EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4585. November 12, 2004]

MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition [1] for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final
judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tacloban City.[2]
The dispositive portion of the same states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
for (sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in the Information. He is imposed a penalty of ONE (1)
YEAR imprisonment and fine double the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS, plus
payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue Code and costs against the accused. [3]
Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March 1996 and the Entry of Judgment from this Court
dated 20 March 1996.
On 03 July 1996, we required[4] respondent to comment on said petition within ten (10) days from notice. On 17
February 1997, we issued a second resolution [5] requiring him to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
imposed on him for failure to comply with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said Comment. On 07 July 1997, we
imposed a fine of P1,000 for respondents failure to file said Comment and required him to comply with our previous
resolution within ten days.[6] On 27 April 1998, we fined respondent an additional P2,000 and required him to comply
with the resolution requiring his comment within ten days under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of five
(5) days or until his compliance. [7] Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three years later, we declared respondent
Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and ordered his
imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid resolutions. [8]
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported [9] that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on
26 March 1999, but was subsequently released after having shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17
February 1997 and 27 April 1998 by remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his long overdue Comment.
In the said Comment[10] dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated that:
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997 as he was at that time undergoing medical
treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; and
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in respondents favor (as
plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that as a result of his moving for the execution of judgment in
his favor and the eviction of the family of herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the present
administrative case.
In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban
City submitted a letter [11] to the First Division Clerk of Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in
another estafa case before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case involving the
victims of the Doa Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar, Branch 30 rendered a
decision against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,[12] it appears that herein respondent
Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of the Doa Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in
the said civil case was issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing compensation for the deaths of his
wife and two daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which was then deposited in the account
of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinezs wife. When plaintiff asked for his money, he was only able to recover a total of
P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining P60,000 as his attorneys fees. Holding that it was absurd and totally
ridiculous that for a simple legal service he would collect 2/3 of the money claim, the trial court ordered Atty. Martinez
to pay the plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for moral and exemplary damages, and the
costs of the suit.
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinezs dilatory tactics during the trial, citing fourteen (14)
specific instances thereof.Martinezs appeal from the above judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his
failure to file his brief, despite having been granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so.[13]
On 16 June 1999, we referred [14] the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
The report[15] of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan stated in part that:
Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties appeared before the Commission,
until finally it was considered submitted for resolution last 27 June 2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June 1997 and that dismissal is
warranted because the case filed by him does not survive due to his demise; as a matter of fact, it is extinguished
upon his death.
We disagree with respondents contention.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable Supreme Court or the IBP may motu
proprio initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is
called by any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer which requires disciplinary
sanctions.
As earlier cited, respondent lawyers propensity to disregard or ignore orders of the Honorable Supreme Court for which
he was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned reflects an utter lack of good moral character.
Respondents conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his
unfitness to protect the administration of justice and therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In
re: Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815; Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA
1, People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be
disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys immediately.
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution [16] adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation, [17] in the
instant case alleging that:
1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law, although admittedly the practice of law is a privilege;
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court and allowed to adduce evidence, the
result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at by the Investigating Commissioner; and

3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the judiciary in various capacities (from acting city
judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter President) for almost 17 years prior to resuming his law
practice.
On 14 January 2004, we required[18] complainant to file a comment within ten days. On 16 February 2004, we
received a Manifestation and Motion[19] from complainants daughter, Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they
had not been furnished with a copy of respondents Motion, notwithstanding the fact that respondent ostensibly lives
next door to complainants family. Required to Comment on 17 May 2004, respondent has until now failed to do so.
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said Motion to herein complainant. The
records also show that respondent was given several opportunities to present evidence by this Court [20] as well as by
the IBP.[21] Indeed, he only has himself to blame, for he has failed to present his case despite several occasions to do
so. It is now too late in the day for respondent to ask this court to receive his evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it waited for his comment on the
original petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration of the records of the instant case, we find the evidence on
record sufficient to support the IBPs findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The issue with which we are now concerned is whether or not
the said crime is one involving moral turpitude. [22]
Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [23] It
involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[24]
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,[25] where the erring lawyer was indefinitely suspended for having
been convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude and stated:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the
land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense[26] (emphasis supplied)
Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v. Commission on Elections[27] and disqualified a
congressional candidate for having been sentenced by final judgment for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in
accordance with Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which states:
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis
supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time
of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full
upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein petitioners averment that he was
not a lawyer, we nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect that

(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character
of a person. [Indeed] the effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v.
Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges
on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right
and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.[28] (emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,[29] we stated that:
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004] The
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227] It also manifests a
lawyers low regard for her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem. [Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October
2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes
such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. And while the
general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction
to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where, however, the misconduct outside of
the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him
from the office of attorney.[30]
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits, the practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a
proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.[31] A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice them. [32] Verily, lawyers must at
all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must
always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing
them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as officers
of the Court.[33]
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondents plea that if given another chance to have his day in court
and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at. We note with displeasure
the inordinate length of time respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his Comment on the original
petition to disbar him. These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Sec.
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment. Thus, from the time we
issued our first Resolution on 03 July 1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16 March 1999, when he
submitted said Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three years had elapsed.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took respondent to comply, his Comment consists of
all of two pages, a copy of which, it appears, he neglected to furnish complainant. [34] And while he claims to have been
confined while undergoing medical treatment at the time our Resolution of 17 February 1997 was issued, he merely
reserved the submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer any explanation for his failure
to submit his Comment from the time we issued our first Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In fact, said
Comment alleged, merely, that the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away sometime in June 1997, and imputed

upon the latter unsupported ill-motives for instituting the said Petition against him, which argument has already been
resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before the Commission as the main reason for
the long delay, until the same was finally submitted for Resolution on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore,
squandered away seven years to have his day in court and adduce evidence in his behalf, which inaction also unduly
delayed the courts prompt disposition of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,[35] we reminded attorneys that there must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section
5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes that for a willful violation of this
rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action. [36] It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined
lawyers and judges for willful disregard of its orders to file comments or appellants briefs, as a penalty for
disobedience thereof. [37]
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondents old age and the fact that he served in the judiciary
in various capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold respondent to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, [38] and his conduct should be above reproach. [39] The fact
that respondent has chosen to engage in private practice does not mean he is now free to conduct himself in less
honorable or indeed in a less than honorable manner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege, [40] demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.
[41]
Sadly, herein respondent falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. We agree.
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld
the imposition of one years suspension for non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of
six months upon partial payment of the obligation.[42] However, in these cases, for various reasons, none of the
issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held therein that
the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension
from the practice of law.
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands convicted by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda, which is similar to this case in that both respondents were
convicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which we have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the order of suspension from
the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided after Tuanda, we have held disbarment to be the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus:
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, [43] we disbarred a lawyer convicted
of estafa without discussing the circumstances behind his conviction. We held that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of respondent's conviction no longer
rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to
hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his
conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice. [44]
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,[45] a lawyer was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral
turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of
respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section 25 of Rule 127. [46]

3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces, [47] the erring lawyer acknowledged the execution of a
document purporting to be a last will and testament, which later turned out to be a forgery. He was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document, which the Court held to be
a crime involving moral turpitude, said act being contrary to justice, honesty and good morals, and was
subsequently disbarred.
4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez, [48] Atty. Gutierrez was convicted for
murder. After serving a portion of the sentence, he was granted a conditional pardon by the
President. Holding that the pardon was not absolute and thus did not reach the offense itself but merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term, the court nevertheless disbarred him.
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon, [49] Atty. Vinzon was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating the
amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently disbarred. We held thus:
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no question that the term moral
turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all
respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice,
honesty and good morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41
Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt cannot now be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)[50]
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avancea,[51] the conditional pardon extended to the erring lawyer by the Chief
Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment imposed by this court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[52] a lawyer was charged and found guilty of the crime of falsification
of public document for having prepared and notarized a deed of sale of a parcel of land knowing that the
supposed affiant was an impostor and that the vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled
that disbarment follows as a consequence of a lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and since the crime of falsification of public document involves moral turpitude, we
ordered respondents name stricken off the roll of attorneys.
8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,[53] we upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents,
because she was totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession. [54]
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,[55] a lawyer was disbarred for having been convicted
of estafa by final judgment for misappropriating the funds of his client.
In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his
position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. [56]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on official leave.
Corona, and Tinga, JJ., on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral
relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City [1] and
as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all
surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying
on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and
that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent
who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her
office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent
admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and
Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then
on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued,
and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then
met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship
with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that
respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant
against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, [2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and
had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese
woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad,
Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 [3]. Upon their return
to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills
residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his
second marriage before they would live together. [4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the
Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988,
respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui.
Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii
sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after
she reported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of
Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that
after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent
averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio;
and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents funds. [6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought
moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present
allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos
Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that
the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui,
and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No.
89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between
the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence
however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988
and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was
discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No.
26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live
together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos
left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same evidence
had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the concept of
husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and
indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of
complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil.
178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions
on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of
evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was
dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived
together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in
Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for
submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent
filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22,
1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly
certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by
respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent
wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. [12] It is the
contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 [13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code,
and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and
submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make
her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), [15] respondent averred that she did not have the original
copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy
because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has
conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent
averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral
manner.[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui
because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his
courtship.[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have
knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent

reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant
confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent
stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the
marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui
on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of
respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a
picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have
no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and
who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21] to
bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In
fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be
considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom
she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris
Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which
resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs.
Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. [23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents
as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise
averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document
containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient
proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no
showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation,
finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the
light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single,
separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she
left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to
the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and
respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time
did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that
can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure,
she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than
condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy
family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated
December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against
Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and
willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession
simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process,
once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in
court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of
good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership
in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena,
117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional
probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior
to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7
C.J.S. 959).[26]

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him
to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to
two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple,
they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not
have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out
more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss in
her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she
knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest
effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui
never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal
affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed
was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the
moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. [27] Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering
his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law
and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit.
After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. [30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to
believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was
provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the
date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget
the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially
so when she haspersonal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage
Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate,
with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on
her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman and Acting C.J.), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be
denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt,
after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the
instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them
and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent
and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were
steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son,
Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.[1] It was after the child was born, complainant alleged,that respondent
first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent

allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latters
birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another
woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On
February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to
comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment
required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondents motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by
respondent on September 17, 1979. [2] Respondents third motion to dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution dated
September 15, 1982.[3] In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the
community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a
lawyer.[4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the
case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment of
the required fees.[5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to complainants
opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to
take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross immorality
made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who
also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent
from the legal profession.His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests
a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held
that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A
grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [6] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of respectable members of the community. [7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang [8] quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman,
both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of
respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him,
even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. [9]
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not find
complainants assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be
respondents girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and
intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then
an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily
led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman.We cannot castigate
a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered
into because of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to
the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he
worked very hard to be admitted into.Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there
appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him. [10] Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be
allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his
oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant
Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of
the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified complaint within ten (10)
days from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and
verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default for failure to file an answer
to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to submit before the
Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the
resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The
hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for
10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never
moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she and her husband had
already "reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent and
complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file
a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and nothing
was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP Board of Governors
submitted to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of

immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a
responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were
born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well
as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and
children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and
wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely
Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at
Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised
that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent
would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of
his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by
hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant's) children
in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had
taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the
complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter byhabeas corpus. The Regional Trial
Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and
continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating that complainant and
respondent had been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent
reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away
the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting
upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the
bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed
with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the continued possession ... of a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss
requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is
important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral
character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher
who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly
morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his
own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by reason of his immoral
conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who
consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with another
woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship with a married
woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which
he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took up again

with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly,
respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his
own daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders
from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to
the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he
has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
l 100 Phil. 586 (1956).
2 100 Phil. at 592.
3 100 Phil. a, 593.
4 117 Phil. 865 (1963).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7136

August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment 1 before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent)
for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he
had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been
receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet
you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following
day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at
her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion,
he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of
furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face,
which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene,
reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that
you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain?
Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of
us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love
you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent
together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is
gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!" 2
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11 th Street, New Manila where,
as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his
friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was
handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch
of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong
City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page
21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with
Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the
original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and
known only to the immediate members of their respective families , and that Respondent, as far as the
general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of
his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in
the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to
continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now they are. 6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to
keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact
they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to
Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the
formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2). 9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer,
has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the
institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery
with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being thatunder
the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, 12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named
respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy
of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha
Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS 14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in
which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's
Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the
annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was
pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as
his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant. 17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
(Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139 22 of the Rules
of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against
him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in
the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an
adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the
accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that]their
relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . , and
Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under
the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship
with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special"
relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there
was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
"Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife
Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the
respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie
or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery"
being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have
sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be
married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void." 26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies
is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members
of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some
kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise
Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a "lawyer," 38 years old as the
child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate 28 with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit 30 which he
identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's
father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer. 31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than
clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that
of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 which is the quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in
an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is
required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section
27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment
or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of
the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly
immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is,
following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in
any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." 35 The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair
was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant,
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with

respect tobetrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are
punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifestsdeliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage
. . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has beencarrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low
regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably
unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon
him.39 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I
recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the
husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon7 of the same
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner,
filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his
(complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that
the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts
alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are
inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which
provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal
has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts
complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware

that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he
showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state
that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of
complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong
held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents.
Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent
Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages
to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions.
Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala)
himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after
complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving
both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11 th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows
with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's
were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts
that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had
decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said
address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation
from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there
bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center.
What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl,
Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful
and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal
procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje
have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene
Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no
choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to
be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a
bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case 47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
mayproceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office,
and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of
the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792
Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, CJ,

Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the
Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the
conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the
conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; [2] and constitutes sufficient ground
for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. [3]
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May
20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. [4]
After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its
attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004. [6]Afterwards,
the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was later
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, [7] which involved moral turpitude, should
result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in this wise:
x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after
gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi
driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken
is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under
the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a
turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and
held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused

to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of
liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get
up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist
blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up
again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The
taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went
back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The
taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the
ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same
to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting
him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The
incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the
complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the
hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck, [9] complainant would have
surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr.
Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and
disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an
application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of the civil
liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano. [10]
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular
undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals. [11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also
exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:
1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi,
had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car,
got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil
liabilities to Complainant.[12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground
for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. [13] In the instant case, respondent has
been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already
been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1)
whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his
conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court
rejected the employers contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the
crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court
explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it
was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as
explained thus:
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x. [16] (Emphasis
supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the
presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of
that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back
turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's
face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that
it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and
desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed
him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to
defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that
Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. [17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of
respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it.
The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted
by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers
assault.

We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He
shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault
was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as
not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who
deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected
poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was
definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying
to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm [18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil
liabilities.[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his
attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He
obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has
been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains
adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent
reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his

victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter
has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers,
but certainly to their good moral character. [22] Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross
as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and
the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office. [23]
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an
essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.[24]

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial
court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants family.
[25]

But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants

family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. [26]
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been
mauled by complainant and two other persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:
The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty.
Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other
in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not
downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do
so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainants version of the incident
particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x. [28]
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.
[30]
Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are
expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it
is

bestowed

only

upon

individuals

who

are

competent

intellectually,

academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers

must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31]
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile
confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should
never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court
cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to
society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty
aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.
Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction
would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery,
and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [A.C. No. 1474. January 28, 2000]

CRISTINO G. CALUB, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARBRAHAM A. SULLER, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against respondent premised on grossly immoral conduct for having raped his
neighbor's wife.
In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller went to the complainant's
abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade.
As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife let him in. Thereafter, respondent began touching
her in different parts of her body. When she protested, respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.
At that moment, complainant returned home to get money to pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the house, he saw his wife
and respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed.[1] She was kicking respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on her
arms and other leg, preventing her from defending herself.
On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union a criminal complaint [2] for rape against
respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court of First Instance, Agoo, La Union.
On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Abraham A. Suller.[3]
On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within ten (10) days from notice. [4]

On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a fabrication. [5]
On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. [6]
From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings where both parties appeared with their respective
counsel. In a petition filed on November 6, 1978, respondent prayed for the suspension of proceedings pending final termination of
Criminal Case No. A-420 pending with the Court of First Instance, La Union, Branch 3, Agoo. [7] Kycalr
On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor General, the case having been referred to him previously. [8]
In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On August
28, 1991 the latter sent notice of hearings to both parties. [9]
On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the proceedings and considering the case submitted for resolution
as notice to complainant remained unserved while respondent failed to appear despite due notice. [10]
On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution recommending that the disciplinary
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year be meted on respondent. [11]
The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Such acquittal, however, is not determinative of this administrative case.
The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the complainant suffice to show that respondent acted in a
grossly reprehensible manner in having carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent in her very home.
"A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court."[12]
In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not sufficient punishment
for the immoral act of respondent. The rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. The privilege to
practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. [13] "Good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in
order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity." [14]
WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practise of law. Let his name be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL
DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDODE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:
The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan,
et al. The Petition prays
1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves
from hearing and deciding this petition;
2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and

3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court from
hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from
participating in any partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by
attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the
Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case
that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v.
Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.
Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19 May 2003, before the
Sandiganbayan, asking that the appointment of counsels de officio (sic) be declared functus officio and that, being the
now counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No.
26905 pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against his client be
dismissed.
During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the court several portions of the
book, entitled Reforming the Judiciary, written by Justice Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the
defense. On 9 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other things, that
a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the truth of the statements contained in
Justice Artemio Panganibans book, REFORMING THE JUDICIARY, in relation to the prejudgment
committed by the Supreme Court justices against President Estrada in the subject case/s
of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,
b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio Panganiban, Justice
Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department of National
Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring whatever supporting documents they
may have in relation to their direct and indirect participation in the proclamation of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book of Justice
Panganiban, including the material events that led to that proclamation and the ruling/s in
theEstrada vs. Arroyo, supra. (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)
The truth referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner pertains to what he claims should
have been included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:
The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief
Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
a) going to EDSA 2;
b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of permanent
disability even without proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional conditions,
e.g., written declaration by either the President or majority of his cabinet; and
c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability.
It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which are obviously undeniable.
Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada. (Petition, Rollo, pp. 13-14.)
On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss,
filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon of the foregoing order. According to
Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the
Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred,
Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language when she blurted

out,Magmumukha naman kaming gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the
motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.)
remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion would result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the
alleged bias and partial attitude of the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for
their disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution
(Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estradas Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon (Na
tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6, 2003 is DENIED for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 37.)
and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioners motion for disqualification of 14
July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby DENIES the Motion for
Disqualification. (Rollo, p. 48.)
The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for utter
lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a
recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On
the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on the other
hand, he would elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He
denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went on to state thatThe act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of the public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is
not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But
the act of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in ESTRADA
vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the
Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the
name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem absurd to allow the
Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their UNLAWFUL act. (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of
the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction
of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)
The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question pertaining to the legality of
the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead
issue.
Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within the judicial forum; indeed, he
has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension
and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the Supreme Court. In a letter,
dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he
has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before
the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain
of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its
Members. But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders Attorney Alan Paguia,
counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten days from notice hereof, why he should not
be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading,
Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the
members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give some semblance of
validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its members, provides Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political
partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan political activities.
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term partisan political activities; the law states:
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat
of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate.
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any
candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any
candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause
the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public
office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice
of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of
the Court at such an event could be no different from their appearance in such other official functions as attending
the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court
for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any
wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally
imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on a
case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has
persisted in ignoring the Courts well-meant admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of law? It renders the
decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were not observed.
There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide

and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already made
and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to
voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur. Carpio, J., no part.
SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 4497. September 26, 2001]
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROO,[1] respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the administrative complaint [2] for disbarment of respondent, Atty. Florante E. Madroo, filed by
spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido. Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing
numerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at Balingasag, Misamis
Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate administrative cases against
respondent.
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,[3] complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed charges of grave threats and acts unbecoming
a member of the judiciary against respondent. Respondent was therein found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm
at complainant, who was unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation. Respondent was accordingly dismissed
from the service with prejudice to reemployment in government but without forfeiture of retirement benefits.
Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge Madrono, A.M.
No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge Madrono, A.M. No. MTJ-90-486.[4] In the first case, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that respondent granted and reduced bail in a criminal case without prior
notice to the prosecution. In the second case, the spouses Saburnido charged that respondent, in whose court certain
confiscated smuggled goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the goods but did not issue the
corresponding memorandum receipts. Some of the goods were lost while others were substituted with damaged
goods. Respondent was found guilty of both charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous
complaints against them, namely:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,[5] for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido. Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent his service firearm to an acquaintance who thereafter extorted
money from public jeepney drivers while posing as a member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758, [6] for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido and two
others. Respondent averred that Venustiano, with the help of his co-respondents in the case, inserted an entry in the
police blotter regarding the loss of Venustianos firearm.

3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,[7] for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, filed by
respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent alleged that Venustiano Saburnido, without permission from his
superior, took into custody a prisoner by final judgment who thereafter escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95-33,[8] filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors during the
1995 elections despite being related to a candidate for barangay councilor.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against Venustiano Saburnido had been
dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido was still pending.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation, since they had earlier filed
administrative cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from the judiciary. Complainants assert that due to the
complaints filed against them, they suffered much moral, mental, physical, and financial damage. They claim that their
children had to stop going to school since the family funds were used up in attending to their cases.
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in the administrative cases in which he was
dismissed and his benefits forfeited did not constitute moral turpitude. Hence, he could not be disbarred therefor. He
then argues that none of the complaints he filed against complainants was manufactured. He adds that he was so
unlucky that Saburnido was not convicted. [9] He claims that the complaint for serious irregularity against Venustiano
Saburnido was dismissed only because the latter was able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating that his
service firearm was lost. He also points out that Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped during his
watch. As for his complaint against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent contends that by mentioning this case in the
present complaint, Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right to call the attention of the proper authorities to a violation
of the Election Code.
In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases against them were meant only to harass them. In
addition, Rosalia Saburnido stressed that she served in the BEI in 1995 only because the supposed chairperson was
indisposed. She stated that she told the other BEI members and the pollwatchers that she was related to one
candidate and that she would desist from serving if anyone objected. Since nobody objected, she proceeded to
dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She added that her relative lost in that election while respondents son won.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996, [10] we referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted that respondent and his counsel failed to
appear and present evidence in the hearing of the case set for January 26, 2000, despite notice. Thus, respondent was
considered to have waived his right to present evidence in his behalf during said hearing. Neither did respondent
submit his memorandum as directed by the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that complainants submitted convincing proof that
respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of administrative
sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and recommendation
of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court. [11]Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at
all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession.Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. -- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a
member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or
another individual, as complainants were instrumental in respondents dismissal from the judiciary. We see in
respondents tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has been
grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.
Respondents action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross
misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. xxx

Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the practice of law is
sufficient to discipline respondent.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. [12] While we will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where
a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. [13] In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction
against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the
public and the legal profession.[14]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroo is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon his receipt of notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be
spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.