Alice

Bertella
Rubina Cantele

77918-History and International Relations of the Middle East
Massimiliano Trentin

The Cold War and American Role in the Middle East

Introduction

The Cold War brought about a deep Soviet- American rivalry in the Middle East on three levels: a
geopolitical clash to recruit allies and secure access to strategic resources (specially oil);
diplomatic moves to avoid the Arab-Israeli conflict from becoming a super-power confrontation;
and ideological struggle for the future of the Muslim world1.
Many scholars argue that the Super Powers intervention in the Middle East during the Cold War
had replaced imperialism carried out by European powers at an early stage of the XX century2.
The United States and the Soviet Union became deeply engaged the Middle East during the
World War II, before that moment little attention was paid to this area by the Great Powers.
Nevertheless, European imperialism and Super Powers intervention show significant
differences: regarding the goals, the former exploited and physically imposed its power, while
the latter aimed for a less evident, but more focused on development, control. Furthermore,
during the two eras fights had different connotations, liberation movements features in the first
case whereas civil wars structures in the second. This was primarily due to the different role

Douglas Little, The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez crisis to Camp David Accords, The Cambridge History of the
Cfr. E.g. James L. Galvin, The Modern Middle East History, Oxford University Press, 2008; Rashid Khalidi, The Cold
war and American Dominance in the Middle East, Boston Beacon Press, 2009.

played by ideology in the two different contexts3. American foreign policy has always swung
between idealism and realism4; even though nobody can deny that the will to spread democracy
and Western values hided strong economic interests in oil provisions, it is undeniable that not at
any time idealist theorists had found such a great ground as it happened in the Cold War era5.

American Foreign Policy in the Middle East

American foreign policy in the Middle East shows two different sides: on one hand it appears to
be firm and resolute since in the long term period it aimed steadily to pursue specific fixed goals,
while on the other hand it has been defined ambiguous because of different approaches
chased by different administrations.
Six main goals can be constantly identified from the beginning until the end of the cold war
within the American political agenda: URSS containment, access to oil provisions, pacific
resolution of conflicts and balance of power among regional states, safety of Israeli
independence and territorial integrity, economic development of emerging countries and
protection of communication and connecting routes.
The most important sources where these points can be traceable are the National Security
Council Report (1954)6 and the Deposition of the Vice Secretary of State for the Middle East and
South Asia Affairs Peter Constable (1981).

3

Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge
University Press, 2005, p. 2.
4
Idealists took for granted the objective validity, authority, and supremacy of universal norms, laws, and principles.
Realists, asserting the primacy of national interest, saw such universal norms as only conditionally binding. By
Idealism and Realism, in Encyclopaedia, pp.856-57.
5
Galvin, supra nota 2, p. 325.
6

a) No one of the three major areas outside the Western Hemisphere has yet achieved adequate security against the several threats posed by the
Soviet system. b) Europe will be in a better position to resist Soviet military attack and to withstand Soviet pressures in the cold war than either of
the other two areas. Western Europe will probably not have reached a security position by 1955, which would be adequate to assure its defence
against a determined Soviet attack. c) Taking into account the serious and immediate dangers facing the free world in the Far East and the Middle
East and the political and economic obstacles to a more rapid build-up of NATO forces, the U.S. should not undertake a general upward revision of
present NATO programs but it should attach a high priority to the upward revision of certain specific programs to fill particular defence gaps and
should be prepared to support military assistance programs for a number of years to come. d) There is urgent need for a larger allocation of U.S.
economic and military resources to selected countries, in the Middle East and South Asia, particularly Iran, Egypt, India and Pakistan, and for
measures which would serve to establish American interests in the area. Such new programs would contribute directly to greater political stability
and to a measure of military strength. e) There is similarly an urgent need for a substantially larger allocation of U.S. resources to the Far East,
particularly to Indo-china, Korea, Japan, and Formosa. Such larger programs could provide urgently needed indigenous military forces to help the
countries of the area achieve stability, to deter or resist Chinese Communist aggression, and possibly to permit the withdrawal of some Western
forces to positions of greater strategic advantage. f) There is also need for additional economic programs for the underdeveloped countries to
stimulate the production of raw materials and foodstuffs and thereby benefit the Western European countries and Japan and strengthen the
economic base of the whole free world. Report to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of State Defence and the
Director for Mutual Security, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Vol.II,
Part. I, available for consultation https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d42.

However, during these 30 years American politics used different strategies to achieve the goals
mentioned above, which can be divided in two different groups: peripheral containment and
strong points containment. The first group refers to the political manoeuvres directed to circle
URSS through an alliance-system like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949), the
Baghdad Pact (1955), the Central Treaty Organization (Cento, 1959) and the South East Asian
Organization (SEATO, 1954). The second group concerns security bastions chose for economical,
military and political solidity in order to contain Soviets allies in the region, for example Israel in
the case of Syria and Iran and Saudi Arabia in the case of Iraq.

The Cold War Modernisation

At the beginning of the Cold War the theory of modernisation emerged as the dominant
paradigm of economics, social and political development within the American foreign policy
establishment. In fact, modernisation theory furnished a structure through which elites could
manage social change, a market based instruction for economic development and an
explanation for US intervention in newly independent countries7. US wanted to export its model
skipping all the intermediate stages that experienced during their path to industrial modernity,
fostering third world growth while simultaneously combating communism. Nevertheless,
modernisation theory was more than an expression of cold war ideology.
The United States offered its own perspective of modernity by acting as a senior partner that
could give assistance in terms of both goods and guidance to the new developing countries that
where becoming members of the free world8.
Modernity was defined as the opposite of tradition and fostered development assistance
accelerating societies linear progress toward a universal model, which involved media
consumption, social mobility and economic growth9. As a matter of fact, modernisation was
actually a strongly contested process that was often rejected in different ways from both local

7
Nathan J. Citino, The Crush of Ideologies: the United States, the Arab World, and Cold War Modernization,
Colorado State University, 2012, p.91.
Peter Slugget, The Cold War in the Middle East, Oxford University Press, p.63.
9
Citino, supra nota 8, p.93.
8

elites and population, because of the way throughout the modernisers were trying to export
their modernising magic10.
At the same time, URSS as well attempted to export its own development model based on
communism. In this way the superpowers were trying to define modernity by demonstrating the
universal applicability of their ideologies in the new independent states.
However, modernisers from developing countries even though were sharing some of the basic
assumptions with American theorists, they were disagreeing with them about the political
objectives. Some Arab scholars like Qutb redesigns Orientalism imaginary to identify Islam with
forward progress and he clearly rejected the statement that the US should be used as a model
for developing countries. Moreover, he underlines the universality of Islam in contrast with the
sectarian and bigoted nature of modernising system. Fathy, an Egyptian educated in western
countries, argued that human values were missing from the materialist visions supported by
both East and West. Nonetheless, an Iraqi academic Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz supported the
American model of federalism as a positive example for Pan-Arab state. In conclusion, American
and Arab modernisers share the idea of historical change as linear and the goal of economic
growth, but they had strong ideological differences. They rejected the American model in order
to define an alternative agenda11.













10
Nils Gilman, H-Diplo Articles Review, Special Forum: Modernization as a Global Project, Diplomatic History, June
2009.
Citino, supra nota 8, p.97.

11

Bibliography

Nathan J. Citino, The Crush of Ideologies: the United States, the Arab World, and Cold War Modernization,
Colorado State University, 2012.

James L. Galvin, The Modern Middle East History, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Rashid Khalidi, The Cold war and American Dominance in the Middle East, Boston Beacon Press, 2009.

Douglas Little, The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez crisis to Camp David Accords, The Cambridge History of the
Cold War Vol.II Crises and Dtente, Cambridge University Press.

Peter Slugget, The Cold War in the Middle East, Oxford University Press.

Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge
University Press, 2005.

Websites

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d42