FORTUN vs.

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Doctrine: The Presidents power to declare martial law or suspend the writ is independent, separate, and
distinct from any constitutionally mandated act to be performed by either the Legislature or the Judiciary. It
is neither joint nor sequential with Congress power to revoke the declaration or suspension or to extend it
upon the initiative of the President. Accordingly, even if Congress has not acted upon the Presidents
declaration or suspension, the Court may review the declaration or suspension in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen. Otherwise stated, Congress inaction on the declaration or suspension is
not determinative of the Courts exercise of its review power under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution.

PETITIONER

RESPONDENT

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the writ is a joint and sequential
function of the President and Congress such that, without Congressional action on the proclamation either
affirming or revoking it, the President having in the meantime lifted the declaration and restored the writ,
this Court has nothing to review

HELD: WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same have
become moot and academic.
RATIO: Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
The Constitution vests exclusively in the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the emergency powers to
declare martial law or suspend the writ in cases of rebellion or invasion, when the public safety requires it.
The imposition of martial law or suspension of the writ takes effect the moment it is declared by the
President. No other act is needed for the perfection of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of
the writ.
J. Mendoza: A declaration of martial law by the President alone is complete by itself and does not require
for its validity the approval or concurrence of Congress. It is a power placed solely in the President to
enable him to secure the people from harm and restore the public order so that they can enjoy their
freedoms. Because it is liable to abuse, it is made subject to check by Congress and/or the [Supreme
Court].
The power of Congress is to revokenot to confirm or ratify, much less to approve,the Presidents action
declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is a veto power, just as
the power of the judiciary to review the Presidents action is a veto power on the Executives action.
It is clear, therefore, that the Presidents power to declare martial law or suspend the writ is independent,
separate, and distinct from any constitutionally mandated act to be performed by either the Legislature or
the Judiciary. It is neither joint nor sequential with Congress power to revoke the declaration or suspension
or to extend it upon the initiative of the President. Accordingly, even if Congress has not acted upon the
Presidents declaration or suspension, the Court may review the declaration or suspension in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen. Otherwise stated, Congress inaction on the declaration or
suspension is not determinative of the Courts exercise of its review power under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution.
To hold that the power of this Court to review the Presidents declaration of martial law or suspension of
the writ is sequential, or joint, with the review power of Congress is to make it impossible for this Court to
decide a case challenging the declaration or suspension within thirty days from its filing, as mandated by
the Constitution. Congress has no deadline when to revoke the Presidents declaration or suspension.
Congress may not even do anything with the Presidents declaration or suspension and merely allow it to
lapse after 60 days. On the other hand, the Constitution mandates that this Court must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from [the] filing of the case. Clearly, the Courts review power is
neither sequential nor joint with the review power of Congress.
The Presidents lifting of the declaration or suspension merely means that this Court does not have to
decide the case within the 30day period, as the urgency of deciding has ceased. Certainly, the Court is not
divested of its jurisdiction simply because the urgency of deciding a case has ceased.