People vs. Binamira y Alayon, G.R. No. 1100397, Aug.

14, 1997

Facts:
Armando Binamira y Alayon was convicted of robbery with homicide in the Municipality of Makati. The crime
involved two seized items owned by the deceased victim, a lady citizen watch and a gold necklace. Armando
was apprehended by security guards while he was urinating and was then turned over to Police Investigator
Wilfredo Cruz. Before his extrajudicial confession, he was informed of his rights and was asked:
Dahilan sa ikaw ay walang manananggol o abogado sa pagsisiyasat na ito, ikaw ay bibigyan naming ng isang
abogado sa katauhan ni Atty. Romeo P. Parcon ng Makati CLAO office na siyang mamamatnubay sa iyo
ngayon. Pumapayag ka ba?...
Armando answered in the affirmative.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence because it was improperly taken during
the custodial investigation.
Held:
The Court ruled that the extrajudicial confession was inadmissible because, as admitted by the Solicitor
General, the confession does not show that the appellant was informed of his right to have counsel preferably
his own choice as required under the present constitution.
The Court also did not agree with the defense that since the confession was taken on Oct. 3, 1985, the 1987
Constitution was still not in effect. The Court reasoned that, although the 1973 Constitution did not expressly
state the right to a counsel, preferably the accuseds own choice, jurisprudence such as Morales vs. Enrile
(April 26, 1983) laid down the guidelines to be observed strictly by law enforcers during custodial investigation,
and there had occasion to state that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence
of cousel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petitioner either of the detainee himself or anyone on his behalf.
In one case, the confession of an accussed was rejected there being no showing that the lawyer of the Citizens
Assistance Office (CLAO) called by the NBI to assist the accused was his counsel of choice.

G.R. No. 191411

July 15, 2013

Rafael L. Coscolluela, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, respondents
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental for three (3) full terms which ended on
June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as
Nacionales
subordinate,
and
Malvas
as
Provincial
Health
Officer.
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-complaint dated
November 7, 2001 from Peoples Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase
of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of P20,000,000.00 which allegedly
happened
around
a
month
before
Coscolluela
stepped
down
from
office.
Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted its
investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded the
complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. Consequently, petitioners filed their respective counteraffidavits.
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Caares prepared a Resolution,
finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and recommended the filing of the corresponding
information. On even date, the Information was prepared and signed by Caares and submitted to Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro for recommendation. Miro recommended the approval of the
Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro, came
only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB.
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information only when
they
received
a
copy
of
the
latter
shortly
after
its
filing
with
the
SB.
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his constitutional right
to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after
almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted
Coscolluelas
motion.
In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash dated August 7, 2009, explaining that
although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it still had to go through careful review and
revision before its final approval. It also pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections regarding the
purported delay in the proceedings during the interim.
Issues: Whether or not the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases of the petitioner was violated.
Ruling: The petitions are meritorious.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to
complete. Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsmans resolution of the case largely remains
unjustified. Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right
to speedy disposition of cases. Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by
the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.
A persons right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which provides All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners right to a speedy disposition of
their criminal case had been violated.

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; in connection with a contract or transaction. In issuing the questioned
resolution, the Sandiganbayan applied the restrictive meaning of the term transaction as used in section 3(b) of
R.A. 3019 adopted in Soriano Jr. v. Sandiganbayan. In Soriano Jr., the Supreme Court (SC) pronounced that
the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term
must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which
involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner. The State here argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of the
term transaction in Soriano Jr. considering that the term transaction should be construed more liberally. The
SC did not give credence to the States position. It held that it does not help the State any that the
term transaction as used in section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 is susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and
liberally, considering that laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and laws imposing penalties and
forfeitures are to be construed strictly against the State or against the party seeking to enforce them,
and liberally against the party sought to be charged. Hence, the SC ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not
arbitrarily, or whimsically, or capriciously quash the information for failing to properly state the fourth element of
the violation of section 3(b) of R.A. 3019.
Ombudsman; Ombudsman can file appeal or certiorari from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court.
Respondents contend that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to file the petitions for certiorari
because only the Solicitor General could file the petitions in this Court pursuant to section 35, Chapter 12, Title
III, Book IV of the Administrative Code as amended by E.O. 292. The Supreme Court found respondents
contention grossly erroneous. That only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal or certiorari
in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings is the general rule, but the rule
admits the exception concerning all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to E.O. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. More specifically, section
4(c) of R.A. 8249 authorizes the exception, viz: c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with [E.O.] 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Consequently, the filing of the petitions in these cases by the
Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, was authorized by law. People of the
Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First Division and Third Division Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Perez,
Ramon Arceo and Enest Escaler/People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First Division and Third
Division Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Perez, Ramon Arceo, Enest Escaler and Ramon Castillo Arceo,
Jr., G.R. No. 188165/G.R. No. 189063, December 11, 2013.

DAAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NOS. 163972-77

Joselito Daan together with co-accused Benedicto Kuizon were charged for three counts of malversation of
public funds which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period
making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato,
Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to
the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted for three counts of falsification of public document
by a public officer or employee.The accused offered withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same
with a plea of "guilty",provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary
surrender will beappreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused
proposedinstead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public document by a
publicofficer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a
private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of
"not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners plea
bargaining offer.
Held: Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for
a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed
to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of
the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference,[8] viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special
laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference
shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the

accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the
court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its
evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made
during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be
made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt
should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use
word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty
for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama (G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 246), the Court ruled that
the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of
right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court, viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a
yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May
31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not
have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v.
Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained
clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could
rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser
crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason for
this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is
allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less
bargaining. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.
Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve
petitioner's motion to plea bargain.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in pleading
guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code will strengthen the cases against the principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto
Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein JOSELITO
RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of
Bato, Leyte.
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total
amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26,
2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the
accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration. Petition
granted

Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines [G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016]
Bersamin, J:
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorariseparately filed by former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno
B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission
on Audit whose charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to
evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as
defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines xxx Benigno
Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence,conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were denied by
the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.
After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were
denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to
commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied
by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Procedural:
1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to
evidence.
Substantive:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and
Uriarte ;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder: (a) Was there
evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not less than
P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information
proved by the Prosecution?
RULING:
Re procedural issue:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the
trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the
petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the
demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction,

and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the
writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so x x x would be to destroy its
comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending
control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case as the ends of
justice may require. So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to
do substantial justice.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the
contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to
commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the
implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the
accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377
SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges
conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a
person of common understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would
enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are
not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but
rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an
element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary
because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the
rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable
for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is
to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.
Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan
readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of
the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated
such sweeping generalization.
In fine, the Prosecutions failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of
the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges
against each of them.
Re second substantive issues:
(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million was
adduced against GMA and Aguas.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not
less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the
criminal prosecution.

As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten
wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or
Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any
amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing
even the remotest possibility that the CIFs [Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been
diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury (under Section 2 (b)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying
words:misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds [See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This
process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct
construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with
which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter. To convert connotes the act of
using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own; tomisappropriate means to own, to take
something for ones own benefit; misuse means a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly,
unforeseeably, or not as intended; and malversationoccurs when any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially. The common thread that binds all the four terms together is
that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company
of the four other terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public
treasurysimilarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public
treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to
use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that GMA
and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of
raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions
issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10,
2015; GRANTS the petitioners respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of
evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements
on costs of suit.