Section 1.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC GR No. 190582
FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition
for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the
said petition. To support their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and Koranic passages in their decision. COMELEC
averred that they advocate sexual immorality and to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, their acts are even
punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201. When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, it was denied.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated
the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Thus, Ang Ladlad filed a petition praying that the court annul the Assailed resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant
Ang Ladlads application for accreditation.
ISSUE:
Did COMELEC violated the Non-establishment and due process clause of the Constitution?
HELD:
YES! Respondent mistakenly opines that the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors may be registered under the party-list system. In Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. What our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious
matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. The SC thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide
existence through its members and affiliate organizations. This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence is a new one. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation
mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of
petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed
Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a
serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due process.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS (EQUAL PROTECTION)
G.R. Nos.132875-76. February 3, 2000
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has
the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman.
ISSUE:
Is there a substantial differentiation to a Congressman which removes Jalosjos as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law by reason of the mandate of the sovereign will?
HELD:
No, there is no substantial differentiation. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws., this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The Court cannot
validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the
position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

GSIS VS. MONTESCLAROS, G.R. NO. 146494, JULY 14, 2004

FACTS:
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros married Milagros Orbiso on July 10, 1983. In 1985, Nicolas filed an
application for retirement benefits with the GSIS. In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his
sole beneficiary. In 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump
sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity thereafter. Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros
filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146 but GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of
PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with
the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Milagros questioned the validity of Section
18 of PD 1146.
ISSUES:
1. Does Section 18 of PD 1146 violate the due process clause?
2. Does the proviso deny the equal protection of laws?
DECISION:
1. YES. Section 18 of PD 1146 is violative the due process clause. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. No law can deprive such
person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard. In the case at
bar, the proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the
dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
2. YES. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of law. It discriminates against the dependent
spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension because
even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent
spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner
qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

PEOPLE VS. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE, GR NO. 149462 (RICHARD L. BRINGAS)

FACTS:
On August 1, 1997, a search warrant was served on Ising Gutierrez Diwa, residing at No. 275 North Service Road corner
Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, by SPO1 Angel Lumabas and their group for alleged violation of Republic Act
No. 6425.Upon reaching the house, its door was opened by a woman. SPO3 De Leon introduced themselves as
policemen to the woman who opened the door, whom they later identified in court as the appellant. They informed her
they had a search warrant, but appellant suddenly closed and locked the door. It was only after some prodding by the
barangay officials that she reopened the door. The authorities then conducted the search. They found a bundle of
marijuana wrapped in Manila paper under the bed and inside the room. They asked appellant who owned the marijuana.
She cried and said she had no means of livelihood. Appellant was brought to the police headquarters for further
investigation. Both SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon identified the confiscated five (5) bundles of marijuana in court.
They were ordered to forthwith seize and take possession of an undetermined quality of shabu and marijuana leaves.
They found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in manila paper under the bed and inside the room. Appellant was brought to
the police headquarters for further investigation. Appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant against her. She
asserted that she lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Brgy. Balsa, Caloocan City and that she was just visiting a friend Marlyn,
who lived at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada Street., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
ISSUE:
Was the search warrant valid?
DECISION:
NO. The search warrant has irregularity because the authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the search. They did not conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant and their knowledge was based on
pure hearsay only. The prosecution witness failed to establish appellants ownership of the house where the prohibited
drugs were discovered. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is
reversed. Appellant is acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

Section 3.

1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
ZULUETA VS. CA
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without
the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;
Held:
(1) Yes. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife
(who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
PEOPLE VS. MARTI, 193 SCRA 57 (MYRA MAE J. DUGLAS)
FACTS:
On August 14, 1987 the appellant and his wife Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send the 4
packages to Switzerland. Before the packages were sent to Bureau of Customs, Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor, smelled
peculiar smell from the packages and opened one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper and took several
grams of the contents and requested the NBI for laboratory examination of the samples he extracted. Joey Reyes
together with the presence of NBI agents open the rest of the boxes and extracted package contained bricks or cake-like
dried marijuana leaves. Thereafter, an information was filed against appellant for RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Trial court a quo rendered the assailed decision. It admitted the evidence obtained in illegally searched and seized
objects, convicting the appellant despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial
proceedings were not observed.
Theaccused assigns the following errors: lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched and seized
objects contained in the four packages; erred in convicting appellant despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the
constitution while under custodial proceedings were not observed; erred in not giving credence to the explanation of the
appellant on how the 4 parcels came to his possession.
The modification introduced under the 1987 constitution relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis a vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner
as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed
with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
ISSUE:
May the act of a private individual allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional right be invoked against the State?
DECISION:
NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State.
The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support
in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land
must always be subject to protection. Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the

individual and the state. Its concerns is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other
individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any
power holder. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directly only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Wherefore, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge is hereby
affirmed.
If the search is made upon the request of the law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot
be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within
the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
IGLESIA NI KRISTO VS CA (KEITH)

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR (MICHO GUERRERO)
FACTS:
Alejandro Estrada filed the charge of gross immoral conduct against Soledad Escritor, Court Interpreter of the RTC of Las
Pias City, Branch 253 for the belief that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court for living
with Luciano Quilapio, Jr., without the benefit of marriage and having a child with him, and thus she should not be allowed
to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Escritor testified that she was already widowed when she entered the judiciary in 1999, after her husband died in 1998.
She admitted the abovementioned allegations, but contended that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs as members of the Jehovahs Witnesses. That after ten years of living together, they both executed on
July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness."At the time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still
alive but living with another woman. Quilapio was likewise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from his
wife.
The declaration requires the approval of Jehovah's Witnesses elders. This was duly complied.The marital status of the
declarants and their respective spouses' commission of adultery are also investigated before the declarations are
executed. Further, the Jehovah's congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple cannot
secure the civil authorities' approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments.Although the legal
impediment to marry on the part of Soledad was lifted after being widowed, Luciano was still not capacitated to remarry.
Thus, their declarations remained valid. Once all legal impediments for both are lifted, the couple can already register their
marriage with the civil authorities and the validity of the declarations ceases. Thecongregation can then solemnize their
marriage as authorized by Philippine law. In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the
congregation.
ISSUE:
Should respondent Escritor be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct"?
DECISION:
NO. A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of
morality and decency. There is nothing in the Office of the Court Administrators memorandum to the Court that
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the

compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her
conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to
religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but
must also apply the compelling state interest test.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

OCA VS. WILMA SALVACION HUESDENS, AM NO. P-11-2927, DECEMBER 13, 2001 (CLARK LIM)
FACTS:
Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens, Staff Clerk IV of the MTCC, Tagum City, sent a leave application for foreign travel which
was received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). However, Wilma left for abroad without waiting for the result
of her application. It turned out that no travel authority was issued in her favor because she was not cleared of all her
money and property accountabilities. Nevertheless, Wilma reported back to work. The OCA recommended that Wilma be
deemed guilty for violation of the OCA Circular No. 49-2003 since she failed to secure authority to travel abroad. However,
it has been argued that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) unduly restricts a citizens right to travel guaranteed by Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Does the case involved a violation of a government employees constitutional right to travel abroad?
DECISION:
NO. There is no violation of Wilmas constitutional right to travel abroad because Wilma did not comply with the Courts
rules and regulations. The exercise of ones constitutional right to travel is not absolute because there are constitutional,
statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Under Section 6 Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the
liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law. It should be noted that Wilma did not raise any constitutional concerns. In fact,
she was apologetic and openly admitted that she went abroad without the required travel authority.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

HILADO VS REYES (G.R. 163155, July 21, 2006)

FACTS
The case involves a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners against Manila RTC Judge Amor A. Reyes to let them
check the records of the case. This case stemmed from an intestate proceeding involving the Estate of Roberto S.
Benedicto and petitioners are sugar planters who has filed complaints for damages or collection of sums of money against
the deceased during his lifetime. Petitioners counsel has been able to access records and documents related to the case
from the probate court until they were denied access to them which is how the present controversy arose.
Petitioners contended that the records of the case are public records to which the public has the right to access, inspect
and obtain official copies thereof, recognition of which right is enjoined under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution while
respondent alleged that the prohibition should be dismissed on the ground that petitioners arent parties to the case.
ISSUE
Was the petitioner's right to information, specifically the right of access to public documents, violated by private
respondent when it was denied access to the Estate's inventory or docket of the case?
RULING
No, petitioners right to information has not been violated since the documents sought arent matters of public concern. If
the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a
citizen's constitutional right to information. Once a particular information has been determined to be of public concern, the
accessory right of access to official records, including judicial records, are open to the public.
The term judicial record or court record does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts. It comprises
the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and returns made
thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place during the trial and which are in the possession,
custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. Decisions and opinions of a
court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the
laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have
free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or
keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public. In the case at bar, petitioner has the right to access the documents
sought based on relevant factors.. As long then as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of
court records and pays court fees, a court may not deny access to such records. PETITION GRANTED.

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
GSIS vs. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS
510 S 623
FACTS:
A four day concerted demonstration, rallies and mass walkout was held in front of the GSIS main building in Pasay City.
The mass action participants were GSIS personnel, among them are members of the herein KAPISANAN, a public sector
union of GSIS rank and file employees. Said mass action targets the herein petitioner GARCIA and his management style.
On October 10, 2004 the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a Memo directing 131 union and non-union
members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for participating in the rally. KAPISANANs
counsel, Atty. Molina sought reconsideration of the said memo on the ground that the subject employees resumed work in
obedience of the return to work issued.
However, the plea of reconsideration was denied by the filing of the administrative charges against some 110
KAPISANAN members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. KAPISANAN then
filed a Petition for Prohibition before the CA, on the grounds that:
1. Members should not be made to explain why they supported their unions cause
2. Petitioner Garcia blatantly disregarded Civil Service Reso No. 021316 otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited
Mass Action
Pending resolution of the petition for prohibition of the CA, the GSIS Management proceeded with the investigation of the
admin cases which resolved 207 out of 278 cases, resulting to the exoneration of 20 respondent-employees, reprimand of
182 and suspension of 5.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of public sector to form unions or associations include right to strike?
HELD:
Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work. The right
of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to
strike. Fact remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had
taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in
front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince others
to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by
the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
LAGCAO vs. LABRA
Facts:
Petitioner Lagcao owned Lot No. 1029 with an area of 4,048 square meters situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City which was
occupied by squatters. He instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters wherein MTCC Branch 1, Cebu City,
rendered a decision ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. The RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of
execution and order of demolition.
However, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia requested the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still
looking for a relocation site for the squatters. The MTCC issued orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120
days. But during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified
Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. On July, 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the
SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 to
be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof.
RTC Branch 23, Cebu City upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 and petitioners action filed for declaration of nullity
of said ordinance for being unconstitutional was dismissed and subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
Issue:
Is the assailed SP Ordinance violative to the constitutional rights of the petitioner?
Held:
Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to
accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by
the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the
public.
Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to
(e) of Section 9 of RA 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act). Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other
modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No.
1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160.
Therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners right to due process.

Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT VS COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other
destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later
proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. Pursuant to the EIAC's
recommendations, the Secretary of Labor issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and
requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the
former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's
Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA. The Federation
of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge
existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of
FETMOP.
Issue:
Does Department Order No. 3 violates the Non-Impairment of Contracts clause?
Held:
No, Department Order No. 3 does not violate the Non-impairment of Contracts Clause. The non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. Equally important, into every contract is read
provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject
impressed with the public welfare. The questioned Department Order were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a
valid exercise of Police Power by the State. Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Thus, police power concerns government enactments which
precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the
assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate
that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the
fullest protection to our overseas workers.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty
RE: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and
Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.
A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC, Aug. 19, 2009
Facts:
Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote to the Chief Justice for being grateful
of giving them access to the Justice System previously denied by an up-front excessive court fee. In addition, they are
asking thecourt to grant to their Foundation, who works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same option granted
to indigentpeople which is the exemption from payment of legal fees.
Issue:
Should an incorporated foundation that serves indigent litigants be exempted from payment of legal fees?
Ruling:
No.The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the1987
Constitution with Sec. 21, Rule 3 and Sec. 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as promulgated rules of the Supreme Court.
The clear intent and precise language of the provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a naturalparty litigant may
be regarded as an indigent litigant.
The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of
all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their
organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot beaccorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to
indigent litigants.

Section 12.

1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

PEOPLE vs ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA

FACTS:
Eric Guillermo was an employee of Victor Francisco Keyser. When Guillermo killed Keyser in their company
building, he calmly told Romualdo Campos, the security guard in the building, that he had killed Keyser and he needed his
assistance in disposing the body. Campos immediately called the police who then accosted Guillermo. SPO1 Reyes then
asked Guillermo where the body of the victim was and how he did it. The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo
Police Station for further investigation without appraising him about his constitutional rights and without providing him with
the services of counsel.
Eric Guillermo was then charged of Murder. Keysers death shocked the nation. Guillermo who was then in police
custody was interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters. During the interviews, Guillermo admitted in
committing crime and never gave it a second thought. He even further disclosed the details of the crime. After trial,
Guillermo was convicted and was sentenced to die by lethal injection.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Guillermo to remain silent and to counsel was violated, hence, his
confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.
HELD:
The constitutional rights of Guillermo to remain silent and to counsel was violated, hence, his confession is
inadmissible in evidence against him. The confession of Guillermo while he was under investigation falls short of the
protective standards laid down by the Constitution. Under Article III of the Constitution, a confession to be admissible must
satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing.
In this case, the alleged confession at the police station of Guillermo lacks the safeguards required by the bills of
rights. The investigating officer made no serious effort to make Guillermo aware of his basic rights under custodial
investigation. As held in People vs Dano, even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was
made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it
had been voluntarily given.
However, the inadmissibility of Guillermos confession with the police does not necessarily lead to his acquittal.
The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12 are meant to preclude the slightest use of the states
coercive power as would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power.
In this case, Guillermo admitted the confession of the crime not just to the police but also to private individuals.
First, he disclosed it to Campos, the security guard. Second, when Guillermo agreed to be interviewed by the media, and
spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. During the said interviews, the TV news reporters were acting as media
professionals and not under the direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for Guillermo to face the TV
cameras, considering the fact that he was interviewed on several occasions by different reporters. Each time, Guillermo
repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keysers killing. As held in Andan, statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in
evidence.
PEOPLE VS ELIZALDE CULALA Y BOGNOT (SEC. 12 (2) )
Municipal attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the constitution; extra-judicial confession before him
is inadmissible in evidence.
Facts:
Culala was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. During trial, the prosecution introduced in evidence the
extra-judicial confession of the Culala admitting the commission of the crime, alleged to have been obtained in the
presence and with the assistance of the municipal attorney, who testified that he apprised the accused of his constitutional
rights. Culala placed reliance on the defense of denial and alibi. He pointed out that the extra-judicial confession executed
by him suffered from constitutional infirmities and consequently, inadmissible as evidence because it was extracted under
duress, force and intimidation and was only countersigned later by the Municipal Attorney. After trial, the court convicted
and sentenced Culala of death penalty.
Issue:

Is the extrajudicial confession of accused admissible in evidence?

Held:
No, it is inadmissible as evidence. On the admissibility of subject extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant, it is
worthy to note that during the custodial investigation he was assisted by Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. In People vs. Bandula, it was held that a Municipal Attorney cannot be an independent counsel
as required by the Constitution. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the
mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace
and order. It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without
running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during
custodial investigations. Consequently, for being violative of the Constitution, the extrajudicial confession of accusedappellant is inadmissible.

PEOPLE VS. PABLITO ANDAN, G.R. NO. 116437, MARCH 3, 1997 (SEC. 12)
Facts:
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. The victim, Marianne Guevarra, left her
home for her school dormitory. While on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the blood
pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. The victim agreed to do so as the old woman was her distant relative.
She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen,brought her to the
kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their backyard
that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved, prompting
appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her.
Her gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team.
Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. When the police confronted him with evidence, appellant relented,
but implicated two of his neighbors, and that he was merely a lookout. Some people and media representatives were
already at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon seeing the
mayor, appellant approached him and whispered that they talk privately. In the presence of the mayor, the police,
representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. Since no lawyer was
available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea
of "not guilty and said that he was coerced to confess. The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death.
Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Is the appellants confession not being assisted by a counsel, a violation of the constitution, and is therefore inadmissible
as evidence against him?
Held:
NO. Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is
inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may
arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. It
was appellant himself, who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. When appellant
talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not
violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by
the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements spontaneously made by a
suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE vs. EDUARDO GOMEZ and FELIPE IMMACULATA SECTION 12.
G.R. No. 101817. March 26, 1997
FACTS:
Accused Eduardo Gomez, a bartender, and Felipe Immaculata, a stay-in Driver of David, were implicated in the crime of
transporting twenty (20) kilograms of heroin on a flight from Bangkok to Manila sometime March 14, 1990. They were
alleged to be in conspiracy with Aya Yupangco, Art David, Lito Tuazon and Benito Cunanan, all business partners.
Gomez, claiming to be innocent of such travel he is into, surrendered himself to Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)of the
United States in Manila. Meanwhile, Immaculata was imprisoned in Hongkong because of an expired visa while he travels
with David. He was visited by NBI agents for his implication in the "heroin" case, of which he denied the accusation. Later,
he agreed, without the assistance of counsel, to execute a sworn statement at the Stanley Prison. After his prison term,
Immaculata was deported to Manila. Eventually, Gomez and Immaculata were then convicted by the RTC which made
them file for notices of appeal. In his appeal, Immaculata insists that the trial court has erred in including him in the drug
conspiracy and in admitting in evidence his sworn statement taken, without the assistance of counsel, by an NBI agent at

the Stanley Prison in Hongkong. He contended that this is in violation of his constitutional rights as contemplated in
Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Was Immaculatas uncounselled statement made in Stanley Prison in Hongkong admissible as evidence in the
Philippines?
HELD:
No. While the sworn statement taken from Immaculata by an NBI agent at the Stanley Prison in Hongkong during his
incarceration was not made the basis for Immaculata's conviction by the court, a word could be said about the manner in
which it was procured. It would seem that Immaculata was merely apprised in general terms of his constitutional rights to
counsel and to remain silent. He then was asked if he would be willing to give a statement. Having answered in the
affirmative, the NBI investigating agent asked him whether he needed a lawyer. He simply answered, Sa ngayon po ay
hindi na at totoo lang naman ang aking sasabihin. Kung mayroon po kayong tanong na hindi ko masasagot ay sasabihin
ko na lang po sa inyo. After that response, the investigation forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly was in
compliance with Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel to a person under
custody even when he waives the right to counsel. It is immaterial that the sworn statement was executed in a foreign
land. Immaculata, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy these constitutional rights, like anyone else, even when abroad
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.

GOVT OF HONGKONG VS OLALIA, JR (Section 13)

FACTS:
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an
advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him.the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent.
petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private
respondent, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail. but Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk.". judge bernardo inhibited himself from the case and judge olalia handled the case.
private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by
respondent judge. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge,
hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Does the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee?
HELD:
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42,
and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It
is "available only in criminal proceedings,"
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting
him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the
standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it
is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of
extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a
flight risk and should be granted bail.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be
used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence"
that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.

Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted
bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

Section 14.
1. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HERMINIANO SATORRE

FACTS:
On 25th day of May, 1997 at 2:00 oclock dawn, in Sitio Kamari, Barangay Calidngan, Municipality of Carcar, Province of
Cebu. Herminiano Satorre with intent to kill, with the use of .38 paltik revolver and by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot ROMERO PANTILGAN, hitting the
latter at the head which caused his instantaneous death. Rufino Abayata, a barangay kagawad narrated that Herminiano
Satorres father, Abraham Satorre, informed them that it was Herminiano Satorre who shot Pantilgan. Cynthia Castaares,
The Barangay Captain of Can-asuhan, Carcar, Cebu testified that Abraham Satorre brought Herminiano Satorre to her
residence where he confessed having killed Pantilgan. That same evening, Brgy Capt Caasters went to the Carcar Police
Station with Hermniano where she executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant voluntarily narrated that he
killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun which he wrestled from Patilgan possession. then and there Hemeniano was
detained. However Herminiano denied the charges against him.Lower Court found Hermniano Guilty of the crime Murder.
Issue:
Was due process obtained by the Herminiano Satorre.
Held:
No, Extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is uncorroborated. There must be such corroboration
that, when considered in connection with confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The
quantum of evidence adduced by the prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The bare allegation that he confessed or admitted killing Romero Pantilgan is not proof of guilt. The
prosecution was not able to conclusively establish the ownership of the gun other than the bare testimony of prosecution
witnesses that appellants brothers surrendered the gun to them.
It appears that the trial court simply based appellants conviction on the testimonial evidence of prosecution witnesses that
appellant orally owned up to the killing. We cannot affirm Herminianos conviction on mere testimonial evidence,
considering that the voluntariness of said confession cannot be conclusively established because of Herminianos
personal circumstances and the failure of the police to reduce the alleged oral confession into writing. The doubts
surrounding the alleged oral confession, the conduct of the investigation as well as the inapplicable jurisprudential
precedents cited by the trial court do not lead to the same moral certainty of appellants guilt. . For lack of evidence to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant Herminiano Satorre is ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately
RELEASED from confinement, unless he is lawfully held in custody for another cause.
PEOPLE VS OSTIA
FACTS:
Spouses Ponciano Onato and Edita Onato lived with their 4-year old daughter Beverly in Sto. Nio, Samar. Ponciano was
a fisherman and a farmer but was employed by Tito Soria in his buy-and-sell of fish business. Roberto Ostia, aco-worker
of Ponciano, resided in the poblacion of Sto. Nio. Rufo Legaspi, a carpenter and a Barangay Tanod, was a neighbor of
Ponciano. On May 13, 1995, at about 7:00 p.m., Rufo was seated near his house and resting before retiring for the
evening. Then, Rufo saw Roberto, with Beverly on his right shoulder, walking towards the poblacion. Robertos left hand
was holding the right hand of Mary Donoso, a 9- year old playmate of Beverly. The trio was in animated conversation on
their way towards the poblacion. After an hour or so, Edita noticed that Beverly had not returned to their house. She
looked for her. Rufo told Edita that he saw Beverly perched on the shoulder of Roberto on their way towards the
poblacion. Then, Roberto passed by. However, Beverly was no longer with him. Puzzled, Edita asked Roberto where
Beverly was. Instead of responding, Roberto fled. Rufo, who witnessed the incident, advised Edita to report the incident to
the police authorities. Edita rushed back home and woke up Ponciano. She told her husband that Beverly had been taken
by Roberto and that Beverly had not yet returned home. The couple rushed from their house and reported the incident to
the police authorities. With the help of their neighbors and police officers Toribio and Espino, the couple looked for Beverly
but failed to locate her. They resumed their search the next day. They found Beverly sprawled in a grassy portion below a
copra kiln about 120 meters away from the house of the Onato couple and about 15 meters from the nearest house.
Beverly was already dead. Pictures of Beverly were taken where her body was found. Since the municipal health officer
was not there, the Municipal Santiary Inspector Lorenzo Bernabe conducted the autopsy. He had 4 findings: 1st, a
lacerated wound from Beverlys vaginal wall to the anus; 2nd a lacerated wound from the vagina to the mons pubis; 3rd a
contusion in the lumbar area and 4th, blood clots in the left ear. Ponciano filed a crim complaint for rape with homicide. An

information for rape with homicide was then filed. On his arraignment, Ostia had no counsel so a counsel de officio was
assigned to him. During trial, Ostia through counsel moved that he be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty to rape
with homicide and to enter a plea of guilty to murder. Ponciano and the public prosecutor agreed. In his testimony, Ostia
admitted that he killed Beverly by smashing a piece of rock bigger than the size of his fist, about seven inches in diameter,
on her head and chest and on the other parts of her body because, in the meantime, he lost control of himself. The RTC
found Ostia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and with
the generic aggravating circumstances of (a) abuse of confidence considering that Roberto and Ponciano were coworkers, (b) nighttime considering that Beverly was killed in the evening and (c) despoblado considering that the nearest
house to the situs criminis was fourteen meters. The death penalty was imposed so the case was automatically appealed.
Note: The first ground for the appeal was Ostias conviction despite his alleged improvident plea of guilty. SC sided with
Ostia on this issue and said the RTC judge failed to adhere to the procedure accdg. to Rule 116 Sec. 3 with respect to
plea of guilty. The second ground was the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. The SC said it was not
alleged in the information and it was also not proven by the prosecution. Hence, it could not be used. The third ground
was about the generic aggravating circumstances.
Issue:
Whether or not there was abuse of confidence.
Held:
None!
Ratio:
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating nighttime, despoblado and abuse of confidence as generic aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime. The prosecution failed to prove that Ostia purposely sought or took
advantage of nighttime in killing Beverly. There is no evidence that he sought or took advantage of the solitude of the situs
criminis in committing the crime. Abuse of confidence could not be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstance
because the prosecution failed to prove that (a) Ostia enjoyed the trust and confidence of Beverly or her parents; (b) and
that even if Ostia enjoyed said confidence, he took advantage of said trust or confidence to kill Beverly. The barefaced fact
that Ostia and Ponciano were co-workers does not constitute evidence that the latter reposed trust and confidence in
Ostia. In the absence of any generic aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the Ostia is
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it.

YU VS YU GR 164915
FACTS:
Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CA alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Yu unlawfully
withheld from him custody of their minor child Bianca. Subsequently respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property. The petition include prayer for the award to her of the sole
custody of Bianca and and for the fixing of schedule of petitioners visiting rights subject only to the final and executory
judgment of the CA
ISSUE:
Is writ of habeas corpus available to determine the custodial rights of parents over their children?
HELD:
By petitioners filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the
issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus
case, there was no need for petitioner to replead his prayer for custody for, as quoted in Art. 49 & 50 of the Family Code:
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action [for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] and in the absence of
adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses
and the custody and support of their common children. x x x It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the
other parent. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[17]
Art. 50. x x x x
The final judgment in such cases [for the annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the
delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such other matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
(Emphasis and underscoring added)
Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage to resolve the custody of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could only mean that the filing of a
new action is not necessary for the court to consider the issue of custody of a minor.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
LILANY YULO y BILLONES vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 142762. March 04, 2005
FACTS:
Lilany B. Yulo and Josefina Dimalanta went to the house of Myrna Roque. Josefina introduced Yulo to Myrna as her best
friend and a good payer. Josefina told Myrna that Yulo wanted her checks encashed. In view of Josefinas assurance that

petitioner is trustworthy, Myrna agreed to encash the checks. Yulo then issued to Myrna three checks. Two Equitable Bank
Checks and one Bank of the Philippine Islands Check.
When Myrna presented the checks for payment to the drawee banks, they were dishonored. The EB checks were Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds, while the BPI check was stamped Account Closed. As Myrna did not know Yulos address, she
immediately informed Josefina about the dishonored checks. Myrna tried to get Yulos address from Josefina, but the
latter refused and instead made the assurance that she will inform Yulo that the checks were dishonored. When no
payment was forthcoming, Myrna lodged a complaint against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Three Informations were filed by the Caloocan City Prosecutor with the Regional Trial Court for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. The trial court rendered its decision which finds Lilany Yulo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Yulo filed a
motion for reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals resolved her motion only after three (3) years from its filing,
where it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lilany Yulo was deprived of her right to speedy disposition of cases.
HELD:
Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides; All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Under the foregoing provision, any party to a case has the right
to demand on all officials tasked with the administration of justice to expedite its disposition. However, the concept of
speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient. In applying the Constitutional guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances of each case.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. To determine whether the right has been violated, the following factors may be considered: (1) the
length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4)
the prejudice caused by the delay.
In the instant case, the delay was sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals. The ponente of the decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 17513, Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul, retired during the pendency of petitioners motion for reconsideration.
However, the case was assigned to Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole only on February 28, 2000 and brought to
her attention on March 2, 2000. We note that it took Justice Gozo-Dadole only two (2) weeks from notice to resolve the
motion. Clearly, she did not incur any delay. We, therefore, rule that there has been no violation of the petitioners right to a
speedy trial.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE
FACTS:
Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her
34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their
child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys birth certificate
was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes
repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot,
Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe
was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin
sued Arnel for support.
Arnel denied having fathered the child and denies the genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he
purportedly signed as the father.
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE:
Can DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination?
HELD:
Yes, DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as
part of object evidence.

PEOPLE VS. RONDERO, G.R. NO. 125687, DECEMBER 9, 1999

FACTS:
In 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta but noticed that his 9 year old sister, Mylene, was not around.
Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to
search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong sought the assistance of the Barangay Captain and requested their other
neighbors to look for Mylene. When Maximo was about five (5) meters away from his house, he saw accused Delfin
Rondero with an ice pick clenched in his mouth, washing his bloodied hands at an artesian well. After some time, the
group went to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylene's lifeless body. Her right hand was raised above her
head. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well
where he had seen Rondero earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with
blood. Maximo disclosed to the police what he saw earlier at the artesian well. Thus, the policemen arrested Rondero.
Hair samples from Mylene and Rondero were taken to the NBI for laboratory testing. The microscopic examination
showed that the hair strands found on Mylene's right hand and the hair strands taken from Rondero have similar
characteristics. However, Rondero alleges that while in the custody of police officers, some hair strands were forcibly
taken from him without his consent and submitted to the NBI for investigation, in violation of his right against self
incrimination.
ISSUE:
Was there violation of Ronderos right against self-incrimination?
DECISION:
NO. Section 17, Article III of the Constitution expressly provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. However, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from an
accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the
body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the
mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although Rondero insists that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
PEOPLE VS GALLARDE (G.R. 133025, February 17, 2000) Section 17 Privilege against Self-Incrimination
FACTS
Radel GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide of one EDITHA Talan. The crime
was supposedly perpetrated on the night when GALLARDE along with other people gathered at EDITHAs parents house
and were drinking. According to him, he went home after because he was already drunk but someone saw him and
EDITHA talking right before he headed to his house which was around the last time EDITHA was seen. Later on that
evening, when EDITHAs disappearance was reported, they found her body buried a few meters behind his house which
prompted him to be taken to the police as the primary suspect of the crime taking into account all the surrounding
circumstances. During this period, photos of GALLARDE were taken immediately after the incident.
During the trial and the presentation of evidence, the trial court rejected the photographs taken of GALLARDE that night
immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while GALLARDE was already under the mercy of
the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is
not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE
Was GALLARDEs constitutional right against self-incrimination granted under Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution violated when photos of him were taken immediately after the incident?
RULING:
NO. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely
mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance
and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion,
that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged
with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be
compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have
the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his
garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

Section 18.
1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted.
PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN, G.R. NOS. L-45892 AND 45893 (MICHELE MANLIGUEZ-BELOY NAPAY)
FACTS:
Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No.
1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age
of twenty years in 1936, wilfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the1st and 7th of April of
said year, even though they had been required to do so. The two appellants were duly notified to appear before the
Acceptance Board in order to register for military service but still did not register up to the date of the filing of the
information. Appellants argue that they did not register because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother
eight years old to support, and Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or
be killed. The Court of First Instance sentenced them both to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.
ISSUE:
Does compulsory military service constitute a violation of the constitutional right against involuntary servitude?
HELD:
No. Compulsory military service does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right against involuntary servitude, it is
an exception to involuntary servitude in defense of the state.
In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even
against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of
being shot down in its defense. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse
them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can
ask for determent in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend
to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
Section 19.
1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use
of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
ECHEGARAY VS SECRETARY (SEC.19)
Facts:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter
of his common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be imposed upon him. He then filed a motion for
reconsideration and a supplemental motion for raising constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for
rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution
to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for
prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or
unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a violation of the Philippines obligations under international
covenants, 4. an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the
power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend,
the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law,
and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal
injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most
modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to
that, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty.
Issue:

Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

Held:
No. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment because (1)
R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) its implementing rules are uncertain as
to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause
the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal
injection inherently cruel.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In Harden
v. Director of Prisons- punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death
is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. Would the lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law cruel, degrading or inhuman? The Court believes not.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which court will fix the time and date of execution,
and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the court which
designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the judgment is
entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the trial court
including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the
time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the
last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than
one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and
executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times. Hence, the
death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became
final and executory wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. Petitioner
also contends that the infliction of wanton pain in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that
respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is
concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated. First. Petitioner
has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not
trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the
United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict,
without any other evidence whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which
requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task.
We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid
inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution
of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or
suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that
crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty
inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG [67 SCRA 166; ADM. MATTER. NO. 297-MJ; 30 SEPT 1975] Sec. 20
Facts:
A criminal complaint for estafa against Avelina Serafin was filed by the Spouses Mendoza. Said complaint sworn to by the
police chief before respondent judge on its face does not charge any crime but merely recites complainant's failure to pay
a simple indebtedness. The supporting statements 4 executed and sworn to by the Mendoza spouses as offended parties
before Judge Lindayag likewise show on their very face that their complaint was about a simple debt of P1,500.00
borrowed by complainant from Mrs. Mendoza and which she had failed to repay despite her promise to do so. The notes
taken during the preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge show beyond doubt that there is no vestige of
the essential elements of estafa as provided in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Judge Lindayag adimitted the
criminal complaint and issued on the same day the warrant of arrest against Serafin. Now Serafin filed a case against
respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple
indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for
non-payment of a loan of a sum of money.
Issue:
Did Judge Lindayag committ a violation when it ordered the imprisonment of Serafin for non-payment of debt?
Held:
Yes Judge Lindayag committ a violation when it ordered the imprisonment of Serafin for non-payment of debt. Since
Serafin did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is no
collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote
her a letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her
valuable things at her home. Under Article III Section 20 of the Constitution which provides that No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a pol-tax she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint"
that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same
day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged,"
respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly.

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

SANVICENTE VS PEOPLE (SEC. 21, DOUBLE JEOPARDY)

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua by fatally shooting the victim outside the
Far East Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after he allegedly attempted to rob him of a large
amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller machine.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report, stating that
slugs recovered from the crime scene, on the one hand, and cartridge cases fired from petitioners caliber .45 Mark IV
pistol, on the other hand, were fired from the same firearm. The Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the
deceased failed to appear at the trial. In order to dispense with her testimony, petitioner admitted the due execution and
genuineness of the medico-legal report.
Meanwhile, petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. Hence, petitioner
filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification
of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecutions evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence,
inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not proven by positive evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court
issued an Order dismissing the case together with the civil aspect thereof for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the ground, among others, that with the dismissal of the case,
double jeopardy had set in. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals in which it nullified the
order of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was then denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Was the demurrer granted by the court amounts to an acquittal in which any further prosecution would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy?
Held:
Yes. Given the far-reaching scope of the right of an accused against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an
alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case, or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to
correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial
court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

CHAVEZ VS. COMELEC , GR 162777, AUG 31, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520 which provides that All
propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture,
image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the
name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be
immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity
of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to
have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
He claims that said section in the nature of an ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision
makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the
said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal.
ISSUE:
Is Sec. 32 of COMELEC Res. No. 6520 in the nature of an ex post facto law?
HELD:
NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this
nature must operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the
offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of "propaganda materials such as posters, streamers,
stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements
on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the
placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office." Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the
entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public

office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and
image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed
in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the
given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed,
nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law
in this case.

BOCEA vs Teves (Sec. 22)

FACTS:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335. RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation
of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioners directly filed the present petition before this Court against
respondents.
BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the
constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others,
that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required
quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their
respective families prejudice.
Respondents countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due process and right to security of
tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987
Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided a reasonable and valid
ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
provided that an employee may only be separated from the service upon compliance with substantive and procedural due
process. The OSG added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
In Abakada, the Court declared Section 12of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to
approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the principle of separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of
the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to Section 13of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that
until the contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEAs members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b)
security of tenure and (c) due process?
HELD:
Ruling in Abakada is adopted.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative agencies
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily imbedded in
this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari
potest, which means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that
such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of
his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. However, this principle of non-delegation of powers
admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies like the Board in this case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection clause
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: due process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain ones side. BOCEAs apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in
Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target
revenue collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all

relevant factors that may affect the level of collection.

As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are in the
hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the
Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached
from the manifest intendment and language thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. We have so declared in Abakada, and we now
reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.