Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Custodial Investigation
Art. III, Sec. 12
Miranda vs. Arizona , 384 US , 436 (1966)
FACTS:
On March 2, 1963, Patricia McGee (not her real name) was kidnapped and raped while walking home after work in
Phoenix, Arizona. She accused Ernesto Miranda of the crime after picking him out of a lineup. He was arrested and taken
to an interrogation room where after three hours he signed a written confession to the crimes. The paper on which he
wrote his confession stated that the information was given voluntarily and that he understood his rights. However, no
specific rights were listed on the paper.
Miranda was found guilty in an Arizona court based largely on the written confession. He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years
for both crimes to be served concurrently. However, his attorney felt that his confession should not be admissible due to
the fact that he was not warned of his right to have an attorney represent him or that his statement could be used against
him. Therefore, he appealed the case for Miranda. The Arizona State Supreme Court did not agree that the confession had
been coerced, and therefore upheld the conviction. From there, his attorneys, with the assistance of the American Civil
Liberties Union, appealed to the US Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifying them of their right to counsel and their
protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment.
RULING:
The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless they
demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination." The Court
noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that
"the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." The Court specifically outlined the
necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects, including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have
counsel present during interrogations.
At first, the attorneys for Miranda attempted to argue that his rights had been violated as he had not been given an attorney
during the confession, citing the Sixth Amendment. However, the Court focused on the rights guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment including that of protection against self-incrimination. The Majority Opinion written by Warren stated that
"without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak where
he would otherwise do so freely." Miranda was not released from prison, however, because he had also been convicted of
robbery which was not affected by the decision. He was retried for the crimes of rape and kidnapping without the written
evidence and found guilty a second time.
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bruises on his face, corroborated Lugod's assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the confession of Lugod
cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution is the fact that several
persons testified having seen Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube and on several other occasions wearing the
rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively as well as the testimony
of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16 September 1997 leaving
Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence are circumstantial in nature. The
combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical conclusion that Lugod raped
and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses,
merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of the crime and nothing
more. Lugod was acquitted.
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Issue:
Whether or not del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation at the time he was invited for questioning
at the house of the barangay captain.
Held:
Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was invited" for questioning at the
house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware
thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect
in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his
right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible
against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Herein, like victim Virginia
Bernas, del Rosario too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a
dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Del Rosario
was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the
same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he
only saw for the first time that day. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a
whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.
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Administrative Investigations
People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales
of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by
it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos
stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted
that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a
compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded
not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued
that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those
stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of
accused.
Held:
No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial investigation when his
statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self
incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which
involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any
way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted
in court.
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Police Lineup
Gamboa vs.Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988)
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was
identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit
on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional
rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated.
Held:
No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to
counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the
time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was
duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate
his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.
What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
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money taken by the accused; P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs. Escordial
appealed.
Issue:
Whether the out-of-court identification in the show up at the police station made after the start of the custodial
investigation, may be used in court.
Held:
While it cannot be denied that Escordial was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained
any statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory which was used in evidence against him. No uncounseled
statement was obtained from Escordial which should have been excluded as evidence against him. However, Escordial
was never assisted by counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his arrest in
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the Bacolod police station. Although Escordial
made no statement during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court
identification of Escordial by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver,
Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega. As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the previous cases are different inasmuch as
Escordial, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible
perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted
by the police. An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone
is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness
from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been
recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the
accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality." The Court thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police lineup, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him.
Herein, Escordial was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on 3 January 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa
Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when
Escordial did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against
him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held inadmissible
for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of the primary illegality.'"
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confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a few months after. Further, although Saunar might have really
been around to properly apprise Januario of his constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn statement itself, the
same cannot be said about Canape. Canape was not properly informed of his constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing
a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he
could ask for counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are simply not in compliance with
the constitutional mandate. In this case, appellant Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked
whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right
to counsel of his own choice. Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights
to remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and to
contemplate an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Canape's sworn statement,
which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails to reflect compliance with this requirement. Neither does the testimony
of NBI Agent Toribio. Bearing in mind that Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents should have exerted
more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights. The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of Januario's and
Canape's constitutional rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article III of the Constitution.
They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph of Section 12 of the same article which mandates that an admission of
facts related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel; otherwise it would be inadmissible in evidence
against the person so admitting.
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Affidavits they executed on 11 September 1997, as well as by their testimonies on cross-examination. Nonetheless, even
if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances the Court cannot rule it out
because of Samus' failure to make timely objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the
assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the
defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. If only Samus had made a timely objection to the
admissibility of Pontaos testimony and the picture of a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt, which Samus
identified during his testimony, the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to
support its case. To disregard unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can no longer present
additional evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.
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Counsel of Choice
People vs. Gallardo [GR 113684, 25 January 2000]
First Division, Pardo (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 28 July 1991, the lifeless body of Edmundo Orizal was found in the rest house of Ronnie Balao in Balzain,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In an autopsy performed by Dr. Edmundo Borja, Tuguegarao Municipal Health Officer, the victim
was found to have sustained 7 gunshot wounds in the chest, abdomen, back, left and right thighs, and two (2) grazing
wounds on the left arm and back. Investigation by the Tuguegarao police station identified the suspects in the murder of
Edmundo Orizal as Armando Gallardo y Gander, Alfredo Columna y Correa (alias Fermin), and Jessie Micate y Orteza.
The police received information that the suspects were detained at the Camalaniugan Police Station because of other
criminal charges. So elements of the Tuguegarao police went to the Camalaniugan Police Station in August 1991 to fetch
the suspects. Only Gallardo and Columna were in the custody of the Camalaniugan Police Station. Gallardo and Columna
were brought to the Tuguegarao Police Department. On August 18, 1991, they were investigated by Police Investigator
SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that they, together with Jessie Micate, killed Edmundo Orizal.
During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of the accused, and during the taking of the
statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was present. She administered the oath on the jurat
of the statements. Galardo and Columna signed their statements admitting the killing of Edmundo Orizal. On 7 November
1991, on the basis of the sworn confessions of the accused, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan an information charging the accused with murder. On 2 December 1991, all three
accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. In due course, the trial court found them guilty of murder for the
treacherous killing of Edmundo Orizal and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay in solidum the heirs
of Edmundo Orizal in the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and P150,000.00 as moral damages. Gallardo,
Columna and Micate appealed.
Issue: Whether the counsel provided by the State to the accused satisfies the Constitutionlal requirement that a competent
and independent counsel be present in a custodial investigation.
Held: The extrajudicial confessions of the accused were given after they were completely and clearly apprised of their
Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a judge administered their oath. while the initial choice of the lawyer in
cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one.
A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the
former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer. Herein, although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by the accused
themselves, the accused were given an opportunity whether to accept or not to accept him as their lawyer. They were
asked and they immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel during the investigation. There is no
requirement in the Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be previously known to them.
The Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and independent counsel, who will represent the accused and
protect their Constitutionally guaranteed rights. Further, to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Herein, Atty. Velasco acted properly in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution and
informed the accused of their Constitutional rights. Atty. Velasco assisted the accused and made sure that the statements
given by the accused were voluntary on their part, and that no force or intimidation was used by the investigating officers
to extract a confession from them. Under rules laid by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to
be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing. All these requirements were complied with.
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a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys
from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for
one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by
the framers of the charter.
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(1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced (1) Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abion to suffer the supreme penalty of
death by lethal injection; and (2) Edwin Morial, due to his minority, to suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. On
the civil aspect of the case, the court held the three accused libale jointly and severally (1) to indemnify the heirs of Paula
Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (2) to indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas the amount of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (3) to indemnify complainant Benjamin Morial the amount of P20,546.00 as actual
damages for the funeral, burial and wake expenses; (4) to pay to the heirs [the] aforementioned moral damages of
P60,000.00 for each death; and (5) to restitute or restore to Benjamin Morial the P11,000.00 amount robbed. The court
also ordered them to pay the costs. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Leonardo Morilas extra-judicial confession was valid, inasmuch as the material points were tackled
when the counsel, Atty. Aguilar Tobias, was present.
Held: Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during
the custodial investigation. An accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from
the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when the lawyer left, he
knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that Leonardo and his companions committed the crime. Neither can
Atty. Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had admitted the "material
points," referring to the three accused's respective participation in the crime. For even as the person under custodial
investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its termination indeed, "in
every phase of the investigation." An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be
present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." Furthermore, Section 2(a) of RA 7438 requires that
"[a]ny person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel." The last
paragraph of Section 3 of the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be
conducted." The right of Leonardo Morial to counsel was therefore completely negated by the precipitate departure of
Atty. Tobias before the termination of the custodial investigation. If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters
so pressing that he had to abandon a client undergoing custodial investigation, he could have terminated the same to be
continued only until as soon as his schedule permitted, advising the suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he
failed to do. Appallingly, he even asked his client whether he was willing to answer questions during the lawyer's absence.
The records also disclose that Atty. Tobias never informed appellant of his right to remain silent, not even before the
custodial investigation started. Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, by his
"coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt departure before the termination of the
proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier
"competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and effective" counsel that jurisprudence
requires. Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors
and which this Court condemns. His casual attitude subverted the very purpose for this vital right.That the extra -judicial
confession was subsequently signed in the presence of counsel did not cure its constitutional defects. As Leonardo Morial
was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible
in evidence against him.
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Confession to Newsmen
People vs. Andan [GR 116437, 3 March 1997]
Facts: On 19 February 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, 20
years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on 21 February 1994. Marianne wore a striped
blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and
more than P2,000.00 in cash. Marianne was walking along the subdivision when Pablito Andan y Hernandez invited her
inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed
to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house.
Andan then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, Andan dragged the
unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night came and Andan pulled
Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a 6-foot high
concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Andan stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped
the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete
block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the
fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. At 11:00 a.m. of the following day, the body of
Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck.
Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where
Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be
blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. Andan's nearby
house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed
the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of Andan's wife, that Andan also lived there
but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of
pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet Tshirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to Andan. The police tried to
locate Andan and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a
police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced Andan in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought
him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, Andan denied any knowledge of Marianne's death.
However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the
pigpen, Andan relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was
merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. Immediately, the police
took Andan to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the police. Andan
went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags
which were later identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of Andan and the two other
suspects holding the bags. By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters
awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the
mayor, Andan approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led Andan to the office of the
Chief of Police and there, Andan broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one
who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the
confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist Andan but since no lawyer was available he ordered the
proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and
Andan's own wife and son, Andan confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show
them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying
he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic
magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his confession, Andan hugged his wife and son and asked the
mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. Andan was detained
at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came.
Andan was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime. Pablito Andan y
Hernandez alias "Bobby" was charged with rape with homicide. On arraignment, however, Andan entered a plea of "not
guilty." In a decision dated 4 August 1994, the trial court convicted Andan and sentenced him to death pursuant to
Republic Act 7659. The trial court also ordered Andan to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. Hence, the automatic review.
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Issue: Whether Andans confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen may be admitted as evidence against
Andan.
Held: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado character of custodial
interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. When the police
arrested Andan, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, Andan was
already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. Andan was already under custodial
investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional
rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the
two bags recovered from Andan's house. The victim's bags were the fruits of Andan's uncounselled confession to the
police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible.
On the other hand, however, Andan's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter.
In fact, the mayor did not question Andan at all. No police authority ordered Andan to talk to the mayor. It was Andan
himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
Andan was going to confess his guilt to him. When Andan talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.
Andan's confessions to the media were properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The records show that Alex
Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed Andan on 27 February 1994. The interview
was recorded on video and showed that Andan made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his
wife, child and other relatives. Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on
25 February 1994. Andan's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police
authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed Andan. They were not acting under the
direction and control of the police. They were there to check Andan's confession to the mayor. They did not force Andan
to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing
him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did Andan protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed
his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his
confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in
the interview of Andan by the news reporters. Thus, Andan's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual
exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government
has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect
the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
Page 32 of 155
Page 33 of 155
of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of Balaoan, La
Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the police should have already desisted from continuing
with the interrogation but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the investigation. To the
credit of the police, they requested the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the
relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the accused of
their statements before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence of a lawyer during the
investigation. In the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the
accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The
apparent consent of the 2 accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must
be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, any admission obtained from the 2 accused
emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. Securing the
assistance of the PAO lawyer 5 to 8 days later does not remedy this omission either. Although there was a showing that
the PAO lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the accused, enlightened them on the possible repercussions
of their admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable advice given by counsel still
came several days too late. It could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken. The second affixation of the signatures/thumbmarks of
the accused on their confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with
the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an informed
one. Admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing and
later signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. If the lawyer's role is diminished to being
that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit an indication therein that there was compliance with
the constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met. The
standards utilized by police authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the accused therefore fell short of the
standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.
As with the interview taken by DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite, the taped interview was offered to form part of
the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to whom the admissions were made and to prove through electronic device the
voluntary admissions by the 2 accused that they raped and killed Shirley Victore. The defense objected to its acceptance
on the ground that its integrity had not been preserved as the tape could easily have been spliced and tampered with.
However, as Roland Almoite testified, it was the original copy of the taped interview; it was not altered; the voices therein
were the voices of the 2 accused; and, the defense never submitted evidence to prove otherwise. Under the circumstances,
the Court is inclined to admit the authenticity of the taped interview. A review of the contents of the tape as included in
Roland Almoite's testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free from any influence or intimidation from police
officers and was done willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority ordered or forced
the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected that police officers were around since the interview
was held in the police station, there was no showing that they were within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where
the interview was being conducted. At most, the participation of the police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite
to conduct an interview. The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and
even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect
to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements
made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of
an investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer, they did not talk to him as a law
enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional
rights. Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of the 2 accused to
the radio announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In relation to
this, the admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are bolstered and substantiated by
the findings of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post Mortem Findings.
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P500,000.00 as moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000 plus P3,000 per court appearance as
attorney's fees. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Guillermos confession to the police officers, to the security guard of Greatmore Corp., and to the
newsmen are admissible as evidence.
Held: The confession Guillermo made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser
at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the Constitution. The investigating officer
made no serious effort to make Guillermo aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation. While the investigating
officer was aware of Guillermos right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one
on the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation.
Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that Guillermo had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of Guillermos confession to SPO1 Reyes at the
Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial
investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through
questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to
having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the
slightest use of the States coercive power as would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power. Herein, Guillermo admitted
the commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private individuals. According to the testimony of the
security guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing Guillermo called him to say that he had killed his
employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos testimony was not rebutted by the defense, and thus
Guillermo's statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Further, when interviewed on separate
occasions by the media, Guillermo not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously
admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of
GMA Channel 7. The TV news reporters were acting as media professionals when they interviewed Guillermo. They were
not under the direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for Guillermo to face the TV cameras. The
interviews also took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, Guillermo did not protest or insist on his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keysers killing. As held in
Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and
admissible in evidence.
Page 37 of 155
Other Confessions
People vs. Gomez [GR 101817, 26 March 1997]
First Division, Vitug (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 27 February 1990, Art David, an employer of Felipe Immaculata sent the latter to Bangkok, Thailand, to
canvass ready-to-wear clothes. David and Eduardo Gomez followed Immaculata about a week later (04 March 1990).
Immaculata fetched the two at the Bangkok Airport. Immaculata, David and Gomez proceeded to and stayed at the Union
Towers Hotel. After 2 days, they transferred to the apartment of one Lito Tuazon where they spent the rest of their stay in
Bangkok. On 14 March 1990, Immaculata, Gomez and Aya Yupangco left Bangkok and boarded Manila-bound flight PR731. Immaculata and Yupangco occupied seats 2A and No. 54D. Gomez was on the same flight. He checked-in two
golfbags, and he was issued interline claim tags PR 77-28-71 and 77-28-72. In Manila, Gomez deposited the two golfbags
with the interline baggage room for his connecting flight from Manila to San Francisco via United Airlines ("UAL") flight
058 scheduled to depart the following morning (15 March 1990). The golfbags were kept in the transit rack baggage along
with other pieces of luggage destined for San Francisco via the UAL flight. Well before flight time on 15 March 1990,
Romeo Dumag, a customs policeman at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport ("NAIA"), was requested by Customs
Collector Edgardo de Leon to help facilitate the checking-in of Eduardo Gomez. Dumag sought from his security officer,
a certain Capt. Reyes, the latter's permission. Having received the go-signal, Dumag accepted from De Leon the ticket and
passport of Gomez. Dumag proceeded to the UAL check-in counter. The airline's lady staff, Annabelle Lumba, directed
Dumag to first claim the passenger's items to be checked-in at the interline baggage room. At the interline baggage room,
Dumag spoke to Michael Angelo Benipayo, a PAL employee assigned at the NAIA central baggage division and baggage
handling section, and presented the two claim tags of Gomez together with the latter's passport and plane ticket.
Convinced that Dumag had been duly authorized to retrieve the baggage, Benipayo released, upon the approval of a
customs examiner named Nick, the two golfbags wrapped in blue cloth. To acknowledge the release, Dumag affixed his
signature to the "unclaimed baggage/transit list." PAL loader Edgardo Villafuerte helped carry the golfbags to the UAL
check-in counter. Annabelle Lumba attached a San Francisco laser tag (UA Tag 594513 and Tag 594514) and wrote the
name "Gomez" on each side of the golfbags. She then handed to Dumag the boarding pass and UAL plane ticket for
Gomez. Dumag proceeded to Patio Manila, a restaurant at the NAIA, where he turned over to Collector De Leon the
travel papers of Gomez. Gomez failed to board the UAL flight. The two golfbags were off-loaded from the aircraft. At
around 4:00 p.m., PAL staff Dennis Mendoza brought the golfbags back to the check-in counter for a security check-up.
The x-ray machine showed unidentified dark masses. Alarmed, Mendoza immediately relayed the information to Capt.
Ephraim Sindico of the 801st Aviation Security Squadron of the Philippine Air Force Security Command
("PAFSECOM") then deployed at the NAIA. Capt. Sindico rushed to the check-in area. He instructed his men to get the
golfbags pass through the x-ray machine once again. Satisfied that something was indeed wrong, Capt. Sindico reported
the matter to Col. Claudio Cruz who ordered his men to have the golfbags go, for the third time, through the x-ray
machine. The unidentified dark masses having been definitely confirmed, Col. Cruz ordered his men to open the glued
bottom zipper of the golfbags. The golfbags yielded 31 single packs, each with an approximate size of 1" x 6" x 4,"
containing a white powder substance suspected to be "heroin" with a total weight of 20.1159 kilograms. The examination
by the PAFSECOM personnel was witnessed by the NAIA manager, a representative of the UAL and other customs
personnel. Eduardo Gomez, a bartender, and Felipe Immaculata, a former bus driver, were implicated in the crime of
transporting 20 kilograms of heroin, estimated to be worth $40,000,000.00, contained in two golfbags. Also charged, with
having violated Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972), as amended, were Aya Yupangco, Art David, Lito Tuazon and Benito Cunanan, who all were able to evade
arrest. Gomez surrendered to the officer-in-charge of the then Clark Air Force Base in Angeles City. The OIC of Clark
Air Force Base turned over custody of Gomez to the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") of the United States in Manila.
The DEA, in turn, surrendered him to the NBI. On the other hand, on 22 March 1990, David and Immaculata left for
Hongkong reportedly to get some spare parts for David's Mercedes Benz car. In Hongkong, after buying the car spare
parts, David and Immaculata went to the U.S. Department of Justice in Hongkong. While waiting for David, Immaculata
was confronted by a group of people, who turned out to be from the Hongkong Immigration Office, requesting for his
travel papers. Immaculata was brought in for investigation because of an expired visa, then turned over to the police
authorities and finally to the court which decreed his imprisonment. In the Hongkong prison, Immaculata was visited by
NBI agents for his implication in the "heroin" case. He denied the accusation. Later, he agreed, without the assistance of
counsel, to execute a sworn statement at the Stanley Prison. After his prison term, Immaculata was deported to Manila.
Gomez and Immaculata entered a plea of "not guilty" to the accusation. After trial, Gomez and Immaculata were each
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 113 (Criminal Case 90-4717). While Gomez and Immaculata filed separate notices of appeal to the Supreme
Page 38 of 155
Court from their conviction, only Immaculata, however, filed his brief. Gomez, assisted by counsel, filed a "manifestation
of withdrawal of appeal" to which the Solicitor General interposed no objection. The Court would only thus consider the
appeal of Immaculata.
Issue: Whether Immaculatas uncounselled statement made in Stanley Prison in Hongkong is admissible as evidence in
the Philippines.
Held: While the sworn statement taken from Immaculata by an NBI agent at the Stanley Prison in Hongkong during his
incarceration was not made the basis for Immaculata's conviction by the court, a word could be said about the manner in
which it was procured. It would seem that Immaculata was merely apprised in general terms of his constitutional rights to
counsel and to remain silent. He then was asked if he would be willing to give a statement. Having answered in the
affirmative, the NBI investigating agent asked him whether he needed a lawyer. After that response, the investigation
forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly was in compliance with Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution which
requires the assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel. It is immaterial that
the sworn statement was executed in a foreign land. Immaculata, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy these constitutional
rights, like anyone else, even when abroad.
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atmosphere, Lugod's claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the
voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited Lugod in the jail cell, he
noticed that Lugod had bruises on his face, corroborated Lugod's assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the
confession of Lugod cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution is
the fact that several persons testified having seen Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube and on several other
occasions wearing the rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively
as well as the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16
September 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence are
circumstantial in nature.The combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical
conclusion that Lugod raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of the
crime and nothing more. Lugod was acquitted.
Page 42 of 155
Re-enactment
People vs. Luvendino, G.R. 69971, 3 July 1992
Facts: On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home at Deva Village, Tambak, Taguig,
Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of Manila where she was a sophomore commerce student. She would
usually be home by 7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings, but on that tragic day, she would not reach home alive. On that
particular evening, her father Panfilo Capcap arriving home from work at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was
told by his wife and other children that Rowena was not yet home from school. Later, a younger brother of Rowena, sent
on an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena's bag which he had found dropped in the middle of a street in the village.
Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking the help of the barangay captain of Hagonoy, Taguig. Not being satisfied with the
latter's promise to send for a "tanod" to help locate his missing daughter, Panfilo went to the Taguig Police Station to
report his daughter as missing. The desk officer there advised him that a search party would be mounted presently. Panfilo
returned home and, with the help of some neighbors, launched a search party for the missing Rowena. The search ended in
a grassy vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80 meters from the Capcap residence, where lay
the apparently lifeless body of Rowena, her pants pulled down to her knees and her blouse rolled up to her breasts. Her
underwear was blood-stained and there were bloody fingerprint marks on her neck. Rowena, her body still warm, was
rushed to a hospital in Taguig, where on arrival she was pronounced dead. The autopsy report stated that the multiple
injuries indicated the victim had struggled vigorously with her attacker(s); that the presence of spermatozoa showed that
the victim had sexual intercourse prior to death; and that death was due to asphyxia by manual strangulation. By 5 March
1984, an information had been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C. Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias "Cesar Putol" and
Ricardo de Guzman alias "Ric" with the crime of rape with murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against all the accused
but only Ernesto Luvendino was actually apprehended; the other 2 have remained at large. It appears that Luvendino reenacted the events that transpired in the evening of January 17 at the crime scene, where pictures were taken by a
photographer brought by the police officers. In the course of the demonstration, Luvendino allegedly remarked: "Inaamin
ko po na kasama ko si Cesar Borca sa pag re-rape kay Rowena." At arraignment, Luvendino assisted by his counsel, Atty.
Luisito Sardillo, pleaded not guilty and then proceeded to trial. On 12 December 1984, the trial court rendered a decision
finding Luvendino guilty, sentencing him to death, and requiring him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Rowena in the
amountof P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of her death.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in:
a. Not holding that his demonstration or re-enactment of the crime as well as his subsequent written
admission of guilt as inadmissible for having been made without the benefit of counsel.
b. According credence to the identification and other statements made by the prosecution witness Bayani
Cemitara
c. Allowing Luvendinos counsel before the trial court to continue as such notwithstanding such counsels
express mental reservations
Held:
a. The trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what had occurred during the reenactment of the crime by Luvendino. The reenactment was apparently staged promptly upon apprehension of
Luvendino and even prior to his formal investigation at the police station. The decision of the trial court found that the
accused was informed of his constitutional rights "before he was investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police
headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino. The decision itself, however, states that the reenactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that
before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional rights including,
specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right before proceeding with the demonstration. Under
these circumstances, the Court must decline to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment.
b. Next is the extrajudicial confession of appellant. He claimed that it was extracted because of the beating of the
policemen and that a chain had been wrapped around his neck. The court disbelieved such claim since he was not
examined for his claim of maltreatment, he did not institute any criminal action against his alleged intimidators, it could
not have been missed by his lawyer and his mother. The court ruled that were the confessant failed to present any
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on his person for purposes of confession, the extrajudicial confession may
be admitted. Also, he claimed he was not inform of his constitutional rights before extraction was given by him or
extracted from him. First, he was informed by Police Sgt. Galang before he commenced investigation. Second, the
written extrajudicial confession itself stated Ludevino was informed of his constitutional rights and that he was waiving
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those rights. Third, he first signed his extrajudicial statement at the police department and that later, when he was brought
to the office of the Provincial Fiscal Mateo, where he subscribed to or signed once more the same document, this time
under oath, in the presence of his mother and Atty. Eustacio Flores.
The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made
one and was first announced on April 26, 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and it was reiterated in People v. Galit. The
Morales-Galit doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined in
Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers prior to April 26, 1983, the date of promulgation of
Morales.
c. Second error was that the trial court had erred in believing the testimony of prosection Cemitara. It is well-settled rule
that the assessments by a trial court of the credibility and sincerity of the witnesses who testified before it are to be
accorded great respect by appellate courts. Appellant presented no evidence to show any personal grudge on the part of
Cemitara against Luvendino, nor any evidence of any ill motive weighty enough to have moved Cemitara falsely testify
for the prosecution.
d. Third principal assignment of error, that he had been deprived of due process because he was represented or continued
to be represented, by a lawyer who had manifested mental reservations. Atty. Sardillo himself did not insist on
withdrawing as defense counsel. If appellant Ludevino in trut had entertained substantial doubts as to the sincerity or
capability or impartiality of his lawyer, he could have easily terminated the services of that counsel and retained a new
one or sought from the trial court the appointment of counsel de officio. Instead, appellant continued to retain the services
of Atty. Sardillo until the trial court rendered its decision and that Atty. Sardillo continued to represent appellant
Luvendino as defense counsel with reasonable competence.
Page 44 of 155
Right to Bail
When right may be invoked
Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945)
Facts: Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army,
to the Commonwealth Government, pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, dated 29
December 1944. She was one of the petitioners in case No. L-44, "Raquiza vs. Bradford," of the Supreme Court. She is
now confined in the Correctional Institution for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth Government since
October, 1945, when she was thus delivered to the said government. On 2 October 1945, Herras Teehankee, through her
husband, Alberto Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition wherein, invoking the provisions of Executive Order
No. 65, promulgated by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, dated 3 September 1945, she prayed that her
immediate release be ordered on the ground that no evidence exists upon which she could be charged with any act
punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the People's Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in conformity with the
aforesaid executive order, and upon approval of such bail, that an order be forthwith issued directing the officer having
official custody of her person to immediately release her. On 9 October 1945, the Hon. Leopoldo Rovira, Presiding Judge
of the People's Court, entered an order referring the petition for provisional release for consideration by the Fifth Division
of the People's Court, but adding the following statement: "in my opinion, it should be denied notwithstanding the
recommendation of the Solicitor General for her provisional release under a bond of P50,000." On the same date, the Hon.
Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of the People's Court, entered an order disposing of said petition and denying the same
"in view of the gravity of the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the Special Prosecutors
recommends as high as P50,000 for her provisional release." Herras Teehankee filed for reconsideration, but the Court,
through Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied said motion. Herras Teehankee filed a petition for the writs of certiorari
and mndamus on 19 October 1945 with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a person may file for bail even before a formal charge or information is filed against him?
Held: Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which provides that "All persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.
Excessive bail shall not be required" -- refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information
has already been formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to the provision, the general rule is that any
person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense
and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise
deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can
invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed
against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this
guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence
of his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under a formal
complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the
proper authorities may even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more
favored position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in
favor of one already formally charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article III, section 1[17]), a fortiori, this
presumption should be indulged in favor of one yet so charged, although already arrested or detained.
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position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his
motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that
he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime
and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides' presence at the arraignment violates the latter's
constitutional rights.
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legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the
trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact,
an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being
"confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area. Paderanga, through his counsel, emphatically made it known
to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was then
confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain
medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of
the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it
would have taken but the slightest effort to place Paderanga in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then
incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or
placing him under guard. Thus, Paderanga was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically
restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the
application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge
that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, Paderanga never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the
clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the
submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof. Where the trial court has reasons to believe that
the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross
error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature
of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. Where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the
accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the
prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application. No irregularity, in the context of procedural due
process, could therefore be attributed to the trial court as regards its order granting bail to Paderanga. A review of the
transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of 5 November 1992 and the omnibus order of 29 March
1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. The lower court exhausted all means to convince itself
of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the
requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the
court conclude that Paderanga could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then
and up to the present, Paderanga has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
Page 52 of 155
necessary for the prosecution to present all its witnesses before he could resolve the motion for bail. The stance cannot be
sustained. The prosecution must be given an opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable time whether the
motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course
of a regular trial. If the prosecution is denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process.
The records show that the prosecution was supposed to present its 6th and 7th witnesses on 4 June 1998 when Judge
Bongolan prematurely resolved the motion.
A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to
protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a
magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of discretion. Further, Judge
Bongolan fixed the bail at P50,000.00 without showing its reasonableness. The judge should have set the petition for bail
hearing for the additional reason of taking into account the guidelines for fixing the amount of bail, even if the Provincial
Prosecutor would not interpose an objection to the grant of bail. Furthermore, the release of the accused was done in haste
by Judge Benesa. If Benesa examined the records of the case, he would have discovered that the prosecution was given by
Judge Bongolan, 10 days from 3 June 1988 within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration from his Order granting bail
to the accused. Without the 10 day period having lapsed, Judge Benesa ordered the release of the accused. Again, the
prosecution was denied its day in court.
Page 54 of 155
petition as its own. On 18 June 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution that denied said motion for reconsideration
of Galan on the ground that the certification on non-forum shopping was not signed by Galan. The Court of Appeals also
reasoned that the fact that the OSG joined Galan in her petition did not cure the above deficiency. The OSG received
copy of the resolution on 29 June 1998. On 3 August 1998, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA-GR SP 47142). On 12 August 1998, said petition of the OSG was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that the petition was practically a reproduction of the petition earlier filed by Guadalupe Galan, which was
dismissed on 26 March 1998. Hence, the appeal by certiorari.
Issue: Whether the appreciation of the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt may be based on the voluminous
records of the case, without necessarily hearing the prosecution.
Held: The assailed Order dated 10 November 1997 granting bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with the
requirement that in cases when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must first be
conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the instances when bail is a matter of right or discretionary,
Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that "no person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to
persons charged with a crime the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence
of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the
law that re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused Gos
right to bail is merely discretionary. When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion
of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to
enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how Judge
Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt of the accused when he did not even
bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the voluminous records of the case simply does not
suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the
crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present
its evidence. It is worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Another compelling reason why a
hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to determine the amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Without the required hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00
is undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis.
Further, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely made a conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a
substantive and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that after the hearing, whether the bail is
granted or denied, the presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The
irregularity in the grant of bail, however, is not attenuated since the judges findings were based on the summary clinical
report of Dr. Matiga dated 4 February 1997 while the order granting bail was issued on 10 November 1997. It could not
therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state of health of Go could still be accurately reflected by the said medical
report when 9 had already passed from the time that said medical report was prepared. It was therefore clear error for
Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical report in granting bail when the defense failed to present a more
recent one that would convincingly raise strong grounds to apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused would
endanger his life.
Page 56 of 155
Bail on appeal
People vs. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619 (1993)
Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year
old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the
accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for
accuseds provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of
bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his
constitutional right to bail.
Issue: Whether or not the accuseds right to bail violated.
Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence
of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is
determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither
a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.
Page 57 of 155
bondsman, AFISCO Insurance Corporation, filed a motion in the trial court on 6 January 1987 for the cancellation of
petitioners' bail bond for the latter's failure to renew the same upon its expiration. Obtaining the consent of the bondsman
was, thus, foreclosed. Furthermore, pursuant to the same Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused may be admitted to bail upon
the court's discretion after conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. However, such bail shall be denied or bail previously granted shall be canceled if the penalty imposed is
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years if any one of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5 is present. Herein, Maguddatu, et. al. are not entitled to bail. Firstly, Maguddatu, et. al. violated the
conditions of their bail. Maguddatu, et. al.'s non-appearance during the promulgation of the trial court's decision despite
due notice and without justifiable reason, and their continued non-submission to the proper authorities as ordered by the
Court of Appeals, constitutes violations of the conditions of their bail. Moreover, it appears that Maguddatu, et. al. failed
to renew their expired bail bond, as shown by a Motion, dated 6 January 1987, filed by AFISCO Insurance Corporation,
praying for the cancellation of petitioners' bail bond because of the latter's failure to renew the same upon its expiration.
Lastly, Maguddatu, et. al. had no cause to expect that their application for bail would be granted as a matter of course
precisely because it is a matter of discretion. In fact, the filing of a notice of appeal effectively deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction to entertain the motion for bail pending appeal because appeal is perfected by the mere filing of such notice. It
has been held that trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the
capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.
Page 59 of 155
Page 60 of 155
circumstances warrant a higher penalty. The reasonableness of this circular has already received the Court's imprimature
in Edao vs. Cea (GR L-6821, 10 May 1954). The Court is unprepared to downgrade this method of computation, what
with a compound of reduced peso value and the aggravated crime climate. The Court thus find no discernible abuse of
discretion, given the facts and the law, when the judge fixed Villasenor's bail at P60,000.00.
Page 62 of 155
De la Camara v Enage
G.R. Nos. L-32951-2, September 17, 1971
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts: Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested on 7 November 1968 and
detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other
laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968. Thereafter, on 25 November
1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and
another for multiple murder against de la Camara, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting
from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on 14 January 1969, came an application for bail filed by de la Camara with the
lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of 21 August 1968.
He likewise maintained his innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez Enage (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II) started the trial of de la Camara on 24 February 1969, the prosecution
resting its case on 10 July 1969. The Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting de la Camara's application for
bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that de la Camara would flee even if he had
the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00
for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. On 12
August 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to the
Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property,
would be reasonable. De la Camara filed motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge however remained
adamant. De la Camara filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, de la Camara had
escaped from the provincial jail.
Issue: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the determination of the amount of bail, excessive enough to
discourage the accused from fleeing.
Held: Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the
Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been
more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the
United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American
decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared that 'bail set
at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth
Amendment." Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of 10 August 1970 fixing the amount of
P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by de la Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and the sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder,
there being 12 victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two
offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in the present case that the
Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. No attempt at rationalization can
give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but
at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge
would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a
mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of
petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must
have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount
required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he
were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of
expectations then. De la Camara's subsequent escape, however, cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the
relief prayed for. What the Judge did, on the other hand, does call for repudiation from the Supreme Court.
Page 63 of 155
Almeda v Villaluz
G.R. No. L-31665, August 6, 1975
CASTRO, J.:
Facts: Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a
motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villaluz.
The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the
judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. At the hearing of 18 February 1970, Almeda asked the trial court
to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral
motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on
the part of Almeda. At the same hearing, the city fiscal of Pasay City (Fiscal Gregorio Pineda), thru his assistant,
reiterated his oral motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of the information so as to include allegations of
recidivism and habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The latter vigorously objected, arguing that (a) such
an amendment was premature since no copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to amend
should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and (c) the proposed amendment would place
him in double jeopardy considering that he had already pleaded not guilty to the information. The trial court nevertheless
granted the fiscal's motion in open court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied. Immediately thereafter, the
assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then and there, entered his amendment by annotating the same
on the back of the document. Almeda forthwith moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground of double jeopardy,
but this motion and a motion for reconsideration were denied in open court. Almeda filed the present special civil action
for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the insistence of a cash bond, over any other surety, renders the recomended bail excessive.
Held: Bail is "the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The
purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at
the trial. The accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense
and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may not be denied even where the
accused has previously escaped detention, or by reason of his prior absconding. In order to safeguard the right of an
accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." This is logical because the
imposition of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. "Where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking
bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise
our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy." Herein, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered
in terms of surety or property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does
not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman
the bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the reputation or credit
standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the
court to guarantee the production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his conviction or
acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court,
and its procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying him
his constitutional right to bail. Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only
upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose
of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty
on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is
authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by
depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the
attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option
to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise
acceptable sureties and insists that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond. The court is not
without devices with which to meet the situation, considering that Almeda's past record that is the range of his career in
crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail. First, it could increase the amount of the
bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the
purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the
latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an
Page 64 of 155
accounting of his movements. And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the
requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution "Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." With respect to the amount of the bail bond, the trial
court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the following factors, where applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give
bail: (2) the nature of the offense; (3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the character and reputation of the accused;
(5) the health of the accused; (6) the character and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the accused's appearance
or non-appearance at the trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. It is not amiss, at this point, to
remind all courts to exercise extreme care and caution in the screening of bondsmen and sureties in regard to their
reputation, solvency and promptitude. Aside from the other precautions hitherto considered useful, courts should see to it
that all surety bonds are accompanied by corresponding clearances from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
Bondsmen who cannot make good their undertakings render inutile all efforts at making the bail system work in this
jurisdiction.
Page 65 of 155
Yap v CA
G.R. No. 14152, June 6, 2001
GONZAGAREYES, J.:
Facts: For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, Francisco Yap Jr. (@ Edwin Yap] was convicted of
estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correctional,
as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in
excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years." He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be
allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated 17 February 1999. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, Yap filed
with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the
last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor
General opined that Yap may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain
to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and
private complainant." Yap filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right
against excessive bail. The resolution of the Court of Appeals, issued on 6 October 1999, upheld the recommendation of
the Solicitor General. A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by the
court, but was denied in a resolution issued on 25 November 1999. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the bail may be fixed at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which the accused is charged.
Held: The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to Yap on appeal. The court stated that it was
doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by Yap's admission he went out of the
country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount
of bail at P5,500,000.00. The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious
rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could
render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abano, the Court made the pronouncement that it will not
hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail,
effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions. At the same time, Section
9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the setting of
the amount of bail: (a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense; (c)
Penalty for the offense charged; (d) Character and reputation of the accused; (e) Age and health of the accused; (f) Weight
of the evidence against the accused; (g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) Forfeiture of other bail; (i)
The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is
on bail. Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is
certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to
an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his
movements. Herein, where Yap was found to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the Court of
Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-departure order against him. Under the
circumstances, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any
change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may
be meritorious, the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial
of Yap's right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of
which Yap is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction
of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this the Court cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment,
nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.
Page 66 of 155
Cabanero v Canon
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1369, September 20, 2001
PARDO, J.:
Facts: A certain Jaime Caal accused Mrs. Guillerma D. Cabaero's son, Jessie D. Cabaero, of entering Caals
farmland and harvesting falcata trees valued at P3,191.00. The chief of police filed the case with the 7th MCTC Hinatuan
Tagbina, with station at Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, presided over by Judge Antonio K. Caon. The Judge conducted a
preliminary investigation of the case to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. On 1 October
1998, Judge Caon issued a warrant of arrest not only against Jessie Cabaero but also against Guillerma D. Cabaero for
covering up for her son. On 15 October 1998, policemen arrested Guillerma and detained her at the Hinatuan Municipal
Jail. To secure her temporary liberty, she posted bail, which could not be issued and approved in her name because she
was not an accused in Criminal Case 4036-H. The judge pegged the bail at P30,000.00. On 16 October 1998, Guillerma
was released. Incidentally, on 7 October 1998, when her son was arrested, he also posted bail amounting to P30,000.00. In
a complaint dated 16 September 1999, Mrs. Guillerma D. Cabaero charged Judge Antonio K. Caon, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Hinatuan-Tagbina, at Hinatuan, Surigao Del Sur with partiality, issuance of unjust interlocutory orders and
grave abuse of discretion relative to Criminal Case 4036-H (People vs. Jessie Cabaero, for qualified theft), alleging that
considering the value of the property allegedly stolen, the bail required was excessive. On 24 April 2000, the judge died.
Issue: Whether Judge Caon imposed excessive bail in the case of qualified theft.
Held: Judge Caon erred in ordering the arrest of Guillerma D. Cabaero. She was not included as one of the respondents
in the criminal case filed by the chief of police of Hinatuan. The judgess interpretation of his powers under the Revised
Rules of Court was far-fetched. The judge also imposed excessive bail. Under Department Circular 4, the 1996 Bail Bond
Guide for the National Prosecution Service for the offense of qualified theft, if the value of the property stolen is more
than P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00, the bail recommended is P24,000.00. Herein, the monetary value of the
falcata trees cut into logs is P3,1991.40. The bail of P30,000 is not proportionate to the amount stolen. When the law
transgressed is elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Antonio K.
Caon was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P5,000.00, to be taken from his retirement benefits in view of his
demise.
Page 67 of 155
The amount of bail should, therefore be reasonable at all times. It must be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to serve this purpose. Excessive bail should not be
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required. The Rules of Court allowed the payment of Bail bond in cash in lieu of surety bond, but the choice belong to the
accused.
Moreover under 2000 Bail Bond Guide of DOJ, crimes of Reckless Imprudence resulting in homicide and with violation
of LTO Traffic Code, bail shall be 30k regardless of the number of deaths.
The Supreme Court charge Judge Bellosillo guilty for ignorance of the law and oppression in imposing excessive bail
bonds on Dela Cruz and Serranos case and respondent Judge was ordered to pay a fine of 10k FROM HIS
RETIREMENT BENEFIT.
Page 69 of 155
likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a
moral certainly having arisen as to their culpability.
Page 71 of 155
Dumlao v COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Facts: A Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order was filed by Patricio Dumlao,
Romeo B. Igot and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa 51, 52, and
53 for being Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 52 as discriminatory
and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides that "In
addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XIIC of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which
are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective
provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the
law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected,
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired." Dumlao alleged that the afore
cited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary
grounds and, therefore, class legislation." For their part, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of Section 7 of BP 51,
which provides that "Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office
for a term of 6 years. which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980"; Section 4 of BP 52, which provides that
"any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil
court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact"; Section 1 and Section
6 of BP 52. In addition to the said provisions, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also questioned the accreditation of some political
parties by the COMELEC, as authorized by BP 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the
Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination."
Issue: Whether Section 4, BP 52, which disqualifies elective candidates who have been charged in civil and/or military
tribunals, is valid.
Held: Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed
against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges
have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for
public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the
right to hold office during the term of the sentence. Although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie
evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the
prima facie evidence against him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the
Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of finding between
two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a
legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Being
infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. The
first paragraph of Section 4, BP 52, on the other hand, is valid. However, that portion of the second paragraph of section 4
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court
or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and
void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
Page 72 of 155
People v Mingoa
G.R. No. L-5371, March 26, 1953
REYES, J.:
Facts: Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon,
and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, Aquino Mingoa was
prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon. Mingoa explained to
the examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with
him to a show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in
court and presented no evidence in his favor. Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding
penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that it
involved a constitutional question.
Issue: Whether Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use" violates the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained.
Held: The validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter, Cooley, in his work on
constitutional limitations (8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641), says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a
law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the
experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of
innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain
facts have been proved they shall, be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden
of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the
inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the
two in common experience. The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of the Supreme
court in US vs. Tria (17 Phil 303); US vs. Luling (34 Phil 725); and People vs. Merilo (GR L-3489, 28 June 1951).
The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of a public
officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate act presumed is that the officer
has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has
received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a
natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two.
Furthermore, the statuteestablishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present
evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations.
Herein, Mingoa's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his
inability to produce the fund which was found missing. If the money was really lost without Mingoa's fault, the most
natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he did not do.
Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he
even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further, as the prosecution points out in its brief, Mingoa had at first
tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss
many teachers and other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that
Mingoa had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure invention.
Page 73 of 155
of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to great
weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
Page 75 of 155
Page 76 of 155
Delgado v CA
G.R. No. L-46392, November 10, 1986
PARAS, J.:
Facts: Emma R. Delgado -- together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino
Bautista (at large) -- was charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents resulting in deceiving
one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the United States. All the accused (except Catalino
Bautista) pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits ensued. Delgado was assisted and represented by her
counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On 13 December 1973, the date set for the continuation of the defense evidence,
said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for
postponement on the ground allegedly that he was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted. The trial fiscal
objected, believing that the motion was dilatory because there had been numerous postponements in the past at Delgado's
behest. The trial Court sustained the fiscal's objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to have waived presentation
of her evidence, and considered the case submitted for decision. Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was rendered by the
trial court, dated 20 March 1974, finding Gloria C. Tortona, Emma R. Delgado and Celia Capistrano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public and/or Official Documents, and sentencing
each to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum to 6 years, also
of prision correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to indemnify the offended party Erlinda Ruedas in the amount of P7,431.00. Each was further ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, the complainant moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00, and one fourth of the costs of the proceedings.
Tortona did not appeal from the decision. Capistrano and Delgado appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of
"whether or not on the basis of the evidence and the law the judgment appealed from should be maintained." On 6
December 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court as to Delgado and
reversing the judgment as to Capistrano. On 27 December 1976, an entry of final judgment was issued and on 1 February
1977, the records of the case were remanded to the lower court for execution of judgment. Believing that there was
irregularity in the sending of notices and copy of the decision as Delgado was not informed or notified of said decision by
her counsel on record, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, Delgado filed on 17 February 1977 with the Court of Appeals an "Urgent
Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and Allow the Movant to Personally Receive Copy of the
Decision." The motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 April 1977. On 11 May 1977 an
Order was issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila directing the arrest of Delgado and the confiscation of her bond
for failure to appear at the execution of judgment on 11 May 1977. On 27 May 1977, Delgado filed a Motion for the
Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgments, etc.. and prayed that she be granted a
new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by competent counsel (Yco not being a member
of the Philippine Bar). On 3 June 1977, the Court of Appeals denied Delgado's motion. Delgado filed a petition for
"Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for a Writ of preliminary injunction" with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Delgado is entitled to a new trial, inasmuch as Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, Delgados counsel, is not a
member of the Philippine bar.
Held: A accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the
Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf
will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a
denial of due process. Herein, since Delgados "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a real lawyer, the Court remanded
the case to the trial court for new trial.
Page 77 of 155
People v Baluyot
G.R. No. L-32752-3, January 31, 1977
MAKASIAR, J:
Facts: On 6 August 1970, in the Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, Miguel Baluyot y Dulay, Pablo Pinca y
Narca and Antonio Balinjari y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot robbed money from Gerry Sureta alias Marcelino Carceles y
Abasola, then driving a taxi marked AIRLANE with plate 14-97, 40-TX 870 (TX-9345s/69), to the damage and prejudice
of Sureta. They stabbed Sureta, hitting him n the neck, thereby inflicting serious wounds (stab wounds), which directly
caused the death of Sureta. Baluyot, Pinca and Balinjari were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide before the
Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth Judicial District holding sessions in Malolos, Bulacan (Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit,
presiding). Upon arraignment on 28 September 1970, all the accused, assisted by attorney de oficio, Atty. Oscar Torres,
pleaded not guilty to the information. The following day September 29 when the case was called for trial, the
prosecution started presenting its evidence. The accused were assisted by the same attorney de oficio, Atty. Oscar Torres,
who manifested that he was appearing as counsel for the accused in that day's trial only. Trial was continued the following
day, 30 September 1970. The accused were this time assisted by another counsel de oficio, Atty. Godofredo Linsangan.
Thereafter, the continuation of the trial was reset for 7 October 1970. At this hearing, the accused were assisted by another
counsel de oficio, Atty. Eduardo Villafuerte, who was appointed by the trial court after the accused informed it that they
had no lawyer. Then the trial court asked the new counsel de oficio what his pleasure was, and the latter requested that he
be given a few minutes within which to confer with the accused. The trial court gave him 20 minutes within which to
"consummate" his conference. Accordingly, when the session was resumed, Atty. Villafuerte manifested that "after
conferring with the accused, they intimated their desire to withdraw their former plea of not guilty and to substitute in lieu
thereof the plea of guilty to the offense charged." Without inquiring from the prosecution what its stand was on the motion
of counsel for the accused, the trial court, addressing itself to all the accused said "You have heard the manifestations of
counsel. Do you now affirm the truthfulness and correctness of the manifestation of counsel to the effect that you now
desire to withdraw your former plea of not guilty and to substitute the same with that of guilty to the offense charged?"
All of the accused replied in the affirmative. When asked whether the accused were ready to hear their sentence, the latter
replied in the affimative. Then and there, and without much ado, the trial court dictated in open court its decision
convicting Baluyot, Pinca and Balinjari of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing each and all of them to
death, "with the other accessories of the law; to proportionately indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P12,000.00; to correspondingly pay the said heirs by way of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00,
proportionately; and similarly, to proportionately pay the costs of these proceedings." Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether it is sufficient for the trial court to ask the accused whether they were ready to receive their sentence after
they had affirmed the "truthfulness and correctness" of their counsel's manifestation on their change of plea.
Held: Similar to the identical case of People vs. Ricalde (L-34673, January 30, 1973), it is held that previous decisions
have repeatedly warned against the danger of the plea of guilty being improvidently entered in capital cases. The Court
has uniformly stressed the importance of the trial court's receiving evidence notwithstanding the plea of guilty in order
that no reasonable doubt may remain as to the guilt and the degree of culpability of the accused. The Court has time and
time again reminded judges that they are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads
guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of inevitable conviction. Herein, the trial court did not
even ascertain for itself whether the accused completely understood the precise nature of the charge and the meaning of
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, craft and abuse of superior strength as having attended the commission of the
crime, so as to obviate any doubt as to the possibility that they have misunderstood the nature and gravity of the charge to
which they were pleading guilty. The trial court did not conduct a dialogue with the accused on their educational
attainment, especially considering that a cursory perusal of their signatures on the statements they gave to the Malolos
Police Force tends to show that they have very little or scanty education. Moreover, after the arraignment, trial was held
on three dates and on each day the accused were assisted by 3 different counsel de oficio. In the hearing of 7 October
1970 the day the decision under review was rendered the counsel de oficio who assisted the accused was designated
by the trial court only after the case was called for trial, i.e., after the accused had informed the trial court that they did not
have a lawyer. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume that said counsel de oficio proceeded to trial
without first fully investigating the facts of the case and that his interview with the accused, even if it lasted for 20
minutes as the record insinuates, was not, and could not have been sufficient to enable him to acquire a fairly good grasp,
much less a comprehensive knowledge, of the relevant facts of the case. Incidentally, under the Rules of Court, whenever
an attorney de oficio is employed or assigned by the court to defend the accused at the trial, he shall be given a reasonable
Page 78 of 155
time to consult with the accused and prepare his defense before proceeding further in the case, which shall not be less than
2 days in case of trial. The record, incidentally, does not show the existence of a "good cause" to justify the trial court in
shortening the trial fixed by the Rules. The trial court cannot plead ignorance of the prevailing injunction directed towards
trial judges to exercise patience and circumspection in explaining to the accused not only the nature and meaning of the
accusation and the full import of their plea of guilty but also the meaning in layman's language of the aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the trial court did not even consult the testimonies
of the 3 State witnesses namely, the doctor and the police officers who took down the statements of the accused
who testified during the first and second hearings, at least with the end in view of ascertaining the degree of the penalty
that should be imposed after accepting the plea of guilty of the accused. What the trial court did was only to ask the
accused whether they were ready to receive their sentence after they had affirmed the "truthfulness and correctness" of
their counsel's manifestation on their change of plea. In short, the trial court did not even inform the accused that their plea
of guilty might mean death for all of them.
Page 79 of 155
Libuit v People
G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: Joel Libuit was charged with the crime of estafa. Sometime in May 1993, Domingo del Mundo delivered and
brought his car (Chevy 2dr. HT: Plate No. EDD-725) valued at P60,000.00, to the motor shop owned and/or operated by
Joel Libuit and Julius Libuit for repair, it was received by Jose Bautista, mechanic, but accused Joel, once in possession of
the said car, misappropriated, converted and/or misapplied the said car to his own personal use and benefit and despite
repeated demands to return the said car to the owner, accused refused.
It appears from the prosecution evidence that sometime in May 1993, del Mundo, brought his car for repair at the Paeng
Motorworks operated by the Joel. The car was received by Jose Bautista, a mechanic, in the presence of the Joel who
assured the del Mundo that it would be safe in his motor shop.
When del Mundo returned to the motor shop in January 1994, he saw his car by the roadside while the engine was inside
the shop. Bautista explained that the engine was pulled out because it also needed repairs. Joel and Bautista assured him
that they would finish the repair work and deliver the car to del Mundos house after two weeks. However, Joel failed to
deliver the car. Del Mundo gave him another two weeks. Thereafter, del Mundo returned to the motor shop and found that
his car was already missing. He reported the matter to the police, who discovered that Joel had sold the cars differential
and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found.
Joel testified on direct examination. However, his defense counsel, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza withdrew from the case after
his initial cross-examination. The continuation of his cross-examination was reset to give him time to engage the services
of another counsel. Joel eventually secured the services of Atty. Jose Dimayuga.
At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga failed to appear despite notices. On motion of the prosecution, court issued
an order striking from the records Joel's direct testimony and declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence already on record.
Court found herein petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.
On appeal, CA affirmed in toto the decision of trial court. CA held that the trial court never deprived Joel of his right to
counsel as he was represented by a counsel de parte, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza. When said counsel withdrew, the trial
court allowed the resetting of Joel's cross-examination to give him time to engage the services of another counsel. It
ordered the striking of his testimony from the records only after his new counsel failed to appear at the subsequent
hearings.
Issue: Was petitioner deprived of his right to counsel?
Held: Joel contends that the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel consistently failed to
appear for his cross-examination.
The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ
the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to
arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice. When the time for the presentation of evidence for the
defense arrived, and Joel appeared by himself alone, the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.
Since Joel was represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be deemed dutybound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation of his cross-examination. Indeed, after his initial crossexamination, the trial court granted the motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of another
counsel.
The failure of Atty. Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was sufficient
legal basis for the trial court to order the striking from the records of his direct testimony, and thereafter render judgment
Page 80 of 155
upon the evidence already presented. In fact, the repeated failure to appear of Joel's counsel may even be taken as a
deliberate attempt to delay the courts proceedings.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like the present case would be discretionary with the trial court,
which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse. This Court is convinced that the trial court had
been liberal in granting postponements asked by the petitioner himself. We think that such liberality removes any doubt
that its order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Petition is denied.
Page 81 of 155
Moslares v CA
G.R. No. 129744, June 26, 1998
MELO, J.:
Facts: On 19 February 1991, Honor P. Moslares purchased three units of Toyota Corolla 1600 from Toyota Bel-Air, Inc.
which were thereupon registered under his name, under the name of Manila Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines, and under the name of Austra-Phil Homes Inc. In payment thereof, Moslares issued Philippine Bank of
Communications Check 841644 dated 24 May 1991 in the amount of P1,425,780.00. When presented for payment, said
check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Thus, Moslares was charged for violation of
Batas Pambansa 22 and for Estafa. The hearings of the case were postponed several times either at the instance of
Moslares or the prosecution, or motu proprio by the court. On 13 September 1995, the scheduled date of the presentation
of evidence by Moslares, he failed to appear, but was represented by a newly retained lawyer, Atty. Dionisio Landero,
who claimed that he was not ready to proceed with the trial as he was not yet familiar with the case. As a result, the trial
court set the promulgation of the decision on 30 October 1995. On 9 October 1995, Moslares filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/Re-Trial. However, on 26 October 1995 the trial court issued its decision, stating that "Moslares did not
attend during the presentation of evidence for the prosecution nor for the defense. The Court set the presentation of
evidence for the defense 19 times, 4 of which were cancelled on the ground that there was a typhoon and the public
prosecutor was 'indisposed'. But the accused did not even testify and presented only one witness, a certain Sixto Avila.
Subject cases were submitted for decision 4 times for failure of the accused to present evidence but was lifted in the
interest of justice upon motion of the accused. He changed his lawyer four times everytime the Court ordered the case
submitted for decision for failure of the accused to present his evidence in order to gain a delay." The court therein found
Moslares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of BP 22 (Criminal Case 92-0099 and Criminal Case 92-0100), and
sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of 1 year for each criminal case. On 30 October 1995, the trial court proceeded
to promulgate in absentia the 26 October 1996 decision. On 14 November 1995, Moslares filed a notice of appeal which
was denied due course by the lower court in its assailed order dated 1 February 1996. The lower court, relying on the case
of People vs. Mapalao (197 SCRA 79 [1991]), considered Moslares to have waived his right to appeal. On 14 February
1996, Moslares filed a petition for relief from judgment which was likewise denied by the trial court. On 14 March 1996,
Moslares filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which treated the petition as one for certiorari. Moslares
also filed on 3 October 1996, a petition to post bail, later supplemented. On 29 November 1996, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision dismissing the petition for review and denying the petition to post bail. Motions for reconsideration
subsequently filed by Moslares were denied. Moslares filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Moslareshas waived his right to present evidence
Held: While it is true that the right to present evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, it cannot be said that
Moslares had waived said right in the present case. The postponements sought by Moslares and counsel appear to be
justified and were not vexatious and oppressive. The intention and the willingness of Moslares to present evidence can be
gleaned from the fact that he had already presented one witness and has other witnesses ready for presentation, although
this was delayed, but for meritorious reasons, such as illness of Moslares and his counsel, Moslares' confinement at a
hospital, ongoing negotiations between the parties, and substitution of counsel. The rights of an accused during trial are
given paramount importance in our laws and rules on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is
the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Verily, this right is even guaranteed by the Constitution itself. This right has
been recognized and established in order to make sure that justice is done to the accused. Further, the constitutional right
of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of government has the power to
deprive him of that right. It would have thus been more befitting and seemly of the Court of Appeals had it ordered the
trial court to reopen the case for the reception of Moslares' evidence. Granting that Moslares had sought a number of
postponements, the requirements of substantial justice mandate that he should have been given his day in court. The grant
of a reasonable continuance would have been sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy
disposition of the case but at the expense of a fundamental right. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have proceeded
with the promulgation of decision on the premise that Moslares had waived his right to appear in court to present his
evidence. Likewise, the Court of Appeals, in affirming said decision, gravely abused its discretion as it sustained a
decision of the lower court rendered in violation of Moslares' right to due process.
Page 82 of 155
maximum (appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the generic mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender); and Giovan to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
20 years and 1 DAY of reclusion perpetua, as maximum (appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender). Both were ordered to pay Gina Marie Mobley in the amounts of: P50,000.00 for her being raped, P12,195.00
(the equivalent of US$450.00 dollars at the exchange rate of P27.10 to US$1.00) as actual damages, and P500,000.00 as
moral damages, plus costs. In Criminal Case 12601-R (acts of lasciviousness), the Court sentenced Bryan to suffer a
straight penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor; and Giovan to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum. Both were ordered to indemnify,
jointly and severally Gina Marie Mobley in the amount of P100,000.00 for and as moral damages, plus costs; and
furthermore, pay, jointly and severally, the offended party attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00 in the two cases.
Bryan and Giovan filed separate appeals.
Issue: Whether the alleged lack of arraignment nullifies the proceedings against Bryan Dy and Giovan Bernardino.
Held: Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the
defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of not guilty in their behalf. However, it
becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. The defense cannot hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or
information. The reason proffered by Bryan and Giovan for their refusal to be arraigned, i.e., that to do so would
supposedly constitute a waiver of their right to appeal the resolutions of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice, appears
to be specious. Evidently, Bryan and Giovan only wanted the trial court to suspend the arraignment to enable them to
exhaust their remedy of appeal to the Secretary of Justice. However, Bryan and Giovan had no valid ground to move that
their arraignment be held in abeyance, considering that at that time they had not filed a petition for review of the
prosecutors resolution before the Department of Justice. It is also important to stress that to nullify the proceedings had
before the court a quo would set a dangerous precedent. For, all that an accused would do is to refuse to be arraigned and
then proceed to trial, and if found guilty would just invoke the absence of arraignment to set aside the proceedings had in
the trial court. Such practice would run counter to the purpose and spirit of our rules of procedure which is: to help
achieve an orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Nonetheless, Bryan and Giovan were substantially informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them when their counsel received a copy of the Prosecutors resolution
maintaining the charge for rape and acts of lasciviousness. The failure to read the complaint or information in a language
or dialect known to them was essentially a procedural infirmity that was eventually non-prejudicial to Bryan and Giovan.
Not only did they receive a copy of the information, they likewise participated in the trial, cross-examined the
complainant and her witnesses and presented their own witnesses to debunk and deny the charges against them. The
conduct of the defense, particularly their participation in the trial, clearly indicates that they were fully aware of the nature
and cause of the accusations against them. Interestingly, after the arraignment, the defense never brought up the supposed
invalidity or defect thereof. Rather, Bryan and Giovan and their counsel vigorously and fully participated in the trial of the
case. Bryan and Giovan are clearly estopped to question the alleged invalidity of or infirmity in their arraignment. By
actively participating in the trial of the case, they have effectively waived whatever procedural error there was in their
arraignment. In short, whatever was the defect in their arraignment was substantially cured by their own omission and
subsequent actions.
Page 84 of 155
Page 85 of 155
suspension of arraignment. True, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires a motion by the
proper party, but this new requirement of motion by the proper party could not be applied to these cases because the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such requirement, took effect only on 1 December 2000. Besides,
a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made by the person possessing such right. Unfortunately, Arnel was
apparently deprived of such mental faculties. Thus, no waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made by Arnel at
the time of his arraignment by reason of his mental condition. Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or
discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to
investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make
a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of
detention until his faculties are recovered. Moreover, the aforementioned Section 12(a) of Rule 116 mandates the
suspension of the arraignment and the mental examination of the accused should it appear that he is of unsound mind. In
these cases, the trial court should have ascertained Arnels mental state instead of proceeding with his arraignment and its
subsequent proceedings. The physical and outward manifestations of Arnel at the time of his arraignment, which were
brought to the attention of the trial court, indicated substantial demonstration of a mental disorder that rendered Arnel
unfit to be arraigned or tried in the four criminal cases. The trial court failed to exercise utmost circumspection in
assuming that Arnel was in full possession of his mental faculties and understood the proceedings against him. The
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries
with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare
for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental
deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully
satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives. Under the circumstances in
these cases, the trial court gravely failed in this regard.
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considering that Roberto and Ponciano were co-workers, (b) nighttime considering that Beverly was killed in the evening
and (c) despoblado considering that the nearest house to the situs criminis was 14 meters. The court sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death, to pay the costs, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim Beverly Onato in the amount of
P50,000.00. Hence, the automatic appeal.
Issue: Whether the trial court porperly informed the accused of the nature of the charges against him.
Held: The trial court is required to probe thoroughly into the reasons as well as the facts and circumstances for the change
of plea of the accused and his comprehension of his plea; explain to him the elements of the crime for which he is charged
as well as the nature and effect of qualifying circumstances, generic aggravating circumstances and mitigating
circumstances in the commission thereof; and inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil liabilities for the crime
for which he would plead guilty to. Herein, the Information was merely read and translated to Ostia in the waray dialect
which he understood. The trial court informed Ostia that by pleading guilty, he admitted all the facts alleged in the
Information and that the court would no longer conduct any trial but that it would impose on him the proper penalty for
the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a heinous crime under RA 7659 punishable by two
indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death and that either of said penalties may be imposed on him
depending upon the circumstances which may ultimately be appreciated by the court. When asked by the trial court if he
pleaded guilty on his own volition, and if nobody forced, threatened or coerced him into admitting having killed Beverly,
Ostia answered that he admitted having killed Beverly on his own free will. Thus, the trial court failed to comply with its
duties under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. It bears stressing that Ostia did not even know how to read and
write. In fact, he merely affixed his thumbmark on the Waiver of Right to a Preliminary Investigation. The trial court
failed to explain to Ostia (a) the nature of murder and the elements thereof; (b) that killing Beverly, a four-year old girl,
constituted treachery, a qualifying circumstance; Ostia being unlettered could not be presumed to understand the
requisites of treachery, a highly technical legal term; (c) the nature and effect of a qualifying aggravating circumstance in
the killing of Beverly and its effect on the penalty that may be imposed on him; (d) what heinous crimes are and the
meaning and import of indivisible penalties; (e) the specific circumstances which may be considered by the court in the
imposition of reclusion perpetua or death penalty; (f) whether his plea of guilty after the prosecution had commenced
presenting its evidence may still be considered by the trial court as a mitigating circumstance; (g) the nature of civil
liabilities that he may be ordered to pay and the amounts thereof. The trial court even failed to probe into the reasons for
Ostias change of plea from not guilty of rape with homicide to guilty of murder and for his failure to adduce
evidence during the reinvestigation of the case despite having been granted the right to do so by the trial court. The trial
court did not even bother inquiring from Ostia whether he sought the advice of his counsel before pleading guilty to
murder and whether he wanted to adduce evidence in his behalf to prove any mitigating circumstances in the commission
of the crime to warrant the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding the improvident plea of
guilty of Ostia, the Court found it unnecessary to remand the case to the trial court. This is so because independent of
Ostias plea of guilty and his testimony admitting liability for Beverlys death, the evidence adduced by the prosecution,
albeit circumstantial, established the guilt of Ostia for murder beyond reasonable doubt.
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right to public trial. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room
allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any
transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. It suffices to satisfy
the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with
what offense he may be charged." Reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least 14 hearings had been held in
chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of policemen. An objective appraisal of conditions in
municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling the apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional
command. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on
procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the
general public is much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the
occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more
considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied
whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the persons in court alert to his
demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because,
it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.
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Issue: Whether Aquino may waive his right to be present during the hearings before the Military Commission.
Held: As a general rule, subject to certain exceptions, any constitutional or statutory right may be waived if such waiver is
not against public policy. The personal presence of the accused from the beginning to the end of a trial for felony,
involving his life and liberty, has been considered necessary and vital to the proper conduct of his defense. The "trend of
modern authority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in a criminal case may waive irregularities and rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, very much the same as in a civil case." There are, for instance, certain rights secured to the
individual by the fundamental charter which may be the subject of waiver. The rights of an accused to defend himself in
person and by attorney, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to a speedy and public trial, and to meet
the witnesses face to face, as well as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. They are rights necessary either because of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial
trial, or of the need of protecting the individual from the exercise of arbitrary power. And yet, there is no question that all
of these rights may be waived. Under the present Constitution, trial even of a capital offense may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused. It is now provided that "after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." Thus, considering the
provisions of the Constitution and the absence of any law specifically requiring his presence at all stages of his trial, there
appears, therefore, no logical reason why Aquino, although he is charged with a capital offense, should be precluded from
waiving his right to be present in the proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, since this right was conferred upon
him for his protection and benefit. Further, Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court (Deposition of witness for
the prosecution) the "Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the examination or the taking of the
deposition after notice hereinbefore provided, shall be considered a waiver," Similarly, Presidential Decree 328 expressly
provides that "the failure or refusal to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver."
Herein, then, Aquino has the full right to waive his presence at said proceedings. Since only 6 Justices (Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Muoz Palma and Aquino) are of the view that Aquino may waive his right to be present at
all stages of the proceedings while 5 Justices (Castro, Makasiar, Esguerra, Concepcion Jr. and Martin) are in agreement
that he may so waive such right, except when he is to be identified, the result is that the Military Commission's Order
requiring his presence at all times during the proceedings before it should be modified, in the sense that Aquino's presence
shall be required only in the instance just indicated.
merit in its Resolution dated 5 August 1997. Duterte and de Guzman filed a special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether there was unreasonable delay in the termination of the irregularly conducted preliminary investigation.
Held: Compounding the deprivation of Duterte's and de Guzman's right to a preliminary investigation was the undue and
unreasonable delay in the termination of the irregularly conducted preliminary investigation. Their manifestation adopting
the comments of their co-respondents was filed on 18 February 1992. However, it was only on 22 February 1996 or 4
years later, that they received a memorandum dated 8 February 1996 submitted by Special Prosecutor Officer I Lemuel
M. De Guzman recommending the filing of information against them for violation of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). The inordinate delay in the conduct of the "preliminary investigation" infringed upon their
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their case. Further, the constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases does not come into play only when political considerations are involved. The Constitution makes no
such distinction. While political motivation in Tatad may have been a factor in the undue delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation therein to justify the invocation of their right to speedy disposition of cases, the particular facts
of each case must be taken into consideration in the grant of the relief sought. Duterte, et. al. herein could not have urged
the speedy resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still ongoing. Peculiar to this case is the fact that Duterte, et. al. were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits
which is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long
years of being in the dark, they, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or even novel reason which could
justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay the many layers of review that the
case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing. The
incident herein does not involve complicated factual and legal issues, especially in view of the fact that the subject
computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the AntiGraft League filed its
complaint. The Office of the Ombudsman capitalizes on Duterte, et. al.'s three motions for extension of time to file
comment which it imputed for the delay. However, the delay was not caused by the motions for extension. The delay
occurred after petitioners filed their comment. Between 1992 to 1996, Duterte, et. al. were under no obligation to make
any move because there was no preliminary investigation within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule II of A.O. No. 07 to
speak of in the first place. Hence, the petition was granted.
investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein.
Among this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver
and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time
they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied them the
right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 leave
them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or
refused to do so, The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes.
Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and
protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. When they so testified and produced evidence as ordered,
they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. It must be noted that initially the
provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows "That no person
shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes
no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not
to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to Ver, et. al. notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava
Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely denied the said sacred
constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. The review of the pleadings and
their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence
to and compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of the
constitutional standards both under the "due process clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV.
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. cannot be admitted against
them in any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence
of a grant of immunity by law.
Involuntary servitude
Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (1979)
Facts: Petitioner was assigned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the CFI Nueva Ecija. After said
appointment, he was employed in the Public Assistance and Claims Adjudication Division of the Insurance Commission.
After he had ceased to be a court stenographer, the CA required him to transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases
decided by Gapan Court which had been appealed. Because of his failure to comply with the resolutions of the CA, he
was declared in contempt of the court. Arrested and incarcerated until he could submit a complete transcript of his noted
in the said cases. Petitioner contends that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes after he ceased to be a court
stenographer would transgress the rule against involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972 Constitution). He was
averse to being subjected "to involuntary servitude sans compensation". He desired to be released from the obligation of
transcribing his notes. (He filed his petition in forma pauperis).
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners contention is tenable?
Held:
No. Involuntary Servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the condition of one
who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not.
That situation does not obtain in this case.
The traditional mode of exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in
contempt of court if he does not comply with the order for the transcription of his notes and imprison him until he obeys
the order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of Court).
Another sanction to compel the transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer, promotion, resignation or clearance of a
stenographer until he completes the transcription of his notes. This is provided for in Circular No. 63 of the Secretary of
Justice.
In the instant case, Aclaracion transcribed his notes in the Muncal and Paderes cases while he was an employee of the
Insurance Commission. During the time that he made the transcription, he received his salary as such employee.
In Re: Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara, G.R. No. 154037. April 30, 2003
FACTS:
Benjamin and the other petitioners are tenants of Berlito Taripe on a lot located in Paranaque City. It appears that the
property was included in the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution, and Partition pending before
the sala of Judge Fortunito Madrona, for the settlement of estate of the late Anselma P. Allers filed by Eleuteria. On
October 5, 1999, the probate court ordered the lessees, herein Benjamin and the other petitioners to pay monthly rentals to
Eleuteria, the duly appointed Special Administratrix. Copies of the order were furnished Benjamin by registered mail.
Five months later, Elueteria filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution to enforce the October 5, 1999 order. The writ
was duly issued, and the Sheriff conferred with lessees, who informed him that they already paid three months advance
rental to Taripe. On August 4, 2000, Elueteria filed a motion to require petitioners to explain why they should not be cited
in indirect contempt of court for disobeying the October 5, 1999 order of the probate court, which the trial court granted,
giving Benjamin and the others 20 days from receipt to explain why they should not be cited in indirect contempt of court.
After six months, the petitioners wrote the trial court, informing it that they are freezing the rental payments as they were
in a quandary as to whom it should be paid. Elueteria then filed a motion to cite Benjamin, et. al in contempt, which
motion was set for hearing. The trial court granted the motion, declared them in indirect contempt of court, ordered them
to pay a fine of P30,000.00, and ordered their imprisonment until such time that they paid their monthly rentals.
Again, Benjamin et. al wrote the trial court, asking it to lift the indirect contempt, and explained that their failure to attend
was due to financial constraint, they being ordinary construction workers, and living on minimum wages, and their failure
to pay the rentals was due to their quandary as to whom to remit it.
Eleuteria thereafter filed a motion for issuance of warrant of arrest against Benjamin, which the trial court granted. On
December 24, 2001, they were arrested by Ormoc City policemen.
Benjamin, et. al, thus filed a petition for issuance of habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals, which ordered their
temporary release. However, after hearing, their petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, they elevated their
case to the Supreme Court, holding that the indirect contempt citation issued by the court was improper, and the order to
imprison them for non-payment of rentals unlawful.
Issue: Whether or not they can be imprisoned for non-payment of rentals?
RULING:
The Supreme Court:
In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person
shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal
offense. It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or implied. In the present case, petitioners, as
recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix.
Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to
whom to pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them.
Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.
Double Jeopardy
People vs. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 (1968)
Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He
pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said
motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The
doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express
consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in
having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby
prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even
upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is
revived by the fiscal.
PSB v. Bermoy
G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005
FACTS: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (petitioner), respondents Pedrito and Gloria
Bermoy (respondent spouses) were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial
Court. Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for trial. After the
prosecution rested its case, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused. The trial court dismissed the case. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied petition holding that the trial court was correct in granting
the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper identification of the accused. But
even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on
petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. Thus this petition. The Solicitor
General contends that the trial courts dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.
ISSUE: W/N Double Jeopardy is applicable in the case at bar?
HELD: YES. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal case:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c)
(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[15]
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in
double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of
evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.[16] A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first
exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case No. 96154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of
respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally, Criminal
Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses.
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that [a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if
the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of
evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution and Section 7, the courts
are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.
or to appeal from the dismissal order, and not certiorari. Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e.,
(a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and,
(c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the defense of
double jeopardy must prevail.
Argel v Pascua
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131 8.20.01
FACTS: Petitioner who was charged with murder was previously acquitted by Judge Pascua. After his acquittal, said
Judge modified her decision on the account that she made a mistake of rendering her previous judgment believing there
was no witness against the accused due to the fact that the testimony of the witness was not attached to the records when
she wrote her decision. After finding the accused guilty of murder she ordered the arrest of the accused.
ISSUE: WON a final judgment by the court can be susceptible for amendment or modification.
RULING: No. The final judgment becomes the law of the case and is immune from alteration or modification regardless
of claims of incorrectness or error. A judgment of acquittal in criminal cases becomes immediately effective upon its
promulgation. It cannot be recalled for amendment only in case of any clerical error, clarify any ambiguity caused by
omission or mistake in the dispositive portion. The inherent power of the court to modify its decision does not extend to a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each
respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A
conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro
were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held,
presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and
after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way
out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a
scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the
prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of
some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of
total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a
public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired
gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner
consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused
are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby
avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks
after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was
in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by
virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and
their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from
Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President
Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the
Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was
clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian
powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of
one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the
cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice
Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would
have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the
integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights
are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been
taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments.
Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge
manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the
petitioner.
Page 131 of 155
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with
an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the
public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but
serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their
own conscience and honor.
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987]
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of
Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double
jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with
personnel of BatangasElectric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search
and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric
wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the
walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the plants electric meter. The case wasdismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed
nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and
prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City
Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting
damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to
quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first
offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation ofelectrical devices without the approval and necessary
authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed
to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different
crime charged against the 1st complainant against Mr. Opulencia.
Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged
against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the
Revised Penal Code.
Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously explained in
the case of Yap vs Lutero,the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that If an act is
punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the
case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of
double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if
the offensescharged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second
charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of
conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against
the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint
against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
offended party consent to the accused's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, Manuel cannot claim this
privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7 (c), Rule 117 which states that
"the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the
offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: xxx (c) the plea of guilty to
the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party." Under the rule, Manuel could
still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of
consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of
his change of plea was irregular and improper.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/
evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present
Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by
overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the
resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
SECTION 18.
Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein
private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from
the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters
attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
RULING: No.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to
appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the
CSC on said matter, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a
court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes
of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the merits
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question,
initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
ARTICLE XIV - EDUCATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS CULTURE AND SPORTS
Section 5.
Epicharis Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee
L-40779
November 28,
Facts:
1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A.in Theology;
2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-1976
respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission
in their school reason in the letter: Petitioners frequent questions and difficulties had the effect of slowing down the
progress of the class.
3. Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision was
final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School4. Petitioner then subsequently made
inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she
was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfil their requirements
for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in Theology which would entail about four to five
years more of studies whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it
would entail only about two years more.5. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in
the current semester
Issue:
Whether or not the Faculty Admissions Committee had authority and discretion inallowing petitioner to continue studying
or not?
Held:
Yes. Being a particular educational institution (seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit.Petitioner cannot compel
the mandamus to admit her into further studies since therespondent had no clear duty to admit the petitioner. That
respondent Fr. Lambino andLoyola School of Technology has the discretion whether to admit the petitioner or not.Factors
that were considered are academic standards, personality traits, character orientation and nature of Loyola School of
Theology as a seminary
Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court sees no useful purpose to be served by
remanding the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The, only acceptable reason for such a remand would be so
that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the petitioners' first have acted within the scope of their powers or
grossly abused them, a matter that this Court has already passed upon here. Such a remand cannot be justified on the
theory that the Trial Court will make its philosophy independent determination of whether or not respondent medical
institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its continued operation, since, as here ruled, it has not
that power. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the temporary restraining order issued
by the Court is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and
respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.
Lupangco v. CA
GR NO 77372 April 21 1988
Facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution
No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy.
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and
Regulations of the Commission
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like
them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to
declare the same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to
review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution.
In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.
Held: It is not constitutional. The questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the
integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional
infirmities. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without
any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the
fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in
attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will
promote their personal growth.
Reyes v. CA
FACTS: Respondent-students (students, for brevity) as then applicants to the University of the Philippines College, of
Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percentile in the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which was
the cutoff score prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as
approved by the University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986. However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cutoff score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88. Upon
appeal of some concerned Pre-Med students, the BOR in its 996th resolution dated February 24, 1987 reverted to the
NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile. The BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in its 997th resolution dated March 24,
1987. Subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant to the instruction of the Chancellor, conducted an
investigation on the student's case and recommended inter alia the admission of all applicants obtaining a percentile rating
ranging from 70 to 90 "as a matter of right". The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the BOR directive for
them to admit the students. This prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). On June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BOR (Board of Regents) has the power over Admission Requirements
HELD: No. Any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the College Faculty must bear the UCs approval; The
right and power to fix admission requirements is clearly vested by law in the University Council; The UC has the final say
in the admission requirements provided that it conforms with the law, rules and regulations of the university. In the event
the power is abused or misused, it becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest governing body in the university, to
step in and to correct the anomaly.
TAN vs. CA
FACTS: Sometime in 1986, private respondent Grace Christian High School ("Grace Christian") applied with the then
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) for a tuition-fee increase of fifteen percent (15%) for the School Year
(SY) 1986-87. Private respondent Grace Christian had applied for, and been granted, yearly increments in tuition fees
from SY 1973-74 (except for SY 1983-84) until SY 1985-1986. On 18 December 1986, Grace Christian received a notice
from the MECS that its fee-increase application had been definitely approved on 10 November 1986.
Meanwhile, a group of parents whose children are enrolled in Grace Christian, allegedly alarmed by what they perceived
to be the deterioration despite the periodic fee increases in academic standards and physical facilities of the school,
formed the Grace Christian High School Parents-Teachers Association ("Association"). The Association, composed of a
majority of the parents (despite its name, no faculty member sits on the executive committee) demanded: (a) recognition
as an organization; and (b) representation in Grace Christian's policy-making process, viz., faculty selection and
improvement of the physical plant. Feeling that their demands had been largely ignored, the Association in October 1985
asked for a formal dialogue with the school administration. During a heated exchange in this dialogue, one of the
petitioners herein, William Tiu, stood up and pointed a finger and shouted at Grace Christian's vice-principal, and later
spat on the latter.
On 23 September 1986, Grace Christian had been granted provisional authority by the MECS to impose a fifteen percent
(15%) increase in tuition fee for SY 1986-1987. Thereupon, some of the above-mentioned group of parents lobbied with
the other parents urging non-payment of the fee increase. During the enrollment period for the second semester of SY
1986-1987, a number of parents, among them petitioners (comprising nine [9] members or officers of the 19 member
executive committee, of the Association) refused to pay the incremental fee: Grace Christian in turn refused to receive
these parents' payment of regular (i.e., the fee before the fifteen [15%] increase) tuition fee for that semester. On 16
December 1986, Grace Christian reminded the parents about the payment of the approved increased tuition fee for the
second semester.
From 23 February to 5 March 1987, a group of parents, petitioners included, staged a rally outside the school gates.
Banners and placards critical of the school administration were set up. The latent animosity between the Association (or
some members thereof) and Grace Christian began to flare up. Petitioners first came out with statements in the print and
broadcast media attacking Grace Christian's periodic fee increases and allegedly deteriorating academic standards. Some
of the petitioners, armed with video-cameras, forced their way into the school premises and interrupted a class in session,
urging students therein to speak using the allotted class hour against school policies. Some of the students walked
out of their classrooms to join their parents in the rally outside.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has the freedom to choose its students.
HELD: Private schools are subject to reasonable regulation and supervision of the State, but they may also have the right
to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students.