Professional Documents
Culture Documents
O CT O BE R 2016
66
64
62
2016:Q2
60
58
56
54
1948
1958
1968
1978
1988
1998
2008
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/azhha.htm
11
10
Migration Rate
0.18
Inter-county,
0.16
same state
0.14
(left axis)
0.040
0.035
0.030
0.12
0.025
2013
Intra-county
(right axis)
0.020
0.1
0.08
0.015
0.06
Inter-state
(left axis)
0.010
0.04
0.005
0.02
0.000
0
1948
1958
1968
1978
1988
1998
2008
Notes: Migration rates of the civilian population age 16 and up from the Current Population
Survey. Post-1989 migration rates are calculated from microdata and exclude imputed values.
Sample details are given in Molloy, Smith and Wozniak (2011) and Saks and Wozniak (2011)
Source: Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak (2014)
25
20
15
Thousands
6,000
Aug-16
5,000
0
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000
2008
Hires
4,000
Job
openings
Source: Council of State Governments (1952); Greene (1969); Kleiner (1990); Kleiner (2006); and
Kleiner and Krueger (2013), Westat data; CEA calculations
3,000
2,000
Quits
1,000
0
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2015
60
Bottom 90 Percent Share of Income
50
40
30
20
Union Membership:
(Troy and Sheflin
1985)
Union Membership:
(CPS Membership)
10
0
1917
1937
1957
1977
1997
2017
Note: Total employment prior to 1947 is derived from estimates in Weir (1992). For 1948 to
2015, employment data are annual averages from the monhtly Current Population Survey.
Source: Troy and Sheflin (1985); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; Weir
(1992); CEA calculations
8.5
8.0
7.5
7.0
2015
6.5
6.0
1960
Policy Solutions
In a perfectly competitive market, where wages are
driven by labor productivity, the best solution to
raising wages and reducing inequality is to invest in
skills that boost productivity. But in the presence of
anti-competitive firm behavior or labor market
frictions that limit competition, policy must take a
multipronged approach to promoting wage and job
growth.
In a recent speech, Acting Assistant Attorney General
Renata B. Hesse emphasized that anti-trust
enforcement efforts are focused at harm to the
competitive process wherever it occurs, and benefit
not just consumers but also benefit workers, whose
wages wont be driven down by dominant employers
with the power to dictate terms of employment
(Hesse 2016). Detecting and prosecuting collusive
behavior is an important priority for the antitrust
agencies, both to eliminate the specific conduct in
question and for its value as a deterrent in other
settings. In the past decade, DOJ has brought a
number of successful enforcement actions involving
labor market collusion.
While enforcement of anti-trust laws can and does
play a role in stopping anti-competitive conduct in
labor markets, a firms ability to exercise market
power in the labor market depends on many factors.
Promoting competition must therefore include, but
not be limited to, aggressive anti-trust enforcement.
Additional important policies include those that
facilitate job search, increase worker options, and
directly counter the wage-setting power of
employers.
In April 2016, President Obama issued an executive
order requiring agencies across the Federal
government to consider specific actions to promote
competition. Since then, the Administration has
advanced and supported a number of steps to
promote competition and level the playing field for
workers in in the job market, building on a strong
record throughout the preceding years.
Independent Anti-Trust Enforcement
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
16
References
Abraham, Katharine G. 2015. Is Skill Mismatch
Impeding U.S. Economic Recovery? Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 68(2): 291-313.
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20
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