1

CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
Sec. 39-46
Liens and Encumbrances
DBP vs Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija
DBP complied with all that was required of it for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the certificate of sale. It cannot be blamed that annotation could
not be made contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the subject certificates of title were missing and could not be found. It was the ROD who is
responsible for the failure of the annotation as they are charged with the keeping and custody of those documents. It does not make sense to require DBP to repeat
the process of primary entry, paying anew the entry fees, in order to procure annotation which through no fault on its part.
Current Doctrine: Entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is voluntary or involuntary, so long as the registrant has complied
with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the ROD.

Ponce De Leon vs Rehabilitation Finance Corp

Article 160 of the Civil Code which provides that All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This provision must be construed in relation to Articles 153 to 159 of the Civil Code which enumerated the properties
acquired during the marriage that will constitute the conjugal partnership.
It was ruled, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during t he marriage. In other words, proof of
acquisition during coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership.

Guaranteed Homes Inc vs Valdez

EJS is valid even the existence of fraud
First, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales executed by Cipriano alone despite the existence of the other heirs of Pablo, is not
binding on such other heirs, nevertheless, it has operative effect under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree, which provides that:
SEC. 44. Statutory Liens Affecting Title. Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser
of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of
the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
Even assuming arguendo that the extrajudicial settlement was a forgery, the Court still has to uphold the title of petitioner. The case law is that although generally a
forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title, there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. And one such
instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.

Sec. 47-50

PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES

DIRECT VS COLLATERAL ATTACK

Golloy vs CA
Laches; Long inaction and delay of the title holder in asserting his right over the disputed lot bars him from recovering the same. In a case, SC held that We also
agree with the petitioners that laches effectively bars the respondent from recovering the lot in dispute. Although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the
petitioners because, admittedly, the title to Lot No. 5517 is still registered in the name of respondent, still the petitioners have acquired title to it by virtue of the
equitable principle of laches due to respondents failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty two (32) years.

Catores vs Afidchao
When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the
title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
In the action for recovery filed by respondent in the trial court, petitioner's Answer did not directly impugn the validity of respondent's title. Rather, she alleged that
the area which she occupied was not within the titled property of respondent. Thus, her petition in the instant case is replete with claims of errors in the technical
description as appearing in the title of respondent and even in that of her predecessors-in-interest. However, these allegations constitute a collateral attack against
respondents title, which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana.

CHAPTER 5, SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION

Sec. 51-56. Voluntary Dealings w/ Registered Lands
Constructive Notice upon registration
Adriano vs Pangilinan 373 SCRA 544
Having obtained TCTs in their names, they conveyed the subject property to third persons, who in Blondeau was a bona fide purchaser while in Philippine National
Bank was an innocent mortgagee for value. It should be stressed that in both these cases, the seller and the mortgagor were the registered owners of the subject
property; whereas in the present case, the mortgagor was an impostor, not the registered owner.

Blondeau vs Nano 61 Phil 625

As between two innocent persons, Blondeau and Vallejo, one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust, Vallejo who made it possible by his act of
confidence must bear the loss. The Torrens system permits a forged transfer, when duly entered in registry, to become the root of a valid title in a bona fide
purchaser. The law erects a safeguard against a forged transfer being registered by the requirement that no transfer shall be registered unless the owners
certificate is produced along with the instrument of transfer. An executed transfer of registered lands placed by the registered owner thereof in the hands of another
operates as a representation to a third party that the holder of the transfer is authorized to deal with the lands. In the f irst place, a forger cannot effectuate his
forgery in the case of registered land by executing a transfer which can be registered, unless the owner has allowed him, in some way, to get possession of the
owners certificate.

PANIC NOTES; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; FINAL EXAM

DBP vs Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija 162 SCRA 450

It is admitted that the requisite registration fees were fully paid and that the certificate of sale was registrable on its f ace. DBP, therefore, complied with all that was
required of it for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the certificate of sale. It cannot be blamed that annotation could not be made contemporaneously
with the entry because the originals of the subject certificates of title were missing and could not be found, since it had nothing to do with their safekeeping. If
anyone was responsible for failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of those documents.
Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long
as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent
solely on the register of deeds.

Sec. 57-61

M ORTGAGES AND LEASES

LBP vs Republic 543 SCRA 452

Mortgagees of non-disposable lands, titles to which were erroneously issued, acquire no protection under the Land Registration Law.Since Lourdes Farms, Inc. is
not the owner of the land, it does not have the capacity to mortgage it to LBP.

Reyes vs De Leon 20 SCRA 369

Between an unrecorded sale of a house of a prior date and a recorded mortgage of the same house of a later date the former is preferred to the latter for the reason
that, if the original owner had parted with his ownership of the thing sold, then he no longer had the ownership and free disposal of that thing so as to be able to
mortgage it.

Guiang vs CA 353 Phil 578

The absence of the consent of one spouse in the sale of a conjugal property renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.The
sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the
vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
General Rule:

form is not important for the validity of a contract provided there is consent, subject matter and cause. But this rule appli es only to consensual contracts.
When the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable.

A contract in a public instrument is only for convenience.

EXN: Rule in case of sale of conjugal property Any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband of the conjugal property without the written consent of the
wife is void (Under the Family Code). However, when the sale was made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the disposition of conjugal property without the
wifes consent is not void but merely voidable. The wife may, during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction questioned ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required (Guiang vs CA).

Sec. 62-63

DISCHARGE OF C ANCELLATION OF M ORTGAGE OR LEASE

FORECLOSURE OF M ORTGAGE
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE (Sec. 3 Rule 68, ROC)
a.
After debtor incurred in default, the court, upon motion, shall order the property to be sold under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court;
b.
Such sale shall not affect the prior encumbrances upon the property
c.
When confirmed by the court, upon motion, it shall operate to divest the rights in the property of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to the rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.
d.
Upon the finality of the order or confirmation or expiration of the period of redemption, the purchaser shall be entitled to the possession of the property unless
a third party is actually holding the land adversely. In this case, writ of possession may be requested.
e.
The order of confirmation of the sale shall be registered with the ROD.
1.
If no redemption COT shall be cancelled and a new one shall be issued t o the purchaser
2.
If property is redeemed mortgagors COT shall stand uncancelled but the
(1) Certificate of Sale,
(2) the order of confirming it, and
(3) the deed of redemption shall be filed with the ROD and a brief memorandum thereof be noted on the mortgagors COT.

ACT NO. 3135

EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
a.
After default of the debtor, mortgagee may file a petition with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made (notice and publication shall
be made);
b.
The sheriffs certificate of sale shall be filed with the ROD;
c.
A brief memorandum will be entered on the mortgagors COT
1
In case of redemption same procedure in judicial foreclosure shall be followed;
2
If no redemption the
(1) final deed of sale by the official authorized for the purpose, or his
(2) certificate of non-redemption, shall be filed with ROD who shall cancel the mortgagors COT and issue a new on to the purchaser.

REDEMPTION
A.

Judicial Foreclosure
General Rule: No right of redemption exists.
Exception:
(1) Mortgagee is a banking institution
(2) Redemption by way of Equity of Redemption

PANIC NOTES; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; FINAL EXAM

3
What is EQUITY OF REDEMPTION?
-Mortgagors may redeem by paying their secured debt prior to the confirmation of the sale.
B.

Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Rule: Redemption shall be made within 1 year from the date the certificate of sale was registered.

RULE WHERE LAND COVERED BY HOMESTEAD OR FREE PATENT IS MORTGAGED

Rural Bank
a.
Mortgagor may redeem within 2 years from the registration of the sale (RA 720)
b.
Failure to redeem, he or his heirs may redeem or repurchase the property within 5 years from the expiration of the 2 year-period (CA 141)
Note: 2 years + 5 years = total of 7 years redemption period
Ordinary Bank
a.
Mortgagor may redeem within 1 year from the registration of the sale (ACT 3135)
b.
Failure to redeem, he or his heirs may redeem or repurchase the property within 5 years from the expiration of the 1 year-period (CA 141)
Note: 1 years + 5 years = total of 6 years redemption period

Rural Bank of Oroquieta vs. CA 101 SCRA 5

Basic rules on judicial foreclosure (Memorize)1.
Under Section 3, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, it is the confirmation by the court of the auction sale that would divest the mortgagors of their rights to the
mortgaged lot and that would vest such rights in the bank as purchaser at the auction sale.
2.
The clause subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law found in the last part of Section 3, has no application to a case where the
mortgagor did not exercise his right of redemption under Section 78 of the General Banking Law.
3.
A foreclosure sale is not complete until it is confirmed, and before said confirmation, the court retains control of the proceedings by exercising a sound
discretion in regard to it, either granting or withholding confirmation as the rights and interests of the parties and the ends of justice may require.
4.
In order that a foreclosure sale may be validly confirmed by the court, it is necessary that a hearing be given the interested parties, at which they may have an
opportunity to show cause why the sale should not be confirmed.
5.
The acceptance of a bid at the foreclosure sale confers no title on the purchaser. Until the sale has been validly confirmed by the court, he is nothing more
than a preferred bidder. Title vests only when the sale has been validly confirmed by the court.
6.
The confirmation retroacts to the date of the sale. A hearing should be held for the confirmation of the sale. The mortgagor should be notified of the hearing.
Lack of notice vitiates the confirmation of the sale. The mortgagor may still redeem the mortgaged lot after the rendition of the order confirming the sale
which is void for lack of hearing and notice to the mortgagor.
7.
Notice and hearing of a motion for confirmation of sale are essential to the validity of the order of confirmation, not only to enable the interested parties to
resist the motion but also to inform them of the time when their right of redemption is cut-off.
8.
An order of confirmation, void for lack of notice and hearing, may be set aside anytime.
9.
After the foreclosure but before its confirmation, the court may grant the judgment debtor or mortgagor an opportunity to pay the proceeds of the sale and
thus refrain from confirming it.
10. If after the foreclosure sale and before the confirmation thereof, the mortgagee, as purchaser at the auction sale, sold the mortgaged property to another
person, that subsequent sale does not render the foreclosure sale more effective. That subsequent sale does not prevent the trial court from granting the
mortgagor a period within which to redeem the mortgaged lot by paying the judgment debt and the expenses of the sale and costs.
11. Whatever may have been the old rule by all of the modern authorities, it is the policy of the courts to assist rather than to defeat the right of redemption.
12. After the confirmation of the sale, made after hearing and with due notice to the mortgagor, the latter cannot redeem anymore the mortgaged lot (unless the
mortgagee is a banking institution).
13. It is after the confirmation of the sale that the mortgagor loses all interest in the mortgaged property.

In the instant case, where the foreclosure sale has not yet been confirmed but the statutory one-year period for redemption expired and the mortgaged lot was sold by the
mortgagee (as the only bidder at the auction sale) to a third person, the trial court should give the purchaser a chance to be heard before requiring the mortgagee-bank to accept
the redemption price tendered by the mortgagors.

Where a bank sought a judicial foreclosure rather than a foreclosure of mortgage under The General Banking Act, confirmation by the Court of the auction sale under Rule 68 is
necessary.Under section 3, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, it is the confirmation by the court of the auction sale that would divest the Serrano spouses of their rights to the
mortgaged lot and that would vest such rights in the bank as purchaser at the auction sale. The clause subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law, found in
the last part of section 3, has no application to this case because the mortgagor did not exercise his right of redemption under section 78 of the General Banking Law. What
applies to this case is the settled rule that a foreclosure sale is not complete until it is confirmed, and before said conf irmation, the court retains control of the proceedings by
exercising a sound discretion in regard to it, either granting or withholding confirmation as the rights and interests of the parties and the ends of justice may require.
In judicial confirmation of auction sale, a hearing with notice to mortgaged debtor, mortgaged creditor, and purchaser at the auction sale is indispensable.A hearing should be
held for the confirmation of the sale. The mortgagor should be notified of the sale. The mortgagor may still redeem the mortgaged lot after the rendition of the order confirming
the sale which is void for lack of hearing and notice to the mortgagor.
Prior to confirmation of auction sale, the court may grant the debtor sufficient time to redeem the mortgaged estate.If after the foreclosure sale and before the confirmation
thereof, the mortgagee, as purchaser at the auction sale, sold the mortgaged property to another person, the subsequent sale does not render the foreclosure sale more
effective. That subsequent sale does not prevent the trial court from granting the mortgagor a period within which to redeem the mortgaged lot by paying the judgment debt
and the expenses

Tolentino vs CA 517 SCRA 732

Section 6 of R.A. 3135, as amended, provides for the requisites for a valid redemption of a property which was sold in an ext rajudicial sale.Anent the legality of petitioners
judicial redemption and the banks computation of the redemption price, Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, provides for the requisites for a valid redemption, to
wit: SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial
creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is

PANIC NOTES; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; FINAL EXAM

4
sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
sections 464 to 466, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
Where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the determination of the redemption price is governed by Section 78 of the General Banking Act, as amended by P.D.
No. 1828.which provides: In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extrajudicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan granted
before the passage of this Act or under the provisions of this Act, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold at public auction, judicially or
extrajudicially, for the full or partial payment of an obligation to any bank, banking or credit institution, within the purview of this Act shall have the right, within one
year after the sale of the real estate as a result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the
order of execution, or the amount due under the mortgage deed, as the case may be, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs,
and judicial and other expenses incurred by the bank or institution concerned by reason of the execution and sale and as a result of the custody of said property less
the income received from the property. Section 78 of the General Banking Act amended Section 6 of Act No. 3135 insofar as the redemption price is concerned when
the mortgagee is a bank or a banking or credit institution. Thus, the amount at which the foreclosed property is redeemable is the amount due under the mortgage
deed, or the outstanding obligation of the mortgagor plus interest and expenses in accordance with Section 78 of the General Banking Act.
GENERAL RULE- REDEMPTION - not sufficient that a person offering to redeem simply manifests his/her desire to do sothe statement of intention must be
accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. This constitutes the exercise of the right to repurchase. Bona fide redemption necessarily implies
a reasonable and valid tender of the entire purchase price, otherwise the rule on the redemption period fixed by law can easily be circumvented.
The action for judicial redemption should be filed on time and in good faith, the redemption price is finally determined and paid within a reasonable time, and the
rights of the parties are respected.
1)
timely redemption or redemption by expiration date;
2)
good faith as always, meaning, the filing of the action must have been for the sole purpose of determining the redemption price and not to stretch the
redemptive period indefinitely;
3)
once the redemption price is determined within a reasonable time, the redemptioner must make prompt payment in full.
Right of Redemption

Equity of Redemption

The right of the mortgagor to repurchase the property even

after confirmation of the sale, in cases of foreclosure by
banks, within one year from the registration of the sale.

The right of the mortgagor to redeem

the mortgaged property after his default in the
performance of the conditions of the mortgage but before
the sale of the property or the confirmation of the sale

Redemption Where Mortgagee is a Bank or Credit Institution

(a) The applicable law is section 78 of R.A No. 337 or the General Banking Act.
(b) It effectively amended the section 6 of Act No. 3135 insofar as redemption price is concerned.
(c) What is required for redemption is the tender of the amount due under the mortgage deed, plus interest.
Rule Where the Land Covered By Homestead or Free Patent Is Mortgaged to a Rural Bank
(a) The period of redemption is within 2 years from the date of foreclosure (if no TCT) or from registration of the certificate of sale at such foreclosure, (if the property is
covered by TCT)
(b) Failure to exercise such right would entitle him or his heirs to repurchase the property within 5 years from the expiration of two years period of redemption.
(c) The period of repurchase is likewise 5 years from the date of expiration of the period of redemption if the mortgagor is not a rural bank. Also, the period of redemption is
only for a period of 1 year from the registration of certificate of sale.
Sec. 64-68

INVOLUNTARY DEALINGS
Sec. 69-70
Huang vs CA 236 SCRA 420
Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal
with it for the benefit of another. A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of
another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary or cestui que trust.
Trust is either express or implied.
1)
Express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties.
2)
Implied trust comes into being by operation of law.
a.
constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. The duty to convey the property arises because it was acquired through fraud, duress,
undue influence or mistake, or through breach of a fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition of anothers property.
b.

resulting trust arises where a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference that he
does not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have the beneficial interest in the property. It is founded on the presumed
intention of the parties, and as a general rule, it arises where, and only where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties,
as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the transaction out of which it is sought to be established.
In this case, the improvements were for the benefit of Dolores as owner. The pertinent law is Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides that
there is an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having
the beneficial interest of the property. A resulting trust arises because of the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest
therein for himself.

Action to compel the trustee to convey the property registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe unless the trustee repudiates the
trust. he prescriptive period is ten (10) years from the repudiation of the trust. It is ten (10) years because just as a resulting trust is an offspring of the law, so is the
corresponding obligation to convey the property and the title thereto to the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Art. 1144 of the New Civil Code,
which is the law applicable, provides: The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (a) Upon a written contract;
(b) Upon an obligation created by law; (c) Upon a judgment.

PANIC NOTES; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; FINAL EXAM

5
The reckoning point is repudiation of the trust by the trustee because from that moment his possession becomes adverse.Thus, the reckoning point is repudiation
of the trust by the trustee because from that moment his possession becomes adverse, which in the present case gave rise to a cause of action by Dolores against
the Huang spouses. However, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that:
a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust;
b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and,
c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.

Sanojas vs CA 258 SCRA 79

Annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right
is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529) and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone
is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice is registered by filing a sworn statement with the
Register of Deeds of the province where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the claimed right together with other datas pertinent thereto. The
registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529.
ISSUE
As between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale, which should be preferred given that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on
September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the
sale on February 12, 1985.
GENERAL RULE:
SC previously held that where a sale is recorded later than an attachment, although the former is of an earlier date, the sale must give way to the attachment on the
ground that the act of registration is the operative act to affect the land.
Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is
not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on
the face of the register or certificate of title.
EXCEPTION:
While it is the act of registration which is the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned, it is likewise true, that the
subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to
the sale. Thus, one who buys from the registered owner need not have to look behind the certificate of title, he is, nevertheless, bound by the liens and
encumbrances annotated thereon. One who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include
the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the
law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act. To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification
limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim
is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by
the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that
someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.

Sec. 71-77
Heirs of Marasigan v. IAC 152 SCRA 253
Act of registration of a transaction creates constructive notice to the whole world.There is a clear showing that although the late Maria Marasigan acquired the
property in question from the Bazars pursuant to a deed of absolute sale on December 18, 1974 or a little over four months before the filing of Civil Case No. 97479,
the transaction became effective as against third persons only on July 5, 1977 when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of
registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world.
Notice of lis pendens; In case of subsequent sales or transfers, the Register of Deeds is duty bound to carry over the notice of lis pendens on all titles to be issued,
otherwise if he cancels any notice of lis pendens in violation of his duty, he may be held civilly and criminally liable to innocent third persons. Moreover, there is no
question that when the late Maria Marasigan was issued her transfer certificate of title to the subject property (T.C.T. No. 126056), the Registrar of Deeds of Manila
then carried over to the new title the notice of lis pendens which the private respondent had caused to be annotated at the back of the Bazar's title. In case of
subsequent sales or transfers, the Registrar of Deeds is duty bound to carry over the notice of lis pendens on all titles to be issued. Otherwise, if he cancels any
notice of lis pendens in violation of his duty, he may he held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third persons (The Director of
Lands, et al. v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177).
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS means that a certain property is involved in a litigation and serves as notice to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at his
own risk
Where the registration of the deed of sale over the property was definitely subsequent to the annotation, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was bound by the
outcome of the litigation against her vendors or transferors.As earlier stated it was only on July 5, 1977 that the sale between Maria Marasigan and the Bazars
became effective as against third persons. The registration of the deed of sale over the subject property was definitely subsequent to the annotation made on
January 27, 1976. Consequently, Marasigan was bound by the outcome of the litigation against her vendors or transferors. (See Rivera v. Tirona, et al., 109 Phil.
505).

San Lorenzo Dev Corp vs CA 449 SCRA 99

The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains greater significance in case of double sale of immovable property. When the thing
sold twice is an immovable, the one who acquires it and first records it in the Registry of Property, both made in good faith, shall be deemed the owner. Verily, the act
of registration must be coupled with good faiththat is, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor or must not have been
aware of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and
fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. Following the foregoing
definition, we rule that SLDC qualifies as a buyer in good faith since there is no evidence extant in the records that it had knowledge of the prior transaction in favor
of Babasanta.

PANIC NOTES; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; FINAL EXAM

6
If a vendee in a double sale registers the sale after he has acquired knowledge of a previous sale, the registration constitutes a registration in bad faith and does not
confer upon him any right.Assuming ex gratia argumenti that SLDCs registration of the sale had been tainted by the prior notice of lis pendens and assuming
further for the same nonce that this is a case of double sale, still Babasantas claim could not prevail over that of SLDCs. , this Court had the occasion to rule that if a
vendee in a double sale registers the sale after he has acquired knowledge of a previous sale, the registration consti tutes a registration in bad faith and does not
confer upon him any right. If the registration is done in bad faith, it is as if there is no registration at all, and the buyer who has taken possession first of the property
in good faith shall be preferred.
the constructive notice operates as suchby the express wording of Section 52from the time of the registrationof the notice of lis pendens which in this case was
effectedonly on 2 June 1989, at which time the sale in favor of SLDChad long been consummated insofar as the obligation of theSpouses Lu to transfer ownership
over the property to SLDCis concerned.

Magdalena Homeowners Association vs CA 184 SCRA 325

Lis Pendens; Notice of; When proper.According to Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens
is proper in the following cases, viz.:
d) An action to recover possession of real estate;
e) An action to quiet title thereto;
f) An action to remove clouds thereon;
g) An action for partition; and
h) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
The notice of lis pendensi.e., that real property is involved in an actionis ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The
notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all
people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are
subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and l aid down therein. The cancellation of
such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its
continuance or removallike the continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment or injunctionis not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the
action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens; Case at bar.In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in virtue of the
perfection of the plaintiffs appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final
judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere
incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies. Now, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.

REGISTRATION OF JUDGMENTS, O RDERS, P ARTITIONS

De Mesa vs CA 232 SCRA 773

SC: The trial court cannot compel herein petitioner to sign the extrajudicial deed of partition prepared solely by private respondents. Concomitantly, it cannot issue a
writ of possession pursuant to the said extrajudicial partition.
An action for partition, which is typically brought by a person claiming to be the owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff
recognizes to be his co-owners, may readily be seen to simultaneously present two principal issues. Firstly, there is the issue of
1) whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned.
2) assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and
the defendants, that is, what portion should go to which co-owner.
After a judgment is rendered in an action for partition declaring that the property in question shall be divided among the parties thereto, the procedure provided by
law thereafter is that,
if the parties can agree among themselves, then the partition can be made by them through the proper instruments of conveyance which shall be submitted for
approval of the court, and such partition with the court order confirming the same shall be recorded in the office of the proper registry of deeds.
If the parties were unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall by order appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court
in such order shall direct.
The decision in Civil Case merely declares that partition is proper and forthwith specified therein the respective aliquot shares of the parties to the real estate and to
the proceeds of the funeral business. Withal, it did not specifically state, by metes and bounds and by adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate
to be assigned to each party. Actual partition is, therefore, necessary. Since the parties, however, cannot agree on the actual division and allocation of the property
held in common, the trial court should order the appointment of commissioners to carry out the partition, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 69.

Republic vs CA and Santos 383 SCRA 611

The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a
public purpose.
Eminent domain, generally.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the
conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect
merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession,
but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
Limits

taking must be for public use.

PANIC NOTES; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; FINAL EXAM

just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property.

These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights,
upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter.
Requirement of public use
In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized
1)
public employment or the actual use by the public, and
2)
public advantage or benefit.
It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and
each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted.
In this case, The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of
the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose.
Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose
originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its
expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only
limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is.

Samplio vs CA 103 Phil 70

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that
such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit,
especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.
PERSONS WHO ARE BARRED AFTER EXPIRATION OF Two YEARS.The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an
extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had
notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of section 1 or Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs
of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
THIRD PERSON NOT AFFECTED.The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court of extrajudicial settlement or by affidavit is an ex-parte
proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death
of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, specially as no mention of such effect is made either directly or by implication. Sampilo and Salacup vs.
Court of Appeals and Sinopera, 103 Phil. 70, No. L-10474 February 28, 1958

ASSURANCE FUND, R EGISTRATION OF CHATTEL M ORTGAGE AND CONSULTAS

Assurance Fund
a.
Person sustains loss or damage or is deprived of his estate or interest on the land
b.
On account of bringing the land under the operations of the Torrens System
c.
Through FAME on certificate of title or entry or memorandum in the registration
d.
Without negligence on his part
e.
Prescription period observed; no other remedies
VS
1)
2)

RD
National Treasurer

Joaquin vs Madrid 106 Phil 1060

REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES; FORGED DOCUMENTS; TRANSFER OF RIGHT NOT EFFECTED.In order that the holder of a certif-icate for value issued by virtue
of the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in good faith for value, the instrument registered should not be forged. When the instrument
presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the
assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.
In the second assignment of error it is further argued that as the petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value, he should be protected as against the registered
owner because the latter can secure reparation from the assurance fund. The fact is, however, that petitioner herein is not the innocent purchaser for value
protected by law. The innocent purchaser for value protected by law is one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner himself,
not by a forged deed, as the law expressly states. Such is not the situation of the petitioner, who has been the victim of impostors pretending to be the registered
owners but who are not said owners.

Eagle Realty Corp vs Republic 151424

Public officer having supervision and control over Registers of Deeds, the Commissioner of Land Registration therefore also has the authority to file the action
himself.Under Section 6, P.D. 1529, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds. It is well understood
that supervision and control includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate. A corporation
engaged in the buying and selling of real estate is expected to exercise a higher standard of care and diligence in ascertaining the status and condition of the
property subject of its business transaction.Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the real estate business.
Assurance Fund; It is a condition sine qua non that the person who brings the action for damages against the Assurance Fund be the registered owner and, as the
holders of transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for value.Petitioners claim against the Assurance Fund must necessarily
fail. Its situation does not come within the ambit of the cases protected by the Assurance Fund. It was not deprived of land in consequence of bringing it under the
operation of the Torrens system through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in the certificate of title. It was simply a victim of
unscrupulous individuals. More importantly, it is a condition sine qua non that the person who brings the action for damages against the Assurance Fund be the
registered owner and, as the holders of transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. And we have already established
that petitioner does not qualify as such

PANIC NOTES; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; FINAL EXAM

Borlough vs Fortune Enterprises 100 Phil 1063

MOTOR VEHICLES; TRANSFER OF RIGHTS; EFFECT OF PASSAGE OF MOTOR VEHICLES LAW ON CHATTEL MORTGAGE LAW.The recording provisions of the
Revised Motor Vehicles Law are merely complementary to those of the Chattel Mortgage Law. A mortgage of any motor vehicle in order to affect third persons
should not only be registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, but the same should also be recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office as required by section 5 (e) of the
Revised Motor Vehicles Law. The failure of the mortgagee to report the mortgage executed in his favor has the effect of making said mortgage ineffective against a
purchaser in good faith who registers his purchase in the Motor Vehicles Office .
One holding a lien on a motor vehicle, in so far as he can reasonably do so, must protect himself and others thereafter dealing in good faith by complying and
requiring compliance with the provisions of the laws concerning certificates of title to motor vehicles, such as statutes providing for the notation of liens or claims
against the motor vehicle certificate of title or manufacturers certificate, or for the issuance to the mortgagee of a new certificate of ownership. Where the lienholder
has satisfied himself that the existence of the lien is recited in the certificate of title, he has done all that the law contemplates that he should do, and there is notice
to the public of the existing lien, which continues valid until the record shows that it has been satisfied and a new certificate issued on legal authority, even though
another certificate which does not disclose the lien is procured as the result of false statements made in the application therefore, and the vehicle is purchased by a
bona fide purchaser.
The holder of a lien who is derelict in his duty to comply and require compliance with the statutory provisions acts at his own peril, and must suffer the
consequence of his own negligence; and accordingly, he is not entitled to the lien as against a subsequent innocent purchaser or encumbrancer, even though such
lien had been previously filed as provided by other chattel mortgage statutes. The rule is otherwise, however, as against claimants not occupying the position of
innocent purchasers, such as a judgment creditor, or one acquiring title with actual notice of an unregistered lien, and the statutes do not protect a purchaser
holding under a registered title if a link in the title is forgery. Moreover, such statute will not impair vested of a mortgage under a chattel mortgage duly recorded.

Almirol vs ROD of Agusan 22 SCRA 1152

Register of Deeds; No power to determine validity of document.The Register of Deeds may not validly ref use to register a deed of sale presented to him for
registration. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the Register of Deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.
Indeed, a Register of Deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the
problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken
with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit an d certify the question to the
Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.
Mandamus does not lie to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale in question, because pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of Republic Act
1151, where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration, whose
decision on the matter shall be binding upon all Registers of Deeds. Hence, this administrative remedy must be resorted to, before there can be recourse to the
courts.

PETITIONS AND ACTIONS AFTER O RIGINAL REGISTRATION

Manotok vs Heirs of Barque 162335 & 162605

Land Registration Authority (LRA) properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owners duplicate certificate of title prior to the
reconstitution.Sec. 3(a) of RA 26. By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give more weight and
preference to the owners duplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources.Since respondents source of reconstitution is the owners duplicate
certificate of title, there is no need for the reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the submitted
plan appears to be spurious.
Land Registration Authority (LRA) exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared that Manotok, et al.s title is sham and spurious.To allow the cancellation of Manotok,
et al.s title in an administrative reconstitution proceeding will permit an indirect attack on the certificate of title in violation of Section 48 of PD 1529. The LRA
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared that Manotok, et al.s title is sham and spurious. Ownership is never in issue in a petition for reconstitution of title.By
cancelling the TCT of Manotok, et al., and upholding the TCT of the Heirs of Barque, the Court of Appeals resolved in the administrative reconstitution case the issue
of ownership over the property in dispute. This is grave error because ownership is never in issue in a petition for reconstitution of title
The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction to act on the petition for reconstitution filed by the Heirs of Barque in view of the
existing Torrens title of Manotok, et al. No court, much less an administrative body, can entertain a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed title if the land is
already covered by a Torrens title in the name of another party, unless there is a final judgment first cancelling such Torrens title. The only exception is when the
Torrens title has been issued for less than one year, which is not the situation in the present cases.
The reconstituting officer has no power to decide questions of ownership. A Torrens title, even a reconstituted title, is evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Certainly, the reconstituting officer in an administrative proceeding has no authority to deprive a third
party of his property by cancelling his Torrens title to the property. In a petition for reconstitution, such third party is not even required to be impleaded as a
respondent.
RE: Petition for Reconstitution of Title -re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or
estate covered thereby.

New Durawood Co., Inc vs CA 111732

o
Section 109 of P.D. 1529 is the law applicable in petitions for issuance of a new owners DCT which are lost or stolen or destroyed.
o
R.A. 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of lost or destroyed OCTs on file with the Register of Deeds.
o
Court never acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of new certificates.In the instant case, the owners duplicate certificates of title were in the
possession of Dy Quim Pong, the petitioners chairman of the board and whose family controls the petitioner-corporation. Since said certificates were
not in fact lost or destroyed, there was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Certificates of
Title, hence the newly issued DCTs are NULL and VOID.
o
Section 109 of said law provides, inter alia, that due notice under oath of the loss or theft of the owners duplicate shall be sent by the owner or by
someone in his behalf to the ROD. In this case, while an affidavit of loss was attached to the petition in the lower court, no such notice was sent to the
Register of Deeds.

PANIC NOTES; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; FINAL EXAM

9
o

In case of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owners duplicate certificate of title, the remedy is to file a petition in court to compel
surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds.Private respondents tried to convince the Court that by their failure to locate Francis Dytiongsee, they
had no other recourse but to file a petition for reconstitution. Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529, however, states that the remedy, not a petition for reconstitution.

Republic vs IAC and Kiram 68303

Lack of notice of hearing confers no jurisdiction upon the Court; Judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a land registration proceeding.It is not disputed, to
begin with, that the notices (of hearing) were not posted on the main entrances of the provincial and municipal halls of the locality in which the lands are located. We
have held that such a mode of publication is a jurisdictional requirement. The failure on the part of the applicant to comply with it confers no jurisdiction upon the
court. Neither is there any showing that the adjacent owners or other interested parties were actually notified of the pending application. This too taints the petition
with a jurisdictional defect. It is not enough that there is publication in the Official Gazette. Publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is but one requirement. In
addition, Republic Act No. 26 decrees that such a notice be posted on the main entrance of the corresponding provincial Capitol and municipal building, as well as
served actually upon the owners of adjacent lands.

Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

notice and procedural requirements of Art. 26 on reconstitution of titles are mandatory.Republic Act No. 26 entitled An act providing a special procedure for the
reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed approved on September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First Instance to
hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the
court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for.The Petition for Reconstitution must
a.
allege certain specific jurisdictional facts;
b.
the notice of hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and posted in particular places and
c.
the same sent or notified to specified persons.
d.
Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to be followed
Effect of failure to notify one adjacent boundary owner and one post notice at the entrance to the municipal building.The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as
the owner, possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having an interest, title or claim to a substantial portion of Lot 2, as well as
the failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at
the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.

The Condominium Act

A condominium is an interest in real property consisting of

separate interest in a unit in a residential, industrial or commercial building and

an undivided interest in common, directly or indirectly, in the land on which it is located and in other common areas of the building. A condominium may include, in
addition, a separate interest in other portions of such real property. Title to the common areas, including the land, or the appurtenant interests in such areas, may be held
by a corporation specially formed for the purpose (hereinafter known as the "condominium corporation") in which the holders of separate interest shall automatically be
members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units in the common areas.
PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Protective Buyers Decree)
Sunset View Condominium Corp vs Campos 52361
it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as ownership is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase
price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is not the owner of the unit and consequently is not a
shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
Ownership of a unit is a condition to become a shareholder in the condominium corporation; Separate interest in a condominium, construed.Pursuant to the
above statutory provision, ownership of a unit is a condition sine qua non to being a shareholder in the condominium corporation. It follows that a purchaser of a
unit who is not yet the owner thereof for not having fully paid the full purchase price, is not a shareholder. By necessary implication, the separate interest in a
condominium, which entitles the holder to become automatically a shareholder in the condominium corporation, as provided in section 2 of the Condominium Act,
can be no other than ownership of a unit.
Collections of overdue accounts on assessments of a condominium within the jurisdiction of regular courts.Inasmuch as the private respondents are not
shareholders of the petitioner condominium corporation, the instant cases for collection cannot be a controversy arising out of intra-corporation or partnership
relations between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates, respectively which controversies are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
pursuant to Section 5 (b) of P.D. No. 902-A. The subject matters of the instant cases according to the allegations of the complaints are under the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.

Christian General Assembly vs Ignacio 164789

PD No. 957, enacted on July 12, 1976, one of its whereas clauses states: WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens
and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value; Section 3 of PD No.
957 granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business. Thereafter, PD No. 1344 was issued on
April 2, 1978 to expand the jurisdiction of the NHA to include the following: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business
and in addition to its powers provided exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
a.
.Unsound real estate business practices
b.
Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
c.
Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The expansive grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB does not mean, however, that all cases involving subdivision lots automatically fall under its jurisdiction. As we said
in Roxas v. Court of Appeals (391 SCRA 351 [2002]): In our view, the mere relationship between the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and
subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element
is the nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. 1344. On this matter, we have consistently held that the concerned administrative agency, the HLURB,
has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations. x x x Note particularly pars.

PANIC NOTES; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; FINAL EXAM

10
(b) and (c) as worded, where the HLURBs jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. As to par. (a), concerning
unsound real estate practices, it would appear that the logical complainant would be the buyers and customers against the sellers (subdivision owners and
developers or condominium builders and realtors), and not vice versa.
(HLURB) has no jurisdiction over cases filed by subdivision or condominium owners or developers against subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers or owners.
The rationale behind this can be found in the wordings of Section 1, PD No. 1344, which expressly qualifies that the cases cognizable by the HLURB are those
instituted by subdivision or condomium buyers or owners against the project developer or owner. This is also in keeping with the policy of the law, which is to curb
unscrupulous practices in the real estate trade and business.
From these allegations, the main thrust of the CGA complaint is clearto compel the respondents to refund the payments already made for the subject property
because the respondents were selling a property that they apparently did not own. In other words, CGA claims that since the respondents cannot comply with their
obligations under the contract, i.e., to deliver the property free from all liens and encumbrances, CGA is entitled to rescind the contract and get a refund of the
payments already made. This cause of action clearly falls under the actions contemplated by Paragraph (b), Section 1 of PD No. 1344, which reads: SECTION 1. In
the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction.

Eugenio vs. Drilon, 252 SCRA 106, G.R. No. 109404 January 22, 1996
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, appeals from judgments or final orders of the x x x Office of the President may be taken to the CA. However, in order to
hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision one and a half years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular
in the interest of speedy justice.
P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.In his Petition before this Court, petitioner
avers that the Executive Secretary erred in applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the nondevelopment of the E & S Delta Village justified private respondents nonpayment of his amortizations. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976,
said law cannot govern the transaction. We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is
to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from
the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.
Social Justice; P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and
machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers. Section 23 of P.D. 957 correctly invoked to justify non-payment of amortizations for failure of
the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same
Decisions, resolutions and orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.Finally, since petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the (Executive Secretarys) Decision dated March 10, 1992 was filed only on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said decision had become final and executory,
pursuant to Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, which provides that (d)ecisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President
shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof x x x, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.

PANIC NOTES; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; FINAL EXAM