Rule of Law

Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional
certain presidential decrees and executive orders of the
martial law era and under the incumbency of Pres. Estrada
relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds,
particularly: Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of
P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313.
On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that
established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the
development of the coconut industry through capital
financing. Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer
the Fund through the Coconut Investment Company (CIC)
whose objective was, among others, to advance the coconut
farmers interests.For this purpose, the law imposed a levy
ofP0.55on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every
100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he
was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock.
In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved
the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of the
coconut farmers to enable such bank to promptly and
efficiently realize the industry's credit policy. Thus, the PCA
bought 72.2% of the shares of stock of First United Bank,
headed by Pedro Cojuangco.Dueto changes in its corporate
identity and purpose, the banks articles of incorporation were
amended in July 1975, resulting in a change in the banks
name from First United Bank United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB).
In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued
Executive Order (E.O.) 312, establishing a Sagip Niyugan
Program which sought to provide immediate income
supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation
of a sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and

other coconut products.The Executive Order sought to

establish aP1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired
using coco-levy funds or assets of entities supported by
those funds. A committee was created to manage the fund
under this program. A majority vote of its members could
engage the services of a reputable auditing firm to conduct
periodic audits.
At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313,
which created an irrevocable trust fund known as the
Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).This aimed to provide
financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut
industry, and to other agri-related programs. The shares of
stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Funds initial capital.
These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted
approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of
SMC.E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust
Department, as the Trust Funds trustee bank. The Trust Fund
Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the
operations of the Trust Fund. The Committee would designate
an external auditor to do an annual audit or as often as
needed but it may also request the Commission on Audit
(COA) to intervene.
To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, the Office of the Solicitor
General, and other government agencies to exclude the 27%
CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled Republic of the
Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,which was then
pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift the
sequestration over those shares.
On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and
313. This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner
organizations and individuals brought the present action in
G.R. 147036-37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional. On April 24,
2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations and

individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D.

755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for
being unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds?
Whether or not(a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section
5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 are
unconstitutional?

RULING:

R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the
governments general funds butto provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the
coconut industry, which is so affected with public interest as
to be within the police power of the State. The funds sought
to support the coconut industry,one of the main economic
backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits
for the coconut farmers and farm workers.
Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. Its
character as such fund was made clear by the fact that they
were deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned government
bank) and not in the Philippine Treasury.

1. coco levy as public funds

2. constitutionality of the assailed p.d.s and e.o.s

The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised
pursuant to law to support a proper governmental
purpose.They were raised with the use of the police and
taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut
industry and its farmers in general.The COA reviewed the use
of the funds.The BIR treated them as public funds and the
very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public
character.

The Court has already passed upon this question in Philippine

Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic of
the Philippines. It held as unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D.
755 for effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize portions of
theCCS Fundto pay the financial commitment of the farmers
to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCS Fund
levies with UCPB interest free. And as there also provided,
the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like levies that PCA is authorized
to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary
funds to be transferred to the general fund of the
Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds.

The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds
are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public
purpose.Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from
persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty for the support of the government and for all
itspublic needs. Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed
pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276.The funds
were collected and managed by the PCA,an independent
government corporation directly under the President.And, as
the respondent public officials pointed out, thepertinent laws
used the termlevy, which meansto tax, in describing the
exaction.

In any event, such declaration is void. There is ownership

when a thing pertaining to a person is completely subjected
to his will in everything that is not prohibited by law or the
concurrence with the rights of another. An owner is free to
exercise all attributes of ownership: the right, among others,
to possess, use and enjoy, abuse or consume, and dispose or
alienate the thing owned. The owner is free to waive all or
some of these rights in favor of others.But in the case of the
coconut farmers, they could not, individually or collectively,
waive what have not been and could not be legally imparted

to them.
Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III,Section 5of P.D. 961, and
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact
that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through
taxation.And since taxes could be exacted only for a public
purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of
individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct
group of persons.
These assailed provisions,which removed the coco-levy funds
from the general funds of the government and declared them
private properties of coconut farmers,do not appear to have
a color of social justice for their purpose.The levy on copra
that farmers produce appears, in the first place, to be a
business tax judging by its tax base.The concept of farmersbusinessmen is incompatible with the idea that coconut
farmers are victims of social injustice and so should be
beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their earnings.
On another point, in stating that the coco-levy fund shall not
be construed or interpreted, under any law or regulation, as
special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds
of the national government,P.D.s 961 and 1468 seek to
remove such fund from COA scrutiny.

government money and property.The cited P.D.s and E.O.s

also contravene Section 2 of P.D. 898 (Providing for the
Restructuring of the Commission on Audit), which has the
force of a statute.And there is no legitimate reason why such
funds should be shielded from COA review and audit.The
PCA, which implements the coco-levy laws and collects the
coco-levy funds, is a government-owned and controlled
corporation subject to COA review and audit.
E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity.Apparently, it
intends to create a trust fund out of the coco-levy funds to
provide economic assistance to the coconut farmers and,
ultimately, benefit the coconut industry.But on closer look,
E.O. 313 strays from the special purpose for which the law
raises coco-levy funds in that it permits the use of coco-levy
funds for improving productivity in other food areas.
Clearly, E.O.313 above runs counter to the constitutional
provision which directs thatall money collected on any tax
levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purpose only.Assisting other
agriculturally-related programs is way off the coco-funds
objective of promoting the general interests of the coconut
industry and its farmers.

This is also the fault of President Estradas E.O. 312 which

deals with P1 billion to be generated out of the sale of cocofund acquired assets.E.O. 313 has a substantially identical
provision governing the management and disposition of the
Coconut Trust Fund capitalized with the substantial SMC
shares of stock that the coco-fund acquired.

A final point,the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,Section

84(2),the first part by the previously mentioned sections of
E.O. 313 and the second part by Section 4 of E.O. 312 and
Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313.E.O. 313 vests the power to
administer, manage, and supervise the operations and
disbursements of the Trust Fund it established (capitalized
with SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in a Coconut
Trust Fund Committee.

But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of

P.D.s755,961 and 1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and 313
that remove such funds and the assets acquired through
them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article IX-D,
Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution.Section 2(1) vests in
the COA the power and authority to examine uses of

Section 4 ofE.O. 312 does essentially the same thing.It vests

the management and disposition of the assistance fund
generated from the sale of coco-levy fund-acquired assets
into a Committee of five members.

In effect, the provision transfers the power to allocate, use,

and disburse coco-levy funds that P.D. 232 vested in the PCA
and transferred the same, without legislative authorization
and in violation of P.D. 232, to the Committees mentioned
above.An executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree
which has the same standing as a statute enacted by
Congress.
Adherence to International Law - Adherence to policy
of peace, freedom, amity
Bayan Muna v. Romulo
FACTS:
Rome Statute - establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
with "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes) of international concern and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdiction.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d'Affaires

Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,
only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have
completed the ratification, approval and concurrence
process. The Philippines is not among the 92.

harassment suits that might be brought against them in

international tribunals. It is reflective of the increasing pace
of the strategic security and defense partnership between
the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral
agreements have been effected by and between the US and
33 other countries.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L.
Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28,
2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that,
under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice
and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of
discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and
effect.
For their part, respondents question petitioners standing to
maintain a suit and counter that the Agreement, being in the
nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate
concurrence for its efficacy. And for reasons detailed in their
comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the
Agreement.

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent

US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the
USA and the RP.

ISSUES:

Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03 dated May 13, 2003

(E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then
DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US
proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to
and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In
esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and

RULING:

Whether or not the Agreement, which has not been

submitted to the Senate for concurrence, contravenes and
undermines the Rome Statute and other treaties.

This petition is bereft of merit. Petition for certiorari,

mandamus and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to

form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot
be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners contention perhaps taken unaware of certain
well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargon
is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as
expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein
the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law and international jurisprudence as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
cooperation, and amity with all nations .An exchange of notes
falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements,
which is an internationally accepted form of international
agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty
Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that
has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each
of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by
the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure,
the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to
record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to,
either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to
avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and
executive agreements have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through executive action.
On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and
at other times that of more formal documents denominated
agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner to
the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The
Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and

other governments ends and agreements whether
denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or
otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition
that E/NBFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-Surrender
Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance
thereof or as consent to be bound is a recognized mode of
concluding a legally binding international written contract
among nations.
Senate Concurrence Not Required; treaties
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
defines a treaty as an international agreement concluded
between states in written form and governed by international
law,whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation. International agreements may be in the form of
(1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after
executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are
similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative
concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a
narrower range of subject matters than treaties.
Under international law, there is no difference between
treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting states concerned,as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.
Neither,on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it
violates the Constitution. Authorities are, however, agreed
that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart
from the concurrence-requirement aspect. As has been
observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater
dignity than an executive agreement, because its
constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having
behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the
people;a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes
precedence over any prior statutory enactment.

The Agreement Not in Contravention of the Rome

Statute
Contrary to petitioners pretense, the Agreement does not
contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements
the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of
complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.As aptly
pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the
jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions of the signatory states. Art. 1 of the
Rome Statute pertinently provides:

Article 1
The Court
An International Crimininal Court(the Court) is hereby
established.It x x xshall have the power to exercise its
jurisdictionover persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern, as referred to in this Statute, andshall
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.The
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by
the provisions of this Statute.
Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome
Statute declares that it is the duty of every State to exercise
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes. This provision indicates that primary
jurisdiction over the so-called international crimes rests, at
the first instance, with the state where the crime was
committed; secondarily, with the ICC in appropriate
situations contemplated under Art. 17, par. 1of the Rome
Statute.
Of particular note is the application of the principle ofne bis
in idemunder par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again
underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis
that of the ICC.As far as relevant, the provision states that no
person who has been tried by another court for conduct

[constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by

the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same
conduct.
The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken
collectively, argue against the idea of jurisdictional conflict
between the Philippines, as party to the non-surrender
agreement, and the ICC; or the idea of the Agreement
substantially impairing the value of the RPs undertaking
under the Rome Statute. Ignoring for a while the fact that the
RP signed the Rome Statute ahead of the Agreement, it is
abundantly clear to us that the Rome Statute expressly
recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over
serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only
when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to
prosecute.
Given the above consideration, petitioners suggestion that
the RP, by entering into the Agreement, violated its duty
required by the imperatives of good faith and breached its
commitment under the Vienna Convention to refrain from
performing any act tending to impair the value of a treaty,
e.g., the Rome Statute has to be rejected outright. For
nothing in the provisions of the Agreement, in relation to the
Rome Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of the Statute,
let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC. Lest it be
overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a proviso that enjoins
the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person,
should the process require the requested state to perform an
act that would violate some international agreement it has
entered into. We refer to Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute,
which reads:
Article 98
Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent
to surrender
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently

with its obligations under international agreements pursuant

to which the consent of a sending State is required to
surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the
Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for
the giving of consent for the surrender.
Moreover, under international law, there is a considerable
difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a
signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty; whereas a
State-Party, on the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all
the provisions of a treaty in good faith.
In the instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is
only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party
for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged
to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the
Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be
premature.
As a result, petitioners argument that State-Parties with nonsurrender agreements are prevented from meeting their
obligations under the Rome Statute, specifically Arts. 27, 86,
89 and 90, must fail. These articles are only legally binding
upon State-Parties, not signatories.
Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90 would show
that the Agreement is not incompatible with the Rome
Statute. Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides that if the requesting
State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested State,
if it is not under an international obligation to extradite the
person to the requesting State, shall give priority to the
request for surrender from the Court In applying the
provision, certain undisputed facts should be pointed
out:first, the US is neither a State-Party nor a signatory to the
Rome Statute; and second, there is an international
agreement between the US and the Philippines regarding
extradition or surrender of persons, i.e., the Agreement.

Clearly, even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party,

the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international
agreements entered into between States, even when one of
the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with
Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void
ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at
variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of
international law.The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact
that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves
criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it
precludes our country from delivering an American criminal
to the ICC.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard
that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its
desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of
the country's judiciary to try offenses under its national
criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.

Pharmaceutical and Healthcare v. Health Secretary

FACTS:
On 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 51
otherwise known as the Milk Code. The said code states
that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be

ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24
of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality,
and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents
and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding. Petitioner assailed the RIRR for allegedly going
beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending
and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the
DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but
also various international instruments regarding infant and
young child nutrition. Respondents' position that said
international instruments are deemed part of the law of the
land and therefore the DOH may implement them through
the RIRR.
ISSUE: Whether the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Milk Code (A.O 2006-0012) issued by DOH
is unconstitutional.
RULING:
YES. Under the Constitution, international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation
or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through
a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law. Treaties become part of the law of the land
through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of
the Constitution, which provides that No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate. Thus, treaties or conventional international law
must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for
it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts. In this case, it is said that, ICMBS and
WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been

concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the

Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.

However, the ICMBS, which was adopted by the WHA in

1981, had been transformed into domestic law through local
legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code
that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not
the ICMBS per se. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim
reproduction of the ICMBS, but the Court noted that the Milk
Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely
prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the
general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS.
Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising,
promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if
such materials are duly authorized and approved by the
Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
DOCTRINE:
Ultra Vires beyond the powers performs acts, which do
not provide in its express, implied or incidental powers
Transformation international law can become part of a
municipal law through constitutional machinery such as an
act of Parliament.
Incorporation by constitutional declaration, international
law have the force of domestic law.

Espina v. Zamora
FACTS:
In the year 2000, then President Estrada signed into law R.A.
8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of
2000 which lessens the restraint on the foreigners right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business. It

expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited

foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business.
R.A. 8762 also allows natural born Filipino citizens, who had
lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to
engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as
Filipino citizens.
Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate
of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUES:

incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino

retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade business
and qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage
in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores
through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of
sales representatives, door to door selling, restaurants and
sarisari stores and such other similar retailing activities.
In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade
liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small
and medium enterprises since its implementation. The
constitutionality of R.A. 8762 is upheld and this petition is
dismissed.
Supremacy of Civilian Authority

Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.

IBP v. Zamora

RULING:

FACTS:

No, R.A. 8762 is not unconstitutional.

President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in the exercise of his

powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President
declared that the employed services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for
a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation
shall have improved. The IBP then filed a petition seeking to
declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.

Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the

development of a self reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it
does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the
economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit
foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic
policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all
areas of development.
Further, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not
encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not
prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
In this case, R.A. 8762 only allows aliens to engage in retail
trade business subject to the categories enumerated in the
law. Only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or

ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of Pres. Estrada is in violation of the
supremacy of civilian authority over the military as provided
by in the Constitution
RULING:

The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach

of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in
the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage
the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it
cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
insidious incursion of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head
of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.
Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in
the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the PNP.
POLICIES - Independent foreign policy and a nuclearfree Philippines
Bayan v. Exec Sec
FACTS:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of
America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized,
among others, the use of installations in the Philippine
territory by United States military personnel. To further
strengthen their defense and security relationship, the
Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual
Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. In view of the impending

expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991,

the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a
possible extension of the military bases agreement. On
September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the
proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence
of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the
United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the
Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on "the
complementing strategic interests of the United States and
the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region." Both sides
discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon
and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February
10, 1998.

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through

respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On
October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to
the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification,
the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on
Foreign Relations. On May 3, 1999, the Committees
submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 4438
recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and
the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee
its implementation. Debates then ensued.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was
approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its
members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered
as Senate Resolution No. 18.

On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an

Exchange of Notes between respondent Secretary Siazon and
United States Ambassador Hubbard.

general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases

within its general language which are not within the provision
of the particular enactment.

The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles

(pls read na lang sa original case kasi medyo mahaba. )

To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to
the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate
extended its concurrence under the same provision, is
immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21,
Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is
crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory
to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

ISSUES:
W/N the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
RULING:
Art. 7 Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Art. XVIII Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning military bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically
deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent
and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21,
Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and
for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will
be further discussed hereunder. It is a finely-imbedded
principle in statutory construction that a special provision or
law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat
generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which, in its most
comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the
former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the

(Ang main argument lang dito is dapat concurred sya sa

Senate with 2/3 vote of its members, ratified by the majority
of the people {kung required by the congress, pero kung
hindi na, hindi na kailangan ng ratification ng people through
referendum}, and recognized as treaty by the other state
{dito the mere fact na nasign ng ambassador ng US, ibig
sabihin nag aapply sya as treaty, saka based sa definition ng
vienna convention on treatied, ang executive agreement is
also synonymous with a treaty} so hindi contradictory ang
articles 7 and 18)
Lim v. Exec Sec
FACTS:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition prays that
respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called
"Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and hearing, that
judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction
and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in
Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the
Constitution.
1995: last Balikatan exercises was held. This was due
to the paucity of any formal agreement between the two
states. The exercises were then conducted on a reduced
scale.
1999: Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was concluded
by US and PH.

January 2002, armed forces of the US started arriving

in Mindanao to take part in the so-called Balikatan exercises the largest combined training operations involving Filipino
and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT), a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the PH
and the US in 1951.

From the perspective of public international law, a

treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle
of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept). Hence,
every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith. Further, a party to
a treaty is not allowed to invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.

This was caused by the international anti-terrorism

campaign declared by US President GW Bush in reaction to
the tragic events that occurred on 11 September 2001 (three
commercial aircrafts were hijacked, flown and smashed into
the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City
and the Pentagon building in Washington DC by terrorists
with alleged links to the al-Qaeda, a Muslim extremist
organization headed by Osama bin Laden).

Sec. 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution states that the

SC, among others, have the power to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

1 February 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino

P. Ersando, joined by SANLAKAS and Partido ng Manggagawa
partylists, filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition,
attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. It was
also assailed that certain members of their organization are
residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly
affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.
The Solicitor General claims that there is actually no
question of constitutionality involved. The true object of the
instant suit, it is said, is to obtain an interpretation of the
VFA. The Solicitor General asks that SC to accord due
deference to the executive determination that "Balikatan 021" is covered by the VFA, considering the President's
monopoly in the field of foreign relations and her role as
commander-in-chief of the Philippine armed forces.
ISSUES:
W/N the Balikatan exercises, as a product of the VFA, a
treaty, is favored over a municipal law.
RULING:
YES

Moreover, as stressed in Ichong v. Hernandez, the SC

ruled that the provisions of a treaty are always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is
subject to the police power of the State. In Gonzales v.
Hechanova, it was stated that the Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.
1987 Constitution contains key provisions useful in
determining the extent to which foreign military troops are
allowed in Philippine territory. Article II. Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, provides the following:
SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation,
and amity with all nations.
SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy.
In its relations with other states the paramount consideration
shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national
interest, and the right to self- determination.

SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,

adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in the country.
However the Constitution must also be construed in
the context of the MDT and the VFA. In accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, neither the MDT nor the VFA
allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on
Philippine territory:
Article 2. The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the
Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the
following Principles.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
In the case at bar, a nagging question remains: are
American troops actively engaged in combat alongside
Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and
assistance exercise? Contrary to what petitioners contend,
the SC cannot take judicial notice of the events as reported
from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, the SC
do not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports
per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy,
or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be
established in accordance with the rules of evidence. As a
result, SC cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof,
petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged
in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training
exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. It
is all too apparent that the determination thereof involves
basically a question of fact. On this point, the SC must concur
with the Solicitor General that the present subject matter is
not a fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari.
Hence, the petitions are dismissed without prejudice to
the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in
the RTC.

Other notes: A rather recent formulation of the relation of

international law vis-a-vis municipal law was expressed in
Philip Morris, Inc. v. CA which states that the fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not by any means imply the primacy of international
law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the
doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules
of international law are given a standing equal, not superior,
to national legislation.
Just and Dynamic Social Order - Promotion of Social
Justice
Calalang v. Williams
FACTS:
Maximo Calalang as a private citizen and taxpayer of Manila,
brought to this court the petition for writ of prohibition
against A.D. Williams as Chairman of the National and et al.
In its resolution of July 17, 1940 the National Traffic
Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works
and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarinas Street from 7:30 AM to 12:30 PM and from 1:30
PM to 5:30 PM; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7
AM to 11 PM; one year from the date of opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic. that the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which
authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940,
the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications,

recommended to the latter the approval of the

recommendation made by the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that
the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles
be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on
August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the
Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of
the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and
during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic;
that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of
Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such
enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned
to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Commonwealth Act No 548 is
constitutional
2. Whether or not the rules and regulations promotes
Social Justice.
RULING:
1. Yes. The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them
and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations
now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid
down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads
and streets designated as national roads by acts of the

National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of

the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if
at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a
national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged
by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of
some other government official to whom is confided the duty
of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of
such discretion is the making of the law.
2. Yes. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the
National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and
regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of
said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without

which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to

prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and, personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for
all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox
lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is
hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
DEFINITION: Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by
the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi
est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded
on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."

Just and Dynamic Social Order - Aspects of Social

Justice : labor
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services
FACTS:
Antonio Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. under a POEA approved
Contract of Employment entitling him with a position of Chief
Officer with basic month salary of US$1,400, overtime pay of
US$700/ month and Vacation Leave with pay.
However, at the date of his departure (March 19, 1998)
he was constrained to accept a downgraded employment
contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made Chief
Officer by the end of April 1998.
Petitioners employment contract was for a period of 12
months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999.
However, when the respondents did not give him the position
of Chief Officer as they promised, he refused to stay and
returned to the Philippines on May 26, 1998. Therefore, he
was only able to serve 2 mos. and 7 days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of 9 mos. and 23 days.
Petitioner then filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter
against respondents for constructive dismissal.

Court Proceedings from the Labor Arbiter (LA), NLRC, and CA:
The Labor Arbiter, applying the provisions of the 5th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, which
provides:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of
overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause
as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to
the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of

twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less.
granted Serranos Complaint awarding him the claim for his
salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the
aforesaid contract of employment instead of the unexpired
portion of his contract which is 9 mos. and 23 days., the
former being the lower rate between the two. The Labor
Arbiter included in the computation of Serranos salary not
only his basic salary but also his overtime pay and vacation
leave pay.
Both petitioner (alleging that he is entitled for his salary for
the entire unexpired portion of his contract) and respondent
(contending that the LA erred in finding that they illegally
dismissed petitioner) appealed the Labor Arbiters judgment
to the NLRC. The NLRC then issued a judgment modifying
that of the LA reducing the overtime pay and vacation leave
pay on the applicable salary rate Serrano is entitle to claim.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said
judgment in which he questioned the constitutionality of RA
8042 which was also denied.
The petitioner then filed a petition before the CA reiterating
the constitutional challenge against the subject clause.
However, the CA only affirmed the NLRC ruling without
passing upon the constitutional issue raised by petitioner..
Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.

is unconstitutional but only on the grounds that it deprives

the OFWs of equal protection and due process.

(i)
On the issue of whether 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 is unconstitutional as it impairs
the terms of contract of the OFWs, the Court ruled in the
negative. According to the Court laws already in existence
prior to the execution of the contract shall be deemed a part
thereof. Therefore, as the enactment of RA No. 8042
preceded the execution of the employment contract between
the parties, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all
the provisions of R.A. No. 8042. However even if the Court
were to disregard the timeline it should be well to understand
that all private contracts must yield to the superior and
legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public
welfare

(ii)
On the issue that the said provision of R.A. 8042 is
unconstitutional as it deprives OFWs of equal protection and
due process the Court ruled in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the law.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042 is unconstitutional for allegedly (i) impairing
the terms of contract of the OFWs, (ii) depriving them of
equal protection and (iii) denying them due process.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3,] Article XIII accord all
members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place
of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

RULING:

Hence, Filipino workers of similar category are equally

guaranteed with monetary benefits and obligation and none

The 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042

should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed

by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.

However, such rights are not absolute but subject to the

inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a
system of classification into its legislation; however, to be
valid,
the
classification
must
comply
with
these
requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is
germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to
existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all
members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews

the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law:

a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the

challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally
related to serving a legitimate state interest;
b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the
government must show that the challenged classification
serves an important state interest and that the classification
is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and
c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification
which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage
of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the
burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest.
In this case, the Court applied the 3rd level of scrutiny which
is the strict judicial scrutiny because the challenge to RA

8042 is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the

perpetuation of prejudice against persons favoured by the
Constitution with special protection which is the working
class.
The court held that the subject clause has a discriminatory
intent against and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two
levels:
I.
OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year
vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or
more;
II.
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of
more than one year; and
III.
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period
employment;
I. OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year
vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more
In a matrix of cases involving claims from illegal dismissal
already resolved by this Court it is clearly shown that only
OFWs with employment contract of less than one year were
able to claim for the entire unexpired term of their contracts
while the OFWs with one year or more were only entitled for
the equivalent of their 3-month salary for every year of the
unexpired term of their employment contract.
To clearly illustrate the disparity in the treatment of these
two groups, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A with an
employment contract of 10 months at a monthly salary rate
of US$1,000.00 and a hypothetical OFW-B with an
employment contract of 15 months with the same monthly
salary rate of US$1,000.00. Both commenced work on the
same day and under the same employer, and were illegally
dismissed after one month of work. Under the subject clause,
OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00, equivalent to his
salaries for the remaining 9 months of his contract, whereas
OFW-B will be entitled to only US$3,000.00, equivalent to his
salaries for 3 months of the unexpired portion of his contract,

instead of US$14,000.00 for the unexpired portion of 14

months of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser
amount.
Said disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court
takes into account that prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
8042 on July 14, 1995, illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter
how long the period of their employment contracts, were
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of
their contracts.
II. Among OFWs With Employment Contracts of More Than
One Year
If the subject clause is to be applied it will create a sub-layer
of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for
more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with
less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while
those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more
remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject
clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries
for three months only.
To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing
interpretation of the subject clause, the Court assumes
hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each have a 24-month
contract at a salary rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C is
illegally dismissed on the 12th month, and OFW-D, on the
13th month. Considering that there is at least 12 months
remaining in the contract period of OFW-C, the subject clause
applies to the computation of the latter's monetary benefits.
Thus, OFW-C will be entitled, not to US$12,000,00 or the
latter's total salaries for the 12 months unexpired portion of
the contract, but to the lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the
latter's salaries for 3 months out of the 12-month unexpired
term of the contract. On the other hand, OFW-D is spared
from the effects of the subject clause, for there are only 11
months left in the latter's contract period. Thus, OFW-D will
be entitled to US$11,000.00, which is equivalent to his/her

total salaries for the entire 11-month unexpired portion.

III. OFWs vis--vis Local Workers With Fixed-Period Employment

Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixedterm employment who were illegally discharged were treated
alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they
were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment
of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject
clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their employment contract have since
been differently treated in that their money claims are
subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court found no compelling state interest that the subject
clause may possibly serve.
The OSGs contention that the purpose of the subject clause
is to provide Filipino seafarers better chance of getting hired
by foreign employers and protecting the local placement
agencies (because the obligation of payment of illegally
dismissed employees claims which the local agencies and
foreign employers shall solidarily pay only end up as a
burden solely for the latter due to the limitation of the
enforcement of judgment over the latter) is not enough to
justify the burden it imposes to the OFWs which is favoured
by the Constitution as they have less means in life compared
to their employers.
Moreover, the Court held that there are other resorts which
are less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies
in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.
Such as the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas
Workers which imposes administrative disciplinary measures
on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual
obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of

R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other
OFWs to equal protection and substantive due process.
Just and Dynamic Social Order - Aspects of Social
Justice : Agrarian Reform
Association of Small
Agrarian Reform

Landowners

v.

Secretary

of

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social

Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by
the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by
law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was
promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenantfarmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O.
No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner
of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was
enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
(PP131s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is
the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing
the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them
suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions. consolidated cases involving common legal
questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988"
FACTS:

These are four consolidated cases questioning the

constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act
(R.A. No. 6657 and related law, Agrarian Land Reform Code
or R.A. No. 3844).
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No.
27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the
power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for
violation of the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process and equal protection. They
contended that the taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation which such payment is not
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228
and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the
said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that
no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation which was denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject
their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so
far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They
therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

Inshort, the Association of Small Landowners in the

Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution
scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is
comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose

landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that

since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should
not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under
R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till
their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from
agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a
different class.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal
protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian
reform program, must be in terms of cash.
RULING:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they
belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform
program. Under the law, classification has been defined as
the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these
same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have
not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled
to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must

be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these

two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those
who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this
matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway
in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only
where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform
program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is
a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which
prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining
just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that
amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government
even without judicial intervention so long as both parties
agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through
appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an
administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner
does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination.
This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision
may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is
merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain.
The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in
funds if all compensation have to be made in cash if
everything is in cash, then the government will not have
sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e.,
shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

Hacienda Luisita v. Luisita Industrial Park

FACTS:
In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compaia General de Tabacos
de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold Hacienda Luisita and the
Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill of the hacienda,
to the Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned
and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group. The Central
Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in obtaining a dollar
loan from a US bank. Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911
million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price
component of the sale, with the condition that the lots
comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the
applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should
there be any, and whenever conditions should exist
warranting such action under the provisions of the Land
Tenure Act. Tadeco however did not comply with this
condition.
On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit
before the Manila RTC against Tadeco, et al., for them to
surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers
at cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita
does not have tenants, besides which sugar lands of which
the hacienda consisted are not covered by existing agrarian
reform legislations. The Manila RTC rendered judgment
ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the CA.
On March 17, 1988, during the administration of President
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the Office of the Solicitor General
moved to withdraw the governments case against Tadeco, et
al. The CA dismissed the case, subject to the PARCs approval
of Tadecos proposed stock distribution plan (SDP) in favor of
its farmworkers. [Under EO 229 and later RA 6657, Tadeco
had the option of availing stock distribution as an alternative
modality to actual land transfer to the farmworkers.] On
August 23, 1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation,

herein petitioner HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition

by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco conveyed to HLI
the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other
farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for
HLI shares of stock.
On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworkerbeneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita
signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed
HLIs Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). On May 11,
1989, the SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI,
and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR
Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis and
mechanics of HLIs SDP, which was eventually approved by
the PARC after a follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR
on October 14, 1989, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who
participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.
On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500
hectares of land of the hacienda from agricultural to
industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR
approved the application on August 14, 1996, subject to
payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to
the FWBs and to HLIs continued compliance with its
undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.
On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of
12,000,000 shares of stocks of Centennary Holdings, Inc.
(Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to
the latter. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300
hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park
Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial
complex. From this area was carved out 2 parcels, for which 2
separate titles were issued in the name of LIPCO. Later,
LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to the Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) in payment of LIPCOs
PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to RCBC. LIPCOs titles
were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart
from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later
detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the

government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway

(SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the
original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.
Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions
reached the DAR in the latter part of 2003. The first was filed
by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), praying
for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its
revocation. The second petition, praying for the revocation
and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands
in the hacienda, was filed by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang
Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA). The DAR then
constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues
relating to the SDP of HLI. After investigation and evaluation,
the STF found that HLI has not complied with its obligations
under RA 6657 despite the implementation of the SDP. On
December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution
No. 2005-32-01, recalling/revoking the SDO plan of
Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject lands be
forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or
mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP.
From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its
motion notwithstanding, HLI also filed a petition before the
Supreme Court in light of what it considers as the DARs
hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under CARP even before
PARC could rule or even read the motion for reconsideration.
PARC would eventually deny HLIs motion for reconsideration
via Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or revoke
HLIs SDP?
(2) [Issue raised by intervenor FARM (group of farmworkers)]
Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of
outright land transfer, unconstitutional?
(3) Is the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid? [Did PARC
gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject SDP and

placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory acquisition

and distribution scheme?]
(4) Should those portions of the converted land within
Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase
be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC
resolution? [Did the PARC gravely abuse its discretion when
it included LIPCOs and RCBCs respective properties that
once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP
compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of
Coverage?]
RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition of HLI and AFFIRMED the
PARC resolution placing the lands subject of HLIs SDP under
compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme
of the CARP, with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296
qualified FWBs were given the option to remain as
stockholders of HLI. It also excluded from the mandatory
CARP coverage that part of Hacienda Luisita that had been
acquired by RCBC and LIPCO.]

(1) YES, the PARC has jurisdiction to revoke HLIs SDP

under the doctrine of necessary implication.
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the
authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of the
corporate landowner belongs to PARC. Contrary to petitioner
HLIs posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP
which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA
6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not
explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an
approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is deemed
possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary
implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute
is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be
stated that the conferment of express power to approve a

plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate

owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the
approval of the plan. To deny PARC such revocatory power
would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the
very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the
corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be
without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance
with it.
(2) NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. [The
Court actually refused to pass upon the constitutional
question because it was not raised at the earliest opportunity
and because the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the
case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of
acquisition under RA 9700.]
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial
review over, and pass upon the constitutionality of, acts of
the executive or legislative departments, it does so only
when the following essential requirements are first met, to
wit: (1) there is an actual case or controversy; (2) that the
constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible
opportunity by a proper party or one with locus standi; and
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.

Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at

bar.
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy,
intervenor FARM, composed of a small minority of 27
farmers, has yet to explain its failure to challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 as early as November
21, 1989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or
at least within a reasonable time thereafter, and why its
members received benefits from the SDP without so much of
a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after
approval of the SDP that said plan and approving resolution

were sought to be revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or any

of its members, but by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the
AMBALA petition did NOT question the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the purported flaws
and gaps in the subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even
the public respondents, as represented by the Solicitor
General, did not question the constitutionality of the
provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 members
formerly belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental
Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some eighteen
(18) years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late
in the day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even
accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the
alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits
were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into
resolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed to assail
after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of
numerous events and activities which resulted from the
application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
The last but the most important requisite that the
constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of the case
does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present,
the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the
resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid,
whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of
a statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by
which judgment can be made without touching the
constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored.

The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions
originally taken by AMBALA (to which the FARM members
previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the
alleged non-compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP
to support a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the
lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of

discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such noncompliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and
implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory
provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be
resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying
petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per se
that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the
said provision in the SDP that is flawed.

3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the

SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall arrange with the FIRST PARTY
[TDC] the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY
[FWBs] on the basis of number of days worked and at no cost
to them of one-thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of
the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that are presently
owned and held by the FIRST PARTY, until such time as the
entire block of 118,391,976.85 shares shall have been
completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD PARTY.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700,

amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31
of RA 6657 vis--vis the stock distribution component of said
Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides:
[T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be
limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition.
Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution
scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available
option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is
unconstitutional should be a moot issue.

[I]t is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were
qualified beneficiaries at the time of the approval of the SDP,
suffered from watering down of shares. As determined
earlier, each original FWB is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares.
The original FWBs got less than the guaranteed 18,804.32
HLI shares per beneficiary, because the acquisition and
distribution of the HLI shares were based on man days or
number of days worked by the FWB in a years time. As
explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37
days in a fiscal year before he or she becomes entitled to HLI
shares. If it falls below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does
not get any share at year end. The number of HLI shares
distributed varies depending on the number of days the
FWBs were allowed to work in one year. Worse, HLI hired
farmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such
that, as indicated in the Compliance dated August 2, 2010
submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of
farmworkers of HLI as of said date stood at 10,502. All these
farmworkers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were
given shares out of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares
representing the 33.296% of the total outstanding capital
stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocation of
each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result
of the use of man days and the hiring of additional
farmworkers.

(3) YES, the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid. [NO, the PARC
did NOT gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject
SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory
acquisition and distribution scheme.]
The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the
mechanics and timelines of HLIs stock distribution violate
DAO 10 because the minimum individual allocation of each
original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of
the use of man days and the hiring of additional
farmworkers; (2) the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs
stock transfer is contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10
prescribes.
In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the
mechanics and timelines of stock distribution, We find that it
violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA
states:

Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA

expressly providing for a 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs
stock transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of
DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the

implementation of the approved stock distribution plan within

three (3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner of
the approval of the plan by PARC. In fact, based on the said
provision, the transfer of the shares of stock in the names of
the qualified FWBs should be recorded in the stock and
transfer books and must be submitted to the SEC within sixty
(60) days from implementation.

To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible

as it is practical, for the three-month threshold. Remove this
timeline and the corporate landowner can veritably evade
compliance with agrarian reform by simply deferring to
absurd limits the implementation of the stock distribution
scheme.
Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are given thirty (30)
years within which to pay the cost of the land thus awarded
them to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the
government. To be sure, the reason underpinning the 30-year
accommodation does not apply to corporate landowners in
distributing shares of stock to the qualified beneficiaries, as
the shares may be issued in a much shorter period of time.
Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of
the SDP by PARC should be upheld [because of violations of]
DAO 10. It bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the
PARC and the DAR have the power to issue rules and
regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a product of
such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of
law and must be duly complied with. The PARC is, therefore,
correct in revoking the SDP. Consequently, the PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989 approving
the HLIs SDP is nullified and voided.
(4) YES, those portions of the converted land within
Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase
should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC
resolution.

[T]here are two (2) requirements before one may be

considered a purchaser in good faith, namely: (1) that the
purchaser buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such property;
and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair price for the
property at the time of such purchase or before he or she has
notice of the claim of another.
It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC arebased
on the above requirements and with respect to the adverted
transactions of the converted land in questionpurchasers in
good faith for value entitled to the benefits arising from such
status.
First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred
(300) hectares of industrial land, there was no notice of any
supposed defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or
that any other person has a right to or interest in such
property. In fact, at the time LIPCO acquired said parcels of
land, only the following annotations appeared on the TCT in
the name of Centennary: the Secretarys Certificate in favor
of Teresita Lopa, the Secretarys Certificate in favor of
Shintaro Murai, and the conversion of the property from
agricultural to industrial and residential use.
The same is true with respect to RCBC. At the time it
acquired portions of Hacienda Luisita, only the following
general annotations appeared on the TCTs of LIPCO: the Deed
of Restrictions, limiting its use solely as an industrial estate;
the Secretarys Certificate in favor of Koji Komai and Kyosuke
Hori; and the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of RCBC to
guarantee the payment of PhP 300 million.
To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots
they bought were subjected to CARP coverage by means of a
stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was
annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired.
However, they are of the honest belief that the subject lots
were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes
and for which said lots were taken out of the CARP coverage

subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can be

legally and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA
6657 explicitly allows conversion and disposition of
agricultural lands previously covered by CARP land
acquisition after the lapse of five (5) years from its award
when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound
for agricultural purposes or the locality has become
urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value
for residential, commercial or industrial purposes.
Moreover, DAR notified all the affected parties, more
particularly the FWBs, and gave them the opportunity to
comment or oppose the proposed conversion. DAR, after
going through the necessary processes, granted the
conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda Luisita pursuant to
its primary jurisdiction under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and its
original exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform. The DAR conversion
order became final and executory after none of the FWBs
interposed an appeal to the CA. In this factual setting, RCBC
and LIPCO purchased the lots in question on their honest and
well-founded belief that the previous registered owners could
legally sell and convey the lots though these were previously
subject of CARP coverage. Ergo, RCBC and LIPCO acted in
good faith in acquiring the subject lots.

And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of

Hacienda Luisita for value. Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300
hectares of land from Centennary for the amount of PhP750
million pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. On
the other hand, in a Deed of Absolute Assignment dated
November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed portions of Hacienda
Luisita in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en pago to pay for a
loan of PhP431,695,732.10.
In relying upon the above-mentioned approvals, proclamation
and conversion order, both RCBC and LIPCO cannot be
considered at fault for believing that certain portions of

Hacienda Luisita are industrial/commercial lands and are,

thus, outside the ambit of CARP. The PARC, and consequently
DAR, gravely abused its discretion when it placed LIPCOs
and RCBCs property which once formed part of Hacienda
Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via
the assailed Notice of Coverage.
[The Court went on to apply the operative fact doctrine to
determine what should be done in the aftermath of its
disposition of the above-enumerated issues:
While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda
Luisita subject of PARC Resolution Nos. 2005-32-01 and 200634-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain operative
facts that had occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the
operative fact doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or
executive action null and void, or, by extension, no longer
without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting
unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically
be, since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or
juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the
meantime. The actual existence of a statute or executive act
is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the

Hacienda Luisita SDP are upheld, the revocation must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to the
right of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether
they want to remain as HLI stockholders or not. The Court
cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that in 1989, 93% of the
FWBs agreed to the SDOA (or the MOA), which became the
basis of the SDP approved by PARC per its Resolution No. 8912-2 dated November 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the
FWBs were said to have received from HLI salaries and cash
benefits, hospital and medical benefits, 240-square meter
homelots, 3% of the gross produce from agricultural lands,

and 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare

converted land and the 80.51-hectare lot sold to SCTEX. HLI
shares totaling 118,391,976.85 were distributed as of April
22, 2005. On August 6, 20l0, HLI and private respondents
submitted a Compromise Agreement, in which HLI gave the
FWBs the option of acquiring a piece of agricultural land or
remain as HLI stockholders, and as a matter of fact, most
FWBs indicated their choice of remaining as stockholders.
These facts and circumstances tend to indicate that some, if
not all, of the FWBs may actually desire to continue as HLI
shareholders. A matter best left to their own discretion.]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
Separation of Church and State
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women
who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003,
Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition
for registration with the COMELEC. On November 11, 2009,
after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying
that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation.
Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary
mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had
previously announced that it would begin printing the final
ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as
it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated
the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of

religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions

contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well
as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does
not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed
on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELECs field personnel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in denying the
Ang Ladlad to be a party list.
HELD: Yes. They denied ang ladlad because they believe that
it would hurt the youth sector especially they are living an
immoral life. COMELEC based their decision on two religious
tests based on Biblical and Quranic scriptural quotations
about homosexuality. This is contrary to Law and a grave
abuse of discretion since the exercise of civil and political
rights is specifically protected against the application of such
religious tests.
The 1987 Philippines Constitution's Bill of Rights Article III
Section 5 defines the Principle of the Separation of Church
and State in three key provisions: No law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. (Nonestablishment Clause). The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. (Freedom of Religion clause). No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. (No Test
clause).

The denial of Ang Ladlad registration on purely moral

grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. COMELEC blanket justifications
give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC
targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of
any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause. Despite
the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution,
which provides nor shall any person be denied equal
protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the
provision as an absolute prohibition on classification.
Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of
similar persons.[33] The equal protection clause guarantees
that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.
[34]
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.[35] In
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,[36] we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the
standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have
followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to
invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[37]
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine
population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to
disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent,
the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law
exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were
to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it,
the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of

an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is

sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal
protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to
the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation,
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of
or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as
other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this
case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same
basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Imbong v. Ochoa
FACTS:
Congress enacted, RA 10354, otherwise known as
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law) in December 2012. Right after the
Presidents concurrence to the law, and prior to its
implementation, various petitions were filed assailing the
constitutionality of the RH Law.
The RH Law mainly focuses on the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and keep women and
children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. The RH Law emphasizes the need to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with
access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods.
ISSUES:
Procedural:
1.
Whether the court may exercise its Power of Judicial
Review over the assailed RH Law?

2.
Whether theres actual case or controversy on the RH
Law as alleged by the petitioners?
3.
Whether the raised facial challenge petitions against
the RH law must not prosper?
4.
Whether petitioners have Locus Standi in filing
petitions to assail the RH Law?
5.
Whether the court has jurisdiction over the said
petitions that were filed for declaratory relief?
6.
Whether the RH Law violated the One Subject/One
Title provisioned in the Constitution?

Substantive:
Whether the RH law unconstitutionally violates:
A.

Right to Life of the unborn child?

B.

Right to Health?

C.

Freedom of Religion?

D.

The Family?

E.

Freedom of Expression and academic freedom?

F.

Due Process?

G.

Equal Protection?

H.

Involuntary Servitude?

I.

Delegation of Authority to FDA?

J.

Autonomy of the ARMM?

RULING:
PROCEDURAL RULINGS:
1)
Yes, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to
respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within

its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same

time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a
very limited and specific point - to determine whether the
acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.

While the Court may not answer the questions of wisdom,

justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may perform judicial
review when it is alleged to be unconstitutional as a result of
grave abuse of discretion. Therefore the Court can exercise
its judicial power to review the RH Law Bill.

2)
Yes, an actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests.

In this case, considering that the RH Law and its

implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. Therefore a controversy exists with
the RH law and it is ripe for judicial determination.

3)
No, a facial challenge (also known as First amendment
challenge in the U.S.) is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but
also all other rights such as religious freedom, freedom of the
press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

While the Court has withheld the application of facial

challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope
to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.

This is because the court is mandated by the Fundamental

Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

In this case, considering that the petitions have seriously

alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech
and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above
have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of the petitions and to
determine the constitutionality of the RH Law.

4)
Yes, Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the challenged governmental act. The doctrine of
transcendental importance, as invoked by the petitioners,
applies appropriately to the case.

The concept of the doctrine is that (legal) standing is a

matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs (ordinary citizens, taxpayers, etc.) When
the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of

transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to

society, or of paramount public interest.

In this case, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional

provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of
religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Therefore, the Petitioners have raised issues that are of
transcendental importance hence legal standing based on
the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance.

5)
No, however as a general rule, where a case has farreaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the
Court may consider the petitions as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65 over which the court has jurisdiction.

In this case, it was evident that most of the petitions were

praying for injunctive reliefs as petitioners main contention
is to declare the RH law as unconstitutional so as to eschew it
from being implemented. Hence, the Court considered the
said petitions as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65 and
took jurisdiction.

6)
No, as a general rule the one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry
as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.
In this case, textual analysis shows that "reproductive health"
and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane
to the objective to control the population growth. Therefore

the Court found no reason to believe that Congress

intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents
of the assailed legislation.

SUBSTANTIVE RULINGS

A)
No, the RH law does not violate the right to life of the
unborn as it recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has
life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The
clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a
measure legalizing abortion. The RH law prohibits any drug or
device that induces abortion through either the destruction of
the fertilized ovum or the obstruction of fertilized ovum from
being implanted to the mothers womb.

Though the RH Laws provision shows consistency with the

constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, it was observed
that its Implementing Rules and Regulations needs to be
amended so that it is consistent with the RH law in
prohibiting abortion. The word "primarily" in Section 3.0l(a)
and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void as without
omitting the said word will open the floodgates to the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."
B)
No, the RH Law does not trump on the constitutional
right to health. The petitioners allege that since the RH Law
promotes contraceptives, theres a risk of the proliferation of
oral hormonal contraceptives which may contract fatal side
effects to its users such as breast cancer, etc.

Contrary to the Petitioners contention, the intent of the RH

Law is to keep intact to the provisions of RA 4729 (which
regulates the sale and distribution of contraceptives through
a duly licensed physician) and RA 5921 (a law requiring all
medicines, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices to be sold
only through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy).
These laws were not repealed when RH law was enacted and
both laws are consistent with Section 10 of the RH law and
are adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
C)
No, the Court cannot identify whether the use of
contraceptives or participation of the Reproductive health
provisions is morally right or wrong according to ones dogma
or religious point of view. This is mainly because these
concepts are limitless in the human mind. The court ruled
though that it has the authority to determine if the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and

State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. The principle is based on
mutual respect; the State cannot meddle in the internal
affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas
or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church
cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and
the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation
follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are
good for the country.

The State may implement its legitimate secular objectives

without being intruded upon by the policies of any one
religion. The State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of

contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of the

petitioners.

Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or

medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking
health care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections
based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate
the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.
They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the
Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity

specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers to refer
patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to
do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to
disseminate information and perform RH procedures under
pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion.
While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance
to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the
effective implementation of the law.

Excluding public health officers from being conscientious

objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal
protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between
public health officers and their private counterparts. In
addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every
individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if
he/she is employed in the government.

Using the compelling state interest test, there is no

compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of
conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the
life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the
above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain
to life-threatening cases.

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are

least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective.
The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to
ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729,
RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710
(The Magna Carta of Women).

Lastly, Section 15 of the RH Law which requires would-be

spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of
police power by the government. The law does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be included
in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to
accept or reject information they receive and they retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.

D)
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a
minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii)
which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of
parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons

exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required

only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the
right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is
non-surgical procedures.

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to

procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not
deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor
child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether
to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

E)
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of
Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education program,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be
filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the

Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum
on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more

importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term primary. The right of
parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the
State. The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and
corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations,

school officials, and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the
program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.

F)
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of
the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague. The definition of
private health care service provider must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public
health service provider. The private health care institution
cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to
private health care service provider.

The terms service and methods are also broad enough to

include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are
exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH
Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect
and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and
effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

G)
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
governments RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article
XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce
their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law
does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have
and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to
have children.
The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor. The
exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid.
There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.
H)
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for
private and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to
involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is
both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and nongovernment RH service providers to render pro bono service.
Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as
long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH
service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)

I)
No, the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to
be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not
only has the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods (under RA
3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).

J)
No, the RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy
of local governments. Par (c) of Section 17 provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local
government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the national government
under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU.

In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH

services. Provisions of these services are not mandatory.
Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the
autonomy enjoyed by LGUs. Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11
of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates
the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that
would benefit the general welfare.