PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Atty. Lopez-Rosario
I.
NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY
FACTS:
-

Rodolfo Navarro, the Mayor of Dapa, Surigao, filed an administrative case against
MCTC Judge Hernando Domagtoy
Navarro alleged that Domagtoy solemnized a wedding wherein the groom is still
married to another woman
Also, Domagtoys jurisdiction is in Sta. Monica-Burgos but performed a marriage
ceremony outside his jurisdiction, located in his residence at Dapa
In his defense, respondent stated that he merely relied on the affidavit issued that the
groom has not seen his wife for seven (7) years
As to the solemnization outside his jurisdiction, he maintained that he did not violate
Art. 7, Par. 1 of the Family Code

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a joint affidavit is sufficient proof of presumptive death, thereby giving
an ample reason to proceed with the marriage ceremony;
2. Whether or not Domagtoy has the authority to solemnize the marriage even outside
his jurisdiction
HELD:
1st Issue
-

According to Art. 41, Par. 2 of the Family Code, it is clearly stated that the spouse
must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract as subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage
subsequent marriages where it is not proven presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law
In the case at bar, without the judicial declaration, the groom remains to be married to
his wife and the act of Domagtoy resulted in a bigamous marriage under Art. 35 of the
Family Code
2nd Issue

Respondent was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa

The solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the courts jurisdiction is covered
by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code
The exceptions under Art. 8 cannot be applied in the present case because there is
no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent
judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Art. 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability

FACTOR, J.V.B.

II.
NIAL VS. BAYADOG
FACTS:
-

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones in 1974, and out of the marriage were
born herein petitioners
One (1) year and eight (8) months after the death of Bellones, Pepito and Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license in 1986
In lieu of the license, Pepito and Badayog executed an affidavit stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license
In 1997, Pepito died after which, the daughter of Pepito from the first marriage, filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of her father to Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment
of marriage under Art. 47 of the Family Code
The RTC ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void
their fathers marriage to respondent before his death
Petitioners filed a petition for review before the SC
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Nial and Badayogs cohabitation is the one contemplated under the
law;
2. Whether or not petitioners are among the persons who could file an action for
annulment of marriage
HELD:
**The solemnization of the marriage occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
1st Issue
-

No, at the time of Pepito and Normas marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five (5) years
Under the law, the 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the five (5) years and continuity
that is unbroken
The rationale for the securing of a marriage license is clearly stated under Articles 63
and 64 of the Civil Code
In the present case, from the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five(5) years, the fact remains that their 5-year cohabitation was not the one
contemplated by law because Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent
2nd Issue

Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage
Art. 47 pertains to the grounds, period and persons who can file an annulment suit,
not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage
Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of

2 FACTOR, J.V.B.

either in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid

FACTOR, J.V.B.

III.
BORJA MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ
FACTS:
-

Herminia Borja-Manzano claimed that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano but through Judge Roque Sanchez, his late husbands marriage with a
certain Luzviminda Payao was solemnized
Judge Sanchez claimed that when he officiated the marriage, he did not know that
Manzano was legally married and that he relied on the joint affidavit of the two stating
therein that they have been cohabitating for seven years without the benefit of
marriage
After an evaluation, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
The Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed
Complainant agreed but on Judge Sanchezs part, he fild a manifestation
He alleged that on the basis of the affidavits submitted by the late Manzano and of
Payao, who both expressly stated that they were married to somebody else and left
their previous families, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Art. 34 of the Family Code

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Manzano and Payao is valid
HELD:
- No, their marriage is void
- Art. 34 provides for the exemption to the rule regarding the requirement of marriage
license but not all of the requirements expressly provided in the said rule are present
in the present case
- It was clearly stated in their respective affidavits that both the late Manzano and
Payao have a prior existing marriage, such is a legal impediment to marry each other,
the fact, which, Judge Sanchez knew
- The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses
for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63 (1) of the Family Code allows spouses
who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but
in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation
does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry

IV.

4 FACTOR, J.V.B.

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO
FACTS:
-

Cipriano Obercido III was married to Lady Myros M. Villanueva in the Philippines
After a few years, Villanueva and their son left for the United States and later on
became a naturalized citizen
Cirpriano learned from their son that Villanueva obtained a divorce decree and
married an American citizen
Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Art. 26,
Par. 2 of the Family Code, which the court granted
The Republic through the OSG sought reconsideration but was denied
The OSG elevated the matter to the SC contending that Art. 26, Par. 2 of the Family
Code is not applicable because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cipriano can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code
HELD:
-

Yes, Cipriano may remarry

When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
The legislative intent of the said provision is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse
Taking into consideration the legislative intent, the said provision should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, ath the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree
Art. 25, Par. 2 of the Family Code presents two (2) elements:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitaing him or her to
remarry
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the two requisites for the application of the
provision are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse,
should be allowed to remarry

V.
ILUSORIO VS. ILUSORIO BILDNER
FACTOR, J.V.B.

FACTS:
-

Erlinda K. Ilusorio who was married to Potenciano Ilusorio filed a petition with the
Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of unlawful restraint of the subject
Erlinda K. Ilusorio appealed before the SC
The case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his
children , appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he
never refused to see her
SC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit
Erlinda K. Ilusorio moved for the reconsideration of the decision

ISSUE:
Whether or not Potenciano may be compelled to live together with Erlinda by a court order
HELD:
-

No, although the court agrees with Erlindas contention invoking Arts. 68 and 69 of the
Family Code, the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the
spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate
or court order to enforce consortium
There was an obvious absence of empathy between the spouses, having separated
from bed and board since 1972. As defined by the court, empathy as a shared feeling
between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion

VI.
JADER MANALO VS. CAMAISA

6 FACTOR, J.V.B.

FACTS:
- Petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an advertisement placed
by respondents, the Spouses Norma Fernandez and Edilberto Camaisa, about a tendoor apartment in Makati and Taytay, which are both for sale
- After the inspection of the said lots and pertinent documents, petitioner met with
respondents and made a definite offer to buy the properties to Edilberto with the
knowledge and conformity of the wife in the presence of the real estate broker, to
which Edilberto agreed
- The agreement was in writing by the petitioner and signed by Edilberto who assured
the former of his wifes conformity and consent to the sale
- For two (2) consecutive days, petitioner met with the respondents, on the first day,
petitioner met with Edilberto for the formal signing and delivery of the checks, and on
the second day, petitioner met with Norma for the clarification of some provisions of
the contracts
- When petitioner met again with respondents for the formal affixing of Normas
signature, she was surprised upon learning that the spouses are backing out of the
agreement because they needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration
- To make Norma sign, petitioner reminded them that the contracts to sell had already
been perfect and the refusal to sign would prejudice her, but to no avail
- Petitioner then filed a complaint before the RTC, which was countered by the
spouses, answering that it was an agreement between petitioner and Edilberto and
the sale was still subject to conformity of the wife
- Norma filed a Motion for Summary Judgment before the trial court, then the latter
dismissed the complaint on the ground that under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the
court cannot intervene to authorize transact tion in the absence of the consent of the
wife since said wife who refused to give consent had not been shown to be
incapacitated
- Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA and affirmed the dismissal stating that the
properties subject of the contracts were conjugal properties and as such, the consent
of both spouses is necessary to give effect to the sale
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the contracts to sell between the petitioner and respondent spouses
were already perfect such that the latter could no longer back out of the agreement
HELD:
-

No, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife
must concur because the properties subject of the contracts in this case were
conjugal
Art. 124 of the Family Code requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the
husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the
wife, other wise, the disposition is void
Respondent admitted that she did not give her consent to the sale and although she
may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, the
law still requires her written consent to the sale for validity, and being merely aware of
a transaction is not consent
The court authorization under Art. 124 of the Family Code may not also be sought
because it can only be resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give
consent is incapacitated

VII.
AYALA INVESTMENT VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTOR, J.V.B.

FACTS:
-

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC)
As added security for the credit line, respondent-husband Alfredo Ching, Executive
Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and
severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC
When PBM failed to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case against the former and Alfredo
Ching
The court rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay
AIDC
AIDC filed a motion which caused the lower court to issue a writ of execution
Thereafter, Magsajo, the Deputy Sheriff caused the issuance and service upon
respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale, which he then scheduled the auction
Private respondents filed a case against petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging
that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied
on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, to which the court granted
AIDC filed a petition before the CA questioning the lower courts order
The auction took place and AIDC won
The CA then granted AIDCs petition but denied the petition insofar as it seeks to
enjoin the respondent Judge from proceeding with the other civil case
AIDC filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied
The respondent court rendered a decision affirming the decision of the trial court
ruling that the loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the
advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
petitioners-appellees
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration which was denied by the respondent court
Petitioner filed a petition before the SC

ISSUE:
Whether or not obligation incurred by the respondent-husband did not redound to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of the private respondent
HELD:
-

No,
There is no difference between the terms redounded to the benefit of or benefited
from on the one hand; and for the benefit of on the other
Art 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Art. 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded,
which used the term for the benefit of. On the other hand, Art. 122 of the Family
Code provides that The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family. As can be seen, the terms are used
interchangeably
Even in such kind of accommodation, a benefit for the family may also result, when
the guarantee is in favor of the husbands employer. However, the benefits
contemplated by Art. 161 of the Civil Code are different. The benefits must be one
directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the
loan itself
In accommodation contracts of the husband, the Court requires that there must be the
requisite showing some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the
spouses or benefits to his family or that such obligations are productive of some
benefit to the family. Unfortunately, in this case there were no proofs showing any of
it
The provisions of the Family code is applicable in the case because they highlight the
underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the
husbands duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it

8 FACTOR, J.V.B.

This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations
entered into by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the
family and that the measure of the partnerships liability is to the extent that the
family is benefited.
There are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the Civil
Code which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any part of
the conjugal property

VIII.
MODEQUILLO VS. BREVA

FACTOR, J.V.B.

FACTS:
- On January 29, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a judgment against Jose
Medequillo and one Benito Malubay to pay jointly and severally to a certain Francisco
Salinas
- The Regional Trial Court issued a writ of execution on the giids abd cgatteks if
Modequillo
- The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land and an agricultural lang registered in
the name of Modequillo
- Modequillo filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the residential land is where the
family home was built since 1969 and was constituted as a family home under the
Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988
- The trial court denied the motion
- Modequillo elevated the matter to the SC arguing that the residential house and llot is
exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated in Art. 155 of the Family Codel
and that the decision in this case pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular
accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which became final in 1988 is not one of
those instances enumerated under Art. 155 of the Family Code when the family home
may be levied upon and sold on execution.
- Modequillo also alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the said house and lot
became a family home only on Aug. 4, 1988 when the Family Code became effective,
and that the Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that all family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupancy prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that they are eexempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of said Code;
and that it also erred when it declared that Art. 162 of the Family Code does not state
that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject family home is exempt execution of the money judgment
HELD:
- No, the subject family home is not exempt
- Under Art. 153 the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute
the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually
resides in the premises, it is therefore, a family home as contemplated by law
- Under Art. 155 of the Family Code, it states that the family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sake or attachment except in cases of debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home and such exemption provided as aforestated is
effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein
- In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as
a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a
family home by operation of law only under Art. 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed
constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on Aug. 3, 1988
not Aug. 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on Aug. 4, 1987
(1988 being a leap year)
- Art. 162 of the Family Code does simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectitvity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code
- Art. 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive
effect
- The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the
time of the vehicular accident on Mar. 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising
therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on Jan. 29, 1988. Both preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on Aug. 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
xemptions from execution provided in the Family Code

1 FACTOR, J.V.B.
0

IX.
ANDAL VS. MACARAIG
FACTS:
FACTOR, J.V.B.

1
1

Emiliano Andal, son of respondent Eduvigis macaraig, became sick of tuberculosis

Felix Andal, brother of Emiliano, lived with his brother to help him with his house and
work
Emilianos case worsen on or about September 10, 1942, that he could hardly move
and get up from his bed
On September 10, 1942, Maria Dueas, Emilianos wife, eloped with Felix, and both
went to live in the house of Marias father, until the middle of 1943
Since May 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as
husband and wife
On January 1, 1943, Maria Duenas gave birth to a boy who she named Mariano
Andal
Mariano Andal as assisted by his mother Maria Dueas filed a case before the lower
court to which it rendered judgment in favor of them declaring Amriano Andal as the
legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land
Eduvigis Macaraig, took the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mariano Andal is a legimate child
FACTS:
-

Yes, Mariano is the legitimate child of Emiliano Andal

Art. 108 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 108. Children born after the one hundred and eighty (180) days next following
that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred (300) days next
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for
the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty
(120) days of the three hundred (300) next preceding the birth of the child.

There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial
period of conception, specially during the period comprised between Aug. 21, 1942
and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 days next
preceding the birth of Mariano Andal
Even if the brother was living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging
in illicit intercourse since May 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between
Emiliano and his wife
Even if Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis that he could barely even
move, still, that does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons
suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage
because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse
According to Manresa, impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1)
absence during the initial period of conception; (2) impotence which is patent,
continuing and incurable; and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations
Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least has access one to the other, and
Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within three (3) days following the
dissolution of the marriage

X.
ROCES VS. CIVIL REGISTRAR
FACTS:

1 FACTOR, J.V.B.
2

Joaquin P. Roces filed with the Court of First Instance a petition alleging that he is
married to Pacita Carvajal and that he came to know of the existence of a birth
certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar, mentioning him as the father of
one Ricardo V. Roces, an illegitimate child
The birth certificate also shows that it had been executed which neither the
knowledge nor the consent of the petitioner
The Local Civil Registrar filed an answer stating that he had no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments and pursuant to
Art. 412 of the Civil Code, it would effect the correction needed
Ricardo Joaquin V Roces, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Carmen
O. Valdellon intervened and opposed the petition on the ground that it involves not
merely correction of clerical errors but controversial matter and that there is another
pending action involving the same question involving the same question
The lower court issued an order dismissing the petition
Petitioner sought a review before the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements in said birth certificate identifying the alleged father of said
child are valid
HELD:
-

No, the statements are invalid

Art. 280 and Sec. 5 of Act No. 3753 explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the
father of a child born outside wedlock when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is
not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any information or
circumstance by which he could be identified.
According to the said birth certificate, the mother of the child is said to be single, that
the certificate is signed by the physician, and the father of the child, it states that said
petitioner is married. On the back of the instrument there is a sworn statement of the
mother about the truth of the data therein contained
Petitioner did not subscribe either to the birth certificate or the verified statement or
any other declaration of similar import
Appearing on the face of the birth certificate of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces, that the
alleged father of child has not signed the instrument, it is clear that the statements
therein relative to the identity of the father of said child are an open violation of the
law

XI.
ILANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
FACTOR, J.V.B.

1
3

Leoncia Delos Santos and Artemio G. Ilano first met at the formers workplace. On
another occasion, they met again and from there their love story blossomed
The two eloped and lived in a house near Artemios office in Pampanga where
Artemio would come home to her three (3) or four (4) times a week
There, an apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the same
company where Artemio is working who took care of the necessities of Leoncia,
including bills and rental payment
In June of 1962, Leoncia who was conceiving at the time, was fetched by petitioner
and they transferred to Pasay
In December 30, 1963, Leoncia bored a female child who was later named
Merceditas S. Ilano
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living, he showed concern as the
father by being with her, taking her to restaurants, and signing of report cards
When Artemio ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave Leoncia
his picture with the following dedication: To Nene, with best regards, Temiong.
When Leoncia was undergoing labor, it was her aunt who accompanied her to the
hospital. Petitioner was with her in the afternoon so when the nurse needed
information about Leoncia (who was still unconscious at the time), she took it from
him. It was already seven oclock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the
following morning for Artemios signature but he left an instruction to give the birth
certificate to Leoncia for her signature because he was leaving early in the morning
Petitioner contradicted every testimony of Leoncia
He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures of documents and papers, and
even pointed Melencio Reyes to be the lover of Leoncia, and not him
Nida Ilano Ramos, daughter of Artemio vouched for her father, who claimed that she
does not know Leoncia, and that he was all the time at home during the occasions
mentioned by Leoncia
Victoria J. Ilano, petitioners wife, also corroborated the testimonies and said that her
husband never slept out of their house because of his capacity as the President of the
phone company where he and Melencio worked
The trial court was not fully satisfied that Artemio is the father of Merceditas
The Court of Appeals then reversed the decision of the trial court
Hence, the present petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not Artemio is the father of the plaintiff
HELD:
-

Yes, Artemio is the father of Merceditas

The relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as
his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabitated with
the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.

Art. 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in
accordance with Art. 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to
support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code

1 FACTOR, J.V.B.
4

The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the transgressions of social
conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon them. They were
born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the
disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents
The belated denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative
father is not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which had already
been recognized by defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing that he is
plaintiffs father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable and cannot be
withdrawn
A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of
person, the permanence of which affects public interest. Even when the act in which it
is made should be revocable, the revocation of such act will not revoke the
recognition itself
To be sure, to establish the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
Continuous does not, however, mean that the concession of status shall continue
forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own,
directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment through
without publicity. There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care
The totality of the evidence is more than sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that appellee is the father of the plaintiff Merceditas
An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed affiliation by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, according to the Civil Code, such
evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible
in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
adminission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
The last paragraph of Art. 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all
the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. Any other evidence or proof that the
defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs
of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition
is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be
enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation
evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation

XII.
LIYAO VS. TANHOTI-LIYAO
FACTOR, J.V.B.

1
5

FACTS:
-

Corazon G. Garcia is separated in-fact from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10)
years
Corazon cohabited with William Liyao from for ten (10) years until his death. Living
with them are Corazons two (2) children from Ramon in White Plains
Corazon gave birth to William Liyao Jr. (Billy)
William Liyao did all the duties and responsibilities of a father while he was still alive
such as paying the necessities, opening a trust fund for his son, bringing Billy to the
office, playing with him and taking care of him
Every time he is with Billy, he introduces him as his son even during important
occasions like Williams last birthday held at the Republic Supermarket
Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a
recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt
acts
After William Liyaos death, Corazon became the sole provider of Billy
Several people including Maurita Pasion and Gloria Panopio, close friend and
neighbor respectively of Corazon and William both testified stating that, they knew
Corazon, William, and Billy. William would always introduce Billy to be his son and
during his birthday, he introduced Billy as his son. He would also talk about his plan
for the baptism of Billy that it would be so grand that he would make the bells of San
Sebastian Church ring
Respondents, daughters and wife of William, contradicted the witnesses testimonies
by stating that Corazon is still legally married to Ramon Yulo, who at one time was
chanced upon by Linda, picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Also, that
their family never received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William
Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of their father
The trial court sided with Corazon Garcia thatWilliam Liyao Jr is the son of William
Liyao since the former was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited
with the deceased
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling saying that the law favors the legitimacy
rather than the illegitimacy of the child and the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted
only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife
was physically impossible at the period cited in Art. 257 in relation to Art. 255 of the
Civil Code
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
Whether or not William Liyao, Jr may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the
estate of his supposed father?
HELD:
-

No, he may not impugn his own legitimacy

General rule is that a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to
be legitimate but may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary as stated under Art.
255
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon
Yulom at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Art. 255 of the Civil Code may
only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set
forth under Art. 262 of the Civil Code
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and
he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view
of the moral and economic interest involved.

1 FACTOR, J.V.B.
6

XIII.
TAMARGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTOR, J.V.B.

1
7

FACTS:
-

On October 20, 1982, Adelberto, who was then 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted to her death
Complaints were filed before the RTC against Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelbertos
natural parents
The RTC ordered that Adelberto be acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on
the ground that he had acted without discernment
On December 10, 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to
adopt Adelberto, which was granted on November 18, 1982, after Adelberto shot and
killed Jennifer
The natural parents of Adelberto answered that the adopting parents should be the
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed
The Tamargos contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with
his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the
mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption
The trial court dismissed the petitioners complaint, ruling that the natural parents of
Adelberto were not the indispensable parties to the action

ISSUE:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be
given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a
damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when
actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents
HELD:
-

No, the retroactive effect may not be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose
a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had
no actual or physical custody over the adopted child
Retroactive effect may be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such
is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
child
Art. 2180 imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them
The responsibility treated of in the above article shall cease when the person
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage
Under the Doctrine of Imputed Negligence or vicarious liability, a person is not only
liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom
he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is
made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents
which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor is the relationship existing
between the parents and the minor child living wuth them and over whom, the law
presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control
The above provision is re-enacted under Art. 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
and Art. 221 of the Family Code
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred
when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural
parents of the Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then
actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for the
damages
XIV.
MARIATEGUI VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

1 FACTOR, J.V.B.
8

Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime and when he died, he
did not leave a will
He begot four (4) children from his first wife, and three (3) each from his second and
third wife
Lupo left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried
Lupos descendants from his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves the Muntinglupa
Estate
Lupos children from his third marriage filed with the lower court a claim that three of
the lots were owned by their common father, Lupo, and that, with the adjudication of
one of the lots to their co-heirs, they were deprived of their respective shares in the
lots
The children from the first and second marriages filed a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that the complaint was one for recognition of natural children
The trial court denied the motion to dismissed so the plaintiffs elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals, which declared that all the children and descendants of Lupo
are entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo
The defendants-appelles filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were
able to prove their successional rights over said estate
HELD:
-

Yes, they were able to prove their successional rights

Art. 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or
by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents
While the trial court found Jacintos testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in
substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided,
these are but minor details
The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of
Felipa, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupos death

XV.
IN RE: ASTORGA GARCIA
FACTS:
FACTOR, J.V.B.

1
9

Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child, Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia
He alleged that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname ad
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent
Petitioner then prayed that Stephanies middle name, Astorga be changed to Garcia,
her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig
The trial court rendered decision granting the adoption
Petitioner filed a motion for clarification praying that Stephanie should be allowed to
use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name
The trial court denied petitioners motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name
Hence, the present petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father
HELD:
-

Yes, an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
A surname is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he
bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him
The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname
to which the child is entitled is fixed by law
Arts. 364 to 384 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the
use of surname of an individual whatever may be his status in life
There is no law regulating the use of a middle name
The members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as
his middle name
In case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical
act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to
consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code and
Sec. 17 Art. V of RA 8552
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother
Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname as her middle name will maintain
her maternal lineage
Art. 189 (3) of the Family Code and Sec. 18, Art. V of RA 8552 provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future
XVI.
TONOG VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

2 FACTOR, J.V.B.
0

Dinah B. Tonog who was cohabiting with Edgar V. Daguimol gave birth to an
illegitimate daughter, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog
A year after her birth, Gardin Faith was left in the care of the father when Tonog left
for the United States to work as a nurse
Daguimol filed a petition for guardianship over the baby before the trial court, which
rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor
Tonog only learned of the judgment after a few months so she filed a petition for relief
from judgment
The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed petitioner to file her
opposition
Daguimol moved for reconsideration and in relation Tonog filed a motion to remand
custody of Gardin Faith to her
The trial court denied Daguimols motion for reconsideration and granted Tonogs
motion for custody
Daguimol file a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the actuations of the
trial court
CA dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of merit
Daguimol filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA to which it modified its
previous decision
According to the CA the psychological and emotional effects of the transfer of custody
to the child should be considered
Tonog appealed to the SC

ISSUE:
Whether or not the temporary custody of the child should be given to the mother, Dinah B.
Tonog
HELD:
-

No, bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find
that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her
The child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the people and pplaces to which she had apparently
formed an attachement
Art. 220 of the Family Code thus provides that parents and individuals exercising
parental authority over their unemancipated children are entitled, among other rights,
to keep them in their company. In legal contemplation, the true nature of the parentchild relationship encompasses much more than the implication of ascendancy of one
and obedience by the other
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law
The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to
a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation or parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same
Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Art. 176 of the Family Code provides
that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother
Art. 213 if the Family Code provides that no child under seven (7) years of age shall
be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother
has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a
mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule
has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child; those cases must indeed
be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of
adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will
FACTOR, J.V.B. 2

ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have
any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation

XVII.
TIJING VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:

2 FACTOR, J.V.B.
2

Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are spouses who have six children. The youngest
being Edgagrdo Tijing, Jr. was born at a lying in clinic in Manila
Bienvenida serves as a laundrywoman of respondent Angelita Diamante, who looks
after Edgardo, Jr. every time Bienvenida does the laundry
The issue started when Angelita went to Bienvenidas house to fetch for an urgent
laundry job but since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked to
wait until she returned.
Bienvenida then left Edgardo, Jr. to Angelita but was shocked when she returned
home and did not find the two
Bienvenida went to Angelitas house but the maid told her that Angelita was out for a
stroll and asked her to come back later
Bienvenida returned to Angelitas house after three (3) days only to find out that the
latter already moved to another place
Bienvenida went to the barangay and the police to seek help but they seemed
unmoved by her pleas
Four years later, upon finding out about the death of Angelitas alleged common-law
husband, Tomas Lopez, in a tabloid, she hurriedly went to the place
There, she saw her alleged son who was named Tomas Lopez according to Benjamin
Lopez, brother of Angelitas common-law husband
She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so
Spouses Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus with the trial court to recover their
son
They presented two witnesses, Lourdes Vasquez, the nurse and midwife of the clinic
where Edgardo Jr was born, and Benjamin Lopez
Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in the delivery of Edgardo jr and showed
clinical records and signatures
Benjamin Lopez declared that his brother, the late Thomas Lopez, could not have
possibly father Edgardo Jr. because he lost his child-bearing capacity due to an
accident wherein he bumped his private part against the edge of a banca. Also,
Thomas Lopez revealed to him that Edgardo Jr. was only an adopted son
Angelita on the other hand, claimed that she is the natural mother, giving birth to John
Thomas Lopez at a lying-in clinic in Manila and that it was Tomas Lopez who
registered the birth of the child with the local civil registrar
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Tijings
Angelita appealed to the CA which reversed and set aside the decision of the lower
court
Petitioners sought reconsideration before the SC

ISSUE:
Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person,
and is the son of petitioners?
HELD:
-

Yes, a close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented
by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her
missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
The court believed in the testimonies of the witnesses of the spouses Tijing and
documents they provided
It was also unusual the fatc that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed
by Thomas Lopez instead of the midwife four (4) months after the alleged birth of the
child. Under the law, the attending physicial or midwife in attendance at birth should
cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can
the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil
registrar within thirty (30) days after the birth
Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private
respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Bulacan, which is false
because even private respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife
FACTOR, J.V.B.

2
3

XVIII.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. CAPITANOS
FACTS:

2 FACTOR, J.V.B.
4

St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrolment drive which included
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying
Shserwin Capitanos, being a student of the said school was part of the campaigning
group
On the day of the campaign, Sherwin along with other high school students were
riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva
The jeep was driven by James Daniel II, also a minor and student of the said school
Daniel allegedly drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned
turtle, which caused the injuries of Carpitanos, who later on died due to the injuries
suffered
Spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel
II and his parents, Vivencio Villanueva, the vehicle owner, and St. Marys Academy
The RTC rendered a decision holding all the respondents liable for damages
St. Marys Academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
promulgated a decision affirming the decision of the lower court but reducing the
amount of the actual damages
St. Marys filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
Hence, this appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not St. Marys Academy should be held liable under the provisions of the Family
Code
HELD:
-

No, St. Marys Academy should be exempted from liability

The respondents reliance on Art. 219 of the Family Code that those given the
authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor was unfounded
Also, the provisions which the Court of Appeals based their decision on was
unfounded such as Arts. 218 and 219 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner
was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the
minor students in the jeep
For the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered
as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury cause because the negligence
must have a casual connection to the accident
The fault was to be attributed to the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep and for the allowing James Daniel II to drive the vehicle even though at the time,
there was somebody else who was driving the said vehicle

XIX.
REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA
FACTS:
FACTOR, J.V.B.

2
5

Roridel O. Molina commenced the action for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage with Reynaldo Molina which bore them a son
It was alleged that Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a
husband and a father since he spent more time and money with his friends, and he
gets money from his parents for aid and assistance. Also, he was relieved from his
job and so, Roridel became the sole breadwinner. Lastly, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City, then a couple weeks
later, Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and their child
In Reynaldos answer, he admitted that they both could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to his wifes strange behavior and refusal to perform the duties and
responsibilities of a wife
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void
The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the RTC
The Soliitor General filed a petition insisting that the interpretation of the CA of the
phrase psychological incapacity was incorrect because opposing and conflicting
personalities is not equivalent to such

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in its interpretation of the phrase psychological
incapacity
HELD:
-

No, the CA incorrectly interpreted the phrase psychological incapacity

In Leeouel Santos vs. CA, it was ruled that psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity and that there is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability
In the present case, there is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoke of
is an incapacity because it is more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect
in the performance of some marital obligations
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed
down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

2 FACTOR, J.V.B.
6

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.

XXI.
MARCOS VS. MARCOS
FACTOR, J.V.B.

2
7

FACTS:
-

Wilson G. Marcos is married to Brenda B. Marcos and out of their marriage, give (5)
children were born
The two first met when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, where
she was an escort of Imee Marcos and he was a Presidential Guard of the President
Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts
When they got married, they stayed at the housing unit acquired by Brenda when she
was still single
After they left the military service, Wilson engaged in different business ventures but
did not prosper. Brenda always urged him to look for work so that their children would
see him, instead of her as the head of the family
For failing to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and when
things get worse, he would hit her and beat their children, and sometimes he would
force her to have sex with him even though she still already tired
After a few years, they lived separately, but the worst situation that made the straw
broke the camels back was when they had a quarrel. She would not want to see him
anymore because they were already living separately, but there was a time when he
came ho their house that when she saw him, she lambasted her. In turn, he inflicted
physical harm on her and her mother who came to her aid
She and their children eventually left the house and lived in her sisters home
She submitted herself to medical evaluations which were diagnosed as contusions
The following year, when one of their children went missing, she went with her sister
and driver to their house but upon seeing them, Wilson ran after them with a samurai
and beat the driver
Brenda submitted herself to psychological evaluation but Wlson did not
The RTC ruled that the marriage between petitioner Brenda and Wilson was declared
null and void
The CA reversed the RTCs decision holding that psychological incapacity had not
been established by the totality of the evidence presented
Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not Wilson Marcos suffers from psychological incapacity
HELD:
-

No, the evidence presented does not show such incapacity

The behavior of the respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver
Art. 36 of the Family Code is not ot be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serios
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is
a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Arts. 68 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Coe
Neither is Art. 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void
XXII.
BUENAVENTURA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

2 FACTOR, J.V.B.
8

FACTS:
-

The petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage was file by petitioner Noel
Buenaventura on the ground of alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel
Singh Buenaventura
After the wife filed an answer, Noel amended his petition by stating that both of them
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage
Respondent denied the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated
RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void ab initio, and asked
Noel to pay damages
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for lack of
merit
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was again denied
Petitioner filed an instant petition before the SC

ISSUE:
Whether or not damages should be awarded in a case of nullity of marriage
HELD:
-

The moral damages should not be awarded

By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated
The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering
into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a
consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner
purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it
was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral
damages was without basis in law and in fact
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of
exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages

XXIII.
ONG VS. ONG
FACTOR, J.V.B.

2
9

FACTS:
-

Ong Eng Kiam (William Ong) was married to Lucita G. Ong and out of the marriage,
were three (3) children
Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under art. 55, par. (1) of the Family Code
before the RTC
She alleged that their marriage was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation
and grossly abusive conduct
Lucita claimed that everyday, they would quarrel and during heated arguments
William would shout invectives at her and beat her in every possible way; He would
also beat their children using the buckle of his belt; all of these due to petty things
such as issues regarding their business or their children; The worst of the incidents
that made Lucita leave was went William inflicted harm on her and while bending
down due to pain, William pointed a gun at her
William denied all the allegations including physical harm and shouting invectives.
Although, he admitted that they quarreled, he left the house and it was only when he
went back home to work that he learned that Lucita already left the house
The RTC rendered its decision decreeing legal separation
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision
Both the RTC and CA relied heavily on the straightforward and credible testimonies
which proved that there was an adequate ground for legal separation under Art. 55,
par (1) of the Family Code
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA
Hence, the present petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not the legal separation should be allowed between the Ong spouses
HELD:
-

Yes, it should be allowed

Without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the
Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties
have given ground for legal separation
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his
abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said
provision

XXIV.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL
REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG

3 FACTOR, J.V.B.
0

FACTS:
-

Julian lin Carulasan Wang was born to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang
who were then not yet married to each other
When they got married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son to be able to
change the childs name from to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
They were planning to stay in Singapore for a long time together with Julians sister
who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore, middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian
will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a
middle name. Furthermore, the children might ask whether they are siblings since
they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin
language because they pronounce R as L
The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition
According to the RTC, under art. 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why
this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a
minor
The Court required the OSG to comment on the petition, the latter sided with the trial
court
The OSG argued that under art. 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied
by the mere expedient of dropping the same. Also, there is no showing that the
dropping of the middle name is in the best interest of the child, since mere
convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or
cancellation of entry
Petitioner then filed a petition before the SC

ISSUE:
Whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Art. 174 of the Family
Code
HELD:
-

No, the law does not allow the same

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name. Among the ground for change of name which have been held valid
are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desire change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice publice interest
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) it is absolute, intended to
protect the individual from being confused with others; (2) it is obligatory in certain
respects, for nobody can be without a name; (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings; (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable
and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis cause; lastly, (5) It is imprescriptible
The above citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not
mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve
to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has

FACTOR, J.V.B.

3
1

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name

3 FACTOR, J.V.B.
2