Bun 1

NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT

NEW NUCLEAR - DARLINGTON
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
NK054-REP-07730-00027 Rev 000
Prepared By:
Nuclear Waste Management Division

Ontario Power Generation Inc.
August 2009
New Nuclear Darlington

Environmental Assessment
Nuclear Waste Management

Technical Support Document
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Technical Support Document (TSD) relates to Nuclear Waste Management for the
New Nuclear Darlington Project (NND) and has been prepared to support the NND
Environmental Assessment. It describes available technologies and assesses the
radiological effects on members of the public and Nuclear Energy Workers (NEWs) on
the Darlington Nuclear (DN) site from operating the on-site radioactive waste storage
systems. It has been prepared by the Nuclear Waste Management Division (NWMD) of
Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG), which carries technical responsibility for the
Nuclear Waste Management System for NND. This TSD is one of a series of related
documents describing different aspects of the overall effects assessment, one for each
environmental component. More details on the basis for the EA are given in
Appendix C.
The radioactive low and intermediate level waste (L&ILW) produced during the
operation, maintenance, refurbishment, and decommissioning of the reactors will be
managed in a similar manner regardless of the reactor design selected. L&ILW will be
managed either on the DN site in a L&ILW management facility or transported off-site to
be managed at an appropriately licensed facility.
On-site used nuclear fuel storage facilities (both wet and dry) will be part of each of the
reactor designs considered. The on-site dry storage of used fuel proposed for all three
reactor designs is expansion of the current at the Darlington Waste Management Facility
(DWMF). It is assumed that the used fuel will be stored on-site until the federally
mandated Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) takes responsibility for
the long-term management of the used fuel. It is assumed that the NWMO long-term
management facility will be available within the operating lifespan of NND.
ES-1 Waste Management Concepts
The range of options presented for management of the radioactive wastes that will be
generated by the proposed NND is intended to provide bounding conditions for the EA.
No decision has yet been taken on which waste management system will be used.
The EA will consider two options for storage of low and intermediate level waste
(L&ILW): on-site, using compaction, packaging, and a modular storage building; and
off-site, transporting un-processed L&ILW to an appropriately licensed facility. Storage
is assumed to be in standard L&ILW Storage Buildings (SBs).
The Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) MACSTOR (Modular Air Cooled
STORage) system is the standard used fuel dry storage (UFDS) system offered by AECL
for the proposed reactor ACR-1000, consisting of concrete storage cells that provide
shielding and convective air cooling. Another option for the ACR-1000 is OPGs Dry
Storage Container (DSC) system - a proven system that has been used for CANada
DeuteriumUranium (CANDU) used fuel since 1995.
ES-1


Three basic technologies are widely used around the world for dry storage of used
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuels: solid metal casks suitable for transport or
storage; concrete canisters consisting of an outer vertical concrete shield with an inner
steel liner; and concrete modules, consisting of an outer horizontal concrete shield vault
with an inner steel liner.
Long-term management and eventual disposal of used fuel in Canada is the responsibility
of the NWMO.
Refurbishment wastes are conservatively assumed to be stored on-site until the stations
are decommissioned, at which point they will be transported off-site to a suitably licensed
repository. Steam generators may eventually need to be segmented for off-site shipment.
The majority of the decommissioning wastes will be generated at the time the station is
dismantled. It is assumed that on-site storage of these wastes will not be required and
that they will be sent directly to a suitable repository.
Long term site planning for NND will need to consider space for three L&ILW SBs
(4,500 m2), three UFDS buildings (16,000 m2), one UFDS processing building (2,000
m2), one steam generator storage building (4,550 m2), and one refurbishment waste
storage building (3,150 m2). The total area should include a minimum 5 m buffer
between the storage buildings and the waste management facility fence, plus an
additional buffer for security around the UFDS buildings. While there is no reason to
believe that a Safety Assessment could not demonstrate that a location north of the CN
rail line is feasible, the safety assessment used in this TSD assume that any waste
processing or storage building are built south of the CN rail line and no closer than 150 m
to the site perimeter fence. However, for EA planning purposes, this TSD has accepted
this analysis to demonstrate that the UFDS can be located anywhere on the site. Should
the Vendor require the UFDS buildings to be located north of the CN rail line, or any
waste processing or storage building to be located closer than 150 m to the site perimeter
fence, OPG has committed to updating safety assessment for this location as part of the
licensing process.
An EA for the existing DWMF was completed [OPG, 2003] and approved in 2004 for the
construction and operation of the processing building for used fuel. The DWMF has
been in-service since January 2008.
ES-2 Waste Forecasts
Operational Wastes will include both L&ILW and used nuclear fuel.
L&ILW is assumed to be largely similar to wastes from OPG's current reactor fleet, both
in its physical characteristics and in its radiological activity levels. The volumes and
types of L&ILW for each reactor are summarized, both annually and the expected
lifetime arisings for a nominal 60 years operation: for both the ACR-1000 and AP1000
ES-2


designs, the expected lifetime arisings are just below 10,000 m3; for the Areva US EPR
(EPR) design, approximately 13,500 m3 lifetime arisings are expected. An important
new waste stream for the AP1000 and Evolutionary Pressurized Reactor (EPR) is
related to the boric acid system used for reactivity control in light water reactors.
All three reactor technologies under consideration for use at NND use enriched fuel,
although the degree of enrichment varies by reactor type. The dimensions and
configuration of ACR-1000 fuel is quite similar to conventional CANDU fuel. The fuel
used by the AP1000 and EPR are of an entirely different design.
The ACR-1000 is operated with on-power refuelling: fuel bundles are discharged in a
regular stream to the fuel bay and stored in baskets designed to be compatible with the
AECL MACSTOR dry storage system. PWRs are operated in batch cycles of 18 months
to 2 years, after which the reactor is shut down and a portion of the core removed and
replaced with new fuel. The expected used fuel arisings (in tonnes of uranium over the
lifetime) from each of the reactor designs are: ACR-1000, 5,246; AP1000, 1,400; and
EPR, 2,712.
For refurbishment wastes, this study assumes that mid-life refurbishment will be
required. For the ACR-1000, this would consist of replacing the steam generators, fuel
channels, calandria tubes, and feeders. For the AP1000 and EPR, refurbishment would
consist of replacing the steam generators and reactor vessel heads.
ES-3 Waste Management Considerations
ES-3.1
Waste Characteristics
L&ILW from the light water reactors are expected to have much less tritium and C-14
than the current CANDU reactors. Tritium and C-14 from the ACR-1000 are expected to
be comparable to current operations if no tritium removal facility is in operation. An
important new waste stream to Canadian power reactors is related to the boric acid
system used for reactivity control in light water reactors and criticality control in the used
fuel bays.
The fuel from the new-build reactors will have higher enrichment than current CANDU
fuels. This introduces elements of criticality control requirements for storage as well as
potential heat load issues for dry storage and eventual disposal.
The light water reactor fuel assemblies are much larger and heavier than the traditional
CANDU fuel bundle.
The steam generators for the reactor types considered are larger and heavier than those
used in OPGs existing reactor fleet, making procedures surrounding their eventual
replacement more complex. The radioactivity in a steam generator is expected to be
similar for all reactor types.
ES-3

ES-3.2

Processing
There are two processing scenarios being considered for LLW in the NND environmental
assessment: on-site processing, consisting of compaction and storage; and transport to an
off-site facility. On-site processing using compaction will reduce the volume for
eventual off-site transportation but is the not the most effective technique to minimize
overall storage requirements. Off-site processing can further reduce disposal volumes by
the use of more advanced processing technologies at the expense of increased initial
transportation.
Processing of used fuel refers to preparation for dry storage, which is well-developed
both within OPG and internationally. Some modifications to available designs will be
required for all reactor types due to the new fuel dimensions and for the ACR-1000
higher burnup and heat load.
Refurbishment waste may require decontamination and/or size reduction. Apart from the
large size and weight of the objects, no technical issues are expected with processing
refurbishment waste.
ES-3.3
Storage
The storage facilities must be designed to meet the regulatory dose rate limits of an
averaged 0.5 Sv/hr at the facility fence and 1 mSv/yr at the station boundary.
All three reactor types have 10 to 15 years of wet bay storage and assume that older fuel
will be transferred to dry storage as the bay fills up. The timing of dry storage operation
depends on the fuelling cycle. For the purposes of this report, it is assumed that 50% of
the used fuel during the reactor lifetime will require on-site dry storage. After this, it is
assumed that the NWMO will take ownership of the fuel, and that a long term waste
management facility will be in place.
Storage of refurbishment wastes is required for fuel channel components (ACR-1000),
reactor vessel heads (AP1000 and EPR) and steam generators (all reactor types). It is
assumed that refurbishment wastes will be stored on-site in a dedicated storage building.
Fuel channel components and reactor vessel heads will require shielded storage.
Currently, OPG uses shielded containers in storage buildings as the reference concept for
future reactor refurbishments.
ES-3.4
Long-term Management
Operational L&ILW will eventually require transfer to a suitably licensed, long-term

management facility.
Long-term management of refurbishment wastes faces similar issues as operational
L&ILW. The most likely destination for these wastes would be the decommissioning
waste repository due to the similarity to anticipated decommissioning wastes.
ES-4


The responsibility for long-term used fuel management lies with the Nuclear Waste
Management Organization (NWMO). Its Adaptive Phased Management approach has
been approved by the federal government and is now entering the siting phase. The
assumed in-service date of a long-term management facility for used fuel is 2035. Some
preliminary implications of NND on the NWMO have been assessed.
ES-3.5
Off-site Transportation
Future transportation of L&IL radioactive materials for NND to an off-site licensed

facility will be conducted under OPGs Radioactive Material Transportation (RMT)
Program. If additional transportation packages are required for the transport of specific
radioactive wastes from NND, these packages would be designed, certified as necessary,
procured according to OPG's existing processes, and will comply with Canadian
Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations.
The regulatory requirements on the design of transportation packages used to move L&IL
waste between sites, OPGs existing well-developed transportation program, the many
years of experience in transporting radioactive materials, and the training required for
personnel involved with transportation and the Transportation Emergency Response Plan
would ensure that future transportation incidents remain rare.
The bounding scenario for off-site shipment of LLW is the EPR which assumed that all
their generated radioactive waste will be shipped off-site for processing and storage. This
bounding scenario would result in a 38,700 m3 lifetime arising of LLW for the EPRs,
which requires approximately 1,935 truck shipments of 20 m3 each over a 60 year period
of NND, or about two to three truck shipments per month.
For ILW, the lifetime generation from the AP1000 is the bounding quantity of
approximately 688 m3 per reactor. For the four AP1000 reactors, the lifetime volume
generated would also result in two to three truck shipments per month during the
operating period. Note that the peak shipping rates may be higher during outage
campaigns, but the lifetime average shipping rate is still very low.
Other shipments of radioactive materials, contaminated equipment and contaminated
clothing would also periodically occur. An example of this might be the shipment of
tritiated heavy water for off-site upgrading and detritiation.
ES-4 Malfunctions and Accidents
Bounding accidents for the different reactor designs for L&ILW types and used fuel
loading, storage and transfer were identified. The hypothetical public and NEW radiation
doses were calculated for these bounding accidents.
The overall bounding accident is a drop of a PWR dry fuel storage cask containing 40
used fuel assemblies with a 30% failure of the fuel elements. Using a slightly more
ES-5


conservative source term than the vendor supplied information, the hypothetical public
doses to a member of the public are 0.237 mSv (237 Sv) to an adult and 0.240 mSv (240
Sv) to an infant. The corresponding hypothetical radiation dose to a NEW is 33.9 mSv.
The hypothetical radiation doses are below their respective annual radiation dose limits of
1 mSv to a member of the public and 50 mSv to a NEW.
Ensuring criticality safety for dry fuel storage under all credible circumstances will be
achieved as a design requirement for all three reactor types.
ES-6


TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
Introduction...................................................................................................................... 1-1
1.1
Background .......................................................................................................... 1-1
1.1.1 The New Nuclear Darlington Project ................................................... 1-1
1.1.2 The New Nuclear Darlington Environmental Assessment ................... 1-2
1.2
Technical Support Document .............................................................................. 1-2
1.3
Nuclear Waste Management Technical Support Document ................................ 1-3
1.3.1 Storage of NND Operational L&IL Wastes............................................. 1-4
1.3.2 On-site Storage of NND Used Fuel ......................................................... 1-4
1.4
Scope of TSD in relation to Environmental Assessment..................................... 1-4
Waste Management Concepts.......................................................................................... 2-1
2.1
Operational Wastes Low Level Waste.............................................................. 2-1
2.2
Operational Wastes - Intermediate Level Waste ................................................. 2-2
2.3
Used Fuel ............................................................................................................. 2-2
2.3.1 ACR-1000 ................................................................................................ 2-2
2.3.2 AP1000 and EPR ..................................................................................... 2-3
2.3.3 Facility Examples..................................................................................... 2-9
2.3.4 Used Fuel Disposal ................................................................................ 2-13
2.4
Refurbishment Wastes ....................................................................................... 2-15
Waste characteristics and Volume Forecasts................................................................... 3-1
3.1
L&ILW Operational Waste Characteristics......................................................... 3-1
3.2
L&ILW Projected Volumes................................................................................. 3-2
3.3
L&ILW Projected Storage Requirements............................................................ 3-3
3.3.1 LLW Projected Storage Requirement...................................................... 3-3
3.3.2 ILW Projected Storage Requirements ..................................................... 3-4
3.3.3 Overall Storage Building Requirements for L&ILW .............................. 3-5
3.4
Used Fuel ............................................................................................................. 3-5
3.4.1 Used Fuel Characteristics and Volumes .................................................. 3-5
3.4.2 ACR-1000 Bundle Storage System Options............................................ 3-8
3.4.3 Used Fuel Projected Storage Requirements........................................... 3-10
3.5
Refurbishment Wastes ....................................................................................... 3-12
3.6
Summary of Waste Management Needs............................................................ 3-14
Other Waste Management Considerations....................................................................... 4-1
4.1
Processing ............................................................................................................ 4-1
4.1.1 Operational L&ILW................................................................................. 4-1
4.1.2 Used Fuel ................................................................................................. 4-1
4.1.3 Refurbishment Wastes ............................................................................. 4-2
4.2
Operational Points................................................................................................ 4-2
4.2.1 Station Storage Provisions ....................................................................... 4-2
4.2.2 Used Fuel Management ........................................................................... 4-2
4.3
Long-Term Waste Management .......................................................................... 4-3
4.3.1 Operational L&ILW................................................................................. 4-3
4.3.2 Used Fuel ................................................................................................. 4-4
4.4
Off-Site Transportation and Accidents ................................................................ 4-5
i

5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0

4.4.1 Overview of Current Radioactive Material Transportation Program ...... 4-5

4.4.2 Transportation of L&IL Radioactive Waste to an Off-site Licensed
Facility ..................................................................................................... 4-6
4.4.3 Transportation Package Requirements for Transportation of L&IL
Waste........................................................................................................ 4-7
4.4.4 Shipments to an Off-site Licensed Facility.............................................. 4-9
4.4.5 Transportation Emergency Response Plan .............................................. 4-9
4.4.6 Transportation Summary ....................................................................... 4-10
Normal Operations........................................................................................................... 5-1
5.1
Used Fuel Operations Radiological Impacts..................................................... 5-1
5.1.1 Introduction.............................................................................................. 5-1
5.1.2 ACR-1000 Normal Operation.................................................................. 5-1
5.1.3 EPR Normal Operation ............................................................................ 5-3
5.1.4 AP1000 Normal Operation ...................................................................... 5-4
5.2
Routine Radiological Emissions from Radioactive Waste Processing................ 5-5
5.3
Conventional Emissions....................................................................................... 5-6
5.4
Impact on the Environment.................................................................................. 5-7
Radiological Impact of Malfunctions and Accidents....................................................... 6-1
6.1
Approach to Identifying Malfunctions and Accidents......................................... 6-1
6.2
Assessment Methodology .................................................................................... 6-1
6.3
L&ILW - Malfunctions and Accidents ................................................................ 6-3
6.3.1 Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for L&ILW ........................... 6-3
6.3.2 Bounding Case for Low Level Waste Pool Fire Beside Stacked
Waste Containers ..................................................................................... 6-3
6.3.3 Bounding Case for Intermediate Level Waste - Pool Fire Involving
Resin Liner............................................................................................... 6-8
6.4
Refurbishment Waste Storage and Handling....................................................... 6-8
6.4.1 Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for Refurbishment Waste...... 6-8
6.4.2 Bounding Case - Drop of a Retube Waste Container ............................ 6-12
6.4.3 Bounding Case - Drop of a Steam Generator ........................................ 6-12
6.5
Used Fuel Dry Storage Assessment of Bounding Accident ........................... 6-12
6.6
ACR-1000 Malfunctions and Accidents During Dry Storage of Used Fuel ..... 6-13
6.6.1 Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for ACR-1000..................... 6-13
6.6.2 ACR-1000 Assessment of Bounding Accident................................... 6-14
6.6.3 Criticality Assessment for ACR-1000 ................................................... 6-14
6.7
EPR Malfunctions and Accidents During Dry Storage of Used Fuel................ 6-20
6.7.1 Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for EPR ............................... 6-20
6.7.2 EPR Assessment of Bounding Accident............................................. 6-24
6.7.3 Criticality Assessment for EPR ............................................................. 6-24
6.8
AP1000 Malfunctions and Accidents During Dry Storage of Used Fuel.......... 6-25
6.8.1 Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for AP1000 ......................... 6-25
6.8.2 AP1000 Assessment of Bounding Accident ....................................... 6-29
6.8.3 Criticality Assessment for AP1000........................................................ 6-29
Summary .......................................................................................................................... 7-1
References........................................................................................................................ 8-1
ii


LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A: Operational Waste Details................................................................................... A8-1
Appendix B: Refurbishment Waste Details................................................................................ B-1
Appendix C: New Nuclear - Darlington - Basis for EA ............................................................. C-1
iii


LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1-1: Typical Storage Building ...................................................................................... 2-1
Figure 2.3-1: Typical MACSTOR 200 Modules at Gentilly-2................................................... 2-4
Figure 2.3-2: MACSTOR 200 Module Cross-section ................................................................ 2-4
Figure 2.3-3: OPG Dry Storage Container ................................................................................. 2-5
Figure 2.3-4: Typical Metal Cask Container for PWR Fuel....................................................... 2-6
Figure 2.3-5: Concrete Canister for PWR Fuel .......................................................................... 2-8
Figure 2.3-6: NUHOMS Concrete Module for PWR Fuel ......................................................... 2-9
Figure 2.3-7: ZWILAG Interim Storage for Used Fuel............................................................ 2-10
Figure 2.3-8: Lingen Interim Storage for Used Fuel ................................................................ 2-11
Figure 2.3-9: Typical US Concrete Cask Storage..................................................................... 2-11
Figure 2.3-10: Typical US NUHOMS Concrete Vault Storage ............................................... 2-12
Figure 2.3-11: Typical US Metal Cask Storage........................................................................ 2-12
Figure 2.3-12: Typical On-Site Metal Cask Transporter .......................................................... 2-13
Figure 2.3-13: Swedish Used Fuel Disposal System ................................................................ 2-14
Figure 2.4-1: Conceptual ACR-1000 Steam Generator Storage............................................... 2-16
Figure 2.4-2: Conceptual ACR-1000 Fuel Channel Waste Storage ......................................... 2-17
Figure 2.4-3: Bruce A Steam Generator Storage at WWMF.................................................... 2-18
Figure 2.4-4: Palo Verde Steam Generator Storage.................................................................. 2-18
Figure 2.4-5: RWC Storage at WWMF .................................................................................... 2-19
Figure 3.4-1: EPR Fuel ............................................................................................................... 3-6
Figure 3.4-2: ACR-1000 Fuel ..................................................................................................... 3-8
Figure 3.4-3: ACR-1000 Fuel Storage Basket............................................................................ 3-8
Figure 3.4-4: ACR-1000 Fuel Basket Stacking Frame............................................................... 3-9
Figure 3.4-5: 60-Bundle MACSTOR Fuel Basket ................................................................... 3-10
Figure 3.5-1: ACR-1000 Fuel Channel..................................................................................... 3-15
Figure 3.5-2: ACR-1000 Steam Generator ............................................................................... 3-16
Figure 3.5-3: AP1000 Reactor Vessel ...................................................................................... 3-17
Figure 3.5-4: AP1000 Steam Generator.................................................................................... 3-18
Figure 3.5-5: EPR Reactor Vessel ............................................................................................ 3-19
Figure 3.5-6: EPR Steam Generator ......................................................................................... 3-20
iv


LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.3-1: Examples of Metallic PWR Dry Storage Casks..................................................... 2-7
Table 3.1-1: Summary of Operational L&ILW Characteristics ................................................. 3-1
Table 3.2-1: Summary of L&ILW Annual Arisings................................................................... 3-2
Table 3.2-2: Summary of L&ILW Lifetime Arisings................................................................. 3-3
Table 3.3-1: Summary of Storage Requirements for Operational LLW .................................... 3-4
Table 3.3-2: Summary of Storage Requirements for Operational ILW...................................... 3-4
Table 3.3-3: On-Site L&ILW Storage Building Expansions...................................................... 3-5
Table 3.4-1: Summary of Fuel Characteristics and Arisings...................................................... 3-7
Table 3.4-4: Summary of Dry Storage Space Requirements.................................................... 3-11
Table 3.4-5: On-Site Used Fuel Storage Building Expansions................................................. 3-11
Table 3.5-1: On-Site Refurbishment Waste Storage................................................................. 3-13
Table 5.1-1: Properties of 10 Year Cooled ACR-1000 Fuel ...................................................... 5-1
Table 5.1-2: Properties of 10 Year Cooled EPR Fuel................................................................. 5-3
Table 6.3-1: Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for L&IL Waste................................... 6-5
Table 6.4-1: Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for Refurbishment Waste .................... 6-9
Table 6.6-1: Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for ACR-1000 ................................... 6-15
Table 6.7-1: Properties of 10 Year Cooled EPR Fuel............................................................... 6-20
Table 6.7-2: Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for EPR.............................................. 6-21
Table 6.8-1: Properties of 10 Year Cooled AP1000 Fuel......................................................... 6-25
Table 6.8-2: Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for AP1000........................................ 6-26
Table A-1: Summary of Average L&ILW Specific Activity .................................................... A-1
Table A-2: Typical EPR L&ILW Source Term Details ............................................................ A-2
Table A-3: Details of Processed L&ILW Volumes................................................................... A-3
Table A-4: Annual Waste Forecasts .......................................................................................... A-4
Table B-1: Summary of Darlington Fuel Channel Component Specific Activity..................... B-1
Table B-2: Summary of Steam Generator Activity ................................................................... B-2
Table C-1: New Nuclear Darlington Basis for EA .............................................................. C-1


SPECIAL TERMS
Units
Bq
C
GBq
kg
km
m
mm
mSv
MW
m2
m3
Sv
TBq
Tonne
Sv
becquerel
Celsius
gigabecquerel
kilogram
kilometre
metre
millimetre
millisievert
megawatt
square meter
cubic meter
sievert
terabecquerel
a unit of weight equivalent to 1000 kilograms
microsievert
Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACR-1000
AECL
ALARA
AP1000
APM
CANDU
CEAA
CNSC
DFO
DGR
DN
DNGS
DWMF
DSC
EA
EF
EIS
EPR
IAEA
IC
ILW
JRP
L&ILW
LLW
Advanced CANDU 1000, reactor design by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
Advance Passive (AP1000) Reactor design offered by Westinghouse
Adaptive Phase Management
Canada Deuterium Uranium (trademark of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited)
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Department of Fisheries and Ocean
Deep Geologic Repository
Darlington Nuclear
Darlington Nuclear Generating Station
Darlington Waste Management Facility
OPGs Dry Storage Container
End Fittings
Environmental Impact Statement
Areva US EPR
International Atomic Energy Agency
In-ground Container. Current design size is 18 m3, the IC-18.
Intermediate-Level Waste
Joint Review Panel
Low and Intermediate Level Waste
Low-Level Waste
vi

LVRF
MACSTOR
NBC
NEW
NFC
NND
NU
NWMD
NWMO
OD
OL
OPEX
OPG
PNGS
PPE
PT
PWR
PWMF
RWC
RWS
SB
SG
TSD
UFDS
US DOE
WWMF

Low Void Reactivity Fuel

Modular Air Cooled Used fuel storage system offered by AECL
National Building Code of Canada
Nuclear Energy Worker
National Fire Code of Canada
Natural Uranium
Nuclear Waste Management Division
Nuclear Waste Management Organization
Outer Diameter
Overall Length
Operating Experience
Pickering Nuclear Generating Station
Plant Parameter Envelope
Pressure Tube
Pressurized Water Reactor
Pickering Waste Management Facility
Retube Waste Container
Refurbishment Waste Storage
Storage Building
Steam Generator
Used Fuel Dry Storage
U.S. Department of Energy
Western Waste Management Facility
Glossary of Terms
Term
ALARA
Becquerel
Darlington Waste
Management Facility
(DWMF)
Dry Storage
Definition
A principle in radiation protection according to which
radiation exposures are kept as far below the regulatory
limits as reasonable, taking into account social and
economic factors. These factors could include, for
example, the financial impact of protection measures as
balanced against the benefit obtained.
The standard international unit of radioactivity equal to
one radioactive disintegration per second.
The DWMF provides dry fuel storage for the Darlington
reactors.
Placement of used fuel in an engineered, dry environment
for storage, such as in concrete dry storage containers.
Fuel is cooled for at least 10 years in the Irradiated Fuel
Bay before transfer to dry storage.
vii


Term
In-Ground Storage
Definition
Storage of radioactive waste in in-ground storage
containers (ICs) generally used for intermediate-level
waste. All ICs with the exception of those used for heat
exchangers consist of steel liners fixed with concrete
inside boreholes in the ground.
Irradiated Fuel Bay
Water-filled pool-type storage (also called wet bay, or
wet storage), located at reactor sites, in which used
nuclear fuel is stored, cooled and shielded.
Intermediate Level Waste
Consists mostly of used reactor components, as well as the
resins and filters used to keep reactor water systems clean.
These items, which cannot be handled without shielding,
are stored in steel-lined in-ground storage structures.
Low-Level Storage Building A storage building manufactured from prefabricated, prestressed concrete, used for low-level waste. Processed and
non-processed wastes are stored in a variety of stackable
metal containers.
Low Level Waste
Consists of minimally radioactive materials such as mopheads, rags, paper towels, floor sweepings and protective
clothing used in the nuclear stations during routine
operation and maintenance. This waste does not require
shielding and, after any processing, is stored in Low Level
Storage Buildings.
Nuclear Energy Worker
A worker who might receive as a result of their work or
occupation a radiation dose greater than the dose limit for
the general public.
Nuclear Waste Management The NWMO was established in 2002 by Ontario Power
Organization (NWMO)
Generation Inc., Hydro-Qubec and New Brunswick
Power Corporation. This organization was formed to
assume responsibility for the long-term management of
Canadas used nuclear fuel. The NWMO operates in
accordance with the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act.
Pickering Waste
The PWMF provides dry fuel storage for the Pickering
Management Facility
reactors.
(PWMF)
Refurbishment Waste
Radioactive waste produced from the refurbishment and
life extension of reactors including retubing (fuel channel
replacement); steam generator replacement (large heavy
object wastes, i.e. steam generators); and/or feeder pipe
replacement.
Repository
Facility for the long-term management of waste materials.
Sievert
A measurement unit of radiation dose. Frequently
expressed as millisievert (mSv), equal to one-thousandth
of a sievert, or as a microsievert (PSv), equal to onemillionth of a sievert.
viii

Term
Storage
Tritiated Heavy Water

Used Fuel
Waste Management
Western Waste
Management Facility
(WWMF)

Definition
The placement of waste in a nuclear facility where
isolation, environmental protection and human control,
i.e., monitoring, are provided with the intent that the waste
will be retrieved for processing and/or transfer to a longterm repository at a later time.
Results from the substitution of deuterium in heavy water
(D2O) with tritium.
When a fuel bundle no longer contains enough fissionable
uranium to heat water efficiently, the fuel is considered
used and is then replaced by a new fuel bundle. The
used fuel contains more than 99% of the radioactive byproducts of nuclear reactors.
All activities, administrative and operational, that are
involved in the handling, pre-treatment, treatment,
conditioning, transportation, storage and long-term
management of waste from a nuclear facility.
The WWMF is a centralized processing and storage
facility for OPGs low and intermediate- level radioactive
wastes, and dry storage for used fuel from the Bruce
nuclear generating stations.
ix


LIST OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENTS (TSDs)

Atmospheric Environment Existing Environmental Conditions TSD SENES Consultants Limited
Atmospheric Environment Assessment of Environmental Effects TSD SENES Consultants Limited
Surface Water Environment Existing Environmental Conditions TSD Golder Associates Limited
Surface Water Environment Assessment of Environmental Effects TSD Golder Associates Limited
Aquatic Environment Existing Environmental Conditions TSD SENES Consultants Limited and Golder
Associates Limited
Aquatic Environment Assessment of Environmental Effects TSD - SENES Consultants Limited and Golder
Associates Limited
Terrestrial Environment Existing Environmental Conditions TSD Beacon Environmental
Terrestrial Environment Assessment of Environmental Effects TSD Beacon Environmental
Geological and Hydrogeological Environment Existing Environmental Conditions TSD CH2M HILL Canada
Limited and Kinectrics Incorporated
Geological and Hydrogeological Environment Assessment of Environmental Effects TSD CH2M HILL Canada
Limited
Land Use Existing Environmental Conditions TSD MMM Group Limited
Land Use Assessment of Environmental Effects TSD MMM Group Limited
Traffic and Transportation Existing Environmental Conditions TSD MMM Group Limited
Traffic and Transportation Assessment of Environmental Effects TSD MMM Group Limited
Radiation and Radioactivity Environment Existing Environmental Conditions TSD AMEC NSS
Radiation and Radioactivity Environment Assessment of Environmental Effects TSD SENES Consultants Limited
and AMEC NSS
Socio-Economic Environment Existing Environmental Conditions TSD - AECOM
Socio-Economic Environment Assessment of Environmental Effects TSD - AECOM
Physical and Cultural Heritage Resources Existing Environmental Conditions TSD Archaeological Services
Incorporated
Physical and Cultural Heritage Resources Assessment of Environmental Effects TSD Archaeological Services
Incorporated
Ecological Risk Assessment and Assessment of Effects on Non-Human Biota TSD SENES Consultants Limited
Scope of Project for EA Purposes TSD SENES Consultants Limited
Emergency Planning and Preparedness TSD SENES Consultants Limited and KLD Associates Incorporated
Communications and Consultation TSD Ontario Power Generation Incorporated
Aboriginal Interests TSD Ontario Power Generation Incorporated
Human Health TSD SENES Consultants Limited
Malfunctions, Accidents and Malevolent Acts TSD SENES Consultants Limited
Nuclear Waste Management TSD Ontario Power Generation Incorporated

1.0
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Background

Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG) was directed by the Ontario Minister of Energy in June
2006 to begin the federal approvals process, including an environmental assessment (EA), for
new nuclear units at an existing site. OPG initiated this process and in September 2006
submitted an application for a Licence to Prepare Site to the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC) for a new nuclear power generating station at the Darlington Nuclear site
(DN site), located in the Municipality of Clarington on the north shore of Lake Ontario in the
Region of Durham. The DN site is currently home to the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station
(DNGS), a 4-unit plant, the first unit of which was commissioned by OPG in 1990. It remains
under OPGs ownership and operational control.
Before any licensing decision can be made concerning the new nuclear generating station, an EA
must be performed to meet the requirements of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
(CEAA) and be documented in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). An EIS is a document
that allows a Joint Review Panel, regulators, members of the public and Aboriginal groups to
understand the Project, the existing environment and the potential environmental effects of the
Project. Guidelines for the preparation of the EIS were prepared by the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Agency (the CEA Agency) and the CNSC (in consultation with Department of
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), the Canadian Transportation Agency and Transport
Canada). The Guidelines require that the proponent prepare the EIS and support it with detailed
technical information which can be provided in separate volumes. Accordingly, OPG has
conducted technical studies that will serve as the basis for the EIS. These technical studies are
documented in Technical Support Documents (see Section 1.2 below). The basis for the NND
project is included in Appendix C.
1.1.1
The New Nuclear Darlington Project
New Nuclear Darlington (NND), a new generating station, is proposed to be located primarily
on the easterly one-third (approximately) of the DN site, with reactor buildings and other related
structures located south of the CN rail line. The proposed New Nuclear Darlington Project
involves the construction and operation of up to four nuclear reactor units supplying up to 4,800
MW of electrical capacity to meet the base load electrical requirements of Ontario. The
proposed Project will include:
x
x
x
x
x
Preparation of the DN site for construction of the new nuclear facility;

Construction of the NND nuclear reactors and associated facilities;
Construction of the appropriate nuclear waste management facilities for storage and
volume reduction of waste;
Operation and maintenance of the NND nuclear reactors and associated facilities for
approximately 60 years of power production (i.e, for each reactor);
Operation of the appropriate nuclear waste management facilities; and
1-1


Development planning for decommissioning of the nuclear reactors and associated

facilities, and eventual turn-over of the site to other uses.
For EA planning purposes, the following temporal framework has been adopted for the Project:
Project Phase
Site Preparation and Construction
Operation and Maintenance
Decommissioning and Abandonment
1.1.2
Start
2010
2016
2100
Finish
2025
2100
2150
The New Nuclear Darlington Environmental Assessment
The EA considers the three phases of the NND Project (i.e., Site Preparation and Construction,
Operation and Maintenance, and Decommissioning and Abandonment) extending over
approximately 140 years. In doing so, it addresses:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
1.2
The need for, and purpose of the Project;

Alternatives to the Project;
Alternative means of carrying out the Project that are technically and economically
feasible, and the environmental effects of such alternatives;
The environmental effects of the Project including malfunctions, accidents and
malevolent acts, and any cumulative effects that are likely to result from the Project in
combination with other projects or activities that may be carried out;
Measures to mitigate significant adverse environmental effects that are technically and
economically feasible;
The significance of residual (after mitigation) adverse environmental effects;
Measures to enhance any beneficial environmental effects;
The capacity of renewable resources that are likely to be significantly affected by the
project, to meet the needs of the present and the future;
The requirements of a follow-up program in respect of the Project;
Consideration of community knowledge and Aboriginal traditional knowledge; and
Comments that are received during the EA.
The EA studies were carried out and are documented within a framework of individual aspects or
components of the environment. The environmental components are:
1-2

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Atmospheric Environment;
Surface Water Environment;
Aquatic Environment;
Terrestrial Environment;
Geological and Hydrogeological Environment;
Land Use;
Traffic and Transportation;
Radiation and Radioactivity Environment;
Socio-Economic Environment;
Physical and Cultural Heritage Resources;
Aboriginal Interests;
Health - Human; and
Health Non-Human Biota (Ecological Risk Assessment).
Other EA-related studies addressed subjects not associated with a specific environmental
component, however, were necessary to support the EA program. These included:
x
x
x
x
x
Scope of the Project for EA Purposes;

Emergency Planning and Preparedness;
Communications and Consultation;
Malfunctions, Accidents and Malevolent Acts; and
Nuclear Waste Management.
The various EA studies are documented in individual Technical Support Documents (TSDs). In
most cases where the TSDs relate to environmental components, separate documents were
prepared to describe: i) existing environmental conditions; and ii) likely environmental effects.
In other cases, the subject of the study is included in a single TSD.
This TSD relates to Nuclear Waste Management. It has been prepared by the Nuclear Waste
Management Division of OPG.
1.3
Nuclear Waste Management Technical Support Document
This Technical Support Document (TSD) describes available radioactive waste system and
assesses the radiological effects of the Project due to the management of solid radioactive wastes
on members of the public and on Nuclear Energy Workers (NEWs). This TSD also describes the
malfunction and accident scenarios related to used fuel, and low and intermediate level waste,
and identifies and further assesses the bounding scenario for each.
It has been prepared in support of the EA by the Nuclear Waste Management Division of OPG,
which carries responsibility for the Nuclear Waste Management System for NND. This TSD is
one of a series of related documents describing different aspects of the overall effects
assessment, one for each environmental component.
1-3

1.3.1

Storage of NND Operational L&IL Wastes
The radioactive low and intermediate level waste (L&ILW) produced during the day-to-day
operation and maintenance of the reactors will be handled in a manner that attempts to minimize
the volume produced. Typical examples of L&ILW include ion exchange resins, filters, rags,
mops, floor sweepings, tools and clothing that have become contaminated as part of operation
and maintenance activities. L&ILW will be managed in a similar manner regardless of the
reactor design selected.
For EA purposes, two alternative means of managing L&ILW are proposed: the L&ILW will be
managed on-site with an expansion of the existing Darlington Waste Management Facility
(DWMF); or transported off-site to be managed at an appropriately licensed facility. The
specific types, volumes and characteristics of L&ILW produced during the life of the facility will
be described for each reactor class.
1.3.2
On-site Storage of NND Used Fuel
On-site wet storage of used fuel will be part of each of the reactor designs considered. For each
reactor design, the facility will provide transfer systems that carry the used fuel from the reactor
to an irradiated fuel bay in which the used fuel is stored and cooled. The used fuel will be stored
in an irradiated fuel bay until it has cooled sufficiently for dry storage.
The NND Project proposes on-site storage through expansion of the DWMF. For EA planning
purposes, the volumes and characteristics of used fuel waste arising from the operation of each
reactor will vary depending on the reactor technology.
For EA planning purposes, it is also assumed that the used fuel will continue to be stored on-site
until the federally mandated Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) takes
responsibility for the long-term management of the used fuel as directed by the federal
government. The site study, construction, and operation of this long-term used fuel management
facility will be the subject of its own separate environmental assessment process.
1.4
Scope of TSD in relation to Environmental Assessment
At the time of completing this TSD, three vendors were being considered by the Province of
Ontario for supplying and installing the reactors and associated equipment for the Project.
Accordingly, the specific reactor to be constructed and operated had not yet been determined.
Therefore, for purposes of the EA, the Project was defined in a manner that effectively
incorporated the salient aspects of all of the considered reactors. Similarly, the existing
environmental conditions and the likely environmental effects of the Project were also
determined in a manner that considered the range of reactor types and number of units that may
comprise the Project.
The essential aspect of the method adopted for defining the Project for EA Purposes is the use
of a bounding framework that brackets the variables to be assessed. This bounding framework is
defined within a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE). The PPE is a set of design parameters that
1-4


delimit key features of the Project. The bounding nature of the PPE allows for appropriate
identification of a range of variables within a project for the purpose of the environmental
assessment while also recognizing the unique features of each design. For further information
concerning the use of the PPE for this EA, the reader is directed to Section 2.1 of the EIS.
The information presented in this TSD is deemed to be appropriately bounding so as to facilitate
the assessment of environmental effects that may be associated with any of the considered
reactors. As both the EA studies and the vendor selection programs continue, it may be that
aspects of this TSD are updated to respond to these evolving programs, in which case the
updated information will be presented in an addendum to this TSD or in the EIS. The EIS itself
will remain subject to edits until it has been accepted by the Joint Review Panel (JRP) as suitable
for the basis of the public hearing that will be convened to consider the Project.
This TSD is a document prepared in support of the EIS. Where there may be differences in the
information presented in the two documents, the EIS will take precedence for the reasons noted
above.
1-5

2.0

WASTE MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS
The following sections present information on potential management options for the various
waste types. The range of options is intended to provide bounding conditions for the
environmental assessment and licensing. No decision has been taken at this time on which
options will be used in practice.
The storage facilities must be designed to meet the regulatory dose rate limits of an averaged
0.5 Sv/hr at the facility fence and 1 mSv/yr at the station boundary.
2.1
Operational Wastes Low Level Waste
The EA will consider two options for the storage of low-level waste (LLW):
a) On-site: consisting of compaction of a portion of the LLW, combined with appropriate
packaging and interim storage in a modular storage building on the Darlington site.
Eventually, the waste would be transported to an appropriate facility off-site for longterm management.
b) Off-site: consisting of transporting the un-processed LLW to an appropriately licensed
facility, such as the Western Waste Management Facility (WWMF), for processing,
packaging and storage. Processing would consist of incineration and/or compaction of
appropriate portions of the LLW. Eventually, the waste would be transported or
transferred to an appropriate facility for long-term management.
In either option, interim storage is assumed to be in standard storage buildings (SBs), with a
nominal capacity of 7,000 m3 each, as shown in Figure 2.1-1.
FIGURE 2.1-1: TYPICAL STORAGE BUILDING
2-1


Waste processing in option (a) would consist of low-force compaction of the incinerable and
compactable portions of the LLW with a box compactor, similar to the one currently used at the
WWMF, with an average volume reduction of 4:1. The wastes are packaged into 2.5 m3 steel
boxes. Non-processible wastes would be packaged into steel containers, similar to the ones
currently used at the WWMF, with an average volume increase of 25% due to the void spaces
and other container stacking inefficiencies. Any miscellaneous radioactive liquid wastes would
either be solidified or processed (typically by incineration) at a suitably licensed off-site facility.
Only a small processing area is required for compaction of waste and the location of the
compactor would be determined later. The compactor could be located within the new
powerhouse, within the dry fuel processing building, or if required, a small area for compaction
could be set up inside the first storage building. Any location must ensure that the compactor
exhaust is both filtered and goes past a monitoring point before discharge.
Waste processing in option (b) would consist of incineration and/or compaction, with an average
volume reduction of 40:1 for incinerable wastes and 4:1 for compactable wastes. Nonprocessible wastes would be packaged with an average volume increase of 25%, as per above.
2.2
Operational Wastes - Intermediate Level Waste
As with the LLW, two options are being considered for ILW:
a) On-site: consisting of self-shielded packaging and interim storage in a modular storage
building on the Darlington site. Eventually, the waste would be transported to an
appropriate facility off-site for long-term management.
b) Off-site: consisting of shielded transportation to an appropriately licensed off-site facility,
such as the WWMF, for storage. Eventually, the waste would be transported or
transferred to an appropriate facility for long-term management. Storage could either be
in above ground facilities using shielded packages, or in in-ground facilities (such as InGround Containers (IC) such as the IC-18) using un-shielded packages within a shielded
shipping flasks.
On-site storage facilities might consist of a shared storage building between LLW and
intermediate-level waste (ILW), with a segregated area for the ILW. ILW waste might also be in
a smaller separate building. Above-ground storage of ILW with LLW would require that all
waste be in container and there be supplementary fire protection/fire detection features.
2.3
Used Fuel
2.3.1
ACR-1000
There are two potential systems for the dry storage of ACR-1000 used fuel:
a) AECL MACSTOR: (Modular Air-Cooled STORage) consisting of above-ground, air
cooled storage modules, with the fuel placed into unshielded canisters and transferred
2-2


from the reactor to the storage facility in a reusable shielding cask. This is similar to
systems that AECL has deployed at Gentilly 2, Korea, and Romania.
b) OPG shielded dry storage container: a free-standing reinforced concrete container, with
an inner steel liner and an outer steel shell, which can hold up to 384 fuel bundles. The
dry storage containers would be stored in a warehouse-type building, similar to the
current operations at DWMF, PWMF and WWMF.
The AECL MACSTOR system is the standard dry storage system offered by AECL for the
ACR-1000 and uses a 60 bundle storage basket. It is available in several configurations: the
MACSTOR 200, shown in Figures 2.3-1 and 2.3-2, holds 200 baskets per module for a total of
12,000 bundles per module. The newer MACSTOR/KN 400 holds 400 baskets per module for a
total of 24,000 bundles per module.
Loaded fuel casks are hoisted to the top of the structure by the traveling bridge crane, and the
module is then lowered into the storage cell. The concrete storage cells provide shielding and
convective air cooling.
OPGs DSC system for used CANDU fuel is a proven system in use since 1995 at Pickering and
more recently at Western and Darlington Waste Management Facilities. The DSCs are
engineered to have a life of 50 years but with monitoring and maintenance that they receive, it is
likely that they will last long. As shown in Figure 2.3-3, the DSC will hold 384 fuel bundles in 4
standard OPG type fuel modules.
A loaded DSC weighs some 75 tonnes. It is loaded while submerged in the fuel bay.
Prior to transferring fuel to a DSC, the fuel must be loaded into modules, if it is not already
stored in that configuration. The loaded module is then placed in the DSC. After seal welding
the DSC, it is transferred to a storage building, which is designed to hold a nominal 500 DSCs.
2.3.2
AP1000 and EPR
The used fuels from the Westinghouse AP1000 and Areva US EPR (EPR) are very similar to
each other both physically and radiologically. Several basic technologies are in wide use around
the world for dry storage of PWR fuels. They are all licensed for this purpose in a number of
jurisdictions.
a) Metal casks: Consisting of solid metal casks suitable for transport or storage. The casks
typically hold 24 to 40 PWR fuel assemblies. The casks may be stored either indoors
(common in Europe) or outdoors on a simple concrete pad (common in the US). For the
purposes of this report, a standard cask size of 32 fuel assemblies has been assumed as a
reasonable average to calculate storage space requirements. An example of this would be
the Transnuclear TN 32 cask. It is also assumed that the casks would be stored inside a
building, similar to the European practice. The casks are typically loaded in the fuel bay
or through a docking port with the fuel handling system. Lids are typically bolted in
2-3


FIGURE 2.3-1: TYPICAL MACSTOR 200 MODULES AT GENTILLY-2
FIGURE 2.3-2: MACSTOR 200 MODULE CROSS-SECTION
2-4


FIGURE 2.3-3: OPG DRY STORAGE CONTAINER
2-5


FIGURE 2.3-4: TYPICAL METAL CASK CONTAINER FOR PWR FUEL
(Dimensions are in mm)
2-6


place. A typical metal cask is shown in Figure 2.3-4, including the impact limiters for
transportation. Examples of some available PWR casks are given in Table 2.3-1. (Note
that these cask designs are based on current generation PWR fuel lengths (~4.1 m Overall
Length (OL)).Versions for the new longer fuels used in the AP1000 and EPR (~4.8 m
OL) are currently under development by several of the vendors).
b) Concrete canister: Consisting of an outer vertical concrete shield, with an inner steel
liner. The steel liner is loaded in the fuel bay, and then transferred to the canister in a reusable shielding cask. The canister is generally located outdoors, on a concrete pad and
is not moved. The inner steel liner typically has a welded closure. The concrete shield
has integral air channels for convective cooling. An example of this is the BNFL/Sierra
VSC-24, which holds 24 PWR fuel assemblies, shown in Figure 2.3-5.
c) Concrete module: Consisting of an outer horizontal concrete shield vault, with an inner
steel liner. The steel liner is loaded in the fuel bay, and then transferred to the canister in
a re-usable shielding cask. The canister is generally located outdoors, on a concrete pad
and is not moved. The inner steel liner typically has a welded closure. The concrete
shield is typically pre-fabricated off-site for easy installation and has integral air channels
for convective cooling. The modules are ganged together to improve the shielding
efficiency. An example of this is the NUHOMS 32, which holds 32 PWR fuel
assemblies per liner, one liner per shield vault, shown in Figure 2.3-6.
d) Modular Vault: Other vault storage systems are also used, such as the MVDS (modular
vault dry storage system), which consists of a large shielded building with individual infloor tubes for fuel storage. The tubes are surrounded by a passive convective cooling
system. The system is capital intensive, and despite its name, is less modular than the
three main systems described above.
Forecasted expansion dates for dry storage are summarized in Table 2.3-1. Further details on the
forecasts can be found in Appendix A.
TABLE 2.3-1: EXAMPLES OF METALLIC PWR DRY STORAGE CASKS
CASK
Castor V/21A
Castor X33F
NAC 128 S/T
Transnuclear TN24
Transnuclear TN32
Transnuclear TN40
CAPACITY
(# PWR FUEL
ASSEMBLIES)
24
33
28
24
32
40
MAXIMUM
HEAT
LOAD
(KW)
34
16.6
17.4
24
32.7
27
2-7
AVERAGE FUEL
BURNUP LIMIT
(GW D/ TONNE
U)
60
60
35
35
40
45
GROSS
MASS
LOADED
(TONNE)
108
96
94
95
105
103
DIMENSIONS (M)
2.4 m OD x 4.9 m OL
2.4 m OD x 4.8 m OL
2.4 m OD x 4.6 m OL
2.3 m OD x 5.1 m OL
2.5 m OD x 5.1 m OL
2.5 m OD x 5.1 m OL


FIGURE 2.3-5: CONCRETE CANISTER FOR PWR FUEL
2-8


FIGURE 2.3-6: NUHOMS CONCRETE MODULE FOR PWR FUEL
2.3.3
Facility Examples
Examples of some existing facilities for the dry storage of PWR fuel are described below.
2.3.3.1
ZWILAG
The ZWILAG facility is located in Switzerland. It is a centralized facility for the processing and
storage of wastes from the countrys nuclear power plants, including used fuel. The used fuel is
stored in containers within a storage building, shown in Figure 2.3-7, measuring 68 m long x 41
m wide x 18 m high. When fully occupied, this hall can store around 200 containers standing on
end. Containers are handled by an overhead crane. The containers are transported horizontally
by rail or road and are rotated to the vertical as they are off-loaded for storage.
2-9


FIGURE 2.3-7: ZWILAG INTERIM STORAGE FOR USED FUEL
2.3.3.2
Lingen
The Lingen facility is located in Emsland, Germany. It is a power plant facility for the storage of
used fuel originating from that power plant (1300 MW PWR). The storage building hall, shown
in 2.3-8, is designed for 130 containers. Containers are handled by an overhead crane. The
containers are transported horizontally by rail or road and are rotated to the vertical as they are
off-loaded for storage. The building includes forced ventilation and passive convective cooling.
2.3.3.3
Other Facilities
Used fuel dry storage facilities in the United States (US) are typically constructed in the form of
an outdoor concrete storage pad. The pad is surrounded with a security fence, and may also be
surrounded by an earthen berm for shielding and/or visual screen purposes. There are currently
approximately 30 used fuel dry storage facilities in the US, with the oldest ones dating back to
the 1980s. Many of them store several different cask designs (e.g. purchased from different
vendors, or upgraded to newer models of casks as designs have evolved). Typical installations
and a transporter are shown below in Figures 2.3-9 through 2.3-12.
2-10


FIGURE 2.3-8: LINGEN INTERIM STORAGE FOR USED FUEL
FIGURE 2.3-9: TYPICAL US CONCRETE CASK STORAGE
2-11


FIGURE 2.3-10: TYPICAL US NUHOMS CONCRETE VAULT STORAGE
FIGURE 2.3-11: TYPICAL US METAL CASK STORAGE
2-12


FIGURE 2.3-12: TYPICAL ON-SITE METAL CASK TRANSPORTER
2.3.4
Used Fuel Disposal
Long-term management and eventual disposal of used fuel in Canada is the responsibility of the
Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO). While their program is based primarily on
CANDU fuels, they have the mandate to manage all used fuel in Canada. The disposal portion
of the NWMO Adaptive Phased Management plan is similar to those developed in other
countries PWR reactor fuel, such as Sweden (shown in Figure 2.3-13). The primary difference
with the NWMO concept is in the detailed design of the disposal canister (to accommodate the
physical dimensions of the PWR fuel) and the spacing of the canisters (to accommodate the
higher expected heat load from the enriched fuels).
The other factor to consider for new-build reactors is the timing of the disposal operation. The
new reactors will be in operation until 2100, long past the shutdown dates of the existing fleet.
Therefore, long-term used fuel management must be available for an extended period of time.
Once a reactor design has been selected, the NWMO will need to modify its concept to include
the fuel from the new-build reactors. Some preliminary studies have been done (Russell, 2008).
2-13


FIGURE 2.3-13: SWEDISH USED FUEL DISPOSAL SYSTEM
2-14

2.4

Refurbishment Wastes
The reference assumptions for management of refurbishment wastes from the current reactor
fleet include on-site storage, followed by shipment off-site for disposal at a later date. For the
purposes of this report, similar assumptions are made for refurbishment waste from NND.
All wastes are assumed to be prepared for storage by the reactor refurbishment project
organization and delivered to the hand-over point at the waste management facility. For steam
generators, this would include draining, drying, sealing up of all openings with welded plates,
and applying a suitable corrosion protection to the sealed surfaces. Steam generators would be
transported on multi-axle heavy load vehicles. Figures 2.4-1 and 2.4-2 show some conceptual
layouts for the refurbishment waste.
In the longer term, the steam generators would likely need to be segmented prior to off-site
shipment for disposal. This could be done at the time of decommissioning the existing
Darlington reactors, when equipment to segment large objects from decommissioning is assumed
to be on-site. This would occur in the 2050 time frame (assuming that the existing reactors are
not refurbished) to 2080 timeframe (assuming the existing reactors are refurbished and their life
extended). Alternatively, the steam generators would be stored until the new reactors are
decommissioned. In both cases, it is assumed that a suitable repository is available at that time.
Figures 2.4-3 and 2.4-4 show examples of steam generator storage at the WWMF and at Palo
Verde in the US (which has SGs comparable in size to the ones being considered for NND).
For fuel channel wastes, the preparation for storage includes the packaging of the wastes into
Retube Waste Containers (RWCs). The filled and sealed RWCs would be transported to the
storage building, and handled by heavy forklift, as shown in Figure 2.4-5.
2-15


70 m
65 m
7m
24 m
FIGURE 2.4-1: CONCEPTUAL ACR-1000 STEAM GENERATOR STORAGE
2-16


70 m
45 m
(Heavy forklift
maneuvering
area)
(Door)
Note:
For 4 Darlington B ACR units (520 fuel channels each), assuming Bruce A style RWCs:
- 260 endfitting boxes, 1.7 m x 3.35 m, stacked 3 high, assuming 16 EFs per box
- 140 PT/CT boxes, 1.85 m x 1.85 m, stacked 2 high, assuming PTs & CTs are volume reduced
FIGURE 2.4-2: CONCEPTUAL ACR-1000 FUEL CHANNEL WASTE STORAGE
2-17


FIGURE 2.4-3: BRUCE A STEAM GENERATOR STORAGE AT WWMF
FIGURE 2.4-4: PALO VERDE STEAM GENERATOR STORAGE
2-18


FIGURE 2.4-5: RWC STORAGE AT WWMF
2-19


3.0
WASTE CHARACTERISTICS AND VOLUME FORECASTS
3.1
L&ILW Operational Waste Characteristics
The operational solid L&ILW from the new reactors is expected to have physical and
radiological characteristics similar to the waste from OPGs existing CANDU fleet. However,
waste from the light water reactors is expected to have much less tritium and C-14 than the
current CANDU reactors. A summary of the specific activity data is given in Table 3.1-1. The
waste characteristics of the existing OPG CANDU wastes are also included for comparison
purposes. Further details on the radiological characteristics can be found in Appendix A. Note
that AECL has not reported values for tritium and C-14 in ACR-1000 wastes in their data
[Candesco, 2008]. Based on existing CANDU experience, these can be expected to be higher
than the PWR reactors.
TABLE 3.1-1: SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL L&ILW CHARACTERISTICS
ACR-1000
AP1000
EPR
OPG CANDU
Average specific activity for

total L&ILW (Bq/m3)
9.4 E+10
2.5 E+11
3.9 E+11
2.4 E+11
Estimated average specific

activity for LLW (Bq/m3)
6.7 E+10
2.9E+10
4.5 E+10
1.7 E+11
Estimated average specific

activity for ILW (Bq/m3)
3.9 E+11
5.1 E+12
7.9 E+12
1.0 E+12
Comments
LLW / ILW split

based on existing
OPG CANDU split
Does not include
H-3 or C-14
References
[Candesco, 2008]
LLW / ILW split

based on ratios to
EPR split
[Candesco, 2008]
3-1
LLW / ILW split

based on waste
stream specific data
supplied by Areva
LLW / ILW split

based on OPG waste
stream specific data
[Areva, 2007],
[Candesco 2008]
[Rodrigues, 2008]

3.2

L&ILW Projected Volumes
Operational L&ILW is largely similar to wastes from the OPG current reactor fleet. LLW will
consist of used protective equipment, paper, plastic, contaminated components, sludges, etc.
ILW will consist mostly of IX resins and filters. The annual volumes and types for each reactor
are summarized in Table 3.2-1, while Table 3.2-2 summarizes the expected lifetime arisings for a
nominal 60 year reactor operating life. The characteristics and activity levels of the wastes are
generally similar to existing OPG CANDU wastes. Further details can be found in Appendix A.
TABLE 3.2-1: SUMMARY OF L&ILW ANNUAL ARISINGS
AS GENERATED (M3/YR) PER REACTOR
WASTE TYPE
LLW
Incinerable1
Compactable
Non-processible
Sludge
TOTAL
ILW
Ion Exchange (IX) resins
Filters
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL L&ILW
References
ACR-1000
AP1000
111
30
14
EPR
155
106
28
7
1
142
150
40
2
23
215
7
3
9
11
0.2
11
7
3
10
164
154
225
[AECL, 2007],
[Candesco, 2008]
[Candesco, 2008],
[Westinghouse, 2007]
[Areva, 2007],
[Candesco, 2008]
For the AP1000 and EPR, a new waste stream to Canadian power reactor operations is related
to the boric acid system used for reactivity control in light water reactors. The primary coolant,
used fuel wet bay and other liquid streams will contain boric acid. These liquid streams are
mostly processed and recycled in-plant. Liquid boric acid wastes are eventually concentrated by
evaporation (EPR), resulting in a sludge or concentrate that is solidified, or by ion-exchange
(AP1000), resulting in borated spent resins. The AP1000 also has the flexibility to use
temporary, mobile liquid waste processing, such as reverse osmosis equipment. This will also
result in the production of concentrate and sludge.
Because boric acid is highly corrosive to carbon steel, special precautions will be taken to ensure
that the wastes are neutralized and packaged in suitable containers.
The vendors of the ACR-1000 and AP1000 did not separate out incinerable wastes as a separate category. These
had been included in the compactible category for these reactors. If incineration is available (e.g. at the WWMF),
then a large fraction of the compactible wastes may in fact be incinerated. For the purposes of this report, it has
been assumed that the fraction of incinerable waste for ACR-1000 and AP1000 is the same as for the EPR.
3-2


TABLE 3.2-2: SUMMARY OF L&ILW LIFETIME ARISINGS

AS GENERATED (M3) PER REACTOR
WASTE TYPE
LLW
Incinerable2
Compactable
Non-processible
Sludge
TOTAL
ILW
IX resins
Filters
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL L&ILW
References
ACR-1000
AP1000
6669
1779
864
EPR
9,312
6368
1698
406
63
8,534
8,999
2,403
122
1,352
12,876
393
153
546
679
9
688
391
204
594
9,858
9,222
13,470
[AECL, 2007],
[Candesco, 2008]
[Candesco, 2008],
3.3
L&ILW Projected Storage Requirements
3.3.1
LLW Projected Storage Requirement
[Areva, 2007], [Candesco,

2008]
Table 3.3-1 summarizes the number of SBs required to store the lifetime arisings of LLW from
the various reactor configurations. The limiting case for EA purposes is 2 SBs for on-site
storage of LLW. This will store all of the LLW from any of the reactor configurations being
considered. Processing and storage of operational LLW is required to be in operation by the
time the first unit is radioactive (~2017), and must continue until the end of life of the last unit.
For off-site processing and storage, one SB will be required. However, it is likely that no
additional SBs will need to be constructed at the WWMF, since the bulk of the wastes will be
generated after 2018 when the L&ILW Deep Geologic Repository (DGR) is assumed to be in
operation. As the existing SBs are emptied and the contents transferred to the DGR, the freed up
space can be used to store the wastes from new-build reactors if this waste is not destined for the
DGR.
The vendors of the ACR-1000 and AP1000 did not separate out incinerable wastes as a separate category. These
had been included in the compactible category for these reactors. If incineration is available (e.g. at the WWMF),
then a large fraction of the compactible wastes may in fact be incinerated. For the purposes of this report, it has
been assumed that the fraction of incinerable waste for ACR-1000 and AP1000 is the same as for the EPR.
3-3


TABLE 3.3-1: SUMMARY OF STORAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL LLW

ACR-1000
AP1000
EPR
3,192
2,586
4,354
Maximum number of reactor units

On-site:
Lifetime LLW on-site stored with compaction only
(m3 per reactor)
# of SBs required per unit (7,000 m3 each)
# of SBs required for maximum number of units
< 0.5
< 0.5
<1
<2
<2
<2
Off-Site:
Lifetime LLW stored off-site
with incineration + compaction (m3 per reactor)
# of SBs required per unit (7,000 m3 each)
# of SBs required for maximum number of units
3.3.2
1,691
1,154
2,329
< 0.25
< 0.25
< 0.5
<1
<1
<1
ILW Projected Storage Requirements
The required ILW storage space is summarized in Table 3.3-2.

TABLE 3.3-2: SUMMARY OF STORAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL ILW
ACR-1000
AP1000
EPR
546
688
594
393
679
391
153
204
# of SBs required for on-site storage per unit

(7,000 m3 each)
< 0.1
< 0.1
< 0.1
# of SBs required for on-site storage for maximum number of

units
< 0.5
< 0.5
< 0.5
# of ICs required for off-site storage per unit

(18 m3 each)
31
39
33
# of ICs required for off-site storage for maximum number of

units
122
153
99

On-site:
Lifetime Total ILW stored (m per reactor)
Lifetime IX resins stored (m per reactor)
Lifetime filters & misc ILW stored (m per reactor)
Off-site:
The limiting case for EA purposes is one SB for on-site storage of ILW. For off-site storage, up
to approximately 150 in-ground containers (ICs) would be required. However, it is likely that no
additional ICs will need to be constructed at the WWMF, since the bulk of the wastes will be
generated after 2018 when the L&ILW DGR is assumed to be in operation. As the existing ICs
3-4


are emptied and the contents transferred to the DGR, the freed up space can be used to store the
wastes from new-build reactors if this waste is not destined for the DGR.
3.3.3
Overall Storage Building Requirements for L&ILW
The total number of on-site L&ILW storage buildings required and the projected need date are
summarized in Table 3.3-3. Further details on annual waste arisings can be found in
Appendix A.
TABLE 3.3-3: ON-SITE L&ILW STORAGE BUILDING EXPANSIONS
ACR-1000
AP1000
EPR
14,952
13,098
14,845
Forecast In-service Dates: SB 1
2017
2017
2017
SB 2
2046
2049
2045
SB 3
2074
N/A
2074

Total lifetime stored volume for maximum number of
reactor units (m3)
Total number of SBs required
3.4
Used Fuel
3.4.1
Used Fuel Characteristics and Volumes
The fuel from all of the new-build reactors will have higher enrichment and burnup than current
CANDU fuels. This introduces elements of criticality control requirements for storage as well as
potential heat load issues for dry storage and eventual disposal. The high burnup will also affect
the source term of radionuclides in the used fuel. Typical source term values for PWR fuels are
summarized in Appendix A, extracted from reference [US DOE, 2008].
The light water reactor fuel assemblies as shown in Figure 3.4.1 are physically much different
from the traditional CANDU fuel bundle. They are much larger and heavier (~4.8 m long and
~800kg total weight) and the fuels also have integral control rods and burnable poison rods.
PWRs are operated in batch cycles of 18 months to 2 years, when the reactor is shut down and a
portion of the core is removed and replaced with new fuel (typically 40% to 60%, depending on
the length of the operating cycle, degree of enrichment, final burnup, etc). The fuel rods are
handled vertically when placed into or removed from the core. They are also stored vertically in
the used fuel bay.
Table 3.4-1 summarizes the fuel characteristics and expected volumes for the three reactor
designs.
3-5


FIGURE 3.4-1: EPR FUEL
3-6


TABLE 3.4-1: SUMMARY OF FUEL CHARACTERISTICS AND ARISINGS
PARAMETER
ACR-1000
AP1000
EPR
Description
43 element CANFLEX-ACR bundle (0.5

m L x 0.1 m OD)
~ 20 kg/bundle
12 bundles per channel, 520 channels
(6,240 bundles per reactor)
Conventional PWR:
(264 rods, 17x17 array
4.8 m L x 0.21m sq
~538 kg U / assembly,
~786 kg total wt)
157 assemblies in core
Conventional PWR:
(265 rods, 17x17 array,
4.8 m L x 0.21m sq
~535 kg U / assembly,
~785 kg total wt)
241 assemblies in core
Enrichment
Up to 2.5% for equilibrium core
Up to 5% for equilibrium core
20,000
2.4-4.5% avg initial core

4.8% avg for reloads
60,000
On-power, ~ 12 bundles per day at

equilibrium
Shutdown and change 64 assemblies every

18 months at equilibrium
Shutdown and change 40% to 60% of fuel

in 18 to 24 month cycle at equilibrium
5,246
1,400
2,712
~262,300 bundles
~2,600 assemblies
~5,100 assemblies
4,372
43
85
Burnup (MWday/tonne U)
Refuelling cycle
Lifetime fuel arisings
(tonnes U)
Lifetime fuel arisings
(bundles or fuel assemblies)
Average annual fuel arisings
Comments
References
Decay heat estimated to be 11.8 watts per

bundle at 10 years for 20,500
MWday/tonne U burnup [Pontikakis et al
2005]
[AECL, 2007], [Candesco, 2008]
Fuel assembly also contains various

burnable poison elements and control
elements to compensate for fresh fuel
reactivity
[Candesco, 2008], [IAEA, 2004],
3-7
62,000
Fuel assembly also contains various

burnable poison elements and control
elements to compensate for fresh fuel
reactivity
[Areva, 2007], [Candesco, 2008],
[IAEA, 2004]

3.4.2

ACR-1000 Bundle Storage System Options
The ACR-1000 fuel bundle (shown in Figure 3.4-2) looks similar to conventional CANDU fuel
bundle in terms of dimensions and physical configuration. Like other CANDUs, the ACR-1000
is operated with on-power refuelling, resulting in a regular stream of fuel bundles discharged and
transferred to the wet used fuel bay. The default storage system in the wet bay for ACR-1000
fuel is 36 bundle baskets, as shown in Figure 3.4-3. These in term are loaded into stacking
frames in the wet fuel bay as shown in Figure 3.4-4. In the AECL MACSTOR dry storage
system, a 60 bundle basket as shown in Figure 3.4-5 is used for storage.
FIGURE 3.4-2: ACR-1000 FUEL
FIGURE 3.4-3: ACR-1000 FUEL STORAGE BASKET
3-8


FIGURE 3.4-4: ACR-1000 FUEL BASKET STACKING FRAME
3-9


FIGURE 3.4-5: 60-BUNDLE MACSTOR FUEL BASKET
The alternative storage system option would be to adapt OPGs current used wet/dry system to
the storage of used fuel that was initially enriched. The dry storage canister has been described
earlier.
The MACSTOR system components are not compatible with OPGs DSC system. Therefore,
the fuel would need to be re-packaged into standard modules prior to storage in DSCs if this was
adopted as the preferred dry storage option.
3.4.3
Used Fuel Projected Storage Requirements
One planning assumption is that only 50% of the used fuel requires an interim dry storage
facility on site. Table 3.4-4 summarizes the amount of used fuel produced and the number of
individual storage containers/cask required for the different reactor designs. Table 3.4-5
summarizes the number of future storage buildings and their required dates for the various
reactor designs.
3-10


TABLE 3.4-4: SUMMARY OF DRY STORAGE SPACE REQUIREMENTS

PER REACTOR
ACR-1000
AP1000
EPR
Lifetime fuel generated (bundles or fuel assemblies)
262,300
2,602
5,069
Fuel dry stored (bundles or fuel assemblies)
131,150
1,301
2,535
# of DSCs required (384 bundles per DSC)
342
N/A
N/A
# of AECL fuel baskets (36 bundles per basket)
3,644
N/A
N/A
# of MACSTOR/KN-400 modules
(400 baskets/module)
10
N/A
N/A
# of 24 fuel assembly PWR casks
N/A
55
106
N/A
41
80
N/A
33
64
TABLE 3.4-5: ON-SITE USED FUEL STORAGE BUILDING EXPANSIONS

ACR-1000
AP1000
EPR
50%
50%
50%
524,600
5,204
7,604
1,366
163
238
Forecast In-service Dates: SB1
2028
2028
2028
SB2
2043
N/A
N/A
SB3
2054
N/A
N/A

Fraction of total fuel dry stored
Total used fuel dry stored for maximum number of
reactor units
Option A Cask/DSC in Building:
Total number of dry storage casks/DSCs required3
4
Total number of dry storage buildings required
Option B MACSTOR / NUHOMS modular vault:

Total number of dry storage modules required
40
163
238
Forecast In-service Dates: Stage 1
2028
2028
2028
Stage 2
2038
2038
2036
Stage 3
2046
2047
2041
Stage 4
2054
2056
2047
Stage 5
N/A
N/A
2053
Each DSC contains 384 CANDU fuel bundles. Each PWR cask contains 32 fuel assemblies.
Each dry storage building holds 500 DSCs or 300 PWR casks.
5
Each MACSTOR stage consists of 10 modules, each module with 400 baskets. Each NUHOMS stage consists of
48 vaults, each holding 1 canister with 32 fuel assemblies.
4
3-11

3.5

For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that mid-life refurbishment of the reactors will be
required. Plant specific radiological source term information has not been generated for
refurbishment waste yet.
For the ACR-1000, the principal refurbishment wastes would include fuel channels, calandria
tubes, feeders, and/or steam generators, depending on the required scope of the refurbishment.
The fuel channel materials (zirconium alloys and stainless steel) are similar to those used in
existing CANDU reactors. Therefore, the expected activation products will be similar, although
the absolute amounts of given nuclides may differ due to the design specific neutron flux
spectrum and location of the various materials in the core. The pressure tubes, calandria tubes,
calandria tube inserts, end fittings and shield plugs would likely be classified as ILW, while the
feeder pipes would be classified as LLW. A typical fuel channel source term based on
Darlington A is summarized in Appendix B.
Steam generator contamination occurs through the deposition of materials, such as oxides, from
the primary coolant, mainly on the inner surfaces of the steam generator tubes (primary side).
Both activated corrosion products and fission products may be present. Leakages in the tubes
may result in contamination on the secondary side. All of the reactor types under consideration
use light water as the primary coolant with similar primary chemistry. Therefore, the type of
radioactivity deposited is expected to be similar for all of the reactor types. The absolute amount
of the fission product and transuranic contamination will depend largely on the amount of these
materials released from the fuel during operation (e.g. via pinhole leaks in the fuel cladding) and
on the efficiency of the reactor coolant cleanup system.
Typical expected steam generator contamination levels for Pickering B, Darlington A, and
Ringhals 3 (a Swedish PWR) [Vattenfall 2007] are summarized in Appendix B. The total
radioactivity in a steam generator appears to be relatively consistent for the two reactor types,
with both being in the range of 1 to 3 TBq per steam generator, or about 2 to 5 GBq/tonne. The
steam generators are expected to be classified as LLW.
For the AP1000 and EPR, refurbishment would consist of steam generator and reactor vessel
head replacement. Note that these are conservative assumptions for EA planning purposes, and
may not in fact be required. The outage duration for a reactor unit is conservatively assumed to
be two years for the ACR-1000 and one year for the AP1000 and EPR designs. (In practice,
PWR steam generator replacement outages have typically been as short as several months).
PWR reactor vessel heads are expected to be activated stainless and carbon steels, with some
small amounts of fission product and other surface contamination on the inside portions of the
head. The heads are likely to be classified as ILW due to high concentrations of long-lived
nickel isotopes and high dose rates.
Tables 3.5-1 summarizes the sizes and required storage space to refurbishment waste.
3-12


TABLE 3.5-1: ON-SITE REFURBISHMENT WASTE STORAGE

ACR-1000
AP1000
EPR
4 SGs per unit

(16 total)
5.5 m OD x 24.2 m L
472 tonne each
2 SGs per unit

(8 total)
5.6 m OD x 22.5 m L
665 tonne each
4 SGs per unit

(12 total)
5.2 m OD x 24.3 m L
550 tonne each
Sealed SG shell
Sealed SG shell
Sealed SG shell
Storage method
Intact in SG storage
building
~65 m x 70 m footprint
building
building
In-service date
2048
2048
2048
520 fuel channels per

unit (2080 total)
1 reactor pressure vessel

head (4 total)
4.8 m OD x 2.0m H
1 reactor pressure vessel

head (3 total)
5.75m OP x 3.2 H
116 tonne
Assumed packaging
Bruce style retube waste

containers: 16 end
fittings per RWC-EF
container; 28 pressure
tubes per RWC-PT; 40
calandria tubes per
PWC-PT; 3 RWC-PTs
per unit for misc
components. Total 4
units:
260 RWC-EF
140 RWC-PT
Sealed shell
Sealed shell
Storage method
RWC storage building

Included in SG storage
building
Included in SG storage
building
In-service date
2048
2048
2048
[AECL, 2007],
[Candesco, 2008]
[Candesco, 2008],
[IAEA, 2004],
[Areva, 2007],
[Candesco, 2008],
[IAEA, 2004]
Refurbishment major LLW
Assumed packaging
Refurbishment major ILW
References
As summarized in Table 3.5-1, the steam generators for all of the new reactor types are larger
and heavier than those used in OPGs existing reactor fleet. (By way of comparison, the Bruce
A steam generators are 2.6 m max OD x 10.4 m OL with a weight of ~110 tonnes, while the
Pickering B SGs are 2.5 m max OD x 14.3 m OL with a weight of 87 tonnes. Darlington SGs,
which are the largest in the OPG fleet, are 4.7 m max OD x 22.2 m OL and 340 tonnes.) If they
are to be replaced, the large size and weight would introduce complexities related to the handling
and movement of the components, as well as the preparation of the components for eventual
disposal. However, steam generators of this size have been successfully replaced in a number of
plants in the US and Europe.
Figures 3.5-1 through 3.5-6 depict the major refurbishment components for each reactor type.
3-13


For both LLW and ILW, the limiting case for refurbishment waste storage is the 4 unit ACR1000 station. Conceptual storage building layouts were shown earlier in Figures 2.4-1 and 2 4-2.
The additional operational LLW is projected at 500 m3 per reactor per year of refurbishment
outage.
3.6
Summary of Waste Management Needs
Suitable land for the expansion of the DWMF will need to be reserved on the Darlington site.
For long term DN site planning involving NND, this should include space for:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
three low level storage buildings (30 m x 50 m each 4,500 m2 total)

three used fuel dry storage buildings (70 m x 76 m each 16,000 m2 total)
one used fuel dry storage processing building (40 m x 50 m 2,000 m2)
one steam generator storage building (65 m x 70 m 4,550 m2)
one retube waste storage building (45 m x 70 m 3,150 m2)
Some of the future buildings might be located separately on-site from the current DWMF.
The waste management area(s) should include a minimum 5 m buffer between the storage
buildings and the waste management facility fence. Additional security perimeter clearances are
also required for the used fuel dry storage buildings. While there is no reason to believe that a
Safety Assessment could not demonstrate that a location north of the CN rail line is feasible, the
safety assessment used in this TSD assume that any waste processing or storage building are
built south of the CN rail line and no closer than 150 m to the site perimeter fence. However, for
EA planning purposes, this TSD has accepted this analysis to demonstrate that the UFDS can be
located anywhere on the site. Should the Vendor require the UFDS buildings to be located north
of the CN rail line, or any waste processing or storage building to be located closer than 150 m to
the site perimeter fence, OPG has committed to updating safety assessment for this location as
part of the licensing process.
3-14


FIGURE 3.5-1: ACR-1000 FUEL CHANNEL
3-15


FIGURE 3.5-2: ACR-1000 STEAM GENERATOR
3-16


FIGURE 3.5-3: AP1000 REACTOR VESSEL6
The reactor vessel head is the portion above the upper support plate.
3-17


FIGURE 3.5-4: AP1000 STEAM GENERATOR
3-18


FIGURE 3.5-5: EPR REACTOR VESSEL7
The reactor vessel head is the portion above the o-ring seal.
3-19


FIGURE 3.5-6: EPR STEAM GENERATOR
3-20


4.0
OTHER WASTE MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
4.1
Processing
4.1.1
Operational L&ILW
Operational solid L&ILW is very similar physically and radiologically to wastes currently
handled by OPG stations. Therefore, no issues are expected with the processing of these wastes.
The total storage / disposal volume of wastes will depend on the chosen processing and
packaging method. For example, incineration will offer a higher volume reduction (generally >
40:1) compared to simple compaction (4:1). Advanced compaction techniques, such as
supercompaction, can process a wider range of wastes than simple compactors and can offer high
volume reduction (up to 10:1), resulting in lower overall stored volume.
There are two processing scenarios being considered for the environmental assessment that
bound the processing options:
a) On-site processing (consisting of compaction) and storage.
b) Transport of unprocessed waste to an off-site facility (such as WWMF) for incineration,
compaction and storage
On-site processing by compaction will reduce the number of eventual off-site transportation trips
because some of the waste has been compacted. But the volume of stored waste at NND will be
greater than if the waste was further processed off-site by better volume reduction techniques
such as incineration for low level waste.
4.1.2
Used Fuel
Processing of used fuel refers to the preparation for dry storage. In all cases, this typically
involves drying of the fuel, sealing of the dry storage container (either by welding or bolting),
backfilling with inert gas, decontamination of the container and transferring it from the fuel bay
or processing area to the storage area. These tasks are all well developed, both within OPG (for
CANDU type fuels) and internationally for PWR type fuels.
The ACR-1000 fuel bundles are stored in 36 bundle baskets, which are optimized for the AECL
MACSTOR dry storage system. If OPG decides to use a DSC-type of dry storage, then a
mechanism must be fabricated to transfer the fuel from these baskets to an OPG style fuel
module.
Except for matching design details of the plant to the dry storage system (e.g. physical space
available in the bays for cask handling, crane capacities, etc), no major issues are expected for
the processing of used fuels from the PWR reactors.
4-1

4.1.3

Processing of refurbishment wastes refers to the decontamination and/or size reduction of

replaced steam generators and other large components.
All three reactor types have large and heavy steam generators (> 450 tonnes). These will likely
require segmentation prior to disposal. Although there is no Operating Experience (OPEX)
within OPG for handling steam generators of this size, there is extensive international experience
in Europe and the US, both in the handling, decontamination and segmentation of SGs in this
size range.
Aggressive decontamination techniques can be used, such as grit blasting, since the equipment
will not be re-used. Secondary wastes are generally limited to spent grit (which is recycled in the
process to a large degree), which can be packaged in conventional containers, such as drums.
Apart from the need to design for handling of the large size and weight of the objects, no
technical issues are expected with the processing of this waste.
4.2
Operational Points
4.2.1
Station Storage Provisions
The AP1000 and EPR provide a small amount of buffer storage for packaged operational
L&ILW prior to off-site shipment. The basic ACR-1000 design includes a storage building for
all operational L&ILW.
All three reactor types provide storage for wet operational wastes, such as IX resins. However,
periodic emptying of the storage tanks and transferring to external storage is still required.
4.2.2
Used Fuel Management
All three reactor designs only provide 10 to 15 years of wet storage for used fuel. They all
assume that older fuel will be transferred to dry storage as the bay fills up.
The timing of dry storage operation depends on the fuelling cycle. The ACR-1000 has
continuous on-power refuelling at a rate of about 4,400 to 4,500 bundles per year. This rate
requires the equivalent of about 12 DSCs per year to be removed from the fuel bay to maintain
steady state. If the AECL MACSTOR system is used, then approximately 120 fuel baskets need
to be removed from the bay per year.
The AP1000 and EPR have batch refuelling campaigns every 18 to 24 months. A typical
refuelling outage would replace 60 to 100 fuel assemblies (18 month cycle). A typical PWR dry
storage cask will hold 24 to 40 fuel assemblies, which results in 1.5 to 4 casks being filled every
18 months. This is a far lower rate than the ACR-1000, and would more than likely be done in
batch campaigns every few years.
4-2


For the purposes of this report, it is assumed that 50% of the lifetime used fuel will require onsite dry storage. After this, it is assumed that the NWMO will take ownership of the fuel under
its Adaptive Phased Management (APM) program.
Note that the higher enrichment and burnup of the fuels in the new reactor designs will have an
impact on the minimum cooling period prior to transfer to dry storage (i.e. the higher the burnup,
the higher the initial decay heat and the longer the required cooling period before dry storage).
The practical cooling time will be limited by the available storage space in the wet bays. This
will drive the design requirements for the storage casks.
PWR dry storage casks are typically designed for much higher heat loads than OPGs DSCs (up
to about 40 kW, compared to 2.2 kW for a DSC), allowing shorter cooling times [IAEA, 2007].
4.2.3
Storage of refurbishment wastes is required for fuel channel components (ACR-1000), reactor
vessel heads (AP1000 and EPR) and steam generators (all reactor types). Dedicated storage
facilities have been constructed in a number of countries (e.g. US, Germany, Japan, Slovenia,
etc) for full sized steam generators.
For the purposes of this report, it is assumed that refurbishment wastes are stored on-site in a
dedicated storage facility (i.e. separate from any operational waste storage) until the stations are
decommissioned, at which point they will be transported off-site to a suitably licensed
repository.
For the fuel channel components and reactor vessel heads, the primary hazard is related to high
dose rates. Therefore, shielded storage will be required for these wastes, either in the form of
shielded containers, a shielded storage structure or some combination thereof. Storage for fuel
channel wastes has been constructed at WWMF, based on a shielded container in a storage
building concept, and at Pt Lepreau, based on an unshielded container in a shielded vault
concept. Currently, OPG has adopted the shielded container in a storage building as the
reference concept for future reactor refurbishments for NEW As Low as Reasonably Achievable
(ALARA) purposes and repository readiness.
4.3
Long-Term Waste Management
4.3.1
Operational L&ILW
For the purpose of the NND EA, the long-term management facility is not specifically defined,
other than it must be a suitably licensed facility. The potential options would include:
a) Revising the Hosting Agreement and allowing the proposed L&ILW DGR to fill up to its
current design capacity, then conducting a further EA in the future for an expansion, if
required. For example, if not all of the existing reactors are refurbished and lifeextended, then the wastes from the existing fleet will be less than the design capacity of
the DGR allowing room for some additional wastes from new-build.
4-3


b) Maintaining the wastes in interim storage (either at the DMWF or the WWMF) until such
time as a decommissioning waste repository or other facility is available. The
decommissioning waste repository has not yet been designed, so its size can easily be
adjusted to accommodate extra wastes from NND.
4.3.2
Used Fuel
The responsibility for long-term used fuel management lies with the Nuclear Waste Management
Organization (NWMO). The NWMO was established in 2002 by OPG, New Brunswick Power
and Hydro Quebec and has the legal obligation to provide long-term used fuel management
services to all used fuel owners in Canada. Currently, OPG holds some 90% of the used fuel
inventory in Canada.
Its Adaptive Phased Management approach [NWMO, 2005] has been approved by the federal
government and is now entering the siting phase. For planning purposes, the assumed in-service
date of a long-term management facility is 2035. While the focus of the NWMO program has
been on conventional CANDU fuels, it is recognized that there are other fuels that need to be
managed, such as from research reactors as well as those from various experimental programs.
The ACR-1000 fuel is similar in configuration to conventional CANDU fuels, so should be
easily accommodated, although some adjustments may be required to parameters such as
disposal canister spacing in order to compensate for the higher enrichment and the higher burnup
of the ACR-1000 fuel.
The PWR fuels from the AP1000 and EPR are physically much different from the CANDU
fuels. However, there is international OPEX from countries such as Finland, Sweden and others,
which can be adapted to the Canadian context. Except for the exact configuration of the fuel
canisters, the Finnish and Swedish repository concepts for the long-term management of used
fuel are very similar to the Canadian one.
The main technical points that need to be addressed for fuels from NND reactors are:
a) Effect of different physical configuration (e.g. longer, heavier fuels from PWRs)
b) Effect of higher burnup (e.g. heat load and required storage/cooling times prior to
emplacement)
c) Effect of higher initial enrichment (e.g. criticality issues)
d) Capacity of the repository to handle the additional fuel
A preliminary assessment of these points has been done (Russell, 2008).
4-4

4.3.3

Long-term management of refurbishment wastes faces many of the same issues as for
operational wastes. The most likely destination for these wastes would be the decommissioning
waste repository.
An additional consideration is the size and weight of the steam generators and other large
components. These would require substantial size reduction to be handled by the proposed DGR
(e.g. 35 tonne hoist limit would require each SG to be cut into about 15 pieces). A future
decommissioning repository could be designed to handle much larger and/or heavier packages
since these may be commonplace from decommissioning.
4.4
Off-Site Transportation and Accidents
This section discusses OPGs Radioactive Material Transportation (RMT) program, the types of
the transportation packages used, and OPGs Transportation Emergency Response Plan.
Transportation accident is described in the Malfunctions, Accidents and Malevolent Acts TSD.
The transportation of radioactive material is regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC) under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA) and the Packaging and
Transport of Nuclear Substance Regulations (PTNSR). In the regulations, there is a graded
approach to the packaging requirements that corresponds to the hazard level of the radioactive
material to be transported. The most hazardous materials must be shipped in the most robust
packages. The packages are designed to withstand tests representing different severity levels of
transport conditions. The severest level includes tests for accidents such as collisions and fire.
The PTNSR also specifies the requirements for transport of nuclear substances, including the
production, use, inspection, maintenance and repair of packaging and the preparation,
consigning, handling, loading, carriage, storage during transport, receipt at final destination and
unloading of packages.
The transportation of radioactive material is also regulated under the Transportation of
Dangerous Goods Act, Class 7 Radioactive, and must also comply with the Highway Traffic
Act(s) of the provinces through which the material travels. In this highly regulated environment,
a robust program for procurement, maintenance, documentation, staff training and oversight has
been developed.
4.4.1
Overview of Current Radioactive Material Transportation Program
The Nuclear Waste Management Division (NWMD) of OPG has the overall accountability for
the transportation of radioactive material. It operates a Radioactive Material Transportation
(RMT) program that provides a fleet of tractors, trailers and specialized packaging, a
maintenance facility and support staff. RMT also provides quality-assurance oversight and
verification for higher-risk (Type A and Type B) radioactive shipments originating from OPG.
This existing program will be expanded as required to meet the needs of NND.
4-5


OPG has an excellent radioactive materials transportation safety record. In an average year for
the overall OPG RMT program, over 900 shipments of radioactive materials are consigned,
and/or carried by OPG, traveling approximately 500,000 kilometers. Materials shipped include
contaminated tools and equipment, low and intermediate level radioactive waste, solid and liquid
samples, used fuel, and tritiated heavy water which is currently transported off-site from
Pickering and Bruce Power NGS for processing to remove tritium.
All radioactive material shipments are logged into a computerized database that records
information about the type of material being transported, point of origin, destination, shipper,
and carrier. RMT also transports non-radioactive material, such as work clothing to and from the
Bruce Power laundry facility.
In the more than 35 years that Ontario Power Generation has been transporting radioactive
materials, and more than 11.5 million kilometres travelled, only five (5) shipments have been
involved in traffic accidents. Three (3) accidents involved trucks transporting low level waste
and two (2) involved the transportation of heavy water. There were no releases to the
environment as a result of these accidents.
OPGs radioactive transportation program is supported by:
(a)
Packaging designed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with applicable regulations and
standards.
(b)
Regular audits and reviews of transportation procedures.
(c)
An on-going Transportation of Dangerous Goods Class 7 (radioactive materials) training

program.
(d)
Rigourous transportation package inspection and maintenance; long service life packages
are also subject to an aging management program.
(e)
Oversight of high-hazard and non-routine shipments.
(f)
Procurement and engineering support for tractors and trailers.
(g)
A Transportation Emergency Response Plan that is audited both internally and externally
by authorities like Transport Canada.
4.4.2
Transportation of L&IL Radioactive Waste to an Off-site Licensed Facility
Future transportation of L&IL radioactive materials for NND to an off-site licensed facility will
be conducted under the RMT program as outlined in Section 4.4.1. The timing of shipments will
depend on the final decision on whether the L&IL waste will be stored on-site versus off-site, the
waste forms, and the availability of an alternate off-site licensed facility for interim storage,
long-term storage or disposal.
4-6


If additional transportation packages are required for the transport of specific radioactive wastes
from NND, these packages would be designed, certified as necessary, and procured according to
OPG's existing processes.
4.4.3
Transportation Package Requirements for Transportation of L&IL Waste
The PTNSR provide comparable levels of safety for radioactive materials of different
radiotoxicities and different quantities by relating the nature and amount of the contents with
graded packaging integrity and performance requirements. The relevant categories of packages
established in the regulations are presented below in increasing order of physical integrity and
performance:
x
x
x
x
Excepted packaging for contents such as empty containers with traces of radioactivity
from previous usage;
Industrial Packaging (Type IP-1, Type IP-2, Type IP-3) for LLW;
Type A for contents such as contaminated inspection equipment; and
Type B for ILW such as filters and ion exchange resins, and non-waste radioactive
materials such as tritiated heavy water.
The graded approach to the packaging requirements in the Regulations addresses three general
severity levels for transport conditions:
(a)
(b)
(c)
routine conditions of transport (incident free);

normal conditions of transport (minor mishaps such as rough handling);
accident conditions of transport (including collisions and fire).
Excepted packages are packages in which the allowed radioactive content is restricted to such
low levels that the potential hazards are insignificant and therefore no testing is required to
demonstrate containment or shielding integrity for routine conditions of transport.
The Industrial package types are required for transport of surface contaminated objects (where
relatively low quantities of radioactive material is distributed over the surface of a nonradioactive entity) or low specific activity materials (where the radioactive material is distributed
at relatively low concentration within a non-radioactive material). The three Industrial package
types have different safety functions. Type IP-1 packages simply contain their radioactive
contents under routine conditions of transport, Type IP-2 and IP-3 packages protect against loss
or dispersal of their contents, and loss of shielding under normal conditions of transport. There
are tests consisting of a free drop test and stacking test for demonstrating the ability of these
packages to withstand the normal conditions of transport. The free drop test simulates the type
of shock that a package would experience if it were in a vehicle that braked suddenly, or if it was
lifted or lowered abruptly during handling. In most cases packages would still be fit for transport
after experiencing such shocks. Since heavier packages are less likely to be exposed to large
drop heights during normal handling, the free drop distance for this test is graded (between 0.3
and 1.2 metres) according to the package mass. The stacking test is designed to simulate the
4-7


effect of loads pressing on a package over a prolonged period of time to ensure that the
effectiveness of the shielding and containment systems will not be impaired.
A Type IP-3 package must also have a demonstrated ability to withstand a penetration test (a 6
kg steel bar dropped onto the package from 1 metre). This test is intended to ensure that the
contents will not escape from the containment system or that the shielding would not be
damaged if a slender object such as a length of metal tubing should strike and penetrate the outer
layers of the packaging.
A Type A package is required when the quantity of radioactive material exceeds the limits for
the Industrial package types. Type A packages also protect against loss or dispersal of their
contents, and loss of shielding under normal conditions of transport. Type A packages for
liquids and gases have additional requirements and must withstand more severe tests that consist
of:
1. A 9 metre free drop test onto an unyielding surface. This test represents a major
accidental impact or collision.
2. A penetration test similar to the one for a Type IP-3 package but with an increased drop
height (1.7 m).
The purpose of these tests is to ensure the package has stronger integrity to counteract the greater
ability of the contents to escape from a damaged package.
The design requirement for a Type B package is that it is capable of withstanding severe accident
conditions in transport without a loss of containment, or an increase in external radiation level to
an extent which would endanger the general public or those involved in rescue or cleanup
operations. It should be safely recoverable after an accident but it would not necessarily be
capable of being reused. The tests for demonstrating the ability to withstand accident conditions
of transport include:
1. A 9 metre free drop test onto an unyielding surface. This test represents a major
accidental impact or collision.
2. A 1 metre free drop onto a steel penetrator bar. This test represents a collision with a
pointed object.
3. A thermal test of 800C for 30 minutes. This test represents a fully engulfing fire
occurring after an accident that ignited liquid, solid or gaseous combustible materials in
the vicinity of the package.
4. A water immersion test under 15 metres of water for at least eight hours. As a result of
transport accidents near or on a river, lake or sea, a package could be subjected to an
external pressure from submersion under water. To simulate the equivalent damage from
this low probability event, the transportation regulations require that a package be able to
withstand external pressures resulting from submersion at reasonable depths.
The design and intended operations of a Type B package must be reviewed, and a design
approval certificate issued by the CNSC prior to first use of the package. For the other package
types, CNSC design approval is not required but the consignor of any shipment using one of
4-8


these packages must have documented evidence readily available for inspection by the CNSC,
indicating that the package design complies with the applicable regulatory requirements.
LLW will usually be transported in Type A or lesser package types, while ILW will transported
in Type B packages. OPG currently uses and will continue to use packages that are fully
compliant with the transportation regulations.
4.4.4
Shipments to an Off-site Licensed Facility
The bounding scenario for shipments of LLW is the EPR with all of the generated radioactive
waste sent for off-site processing and storage. This scenario would result in a 12,876 m3 lifetime
arising of LLW which would require approximately 640 truck shipments of 20 m3 each over a 60
year period, or about one per month. Thus, for the case of 3 EPRs, the lifetime volume of lowlevel radioactive waste is estimated at approximately 38,700 m3 which would result in
approximately 1,935 truck shipments of 20 m3 each, or two to three truck shipments per month
during the 60-year operating life of NND.
For ILW, the lifetime generation from the AP1000 is the bounding quantity of approximately
688 m3 per reactor. For the case of four AP1000 reactors, the lifetime volume generated would
also result in two to three truck shipments per month during the operating period. Note that the
peak shipping rates may be higher during outage campaigns, but the lifetime average shipping
rate is still very low.
During the refurbishment year for a reactor, approximately two additional shipments per day
would be required for the refurbishment waste. This transport of L&ILW would be done along
routes similar to those currently used. There are two options available for the handling of large
components generated from refurbishment activities that require storage as ILW. The first option
is that the large objects can be transported intact as special shipments. While radioactive objects
of this size have been transported in other jurisdictions around the world, they have usually been
done by rail or by barge. Alternately these large objects could be segmented first to simplify
transportation and to meet waste acceptance criteria at an off-site licensed facility.
4.4.5
Transportation Emergency Response Plan
OPG has the capability of responding to a transportation incident (including accidents) involving
radioactive material through its Radioactive Material Transportation Emergency Response Plan
(TERP). The TERP identifies OPG's responsibilities during a transportation incident involving
an OPG shipment of radioactive material, and identifies the liaison and potential interface with
external emergency response organizations. This plan also includes requirements for personnel
training, procedures and equipment, a mutual aid agreement (Mutual Initial Response Assistance
Agreement) with other nuclear facilities and a service agreement with an external spills
contractor.
Under the Transportation of Dangerous Goods (TDG) Regulations, the Shipper is required to
have emergency response capability, and to file an emergency response plan with the Director
General, Transport Canada, when transporting quantities which exceed a threshold value.
4-9


Transport Canada assesses the acceptability of the identified response capability and confirms
the feasibility of the outlined emergency response plan. The TERP program is tested annually
using drills and exercises to practice emergency response capability, and to provide the means to
test the effectiveness of different aspects of emergency response capability and identify areas for
improvement.
4.4.6
Transportation Summary
In summary, the regulatory requirements on the design of transportation packages used to move
L&IL waste between sites, OPGs existing well-developed transportation program, the many
years of experience in transporting radioactive materials, and the training required for personnel
involved with transportation and the TERP are in place to prevent a release of radioactivity
resulting from a transportation accident involving a shipment of low or intermediate level waste.
4-10


5.0
NORMAL OPERATIONS
5.1
Used Fuel Operations Radiological Impacts
5.1.1
Introduction
Normal operating releases or accidental releases from the fuel are due to volatile gases that
escape through small defects in the fuel cladding. Any mechanical handling during storage and
processing will introduce some mechanical shock to the system that may increase the percentage
of defects in the fuel and lead to some releases.
The release scenarios (either normal operations or accidents) for used fuel storage are similar for
the three reactor designs. After the minimum 10 years of wet storage, the source term of volatile
radionuclides available for release is reduced to the amount of Kr-85 and tritium that can escape
through a defect in the fuel cladding occurs. Available for release refers to the fractions of Kr-85
and tritium that have migrated to the gap between the fuel and the cladding, and to the grain
boundaries within the fuel pellet. These gap fractions vary for the different fuel types.
5.1.2
ACR-1000 Normal Operation
As described earlier, there are differences in the amount of used fuel in the different used fuel
storage options. In general, the DSC approach will always be more conservative than the
MACSTOR approach simply because more used fuel is involved and the DSC will be used for
this assessment.
Table 5.1-1gives the properties for 10 year cooled ACR-1000 fuel [AMEC, 2008].
TABLE 5.1-1: PROPERTIES OF 10 YEAR COOLED ACR-1000 FUEL
Key Parameter
Kr-85 per assembly (Bq)
Kr-85 Gap Fraction
H-3 per assembly (Bq)
H-3 Gap Fraction
Estimated Annual Inventories
(Bundles)
Fuel Defect Rates
ACR-1000
2.12E+12
0.0617
1.18E+11
0.0617
4,372
0.10%
Under normal operating conditions, minimal airborne emissions are expected from used fuel dry
storage operations from the station fuel bay and at the Darlington Waste Management Facility
(DWMF). This is because the uranium dioxide matrix, the used fuel sheath and the transfer
clamp elastomeric seal (used in conjunction with OPG DSC) provide multiple barriers toward
preventing the release of radioactive materials. The final vacuum drying step for a dry storage
container will have some low levels of emissions.
5-1


Airborne releases are also unlikely to arise under normal operating conditions during storage of
seal-welded or bolted containers/casks. There is a small potential for airborne emissions
resulting from processing operations such as sealing and vacuum drying.
Surface contamination on containers exterior surfaces will be controlled through prevention
measures and decontamination at NND, as well as through routine surface contamination checks
and monitoring at the DWMF as per current successful practice.
Radioactive contamination could be present on the outside of the fuel cladding. Although this
contamination is expected to adhere to the fuel during storage, there is some potential for it to
become airborne during vacuum drying of the container/cask cavity. A dedicated hose will be
used for vacuum drying operations, to prevent the spread of such contamination to other
workshop systems. Vacuum pump discharge will be directed to an active ventilation system,
where particulate contamination is removed by filters. The stack filters will be monitored
routinely for particulate contamination.
It is expected that a very small quantity of fuel elements may have minor defects in the cladding.
Cladding defects are present in less than 0.1% of fuel bundles (representing < 0.01% of fuel
elements) based on current 37-element natural uranium operating experience. Fuel bundles that
are known to be defective will not be loaded into containers; releases from defective fuel have
been conservatively assessed as described below.
For the purpose of evaluating the potential emissions under normal operating conditions, the
following conservative assumptions are used to obtain an upper bound estimate for airborne
emissions:
a) one fuel element in 1% of fuel bundles is damaged during handling (4 elements per
container), and for each failed fuel element, the free inventory of Kr-85 and tritium is
released into the container cavity;
b) the container seal is ignored and these radionuclides are released into the environment.
These assumptions are deemed conservative for the following reasons:
x
x
x
x
The postulated defect rate is about three times higher on a per element basis than OPG
fuel performance experience.
Fuel element defects occur primarily in the bundle manufacturing process or resulting
from debris fretting in the reactor core. At high fuel temperatures during irradiation, the
free inventory of Kr-85 and tritium in fuel elements with cladding defects would have
been released within the reactor core. Upon cooling release rates drop due to mechanical
factors and thermal factors.
Used fuel is stored for at least 10 years in wet storage prior to transfer to a container for
dry storage. Leaching of grain-boundary inventory and release of gap inventory would
have occurred over this period for bundles with minor cladding defects.
Should free inventory remain in the fuel-sheath gap or grain boundaries subsequent to
wet storage, its release would have occurred during initial vacuum drying.
5-2


Dry storage system is designed and operated to ensure fuel integrity is maintained to the
highest degree practical during storage.
Assuming the facility will process 12 DSCs per year containing 384 bundles, or 128 AECL fuel
storage baskets per year containing 36 bundles, it is postulated that a total of 48 fuel elements (4
elements in each DSC, or approximately 1 element for every 3 canisters) fail during one year
under normal operating conditions (a very conservative scenario).
The chronic off-site radiation dose consequence from this scenario, for a member of the public at
the DN site boundary, is described in the Radiation and Radioactivity Effects Assessment TSD.
5.1.3
EPR Normal Operation
Table 5.1-2 gives the properties for 10 year cooled EPR fuel [AMEC, 2008].
TABLE 5.1-2: PROPERTIES OF 10 YEAR COOLED EPR FUEL
Key Parameter
Kr-85 Gap Fraction
H-3 Gap Fraction
(Assemblies)
Fuel Defect Rates
EPR
1.69E+14
0.1
9.03E+12
0.05
85
0.25%
Under normal operating conditions, no airborne emissions are expected from a storage cask
during transfer from the NND to the DWMF. This is because the uranium dioxide matrix, the
used fuel sheath and the container shall provide multiple barriers toward preventing the release
of radioactive materials. A number of the PWR cask design options are bolted prior to transport
and thereby ensure an air tight seal during transfer from the station to the DWMF. Table 2.1-4
summarizes some current PWR dry storage casks.
seal-welded containers or bolted containers. There is a small potential for airborne emissions
resulting from container processing operations such as sealing and vacuum drying.
A design basis defect rate of 0.25% should be applied for all fuel assemblies for EPR [AMEC,
2008]. Fuel assemblies known to be defective will not be loaded in containers; releases from
defective fuel have been conservatively assessed as described below.
emissions for EPR:
5-3


a) 0.25% of all fuel assemblies are damaged during handling and the free inventory of H-3
and Kr-85 is released into the container cavity;
b) the container containment seal is ignored and these radionuclides are released into the
environment.
x
x
x
x
x
x
The postulated defect rate is likely to be over conservative.

Fuel element defects occur primarily in the bundle manufacturing process or in the
reactor core. At high fuel temperatures during irradiation, the free inventory of H-3 and
Kr-85 in elements with cladding defects would have been released within the reactor
core.
Used fuel is stored for at least 10 years in the station irradiated fuel bays prior to transfer
to a container. Leaching of grain-boundary inventory and release of gap inventory would
Should free inventory remain in the fuel-sheath gap or grain boundaries subsequent to inbay storage, its release would have occurred during initial vacuum drying process (if
applicable).
The containers are designed and operated to ensure fuel integrity is maintained to the
A maximum PWR fuel bundle radionuclide characteristics are used which is more
conservative than the vendor specific information.
The chronic dose is dependent on the annual fuel throughput. The EPR is expected to have an
annual throughput of 85 assemblies per year.
For the EPR, the maximum chronic off-site radiation dose consequence from this scenario, for a
member of the public at the DN site boundary is described in the Radiation and Radioactivity
Effects Assessment TSD.
5.1.4
AP1000 Normal Operation
Under normal operating conditions, no airborne emissions are expected from a storage cask
during transfer from the NND to the DWMF. This is because the uranium dioxide matrix, the
used fuel sheath and the container shall provide multiple barriers toward preventing the release
of radioactive materials. A number of the PWR cask design options are bolted prior to transport
and thereby ensure an air tight seal during transfer from the station to the DWMF. Table 2.3-1
summarizes some current PWR dry storage casks.
seal-welded containers or bolted containers. There is a small potential for airborne emissions
resulting from container processing operations such as sealing and vacuum drying.
5-4


A design basis defect rate of 0.25% should be applied for all fuel assemblies for AP1000
[AMEC, 2008]. Fuel assemblies known to be defective will not be loaded in containers; releases
from defective fuel have been conservatively assessed as described below.
emissions for the AP1000:
x
x
0.25% of all fuel assemblies are damaged during handling and the free inventory of H-3
and Kr-85 is released into the container cavity;
the container containment seal is ignored and these radionuclides are released into the
environment.

x
x
x
x
The postulated defect rate is likely to be over conservative.

Fuel element defects occur primarily in the bundle manufacturing process or in the
reactor core. At high fuel temperatures during irradiation, the free inventory of H-3 and
Kr-85 in elements with cladding defects would have been released within the reactor
core.
Used fuel is stored for at least 10 years in the station irradiated fuel bays prior to transfer
to a container. Leaching of grain-boundary inventory and release of gap inventory would
Should free inventory remain in the fuel-sheath gap or grain boundaries subsequent to inbay storage, its release would have occurred during initial vacuum drying process (if
applicable).
The containers are designed and operated to ensure fuel integrity is maintained to the
A maximum PWR fuel bundle radionuclide characteristics are used which is more
conservative than the vendor specific information.
The chronic dose is dependent on the annual fuel throughput. The AP1000 is expected to have
an annual throughput of 43 assemblies per year. The radiation dose methodology is described in
more detail in [AMEC, 2008]
For the AP1000, the maximum chronic off-site dose consequence from this scenario, for a
member of the public at the DN site boundary, is described in the Radiation and Radioactivity
Effects Assessment TSD.
5.2
Routine Radiological Emissions from Radioactive Waste Processing
Radioactive waste processing might be done in a single building or several. Low level waste
processing by a compactor would make up the majority of routine emissions from radioactive
waste processing. Operational experience at OPGs waste management facilities can be used to
5-5


estimate potential radiological emissions from a future waste processing involving a compactor
for low level waste and steps involving final drying, helium back-filling and welding of a used
fuel storage container or cask.
The exhaust from a compactor would go to the processing area ventilation exhaust where it
would be filtered and monitored before exhaust. Using historical data from the WWMFs Waste
Volume Reduction Building ventilation exhaust combined with an estimate of future low level
waste volumes, a conservative estimate can be prepared for general building emission plus
compactor exhaust emissions. Tritium is a major component of routine emissions and
hypothetical radiation doses in an accident. The ACR-1000 becomes a bounding case for all
reactor types. Because projected airborne emissions from an ACR-1000 without a tritium
removal facility are comparable or less than current airborne emissions on a unit basis, current
low level waste characteristics are used.
Radiological emissions at each of the three used fuel storage facilities have traditionally been
very low. Only particulate emissions are measured. Future emissions using enriched fuel and a
slightly higher fuel defect rate is expected to be higher. Note that some losses of radioactive
gases will occur in the fuel bay during loading and would not appear at the used fuel storage
processing and storage buildings.
A conservative estimate for an annual radiological waste processing building from general
building exhaust, compaction and used fuel container processing would be:
Tritium
Particulate
1.2E+11 Bq
7.5E+05 Bq
These would represent about 1% of DN site annual airborne particulate emissions and 0.1% of
airborne tritium emissions over the last three years [OPG, 2006, 2007, 2008].
Operating experience at WWMF has shown that LLW Storage Building sumps and building
footing drainage may contain tritium but few other radionuclides. Sumps will have to be
sampled and if required drainage taken to the station for treatment and monitoring before
discharge. A sampling station to measure and take samples of any footing drainage would be a
probable requirement if the ACR-1000 design was chosen.
5.3
Conventional Emissions
Conventional emissions from waste processing and storage on-site would be expected to be
small due to the passive nature of the operations. Potential sources for non-radiological airborne
emissions will include emissions from vehicles and material handling equipment , operation of a
diesel generator (for equivalent) for use during loss of normal electrical power (safeguards and
security systems associated with dry fuel storage require backup power), and use of welding
equipment. A fire suppression system using carbon dioxide for Storage Buildings containing
L&ILW is a possibility. If so, routine testing of the fire suppression system will release some
carbon dioxide.
5-6

5.4

Impact on the Environment
The impact of waste storage (both construction of storage facilities and normal waste operations)
on the environment at NND can be inferred from experience at the larger WWMF. Over the
period from 2000 to 2005, an extensive Environmental Assessment Follow-Up Program was
undertaken to assess the effect of construction and operations of new buildings at the WWMF.
The conclusion was that were no unreasonable adverse effects due to the construction and
operations of the new storage structures [Nash, 2005; Klassen, 2006]. Similarly no unreasonable
adverse impacts on the environment are anticipated for normal waste storage and processing at
NND.
5-7


6.0
RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT OF MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS
6.1
Approach to Identifying Malfunctions and Accidents
The CEAA requires that every screening or comprehensive study of a project include
consideration of the environmental effects of malfunctions or accidents that may occur in
connection with the project. Furthermore CEAA also requires considerations of measures
provided or intended to mitigate such effects. This section provides a summary description of
radiological malfunctions and accidents identified with on-site storage of L&IL radioactive
waste and used fuel. Non-radiological (or conventional) events are also possible but would be
covered under and bounded by similar events for the project that are discussed further in the
Malfunctions, Accidents and Malevolent Acts TSD.
The focus of the EA is on those events that are considered credible in the context of the proposed
project. It is not the intent to address all conceivable abnormal occurrences, but rather to address
those that may reasonably occur considering the specific aspects of site conditions and the
project design. Within credible accidents, the intent is to focus on the bounding accident
scenario.
The assessment also acknowledges that malfunctions and accidents (i.e. upset conditions) may be
precipitated by external factors, either natural or anthropogenic. In the context of this
assessment, external factors that lead to upset conditions are considered initiating events.
Initiating events can be external to normal nuclear waste operations. An extreme weather
condition is an example of an external event. Initiating events represent either the failure of or
damage to the systems and components of the radioactive waste on-site storage operations. A
meaningful assessment requires a full consideration of the likelihood of initiating events (both
due to nuclear waste operations related events and non-nuclear waste related but with nuclear)
waste implication) as well as the consequence of such events.
The screening approach taken was to identify those events that may reasonably occur and then
establish if they result in a radiological consequence that warrant further consideration. Where it
was determined, on the basis of screening, that the event could result in a radiological
consequence, that event was advanced for subsequent evaluation. The process is intended to
identify both typical and the bounding (limiting) credible malfunctions and accident from the
radiological perspective.
6.2
Assessment Methodology
The radioactive waste on-site storage philosophy embodies the defence-in-depth approach to
keep radionuclide emissions within regulatory limits and at levels that are ALARA. The
defence-in-depth approach is achieved by using multiple barriers between the nuclear waste and
the environment.
The assessment of nuclear malfunctions and accidents is divided into general areas according to
the waste type.
6-1


Low and Intermediate Level Waste.

Refurbishment Waste
Used Fuel
- ACR-1000 used fuel processing and storage using a modification of the current
DSC design
- AP1000 used fuel processing and storage using a shielded cask design
- EPR used fuel processing and storage using a shielded cask design
For each of these waste types, release of radiation can occur due to the failure of the system and
components. There are two general categories of initiating events resulting in abnormal
conditions or accident, as follows:
Internal events, which are abnormal conditions generated within the radioactive waste
on-site storage systems as a result of equipment failure or human error; and
External events, which are natural and human-made phenomena originating outside the
project that has the potential of leading to wide-spread, multiple internal events.
The internal and external initiating events are screened later in a series of tables (Tables 6.3-1,
6.4-1, 6.6-1, 6.7-2 and 6.8-2).
Nuclear criticality is also reviewed for the three reactor designs to ensure that technology to
ensure safety is available and can be adapted.
Each event was screened to establish if it could result in any radiological impact to the public
and a NEW. Events with a frequency of less than 10-7 events per year are considered
incredible and are not considered further. Design provisions, procedural measures and worker
training that could prevent or mitigate its consequences were also considered. After the
screening of all initiating events, the events with the worse consequence to the public were
chosen as the bounding event for that waste type and phase of operations. The hypothetical
radiation doses to a member of the public and a NEW were then calculated for that waste type
and phase of operation. While there is no reason to believe that a Safety Assessment could not
demonstrate that a location north of the CN rail line is feasible, the safety assessment used in this
TSD assume that any waste processing or storage building are built south of the CN rail line and
no closer than 150 m to the site perimeter fence. However, for EA planning purposes, this TSD
has accepted this analysis to demonstrate that the UFDS can be located anywhere on the site.
Should the Vendor require the UFDS buildings to be located north of the CN rail line, or any
waste processing or storage building to be located closer than 150 m to the site perimeter fence,
OPG has committed to updating safety assessment for this location as part of the licensing
process.
6-2


6.3
L&ILW - Malfunctions and Accidents
6.3.1
Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for L&ILW
Malfunctions and accidents with a radioactive release involving low and intermediate level waste
basically fall into two categories. A handling accident involving some spill of the contents and a
handling accident that also involves a fire situation are the categories. It is assumed that all
waste will be in metal containers. Some new container designs would be required for aboveground storage of intermediate level waste such as filters. These new intermediate level waste
containers would have to provide shielding and be robust enough to contain waste in a fire
scenario.
In general an accident involving fire is much more significant as package releases in a respirable
size would be higher resulting in higher radiation dose to the public and to the worker.
Table 6.3-1 summarizes the accident scenarios for LLW. Two cases involving fire represent the
bounding case for low and intermediate level waste respectively.
6.3.2
Bounding Case for Low Level Waste Pool Fire Beside Stacked Waste
Containers
Future L&ILW waste storage at NND is expected to be in storage buildings similar to what is
being used today at WMMF. It is assumed that all waste will be in containers that are either
similar or more robust that what are used today. Fire detection systems at WWMF are being
upgraded and equivalent or better systems would be anticipated for NND waste storage
structures.
Because all waste will be in containers, the safety approach developed by the US Department of
Energy for Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facilities [US DOE, 2007] was considered suitable for this
application. This approach has been used in the US Waste Isolation Pilot Project for storage in
an underground storage room [US DOE, 2006].
The bounding accident scenario is a pool fire near a stack of waste containers. The basic
scenario is leakage from the gasoline or diesel fuel tank of a forklift or material handling vehicle
catches fire. The conservative assumption is that the forklift is immediately adjacent to a stack
of waste that extends from the floor to the ceiling of a low level storage building. For example
the forklift might have just placed a container into the top row of waste containers inside the
building.
In US DOE methodology, a pool fire is considered to be the more severe case than a normal
combustible fire because the more intense heat causes lid loss on the top row of containers and
waste is physically ejected from the containers. Particulate release fraction that is respirable
from ejected waste are higher than the remaining waste that burns within the container itself.
Waste within 4 meters of the forklift is assumed to be affected by the pool fire. The heat from
this fire is considered intense enough to give a plume rise. The hypothetical radiation dose to a
member of the public from this fire was calculated to be 14 Sv which is between 1% to 2% of
the regulatory limit for a member of the public.
6-3


At the start of the fire, it is assumed that the NEW will immediately leave to get a fire
extinguisher, return and empty the extinguisher at the fire. He/she will then leave the area. The
time that a NEW would be exposed to the fire scenario is expected to be no more than three
minutes. Either the NEW or an Emergency Response Team member will then return later but
wearing full respiratory protection and some plastic protection against tritium uptake through the
skin. Nearly all the radiation dose to the NEW will come from the inhalation dose component in
those first three minutes. Depending on the fire situation, the decision to use carbon dioxide fire
suppression to the storage building may be taken.
The hypothetical radiation dose to the NEW in this fire scenario is 14.2 mSv which is about 28%
of the regulatory annual dose to a worker.
6-4


TABLE 6.3-1: SCREENING OF MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS FOR L&IL WASTE
Potential Malfunction or
Accident Scenario
Natural Initiating Events
Earthquake
Flood
Thunderstorm
Preventative and Mitigative Measures/

Screening Evaluation
The processing or storage building will be
designed in accordance with the National
Building Code (NBC) and/or the National
Fire Code (NFC). They are expected to
remain standing.
Given the Darlington site characteristic,
extensive flooding affecting the processing
or storage buildings is not a credible event.
Thunderstorms can potentially involve
lightning striking either the processing or a
storage building. No public dose
consequences are expected from this event,
as the buildings will have appropriate
grounding provisions.
Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Operations and
Maintenance
No further assessment is
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Procedures will be in place not to allow

waste transfer operations between buildings
during inclement weather.
Tornado

Building Code (NBC) or and the National
remain standing.
6-5

Accident Scenario


Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Low and intermediate level waste containers

would be largely protected by the heavy
shielding walls of the storage buildings.
Any consequences due to tornado missiles
sticking a container would be bounded by
the fire scenario.
Aircraft Crash
Aircraft Crash
The probability of an aircraft strike is

Operations and
proportional to the target area. Therefore the Maintenance
postulated frequency is less than 10-7 events
per year making this an incredible event
[AMEC, 2008]. Therefore no further
assessment is required.
Conventional Accidents
Similar to and covered by the more general
- spills
cases for the overall EA. Refer to
- release of chemicals
Malfunctions, Accidents and Malevolent
- fall of heavy equipment
Acts Technical Support Document
- fire and explosion accidents
- releases of gases
Low and Intermediate Level Waste Radiological Accidents
Vehicle/Package Accident
A handling accident involving either low or
During Transfer to
intermediate waste is possible during a
Processing/Storage Building
transfer to either a processing or storage
(no fire)
building. It is anticipated that the
consequences would be limited to a small
spill of package contents. This
6-6
Site Preparation and

Construction
required
Operations and
Maintenance
Refer to Malfunctions,
Accidents and
Malevolent Acts
Technical Support
Document
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
This will be bounded by
an intermediate waste
single package fire


Accident Scenario

contamination would be cleaned up as part
of normal operations. It is assumed that any
highly dispersible waste forms containing
higher levels of radioactivity would be in a
more robust container.
Fire During Placement of a
A possible accident here is a pool fire (spill
Waste Container on the top row of gasoline or diesel fuel from a material
in a LLSB.
handling vehicle that catches fire beside a
stack of waste containers).
Fire During Transfer to or
Storage of an Intermediate
Level Waste Package in a
Storage Building
Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Operations and
Maintenance
A possible accident here is a pool fire (spill

Operations and
of gasoline or diesel fuel from a material
Maintenance
handling vehicle that impacts on the waste)
involving transfer of an intermediate level
waste form such as a 3 m3 resin liner.
Intermediate waste packaging is assumed to
be robust enough/response time soon enough
that only a confined * burn occurs.
Screening Decision
Further assessment is
required.
This is the bounding
case for low level waste
required.
This is the bounding
case for intermediate
level waste.
In a confined burn, waste is not ejected from the container. Gaskets may fail and internal gases are allowed to escape from the
container. A confined burn requires a container with secure fastenings and depending on contents some type of venting
provision.
6-7

6.3.3

Bounding Case for Intermediate Level Waste - Pool Fire Involving Resin Liner
A fire could also occur during intermediate waste handling particularly during material transfer
to an above ground storage structure. The basic accident scenario again is a pool fire that occurs
during transfer to an above-ground storage facility using equipment such as a forklift. The
vehicles gasoline or diesel fuel tank has ruptured and the fuel has caught on tire. This material
handling accident assumes only a relatively short distance between the forklifts fuel tank and the
waste container.
The accident assumes a confined burn. This means that any intermediate level waste would be
in a robust container with design provisions that in a fire scenario, the lid would stay intact. This
could be done in a variety of means such as over-packing, bolting and venting provisions.
A 3 m3 resin liner in an overpacked arrangement is considered to be a representative bounding
case for intermediate level waste. Because the fire would involve less combustible material, it is
modeled as a ground-level release. It is assumed that the majority of the dose from this
postulated scenario comes from Carbon-14 and tritium. Because a future ACR-1000 may not
have a tritium removal facility, the specific activity of tritium is increased by a factor of three
from current values.
The hypothetical radiation dose to a member of the public was calculated to be 83 Sv for a pool
fire involving intermediate level waste which is about 8% of the regulatory limit to a member of
the public.
At the start of the fire, it is assumed that the NEW will immediately leave to get a fire
extinguisher, return and empty the extinguisher at the fire. He/she then will leave the area. The
time that a NEW would be exposed to the fire scenario is expected to be no more than three
minutes. Either the NEW or an Emergency Response Team member will then return later but
wearing full respiratory protection and some plastic protection against tritium uptake through the
skin. Nearly all the NEW dose will come from the inhalation dose component in those first three
minutes. The hypothetical dose to a NEW is 1.43 mSv which is about 3% of the regulatory
annual dose to a worker.
6.4
Refurbishment Waste Storage and Handling
6.4.1
Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for Refurbishment Waste
Malfunctions and accidents involving refurbishment waste represent a special case of

intermediate level waste handling. It is assumed that because of the potentially much higher
specific activity of refurbishment waste that it would be stored separately from other waste
packages containing potential combustible waste. Therefore the accident scenarios are reduced
to material handling accidents involving a partial spill from a container and release of contents.
Table 6.4-1 summarizes the possible scenarios.
6-8

Ontario Power Generation Inc

TABLE 6.4-1: SCREENING OF MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS FOR REFURBISHMENT WASTE
Accident Scenario
Earthquake
Flood
Thunderstorm

remain standing and be structurally
acceptable.
extensive flooding affecting any processing
Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.

Tornado

acceptable.
6-9

Accident Scenario


Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Refurbishment waste (such as refurbishment

waste containers or steam generators) would
also be expected to be largely unaffected by
tornado missiles due to the containers
design and the storage building design.
Aircraft Crash
Aircraft Crash

Operations and
- spills
-release of chemicals
- releases of gases
Refurbishment Waste Radiological Accidents
Drop of a refurbishment waste
During material handling or storage
container
activities with intermediate waste from
refurbishment, the container falls. It is
assumed that the container is a robust
container similar to the retube waste
6-10

Construction
required
Operations and
Maintenance
Accidents and
Malevolent Acts
Technical Support
Document
Operations and
Maintenance
required.

Accident Scenario
Drop of a steam generator
Drop of a Rector Head
Fire


containers being stored at WWMF.
Any openings in a steam generator would
either be bolted or welded shut. During
waste moving and loading into a storage
building, any potential drop would be quite
short. Because the steam generator is a
heavy pressure vessel, any damage would be
limited to rupture of the bolted or welded
cover.
During storage operations a reactor head is
sealed and then a drop of the reactor head
occurs during transfer to storage. It is
assumed that steps would be taken before
moving the reactor head to either provide a
degree of containment or to fix potentially
loose contamination in place. Note the
hazard here comes from the thin corrosion
film on the reactor head and not the reactor
head itself.
Refurbishment waste is almost entirely noncombustible. Also some of the waste forms
such as Retube Waste Containers would
have a relatively large thermal inertia.
Current and future practices are that this
type of waste is stored separately from the
low level combustible waste. Releases from
a fire event would be considered to be small.
6-11
Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
This accident would be
bounded by the steam
generator case.
Refurbishment
required

6.4.2

Bounding Case - Drop of a Retube Waste Container
During refurbishment of a reactor, there may be a need to remove some core components and
store them. Because of the very high specific activity of core components there will be a need to
store the waste in a very robust (can survive anticipated waste handling accidents) and heavily
shielded container. Of the three reactor types, the ACR-1000 is expected to have the highest
volume of refurbishment waste and probably the highest gamma hazard.
While the hypothetical radiation doses are very dependent on the time from reactor shutdown to
removal of the core component, the maximum hypothetical radiation dose from the drop of
retube waste container is 0.7 Sv to a member of the public which is less than 1% 0f the
regulatory annual limit for radiation dose to a member of the public. The dose to a NEW due
this postulated scenario is 4.1 mSv which is about 8% of the regulatory radiation dose limit for
radiation dose to a worker.
6.4.3
Bounding Case - Drop of a Steam Generator
During refurbishment of all reactor types, replacement of steam generators is a possibility. A

material handling accident is assumed where there is a short drop of a steam generator. All
openings on the steam generator would have been previously welded or bolted shut. The
accident assumes that there is a breech in one of these openings. The drop would jar loose some
of the particulate on the steam generator internal surfaces. Some of this particulate would be in
the respiratory range and would escape through the breech(es).
For the Continued Operation of Pickering B EA, a very conservative modelling was done for a
steam generator drop. No credit was given for the point that the majority of particulate that
would become airborne would be inside the steam generator tubes and would have little chance
of escape. Despite the NND steam generators being larger, modelling of a NND steam generator
drop using the methodology [US DOE, 2007] would be expected to give a lower result. The
conservative modelling for the PNGS B refurbishment case of a steam generator drop with a
hypothetical public radiation dose of <0.1 Sv to a member of the public (less than 0.01% of
regulatory annual radiation dose limit to a member of the public) and 609 Sv for a NEW (about
1% of the regulatory annul radiation dose limit to a worker) would still represent a reasonable
upper limit for the larger steam generators.
6.5
Used Fuel Dry Storage Assessment of Bounding Accident
These scenarios for all three reactor start with the transfer of the loaded cask/container to the
storage or processing building from the irradiated fuel bay area.
Normal operating releases or accidental releases from the fuel are due to volatile gases that
escape through small defects in the fuel cladding. Accident conditions introduce a mechanical
shock to the system that increase the percentage of defects in the fuel and lead to higher releases.
The bounding case for mechanical shock is the design basis accident where a significant
percentage (30%) of the fuel elements becomes damaged
6-12


The accident scenarios for used fuel storage are similar for the three reactor designs. After the
minimum 10 years of wet storage, the source term of volatile radionuclides available for release
is reduced to the inventory of Kr-85 and tritium if an accident causing a defect in the fuel
cladding occurs. Available for release refers to the fractions of Kr-85 and tritium that have
migrated to the gap between the fuel and the cladding, and to the grain boundaries within the fuel
pellet. These gap fractions vary for the different fuel types.
There are two cases that need to be considered for all three reactor types:
Acute Release Malfunctions and Accidents: An acute release from a credible accident
scenario in which used fuel bundles/assembles are damaged and the volatile inventories in the
gap are released directly into the environment. The failure of 30% of fuel elements within the
storage container/cask is assumed to occur. Realistically, fuel sheath failure is not expected to
result from any postulated credible scenario. This case represents the bounding acute release
assessment.
Criticality There should be both design and operating provisions for used fuel handling and
storage to ensure that nuclear criticality (the point in which a nuclear reaction is self-sustaining)
cannot occur.
IAEA Safety Series document (IAEA, 2008) lays out the basic principles for safe storage of used
nuclear fuels. It states that the storage facility should be designed to fulfill the fundamental
safety functions including control of sub-criticality. It continues to state that a fundamental
safety objective of all designs for used fuel storage facility is to ensure sub-criticality of the
entire system under all credible circumstances.
The sub-criticality of the used fuel may be ensured or influenced by a number of design features
and precautions.
x
x
x
x
Material Mass, Element, Enrichment, Heterogeneity

Shape Geometry, Volume, Concentration, Density
Poison Solid, Liquid
Others Reflection, Moderator, Unit Interaction.
6.6
ACR-1000 Malfunctions and Accidents During Dry Storage of Used Fuel
6.6.1
Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for ACR-1000
As described earlier, there are differences in the amount of used fuel in the different used fuel
storage options. In general, the DSC approach will always be more conservative than the
MACSTOR approach simply because more used fuel is involved and the DSC will be used for
this assessment.
6-13


Malfunctions and accidents involving the bounding used fuel dry storage canister are
summarized in Table 6.6-1. The hypothetical radiation dose for the bounding case needs to be
further assessed.
6.6.2
ACR-1000 Assessment of Bounding Accident
To provide an upper bound estimate of a stylized acute release resulting from a worst-case
accident during dry storage operations, public and occupational doses were estimated assuming
failure of 30 percent of the used fuel in a container containing a total of 384 used fuel bundles. It
is assumed that the container seal weld fails (or loss of seal and slightly negative atmospheric
pressure inside a container) and the available free radionuclide inventory in the container is
immediately released to the atmosphere.
The acute off-site dose consequences resulting from this stylized scenario, for a member of the
public at the DN fenced site boundary, are estimated to be 21.6 Sv for an adult or 21.0 Sv for
an infant. The adult dose estimate is about 2% of the regulatory dose limit of 1 mSv/year (1,000
Sv/year). The estimated acute maximum dose to a worker in the vicinity is 3.2 mSv. Because
of the conservatism of the assumptions, these dose estimates are considered bounding for
container handling accidents in dry storage operations at the DWMF.
6.6.3
Criticality Assessment for ACR-1000
The general principles for criticality control were discussed earlier in Section 6.5.
Criticality assessments previously carried out for natural uranium (NU) reference fuel bundles at
DWMF concluded that the used fuel stored in DSCs would remain sub-critical under all normal
and abnormal storage conditions, as well as under any credible accident conditions. Similar
criticality assessments have also been done for the slightly enriched CANFLEX-LVRF (Low
Void Reactivity Fuel). However, neither the conclusions drawn for the NU DWMF reference
fuel bundles or the slightly enriched CANFLEX-LVRF necessarily extend to the storage of used
CANFLEXACR fuel in similar containers due to the use of higher enriched uranium in the new
fuel. In extending the application of the current or modified DSC design to used fuel from ACR1000 it must be demonstrated that used CANFLEXACR fuel remains sub-critical throughout
the container loading, transfer, processing and storage operations, and under any credible
accident scenario at the DWMF.
6.6.3.1
Normal Operations
Under normal operating conditions the fuel is held in a secure configuration, therefore, a change
in configuration of the material is not possible. Thus ensuring sub-criticality under normal
operating condition for CANFLEX-ACR used fuel is based on demonstrating
a) sub-critical conditions in each individual container, and
b) sub-critical conditions inside the storage facility once all containers are loaded.
6-14


TABLE 6.6-1: SCREENING OF MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS FOR ACR-1000
Accident Scenario
Earthquake
Flood
Thunderstorm
Tornado

acceptable.
acceptable.
6-15
Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.

Accident Scenario


Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Either DSCs or the MACSTOR approach

would also be expected to be largely
unaffected by tornado missiles because of
heavy shielding and/or thick walls of the
storage building.
Aircraft Crash
Aircraft Crash
- spills
- releases of gases

Operations and
required

cases for the overall EA. Refer to Chapter 3
in Malfunctions, Accidents and Malevolent
Acts Assessment of Environmental Effects
Refer to Chapter 3 in
Malfunctions, Accidents
and Malevolent Acts
Assessment of
Environmental Effects
Technical Support
Document
Nearby Fire to Storage Container

Fire near the dry storage
The heavily shielded containers for dry fuel
container
storage would have considerable thermal
inertia. Also it would be operating practice
to store them away from any appreciable
amount of combustible material. It is highly
unlikely that the containers/casks would see
6-16

Construction
Operations and
Maintenance
Operations and
Maintenance
required.

Accident Scenario
ACR-1000 Bounding Accident

Bounding case is postulated to
be a drop of a loaded canister
causing damage to 30% of the
fuel pencils.
ACR-1000 Criticality
A criticality incident might
occur during used fuel
operations,


any fire strong enough to lead to a release.
Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Gaseous radionuclides (Tritium, Kr-85) will

be released.
Operations and
Maintenance
required
Design features should ensure that a

criticality event would not occur.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
6-17


For storage of containers containing used fuel, ANS 8.7 Section 4.2.1, states that the limits for
storage of fissile material shall be based on experimental data or on the results of calculations
made through the use of validated computational techniques. This requirement could set limits
on the size and the configuration of the array in which containers are arranged in the storage
buildings, since an increased number of containers involves a larger mass of fissile material, and
hence implies a greater potential for neutron interaction between containers. However, the
concrete of the container walls effectively shields out neutrons originating outside the container,
so that there is essentially no neutron interaction between containers. There are therefore no
constraints, from a criticality perspective, on the number of containers that can be stored or the
configuration in which they are stored.
6.6.3.2 Abnormal Operating Conditions and Credible Accidents

Under abnormal operating conditions or credible accidents two possible factors which could
influence the potential for criticality must be considered. These underlying changes in process
conditions involve:
a) configuration of the material, and
b) addition of a moderator.
None of the previously considered accident scenarios could lead to a criticality incident as there
is no case in which the lid of the container fails, leading to potential loss of configuration of the
fuel bundles, nor is there a pathway created for ingress of a moderator.
There are, however, other abnormal operating conditions which could be postulated, that may not
previously have been considered, as they would not give rise to a release of radioactive material.
They could however be significant from a criticality perspective. These identified conditions are:
inadequate/incomplete drainage/drying of the container prior to transfer to the DWMF

the water remaining in the container would act as a moderator,
inadvertent addition of a moderator into the container during processing at the DWMF,
and
loss of fuel/module integrity during long term storage, resulting in a change of
configuration of the fuel bundles.
6.6.3.2.1
Inadequate Drainage of the Container
Sub-criticality of the contents of a container must be guaranteed for the complete range of
conditions from the loaded container filled with water to being completely drained. The most
limiting configuration for criticality safety is the situation where there is water retained within
the storage module tubes in and around bundles, but reduced density or no water between the
tubes, as this condition maximizes the neutron coupling between the bundles. Nonetheless,
neutron absorption in the stainless steel module tubes ensures that, even in this limiting
configuration, substantial sub-criticality margin remains.
6-18


While there is potential for some water to remain in the container after draining and vacuum
drying, it is not likely that the container, as readied for transfer to the DWMF, will retain
sufficient quantities to mirror the conditions for the most limiting configuration. Any residual
water would be expected to condensate in cooler areas such as the bottom of the container away
from the fuel. Furthermore, upon arrival at the DWMF, the containers undergo additional
draining and vacuum drying steps. During further processing and subsequent storage, therefore,
it is extremely unlikely that the containers will retain any water at all.
It can thus be concluded that containers containing CANFLEXACR bundles as transferred from
the NND to the DWMF are unlikely to contain substantial quantities of water as a result of
inadequate drainage or drying of the container interior cavity. However, in the event that some
water is present, the configuration is bounded by the limiting condition addressed above.
Therefore, this scenario is not assessed further.
6.6.3.2.2
Addition of a Moderator during Container Processing at the DWMF
The potential for a moderator, other than water, to enter the container during the processing
operations is discussed in this section. The most likely point in the operations for this to happen
is while the container is under vacuum during the final drying and helium backfill process. This
operation is carried out via the drain port located at the bottom of the container. This port has a
non-return valve. A pump is connected to the drain port and the vacuum generated. The pump is
then disconnected and the vacuum maintained by the action of the non-return valve. The helium
is delivered to the container via a tube which incorporates a tool to release the non-return valve.
Ingress of a moderator, for example, oil from a malfunctioning pump, is therefore prevented by
the non-return valve or the physical attachment of the helium delivery tube. Hence, even if the
non-return valve failed in such a way that a route into the container was possible, no significant
quantities of fluid are available to be drawn into the container. The other fluid with potential for
ingress to the container is fire fighting water or foam.
In order for fire fighting liquid to get into the container it would need to have a point of ingress.
At the only point in the operations where the container is held under vacuum, entry of water or
foam is prevented by the non-return valve on the drain port, as discussed above. The other entry
point to the container is the vent port, which is sealed via a welded plug at the time the lid is
welded in place. The vent port is located on the side of the container lid, so there is no potential
for sufficient liquid to accumulate on a surface of the container and, as a consequence, drip
through the port. Furthermore, prior to the final seal welding of the port, a transfer plug is in
place. This scenario is therefore not credible given the lack of an entry route for the liquid into
the container and is not assessed further.
6.6.3.2.3
Loss of Container or Storage Module Integrity during Long Term Storage
The long term integrity of the container is maintained during storage. The integrity of the
concrete and steel components (including welds) will be adequate to provide at least 50 years of
service if stored indoors with a maintenance program. The modules are made of stainless steel
and, as such, are not susceptible to the corrosion/oxidation which could affect the carbon steel
6-19


components of the container. The integrity of the modules will, therefore, be at least similar to
that of the containers.
The only scenario which could adversely affect the criticality safety of the container would be a
loss of configuration of the fuel bundles, which would require a massive failure of the structure
of the modules or the container. The integrity of all components ensures that such a failure,
within the 50 year storage period considered is not credible and is not assessed further.
6.6.3.3 Criticality Safety Assessment Summary

Prior to considering use of either the current OPG design of DSC, a modified version of the
DSC, or indeed any alternative storage option such as the MACSTOR system, for dry storage of
used CANFLEX-ACR fuel, the system design will first be assessed against all applicable design
requirements, including those related to criticality safety. The design of the container, as well as
the entire used fuel management process, must ensure that used CANFLEX-ACR fuel remains
adequately sub-critical throughout the proposed container loading, transfer, processing and
storage operations, and under any credible accident scenarios. The assessment presented above
indicates that, given a used fuel storage container and process which has been suitably qualified
for this design basis, there are no anticipated scenarios for dry storage of used fuel from ACR1000 under which criticality safety objectives would not be met.
6.7
EPR Malfunctions and Accidents During Dry Storage of Used Fuel
6.7.1
Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for EPR
For malfunctions and accidents assessment, a more conservative value (Maximum PWR,
[AMEC, 2008]) will be used for the source term for hypothetical radiation dose assessments.
Table 6.7-1 gives the properties for 10 year cooled EPR fuel [AMEC, 2008] and for Maximum
PWR.
TABLE 6.7-1: PROPERTIES OF 10 YEAR COOLED EPR FUEL
Key Parameter
Kr-85 Gap Fraction
H-3 Gap Fraction
(Assemblies)
Fuel Defect Rates
EPR
1.69E+14
0.1
9.03E+12
0.05
85
Maximum PWR
1.55E+14
0.1
1.39E+13
0.05
85
0.25%
0.25%
Malfunctions and accidents involving used fuel casks are summarized in Table 6.7-2. The
hypothetical radiation dose for the bounding case needs to be further assessed.
6-20


TABLE 6.7-2: SCREENING OF MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS FOR EPR
Accident Scenario
Earthquake
Flood
Thunderstorm

acceptable.
Given the Darlington site characteristics,
Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.

Tornado

acceptable.
6-21

Accident Scenario


Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Because of thick walls of the storage

building and the heavy shielding of the cask
itself, dry fuel storage casks would also be
expected to be largely unaffected by tornado
missiles.
Aircraft Crash
Aircraft Crash
- spills
- releases of gases
Nearby Fire to Storage Cask
Fire near the dry storage cask.
Operations and
required


Construction
Operations and
Maintenance
Accidents and
Malevolent Acts
Assessment Technical
Support Document
The heavily shielded casks for dry fuel

inertia. Also it is operating practice to store
them away from any appreciable amount of
combustible material. It is highly unlikely
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
6-22

Accident Scenario
EPR Bounding Accident

Bounding case is the drop of a
cask with a failure of 30% of
the fuel elements.
EPR - Criticality
operations,


that the containers/casks would see any fire
strong enough to lead to a release.
Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Gaseous radionuclides (Tritium, Kr-85) will

be released.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.

Operations and
Maintenance
required.
6-23

6.7.2

EPR Assessment of Bounding Accident
To provide an upper bound estimate of an acute hypothetical release resulting from a worst-case
accident during used fuel dry storage operations, public and occupational doses were estimated
assuming failure of 30% of used fuel in a cask. It is not expected that significant fuel failure will
occur under any of the postulated handling and storage events given the robust design of the cask
and fuel assemblies themselves. It is assumed for this assessment that the seal weld or bolted
containment boundary of the cask will be lost and the free radionuclide inventory in the
container is immediately released into the atmosphere.
The acute off-site dose consequences resulting from this hypothetical scenario, for a member of
the public at the DN site boundary will be dependent on whether a 24 or 40 assembly cask is
involved. The hypothetical radiation doses for a 24 assemblies cask are 142 Sv for an adult and
144 Sv for an infant. The hypothetical radiation dose for a 40 assemblies cask are 237 Sv for
and adult and 240 Sv for an infant. The adult dose estimate is about 24% percent of the
regulatory dose limit of 1 mSv/year (1,000 Sv/year) for the 40 assemblies cask bounding
accident.
Assuming that the worker is immersed in a cloud consisting of the available free radionuclide
inventory, the estimated acute maximum hypothetical radiation doses to a worker in the vicinity
are 20.4 mSv from a 24 used fuel assemblies cask and 33.9 mSv, from a 40 used fuel assemblies
cask. This is about 68% of the one year radiation dose limit of 50 mSv for a NEW.
6.7.3
Criticality Assessment for EPR
PWR containers for an EPR will be designed to remain sub-critical. However sub-criticality can
be influenced by internal or external hazards which have the potential to reconfigure the preexisting used fuel assembly array in such a way as to increase the potential for criticality.
Erosion of the criticality safety margin can occur if any of the factors listed above are changed.
Therefore those accident scenarios which may result in a change in any of these factors must be
considered, and the storage facility designed in such a way as to either make these accidents
incredible or to maintain sufficient criticality safety margin that the resulting changes are not
able to cause criticality. Fuel baskets and containers for used fuel storage should be designed in
such a way as to ensure that the used fuel will remain in a configuration which has been
determined to be sub-critical during loading, transport, storage, and retrieval. The used fuel dry
storage facilities will be designed in such a way that consequences likely to result from the
redistribution or the introduction of a moderator as a consequence of an internal or external event
can be accommodated.
Criticality events are prevented by the absence of a moderator and provision of sufficient poison
in the basket even if the internal fuel orientations are changed by events. The lack of a
moderator in the cask is significant since, at enrichments below 5%, un-moderated criticality is
not physically possible under any conditions in the absence of other neutron sources
(NRC, 2007). In the absence of moderation, experiments and calculations have demonstrated
6-24


that criticality is not possible at the enrichments currently used in light-water reactor (LWR) fuel
(NRC, 2007). Furthermore, prior to dry storage, the fuel assemblies would previously have been
stored in the fuel pool with neutron poison in the racks to ensure sub-criticality. The smaller
subset of fuel elements placed in the dry storage cask may be unable to become critical even with
moderator (water) in cask (EPRI, 2004). As such, assessment of the PWR container must
demonstrate no credible accident can lead to ingress of a moderator.
Alternatively, if a design is chosen which cannot meet this objective, additional neutron
absorbing material may be required, such as a boron poison in the form of boral plating. Boral
plating on the basket is an effective means of criticality control. With this poison present,
criticality is not credible whether the assembly is moderated or unmoderated. No credible
scenario which would eliminate the boral and leave the geometry of the fuel intact has been
identified. Even if the boral plates were to separate from the basket structure, they would have
limited room to move and, once the basket is sealed, there is no credible means by which they
could fall out of the basket. If the contents of the cask were to somehow relocate, the boral
plating would relocate with the debris. In all likelihood, this postulated configuration would be
highly sub-critical because of the boral plating and because a bed of debris is not an optimal
geometry [(NRC, 2007).
Ensuring criticality safety under all credible circumstances will be achieved as a design
requirement of the technology option selected for dry storage of used EPR fuel.
6.8
AP1000 Malfunctions and Accidents During Dry Storage of Used Fuel
6.8.1
Screening of Malfunctions and Accidents for AP1000
For malfunctions and accidents assessment, a more conservative value (Maximum PWR,
[AMEC, 2008]) will be used for the source term for hypothetical radiation dose assessments.
Table 6.8-1 gives the properties for 10 year cooled AP1000 fuel and for Maximum PWR.
TABLE 6.8-1: PROPERTIES OF 10 YEAR COOLED AP1000 FUEL
Key Parameter
Kr-85 Gap Fraction
H-3 Gap Fraction
(Assemblies)
Fuel Defect Rates
AP1000
1.31E+14
0.1
9.03E+12
0.05
43
Maximum PWR
1.55E+14
0.1
1.39E+13
0.05
43
0.25%
0.25%
Malfunctions and accidents involving used fuel casks are summarized in Table 6.8-2. The
hypothetical radiation dose for the bounding case needs to be further assessed.
6-25


TABLE 6.8-2: SCREENING OF MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS FOR AP1000
Accident Scenario
Earthquake
Flood
Thunderstorm

acceptable.
Given the Darlington site characteristics,
Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.

Tornado

acceptable.
6-26

Accident Scenario


Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Because of thick walls of the storage

building and the heavy shielding of the cask
itself, dry fuel storage casks would also be
expected to be largely unaffected by tornado
missiles. .
Aircraft Crash
Aircraft Crash
- spills
- releases of gases
Nearby Fire to Storage Cask
Fire near the dry storage cask.

Operations and
required

cases for the overall EA. Refer to Chapter 3
in Malfunctions, Accidents and Malevolent
Acts Assessment of Environmental Effects

Construction
Refer to Chapter 3 in
Malfunctions, Accidents
and Malevolent Acts
Assessment of
Environmental Effects
Technical Support
Document
The heavily shielded casks for dry fuel

inertia. Also it is operating practice to store
them away from any appreciable amount of
Operations and
Maintenance
6-27
Operations and
Maintenance
required.

Accident Scenario
AP1000 Bounding Accident

Bounding case is a drop of a
loaded cask and it is assumed
that 30% of the fuel pencils
fail.
AP1000 - Criticality
operations,


combustible material. It is highly unlikely
that the containers/casks would see any fire
strong enough to lead to a release.
Project Phase/Works
and Activities
Screening Decision
Gaseous radionuclides (H-3, Kr-85) will be

released.
Operations and
Maintenance
required.

Operations and
Maintenance
required.
6-28

6.8.2

AP1000 Assessment of Bounding Accident
To provide an upper bound estimate of an acute hypothetical release resulting from a worst-case
accident during used fuel dry storage operations, public and occupational doses were estimated
assuming failure of 30% of used fuel in a cask. It is not expected that significant fuel failure will
occur under any of the postulated handling and storage events given the robust design of the cask
and fuel assemblies themselves. It is assumed for this assessment that the seal weld or bolted
containment boundary of the cask will be lost and the free radionuclide inventory in the cask is
immediately released into the atmosphere.
The acute off-site dose consequences resulting from this hypothetical scenario, for a member of
the public at the DN site boundary will be dependent on whether a 24 or 40 assembly cask is
involved. The hypothetical radiation dose for a 24 assemblies cask are 142 Sv for and adult
and 144 Sv for an infant. The hypothetical radiation dose for a 40 assemblies cask are 237 Sv
for and adult and 240 Sv for an infant. The adult dose estimate is less than 25% percent of the
regulatory dose limit of 1 mSv/year (1,000 Sv/year) for the 40 assemblies cask case.
Assuming that the worker is immersed in a cloud consisting of the available free radionuclide
inventory, the estimated acute maximum hypothetical radiation doses to a worker in the vicinity
are 20.4 mSv from a 24 used fuel assemblies cask and 33.9 mSv, from a 40 used fuel assemblies
cask. The hypothetical radiation to a NEW for a 40 assemblies flask bounding accident is 68%
of the annual radiation dose limit of 50 mSv.
6.8.3
Criticality Assessment for AP1000
PWR containers for an AP1000 will be designed to remain sub-critical. However sub-criticality
can be influenced by internal or external hazards which have the potential to reconfigure the preexisting used fuel assembly array in such a way as to increase the potential for criticality.
Erosion of the criticality safety margin can occur if any of the factors listed above are changed.
Therefore those accident scenarios which may result in a change in any of these factors must be
considered, and the storage facility designed in such a way as to either make these accidents
incredible or to maintain sufficient criticality safety margin that the resulting changes are not
able to cause criticality. Fuel baskets and containers for used fuel storage should be designed in
such a way as to ensure that the used fuel will remain in a configuration which has been
determined to be sub-critical during loading, transport, storage, and retrieval. The used fuel dry
storage facilities will be designed in such a way that consequences likely to result from the
redistribution or the introduction of a moderator as a consequence of an internal or external event
can be accommodated.
Criticality events are prevented by the absence of a moderator and provision of sufficient poison
in the basket even if the internal fuel orientations are changed by events. The lack of a
moderator in the cask is significant since, at enrichments below 5%, un-moderated criticality is
not physically possible under any conditions in the absence of other neutron sources
(NRC, 2007). In the absence of moderation, experiments and calculations have demonstrated
6-29


that criticality is not possible at the enrichments currently used in light-water reactor (LWR) fuel
(NRC, 2007). Furthermore, prior to dry storage, the fuel assemblies would previously have been
stored in the fuel pool with neutron poison in the racks to ensure sub-criticality. The smaller
subset of fuel elements placed in the dry storage cask may be unable to become critical even with
moderator (water) in cask (EPRI, 2004). As such, assessment of the PWR container must
demonstrate no credible accident can lead to ingress of a moderator.
Alternatively, if a design is chosen which cannot meet this objective, additional neutron
absorbing material may be required, such as a boron poison in the form of boral plating. Boral
plating on the basket is an effective means of criticality control. With this poison present,
criticality is not credible whether the assembly is moderated or unmoderated. No credible
scenario which would eliminate the boral and leave the geometry of the fuel intact has been
identified. Even if the boral plates were to separate from the basket structure, they would have
limited room to move and, once the basket is sealed, there is no credible means by which they
could fall out of the basket. If the contents of the cask were to somehow relocate, the boral
plating would relocate with the debris. In all likelihood, this postulated configuration would be
highly sub-critical because of the boral plating and because a bed of debris is not an optimal
geometry (NRC, 2007).
Ensuring criticality safety under all credible circumstances will be achieved as a design
requirement of the technology option selected for dry storage of used AP1000 fuel.
6-30

7.0

SUMMARY
This TSD relates to Nuclear Waste Management, providing an assessment of any radiological
effects on NEWs, and members of the public that may result from operating the proposed waste
management facility to support NND. It also considered the malfunctions and accident scenarios
related to the different waste types.
The EA considers two options for storage of L&ILW; on-site, using compaction on LLW where
possible, packaging, and a modular storage building; and off-site, transporting un-processed
LLW to an appropriately licensed facility. Storage is assumed to be in appropriate licenced
containers and placed standard SBs. Refurbishment wastes are conservatively assumed to be
stored on-site until the stations are decommissioned, at which point they will be transported offsite to a suitably licensed repository.
L&ILW from the light water reactors are expected to have much less tritium and C-14 than the
current CANDU reactors. Tritium and C-14 from the ACR-1000 will also be reduced. An
important new waste stream is related to the boric acid system used for reactivity control in
light water reactors and criticality control in the used fuel bays.
Steam generator radioactivity is expected to be similar for all reactor types.
The fuel from all of the new-build reactors will have higher enrichment than current CANDU
fuels. This introduces elements of criticality control requirements for storage as well as potential
heat load issues for dry storage and eventual disposal.
All three reactor types have 10 to 15 years of wet bay storage and assume that older fuel will be
transferred to dry storage as the bay fills up. The timing of dry storage operation depends on the
fuelling cycle. It is assumed that 50% of the lifetime used fuel will require on-site dry storage
and that the NWMO will take ownership of the fuel.
Long term site planning will need to include space for three L&ILW SBs (4,500 m2), three
UFDS buildings (16,000 m2), one UFDS processing building (2,000 m2), one steam generator
storage building (4,550 m2), and one refurbishment waste storage building (3,150 m2). The total
area should include a minimum 5 m buffer between the storage buildings and the waste
management facility fence, plus an additional buffer for security around the UFDS buildings.
While there is no reason to believe that a Safety Assessment could not demonstrate that a
location north of the CN rail line is feasible, the safety assessment used in this TSD assume that
any waste processing or storage building are built south of the CN rail line and no closer than
150 m to the site perimeter fence. However, for EA planning purposes, this TSD has accepted
this analysis to demonstrate that the UFDS can be located anywhere on the site. Should the
Vendor require the UFDS buildings to be located north of the CN rail line, or any waste
processing or storage building to be located closer than 150 m to the site perimeter fence, OPG
has committed to updating safety assessment for this location as part of the licensing process.
7-1


Hypothetical radiation doses to a member of the pubic and to a NEW for malfunctions and
accident situations were calculated and were found to be within their respective dose limits. The
worst case is the bounding accident to a 40 assemblies cask. Using a slightly more conservative
source term than the vendor supplied information, the hypothetical dose to a member of the
public are 237 Sv to an adult and 240 Sv to an infant. This corresponds to slightly less than
25% of the regulatory annual radiation dose limit to a member of the public. The corresponding
hypothetical NEW dose is 33.9 mSv. This corresponds to about 68% of the regulatory annual
radiation dose limit to a worker.
7-2

8.0

REFERENCES
(AECL) Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2007. ACR-1000 Technical Description, AECL
Report 10820-01371-TED-001, Rev 1, June 2007.
(AMEC) AMEC NSS Limited, 2008., New Nuclear Darlington ACR-1000, AP1000, EPR
Used Fuel Dry Storage Option, AMEC Report P1114/RP/001, October 2008.
(AMEC) AMEC NSS Limited, 2008a. Darlington Retube Waste Radionuclide
Characterization, Report P1047/RP/001 prepared for Nuclear Waste Management
Division, March 13, 2008.
Areva, 2007. U.S. EPR Final Safety Analysis Report. Areva Report, Rev 0.
Candesco, 2008. The Use of Plant Parameter Envelopes to Assess the Reactor Designs Being
Considered for the Darlington Site, Candesco Report OPG-PPE-00025-0 prepared for
Ontario Power Generation, March 2008. Issued as OPG Report CD# N-REP-0120010000, April 2008.
(EPRI) Electric Power Research Institute, 2004. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of
Bolted Storage Casks. Updated Quantification and Analysis Report, 1009691, EPRI
Technical Report December 2004.
(IAEA) International Atomic Energy Agency, 2008. Storage of Spent Fuel, IAEA Safety
Standards, Draft Safety Guide DS 371, February 11 2008.
(IAEA) International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007. Operation and Maintenance of Spent Fuel
Storage and Transportation Casks/Containers. IAEA TECDOC Series 1532, January
(IAEA) International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004. Status of Advanced Light Water Reactor
Designs. IAEA TECDOC Series 1391, July 2004.
Klassen, K. J., 2006. CNSC Letter to K. E. Nash of OPG, Western Waste Management
Facility Integrated EA Follow-up Program Reports, File: CD# 01098-CORR-0053100341, February 15, 2006.
Nash, K.E., 2005. OPG Letter to K. Klassen of the CNSC, Western Waste Management
Facility Integrated EA Follow-up Program Reports, File: CD# 01098-CORR-0053100314, June 30, 2005 (includes four reports).
(NRC) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Washington, 2007. A Pilot Probabilistic Risk Assessment Of a Dry Cask Storage
System At a Nuclear Power Plant, DC 20555-0001, NUREG 1864, March 2007.
(NWMO) Nuclear Waste Management Organization, 2005, Report, Choosing a Way Forward
The Future Management of Canadas Used Nuclear Fuel Final Study, November 2005.
(OPG) Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2008. OPG Report, 2007 Results of Radiological
Environmental Monitoring Programs, CD# N-REP-03481-10006, April 2008.
(OPG) Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2007. OPG Report, 2006 Results of Radiological
Environmental Monitoring Programs, CD# N-REP-03481-10005-R01, December 2007.
8-1


(OPG) Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2006. OPG Report, Annual Summary and Assessment of
Environmental Radiological Data for 2005, CD# N-REP-03481-10004-R01, November
2006.
(OPG) Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2003. Darlington Used Fuel Dry Storage Project
Environmental Assessment, March 2003.
Pontikakis, N., C.R. Boss, K.F. Hau, and K. Wittann, 2005. Improved Design Features for ACR700 Radioactive Waste Management Systems. Paper presented at Canadian Nuclear
Society conference on Waste Management, Decommissioning and Environmental
Restoration for Canadas Nuclear Activities: Current Practices and Future Needs, Ottawa,
Ontario Canada May 8-11 2005.
Rodrigues, F., 2008. Reference Low and Intermediate Level Waste Inventory For The Deep
Geologic Repository, OPG Report, CD# 00216-REP-03902-00003-R001, Ontario Power
Generation, August 2008.
Russell, Sean, 2008, Preliminary Assessment of Potential Technical Implications of Reactor
Refurbishment and New Nuclear Build on Adaptive Phased Management, NWMO
Report TR-2008-10 November 2008.
(US DOE) U.S. Department of Energy, 2008. Final Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and HighLevel Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, Report DOE/EIS0250FS1, June 2008.
(US DOE) U.S. Department of Energy, 2007. Preparation of Safety Basis Documents for
Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facilities, DOE Standard File DOE-STD-5506-2007, April
2007
(US DOE) U.S. Department of Energy, 2006, DOE Report, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact
Handled (CH) Waste Documented Safety Analysis,: File DOE/WIPP-95-2065 Revision
10, November 2006.
Vattenfall, 2007. :Aktivitetsinnehll i skrotad nggenerator frn Ringhals 3 (Radioactivity in
scrap steam generator from the Ringhals 3), Vattenfall Report 1945206 rev 4.0, June 29,
2007.
Westinghouse Electric Company (Westinghouse), 2007. UK AP1000 Safety, Security and
Environmental Report, Westinghouse Report UKP-GW-GL-700, Rev 1, August 2007.
8-2


APPENDIX A
OPERATIONAL WASTE DETAILS


TABLE A-1: SUMMARY OF AVERAGE L&ILW SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

ACR
Radionuclide
Ag-108m
Ag-110m
Am-241
Ba-137m
Ba-140
Be-7
C-14
Cl-36
Ce-141
Ce-144
Cm-244
Co-58
Co-60
Cr-51
Cs-134
Cs-137
Eu-152
Eu-154
Eu-155
Fe-55
Fe-59
Gd-153
H-3
I-129
I-131
I-133
La-140
Mn-54
Na-24
Nb-93m
Nb-94
Nb-95
Ni-59
Ni-63
Pr-144
Pt-193
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu-241
Rh-103m
Rh-106
Ru-103
Ru-106
Sb-124
Sb-125
Sn-113
Sn-121m
Sr-89
Sr-90
Tc-99
Te-127m
Te-129
Te-129m
Y-90
Y-91
Zn-65
Zr-93
Zr-95
Others
Total
Volume (m3/yr)
per unit
AP1000
USEPR
Quantity
(Bq/yr)
Avg L&ILW
Specific
Activity
(Bq/m3)
Quantity
(Bq/yr)
Avg L&ILW
Specific
Activity
(Bq/m3)
7.5E+10
4.6E+08
1.7E+09
1.1E+07
5.0E+09
5.0E+09
3.2E+09
2.1E+07
1.1E+10
6.8E+07
3.0E+07
3.0E+07
6.1E+11
1.6E+12
5.0E+09
1.3E+11
3.7E+09
9.6E+09
3.0E+07
7.9E+08
1.1E+12
2.0E+10
1.1E+11
6.9E+09
1.2E+08
6.4E+08
2.8E+12
1.6E+11
1.7E+10
9.4E+08
2.0E+10
1.5E+10
1.2E+08
9.1E+07
5.6E+12
3.4E+10
2.3E+12
1.1E+13
1.1E+10
1.5E+10
6.9E+10
7.0E+07
Quantity
(Bq/yr)
Avg L&ILW
Specific
Activity
(Bq/m3)
Avg LLW
Specific
Activity
(Bq/m3)
Avg ILW
Specific
Activity
(Bq/m3)
7.7E+08
4.1E+12
3.4E+06
1.8E+10
1.5E+04
2.0E+03
1.5E+05
6.4E+06
4.6E+06
2.6E+07
1.3E+13
7.1E+09
1.6E+08
1.0E+10
5.7E+10
3.2E+07
7.3E+05
4.5E+07
5.4E+10
7.6E+03
3.2E+08
3.5E+02
6.3E+11
8.5E+04
2.7E+09
2.9E+10
1.2E+07
1.3E+08
4.6E+06
1.8E+06
3.4E+07
4.2E+12
8.7E+12
9.1E+10
6.8E+12
1.3E+13
1.9E+10
3.9E+10
4.0E+08
3.0E+10
5.7E+10
9.5E+09
6.7E+09
3.9E+10
6.3E+08
1.5E+09
1.1E+08
5.2E+07
1.8E+06
2.6E+10
6.3E+07
2.5E+08
1.7E+04
2.7E+07
2.2E+05
1.8E+10
6.7E+09
1.4E+10
1.3E+09
3.2E+08
1.9E+07
1.1E+11
1.5E+11
1.3E+03
1.4E+11
6.8E+01
1.6E+11
1.5E+04
5.1E+06
1.1E+06
2.1E+05
6.0E+07
1.0E+07
4.1E+06
7.0E+08
2.1E+05
5.7E+07
4.5E+07
7.5E+09
8.2E+04
1.7E+06
3.2E+06
4.8E+06
2.1E+08
1.5E+06
2.7E+06
4.1E+06
1.0E+08
9.5E+05
4.3E+06
8.5E+06
1.2E+07
1.3E+09
9.7E+08
5.9E+08
5.0E+09
4.1E+09
7.2E+07
4.7E+10
1.2E+13
7.5E+10
1.8E+13
6.3E+10
7.8E+10
2.8E+08
5.9E+10
3.9E+08
3.2E+09
3.4E+07
3.4E+08
1.4E+07
1.5E+05
1.5E+06
1.5E+09
8.3E+11
9.6E+06
5.4E+09
7.1E+09
1.3E+13
3.2E+07
5.9E+10
1.2E+10
7.8E+07
1.2E+13
7.6E+10
4.2E+09
7.5E+10
4.5E+10
3.9E+11
OPG CANDU
Avg L&ILW
Specific
Activity
(Bq/m3)
2.7E+07
4.6E+08
2.7E+08
2.4E+09
2.8E+11
4.3E+08
1.6E+11
2.8E+10
1.3E+09
1.9E+06
7.3E+08
1.2E+08
1.3E+10
4.2E+11
1.8E+11
4.5E+11
7.7E+11
4.2E+08
1.4E+09
5.8E+07
5.6E+07
1.9E+09
8.0E+08
2.0E+09
3.4E+09
1.9E+06
6.2E+06
2.6E+05
1.6E+11
9.7E+10
7.0E+08
4.3E+08
7.5E+11
1.3E+10
7.0E+10
9.4E+10
3.4E+10
3.5E+12
3.3E+09
5.6E+07
3.1E+08
4.2E+08
1.5E+08
1.5E+10
1.4E+07
5.0E+09
3.0E+07
2.6E+12
1.6E+10
2.7E+09
1.1E+12
1.7E+07
7.2E+09
1.4E+11
6.0E+08
1.5E+13
9.4E+10
3.8E+13
2.5E+11
8.8E+13
3.9E+11
164
154
225
A-1
1.6E+08
1.0E+09
8.8E+03
5.4E+08
6.9E+01
6.3E+09
1.0E+05
7.6E+06
3.0E+00
8.8E+07
2.7E+04
3.3E+03
2.8E+05
2.4E+11
1.7E+11
1.0E+12
315
300
15


TABLE A-2: TYPICAL EPR L&ILW SOURCE TERM DETAILS

Bq/m3
LLW
Nuclide
Ag-108m
Ag-110m
Ba-137m
Ba-140
Be-7
C-14
Ce-141
Ce-144
Co-58
Co-60
Cr-51
Cs-134
Cs-137
Fe-55
Fe-59
H-3
I-129
I-131
La-140
Mn-54
Nb-95
Ni-59
Ni-63
Pr-144
Pu-241
Rh-103m
Rh-106
Ru-103
Ru-106
Sb-124
Sb-125
Sn-113
Sr-89
Sr-90
Te-127m
Te-129
Te-129m
Y-90
Y-91
Zn-65
Zr-95
Total
Incinerable
Compacible
Nonprocessible
AVERAGE
DAW
1.8E+07
2.9E+07
1.9E+07
2.4E+07
4.0E+06
5.6E+07
1.1E+07
3.9E+06
4.2E+07
1.1E+07
3.9E+06
5.0E+07
3.7E+07
8.5E+05
5.2E+07
9.5E+08
1.7E+07
7.4E+08
7.7E+08
1.3E+08
1.8E+08
5.9E+08
2.0E+09
7.7E+06
7.5E+07
7.9E+05
8.0E+06
1.1E+07
5.4E+07
1.2E+08
1.0E+07
5.2E+08
1.7E+07
7.3E+08
8.0E+08
1.3E+08
1.9E+08
6.0E+08
1.3E+09
7.7E+06
7.5E+07
7.8E+05
8.0E+06
1.3E+07
5.6E+07
1.3E+08
9.3E+06
4.7E+08
3.8E+06
1.0E+09
1.1E+09
9.4E+07
3.9E+07
1.3E+08
3.5E+09
1.7E+06
1.6E+07
1.7E+05
1.8E+06
3.7E+07
1.8E+08
1.2E+08
2.2E+06
8.6E+08
7.9E+07
1.8E+07
1.5E+07
6.5E+07
6.3E+07
4.4E+07
5.5E+07
1.1E+09
1.2E+09
8.3E+07
3.9E+09
4.4E+07
2.1E+08
1.2E+08
3.9E+07
4.4E+07
7.9E+09
1.1E+07
1.0E+07
3.3E+07
1.4E+06
1.2E+07
7.7E+07
1.7E+07
6.5E+07
5.6E+09
1.9E+06
9.3E+06
3.4E+07
1.3E+06
1.1E+07
7.7E+07
1.7E+07
6.4E+07
4.9E+09
3.3E+07
2.2E+06
7.2E+06
3.0E+05
2.5E+06
1.7E+07
3.6E+06
4.9E+07
7.4E+09
Evaporator
concentrate
2.1E+10
8.8E+10
ILW
Storage tank
sludge
2.1E+10
8.8E+10
Demin /
Centrifuge
sludge
AVERAGE
Sludge
1.1E+10
4.4E+10
2.1E+10
8.7E+10
Mixed waste
8.6E+07
1.4E+08
5.4E+07
1.8E+07
2.0E+08
1.4E+08
1.6E+10
1.5E+10
4.0E+08
5.1E+10
8.8E+10
3.1E+10
3.0E+08
1.4E+08
1.6E+10
1.5E+10
4.0E+08
5.1E+10
8.8E+10
3.1E+10
3.0E+08
6.9E+07
7.8E+09
7.6E+09
2.0E+08
2.5E+10
4.4E+10
1.6E+10
1.5E+08
1.4E+08
1.5E+10
1.5E+10
3.9E+08
5.0E+10
8.7E+10
3.1E+10
2.9E+08
2.9E+10
2.1E+09
2.9E+10
2.1E+09
1.5E+10
1.1E+09
2.9E+10
2.1E+09
1.4E+08
1.4E+08
6.9E+07
1.4E+08
8.1E+07
3.5E+09
3.6E+09
6.3E+08
8.4E+08
2.8E+09
9.2E+09
3.6E+07
3.5E+08
3.7E+06
3.8E+07
5.3E+07
2.5E+08
5.8E+08
4.8E+07
2.5E+09
8.4E+07
4.2E+09
8.4E+08
4.0E+09
3.6E+09
4.2E+09
8.4E+08
4.6E+09
3.6E+09
2.1E+09
4.2E+08
2.3E+09
1.8E+09
4.1E+09
8.3E+08
4.0E+09
3.6E+09
1.5E+09
3.6E+08
5.1E+09
4.8E+08
7.3E+08
3.6E+08
3.0E+08
8.1E+09
1.1E+09
3.7E+11
1.5E+09
3.6E+08
5.1E+09
4.8E+08
7.3E+08
3.6E+08
3.0E+08
8.1E+09
1.1E+09
3.7E+11
7.3E+08
1.8E+08
2.5E+09
2.4E+08
3.7E+08
1.8E+08
1.5E+08
4.1E+09
5.3E+08
1.9E+11
1.4E+09
3.6E+08
5.0E+09
4.7E+08
7.3E+08
3.6E+08
3.0E+08
8.0E+09
1.1E+09
3.7E+11
Note: Extracted from [Areva 2007] and converted to Bq/m3
A-2
5.2E+07
4.7E+07
1.5E+08
6.5E+06
5.5E+07
3.6E+08
7.8E+07
3.1E+08
2.6E+10
AVERAGE
LLW
Filters
3.6E+06
2.2E+09
9.1E+09
3.3E+07
7.7E+05
4.7E+07
1.8E+07
2.5E+09
2.5E+09
1.3E+08
5.3E+09
9.3E+09
6.3E+09
3.2E+07
1.5E+07
1.6E+05
1.6E+06
3.3E+07
3.2E+09
3.3E+08
2.0E+06
7.7E+08
1.4E+07
5.8E+07
4.3E+08
8.8E+07
4.2E+08
4.0E+08
2.0E+06
6.5E+06
2.7E+05
1.5E+08
5.3E+07
5.3E+08
5.0E+07
7.6E+07
3.8E+07
3.1E+07
8.5E+08
1.5E+08
4.5E+10
6.2E+11
1.4E+12
1.1E+10
2.7E+12
9.5E+09
2.1E+12
5.6E+11
7.5E+12
Primary
Coolant IX
Radwaste
Demin IX
AVERAGE
ILW
1.4E+12
4.1E+12
2.1E+10
8.8E+10
3.7E+11
1.1E+12
1.0E+09
9.5E+09
5.9E+11
1.3E+12
1.0E+10
2.1E+12
4.1E+12
2.6E+12
9.1E+09
1.4E+08
1.6E+10
1.5E+10
4.0E+08
5.1E+10
8.8E+10
3.1E+10
3.0E+08
2.7E+08
2.5E+09
3.7E+11
8.3E+11
6.4E+09
5.7E+11
1.1E+12
1.6E+12
5.7E+09
2.0E+12
7.9E+10
2.9E+10
2.1E+09
1.3E+12
2.1E+10
9.5E+09
1.4E+08
2.5E+09
1.2E+11
6.2E+10
1.3E+11
2.6E+11
4.2E+09
8.4E+08
4.6E+09
3.6E+09
3.3E+10
1.6E+10
3.6E+10
6.9E+10
4.6E+10
3.3E+10
2.4E+11
1.5E+09
3.6E+08
5.1E+09
4.8E+08
7.3E+08
3.6E+08
3.0E+08
8.1E+09
1.1E+09
3.7E+11
1.3E+10
8.7E+09
6.4E+10
1.9E+08
5.4E+09
8.7E+09
2.8E+09
3.3E+11
1.0E+10
7.9E+12
2.0E+10
3.3E+10
1.0E+10
5.3E+11
3.8E+10
2.0E+13
COMBINED
L&ILW
3.4E+06
1.8E+10
5.7E+10
3.2E+07
7.3E+05
4.5E+07
1.2E+07
1.3E+08
1.9E+10
3.9E+10
4.0E+08
3.0E+10
5.7E+10
7.8E+10
2.8E+08
1.4E+07
1.5E+05
1.5E+06
3.2E+07
5.9E+10
1.3E+09
1.9E+06
7.3E+08
1.2E+08
5.6E+07
1.9E+09
8.0E+08
2.0E+09
3.4E+09
1.9E+06
6.2E+06
2.6E+05
7.0E+08
4.3E+08
3.3E+09
5.6E+07
3.1E+08
4.2E+08
1.5E+08
1.5E+10
6.0E+08
3.9E+11


TABLE A-3: DETAILS OF PROCESSED L&ILW VOLUMES

L&ILW Operational Wastes (per reactor unit)
Annual
Waste type
LLW
Incinerable
Compactible
Non-processible
Sludge
Misc
TOTAL
ILW
IX resins
Filters
Misc
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL L&ILW
ACR
m3/yr
As generated
AP1000
ft3/yr
m3/yr
111.2
29.6
14.4
3,750
1,000
239
37
106.1
28.3
6.8
1.0
155.2
5,026
6.6
2.6
USEPR
ft3/yr
m3/yr
ACR
m3/yr
As stored (@ DWMF)
AP1000
USEPR
ft3/yr
m3/yr
ft3/yr
m3/yr
150.0
40.0
2.0
22.5
0.1
214.6
27.8
7.4
18.0
938
250
299
37
26.5
7.1
8.5
1.0
142.2
5,300
1,415
70
796
2
7,583
53.2
1,523
400
5
11.3
0.1
230
120
6.5
3.4
6.6
2.6
9.1
405
11.5
350
9.9
164
5,431
154
7,933
225
ACR
m3/yr
As stored (@ WWMF)
AP1000
USEPR
ft3/yr
m3/yr
ft3/yr
m3/yr
37.5
10.0
2.5
22.5
0.1
72.6
2.8
7.4
18.0
94
250
299
37
2.7
7.1
8.5
1.0
43.1
1,325
354
88
796
2
2,564
19.2
133
354
88
796
2
1,372
3.7
10.0
2.5
22.5
0.1
38.8
28.2
680
400
5
11.3
0.1
230
120
6.5
3.4
6.6
2.6
400
5
11.3
0.1
230
120
6.5
3.4
9.1
405
11.5
350
9.9
9.1
405
11.5
350
9.9
62
1,928
55
2,914
82
37
1,085
31
1,722
49
DWMF includes compaction @ 4:1

WWMF includes compaction @ 4:1 plus incineration at 40:1
Lifetime
Waste type
LLW
Incinerable
Compactible
Non-processible
Sludge
Misc
TOTAL
ILW
IX resins
Filters
Misc
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL L&ILW
LLSB volume = 7000 m3
ACR
m3
As generated
AP1000
ft3
m3
6,669
1,779
864
225,000
60,000
14,340
2,220
6,368
1,698
406
63
9,312
301,560
393
153
USEPR
ft3
m3
ACR
m3
As stored (@ DWMF)
AP1000
USEPR
ft3
m3
ft3
m3
8,999
2,403
119
1,352
3
12,876
1,667
445
1,080
56,250
15,000
17,925
2,220
1,592
425
507
63
8,534
318,000
84,900
4,200
47,760
120
454,980
3,192
91,395
24,000
312
679
9
13,800
7,200
391
204
393
153
546
24,312
688
21,000
594
9,858
325,872
9,222
475,980
13,470
# LLSBs required
# reactor units
Total lifetime volumes (m3)
Total # LLSBs for all reactor units
ACR
m3
As stored (@ WWMF)
AP1000
USEPR
ft3
m3
ft3
m3
2,250
601
149
1,352
3
4,354
167
445
1,080
5,625
15,000
17,925
2,220
159
425
507
63
2,586
79,500
21,225
5,250
47,760
120
153,855
1,691
40,770
24,000
312
679
9
13,800
7,200
391
204
393
153
546
24,312
688
21,000
594
3,738
115,707
3,275
174,855
4,948
1
4
14,952
3
1
4
13,098
2
A-3
1
3
14,845
3
1,154
7,950
21,225
5,250
47,760
120
82,305
225
601
149
1,352
3
2,329
24,000
312
679
9
13,800
7,200
391
204
546
24,312
688
21,000
594
2,237
65,082
1,842
103,305
2,924
1
4
8,949
2
1
4
7,367
2
1
3
8,771
2


TABLE A-4: ANNUAL WASTE FORECASTS

ACR
2018
2019
1 unit
2 units
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
3 units
4 units
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
L&ILW
LLW produced (m3)
LLW stored on site (m3)
LLW stored off-site (m3)
ILW produced (m3)
ILW stored (m3)
Cummulative Total on-site storage (m3)
On-site storage expansions
On-site storage capacity
Cummulative total off-site storage (m3)
Used Fuel
Used fuel produced (bundles)
Used fuel dry stored (bundles)
Cummulative dry storage (bundles)
Cummulative dry storage (DSCs)
DSC Dry storage expansions (DSCs)
DSC Dry storage capacity (DSCs)
MACSTOR expansions (bundles)
MACSTOR Capacity (bundles)
Refurbishment waste
LLW
ILW
AP1000
L&ILW
LLW produced (m3)
ILW produced (m3)
ILW stored (m3)
Used Fuel
Used fuel produced (assemblies)
Used fuel dry stored (assemblies)
Cummulative dry storage (assemblies)
Cummulative dry storage (casks - 32)
Dry storage expansions
Dry storage capacity
Nuhoms expansions (canisters)
Nuhoms Capacity (canisters)
Refurbishment waste
LLW
ILW
USEPR
L&ILW
LLW produced (m3)
ILW produced (m3)
ILW stored (m3)
Used Fuel
Refurbishment waste
LLW
ILW
155
53
28
9
9
62
7,000
7,000
37
310
106
56
18
18
187
310
106
56
18
18
312
310
106
56
18
18
436
310
106
56
18
18
561
310
106
56
18
18
685
466
160
85
27
27
872
621
213
113
36
36
1,121
621
213
113
36
36
1,371
621
213
113
36
36
1,620
621
213
113
36
36
1,869
621
213
113
36
36
2,118
621
213
113
36
36
2,367
621
213
113
36
36
2,617
621
213
113
36
36
2,866
621
213
113
36
36
3,115
621
213
113
36
36
3,364
621
213
113
36
36
3,613
621
213
113
36
36
3,863
621
213
113
36
36
4,112
621
213
113
36
36
4,361
621
213
113
36
36
4,610
621
213
113
36
36
4,859
621
213
113
36
36
5,109
621
213
113
36
36
5,358
621
213
113
36
36
5,607
7,000
112
7,000
186
7,000
261
7,000
336
7,000
410
7,000
522
7,000
671
7,000
820
7,000
970
7,000
1,119
7,000
1,268
7,000
1,417
7,000
1,566
7,000
1,715
7,000
1,864
7,000
2,014
7,000
2,163
7,000
2,312
7,000
2,461
7,000
2,610
7,000
2,759
7,000
2,909
7,000
3,058
7,000
3,207
7,000
3,356
4,415
8,830
8,830
8,830
8,830
8,830
13,244
17,659
17,659
17,659
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 unit
2 units
3 units
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
4,415
8,830
8,830
8,830
8,830
8,830
13,244
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
4,415
13,244
22,074
30,904
39,733
48,563
61,808
79,467
97,126 114,786 132,445 150,104 167,763 185,423 203,082 220,741
11
34
57
80
103
126
161
207
253
299
345
391
437
483
529
575
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
144,000
144,000
144,000 144,000 144,000 144,000 144,000 144,000 144,000 144,000 144,000 144,000 288,000 288,000 288,000 288,000 288,000 288,000
4 units
142
43
19
11
11
55
7,000
7,000
31
284
86
38
23
23
164
284
86
38
23
23
273
284
86
38
23
23
382
284
86
38
23
23
491
284
86
38
23
23
600
427
129
58
34
34
764
569
172
77
46
46
982
569
172
77
46
46
1,201
569
172
77
46
46
1,419
569
172
77
46
46
1,637
569
172
77
46
46
1,856
569
172
77
46
46
2,074
569
172
77
46
46
2,292
569
172
77
46
46
2,510
569
172
77
46
46
2,729
569
172
77
46
46
2,947
569
172
77
46
46
3,165
569
172
77
46
46
3,384
569
172
77
46
46
3,602
569
172
77
46
46
3,820
569
172
77
46
46
4,039
569
172
77
46
46
4,257
569
172
77
46
46
4,475
569
172
77
46
46
4,693
569
172
77
46
46
4,912
7,000
92
7,000
153
7,000
215
7,000
276
7,000
338
7,000
430
7,000
553
7,000
675
7,000
798
7,000
921
7,000
1,044
7,000
1,166
7,000
1,289
7,000
1,412
7,000
1,535
7,000
1,658
7,000
1,780
7,000
1,903
7,000
2,026
7,000
2,149
7,000
2,272
7,000
2,394
7,000
2,517
7,000
2,640
7,000
2,763
43
87
87
87
87
87
130
173
173
173
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
173
43
43
1
300
300
48
48
173
87
130
4
173
87
217
7
173
87
304
9
173
87
390
12
173
87
477
15
173
130
607
19
173
173
781
24
173
173
954
30
173
173
1,128
35
173
173
1,301
41
173
173
1,475
46
173
173
1,648
52
173
173
1,822
57
173
173
1,995
62
173
173
2,169
68
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
300
48
96
300
48
96
96
96
96
96
1 unit
2 units
3 units
215
73
39
10
10
82
7,000
7,000
49
215
73
39
10
10
165
429
145
78
20
20
330
429
145
78
20
20
495
429
145
78
20
20
660
429
145
78
20
20
825
429
145
78
20
20
990
644
218
116
30
30
1,237
644
218
116
30
30
1,485
644
218
116
30
30
1,732
644
218
116
30
30
1,979
644
218
116
30
30
2,227
644
218
116
30
30
2,474
644
218
116
30
30
2,722
644
218
116
30
30
2,969
644
218
116
30
30
3,216
644
218
116
30
30
3,464
644
218
116
30
30
3,711
644
218
116
30
30
3,959
644
218
116
30
30
4,206
644
218
116
30
30
4,454
644
218
116
30
30
4,701
644
218
116
30
30
4,948
644
218
116
30
30
5,196
644
218
116
30
30
5,443
644
218
116
30
30
5,691
7,000
97
7,000
195
7,000
292
7,000
390
7,000
487
7,000
585
7,000
731
7,000
877
7,000
1,023
7,000
1,169
7,000
1,316
7,000
1,462
7,000
1,608
7,000
1,754
7,000
1,900
7,000
2,046
7,000
2,193
7,000
2,339
7,000
2,485
7,000
2,631
7,000
2,777
7,000
2,924
7,000
3,070
7,000
3,216
7,000
3,362
84
84
169
169
169
169
169
253
253
253
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
253
84
84
3
300
300
48
48
253
84
169
5
253
169
338
11
253
169
507
16
253
169
676
21
253
169
845
26
253
169
1,014
32
253
253
1,267
40
253
253
1,521
48
253
253
1,774
55
253
253
2,028
63
253
253
2,281
71
253
253
2,535
79
253
253
2,788
87
253
253
3,041
95
253
253
3,295
103
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
48
48
48
48
48
96
96
96
96
300
48
144
300
48
300
48
96
300
48
144
144
A-4

2044
2045

2046
2047
2048
U1 refurb
ACR
2049
2050
U1 + U2
U2 refurb
refurb
2051
2052
2053
2054
U3 refurb
2055
2056
U2 + U4
U4 refurb
refurb
2057
2058
2059
2060
2061
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068
2069
L&ILW
LLW produced (m3)
ILW produced (m3)
ILW stored (m3)
Used Fuel
Refurbishment waste
LLW
ILW
AP1000
L&ILW
LLW produced (m3)
ILW produced (m3)
ILW stored (m3)
Used Fuel
Refurbishment waste
LLW
ILW
USEPR
L&ILW
LLW produced (m3)
ILW produced (m3)
ILW stored (m3)
Used Fuel
Refurbishment waste
LLW
ILW
621
213
113
36
36
5,856
621
213
113
36
36
6,105
621
213
113
36
36
6,604
621
213
113
36
36
6,853
621
213
113
36
36
7,102
621
213
113
36
36
7,351
621
213
113
36
36
7,601
621
213
113
36
36
7,850
621
213
113
36
36
8,099
621
213
113
36
36
8,348
621
213
113
36
36
8,597
621
213
113
36
36
8,847
621
213
113
36
36
9,096
621
213
113
36
36
9,345
621
213
113
36
36
9,594
621
213
113
36
36
9,843
621
213
113
36
36
10,093
621
213
113
36
36
10,342
621
213
113
36
36
10,591
621
213
113
36
36
10,840
621
213
113
36
36
11,089
621
213
113
36
36
11,339
621
213
113
36
36
11,588
621
213
113
36
36
11,837
621
213
113
36
36
12,086
7,000
3,654
621
213
113
36
36
6,355
7,000
14,000
3,804
7,000
3,505
14,000
3,953
14,000
4,102
14,000
4,251
14,000
4,400
14,000
4,549
14,000
4,698
14,000
4,848
14,000
4,997
14,000
5,146
14,000
5,295
14,000
5,444
14,000
5,593
14,000
5,743
14,000
5,892
14,000
6,041
14,000
6,190
14,000
6,339
14,000
6,488
14,000
6,638
14,000
6,787
14,000
6,936
14,000
7,085
14,000
7,234
17,659
17,659
238,401
621
17,659
17,659
256,060
667
17,659
17,659
273,719
713
17,659
17,659
291,379
759
19,484
17,659
309,038
805
15,070
17,659
326,697
851
13,244
17,659
344,357
897
17,659
17,659
379,675
989
17,659
17,659
397,334
1,035
19,484
17,659
414,994
1,081
15,070
17,659
432,653
1,127
13,244
17,659
450,312
1,173
17,659
17,659
467,972
1,219
17,659
19,484
487,456
1,269
17,659
15,070
502,526
1,309
17,659
13,244
515,770
1,343
17,659
8,830
524,600
1,366
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
288,000
432,000
432,000
432,000
432,000
432,000
432,000
432,000
1,500
144,000
576,000
1,500
288,000
1,000
144,000
432,000
17,659
17,659
362,016
943
500
1,500
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
2,000
3,600
1,000
1,000
U1 refurb U2 refurb
1,600
2,000
3,600
1,000
1,000
U3 refurb U4 refurb
1,600
569
172
77
46
46
5,130
569
172
77
46
46
5,348
569
172
77
46
46
5,567
569
172
77
46
46
5,785
569
172
77
46
46
6,003
7,000
2,886
7,000
3,008
7,000
3,131
7,000
3,254
173
173
2,342
73
173
173
2,515
79
173
173
2,689
84
300
300
300
96
96
96
644
218
116
30
30
5,938
569
172
77
46
46
6,440
569
172
77
46
46
6,658
569
172
77
46
46
6,876
569
172
77
46
46
7,095
569
172
77
46
46
7,313
569
172
77
46
46
7,531
569
172
77
46
46
7,750
569
172
77
46
46
7,968
569
172
77
46
46
8,186
569
172
77
46
46
8,405
569
172
77
46
46
8,623
569
172
77
46
46
8,841
569
172
77
46
46
9,059
569
172
77
46
46
9,278
569
172
77
46
46
9,496
569
172
77
46
46
9,714
569
172
77
46
46
9,933
569
172
77
46
46
10,151
569
172
77
46
46
10,369
569
172
77
46
46
10,588
7,000
3,377
569
172
77
46
46
6,222
7,000
14,000
3,499
14,000
3,622
14,000
3,745
14,000
3,868
14,000
3,991
14,000
4,113
14,000
4,236
14,000
4,359
14,000
4,482
14,000
4,605
14,000
4,727
14,000
4,850
14,000
4,973
14,000
5,096
14,000
5,218
14,000
5,341
14,000
5,464
14,000
5,587
14,000
5,710
14,000
5,832
14,000
5,955
173
173
2,862
89
173
173
3,036
95
173
173
3,209
100
173
173
3,383
106
173
173
3,556
111
173
173
3,730
117
173
173
3,903
122
173
173
4,077
127
173
173
4,250
133
173
173
4,424
138
173
173
4,597
144
173
173
4,771
149
173
173
4,944
155
173
173
5,118
160
173
86
5,204
163
173
173
173
173
173
173
173
173
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
300
48
144
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
144
144
144
144
300
48
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
144
144
1,600
37
U1 refurb
1,600
37
144
144
1,600
37
1,600
37
U3 refurb
U2 refurb
644
218
116
30
30
6,433
644
218
116
30
30
6,680
644
218
116
30
30
6,928
644
218
116
30
30
7,175
644
218
116
30
30
7,423
644
218
116
30
30
7,670
644
218
116
30
30
7,917
644
218
116
30
30
8,165
644
218
116
30
30
8,412
644
218
116
30
30
8,660
644
218
116
30
30
8,907
644
218
116
30
30
9,155
644
218
116
30
30
9,402
644
218
116
30
30
9,649
644
218
116
30
30
9,897
644
218
116
30
30
10,144
644
218
116
30
30
10,392
644
218
116
30
30
10,639
644
218
116
30
30
10,886
644
218
116
30
30
11,134
644
218
116
30
30
11,381
644
218
116
30
30
11,629
644
218
116
30
30
11,876
644
218
116
30
30
12,124
7,000
3,508
644
218
116
30
30
6,185
7,000
14,000
3,654
14,000
3,801
14,000
3,947
14,000
4,093
14,000
4,239
14,000
4,385
14,000
4,531
14,000
4,678
14,000
4,824
14,000
4,970
14,000
5,116
14,000
5,262
14,000
5,409
14,000
5,555
14,000
5,701
14,000
5,847
14,000
5,993
14,000
6,139
14,000
6,286
14,000
6,432
14,000
6,578
14,000
6,724
14,000
6,870
14,000
7,016
14,000
7,163
253
253
3,548
111
253
253
3,802
119
253
253
4,055
127
253
253
4,309
135
253
253
4,562
143
253
253
4,816
150
253
253
5,069
158
253
253
5,323
166
253
253
5,576
174
253
253
5,830
182
253
253
6,083
190
253
253
6,336
198
253
253
6,590
206
253
253
6,843
214
253
253
7,097
222
253
253
7,350
230
253
253
7,604
238
253
253
253
253
253
253
253
253
253
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
144
192
192
192
192
192
300
48
240
300
144
300
48
192
300
144
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
2,565
85
2,565
85
2,565
85
A-5


2070
2071
2072
2073
2074
2075
2076
2077
ACR
2078
2079
U1 SD
U2 SD
2080
2081
2082
2083
2084
2085
U3 SD
U4 SD
2086
2087
2088
2089
2090
TOTAL
L&ILW
LLW produced (m3)
ILW produced (m3)
ILW stored (m3)
Used Fuel
Refurbishment waste
LLW
ILW
AP1000
L&ILW
LLW produced (m3)
ILW produced (m3)
ILW stored (m3)
Used Fuel
Refurbishment waste
LLW
ILW
USEPR
L&ILW
LLW produced (m3)
ILW produced (m3)
ILW stored (m3)
Used Fuel
Refurbishment waste
LLW
ILW
621
213
113
36
36
12,335
621
213
113
36
36
12,585
621
213
113
36
36
12,834
621
213
113
36
36
13,083
14,000
7,383
14,000
7,532
14,000
7,682
14,000
7,831
621
213
113
36
36
13,332
7,000
21,000
7,980
621
213
113
36
36
13,581
621
213
113
36
36
13,831
621
213
113
36
36
14,080
466
160
85
27
27
14,267
310
106
56
18
18
14,391
310
106
56
18
18
14,516
310
106
56
18
18
14,641
310
106
56
18
18
14,765
310
106
56
18
18
14,890
155
53
28
9
9
14,952
0
0
0
0
0
14,952
0
0
0
0
0
14,952
0
0
0
0
0
14,952
0
0
0
0
0
14,952
0
0
0
0
0
14,952
0
0
0
0
0
14,952
21,000
8,129
21,000
8,278
21,000
8,427
21,000
8,539
21,000
8,614
21,000
8,688
21,000
8,763
21,000
8,838
21,000
8,912
21,000
8,949
21,000
8,949
21,000
8,949
21,000
8,949
21,000
8,949
21,000
8,949
21,000
8,949
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
17,659
13,244
8,830
8,830
8,830
8,830
8,830
4,415
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
524,600
1,366
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
576,000
U1 SD
U2 SD
U3 SD
U4 SD
37,248
12,768
6,765
2,184
2,184
1,049,200
524,600
14,400
4,000
569
172
77
46
46
10,806
569
172
77
46
46
11,024
569
172
77
46
46
11,242
569
172
77
46
46
11,461
569
172
77
46
46
11,679
569
172
77
46
46
11,897
569
172
77
46
46
12,116
569
172
77
46
46
12,334
427
129
58
34
34
12,498
284
86
38
23
23
12,607
284
86
38
23
23
12,716
284
86
38
23
23
12,825
284
86
38
23
23
12,934
284
86
38
23
23
13,043
142
43
19
11
11
13,098
0
0
0
0
0
13,098
0
0
0
0
0
13,098
0
0
0
0
0
13,098
0
0
0
0
0
13,098
0
0
0
0
0
13,098
0
0
0
0
0
13,098
14,000
6,078
14,000
6,201
14,000
6,324
14,000
6,446
14,000
6,569
14,000
6,692
14,000
6,815
14,000
6,938
14,000
7,030
14,000
7,091
14,000
7,152
14,000
7,214
14,000
7,275
14,000
7,337
14,000
7,367
14,000
7,367
14,000
7,367
14,000
7,367
14,000
7,367
14,000
7,367
14,000
7,367
173
173
173
173
173
173
173
173
130
87
87
87
87
87
43
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
5,204
163
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
34,137
10,346
4,615
2,752
2,752
10,409
5,204
6,400
148
U1 SD
644
218
116
30
30
12,371
644
218
116
30
30
12,618
644
218
116
30
30
12,866
644
218
116
30
30
13,113
14,000
7,309
14,000
7,455
14,000
7,601
14,000
7,747
644
218
116
30
30
13,361
7,000
21,000
7,894
U2 SD
U3 SD
644
218
116
30
30
13,608
644
218
116
30
30
13,856
644
218
116
30
30
14,103
429
145
78
20
20
14,268
429
145
78
20
20
14,433
215
73
39
10
10
14,515
215
73
39
10
10
14,598
215
73
39
10
10
14,680
215
73
39
10
10
14,763
215
73
39
10
10
14,845
0
0
0
0
0
14,845
0
0
0
0
0
14,845
0
0
0
0
0
14,845
0
0
0
0
0
14,845
0
0
0
0
0
14,845
0
0
0
0
0
14,845
21,000
8,040
21,000
8,186
21,000
8,332
21,000
8,430
21,000
8,527
21,000
8,576
21,000
8,624
21,000
8,673
21,000
8,722
21,000
8,771
21,000
8,771
21,000
8,771
21,000
8,771
21,000
8,771
21,000
8,771
21,000
8,771
253
253
253
253
253
253
253
253
169
169
84
84
84
84
84
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
7,604
238
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
240
38,628
13,062
6,988
1,783
1,783
15,207
7,604
7,695
255
Note: Colours indicate special dates such as start of a unit, new storage buildings going into service, or unit refurbishment.
A-6


APPENDIX B
REFURBISHMENT WASTE DETAILS


TABLE B-1: SUMMARY OF DARLINGTON FUEL CHANNEL COMPONENT

SPECIFIC ACTIVITY8
NUCLIDE
C-14
Cr-51
Mn-54
Fe-55
Fe-59
Co-60
Ni-59
Ni-63
Nb-94
Nb-95
Nb-95m
Zr-93
Zr-95
In-113m
In-114
Sn-113
Sn-119m
Sn-123
Sb-125
Te-123m
Te-125m
All Others
TOTAL (TBq/kg)
Material
TBq/Kg (AFTER 270 DAYS OF DECAY)

Pressure Tubes
Calandria Tubes
1.32E-03
1.32E-05
2.52E-04
5.76E-02
3.11E-04
8.28E-03
5.97E-07
2.37E-04
1.06E-02
1.23E+00
6.27E-03
3.47E-04
5.33E-01
2.82E-05
2.93E-04
2.82E-05
6.71E-04
1.57E-05
1.59E-04
1.22E-04
3.91E-05
7.96E-03
1.86E+00
Zr-2.5% Nb
2.19E-04
9.92E-05
2.32E-04
7.10E-02
4.18E-04
1.24E-02
1.47E-05
5.82E-03
1.63E-06
1.17E+00
6.58E-03
3.68E-04
5.59E-01
2.56E-02
1.89E-03
2.56E-02
3.45E-01
1.46E-02
1.37E-01
9.62E-03
3.35E-02
1.13E-02
2.43E+00
Zircalloy-2
Extracted from [AMEC, 2008a]
B-1
End fittings
Shield Plugs
4.42E-05
1.37E-03
5.04E-02
2.21E+00
1.24E-03
2.23E-01
2.24E-05
2.71E-03
5.05E-07
6.80E-07
2.63E-09
1.27E-10
2.24E-07
4.63E-05
5.68E-07
4.63E-05
7.13E-04
1.03E-05
2.57E-04
8.44E-06
6.28E-05
5.02E-04
2.49E+00
SS403
1.01E-08
3.42E-07
4.43E-03
1.67E-01
1.04E-04
9.24E-03
1.36E-14
1.34E-05
1.81E-01
A295 ductile iron
Calandria Tube
Inserts
2.37E-04
6.52E-03
1.84E-01
1.15E+01
7.22E-03
4.67E-01
8.32E-05
1.28E-02
1.65E-06
4.12E-06
9.96E-09
5.58E-10
8.47E-07
1.35E-04
3.56E-06
1.35E-04
1.87E-03
4.28E-05
7.12E-04
6.43E-05
1.74E-04
7.00E-03
1.22E+01
SS410


TABLE B-2: SUMMARY OF STEAM GENERATOR ACTIVITY

NUCLIDE
TOTAL PER SG (TBq)

Ringhals 3 (Sweden)9
Pickering B
H-3
1.2E+00
C-14
9.0E-04
Mn-54
4.7E-03
Fe-55
1.2E+00
Fe-59
9.3E-03
Co-60
7.4E-01
1.1E-01
Ni-59
3.5E-03
Ni-63
3.3E-01
Zn-65
8.0E-04
Sr-90
3.6E-03
Zr-95
3.3E-02
Nb-94
7.3E-04
Nb-95
8.3E-02
Ru-103
2.0E-02
Ru-106
9.4E-03
Sn-113
2.1E-03
Sb-124
3.2E-02
Sb-125
1.1E-02
Ce-141
9.8E-03
Ce-144
9.2E-03
Am-241
1.9E-06
3.6E-04
Cm-242
8.1E-13
Cm-244
2.4E-06
9.6E-05
Pu-238
1.3E-05
9.6E-05
Pu-239/240
1.2E-05
5.5E-04
Pu-241
5.6E-04
Total
1.1E+00
2.7E+00
Extracted from [Vattenfall 2007]
B-2


APPENDIX C
NEW NUCLEAR - DARLINGTON - BASIS FOR EA


TABLE C-1: NEW NUCLEAR DARLINGTON BASIS FOR EA

Project Phase / Works
and Activities
Description
Site Preparation Phase

Mobilization and
Preparatory Works
Mobilization (construction workforce and equipment): will involve mobilization of equipment and the construction workforce to the site. The
physical aspects of mobilization will involve the establishment of parking areas for staff and equipment, service areas for construction offices,
construction phase fencing for security and safety and equipment storage; security/guardhouse and reception facilities.
Clearing and Grubbing: Vegetation within areas of future construction will be removed. A variety of methods including the removal of trees by
truck, chipping of smaller vegetation and grubbing with a dozer or excavator will be used to remove vegetation. Environmental effects
management measures will be applied throughout the activity such as minimizing the area to be cleared to the extent feasible and complying with
seasonal constraints and regulatory requirements for clearing operations.
Installation of Services and Utilities: includes temporary services and utilities required during construction and permanent services and utilities
required to support operations. Wherever possible, utilities and services will be installed to accommodate the needs of both construction and
operation phases. Utilities and services will include: i) potable water; ii) sanitary sewage collection discharging to a municipal water pollution
control plant; iii) electrical and telephone service; iv) P.A. system; v) fencing. Excavation to install services is captured by other earthmoving
activities.
Development of Roads and Related Infrastructure: includes improvements to access into the site and features to provide for temporary (i.e.,
during construction) and permanent (during operations) access, egress and parking. Onsite roads and infrastructure will include local access roads
and parking facilities within the site to accommodate workforce-related and other traffic during both construction and operation phases. For EA
purposes, it is assumed that off-site parking facilities may be used with workers transferred to the NND via shuttle bus.
Excavation and Grading
Excavation and grading will comprise all earth and rock-moving activities including earthmoving and grading, drilling and blasting. Excavation
activities will be conducted in-the-dry with dewatering where required. Collected water will be managed and discharged as described in
Management of Stormwater.
On-Land Earthmoving and Grading: During site preparation activities, effectively all land area east of Holt Road will be disturbed to a large
extent. Topsoil stripping will be by means of suitable earthmoving equipment (e.g., scrapers, excavators and trucks). Excavated soils transferred
to the Northeast and Northwest Landfill Areas and lake infill will be placed using good management practices that address surface erosion, dust
control and related aspects including noise and vehicle emissions.
Transport of Surplus Soil to Off-site Disposal: Should it be necessary to do so, surplus soil will be transported to disposal at an off-site
location(s). The destinations for this material have not been determined, however, it is intended that the material be used to rehabilitate extraction
pits and quarries or other development sites, or similar beneficial use.
Rock Excavation and Grading (Drilling, Blasting, Boring): will involve the excavation and grading of rock and like material, and associated
activities such as drilling or blasting to facilitate its excavation and transfer to rock fill areas (i.e. lake infill) or disposal areas.
Development of Construction Laydown Areas: will include specific areas identified for, and developed as, staging areas for contractor
operations and storage areas for construction equipment and materials. Laydown areas will be graded, temporarily fenced, and surfaced,
depending on function, with granular or asphalt.
C-1



and Activities
Description
Marine and Shoreline

Works
Marine and Shoreline Works includes all works and activities conducted within or adjacent to Lake Ontario such that they are likely to interact
with the marine and aquatic environment. Marine and shoreline-related works and activities will include the following:
Lake Infilling and Shoreline Protection: will occur throughout an area of Lake Ontario and will extend from the easterly limit of the DN site to
approximately the DNGS intake channel; and about 100 m into the lake on its westerly limit to approximately 450 m on its easterly limit. Lake
infilling will create a new landform of up to approximately 40 ha. The lake infill operation will begin with the construction of a low-permeability
coffer dam on its outer perimeter to contain the deposit lake infill materials and isolate the area from lake water intrusion. The core would
typically consist of low-permeability soils or compacted granular materials, driven or vibrated steel sheeting, or drilled caissons. The lake-facing
surface of the dam will be covered with armour stone placed by crane on the lake side of the dam. Any fish within the area to be dammed will be
directed out of the work area by progressive seining and other appropriate means as the dam is placed. Once the cofferdam is complete, the water
contained within it will be pumped out and discharged to Lake Ontario. The material placed within the cofferdam to create the new landform will
originate on-site and be placed as part of the Excavation and Grading activity.
Construction of Wharf: a wharf will be developed in a portion of the lake infilled area generally in front of the Power Block. The wharf will be
used during construction for off-loading oversize and over-weight components and its construction will be appropriate for this purpose.
Lake Bottom Dredging: dredging activities are expected to be minimal, but may be required at the point where the cooling water intake tunnel
daylights to the lake bottom. Any such minor dredging will involve conventional equipment designed and operated for the purpose (suction and/or
mechanical). All dredged sediment will be placed into barges and subsequently off-loaded and disposed of in the Northeast Landfill Area or
existing onsite construction landfill.
Development of
Administration and
Physical Support
Facilities
Administration and Support Facilities comprise various buildings housing staff, equipment and operations necessary to provide ongoing support to
the NND. These will include offices, workshops, maintenance, storage and perimeter security buildings, and utilities operating centres. All such
buildings will consist of conventional steel and masonry structures.
Construction Phase
For assessment purposes, it is assumed that the entire site will be prepared for construction at the outset. Construction of the nuclear power plant elements (i.e., construction
phase) will begin as soon as possible into the site preparation activities and accordingly, the site preparation and construction phases will overlap in time. This is a bounding
assumption since it represents the greatest amount of related work in the shortest period of time.
Construction of Power
Block
The Power Block includes the reactor building, the turbine-generator building/turbine hall (powerhouse) and related structural features that are
physically associated with them. Development of the Power Block includes the installation of all power generation equipment within it, including
the reactors, primary and secondary heat transport components, and all powerhouse components including turbines, generators and heat
exchangers and pumps and standby power systems. Supply of construction materials and operating equipment to the site is included in the
Construction Material and Operating Equipment Supply.
Foundations will extend into bedrock and may require drilling and blasting. Some elements of construction will be further supported on steel piles.
Above-grade construction will involve techniques typical of heavy industrial development. Placement will involve extensive use of heavy
equipment, including heavy-lift fixed and mobile cranes. Installation of operating equipment will involve movement and placement of large and
specialty components using various standard and extraordinary procedures, depending on the size and weight of the component.
C-2



and Activities
Description
Construction of Intake
and Discharge Structures
Intake and Discharge Tunnels and Structures for Once-Through Lake Water Cooling: For EA purposes, the once-through cooling water
intake and diffuser structures at NND are assumed to be similar to the existing structures at DNGS, although appropriately sized to accommodate
the required water flow rates at NND. The tunnels at DNGS were constructed using typical underground mining techniques involving blasting and
excavation. Tunnels for once through cooling water at NND may alternatively be constructed by boring using a purpose-built tunnel boring
machine (TBM).
Intake and Discharge Structures for Cooling Tower Water Makeup and Service Water: Although the water from both mechanical draft and
natural draft cooling towers is recirculated, some make-up water is required to replace tower blowdown and other losses (e.g.,evaporation) and for
plant service water needs. This water will be drawn from Lake Ontario via intake and discharge pipelines. The open-cut drill-and-blast method is
likely to be used to excavate a trench to place the intake or outfall pipe. Pipes will be placed in trenches and backfilled with a granular material,
and armour surface protection. Screens may be used to prevent debris from entering the intake structure. Both the intake and discharge structures
for makeup water and service water will be substantially smaller than those required for once-through lakewater cooling due to the smaller
associated water volumes.
Construction of Ancillary
Facilities
Ancillary facilities include all features necessary to support operations of the reactors and generation of electricity, although not physically
associated with the power block. Clearing and grubbing and major earthmoving and grading to accommodate development of the ancillary
features are included in the Mobilization and Preparatory Works, and the Earthmoving and Grading activities, respectively.
Expansion of Existing Switchyard: will involve the physical enlargement of the footprint of the existing DNGS switchyard, an increase to the
electrical capacity to accommodate its use for NND, and its connection to the existing electrical grid. The switchyard expansion will effectively be
as an easterly extension to the existing switchyard.
Cooling Towers Mechanical Draft: includes the towers and the associated infrastructure to support their operation. Mechanical draft cooling
towers are typically shorter in height and larger in footprint than natural draft cooling towers. Construction of the towers will involve conventional
techniques and materials, primarily steel framing, concrete and masonry, and mechanical and electrical components.
Cooling Towers Natural Draft: includes the towers and associated infrastructure to support their operations. Up to two natural draft towers
may be constructed for each unit (depending on the design). The towers will have a hyperbolic shape. The towers will be constructed of steel
reinforced concrete with structural, mechanical and electrical components and will be erected by means of traditional construction methods (e.g.,
slip forming, crane lifts), and conventional construction materials.
Cooling Towers Fan Assisted Natural Draft: are not included in any of the three model plant layout scenarios considered in the EA. Because
they are a variation of the two cooling tower types that are considered, their potential interfaces with the environment during construction are
considered to be bounded by the cooling tower options that are addressed in the EA. Fan assisted natural draft cooling towers have a slightly
larger base dimension than the natural draft cooling tower, and have fans placed around the base of the tower to increase the air flow rate. These
towers have a similar hyperbolic shape as a traditional natural draft tower, but approximately the height.
Cooling Tower Blowdown Ponds: For each of the cooling tower options one or more blowdown ponds may be required to receive and treat
blowdown from the towers. Blowdown is the portion of the circulating water flow that is removed in order to maintain the amount of dissolved
solids and other impurities at acceptable levels. The ponds would be excavated into the ground surface and lined (e.g., with clay or synthetic
materials) to ensure proper containment. The ponds will be sized to accommodate the required volume for the system, and the water would be
appropriately treated to comply with discharge water quality criteria, prior to discharge.
C-3



and Activities
Construction of
Radioactive Waste
Storage Facilities
Description
Radioactive Waste Storage Facilities comprise used fuel dry storage facility to house containerized used fuel bundles following their removal from
wet storage in the used fuel bays. Low and Intermediate Level Waste Storage building(s) may also be required. For EA purposes, it is assumed
that a used fuel dry storage building for NND will not be required until approximately 2025, though a storage building for Low and Intermediate
Level Waste will likely be required starting in 2017.
Common to Site Preparation and Construction Works and Activities

Management of
Stormwater
As the site is developed, ditches and swales will be constructed to collect and convey surface water to stormwater management ponds and
ultimately to discharge to an existing drainage course or Lake Ontario. Stormwater management features will be developed to address the
requirements for runoff control both during site preparation and construction (temporary) and during operations (permanent). Wherever possible,
stormwater management features will consider the needs of both construction and operation phases.
Supply of Construction
Equipment, Material and
Operating Plant
Components
Supply of construction materials and operating equipment includes the delivery to the site, of all necessary materials and components for
construction of NND. While much of the material that will be delivered to the site will be via the road network, large components may be
delivered by rail (to an existing rail siding on a neighbouring property and then transported overland to the site or to a new rail siding on the DN
site), or by barge to the new wharf.
Rock Delivery for Cofferdam: delivery of imported rock for cofferdam construction is estimated to be up to 200 trucks per day.
Construction Equipment: comprises all mechanized and related equipment required to support construction. Heavy earthmoving equipment will
be typical of large-scale construction projects (e.g., trucks, dozers, loaders, excavators, scrappers, graders, compactors).
Aggregate and Concrete: For EA purposes, it is assumed that ready-mixed concrete will be provided by an offsite supplier operating on a nearby
property, or is mixed on site in a concrete batch plant. Approximately 750,000 to 1,000,000 m3 of concrete will be required for 4 units.
Manufactured Construction Materials: will include items associated with site preparation (e.g., precast concrete structures, culverts and utility
piping, fence), structural components for buildings and other facilities (e.g., fabricated steel products, masonry), mechanical and electrical
components for buildings and facilities, and various sundry items (e.g., interior finish components). All manufactured construction materials will
be delivered to the site via highway-licensed trucks travelling on provincial and municipal roads, by rail, or by barge. Aside from concrete, the
largest single quantity of material that will be delivered to the site will be structural steel (rebar etc). Approximately 150,000-200,000 tonnes of
structural steel would be required for 4 units.
Plant Operating Components: are fixtures and components associated with an operating nuclear plant. These will include conventional items
(e.g., pumps, turbines, electrical power systems) as well as those that are unique to nuclear plants (e.g., calandria). Most operating components
will be delivered to the site via highway-licensed trucks travelling on provincial and municipal roads. Some oversize items will require special
permits and transport provisions, and others are likely to be transported to the site by rail or via barge and off-loaded at the purpose built wharf.
C-4



and Activities
Description
Management of
Construction Waste,
Hazardous Materials,
Fuels and Lubricants
Construction waste: will be transferred from the site to disposal or recycling at appropriately-licensed waste management facilities. This activity
does not include disposal of excavated spoil (see Excavation and Grading). The existing on-site DNGS construction landfill may also be reopened
for the disposal of construction waste.
Hazardous Materials: (e.g., solvents, chemicals, compressed gases) associated with site preparation and construction will be managed, including
storage, use and disposal, in compliance with applicable legislation, codes and practices. These materials will include expired chemicals, cleaners,
paint, aerosol cans and electrical components. Non-radioactive oil and chemical wastes will be removed from the site for disposal.
Fuels, Lubricants and Chemicals: those required for mechanical construction equipment will be delivered to the site in appropriately-qualified
vehicles and/or containers, stored in purpose-built facilities, and dispensed and used, all in compliance with applicable legislation, codes and
practices. Contingency plans for a detailed response system in the event of a spill will be developed.
Work Force, Payroll and

Purchasing
Site preparation and construction will require a contractor labour force that will vary in size throughout the work based on the scope and nature of
the activities underway at any given time. This activity will represent the daily transportation-related aspects of workforce commute as well as the
economic aspects associated with payroll and construction-related capital purchases. The labour force will peak, in the early years of the Project,
at approximately 3,800. In later years of the site preparation and construction phase, the workforce involved in the construction of units 3 and 4
will overlap with staff operating units 1 and 2 and will peak at approximately 5,200.
Operation and Maintenance Phase

Prior to the start of the Operation and Maintenance Phase, commissioning activities will be undertaken including the testing of systems and components. Nuclear fission
reactions in the reactor core will be increased in a controlled manner until criticality is achieved. Reactor power will then be increased in a controlled manner. Steam will be
admitted into the turbine and the steam and feedwater system will be placed into service. The units electrical generator will be connected, or synchronized, to the electrical grid.
Maintenance, both routine and major, is included in this phase of the Project. Three general areas of maintenance are performed: preventative maintenance, corrective
maintenance, and improvement or upgrade activities (including during planned shutdowns and outages).
Operation of Reactor
Core
The reactor consists of the reactor assembly and reactivity control devices. The reactor core is the starting point for the generation of radioactivity.
All other systems in the nuclear power plant (NPP) work to support the reactor core. This activity includes operation, startup, shutdown, and
maintenance, testing and modification of the reactor core components, including the maintenance required for refurbishment. Nuclear malfunction
and accident considerations will originate here.
In an ACR-1000 reactor the horizontal calandria vessel is axially penetrated by calandria tubes. The calandria tubes provide access through the
calandria vessel to the fuel channel assemblies containing nuclear fuel bundles of varying fuel enrichments.
In the EPR and AP1000 reactors, a pressure vessel contains vertically oriented assemblies of fuel rods called fuel assemblies. The assemblies,
containing various fuel enrichments, are configured into the core arrangement located and supported by the reactor internals. The reactor internals
also direct the flow of the coolant past the fuel rods.
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and Activities
Operation of Primary
Heat Transport System
Description
The function of the primary heat transport system is to move heat from the reactor core into the primary side of the steam generator. This system
will generate L&ILW (such as filters and ion exchange resins). This is captured in the Waste Management work activity. Maintenance of this
system includes periodic chemical cleaning of the steam generators and replacement of parts during refurbishment and is included in the Major
Maintenance work activity. Water losses are captured under the ventilation and drainage project works and activities. For all of the technologies,
the chemistry of the reactor coolant is controlled by filtering, ion exchange, and chemical addition.
In an EPR reactor, core cooling and moderation are provided by light water (H20) at high pressure. There is no separate moderator system, only a
reactor coolant system. The coolant is circulated through 4 cooling loops, each containing a steam generator. A pressurizer and a chemical and
volume control system are used to maintain inventory and chemical composition in the reactor coolant system. The coolant used in this system
contains boron, which acts as a neutron absorber and can also result in a reaction that forms tritium in the heat transport system fluid.
Unique to the AP1000 reactor is the use of 2 cooling loops instead of 4, and therefore the use of only two steam generators. The remainder of the
system is similar to that of the EPR reactor.
In an ACR-1000 reactor, the heat transport system circulates light water through the reactor fuel channels to remove the heat produced by the
fission of uranium fuel within the fuel bundles. Coolant from the fuel channels passes to the four steam generators where the heat is transferred to
the secondary side to generate steam.
The ACR-1000 reactor has a calandria filled with a heavy water (D2O) moderator. The moderator slows down neutrons from fission reactions in
the fuel, increasing the opportunity for these neutrons to trigger additional fissions. The heavy water moderator is circulated and cooled. This
system is separate from the primary heat transport system, and is a low pressure, low temperature closed circuit. This activity includes routine
maintenance of the moderator systems and their auxiliaries.
Heavy water management is only applicable to the ACR-1000. Heavy water is managed during maintenance activities and those activities
connected to the movement of heavy water inventories into and out of the moderator system. Heavy water is managed in the ACR-1000 by the
D2O Supply System, the D2O Vapour Recovery System and the D2O Cleanup System.
Measures are taken to minimize the loss and downgrading of the heavy water, which escapes from the moderator systems. Heavy water may be
transported offsite to a licensed facility for the removal of tritium.
Losses from the heavy water management system are addressed under the active ventilation systems and radioactive liquid waste management
activities.
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and Activities
Description
Operation of Active
Ventilation and
Radioactive Liquid
Waste Management
Systems
Radioactive Liquid Waste Management: The active drainage system segregates liquid waste by the degree of contamination and directs it to the
receiving tanks of the radioactive liquid waste management system. The system discharges treated wastes at a controlled rate to Lake Ontario after
stringent testing and treatment to maintain acceptable activity levels for release.
Tritium can be found in heavy water after contact with the reactor core, and this may be present in waterborne and airborne emissions from water
losses. There are cleanup (ion exchange columns and filters) and upgrading facilities for recovered heavy water that will be used if heavy water is
present in the liquid waste stream. There are also heavy water vapour recovery circuits in each reactor building to dry the atmosphere in areas that
are subject to heavy water leakage during operation or servicing of equipment.
Tritium can also be produced through neutron capture by B-10 in the EPR and AP1000 reactors. This tritium can be found in liquid and airborne
effluents due to water losses.
Radioactive Gaseous Waste Management: Gaseous wastes from potentially active areas, such as reactor buildings, will be monitored for
activity before release to the atmosphere. The gases from the active ventilation stacks are filtered through absolute and charcoal filters before
being released, to minimize the release of radioactivity. In some cases, the release of active gaseous waste is delayed to allow for decay of shortlived radioisotopes.
Operation of Safety and

Related Systems
A multiple barrier approach has been built into the design of all of the reactors to control releases of radioactivity to the environment.
The ACR-1000 reactor has five safety systems: Shutdown System 1 (SDS1) and Shutdown System 2 (SDS2), which provide emergency safe
shutdown capability for the reactors, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) and the Containment
System.
The EPR reactor design includes four safety systems: the Safety Injection System (SIS) which provides emergency cooling, the Rod Cluster
Control Assembly (RCCA) shutdown system which provides rapid reactor shutdown, the Emergency Feedwater System (EFWS), as well as the
Containment System.
The AP1000 reactor includes four safety systems: the Passive Core Cooling System (PXS) which is designed to provide emergency core cooling;
the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) which provides for the removal of heat from the containment vessel using water and airflow; the
Containment System which is a steel vessel surrounded by a concrete shielding structure; and the Reactor Trip System, which acts to keep the
reactor operating away from any safety limit.
Operation of Fuel and

Fuel Handling Systems
Fuel and Fuel Handling includes receipt, handling and storage of fresh fuel and used fuel.
Fuel: The reactor may be fuelled with low enriched uranium (LEU) or more highly enriched uranium, with a maximum enrichment of
approximately 5% U-235. The enrichment level and configuration of the fuel differs based on the reactor class. Fuel will be delivered to the NND
site in protective flame retardant containers and stored in these containers until required. Criticality safety is a concern due to the enrichment of the
fuel and a criticality program will be put in place to mitigate this.
Fuel Storage and Handling: The fuel handling system comprises equipment required for fuel changing, for the storage of fresh fuel, and for onsite storage of used fuel.
C-7



and Activities
Description
New fuel storage: New fuel is stored in a high density rack which includes integral neutron absorbing material to maintain the required degree of
subcriticality. The rack is designed to store fuel of the maximum design basis enrichment.
Fuelling system: In the ACR-1000 reactor, fuelling of the reactor is completed online. Fresh fuel bundles are pushed into one end of the fuel
channel by a remotely operated fuelling machine. Irradiated fuel bundles are simultaneously discharged at the other end of the channel into
another fuelling machine.
For the EPR and AP1000 reactors, fuelling must be completed during a refuelling outage. The refuelling operation is divided into four major
phases: preparation, reactor disassembly, fuel handling, and reactor assembly. Prior to refuelling, the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) cavity is
flooded with borated water and the reactor internals are placed in an internals storage pool separated from the reactor cavity by a removable gate.
Fuel assemblies are remotely removed from the RPV and sent to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) through the fuel transfer tube. Some new fuel
assemblies may be stored in the SFP, from where they will move through the fuel transfer tube and be placed into the RPV by the refuelling
machine. When the refuelling is complete, the RPV internals are replaced into the RPV, instrumentation, and control/shutdown rods are
reconnected, and the reactor vessel head is placed and fastened back onto the RPV. The borated water is then drained from the refuelling work
areas and can be reused in the IRWST.
Used Fuel Handling: In every reactor technology, the used fuel storage facility will be composed of transfer systems that carry the used fuel from
the reactor to a used fuel storage pool in which the fuel is stored and cooled. The used fuel will be stored in a used fuel storage bay until it has
cooled sufficiently for storage using an alternative means.
Used Fuel Bay and Auxiliaries: The design specifications and location of the used fuel storage pool will be determined based on the reactor
technology selected and the level of enrichment of the fuel to be used. Neutron absorbing material and spacers will be used to maintain the desired
degree of subcriticality. A fuel bay cooling and purification system is used to maintain chemical composition, volume, activity level and
temperature of the water in the fuel bay at desired levels. Filters, ion exchange columns and heat exchangers may be used depending on the
specific reactor design selected.
Operation of Secondary
Heat Transport System
and Turbine Generators
Turbine/Generator and Auxiliaries comprise the turbine/generator, steam supply, main condenser, feedwater heating system and auxiliary
systems. These systems are similar for the EPR, AP1000 and ACR-1000 reactors. This system also includes the generator oil supply and the
associated fire suppression systems. This activity also includes maintenance of the system components. Interactions with the environment resulting
from this activity are from oil leaks and water usage.
Turbine/Generator System: Each unit has one turbine/generator unit and its auxiliary systems. The EPR and ACR-1000 reactors have four
steam generators, and the AP1000 has two.
Steam Supply: Steam is produced in steam generators in the reactor building, and transported by pipes to each turbine/generator. The specific
configuration may vary by reactor design.
C-8



and Activities
Description
Main Condenser: Steam from the turbines exhausts into the condenser shells where it is condensed using Condenser Circulating Water and
collected in the hotwells. The condensate feedwater system collects the condensed steam from the turbine and supplies it to the steam generators.
External makeup to the closed loop steam and feedwater system is from the demineralized water storage tank. This configuration is independent of
reactor technology selected.
Feedwater Heating System: The feedwater heating system supplies feedwater to the steam generators where applicable, preheats the water to
achieve a good heat rate, and performs several other functions. This is generally true for all reactor technologies.
Auxiliary Systems: The major turbine/generator auxiliary systems are: the sampling system, which permits sampling steam and feedwater for
chemical analysis; and the chemical control system, which eliminates the residual oxygen from the deaerated feedwater and controls its pH. These
systems have different names depending on which reactor is being discussed but perform the same functions.
Operation of Condenser
and Condenser
Circulating Water,
Service Water and
Cooling Systems
The condenser circulating water system (CCW) supplies cold water to the condenser tubes to condense the steam from the turbine exhaust. Four
options are being assessed for the CCW system. These options are: once through cooling water, natural or mechanical draft cooling towers, or fan
assisted natural draft cooling towers. Dependent on climate and land considerations, a combination of these technologies may be used to provide
condenser circulating water at NND.
The once-through CCW system draws water from Lake Ontario, pumps the water through the condenser tubes, and discharges the water back to
Lake Ontario. Water will be brought into the plant through a lake bottom intake tunnel. The configuration of the intake tunnel and structure will be
similar to that currently being used at DNGS, but sized to the necessary water volumes.
Natural draft cooling towers are taller and have a smaller footprint than mechanical draft cooling towers, and up to two towers will be required for
each reactor unit. A natural draft tower uses convection and evaporation forces to cool the condenser circulating water.
Mechanical draft cooling towers use power driven fan motors to force or draw air through the tower. They are typically shorter and have a larger
footprint than natural draft cooling towers.
For both cooling tower technologies, makeup condenser cooling water is drawn from Lake Ontario at significantly lower rates than with once
through cooling, however, a portion of the water is lost to evaporation. The blowdown flow is directed to blowdown ponds, where mineral and
particulate impurities may be removed. Discharge will comply with appropriate criteria for surface water discharge to Lake Ontario.
Service Water Systems: Water will be drawn from Lake Ontario and distributed to the various systems. For the once-through cooling option,
service water will be combined with the CCW systems intake. For the cooling tower option, service water is drawn from the CCW closed loop
circuit.
Demineralized Water: NND will include two demineralized water plants to remove minerals removed from lake water prior to use in plant
cooling systems.
Inactive Drainage Systems: The inactive drainage system collects wastewater in various buildings (turbine building, waste treatment building,
pumphouses etc.). The wastewater is collected and treated as required to comply with discharge criteria prior to discharge.
Operation of Electrical
Power Systems
Electrical Power Systems deliver power to and from the grid, generate emergency power and distribute power throughout the station. The
Electrical Power Systems will be similar for all reactor technologies as their operation is independent of the reactor itself. Possible environmental
interactions may include noise, spills or leaks from storage tanks, and air emissions from the generators.
C-9



and Activities
Description
Switchyard and Main Transformers: A switchyard is located near the station to connect the station to the grid transmission lines. The main
transformers and associated service transformers are oil cooled.
On-Site Power System: Power used internally at DNGS is supplied both from the unit itself and from the grid. Several buildings largely used for
administration or general support functions are supplied with electricity from the grid.
Generation of Emergency and Standby Power: On-site standby diesel generators (DGs) provide back-up power sources to specific station
loads. The configuration of the diesel generators is similar for all reactor technologies.
Operation of Site
Services and Utilities
Domestic Water: The domestic water system will be supplied from Durham Region water mains.
Sewage System: The sewage system collects waste throughout the complex and discharges it into the Regional Municipality of Durham sewage
mains.
Stormwater Management: Stormwater management features will be developed to address the requirements for runoff control. Stormwater runoff
ponds will be sufficient in number and size to provide adequate retention times following rainfall events. The pond design will incorporate an
emergency overflow bypass for flows in excess of the design storage capacity.
Compressed Air: The compressed air systems consist of instrument air, service air, high pressure air and breathing air.
Heating and Ventilation: The heating and ventilation systems are required to provide comfort to people working inside the plant and prevent
equipment and line freezing during plant shutdown in the winter. Steam, electricity, and hot water are used for heating.
On-Site Transportation: There is an extensive existing road network at the DN site including the roadways and parking lots necessary to service
DNGS. Further infrastructure will be developed to service NND. The roads are used by employees, contractors and visitors to drive to and from
the site, as well as for the transfer of materials.
Other Auxiliary Systems: Other auxiliary systems will include: communication systems; lighting systems, site security facilities, auxiliary and
service buildings, and fencing. NND will also have a dedicated onsite laundry facility.
Management of
Operational Low and
Intermediate-Level
Waste
Management of Low and Intermediate-Level Waste (L&ILW) will be similar regardless of reactor design selected. Two options for management
of L&ILW include storage in a modular building on the DN site, and transport to an appropriately licensed facility off-site. Low Level Storage
Buildings (LLSB), constructed as required, could accommodate both Low and Intermediate Level Waste. Eventually, the waste would be
transported to an appropriate facility off-site for long-term management. The first LLSB will be required by approximately 2017.
Transportation of
Operational Low and
Intermediate-Level
Waste to a Licensed Offsite Facility
Transportation of L&ILW to the WWMF or another licensed facility and transportation of other radioactive materials, such as tritiated heavy
water, will be carried out in accordance with the NSCA and its Regulations and other applicable regulations (e.g., as made under the
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act).
C-10



and Activities
Description
Dry Storage of Used Fuel
Used fuel from NND will be stored in used fuel bays for approximately ten years following removal from the reactor. After this cooling period,
the fuel is moved to dry storage containers which are processed and stored in a Used Fuel Dry Storage (UFDS) Building. Storage containers differ
between the ACR and the two PWR reactors due to differences in fuel characteristics. UFDS buildings will be constructed as required, and will be
either an independent facility of an expansion to the existing DWMF.
Management of
Conventional Waste
The generation of non-radioactive wastes will be minimized to the extent practicable through re-use and recycling programs. All residual waste
will be collected regularly by licensed contractors and transferred to appropriately licensed off-site disposal facilities. Hazardous wastes will be
handled in accordance with applicable regulations.
Replacement /
Maintenance of Major
Components and Systems
Major Maintenance: Some systems and components will require maintenance, replacement or upgrading. A maintenance program for the plant
will be developed to address issues related to ageing, wear and degradation. A portion of this work will require the unit to be offline for these
maintenance activities to be completed. Typically, this work is done during a maintenance or refuelling outage that occurs once every one to three
years (1-2 months duration), depending on station protocols and an assessment of needs. The periodic chemical cleaning of systems and
components (e.g. steam generators) is also included in this activity. Many maintenance activities do not require a unit shutdown, and will be
performed with the unit in an operating state.
Refurbishment: During the 60 year life of the station, specific reactor components and the steam generators, will likely require replacement. In
addition to the steam generators, refurbishment of the ACR-1000 would require replacement of fuel channel assemblies, calandria tubes and
feeder pipes; and the EPR and AP1000 would require replacement of the reactor pressure vessel head. Each of these activities will require the
reactors being removed from service for a period of time (one to three years).
The reactor will be defuelled, systems will be drained and access ways through containment created. The components will be removed by cutting
or disconnecting piping and equipment.
The Low and Intermediate Level Waste from refurbishment will be transported either to a purpose built facility on-site or transported a licensed
facility is in accordance with CNSC transportation regulations in place at the time of refurbishment.
Safe Storage: Preparation for, and safe storage of a reactor are the first two of the three-stage decommissioning program (the final stage is
dismantling, disposal and site restoration). Safe storage involves removing the reactors from service for a period of time to allow for decay of
radionuclides. In preparation for safe storage, the reactors will be defueled, and dewatered. During the safe storage period resident maintenance
staff will perform routine inspections and carry out preventative and corrective maintenance.
Physical Presence of the

Station
When complete, NND will exist as a functioning nuclear power plant comprised of up to four individual reactors. The greatest potential difference,
in an environmental context, between the new facility and the existing station are the cooling towers that may be included as an alternative to the
once-through cooling. From a physical presence perspective, natural draft cooling towers would be the more dominant of the cooling tower
options, with several towers likely, each extending to a height of as much as 152.4 m above finished grade. A visible steam plume would routinely
be associated with cooling tower operation.
During operations, used reactor fuel will be stored onsite in water-filled bays for a period of several years, following which it will be removed
from the bays, repackaged into dry storage containers and placed into on-land storage, also onsite, for a period of up to several decades.
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and Activities
Administration,
Purchasing and Payroll
Description
Upon completion of the Construction Phase of the project, the maximum estimated staff required for the operation of NND is expected to be 1,400
for the first two units in approximately 2016, and 2,800 for four units in about 2025. During the period 2018-2024, the workforce involved in the
operation of units 1 and 2 will overlap with the workforce staff associated with the construction of units 3 and 4. During these years the Projectrelated workforce will total approximately 5,200.
The Project-related workforce will increase from the normal complement of 2,800 by a further 2,000 during NND refurbishment (approximately
2050-2055).
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NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT

TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT

Nuclear Waste Management Division

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

Operational L&ILW will eventually require transfer to a suitably licensed, long-term

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

Future transportation of L&IL radioactive materials for NND to an off-site licensed

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

4.4.1 Overview of Current Radioactive Material Transportation Program ...... 4-5

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Advanced CANDU 1000, reactor design by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

Low Void Reactivity Fuel

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

New Nuclear Darlington

Tritiated Heavy Water

Nuclear Waste Management

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

LIST OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENTS (TSDs)

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

The New Nuclear Darlington Project

Preparation of the DN site for construction of the new nuclear facility;

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

Development planning for decommissioning of the nuclear reactors and associated

The New Nuclear Darlington Environmental Assessment

The need for, and purpose of the Project;

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

Scope of the Project for EA Purposes;

Nuclear Waste Management Technical Support Document

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management

Storage of NND Operational L&IL Wastes

On-site Storage of NND Used Fuel

Scope of TSD in relation to Environmental Assessment

New Nuclear Darlington

Nuclear Waste Management