Chapter III

Equal protection Clause

1. People vs. Cayat
Facts/Issue:
Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet,
Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian
tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of
Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one
bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a
native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of
the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe
within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in
his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine
or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the socalled native wines and liquors which the members of
such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage
of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act
1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies
the equal protection of the laws, violates due process
clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law
that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The

classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon
accident of birth or parentage, as counsel for the
appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and
culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers, not to
religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and
more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a
low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. (Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to
meet the peculiar conditions existing in the nonChristian tribes.

The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to

insure peace and order in and among non-Christian
tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class
evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its
operation against a certain number of non-Christians by
reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument
against the equality of its application.

2. Association of Small Landowners

Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Vs

These are four consolidated cases questioning the

constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land
Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on
Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the
adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program.
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was
promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among
tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino
issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in
favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree
as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No.
131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform
program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229,
providing
the
mechanics
for
its
(PP131s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless
gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs
Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised
of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose
landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that
since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they

should not be forced to distribute their land to their

tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown
willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to
be exempted from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian
reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground
that these laws already valuated their lands for the
agrarian reform program and that the specific amount
must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the
principle in eminent domain which provides that only
courts can determine just compensation. This, for
Manaay, also violated due process for under the
constitution, no property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that
landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not
necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just
compensation has always been in the form of money and
not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal
protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian
reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that
they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian
reform program. Under the law, classification has been
defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each
other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the
class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or
things similarly situated must be treated alike both as
to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.

The Association have not shown that they belong to a

different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of
other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will
not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears
that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as
part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just
compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However,
there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies
like the DAR from determining just compensation. In
fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon
by the landowner and the government even without
judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The
DAR can determine just compensation through
appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an
administrative body is merely preliminary. If the
landowner does not agree with the finding of just
compensation by an administrative body, then it can go
to court and the determination of the latter shall be the
final determination. This is even so provided by RA
6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the
decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is
merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent
domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary
exercise of eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be
made in cash if everything is in cash, then the
government will not have sufficient money hence,
bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be
used for just compensation.

4. IMBONG VS OCHOA G.R. No. 204819 April 8,

2014 JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C.
IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE
CARLOS
IMBONG
and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,

JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.

ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. (equal
protection of law).
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the
law.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
governments RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the
State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged,
sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it
shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to
reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not
impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to
the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from
the mandatory RH education program under Section 14
is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially
with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health
education.
Discussion on procedure
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule
that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be

raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of

constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy
means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not
merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be
an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to
the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For
a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a
First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom
of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the right to ones
freedom of expression, as they are modes which ones
thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined
as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the
doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of

overreaching significance to society, or of paramount

public interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and
its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the
rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The one
subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title
of a law must not be so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under
this view, the court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the
parties just as if such statute had no existence. But
certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration
of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for
partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be
willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by
the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2)
The valid portion can stand independently as law.
5. Biraogo vs. THE PHIIPPINE
COMMISSION OF 2010, GR NO. 192935

TRUTH

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine

Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of
the President with the primary task to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and
to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all
the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending

parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess

evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it
has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order
their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional
and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as
if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal
standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress
because the Presidents executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution,
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616
(as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence,
authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or
supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,

because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial

body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the
petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation
of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to
wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the
power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they
are allowed to question the validity of any official action
which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O.
No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is
governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It

provides that every action must be prosecuted or

defended in the name of the real party in interest. Realparty-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos
assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues
in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our
laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionallymandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist
is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is
entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment
or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the
power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, whatever funds
the Congress has provided for the Office of the President
will be the very source of the funds for the commission.
The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there
is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or
erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the
two offices. The function of determining probable cause
for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the

courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.

PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts
so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a
states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms
of a statue or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,
that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of
its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law

of the nation to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
6. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice;
HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as
Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the
JOINT
DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACTFINDING TEAM, Respondents.
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the
creation of a joint committee with the Department of
Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and
anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007
elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 0012011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases
composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In
its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated.
The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein
petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en
banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for
the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et
al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo,
among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the
creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint
Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint

Panel is valid?
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the
equal protection clause?
HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.
FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint
Panel is valid.
POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates the powers and functions of the Comelec.
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the
enforcement and administration of all election laws is
intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to
the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of
elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power
in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct
preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the
Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the
prosecutors had been conducting preliminary
investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated
authority given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the
creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team,
should be viewed not as an abdication of the
constitutional bodys independence but as a means to
fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and
prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its
mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not
violate the equal protection clause.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because its sole
purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain
persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel
was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as
well as public officials linked to the Arroyo
Administration.

While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those

subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were
public officers who were investigated upon in
connection with their acts in the performance of their
official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to
the investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely
requires that all persons under like circumstances and
conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. DISMISSED.
7. ELEAZAR QUINTO VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and
administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates
of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the
May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4
and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a)
Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall
not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned
from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino,
Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and
who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the
instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also
contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of
the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two
conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or
reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a
declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from
their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph

of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the
equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as
ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of
their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that
there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts,
does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so
that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary
that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and
substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and
other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not
all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled
vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a
four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it
does not comply with the second requirementif it is
not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification
must be enforced not only for the present but as long as
the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist.
And, under the last requirement, the classification would
be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the
Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding
elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is

to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote
ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is
further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and
discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger
that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by
political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition
that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena,
while still in office, could result in neglect or
inefficiency in the performance of duty because they
would be attending to their campaign rather than to their
office work.

If we accept these as the underlying objectives of

the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid
classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the
classification must be germane to the purposes of the
law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or
an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary,
or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could
wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at
the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the
recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to
take charge of national housing, social welfare
development, interior and local government, and foreign
affairs). With the fact that they both head executive
offices, there is no valid justification to treat them
differently when both file their CoCs for the elections.
Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in
the example, running this time, let us say, for President,
retains his position during the entire election period and
can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship
in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office,
the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The
public officer who files his certificate of candidacy
would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent
performance to show his fitness for the position aspired
for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat
appointive officials differently from the elective ones.
The classification simply fails to meet the test that it
should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section
66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these

deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and
fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers
the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not
germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain."

Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the
Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question
an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution,
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any
person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides
that
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline
for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election.
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within
this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the
start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Provided, finally, That any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members
of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing
of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the
equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not
require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,
which has four requisites:

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for

excluding elected officials from the operation of the
deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will,
perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of
the people. It involves the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering
that elected officials are put in office by their
constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said
that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed
resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of
the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is
accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served
by such officials until the end of the term for which they
were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation
insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective
officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law.
For the law was made not merely to preserve the
integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service;
the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of
judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with
the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of
deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to
GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions
for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this
Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the
Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not
UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and
(3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or
appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official
or employee, or those in the civil or military service,
including those in government-owned or-controlled

corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned

upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay
office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate
deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law,
there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on
candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of
RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For
this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also
fail.
8. Guttierez vs. DBM GR no. 153266
FACTS:
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758,
called the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government
employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of
allowances and additional compensation already being
enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary
rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations
that the employees may be receiving from such
consolidation. Thus:
Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and
Compensation. -- All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing
and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of
marine officers and crew on board government vessels
and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of
foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such
other additional compensation not otherwise specified
herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be
deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein
prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether
in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as
of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized
salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Pursuant to the above, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued NCC 59 dated September
30, 1989,[1] covering the offices of the national
government, state universities and colleges, and local
government units. NCC 59 enumerated the specific
allowances and additional compensations which were
deemed integrated in the basic salaries and these
included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and
Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM reissued and published NCC 59 on May 3, 2004.[2]
The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular
(CCC) 10 dated October 2, 1989,[3] covering all
government-owned or controlled corporations and

government financial institutions. The DBM re-issued

this circular on February 15, 1999[4] and published it on
March 16, 1999. Accordingly, the Commission on Audit
(COA) disallowed the payments of honoraria and other
allowances which were deemed integrated into the
standardized salary rates. Employees of governmentowned or controlled corporations questioned the validity
of CCC 10 due to its non-publication. In De Jesus v.
Commission on Audit,[5] this Court declared CCC 10
ineffective because of such non-publication. Until then,
it ordered the COA to pass on audit the employees
honoraria which they were receiving prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 6758.
Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 200103 dated November 12, 2001,[6] clarifying that only the
exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may
continue to be granted the employees; all others were
deemed integrated in the standardized salary rates. Thus,
the payment of allowances and compensation such as
COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others,
which were already deemed integrated in the basic salary
were unauthorized. The Courts ruling in subsequent
cases involving government-owned or controlled
corporations followed the De Jesus ruling.
On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus in G.R. 153266, questioning the propriety of
integrating their COLA into their standardized salary
rates. Employees of other offices of the national
government followed suit. In addition, petitioners in
G.R. 159007 questioned the disallowance of the
allowances and fringe benefits that the COA auditing
personnel assigned to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) used to get. Petitioners in G.R. 173119
questioned the disallowance of the ICA that used to be
paid to the officials and employees of the Insurance
Commission.
The Court caused the consolidation of the
treated them as a class suit for all
employees, excluding the employees of
owned or controlled corporations and
financial institutions.[7]

petitions and
government
governmentgovernment

On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget

Circular 2005-502[8] which provided that all Supreme
Court rulings on the integration of allowances, including
COLA, of government employees under R.A. 6758
applied only to specific government-owned or controlled
corporations since the consolidated cases covering the
national government employees are still pending with
this Court. Consequently, the payment of allowances and
other benefits to them, such as COLA and ICA,
remained prohibited until otherwise provided by law or
ruled by this Court. The circular further said that all

agency heads and other responsible officials and

employees found to have authorized the grant of COLA
and other allowances and benefits already integrated in
the basic salary shall be personally held liable for such
payment.
ISSUE: The common issues presented in these
consolidated cases are:
1. Whether or not the COLA should be deemed
integrated into the standardized salary rates of the
concerned government employees by virtue of Section
12 of R.A. 6758;
2. Whether or not the ICA may still be paid to officials
and employees of the Insurance Commission;
3. Whether or not the GSIS may still pay the allowances
and fringe benefits to COA auditing personnel assigned
to it;
4. Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated
September 30, 1989 in the Official Gazette or newspaper
of general circulation nullifies the integration of the
COLA into the standardized salary rates; and
5. Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and
police personnel to the exclusion of other government
employees violates the equal protection clause.
Five. Petitioners contend that the continued grant of
COLA to military and police personnel under CCC 10
and NCC 59 to the exclusion of other government
employees violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
But as respondents pointed out, while it may appear that
petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of these
issuances, they are in fact attacking the very
constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. 6758. It is
actually this provision which allows the uniformed
personnel to continue receiving their COLA over and
above their basic pay, thus:
Section 11. Military and Police Personnel. - The base
pay of uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Integrated National Police shall be as
prescribed in the salary schedule for these personnel in
R.A. 6638 and R.A. 6648. The longevity pay of these
personnel shall be as prescribed under R.A. 6638, and
R.A. 1134 as amended by R.A. 3725 and R.A. 6648:
Provided, however, That the longevity pay of uniformed
personnel of the Integrated National Police shall include
those services rendered as uniformed members of the
police, jail and fire departments of the local government
units prior to the police integration.
All existing types of allowances authorized for
uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines and Integrated National Police such as cost

of living allowance, longevity pay, quarters allowance,
subsistence allowance, clothing allowance, hazard pay
and other allowances shall continue to be authorized.
Nothing is more settled than that the constitutionality of
a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not
collaterally.[31]
In any event, the Court is not persuaded that the
continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to
the exclusion of other national government officials run
afoul the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The
fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another. The classification
must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must
apply to all those belonging to the same class.[32]
To be valid and reasonable, the classification must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.[33]
It is clear from the first paragraph of Section 11 that
Congress intended the uniformed personnel to be
continually governed by their respective compensation
laws. Thus, the military is governed by R.A. 6638,[34]
as amended by R.A. 9166[35] while the police is
governed by R.A. 6648,[36] as amended by R.A. 6975.
[37]
Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed
personnel differently from other national government
officials. Being in charged of the actual defense of the
State and the maintenance of internal peace and order,
they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in
the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of
low, moderate, and high-cost areas. Since their basic pay
does not vary based on location, the continued grant of
COLA is intended to help them offset the effects of
living in higher cost areas.[38]
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R.
No. 172713 and DENIES the petitions in G.R. 153266,
159007, 159029, 170084, 173119, 176477, 177990 and
A.M. 06-4-02-SB.
SO ORDERED.
9. PAGCOR VS. BI, GR NO. 172087

645 SCRA 338 Taxation Law Income Taxation

Corporate Taxpayers PAGCOR is not exempt from
income taxation
Political Law Equal Protection Clause
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) was created by P.D. No. 1067-A in 1977.
Obviously, it is a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC).
In 1998, R.A. 8424 or the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997 (NIRC) became effective. Section 27
thereof provides that GOCCs are NOT EXEMPT from
paying income taxation but it exempted the following
GOCCs:
1. GSIS
2. SSS
3. PHILHEALTH
4. PCSO
5. PAGCOR
But in May 2005, R.A. 9337, a law amending certain
provisions of R.A. 8424, was passed. Section 1 thereof
excluded PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence
PAGCOR was subjected to pay income taxation. In
September 2005, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) for R.A.
9337. In the said IRR, it identified PAGCOR as subject
to a 10% value added tax (VAT) upon items covered by
Section 108 of the NIRC (Sale of Services and Use or
Lease of Properties).
PAGCOR questions the constitutionality of Section 1 of
R.A. 9337 as well as the IRR. PAGCOR avers that the
said provision violates the equal protection clause.
PAGCOR argues that it is similarly situated with SSS,
GSIS, PCSO, and PHILHEALTH, hence it should not be
excluded from the exemption.
ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR should be subjected to
income taxation.
HELD: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 9337 is constitutional. It
was the express intent of Congress to exclude PAGCOR
from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR is now subject
to income taxation.
PAGCORs contention that the law violated the
constitution is not tenable. The equal protection clause
provides that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.

The general rule is, ALL GOCCs are subject to income

taxation. However, certain classes of GOCCs may be
exempt from income taxation based on the following
requisites for a valid classification under the principle of
equal protection:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
When the Supreme Court looked into the records of the
deliberations of the lawmakers when R.A. 8424 was
being drafted, the SC found out that PAGCORs
exemption was not really based on substantial
distinctions. In fact, the lawmakers merely exempted
PAGCOR from income taxation upon the request of
PAGCOR itself. This was changed however when R.A.
9337 was passed and now PAGCOR is already subject to
income taxation.
Anent the issue of the imposition of the 10% VAT
against PAGCOR, the BIR had overstepped its authority.
Nowhere in R.A. 9337 does it state that PAGCOR is
subject to VAT. Therefore, that portion of the IRR issued
by the BIR is void. In fact, Section 109 of R.A. 9337
expressly exempts PAGCOR from VAT. Further,
PAGCORs charter exempts it from VAT.
To recapitulate, PAGCOR is subject to income taxation
but not to VAT.
10. G.R. No. 149907

April 16, 2009

ROMA DRUG and ROMEO RODRIGUEZ, as

Proprietor of ROMA DRUG, Petitioners,vs.THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GUAGUA,
PAMPANGA, THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
OF PAMPANGA, BUREAU OF FOOD & DRUGS
(BFAD) and GLAXO SMITHKLINE, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On 14 August 2000, a team composed of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) operatives and inspectors
of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) conducted a
raid on petitioner Roma Drug, a duly registered sole
proprietorship of petitioner Romeo Rodriguez
(Rodriguez) operating a drug store located at San
Matias, Guagua, Pampanga. The raid was conducted
pursuant to a search warrant 1 issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City. The raiding
team seized several imported medicines, including
Augmentin (375mg.) tablets, Orbenin (500mg.)

capsules, Amoxil (250mg.) capsules and Ampiclox

(500mg.).2 It appears that Roma Drug is one of six drug
stores which were raided on or around the same time
upon the request of SmithKline Beecham Research
Limited (SmithKline), a duly registered corporation
which is the local distributor of pharmaceutical products
manufactured by its parent London-based corporation.
The local SmithKline has since merged with Glaxo
Wellcome Phil. Inc to form Glaxo SmithKline, private
respondent in this case. The seized medicines, which
were manufactured by SmithKline, were imported
directly from abroad and not purchased through the local
SmithKline, the authorized Philippine distributor of
these products.
The NBI subsequently filed a complaint against
Rodriguez for violation of Section 4 (in relation to
Sections 3 and 5) of Republic Act No. 8203, also known
as the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD), with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in San Fernando,
Pampanga. The section prohibits the sale of counterfeit
drugs, which under Section 3(b)(3), includes an
unregistered imported drug product. The term
unregistered signifies the lack of registration with the
Bureau of Patent, Trademark and Technology Transfer of
a trademark, tradename or other identification mark of a
drug in the name of a natural or juridical person, the
process of which is governed under Part III of the
Intellectual Property Code.
In this case, there is no doubt that the subject seized
drugs are identical in content with their Philippineregistered counterparts. There is no claim that they were
adulterated in any way or mislabeled at least. Their
classification as counterfeit is based solely on the fact
that they were imported from abroad and not purchased
from the Philippine-registered owner of the patent or
trademark of the drugs.
During preliminary investigation, Rodriguez challenged
the constitutionality of the SLCD. However, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Celerina C. Pineda skirted the
challenge and issued a Resolution dated 17 August 2001
recommending that Rodriguez be charged with violation
of Section 4(a) of the SLCD. The recommendation was
approved by Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang
approved the recommendation.3
Hence, the present Petition for Prohibition questing the
RTC-Guagua Pampanga and the Provincial Prosecutor to
desist from further prosecuting Rodriguez, and that
Sections 3(b)(3), 4 and 5 of the SLCD be declared
unconstitutional. In gist, Rodriguez asserts that the
challenged provisions contravene three provisions of the
Constitution. The first is the equal protection clause of
the Bill of Rights. The two other provisions are Section
11, Article XIII, which mandates that the State make

essential goods, health and other social services

available to all the people at affordable cost; and
Section 15, Article II, which states that it is the policy of
the State to protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Through its Resolution dated 15 October 2001, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC
from proceeding with the trial against Rodriguez, and
the BFAD, the NBI and Glaxo Smithkline from
prosecuting the petitioners.4
Glaxo Smithkline and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) have opposed the petition, the latter in behalf of
public respondents RTC, Provincial Prosecutor and
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD). On the
constitutional issue, Glaxo Smithkline asserts the rule
that the SLCD is presumed constitutional, arguing that
both Section 15, Article II and Section 11, Article XIII
are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of
which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. It
adds that Section 11, Article XIII in particular cannot be
work to the oppression and unlawful of the property
rights of the legitimate manufacturers, importers or
distributors, who take pains in having imported drug
products registered before the BFAD. Glaxo Smithkline
further claims that the SLCD does not in fact conflict
with the aforementioned constitutional provisions and in
fact are in accord with constitutional precepts in favor of
the peoples right to health.
The Office of the Solicitor General casts the question as
one of policy wisdom of the law that is, beyond the
interference of the judiciary.5 Again, the presumption of
constitutionality of statutes is invoked, and the assertion
is made that there is no clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution presented by the SLCD.
II. The constitutional aspect of this petition raises
obviously interesting questions. However, such
questions have in fact been mooted with the passage in
2008 of Republic Act No. 9502, also known as the
Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines
Act of 2008.6
Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 9502 amends Section 72 of
the Intellectual Property Code in that the later law
unequivocally grants third persons the right to import
drugs or medicines whose patent were registered in the
Philippines by the owner of the product:
Sec. 7. Section 72 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise
known as the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 72. Limitations of Patent Rights. The owner of a
patent has no right to prevent third parties from

performing, without his authorization, the acts referred

to in Section 71 hereof in the following circumstances:
72.1. Using a patented product which has been put on
the market in the Philippines by the owner of the
product, or with his express consent, insofar as such use
is performed after that product has been so put on the
said market: Provided, That, with regard to drugs and
medicines, the limitation on patent rights shall apply
after a drug or medicine has been introduced in the
Philippines or anywhere else in the world by the patent
owner, or by any party authorized to use the invention:
Provided, further, That the right to import the drugs and
medicines contemplated in this section shall be available
to any government agency or any private third party;
72.2. Where the act is done privately and on a noncommercial scale or for a non-commercial purpose:
Provided, That it does not significantly prejudice the
economic interests of the owner of the patent;
72.3. Where the act consists of making or using
exclusively for experimental use of the invention for
scientific purposes or educational purposes and such
other activities directly related to such scientific or
educational experimental use;
72.4. In the case of drugs and medicines, where the act
includes testing, using, making or selling the invention
including any data related thereto, solely for purposes
reasonably related to the development and submission of
information and issuance of approvals by government
regulatory agencies required under any law of the
Philippines or of another country that regulates the
manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product:
Provided, That, in order to protect the data submitted by
the original patent holder from unfair commercial use
provided in Article 39.3 of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement), the Intellectual Property Office, in
consultation with the appropriate government agencies,
shall issue the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary therein not later than one hundred twenty
(120) days after the enactment of this law;
72.5. Where the act consists of the preparation for
individual cases, in a pharmacy or by a medical
professional, of a medicine in accordance with a medical
shall apply after a drug or medicine has been introduced
in the Philippines or anywhere else in the world by the
patent owner, or by any party authorized to use the
invention: Provided, further, That the right to import the
drugs and medicines contemplated in this section shall
be available to any government agency or any private
third party; xxx 7
The unqualified right of private third parties such as
petitioner to import or possess unregistered imported

drugs in the Philippines is further confirmed by the

Implementing Rules to Republic Act No. 9502
promulgated on 4 November 2008.8 The relevant
provisions thereof read:
Rule 9. Limitations on Patent Rights. The owner of a
patent has no right to prevent third parties from
performing, without his authorization, the acts referred
to in Section 71 of the IP Code as enumerated hereunder:
(i) Introduction in the Philippines or Anywhere Else in
the World.
Using a patented product which has been put on the
market in the Philippines by the owner of the product, or
with his express consent, insofar as such use is
performed after that product has been so put on the said
market: Provided, That, with regard to drugs and
medicines, the limitation on patent rights shall apply
after a drug or medicine has been introduced in the
Philippines or anywhere else in the world by the patent
owner, or by any party authorized to use the invention:
Provided, further, That the right to import the drugs and
medicines contemplated in this section shall be available
to any government agency or any private third party.
(72.1)
The drugs and medicines are deemed introduced when
they have been sold or offered for sale anywhere else in
the world. (n)
It may be that Rep. Act No. 9502 did not expressly
repeal any provision of the SLCD. However, it is clear
that the SLCOs classification of unregistered imported
drugs as counterfeit drugs, and of corresponding
criminal penalties therefore are irreconcilably in the
imposition conflict with Rep. Act No. 9502 since the
latter indubitably grants private third persons the
unqualified right to import or otherwise use such drugs.
Where a statute of later date, such as Rep. Act No. 9502,
clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature
to abrogate a prior act on the subject that intention must
be given effect.9 When a subsequent enactment covering
a field of operation coterminus with a prior statute
cannot by any reasonable construction be given effect
while the prior law remains in operative existence
because of irreconcilable conflict between the two acts,
the latest legislative expression prevails and the prior
law yields to the extent of the conflict.10 Irreconcilable
inconsistency between two laws embracing the same
subject may exist when the later law nullifies the reason
or purpose of the earlier act, so that the latter loses all
meaning and function.11 Legis posteriors priores
contrarias abrogant.
For the reasons above-stated, the prosecution of
petitioner is no longer warranted and the quested writ of
prohibition should accordingly be issued.

III. Had the Court proceeded to directly confront the

constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the SLCD,
it is apparent that it would have at least placed in doubt
the validity of the provisions. As written, the law makes
a criminal of any person who imports an unregistered
drug regardless of the purpose, even if the medicine can
spell life or death for someone in the Philippines. It does
not accommodate the situation where the drug is out of
stock in the Philippines, beyond the reach of a patient
who urgently depends on it. It does not allow husbands,
wives, children, siblings, parents to import the drug in
behalf of their loved ones too physically ill to travel and
avail of the meager personal use exemption allotted by
the law. It discriminates, at the expense of health, against
poor Filipinos without means to travel abroad to
purchase less expensive medicines in favor of their
wealthier brethren able to do so. Less urgently perhaps,
but still within the range of constitutionally protected
behavior, it deprives Filipinos to choose a less expensive
regime for their health care by denying them a plausible
and safe means of purchasing medicines at a cheaper
cost.
The absurd results from this far-reaching ban extends to
implications that deny the basic decencies of humanity.
The law would make criminals of doctors from abroad
on medical missions of such humanitarian organizations
such as the International Red Cross, the International
Red Crescent, Medicin Sans Frontieres, and other likeminded groups who necessarily bring their own
pharmaceutical drugs when they embark on their
missions of mercy. After all, they are disabled from
invoking the bare personal use exemption afforded by
the SLCD.
Even worse is the fact that the law is not content with
simply banning, at civil costs, the importation of
unregistered drugs. It equates the importers of such
drugs, many of whom motivated to do so out of altruism
or basic human love, with the malevolents who would
alter or counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs for reasons of
profit at the expense of public safety. Note that the
SLCD is a special law, and the traditional treatment of
penal provisions of special laws is that of malum
prohibitumor punishable regardless of motive or
criminal intent. For a law that is intended to help save
lives, the SLCD has revealed itself as a heartless,
soulless legislative piece.
The challenged provisions of the SLCD apparently
proscribe a range of constitutionally permissible
behavior. It is laudable that with the passage of Rep. Act
No. 9502, the State has reversed course and allowed for
a sensible and compassionate approach with respect to
the importation of pharmaceutical drugs urgently
necessary for the peoples constitutionally-recognized
right to health.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part. A writ

of prohibition is hereby ISSUED commanding
respondents from prosecuting petitioner Romeo
Rodriguez for violation of Section 4 or Rep. Act No.
8203. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 15
October 2001 is hereby made PERMANENT. No
pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
11. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE VERA
65 Phil. 56 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill
of Rights Equal Protection Probation Law
Separation of Powers Undue Delegation of Powers
Power to Pardon
Constitutionality of Laws May the State Question Its
Own Laws
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a
criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he
filed for probation. The matter was referred to the
Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial
of Cu Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was set
by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation.
The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to
delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts
like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is
presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to
place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because
under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law),
probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with
probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a
province, and that Manila, even if construed as a
province, has no designated probation officer hence, a
Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the
matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it
violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection
of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it the
prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the
probation law if a province chooses to apply the
probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer,
but if it will not, then no probation officer will be
appointed hence, that makes it violative of the equal
protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an
undue delegation of power because it gave the option to
the provincial board to whether or not to apply the
probation law however, the legislature did not provide
guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an

encroachment of the executives power to grant pardon.
They say that the legislature, by providing for a
probation law, had in effect encroached upon the
executives power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the
Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by HSBC
ironic because their main stance was the nonapplicability of the probation law only in Manila while
recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is
that, the Prosecution, representing the State as well as
the People of the Philippines, cannot question the
validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself
created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of
Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the
past without question but is now questioning the validity
of the said law (estoppel).

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well
taken on this note. There is violation of the equal
protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given
the option to apply the law by simply providing for a
probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a
probation officer, then the accused within said province
will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the
Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

1. May the State question its own laws?

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221

provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the
respective provincial boards have provided for a
probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as
to what standard (sufficient standard test) should
provincial boards follow in determining whether or not
to apply the probation law in their province. This only
creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily
according to its whims.

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

Encroachment of Executive Power

HELD:

Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court

recognized the power of Congress to provide for
probation. Probation does not encroach upon the
Presidents power to grant pardon. Probation is not
pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix
penalties while pardon is a power of the president to
commute penalties.

ISSUE:

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its

duly authorized representative, from questioning the
validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the
State even if it had been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is
unconstitutional.