Breanna Derlagen s4201033

HusserlsEpochandPhenomenologicalDescription
InIdeasI,EdmundHusserlintroducestheconceptofepochasameansof
suspendingjudgmentsothattheessenceofphenomenamaybeexaminedasitis
presentedtotheconsciousness.ThroughtheanalysisofHusserlsworks,aswellas
theconceptsofJacquesDerridaandRobertWalsh,Iwillarguethatitisnotpossible
togiveafullphenomenologicaldescriptionwhileperformingthissuspension.Firstly,
theessenceofaphenomenaisproblematicastheperspectivewereachisintendedto
representaviewthatotherswouldalsoreach;secondly,thesymbolicandindicative
natureoflanguagehasthepotentialtotaintthepurityofourexperiencewiththe
phenomena;andthirdly,theproblemofindividual,firstpersonperspectiveandthe
possibilityofdivergentintentionality.
InTheThesisoftheNaturalStandpointanditsSuspension,EdmundHusserl
proposesaradicalalterationofthethesisofthenaturalstandpoint.Thisessaybegins
byexplainingthatpeopleareapartofafactworldthatexistsoutsideofusand
presentsitselftousassomethingthatexists.Everyoneinteractsandisrelatedtoitin
thesameway,andeventhoughwemayquestionordoubtorrejectthethingsthis
factworldpresentstous,itstillremains;meaning,westillareinteractingwith
something.aworldthathasitsbeingoutthere(Husserl,112).Thisinteractionwith
thefactworldistermedthegeneralthesisofthenaturalstandpoint(Husserl,112),
whichsciencesofthenaturalstandpointattempttounderstandmorecomprehensively
thanmereexperience,whilesimultaneouslyattemptingtosolveproblemsofscientific
knowledge.

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Husserlstates:theattempttodoubtanyobjectofawarenessinrespectofit
beingactuallytherenecessarilyconditionsacertainsuspension(Aufhebung)ofthe
thesis(Husserl,Ideas,114).Hereferstothissuspensionasepoch:a
phenomenologicalreductionthatsuspendsthisgeneralthesisofthenatural
standpoint.Husserlassertsthatthisthesisisnotabandoned,butsetasidesoallthat
remainsisouressentialexperiencewithanobject(whichdoesnotnecessarilyrefer
toaphysicalobject;itcanbeanemotion)ortheworldingeneral.Inotherwords,
epochisachievedbysuspendingallphilosophical,social,culturalandhistorical
biasesandassumptionsabouttheexternalworld,leavingbehindonlyreflection,
directintuition,analysisanddescription.Thismethodallowsthesubjecttobracket
theexternalworldwhilesuspendingjudgment,observinganddescribingtheobjector
phenomenathroughtheprimordialactofpureexperience.
Personally,Idonotbelieveweareabletoperformthissuspension
recommendedbyHusserlandsimultaneouslygiveafullphenomenological
description.Husserlarguesthattheactofbracketingorepochwillstripdownthe
phenomenatoitsbareessence.Husserlbelievesthatthesefirstpersonperspectives
shouldrepresentaviewthatotherpeoplecouldalsoreach;inotherwords,wegivea
phenomenologicaldescriptionthatcanbeagreeduponbythemajorityofpeople.Ido
notthinkthisisnecessarilypossibleaseachpersonsconsciousnessinteractswiththe
factworldinstrangeandsometimesinexplicableways.Thepureactofconsciousness
isradicallydifferentforeachperson.Forexample,ifIweretoattempttohaveapure
phenomenologicalexperiencewithafieldoftulipsthroughHusserlsmethodof
epoch,Icouldcometothephenomenologicaldescriptionofpeacefulbeauty,
whereassomeoneelsecouldviewthemasloudandviolentlycolourful.Ifeachofus
feltstronglyenoughaboutourphenomenologicaldescription,itcouldbecome
difficulttocometoanagreement.
Itcould,however,bearguedthateventuallyaconsensuscouldbereached
betweenthetwoofusastothephenomenologicalessenceofthetulips,offeringan
acrosstheboardphenomenologicaldescription.Though,Istillfindthistobe
problematicasonceyouadjustyourphenomenologicaldescriptiontoadheretothe
viewofothers,itmaybedilutedinitspurity.
AnotherreasonIbelievethisphenomenologicaldescriptionisproblematicis

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thesymbolicnatureoflanguage.Onceyoudescribesomethingthroughlanguage,it
notimmediatelyplaceitbackwithinsomesortofcontext.Iftheessenceofanobject
issomethingweexperience,whyshouldweneedtovocalizeittomakesureweare
correct?IfIdescribethetulipsasred,Iautomaticallythinkabouttheconnotations
behindtheworldredmakemethinkoflove,anger,fire,passion,apples,anda
myriadofotherthingsIassociatewiththecolourred.InRobertWalshsHusserls
EpocheasMethodandTruth,hepointsouttheproblemoflanguageinconnectionto
thoughtexhibitedbothinHusserlsTheOriginofGeometryandMerleauPontys
PhenomenologyofPerception,explainingtheseductionoflanguage(Walsh,217),
whereinweareconstrainedbyahorizonofmeaningpertainingtolanguage,a
tendencyofwordsandconceptstobecomescdimcntcd"intheformofpersisting
linguisticacquisitions,"(Walsh,217).Walshbelieveslanguagemustbepushed
beyondthelimiting,hermeneutichorizonofthefactworldtotheprereflective
worldofintersubjectiveselfconsciousness.(Walsh,217),meaningthepure,primal
experiencethatcanbeheldincommonwithotherconsciousminds.
Idonotbelieveitispossibletopushlanguagebeyondthehorizonofthefact
worldunlessyoumakeupalanguageentirelyofyourownandeventhen,there
wouldbenowayofcommunicatingthistootherpeopleinawaythattheycould
understand.
InSpeechandPhenomena:AndOtherEssaysonHusserlsTheoryofSigns,
JacquesDerridadiscussestwofacetsoflanguageidentifiedbyHusserl:expression
andindication.Expressionreferstothemeaningwegivetoawordorlinguisticsign,
whereasindicationreferstothewaylanguageempiricallyreferstosomethingelse,or
iscontextualised.Derridaarguesthatindicationandexpressioncannotbeseparated
becauseourconsciousnessusessignsthataredependentonindicativemeaning,
stating:
Betweenthephonicelement(inthephenomenologicalsenseandnotthat
ofarealsound)andexpression,takenasthelogicalcharacterofa
signifierthatisanimatedinviewoftheidealpresenceofaBedeutung
(itselfrelatedtoanobject),theremustbeanecessarybond.Husserlis

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unabletobracketwhatinglossamaticsiscalledthesubstanceof
expressionwithoutmenacinghiswholeenterprise.Theappealtothis
substancethusplaysamajorphilosophicalrole.(Derrida,76)
Thissubstanceofexpressionisunabletobebracketedandexpressedwithout
beingindicativeaslanguagecontainsadiscursivecontentthatrefersto
somethingelseasapointofreference.
Epochalsocallsintoquestiontheconceptofperceptioninregardstothe
natureofexperience.Aphenomenologistsperspectiveisfromafirstperson
pointofview,andthisperspectiveintendstorepresentaviewthatotherswould
alsoreach.However,ifIwerehallucinatingthetulips,otherswouldnotbeable
tohavethesamephenomenologicalexperienceasme.WhereIsawafieldof
tulips,someoneelsecouldmerelyseeafieldofgrass.Therefore,ifIsawafield
ofTulipswheresomeonesawafieldofgrasstheintentionalitydirectedtowards
thefactworldwouldbedifferent.Husserlsversionofintentionalityrefersto
therelationshipbetweenconsciousnesssandtheexternalworld,andtheway
consciousnessisdirectedtowardsanobject.Thoughtheintentionalitywouldbe
different,neitherofuswouldberightorwrongasitisourownpersonal
interpretationoftheexperience,thoughupondiscussionwewouldbothquestion
eithereachothersorourownperceptionofthefield.
Husserlanswersthiscriticismthroughtheprincipleofprinciples,
outlinedinhisessayIdeasas:Everyoriginarypresentiveintuitionisa
legitimizingofknowledge,thatwhateverpresentsitselfinintuitionin
primordialform(asitwereinitspersonalactuality)istobeacceptedsimplyas
whatitispresentedasbeing,thoughonlywithinthelimitsinwhichitthen
presentsitself."(Ideas,p44).Husserlbelieveseveryobjectthatpresentsitselfis
tobeacceptedasitis.However,thisprincipleofprinciplesfailstotakeinto
accounthallucinations.IfIbelievesomethingispresentingitselftome,butitis
actuallyahallucination,myintentionalitywouldstillbethesameassomeone
experiencingsomethingreal.
Throughthisanalysisofvarioussources,Imaintainmyviewthat

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Husserlsconceptofepochorthesuspensionofcertainjudgmentssoa
phenomenamaybeexperiencedinitspureessenceisproblematicasitis
difficulttocometoaconclusionthatotherpeoplewouldreach.Also,the
symbolic,indicativenatureoflanguageanddivergentperspectivesmakethis
suspensionproblematicasthepurephenomenologicalessencemaybedilutedor
lost.

References:
Derrida,J(1973).SpeechandPhenomena:IntroductiontotheProblemofSignsin
HusserlsPhenomenology,trans.D.B.Allison,Evanston:Northwestern
UniversityPress.
Husserl,E.(1980).TheThesisoftheNaturalStandpointanditsSuspension.InR.C.
Solomon(Ed.),PhenomenologyandExistentialism(pp112117).Lanham:
Rowman&Littleford.
Husserl,E.(2010).TheIdeaofPhenomenology.Trans.L.Hardy(pp.1531)
Dordrecht:Kluwer.
Husserl,E.(2012).Ideas:GeneralIntroductiontoPurePhenomenology.Routledge.
Walsh,R.D.(1988)HusserlsEpocheasMethodandTruth.(pp214223)Available
online:
https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/bitstream/1808/9170/1/auslegung.v14.n02.211
223.pdf