Hazop Hazid Report CNG Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Rev B PDF

Project Title :
ENGINEERING PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION

COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS - TAMBAK LOMBOK
HAZOP AND HAZID STUDIES REPORT
DOCUMENT STATUS
Approved
:
Approved
:
as Noted
Not Approved
24 JUL 2013
REISSUED FOR REVIEW
YS
MTH
MEF
28 JUN 2013
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
YS
MTH
MEF
REV
DATE
DESCRIPTION
PREPARED
CHECKED
APPROVED
COMPANY
PT. Enviromate Technology International

PT Pertadaya Gas
HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
BACKGROUND
STUDY OBJECTIVES
SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY
REPORT LAYOUT
7
7
8
8
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.1
OVERVIEW
2.1.1
Inlet scrubber (V-100)
2.1.2
Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B)
2.1.3
Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B)
2.1.4
Compressor (K-101 / / K-109)
2.1.5
CNG Cooler ( E-100)
2.1.6
CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82)
2.1.7
Double pipe Exchanger
2.1.8
CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200)
2.1.9
Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B)
2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process
2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B)
2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300)
2.1.13 Fuel Gas
2.1.14 Instrument air
2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400)
2.1.16 Fire water system
2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001)
2.1.18 Insulation
2.1.19 Vent System
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9
9
10
10
11
11
12
12
12
12
13
13
13
13
14
14
14
14
14
STUDY METHODOLOGY
16
3.1
HAZOP
3.1.1
Overview
3.1.2
Worksheet Definition
3.2
HAZID
3.2.1
Overview
3.2.2
Worksheet Definitions
16
16
16
16
16
17
HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS
18
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
INTRODUCTION
THE HAZOP/HAZID TEAM
GUIDE WORDS
DRAWINGS REVIEWED
SELECTED NODES
18
18
18
19
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HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB
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HAZOP/HAZID RESULTS
21
5.1
5.2
ACTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO
21
23
HAZOP/HAZID FOLLOW-UP
25
REFERENCES
26
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C
APPENDIX D
HAZOP/HAZID SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

HAZOP REVIEW WORKSHEETS
HAZID REVIEW WORKSHEETS
DRAWINGS
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PT. Pertadaya Gas
PT. PROSIM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The PT Perta Daya Gas has awarded to PT. Enviromate Technology International (PT. ETI) to
conduct and construction of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) facility. The plant will be located at
Tambak Lorok, Central Java, Indonesia. The CNG facility is consisting of following equipment:
Gas-Liquid separation system, Gas Drying & H2S adsorption system, Gas Compression system,
CNG Cylinders storage package, Heat Exchangers and Metering systems.
The Utility for supporting CNG Plant are consisting Fuel Gas System, Gas power generation, Air
Instrument Package, Waste Heat Recovery Unit, Pumps, Cooling towers, Water treatment Package
and Sump system.
The incoming gas is taken from existing pipe then being compressed to CNG storage cylinders by
CNG Compressors. Storage CNG will be performed maximum at 20 hours/day and decanting phase
will be performed on the peak load within 4 hours/day (18.00 to 23.00). The design capacity of
CNG Plant is 19.88 MMSCFD gas to the CNG storage cylinders.
Waste heat recovery Unit is provided to utilize the energy from exhaust compressor gas engine to
reduce Joule Thompson effect on the pressure reducing system. The WHRU will heat water from
tank which will be utilized as heating media of the CNG gas on CNG heat exchanger.
Cooling water system which consisting of Cooling Tower, Circulation pumps and CNG cooler will
be pro-vided to optimize the requirement of CNG cylinders.
The HAZOP/HAZID review sessions were carried out at the Istana Karang Laut office in Plaza
Citivew Kemang, Jakarta, utilizing 2 days for review, over the period 17th, and 21st June 2013.
The study identified 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations. The
recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the process
or improve the clarity of the process drawings.
HAZOP
Design
It was noted in the HAZOP It identified during the review and also with discussion with Tambak
Lorok, some of the valve arrangement need to be lock open to ensure that it doesnt block due to
human error (eg. at upstream BDV, by pass line). General comments also noted to provide setting
for all the instrumentation system (e.g. PIC, PSHH, PSV)
Its been reviewed that gas from suction compressor can be directed to downstream of E-200 to
metering M-200 resulting in double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100. It was
recommended to install additional check valve to PG-2"-3C-027 to prevent that case.
It recommended to provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas
blow by from V-100, to ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification and
also to nsure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to
personnel/operator at Incoming Scrubber System.
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In the Waste Heat Recovery Unit, it was recommended to provide PSHH at downstream P-500A/B
to trip P-500A/B in the case of manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close resulting in
overpressure of the system.
The existing fire water capacity need to be reviewed to ensure source of water and its amount is
adequate to handle fire on the CNG plant in addition with existing fire water requirement in
Tambak Lorok.
It was discussed also that the design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type.
Maintenance and Operational
Based on the discussion raised up, its required to develop operating manual for delivery gas
including showing correlation between pressure and flow at storage period and operation of
redundant equipment such as compressor.
To control corrosion at basin cooling tower, it was recommended to provide SOP to control PH at
cooling tower periodically.
HAZID
In the HAZID session, location of the lightning stack has not identified yet, therefore it is
recommended to review the location of the lightning stack to be away from the venting stack to
reduce the probability of fire on the vent stack
It was reviewed also that high noise level around the compressor area will potentially injured the
personnel who operate the plant in daily basis. It was recommended to have noise study and provide
warning sign the area to use ear plug protection.
Fire and Gas detection was also reviewed in the HAZID, it is recommended to provide the
philosophy of the fire and gas detection system of the plant in formal documentation and provide
clear actions of each detector, which one create alarm or shut down/blowdown of the plant. Fire
detection philosophy was not provided in the building, specifically in the electrical room such as
control room/MCC/batery room. It is recommended to provide clear philosophy, e.g. providing early
warning system for smoke detection in electrical room (High Sensitivity Smoke Detector), including
fire suppression system such as portable fire extinguisher or automatic fire suppresion system (e.g.
FM-200,etc)
The scenario of fire and explosion in the CNG plant was not established yet during the review
especially in relation position of the processing facility to location where stand by personnel
available such as control room. Therefore, review of this scenario is recommended to justify design
and location of the control room building. It is include also the fire and explosion impact to
surrounding facility at Tambak Lorok. In the discussion also identified that the control room will not
provided with glass windows to avoid explosion effect from the plant, hence that CCTV is
recommended to be provided in the control room to monitor the plant.
During the review, location of the vent stack has not been identified yet. Therefore, dispersion and
radiation analysis need to be done to define safe location and height required for the vent stack.
Consideration for emergency situation was also reviewed, and it is recommended to review
emergency evacuation plan including emergency route, muster point location, safety equipment lay
out and emergency lighting.
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Good communication among parties involved (Tambak Lorok and Gundih) also important to make
sure operability and deliverability of the process plant, especially to handle emergency situation.
Therefore a procedure defining internal and external communication need to be established among
parties to make sure the plant is operated safely.
MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO
The Major Hazard of this plant is :
Process Hazard :
1. High Pressure Gas containment in the CNG Storage Tanks
2. Gas Compression System
3. Hot water circulation system
4. Cold Venting
Non Process Hazard :

1. Control Room located in hazardous area
2. Human Error - Alarm
3. Communication between ETI, IP, Gundih
4. Transportation
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
PT. Perta Daya Gas is planning to develop CNG Plant Project. The plant will be located at Tambak
Lorok, Central Java province, Indonesia.
PT. Perta Daya Gas therefore commissioned an independent Chairman and Scribe for a series of
safety studies to review and identify hazards and operability issues related to operation of
Compressed Natural Gas Plant Project.
This report details the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) and Hazard Identification (HAZID) review
and includes a summary of the recommendations identified during the review, as well as the
HAZOP/HAZID review worksheets.
1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the HAZOP study are to:
Identify safety related hazards and operability problems related to the process that could directly
threaten the safety of production personnel or cause operational problems;
Determine the seriousness of the consequences for the identified problems;
Identify engineering and procedural safeguards already incorporated into the design that will
reduce the likelihood or the severity of consequences related to the identified problem;
Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering and procedural safeguards; and
Recommend additional safeguards or operational procedures where necessary.
The objectives of the HAZID study include:
Assess changes and consider new requirements that have emerged since the last PHA;
Identification of new hazard causes or initiating factors associated with the modifications with a
potential to result in major accident events (MAEs), which may give rise to serious and
immediate risk to health and safety of personnel;
Assessment of the consequences of these new MAEs;
Determination of risk based on the likelihood and the severity of the consequences for each
identified MAEs;
Identification of existing safeguards that may include engineering or operational controls and
measures included in the design for prevention and/or mitigation of the MAEs;
Evaluation of the residual risk taking into account the existing control and mitigation measures;
and
Recommendation of additional safeguards or procedures, where necessary to demonstrate as

Low as Reasonable Practicable (ALARP).
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1.3 SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY

The HAZOP/HAZID study covers these packages in detail:
1. Main Proces System:
V-100 : Gas Scrubber
M -100A/B & M -200A/B : Station Inlet & Outlet Metering
D-100A/B : Gas Dryer
K-101 to K109 : CNG Compressors
E-100 : CNG Cooler & E-200 : CNG Heat Exchager
V-200-1 to V-200-80 : CNG Compartement
V-400 : Sump Tank
2. Utilities
WHRU and Hot Water circulation
Water Treatment Facilities and Cold water circulation
Open & Close Drains
Venting system
Instrument Air System
Fuel Gas System
Fire Water Ring
Engine Generator
1.4 REPORT LAYOUT

This HAZOP/HAZID report is structured as follows:
Section 1 gives an introduction, defining the objectives and scope of the study;
Section 2 describes the process;
Section 3 describes the HAZOP/HAZID methodology;
Section 4 describes the HAZOP/HAZID workshops;
Section 5 lists the references given in the report;
Appendix A presents the summary HAZOP & HAZID recommendations;
Appendix B presents the HAZOP review worksheets;
Appendix C presents the HAZID review worksheets; and
Appendix D presents the Drawings used, outlining the nodes.
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2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.1 OVERVIEW
The CNG facility is consisting of following equipment: Gas-Liquid separation system, Gas Drying
& H2S adsorption system, Gas Compression system, CNG Cylinders storage package, Heat
Exchangers and Metering systems.
The Utility for supporting CNG Plant are consisting Fuel Gas System, Gas power generation, Air
Instru-ment Package, Waste Heat Recovery Unit, Pumps, Cooling towers, Water treatment Package
and Sump system.
The incoming gas is taken from existing pipe then being compressed to CNG storage cylinders by
CNG Compressors. Storage CNG will be performed maximum at 20 hours/day and decanting phase
will be performed on the peak load within 4 to 5 hours/day (18.00 to 23.00). The design capacity of
CNG Plant is 19.88 MMSCFD gas to the CNG storage cylinders.
Waste heat recovery Unit is provided to utilize the energy from exhaust compressor gas engine to
reduce Joule Thompson effect on the pressure reducing system. The WHRU will heat water from
tank which will be utilized as heating media of the CNG gas on CNG heat exchanger.
Cooling water system which consisting of Cooling Tower, Circulation pumps and CNG cooler will
be pro-vided to optimize the requirement of CNG cylinders.
2.1.1 Inlet scrubber (V-100)
The gas scrubber (V-100) will be installed on incoming gas to remove any hydrocarbon liquid from
upstream facility. The liquid level on the gas scrubber will be controlled by control valve LV-0101
to avoid liquid carried over to the CNG Plant. High liquid level on the scrubber will initiate the
valve to open, then if liquid level has reached normal condition valve will be closed, so the valve
will be as on/off mode.
The gas scrubber is provided with PSV-0101A/B with set pressure of 34 barg for overpressure
protection, One PSV will be on operation and another one as spare.
Inlet line will be provided with SDV-0101 in order to isolate the plant in emergency condition. The
initiators of SDV-0101 closing refer to Cause & effect diagram.
2.1.2 Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B)
The metering will measure natural gas inlet to CNG plant. Total gas inlet is 19.88 MMSCFD. Gas
inlet would be 19.88 MMSCFD and flows to inlet compressor and 1.1 MMSCFD flows to auxiliary
fuel gas. Metering type is 2x100% custody orifice meter. Metering will be operated in continous
operation. Flow and accumulation flow should be monitored by flow computer. Gas inlet to
metering tends to consist of high moisture. Orifice should be designed for wet gas condition.
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2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B)

The outlet gas from gas scrubber (V-100) will be dried through Gas Drying Unit (D-100A/B). Unit
consist of two Gas Dryer + H2S absorber, i.e D-100A/B and D-200A/B. These will be operated on
parallel configuration. Maximum capacity of drying Unit is 10 MMSCFD. The range of inlet
pressure is 20.6-25 barg. One bed will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating
mode. Gas dryer will remove water and H2S content on the feed gas to produce moisture dew point
to -40oC and maximum 3 ppm H2S. Dew point meter and H2S meter should be installed within
Dryer package unit. Adsorption time is 4-8 hours and the regeneration time is 4-8 hours (heating,
cooling and standby).
Gas dryer pre filter (F-100) will be provided at upstream of desiccant gas dryer (D-100A/B) to
ensure that gas goes to molecular sieve is clean and no hydrocarbon liquid carried over. One filter
will be operated and bypass line opened during filter maintenance, pressure differential indicator
will be provided across the filter such that operator will able to determine the switching operation.
Gas dryer after filter (F-110) will be provided on the downstream of desiccant gas dryer (D-100A/B)
to ensure that are there is no solid particle carried over on the gas before entering the CNG
compressor. One filter will be operated and bypass line opened during filter maintenance, pressure
differential indicator will be provided across the filter such that operator will able to determine the
switching operation.
Blower, electric heater, air cooler and liquid knocked out drum will be provided on the regeneration
line. A portion of dried gas will be utilized as regeneration gas. The regeneration gas will be heated
by an electric heater then after removing the water on the desiccants, the regent gas will be cooling
downed via the air cooler then liquid will be removed on the liquid knocked out drum. After
removing liquid on the knocked out drum, regent gas will be re-injected on the main gas line.
The valve sequences on the dryer unit will be controlled by a microprocessor on the dryer unit
package. Running and fault status on the dryer package will be transferred to Plant Control System
(PCS) for monitoring only.
This system is auto mode. No interlock system to main PCS.
2.1.4 Compressor (K-101 / / K-110)
The dry gas from dryer with operating pressure of 20.6-25 barg at 26.7-51.7 oCwill be transferred to
the storage cylinder at pressure of 250 barg through CNG compressors (K101/102/103/104/105/106/107/108/109/110). There are 10 (ten) compressor trains with 9 (nine)
compressors will be operated in parallel and 1 (one) compressor on standby mode.
Each compressor will be operated with outlet capacity of 2.3 MMSCFD at inlet pressure of 24 barg.
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The compressor is reciprocating type in three stages compression, air coolers will be provided on
each discharge stage to enhance the efficiency of compressor.
The maximum discharge pressure and temperature from CNG compressor are 250 barg and 48OC
respectively. The compressor will be supplied by vendor as a skid including electrical and
instrumentation inside. Control system of CNG compressor is provided with PLC by vendor, the
operating parameter will be transferred to Plant Control System (PCS) for monitoring purpose.
Shutdown system of the compressors will be managed by PLC, trigger of shutdown such as lube oil
pressure low, suction pressure low, discharge pressure high, discharge temperature high and High
vibration will be further developed by vendor.
Compressors are driven by Gas Engine drive with fuel gas that supplied from upstream of dryer
skid.
2.1.5 CNG Cooler ( E-100)
Compressed gas from CNG compressor with temperature of 48oC will be cooled down to 35oC
before entering to CNG cylinders. Cooling water system is closed loop cooling system which
involving CNG cooler (E-100), Cooling water circulation pump (P-200A/B) and Cooling Tower (E400). The compressed natural gas need to be cooled down to 35oC for optimizing the requirement of
cylinder storage capacity. The temperature of cooling water inlet to CNG cooler (E-100) is 30oC and
temperature cooling water outlet at 39oC. To avoid prolonged overpressure due to tube rupture,
CNG Compressor would be shut downed by PSHH-0503 then CNG gas would be release to cooling
water return line to Cooling tower (E-400).
DURING DECANTING PERIOD:
Cooling water to CNG Cooler will be discontinued to produce CNG stream with temperature 48oC
and it will be commingled with CNG stream from compartment (Temperature 35 oC).
If pressure decreases and disturbing performance of CNG compressor then CNG stream could be
flowed through E-100 bypass line. Restriction orifice installed in this bypass line to giving sufficient
backpressure for CNG compressor.
2.1.6 CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82)
CNG from E-200 will be stored at CNG storage cylinders. The CNG storage cylinders are consisting
of 95 compartment (base on 20 hours storage time at 18.7 MMSCFD CNG inlet). Each
compartment is consisting of 8 tube cylinders. One cylinder has capacity of 2.38 m3. Three CNG
compartment will be arranged in 1 (one) bank. Each bank will be provided 1 unit manual valve for
incoming and outgoing CNG. Pressure relief device (PSV) protect respectives cylinders. Discharge
PSV will be released to atmosphere and no additional pipe is required for PSV discharge line.
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2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger

Double pipe exchanger would be installed at downstream of PV-0501 to minimize temperature
drop during CNG depressuring by PV-0501 A/B. Heating media is using Hot water in outer pipe
side and CNG stream in inner pipe. Timer valve (KV) would be opened to supply hot water to outer
pipe of double pipe exchanger. Restriction orifice (RO) is provided on hot water inlet to restrict
capacity of hot water to exchanger.
If temperature at downstream PV-0501 close with -25o C, Hot water supply could be discontinued
this condition occur when pressure in compartments was dropped.
2.1.8 CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200)
The CNG Heat exchanger is required during decanting stage, this is to reheat CNG on the
downstream of pressure reducing valve. The temperature decrease due to large pressure drop in
PV0501A/B, this is called Joule Thompson effect. Temperature on the downstream can be lower
than the dew point of CNG such that condensation may occurs.
The CNG heat exchanger (E-200) maximum duty is 4100 kW (basis 4 hours decanting time) then
duty will decrease gradually as the upstream pressure is reduced during decanting process. The
initial stage of decanting, the temperature of CNG will be increased from -38oC to about 30oC. The
heating media for this heat exchanger is hot water system with temperature of 90oC. Hot water
circulation flowrate is 140 m3/hr and the flowrate to E-200 will be controlled by (TV0502).
Temperature control Valve (TV-0502) will manipulate hot water flowrate to E-200 to maintain CNG
export to the pipeline at temperature of 30oC. Temperature control is using cascade with TIC-0502.
2.1.9 Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B)
The pressure of CNG outlet to PLN will be maintained at 28 barg and temperature of 30oC. PIC0501A/B are used for controlling CNG outlet pressure. Pressure reducing system will be provided
by two control valves ( PV0501A/B) with one operating and one standby.
This valve is designed base on 4 hours decanting time (96 MMSCFD).
2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process
The storage and decanting process will be performed by opening and closing delivery valve (KV0501A/B) downstream of CNG storage cylinders. Storage CNG will be carried out fixed maximum
20 hours per day and decanting will be performed 4 to 5 hours per day. During decanting period the
CNG Cooler (E-100) will be bypassed to reduced joule thomphson effect on the downstream of PV0501A/B.
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Duration of decanting can be resetted from the control room, but changing setting time shall refer to
operating pressure on the CNG storage cylinders. Over pressure on the CNG cylinders will initiate
high pressure on the discharge compressor then process shutdown can be triggered.
2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B)
The metering system with 2x100% with crossover will measure natural gas outlet from CNG plant.
Total gas outlet is 113 MMSCFD for 4 hours. Metering is used as custody meter. Flow and
accumulation flow should be monitored in main PLC. For Gas composition analysis, one sampling
connection is installed at the upstream of Outlet Metering (M200A/B).
Gas Flow would be measured for 4 hours per day during decanting time. Totalizer would count total
value base on measured gasflow.
2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300)
The exhaust gas from gas engines ducting will be utilized as source of energy to increase the
temperature of hot water from 63oC to 90oC. Exhaust gas from each turbine will be commingled on
header before entering WHRU, and water will be heating up on the WHRU boiler.
Hot water from WHRU will be stored on the hot water storage Tank at temperature of 90oC.
During storage phase (20 hours), WHRU would heat water in Hot water tank (T-200) for
approximately 10 hours from 30o to 90o C. The water circulating pump (P-500 A/B) with capacity of
45m3/hr is used to circulate water from T-200 through WHRU heater (E-300) and back to T-200.
During decanting phase (4 hours), Hot water pump (P-300 A/B) with capacity of 140 m3/h will
circulate hot water from T-200 to E-200 and back to T-200. Temperature of hot water in the Hot
water tank (T-200) is controlled by manipulating damper position on each exhaust gas Turbine of
CNG compressors.
2.1.13 Fuel Gas
Fuel gas is supplied for two (2) units gas engine generators (1 operation & 1 stand by) thru Fuel gas
strainer and for ten (10) units gas engine compressors (9 operation and 1 unit standby). The fuel gas
strainer is designed based on capacity of less than 1.5 MMSCFD.
Fuel Gas metering (FQI-0901) is provided to measure auxilary fuel gas consumption in CNG
facility.
2.1.14 Instrument air
The instrument air will be provided on CNG plant to enhace the overall reliability of the Plant.
Instrument air requirement is calculated based on the number of control valves and on-off control
valves plus a design margin of 20%. Three (3) Air compressors will be provided with two operating
as lead and lag basis and one compressor as a standby.
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Instrument air system will be provided with a drying unit such that the dew point of instrument air is
less than -40oC.
2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400)
Water as cooling media will be utilized for CNG Cooler (E-100) before storage stage, The CNG
from gas compressor with temperature of 48oC will be cooled down to 35oC using cooled water.
Cooling water is supplied to the heat exchangers through the Cooling Tower Pump (P-200 A/B) at
flowrate of 35m3/hr. After taking heat of CNG, cooling water leaves heat exchanger at temperature
of 30oC is re-circulated to the Cooling Tower ( E-400) for cooling down and reused. Make-up water
will be provided to compensate water losses on the Cooling Tower (E-400).
2.1.16 Fire water system
Fire water will be taken from existing fire water system in front of CNG plant.
Fire hydrants and monitors will be located based on equipment layout during detail engineering.
2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001)
Auxiliary water for CNG plant will be taken from well in plant. Well water will be treated by
Reverse osmisis (RO) technology prior to be used as make up water. Total consumption for make
up water is 3.2 m3/h. The feedwater to the RO unit will be design accordingly based on input from
vendor.
2.1.18 Insulation
Personnel Protection Insulation (PP) shall be specified on all lines with normal operating
temperatures above 70C. This will be applied only to sections of pipe that personnel could come
into contact with during normal operation.
Heat Conservation Insulation (HC) shall be specified for heated systems above 65C (e.g. hot water
from WHRU).
Noise Abatement Insulation (NI) shall be specified on compressor suction and discharge lines,
subject to vendor confirmation.
2.1.19 Vent System
Relief Gas from Pressure safety valves and Blow down system would be collected to vent header
then to vent stack. Automatic drain would be provided to controlling liquid level at bottom vent
stack.
Flame arrester would be installed at upstream of vent stack to avoid flame due to lightning or other
fire source.
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Relief gas from CNG cylinders would be free vent to atmosphere instead of to vent header line as
per client and manufacture requirement.
The vent stack with providing water seal at the bottom of the vent stack to prevent air ingress.
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3 STUDY METHODOLOGY
3.1 HAZOP
3.1.1 Overview
The study was carried out using the traditional HAZOP Guide Word method, where the system is
broken down into manageable sections and a set of standard Guide Words applied. The
methodology requires exhaustive consideration of each process activity to determine if there are any
potential problems in relation to safety or operations that may arise due to deviations in the process.
The Causes and Consequences of each deviation are identified. The HAZOP team evaluates the
severity of the problem and adequacy of existing safeguards, and where necessary, recommends
additional safeguards as Actions. The hazard and operability problems highlighted in the course of
the review were captured in the HAZOP Review worksheets (Appendix A).
3.1.2 Worksheet Definition
All concerns raised are documented in the HAZOP Review Worksheets, which include the column
headers as described in Table 3.2a.
Table 3.1a
HAZOP Review Worksheet
Column Heading
No.
Description
Reference Number
Guide word/Deviation
A set of standard guide words used to analyse and determine

potential problems that arise
Possible Causes
Causes or problems identified
Possible Consequences
Description of the consequences of the possible impact of the cause
Type
Types of issues that are involved, either Drawing Error/Comment,

Engineering, Operability, Safety, Financial and Regulatory
Safeguard
Description of the safeguards in place
Recommendations/Comment
Description of the recommendation(s) that could be in place
Action Party
Relevant party taking responsibility for action(s) identified
The completed HAZOP review worksheets are attached in Appendix A.

3.2 HAZID
3.2.1 Overview
HAZID review is used as a means to identifying potential hazards, determining the associated
consequences and evaluating means of preventing the hazard or controlling the consequences. They
should not be confused with a HAZOP review which looks at specific areas of the process to
identify potential design/operating problems and determine ways of improving the process design to
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PT. PROSIM
prevent such incidents from occurring. A HAZID review is based on a combination of identification,
analysis and brainstorming activities. The technique exhaustively considers each review area, by
reference to an agreed set of guidewords. During the review, each facility was considered in turn
with the facility broken down according to specific areas or enclosed buildings, e.g., Main Deck.
3.2.2 Worksheet Definitions
All findings during the HAZID sessions are recorded by the scribe using HAZID worksheets. These
worksheets contain the column headings given in Table 3.3b.
Table 3.3b
HAZID Record Sheet Headings
Column Heading
Description
No.
Reference number
Category / Guideword
Initiating event and guideword used to generate hazard scenario
Event Description
Description of scenario and mode of realization
Consequence
Description of the consequences of the hazard or possible impact and

escalation of the scenario
Prevention
Existing measures to prevent the hazard from occurring
Control
Existing measures to control or mitigate the hazard to prevent escalation
Recommendation /
Comments
Actions generated during the review. Comments on the protective systems

in place, justification of the design are also included in italics.
Action Party
Responsibility for addressing each action item will be assigned to the

design team or to the project team
Ranking
Qualitative ranking of the frequency and consequence of the hazard

(carried out after the review is completed to save time during the review
itself)
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4 HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The HAZOP/HAZID review sessions were carried out at the Istana Karang Laut office in
Plaza Citiview Kemang, Jakarta, utilizing 2 days for review, over the period 17th and 21st
June 2013.
4.2 THE HAZOP/HAZID TEAM
The HAZOP/HAZID team comprises a multidisciplinary team of personnel involved with the design
and operation of the facilities, led by a safety consultant from PT PROSIM The names and
attendance records of the HAZOP/HAZID team members for each of the systems are tabulated in
Table 4.2a.
Table 4.2a
HAZOP/HAZID Team Attendance
Name
Co.
Role
June
2013
June
2013
17
21
Margaretha T
PT PROSIM
Chairman
Yulia Tirtasiwi
PT PROSIM
Scribe
Sugiyanto
PT ETI
Process Engineer
Bernardo
PT ETI
Rudolf S
PT ETI
Suarno
PT ETI
Cut Julia
PT IKL
Project Manager
Warno Abdullah
PT IKL
Engineering Manager
Suseno
PT IKL
Process Engineer
Irvan N
PT IKL
Haidar
PT IKL
Gigin Ginanjar
PT IKL
PT IKL
Isa
Process Engineer
4.3 GUIDE WORDS

The full set of Guide Words used in the HAZOP/HAZID Review is listed in Table 4.3a & b. It
should be noted that if not found to be applicable or not to produce any problem of concern that had
not already been raised, the Guide Word was not recorded in the Worksheets for that node.
Table 4.3a
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
HAZOP Guide Words
Guide Word
No Flow
Less Flow
More Flow
Reverse Flow
Misdirected Flow
Less Level
More Level
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8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
PT. PROSIM
Less Pressure
More Pressure
Less Temperature
More Temperature
Contaminants
Composition
Corrosion / Erosion
Instrumentation
Relief
Personnel Safety
External Factors
Operations
Maintenance
Drawing
Table 4.3b
HAZID Guide Words
Safety System
Guide Word
No.
Comments
Non Process
Structural Failures
Extreme weather/subsidence/fatigue
Events
Impact
Collisions
Transportation
Helicopter/personnel baskets/vessels
Lifting
Dropped Objects
Non Process Fires
Fires/escalated fires
Toxic Release
Chemical spill
Security
Pirates/fishermen
Noise
High noise areas/vibration
Health hazards
Diseases/working condition/chemicals
Loss of
containment
Ignition
Fires from individual process systems
Safety Systems
Ignition Sources
Escape/ Refuge
Personnel escape to TR
Communication
Hotlines/radio, etc
Emergency Lighting
Lighting during escape/ evacuation
Discharge to air
Vent/ flare/ relief, etc
Discharge to water
Produced water, etc
Discharge to soil
Gas/ water injection , etc
Waste disposal
Hazardous material/ solids/ sanitary waste,

etc.
Environmental
Hazards
4.4 DRAWINGS REVIEWED

A basic Piping and Instrumentation (P&ID) for the process acted as a basis for discussion during the
review, along with the operating procedures. The drawings used are attached in Appendix B.
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4.5 SELECTED NODES

The process was initially broken down according to the step and then by each action comprising the
step. Each action was considered separately with the full list of Guide Words applied. Thus each
action becomes a node, so, for instance, each feed line into a reactor was considered as a separate
node. The nodes used are presented in Table 4.5a & b while the associated worksheets are given in
Appendix A (HAZOP) and Appendix B (HAZID).
Table 4.5a
Nodes Reviewed in HAZOP
Node
Section
Drawing Number
Rev
N1
Incoming Gas from Gundih field through Gas Scrubber V100 to Station Inlet Metering M100A/B
TS78-P-PID-001
TS78-P-PID-002
B
B
N2
Outlet Station Inlet Metering to Gas Dryer Prefilter F-100,

Gas Dryer 100A/B, Gas Dryer After Filter F-110
including Regenerator Filter
TS78-P-PID-003
N2R
N3
Regeneration System
Compression System K101 (typical for K102 to K109),
including Blowdown Tank VE301A
TS78-P-PID-003
TS78-P-PID-004
B
B
N4
Inlet CNG Cooler E-100 to CNG Compartment

(STORAGE TIME)
Inlet CNG Heat Exchanger E-200 to Station Outlet
Metering M-200A/B (DECANTING)
TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2
TS78-P-PID-006
Hot water circulation including Hot Water Tank T-200,

Hot Water Pump P300A/B and circulation to E-100 and
E-200
Waste Heat Recovery Unit include Water circulation
pump P-500A/B and WHRU
Water Treatment Plant
TS78-P-PID-007
TS78-P-PID-005 sheet 2 of 2
B
B
N5
N6
TS78-P-PID-007
TS78-P-PID-012
TS78-P-PID-011
N10
Cooling System, including Make up Water Tank T-400,

Make Up Water Pump P-100, Cooling Tower E-400 and
Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A/B
Sump Tank V-400 including Sump Tank P-400
TS78-P-PID-010
N11
Fuel Gas System
TS78-P-PID-009
N12
N13
Fire Water System
TS78-P-PID-013
N14
Power Generation system
TS78-P-PID-014
N15
Vent Gas System, including discharge of pressure

relieving device and BDVs vent header, KO Drum V-600,
up to Vent Stack VS-100
TS78-P-PID-015
N7
N8
N9
Table 4.5b
Node Reviewed in HAZID
Node
N1
Section
Drawing Number
CNG Plant Tambak Lorok
TS78-L-LY-001
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5 HAZOP/HAZID RESULTS
5.1 ACTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
A total of 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations were generated during the
review. The recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with
the process or improve the clarity of the process drawings (P&IDs). A complete list of the
recommendations made by the team during the review itself is tabulated in Appendix A. A unique
number is assigned to each recommendation and the node identification number is included so that it
may easily be traced back to the review worksheets (Appendix B & C). Brief summary of
highlighted recommendations are presented below.
HAZOP
Design
It was noted in the HAZOP It identified during the review and also with discussion with Tambak
Lorok, some of the valve arrangement need to be lock open to ensure that it doesnt block due to
human error (eg. at upstream BDV, by pass line). General comments also noted to provide setting
for all the instrumentation system (e.g. PIC, PSHH, PSV)
Its been reviewed that gas from suction compressor can be directed to downstream of E-200 to
metering M-200 resulting in double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100. It was
recommended to install additional check valve to PG-2"-3C-027 to prevent that case.
It recommended to provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas
blow by from V-100, to ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification and
also to nsure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to
personnel/operator at Incoming Scrubber System.
In the Waste Heat Recovery Unit, it was recommended to provide PSHH at downstream P-500A/B
to trip P-500A/B in the case of manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close resulting in
overpressure of the system.
The existing fire water capacity need to be reviewed to ensure source of water and its amount is
adequate to handle fire on the CNG plant in addition with existing fire water requirement in Tambak
Lorok.
It was discussed also that the design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type.
Maintenance and Operational
Based on the discussion raised up, its required to develop operating manual for delivery gas
including showing correlation between pressure and flow at storage period and operation of
redundant equipment such as compressor.
To control corrosion at basin cooling tower, it was recommended to provide SOP to control PH at
cooling tower periodically.
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HAZID
In the HAZID session, location of the lightning stack has not identified yet, therefore it is
recommended to review the location of the lightning stack to be away from the venting stack to
reduce the probability of fire on the vent stack
It was reviewed also that high noise level around the compressor area will potentially injured the
personnel who operate the plant in daily basis. It was recommended to have noise study and provide
warning sign the area to use ear plug protection.
Fire and Gas detection was also reviewed in the HAZID, it is recommended to provide the
philosophy of the fire and gas detection system of the plant in formal documentation and provide
clear actions of each detector, which one create alarm or shut down/blowdown of the plant. Fire
detection philosophy was not provided in the building, specifically in the electrical room such as
control room/MCC/batery room. It is recommended to provide clear philosophy, e.g. providing early
warning system for smoke detection in electrical room (High Sensitivity Smoke Detector), including
fire suppression system such as portable fire extinguisher or automatic fire suppresion system (e.g.
FM-200,etc)
The scenario of fire and explosion in the CNG plant was not established yet during the review
especially in relation position of the processing facility to location where stand by personnel
available such as control room. Therefore, review of this scenario is recommended to justify design
and location of the control room building. It is include also the fire and explosion impact to
surrounding facility at Tambak Lorok. In the discussion also identified that the control room will not
provided with glass windows to avoid explosion effect from the plant, hence that CCTV is
recommended to be provided in the control room to monitor the plant.
During the review, location of the vent stack has not been identified yet. Therefore, dispersion and
radiation analysis need to be done to define safe location and height required for the vent stack.
Consideration for emergency situation was also reviewed, and it is recommended to review
emergency evacuation plan including emergency route, muster point location, safety equipment lay
out and emergency lighting.
Good communication among parties involved (Tambak Lorok and Gundih) also important to make
sure operability and deliverability of the process plant, especially to handle emergency situation.
Therefore a procedure defining internal and external communication need to be established among
parties to make sure the plant is operated safely.
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5.2 MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO

The Major Hazard of this plant is :
Process Hazard :
1. High Pressure Gas containment in the CNG Storage Tanks
2. Gas Compression System
3. Hot water circulation system
4. Cold Venting
Non Process Hazard :

5. Control Room located in hazardous area
6. Human Error - Alarm
7. Communication between ETI, IP, Gundih
8. Transportation
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The hazard management plant can be shown as follow:
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6 HAZOP/HAZID FOLLOW-UP
The project, design and operation team should conduct a HAZOP/HAZID follow up session to
response the HAZOP/HAZID recommendations. The response and action plan shall be back up with
the relevant data and justification whether the recommendation is agreed or rejected. At the end, the
team shall formulate action plans, steward all action items and ensure that the relevant changes are
made to the design to address hazard and operability concerns identified as part of this
HAZOP/HAZID.
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7 REFERENCES
/1/
Process Plan Description - TS78 - P - BD - 001
/2/
Drawing List :
No
Drawing Title
Drawing Number
Rev
1
2
3
4
5
PID - Incoming Scrubber System

PID - Station Inlet Metering (M-100A/B)
PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package)
PID - Compressor System / K-101 (Vendor Package)
PID - Storage and Decanting System
B
B
B
B
B
PID - CNG Heat Exchanger
7
8
9
PID - Station Outlet Metering (M-200A/B)

PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit
PID - Instrument Air System
10
PID - Instrument Air Network
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
19
20
PID - Fuel Gas System

PID - Sump System
PID - Cooling System
PID - Water Treatment Plant
PID - Fire Water System
PID - Power Generator System
PID - Vent Gas System
General Plant Lay Out
PFD Inlet Metering and Dryer
PFD Gas Compression System
PFD CNG Storage and Pressure Reducing System
PFD Waste Heat Recovery Unit
PFD Cooling Water System
PFD Heat Material Balance
UFD Fuel Gas System
UFD Instrument air system
TS78-P-PID-001
TS78-P-PID-002
TS78-P-PID-003
TS78-P-PID-004
TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1
of 2
of 2
TS78-P-PID-006
TS78-P-PID-007
of 2
of 2
TS78-P-PID-009
TS78-P-PID-010
TS78-P-PID-011
TS78-P-PID-012
TS78-P-PID-013
TS78-P-PID-014
TS78-P-PID-015
TS78-L-LY-001
TS78-P-PFD-001
TS78-P-PFD-002
TS78-P-PFD-003
TS78-P-PFD-004
TS78-P-PFD-005
TS78-P-PFD-006
TS78-P-UFD-001
TS78-P-UFD-002
HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BA26
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B1
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
JULY 2013
Appendix A
HAZOP/HAZID Summary Recommendation
PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA
PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT
Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet
SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION

NODE
1
Causes / Concerns
SDV 0101 at upstream V-100
close due to failure
Consequences
Comments / Recommendations
Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Santos Ensure existing pipeline design pressure is higher
Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to than maximum discharge pressure from Gundih
fire or fatality
facility
Rec Number
CNG-HP-1
SDV 0101 at upstream V-100

close due to failure
Loss of Production
CNG-HP-2
Any of manual valve at

incoming line to V-100
inadvertently close
PV 0105 stuck close or manual
valve around the PV 0105
inadvertently close
Control loop malfunction
causing LV-0101 to open fully
Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Santos Provide operating manual for delivery gas
Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to
fire or fatality
Potential overpressurization of V-100 resulting in
Provide setting pressure PIC-0105 to show at PID
hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality
TS78-P
CNG-HP-3
Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential Provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent
vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and
of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100
explosion
CNG-HP-5

Ensure equipment purchase suitable as per

hazardous area classification
CNG-HP-6

Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential

explosion
Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential
explosion
Ensure vent stack at sump tank is located high

enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator
CNG-HP-7
Sour Gas (H2S) and water

content in the production gas
Manual by pass valve at
downstream line PG-10-30-053
from metering M100A/B to
Compressor unit unit is
inadvertenly open
Manual valve upstream BDV0301 inadvertenly close in the
event of ESD and BDV-0301
required to open
Blower E-101 at regeneration
unit damage/ not in operation
Internal corrosion of piping and vessel leading to

release of hydrocarbon gas and potential fire
Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system
resulting in equipment damage
Consider to provide corrosion coupon at upstream

V-100
LC by pass manual valve 10" at downstream line
PG-10-30-053 and update PID
CNG-HP-8
Review availability of isolation valve (SDV) from

Gundih facility in the case of overpressure from
pipeline
CNG-HP-4
CNG-HP-9
Overpresurization of upstream equipment leading to Provide Lock Open (LO) at manual valve upstream
fire/fatality
BDV-0301
CNG-HP-10
No regeneration process causing wet gas going to

compressor
Ensure interlock system install to prevent

overtemperature/overpressure in the case P-101
shutdown, Electric Heater should also shutdown
(Check with vendor)
CNG-HP-11
D-200 A-B shutdown
Potential reverse flow leading to equipment damage
Ensure D-200 A-B including regeneration system

has adequate design to accomadate reverse flow
CNG-HP-12
Switch operation between

compressors
Potential human error to operate manual valve and

safety devices
Provide operating manual for operating redundant

equipments, including compressors
CNG-HP-13
One of running compressor fails Less of CNG production

to operate
Review sizing of manual valve incoming CNG

compartment to be available at market or provide
spare manual valve in the case of maintenance
required
CNG-HP-14
Fouling/Plugging at E-100 or
loss of cooling water
Provide portable temperature detector to check skin

temperature of CNG compartment
CNG-HP-15
Loss of containment/piping leak Tube leak at E-100

due to corrosion
Provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower

periodically
CNG-HP-16
SDV0601 fails close or manual

valve in the metering station
inadvertenly closed
Gas from suction compressor
going to downstream of E-200 to
metering M-200
Manual valve upstream BDV0505 inadvertenly close in the
event of ESD and BDV-0505
required to open
Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop
due to failure OR Strainer at
upstream P-300A/B blockage
Show setting point of PV 0501A/B
CNG-HP-17
2R
2R
Inefficiency in cooling resulting in high temperature

leading to less CNG production
Potential overpressurization of CNG HE E-200

leading to hydrocarbon release and potential fire
Double counting of sales gas from Santos meter with Install additional check valve at line PG-2"-3C-027
M-100
CNG-HP-18
Overpresurization of upstream equipment leading to Provide Lock Open (LO) manual valve at upstream
fire/fatality
BDV-0505
CNG-HP-19
Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat

transfer and lower gas sales temperature
CNG-HP-20
Provide low temperature switch at line PG-12"-3C021 to close KV-0503 A to prevent low temperature
in the gas sales
Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop High temperature in the circulation water around the Provide low temperature alarm at line PG-12"-3Cdue to failure OR Strainer at
waste heat recovery unit
021 to alert operator
CNG-HP-21
Three way valve TV-0502 to E- Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat
200 is inadvertenly close
transfer and lower gas sales temperature
Any manual valve at upstream E- Potential overpressure of downstream pump
300 inadvertenly close or check
One or more gas engine driver
Less of flue gas to E-300 resulting in lower
shutdown
temperature generated for water circulation
CNG-HP-22
7
7
Start up
Condense water from flue gas at Corrosion at E-300 leading to equipment damage
E-300
CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK
Provide Temperature Control Valve at bypass line

of E-200
Vendor to provide minimum flow recycle line at P500A/B
Review requirement set point of TIA-0704
Low gas temperature from exhaust gas compressor to Provide drain line at lowest point gas ducting E-300
WHRU resulting condensation at gas ducting E-300
Page 1 of 2
Review requirement TIA-0705
CNG-HP-23
CNG-HP-25
CNG-HP-26
CNG-HP-27
NODE
7
9
10
Causes / Concerns
Drawing
Manual valve at outlet T-100 is
inadvertenly close or strainer
blocked
Manual valve or strainer at inlet
Basin cooling water is
inadvertently close
Manual valve at upstream P200A/B inadvertenly close or
strainer blocked
Liquid control valve failure at
individual equipments (V-300,
Compressor K-101-109, V-100)
Consequences
Revise drawing TS78-P-PID-007 to show setting
point of all instrumentation alarm and trip
Rec Number
CNG-HP-28
Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage
Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream

P-100 and P-600
CNG-HP-29
Potential overflow at T-600
Review design of floating valve T-600 to be radar

type
CNG-HP-30
Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage
Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream

P-200
CNG-HP-31
Build up pressure in Sump Tank V-400 leading to

potential overpressurization
Review outlet line at venting V-400 to be sufficient

for case high pressure gas introduced from
upstream equipment to this vessel
CNG-HP-32
11
3" Manual valves at

Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor
incoming/outgoing line Fuel
shutdown
Gas filter is inadvertently closed
Provide lock open (LO) for 3" manual valves at

upstream and downstream Fuel Gas Filter
CNG-HP-33
12
Manual valve upstream of

Instrument Air Receiver V-300
inadvertently closed
Potential overpressurization of upstream piping
Confirm availability of high pressure trip at

internal of Air Compressor C300A/B/C package to
shut down compressor in the case of block of
discharge
CNG-HP-34
12
Loss of instrument air supply potentially leading to

PSD
Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream

CNG-HP-35
13
Manual valve downstream

Operation
Review existing Tambak Loroks fire water capacity

to be adequate for fire water handling in CNG
Plant
CNG-HP-36
13
Operation
Consider to provide additional flowmeter to

measure fire water consumption for Tambak Lorok
CNG-HP-37
14
Any manual valve down stream Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment

GE-100A to cooling system
damage
inadvertenly close
Confirm availability of TSHH to trip Gas

Generator GE-100A in case of high temperature has
been included in the generator package.
CNG-HP-38
14
Any manual valve down stream Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment

GE-100A to cooling system
damage
inadvertenly close
Lighting struck during
Fire at vent stack
PSV/BDV release
Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream GE100A
CNG-HP-39
Consider to install CO2 snuffing system at VS-100

to extinguish fire at vent stack completed with
fusible plug
CNG-HP-40
15
Page 2 of 2
PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL
Appendix A SUMMARY HAZOP/HAZID
SUMMARY HAZID RECOMMENDATION

HAZID
No.
4.1.3
Hazard Description
Consequences
Lightning
Possible damage to the

equipment and potential
fire
Prevention
4.3.1
Light vehicles impact

e.g. Car
Potential impact to
piping/equipment
leading to hydrocarbon
release, fire, personnel
injury/fatality and asset
damage
High noise level from Potential personnel ear compressor and gas
injury
engine area
Toxic Material during Personnel injury
MSDS provided in the
handling chemical: for
storage facility
cooling water,
corrosion inhibitor e.g.
oxygen scavanger
4.7.1
4.8.1
Control
Recommendation/ Comment
Rec Number
Co.
Pr
Ri
Type
S (4)
C(3)
S (H16)
C(H12)
Design
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Operation /
Maintenance
CNG-HD- 3
S (1)
C(-)
S (H3)
C(-)
Design
Ensure portable eye wash station CNG-HD- 4

provided during chemical
handling (e.g : at control room,
loading area and water treatment
area)
S (1)
C(-)
S (H3)
C(-)
Design
Grounding provided
for each equipment
Update EQL drawing to show

CNG-HD- 1
Lightning protection at CNG
compartment area (lightning
stack) in process/utility area
vehicle park area away Operation cars shall be equipped CNG-HD- 2
from process area
with flame arrestor and diesel
engine
Provide SOP to wear ear plug

around noise area
4.8.3
Hazardous waste
disposal
Personnel injury during PPE - hand gloves,

handling waste disposal face shield
Alocate waste disposal resulting

from operation/construction
activity in safe area (third party)
CNG-HD- 5
S (1)
C(-)
S (H3)
C(-)
Operation /
Maintenance
4.9.6
Hot Surfaces at
exhaust gas, WHRU
and heat exchanger (E200)
Leak from Process
Equipment
Potential injury due to

exposure to heat
PPE
Provide warning sign around

hot surface equipment and
pipings
CNG-HD- 6
S (2)
C(-)
S (M4)
C(-)
Design
4.10.1
Loss of Containment
personal protection
insulation provided
Release of hydrocarbon Unit SD by low

resulting in potential
pressure trip
fire/explosion leading to
injury/fatality
Release of hydrocarbon NA
resulting in potential
fire/explosion leading to
injury/fatality
Gas detection system

at process area
Define philosophy of fire and

gas detection system and
develop fire and gas detection
area at process plant
Fire hydrant provided Regularly to check temperature
with source from
in the MCC cabinet and DCS
existing IP
panel to monitor short circuit
and provide portable fire
extinguisher
CNG-HD- 7
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Design
CNG-HD- 8
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Operation /
Maintenance
Heat & Smoke

detector, Portable Fire
Extinguisher provided
at control room &
MCC room
Lightning protection
provided at CNG
compartment area
Regularly to check temperature

in the MCC cabinet and DCS
panel to monitor short circuit
and provide portable fire
extinguisher
Define safe location and
minimum height required for
vent stack and vent location to
be suitable with wind directions
so that dispersed gas will not be
exposed to process plan
CNG-HD- 9
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Operation /
Maintenance
CNG-HD- 10
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Design
ERP
Provide emergency evacuation

risk analysis to determine safe
evacuation route and location of
muster area
CNG-HD- 11
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Design
CNG-HD- 12
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Operation /
Maintenance
Heat and Smoke

detector
Form emergency response team

(ERT) and conduct emergency
drill
Review scenario of fire and
explosion from gas plant to the
area of standby personnel such
as control room and provide
mitigation plan (design and
location of the building) to
anticipate fire/explosion
CNG-HD- 13
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Design
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Design
Define safety requirement on

CNG-HD- 14
control room specification to
accommodate fire/explosion
scenario e.g. door, wall and
window specifications
Consider to provide CCTV in the CNG-HD- 15
control room for monitoring
purpose
Define internal and external
CNG-HD- 16
communication system (PABX)
for connecting operator in the
control room to outside parties
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Design
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Design
Define safety layout at CNG

plant to show ESD push button,
fire hydrant, etc
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Design
4.11.1
Battery
Fire/explosion in the
event of hydrocarbon
release.
4.11.2
Vent
Fire/explosion in the
event of hydrocarbon
release in process area if
stroke by lightning
4.12.1
Fire on Plant area
Personnel trap/ unable

to evacuate leading to
injury/fatality
4.14.1
Control room
Fire or explosion from

process area impact to
control room leading to
potential personnel
injury/fatality
Inability to monitor
process area
Battery room is
located in non
hazardous area
4.15.1
Inability to contact
control room within
emergency
Inability to coordinate
Each operator
response leading to
provided with hand
potential major accident held radio
leading to personnel
injury/fatality and asset
loss
F&G alarm system
4.16.1
Inability to initiate
ESD
Inability to control fire

Local ESD push
leading to potential
button at control
major accident leading to room
personnel injury/fatality
and asset loss
4.18.3
Blowdown of water
from cooling tower,
discharge RO
Potential contamination
from process fluid
Discharge water is
Define Sampling point Define Sampling point to
connected to existing to monitor discharge monitor discharge water
canal (IP)
water
Page 1 of 1
CNG-HD- 17
CNG-HD- 18
HAZID Worksheet Summary
Appendix B
HAZOP Review Worksheets
Node
1
Review date 17-Jun-13
Client
Project
Facility
Section
Comment
Design
Intent
Abbreviations
PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

Compressed Natural Gas Plant
Tambak Lorok
Incoming Gas from Gundih field through Gas Scrubber V-100 to
Station Inlet Metering M100A/B
PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT
SOP
IM
Standard Operating Procedures

Inspection & Maintenance
PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Preventative Maintenance
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
To remove any hydrocarbon liquid from upstream facility and measure natural gas inlet to CNG plant
Design
DP : 34 barG
Conditions:
DT: 65 deg C
Opt.
Conditions
OP : 20.6-30.9 barG
Drawing
PID - Incoming Scrubber System

PID - Station Inlet Metering (M-100A/B)
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
1.1.1
No
Deviation
No Flow
OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C
Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD

TS78-P-PID-001
TS78-P-PID-002
Causes / Concerns
SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 close

due to failure
Consequences
Safeguards
Potential overpresurization Pressure regulator (PV) at

of upstream plant (Gundih upstream facility to adjust
Facility ) resulting in
discharge pressure
hydrocarbon release
leading to fire or fatality
Initiating
L
Co
Pr
S (4)
C(4)
Ri
Ri
S (M4)
C(M4)
Loss of Production
1.1.2
No
No Flow
Any of manual valve at incoming

line to V-100 inadvertently close
Potential overpresurization Pressure regulator (PV) at

of upstream plant (Gundih upstream facility to adjust
Facility ) resulting in
discharge pressure
hydrocarbon release
leading to fire or fatality
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
B
B
Rec. No.
Ensure existing pipeline design

pressure is higher than maximum
discharge pressure from Gundih
facility
CNG-HP-1
Review availability of isolation

valve (SDV) from Gundih facility
in the case of overpressure from
pipeline
CNG-HP-2
Provide operating manual for

delivery gas
CNG-HP-3
Loss of Production
Page 1 of 53
HAZOP Node N1
No.
1.1.3
1.1.4
Guide
Words
No
No
Deviation
No Flow
No Flow
Causes / Concerns
Co
Pr
Ri
PV 0105 stuck close or manual valve Potential

PIH-0103 set at 31 barg as
around the PV 0105 inadvertently
overpressurization of V-100 high pressure alarm to
close
resulting in hydrocarbon
alert operator
release leading to fire or
fatality
PIHH-0103 set at 33 barG
to close SDV-0101
PSV 0101A/B set at 34
barG is sized for fire case
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
Any of manual valves at Station Inlet Potential overpresurization PIH-0103 set at 30 barg as
Metering M100A/B inadvertently
of upstream M-100A/B
high pressure alarm to
close
resulting to fire or fatality alert operator
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
1.2.1
Less
Less Flow
Refer to No Flow - manual valves

partially closed
1.3.1
More
More Flow
Slugging
1.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow
1.5.1
Part of
Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of

concerns identified
1.5.1
Part of

concerns identified
No additional significant issues of

concerns identified
Consequences
Safeguards
Initiating
L
Provide setting pressure PIC-0105
to show at PID TS78-P
Rec. No.
CNG-HP-4
Note : maximum upstream pressure

from Gundih is not more than 34 barG
PIHH-0103 set at 33 barG

to close SDV-0101
PSV 0101A/B set at 34
barG is sized for block
discharge
High level at V-100 leading Slug Catcher provided at

to liquid carry over to
Gundih facility
metering skid M-100 and
downstream equipment
LV-0101 will maintain
level in Gas Scrubber V100
LIH-0102 as high level
alarm to alert operator
LIHH-0102 will close SDV0102
Parameter: Level
Page 2 of 53
HAZOP Node N1
No.
1.6.1
Guide
Words
Less
Deviation
Less Level
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Control loop malfunction causing LV- Gas blowby to Sump Tank LIL-0102 alarm to alert
0101 to open fully
V-400 leading to potential Operator
vessel damage (design
pressure 3.5 barG), fire and
explosion
LILL-0102 to initiate
shutdown of SDV-0102
Initiating
L
Co
Pr
Ri
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
Provide SOP to accommodate gas

release from vent of sump tank due
to gas blow by from V-100
CNG-HP-5
Ensure equipment purchase

suitable as per hazardous area
classification
CNG-HP-6
Ensure vent stack at sump tank is

located high enough to prevent
exposure to personnel/operator
CNG-HP-7
Sump Tank open to

atmosphere
1.6.2
Less
Less Level
1.7.1
More
More Level
1.7.2
1.7.3
1.7.4
More
More
More
More Level
More Level
More Level
Manual valve at bypass line LV-0101

or manual drain valves
inadvertently open, leak at liquid
lines
Gas blowby to Sump Tank LIL-0102 alarm to alert

V-400 leading to potential Operator
vessel damage (design
pressure 3.5 barG), fire and
explosion
LILL-0102 to initiate
Sump Tank open to
atmosphere
Control loop malfunction causing LV- High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level
0101 to stuck close
alarm to alert Operator to
open by pass line
Any of manual valve

upstream/downstream LV-0101
inadvertently close
SDV-0102 fails closed
Slugging
LIHH-0102 to initiate
High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level
open by pass line
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
S (-)
E (2)
C(2)
S (-)
E (L2)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Rec. No.
open by pass line
open by pass line
Page 3 of 53
HAZOP Node N1
No.
Guide
Words
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Initiating
L
Co
Pr
Ri
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
S (-)
E (2)
C(2)
S (-)
E (L2)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
Rec. No.
as
1.8.1
1.8.2
1.9.1
Less
Less
More
Less Pressure
Less Pressure
More Pressure
Loss of containment/piping leak

due to corrosion
Release of hydrocarbon
PIL-0102 as low pressure
leading to environmental alarm at incoming V-100
pollution and potential fire to alert operator
PILL-0102 at incoming V100 will initiate closure of
SDV 0101
Fire and Gas Detector at V100
Refer to Misdirected Flow 1.5.1

Refer to No Flow 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3,
1.1.4 ; Less Level 1.6.1, 1.6.2
PV-0105 stuck open
Manual valve at by pass line PV0105 inadvertently open
Potential overpressure at
Metering M100A/B and
PIH-S01 set at 30 bar as

alert operator
Potential overpressure at
Metering M100A/B and
PSH 0301A/B at 32 barG

to close SDV-0101
PIH-S01 set at 30 bar as
alert operator
PSH 0301A/B at 32 barG
to close SDV-0101
Parameter: Temperature
1.10.1
Less
Less Temperature No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
1.11.1
More
More temperature No additional significant issues of

concerns identified
Parameter: Contamination
1.12.1
As Well
Contamination
As

concerns identified
Parameter: Composition
1.13.1
Other
Composition
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion

1.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion
Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in Internal corrosion of piping

the production gas
and vessel leading to
release of hydrocarbon gas
and potential fire
Wall thickness of piping

and equipment already
considered sour gas
condition
Consider to provide corrosion

coupon at upstream V-100
CNG-HP-8
Parameter: Instrumentation
Page 4 of 53
HAZOP Node N1
No.
1.15.1
Guide
Words
Other
Than
Parameter: Relief
1.16.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Safety
1.17.1
Other
Than
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Instrumentation

concerns identified
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified
Parameter: External Factor

1.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than
Parameter: Operation & Maintenance
1.19.1
Other
Operations
Than
Fire at plant
Overpresurization of
piping leading to
equipment damage
Safeguards
Fire and Gas Detector at V100
Initiating
L
Co
Pr
Ri
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Rec. No.

concerns identified
1.20.1
Other
Than
Maintenance
Single isolation valve for

Maintenance of PSV-0101A/B
1.20.2
Other
Than
Maintenance

concerns identified
Parameter: Drawing
1.21.1
Other
Than
Consequences
Potential exposure of high NA

pressure to personnel
during maintenance of PSV0101A/B
Note: Certification/testing of PSV is

conducted during online operation
without dismantle of PSV itself.
Dismantle of PSV can only be
conducted if there is a risk assessment
for single valve at upstream of the PSV
Drawing
Page 5 of 53
HAZOP Node N1
Node
Abbreviations

Client
Project
Facility
Section
Comment
Design
Intent
SOP
IM

Tambak Lorok
Outlet Station Inlet Metering to Gas Dryer Prefilter F-100, Gas
Dryer 100A/B, Gas Dryer After Filter F-110 including Regenerator
Filter
PM
USD
Unit Shutdown
PSD
Process Shutdown
ESD
Emergency Shutdown
H,M,L
High, Medium, Risk
Co
Consequence
Pr
Probability
Ri
Risk
S
Safety Risk
C
Commercial Risk
One bed of dryer will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Adsorption time is 4-8 hours and the regeneration time 4-8 hours (heating, cooling and standby)
To remove water and H2S content on the feed gas to produce moisture dew point to -40 deg C and max 3 ppm H2S
Design
DP : 34 barG
Conditions:
Opt.
OP : 20.6-30.9 barG
Conditions
Drawing
DT: 250 deg C

OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
2.1.1
No
Deviation
No Flow

TS78-P-PID-003
Drawing No.
Causes / Concerns
Any of manual valve at Gas Dryer

package is inadvertenly close
Consequences
Safeguards
Potential
PIH 0102 alarm set at 30
overpressurization of
barG to alert Operator
upstream equipment of D100 leading to rupture and
potential fire event
PIHH 0102 set at 33 barG to
initiate closure of SDV 0101
Initiating
L
Co
Pr
Ri
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.
PSV 0101A/B set at 33 barg

2.2.1
Less
Less Flow
F-100 Blockage
Potential
PIH 0102 alarm set at 30
barG to alert Operator
PIHH 0102 set at 33 barG to
initiate closure of SDV 0101
PSV 0101A/B set at 33 barg
PDI at F-100 as local
indicator for operator
Page 6 of 53
HAZOP Node N2
No.
2.2.2
Guide
Words
Less
Deviation
Less Flow
Causes / Concerns
D-100A/B Blockage (caking)
Consequences
Co
Pr
Ri
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
Depressurization of the
BDV position indication
system, loss of gas to flare and alarm
and loss of production
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
Potential wet gas to Gas

Compression system
resulting in equipment
damage
Potential
Safeguards
Initiating
L
Action Party
Rec. No.
AIH (dew point alarm) at

downstream of Dryer unit
PSH 0301A set at 32 bar at

Gas Dryer D-100A/B to
close SDV-0101
PSV 0301A set at 34 barG is

sized for block discharge
PDSH for Local indicator at
D-100A/B for operator

Compression system
damage
Potential
PSV 0301A set at 34 barG is
PDI at F-110 as local
indicator for operator
Compression system
damage
2.2.3
Less
Less Flow
F-110 Blockage
2.2.4
Less
Less Flow
see No Flow 2.1.1 For partial blockage
2.3.1
More
More Flow
BDV-0301 open due to failure
2.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow

concerns identified
2.5.1
Part of
Misdirected Flow Refer to More Flow 2.3.1
2.5.2
Part of
Misdirected Flow Manual valve at 1/2-in drain line

inadvertently open/leak or liquid
trap at F-100 and F-110 stuck open
Gas blowby to Sump Tank SOP/Maintenance of liquid

leading to gas cloud and
trap
potential fire and explosion
2.5.3
Part of
Misdirected Flow Manual bypass line of F-100 is

inadvertenly open
Potential condense liquid

carry over to D-100
damage
SOP
Page 7 of 53
HAZOP Node N2
No.
2.5.4
Guide
Words
Part of
2.5.5
Part of
2.5.6
Part of
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Misdirected Flow Manual bypass line of F-110 is

inadvertenly open
Safeguards
Potential condense liquid

carry over to compressor
unit resulting in
equipment damage
Misdirected Flow Manual valve to regeneration unit is Ineffective regeneration
inadvertenly open
process in Gas Dryer D100A/B
SOP
Misdirected Flow Manual by pass valve at

downstream line PG-10-30-053 from
metering M100A/B to Compressor
unit unit is inadvertenly open
SOP
Parameter: Level
2.6.1
Less
2.7.1
More
Less Level
More Level
Refer to Misdirected Flow 2.5.2

Liquid trap of F-100 stuck close
Parameter: Pressure
2.8.1
Less
Less Pressure
Loss of containment/leak on D-100

due to corrosion
2.8.2
2.9.2
Less
More
Less Pressure
More Pressure
Refer to More Flow 2.3.1

See No Flow 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.2.1,
Misdirected Flow 2.5.2
2.9.1
More
More Pressure
Liquid trap of F-100 stuck open
2.9.
More
More Pressure

Compression system
damage
Initiating
L
Co
Pr
Ri
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M6)
LC by pass manual valve 10" at

downstream line PG-10-30-053
and update PID
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
Action Party
Rec. No.
PSV 0301B set at 34 barG is

CNG-HP-9
High level at F-100 leading SOP to open by pass

to liquid carry over to Gas manual valve 1/2"
Dryer D-100A/B
leading to environmental
damage and potential fire
Fire and gas detection

system
Low level at F-100 leading Sump tank connected to

to gas blow by to Sump
atmospheric
Tank
Manual valve upstream BDV-0301 Overpresurization of
NA
inadvertenly close in the event of
upstream equipment
ESD and BDV-0301 required to open leading to fire/fatality
Provide Lock Open (LO) at

manual valve upstream BDV0301
CNG-HP-10
2.10.1
Less
concerns identified
2.11.1
More

concerns identified
2.12.1
As Well
Contamination
As

concerns identified
2.13.1
Other
Composition
Than

concerns identified
Page 8 of 53
HAZOP Node N2
No.
2.14.1
Guide
Words
Other
Than
Deviation
Corrosion /
Erosion
Causes / Concerns

the production gas
and potential fire
2.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
2.16.1
Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified
Parameter: Safety
2.17.1
Other
Than

2.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than
2.19.1
Other
Operations
Than
2.20.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Drawing
2.21.1
Other
Than
Fire
Safeguards
considered sour gas
condition
Overpresurization of drier F & G

leading to equipment
damage
Initiating
L
Co
Pr
Ri
S (3)
C(4)
S (M3)
C(M4)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(M4)
Action Party
Rec. No.

concerns identified
Maintenance

concerns identified
Drawing

concerns identified
Consequences
Page 9 of 53
HAZOP Node N2
2R
Node
Client
Project
Facility
Section
Comment
Design
Intent
Design
Opt.
Drawing
Abbreviations
SOP
IM


Tambak Lorok
Regeneration System
PM
USD
Unit Shutdown
PSD
Process Shutdown
ESD
Emergency Shutdown
H,M,L
High, Medium, Risk
Co
Consequence
Pr
Probability
Ri
Risk
S
Safety Risk
C
Commercial Risk
One bed of dryer will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Adsorption time is 12 hours and the regeneration time 12 hours (heating, cooling and standby)
To collect water from the dryer and refresh molecular sieves to be ready to absorb
DP : 34 barG
OP : 20.6-30.9 barG
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
2R.1.1
No
Deviation
No Flow
DT: 250 deg C

OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C

TS78-P-PID-003
Drawing No.
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Manual valve to regeneration system No regeneration process

inadvertenly close
causing wet gas going to
compressor
Safeguards
F-101 to collect any

condense liquid
Initiating
L
Co
Pr
Ri
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.

Back up dryer available
2R.1.2
2R.1.3
No
No
No Flow
No Flow
Blower E-101 at regeneration unit

damage/ not in operation
F-102 blockage
No regeneration process
causing wet gas going to
compressor
Potential
overtemperature/overpres downstream of Dryer unit
sure at gas regeneration
system
Back up dryer available
Pump cavitation
Regular Filter mainentance
Overpressurization of
equipment upstream of F102 leading to equipment
damage
F-102 to collect any

condense liquid
Ensure interlock system install to prevent

overtemperature/overpressure in the case P-101
shutdown, Electric Heater should also
shutdown
(Check with vendor)
CNG-HP-11
PSH-0301B alarm to alert

Operator
Page 10 of 53
HAZOP Node N2R
No.
2R.2.1
Guide
Words
Less
Deviation
Less Flow
2R.2.
2R.3.1
Less
More
Less Flow
More Flow
2R.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow
2R.5.1
Part of
2R.5.
Part of
#N/A
Part of
Parameter: Level
2R.6.1
Less
2R.7.
More
Causes / Concerns
F-102 partially blocked
Consequences
Safeguards
Pump cavitation
Regular Filter maintenance
Overpressurization of
equipment upstream of F102 leading to equipment
damage
PSH-0301B alarm to alert

Operator
Initiating
L
Co
Pr
Ri
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
Action Party
Rec. No.

concerns identified
D-200 A-B shutdown
Potential reverse flow

leading to equipment
damage
potential more flow at D- AIH (dew point alarm) at

100 A-B resulting potential downstream of Dryer unit
offspec to compressor
leading to compressor
damage
PIL 501 at SS-101 as Low
pressure alarm to alert
operator
PILL 501 at SS-101 to
shutdown SDV-151
Misdirected Flow Manual valve at drain line of F-102 Gas blowby to Sump Tank Sump Tank connected to
or separator after cooler
Atmospheric
inadvertently open/leak
Misdirected Flow Liquid trap at F-102 or at separator
after cooler stuck open
Gas blowby to Sump Tank Sump Tank connected to

Atmospheric
Ensure D-200 A-B including regeneration

system has adequate design to accomadate
reverse flow
CNG-HP-12
Liquid trap maintenance

Less Level
More Level
See Misdirected flow 2R.5.2

Liquid trap of F-102 or at drain line
of separator stuck close
High level at F-102 leading Manual by pass valve on

to liquid carry over to Gas around liquid trap
Dryer D-100A/B
Second liquid trap provided
on the pipe to Sump Tank
AIH (dew point alarm)-0301
at downstream of F-101
Parameter: Pressure
2R.8.1
Less
2R.8.2
Less
Less Pressure
Loss of containment/leak on
regeneration system due to corrosion leading to environmental
Less Pressure
See Misdirected flow 2R.5.1
F & G system
Page 11 of 53
HAZOP Node N2R
No.
2R.8.3
Guide
Words
Less
Deviation
Less Pressure
Causes / Concerns
Regeneration pump loss of power
due to mechanical problem
2R.9.1
More
More Pressure
See Now Flow 2R.1.3
2R.10.1 Less
Less Temperature Electric heater stop due to
mechanical failure
2R.11.1
More
More temperature Cooler stop due to motor failure
2R.12.1 As Well
Contamination
As

concerns identified
2R.13.1 Other
Composition
Than

concerns identified

2R.14.1 Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
2R.16.1 Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified

2R.18.1 Other
External Factors
Than

concerns identified

2R.19.1 Other
Operations
Than

concerns identified
2R.20.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Drawing
2R.21.1 Other
Than
Maintenance

concerns identified
Drawing

concerns identified
gas cannot circulate to

regeneration system
resulting in wet gas to
compressor
Safeguards
In efficient heat absorbtion Maintenance

to D-100
liquid cannot be condense

and separated to the
separator

the production gas
and potential fire
2R.15.1 Other
Instrumentation
Than
Parameter: Safety
2R.17.1 Other
Than
Consequences


considered sour gas
condition
Page 12 of 53
Initiating
L
Co
Pr
Ri
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
Action Party
Rec. No.
HAZOP Node N2R
Node
3
Abbreviations
Client
Project
Facility
Section

Tambak Lorok
Compression System K101 (typical for K102 to K110), including
Blowdown Tank VE301
Comment
Design
Intent
Nine (9) compressor online and One (1) stand by; reciprocating type compressor, three-stages
To compress natural gas and transfer to the storage cylinder
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Design
Shut Off Pressure :
Conditions:
Design Capacity: 2.17 MMSCFD each

compressor
Opt.
Conditions
Suction Pressure : 26 barG

Discharge Pressure : 250 barG
Drawing
PID - Compressor System / K-101 (Vendor Package)
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
3.1.1
No
Deviation
No Flow
Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD
Power : TBA KW (each compressor)
Causes / Concerns
SDV W151 fails close
Drawing No.
Consequences
Safeguards
Potential
upstream equipment and
piping leading to loss of
integrity and fire event
TS78-P-PID-004
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.
PSH-0301A at Gas Dryer D100A/B to close SDV-0101
PSV 0301A/B at dryer unit

Low suction pressure to
compressor leading to
compressor damage and
production loss
PT-501 displayed in control

room
PIL 501 at SS-101 as Low

operator
Page 13 of 53
HAZOP Node N3
No.
3.2.1
Guide
Words
Less
Deviation
Less Flow
Causes / Concerns
Blockage of filter FF-201
Consequences
Safeguards
Potential
upstream equipment and
piping leading to loss of
integrity and fire event
Action Party
Rec. No.
PILL 501 at SS-101 to

shutdown SDV-151
PSH-0301A at Gas Dryer D100A/B to close SDV-0101
PDI - S01 provided around

FF 201
PSV 0301A/B at dryer unit
Page 14 of 53
HAZOP Node N3
Node
Abbreviations

Client
Project
Facility
Section
Comment
Design
Intent
IM
PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
CNG Storage cylinder consist of 95 compartments. 5 compartments will be arranged in 1 bank (each has 40 tubes).
Operation : 19-20 hours storage time, 4-5 hours decanting time
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
To cooling down compressed gas and storage to CNG compartment
PID - Storage and Decanting System
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
4.1.1
No
4.2.1
SOP

Tambak Lorok
Inlet CNG Cooler E-100 to CNG Compartment (STORAGE TIME)
Design
CNG Cooler : DP (shell) : 7 barG; (tube) : 263 barG
Conditions: CNG Compartment : DP : 374 barG
Opt.
CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet Shell side) : OP : 3 barG
Conditions CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet tube side) : OP : 249
barG
Drawing
Less
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
No Flow
Manual valves at inlet CNG

Compartement inadvertenly close
Less Flow
See no flow partially
CNG Cooler DT : 65 deg C

CNG Compartment DT : 70 deg C
Duty CNG Cooler: 201 kW
CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet Shell side) 2.38 m3 each cylinder
: OT : 30 deg C/ 39 deg C
CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet tube side)
: OT : 48 deg C/35 deg C
Drawing No.
Consequences
Less of CNG production
Page 15 of 53
Safeguards
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.
Local pressure indicator

provided each
compartment
HAZOP Node N4
No.
4.2.2
Guide
Words
Less
Deviation
Less Flow
Causes / Concerns
One of running compressor fails to
operate
Consequences
Less of CNG production
Safeguards
Indicator of online
compressor in control
room
Review sizing of manual valve
incoming CNG compartment to
be available at market or provide
spare manual valve in the case of
maintenance required
Action Party
Rec. No.
CNG-HP-14
Standby compressor
available
Indication of pressure
and flow of storage
period by graph to
shown loss of production
4.3.1
More
More Flow

concerns identified
4.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow

concerns identified
4.5.1
Part of
Misdirected Flow KV-0503A leak or fails open (storage No adverse consequence

condition)
Parameter: Level
4.6.1
Less
4.7.1
More
Parameter: Pressure
4.8.1
Less
4.9.1
More
4.9.2
More
Less Level
More Level
Not relevant
Not relevant
Less Pressure
More Pressure
More Pressure
Refer to Less Flow

Refer to No Flow
Storage time more than 20 hours
PV-0501A/B will hold

the pressure
PIHH 0509 set at 33 barG
will open XV-0506 and
circulate gas to suction
compressor
Potential over pressure at

overall plant
PIH-S01 set 30 barG
alarm to alert Operator
PIHH-S01 set 32 barG to
close SDVSV-101/102/103 set@
78/165/294 barg
Page 16 of 53
HAZOP Node N4
No.
Guide
Words
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
More
More
Temperature
4.12.1
As Well
Contamination
As
4.13.1
Other
Composition
Than
4.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion
4.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than
Parameter: Relief
4.16.1
Other
Than
Relief
Action Party
Rec. No.
Maximum discharge
pressure of Compressor
255 barG is less than
MAWP Tube storage
design 373 barG
4.10.1
Less
concerns identified
4.11.1
Safeguards
Fouling/Plugging at E-100 or loss of Inefficiency in cooling

TIH-0503/TIH 0508/TIH
cooling water
resulting in high
0509 alarm will alert
temperature leading to less operator
CNG production
Provide portable temperature

detector to check skin
temperature of CNG
compartment
CNG-HP-15
Tube leak at E-100
Provide SOP to control PH at

cooling tower periodically
CNG-HP-16
Gas contamination to
cooling water system
leading to gas release at
cooling tower
Gas trapped at shell side
resulting in eficient heat
transfer
Gas detector at cooling

tower fan
Explosion-proof motor of
cooling tower
TIH-0503/TIH 0508/TIH
0509 alarm will alert
operator

concerns identified
See contamination
Instrument air failure
Unable to supply gas to

customer
Nitrogen back up is
provided to open KV0501 to deliver gas from
CNG compartement to
tambak lorok

concerns identified
Page 17 of 53
HAZOP Node N4
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Safety
4.17.1
Other
Than
Deviation
Occupational
Safety
Causes / Concerns

concerns identified

4.19.1
Other
Operations
Than

concerns identified
Other
Than
Parameter: Drawing
4.21.1
Other
Than
Maintenance

concerns identified
Drawing

concerns identified
Safeguards
Action Party
Rec. No.

concerns identified

4.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than
4.20.1
Consequences
Page 18 of 53
HAZOP Node N4
Node
5
Abbreviations
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Client
Project
Facility
Section

Tambak Lorok
Inlet CNG Heat Exchanger E-200 to Station Outlet Metering M200A/B (DECANTING)
Comment
Design
Intent
E-200 and M-200A/B will be operated during decanting time only. Decanting Time 4-5 hours.
To avoid condensation on the upstream of pressure reducing valve and to measure natural gas outlet from CNG Plant
Design
CNG Heat Exchanger : DP (shell) : 5.5 barG; (tube) : 34 barG
Conditions: M-200A/B : DP : 34 barG
CNG Heat Exchanger DT : 120 deg C

M-200A/B DT : 65 deg C
Duty CNG Heat Exchanger 3860 kW

Capacity M-200A/B: 113 MMSCFD
Opt.
Conditions
CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OP : 2 barG / 1.4

barG
CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet tube side : OP : 26.7 barG / 26
barG
CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OT : 90

deg C / 65 deg C
CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet tube side : OT- 38
deg C / 30 deg C
Decanting : 113 MMSCFD
Drawing
PID - Station Outlet Metering (M-200A/B)
TS78-P-PID-006
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
5.1.1
No
Deviation
No Flow
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Rev:
B
B
Action Party
Rec. No.
Any of manual valves on the

Compressor shut off
PIH 0502 set at 250psig to
decanting line to E-200 inadvertenly pressure is 255 barg vs
alert operator
close or PV0501A/B stuck close
design pressure of
equipment is 263 barg - no
adverse consequence
identified
Page 19 of 53
HAZOP Node N5
No.
Guide
Words
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Action Party
Rec. No.
PIHH 0502 set at 255 psig to

shutdown compressor
Loss of gas to customer
FT-0601A/B at M-200A/B
displayed at control room
FILL 0601 A/Bset at 5
MMSCFD for alarm to alert
operator
5.1.2
No
No Flow
5.2.1
Less
Less Flow
SDV0601 fails close or manual valve Potential

PV0501 A/B to regulate the Show setting point of PV 0501A/B
in the metering station inadvertenly overpressurization of CNG pressure
closed
HE E-200 leading to
hydrocarbon release and
potential fire
PIH 0509 set at 31 psig to
alert operator
PSHH 0509 set at 33 barG to
close KV 0501A
Refer to No Flow - valve partially closed
5.3.1
More
More Flow
PV0501A/B stuck open
5.4.2
Reverse
Reverse Flow
5.5.1
Part of
Gas from suction compressor going

to downstream of E-200 to metering
M-200
Misdirected Flow BDV-0505 fails open
5.5.2
Part of
Misdirected Flow XV-0506 fails open
Parameter: Level
5.6.1
Less
Less Level
Potential
PIH 0509 set at 31 psig to
overpressurization of CNG alert operator
HE E-200 and downstream
piping
PSHH 0509 set at 33 barG to
close KV 0501A
Double counting of sales
Install additional check valve at
gas from Gundih meter
line PG-2"-3C-027
with M-100
Loss of gas to vent
BDV position indicator and
alarm in control room
Loss of gas back to system
instead to customer
CNG-HP-17
CNG-HP-18
Valve position indicator and

alarm in control room

concerns identified
Page 20 of 53
HAZOP Node N5
No.
5.7.1
Guide
Words
More
Parameter: Pressure
5.8.1
Less
5.9.1
5.9.
More
More
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
More Level

concerns identified
Less Pressure
Loss of containment/leak on
Decanting Line
More Pressure
More Pressure
see no flow and more flow
Consequences
leading to environmental
Manual valve upstream BDV-0505

Overpresurization of
inadvertenly close in the event of
upstream equipment
ESD and BDV-0505 required to open leading to fire/fatality
Safeguards
Action Party
Rec. No.
F&G
NA
Provide Lock Open (LO) manual

valve at upstream BDV-0505
CNG-HP-19
5.10.1
Less
concerns identified
5.11.1
More

concerns identified
5.12.1
As Well
Contamination
As
Tube leak at E-200
5.13.1
Other
Composition
Than

concerns identified

5.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion

concerns identified
5.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
5.16.1
Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified
Parameter: Safety
5.17.1
Other
Than
Gas contamination to hot

Atmospheric venting at Hot
water system leading to gas Water Tank T-200
release at WHRU
Page 21 of 53
HAZOP Node N5
No.
5.18.1
Guide
Words
Other
Than
Deviation
External Factors

5.19.1
Other
Operations
Than
5.20.
Other
Than
Parameter: Drawing
5.21.1
Other
Than
Causes / Concerns
Safeguards
Action Party
Rec. No.

concerns identified
concerns identified
Maintenance

concerns identified
Drawing

concerns identified
Consequences
Page 22 of 53
HAZOP Node N5
Node
6
Abbreviations
Client
Project
Facility
Section

Tambak Lorok
Hot water circulation including Hot Water Tank T-200, Hot Water
Pump P300A/B and circulation to E-200
Comment
Circulation to E-200 will be on decanting time only
Design
Intent
To heat compressed gas from storage facility to be ready for sales gas
Design
E-500 DP : 2 barG
Conditions: T-200 DP : 0.17 barG
Source Pressure : atm; Discharge Pump : 3.35 barG
Drawing

Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
6.1.1
No
6.1.2
No
Deviation
No Flow
No Flow
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Temperature: 120 deg C
Opt.
Conditions
No.
T-200 : 290 m3
P-300 : 140 m3/hr
E-500 : 127 kW
Power : 36.8 kW
CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OT : 90 deg C / 65 deg C
TS78-P-PID-007
TS78-P-PID-005 sheet 2 of 2
Drawing No.
Causes / Concerns
Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop

due to failure OR Strainer at
Manual valve on the downstream

P300A/B inadvertently closed
Consequences
Safeguards
Loss of hot water supply

leading to inefficient heat
transfer and lower gas
sales temperature
TT-0512 as low temperature

High temperature in the

circulation water around
the waste heat recovery
unit
TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to

control exhaust gas supply
from compressor
TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C

Low discharge pressure for SOP to operate standby
hot water circulation
pump P-300B
transfer
leading to inefficient heat alarm to alert operator
sales temperature
Page 23 of 53
Iniating L
Rev:
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Provide low temperature switch at line

PG-12"-3C-021 to close KV-0503 A to
prevent low temperature in the gas
sales
CNG-HP-20
Provide low temperature alarm at line

PG-12"-3C-021 to alert operator
CNG-HP-21
S (-)
C(2)
Action Party
B
B
Rec. No.
S (-)
C(L2)
HAZOP Node N6
No.
Guide
Words
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
unit
6.2.1
Less
Less Flow
Potential
upstream piping
Three way valve TV-0502 to E-200 is Loss of hot water supply
inadvertenly close
sales temperature
unit
Safeguards
Iniating L
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Provide Temperature Control Valve at

bypass line of E-200
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Action Party
Rec. No.

from compressor
PSHH 0703A set at 4.5 barG
to close P-300A/B
CNG-HP-22

from compressor
Three way valve TV-0502 to by pass Not adverse consequence

line E-200 is inadvertenly close
6.3.1
More
More Flow
Hot Water Pump P-300A andB

running simultaneously
Excess hot water supply to TIC-0502 as high

E-200 resulting in potential temperature alarm to alert
overheating
operator
Pump running status
indication at control room
6.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow
6.5.1
Part of
Misdirected Flow 2-in manual valve at T-200 to open

drain inadvertently open
Parameter: Level
6.6.1
Less
6.6.2
Less
6.7.1
More
Less Level
Less Level
More Level

concerns identified
SOP
transfer
Overheating of water to E- LSL-0702 to shutdown P300 system
500A/B
see misdirected flow 6.5.1

More evaporation with less make up Loss of hot water supply
water
transfer
Make up water activated
Vapor Condenser E-500

provided
LSL 0701 to start P-600

pump for make up water
Overheating of water to E- LSL-0702 to shutdown P300 system
500A/B
Potential overflow to open LSH 0701 to stop make up
drain
water and provide warning
to operator
Overflow line to Open
Drain
Page 24 of 53
HAZOP Node N6
No.
Guide
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Words
Parameter: Pressure
6.8.1
Less
Less Pressure
refer to No Flow 6.1.1
6.9.1
More
More Pressure
Refer to No Flow
6.10.1
Less
Less Temperature Leak at hot water system at
discharge P-300A/B
6.10.2
Less
Less Temperature Fouling/Plugging at E-200
6.10.3
Less
Less Temperature Refer to No Flow
6.11.1
More
More
Temperature
6.12.1
As Well
Contamination
As
6.13.1
Other
Composition
Than
Consequences

sales temperature
unit
Inefficiency in heating
resulting in lower gas
temperature
Safeguards

Iniating L
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Action Party
Rec. No.

from compressor
Refer to More Flow
E-200 Tube/tube sheet leak
Gas introduce to hot water T-200 is venting to

system leading to potential atmosphere
overpressure of hot water
system

concerns identified
d
6.14.1
Other
Than
Corrosion /
Erosion

concerns identified
6.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
6.16.1
Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified
Parameter: Safety
6.17.1
Other
Than

6.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than

concerns identified
Page 25 of 53
HAZOP Node N6
No.
Guide
Deviation
Words
6.19.1
Other
Operations
Than
6.20.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Drawing
6.21.1
Other
Than
Causes / Concerns
Safeguards
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.

concerns identified
Maintenance

concerns identified
Drawing

concerns identified
Consequences
Page 26 of 53
HAZOP Node N6
Node
7
Client
Project
Facility
Section
Abbreviations

Tambak Lorok
Waste Heat Recovery Unit include Water circulation pump P500A/B and WHRU
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Comment
Design
Intent
To recover heat from exhaust gas of compressor and heating water for heating media E-100 and E-200
Design
Conditions:
Pressure: WHRU : 18 Barg
Temperature: WHRU : 545 deg C
P-500 : 48 m3/hr
Opt.
Conditions
Shell / Coil : 0.03 barG / 3 barG
Shell / Coil OT : 490 deg C / 63 to 90 deg C
Power : 1283 kW
Drawing
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
7.1.1
No
Deviation
No Flow
TS78-P-PID-007
Drawing No.
Causes / Concerns
Water Circulation Pump P-500A/B

stop due to failure OR Strainer at
Consequences
Loss of water circulation

leading to overheating of
hot water circulation to T200
Safeguards
TIC-0703 to close
dampener from
compressor flue gas
Iniating L
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.
TIC-0703 as high
temperature alarm to alert
operator
PSV-0701 as thermal relief
routed to open drain
Pump running status
Low discharge pressure for SOP to operate standby

water circulation leading to pump P-500B
inefficient heat transfer
Page 27 of 53
HAZOP Node N7
No.
7.1.2
Guide
Words
No
Deviation
No Flow
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Any manual valve at upstream E-300 Loss of water circulation

inadvertenly close or check valve
blockage
Safeguards
TIC-0703 to close
dampener from
compressor flue gas
Iniating L
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Less
Less Flow
Any manual valve on the water

circulation line at WHRU system
partially closed
7.3.1
More
More Flow
Water Circulation Pump P-500A/B

running simultaneously
7.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow

concerns identified
7.5.1
Part of
Misdirected Flow 3/4" manual valve to open drain

inadvertenly open
7.5.2
Part of
Parameter: Level
7.6.1
Less
7.7.1
More
Misdirected Flow Manual valve to venting open
Less Level

concerns identified
More Level

concerns identified

Action Party
Rec. No.
TIC-0703 as high
operator
Potential overpressure of
downstream pump
7.2.1
Vendor to provide minimum flow

recycle line at P-500A/B
TIC-0703 to close
dampener from
compressor flue gas
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
CNG-HP-23
TIC-0703 as high
operator
Excess water circulation to Pump running status

E-300/T-200 - no safety
consequence

TIC-0703 to close
dampener from
compressor flue gas

TIC-0703 to close
dampener from
compressor flue gas
TIC-0703 as high
operator
TIC-0703 as high
operator
Page 28 of 53
HAZOP Node N7
No.
Guide
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Words
Parameter: Pressure
Refer to No Flow 6.1.1
7.8.1
Less
Less Pressure
Refer to No Flow
7.9.1
More
More Pressure
7.10.1
Less
Less Temperature Refer to No Flow
One or more gas engine driver
shutdown
Start up
7.11.1
More
More
Temperature
7.12.1
As Well As Contamination
Refer to No Flow, Less Flow,

Misdirected Flow

concerns identified

7.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion
Condense water from flue gas at E300
7.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
7.16.1
Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified

7.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than

concerns identified

7.19.1
Other
Operations
Than

concerns identified
7.20.1
Other
Than
Maintenance
Safeguards
Iniating L
Less of flue gas to E-300

TIA 0704 to alert operator
resulting in lower
temperature generated for
water circulation
Low gas temperature from
exhaust gas compressor to
WHRU resulting
condensation at gas
ducting E-300
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Corrosion at E-300 leading Check with vendor the

to equipment damage
requirement of TIA-0705
as low temperature alarm
S (-)
C(2)
Action Party
Rec. No.
Review requirement set point of

TIA-0704
CNG-HP-25
Provide drain line at lowest point

gas ducting E-300
CNG-HP-26
Review requirement TIA-0705
CNG-HP-27

concerns identified
7.13.1
Other
Composition
Than
Parameter: Safety
7.17.1
Other
Than
Consequences
S (-)
C(M6)

concerns identified
Parameter: Drawing
Page 29 of 53
HAZOP Node N7
No.
7.21.1
7.21.2
7.21.3
Guide
Words
Other
Than
Other
Than
Other
Than
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.
Drawing
Drawing
Drawing
Revise drawing TS78-P-PID-007 to

show setting point of all
instrumentation alarm and trip
Page 30 of 53
CNG-HP-28
HAZOP Node N7
Node
8
Client
Project
Facility
Section
Abbreviations

Tambak Lorok
Water Treatment Plant
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Comment
Design
Intent
to treat sea water and provide potable water for cooling media
Design
Pressure : 7 barG
Conditions:
Opt.
Conditions
Pressure : 4 barG
Temperature : ambient
Drawing
PID - Water Treatment Plant
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
8.1.1
No
8.1.2
8.1.3
No
No
Deviation
No Flow
No Flow
No Flow
TS78-P-PID-012
Drawing No.
Causes / Concerns
Manual valve at inlet Feed Pump

P701 inadvertenly close
Pump P701 stop due to failure
MOV-1201 (valve on duty)

inadvertenly close
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water

for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP)
to low performance of heat
transfer
Low suction pressure of
PSL1209 to stop P702
P702 resulting in pump
damage
No make up water supply Pump maintenance
for cooler/heater leading
transfer
damage
transfer
damage
Flow : 3.2 m3/hr
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L2)
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.
Page 31 of 53
HAZOP Node N8
No.
8.1.4
Guide
Words
No
No Flow
High Pressure Pump P702 failure
No make up water supply Pump maintenance

transfer
8.1.5
No
No Flow
Manual valve downstream P702

inadvertenly close

transfer
8.1.6
8.1.7
No
No
Deviation
No Flow
No Flow
Causes / Concerns
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L1)
LS-1201 to stop Hi press

Pump PU-201
High Pressure Pump PU-201 failure No make up water supply Pump maintenance
transfer
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L2)
Manual valve downstream PU-201

inadvertenly close
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L2)
Manual valve downstream Buffer

Tank TK-02 inadvertenly close
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
Potential overpressure of PSH 1211 to stop P702 and

upstream equipment
P701
Potential overfilling TK02 LS-1201 to stop Feed Pump
P701

transfer
upstream equipment
upstream equipment
PSH 1216 to stop PU-201

PI 1201, PI 1202 and PI
1203 to monitor differential
pressure
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L2)
8.2.1
Less
Less Flow
Filter F-1A//B blockage
8.2.2
Less
Less Flow
Filter FX-01/02 blockage
upstream equipment
PDI 1201 to monitor

differential pressure
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L2)
8.2.3
Less
Less Flow
RO-A blockage
upstream equipment
PSH 1211 to stop P702 and

P701
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L2)
8.3.1
More
More Flow
Control valve upstream FM 1205

stuck open
Potential overflow to TK01 LS01 to stop FEED pump

P701
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L1)
8.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow

concerns identified
8.5.1
Part of
8.5.2
Part of
Misdirected Flow Manual valve for sample

inadvertenly open
Misdirected Flow Manual drain valve from RO-A to
open ditch inadvertenly open
Parameter: Level
8.6.1
Less
8.7.1
More
Parameter: Pressure
8.8.1
Less
Less Level

concerns identified
More Level
see more flow
Less Pressure
see no flow
Loss of make up water to

environment
Loss of make up water to
environment
Action Party
Rec. No.
SOP
SOP
Page 32 of 53
HAZOP Node N8
No.
8.9.1
Guide
Words
More
Deviation
More Pressure
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.
see no flow and less flow
8.10.1
Less
concerns identified
8.11.1
More
More
Temperature

concerns identified
8.12.1
As Well
Contamination
As

concerns identified
8.13.1
Other
Composition
Than
Manual valve from chemical source Low make up water

inadvertenly close
quality leading to scale

8.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion

concerns identified
8.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
8.16.1
Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified
Parameter: Safety
8.17.1
Other
Than

8.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than

concerns identified

8.19.1
Other
Operations
Than

concerns identified
8.20.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Drawing
8.21.1
Other
Than
Maintenance
SOP

concerns identified
Drawing
Page 33 of 53
HAZOP Node N8
Node
9
Client
Project
Facility
Section
Abbreviations

Tambak Lorok
Cooling System, including Make up Water Tank T-100, Make Up
Water Pump P-100, Cooling Tower E-400 and Cooling Tower Pump
P-200 A/B
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Comment
Design
Intent
To provide cooling media for E-100
Design
Conditions:
Pressure: Cooling Tower : 3.5 Barg
Capacity T-100 : 54 m3
Opt.
Conditions
Pressure : ATM
Temperature : 30 - 45 deg C
Power P-100 : 0.85 kW; P-200A/B :

5.88 kW
Drawing
PID - Cooling System
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
9.1.1
No
9.1.2
9.1.3
No
No
Deviation
No Flow
No Flow
No Flow
TS78-P-PID-011
Drawing No.
Causes / Concerns
Manual valve at inlet T-100 is

inadvertenly close
Manual valve at outlet T-100 is

blocked
Make up water pump P-100 broken

or stop
Consequences
Safeguards
Low level at T-100 leading LSL 1101 to shutdown

to loss of pump suction and Pump P-600
potential pump damage
Loss of make up water for Temperature alarm at

cooling media and make up WHRU, E-100 and E-200
T-200 leading to ineffective
heat transfer
Loss of pump suction and
Loss of make up water for
cooling media and make up
T-200 leading to ineffective
heat transfer
cooling media leading to
ineffective heat transfer
Iniating L
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(M4)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(M4)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Provide lock open (LO) for manual

valve upstream P-100 and P-600
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.
CNG-HP-29
Temperature alarm at
WHRU, E-100 and E-200
Pump running status

Page 34 of 53
HAZOP Node N9
No.
9.1.4
Guide
Words
No
Deviation
No Flow
Causes / Concerns
Manual valve or strainer at inlet

Basin cooling water is inadvertently
close
Consequences

Safeguards
Pump maintenance
Temperature alarm at E-100
Iniating L
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Potential overflow at T-600 Floating valve at T-600 to

start/stop pump P-100
9.1.5
No
No Flow
Cooling water pump P-200A/B

broken or not in operation
9.1.6
No
No Flow
9.1.7
No
9.2.1
Pump running status

S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Manual valve at upstream P-200A/B Loss of pump suction and

blocked
Strainer Maintenance
periodically
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(M4)
No Flow
Manual valve at downstream P200A/B inadvertently close
PSH 1108A to stop P200A/B
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Less
Less Flow
Refer to No Flow - valve partially closed
9.3.1
More
More Flow
9.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow
Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A and B More of water cooling

running simultenaously
media - no adverse
consequence
concerns identified
9.5.1
Part of
Misdirected Flow 3" manual valve at T-100/E-400 to

open drain inadvertenly open

9.5.1
Part of
Misdirected Flow 2" manual valve at E-400 to open

drain inadvertenly open
Low level at E-400 leading Floating valve will flow

to loss of pump suction and water from T-600
Less Level
see no flow 9.1.1, 9.1.2,9.1.3,9.5.1
Less Level
Make up water pump P-100 fails to

stop
Loss of water for cooling

media resulting insufficent
heat absorbed during heat
transfer leading to CN gas
offspec
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(M4)
Parameter: Level
9.6.1
Less
9.6.2
Less

Potential
piping at pump discharge
Action Party
Rec. No.
Review design of floating valve T600 to be radar type
CNG-HP-30
Provide lock open (LO) for manual

valve upstream P-200
CNG-HP-31
Pump running status

Page 35 of 53
HAZOP Node N9
No.
Guide
Words
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(M4)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Action Party
Rec. No.
High level at Cooling

Tower basin T-600
9.7.1
More
Parameter: Pressure
9.8.1
Less
More Level
Less Pressure
Float valve will stop

incoming flow to cooling
tower
Float valve at Cooling Tower basin E- Potential overflow to open SOP
400 failure
drain
Iniating L
Leak in water supply line to E-100
9.9.1
More
More Pressure
see no flow 9.1.1, 9.1.2,9.1.3
9.10.1
Less
concerns identified
9.11.1
More
More
Temperature
9.12.1
Motor at E-400 fails to run

concerns identified

9.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion

concerns identified
9.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
9.16.1
Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified

9.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than

concerns identified

9.19.1
Other
Operations
Than

concerns identified
9.20.1
Other
Than
Maintenance
high temperature of water

supply to E-100 leading to
less production
TT-0503 at E-100 as high

operator

concerns identified
9.13.1
Other
Composition
Than
Parameter: Safety
9.17.1
Other
Than
Loss of water for cooling

media resulting insufficent
heat absorbed during heat
transfer leading to CN gas
offspec

concerns identified
Page 36 of 53
HAZOP Node N9
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Drawing
9.21.1
Other
Than
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.
Drawing
Page 37 of 53
HAZOP Node N9
Node
10
Client
Project
Facility
Section
Abbreviations

Tambak Lorok
Sump Tank V-400 including Sump Tank P-400
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Comment
Design
Intent
To collect liquid drain from vessel (closed drain system)
Design
Conditions:
Pressure : 3.5 barG
P-400 Capacity : 1.2 m3/hr
Opt.
Conditions
Tank Ops Pressure : ATM; P

Pump Suc Pressure : Atm, Disch Pressure : 2 barG
Temperature : AMB
Power P-400 : 0.3 kW
Drawing
PID - Sump System
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
10.1.1
No
Deviation
TS78-P-PID-010
Drawing No.
Causes / Concerns
No Flow
4" manual valve at inlet V-400

inadvertenly closed
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
High level at source vessel Safeguards at source vessel
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L1)
10.2.1
Less
Less Flow

concerns identified
10.3.1
More
More Flow
Liquid control valve failure at

individual equipments (V-300,
Compressor K-101-109, V-100)
Build up pressure in Sump Open venting to atmosphere

Tank V-400 leading to
potential
overpressurization
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L1)
10.3.2
More
More Flow
Manual drain valves at individual

equipments inadvertently open
during online operation
Build up pressure in Sump Open venting to atmosphere

Tank V-400 leading to
potential
overpressurization
Loss of level at the source LT at individual equipment
vessel
as low level alarm to alert
operator; and as low level
trip to initiate USD
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L1)
Page 38 of 53
Review outlet line at venting V400 to be sufficient for case high

pressure gas introduced from
upstream equipment to this
vessel
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.
CNG-HP-32
HAZOP Node N10
No.
Guide
Words
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.
Double-valve provided at
drain line of the individual
equipments
10.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow
10.5.1
Part of

concerns identified
Parameter: Level
10.6.1
Less
10.7.1
More

concerns identified
Less Level
Sump Pump P-400 fails to stop due

to LT-1001 failure to function
Loss of liquid level leading Pump will be stopped

to Sump Pump P-400
during no signal (FC)
damage due to cavitation
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L1)
More Level
Pump stopped due to no power

supply or pump damage
Overfilling of Sump Tank

V-400 and liquid release
from vent to environment
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L1)
LAH 1001 as high level

SOP - draining activity is

attended by operator
Standby portable pump will
be provided and connected
to available spare nozzle
Parameter: Pressure
10.8.1
Less
10.9.1
10.9.2
More
More
Less Pressure

concerns identified
More Pressure
More Pressure
Refer to More flow

Blockage of flame arrestor at vent
line
Potential
overpressurization of V400
Bug screen provided
10.10.1
Less
concerns identified
10.11.1
More
More
Temperature
10.12.1

concerns identified
concerns identified
10.13.1
Other
Composition
Than

concerns identified

10.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion

concerns identified
10.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Page 39 of 53
HAZOP Node N10
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Relief
10.16.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Safety
10.17.1
Other
Than
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified

10.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than

concerns identified

10.19.1
Other
Operations
Than

concerns identified
10.20.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Drawing
10.21.1
Other
Than
Maintenance
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.

concerns identified
Drawing
Page 40 of 53
HAZOP Node N10
Node
11
Client
Project
Facility
Section
Abbreviations

Tambak Lorok
Fuel Gas System
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Comment
Design
Intent
To provide fuel to compressor
Design
Conditions:
Pressure : 13.5 barG
Opt.
Conditions
Drawing
Pressure : 10 barG
Temperature : 21 deg C
PID - Fuel Gas System
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
11.1.1
No
Deviation
Capacity : 1.5 m3
TS78-P-PID-009
Drawing No.
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
No Flow
3" Manual valves at

incoming/outgoing line Fuel Gas
filter is inadvertently closed
Loss of fuel gas supply

shutdown
PT-0902 as low pressure

S (-)
C(4)
S (-)
C(M4)

S (-)
C(4)
S (-)
C(M4)
Standby PCV available

PDI 0901A/B to monitor
differential pressure
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Back up fuel gas filter

available
PT-0902 as high pressure
S (-)
C(1)
S (-)
C(L1)
11.1.2
No
No Flow
PCV-0901A/B stuck closed
Loss of fuel gas supply

shutdown
11.2.1
Less
Less Flow
Pump N4 stop due to failure
Less of fuel gas supply

shutdown
11.3.1
More
More Flow
PCV-0901A/B stuck open
11.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow

concerns identified
Potential
Page 41 of 53
Provide lock open (LO) for 3"

manual valves at upstream and
downstream Fuel Gas Filter
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.
CNG-HP-33
HAZOP Node N11
No.
11.5.1
Guide
Words
Less
Parameter: Level
11.6.1
Less
11.7.1
More
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.

concerns identified
Less Level

concerns identified
More Level

concerns identified
Parameter: Pressure
Refer to No Flow and Less Flow
11.8.1
Less
Less Pressure
Refer to More Flow
11.9.1
More
More Pressure
11.10.1
Less
concerns identified
11.11.1
More
More
Temperature
11.12.1

concerns identified
concerns identified
11.13.1
Other
Composition
Than

concerns identified

11.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion

concerns identified
11.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
11.16.1
Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified
Parameter: Safety
11.17.1
Other
Than

11.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than

concerns identified

11.19.1
Other
Operations
Than

concerns identified
11.20.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Drawing
11.21.1
Other
Than
Maintenance

concerns identified
Drawing
Page 42 of 53
HAZOP Node N11
Node
12
Client
Project
Facility
Section
Abbreviations

Tambak Lorok
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Comment
Design
Intent
To provide instrument air for instrumented system
Design
Pressure : 12 barG
Conditions:
Opt.
Conditions
Pressure : 6 - 10 barG
Drawing
PID - Instrument Air System

PID - Instrument Air Network
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
12.1.1
No
Deviation
No Flow
Capacity 183.63 SCFM (each)
Temperature : AMB - 40 deg C
Power: 30 kW (each)
Causes / Concerns
Manual valve upstream of

Consequences
No
No Flow
Any manual valve upstream of Air

Dryer Prefilter F300A/B
Safeguards
Loss of instrument air

Instrument air supply from
supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver Vto PSD
300 is provided for 5
minutes in operation
Potential
upstream piping
12.1.2
Drawing No.
Iniating L
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
PT-0803 set at 7 barg as low

Operator
NA

Page 43 of 53
Confirm availability of high

pressure trip at internal of Air
Compressor C300A/B/C package to
shut down compressor in the case of
block of discharge
S (-)
C(2)
Rev:
Action Party
B
B
Rec. No.
CNG-HP-34
S (-)
C(L2)
HAZOP Node N12
No.
12.1.3
12.1.4
12.1.5
12.1.6
Guide
Words
No
No
No
No
12.1.7
12.2.1
Deviation
No Flow
No Flow
No Flow
No Flow
No Flow
Less
Less Flow
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
PSV 0801 set at 12 barG
release air to atmosphere
Any manual valve upstream of Air

Dryer D300A/B inadvertently
closed
Potential
upstream piping
supply potentially leading
to PSD
PSV 0801 set at 12 barG

release air to atmosphere
Any manual valve upstream Air

Dryer after filter F301A/B
Potential
upstream piping
to PSD

Instrument Air Receiver V300 is provided for 5
PSV 0802 release air to
atmosphere
Potential
upstream piping
to PSD
PSV 0802 release air to

atmosphere
Manual valve downstream

Air Dryer Prefilter F300A/B

blockage
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Action Party
Rec. No.

Potential
upstream piping
Any manual valve downstream Air Loss of instrument air
Dryer after filter F301A/B
to PSD
Air Compressors package

trip/broken
Iniating L

Auto start of standby

compressor by PSLL-0803
Nitrogen back up at
downstream F-310A/B

Potential
upstream piping
Less of instrument air
PDI 0801 to monitor
supply potentially leading differential pressure
to PSD
Wet instrument air quality Dew Point Meter D0801
resulting in
instrumentation damage
shutdown
Spare Air Dryer Prefilter
available
Page 44 of 53
Lock Open (LO) for manual valve

downstream Instrument Air Receiver
V-310
CNG-HP-35
HAZOP Node N12
No.
Deviation
12.2.2
Guide
Words
Less
Causes / Concerns
Less Flow
Air Dryer D-200A/B blockage
12.2.3
Less
Less Flow
Air Dryer After Filter F301A/B

blockage
12.3.1
More
More Flow
12.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow
All Air Compressor running

simultaneously - no adverse
consequence
concerns identified
12.5.1
Part of
Misdirected Flow 3/4" manual drain valve at V-300

inadvertently close
Consequences
Safeguards

PDI 0802A/B to monitor
to PSD
Wet instrument air
Dew Point Meter DE 0801
resulting in
shutdown
Spare Air Dryer available
PDI 0802 to monitor
to PSD
Wet instrument air quality Dew Point Meter D0801
resulting in
shutdown
Spare Air Dryer After filter
available
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
High pressure air blowby

to sump tank V-400
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
Sump Tank V-400 is open to

atmosphere
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.

to PSD
Parameter: Level
12.6.1
Less
12.7.1
More
Parameter: Pressure
12.8.1
Less
12.9.1
More
Less Level

concerns identified
More Level
Water condensation in V-300 and

lube oil entrainment from
compressors
Less Pressure
see no flow, less flow, misdirected flow
More Pressure
see no flow
Low quality of instrument SOP to monitor LG 0801

air leading to potential
instrument damage and
shutdown
12.10.1 Less
concerns identified
12.11.1
More
More
Temperature

concerns identified
Page 45 of 53
HAZOP Node N12
No.
12.12.1
Guide
Words
As Well
As
Deviation
Contamination
Causes / Concerns

concerns identified

12.14.1 Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion

concerns identified
12.15.1 Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
12.16.1 Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified

12.18.1 Other
External Factors
Than

concerns identified

12.19.1 Other
Operations
Than

concerns identified
12.20.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Drawing
12.21.1 Other
Than
12.21.2
Other
Than
Maintenance

concerns identified
Drawing

concerns identified
Drawing

concerns identified
Safeguards
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.

concerns identified
12.13.1 Other
Composition
Than
Parameter: Safety
12.17.1 Other
Than
Consequences
Page 46 of 53
HAZOP Node N12
Node
13
Abbreviations
Client
Project
Facility
Section

Tambak Lorok
Fire Water System
Comment
Fire water is supplied from existing facility
Design
Intent
to provide cooling system and extinguish fire from the process plant and building
Design
Conditions:
Pressure : ATM
Opt.
Conditions
Pressure : ATM
Temperature : ambient
Drawing
PID - Fire Water System
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
13.1.1
No
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Any of manual valve at fire water

ring inadvertently close/stuck close
Existing fire water pump inoperation Fail to supply fire water in

case of fire leading to fire
escalation
Any of manual valve at fire water
Lack of fire water supply
ring partially close
resulting in inadequate
water to extinguishing fire
13.1.2
No
No Flow
13.2.1
Less
Less Flow
13.3.1
More
More Flow

concerns identified
13.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow

concerns identified
13.5.1
Part of

concerns identified
Parameter: Level
13.6.1
Less
Less Level
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Drawing No.
TS78-P-PID-013
Consequences
No Flow
Lack of fire water supply

resulting in inadequate
water to extinguishing fire
Safeguards
SOP
SOP
Iniating L
S (3)
C(3)
S (M3)
C(M3)
S (3)
C(3)
S (M3)
C(M3)
S (3)
C(3)
S (M3)
C(M3)
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.

concerns identified
Page 47 of 53
HAZOP Node N13
No.
13.7.1
Guide
Words
More
Parameter: Pressure
13.8.1
Less
13.9.1
More
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
More Level

concerns identified
Less Pressure
More Pressure
see less flow

concerns identified
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.
13.10.1
Less
concerns identified
13.11.1
More
More
Temperature
13.12.1

concerns identified
concerns identified
13.13.1
Other
Composition
Than

concerns identified

13.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion

concerns identified
13.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
13.16.1
Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified
Parameter: Safety
13.17.1
Other
Than

13.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than

concerns identified

13.19.1
Other
Operations
Than
13.19.2
Other
Than
Operations
13.20.1
Other
Than
Maintenance
Parameter: Drawing
13.21.1
Other
Than
Review existing Tambak Loroks fire

water capacity to be adequate for fire
water handling in CNG Plant
CNG-HP-36
Consider to provide additional flowmeter

to measure fire water consumption for
Tambak Lorok
CNG-HP-37

concerns identified
Drawing
Page 48 of 53
HAZOP Node N13
Node
14
Abbreviations
Client
Project
Facility
Section

Tambak Lorok
Power Generation system
Comment
GE-100 A is main generator and GE-100B is back up generator (emergency???)
Design
Intent
to provide power for CNG plant
Design
Conditions:
Opt.
Pressure :
Temperature:
Pressure :
Temperature :
Conditions
Drawing
PID - Power Generator System
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
14.1.1
No
Deviation
No Flow
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Capacity : 600 kW
TS78-P-PID-014
Drawing No.
Causes / Concerns
Power Generator unable to operate

due to damage
Consequences
Safeguards
No power generated
Standby Generator
leading to plant shutdown provided
Iniating L
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.
Back up power supply from

PLN available
XV 1401 or XV 1402 or XV - 1403
inadvertenly close
PV 1401 or PV-1402 stuck close
Manual valve up stream GE-100A
inadvertenly close
concerns identified
14.2.1
Less
Less Flow
14.3.1
More
More Flow

concerns identified
14.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow

concerns identified
14.5.1
Part of
Misdirected Flow 2-in manual valve to drain system

open
14.6.1
Less
Less Level
Hydrocarbon gas release to

environment

concerns identified
Page 49 of 53
HAZOP Node N14
No.
14.7.1
Guide
Words
More
Deviation
More Level
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(M3)
Confirm availability of TSHH to

trip Gas Generator GE-100A in
case of high temperature has been
included
in (LO)
the generator
package.
Lock Open
for manual
valve
Action Party
Rec. No.

concerns identified
Parameter: Pressure
see less flow
14.8.1
Less
Less Pressure
see more flow
14.9.1
More
More Pressure
14.10.1
Less
concerns identified
14.11.1
More
More
Temperature
Any manual valve down stream GE- Overheating at GE-100A

100A to cooling system inadvertenly leading to equipment
close
damage, plant shutdown
CNG-HP-38
CNG-HP-39
downstream GE-100A
14.12.1

concerns identified
14.13.1
Other
Composition
Than

concerns identified

14.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion

concerns identified
14.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
14.16.1
Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified
Parameter: Safety
14.17.1
Other
Than

14.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than

concerns identified

14.19.1
Other
Operations
Than

concerns identified
14.20.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Drawing
14.21.1
Other
Than
Maintenance

concerns identified
Drawing

concerns identified
Page 50 of 53
HAZOP Node N14
Node
15
Abbreviations
Client
Project
Facility
Section

Tambak Lorok
Vent Gas System, including discharge of pressure relieving device
and BDVs vent header, KO Drum V-600, up to Vent Stack VS-100
Comment
Normally Flare system has no hydrocarbon gas flowing

Drain and liquid outlet of Vent Stack is normally close
Design
Intent
To gather release gas from process relief valves and BDV and routing gas to safe area
Design
Conditions:
Pressure : 5.5 barG
Opt.
Conditions
Pressure : ATM - 2 barG
Temperature : 10-60 deg C
Drawing
PID - Vent Gas System
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Flow
15.1.1
No
Deviation
SOP
IM

PM
USD
PSD
ESD
H,M,L
Co
Pr
Ri
S
C
Unit Shutdown
Process Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
High, Medium, Risk
Consequence
Probability
Risk
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
Capacity Vent Stack : 12.5

MMSCFD
TS78-P-PID-015
Drawing No.
Causes / Concerns
No Flow

concerns identified
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
15.2.1
Less
Less Flow

concerns identified
15.3.1
More
More Flow
PSV or BDV passing
Loss of gas to atmosphere Flame arrestor installed

resulting gas cloud around
process area and potential
fire if ignited
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
15.4.1
Reverse
Reverse Flow
Air ingress to venting system
Potential fire/explosion
inside piping
S (4)
C(4)
S (M4)
C(M4)
15.5.1
Part of

concerns identified
Water seal at bottom of vent

stack to prevent air ingress
to venting system
Page 51 of 53
Rev:
Action Party
Rec. No.
HAZOP Node N15
No.
Guide
Words
Parameter: Level
15.6.1
Less
15.7.1
More
Parameter: Pressure
15.8.1
Less
15.9.1
More
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Less Level

concerns identified
More Level
Liquid carry over from PSV/BDV
Less Pressure

concerns identified
More Pressure

concerns identified
Consequences
release of hydrocarbon
liquid to environment
Safeguards
Vent stack is equipped by

dead leg to collect liquid
and drain to Sump Tank V400
Iniating L
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(L2)
S (4)
C(3)
S (M4)
C(M3)
Action Party
Rec. No.
15.10.1
Less
concerns identified
15.11.1
More
More
Temperature
15.12.1

concerns identified
concerns identified
15.13.1
Other
Composition
Than

concerns identified

15.14.1
Other
Corrosion /
Than
Erosion

concerns identified
15.15.1
Other
Instrumentation
Than

concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
15.16.1
Other
Than
Parameter: Safety
15.17.1
Other
Than
Relief

concerns identified
Occupational
Safety

concerns identified

15.18.1
Other
External Factors
Than
Lighting struck during PSV/BDV

release

15.19.1
Other
Operations
Than

concerns identified
15.20.1
Other
Than
Maintenance
Fire at vent stack
Consider to install CO2 snuffing

system at VS-100 to extinguish
fire at vent stack completed with
fusible plug
CNG-HP-40

concerns identified
Parameter: Drawing
Page 52 of 53
HAZOP Node N15
No.
15.21.1
15.21.2
Guide
Words
Other
Than
Other
Than
Deviation
Causes / Concerns
Consequences
Safeguards
Iniating L
Action Party
Rec. No.
Drawing
Drawing
Page 53 of 53
HAZOP Node N15
Appendix C
HAZID Review Worksheets
PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA
Node
Review
date
Client
Project
Area
Comment
Drawing
No.
Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet

SAA
Co Consequency
Abbreviations
1
17-Jun-13
PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL
COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS PLANT
TAMBAK LOROK
The plan is located beside Indonesia Power Company. The
North side is sea side. The South side is Turbine Generator
belong by IP.
General Lay Out CNG Plant
P
Ri
Rec
S
C
H,M,L
Drawing No.
Hazard Description
Consequences
Prevention
4.1.1
Category/
Guideword
Natural Events
Earthquake
Potential of loss of
plant integrity
leading to damage
and hydrocarbon
release
4.1.2
Natural Events
Rob in process area
Potential damage to
process equipment
4.1.3
Natural Events
Lightning
Possible damage to
the equipment and
potential fire
Control
Probabitliy
Risk
Recommendation
Safety Risk
Commercial Risk
High, Medium, Low
TS78-L-LY-001
Recommendation/
Comment
Plant, equipment,
building and
foundation design
anticipated to
accommodate
earthquake factor
(0.15G), referring to
UBC-1997 and soil
investigation result
Plant is designed NA
above Rob
posistion (80 cm
above average
ground level vs
70 cm average
rob) and in high
position
Grounding provided
for each equipment
Update EQL drawing to

show Lightning
protection at CNG
compartment area
(lightning stack) in
process/utility area
Rec Number
CNG-HD- 1
Rev.
B1
Action Party
Co.
S (4)
C(3)
Pr
Ri
S (H16)
C(H12)
Lightning protection at
CNG compartment
area (lightning stack)
in process/utility area
Page 1 of 7
HAZID Worksheet Node 1
No.
4.1.4
Category/
Guideword
Natural Events
Hazard Description
Consequences
Prevention
Settlement
Possible damage to
the equipment and
potential fire
No major concern
Damage to the
equipment, loss of
production
Control
Recommendation/
Comment
4.1.5
4.2.1
Natural Events
External Events
4.3.1
Transportation
4.3.2
Transportation
4.4.1
Lifting
4.5.1
Non Process Fires Bush fire
No additional
significant issues of
concerns identified
4.6.1
Security
Loss of production. Fence line around Security's Officer stand

Potential major
the plant area
by 24 hrs at plant area
accident leading to
personnel
injury/fatality
Pile foundation (block

design) provided to
withstand settlement
Land slide
External corrosion
Painting &
Periodic maintenance
coating for piping and inspection for all
and equipment
surface vessels and
pipings
Light vehicles impact Potential impact to vehicle park area away Operation cars shall be
equipped with flame
e.g. Car
piping/equipment
from process area
arrestor and diesel engine
leading to
hydrocarbon
release, fire,
personnel
injury/fatality and
asset damage
Heavy equipment to
Potential impact to Concrete road
Pipe bridge provided
gas plant e.g. mobile
piping/equipment
to connect each
crane
leading to
equipment across road
hydrocarbon
release, fire,
personnel
injury/fatality and
asset damage
Lifting equipment
Potential damage to SOP for lifting
(mobile crane, forklift) pipeline and
activity including
failure
equipment
certified
personnel to
conduct the
lifting
Theft/sabotage
Page 2 of 7
Rec Number
CNG-HD- 2
Action Party
Co.
Pr
Ri
S (-)
C(3)
S (-)
C(H9)
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
S (-)
C(2)
S (-)
C(M4)
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
No.
Category/
Guideword
Hazard Description
Consequences
4.6.2
Security
Vandalism
No additional
concerns identified
4.6.3
Security
Wild animals (tiger,

crocodile and snake)
No additional
concerns identified
4.7.1
Noise
4.8.1
Health Hazards
High noise level from Potential personnel

compressor and gas
ear injury
engine area
Toxic Material during Personnel injury
handling chemical: for
cooling water,
corrosion inhibitor e.g.
oxygen scavanger
Prevention
Control
SOP for control

personnel
incoming to the
plant
-
Recommendation/
Comment
Health Hazards
Handling molecular
sieve at dryer system
Rec Number
Action Party
Co.
Pr
Ri
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Provide SOP to wear ear

plug around noise area
CNG-HD- 3
S (1)
C(-)
S (H3)
C(-)
MSDS provided
in the storage
facility
Ensure portable eye wash

station provided during
chemical handling (e.g : at
control room, loading area
and water treatment area)
CNG-HD- 4
S (1)
C(-)
S (H3)
C(-)
S (1)
C(-)
S (H3)
C(-)
S (1)
C(-)
S (H3)
C(-)
S (1)
C(-)
S (M4)
C(-)
PPE - hand
gloves, face
shield
SOP for chemical
handling
4.8.2
Personnel exposure PPE - hand

to H2S resulting in gloves, face
personnel injury
shield
JSA
SOP for handling

molecular sieve at
dryer system
4.8.3
Health Hazards
Personnel hygiene and Health impact to

living activity
operator
Toilet and pantry Medical emergency

are provided in
provided (clinic) for
control room
operation personnel
building
Page 3 of 7
No.
4.8.3
4.9.1
Category/
Guideword
Health Hazards
Hazard Description
Consequences
Prevention
Control
Hazardous waste
disposal
Personnel injury
during handling
waste disposal
PPE - hand
gloves, face
shield
Maintenance/
construction
Working at high
Fall and slip
location such as
resulting in
lightning pole, WHRU injury/fatality
Maintenance
access provided
at WHRU
Recommendation/
Comment
Alocate waste disposal
resulting from
operation/construction
activity in safe area (third
party)
Rec Number
Action Party
Co.
Pr
Ri
S (1)
C(-)
S (H3)
C(-)
Permit to works system
S (4)
C(-)
S (H8)
C(-)
permit to works system
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
permit to works system
S (4)
C(-)
S (H8)
C(-)
ELCB (Earth Leakage

Circuit Breaker)
provided for electrical
equipment/devices e.g.
welding machine
PPE
Provide warning sign
around hot surface
equipment and pipings
S (4)
C(-)
S (H8)
C(-)
S (2)
C(-)
S (M4)
C(-)
CNG-HD- 5
SOP for working

at height during
maintenance and
construction,
including
competent
personnel
4.9.2
Maintenance/
construction
Hot/cold Work
4.9.3
Maintenance/
construction
Confined Space Entry
4.9.5
Maintenance/
construction
Electrical Hazards
4.9.6
Maintenance/
construction
Hot Surfaces at
Potential injury due
exhaust gas, WHRU
to exposure to heat
and heat exchanger (E200)
Fire and potential

fatality
SOP for hot/cold

work activity
during
construction,
including
competent
personnel
Potential fatality
SOP for confined
due to asphyxiation space entry
during
maintenance and
construction,
including
Potential
Proper insulation
electrocution
for
resulting in
cabling/wiring
injury/fatality
personal
protection
insulation
provided
Page 4 of 7
CNG-HD- 6
No.
4.10.1
Category/
Guideword
Loss of
Containment
Hazard Description
Consequences
Prevention
Control
Recommendation/
Comment
Define philosophy of fire
and gas detection system
and develop fire and gas
detection area at process
plant
Rec Number
Leak from Process

Equipment
Release of
hydrocarbon
resulting in
potential
fire/explosion
leading to
injury/fatality
Unit SD by low
pressure trip
Gas detection system

at process area
Fire hydrant provided Regularly to check

temperature in the MCC
with source from
cabinet and DCS panel to
existing IP
monitor short circuit and
provide portable fire
extinguisher
CNG-HD- 8
CNG-HD- 7
Action Party
Co.
Pr
Ri
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
4.10.2
Loss of
Containment
Diesel Leak
No additional
concerns identified
4.11.1
Ignition Sources
Battery
Fire/explosion in
the event of
hydrocarbon
release.
Battery room is
located in non
hazardous area
Heat & Smoke detector,

Portable Fire
Extinguisher provided
at control room & MCC
room
Regularly to check
temperature in the MCC
cabinet and DCS panel to
monitor short circuit and
provide portable fire
extinguisher
CNG-HD- 9
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
4.11.2
Ignition Sources
Vent
Fire/explosion in
the event of
hydrocarbon
release in process
area if stroke by
lightning
Lightning protection
provided at CNG
compartment area
Define safe location and

minimum height required
for vent stack and vent
location to be suitable
with wind directions so
that dispersed gas will not
be exposed to process
plan
CNG-HD- 10
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
S (4)
C(4)
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
S (H8)
C(H8)
4.11.3
Ignition Sources
Static electricity from

external vehicle
Fire/explosion in
the event of
hydrocarbon
release.
vehicle park area away

from process area
Page 5 of 7
No.
4.12.1
Category/
Guideword
Escape/ Refuge
Hazard Description
Consequences
Fire on Plant area
Personnel trap/
ERP
unable to evacuate
leading to
injury/fatality
4.13.1
Emergency
Lighting
Personnel trap in
wrong way
4.14.1
Manned Building Control room
Personnel
injury/fatality
Prevention
Control
Recommendation/
Comment
Provide emergency
evacuation risk analysis to
determine safe evacuation
route and location of
muster area
Form emergency response

team (ERT) and conduct
emergency drill
Rec Number
Co.
Pr
Ri
CNG-HD- 11
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
CNG-HD- 12
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
S (4)
C(4)
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Emergency
lighting for
evacuation is
provided in
control room and
evacuation route
Fire or explosion
from process area
impact to control
room leading to
potential personnel
injury/fatality
Action Party
Heat and Smoke

detector
Review scenario of fire

and explosion from gas
plant to the area of
standby personnel such as
control room and provide
mitigation plan (design
and location of the
building) to anticipate
fire/explosion
CNG-HD- 13
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Define safety requirement

on control room
specification to
accommodate
fire/explosion scenario
e.g. door, wall and
window specifications
CNG-HD- 14
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Inability to monitor process area
S (4)
C(4)
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
S (H8)
C(H8)
Consider to provide
CCTV in the control room
for monitoring purpose
Page 6 of 7
CNG-HD- 15
No.
Hazard Description
Consequences
Prevention
Control
4.15.1
Category/
Guideword
Communication
Inability to contact
control room within
emergency
Each operator
provided with
hand held radio
F&G alarm system
4.16.1
Shutdown
Inability to initiate
ESD
Local ESD push

button at control
room
4.16.2
Shutdown
Loss of power
Inability to
coordinate response
major accident
leading to
personnel
injury/fatality and
asset loss
Inability to control
fire leading to
potential major
accident leading to
personnel
injury/fatality and
asset loss
Plant shutdown
resulting loss of
production
Uncontrolled
process upset
ESD is fail safe

action
-
Rec Number
Action Party
Co.
Pr
Ri
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
CNG-HD- 17
S (4)
C(4)
S (H8)
C(H8)
UPS is provided
S (-)
C(4)
S (-)
C(H8)
S (-)
C(4)
S (-)
C(H8)
S (-)
C(-)
S (-)
C(-)
S (-)
C(-)
S (-)
C(-)
Define safety layout at

CNG plant to show ESD
push button, fire hydrant,
etc
4.17.1
Other
Plant layout
4.18.1
Discharge to air
Note: venting only for

emergency situation
4.18.3
Discharge to
water
Blowdown of water
from cooling tower,
discharge RO
Potential
contamination from
process fluid
4.18.4
Discharge to soil
No additional significant
issue of concern
identified
4.18.5
Waste disposal
Disposal of operation/ Potential

construction waste e.g. environmental
plant, log
disturbance
Recommendation/
Comment
Define internal and
external communication
system (PABX) for
connecting operator in the
control room to outside
parties
CNG-HD- 16
Alternative power
source from PLN for
emergency equipment
-
Discharge water is
connected to existing
canal (IP)
Define Sampling point to

monitor discharge water
CNG-HD- 18
Alocate waste disposal

resulting from
operation/construction
activity in safe area (third
party)
CNG-HD- 5
Page 7 of 7
Appendix D
Drawings Reviewed
NODE 1
NODE 2
2
NODE
NODE 2R
NODE 3
NODE 4
NODE 6
NODE 5
NODE 5
NODE 7
NODE 6
NODE 12
NODE 12
NODE 11
NODE 10
NODE 9
NODE 8
NODE 13
NODE 14
NODE 15

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Project Title :

ENGINEERING PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION

HAZOP AND HAZID STUDIES REPORT

REISSUED FOR REVIEW

ISSUED FOR REVIEW

PT. Enviromate Technology International

HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK

HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS

PT. Enviromate Technology International

HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK

HAZOP/HAZID SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

PT. Enviromate Technology International

PT. Enviromate Technology International

PT. Enviromate Technology International

Non Process Hazard :

PT. Enviromate Technology International

Determine the seriousness of the consequences for the identified problems;

Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering and procedural safeguards; and

Recommend additional safeguards or operational procedures where necessary.

The objectives of the HAZID study include:

Assessment of the consequences of these new MAEs;

Recommendation of additional safeguards or procedures, where necessary to demonstrate as

PT. Enviromate Technology International

1.3 SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY

V-100 : Gas Scrubber

M -100A/B & M -200A/B : Station Inlet & Outlet Metering

D-100A/B : Gas Dryer

K-101 to K109 : CNG Compressors

E-100 : CNG Cooler & E-200 : CNG Heat Exchager

V-200-1 to V-200-80 : CNG Compartement

V-400 : Sump Tank

WHRU and Hot Water circulation

Water Treatment Facilities and Cold water circulation

Open & Close Drains

Instrument Air System

Fuel Gas System

Fire Water Ring

1.4 REPORT LAYOUT

Section 2 describes the process;

Section 3 describes the HAZOP/HAZID methodology;

Section 4 describes the HAZOP/HAZID workshops;

Section 5 lists the references given in the report;

Appendix A presents the summary HAZOP & HAZID recommendations;

Appendix B presents the HAZOP review worksheets;

Appendix C presents the HAZID review worksheets; and

Appendix D presents the Drawings used, outlining the nodes.

PT. Enviromate Technology International

PT. Enviromate Technology International

2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B)

PT. Enviromate Technology International

PT. Enviromate Technology International

2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger

PT. Enviromate Technology International

PT. Enviromate Technology International

PT. Enviromate Technology International

PT. Enviromate Technology International

HAZOP Review Worksheet

A set of standard guide words used to analyse and determine

Causes or problems identified

Description of the consequences of the possible impact of the cause

Types of issues that are involved, either Drawing Error/Comment,

Description of the safeguards in place

Description of the recommendation(s) that could be in place