Revue Internationale de Philosophie

FREGE'S SENSE AND REFERENCE RELATED TO RUSSELL'S THEORY OF DEFINITE

DESCRIPTIONS
Author(s): S. O. WELDING
Source: Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 25, No. 97 (3), L'GALIT (1971), pp. 389402
Published by: Revue Internationale de Philosophie
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23940742
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VARIT

FREGE'S SENSE AND REFERENCE RELATED

TO RUSSELL'S THEORY
OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
by S. O. WELDING

A discussion about Frege's distinction between the Sense and the

Reference of an expression involves topical questions, since Frege's
argument still prevails in most contributions on expressions desig
nating an object in such a way that it is almost generally assumed,

e.g. by Carnap, Church and Quine, as opposed to Russell -

that definite descriptions or descriptive expressions should be con

sidered as names.

I wish to show that Frege's distinction between the Sense and the
Reference of an expression is logically inconsistent. This becomes ob
vious, I think, if Frege's conception of the sense of an expression is in
quired precisely in view of Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions.
I

If we assert of the bisecting lines of a triangle "the point of inter

section of a and b is the same as the point of intersection of b and c",
we have then, according to Frege, two different designations of the

same point expressed in ' the point of intersection of a and b ' and
' the point of intersection of b and c ' (x). The difference between these

(1) On Sense and Reference (for short : SB), p. 26. The translations are taken from :
Translations from the Philosophical Writings of G. Frege, ed. by P. Geach and M. Black,
2ndedn 1960. (I refer to the pagination of the first German edition which is added in the
English translation and in both German editions : G. Frege, Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung.
Fnf logische Studien, hrsg. v. G. Patzig, 3. Aufl. Gttingen 1969 : G. Frege, Kleine Schriften,

hrsg. v. I. Angelelli, Darmstadt, 1967).

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390

S. O. WELDING

expressions (or signs) "corresponds to a difference

presentation of that which is designated" in t

point in question.

"It is natural, now, to think of there being connect

(name, combination of words, letter), besides that to

refers, which may be called the reference of the sign, als

like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of p

contained. In our example, accordingly, the reference

sions 'the point of intersection of a and b ' and 'the point

of b and c' would be the same, but not their senses. The reference

of 'evening star' would be the same as that of 'morning star', but

not the sense" (2).

It is important, I think, to note that Frege does not pay attention

to the fact that a proper name according to common use of

language is or consists in what an object is called ; for, if ' the
morning star' is merely the name of an object, it would not follow
that the object in question is a star and that it is visible in the morning.
We can only infer this, if'the morning star' is not considered to name

but to describe a single object. Thus, if an expression is said to be a

proper name, we should conclude, that it has no sense or mode

of presentation of that which is designated. If, then, ' the morning
star' and 'the evening star' were names for the same object, it would
not be correct to expound that the difference between these expres
sions or signs "corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation

of that which is designated" ; i.e. we cannot maintain, then, that

both expressions have a different sense. This difficulty about proper
names becomes obvious, as I shall discuss below, since Frege suggests

that every designation of a single object should be simply called a

proper name.

An expression or proper name expresses its sense (3) or has a sense

(i.e. the mode of presentation of that which is designated) and has a
reference (i.e. it refers to the object which is designated by that ex
pression or proper name).

(2) SB, p. 26 f. Obviously, there is a lapsus linguae in Frege's argument : he actually

speaks here about 'the evening star' and 'the morning star', since 'evening star', etc.,
would designate, according to Frege, a concept and not an object.
(3) SB, p. 31 : see below.

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frege's sense and reference

391

"The regular connexion between a sign, its sense, and its reference
is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and
to that in turn a definite reference, while to a given reference (an object)

there does not belong only a single sign" (4).

Thus, Frege seems to think that this correspondence holds for any

sign or expression designating one object. This view, however, is

not made explicit, since Frege asserts, on the one hand, that "The sen
se of a proper name is grasped by everybody, who is sufficiently fami

liar with the language or totality of designations to which it (seil,

the sense of the proper name in question) belongs. " and he explaines,

on the other hand, that

"In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' opinions
as to the sense may differ. It might, for instance, be taken to be the

following : the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great.

Anybody who does this will attach another sense to the sentence "Aris

totle was born in Stagira" than will a man who takes as the sense of

the name : the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira.

So long as the reference remains the same, such variations of sense

may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical
structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a perfect

language" (5).

It is surprising how vaguely Frege speaks of the sense of an actual

proper name, viz. that something might be taken as its sense. If we
establish with Frege the sense of 'Aristotle' as : the teacher of Alex
ander the Great who was born in Stagira, then Mr. Margolis is right
in arguing (8) that the statement "Aristotle is the teacher of Alexan

der the Great who was born in Stagira" would become analytic and
could not be different in kind from "Aristotle is Aristotle". It was

indeed decisive for Frege to distinguish between the two statements

"a = a" and "a = b" in such a way that the mode of presentation of
that which is designated by ' a ' should be different from that one de

signated by 'b' (7).

I think Frege is mistaken in his view that it is possible to avoid
variations of the sense of an actual proper name, since he should

(4) SB, p. 27.

(5) SB, p. 27 note.
(6) J. Margolis, On Names : Sense and Reference, in : American Philos. Quarterly, Vol. 5

(1968), p. 210.
(7) SB, p. 25 f : cf. Margolis, loc. cit.

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392

S. O. WELDING

have realized that an actual proper name does not express

for, if we say that e.g. '2 + 2', '2 X 2' and 'the positive
of 16' (8) have the same reference, but that they do no

press the same sense, we should conclude, then, tha

proper name '4', does not express any sense. We migh

thing as the sense of ' 4 ', but it is by no means clear why i

only one sense : its sense could be e.g. 2 + 2, 2 X 2, the po

root of 16, etc. Let us suppose that 2 + 2 were the

we should say, then, that the sense of ' 2 + 2 ' is (iden

the sense of'4'. This amounts to saying that an express

2 ' expresses its sense, which also belongs to an expressi
not express any sense.

According to Frege's exposition we should conclude that, on the

one hand, there exists a one-one relation between a (descriptive)
expression and its sense, if the sense is expressed by the very ex
pression (9), and that, on the other hand, there exists a one-many
relation between an (indescriptive) expression or actual proper name
and its sense. We could simply say that an expression designating one

object has either one and only one sense or more than one, namely
that one we choose to take (10). Thus, it is evident that an actual
proper name or indescriptive expression should be distinguished
from a descriptive expression, if it is true that both kinds of expres
sions cannot have the same relation to their senses. Since an actual

proper name such as 'Aristotle' or '4' cannot give us any (at least
not any precise) information about the object it refers to, it is not
right then to assume that such a name has a sense which "is grasped
by everybody, who is sufficiently familiar with the language", as it

does not express any sense. Frege is mistaken to claim, as I think

he does, that the difference of a sign or expression designating one

(8) Analogous examples are used by Frege. Cf. Function and Object (FB), p. 14 (transi,

in : Geach and Black) : cf. below.

(9) I neglect here that the same sense can be expressed in natural languages by different
expressions. Cf. SB, p. 2 7. (' The murderer of Caesar ' and ' that one who murdered Caesar '

would be different expressions which express the same sense).

(10) Although A. Church determines in accordance with Frege that an expres

sion expresses its sense, he does not realize any logical difference with regard to (actual)
proper names. (Cf. A. Church, An Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Vol. 1, 2nd edn.,

1956, p. 6).

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frege's sense and reference

object corresponds always to a difference of sense or mode of presen

tation of that which is designated : this is not the case, as we should

observe in "Pierre Loti is Louis Marie Julien Viaud" or "5 = V".

Of course, the right use of an actual proper name presupposes that

the object called by this name could be described definitely. But

from this it does not follow that one of these definite descriptions of

that object could be taken as the sense of this actual proper name.
Frege seems to think only of descriptive expressions, i.e. of ex
pressions which express their senses, and not of actual proper names,

when he displays the sense of an expression e.g.

"It may perhaps be granted that every grammatically well-formed

expression representing a proper name always has a sense" (u).

"A proper name must have at least a sense (as I use that word) ;
otherwise there would be an empty sequence of sounds and it would
not be right to call it a name. For scientific use it should be expected
of a proper name that it has also a reference ; i.e. that it refers to or
designates an object. Thus, it is by mediation of sense, and by this only,

that a proper name refers to an object" (12).

Frege explicitly establishes the following terminology :

"A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses
its sense, stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign we
express its sense and designate its reference" (ls).

According to Frege it is possible to form an expression like 'the

celestial body most distant from the Earth' or 'the least rapidly con

vergent series' (14), which have a sense, but yet we do not know,
whether the former expression has a reference, whereas we can show

that the latter has none. Frege wants to exclude from science and
logic expressions or proper names that have no reference (15).
Strictly speaking, it is questionable to maintain that the expression
'the least rapidly convergent series' has a sense but no reference, if

(11) SB, p. 28.

(12) Ausfhrungen ber Sinn und Bedeutung, in : G. Frege, Nachgelassene Schriften, be

arbeitet, eingeleitet usw. v. H. Hermes u.a., Bd. 1, Hamburg 1969, p. 135 (my trans
lation).
(13) SB, p. 31. In this case Black prefers to translate 'bedeutet' not by taking 'refers
to' but 'stands for'.

(14) SB, p. 28.

(15) Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GG), I, p. 9 note 3 and p. 19 f. Cf. below.

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393

394

S. O. WELDING

the sense of an expression is said to be the mode of pre

that which is designated, since we have to admit that t
such a single object which could be designated by this
sentation. Frege does not give any further explanation
respondence between the sense and the reference of t
pression. It is not clear how it could be possible by m
sense that an expression refers to (or designates) one ob
contrary, this question will be even more difficult to a
we take into considerations Frege's distinction betwee
and object.
II

According to Frege a criterion for a well-formed gr

expression designating an object can be found in the singu

article which accompanies a concept-word (16). If an

article or the plural article or one of the words 'all', '
stands in front of a concept-word, the expression in qu
nates a concept (17).
Hence Frege determines a concept by its predicative n
which is more easily recognized, when we express e.g.

"all mammals have red blood" in "whatever is a mammal has red

blood" or in "if anything is a mammal, it has red blood".

"We may say in brief, taking 'subject' and 'predicate' in the gramma

tical sense : A concept is the reference of a predicate ; an object is

something that can never be the whole reference of a predicate, but
can be the reference of a subject" (19).

Since the predicative use of a concept-word (expression) is conclu

sive to the effect that this expression designates a concept, Freg

(16) On Concept and Object (BG), p. 195, in : The Transi., ed. by Geach and Black. Cf.

Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Gdl.), 51 (transi, by J. L. Austin, 2nd edn. 1953). Exception

to this rule are for instance : "the horse is a four-legged animal" and "the Turk besieged

Vienna". Vide BG, p. 196.

(17) Gdl., 51 and BG, p. 198.

(18) The predicative nature of a concept is explained as a (propositional-) function

with one argument. A function is (per def.) in need of supplementation. Cf. FB, p. 6
and p. 14-17 transi, in op. cit.

(19) BG, p. 198. I changed 'linguistic' (sprachlich) to 'grammatical'.

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frege's sense and reference

395

feels obliged to suppose "the three words ' the concept ho

do designate an object, but on that very account, they do not d

nate a concept..." (20) and "... the concept horse is not a c

cept" (21). Frege thinks that we are here confronted by an awkwa

ness of language, i.e. language is here in a predicament, since

would usually say that the city of Berlin is a city or the volcano V
vius is a volcano.

He comments the sentence "the concept man is not empty"

as follows :

"Here the first three words are to be regarded as a proper name;

which can no more be used predicatively than 'Berlin' or 'Vesu
vius'" (22).

Hence, according to Frege, it depends only on the predicative use

of an expression, whether it designates a concept or not. If, then,
an expression is deprived of its predicative use, we should ask : why

have we to infer that this expression designates an object ? What

kind of object is it supposed to be ? Is there any reason for stating
that there is a correspondence between the sense and the reference
of such an expression or proper name ?
According to Frege's account, we should analyse the sentence

"the concept round square is empty" as follows : the first

four words are to be regarded as a proper name which designates
an object. It is hard to understand what kind of object could be
designated by this expression. We should take into consideration
that we express "the same thought" in the sentence "there is no

round square" and in "the concept round square is empty".

"In the sentence "there is at least one square root of 4" we have an
assertion, not about (say) the definite number 2 nor about -2, but about

a concept, square root of 4 ; viz. that it is not empty. But if

I express the same thought thus : "The concept square root

(20) BG, p. 196. In later life Frege denies this strange conclusion. He thinks that
we are misled by the use of the definite singular article to the effect that we believe that

such an expression is a proper name for an object. (Cf. Nachgelassene Schriften, p. 257,
288 f : 1914 or 1924/25, resp.). Frege does not refer to any explanation suggested by

Russell in his theory of definite descriptions.

(21) BG, p. 196 f.

(22) BG, p. 197.

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396

S. O. WELDING

of 4 is realized", then the first six words form the proper

object, and it is about this object that something is asser

It is not clear at all how "the same thought", i.e. ho

(or non-existence) could be asserted in both sentences

cept and an object as well (24), particularly when we take

that Frege regards existence (or non-existence) as a p

concept (25). His explanation remains unsatisfactory
is Julius Caesar" is senseless, i.e. neither true nor fa
"Julius Caesar is realized" has a sense but is false ;

"for the assertion that something is realized (as the w

taken here) can be truly made only about a quite special kin
viz. such as can be designated by proper names of the form

F'" (20).

When we say, however, "concepts such as square root of

4 or man are not empty (are realized) ", then according to Frege,
we should suppose that we make an assertion about concepts, since
' concept ' is used predicatively : this could be expressed more dis

tinctly in the sentence "something is a concept such as square

root of 4 or man and is not empty". But as soon as we are
going to say definitely "the concept square root of 4 [the
concept man, resp.) is not empty (is realized)", Frege maintains
that we do not assert something of a concept but of a (quite special
kind of) object (27). Similar difficulties arise, when we have to analyse

the sentence "the number 2 is a prime number" we assert that an

object falls under a concept. If, however, we say definitely "the
number 2 falls under the concept prime numbe r", Frege feels
obliged to suppose that we assert a relation holding between two ob
jects designated by ' the number 2 ' and ' the concept prime num
ber' (28). If this explanation were true, I wonder why this relation

(23) BG, p. 199.

(24) Since the latter is not possible, the ontological argument for the existence of God

breaks down. Vide Gdl., 53.

(25) Cf. Gdl., 53.
(26) BG, p. 201.
(27) Frege explains to"there is at least one square root of 4" only in his manuscrit of BG :

"One can even say that there is expressed, then, that our concept falls under a higher
one, of which the only mark would be ' being realized ' (in that sense as we use this word
here)". (Vide Nachgelassene Schriften I, p. 118. My transi.).

(28) BG, p. 205.

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frege's sense and reference

397

can be neither asserted singularly, e.g. in "Vesuvius is a volcano

"the number 2 is a prime number" nor generally, e.g. in "an o
falls under a concept". If, finally, this kind of an analysis of a
tence were logically correct, Frege's statement would prove wrong

"If, for example, we collect under a single concept all concepts un

which there falls only one object, then the oneness (die Einzigkeit)
the mark of this concept" (29).

Since the expression 'the oneness' cannot be used predicative

we ought to deny that it designates a mark of a concept, i.e. a conc

If an expression designates a concept only when used predicative

we, then, have to regard the predicative nature of a concept a

specific quality that depends entirely like a substantive in g
mar on its precise wording. Hence it should be noticed th
is not possible to assert definitely of a concept that it falls und

higher one, since we would not assert this but that there is a rela

between two objects, e.g. in "the concept moon of the Ear

falls under the concept oneness".
If an expression designating a concept is only distinguished from
an expression (proper name) designating an object by its use, we
should conclude, I think, that much of Frege's own exposition of
logic turns out to be incomprehensible.
It would not be right to object that Frege displayed his distinction
between concept and object independently of that between the sense
and the reference of an expression or proper name, because there is,
I think, sufficient evidence for holding that Frege thought both dis
tinctions to be part of a coherent logical theory (30).
Ill

Frege assumes that in the sentence "the concept man is no

empty" we assert something of an object. If this were true, we shoul

ask, why, then, do we use the singular definite article just in front of

(29) Gdl., 53. I do not agree with Austin's translation from ' then ' onwards. I wish t

underline the definite article in front of'oneness', even if this sounds somewhat artificial.

(30) SB and BG are published in quick succession 1892. In SB p. 27. Frege refer

already indefinitely to BG. In BG is referred to SB : p. 195 note, p. 198 n., p. 203. Ref
rence to SB in GG I : p. ix n., p. 7 n. and to BG : p. 3 n., p. 5 n.

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398

S. O. WELDING

'concept' ? Frege explains its use by analysing the sen

number 4 is none other than the result of additively c
and 1":

"The definite article in front of 'result' is here logically justified o

if it is known (1) that there is such a result ; and (2) that there
more than one" (31).

Why should we not explain then, accordingly, that the sing

definite article in front of 'concept' is logically justified only if

presupposed (1) that there is such a concept ; and (2) that there is

more than one ? When we assert something of the concept

we stress that there is such a concept man and that there is
more than one, i.e. we are asserting something of exactly on
definite concept, as we would do of exactly one object, if we
a statement about the result in question. It is, therefore, not

cient to refer only to oneness expressed by the singular definite a

in order to suppose that the expression in question is a proper na

as Frege thinks when he concludes : "In that case the phrase

nates an object, and is to be regarded as a proper name" (32)
should further ask, whether this condition for oneness is app
an object, a concept or a relation (S3). The fact that Frege see
presuppose that this condition can only be applied to an obj
clearly shows, I think, that Frege did not really analyse wh

actually assert by using such an expression containing the singul

finite article.

That is why I have to come back to the question : how can we main
tain that there is a correspondence between the sense of an expression
and its reference ? Or again, how does the sense of an expression me
diate its reference ? If we have to regard the sense of an expression as

the mode of presentation of that which is designated, why then,

have we to think that there can only be the presentation of an object,
and not of a concept or of a relation ?

Frege gives a casual explanation which seems to be very in

structive :

(31) BG, p. 204.

(32) BG, p. 204. Cf. the previous note.
(33) Frege precisely denies this, since ' the number 2 ' the concept prime number,
and ' the relation of an object to the concept it falls under ' are regarded as proper names of

an object. Cf. BG, p. 205.

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frege's sense and reference

399

"Instead of 'the square root of 4 which is smaller than 0' one can
also say 'the negative square root of 4'. We have here the case of a
compound proper name constructed from the expression for a concept
with the help of the singular definite article. This is at any rate permis
sible if one and only one object falls under the concept" (M).

Thus Frege says that the singular definite article refers to one and
only one object, which exclusively falls under the concept in question.
We assert, for instance, only of one object that it falls under the con

cept negative square root of 4; i.e. for one and only

one x, x is a negative square root of 4.
Frege remarks additionally in an annotation :
"In accordance with what was said above, strictly speaking (eigent
lich) such an expression must always be assured of reference, by means

of a special stipulation, e.g. by the convention that the number O

should be taken as its reference, when no object or more than one falls

under the concept" (S6).

Since, accordingly, there is more than one object falling under the

concept square root of 4, we should say that the expression

'the square root of 4' has as its reference the number 0,

i.e. there is not one and only one object which is a square root of 4.
Following this stipulation Frege should have defined the sense of
an expression as the mode of presentation of that which is said to be
designated. This would have been the decisive advance to Russell's
Theory of definite Descriptions.
There is no doubt, however, that Frege suggests here merely a hy

pothesis which seems to be concerned only with a certain kind of

expressions. I think we are justified in supposing that Frege was not
aware of the fundamental importance of analysing an expression in
this way. Let us, for a moment, assume that Frege was aware of it,
then there would not arise any difficulty in explaining the difference
of "there is at least one negative square root of 4" and "there is the
negative square root of 4", since Frege would maintain that we assert

in the former sentence the existence of the concept negative

square root of 4 (i.e. that at least one object falls under this

(34) SB, p. 41. I slightly changed Black's translation following after ' if... ' In German :
"..., wenn ein Gegenstand und nur ein einziger unter den Begriff fllt".
(35) SB, p. 42 n. This translation differs slightly from Black's version.

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400

S. O. WELDING

concept) and that we would assert in the latter sentence

of the object designated by 'the negative square root

however, we should say that we state in the former sent

least one object, and in the latter that one and only on

under the concept negative square root of 4. In a

general way Frege could have concluded, then, that in most expre
sions of the form 'the so-and-so' there is one (or more than one

predicate asserted of one object, i.e. that such an expression contains

a definite description of one object. But it would not follow from thi
that we are describing an object in every expression of this form, as

we obviously would not do so when applying expressions such as

'the concept m a n' or generally 'the concept F\ On the contrary,
we should say that we refer definitely to one concept e.g. called
'man' as we refer to one object called 'Vesuvius' when assertin
something of Vesuvius or the object Vesuvius.

If Frege had taken his convention concerning the reference O

seriously, he could not have avoided, I think, analysing the actual
use of expressions such as 'the least rapidly convergent series', 'th

positive square root of 2 ' or (say) ' the present King of France ' when

occuring in a sentence. It is precisely this problem which Russel

tried to solve in his famous Theory (36).
If we presuppose, on the other hand, in accordance with Frege
that an expression has a reference only if it designates one and only

one object, this supposition could only be logically consistent wit

regard to Frege's conception of the sense of an expression, if he had

analysed the sense of an expression precisely, i.e. in correspondenc

with Russell's analysis.

Frege shows clearly, why the expressions 'the square root of 2
and ' the positive square root of 2 ' fail to have a reference :
"Here there is a logical danger. For if we wanted to form from the

words 'square root of 2 ' the proper name 'the square root of 2 ' we
should commit a logical error, because this proper name, in the ab

sence of further stipulation, would be ambiguous *, hence even devoid

of reference.

(3G) Russell disagrees in this point with Frege, since Russell objects that difficulties
would arise, when the reference of an expression were absent. Vide On Denoting, Mind,

Vol. XIV (1905), p. 483.

* (Frege's note) I am taking for granted here that there exist negative and irra

tional numbers.

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frege's sense and reference

401

If there were no irrational numbers as has indeed been maintained

then even the proper name 'the positive square root of 2 ' would
be without a reference, at least by the straightforward sense of the words
(dem unmittelbaren Wortsinn nach), without special stipulation. And
if we were to give this proper name a reference expressly, the object
referred to would have no connection with the formation of the name,

and we should not be entitled to infer that it was a positive square root of
2, while yet we should be only too inclined to conclude just that" (").

I think that Frege does not realize that he is analysing here the sense

of the expressions 'the square root of 2' and 'the positive square
root of 2', in spite of the fact that he gives a correct explanation why

these expressions do not have a reference. Although Frege refers

several times to ' On Sense and Reference ' it is surprising that he does

not discuss the question how the sense or mode of presentation of

that which is designated should be expressed in expressions such as

'the concept prime number'or 'the relation of an object to

the concept it falls under', etc. For, then, Frege would have verified
that there does not exist such a mode of presentation of an object at

all, as well as he is capable of verifying that the expression e.g.

' the positive square root of 2 ' cannot have a reference by analysing
the sense of this expression.
If, additionnally, Frege had denied that actual proper names such
as 'Aristotle' or '4' have a sense, since they express none, then Frege
would be obviously right to maintain that there is a definite corres

pondence between the sense of an expression and its reference :

an expression would have a sense and eo ipso a reference, only
if the sense of this expression consists of a definite description of one
(and only one) object. This view would, then, be only different from

Russell's in his analysis of sentences containing expressions without

reference (or with the reference O).
The essential mistake of Frege's conception of the sense and the
reference of an expression can be reduced to his deficient analysis of
the sense of an expression, since Frege employs at least implicitly
two logically inconsistent criteria for holding that an expression
designates an object : It depends either on the sense or the mode of

(37) GG I, p. 19 f. (v. G. Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, transi, and ed. by M.
Furth, 1964, p. 50. I only changed 'denotation' (Bedeutung) and 'denotes' in 'reference'

and 'rfrs to', resp.). The German quotation is my addition.

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402

S. O. WELDING

presentation of that which is designated (and this seems a

an object) or on the impredicative use of an expressio

use of an expression does not determine its designation (i.

it designates a concept or an object), we should rely on

criterion, which does not imply in all cases that such a

contains a definite description of an object and not (say) o

The consequences of this deficient analysis of the sen

by a proper name or an expression are obvious : Frege

clarify the correspondence between the sense of an expre

reference, nor can be avoid the adoption or postulatio

such as the concept man and, presumably, the con

square, etc.

It should be realized that the root of this doubtful view on

is this that Frege fails to give a logically consistent interpreta
the singular definite article. This may explain, after all, w
is not aware of the decisive difference between indescriptiv

sions (names) and descriptive expressions. It is clear, then,

that Frege was in the position that he could not give a lo
consistent analysis of the sense of an expression. Thus, it i
understand that the logically correct interpretation of the

singular article is the most important point in Russell's Theor

nite Descriptions.
University of Gttingen.

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