Andrea Rocci studied Italian Linguistics, Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis.

He is associate professor of Language Sciences at the University of Lugano. His

research interests include argumentation, the semantics-pragmatics interface,
media discourse and financial discourse.

ISBN 978-3-0343-1554-8

www.peterlang.com

Giovanni Gobber & Andrea Rocci (eds.)

Giovanni Gobber studied Germanic and Slavic Linguistics. He is professor of

German Linguistics and General Linguistics at the Catholic University of Milan.
His research interests include the meta-theory of syntax, comparative functional
linguistics and pragmatics.

Language, reason
and education
Studies in honor of Eddo Rigotti

Giovanni Gobber & Andrea Rocci (eds.)

Peter Lang

Language as reason represents the unifying theme of this multifaceted reflection on Eddo Rigottis scientific contribution offered by his students and
colleagues on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. Spanning argumentation theory, linguistics, psychology, semiotics and communication sciences, the volume reflects Rigottis generous personality and his trajectory of
semiotician, philosopher, linguist and specialist in argumentation studies.
Language as an instrument of communication with semiotic peculiarities is
considered at different levels in which it manifests traces of reason at work.
This means considering how reality reveals itself by means of language
and how the semiotic character of language structures is used by people to
enable joint actions and change the natural and social world. Particularly
in focus is the realm of argumentation, that is of those joint actions where
people exchange reasons in various communities, fora and markets in view
of understanding and practical deliberation. To argumentation Eddo Rigotti
devoted all his research efforts in recent years, with a keen sense of its intrinsic educational value and a sincere care for fostering the development of
the argumentative mind.

Language, reason
and education

113

Peter Lang

Argumentation schemes and topical relations

FABRIZIO MACAGNO, 8QLYHUVLW\RI /LVERQ DOUGLAS WALTON, 8QLYHUVLW\
of Windsor

One of the cornerstones of argumentation theory is the analysis of

the structure of natural arguments. Dialectical and rhetorical arguments
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rules merely transfer the truth value of the premises to the conclusion,
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argumentative reasoning conveys from the premises to the conclusion
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into consideration the speaker and the hearer of a message in anaO\]LQJ DUJXPHQWDWLYH UHDVRQLQJ WKH WUDGLWLRQDO IRUPDO V\VWHPV
become inadequate to investigate natural arguments, as they cannot
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interlocutors attitudes and commitments, their perception of reality
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formal approach to arguments, becomes the cornerstone of the pragmatic approach to natural arguments. What matters in argumentative
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provided criteria based on the ontological structure of language for
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of modern linguistic and argumentative theories, the cornerstone of
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the uses of an argument to persuade an audience into account. By
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inference, by embedding it into ontology, semantics, pragmatics and
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argumentation schemes represent the most common and prototypical
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Argumentation schemes and topical relations

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187

Argumentative inferences and the meaning

of a discourse move

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argumentative inferences and pragmatics needs to be understood by
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move or speech act or discourse sequence consists in the effect it
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arguments:
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an act of true peace.

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In this argument, used by Obama in his Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Address1,
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the premises and the conclusion, i.e. a semantic and argumentative link.
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having a different semantic structure:
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an act of true peace.
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Figure 2: The semantics of inferential relations - sign.

Argumentation schemes and topical relations

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dialectical inference:
Logical syllogism

Dialectical syllogism

If he is a man, then he is an
animate being.
This is a man.
Therefore, he is an animate being.

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does not depend on the disposition of the terms or the propositions.
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Argumentation schemes and topical relations

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Consequence

If Socrates is a man, he is an animate being.

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Assumption

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Assumption 1

Man is a species of animate being.

Syllogism 1

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Man is species of animate being.
Therefore, if man is said of anything, animate being is said of it
DVZHOO

comparatur. Oportet enim in ipso antecedenti semper de loco differentia agi [qui]
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Dialectica

194

Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton

Syllogism 2

,I PDQLVVDLGRI DQ\WKLQJDQLPDWHEHLQJLVVDLGRI LWDVZHOO

Socrates is a man.
Therefore Socrates is an animate being.

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in particular a negative act is regarded as a cause of a negative habit.
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Figure 3: Mechanism of the Argumentum Model of Topics.

concerning the possibility of having a complete and fully descriptive

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problem is that it risks representing an ideal argument, the one mirroring
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only presumptive and subject to default. On the one hand, even though
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deductive rule, but rather an abductive one.
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lead to developing the model by taking into account not only the level of
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major premise that includes the predicates occurring in the minor premise

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as better than another can be directly used to support the conclusion. We
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cars, because a house is more lasting than a car.
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Minor premise

A house is more lasting than a car.

Major premise

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Conclusion

A house is more desirable than a car.

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is not proven, but is presumable.

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married. In the legal domain, many rules of presumption of fact can
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concepts, such as act and intention or disappearance and death. A clear
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abstraction, leading from concepts to categories of concepts or metaconcepts, the generic topoi.

b.

Generic topoi

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characteristic that a predicate needs to have in order be considered as a
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on analogy or the more and the less, are only defeasible, as they represent
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and the disposition of the terms or the propositions in an argument. For instance, Cicero describes the topic from antecedents only taking into account
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such inferences. But the inference does not derive its validity from the pattern. The
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such independently valid inferences.

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ZKLFKWKHFRQGLWLRQDOOLQNVWKHPLQRUSUHPLVHZLWKDSRVVLEOHRUUDWKHU
the best possible, antecedent. The major premise is reconstructed based
on its conditional, and the conclusion corresponds to its antecedent.
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are distinguished:

203

Argumentation schemes and topical relations

Table 3: Types of argument and types of reasoning.
Types of reasoning
(abstraction-form)

Deductive axioms

Induction

Abduction

Types of argument
(abstraction-content)

Argument from
GHQLWLRQJHQXV

Argument form
H[DPSOH

Argument from
LPSURSHUVLJQV

Argument from
cause to effect

Argument from
cause to effect

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DQDO\]LQJDUJXPHQWVIURPDPXOWLORJLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHLQZKLFKWKHORJLFDO
form can be described using distinct types of reasoningZKLFKLQWXUQFDQ
include various rules of inference or logical axiomsMP, MT$WWKHVDPH
WLPHKRZHYHUWKLVDSSURDFKFDQUDLVHVHYHUDOSUREOHPV7KH/DWLQDQG
medieval account of lociWUHDWVIRUPDOUXOHVRI LQIHUHQFHDVPD[LPVDQG
QRWDVGLVWLQFWOHYHOVRI DEVWUDFWLRQ)RUWKLVUHDVRQWKHWZROHYHOVWKH
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same level logical form and semantic-ontological principles, leading to the
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RI UHDVRQLQJWKDWZHZRXOGFODVVLI\DVLQGXFWLYHDEGXFWLYHRUDQDORJLFDO
The modern theories of argument or argumentation schemes inherLWHGWKLVPRGHODQGKDYHSXWIRUZDUGFODVVLFDWLRQVHVVHQWLDOO\PLUURULQJ
WKHDQFLHQWDSSURDFK7KHIDLOXUHWRFRQVLGHUWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQIRUmal and semantic-ontological topics as a difference in kind of levels
of abstraction leads to treating forms of arguments at the same level
DVWKHLUFRQWHQW7KLVDSSURDFKFDQEHH[WUHPHO\KHOSIXOIRUUDSLGO\LGHQWLI\LQJFRPPRQFKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQDUJXPHQWVWKDWDUHIUHTXHQWO\XVHG+RZever, if the purpose is to describe, reconstruct or evaluate an argument,
WKHIDLOXUHWRGLIIHUHQWLDWHEHWZHHQWKHWZROHYHOVFDQOHDGWRVRPHSURElems, such as the ones mentioned in section 2 above. A possible solution
LVWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKHGLVFUHSDQF\RI IRUPDQGFRQWHQWDVDGLYHUJHQFH

204

Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton

LQNLQGDQGWU\WRVKRZKRZWKHVHWZROHYHOVFDQEHLQWHUFRQQHFWHG7KH
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multi-logical approach to natural arguments: the model of argumentation
VFKHPHV:DOWRQ5HHGDQG0DFDJQR

4.

Imperfect bridges

Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of inference, combinaWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHVHPDQWLFRQWRORJLFDOFRQQHFWLRQVDQGWKHORJLFDOIRUPV

that represent the abstract structure of the most common types of natXUDODUJXPHQWVVHH+DVWLQJV3HUHOPDQDQG2OEUHFKWV7\WHFD
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or cause to effect. Moreover, deductive patterns are generally based on a
modus-ponensORJLFDOIRUPZKLOHRWKHUUXOHVRI GHGXFWLYHLQIHUHQFHVXFKDV
WKHGLVMXQFWLYHV\OORJLVPDUHFODVVLHGDVGLVWLQFWDUJXPHQWDWLRQVFKHPHV
In order to better understand the limits of argumentation schemes
DQGKRZWKH\FDQEHGHYHORSHGEDVHGRQWKHLQVLJKWVRI WKH$UJXPHQWXP0RGHORI 7RSLFVLWFDQEHXVHIXOWRWDNHLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQWZRH[amples of the most representative types of argumentation schemes, the
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Major premise

If some particular thing a FDQEHFODVVLHGDVIDOOLQJXQGHUYHUEDO

category C, then a has property FLQYLUWXHRI VXFKFODVVLFDWLRQ

Minor premise

aFDQEHFODVVLHGDVIDOOLQJXQGHUYHUEDOFDWHJRU\C.
a has property F.

Conclusion

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Argumentation schemes and topical relations

Major premise

Generally, if A occurs, then B ZLOOPLJKWRFFXU

Minor premise

In the case, A occurs PLJKWRFFXU

Conclusion

Therefore in this case, B ZLOOPLJKWRFFXU

205

Argumentation scheme 2: Argument from cause to effect.

7KHUVWVFKHPHSURYLGHVDJHQHULFGHIHDVLEOHmodus ponens rule of inference applied to an ontological connection that in the traditional dialectiFDODSSURDFKZRXOGKDYHEHHQGHVFULEHGWKURXJKWKHlociIURPGHQLWLRQ
description, genus, and property. The argument from cause is also based
on a defeasible modus ponens ZKLFK LV FRPELQHG ZLWK D FDXVDO UHODWLRQ
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RQHRI WKHSRVVLEOHW\SHVRI LQIHUHQFHVWKDWFDQEHGUDZQIURPWKHVDPH
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a.

Causal relations and causal arguments

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on a causal relation. We consider the classic Aristotelian causal link
EHWZHHQKDYLQJIHYHUDQGEUHDWKLQJIDVWDQGVHHKRZWKLVFDXVH
HIIHFWUHODWLRQFDQEHXVHGWRGUDZDFRQFOXVLRQRQWKHEDVLVRI GLIIHUent logical rules:
 +
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fast.
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fever.
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fever.
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fever.
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breathing fast.

206

Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton

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the defeasible modus tollens ,Q  WKH VXIFLHQW DQG WKH QHFHVVDU\ FRQGLWLRQV RI  WKH FDXVDO SUHPLVH DUH LQYHUWHG DQG WKH DIUPDWLRQ RI  WKH
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preceding defeasible patterns.
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major premise, or other components of the argument structure, are left
implicit and need to be evaluated in order to assess the quality of the
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RhetoricD2QWKHRWKHUKDQGDQDORJLFDOUHDVRQLQJFDQEH
considered as a form of reasoning, distinct from induction and deducWLRQ-XWKHFRQVLVWLQJLQLPSOLFLWO\DEVWUDFWLQJDJHQHULFFDWHJRU\
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types of reasoning can apply to the same causal relation, as in the cases
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breathing fast.
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breathing fast.

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FRZVDQGKXPDQEHLQJV

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208

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ARGUMENTATION SCHEME
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&/$66,),&$7,2135(0,6(: For all x, if x

has property F, then xFDQEHFODVVLHGDV

having property G.
&21&/86,21 a has property G.

SEMANTIC
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animal.
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property G.
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Socrates

Abduction
- Generally, if A
occurs, then BZLOO
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- Therefore in this
case, BZLOOPLJKW
occur.

Example
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particular case,
the individual a
has property F
and also
property G.
- Therefore, b,
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property F,
then also has
property G.

7KHW\SHVRI LQIHUHQFHVWKDWFDQEHGUDZQIURPDGHQLWLRQDUHSDUWLDOly determined by the semantic structure. Abductive inferences cannot be

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conclusions deductively and other abductively.

Argumentation schemes and topical relations

c.

209

Authority and arguments from authority

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Major premise
Minor premise
Conditional premise

Conclusion

Source ELVDQH[SHUWLQVXEMHFWGRPDLQS contain

proposition A.
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If source ELVDQH[SHUWLQDVXEMHFWGRPDLQ6FRQWDLQLQJ
proposition A, and E asserts that proposition ALVWUXHIDOVH
then APD\SODXVLEO\EHWDNHQWREHWUXHIDOVH
APD\SODXVLEO\EHWDNHQWREHWUXHIDOVH

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The defeasible rule of modus ponens is used in this case, but only prototypically. From the same semantic-ontological relation different types of
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Abductive reasoning can also support some conclusions based on the

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210

Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton

Likely, it is possible to conclude abductively from the fact that a person is

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The same semantic-ontological relation can be reconstructed inductively by providing a past instance of a reliable opinion provided by the
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claims:
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FODLPLQJQRZDERXW\RXUOHJPD\EHWUXHDVZHOO

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guess the color of a card because I made a similar correct guess in the past.
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reliability of his claim:
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d.

Argumentation schemes and levels of abstraction

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can be considered to be different levels of abstraction, distinct perspecWLYHVRQFRPSOH[GDWDLQYROYLQJDPXOWLIDFHWHGFRPELQDWLRQRI VHPDQWLF
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Argumentation schemes and topical relations

211

second level of abstraction, providing the most common of the possible

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Prototypical patterns can be useful for providing rules of thumb in classifyLQJDUJXPHQW+RZHYHUWKHULVNLVKLGLQJWKHGLVFUHSDQF\EHWZHHQWKHWZR
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other in order to assess an argument in its structure or reconstruct its tacit
dimension. In this sense the Argumentum Model of Topics can become a
cornerstone for future developments of the logic of arguments. The analysis of the structure of topical relations provides the semantic-ontological
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distinguished and described in detail by investigating their logical structure.

5.

Conclusion

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distinct and independent. This multidisciplinary aspect of the theory is
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abstraction of argumentation theory and the natural language discourse
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of meaning and semantic-ontological relations in the logic of arguments,
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argumentative move becomes crucial, like the meaning of the concepts
used to achieve it. Necessity and reasonableness become grounded on
ontological relations and not only on the simple disposition of the terms.
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research on the so-called argumentation schemes, or rather prototypical
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the semantic-ontological connections. Argumentation schemes become the
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Abaelardi, Peter. 1970. Dialectica,HG/0GH5LMN$VVHQ9DQ*RUFXP
$ULVWRWOH5KHWRULFDWUDQV:5K\V5REHUWV,QThe Works of Aristotle,
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Aristotle. 1984. Topica, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge. In The Works of
AristotleHG-%DUQHV.3ULQFHWRQ3ULQFHWRQ8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV

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LQIRUPDWLYLWp,QDe la mtaphysique la rhtorique, ed. M. Meyer, 7094.
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Everardi, Nicolaus. 1607. Loci Argumentorum legales. Venetiis: apud Matthaeum Valentinum.
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+DVWLQJV$UWKXUA Reformulation of the Modes of Reasoning in Argumentation3K''LVVHUWDWLRQ(YDQVWRQ1RUWKZHVWHUQ8QLYHUVLW\

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/DZVRQ -RKQ  The Law of Presumptive Evidence. San Francisco:
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Peirce, Charles S. 1992. Reasoning and the logic of things. &DPEULGJH+DUYDUG
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the contemporary theory of argumentation. In Pondering on problems
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Dordrecht: Springer.
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