L-1", L-2," "M", "M-1" and "M-2").
N. de la Merced & Sons, the owner of the Manila
Cinema
Building,
and
Universal
Management
Corporation, the owner of Manila Cinema 1 and 2 paid
a total of P514,068.29 as indemnification to heirs of
the
deceased
to
defray
their
funeral
and
hospitalization expenses and to those who survived
the fire, of which P244,541.80 was reimbursed by the
insurer, Filipino Merchants Insurance Co. (Exhs. "U-1 "
to "U-2"). Damage to the building was estimated at

P4,160,750.00 of which only P3,109,693.89 was paid

by the insurer (Exhs. "S," "S-1 " and "T").
On June 29, 1979, defendant-appellant Bernardo Lim
alias "Jack Robertson," alias Christopher Kelly," alias
"Lim Ming Tak," acting as an alleged informer of Police
Corporal Vicente Palmon and his fellow arson
operatives, informed the latter that it was Manuel
Navoa who was responsible for the fire that destroyed
Manila Cinema 1 and 2.
Relying solely on the credibility of Bernardo Lim and
without first securing a warrant of arrest, Corporals
Palmon and Harrison Tolosa arrested appellant Manuel
Navoa. At the police headquarters, appellant Navoa
allegedly
executed
statements
waiving
his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel (Exh.
"O") and giving an extra-judicial confession (Exhs. "A,"
"A-1" to "A-9"). Both waiver and extra-judicial
confession were subscribed and sworn to before
Inquest Fiscal Zeus Abrogas.
Earlier, on that same day, appellant Bernardo Lim
likewise executed a waiver of his constitutional rights
to silence and to counsel (Exhs. "P" and "Q") and also
gave an extra-judicial confession (Exhs. "R", "R-1 " to
"R-10").
On June 24, 1979, appellant Manuel Navoa made a
reenactment of how the theaters were set on fire
during which, pictures were taken at various stages
(Exhs. "N," "N-1" to "N-14 ").
Both defendants-appellants pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment.
The testimony of appellant Bernardo Lim was
summarized by the trial court as follows:
It was at 8:45 o'clock in the morning of June 22, 1979,
that he was arrested by Corporal Palmon and brought
to the police headquarters where upon instruction by a
police investigator whom he only knew as Lito, he

wrote in his own hand what purports to be a waiver of

his constitutional rights (Exhibit P) and affixed his
signature to what appears to be his statement naming
and identifying his co-accused Navoa as the one who
had set ablaze the two theaters in question and made
the corrections therein (Exhibits R, R-1 to R-10) after
being maltreated, dealt countless fist blows on the
chest, tortured and threatened by said police
investigator, which statement (Exhibits R, R-1 to R-10)
was but prepared by Corporal Palmon without his
participation. Told earlier that it was his right to be
assisted by counsel, he said he needed none because
anyway he was going to give his statement
voluntarily.On the other hand, appellant Manuel
Navoa's testimony is summarized as follows:
Between 7:00 and 7:15 o'clock in the morning of June
22, 1979, at the junction of Jose Abad Santos and Rizal
Avenue Extension, as he was walking to take a ride to
go to school, he was accosted by three police officers.
Corporal Palmon poking a gun at him and Corporal
Tolosa twisting his arm and handcuffing his two hands,
they shoved him into a waiting jeep where a Chinese
looking man was riding in. Taken to the police
headquarters at United Nations Avenue in Manila, upon
arrival he was first brought to the fingerprint section
where after his handcuffs were removed he was made
to fill up a form containing his personal data. After
being fingerprinted, Corporal Palmon brought him to
his office at the second floor of the building where
upon being met by Corporal Tolosa he was divested of
his bag containing books, notebooks, pencils, ball
pens, school Identification card and driver's license
with P200 in cash kept inside his jacket. Except for the
cash money, all were returned to him Told by Corporal
Palmon that he was responsible for the burning of the
two theaters, he denied having anything to do with it,

whereupon Corporal Tolosa told Corporal Palmon, 'Just

leave it to me.' It is not true that he was informed of
his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. In
fact they did not even allow him to get in touch with
his relatives. For, when he tried to reach the
telephone, Corporal Tolosa told him, 'Just try holding
the phone and I will shoot you,' as he pointed a gun at
him. Frightened, he did not attempt again to use the
telephone. About the waiver, Exhibit 0, Corporal
Tolosa's companion wrote it on a piece of paper. After
giving to Corporal Tolosa, it was given to him. With a
ball pen handed to him Corporal Tolosa told him to
copy it on a typewriting paper, a gun being pointed by
Corporal Tolosa on his right cheek. Frightened, he did
as ordered. After that, Corporal Tolosa and his
companion typed the statement (Exhibits A, A-1 to A9). Except the portion beginning from his name on the
first page (Exhibit A) until question and answer No. 17
on the third page (Exhibit A-2) everything on it is not
true. After typing the statement, Corporal Tolosa
disapproved of some words used and ordered him to
make the corrections. When he told him that he
needed the assistance of a lawyer, Corporal Tolosa
ordered him to follow what he was told to do,
otherwise he would get hurt or killed. Because of that
he obeyed and made the corrections appearing on the
fourth seventh and tenth pages (Exhibits A-1, A-7 and
A-9). Afterwards Corporal Tolosa ordered him to sign
the statement, otherwise he would be tortured.
Frightened, he did as he was told. Nothing was given
him for lunch. And it was only in the morning of the
next day, June 23, 1979, that he was given food while
at the Theft and Robbery Section. When told by him
that it was Kelly (accused Lim) alone who was
responsible for having him arrested upon a false
complaint, Corporal Tolosa boxed him twice on the

chest. He never admitted anything to Corporal Palmon.

But aside from what Corporal Tolosa did to him, Patron
Julito Andales struck twice with his open palms his two
ears, boxed him thrice on the chest and several times
on the stomach and tied a piece of wire around his
neck that he tightened and loosened slowly while he
was at the Arson Section, being forced to give answers
to the questions that would tally with his police report,
such as the fact that it was not gasoline but a chemical
that was used to burn the theaters, and that he was
the one responsible for the burning of Delta Theater
and Roman Cinerama and the fire in Tambunting and
other places in Metro Manila. When first brought to the
police headquarters, Corporal Palmon threatened to
kill him, asking Corporal Tolosa if they should kill him.
Then Corporal Palmon warned him that if he would not
admit guilt to Corporal Tolosa he would return to kill
him. Before being brought to the inquest fiscal,
Corporal Tolosa told him to answer that what appears
in his statement is his signature and that he was not
tortured at an, if asked by the fiscal. About the alleged
re-enactment in the pictures, Exhibits N, N-1 to N-14,
he was but ordered by Corporal Tolosa and Patrolman
Andales to pose for them while they were being taken.
It was only in the morning of June 23, 1979, that his
parents and relatives came. To them he revealed the
threat he received and the torture he suffered from the
police officers. A request was made by his mother to
General James Barbers to have him undergo
psychiatric examination so that he could also be
physically examined by a doctor (Exhibit 3). lt was in
August 1976 at the Jai Alai that he came to know the
accused Lim for the first time. Since then he used to
extort money from him, P20, P30, P50, while in the
company of people carrying guns. In March 1979, the
accused Lim asked for P50,000 from him. Told that he

could not give him that much, the accused Lim

threatened to kidnap his younger sister and report him
to the Philippine Constabulary as the one responsible
for the murders, rapes, hold-ups and burnings in Metro
Manila. But because of the threat that his parents and
the members of his family would be killed one by one,
his parents did not report it to the police authorities
when he told them about it.
Teresita Gutierrez, Edgardo Silva,
Cristina de la Cruz and Glory
Rabbon, accused Navoa's teachers
at Gregorio Araneta University in
Malabon, Metro Manila, swore to
his presence in his classes on June
15, 16, 17 and 19 and July 8 and
10, 1978, as evidenced by their
class records (Exhibits 1 & 2
Navoa).
Solely on the basis of the extra-judicial confessions of
both defendants-appellants (Exhibits "A," "A-1" to "A10," "R," "R-1 " to "R-10"), the trial court rendered the
appealed judgment of conviction.
Appellant Bernardo Lim now assigns the following
errors:
The lower court erred in:
CONVICTING APPELLANT BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ
ON THE BASIS MERELY OF THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION (EXHIBITS "R" TO "R-10") OF
THE SAME IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 20 ARTICLE IV OF
THE 1973 CONSTITUTION.
II
CONVICTING APPELLANT BERNARDO LIM Y RAMIREZ
WITH THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF DEATH WITHOUT
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III

NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ARREST OF

APPELLANT BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ WITHOUT ANY
WARRANT AFTER ONE YEAR FROM THE OCCURRENCE
OF THE INCIDENT SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS APPEAL.
IV
DISREGARDING THE ALIBI OF APPELLANT BERNARDO
LIM y RAMIREZ EVEN IF THERE WAS NO POSITIVE AND
PROPER IdENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED BY
WITNESSES OF THE PROSECUTION.
V
FAILING TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRE
WAS THE RESULT OF AN ARSON OR AN ACCIDENT.
On the other hand, appellant Manuel Navoa faults the
trial court with the following errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
ACCUSED- APPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA WAS ILLEGALLY
AND ARBITRARILY ARRESTED ON JUNE 22, 1979.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
ALLEGED WAIVER (EXH. "O") OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
MANUEL NAVOA WHICH WAS TAKEN BY MEANS OF
VIOLENCE, FORCE, THREAT AND INTIMIDATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION (EXHS. "A," "A1" TO "A-9") OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA
WHICH WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF THE 1973
CONSTITUTION.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION (EXHS. "A, "
"A-1 " to "A-9") OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANUEL
NAVOA WHICH WAS TAKEN BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE,
FORCE, THREAT AND INTIMIDATION.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ALIBI

SET BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA CANNOT
STAND ON THE WAY OF CONVICTION FOR THE
OFFENSE CHARGED.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR ACCUSEDAPPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA WHICH CONTRADICTED
CERTAIN
INCRIMINATORY
STATEMENTS
IN
THE
ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION (EXHS. "A", "Al" TO "A-9").
SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS
DESPITE
THEIR
INHERENT
INCREDIBILITIES,
IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES AND PATENT
PARTIALITY.
EIGHTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION (EXHS. "R, "
"R-1 " to "R-10") OF CO-ACCUSED BERNARDO LIM AS
EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANUEL
NAVOA.
NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED- APPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA ON THE
GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
The main thrust of the defendants-appellants'
arguments on appeal is that they were not afforded
the opportunity to avail of their rights under Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution; that there was
no intelligent waiver of their rights, and as such, their
extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible against
them.
The records show that the extra-judicial confessions of
the accused formed the only basis for the judgment of

conviction. The confessions were taken without the

assistance of any counsel for the accused. The
confessions were preceded by waivers of the right to
counsel. Manuel Navoa stated that he did not need the
assistance of a lawyer or anybody else because he
wanted to tell the truth about his participation in the
crime. To augment the waiver which formed the first
part of his typewritten confession, he also executed a
short waiver in his own handwriting. Accused Bernardo
Lim did likewise.
During the trial, accused Navoa repudiated the waivers
and the confessions. He testified that the police
investigators employed force and intimidation,
including outright torture to secure his confession.
However, the trial court did not believe that the
accused were "forced, threatened, intimidated, and
tortured into executing their respective extrajudicial
statements." It found no reason why the police officers
should resort to torture "if only to have them (the
accused) falsely charged and unjustly convicted of the
serious crime of arson for which the penalty is death,
fourteen people having perished in the fire that had
been set ablaze." The court found the confessions
replete with details; no complaints were filed against
the police officers; and no doctors examined the
accused for the alleged injuries.
On the basis of the above findings, accused Navoa and
Lim were each sentenced to DEATH and ordered to pay
P774,550.29 in indemnifications.
We first pass upon the question of whether or not the
extrajudicial confessions were voluntary.
Even before the adoption of the "right to counsel" rule
for custodial interrogations in Article IV, Section 20 of
the 1973 Constitution, this Court had already ruled
that to be valid, a confession must be shown to have
proceeded from the free will of the person confessing.

Thus, in People v. Bagasala (39 SCRA 236), we stated

that where the confession is involuntary, being due to
maltreatment, or induced by fear or intimidation, there
is a violation of this constitutional provision. Any form
of coercion, whether physical, mental or emotional
thus stamps it with inadmissibility. What is essential for
its validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the
person confessing."
The test of free will does not require a showing of force
or intimidation. On November 23, 1976, this Court
ruled:
The constitutional inquiry is not
whether the conduct of the police
officers in obtaining the confession
was shocking, but whether the
confession was free and voluntary;
that is, it must not be extracted by
any sort of threats or violence, nor
obtained by any direct or implied
promises, nor by the exertion of
improper influence. (People v. Alto,
26 SCRA 364) It has been
recognized that 'coercion can be
mental as well as physical and that
the blood of the accused is not the
only
hallmark
of
an
unconstitutional
inquisition.
(Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S.
199, 206, 4 L. Ed. 2d. 242).
In the light of the trial court's factual findings it is
difficult for this Court to make a categorical finding
from the records that the police investigators resorted
to cruel and reprehensible tactics to extort the
confessions. However, we can glean enough to rule
that, under the standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, Navoa's confession was far from being the

product of his free will, Assuming there was no torture,

there was, at the very least, improper pressure and
intimidation.
Appellant Navoa's testimony during trial alleges that
he was intimidated into signing the confession
(Exhibits "A," "A-1 " to "A-9 "). He states:
Q. After these personal items of yours were taken,
what happened?
A. Corporal Tolosa told that I was the one responsible
for the burning of Cinema 1 and 2.
Q. What did you answer?
A. I told him I don't know anything about it.
Q. What did he do afterwards?
A. Corporal Palmon told Corporal Tolosa, 'Shall we kill
him?
(t. s. n., December 9, 1980, p. 5)
xxx xxx xxx
Q. At that time. did they allow you to get in touch with
any of your relatives?
A. They did not.
Q. Did you attempt to inform them you wanted to get
in touch with your relatives?
A. Yes.
Q. To whom did you make this request?
A. To Tolosa.
Q. What was his answer?
A. When I tried to reach the telephone at the table of
Tolosa, Tolosa suddenly pointed his gun at me and told
me, 'Just try holding the telephone and I will shoot
you.'
Q. What was your reactions?
A. I became frightened after that.
(t. s. n., December 9, 1980, p. 6)
More important than the intimidation is the
maltreatment that appellant Manuel Navoa allegedly

suffered at the hands of the police investigators. He

testified:
Q. In what manner did he torture you?
A. First, he tapped my ears two times very slowly.
Q. With what hands?
A. Two hands.
Q. Afterwards?
A. I became very dizzy after that. I did not say
anything, some words, and suddenly he boxed me
three times in the chest and several times in the
stomach and because of that I became weak and
frightened and after that I did not say again anything
some words because if I will say something, it will be
against me. He suddenly tied with a wire again my
neck. And slowly he untied and tied it again and untied
again.
t.s.n., December 9, 1980, p. 9)
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Besides pointing his gun at you, what did Tolosa do
to you?
A. He boxed me two times in the chest and once in the
stomach. When I told him that Kelly was the one
responsible for having jailed me when he complained
to the police falsely.
(t. s. n., December 9,
1980, p. 8)
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What did Andales do to you?
A. He tapped my two ears and because of what he had
done, I became dizzy, and after that, he boxed me
three times in the chest, several times in the stomach
and also he tied a wire around my neck and tightened
it slowly and very slowly he loosened and tightened
again.
Q. Where did this take place?
A. In the room of the Arson Division.

(t. s. n., December 9, 1980, p. 9)

Navoa stood firm in his testimony during the grueling
cross-examination. Thus:
Q. How were you harmed by Cpl. Tolosa?
A. I was already at the headquarters, your Honor.
Q. How were you harmed?
A. He boxed me two times on the chest and once in
the stomach, your Honor.
(t. s. n., December 9, 1980, p. 30)
xxx xxx xxx
. Now, after Cpl. Tolosa subjected you to bodily harm,
do I get you correctly that Pat. Andales subjected you
also to bodily harm?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this was tapping your ears two times, boxing
you on your stomach three times?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. BODEGON:
Q. And not only that, Pat. Andales also tied a wire
around your neck?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do I understand correctly that he would tighten
this wire and then let it loose again and then tighten it
again?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In such that you were subjected to excruciating
pain?
A. (witness nodding his head).
(t.s.n., March 3, 1981, pp. 34-35)
The trial court stated that no results of medical
examinations indicating torture were presented in
evidence by the accused. Noteworthy is our
pronouncement in People v. Cabrera (I 34 SCRA 362)
with respect to the taking of extrajudicial confessions:

[W]e reiterate the reminder to Judges and Fiscals

before whom declarants are brought for swearing to
the truth of their statements to adopt the practice of
having the confessants physically and thoroughly
examined by independent and qualified doctors before
administering the oath, even if it is not requested by
the accused. If physicians are not available then they
should themselves examine the bodies of the
declarants for signs of possible violence. This would
not only deter attempts to secure confessions through
violence but would also preclude future controversies
on whether the statements were obtained through
torture or not, which only delay criminal trials. (People
v. Castro, 11 SCRA 699 [1964]; People v. Francisco, 74
SCRA 159 [1976]). (Emphasis supplied)
The written waiver (Exh. "O") of appellant Navoa
purportedly waiving his constitutional rights to silence
and to counsel should have been excluded by the trial
court.
In a case decided last May 31, 1982, we stated that a
defendant may waive effectuation of his right to
remain silent and to be assisted by counsel at a
custodial police interrogation provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently (People
v. Rollo, 114 SCRA 304).
In the case at bar, there was no such voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver. Exhibit "O" is so pat
and aptly worded, so contrived as to be exactly suited
to meet legal objections that it could have been
prepared only by a veteran police investigator and not
by an ordinary layman like appellant Manuel Navoa.
Exhibit "O" reads:
Ako Manuel Navoa y Martinez, 23
taon
gulang,
binata
at
kasalukuyang naninirahan sa 2975
Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila,

pagkatapos kong malaman ang

aking mga karapatan sang ayon sa
ating Bagong Saligang Batas ay
malaya
at
kusang
loob
na
nagsasaad nitong mga sumusunod:
l) Na ako ay pina-alala naman ng
mga pulis ay aking karapatan sa
ilalim ng ating Bagong Saligang
Batas tulad ng karapatan kong
manatiling
tahimik
at
huwag
sumagot sa anumang itatanong sa
akin, karapatan ko ring magkaroon
ng sariling abogado habang ako ay
tinatanong ng pulis.
2) Pagkatapos kong malaman ang
aking mga karapatan na nabanggit
sa itaas nito ako ay magbibigay ng
isang malaya at kusang loob na
salaysay na ako ay hindi pinilit o
kaya ay pinangakuan ng anumang
pabuya sa pagsisiyasat na ito.
3) Na hindi ko na kailangan ang
tulong ng isang abogado sapagkat
pawang katotohanan lamang ang
sasabihin ko.
4) Na ako ay pansamantalang
nagpapadetine sa pulisya ng aking
kagustuhan na ako ay hindi tinakot,
pinilit o kaya ay pinangakuan ng
anumang pabuya.
5) Na bilang patunay sa sinabi kong
ito ay kusang-loob kong inilagda
ang aking pangalan ngayong ika-22
ng Hunyo, 1979, ganap na ika12:20 ng hapon dito sa Lungsod ng
Maynila.

Manuel Navoa is not well versed in the niceties of the

law and is without any experience whatsoever in
criminal investigations. Indeed there is persuasive
merit in his submission that he only copied the waiver
under threat of a gun from a prepared text written by
one of the police investigators. Thus:
Q. Will you inform the Honorable Court how you
signed, under what circumstances you signed Exh. "O
"?
A. The police companion of Tolosa wrote in a piece of
paper a waiver and gave it to Tolosa who then gave
me a piece of typewriting paper and ball pen and told
me to copy the waiver with his gun pointed at my right
cheek.
Q. What did you do when he told you to copy the
waiver?
A. I became frightened and I copied it.
(t. s. n., December 9, 1980, p. 6)
When Navoa waived his right to counsel and executed
the extra-judicial confession, he was alone in the
company of the police interrogators, deprived of
outside support. This Court is far from satisfied that
the waiver of counsel and the subsequent confession
were indeed products of Navoa's free will.
Moreover, the following material allegations in
defendant-appellant Navoa's alleged extrajudicial
confession, to wit: (1) That at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of June 15, 1978 at Mehan Garden, a certain
Jack Robertson asked defendant-appellant Navoa if he
wanted to earn some fast money; (2) That on June 16,
1978, defendant-appellant Navoa again met Jack
Robertson, this time, Robertson requested him to
recruit several persons who also wanted to earn fast
money, (3) That on June 17 and 18, 1978, Jack
Robertson requested defendant-appellant Navoa and
his recruits to watch a movie at the Manila Cinema 1 at

the Manila Cinema Building along Claro M. Recto

Avenue; (4) That on July 8,1978, defendant-appellant
Manuel Navoa bought some gasoline; and (5) That on
July 9, 1978, defendant-appellant Manuel Navoa and
his recruits again watched a movie at the Manila
Cinema 1 where they discreetly placed bags of
gasoline at designated places-are all belied by the
collective testimonies of the teachers of defendantappellant Navoa who categorically testified that on
those dates, he was present in their classes based on
their recollections and evidenced by their class
records.
Cristina de la Cruz, a teacher of Animal Husbandry at
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation testified:
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
Q. There has been presented in this court an alleged
statement of Manuel Navoa which the prosecution
claimed to have been executed voluntarily. In that
statement marked as Exhs. "A," "A-1" to "A-9"
inclusive, it was stated that at around 10:00 o'clock of
June 16, 1978 which is a Friday, Manuel Navoa was
with a certain Jack Robertson at Mehan Garden. Now
do you know where Manuel Navoa was at around
10:00 o'clock in June 16, 1978 which was a Friday?
. Yes, he was in my class.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
Q. Also in the same statement, Manuel Navoa was
claimed to have voluntarily stated that on June 19,
1978 which is a Monday he was at Cinema 1 watching
a movie with a certain Jack Robertson and six recruits.
Would you know where Manuel Navoa was in the
morning of June 19, 1978?
A. He was in my class also.
Q. Likewise in the said statement, Manuel Navoa was
alleged to have stated that on July 10, 1978 which is a
Monday in the morning, he went to Mehan Garden for

a meeting with Jack Robertson. Do you know where

Manuel Navoa was on July 10, 1978 in the morning.
A. He was attending my class, sir.
Q. Do you have the records of your class to show that
on those particular dates and time, you mentioned,
Manuel Navoa attended your class?
A. Yes, I have my record. It is here.
(t. s. n., October 2,
1980, pp. 3-4)
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
Q. According to your record of attendance, how many
times was Navoa absent during the first semester of
1978?
A. He was a regular student and he attended class.
There was no absences at all.
(t. s. n., October 2, 1980, p. 5)
Teresita Gutierrez, appellant Manuel Navoa's teacher in
Land Reform gave similar testimony. To the same
effect is the testimony of Edgardo Silva, defendantappellant Manuel Navoa's teacher in Logic:
Q. Well on your record, was Navoa present on June 15,
and 17?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right, will you check your record and inform us
whether the said accused Manuel Navoa was present
in your office during this date?
A. He was present, sir.
(t. s. n., November 7, 1980, p. 38)
The testimonies of the teachers are supported by the
class records of attendance which were submitted in
evidence.
Apart from the extra-judicial confessions, the trial
court also relied on the pictures (Exhs. "N," "N-1 " to
"N-10") taken during the re-enactment of the crime by
appellant Navoa.

In People V. Buscato (74 SCRA 30) this Court sustained

the submission of the Acting Solicitor General that for
a reenactment to be given evidentiary weight, the
validity and efficacy of the confession must first be
shown. Such a showing is absent in this case.
These pictures, therefore, should have been likewise
excluded by the trial court because they were based
on the inadmissible extra-judicial confession of
defendant-appellant Navoa (People v. Alcaraz, 136
SCRA 74).
In addition, the prosecution's claim that the reenactment was voluntarily done at the initiative of
appellant Navoa is belied by the direct testimony of
the police photographer who took the pictures during
the alleged re-enactment. The police photographer
categorically testified that it was indeed Patrolman
Palmon who directed the positioning of the people who
took part in the re-enactment. Thus,
Q. And who instructed the positioning of these people
in the pictures marked Exhibits "N-6" to "N-10"?
A. Corporal Palmon, sir.
Q. In all these pictures marked Exhs. "N-6" to "N-10," it
was Corporal Palmon who directed the positioning of
these persons?
WITNESS
A. Yes, sir.
(t.s.n., November 9, 1979, pp. 53-54)
To the same effect is the testimony of appellant Navoa.
He testified that it was Patrolman Andales who
instructed him what to do in the preparation of the
materials to be used in the re-enactment and that it
was Patrolman Tolosa who directed the movements
depicted in the pictures:
Q. Now, pictures marked Exhs. "N," "N-1" to "N-14"
inclusive presented before this court and pursuant to
the testimony of Patrolman Palmon, said pictures were

taken when you voluntarily executed the preparation

for the burning of Cinema I and 2 as depicted in the
pictures, Exhs. "N," "N-1" to "N-14". What can you say?
A. In the making of the preparation to be used in the
re-enactment, Andales told me what to do.
(t. s. n., December 9,
1980, p. 11)
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Who directed the movements depicted in the
pictures, Exhs. "N," "N-1" to "N-14"?
A. Tolosa supervised Andales who told me what to do.
(t. s. n., December 9,
1980, p. 11)
The foregoing circumstances show that the reenactment of the crime and the pictures taken during
such re-enactment were pursuant to a script made by
police officers and directed by them. With more
reason, the pictures taken during the reenactment
should have been excluded.
With the exclusion of appellant Navoa's written waiver
of his constitutional rights (Exh. "O"), his extra-judicial
confession (Exhs. "A, " "A-1" to "A-9") and the pictures
taken during the re-enactment of the crime (Exhs. "N,"
"N-1" to "N-14"), the record is bereft of any other
evidence which could support a judgment of
conviction. No eyewitness who saw Navoa at the
vicinity of the scene of the crime was ever presented.
The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of Navoa
beyond reasonable doubt.
While it is true that appellant Navoa put up only the
defense of denial, this defense went far enough to give
rise to a reasonable doubt of his guilt. Consequently,
Navoa has to be acquitted if only to give meaning to
the time honored principle that the prosecution must
rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.

Like Manuel Navoa, appellant Bernardo Lim was

convicted on the basis of his extra-judicial confession
(Exhs. "R," "R-1" to "R-10") alone. But unlike Navoa,
Bernardo Lim's later contention that his extra-judicial
confession was extorted in violation of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution appears to be
without merit. On the contrary, appellant Lim, who was
a police informer, testified during trial that he indeed
voluntarily gave his statement to the police
investigators. Thus:
Q. Were you informed of your right under our
Constitution to remain silent or to call for an attorney,
to provide you with a lawyer in that investigation. Were
you informed of that matter?
A. No. I voluntarily gave statement to the police."
Q. Were you told that you have the right to get a
counsel?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you say?
A. I said I don't have to get counsel because I am going
to give voluntary statement.
(t. s. n., August 22, 1980, p. 7)
However, Lim's extra-judicial confession upon which
the judgment was based is not adequate to support
conviction for the crime of arson warranting the
extreme penalty of DEATH. Lim's statement limits his
participation solely to the giving of information as to
the exact location of the comfort rooms of the theater
and their distances to the screen.
The reliability of Lim's confession is doubtful. He
testified that his participation in the plotting took place
in December, 1977 and January 3, 1978. The building
housing Cinemas 1 and 2 was burned on July 9, 1978.
The two appellants never saw each other again until
January 26, 1979.
This fact was emphasized during the trial, to wit:

Q. (89) Do I Understand that you never met again from

January 3, 1978 up to January 26, 1979, a period of
more than a year?
A. Yes.
Being the police informer who fingered Manuel Navoa
as the principal culprit, Lim appears to know more
about the crime than what appears in the records. In
his confession and testimony, he limits himself to the
giving of information such as the layout of the movie
houses which facilitated the commission of the crime.
Actually such information was unnecessary as Navoa's
alleged confession shows he and six other men went
to the theaters more than once to acquire fun
familiarity with the place they were supposed to burn
down. The culpability of appellant Lim is intimately
tied up with the truth of Navoa's confession and the
community of criminal design between the two. Since
we find a lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt to
convict Navoa, we are constrained to acquit Lim for
the same reason.
The intentional burning of two moviehouses which
resulted in the death of fourteen (14) victims is
shocking in the perversity of the minds which
conceived it, in their senseless lack of concern for the
sanctity of human life. By its very nature, the crime of
arson is difficult to investigate. The crime itself usually
destroys the evidence which would incriminate the
perpetrators. For that very reason, however, the
development of more sophisticated police techniques
is imperative.
In this particular case, the police should have been
more aware of the protections afforded by Article IV,
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights to persons undergoing
custodial interrogation. In the belief that the
extrajudicial confession and the re-enactment, taken
without the required constitutional safeguards, were

enough to sustain conviction, determined efforts to

apprehend the six other arsonists or to get admissible
and more convincing evidence were no longer taken.
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which provides:
No person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and
to counsel and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him, Any
confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
governs the permissible procedures which the
government may use in applying its power against
individuals suspected of complicity in the commission
of a crime. Without in any way minimizing the
importance of giving police agencies ample latitude in
the legitimate exercise of their duties, this Court is
bound to give full and effective meaning to the public
policy enunciated in Section 20, towards the creation
of more effective safeguards against oppressive and
arbitrary, albeit at times, well-meaning state power.
Not even the most conservative elements of society
can deny that accused persons suffer an enormous
disadvantage when confronted by the overwhelming
interests of the State in public order, public safety, or
its own self-preservation. The accused is at a
disadvantage when government power and resources,
coupled with the private motives of government
officials are used against him.

The old argument that society's need for efficient law

enforcement outweighs and, therefore, condones
small encroachments on individual liberties his no
place in a democratic form of government.
The continued acceptance of hitherto "valid"
confessions to sustain judgments of conviction may
lead to sloppy police investigations, to a lack of
initiative, industry and resourcefulness on the part of
the investigators, and to gross miscarriages of justice
in many cases which must forever remain unknown.**
In any balancing of interests, the scales will even out
vis-a-vis government action only when there is an
improvement of police procedures, the development of
anti-crime techniques, and the perfection of law
enforcement
systems.
And
very
often,
such
development of methods is possible only when the
traditional, authoritarian, and easier procedures are
proscribed and no longer available.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Manuel Navoa
and Bernardo Lim are ACQUITTED of the crime charged
on grounds of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165496
February 12, 2007
HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner,
vs.
EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of
Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated May 20, 2004 1 and
September 28, 20042 in CA G.R. CR No. 28344
dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
In an Information3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent,
Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law, for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine
National Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated August
28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds.
Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.

Following the pre-trial conference, the prosecution

presented its evidence-in-chief.
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed
a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to
Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting
that the prosecution failed to prove that he received
the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the
element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not
arise.4
By Order5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Makati, Branch 65 granted the
Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecutions
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.6
Petitioner appealed the civil aspect 7 of the case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, contending that
the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its
civil aspect.
By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the
RTC held that while the evidence presented was
insufficient to prove respondents criminal liability, it
did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It
accordingly granted the appeal of petitioner and
ordered respondent to pay him the amount of
P1,875,000 with legal interest.8
Upon respondents motion for reconsideration,
however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered
the remand of the case to the MeTC "for further
proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent
herein] may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case."9 Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
remand of the case having been denied, he elevated
the case to the CA which, by the assailed resolutions,
dismissed his petition for the following reasons:
1. The verification and certification of
non-forum shopping attached to the
petition does not fully comply with

Section 4, as amended by A.M. No. 00-210-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court,

because it does not give the assurance
that the allegations of the petition are
true and correct based on authentic
records.
2. The petition is not accompanied by
copies of certain pleadings and other
material portions of the record, (i.e.,
motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence, demurrer to evidence and the
opposition thereto, and the Municipal [sic]
Trial Courts Order dismissing Criminal
Case No. 294690) as would support the
allegations of the petition (Sec. 2, Rule
42, ibid.).
3. The Decision dated September 11,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court attached
to the petition is an uncertified and
illegible mere machine copy of the
original (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).
4. Petitioners failed to implead the People
of the Philippines as party-respondent in
the petition.10
In his present petition, petitioner assails the abovestated reasons of the appellate court in dismissing his
petition.
The manner of verification for pleadings which are
required to be verified, such as a petition for review
before the CA of an appellate judgment of the RTC, 11 is
prescribed by Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant
has read the pleading and that the allegations therein

are true and correct of his personal knowledge or

based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on "information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper
verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. 12
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive
term signifying disassociation and independence,
hence, he chose to affirm in his petition he filed before
the court a quo that its contents are "true and correct
of my own personal knowledge,"13 and not on the basis
of authentic documents.
On the other hand, respondent counters that the word
"or" may be interpreted in a conjunctive sense and
construed to mean as "and," or vice versa, when the
context of the law so warrants.
A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7
indicates that a pleading may be verified under either
of the two given modes or under both. The veracity of
the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on
either ones own personal knowledge or on authentic
records, or both, as warranted. The use of the
preposition "or" connotes that either source qualifies
as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to
state, the concurrence of both sources is more than
sufficient.14 Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive
sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a
construction that will exclude the combination of the
alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the
alternatives standing alone.15
Contrary to petitioners position, the range of
permutation is not left to the pleaders liking, but is
dependent on the surrounding nature of the
allegations which may warrant that a verification be

based either purely on personal knowledge, or entirely

on authentic records, or on both sources.
As pointed out by respondent, "authentic records" as a
basis for verification bear significance in petitions
wherein the greater portions of the allegations are
based on the records of the proceedings in the court of
origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on the
personal knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate,
petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on
his personal knowledge, the truthfulness of the
statement in his petition16 before the CA that at the
pre-trial conference respondent admitted having
received the letter of demand, because he (petitioner)
was not present during the conference. 17 Hence,
petitioner needed to rely on the records to confirm its
veracity.
Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless
formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the
name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is
at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity
of an oath18 to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading have been made in good
faith, or are true and correct and not merely
speculative.19
This Court has strictly been enforcing the requirement
of verification and certification and enunciating that
obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is
needed if fair results are to be expected therefrom.
Utter disregard of the rules cannot just be rationalized
by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 20 While
the requirement is not jurisdictional in nature, it does
not make it less a rule. A relaxed application of the rule
can only be justified by the attending circumstances of
the case.21
To sustain petitioners explanation that the basis of
verification is a matter of simple preference would

trivialize the rationale and diminish the resoluteness of

the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no heed
in providing enough assurance of the correctness of
the allegations.
On the second reason of the CA in dismissing the
petition that the petition was not accompanied by
copies of certain pleadings and other material portions
of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition (i.e., Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the Opposition
thereto, and the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order
dismissing the case) petitioner contends that these
documents are immaterial to his appeal.
Contrary to petitioners contention, however, the
materiality of those documents is very apparent since
the civil aspect of the case, from which he is
appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on
account of the same Demurrer.
Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he subsequently
submitted to the CA copies of the enumerated
documents, save for the MeTC February 27, 2003
Order,
as
attachments
to
his
Motion
for
Reconsideration.
The Rules, however, require that the petition must "be
accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or
true copies of the judgments or final orders of both
lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court." 22
A perusal of the petition filed before the CA shows that
the only duplicate original or certified true copies
attached as annexes thereto are the January 14, 2004
RTC
Order
granting
respondents
Motion
for
Reconsideration and the March 29, 2004 RTC Order
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The
copy of the September 11, 2003 RTC Decision, which
petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified
true copy and is not even legible. Petitioner later

recompensed though by appending to his Motion for

Reconsideration a duplicate original copy.
While petitioner averred before the CA in his Motion for
Reconsideration that the February 27, 2003 MeTC
Order was already attached to his petition as Annex
"G," Annex "G" bares a replicate copy of a different
order, however. It was to this Court that petitioner
belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy of the
said MeTC Order as an annex to his Reply to
respondents Comment.
This Court in fact observes that the copy of the other
MeTC Order, that dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner
attached to his petition before the CA is similarly
uncertified as true.
Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse to him
even with respect to the civil aspect of the case,
petitioner was mandated to submit them in the
required form.23
In fine, petitioner fell short in his compliance with
Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, the mandatory tenor of which
is discernible thereunder and is well settled. 24 He has
not, however, advanced any strong compelling reasons
to warrant a relaxation of the Rules, hence, his petition
before the CA was correctly dismissed.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while
the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this we stress, was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a
game of technicalities, it is equally true that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the

prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy

administration of justice.25 (Emphasis supplied)
As to the third reason for the appellate courts
dismissal of his petition failure to implead the People
of the Philippines as a party in the petition indeed, as
petitioner contends, the same is of no moment, he
having appealed only the civil aspect of the case.
Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action, this
Court ruled:
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are
two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the
criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The
parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff
and the accused. In a criminal action, the private
complainant is merely a witness for the State on the
criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil
action arising from the delict. The private complainant
is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There
is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid
multiplicity of suits.26 (Underscoring supplied)
It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted
respondent.27 As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory and the prosecution
cannot appeal the acquittal because of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Either the offended party or the accused may,
however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment
despite the acquittal of the accused. The public
prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the
civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The
acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far
as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in
the civil aspect of a decision are the offended
party and the accused.28

Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.

When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of
court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the
accused is deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.29 At that juncture, the court is called upon to
decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil
action has been waived or reserved.30
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been
reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of
civil liability is not waived, the trial court should, in
case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages
caused by the wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
there is any.31
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be
adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused was acquitted.32
The civil action based on delict may, however, be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.33
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of
court, the accused may adduce countervailing
evidence if the court denies the demurrer. 34 Such
denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the
case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value
between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the

case. In other words, a court may not deny the

demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same
time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the
evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove
the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same
evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil
liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is
insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does
not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to
establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court
grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of
the case generally proceeds. The only recognized
instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it
the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a
finding that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. Absent such
determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case
must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v.
People,35 held:
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by
the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the
court also declares that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.36
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer
and dismissed the case without any finding that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.
Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He
thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.
Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he
merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder
representing the interest, and that he already made a
partial payment of P1,590,000. Petitioner counters,
however, that the payments made by respondent

pertained to other transactions.37 Given these

conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the
case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties
to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.
Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived his
right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the
case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed
on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33,38 and (2) when
respondent orally opposed petitioners motion for
reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect
to the civil aspect of the case continue.
Petitioners position is tenuous.
Petitioners citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is
incorrect.1awphi1.net Where a court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the person of the
accused, and the crime was committed within its
territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises
jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to
resolve.
One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil
liability of the accused arising from the crime, the
governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not
the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil
action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives
rise to the suit.39
As for petitioners attribution of waiver to respondent,
it cannot be determined with certainty from the
records the nature of the alleged oral objections of
respondent to petitioners motion for reconsideration
of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of
the right to present evidence must be positively
demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the voluntariness of
the waiver is frowned upon,40 hence, courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against it. 41

This Court therefore upholds respondents right to

present evidence as reserved by his filing of leave of
court to file the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
discussions, DENIED.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65
which is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case No.
294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of
receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MARIO NAVOA, RAFAEL NAVOA, RICARDO
SITCHON, MACARIO SAGUINZA, JOHN DOE and
PETER DOE, Defendants-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Roman Daguna & Associates Law Offices, for
Defendants-Appellants.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Accused-appellants Mario Navoa, Rafael Navoa,
Ricardo Sitchon (accused Mario Saguinza was
discharged and utilized as a state witness) were found
by the then Court of First Instance of Bataan, Fifth
Judicial District, Branch II, "guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder as charged, defined, and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
and sentenced each to suffer an imprisonment of
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY TO TWENTY (20) YEARS; further they are
hereby ordered to indemnify jointly and solidarily the
heirs of the victim, Tomas Izon, in the amount of
P20,000.00."cralaw
virtua1aw
library

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-67966. July 31, 1984.]

The three accused appealed to the then Court of

Appeals (now the Intermediate Appellate Court). In a
Decision, dated April 11, 1984, the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the Trial Court
but modified the imposable penalty to reclusion
perpetua Pursuant to our rulings in People v. Daniel; 1
People v. Ramos; 2 and People v. Centeno, Et Al., 3 the
Appellate Court refrained from entering judgment and

forthwith certified the case and elevated the entire

records to this Court for review, the matter being
within
our
exclusive
appellate
jurisdiction.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we
agree with the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law in the appealed Decision. 4 We, therefore, adopt it
in toto and append it as an integral part of this
Decision
(Annex
"A").

perpetua, and to indemnify, jointly and solidarily, the

heirs of the victim, Tomas Izon, in the amount of
P30,000.00.
7
With
proportionate
costs.

The testimonies of eyewitness Baltazar de la Rosa, and

of the accused, Mario Saguinza, who had turned state
witness, furnish ample evidence to sustain conviction.
Saguinzas declaration in open Court also revealed the
motive of the three accused. 5 Appellants defense of
alibi is unavailing as against their positive
identification by eyewitness Baltazar de la Rosa and
proof of their motive. As to the issue raised by the
defense on the credibility of prosecution witnesses,
suffice it to re-state the time-tested doctrine that the
findings of the Trial Court on witnesses credibility is
entitled to the highest respect by Appellate Tribunals
unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been
misconstrued, which is absent in the case at
bar.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

ROLITO CALANG and PHILTRANCO

SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Petitioners,

The penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the

medium period of the penalty prescribed for Murder, is
appropriate in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating
circumstance.
6
WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of conviction
imposed upon Mario Navoa, Rafael Navoa, and Ricardo
Sitchon and sentence them to suffer reclusion

versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. -- -

G.R. No. 190696

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairp

BRION,
BERSAMIN,

ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
August 3, 2010

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed

by the petitioners, Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc.
(Philtranco) and Rolito Calang, to challenge our
Resolution of February 17, 2010. Our assailed
Resolution denied the petition for review on certiorari
for failure to show any reversible error sufficient to
warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.

thirty days of arresto menor, as minimum, to four

years and two months of prision correccional, as
maximum. The RTC ordered Calang and Philtranco,
jointly and severally, to pay P50,000.00 as death
indemnity to the heirs of Armando; P50,000.00 as
death indemnity to the heirs of Mabansag; and
P90,083.93 as actual damages to the private
complainants.

Antecedent Facts

The petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the

Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
25522. The CA, in its decision dated November 20,
2009, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA ruled
that petitioner Calang failed to exercise due care and
precaution in driving the Philtranco bus. According to
the CA, various eyewitnesses testified that the bus was
traveling fast and encroached into the opposite lane
when it evaded a pushcart that was on the side of the
road. In addition, he failed to slacken his speed,
despite admitting that he had already seen the jeep
coming from the opposite direction when it was still
half a kilometer away. The CA further ruled that Calang
demonstrated a reckless attitude when he drove the
bus, despite knowing that it was suffering from loose
compression, hence, not roadworthy.

At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, Rolito

Calang was driving Philtranco Bus No. 7001, owned by
Philtranco along Daang Maharlika Highway in
Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita, Samar when its rear
left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep
coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the
collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeeps driver, lost
control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose
Mabansag, a bystander who was standing along the
highways shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3)
times before finally stopping at about 25 meters from
the point of impact. Two of the jeeps passengers,
Armando Nablo and an unidentified woman, were
instantly killed, while the other passengers sustained
serious physical injuries.
The prosecution charged Calang with multiple
homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Calbayog
City. The RTC, in its decision dated May 21, 2001,
found Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to property, and
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of

The CA added that the RTC correctly held

Philtranco jointly and severally liable with petitioner
Calang, for failing to prove that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the
accident.
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari. In our Resolution dated February
17, 2010, we denied the petition for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed

decision to warrant the exercise

discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

of this Courts

The Motion for Reconsideration

In the present motion for reconsideration, the
petitioners claim that there was no basis to hold
Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang
because the former was not a party in the criminal
case (for multiple homicide with multiple serious
physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence) before the RTC.
The petitioners likewise maintain that the courts
below overlooked several relevant facts, supported by
documentary exhibits, which, if considered, would
have shown that Calang was not negligent, such as the
affidavit and testimony of witness Celestina Cabriga;
the testimony of witness Rodrigo Bocaycay; the traffic
accident sketch and report; and the jeepneys
registration receipt. The petitioners also insist that the
jeeps driver had the last clear chance to avoid the
collision.
We partly grant the motion.

this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not

of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are
devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the
assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.
Liability of Philtranco
We, however, hold that the RTC and the CA both
erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable
with Calang. We emphasize that Calang was charged
criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco was
not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of
action against Calang was based on delict, both the
RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and
severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict
under Articles 21761 and 21802 of the Civil Code.
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the
vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that
an employee has committed. Such provision of law
does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
If at all, Philtrancos liability may only be subsidiary.
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the
subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers
and proprietors of establishments, as follows:

Liability of Calang
We see no reason to overturn the lower courts
finding on Calangs culpability. The finding of
negligence on his part by the trial court, affirmed by
the CA, is a question of fact that we cannot pass upon
without going into factual matters touching on the
finding of negligence. In petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,

In default of the persons criminally

liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and
any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a
1
2

violation of municipal ordinances or some

general or special police regulations shall
have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary
liable for the restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided
that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of
such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions
which
such
innkeeper
or
his
representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over
such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed
by the innkeepers employees.
The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to
employers, according to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, which reads:
The subsidiary liability established
in the next preceding article shall also
apply to employers, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices,
or employees in the discharge of their
duties.

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on

subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed
written into the judgments in cases to which they are
applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce
the subsidiary liability of the employer.3 Nonetheless,
before the employers subsidiary liability is enforced,
adequate evidence must exist establishing that (1)
they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) the
execution against the latter has not been satisfied due
to insolvency. The determination of these conditions
may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employees liability, criminal and civil, has been
pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose,
with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment. 4
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the present
motion. The Court of Appeals decision that affirmed in
toto the RTC decision, finding Rolito Calang guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide, multiple serious
physical injuries and damage to property, is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Philtrancos
liability should only be subsidiary. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

3
4

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48006

July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO,
respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which
held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in
damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by
the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver
employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936,
on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of
Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of
the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died
two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he
was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of

prision correccional. The court in the criminal case

granted the petition that the right to bring a separate
civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the
deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo
as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in
favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest
from the date of the complaint. This decision was
modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the
damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time
the action was instituted. It is undisputed that
Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap,
as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at
high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of
Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is
Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that
he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
(See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is
shown he was careless in employing
Fontanilla who had been caught several
times for violation of the Automobile Law
and speeding (Exhibit A) violation
which appeared in the records of the
Bureau of Public Works available to be
public and to himself. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions
of article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of

Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code;
hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has
been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the
person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on
page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the
petitioner is being sued for his failure to
exercise all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent
damages suffered by the respondents. In
other words, The Court of Appeals insists
on applying in the case article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code
is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of
the Civil Code. This fact makes said
article to a civil liability arising from a
crime as in the case at bar simply
because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV
of the Civil Code, in the precise words of
article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is
applicable only to "those (obligations)
arising from wrongful or negligent acts or
commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is
expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's
contention. The liability sought to be
imposed upon him in this action is not a
civil obligation arising from a felony or a
misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro

Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in

article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of
his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the
plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and
directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The
defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being
punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's)
liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to
said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a
civil action and his property has not been exhausted.
To decide the main issue, we must cut through the
tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and
jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes
under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be
done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth,
unless principles and remedies are distinctly
envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by
the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by
renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the
decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by
the solemn clarity of the consideration in several
sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict
or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the
wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the

primary and direct responsibility of employers may be

safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised
Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law,
from contracts and quasi-contracts, and
from acts and omissions which are
unlawful or in which any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from

felonies or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal
Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from
acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law,
intervenes shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or

omission causes damage to another by
his fault or negligence shall be liable for
the damage so done.

ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the

next preceding article is enforcible, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children
who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by
minors or incapacitated persons subject
to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment
or business are equally liable for any
damages caused by their employees
while engaged in the branch of the
service in which employed, or on occasion
of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability
when it acts through a special agent, but
not if the damage shall have been caused
by the official upon whom properly
devolved the duty of doing the act
performed, in which case the provisions
of the next preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades
are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody.

The liability imposed by this article shall

cease in case the persons mentioned
therein prove that they are exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for
damage caused by his employees may
recover from the latter what he may have
paid.

appears that there was

negligence on their part.

no

fault

or

Should there be no person having such

insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control,
or if such person be insolvent, said
insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond
with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in
accordance with the civil law.

REVISED PENAL CODE

ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty
of felony. Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in
certain cases. The exemption from
criminal
liability
established
in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12
and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this
Code does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced to
the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of
article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years
of age, or by one over nine but under
fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment shall devolve upon
those having such person under their
legal authority or control, unless it

Second. In cases falling within subdivision

4 of article 11, the person for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented
shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion,
the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably
determined, even approximately, or when the liability
also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of
the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damage has been caused with the
consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner
prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of
article 12, the persons using violence or causing the
fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if
there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be

liable, saving always to the latter that part of their

property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of
innkeepers,
tavern
keepers
and
proprietors of establishment. In default
of persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavern keepers, and any other persons or
corporation shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments,
in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special
police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for
the restitution of goods taken by robbery
or theft within their houses lodging
therein, or the person, or for the payment
of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper
himself,
or
the
person
representing him, of the deposit of such
goods within
the
inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions
which
such
innkeeper
or
his
representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over
such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the
innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other
persons. The subsidiary liability

established in the next preceding article

shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry for felonies committed by
their
servants,
pupils,
workmen,
apprentices,
or
employees
in
the
discharge of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence.

Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period; if it
would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles
1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to
cover the driver's negligence in the instant case,
nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or

omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as

article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not
only reckless but even simple imprudence or
negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902
of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It
is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse
confounded." However, a closer study shows that such
a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts
does not destroy the distinction between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito
or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal
institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early
ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In
fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is
often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also
contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or
negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6,
Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer
emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a
sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the
Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five
sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasidelito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que
intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia."
Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation
shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV,

meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil

Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of
culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the
Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito
under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasidelitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or
corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts,
because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter,
cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of
fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be
noted that not all violations of the penal law produce
civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of
the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and
Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p.
728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the
separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's
primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in
the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414)
says:

El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad

civil
abarca
diversos
aspectos
y
comprende a diferentes personas. Asi,
existe
una
responsabilidad
civil
propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl
lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal
alguna, y otra que es consecuencia
indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo
delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility
has various aspects and comprises
different persons. Thus, there is a civil
responsibility, properly speaking, which in
no case carries with it any criminal
responsibility, and another which is a
necessary consequence of the penal
liability as a result of every felony or
misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the
following case: There had been a collision between two
trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril
Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee
of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in
which the company had been made a party as
subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and
the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been
exonerated. The question asked was whether the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for
damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's
opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura,
Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):

Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la

realidad pura y neta de los hechos,
todavia menos parece sostenible que
exista cosa juzgada acerca de la
obligacion civil de indemnizar los
quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el
choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se
funda la accion para demandar el
resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con
las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de
delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual
sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones
penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion
causada por delito o falta en los derechos
civiles,
requiere
restituciones,
reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual
la pena misma ataen al orden publico;
por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de
ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es
que si por esta via se enmiendan los
quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado
excusa procurar el ya conseguido
desagravio;
pero
esta
eventual
coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la
diversidad originaria de las acciones
civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo
de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian
a cuento y que tiene otro regimen),
dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision,
causante de daos o perjuicios, en que
intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial
que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas

ante
los
Tribunales
de
lo
civil
cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia
punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los
asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al
128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y
a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de
delito, en terminos separados del regimen
por ley comun de la culpa que se
denomina aquiliana, por alusion a
precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris.
Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre
aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la
obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa
civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria
una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal
paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal,
despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que
sean por diversos conceptos culpables del
delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las
empresas y los establecimientos al
servicio de los cuales estan los
delincuentes;
pero
con
caracter
subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal,
en defecto de los que sean responsables
criminalmente. No coincide en ello el
Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La
obligacion que impone el articulo anterior
es exigible, no solo por los actos y
omisiones propios, sino por los de
aquellas personas de quienes se debe
responder; personas en la enumeracion

de las cuales figuran los dependientes y

empleados de los establecimientos o
empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea
con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto
acontece,
y
se
observa
en
la
jurisprudencia,
que
las
empresas,
despues de intervenir en las causas
criminales con el caracter subsidiario de
su responsabilidad civil por razon del
delito, son demandadas y condenadas
directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata
de la obligacion, ante los tribunales
civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de
esta obligacion, y formando verdadero
postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la
separacion entre justicia punitiva y
tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen
unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos
cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de
proceder, habiendose, por aadidura,
abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la
Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que
se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece
innegable que la de indemnizacion por los
daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque,
no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del
Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que
permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el
fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el
veredicto
no
hubiese
sido
de
inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que
tal
accion
quedaba
legitimamente
reservada para despues del proceso; pero
al declararse que no existio delito, ni

responsabilidad dimanada de delito,

materia
unica
sobre
que
tenian
jurisdiccion
aquellos
juzgadores,
se
redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil
ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la
accion para pedir su cumplimiento
permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa
juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure
and simple of the facts, it seems less
tenable that there should be res judicata
with regard to the civil obligation for
damages on account of the losses caused
by the collision of the trains. The title
upon which the action for reparation is
based cannot be confused with the civil
responsibilities born of a crime, because
there exists in the latter, whatever each
nature,
a
culpa
surrounded
with
aggravating aspects which give rise to
penal measures that are more or less
severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires
restitutions,
reparations,
or
indemnifications which, like the penalty
itself, affect public order; for this reason,
they are ordinarily entrusted to the office
of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear
that if by this means the losses and
damages are repaired, the injured party
no longer desires to seek another relief;
but this coincidence of effects does not
eliminate the peculiar nature of civil
actions to ask for indemnity.

Such civil actions in the present case

(without referring to contractual faults
which are not pertinent and belong to
another scope) are derived, according to
article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every
act or omission causing losses and
damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such
actions are every day filed before the civil
courts without the criminal courts
interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21
and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing
in mind the spirit and the social and
political purposes of that Code, develop
and regulate the matter of civil
responsibilities arising from a crime,
separately from the regime under
common law, of culpa which is known as
aquiliana, in accordance with legislative
precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be
unwarranted
to
make
a
detailed
comparison
between
the
former
provisions and that regarding the
obligation to indemnify on account of civil
culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to
point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after
distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for
different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor,
make
such
civil
responsibilities applicable to enterprises
and establishments for which the guilty
parties render service, but with subsidiary
character, that is to say, according to the

wording of the Penal Code, in default of

those who are criminally responsible. In
this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The
obligation imposed by the next preceding
article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is
responsible."
Among
the
persons
enumerated are the subordinates and
employees
of
establishments
or
enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their
functions. It is for this reason that it
happens, and it is so observed in judicial
decisions,
that
the
companies
or
enterprises, after taking part in the
criminal cases because of their subsidiary
civil responsibility by reason of the crime,
are sued and sentenced directly and
separately with regard to the obligation,
before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is
different, and the separation between
punitive justice and the civil courts being
a true postulate of our judicial system, so
that they have different fundamental
norms in different codes, as well as
different modes of procedure, and
inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico has abstained from taking part
in the criminal case and has reserved the
right to exercise its actions, it seems
undeniable
that
the
action
for
indemnification for the losses and

damages caused to it by the collision was

not sub judice before the Tribunal del
Jurado, nor was it the subject of a
sentence, but it remained intact when the
decision of March 21 was rendered. Even
if the verdict had not been that of
acquittal, it has already been shown that
such action had been legitimately
reserved
till
after
the
criminal
prosecution;
but
because
of
the
declaration of the non-existence of the
felony and the non-existence of the
responsibility arising from the crime,
which was the sole subject matter upon
which the Tribunal del Jurado had
jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the
civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes
clearer that the action for its enforcement
remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work
on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil
Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasidelito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of
the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384
of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article
1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against
the person responsible (for another),
without including the author of the act.
The action against the principal is
accessory in the sense that it implies the
existence of a prejudicial act committed
by the employee, but it is not subsidiary
in the sense that it can not be instituted

till after the judgment against the author

of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary
to the principal action; the action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself
a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of
French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol.
20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil
Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the
responsibility of the employer is principal and not
subsidiary. He writes:

incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices)

causan un dao, la ley presume que el
padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han
cometido una falta de negligencia para
prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la
que la ley castiga. No hay, pues,
responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino
en la apariencia; en realidad la
responsabilidad se exige por un hecho
propio.
La
idea
de
que
esa
responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo
tanto, completamente inadmisible.

Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada

en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u
omisiones de aquellas personas por las
que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es
principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta
es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en
que se funda el precepto legal. Es que
realmente se impone una responsabilidad
por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera
vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria
contraria a la justicia y a la maxima
universal, segun la que las faltas son
personales, y cada uno responde de
aquellas que le son imputables. La
responsabilidad de que tratamos se
impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa,
pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa
del causi delito, esto es, de la
imprudencia o de la negligencia del
padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del
establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando
cualquiera de las personas que enumera
el articulo citado (menores de edad,

Question No. 1. Is the responsibility

declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for who one is
responsible, subsidiary or principal? In
order to answer this question it is
necessary to know, in the first place, on
what the legal provision is based. Is it
true that there is a responsibility for the
fault of another person? It seems so at
first sight; but such assertion would be
contrary to justice and to the universal
maxim that all faults are personal, and
that everyone is liable for those faults
that can be imputed to him. The
responsibility in question is imposed on
the occasion of a crime or fault, but not
because of the same, but because of the
cuasi-delito,
that
is
to
say,
the
imprudence or negligence of the father,
guardian, proprietor or manager of the
establishment, of the teacher, etc.
Whenever anyone of the persons
enumerated in the article referred to

(minors,
incapacitated
persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any
damage, the law presumes that the
father, guardian, teacher, etc. have
committed an act of negligence in not
preventing or avoiding the damage. It is
this fault that is condemned by the law. It
is, therefore, only apparent that there is a
responsibility for the act of another; in
reality the responsibility exacted is for
one's own act. The idea that such
responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore,
completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y
Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol,"
says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos,
porque se responde solo de su propia
culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por
excepcion, se responde de la ajena
respecto de aquellas personas con las
que media algun nexo o vinculo, que
motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta
responsabilidad,
es
directa
o
es
subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo
de esta clase distingue entre menores e
incapacitados y los demas, declarando
directa la primera (articulo 19) y
subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21);
pero en el orden civil, en el caso del
articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa,
por el tenor del articulo que impone la
responsabilidad precisamente "por los

actos de aquellas personas de quienes se

deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for
the acts of others, because one is liable
only for his own faults, this being the
doctrine of article 1902; but, by
exception, one is liable for the acts of
those persons with whom there is a bond
or tie which gives rise to the
responsibility. Is this responsibility direct
or subsidiary? In the order of the penal
law, the Penal Code distinguishes
between
minors
and
incapacitated
persons on the one hand, and other
persons on the other, declaring that the
responsibility for the former is direct
(article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary
(articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of
the civil law, in the case of article 1903,
the responsibility should be understood
as direct, according to the tenor of that
articles,
for
precisely
it
imposes
responsibility "for the acts of those
persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal
of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above
set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual
is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent
from the civil responsibility arising from criminal
liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of
the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for
the negligent acts of his employee.

One of the most important of those Spanish decisions

is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon
Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by
a street car owned by the "compaia Electric
Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted
in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon,
the widow filed a civil action against the street car
company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000
pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the
company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging
violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault
or negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court
of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del
recurso se funda en el equivocado
supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al
condonar a la compaia Electrica
Madrilea al pago del dao causado con
la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo,
desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de
la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la
causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo
hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este
han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo
diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo
criminal declrao dentro de los limites de
su competencia que el hecho de que se
trata no era constitutivo de delito por no
haber mediado descuido o negligencia
graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el
unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el
concurso de la culpa o negligencia no
califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles
segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que

alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras

perosnas,
a
los
Directores
de
establecimientos o empresas por los
daos causados por sus dependientes en
determinadas condiciones, es manifesto
que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo
hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al
condenar a la compaia recurrente a la
indemnizacion del dao causado por uno
de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los
mencionados textos, en relacion con el
articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento
Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a
ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su
jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas
minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the
appeal is based on the mistaken
supposition that the trial court, in
sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to
the payment of the damage caused by
the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and juridical effects
of the sentence of acquittal rendered in
the criminal case instituted on account of
the same act, when it is a fact that the
two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of
the same act in its different aspects, and
as the criminal jurisdiction declared within
the limits of its authority that the act in
question did not constitute a felony
because there was no grave carelessness
or negligence, and this being the only
basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the
co-existence of fault or negligence which

is not qualified, and is a source of civil

obligations according to article 1902 of
the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance
with article 1903, among other persons,
the managers of establishments or
enterprises by reason of the damages
caused by employees under certain
conditions, it is manifest that the civil
jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the
same act in this latter aspect and in
ordering the company, appellant herein,
to pay an indemnity for the damage
caused by one of its employees, far from
violating said legal provisions, in relation
with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same,
without invading attributes which are
beyond its own jurisdiction, and without
in any way contradicting the decision in
that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case,
either separately or with the street car company. This
is precisely what happens in the present case: the
driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action,
either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of
grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of
fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part
of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of
criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his

civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would

have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and
Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for
the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo,
on his primary responsibility because of his own
presumed negligence which he did not overcome
under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of
Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil
liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's
criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary
liability as an employer under article 1903. The
plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and
they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they
were acting within their rights. It might be observed in
passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious
and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was
either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which
might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him
for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of
October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly,
notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the
conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater
reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at
bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed
against him because his taxi driver had been
convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor
in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi
driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in
the previous criminal case while the latter was found
guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to
two years of prision correccional.

(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is

similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated
February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a
railroad company for damages because the station
agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and
fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles
consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain
held that this action was properly under article 1902 of
the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida
reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que
consigna con relacion a las pruebas del
pleito:
1.,
que
las
expediciones
facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria a
la consignacion del actor de las vasijas
vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera
a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes;
2., que llegadas a su destino tales
mercanias no se quisieron entregar a
dicho consignatario por el jefe de la
estacion sin motivo justificado y con
intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de
entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo
de
reclamarlas
el
demandante
le
originaron daos y perjuicios en cantidad
de
bastante
importancia
como
expendedor al por mayor que era de
vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que
dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir
los pedidos que se le habian hecho por
los remitentes en los envases:

Considerando que sobre esta base hay

necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos
que integran este recurso, porque la
demanda inicial del pleito a que se
contrae no contiene accion que nazca del
incumplimiento
del
contrato
de
transporte, toda vez que no se funda en
el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias
ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual
entre
las
partes
contendientes,
careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el
articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en
que principalmente descansa el fallo
recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la
reparaction de los daos y perjuicios
producidos en el patrimonio del actor por
la injustificada y dolosa negativa del
porteador a la entrega de las mercancias
a su nombre consignadas, segun lo
reconoce
la
sentencia,
y
cuya
responsabilidad
esta
claramente
sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo
Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la
Compaia demandada como ligada con el
causante de aquellos por relaciones de
caracter economico y de jurarquia
administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in
question recognizes, in virtue of the facts
which it declares, in relation to the
evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice
issued by the railroad company in favor of
the plaintiff contemplated that the empty
receptacles referred to in the complaint
should be returned to the consignors with

wines and liquors; (2) that when the said

merchandise reached their destination,
their delivery to the consignee was
refused by the station agent without
justification and with fraudulent intent,
and (3) that the lack of delivery of these
goods when they were demanded by the
plaintiff caused him losses and damages
of considerable importance, as he was a
wholesale vendor of wines and liquors
and he failed to realize the profits when
he was unable to fill the orders sent to
him by the consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is
need of upholding the four assignments
of error, as the original complaint did not
contain any cause of action arising from
non-fulfillment
of
a
contract
of
transportation, because the action was
not based on the delay of the goods nor
on any contractual relation between the
parties litigant and, therefore, article 371
of the Code of Commerce, on which the
decision appealed from is based, is not
applicable; but it limits to asking for
reparation for losses and damages
produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff
on account of the unjustified and
fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver
the goods consigned to the plaintiff as
stated by the sentence, and the carrier's
responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds,
in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected

with the person who caused the damage

by relations of economic character and by
administrative
hierarchy.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the
same act may come under both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it
was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be
noted that it was the employer and not the employee
who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by
this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial
court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of
the defendant, because the latter had negligently
failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the
rails slid off while iron was being transported, and
caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court
held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its
first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated
laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal
action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable
and his employer held only subsidiarily to
him. According to this theory the plaintiff

should have procured the arrest of the

representative
of
the
company
accountable for not repairing the track,
and on his prosecution a suitable fine
should have been imposed, payable
primarily by him and secondarily by his
employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of
the Spanish codes upon this subject.
Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes
obligations
arising
from
faults
or
negligence not punished by the law,
subject to the provisions of Chapter II of
Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter
reads:
"A person who by an act
omission
causes
damage
another when there is fault
negligence shall be obliged
repair the damage so done.

or
to
or
to

"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed

by the preceeding article is
demandable, not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for
those of the persons for whom they
should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or
incapacity, the mother, is liable for
the damages caused by the minors
who live with them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Owners
or
directors
of
an
establishment or enterprise are
equally liable for the damages
caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which
the latter may be employed or in
the performance of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The liability referred to in this

article shall cease when the
persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in
this particular action it may be sufficient
to point out that nowhere in our general
statutes is the employer penalized for
failure to provide or maintain safe
appliances for his workmen. His obligation
therefore is one 'not punished by the
laws' and falls under civil rather than
criminal jurisprudence. But the answer
may be a broader one. We should be
reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt
a forced construction of these scientific
codes, such as is proposed by the
defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants
against their will from the civil courts,
would make the assertion of their rights
dependent upon the selection for
prosecution of the proper criminal

offender, and render recovery doubtful by

reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if
these articles had always stood alone,
such
a
construction
would
be
unnecessary, but clear light is thrown
upon their meaning by the provisions of
the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain
(Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which,
though never in actual force in these
Islands, was formerly given a suppletory
or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of
this law, both classes of action, civil and
criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or
separately, but while the penal action was
pending the civil was suspended.
According to article 112, the penal action
once started, the civil remedy should be
sought therewith, unless it had been
waived by the party injured or been
expressly reserved by him for civil
proceedings for the future. If the civil
action alone was prosecuted, arising out
of a crime that could be enforced only on
private complaint, the penal action
thereunder should be extinguished. These
provisions are in harmony with those of
articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on
the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be
carried much further, but the citation of
these articles suffices to show that the
civil liability was not intended to be
merged in the criminal nor even to be
suspended thereby, except as expressly

provided in the law. Where an individual is

civilly liable for a negligent act or
omission, it is not required that the
injured party should seek out a third
person
criminally
liable
whose
prosecution
must
be
a
condition
precedent to the enforcement of the civil
right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the
responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of
criminal actions against his employees
only while they are in process of
prosecution, or in so far as they
determine the existence of the criminal
act from which liability arises, and his
obligation under the civil law and its
enforcement in the civil courts is not
barred thereby unless by the election of
the injured person. Inasmuch as no
criminal proceeding had been instituted,
growing our of the accident in question,
the provisions of the Penal Code can not
affect this action. This construction
renders
it
unnecessary
to
finally
determine here whether this subsidiary
civil liability in penal actions has survived
the laws that fully regulated it or has
been abrogated by the American civil and
criminal procedure now in force in the
Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of
the code above cited in this case appears
from the briefs before us to have arisen

from the interpretation of the words of

article 1093, "fault or negligence not
punished by law," as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It
has been shown that the liability of an
employer arising out of his relation to his
employee who is the offender is not to be
regarded as derived from negligence
punished by the law, within the meaning
of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this,
however, it cannot be said to fall within
the class of acts unpunished by the law,
the consequence of which are regulated
by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code. The acts to which these articles are
applicable are understood to be those not
growing out of pre-existing duties of the
parties to one another. But where
relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract
or quasi contract, then breaches of those
duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103,
and 1104 of the same code. A typical
application of this distinction may be
found in the consequences of a railway
accident due to defective machinery
supplied by the employer. His liability to
his employee would arise out of the
contract of employment, that to the
passengers out of the contract for
passage, while that to the injured
bystander
would
originate
in
the
negligent act itself.

In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918),

the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona
brought a civil action against Moreta to recover
damages resulting from the death of the child, who
had been run over by an automobile driven and
managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered
judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming
the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in
coming from the southern part of Solana
Street, had to stop his auto before
crossing Real Street, because he had met
vehicles which were going along the latter
street or were coming from the opposite
direction along Solana Street, it is to be
believed that, when he again started to
run his auto across said Real Street and to
continue its way along Solana Street
northward, he should have adjusted the
speed of the auto which he was operating
until he had fully crossed Real Street and
had completely reached a clear way on
Solana Street. But, as the child was run
over by the auto precisely at the entrance
of Solana Street, this accident could not
have occurred if the auto had been
running at a slow speed, aside from the
fact that the defendant, at the moment of
crossing Real Street and entering Solana
Street, in a northward direction, could
have seen the child in the act of crossing
the latter street from the sidewalk on the
right to that on the left, and if the
accident had occurred in such a way that

after the automobile had run over the

body of the child, and the child's body
had already been stretched out on the
ground, the automobile still moved along
a distance of about 2 meters, this
circumstance shows the fact that the
automobile entered Solana Street from
Real Street, at a high speed without the
defendant having blown the horn. If these
precautions had been taken by the
defendant, the deplorable accident which
caused the death of the child would not
have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case
could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child
was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a
clear instance of the same act of negligence being a
proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with
its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of
an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized,
even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted
in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to
apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs.
House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil.,
327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion

Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for

the child's death as a result of burns caused by the
fault and negligence of the defendants. On the
evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession
was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with
her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from
another municipality to attend the same. After the
procession the mother and the daughter with two
others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front
of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd.,
owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile
appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl,
who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened
by the automobile that she turned to run, but
unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot
water from the electric plant was flowing. The child
died that same night from the burns. The trial courts
dismissed the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on
appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and
allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V.
House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was
the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This
Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings
of
fact
hereinbefore
outlined,
he
nevertheless was led to order the
dismissal of the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It
is from this point that a majority of the
court depart from the stand taken by the
trial judge. The mother and her child had
a perfect right to be on the principal
street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening
when the religious procession was held.

There was nothing abnormal in allowing

the child to run along a few paces in
advance of the mother. No one could
foresee the coincidence of an automobile
appearing and of a frightened child
running and falling into a ditch filled with
hot water. The doctrine announced in the
much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359),
still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code
must again be enforced. The contributory
negligence of the child and her mother, if
any, does not operate as a bar to
recovery, but in its strictest sense could
only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this
Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code.
It is thus that although J. V. House could have been
criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
and not only punished but also made civilly liable
because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this
Court awarded damages in an independent civil action
for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year
1915), the action was for damages for the death of the
plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of the servant in driving an automobile
over the child. It appeared that the cause of the
mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The
defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the
International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in
carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas.
Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000

as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court

reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that
he had shown that the exercised the care of a good
father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of
negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly
shown that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family. He
obtained the machine from a reputable
garage and it was, so far as appeared, in
good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage,
were duly licensed by the Government in
their particular calling, and apparently
thoroughly competent. The machine had
been used but a few hours when the
accident occurred and it is clear from the
evidence that the defendant had no
notice, either actual or constructive, of
the defective condition of the steering
gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this
Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only
establishes
liability
in
cases
of
negligence, but also provides when the
liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this
article shall cease when the
persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the

diligence of a good father of a

family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent:
(1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee
there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part
of the matter or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or
in supervision over him after the
selection, or both;
and
(2) that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris
et de jure, and consequently, may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in selection and supervision he
has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption
is overcome and he is relieve from
liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the
master ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this
Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In
the latter case, the complaint alleged that the
defendant's servant had so negligently driven an
automobile, which was operated by defendant as a
public vehicle, that said automobile struck and
damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court,
applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia
vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:

The master is liable for the negligent acts

of his servant where he is the owner or
director of a business or enterprise and
the negligent acts are committed while
the servant is engaged in his master's
employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs.
Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison
Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an
action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of
his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his
way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large
pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy
underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo
Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for
Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co.,
pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly.
This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not
respondent superior but the relationship
of pater familias. This theory bases the
liability of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his
servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes
[1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson
Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff
brought an action for damages for the demolition of its
wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C
belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):

The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at

the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed
was a duly licensed captain, authorized to
navigate and direct a vessel of any
tonnage,
and
that
the
appellee
contracted his services because of his
reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the
opinion that the presumption of liability
against the defendant has been overcome
by the exercise of the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in selecting
Captain Lasa, in accordance with the
doctrines laid down by this court in the
cases cited above, and the defendant is
therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about
his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases
above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases,
primarily and directly responsible in damages under
article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil
Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon
by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs.
Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A
collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a
street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June
8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of
P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was
prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and
slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was
found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to
indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable

to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of

Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric
Company to obtain payment, claiming that the
defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense
was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by
the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way,
there is no escaping the conclusion that
the provisions of the Penal Code govern.
The Penal Code in easily understandable
language authorizes the determination of
subsidiary liability. The Civil Code
negatives its application by providing that
civil obligations arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The
conviction of the motorman was a
misdemeanor falling under article 604 of
the Penal Code. The act of the motorman
was not a wrongful or negligent act or
omission
not
punishable
by
law.
Accordingly, the civil obligation connected
up with the Penal Code and not with
article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other
words, the Penal Code affirms its
jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives
its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability
arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case

relates to the Penal Code and not to the
Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the
trial judge, any different ruling would
permit the master to escape scot-free by
simply alleging and proving that the
master had exercised all diligence in the
selection and training of its servants to
prevent the damage. That would be a
good defense to a strictly civil action, but
might or might not be to a civil action
either as a part of or predicated on
conviction for a crime or misdemeanor.
(By way of parenthesis, it may be said
further that the statements here made
are offered to meet the argument
advanced during our deliberations to the
effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code
should be disregarded and codal articles
1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the
defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals
based its decision in the present case on the
defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903
of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability
arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other
words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric
Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different
theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer
arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas
the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals
in the present case is the employer's primary liability
under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already
seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.

Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is

another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in
the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been
convicted o homicide by simple negligence and
sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the
deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then
brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The
defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the
motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil
liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations,
we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the
exemption from civil liability established
in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all
who have acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family, is not applicable
to the subsidiary civil liability provided in
article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the
defendant in the instant case, because the action
there had for its purpose the enforcement of the
defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code,
while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action
is based on the defendant's primary and direct
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In
fact, the above case destroys the defendant's
contention because that decision illustrates the
principle that the employer's primary responsibility
under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in
character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal
Code.

In trying to apply the two cases just referred to,

counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the
distinction between civil liability arising from a crime,
which is governed by the Penal Code, and the
responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under
the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the
importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs.
Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set
forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was
also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as
inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the
separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there is a distinction between civil liability arising
from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code)
and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising
from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely,
the authorities above cited render it inescapable to
conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable
under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already
invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood in the past,
it might not be inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes

not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we
were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by
law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of
the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana
would have very little scope and application in actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property
through any degree of negligence even the slightest
would have to be indemnified only through the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasidelito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the
letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life.
We will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as
culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish
Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.
There are numerous cases of criminal negligence
which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but
can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be
many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus
ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make

defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the
driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first,
would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to
follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining
relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but
there is also a more expeditious way, which is based
on the primary and direct responsibility of the
defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our
view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for
civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being
a matter of common knowledge that professional
drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually
do not have sufficient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in
all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary,
and probably useless procedure? In construing the
laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate
the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and
direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society.
Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen
and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the
profits resulting from the services of these servants
and employees. It is but right that they should
guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the
personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As
Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves,
at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor
selection and all for their negligence." And according
to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that
such responsibility should fall upon the principal or

director who could have chosen a careful and prudent

employee, and not upon the injured person who could
not exercise such selection and who used such
employee because of his confidence in the principal or
director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also
base this primary responsibility of the employer on the
principle of representation of the principal by the
agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited
(Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer
and employee "vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en
la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one
personality by the merging of the person of the
employee in that of him who employs and utilizes
him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force
and significance when it comes to motor accidents,
and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions
of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack
of understanding of the character and efficacy of the
action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of
the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless
rendered
practically
useless
and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In
the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this
usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed
out to the harm done by such practice and to restore

the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence

under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasidelict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding of private
rights because it re-establishes an ancient and
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel,
is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the defendant-petitioner.

Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of

which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,

1. The present action is not only against

but a violation of section 1, Rule 107,
which is now Rule III, of the Revised
Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment
which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;

vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

3. The complaint had no cause of action

against defendant Marvin Hill, because he
was relieved as guardian of the other
defendant through emancipation by
marriage.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro
Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the
time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill,
with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the
above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration
filed by the defendants on January 14,
1965 and after thoroughly examining the
arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and wellfounded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on
December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered

by ordering the dismissal of the above

entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29,
1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses
Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c)
OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS
NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO
2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE; and
IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION

AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffsappellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably
because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis
stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their
complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin
Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two
decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal
of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil
liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code
he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact
that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his
father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal
and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which
was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73
Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a
scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa

aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or

fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not
only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code.
In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil
action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted
that it was the employer and not the employee who was being
sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence
causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V.
House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable
because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should

ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as
we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in
the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed
to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life.
We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which
is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt,
but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such
cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both

the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has
given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more
likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73
Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a
reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that
the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the
thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in
fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of
Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud
or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil
Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided

textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or

omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo
emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation
of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring
in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so,
because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission
that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia
doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law,"
thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana
includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the
penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding
provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article
1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall
be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this
Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a
new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision
(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal

negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has

been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report
of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to
only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather
than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And considering that
the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability
in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to
32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of
Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the
same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law,
equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic.
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred
to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,

whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot
be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176
is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted

that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason
behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated
by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry
with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give
rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.)
And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of
the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty.
Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial
court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Supplemental Decision dated June 6, 1992 and

October 26, 1992 respectively.
SO ORDERED.4
The facts are as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 129029

April 3, 2000

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for
herself and on behalf of the minors Maria Luisa, Francis
Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy),
respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the amended decision 1
of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision and supplemental
decision of the trial court,3 as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing the appeals
interposed by both accused and Reyes Trucking
Corporation and affirming the Decision and

On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of

Isabela filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19,
Cauayan an amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de
Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and
damage to property, reading as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989, in
the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused being the
driver and person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck
Tractor bearing Plate No. N2A-867 registered in
the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation,
with a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of
beer grande, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drove and operated the same while along the
National Highway of Barangay Tagaran, in said
Municipality, in a negligent, careless and
imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic
laws, rules and ordinances and without taking the
necessary precautions to prevent injuries to
persons and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence the
said trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up
bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano
Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., @ Pacquing, due to
irreversible shock, internal
and external
hemorrhage and multiple injuries, open wounds,
abrasions, and further causing damages to the
heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the amount of
P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr.;

@ Pacquing and damages to his Nissan Pick-Up

bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the total amount of
P2,000,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cauayan, Isabela, October 10, 1989.
(Sgd.)
FAUSTO
C.
CABANTAC
Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused entered a
plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the offended parties
(Rosario P. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and
minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a separate civil action
against the accused arising from the offense charged. 5 On
November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a complaint
against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as
employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi
delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano
Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident).
The private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but
did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against
petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private respondents withdrew
the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused
and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex
delicto in the criminal action.6 However, they did not withdraw the
separate civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner as
employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused
driver.7
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated both
criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the same.
The facts, as found by the trial court, which appear to be
undisputed, are as follows:

The
defendant
Rafael
Reyes
Trucking
Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of transporting beer products for the
San Miguel Corporation (SMC for Short) from the
latter's San Fernando, Pampanga plant to its
various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of
vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer described
above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly
licensed driver. Aside from the Corporation's
memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to
physically inspect their vehicles before each trip
(Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the SMC's Traffic
Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness
of this White Truck trailer prior to June 20, 1989
(Exh. 17). In addition to a professional driver's
license, it also conducts a rigid examination of all
driver applicants before they are hired.
In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White
Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan
bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with
2,000 cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles.
Seated at the front right seat beside him was
Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper ("pahinante"
in Pilipino). At around 4:00 o'clock that same
morning while the truck was descending at a
slight downgrade along the national road at
Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a
damaged portion of the road covering the full
width of the truck's right lane going south and
about six meters in length. These made the
surface of the road uneven because the potholes
were about five to six inches deep. The left lane
parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As
narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before
approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the
Nissan with its headlights on coming from the
opposite direction. They used to evade this

damaged road by taking the left lance but at that

particular moment, because of the incoming
vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the
truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the
wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading
the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Dunca's
vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it
to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a
ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped.
(see Exh. A-5, p. 8, record). The Nissan was
severely damaged (Exhs. A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-14,
pp. 9-11 record), and its two passengers, namely:
Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died
instantly (Exh. A-19) from external and internal
hemorrhage and multiple fractures (pp. 15 and 16,
record).
For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her
widow spent P651,360.00 (Exh. I-3). At the time of
his death he was 45 years old. He was the
President and Chairman of the Board of the
Dynamic Wood Products and Development
Corporation (DWPC), a wood processing
establishment, from which he was receiving an
income of P10,000.00 a month. (Exh. D). In the
Articles of Incorporation of the DWPC, the
spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy
appear to be stockholders of 10,000 shares each
with par value of P100.00 per share out of its
outstanding and subscribed capital stock of
60,000 shares valued at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs. K1 & 10-B). Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns
(Exh. J) the DWPC had a taxable net income of
P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La
Salle
University
graduate
in
Business
Administration, past president of the Pasay
Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the
Philippine Jaycees in 1971 and 1976,

respectively, and World Vice-President of Jaycees

International in 1979. He was also the recipient of
numerous awards as a civic leader (Exh. C). His
children were all studying in prestigious schools
and spent about P180,000.00 for their education
in 1988 alone (Exh. H-4).
As stated earlier, the plaintiffs' procurement of a
writ of attachment of the properties of the
Corporation was declared illegal by the Court of
Appeals. It was shown that on December 26,
1989, Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at
San Fernando, Pampanga, attached six units of
Truck Tractors and trailers of the Corporation at its
garage at San Fernando, Pampanga. These
vehicles were kept under PC guard by the
plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the
Corporation to operate them. However, on
December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals
dissolved the writ (p. 30, record) and on
December 29, 1989, said Sheriff reported to this
Court that the attached vehicles were taken by the
defendant's representative, Melita Manapil (Exh.
O, p. 31, record). The defendant's general
Manager declared that it lost P21,000.00 per day
for the non-operation of the six units during their
attachment (p. 31, t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran,
proceedings on December 10, 1990).8
On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence

with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act

No. 4136), and appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
without any aggravating circumstance to offset the
same, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
two (2) indeterminate penalties of four months
and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to
three years, six months and twenty days as
maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy.
Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral
expenses;2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. Br. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein actual
damages in the amount of P84,000.00; and3.
Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil
Case No. Br. 19-424.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 129029

April 3, 2000

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for
herself and on behalf of the minors Maria Luisa, Francis
Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy),
respondents.
PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the amended decision 1

of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision and supplemental
decision of the trial court,3 as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing the appeals
interposed by both accused and Reyes Trucking
Corporation and affirming the Decision and
Supplemental Decision dated June 6, 1992 and
October 26, 1992 respectively.
SO ORDERED.4
The facts are as follows:
On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of
Isabela filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19,
Cauayan an amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de
Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and
damage to property, reading as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989, in
the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused being the
driver and person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck
Tractor bearing Plate No. N2A-867 registered in
the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation,
with a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of
beer grande, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drove and operated the same while along the
National Highway of Barangay Tagaran, in said
Municipality, in a negligent, careless and
imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic
laws, rules and ordinances and without taking the
necessary precautions to prevent injuries to
persons and damage to property, causing by such

negligence, carelessness and imprudence the

said trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up
bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano
Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., @ Pacquing, due to
irreversible shock, internal
and external
hemorrhage and multiple injuries, open wounds,
abrasions, and further causing damages to the
heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the amount of
P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr.;
@ Pacquing and damages to his Nissan Pick-Up
bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the total amount of
P2,000,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cauayan, Isabela, October 10, 1989.
(Sgd.)
FAUSTO
C.
CABANTAC
Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused entered a
plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the offended parties
(Rosario P. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and
minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a separate civil action
against the accused arising from the offense charged. 5 On
November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a complaint
against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as
employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi
delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano
Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident).
The private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but
did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against
petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private respondents withdrew
the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused
and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex
delicto in the criminal action.6 However, they did not withdraw the
separate civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner as

employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused

driver.7
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated both
criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the same.
The facts, as found by the trial court, which appear to be
undisputed, are as follows:
The
defendant
Rafael
Reyes
Trucking
Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of transporting beer products for the
San Miguel Corporation (SMC for Short) from the
latter's San Fernando, Pampanga plant to its
various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of
vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer described
above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly
licensed driver. Aside from the Corporation's
memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to
physically inspect their vehicles before each trip
(Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the SMC's Traffic
Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness
of this White Truck trailer prior to June 20, 1989
(Exh. 17). In addition to a professional driver's
license, it also conducts a rigid examination of all
driver applicants before they are hired.
In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White
Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan
bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with
2,000 cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles.
Seated at the front right seat beside him was
Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper ("pahinante"
in Pilipino). At around 4:00 o'clock that same
morning while the truck was descending at a
slight downgrade along the national road at
Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a
damaged portion of the road covering the full

width of the truck's right lane going south and

about six meters in length. These made the
surface of the road uneven because the potholes
were about five to six inches deep. The left lane
parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As
narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before
approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the
Nissan with its headlights on coming from the
opposite direction. They used to evade this
damaged road by taking the left lance but at that
particular moment, because of the incoming
vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the
truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the
wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading
the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Dunca's
vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it
to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a
ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped.
(see Exh. A-5, p. 8, record). The Nissan was
severely damaged (Exhs. A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-14,
pp. 9-11 record), and its two passengers, namely:
Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died
instantly (Exh. A-19) from external and internal
hemorrhage and multiple fractures (pp. 15 and 16,
record).
For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her
widow spent P651,360.00 (Exh. I-3). At the time of
his death he was 45 years old. He was the
President and Chairman of the Board of the
Dynamic Wood Products and Development
Corporation (DWPC), a wood processing
establishment, from which he was receiving an
income of P10,000.00 a month. (Exh. D). In the
Articles of Incorporation of the DWPC, the
spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy
appear to be stockholders of 10,000 shares each
with par value of P100.00 per share out of its

outstanding and subscribed capital stock of

60,000 shares valued at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs. K1 & 10-B). Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns
(Exh. J) the DWPC had a taxable net income of
P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La
Salle
University
graduate
in
Business
Administration, past president of the Pasay
Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the
Philippine Jaycees in 1971 and 1976,
respectively, and World Vice-President of Jaycees
International in 1979. He was also the recipient of
numerous awards as a civic leader (Exh. C). His
children were all studying in prestigious schools
and spent about P180,000.00 for their education
in 1988 alone (Exh. H-4).
As stated earlier, the plaintiffs' procurement of a
writ of attachment of the properties of the
Corporation was declared illegal by the Court of
Appeals. It was shown that on December 26,
1989, Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at
San Fernando, Pampanga, attached six units of
Truck Tractors and trailers of the Corporation at its
garage at San Fernando, Pampanga. These
vehicles were kept under PC guard by the
plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the
Corporation to operate them. However, on
December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals
dissolved the writ (p. 30, record) and on
December 29, 1989, said Sheriff reported to this
Court that the attached vehicles were taken by the
defendant's representative, Melita Manapil (Exh.
O, p. 31, record). The defendant's general
Manager declared that it lost P21,000.00 per day
for the non-operation of the six units during their
attachment (p. 31, t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran,
proceedings on December 10, 1990).8

On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

(Sgd.)
ARTEMIO
Regional Trial Judge9

R.

ALIVIA

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing

considerations judgment is hereby rendered:

On September 3, 1992, petitioner and the accused filed a notice

of appeal from the joint decision. 10

1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence
with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act
No. 4136), and appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
without any aggravating circumstance to offset the
same, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
two (2) indeterminate penalties of four months
and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to
three years, six months and twenty days as
maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy.
Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral
expenses;

On the other hand, private respondents moved for amendment of

the dispositive portion of the joint decision so as to hold petitioner
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the private
respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused. 11

2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19424 to pay the defendant therein actual damages
in the amount of P84,000.00; and

On November 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the trial court a

supplemental notice of appeal from the supplemental decision. 13

3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil

Case No. Br. 19-424.

During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and
fled to a foreign country. By resolution dated December 29, 1994,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the accused in the
criminal case. 14

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a supplemental

decision amending the dispositive portion by inserting an
additional paragraph reading as follows:
2:A Ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking
Corporation subsidiarily liable for all the damages
awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the
event of insolvency of the accused but deducting
therefrom the damages of P84,000.00 awarded to
said defendant in the next preceding paragraph;
and . . . 12

On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an amended

decision affirming that of the trial court, as set out in the opening
paragraph of this decision. 15

Cauayan, Isabela, June 6, 1992.

On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the amended decision. 16

On April 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion

for reconsideration for lack of merit 17
Hence, this petition for review. 18
On July 21, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment on
the petition within ten (10) days from notice. 19

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between

(1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action
for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not
avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the
accused. 23 This is the rule against double recovery.
1wphi1.nt

On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General filed his comment. 20

On April 13, 1998, the Court granted leave to petitioner to file a
reply and noted the reply it filed on March 11, 1998. 21
We now resolve to give due course to the petition and decide the
case.
Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for allowance of the petition,
which, however, boil down to two (2) basic issues, namely:
1. May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in
the accident be held subsidiarily liable for the
damages awarded to the offended parties in the
criminal action against the truck driver despite the
filing of a separate civil action by the offended
parties against the employer of the truck driver?
2. May the Court award damages to the offended
parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a
civil action against the employer of the truck
driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in
the information for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and damage to property? 22
We grant the petition, resolving under the circumstances pro hac
vice to remand the cases to the trial court for determination of the
civil liability of petitioner as employer of the accused driver in the
civil action quasi ex delicto re-opened for the purpose.

In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of
liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto,
and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced
against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages
under both types of liability." 24
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate
civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the
accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the
accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the
latter. Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is
founded on at least two specific provisions of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated on quasidelict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for
an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a
preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the
employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct
and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of
the judgment against the employer in an action based on Article
2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the
nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee,
the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. 25
The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal

Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly

liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of
his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of
a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be
insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil
liability adjudged. 26

Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in

holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer of the
accused subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex
delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a
separate civil action against the employer based on quasi delict
resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.

As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael

Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who
has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless
imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the
filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it.
In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the
civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted
with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for
recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising
from the same act or omission of the accused. 27

It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in

the criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a civil action
against the driver (accused) and manifested that they would
pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal action.
However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the
reservation earlier made because private respondents did not
withdraw the civil action against petitioner based on quasi delict.
In such a case, the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear that the
reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a
waiver of other available civil actions arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2
enumerated what are the civil actions deemed waived upon such
reservation or filing, and one of which is the civil indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically provides:

Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of

the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when private respondents,
as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file
the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions
predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34
of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. 28
The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and
directly against petitioner as employer of accused truck driver
became clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil
action against the latter based on quasi delict.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes

the others. The institution of, or the reservation of
the right to file, any of said civil actions separately
waives the others.
The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits
between the same litigants arising out of the same act or
omission of the offender. The restrictive phraseology of the
section under consideration is meant to cover all kinds of civil
actions, regardless of their source in law, provided that the action
has for its basis the same act or omission of the offender. 29
However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for
damages filed against it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable

thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously erred in dismissing

plaintiff's civil complaint. And the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial court's decision. Unfortunately private
respondents did not appeal from such dismissal and could not be
granted affirmative relief. 30
The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules
"in order to promote their objectives and assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action or proceeding" 31 or exempted "a particular case from the
operation of the rules." 32
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in
awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in dismissing the
civil action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private
respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case.
However, petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be
remanded to the trial court so that it may render decision in the
civil case awarding damages as may be warranted by the
evidence. 33
With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the
criminal case was improper because the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the
filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As
enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, 34 "civil indemnity is not part of
the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue brought
before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused
Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for
recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by
the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of
the accused truck-driver.
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from
his conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting the accused
became final and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in the
criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded in the

criminal action was invalid because of its effective waiver. The

pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of the
civil liability arising from the crime has been waived in said
criminal action.
With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the
criminal action exceeded the amount of damages alleged in the
amended information, the issue is de minimis. At any rate, the
trial court erred in awarding damages in the criminal case
because by virtue of the reservation of the right to bring a
separate civil action or the filing thereof, "there would be no
possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such
a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of
the accused. 35
As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy against double
recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same
act or omission whether the action is brought against the
employee or against his employer. 36 The injured party must
choose which of the available causes of action for damages he
will bring. 37
Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused "guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide Through
Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law
(Rep. Act No. 4136)". There is no such nomenclature of an
offense under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was
misled to sentence the accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate
penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of prision correccional, as maximum." This is erroneous because
in reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual willfull crime or
crimes committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series
of crimes. 38
Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this judgment even if
erroneous, as it is, because it has become final and executory.

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence

"is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately
from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.
Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such
descriptive phrase as "homicide through reckless imprudence",
and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately,
"reckless imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple
imprudence causing damages to property"." 39
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense
without disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench
and bar in strict adherence to precedent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE
the amended decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997, and
the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19,
Cauayan, in Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br.
19-424, dated June 6, 1992.
IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court renders judgment as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court

declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property, defined and penalized under Article 365,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, with
violation of the automobile law (R.A. No. 4136, as
amended), and sentences him to suffer two (2)
indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of prision correccional, as maximum, 40
without indemnity, and to pay the costs, and
(2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court orders
the case re-opened to determine the liability of the
defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation to
plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on defendant's
counterclaim.
No costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.