Professional Documents
Culture Documents
POLITICAL SCIENCE
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE
George Thomas Kurian, editor in chief
James E. Alt
Simone Chambers
Geoffrey Garrett
Margaret Levi
Paula D. McClain
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
Prepared with the assistance of the American Political Science Association
A Division of SAGE
Washington, D.C.
CQ Press
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Washington, DC 20037
Phone: 202-729-1900; toll-free, 1-866-4CQ-PRESS (1-866-427-7737)
Web: www.cqpress.com
Copyright 2011 by CQ Press, a division of SAGE. CQ Press is a registered trademark of Congressional Quarterly Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publisher.
Cover design: Anne C. Kerns, Anne Likes Red, Inc.
Cover photos: Protest in India: Associated Press, Mustafa Quraishi; Afghan women vote: Associated Press, Alexandra Boulat;
Japanese Parliment: Kyodo; U.S. Supreme Court: Jarek Tuszynski, Wikimedia Commons, CC-BY-SA-3.0; Iraqi Kurdish women
militia: Associated Press, Hasan Sarbakhshian
Maps: International Mapping Associates
Composition: C&M Digitals (P) Ltd.
The paper used in this publication exceeds the requirements of the American National Standard for Information
SciencesPermanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.
Printed and bound in the United States of America
14 13 12 11 10 1 2 3 4 5
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The encyclopedia of political science/George Thomas Kurian, editor-in-chief.
5 v. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-933116-44-0 (alk. paper)
1. Political scienceEncyclopedias. I. Kurian, George Thomas. II. Title.
JA61.E513 2011
320.03dc22
2010036238
CONTENTS
1
3
3
4
5
9
10
10
11
13
14
15
15
16
17
18
20
21
22
23
24
26
30
32
33
34
36
37
38
40
40
41
43
44
45
45
46
46
48
48
51
52
54
56
57
58
Anticlericalism
Anti-democratic Thought
Anti-Semitism
Antitrust Policy
Apartheid
Apparentement
Appeasement
Appropriation
Approval Voting
Aprismo
Arab-Israeli Relations
Arab League
Arab Political Economy
Arab Political Thought
Arab Socialism
Arbitration
Arendt, Hannah
Aristotle
Armenian Genocide
Arms Control
Arms Race
Arnold, Thurman Wesley
Aron, Raymond
Articles of Confederation
Asian American Identity and Groups
Asian Political Thought
Asia Pacific Region Politics and Society
Assassinations, Political
Assimilation
Astell, Mary
Asylum Rights
Asymmetric Wars
Atlantic Charter
At-Large Elections
Attorney General
Augustine of Hippo
Australian Ballot
Autarky
Authoritarianism, African
Authority
Autocracy
Autogestion
Autogolpe
Autonomy
Baathism
Bachrach, Peter
59
60
62
63
65
66
66
67
67
68
68
69
70
71
72
73
73
75
75
77
81
83
83
84
85
86
91
95
96
97
98
99
100
100
101
101
102
103
103
104
106
107
107
107
109
110
111
111
112
113
113
115
117
120
120
121
121
122
123
123
124
125
125
126
126
127
128
128
129
130
131
132
132
133
134
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
140
141
141
142
143
144
144
145
146
147
147
149
150
150
150
154
154
156
159
160
161
162
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
175
176
176
177
179
181
184
184
185
187
188
189
193
196
196
197
198
199
200
201
201
201
202
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
211
212
212
216
217
220
221
222
224
225
226
230
231
233
233
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
246
247
248
252
253
253
254
255
257
257
258
259
261
261
263
264
265
266
270
271
274
275
276
280
281
283
283
284
284
286
287
288
290
291
291
292
293
293
293
294
295
296
298
299
Consensus
Consent of the Governed
Consequentialism
Conservatism
Conservative Parties
Consociational Democracy
Constant de Rebeque, Henri-Benjamin
Constituency
Constituency Relations
Constitutional Amendments
Constitutional Courts
Constitutional Democracy
Constitutional Law
Constitutional Monarchy
Constitutional Systems, Comparative
Constitution Amending Procedures
Constitutions, Unwritten
Constitutions and Constitutionalism
Constructivism
Consultants, Political
Consumer Society
Contagion of the Left
Containment
Content Analysis
Contentious Politics
Contractarianism
Convenience Voting
Convergence Theory
Cooperative Security
Copyright
Corporation
Correlation
Corruption, Political
Corruption and Other Political Pathologies
Corwin, Edward Samuel
Cosmopolitanism
Cost-benefit Analysis
Counter-Enlightenment Political Thought
Counterfactual
Coup dtat
Covenant
Crime Policy
Crisis Rhetoric
Critical Juncture
Critical Race Theory
Critical Realignment Theory
Critical Theory
Croce, Benedetto
Crosland, Charles Anthony Raven
Crossman, Richard
Cryptography
Cube Law
Cue Taking
Cult of Personality
Cultural Policy
Cultural Relations
299
300
301
301
305
307
308
309
309
310
312
313
314
315
317
318
319
320
323
325
326
327
327
328
328
332
332
333
338
339
340
341
341
343
346
347
348
348
350
350
351
352
353
355
356
357
358
361
362
363
364
364
365
365
365
367
369
370
371
372
373
375
375
375
377
378
380
381
382
383
385
386
387
391
392
394
398
399
399
401
403
404
406
407
407
407
409
409
411
412
413
414
415
416
420
421
423
424
425
425
426
426
427
428
429
429
430
431
436
438
439
440
Discourse Analysis
Discrimination
Disenfranchisement
Disinformation
Dissolution
Distribution of Powers (in a Federation)
Distributive Justice
Districting
District Magnitude
Divided Government
Divine Right of Kings
Doctrines
Domino Theory
Droop Quota
Drug Cartels
Drug Policy
Dual Citizenship and Dual Nationality
Dual Executive
Du Bois, William Edward Burghardt
Due Process
Duration Model
Durkheim, mile
Duvergers Law
Eckstein, Harry
Ecological Analysis
Ecological Fallacy
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Economic Development, State-led
Economic Interdependence
Economic Policy Formulation
Economic Systems, Comparative
Economic Theories of the State
Eco-terrorism
Edelman, Murray J.
Education Policy
Education Policy, Higher
E-governance, E-voting, E-democracy, E-politics
Einaudi, Mario Luigi
Elazar, Daniel J.
Election Commission
Election Monitoring
Electoral Administration
Electoral College
Electoral Cycles
Electoral Formulas
Electoral Geography
Electoral Quotas
Electoral Reform
Electoral Rules
Electoral Systems
Electoral Systems, Comparative
Electronic Voting
Elite Decision Making
Elite Interview
Elites, Political
Elite Theory
441
441
443
444
444
444
446
447
448
449
449
450
450
451
451
451
452
453
454
455
457
457
458
459
459
460
460
461
463
464
466
468
469
470
471
472
473
475
475
476
478
479
480
480
482
482
484
484
485
488
489
490
491
492
492
494
495
496
498
499
501
502
504
505
506
507
508
509
509
512
515
518
519
520
521
521
521
524
525
526
527
528
530
531
532
536
540
542
544
544
545
545
545
546
551
551
552
553
555
556
556
557
558
558
559
559
560
561
562
566
567
571
573
574
575
576
578
579
580
581
582
584
584
585
587
589
590
591
592
592
593
593
594
595
595
596
597
598
599
601
602
605
606
609
610
611
611
613
614
616
618
620
621
622
623
625
626
628
629
630
631
632
632
637
638
639
640
641
642
642
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
650
651
652
657
657
659
660
661
661
663
663
665
666
666
667
668
668
672
673
674
674
674
674
675
676
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
691
691
692
693
693
695
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
Gulf States
Gulick, Luther Halsey, III
Gunboat Diplomacy
Habeas Corpus
Hamilton, Alexander
Hamiltonianism
Harrington, James
Hartz, Louis
Hate Speech
Hayek, Freidrich August von
Health Care Policy
Heckscher, Gunnar
Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
Hegedus, Andras
Hegel, Georg W. F.
Hegemony
Heidegger, Martin
Herzen, Alexander I.
Heuristics
Hierarchical Modeling
Hilferding, Rudolf
Hindu Political Thought
Historical Interpretation
Historical Method, Comparative
Historicism
Hobbes, Thomas
Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawney
Hobson, John Atkinson
Holcombe, Arthur N.
Holocaust
Homeland Security
Homelessness
Homophobia
Hook, Sidney
Hooker, Richard
Horkheimer, Max
Horn of Africa
Horvat, Branko
Human Development Index
Humanitarian Intervention
Human Nature and Politics
Human Rights
Human Security
Hume, David
Humor, Political
Huntington, Samuel P.
Hyneman, Charles S.
Ibn Taymiyya
Idealism
Identity, Politics of
Ideologies, Political
Illich, Ivan
Immigration, Effects on Intergroup Relations
Immigration, Politics of
Immigration Policy
Immobolisme
706
709
710
711
712
712
713
714
714
716
716
718
718
719
719
720
721
722
723
723
724
725
726
726
727
728
729
730
731
731
732
733
734
735
736
736
737
739
739
740
743
745
749
751
751
753
754
755
755
756
759
762
763
764
766
767
768
768
772
774
774
775
775
777
778
779
780
781
781
783
786
787
789
789
791
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
802
807
808
809
810
812
813
814
815
816
817
817
818
819
823
824
828
829
831
832
834
835
835
836
837
837
838
839
839
840
Isolationism
Italian Political Thought
Jabotinsky,Vladimir
Jacksonian Democracy
Jacobinism
Jacobson, Harold K.
James, Cyril Lionel Robert
James, William
Jennings, Ivor
Jeremiad
Jewish Political Thought
Jihad
Jim Crow
Journalism, Political
Judgment, Political
Judgment and Decision-Making
Judicial Activism
Judicial Behavior
Judicial Independence
Judicial Philosophy and Decision Making
Judicial Restraint
Judicial Review
Judicial Selection and Nomination
Judicial Supremacy
Judicial Systems, Comparative
Judiciary
Jurisprudence and Legal Theory
Justice and Injustice
Just War Theory
Kant, Immanuel
Kashmir
Kautilya
Kautsky, Karl Johann
Kelsen, Hans
Kemalism
Key,V. O., Jr.
Keynes, John Maynard
Keynesianism
Kirchheimer, Otto
Kita Ikki
Knowledge Management
Kohr, Leopold
Kollontay, Aleksandra Mikhaylovna
Kropotkin, Peter
Kuhn, Thomas
Kyoto Protocol
Labor Policy
Labor Strikes
Labor Unions
Laicite
Laissez-faire
Language and Language Policy
Language and Politics
Laski, Harold Joseph
Lasswell, Harold Dwight
Latin America and Globalization
842
843
849
849
850
851
851
852
853
853
853
855
856
857
858
859
859
861
862
863
865
867
868
869
871
872
876
881
885
887
887
889
889
890
890
892
892
893
894
895
896
896
896
897
898
898
901
903
903
904
905
906
907
910
911
912
914
915
917
921
922
923
927
931
931
933
935
935
935
937
938
938
939
943
945
946
947
948
949
950
950
952
953
957
958
958
959
960
961
962
964
965
966
966
967
967
968
969
969
970
971
973
977
978
978
978
979
980
981
Luther, Martin
Luxemburg, Rosa
Lu Xun
Lyotard, Jean-Franois
Machiavelli, Niccol
Machine Politics
Macpherson, Crawford Brough
Macroeconomics
Madison, James
Maghreb
Magna Carta
Maistre, Joseph Marie de
Majority-minority District
Malatesta, Errico
Mandarins
Mandate System
Mandate Theory
Manifesto
Mannheim, Karl
Maoism
Marcuse, Herbert
Marginal District
Maritegui, Jos Carlos
Maritain, Jacques
Market Socialism
Marshall Plan
Marsilius of Padua
Martial Law
Marx, Karl
Marxism
Marxist Parties
Mashriq
Mass Immigration
Mass Political Behavior
Mayor
McCarthyism
McKelvey, Richard
Measurement Theory
Media, Political Commentary in the
Media and Politics
Media Bias
Media Effect
Megacities
Menshevism
Mercantilism
Meritocracy
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice
Merriam, Charles E.
Mexican Immigration
Michels, Robert
Microeconomics
Middle East Democratization
Middle Eastern Politics and Society
Migration
Miliband, Ralph
Military Courts
982
983
984
984
987
987
989
989
990
990
991
991
992
992
993
993
994
994
995
995
997
998
998
999
1000
1001
1001
1002
1003
1004
1007
1008
1008
1010
1010
1011
1012
1013
1013
1014
1018
1020
1020
1021
1022
1024
1024
1025
1025
1026
1027
1027
1028
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
1039
1039
1040
1041
1042
1042
1043
1044
1044
1045
1046
1047
1047
1048
1052
1053
1055
1056
1057
1058
1058
1059
1060
1061
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
1066
1067
1068
1069
1071
1071
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1082
1083
1084
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1092
1093
1094
Negative Campaigning
Negotiations and Bargaining
Ngritude
Neoconservatism
Nepotism
Network Society
Neumann, Franz
Neuroscience and Politics
Neustadt, Richard E.
Neutrality
New Conservatism
New Deal
New Europe
New Institutionalism
New Left
Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC)
New Right
News, Construction of
New World Order
Niebuhr, Reinhold
Nietzsche, Friedrich
Nobel Peace Prize
Nonalignment
Noncombatant Prisoners
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)
Nonstate Actors
Nontariff Barriers to Trade
Nonviolence
Normative Theory
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Northern Ireland
North-South Relations
Nove, Alec
Novel, Political
Nozick, Robert
Nuclear Club
Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation
Numeraire and Dollarization
Oakeshott, Michael Joseph
Obligation, Theories of
Occupation and Annexation
Ogg, Frederick Austin
Okin, Susan Moller
Old Europe
Oligarchy
Oligarchy, Iron Law of
Olson, Mancur
Ombudsman
Ombudsman, Parliamentary
One-party Systems
Open Government
Opposition Politics
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)
Organization of American States (OAS)
1094
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
1100
1101
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1113
1114
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1120
1123
1124
1126
1128
1130
1130
1132
1133
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1137
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1138
1140
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1141
1141
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1156
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1159
1159
1161
1162
1162
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1172
1172
1173
1174
1175
1175
1176
1177
1179
1181
1181
1182
1183
1183
1184
1184
1185
1186
1187
1189
1190
1191
1192
1194
1196
1196
1197
1199
1200
1201
1202
1204
1204
1206
1206
1207
1208
1209
Pillarization
Plato
Plebiscite
Plekhanov, Grigorii Valentinovich
Pluralism
Poetry and Politics
Polanyi, Karl
Police Powers
Police State
Policy Analysis
Policy-centered Entrepreneurship
Policy Evaluation
Policy Innovation
Policy Meta-analysis
Policy Networks and Communications
Policy Theory
Political Action Committee (PAC)
Political Agents
Political Anthropology
Political Attitudes and Behavior
Political Change
Political Communication
Political Correctness
Political Culture
Political Discourse
Political Ecology
Political Economy
Political Economy, Comparative
Political Geography
Political Law
Political Network Analysis
Political Obligation
Political Participation
Political Parties
Political Party Platform
Political Philosophy
Political Prisoners
Political Psychology
Political Risk Assessment
Political Science, History of
Political Science Associations
Political Science Journals
Political Sociology
Political Theology
Political Theory
Political Thought, Foundations of
Politics
Politics, Comparative
Politics, Literature, and Film
Polling, History of
Polsby, Nelson
Polyarchy
Polybius
Pool, Ithiel de Sola
Popper, Karl Raimund
Pork Barrel
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1222
1224
1225
1226
1227
1230
1232
1235
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1240
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1250
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1257
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1267
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1558
1559
1562
1565
1566
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1571
1573
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1580
1584
1586
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1587
1588
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1591
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1600
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1623
1624
1625
1626
1627
1628
1630
1631
1632
1632
1635
1636
1637
1639
1639
1641
Systems Structure
Systems Transformation
Tactical Voting
Talk Radio
Tawney, Richard Henry
Taxation
Telecommunications Policy
Television and Politics
Teratopolitics
Term Limits
Terrorism, Financing of
Terrorism, Political
Terrorism, State-sponsored
Thatcherism
Theater, Political
Theocracy
Think Tanks
Third-Party Intervention
Third Sector
Third Way and Social Democracy
Third World Debt
Thomas Aquinas
Thomist, Scholastic, and Medieval Political Thought
Thoreau, Henry David
Threat Perception
Thucydides
Tiananmen Square
Ticket Splitting
Time-series Analysis
Tocqueville, Alexis de
Toleration
Tolstoy, Leo
Torture
Totalitarianism
Town Hall Meeting
Trade Blocs
Trade Diplomacy
Tradition
Tragedy of the Commons
Transitional Justice
Transitional Regimes
Transitology
Transnationalism
Transnational Movements
Transnational Voting
Transparency
Trial Courts
Trotsky, Leon
Trust and Credibility
Trusteeship System
Turnout
Tyranny, Classical
Tyranny of the Majority and Minority Rights
U.S. Political Thought
U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political
Participation
1641
1642
1643
1643
1644
1645
1646
1648
1649
1650
1651
1652
1655
1656
1657
1658
1659
1660
1661
1662
1663
1664
1665
1666
1667
1668
1668
1669
1669
1669
1670
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1677
1678
1679
1679
1681
1683
1683
1684
1685
1686
1687
1689
1690
1690
1691
1693
1694
1697
1700
1702
1703
1706
1708
1709
1710
1711
1711
1713
1714
1718
1719
1720
1721
1723
1724
1725
1726
1726
1727
1728
1730
1730
1732
1737
1737
1738
1739
1739
1740
1741
1742
1743
1744
1747
1748
1751
1751
1753
1753
1755
War Termination
Washington, Booker T.
Ways and Means
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Webb, Sidney, and Beatrice Potter
Weber, Max
Weighted Vote Systems
Weil, Simone
Welfare Rights
Welfare State
West, Decline of the
Westminster Model
Wheare, Kenneth C.
Whip
White, Leonard D.
White Primary
White Supremacy
Wildavsky, Aaron
William of Ockham
Williams, Raymond
Winner-Take-All
Withering Away of the State
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Wittig, Monique
Wollstonecraft, Mary
Womanism
Women,Violence Against
Women and Security
Women in Islamic Nations
Women Legislators
Womens Movement, Comparative
Womens Representation
Womens Rights
Womens Studies
Womens Suffrage
Workers Rights
World Bank
World Trade Organization (WTO)
Wright, Quincy
Xenophobia
Xenophon
Yoshino Sakuzo
Young, Iris Marion
Zetkin, Clara
Zionism
1756
1756
1758
1758
1760
1761
1761
1762
1763
1764
1768
1768
1769
1770
1770
1771
1771
1772
1773
1774
1774
1775
1776
1776
1777
1778
1779
1780
1781
1783
1784
1785
1786
1787
1788
1789
1790
1790
1791
1793
1794
1797
1797
1799
1799
1278
1286
1287
1299
23
24
26
30
32
54
103
611
737
980
1168
1320
1338
46
84
480
558
693
849
958
1011
1105
1123
1313
1613
1674
1697
1706
1771
86
91
217
Gandhism
Glasnost
Indian Ocean Region
Kashmir
Mandarins
Oriental Despotism
Panchayat
Perestroika
Russian Political Thought
Satyagraha
Soviet Union, Former
Tiananmen Square
647
674
775
887
993
1157
1172
1206
1499
1511
1584
1668
COMPARATIVE POLITICS
Communism, Fall of, and End of History
Constitutional Systems, Comparative
Convergence Theory
Decolonization
Economic Systems, Comparative
Electoral Systems, Comparative
Federalism, Comparative
Institutionalism, Comparative
Judicial Systems, Comparative
Law, Comparative
Legislative Systems, Comparative
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements,
Comparative
Mission Civilisatrice
Party Systems, Comparative
Political Economy, Comparative
Politics, Comparative
Postcommunism
Regional Integration, Comparative
Reparations
Social Movements, Comparative
Transitional Justice
Transitional Regimes
Transitology
Womens Movement, Comparative
286
317
333
380
466
489
571
789
871
923
943
950
1046
1194
1249
1301
1319
1438
1459
1565
1679
1681
1683
1784
CONSTITUTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Commerce Clause
Constitutional Amendments
Constitutional Democracy
275
310
313
314
315
318
319
320
495
574
994
1094
1157
1365
142
197
203
367
751
781
834
857
906
907
1013
1014
1018
1020
1063
1069
1075
1099
1111
1130
1214
1239
1240
1305
1344
1374
1510
1643
1648
1657
60
188
231
307
385
387
391
394
398
399
406
Digital Democracy
Direct Democracy
Emerging Democracies
Empire and Democracy
Global Democratic Deficit
Greek Democracy, Classical
Industrial Democracy
Liberal Democracy
Parliamentary Democracy
Participatory Democracy
Polyarchy
Representative Democracy
Self-determination
Third Way and Social Democracy
Toleration
430
436
496
501
674
693
780
959
1176
1184
1311
1462
1530
1662
1670
15
341
343
392
521
1199
1511
1588
113
117
123
150
527
528
531
532
536
632
668
767
843
1106
1126
1141
1610
1768
107
205
207
281
290
423
444
449
573
575
787
802
836
837
973
1010
1020
1068
1335
1441
1619
1630
1713
1725
1726
1726
1727
1728
1730
FOREIGN POLICY
Alliances
Atlantic Charter
Bandwagoning
Boundary Making and Boundary Disputes
Brinkmanship
Chauvinism
Diplomacy
Doctrines
Extradition
Extraterritoriality
Foreign Aid
Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy Role
Great Power
Gunboat Diplomacy
Humanitarian Intervention
International Cooperation
Iron Curtain
Isolationism
Marshall Plan
Millennium Development Goals
Monetary Union
Monroe Doctrine
Multilateralism
New World Order
Nobel Peace Prize
Nonalignment
Nonstate Actors
North-South Relations
Pax Americana
Power Cycle Theory
Power Transition Theory
Public Diplomacy
Refugees
Sanctions and Embargoes
43
100
120
147
150
212
431
450
552
553
599
602
605
692
710
740
810
839
842
1001
1039
1055
1057
1065
1112
1114
1114
1117
1128
1201
1333
1335
1378
1433
1507
Statecraft
Strategic Interest
Summit Diplomacy
Third World Debt
1607
1620
1631
1663
578
579
580
581
582
584
585
587
651
652
657
657
659
660
674
952
953
1045
1197
1342
1411
1533
1709
1778
1779
1780
1781
1783
1785
1786
1787
1788
58
247
675
676
680
704
739
797
1008
1048
1624
IDEOLOGIES
Agrarianism
Anarchism
36
51
59
109
145
175
211
221
284
287
301
327
399
401
426
555
562
567
590
593
705
712
759
779
839
890
893
949
965
995
1000
1004
1021
1064
1071
1077
1087
1096
1097
1098
1104
1108
1207
1351
1363
1421
1470
1477
1547
1549
1550
1554
1558
1590
1639
1656
1673
1799
5
17
204
212
258
545
546
687
768
774
1144
1650
1686
20
171
179
375
561
798
799
903
970
971
1200
1225
1346
1364
1383
1661
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Balance of Power
Collapsed and Failed States
Economic Interdependence
Federation and Confederation
G7/G8 and G20
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Human Security
International Administration
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
International Criminal Court (ICC)
International Criminal Tribunals
International Labor Organization (ILO)
International Labor Standards
International Law
International Monetary Fund
International Norms
International Organization
International Relations
International Relations Doctrines of Power
International Relations Worldviews and Frameworks
International System
113
264
463
576
645
661
749
808
812
813
814
815
816
817
817
818
819
824
828
831
832
933
993
1066
1116
1149
1149
1151
1204
1447
1577
1605
1641
1642
1683
1684
1685
1690
1714
1718
1790
1790
77
81
295
327
338
413
414
450
791
795
796
1056
1071
1133
1134
1339
1430
1440
1483
1660
1667
1758
254
407
451
505
912
914
915
917
922
1342
1509
Adjudication
Administrative Courts
Amicus Curiae Briefs
Arbitration
Capital Punishment
Civil Law
Common Law
Constitutional Courts
Due Process
Equal Protection
Executive Pardon
Habeas Corpus
Judicial Activism
Judicial Behavior
Judicial Independence
Judicial Philosophy and Decision-Making
Judicial Restraint
Judicial Review
Judicial Selection and Nomination
Judicial Supremacy
Judiciary
Jurisprudence and Legal Theory
Law and Society
Legal Profession
Legal Realism
Military Courts
Political Law
Political Prisoners
Precedent
Rule of Law
Sources of Law
Supreme Court
Trial Courts
Universal Jurisdiction
10
11
48
73
189
237
280
312
455
518
545
711
859
861
862
863
865
867
868
869
872
876
927
935
937
1034
1253
1271
1339
1493
1576
1632
1687
1721
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
68
174
193
253
Appropriation
Caucus
Cloture
Congress, Contempt of
Delegated Legislation
67
201
257
298
381
383
444
530
592
650
661
775
938
938
939
945
978
1145
1177
1179
1181
1181
1182
1208
1314
1413
1429
1430
1497
1530
1591
1711
1724
1758
1768
1770
68
69
70
71
72
706
990
1008
1027
1028
1150
1167
1169
1534
1710
14
106
230
300
449
452
468
835
1024
1043
1052
1074
1083
1084
1088
1089
1141
1217
1421
1434
1469
1580
1591
1592
1593
1594
1598
1599
1600
1608
1609
1611
1615
1764
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
Advocacy Coalition Networks
Boycott
Citizen Knowledge
Coalition Formation
Collective Action, Theory of
Cue Taking
Leadership
Negotiations and Bargaining
Political Agents
Political Attitudes and Behavior
Political Network Analysis
Political Participation
Principal-agent Theory
Prisoners Dilemma
Prospect Theory
Student Politics
18
150
225
257
265
365
931
1095
1226
1230
1257
1260
1352
1354
1370
1627
POLITICAL CHANGE
Assassinations, Political
Autogolpe
Civil Disobedience
Civil Wars
Collective Action and Mobilization
Coup dtat
Critical Juncture
Critical Realignment Theory
Labor Strikes
95
107
236
246
266
350
355
357
903
1119
1232
1319
1375
1437
1477
1524
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
Advertising, Political
Campaign Advertising
Communication, Two-step Flow of
Crisis Rhetoric
Debates, Political
Framing and Public Opinion
Jeremiad
Political Communication
Political Discourse
Propaganda
Rhetoric
Spin
16
177
284
353
375
611
853
1235
1243
1365
1478
1587
POLITICAL CONCEPTS
Alienation, Political
Allegiance
Anarchy
Authority
Autonomy
Charisma
Civic Humanism
Civil Society
Community
Consensus
Cosmopolitanism
Covenant
Deontology
Distributive Justice
Equality and Inequality
Essentialism
Fairness
False Consciousness
Freedom
General Will
Geopolitics
Group Cohesion
Groupthink
Judgment, Political
Justice and Injustice
Legitimacy
Natural Law
Political Obligation
Power
Prerogative
Priming
Progress
Public Good
Public-private Dichotomy
38
41
52
104
107
211
233
242
288
299
347
351
407
446
515
521
557
558
616
663
666
700
703
858
881
946
1092
1259
1330
1341
1351
1361
1381
1393
Relativism
Republicanism, Classical
Responsibility
Social Contract
State of Nature
Teratopolitics
Tradition
Tragedy of the Commons
Trust and Credibility
Tyranny, Classical
Universalism
Withering Away of the State
1448
1472
1475
1548
1612
1649
1678
1679
1690
1693
1720
1775
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Autarky
Business Cycles, Political
Business Preference Formation
Centrally Planned Economy
Class and Politics
Class Consciousness, Envy, and Conflict
Common Goods
Consumer Society
Corporation
Democracies, Advanced Industrial
Dependence
Development, Economic
Development, Political Economy of
Development Administration
Dirigisme
Economic Development, State-led
Foreign Direct Investment
Free Trade
Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
International Political Economy
Laissez-faire
Macroeconomics
Mercantilism
Microeconomics
New Institutionalism
Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC)
Nontariff Barriers to Trade
Numeraire and Dollarization
Political Economy
Postindustrial Society
Protectionism and Tariffs
Rent-seeking
State Capitalism
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
Trade Blocs
Trade Diplomacy
103
169
170
208
248
252
276
326
340
386
407
416
420
421
438
461
601
630
718
823
905
989
1022
1027
1107
1109
1118
1135
1245
1325
1371
1458
1604
1619
1675
1677
140
181
185
187
220
294
305
375
404
498
525
556
566
584
631
639
698
935
961
987
1007
1082
1110
1146
1147
1152
1185
1186
1187
1189
1190
1191
1192
1263
1360
1427
1457
1479
1526
1530
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Cognitive Theory and Politics
Elite Decision Making
Elites, Political
Emotions in Politics
Group Relations
Human Nature and Politics
Judgment and Decision Making
Mass Political Behavior
Neuroscience and Politics
Political Psychology
Proportionality
Public Opinion
Social and Political Cognition
Socialization, Political
259
491
492
499
701
743
859
1010
1101
1272
1368
1384
1543
1559
POLITICAL THEORY
Cambridge School
Communalism
176
283
Consequentialism
Constructivism
Contractarianism
Counter-Enlightenment Political Thought
Critical Theory
Decisionism
Decision Theory, Foundations of
Democratic Theory
Empiricism
Enlightenment Political Thought
Formal Political Theory
Frankfurt School
Functionalism
Game Theory
Greek Political Thought, Ancient
Group Theory
Historical Interpretation
Historicism
Idealism
International Relations Theory
Liberal Theory
Liberalism, Classical
Normative Theory
Obligation, Theories of
Political Anthropology
Political Geography
Political Philosophy
Political Sociology
Political Theory
Political Thought, Foundations of
Positive Theory
Postcolonial Theory
Postmodernism
Pragmatism
Rational Choice Theory
Realism and Neorealism
Roman Political Thought
Scottish Enlightenment
Social Choice Theory
Sophists
Straussianism
Structuralism
Systems Analysis
Thomist, Scholastic, and Medieval Political Thought
Utilitarianism
Utopias and Politics
Virtue Theory
301
323
332
348
358
377
378
403
502
508
606
614
641
646
695
702
726
727
755
829
962
960
1120
1137
1227
1250
1268
1288
1293
1296
1315
1317
1325
1336
1423
1428
1487
1522
1546
1574
1623
1626
1641
1665
1730
1732
1738
1
21
96
233
283
328
370
494
540
559
778
835
981
1142
1314
1476
1544
1554
1562
1566
1628
POLITICS OF OPPRESSION
Absolutism
Anti-Semitism
Apartheid
Armenian Genocide
Banana Republic
Caste System
Collectivization
Colonialism
Cult of Personality
Dhimmi
Dictatorship of the Proletariat
Discrimination
Disinformation
Endangered Cultures
Ethnic Cleansing
Feudalism
Genocide
Gleichshaltung
Hate Speech
Hegemony
Holocaust
Homophobia
Imperialism
Internal Colonialism
Jacobinism
Organized Crime and Mafia
Paternalism
Predatory Government
Sedition
Sex Workers and Trafficking
Slavery
State Repression
Torture
White Supremacy
Xenophobia
3
62
65
75
120
199
270
271
365
425
429
441
444
506
524
589
665
674
714
720
731
734
768
807
850
1156
1196
1339
1528
1533
1541
1613
1672
1771
1793
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Administrative Law
Attorney General
Budgeting
13
101
156
Bureaucracy
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism
Cabinets and Cabinet Formation
Central Bank
Chancellor
Civil Service
Cohabitation
Conseil dtat
Deregulation
Dual Executive
Executive Immunity
Executive Order
Good Governance
Governor
Inspector General
Knowledge Management
National Archives
Open Government
Performance Management
Police Powers
Prime Minister (Head of Government)
Privatization
Public Domain
Public Enterprises
Public Utilities
Quangos
Regulation and Rulemaking
Rulemaking
Self-government
Semi-presidential System
Shadow Cabinet
162
166
173
206
210
241
261
299
409
453
544
545
683
691
789
896
1076
1147
1206
1216
1350
1358
1379
1379
1394
1405
1443
1491
1530
1531
1534
PUBLIC POLICY
Agenda Control
Agenda Setting
AIDS, Politics of
Antitrust Policy
Climate Change Conferences, United Nations
Crime Policy
Cultural Policy
Disaster Relief
Drug Policy
Economic Policy Formulation
Education Policy
Education Policy, Higher
Environmental Policy
Fiscal Policy
Food Policy
Garbage Can Model of the Policy Process
Governability
Health Care Policy
Homelessness
Immigration Policy
Incrementalism
Labor Policy
Mining Policy
33
34
37
63
255
352
365
440
451
464
471
472
509
594
596
648
686
716
733
766
774
901
1044
1053
1086
1162
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1222
1224
1267
1327
1347
1359
1386
1390
1396
1405
1520
1531
1567
1568
1571
1589
1645
1646
1659
QUALITATIVE/QUANTITATIVE
METHODS
Analytic Narrative
Bayesian Analysis
Behavioral Game Theory
Case Studies
Causal Inference
Causation and Correlation
Computational Modeling
Concept Analysis
Content Analysis
Correlation
Cost-benefit Analysis
Counterfactual
Discourse Analysis
Duration Model
Ecological Fallacy
Elite Interview
Equilibrium and Chaos
Error Correction Model
Event History and Duration Modeling
Experimental Design
Field Experiment
Forecasting, Political
Heuristics
Hierarchical Modeling
Historical Method, Comparative
Inference
48
126
129
198
202
202
291
293
328
341
348
350
441
457
460
492
519
520
544
551
591
598
723
723
726
781
Interview Techniques
Linear Model
Logistic Regression
Measurement Theory
Minimal Effects Model
Mixed Method
Multilevel Analysis
Multiple Streams Theory
Panel Studies
Parametric Statistical Model
Partial Least Squares
Participant Observation
Path Dependencies
Political Risk Assessment
Power Indices
Process Tracing
Q-methodology
Qualitative Analysis
Qualitative Methodologies
Quantitative Analysis
Quasi-experiment
Questionnaire
Regression with Categorical Data
Reliability
Reliability and Validity Assessment
Resampling Methods
Research Design
Roll-call Analysis
Simulation
Simultaneous Equation Modeling
Small-n and Case Study
Spatial Analysis
Statistical Analysis
Structural Equations Model (SEM)
Survey Research
Survey Techniques and Design
Time-series Analysis
Validity
837
968
978
1013
1042
1047
1066
1067
1172
1175
1183
1184
1196
1276
1334
1359
1400
1400
1401
1406
1410
1412
1443
1448
1448
1473
1473
1484
1539
1539
1542
1586
1617
1625
1636
1637
1669
1737
85
356
409
427
526
756
763
764
856
921
1025
1032
1073
1173
1415
1416
1420
1528
1700
1702
1703
1708
154
222
239
253
293
296
542
642
725
838
840
853
904
964
1159
1174
1204
1292
1372
1396
1431
1450
1453
1455
1456
1485
1525
1604
1658
3
10
45
66
67
100
102
115
136
141
172
291
309
309
Consultants, Political
Convenience Voting
Cube Law
Cumulative Voting
Delegation, Theories of
Descriptive Representation
DHondt Method
Disenfranchisement
Districting
District Magnitude
Droop Quota
Duvergers Law
Election Commission
Election Monitoring
Electoral Administration
Electoral Cycles
Electoral Formulas
Electoral Geography
Electoral Quotas
Electoral Reform
Electoral Rules
Electoral Systems
Electronic Voting
Empowerment
Estates
Exit Poll
First Past the Post
Floating Voter
Fractionalization Index
Functional Representation
Gerrymandering
Impossibility Theorem
Indirect Elections
Initiative and Referendum
Limited Vote
Majority-minority District
Mandate Theory
Marginal District
Minority Representation
Mobilization, Political
Negative Campaigning
Pillarization
Plebiscite
Pluralism
Polling, History of
Preferential Voting
Primaries
Proportional Representation
Psephology
Qualified Majority Voting
Quotas
Representation and Representative
Representative Systems
Reserved Seat
Roll Off
Rotten Boroughs
325
332
364
371
382
412
426
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BIOGRAPHIES
Addams, Jane
Adorno, Theodor W.
Aflaq, Michel
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Mannheim, Karl
Marcuse, Herbert
Maritegui, Jos Carlos
Maritain, Jacques
Marsilius of Padua
Marx, Karl
McKelvey, Richard
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice
Merriam, Charles E.
Michels, Robert
Miliband, Ralph
Mill, James
Mill, John Stuart
Miller, Warren
Mills, C. Wright
Milton, John
Montaigne, Michel de
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis
Moore, Barrington, Jr.
More, Sir Thomas
Morgenthau, Hans Joachim
Morris, William
Mosca, Gaetano
Neumann, Franz
Neustadt, Richard E.
Niebuhr, Reinhold
Nietzsche, Friedrich
Nove, Alec
Nozick, Robert
Oakeshott, Michael Joseph
Ogg, Frederick Austin
Okin, Susan Moller
Olson, Mancur
Ortega y Gasset, Jos
Orwell, George
Otsuka Hisao
Owen, Robert
Paine, Thomas
Pareto,Vilfredo
Parsons, Talcott
Peuchet, Jacques
Plato
Plekhanov, Grigorgii Valentinovich
Polanyi, Karl
Polsby, Nelson
Polybius
Pool, Ithiel de Sola
Popper, Karl Raimund
Poulantzas, Nicos
Prebisch, Ral
Priestley, Joseph
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph
Ptolemy of Lucca
Pufendorf, Samuel
Pye, Lucien
Rand, Ayn
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Strauss, Leo
Sumner, William Graham
Swift, Jonathan
Tawney, Richard Henry
Thomas Aquinas
Thoreau, Henry David
Thucydides
Tocqueville, Alexis de
Tolstoy, Leo
Trotsky, Leon
Unamuno, Miguel de
Uno Kozo
Veblen, Thorstein
Voegelin, Eric
Voltaire, Francois-Marie
Washington, Booker T.
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice Potter
Weber, Max
Weil, Simone
Wheare, Kenneth C.
White, Leonard D.
Wildavsky, Aaron
William of Ockham
Williams, Raymond
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Wittig, Monique
Wollstonecraft, Mary
Wright, Quincy
Xenophon
Yoshino Sakuzo
Young, Iris Marion
Zetkin, Clara
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EDITOR IN CHIEF
George Thomas Kurian is founder and president of the
Encyclopedia Society. Born in India, he emigrated to the
United States in 1968. Over the past twenty years, he has produced more than twenty-three encyclopedias and thirty-one
other reference books, including atlases, dictionaries, almanacs,
annuals, chronologies, desk references, and anthologies.
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
James E. Alt is Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government
at Harvard University. He is author, coauthor, or coeditor of
The Politics of Economic Decline (Cambridge University Press,
1979), Political Economics (University of California Press, 1983),
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge University
Press, 1990), Competition and Cooperation (Russell Sage, 1999),
and Positive Changes in Political Science (University of Michigan
Press, 2007). He also has published numerous articles in scholarly journals. He is the founding director of Harvards Center
for Basic Research in the Social Sciences (now the Institute
for Quantitative Social Science). He is or has been a member
of the editorial boards of the American Journal of Political Science,
British Journal of Political Science, Political Studies, American Political Science Review, and other journals and is a former member
of the Political Science panel of the National Science Foundation. He was a Guggenheim fellow (19971998) and is a
member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Simone Chambers is a professor in the Department of
Political Science at the University of Toronto. She is author
of Reasonable Democracy: Jurgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Cornell University Press, 1996) and the coeditor of
Deliberation, Democracy, and the Media (Rowman and Littlefield,
2000) and Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society (Princeton
University Press, 2001). Chambers has published articles on
deliberative democracy, the Frankfurt School, constitutional
theory, civil society, rhetoric and the public sphere in such
journals as Political Theory, Journal of Political Philosophy,
Constellations, and Perspectives on Politics. She teaches the
history of political thought, critical theory, democratic theory,
continental thought, and public law.
Geoffrey Garrett is founding CEO of the United States
Studies Centre and professor of political science at the University of Sydney. He was previously president of the Pacific
Council on International Policy in Los Angeles and before
Lisa Anderson
School of International and Public Affairs,
Columbia University
Judith Baer
Texas A&M University
Karen Beckwith
Case Western Reserve University
Joseph L. Klesner is professor of political science and associate provost at Kenyon College.
George Klosko is the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Professor
in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia.
Rose McDermott is professor of political science at Brown
University and a fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced
Study at Harvard University.
Lance Bennett
University of Washington
Richard Bensel
Cornell University
Adam Berinsky
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Kenneth Bickers
University of Colorado at Boulder
Jeffrey Herbst
Colgate University
Henry E. Brady
Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California,
Berkeley
Jennifer Hochschild
Harvard University
Lawrence Broz
University of California, San Diego
Cornell Clayton
Washington State University
Michael Howlett
Simon Fraser University
John Ishiyama
University of North Texas
Joseph Cooper
Johns Hopkins University
Shanto Iyengar
Stanford University
Neta C. Crawford
Boston University
Simon Jackman
Stanford University
Martha Crenshaw
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford
University
Stathis N. Kalyvas
Yale University
Christian Davenport
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre
Dame
Henry A. Dietz
University of Texas at Austin
Peter Eisinger
The New School for Management and Urban Policy
Barbara Farnham
Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
H. George Frederickson
University of Kansas
John Freeman
University of Minnesota
William A. Galston
University of Maryland
Shirley Geigers
Savannah State University
Kim Geron
California State University East Bay
James L. Gibson
Washington University in St. Louis
Benjamin Ginsberg
Center for the Study of American Government, Johns Hopkins
University
John C. Green
Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, University of Akron
Paul Gronke
Reed College
Fen Osler Hampson
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton
University
Richard S. Katz
Johns Hopkins University
William R. Keech
Duke University
Anthony King
University of Exeter
Jack Knight
Duke University
Paul A. Kowert
Rutgers,The State University of New Jersey
Yves Laberge
Institut qubcois des hautes tudes internationales
Jack S. Levy
Rutgers,The State University of New Jersey
Mark Irving Lichbach
University of Maryland
Baodong Liu
University of Utah
Burdett A. Loomis
University of Kansas
Stephen Macedo
Princeton University
Cathie Jo Martin
Boston University
Gregory E. McAvoy
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Joseph P. McCormick II
Penn StateYork Campus
Wayne McIntosh
University of Maryland
David Vogel
University of California, Berkeley, Haas School of Business
Andrew Moravcsik
Princeton University
Barbara F. Walter
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies,
University of California, San Diego
Elinor Ostrom
Indiana UniversityBloomington
Paul Quirk
University of British Columbia
David Brian Robertson
University of MissouriSt. Louis
Allan Rosenbaum
Florida International University
Marc Howard Ross
Bryn Mawr College
Bo Rothstein
Gteborg University
Graham Wilson
Boston University
M. Elizabeth Sanders
Cornell University
Yun-han chu
Chinese Association of Political Science
Tihomir Cipek
Croatian Political Science Association
Kathryn Sikkink
University of Minnesota
Ladislav Cabada
Czech Political Science Association
Jack Snyder
Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
Danish Political Science Association
Manfred B. Steger
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
Ken Newton
European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
Sidney Tarrow
Cornell University
Niilo Kauppi
Finnish Political Science Association
Charles Tilly
Columbia University
Gideon Doron
Israel Political Science Association
Lars Svasand
Norwegian Political Science Association
Joan C. Tronto
University of Minnesota
Maura Adshead
Political Science Association of Ireland
Ashutosh Varshney
Brown University
Antonio L. Rappa
Political Science Association of Singapore
Eduardo A.Velasquez
Washington & Lee University
Ilter Turan
Turkish Political Science Association
LIST OF AUTHORS
Samer N. Abboud
Arcadia University
Christiana Abraham
University of the West Indies, St. Augustine
Campus
Seth Abrutyn
Institute for Research on World-Systems,
University of California, Riverside
Karen Ruth Adams
University of Montana
John Agnew
University of California, Los Angeles
Robert Agranoff
School of Public and Environmental Affairs,
Indiana University
John S. Ahlquist
Florida State University
Arif Akgul
Turkish Monitoring Center for Drugs and
Drug Addiction
Doreen K. Allerkamp
School of Social Sciences, University of
Mannheim
Dennis Altman
La Trobe University
Murat Bayar
University of Georgia
Micah Altman
Harvard University
Rudy B. Andeweg
Leiden University
Eva Anduiza
Autonomous University of Barcelona
Stephen C. Angle
Wesleyan University
Andrew L. Aoki
Augsburg College
Karen Beckwith
Case Western Reserve University
Sonu S. Bedi
Dartmouth College
Betsi Beem
University of Sydney
Kai Arzheimer
Johannes GutenbergUniversitt Mainz
Nasser Behnegar
Boston College
Katrin Auel
University of Oxford
Daniel Bland
Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public
Policy (University of Saskatchewan campus)
Esref Aksu
Victoria University of Wellington
Julia Bader
German Development Institute
John H. Aldrich
Duke University
Kate Baldwin
Columbia University
C. Fred Alford
University of Maryland
Terence Ball
Arizona State University
Fidelis Allen
University of Port Harcourt
Jordon B. Barkalow
Bridgewater State College
William B. Allen
Michigan State University
Robert Bates
Harvard University
Andrew Bennett
Georgetown University
David S. Bell
School of Politics and International Studies,
University of Leeds
Paul Bellamy*
New Zealand Parliamentary Library
Views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent official views of the New Zealand Parliamentary Library.
Erin L. Borry
University of Kansas
Courtney Brown
Emory University
Ramiro Berardo
School of Government and Public
Policy, University of Arizona Consejo
Nacional de Investigaciones Cientficas y
Tcnicas-Argentina
Jocelyn M. Boryczka
Fairfield University
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
University of Houston Law Center
Tanja A. Brzel
Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science Freie
Universitt Berlin
William I. Brustein
Ohio State University
John C. Berg
Suffolk University
Henrik Berglund
Stockholm University
Kenneth A. Betsalel
University of North Carolina at Asheville
David J. Betz
Kings College London
Rajani Bhatia
University of Maryland
Ron J. Bigalke Jr.
University of Pretoria
Simon Birnbaum
Stockholm University
Amanda Bittner
Memorial University of Newfoundland
Amy E. Black
Wheaton College
Paul Blackledge
Reader, School of Social Sciences, Leeds
Metropolitan University
Charles P. Blair
Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
Nebojsa Blanusa
University of Zagreb, Croatia
Charles R. Boehmer
University of Texas at El Paso
Jason R. Bossie
Temple University
Denise M. Bostdorff
College of Wooster
Chiara Bottici
New School for Social Research
Janet Box-Steffensmeier
Ohio State University
Richard Boyd
Georgetown University
Megan Bradley
Saint Paul University
David A. Bray
Goizueta Business School
Corey Brettschneider
Brown University
Christian Breunig
University of Toronto
Mark D. Brewer
University of Maine
Jamal Donaldson Briggs
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
John Brigham
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Dovile Budryte
Georgia Gwinnett College
Cynthia Burack
Ohio State University
Susan Burgess
Ohio University
Walter Dean Burnham
Frank C. Erwin, Jr. Centennial Chair in
State Government, University of Texas
Andrew Calabrese
University of Colorado
Karen Callaghan
Texas Southern University
Pamela Camerra-Rowe
Kenyon College
Paul Cantor
University of Virginia
Tereza Capelos
University of Surrey, Guildford
Daniele Caramani
University of St. Gallen
Thomas E. Carbonneau
Pennsylvania State University
M. Cathy Carey
Western Kentucky University
Rebecca E. Bromley-Trujillo
Michigan State University
Leah Carmichael
University of Georgia
John R. Bokina
University of TexasPan American
Julio F. Carrin
University of Delaware
Julio Borquez
University of Michigan, Dearborn
Sarah M. Brooks
Ohio State University
Jeffrey N. Carroll
Temple University
Josep M. Colomer
Higher Council for Scientific Research
(CSIC), Barcelona
David B. Conklin
The Chelsea School
Walter D. Connor
Boston University
Aaron Cooley
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Jerome E. Copulsky
Goucher College
David Cortright
University of Notre Dame
Bezen Balamir Coskun
Zirve University
John C. Courtney
Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public
Policy, University of Saskatchewan
David Cowan
St. Andrews University
Claudiu Craciun
National School of Political Studies and
Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania
Tobin L. Craig
James Madison College, Michigan State
University
Dennis Dalton
Barnard College, Columbia University
Jennifer E. Dalton
York University
David Darmofal
University of South Carolina
Noah Dauber
Colgate University
Christian Davenport
University of Notre Dame
Isabel David
Instituto Superior de Cincias Sociais
e PolticasTechnical University of Lisbon
Laurence Davis
National University of Ireland, Maynooth
Robert Dayley
College of Idaho
Massimo De Angelis
School of Humanity and Social Sciences,
University of East London
Sybille Reinke de Buitrago
IFSH, Universitt Hamburg
Rodolfo O. de la Garza
Columbia University
Filippo Del Lucchese
Brunel UniversityWest London
David Cingranelli
Binghamton University, SUNY
Martha Crenshaw
Center for International Security and
Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Philippe De Lombaerde
United Nations UniversityComparative
Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS)
David Ciuk
Michigan State University
William W. Culver
State University of New York at Plattsburgh
Jasper de Raadt
VU University Amsterdam
Cornell W. Clayton
Washington State University
Michael S. Cummings
University of Colorado Denver
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University of Groningen
Patrick Cloos
Universit de Montral
K. Amber Curtis
University of Colorado
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Western Oregon University
Kevin Coe
University of Arizona
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Rhodes College
Henry A. Dietz
University of Texas at Austin
Simchi Cohen
University of California, Los Angeles
Richard Dagger
University of Richmond
Rekha Diwakar
Goldsmiths, University of London
Kjell E. Engelbrekt
Stockholm University
Ronald Francisco
University of Kansas
Nives Dolak
University of Washington
Jacob F. English
Marquette University
Mary Francoli
School of Journalism and Communication,
Carleton University
Jorge Dominguez
Harvard University
Richard N. Engstrom
Kennesaw State University
Janet L. Donavan
University of Colorado
John H. Evans
University of California, San Diego
Charles F. Doran
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies,Washington, D.C.
Benedikt Franke
St. Johns College, University of
Cambridge
Barbara Farnham
Columbia University
Julian H. Franklin
Columbia University
Henry Farrell
George Washington University
Leonard Freedman
University of California, Los Angeles
Christina Fattore
West Virginia University
Jrg Faust
German Development Institute
Earl H. Fry
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University of Liverpool
Timothy Fuller
Colorado College
Kathy E. Ferguson
University of Hawaii
Matteo Fumagalli
Central European University (Budapest)
Leela Fernandes
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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University of California, Berkeley
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Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
John A. Garcia
University of Michigan
George Ehrhardt
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Bentley University
Monica Gariup
Zayed University
Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni
University of Cambridge
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American University School of Public Affairs
Christian Garland
Independent Scholar
Eldon J. Eisenach
University of Tulsa
Curtis Fogel
University of Guelph
Graeme Garrard
Cardiff University
Rainer Eisfeld
University of Osnabrueck
Carolyn Forestiere
University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Bryan Garsten
Yale University
Rabab El-Mahdi
American University in Cairo
George Gavrilis
University of Texas at Austin
Joyce Gelb
City University of New York
Donald A. Downs
University of WisconsinMadison
John Duggan
University of Rochester
David A. Dulio
Oakland University
John Duncan
Trinity College, University of Toronto
O. P. Dwivedi
University of Guelph
David M. Edelstein
Edmund A.Walsh School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University
Volker K. Frank
University of North Carolina
at Asheville
Bobbi Gentry
Millikin University
Sheldon Goldman
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Daniel B. German
Appalachian State University
Jack A. Goldstone
School of Public Policy, George Mason
University
Asha Gupta
University of Delhi
Michael Goodhart
University of Pittsburgh
Victoria Gordon
Western Kentucky University
Michael W. Hail
Morehead State University
Norbert Gtz
Institute of Contemporary History, Sdertrn
University
Leonard Hammer
Independent Scholar
Ryan Gibb
University of Kansas
Michael T. Gibbons
University of Southern Florida
Tobias T. Gibson
Westminster College
Eytan Gilboa
Bar-Ilan University
Itzhak Gilboa
Bar-Ilan University and University of
Southern California
J. Ramon Gil-Garcia
Centro de Investigacin y Docencia
Econmicas, Mexico
Anthony Gill
University of Washington
Michael Allen Gillespie
Duke University
Bruce Gilley
Portland State University
Mark A. Graber
University of Maryland
Robert Grafstein
University of Georgia
Jim Granato
University of Houston
Shannon Granville
Independent Scholar
Peter Gratton
University of San Diego
Marko Grdesic
University of WisconsinMadison
Ryan R. Gladwin
University of Edinburgh
Donald P. Green
Institution for Social and Policy Studies,
Yale University
Marlies Glasius
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Marcus E. Green
Otterbein University
Andrew Glencross
University of Aberdeen
Samuel R. Greene
Catholic University of America
Christian Gbel
Centre for East and South-East Asian
Studies, Lund University
Michael F. Gretz
New School for Social Research
Mark Gobeyn
Bradley University
Doug Goldenberg-Hart
Senior Acquisitions Editor, CQ Press
Loren Goldman
University of Chicago
Iza Hussin
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Daniel Kapust
University of Georgia
Francisco Herreros
Institute for Public Goods and Policies
(CSIC)
Patrick H. Hutton
University of Vermont
Richard S. Katz
Johns Hopkins University
Jacques E. C. Hymans
University of Southern California
Michael Keaney
Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied
Sciences
Michael C. Herron
Dartmouth College
Ghaidaa Hetou
Rutgers,The State University of New Jersey
Neil Hibbert
University of Saskatchewan
Alexander Hicks
Emory University
John Higley
University of Texas at Austin
Petronela Iacob
Central European University (Budapest)
Joanne Ibarra
University of Texas at Austin
Simon Jackman
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William G. Jacoby
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Christine Keating
Ohio State University
William R. Keech
Duke University
Anthony Kelly
University of Southampton
Norm Kelly
Australian National University
Peter Hilger
University of Helsinki
Farah Jan
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New Jersey
Hans Keman
VU Univerity Amsterdam
Kenneth Janda
Northwestern University
Samuel B. Hoff
Delaware State University
Lee Jarvis
Swansea University
Haroon A. Khan
Henderson State University
Sean O. Hogan
RTI International
Erin K. Jenne
Central European University (Budapest)
L. Douglas Kiel
University of Texas at Dallas
Stephen Holmes
School of Law, New York University
David C. Johnston
Columbia University
Youngmi Kim
Central European University (Budapest)
Arthur Holst
Widener University
Michael Johnston
Colgate University
Edward King
Concordia University
Marc Hooghe
University of Leuven
Charles W. B. Jones
University of Western Ontario
Kristy M. King
Whitman College
Dana Howard
Brown University
Shannon King
College of Wooster
Peter Hudis
Oakton Community College
Joseph Jupille
University of Colorado
Edgar Kiser
University of Washington
Louisa S. Hulett
Knox College
Ronald Kahn
Oberlin College
Robert Klemmensen
Syddansk Universitet
Andrew Hurrell
Oxford University
Akis Kalaitzidis
University of Central Missouri
Joseph L. Klesner
Kenyon College
Stephen R. Hurt
Oxford Brookes University
Mark E. Kann
University of Southern California
Stephan Klingebiel
German Development Institute
Tom Lansford
University of Southern Mississippi
Alan Levine
American University
Aysegul Komsuoglu
Istanbul University
Jeffrey Larsen
Science Applications International
Application; Larsen Consulting Group LLC
Daniel C. Lewis
University of New Orleans
Jonathan Koppell
Yale School of Management
Karina Kosiara-Pedersen
University of Copenhagen, Centre for Voting
and Parties
Spyros Kosmidis
University of Essex
Dirk Kotz
University of South Africa
Michael E. Kraft
University of WisconsinGreen Bay
Jeffrey Kraus
Wagner College
Martin Kreidl
Masaryk University
Charles A. Kromkowski
University of Virginia
Paul James Kubicek
Oakland University
Mirjam Knkler
Princeton University
George Thomas Kurian
President, Encyclopedia Society
Yves Laberge
Independent Scholar, Quebec City
Gladys Lang
University of Washington
Kurt Lang
University of Washington
Jennifer L. Lawless
Women and Politics Institute, American
University
Regina G. Lawrence
Manship School of Mass Communication,
Louisiana State University
Mary Liston
Faculty of Law, University of British
Columbia
David L. Leal
University of Texas at Austin
Baodong Liu
University of Utah
J. Wesley Leckrone
Widener University
Gerhard Loewenberg
University of Iowa
Andr Lecours
University of Ottawa
Joseph Losco
Ball State University
Todd R. Lowery
University of Maryland
Fabrice Lehoucq
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Robert C. Lowry
University of Texas, Dallas
Gary Lehring
Smith College
Cyanne E. Loyle
University of Maryland
Stephan Leibfried
Bremen University
Julia Leininger
German Development Institute
Yphtach Lelkes
Stanford University
Howard H. Lentner
City University of New York
Eric K. Leonard
Shenandoah University
Thorsten Luhde
Federal Ministry of Finance (Germany)
Sander Luitwieler
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Arthur Lupia
University of Michigan
Michael Lusztig
Southern Methodist University
Willem Maas
York University
David MacDonald
University of Guelph
Eduardo Leoni
IBGEBrazilian Institute of Geography
and Statistics
Stephen J. Lange
Morehead State University
Paul Lermack
Bradley University
Scott MacLeod
Simon Fraser University
George R. La Noue
University of Maryland, Baltimore County
David Levi-Faur
Hebrew University
Allan MacNeill
Webster University
Eric MacGilvray
Ohio State University
James M. McCormick
Iowa State University
Henry Milner
Universit de Montral
Lars Magnusson
Uppsala University
Rose McDermott
Brown University
Fathali M. Moghaddam
Georgetown University
Deanna Malatesta
Indiana UniversityPurdue University
Indianapolis
Tony McGann
University of California, Irvine and
University of Essex
Benoit F. Monange
Institut dEtudes Politiques de Grenoble
Laura Mamo
San Francisco State University
Cecilia G. Manrique
University of WisconsinLa Crosse
Joseph R. Marbach
La Salle University
Raffaele Marchetti
LUISS Guido Carli University
Lee Marsden
University of East Anglia
Cathie Jo Martin
Boston University
Guy Martin
Winston-Salem State University
Janet M. Martin
Bowdoin College
Sherry L. Martin
Cornell University
Andrew D. Mason
University of Southampton
James W. McGuire
Wesleyan University
Iain McLean
Nuffield College, Oxford University
Michael McNamara
Cape Breton University
Peter McNamara
Utah State University
Richard J. Meagher
Randolph-Macon College
John Medearis
University of California, Riverside
Jrme Melanon
University of Alberta, Augustana Campus
Jiri S. Melich
Kazakhstan Institute of Management,
Economics, and Strategic Research (KIMEP)
Raymond Mercado
Duke University
Philippe Mongin
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
& Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
Michael Moran
School of Social Sciences, University of
Manchester
Jo Moran-Ellis
Center for International Studies in Social
Policy and Social Services, Bergische
Universitt Wuppertal
Luis Moreno
Spanish National Research Council (CSIC)
Irwin L. Morris
University of Maryland
Rebecca B. Morton
New York University
Michael Mosher
University of Tulsa
Jennifer E. Mosley
School of Social Service Administration,
University of Chicago
Gary Mucciaroni
Temple University
Geoffroy Matagne
University of Liege
Jonathan Mercer
University of Washington
Lawrence C. Mayer
Texas Tech University
John M. Meyer
Humboldt State University
Gerardo L. Munck
School of International Relations, University
of Southern California
Sebastin Mazzuca
Harvard University
Ellen Mickiewicz
Duke University
Michael C. Munger
Duke University
Erin McAdams
College of Charleston
Andrea Migone
Simon Fraser University
Andrew Murphy
Rutgers,The State University of New Jersey
Keally McBride
University of San Francisco
Mark C. Miller
Clark University
Fortunato Musella
University of Naples Federico II
Michael McCann
University of Washington
Maren Milligan
Oberlin College
Ella K. Myers
University of Utah
Niall Dochartaigh
School of Political Science and Sociology,
National University of Ireland, Galway
Ismaila Odogba
University of WisconsinStevens Point
Muhamad S. Olimat
University of South Florida, St. Petersburg
Rick Parrish
West Texas A&M University
Eleonora Pasotti
University of California, Santa Cruz
Juliano Pasqual
Fundacao Getulio Vargas
David M. Olson
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Benjamin J. Pauli
Rutgers,The State University of
New Jersey
Laura Olson
Clemson University
Bruce G. Peabody
Fairleigh Dickinson University
Barry ONeill
University of California, Los Angeles
Colin D. Pearce
University of GuelphHumber
Malte Pehl
College of Charleston
Riccardo Pelizzo
Griffith University
Daniel Pellerin
National University of Singapore
Glenn E. Perry
Indiana State University
Ravi Perry
Clark University
Leyl Pervizat
Hali University in Istanbul
Steven Peterson
Penn State University
J. M. Norton
University of Georgia
Jan Pakulski
University of Tasmania
Hannu Nurmi
University of Turku
Kari Palonen
University of Jyvskyl
Adam W. Nye
Pennsylvania State University
Niccole M. Pamphilis
Michigan State University
Herbert Obinger
Bremen University
Joel Parker
University of Texas at Austin
Mark A. Pickup
Centre for Research Methods in the Social
Sciences, University of Oxford and Simon
Fraser University
Edith Obinger-Gindulis
Bremen University
Michael Parkin
Oberlin College
Jean-Benoit Pilet
Universit libre de Bruxelles
Aron Octavian
Central European University (Budapest)
John M. Parrish
Loyola Marymount University
Pietro Pirani
University of Western Ontario
Jon Pevehouse
University of Wisconsin
J. Mitchell Pickerill
Washington State University
l List of Authors
Wm. C. Plouffe Jr.
Independent Scholar
David Rayside
University of Toronto
Thomas R. Rourke
Clarion University
Andrew Poe
Amherst College
James H. Read
College of St. Benedict and St. Johns
University
Stephen R. Routh
California State University, Stanislaus
Jonathan T. Polk
University of Georgia
Mark A. Pollack
Temple University
Colin Provost
School of Public Policy, University College
London
Sue Pryce
University of Nottingham
Hermann Pnder
Bucerius Law School (Hochschule fr
Rechtswissenschaft)
Elizabeth Rholetter Purdy
Independent Scholar
Kurt Pyle
Michigan State University
George H. Quester
University of Maryland
Chad Rector
George Washington University
Robert B. Reich
University of California, Berkeley
chov
Blanka R
Charles University in Prague
Jean-Marc Rickli
Geneva University Strategic Studies Group
Valry Ridde
Centre de recherche du CHUM, Universit
de Montral
Steven C. Roach
University of South Florida
Ian Roberge
Glendon College,York University
Andrew Roberts
Northwestern University
John Quigley
Michael E. Moritz College of Law, Ohio
State University
Neil Robinson
University of Limerick
Andrea Quinlan
University of Saskatchewan
Stephen R. Rock
Vassar College
Kirk A. Randazzo
University of South Carolina
Joseph Romance
Drew University
Anthony L. Rappa
Singapore Institute of Management (SIM)
University
Richard Rose
University of Aberdeen
Paul S. Rowe
Trinity Western University
Molly Ruhlman
Temple University
Mark Rush
Williams School of Commerce,
Economics and Politics,Washington and
Lee University
Peter Rutland
Wesleyan University
Thomas Saalfeld
University of Bamberg
Filippo Sabetti
McGill University
Marcelo Saguier
Latin American School of Social Sciences
Joseph C. Santora
Thomas Edison State College
Austin Sarat
Amherst College
Meredith Reid Sarkees
American University
Larry Savage
Brock University
Marian Sawer
Australian National University
Claire E. Rasmussen
University of Delaware
Susan Rose-Ackerman
Yale University, Law School and
Department of Political Science
William C. Schaniel
University of West Georgia
Dennis C. Rasmussen
Tufts University
Steven Rosefielde
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Marc Schattenmann
Advisory Council, Das Progressive
Zentrum, Berlin
Carsten Rauch
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
David H. Rosenbloom
City University of Hong Kong
Clyde Ray
Villanova University
Bo Rothstein
University of Gothenburg
List of Authors li
Vivien A. Schmidt
Boston University
Katri Sieberg
University of Tampere
Lyndsey Stanfill
Ohio State University
Saundra K. Schneider
Michigan State University
Koen Stapelbroek
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Julian Schofield
Concordia University
Marian Simms
Deakin University
Jennifer A. Steen
Arizona State University, School of
Government, Politics and Global Studies
David Schultz
Hamline University
J. P. Singh
Georgetown University
Henry B. Sirgo
McNeese State University
Richard M. Skinner
Rollins College
Jonathan Slapin
University of Houston
Brian Slocock
University of West of Scotland
Dennis Smith
Loughborough University
Manfred B. Steger
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
Peter J. Steinberger
Reed College
John Steinbruner
University of Maryland
Jennifer Sterling-Folker
University of Connecticut
Garth Stevenson
Brock University
Martin J. Smith
University of Sheffield
Stephen Smith
University College London
Brian Stipelman
Dowling University
T. C. Smith
Albright College
Daniel Stockemer
University of Ottawa
Anand E. Sokhey
Ohio State University
M. Scott Solomon
University of South Florida
Albert Somit
Southern Illinois University
Robert Speel
Penn State Erie, Behrend College
James H. Spencer
University of Hawaii at Manoa
Clemens Spiess
Heidelberg University
Peter J. Spiro
Beasley School of Law,Temple University
Hendrik Spruyt
Northwestern University
Lavinia Stan
St Francis Xavier University
Gregory W. Streich
University of Central Missouri
Heinz Snker
Center for International Studies in Social
Policy and Social Services, Bergische
Universitt Wuppertal
Thomas C. Sutton
Baldwin-Wallace College
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
Aarhus University
Donald G. Tannenbaum
Gettysburg College
Gregory Tardi
Institute of Parliamentary and
Political Law
Shira Tarrant
California State University, Long Beach
Nadia Urbinati
Columbia University
Lena Wngnerud
University of Gothenburg
Steven Tauber
University of South Florida
James F. Ward
University of Massachusetts, Boston
Andrew J. Waskey
Dalton State College
Tatiana Vashchilko
University of Rochester
Georgina Waylen
University of Sheffield
Ronald Weed
University of New Brunswick
Peter Vermeersch
University of Leuven
David L. Weeks
Azusa Pacific University
Matas Vernengo
University of Utah
Gregory Weeks
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Aaron Thomas
University of California, Los Angeles
Steven Vertovec
Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of
Religious and Ethnic Diversity
David L. Weiden
Indiana UniversityPurdue University
Indianapolis
Michael J. Thompson
William Paterson University
John R.Vile
Middle Tennessee State University
Richard R. Weiner
Rhode Island College
Barbara Vis
VU University Amsterdam
Howard J. Wiarda
University of Georgia
Paul W. Thurner
Department of Political Science, University
of Munich (LMU)
Wim J. M.Voermans
Leiden University, the Netherlands
Erik Wibbels
Duke University
Martina Topic
University of Zagreb, Croatia
Wesley W. Widmaier
Centre for Governance and Public Policy/
Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University
Cirila Toplak
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
Matthew Voorhees
Hartwick College
F. Peter Wagner
University of WisconsinWhitewater
Nelson Wikstrom
Douglas Wilder School of Government and
Public Affairs,Virginia Commonwealth
University
Lee Trepanier
Saginaw Valley State University
Amentahru Wahlrab
University of Texas at Tyler
Harold L. Wilensky
University of California, Berkeley
Lily L. Tsai
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Claire Wallace
University of Aberdeen
Brent M. Will
Temple University
Mark Tunick
Wilkes Honors College
Jennifer E. Walsh
Azusa Pacific University
Kenneth C. Williams
Michigan State University
Jack Turner
University of Washington
Rodrigo Tavares
United Nations UniversityInstitute on
Comparative Regional Integration Studies
(UNU-CRIS)
Sarah Taylor
New School for Social Research
Joanne Tetlow
Comptroller of Maryland
Gran Therborn
University of Cambridge
Michael Thom
Michigan State University
Chris Thornhill
University of Glasgow
Melike Wulfgramm
Bremen University
Matthew S. Winters
University of Illinois
James S. Wunsch
Creighton University
James J. Wirtz
Naval Postgraduate School
Christopher Wlezien
Temple University
Albert B. Wolf
University of California, Irvine
Kerri Woods
University of York
Harald Wydra
St Catharines College, University of
Cambridge
Vineeta Yadav
University of Notre Dame
Richard M.Yon
U.S. Military Academy
Claudia Zilla
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP),
German Institute for International and
Security Affairs
Joseph F. Zimmerman
Rockefeller College, University at Albany
Roukayatou Zimmermann
Deutsches Institut fr Entwicklungspolitik
(DIE)
Catherine Zuckert
University of Notre Dame
Kent Worcester
Marymount Manhattan College
Michael Zuckert
University of Notre Dame
Jeff Worsham
West Virginia University
Dana Zartner
Tulane University
Benjamin Zyla
University of Ottawa
PREFACE
lvi Preface
as they were in ancient Rome. Politics is about power, and
Lord Actons dictum that power corrupts, absolute power
corrupts absolutely, holds true today. Other enduring themes
include the rule of law, modernization, demography, revolution, reform and restoration, tradition, convergence, value systems, lifestyles, class and ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, the
homogenization of cultures, and the preservation of diversity.
These colliding political ideas and movements have blurred
the traditional tidy boundaries of political science and in some
cases have caused them to disappear altogether. Political science, like politics itself, has become borderless. Political science
now represents the union of law, economics, anthropology,
media studies, womens studies, sociology, law, history, theology, international relations, statistics, technology, and philosophy. Political scientists import ideas from other disciplines and,
in turn, export ideas to them, but, on balance, political science
is a net importer of ideas. On an ideological level, the traditional and convenient binary divisions (Left/Right, North/
South, domestic/international) that once constrained innovative scholarship have disappeared or no longer hold as much
currency. TEPS thus maps the enlarged terrain of political
science as we move into the twenty-first century.
There are large areas of political life and culture not covered
or explained by political theory. These include the imponderable and unpredictable dilemmas, the problems and paradoxes,
that make the study of politics a formidable undertaking. It
is the task of political scientists in the twenty-first century to
deal with these problems. Among them are:
Problem 1. Why does it appear that injustice persists even
under the best legal systems and in the best governed nations
and under the best constitutions? Do the foibles and frailties of human natureincluding corruption, scandals, and
blundersmake the quality of any political system no better
than the quality of its politicians?
Problem 2. From whence comes the force of the status quo
and inertia in political evolution, the almost pathological resistance to change in human nature?
Problem 3. Is it power alone that corrupts, or does powerlessness corrupt just as much?
Problem 4. Why does politics, like religion, seem to be a
source of disunity as much or even more than of unity, and
why are divisions in democracies perhaps even more prevalent
than under other political systems?
Problem 6. Do the Eurocentric assumptions of political
science about political beliefs and behavior, such as theories about sovereignty, nationalism, and political ethics, have
relevance in the Third World, or do they actually contribute to
failed and rogue states like Somalia in Africa and Afghanistan
in the Middle East?
Problem 7.Why do class and ethnic groups radically diverge
on their political ideologies and philosophical stances despite
sharing a common political system? As Gilbert and Sullivan
famously said, Why are some men born Tory and others born
Whig?
Problem 8. How are conventional notions of civil rights,
citizenship, and nationality scrambled and reassembled in the
The value of an encyclopedia resides not merely in its contents but in what the French call ordonnancethe selection,
classification, and arrangement of entries and the placement
of navigational aids. TEPS is a strict AZ encyclopedia that
follows the principles of alphabetization in the Chicago Manual
of Style. Each entry of more than five hundred words carries a
bibliography that includes journal articles. Most entries carry
cross references to related entries. Readers are also advised to
consult the Thematic Table of Contents that appears in the
frontmatter. This is a map of the entries in the book organized
by subject matter or subfield. Within each theme, there are six
classes of entries, each weighted and assigned a length based
on its importance.
Class 1, Core Articles: These are wide-ranging articles that
define a field or major analytic concerns and include commentary, discussion, interpretation, and comprehensive reviews
of literature. They are designed as tours dhorizon to lay the
groundwork for all other entries.
Class 2, Long Interpretive Essays: These delve substantively
into key issues, concepts, ideas, and theories or develop a particular argument or thesis.
Class 3, Short Descriptive Essays: These deal with the less
theoretical and programmatic aspects of the discipline but have
no commentary.
Class 4, Breakout Articles: These are derivatives from core
articles that examine and explore particular aspects of a topic.
Class 5, Lexical Entries: These are designed to provide useful definitions of unusual terms and concepts.
Class 6, Biographies: No biographies of living persons (with
a few exceptions) are included in this category, but the nearly
Preface lvii
three hundred biographies cover the seminal thinkers and figures in the formation of political science as it is today and will
be in the coming century.
APSA ASSISTANCE
Three elements determine the strength and quality of an encyclopedia. The first is the credentials of the contributorsany
encyclopedia is only as good as its contributors. We assembled
one of the finest teams of political science scholars, based on
the recommendations of the editorial board. The contributors
were drawn from a host of disciplines in the social sciences
and humanities as well as political science. All were chosen for
the originality and importance of their contributions. They
were also chosen from more than forty countries to ensure
that the breadth and range of interpretations match the needs
of a global information age. The selection of articles and the
mix of authors represent an attempt to strike a balance among
various schools of thought, regions of the world, gender identities, and ideological emphases.
The second element of strength in an encyclopedia is the
editorial board. We had three levels in place. The principal,
or working, editorial board consisted of five members nominated by the APSA: James E. Alt, Simone Chambers, Geoffrey
Garrett, Margaret Levi, and Paula D. McClain. Core articles
in TEPS bear the impress of their careful review and input.
To bring such a vast work to completion, even more help was
needed, and we are most grateful for all the work of the content editors who reviewed long and short essay entries.We also
thank the larger seventy-twomember board of editorial consultants and advisers and the international board of editorial
advisers, which was drawn from political science associations
from around the world to assist the editor in chief in choosing
contributors from outside the United States. Together, these
boards shepherded the project and enlisted the best possible
contributions from universities and associations across the
globe.The full list of members of these three boards appears in
the preceding pages.
The last element of strength is the publisher. CQ Press
has remained for many decades the premier political
science publisher in the United States, and its imprint guarantees the integrity of a work. Over the four years TEPS
was in the making, I had the privilege of working with
a number of veteran publishers and editors at CQ Press,
including John Jenkins, the president; Andrea Pedolsky,
editorial director; and Doug Goldenberg-Hart, acquisitions editor. Doug is an experienced reference book editor,
and his editorial skills and dedication kept the project on
track during its extended gestation. The development
editing team was led initially by January Layman-Wood;
followed by Nancy Matuszak, who helped to bring the
project successfully to its home stretch; Andrea Cunningham; and John Martino. Finally, at the Encyclopedia Society, managing editor Sarah Claudine Day worked on the
project from beginning to end.
Our collective mission for TEPS was not merely to create
an encyclopedia that is original, accurate, and comprehensive
but also one that conveys through its 1,500 entries some of
the vitality and excitement of the world of political science
and politics and offers vibrant cutting-edge interpretations and
insights.
We welcome and earnestly solicit feedback in the form of
comments, suggestions, and corrections for future editions.
Please address them to me (gtkurian@aol.com) or to the publisher (iencypolisci@cqpress.com).
GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN
Editor in Chief
August 2010
INTRODUCTION
DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND ITS CLASSICAL FIELDS
The introduction to The Encyclopedia of Political Science should
contain a short history of the development of the discipline
of political science. Yet one is not easy to construct, given the
various views on what the discipline is. According to Farr
(1988), if one understands political science as the more-or-less
empirical study of practical politics, then Aristotle is the beginning. If perceived as the study of realpolitik, then Machiavelli
gets the nod. If focused on the character of the modern state,
lx Introduction
Merriams construction of the discipline of political science
prompted a response some years later from Bernard Crick.
In The American Science of Politics (1959), Crick articulated the
perspective of many British political scientists. He believed
that American political science was trading in a false scientism
that seeks universally applicable general theories, a scientism
that arguably masks its actual role as an American ideology
(Adcock and Bevir 2005). He argued that the increasing focus
on scientism by American political scientists came at the
expense of older modes of thought, for example, history and
philosophy.
What this brief discussion suggests is the difficulty of providing a definitive history of the development of the discipline
given the wide variety of perspectives about what political
science is and should do. One attempt to create an overview is
found in this encyclopedias article, Political Science, History
of, by John G. Gunnell, who uses a democratic narrative as
the overarching theme. Other approaches are equally plausible.
Yet despite the lack of consensus on the development of
the discipline, some consensus can be reached on the classic
subfields that developed over time, as reflected in the subfields
offered by most political science departments (KaufmanOsborn 2006). These classic subfields are:
1. The politics of a country or region. Whether this
is British, French, Latin American, Chinese, or American
depends on the location of relevant universities and practitioners. Each has its own distinctive history. We shall use as an
example American politics, which incorporates the study
of political behavior, public opinion, elections, electoral structure, institutions, political parties, and different levels of governmentnational, state, local, urbanin the United States.
The subfield embraces writings from the founding and early
development of the United StatesThe Federalist Papers (and
some of the Anti-Federalist papers) and John Adams, Thomas
Paine, and Alexis de Tocqueville, among others. Classic early
academic texts include Woodrow Wilsons Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics (1885), James Bryces The
American Commonwealth (1888), and Arthur Bentleys The Process of Government (1908).
2. Comparative politics began as a field that encompassed two things: area studies of countries and regions other
than ones own and comparisons of governmental institutions,
including legislatures, electoral systems, and prime ministers
versus presidents, among countries. Currently, the subfield
focuses not only on the politics of countries around the globe
but also on concepts and how they apply across countries,
for example, democratization and tolerance, among others.
The institutional and ideological foundations of the modern
national state are central concerns of comparative politics (Boix
and Stokes 2007). While Aristotle studied the development of
constitutions and John Andrews published A Comparative View
of the French and English Nations, in Their Manners, Politics and
Literature in 1785, modern books incorporating comparative politics into their titles probably date from 1961 with
Introduction lxi
6. Public law and judicial politics consist of a number
of areas of study with a mix of methodological approaches.
Public law and constitutional law are associated with the
study of the courts, beginning with the U.S. Supreme
Court. Martin Shapiro (1993: 363) indicates that until the
1950s, public law was thought to contain three distinct
entitiesconstitutional law, administrative law, and international lawlinked, respectively, to American politics,
public administration, and international relations. Classic
constitutional texts include John Marshall and the Constitution:
A Chronicle of the Supreme Court (1919) and The Constitution and What It Means Today (1920), both by Edwin S. Corwin. Behaviorism ushered in the study of judicial behavior/
judicial politics, and the focus shifted away from the decisions
made by the courts to the process and behavior of the judges
and justices making those decisions.
Changes in the nature of politics and the dynamism of political science have led to the development of additional subfields,
including race, ethnicity, and politics; gender and politics; and
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered politics. These subfields are now quite robust, with intellectually stimulating
research, and the concerns raised by scholars in these areas are
increasingly incorporated into the more traditional subfields.
There has also been increasing attention paid to the subfield
of methods, with a focus on how to study politics rather than
on what to study. In addition, political economy, political psychology, and other subfields that emphasize cross-disciplinary
approaches have become permanent features of many modern
political science departments.
All of these developments, both the most recent and the
longest past, reflect the evolution of the discipline to better
respond to the enduring questions of politics, resolve the dissensus over how best to answer these questions, explore new
frontiers in the study of politics, and reflect on real and pressing political and governmental issues of the day.
ENDURING QUESTIONS
Although political science as a modern discipline did not
emerge until the second half of the nineteenth century, the
study of politics is often thought to have started in ancient
Greece and especially in Athens during the tumultuous years
spanning the transition from Athenian city-state democracy
to Alexander the Greats global empire. The grand themes of
war and peace, dictatorship and democracy, wealth and poverty, and interests and values were taken up by such thinkers
as Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle and studied in their own
right, which is to say independent of cosmology, religion, and
mysticism. Many of the questions and themes that engaged
these ancient thinkers still occupy the contemporary agenda.
This is not because no progress has been made since the
ancient Greeks or because there is no cumulative knowledge
in the social sciences. Far from it. A great deal more is known
today than was known by the ancient Greeks both at the individual level of the citizen and the aggregate level of states.
The enduring questions are enduring not because there are
not good answers to them; often there are. They are enduring
because each and every political community has to confront
and deal with them anew.
WAR AND PEACE
lxii Introduction
place within the study of politics. Indeed, all of American
politics as a subfield could in some sense be understood as the
study of democracy.
From micro-level questions about why people vote the
way they do to macro questions of why democracies do not
seem to wage wars against each other, the role of the citizen in democracy is key. Voting and political participation are
the most obvious arenas in which to study why and when
democratic citizens act and with what consequences. However, these only touch the tip of questions, puzzles, and issues
opened up by the question What is a citizen?
But as much as political science has been enthralled with
democracy, it has also been fascinated by how democratization occurs and how democracies endure or break down.
The question of regime transition moves beyond the citizen
to the forces within which citizens move and which in turn
move citizenspower, authority, legitimacy, and law are core
political concepts without which the political world could not
begin to be explained. They are also contested concepts, with
scholars disagreeing about what they mean. More important,
scholars disagree about how these forces work and behave
in the empirical world. This disagreement has been hugely
productive in political science, powering creative empirical
research as well as theoretical insight.
For a list of articles related to these topics, the reader
should see the following Thematic Table of Contents headings:
Comparative Politics; Democracy and Democratization; Nation and State; and Representation and Electoral Systems.
WEALTH AND POVERTY
Introduction lxiii
multiplicity of actors, strategies, and issues. Barriers to agreement are created by the lack of appropriate data for arbitrating contradictory claims. For example, there is consensus that
power is a key concept for political science, but still no one is
clear about just what it is or how to study it. The community
power debate that raged in the 1960s and 1970s still lacks
resolution.3 Nondecision making, hegemony, and other
so farnonobservable influences on what people believe it
is possible to do make it difficult to empirically refute (if one
is so inclined) Robert Dahls pluralistic conception of power
distribution. Yet, as noted below, there is beginning to be
progress on the sources of preferences and beliefs, the key to
understanding who has power and how power relations are
maintained.
By limiting the focus to certain tractable aspects of power,
such as minimum winning coalitions and agenda control in
legislatures, there has been considerably more success in understanding who has power in given contexts and circumstances
under particular sets of rules. Yet, while there are certainly
findings in these domains, detractors object to the narrowing of the question and to the overreliance on technique.
Increasing the science at the expense of the politicsand vice
versaremains the deep challenge for the disciplineand was
one even before Bernard Crick raised the issue.
Political scientists largely share a consensus over the key
issues in politics. It is the conceptualization and measurement
of those issues that generate debate. What does it mean for
citizens to trust government or for government to be trustworthy? We know government effectiveness rests at least in
part on its capacity to deliver services and to obtain legitimacy.
But how do we define, let alone measure, government capacity
or legitimacy? Recent research is beginning to make headway on these issues as well as further illuminate solutions to
the enduring questions and puzzles of political science. In the
process, new political science questions are coming to the fore.
For a list of articles related to these topics, the reader should
see the following Thematic Table of Contents headings: Comparative Politics; Federalism and Local Politics; Institutions and Checks and Balances; Political Concepts;
Political Theory; and Qualitative/Quantitative Methods.
lxiv Introduction
closely match the voters policy preferences than the existing
two parties. Knowing this, politicians who might be tempted
to form third parties do not do so, preferring to stay members
of the existing parties and working to broaden their electoral
appeal. In equilibrium, therefore, the United States and Great
Britain should have only two major and enduring political
partiesas has been the case for the preponderance of their
histories as electoral democracies.
But there are some stunning exceptions to Duvergers law
that have had major real-world consequences. Democrat Bill
Clinton was elected U.S. president in 1992 because a third-party
candidate, Ross Perot, ran and ran very well, winning almost
20 percent of the vote and taking more votes from Republican
George H. W. Bush than from Clinton. This allowed Clinton
to win the White House on not much more than 40 percent
of the vote. In Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher won a landslide re-election in 1983 on an even lower vote share because
a new party, the Liberal Democrats (LibDems), won more than
a quarter of the vote and took more votes from the Labour
opposition than from Thatchers Conservatives. Both elections
not only violated Duvergers law, they also violated the normal
understanding of majority rule. The elections also resulted in
long-lived governments that had far-reaching consequences
not only for the United Kingdom and United States but also
for the world. Had George H.W. Bush been re-elected in 1992
or had Thatcher been defeated in 1983, the world we live in
might be quite different today.
Do these exceptions, so important in the real world, make
Duvergers law much less relevant if not invalidated? Journalists and historians might well say yes. They might also then ask
rhetorically: If political science cannot deliver on its scientific
aspirations here on the terrain the discipline itself considers
most favorable, what hope does the science of politics have in
explaining more complex phenomena such as political change
in nondemocracies or decisions about war or terrorism?
Many political scientists would demur, however. They
would say that the 1992 American and 1983 British elections
are wholly consistent with Duvergers logic, exceptions that
prove the rule. Third parties cannot hope to win in first-pastthe-post elections. The folly of Perot and the Liberal Demo
crats was exposed, and third parties receded in subsequent
elections (until 2010 in Britain, with the jury still out at the
time of writing as to whether the country will revert back to
hewing closer to two parties in the future or change the electoral system to accommodate third parties like the LibDems).
There are two lessons to learn from this simple example.
First, it is actually not a fair criticism to say that political scientists do not concentrate on phenomena of real-world relevance.
In fact, the most important work in the discipline is invariably
focused on questions that historians, journalists, governments,
and citizens would agree are the most important to the operation of the real worldhow democracy works, how political
transitions work, and how countries interact with each other.
Second, political scientists do tend to value parsimonious
generalization more highly than do journalists and the public.
As a discipline with scientific aspirations that are frequently
Introduction lxv
Solid research design requires reliance on appropriate concepts for the problem and subjection of propositions to tests
that determine their validity, the scope of their generalizability,
and the extent to which they can illuminate other problems
and domains. Some of the most exciting contemporary political science research combines solid research design with substantively interesting questions. A casual overview of titles in
recent issues of the Annual Review of Political Science (ARPS),
which is a good source for recent developments in the study
of politics, suggests that the subfield of international relations,
for instance, is focused on enduring issues involving the causes
and consequences of conflict and, more recently, on postconflict reconstruction. Titles like The Politics of Effective
Foreign Aid, Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention
and Resolution, The Prosecution of Human Rights Violations, Treaty Compliance and Violation, Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence, and Bargaining
Failures and Civil War make this clear.
Comparative politics emphasizes accountability, which
spans a range of topics from the political economy of development and democratization to how electoral and political
institutions affect the ability of voters to control politicians.
Again, ARPS article titles suggest the richness of the field:
Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments, Representation and Accountability in Cities, Accountability
in Coalition Governments, Political Order and One-Party
Rule, Legislative Obstructionism, Variation in Institutional
Strength, Quality of Government: What You Get, Democratization and Economic Globalization, Redistricting:
Reading Between the Lines, Negative Campaigning, and
Elections Under Authoritarianism, to name a representative
sample of work.
Within the field both the impacts of real-world developments like the recent rise in inequality in many nations (Origins and Persistence of Economic Inequality, The Politics
of Inequality in America: A Political Economy Framework,
and The Institutional Origins of Inequality in Sub-Saharan
Africa) can be seen, as well as the impact of newly available
tools to assist in, for instance, the analysis of geography (The
Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences, Immigration and Social Policy in the United States, and Regionalism). Issues of race and gender also appear frequently, as
do other subjects that reflect even newer developments in the
discipline.
The frontier of political science research, however, is not
wholly driven by substantive concerns. Progress also reflects
the interdependent development of theory, evidence, and
tools. Political science as a discipline has always been selfconscious about its methods, and the frontier includes both
endless diversification and new forms of reintegration of the
disciplines theoretical and methodological toolkit. Three articles from a recent Annual Review of Political Science (volume
13, 2010) illustrate how persistent methodological divides are
being overcome at the same time that new sources of data
are being used. In a piece on the new political history, Julien
Zelizer emphasizes what political science can learn from the
lxvi Introduction
and changing. Perhaps the online edition of this encyclopedia
will increasingly have articles on the impact of biology and
neuroscience, which could, as Butz and Toomey put it, [A]lter
understandings about sexual orientation, criminal responsibility, prospects for marriage as a social institution, and even the
nature of moral obligation.
CONCLUSION
This short discussion of the discipline of political scienceits
history, its current subfields and methods, and its emerging
subfields, modes of analysis, and testing proceduresreveals
the wide range of questions and concerns that characterize the field. Transforming the huge number of concepts
and terms into an encyclopedia is no easy task, especially
given our desire to make it useful to students, specialists,
and the interested policymaker, among others. By necessity, the most attention has been focused on core ideas and
controversies, but, as this essay suggests, political science is
ever evolving. It also is centrifugal. In an effort to become
more like a science, some practitioners are on the cutting
edge of research methods. In an effort to provide deeper
understanding of enduring problems, some scholars merge
political analysis with what can be learned from philosophy, history, anthropology, and psychology. In an effort to
become relevant, some use the best tools at hand to focus on
immediate political problems.
Although many of the frontier concerns of political science
may seem over the horizon, this encyclopedia offers useful
tools for becoming familiar with an increasingly dynamic field
of political science. Its capacity to respond to change with its
online edition marks it as useful well into the future.
JAMES E. ALT
SIMONE CHAMBERS
GEOFFREY GARRETT
MARGARET LEVI
PAULA D. MCCLAIN
Associate Editors
REFERENCES
Adcock, Robert, and Mark Bevir. The History of Political Science. Political
Studies Review 3 (2005): 116.
Andrews, John. A Comparative View of the French and English Nations, in Their
Manners, Politics and Literature. London: printed for T. Longman, and
G. G. J. and J. Robinson, 1785.
Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. Two Faces of Power. American
Political Science Review 56, 4 (1962): 947952.
. Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. American
Political Science Review 57, 3 (1963): 632642.
Bentley, Arthur. The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1908.
Boix, Carles, and Susan C. Stokes. Overview of Comparative Politics. In
Robert E. Goodin, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Brown, Bernard E., and Roy C. Macridis. Comparative Politics: Notes and
Readings. New York: Macmillan, 1961.
NOTES
1. The initial interest took place in the decades between the first and
second world wars, according to Deutsch and Kinnvall; for others its
origins are in the 1940s. Serious psychological research did not occur
until World War II, however.
2. This is the name of a movement in American political science to
encourage more openness in response to what its members perceived
as a hegemony of rational choice theory and a general narrowing of
questions and scope in the discipline.
3. See, for example, Dahl 1961, Lukes 1974, and Bachrach and Baratz 1962,
1963.
A
Abortion and Politics
By the early twenty-first century, abortion has come to be
one of the most heated political issues in the world. In many
Western nations, abortion is a divisive issue between the political left and the political right, with those on the left supporting
the rights of the mother to control her reproductive life. Abortion opponents, on the other hand, label abortion as murder,
often insisting that the rights of the unborn child begin at the
moment of conception. An estimated fifty million abortions
are performed yearly in various parts of the world, and at least
twenty million of those are considered illegal. Around one-half
of all abortions are performed under conditions detrimental
to the mothers health, and many lead to chronic health problems, loss of fertility, and a womans loss of life. In countries
where abortion laws are the most restrictive, approximately
one-fourth of all pregnancies are illegally terminated.
HISTORY
Until the turn of the nineteenth century, abortion before
quickeningthe point at which the mother feels the baby
movewas generally legal in the United States and Europe.
Quickening was generally believed to occur around the twelfth
week of pregnancy. The use of quickening as the point of viability could be traced back to the ancient Greeks and Romans.
Historically, some abortions were performed with the assistance
of friends, family members, midwives, doctors, or apothecaries. Self-induced abortions, which had a low success rate, were
attempted through a variety of methods that included applications of herbs and ointments to the skin, vigorous internal or
external massage, insertion of foreign objects, stomach binding,
running, lifting, leaping, excessive exercise, starving, bleeding,
blistering, hot and cold baths, emotional distress, fretting, excessive laughing, purging, and vomiting. If all other methods failed,
women sometimes resorted to infanticide.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the male-dominated medical profession had co-opted the birthing process. In the United
States, the American Medical Association, founded in 1847, led
the campaign to make abortion illegal. The move sent desperate women underground, and the number of self-induced and
back alley abortions increased. Over time, outlawing abortion evolved into outlawing all methods of birth control.
The issue of abortion returned to the front burner in the
mid-twentieth century when scores of babies with massive
deformities were born to mothers who had contracted German measles or taken the tranquilizer drug thalidomide. Consequently, many countries passed laws legalizing abortions.
In 1994, the United Nations Conference on Population and
Development signaled a global shift toward improving the
quality of life for women and produced new policies on family
planning and abortion around the world.
ASIA
In countries such as China and India, abortion is viewed as
an acceptable means of controlling exploding populations.
Both countries have liberal abortion policies, and women are
more likely to abort female fetuses. Most Chinese women are
restricted by the governments one-child policy. As of 2005,
the male to female birth ratio in China was 120 boys for every
100 girls, equating to an estimated thirty-two million more
boy than girls. Indias birth ratio as of 2001 was 108 boys for
every 100 girls. In Asian cultures, males are traditionally perceived as more valuable because they are honor bound to take
care of aging parents. Such traditional thinking lingers despite
modern lifestyle changes.
Abortions are performed less often in developing countries than in developed countries because high infant mortality rates and a need for cheap labor in the agricultural sector
result in high fertility rates. In East Timor, for example, the
poorest country in the world, with a per capita income of only
US$400, the infant mortality rate is 45.89 children per one
thousand live births and the fertility rate is 7.8 children per
woman. In comparison, the infant mortality rate in the United
Kingdom is 4.85 per one thousand live births and the fertility
rate is 1.9 births per woman. In Japan, the infant mortality rate
is 2.79 children per one thousand live births, with a fertility
rate of 1.34 per woman.
EUROPE
In the transition countries of eastern Europe, former Soviet
bloc nations are struggling economically as they attempt to
reinvent themselves. Abortion on demand was prevalent under
socialism because it was believed to increase the productivity of women. However, some restrictions have now been
instituted, in part because of the influence of the Catholic
Church. In Poland, for instance, the church was successful in
overturning liberal abortion laws and removing sex education
from classrooms in 1993. Three years later sex education was
reintroduced, and some restrictions on abortion were removed.
Antiabortion forces within the church have been most
successful in Ireland, where all abortions are illegal. Conversely,
in France, where more than 80 percent of the population is
Catholic, abortion rights have been guaranteed since 1974.
Elsewhere in Europe, abortions are legal up to the twelfth week
of pregnancy in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia,
Sweden, and Russia. Limited access to abortion is available in
Britain, Finland, Hungary, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.
Absolutism 3
Reagan, Leslie J. When Abortion Was a Crime:Women, Medicine, and Law in the
United States, 18671973. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Riddle, John M. Contraception and Abortion: From the Ancient World to the
Renaissance. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Sanger, Alexander. Beyond Choice: Reproductive Freedom in the 21st Century.
New York: Public Affairs, 2004.
Stalcup, Brenda, ed. Womens Suffrage. San Diego: Greenwood, 2000.
Stetson, Dorothy McBride, ed. Abortion Politics,Womens Movements, and the
Democratic State. New York: Oxford, 2001.
Unsafe Abortion the Scourge of African Women. IRIN News, January 10,
2010, www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=58537.
World Health Organization. Unsafe Abortion and Associated Mortality in 2003.
Geneva: World Health Organization, 2007.
Zhu, Wai Xing, Li Lu, and Therese Hesketh. Chinas Excess Males, Sex
Selective Abortion, and One Child Policy: Analysis of Data from 2005
National Intercensus Survey. London: BMJ, April 2009, www.bmj.com/
cgi/reprint/338/apr09_2/b1211.pdf.
Absentee Voting
Absentee voting is a process that provides people the opportunity to cast a ballot even if they are unwilling or unable
to appear at a polling station. Absentee voting is common in
developed democracies, such as the United States, Japan, and
the nations of western Europe. A variety of procedures can be
used in absentee voting, including early voting, voting by mail,
and casting ballots by fax or over the Internet. For instance, in
the United States, members of the military who are deployed
outside of their home regions are given absentee ballots that
may be mailed without postage to their precincts, while in the
United Kingdom, postal ballots are freely given on request.
In addition, voters in countries that allow absentee balloting
may cast their votes up to six weeks prior to an election. One
of the principal challenges in absentee voting is ensuring the
secrecy of the ballot and preventing fraud. Consequently, most
countries require that the authenticity of absentee ballots be
certified by witnesses or electoral officials. This form of voting
is recognized as a means to increase voter turnout and prevent
disenfranchisement of citizens who physically cannot appear at
a polling station.
See also Disenfranchisement; Voting Procedures; Voting Rights and
Suffrage.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Absolutism
Absolutism is a historical term for a form of government in
which the ruler is an absolute authority, unrestricted by any
other institution, such as churches, estates, a constitution, laws,
or opposition.
The Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries caused erosion of monarchical power and the rise of
libertarian democratic sentiment in feudal Europe. Political
philosophers of the period reacted by introducing concepts
of the natural law or the divine right of kings. Although contradictory, both concepts claimed that unquestionable rule by
a single person was the best form of government. According
to Thomas Hobbes, human beings ceded authority to a ruler
in exchange for security, which kept society together. JacquesBenigne Bossuet argued that God vested the monarch with
the right to rule in order to protect society and that rebelling
against the monarch would mean challenging God.
Absolutism is characterized by the end of feudal partitioning, unification and centralization of the state, rise of professional standing armies and professional bureaucracies, and the
codification of state laws. The general rise of state power was
demonstrated by expensive lifestyles of absolute monarchs
who identified with the state (Ltat cest moi claimed Louis
XIV of France). Absolutist monarchs attempted to intervene
personally in every area; welfare of the state was therefore
determined by their (in)competence.
Absolutist monarchs held nobility under political control
by keeping them permanently at luxurious courts and arbitrarily distributing payable honorary duties and titles, while
noble estates were managed by exploitative officials.The enormous increase in state expenses was addressed by modernization of tax systems and mercantilism that favored the emerging
bourgeoisie. Monarchs considered absolute rulers include
Louis XIII (reigned 16101643) and Louis XIV of France
(r. 16431715), Ivan the Terrible (r. 15471584) and Peter the
Great of Russia (r. 16821725), Leopold I of Austria (r. as Holy
Roman Emperor 16581705), and Charles XI (r. 16601697)
and Charles XII of Sweden (r. 16971718).
Absolutism went through several historical stages, such as
early absolutism, confessional absolutism, court absolutism, and
Enlightened absolutism. Frederick I of Prussia (r. 17401786),
the Hapsburg emperors of Austria (Marie-Therse, r. 1740
1780, and her son Joseph II, r. 17801790), and Catherine the
Great of Russia (r. 17621796) ruled as absolute monarchs in
eastern Europe while implementing reforms based on Enlightenment ideas. Enlightened absolutism was commonly justified
as a provider of better living conditions for its subjects.
Following bourgeois revolutions in America and France,
absolutism and constitutionalism became principal opposing
political concepts in the West. The Jacobin terror during the
French Revolution (17891799) demonstrated that political
freedom was threatened also by democratic absolutism. To
early-nineteenth-century rightist political thinkers, the French
Revolution, instead of abolishing absolutism, was therefore
rather a struggle between the monarch and the people over
sovereignty, and French Republicanism, Napoleons imperialism,
and constitutionalism were merely forms of absolutism.
Mid-nineteenth-century liberals considered the rising proletariat as another dangerous form of absolutism and argued
against radicals demand of universal suffrage. By 1848, a general
consensus on constitutionalism was reached, and the method
of its implementation became the principal matter of political
controversy. While the term absolutism remained a commonly
used pejorative, especially in France and England, in Germany
the Hegelian Idealism relegated it to historiography from the
1830s on.
In the early twentieth century, research on absolutism as a
historical concept was conceived in contemporary terms. Historians views on the extent of absolutism among European
4 Academic Freedom
monarchs vary. Some argue that a considerable number of
monarchs achieved absolutist control over their states. Others
question the very existence of absolutism, arguing that most
absolutist monarchs had comparable power over their subjects
to any other rulers, and they point to the gap between the
absolutist rhetoric and the reality, especially to many absolutist monarchs incapability to successfully address their constant
financial difficulties.
See also Authority; Monarchy;Tyranny, Classical.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CIRILA TOPLAK
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Blnkner, Reinhard. Absolutismus und moderner Staat: Eine
begriffsgeschichtliche Studie zur Geschichtswissenschaft und zur politischen
Theorie in Deutschland 1830 bis 1890. Gttingen, Germany:Vandenhoeck
and Ruprecht, 1993.
Bing, Gnther, ed. Die Weltgeschichte. Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany:
Herder, 1971.
Davies, Norman. Europe, a History. London: Pimlico, 1997.
James, Alan. The Origins of French Absolutism, 15981661. New York: Pearson
Longman, 2006.
Treasure, Geoffrey, and Russell Richards. The Making of Modern Europe:
16481780. New York: Routledge, 2003.
Academic Freedom
Academic freedom refers primarily to the rights of faculty and
students to provide instruction and inquiry in academic
institutions without restrictions on their analysis or fear of
negative consequences. Although the term is more frequently
applied to higher education, it is used also in public schooling,
though it is often controversial in this context.
Accountability 5
classroom in discussing his/her subject, and (3) when a professor writes as a citizen, he/she should be free from institutional censorship or discipline (American Association of
University Professors, 3). Essentially the institutional and individual components should function harmoniously, as institutions should provide an atmosphere of complete freedom for
educators to conduct research and publish the conclusions,
as long as their performance is sufficient in other academic
responsibilities. While without this academic freedom it can
be argued that educators are unable to fulfill their service of
pursuing and communicating truth, teachers should, however,
be careful to avoid discussion of controversial matters unrelated to the subject at hand.
The 1940 Statement of Principles did not demand religious institutions to implement this form of academic freedom, as limitations of academic freedom because of religious
or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment. The statement is perhaps
intentionally ambiguous in assuming that certain limitations
would exist, seeking to regulate these limitations through the
obligation of honest and immediate disclosure. As granted by
the limitations clause, religious institutions would have liberty
to implement their own principles of academic freedom. Religious institutions that require their faculty to sign statements
of faith merely formalize a mode of voluntary association that
develops naturally at other institutions where such requirements do not exist. Consequently, statements of faith intrinsically considered do not limit genuine academic freedom.
Such declarations of academic freedom are prevalent worldwide. For example, The Magna Charta Universitatum of
1988, signed by Rectors of European Universities, states that,
[T]he university is an autonomous institution at the heart
of societies differently organized because of geography
and historical heritage; it produces, examines, appraises
and hands down culture by research and teaching. To
meet the needs of the world around it, its research and
teach must be morally and intellectually independent of
all political authority and economic power (1).
Originally signed by twenty-nine European countries, the
1999 Bologna Process reinforced the academic ideals laid out
within the Magna Charta and has continued to gain popularity with forty-six participating countries.
See also Education Policy; Education Policy, Higher; Freedom of
Speech.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Aby, Stephen H., and James C. Kuhn IV, comps. Academic Freedom: A Guide to
the Literature. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2000.
Alstyne, William W.Van, ed. Freedom and Tenure in the Academy. Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1993.
American Association of University Professors. 1940 Statement of Principles
on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretative Comments,
n.d., www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs.
Baade, Hans W., and Robinson O. Everett, eds. Academic Freedom:The Scholars
Place in Modern Society. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1964.
Accountability
In political science, the term accountability refers to an actors
acknowledgment and assumption of responsibilities specific
to a roleincluding the responsibility to report and justify
the consequences of actions taken within the scope of the
roleand the existence of sanctions for failing to meet these
responsibilities. A is therefore accountable to B when A is
obliged to inform B about As (past and future) actions and
decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case
of eventual misconduct, as political scientist Andreas Schedler
noted in his 1999 article Conceptualizing Accountability.
The concept of accountability thus entails monitoring
of behavior, justification of behavior, and enforcement of
good behavior. The monitoring and justification aspects of
accountability constitute what is often referred to as answerability. Answerability involves the ability to ask actors about
(1) what they have done and (2) why they have done so. In
other words, there is an informational dimension as well as an
argumentative dimension to answerability. Both dimensions of
answerability require accurate information and are improved
by transparency of actions.
Accountability requires not only answerability for behavior but also enforcement of good behavior. To have accountability as well as answerability, there must also be institutions
for enforcing good behavior that fulfills official responsibilities. Without some way of punishing bad behavior, government agents that shirk their responsibilities cannot be held to
account.
Political, public, or governmental accountability is the ability of citizens, societal actors, or other state actors to hold government officials and agents responsible for their actions in
their official capacities. Successful institutions of governmental
accountability specify the official duties of government agents,
establish a sense of obligation in government agents to fulfill
their responsibilities, and create incentives that motivate government officials to act in the public interest, punishing them
when they pursue their own private interests at the expense of
6 Accountability
the public interest and rewarding them to make pursuing the
public interest in their own interests as well. Political accountability is, in essence, about the need and the ability to restrain
the power of government.
Some define political accountability to include only relationships in which public officials have a legal obligation to
answer to those holding them accountable, and those holding
public officials accountable have a legal right to impose sanctions. Others note that actors are empowered by either formal
institutions or informal rules to sanction and reward government agents for their activities or performance.
THEORIES OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Models of accountability are derived from two main bodies
of theoretical literature: principal-agent theory and theories
of moral responsibility. While the models highlight different
factors in the process of holding actors accountable, they are
not necessarily incompatible with each other.
Principal-agent models of accountability posit relationships
in which the principal (such as an employer or a voter) selects
an agent (an employee, for example, or a local official) to choose
actions that benefit the principals interest. The relationship
between the principal and agent is conceptualized as a contractual relationship between two autonomous actors. Mutually
agreed terms of the contract determine the responsibilities for
which the principal holds the agent accountable. Whether the
principal can actually hold the agent accountable depends on
whether the principal has ways of enforcing the contract.
Scholars have applied agency theory to model the conditions
under which government agents might increase accountability
by making their actions more observable to constituents: the
implications of accountability as an equilibrium state, as well as
a set of mechanisms used when accountability as an equilibrium
fails and the consequences of successfully functioning sanctioning mechanisms when citizens have incorrect information.
In contrast to principal-agent models of accountability that
focus on issues of contract choice, information asymmetries,
and mechanisms for dismissing and punishing agents, theories
of moral responsibility and group solidarity focus on the ways
in which groups and communities establish duties and obligations for their members. Expectations and standards established
by the group determine the responsibilities for which groups
hold members accountable. Moral responsibility models of
accountability focus on internal feelings of obligation and
duty that groups inculcate in their members. Accountability in
these models conceptualizes actors as fulfilling their responsibilities in part because they feel duty-bound to do so. In addition to the negative social sanctions that groups can apply to
discourage misbehavior, theories of moral responsibility also
highlight positive external and internal rewards for fulfilling
responsibilities, such as group expressions of gratitude to individuals, the awarding of social and moral standing, and internal
feelings of pride and identification within individuals.
TYPES OF ACCOUNTABILITY
One way to distinguish between different types of political or
governmental accountability is to look at the different things
Accountability 7
obligation among government officials. Systems of government accountability should also include ways for obtaining
accurate information about the behavior and performance of
government actors, as well as ways of rewarding and punishing their behavior.
Political systems vary widely in the type and strength of the
institutions they have for ensuring governmental accountability. Institutions that are created to contribute to governmental
accountability may not operate successfully or may function
for purposes other than accountability. Elections, for example, are often considered a key element of accountability in
democratic systems.Yet they may function as opportunities for
citizens to choose a good type of political leader who feels
morally responsible for fulfilling official duties, one who will
act on behalf of voters regardless of incentives for reelection.
Moreover, instruments and mechanisms for establishing obligation, providing information, and punishing misbehavior can
contribute to systems of governmental accountability without
being sufficient for ensuring accountability.
BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF
ACCOUNTABILITY
One category of institutions that contribute to accountability are bureaucratic or administrative institutions, such
as performance targets and auditing offices, that enable one
set of government actors to monitor and sanction another
set. Institutions such as bureaucratic performance reviews at
fixed intervals are formal, top-down mechanisms involving
hierarchical authority. Modern officialdom is characterized by the supervision of lower offices by the higher ones.
Bureaucratic institutions of meritocratic selection and promotion, training programs, and selective recruitment from
particular universities or elite social groups also can lead to
informal bureaucratic norms emphasizing loyalty and collective identity, which help to foster a sense of duty among
bureaucrats to put collective goals above individual ones.
Other administrative and bureaucratic institutions of
accountability include institutions of horizontal accountability, which consist of state institutions that oversee and sanction
public agencies and other branches of the government. One
classic example of horizontal accountability is the checksand-balances relationship between legislative, executive, and
judiciary branches of government, which are supposed to
constrain and monitor each other. Other examples include
auditing agencies, anticorruption commissions, ombudsmen,
central banks, and personnel departments. As part of the government itself, however, these institutions can find it difficult
to establish legally authorized or actual autonomous oversight
and sanctioning abilities.
DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS OF
ACCOUNTABILITY
Another category of institutions that contribute to government accountability involve an active role by citizens themselves. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, John Stuart
Mill and other political philosophers came to the conclusion
that representative democracy could provide accountable
Elections that are free and fair enable citizens to elect officials
they believe to be responsive and responsible. People who
want to be officials have to communicate their positions and
objectives to the public. An informed public can then sanction
them for failing to meet their responsibilities and obligations
by voting them out of office.
Although elections can in theory serve as an important
mechanism for accountability, there is a difference between
the existence of electoral democracy and a government
that is actually accountable for the policies that it produces
and implements. While a minimalist definition of electoral
democracy simply requires competitive elections with broad
suffrage where institutionalized political parties take turns in
office, an accountable democratic government is closer to what
Robert Dahl calls a polyarchyan electoral democracy
that also guarantees the existence of alternative information
sources and civil liberties. These additional institutions ensure
the ability of voters to obtain accurate information about official behavior and to sanction them appropriately.
Elections also have a number of shortcomings if used as
the primary or only mechanism for accountability to citizens.
They occur infrequently, so voters have little control over
elected officials between elections.Voters can only vote entire
parties or candidates out of office instead of exercising more
finely tuned sanctions on party or candidate behavior or decisions on a specific issue.
CONSTITUTIONS AND LEGISLATURES
8 Accountability
that always exist in laws and statutes, much policy making is
often done in practice by the bureaucrats who are responsible for implementing the policy. As a result, policy-making
accountability requires institutions that require bureaucrats to
consult with citizens and interest groups who have relevant
interests or special expertise such as corporatism before issuing
administrative statutes to resolve gaps and ambiguities in legislation. Building these kinds of institutions to ensure policymaking accountability in new democracies such as countries
in eastern Europe can often be far more difficult than setting
up national elections and political parties.
This view, however, is controversial. In the past, the working assumption has been that the bureaucracy needs to be
apolitical and professional in order to ensure a degree of state
autonomy. Shielded from political considerations, bureaucrats
should be able to implement policies and laws impersonally,
fairly, and efficiently.
CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTIONS
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS OF
ACCOUNTABILITY
In nondemocratic or transitional systems where formal institutions of accountability are weak, citizens may still be able to
hold government officials accountable through informal institutions of accountability. Officials in these systems may not
fear elections or sanctions from higher levels of the state, but
they can become enmeshed in social obligations established
by solidary communities such as ethnic groups, religious
organizations, or nationalist movements.
Solidary groups, based on shared moral standards and obligations rather than simply shared interests, can offer moral
standing as an incentive to officials for performing well and
providing public goods and services responsibly. Their activities
also can offer forums for government officials to publicize their
good behavior and public praise for this behavior as a reward.
Higher moral standing can be an important source of soft power
for government officials. In contrast to formal institutions of
accountability such as elections and performance contracts,
which are officially authorized for the purpose of holding officials accountable, the norms and obligations provided by solidary groups that help to establish a sense of obligation, transmit
information about the behavior of public officials, and sanction
misbehavior are informal in the sense that they evolved or were
created to maintain the solidarity of a social group. They are
not officially authorized or intended to enable citizens to hold
government officials accountable, but do so nevertheless.
EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
Systems and institutions of accountability can have important
effects on other significant political, economic, and social
outcomes. Effective institutions of accountability can help to
constrain corruption and the extent to which officials can
deviate from the responsibilities of their office. Political systems with governmental accountability may experience more
legitimacy, trust in government, and voluntary compliance
from citizens with state demands such as tax collection and
military draft. Institutions of accountability have been found to
make financial crises less likely and affect economic output.
See also Bureaucracy; Centralization, Deconcentration, and
Decentralization; Checks and Balances; Civil Society; Principalagent Theory; Rule of Law;Transparency.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LILY L. TSAI
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dahl, Robert A. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1956.
Evans, Peter. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Addams, Jane 9
Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Bringing the
State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Fearon, James D. Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians:
Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance. In
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski,
Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 5597. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
Ferejohn, John. Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political
Accountability. In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by
Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 131153. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Fox, Jonathan A., and L. David Brown, eds. The Struggle for Accountability:The
World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements. Cambridge: MIT Press,
1998.
Hechter, Michael. The Principles of Group Solidarity, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1988.
Kaufman, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. Governance Matters
III: Governance Indicators for 19962002. World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 3106, June 30, 2003.
Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. Government Accountability in
Parliamentary Democracy. In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation,
edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin,
279296. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Mainwaring, Scott, and Christopher Welna, eds. Democratic Accountability in
Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Manzetti, Luigi. Political Manipulations and Market Reforms Failures.
World Politics 55 (April 2003): 315160.
Mill, John Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government.
In Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, edited by
H. B. Acton, 229230. London: Dent, 1951.
Moe, Terry. The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of
Political Science 28, no. 4 (1984): 739777.
Moreno, Erika, Brain F. Crisp, and Matthew S. Shugart. The Accountability
Deficit in Latin America. In Democratic Accountability in Latin America,
edited by Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, 79154. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003.
ODonnell, Guillermo. Delegative Democracy. Journal of Democracy 5
(January 1994): 5569.
. Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. Journal of
Democracy 9, no. 3 (1998): 112126.
Rodden, Jonathan. Hamiltons Paradox:The Promise and Peril of Fiscal
Federalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable
Government in Hungary and Poland. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005.
Schedler, Andreas. Conceptualizing Accountability. In The Self-Restraining
State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, edited by Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, 1328. Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner, 1999.
Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. The SelfRestraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York:
Harper and Row, 1975.
Seabright, Paul. Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An
Incomplete Contracts Model. Centre for Economic Policy Research
Discussion Paper no. 889, London, 1996.
Shearer, Teri. Ethics and Accountability: From the For-Itself to the
For-the-Other. Accounting, Organizations, and Society 27, no. 6 (2002):
541573.
Sklar, Richard L. Developmental Democracy. Society for Comparative Studies
in Society and History 29 (October 1987): 686714.
Smiley, Marion. Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community: Power
and Accountability from a Pragmatic Point of View. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992.
Stokes, Susan C. What Do Policy Switches Tell Us about Democracy. In
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski,
Addams, Jane
American social worker, educator, suffragist, and social and
political activist and commentator, Jane Addams (18601935)
was born in Illinois. She is best known for cofounding Hull
House in 1889 with friend Ellen Gates Starr. This revolutionary settlement house was located in Chicagos predominantly immigrant area. Addams used her influence to fight for
decreases in infant mortality, and for childhood immunizations; childrens literacy; better sanitation; and the rights of
women, factory workers, tenants, newsboys, railroad workers,
and midwives. She waged protracted campaigns against disease, truancy, prostitution, drug use, and alcoholism. A staunch
advocate for peace, she also helped to redefine roles for
women of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
After leaving Womens Medical College of Philadelphia for
health reasons, Addams traveled to Europe in 1893. In London,
she visited Toynbee Hall, a settlement house that became the
model for Hull House. Addams gathered a revolving group of
her friends of both sexes at Hull House, which boasted day
nurseries, a kindergarten, boys and girls clubs, a gym, public baths, and a swimming pool. Hull House brought theater,
concerts, and extension courses on a range of subjects into the
lives of Chicagos poor immigrants.
Addams became involved in local politics to promote
her causes, engaging in direct battle with Chicagos political machine. She was named sanitation inspector and served
on the Board of Education and various committees. She also
served on a number of national committees and made history
by nominating Theodore Roosevelt as presidential candidate
for the Progressive Party in 1912. Addams soon became disillusioned with Roosevelt and supported Democrat Woodrow
Wilson in 1916 because of his promise to keep the United States
out of World War I (19141918). When Wilson was unable to
fulfill that promise, Addams broke with the Democratic Party
and voted for Socialist candidate Eugene Debs in 1920.
World War I changed the publics image of Addams. Her
propeace stance during a time of world war and high national
patriotism resulted in Addams, once one of the most admired
women in the country, becoming one of the most reviled.
In 1929, Addams was named president for life of the Womens International League for Peace and Freedom. In 1931,
she shared the Nobel Peace Prize with fellow peace advocate
Nicholas Murray Butler. Three years later, however, her reputation suffered again when she was identified as a dangerous
radical by Elizabeth Patrick Delling in The Red Network: A
Whos Who and Handbook of Radicalism for Patriots.
Adjudication
Adjudication is a mechanism by which disputes or controversies are peacefully resolved. It is a method of conflict
resolution wherein an official and formal declaration of a
legal judgment or determination is rendered in a tribunal
proceeding. Societies can resolve conflicts among parties in
a variety of ways without recourse to formal adjudications:
legislative statutory enactment of policies, mediation and arbitration in employment disputes or labor-management clashes,
persuasion, compromising and negotiation among parties to
a contract, marriage counseling, or even parental discipline.
The diverse methods of conflict resolution can be classified
according to two dimensions: the level of formality of the
proceedings and the level of governmental involvement in
the proceedings. The higher the level of each, the more the
method displays the hallmarks of adjudication.
Both the courts and regulatory administrative agencies
engage in formal adjudication. In terms of the raw numbers
adjudications in the United States, agencies engage in far more
than the courts do. Nevertheless, the archetypal adjudication
is found in the court system, and adjudication procedures in
administrative agencies increasingly resemble adjudication in
the courts.The delivery of justice to aggrieved parties has been
at the heart of adjudication from ancient times, but the contemporary era has developed a specific archetype of adjudication: a tribunal that establishes the facts in a dispute, assesses
the relevant law and attendant guiding rules and principles,
Administrative Courts 11
and then applies the law to the facts. Claims of all parties to
the dispute are duly weighed and considered, and there are
avenues for appeal by the parties of the final decision. The
presiding judge must be impartial and have no vested interest
in the outcome.
In the American system, courts are organized into trial
and appeals courts. Both types of courts engage in adjudication, albeit with different underlying dynamics. Trial courts
possess original jurisdiction; that is, they are the initial courts
to hear cases. There is much variation among different court
jurisdictions and judicial systems in the rules of evidence
that guide and structure the establishment of the facts in trial
courts. Appeals courts have appellate jurisdiction; that is, they
hear appeals from parties who lost in a trial court or in a lower
appeals court. Appellate courts, which are composed of a
multiple judge panel, do not reconsider the facts and do not
retry the case; instead, they assess the fairness of trial court
proceedings by ascertaining whether the law and legal procedures were followed properly. They review trial court procedures and rulings (for example, the admissibility of evidence)
for congruence with statutory and constitutional obligations.
In other words, they review previous court proceedings and
assess whether those court proceedings were fair.
Trial and appellate courts hear and resolve both civil and
criminal cases. Criminal adjudications revolve around murder,
rape, robbery, assault, embezzlement, extortion, and other acts
that bring harm to society and are violations of the penal
code. In criminal adjudications the government brings the
legal action against the defendant. Alternatively, civil cases
revolve around disputes between private parties and potential
violations of private rightsthe state is typically not a party
in such disputes. These private disputes typically are over personal welfare, property, or finances. Judicial responses in such
cases involve a judges declaration ordering certain actions
be taken or some amount of pecuniary compensation to be
awarded.
For a process of adjudication to proceed, two conditions
must be met: the court must have the legal right to hear the
case (jurisdiction) and the parties must have the right to bring
the case before the court (standing). Jurisdictions for courts
stem primarily from statutes and constitutions laying out what
specific types of disputes or types of parties to a dispute fall
under the purview of particular courts. The jurisdictional
requirement reinforces the main function of the courtsto
protect the rights of individuals. At the core of standing is that
the plaintiff has suffered an actual injury or harm to a legally
protected interest. Such a harm or injury must be clear and
concrete and particularized to that plaintiff, and it also must
be actual or immanent, not merely hypothetical or speculative.
The standing requirement distinguishes the courts role from
the role of the legislature, which is to promote the public
interest and society in general. In other words, adjudications
by the courts focus on more individualized-level dispute
resolution, whereas the public policy-making process as conducted by legislatures focuses on more generalized-level disputes. Nevertheless, class-action lawsuits, such as those brought
Administration, International
See International Administration.
Administrative Courts
Administrative courts are judicial bodies that adjudicate cases
involving disputes that arise under administrative lawthat
is to say, disputes over the governments exercise of its public
authority. Administrative law regulates the exercise of authority by executive officials (administrative acts); it also lays out
the correctives or remedies when public officials violate those
rules. Administrative courts are distinct from general courts as
they focus solely on these types of public law disputes, whereas
general courts may deal with both private law disputes (conflicts between private citizens or private entities) and public
law controversies. Administrative courts typically play a more
prominent role in countries with a history of civil law systems
that feature elaborate legal codes (such as France and other
countries in continental Europe) than in nations with a common law tradition where many legal principles are taken from
prior judicial rulings (such as Great Britain, some other nations
in the British Commonwealth, and the United States).
A CLASH OF INTERESTS
At the heart of administrative court litigation is a clash involving the private interests of a citizen on one side and the public
interest as advanced by organs of the state on the other. Ultimately a countrys decision to have a specialized system of
administrative courts is based on a policy decision about the
best way to render and ensure justice and fairness in administration. Citizens or corporations unhappy with a governmental agency decision concerning, for example, welfare eligibility,
old-age or disability entitlements, immigration status, level of
tax liability, the granting of a broadcasting license, or the ability to develop a wetlands area, need a forum for resolving this
type of conflict between their private interest and the public
entity. Should there be a separate set of courts with specialized
jurisdiction only on this type of case, or should general courts
12 Administrative Courts
with broader jurisdiction and less-specialized judges have this
type of private-public dispute fall within their purview?
CONVERGENCE
In practice, however, countries that have attempted to use
just one set of courts to handle all disputes over time have
dropped their conceptual purity and begin to use some specialized forms of administrative courts. Caseload burdens
and the need for judicial expertise in substantive policy
areas often work to increase the number of administrative
courts. Whether the ordinary judicial system can accommodate these types of specialized administrative disputes is an
important determinant of a state ultimately choosing to have
this second structure of courts. A prime example of this is
the United States, where several administrative courts in the
federal government specifically handle litigation stemming
from areas of patents, copyright, customs, and taxes. Most
of these courts were created by the U.S. Congress under its
powers under Article I of the Constitution, as opposed to
the more familiar general federal court system established
by Article III that constitute the judicial branch. The judges
appointed by the president to these courts do not enjoy the
lifetime tenure of Article III federal judges. The decisions
of these courts, however, are reviewable on appeal to the
Article III courts (i.e., the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the
U.S. Supreme Court).
A derivative form of administrative courts can be found
within some U.S. executive branch agencies that have their
own internal administrative tribunals (conducted by ostensibly
independent administrative law judges) to help more expeditiously resolve disputes over administrative decisions. Judicial
review by appeal to an Article III court remains available to
disputants after exhausting the appeals process through these
administrative tribunals and agency appeal boards.
See also Adjudication; Administrative Law; Administrative State;
Conseil dtat; Regulation and Rulemaking;Trial Courts.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . STEPHEN R. ROUTH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abraham, Henry J. The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts
of the United States, England, and France, 7th ed. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
Derbyhire, J. Denis, and Ian Derbyshire. Political Systems of the World. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.
Legomsky, Stephen H. Specialized Justice: Courts, Administrative Tribunals, and
a Cross-national Theory of Specialization. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990.
Melnick, R. Shep. Regulation and the Courts:The Case of the Clean Air Act.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983.
Rabkin, Jeremy. Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Public Policy.
New York: Basic Books, 1989.
Shapiro, Martin. Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration.
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988.
Warren, Kenneth F. Administrative Law in the Political System, 4th ed. Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 2004.
Administrative Law 13
Administrative Law
Administrative law is the body of law that deals with the
procedures, authority, and actions involved in public administration. It incorporates the various powers, responsibilities,
duties, and functions of public agencies and agency officials in
the attempted advancement of their respective missions, along
with judicial decisions that help structure these exercises of
authority. The expansion and progression of administrative law
have been concomitant with the growth of the administrative
state in the twentieth century as governmental bureaucracy has
developed to deal with pressing social, economic, and political
problems emanating from modern society. In other words, at
its core, administrative law is the branch of law that regulates
the exercise of authority by executive branch officials.
A focus of much of administrative law is on the protocols
and procedures to which government agencies must adhere
to take legal and constitutionally acceptable actions that affect
private parties. Thus, it can be said that the corpus of administrative law is composed of efforts to ensure that governmental agencies effectively implement public policies designed to
advance the public interest, and at the same time to guarantee
that the liberty of private interests are safeguarded from possible and potential administrative infringements. Rephrased,
administrative law is a fluid and ever-evolving area of law
that endeavors to reconcile and synthesize public and private
interestsagencies are in place to help government fulfill its
mission, but they may not violate individual liberties.
In the American context at the federal level, there are four
main sources of administrative law: the U.S. Constitution,
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA), particular
agency enabling acts, and administrative common law. The
APA is a federal law that directly lays out the procedures agencies must follow and creates the legal structure for review by
the federal courts of agency actions. At the core of motivation
behind the enactment of the APA was Congresss wish to not
allow executive agencies so much leeway in the conduct of
their duties that executive agents would be able to drift away
from congressional intentions and desires in the law that the
executive was implementing. The great and abrupt growth of
the administrative state under President Franklin Roosevelt
communicated to Congress the need for such structures as
the APA to rein in and guide executive actions. Similar legislative concerns are manifested also in the drafting of agency
enabling acts that set out the boundaries of agency authority
and purpose and the use of the legislative veto.The actual, dayto-day implementation of public policy and enforcement of
laws remains a continuing source of political and institutional
tension between the executive branch and the Congress.
Agencies are the entities that actually execute the laws that
the legislature has enacted, and they engage in several types
of activities when enforcing these laws. These agency activities
include the regulation of private conduct, the disbursement of
entitlements, the management of governmental property, the
granting of licenses and permits, engaging in investigations and
gathering of information, and the making of public policy. The
vast majority of what agency officials do ends up having important consequences on the lives of private parties, by preventing
them or allowing them to engage in a particular action, or giving them or taking away some form of benefit. Two important
sets of actions that agencies engage in when performing such
activities are rulemaking and the issuance of an order after an
adjudication of a dispute. Rulemaking is essentially where an
agency promulgates a general rule or regulation that is filling in
the details of statutory policy and that rule possesses the force
of law. The issuance of an administrative order is more specifically tailored to a particular dispute in which a private party is
required, after an administrative hearing, to conform to the law
by doing or refraining from doing certain things.
There is variation among liberal democracies in their
respective administrative law structures. For example, administrative law in France and Sweden is administered by a system of highly developed separate administrative courts that
are distinct from ordinary courts in that they focus solely on
public law disputes. Such administrative courts are more readily seen and stronger in countries with a history of civil law
legal systems than in nations with a common law legal heritage (such as the United States and Great Britain). The purpose of these courts is to closely oversee public agency actions.
In the French system, all administrative decisions produced
by executive officials are subject to review by the Conseil
dtat (Council of State), which sits at the apex of this system
of administrative lower tribunals and intermediate courts of
appeals. This particular court possesses much authority, independence, and prestige in the French legal system, and there
is no comparable analogue to it in either the United States or
Great Britain. Through its myriad decisions over the past two
hundred years, the Conseil dtat has developed abiding legal
precedents and principles concerning administrative power as
exercised by the state.Thus, the leading administrative court in
France constitutes a viable check to executive power, as well as
lending legitimacy to various state actions. The judiciarys use
of administrative law is a leading method by which bureaucrats
can be held accountable and to ensure executive fidelity to the
law and correct procedures.
Some controversy and ongoing questions revolve around
agency activities and how administrative law has developed to
deal with those concerns. A variety of nations have opted for
an external watchdog of an ombudsman to help assist in scrutinizing potentially problematic actions taken by government
administrators. The ombudsman is an appointed public official
who has the authority to investigate accusations of corrupt,
incompetent, or incorrect actions taken by bureaucrats. This
oversight mechanism started in Scandinavia and has filtered
out over time to other European democracies and to the
European Union, but its full potential is yet to be seen.
In the United States, an important worry is that the scope
of agency action has worked to undermine the separation-ofpowers systemlegislative, executive, and judicialas laid out
in the Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that it
is constitutionally permissible for executive agencies to exert
authority that one normally associates with the legislative and
14 Administrative State
judicial branches as long as judicial review of agency decisions is
available to the affected parties and agencies operate only in areas
that are clearly under their regulatory jurisdiction and expertise.
Thus, this merging of governmental powers is constitutionally
satisfactory as long as appropriate safeguards are kept in place.
Of special concern in these separation-of-powers considerations is the delegation doctrine. The delegation doctrine
prohibits excessive delegation of discretionary powers by
the Congress to federal agencies. The major question here is
where exactly is the threshold when the U.S. Congress has
delegated too much authority to an agency so that the agency
is actually legislating the law, and not the Congress itself?
From the 1940s to the present, the delegation doctrine has
become essentially dormant in the federal courts and does not
pose much of a constraint on Congress, with Congress giving
healthy amounts of leeway to agencies in the implementation
of federal law. As long as some type of intelligible principle is
articulated in the relevant law to generally guide the implementing agency, the courts will uphold the agency action as
meeting the requirements of the delegation doctrine and is
thus constitutional.
See also Administrative Courts; Delegation, Theories of; Regulation and Rulemaking.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . STEPHEN R. ROUTH
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Breyer, Stephen G., Adrian Vermeul, Richard B. Stewart, and Cass Sunstein.
Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems,Texts, and Cases. New
York: Aspen, 2006.
Cass, Ronald A., Colin S. Driver, and Jack M. Beermann. Administrative Law:
Cases and Materials. New York: Aspen, 2006.
Funk, William F., and Richard H. Seamon. Administrative Law: Examples and
Explanations, 3rd ed. New York: Aspen, 2009.
Hall, Daniel E., and John Feldmeier. Administrative Law: Bureaucracy and
Democracy, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2008.
Strauss, Peter L. Administrative Justice in the United States, 2nd ed. Durham,
N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2002.
Warren, Kenneth F. Administrative Law in the Political System, 4th ed. Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 2004.
Administrative State
The term administrative state denotes political systems in contemporary developed nations with rationally organized, technically oriented government agencies that play large, central,
and powerful roles in the formulation of public policy and the
implementation of government services, constraints, functions,
and programs. The term came into common usage in political
science with the publication of Dwight Waldos classic 1948
book The Administrative State. The administrative state developed from a variety of historical causes including the rise of
the twentieth century welfare-warfare state, market failures in
capitalist economies, and socialist economic organization.
THE BUREAUCRACY
A chief characteristic of the administrative state is the development of a new and relatively independent power center in
government, typically referred to as the bureaucracy, that is
difficult for chief executives, legislatures, and courts to control.
Independence develops from the selection of tenured administrative personnel based on technical expertise (merit), the
scope of administrative tasks and the detailed knowledge they
require, and the continuous operation of administrative units
regardless of changes in their leadership and staff. Such units
are difficult for legislators, elected and politically appointed
executives, and courts to supervise and hold accountable due
to their technical expertise, knowledge of and adherence to
routine, scope of activity, and limited transparency.
The organization of administrative units in the administrative state is typically bureaucratic; that is, incorporating specialization, hierarchy, expertise, impersonality, and large size.
Specialization of units is by jurisdiction and function. Ministries or departments are generally the largest units. Smaller
units are called agencies, and subunits are called bureaus. Jurisdictional specialization is manifested in such units as Ministries or Departments of Labor, Commerce, Agriculture, and
Interior, among others. Specialization by function forms the
basis of units devoted to such matters as defense; national
security; crime control; education; nuclear power; welfare; and
economic, environmental, and social regulation, as well as for
overhead administrative activities such as budgeting, procurement, and personnel administration.
These categories are not wholly distinctoverlaps are
common and one persons regulation may be anothers service, as in the case of measures for consumer protection. Hierarchy reaching upward through political appointees in the
administrative units to the various offices of the chief executive and culminating with the president, premier, or prime
minister promotes coordination of the administrative component as a whole. Expertise, sometimes referred to as technorationality, results from specialization and the selection of
administrative personnel based on merit. Impersonality, which
contributes to procedural regularity and continuity of operations, is promoted by organizations based on positions rather
than on persons (e.g., individual administrators), adherence to
comprehensive procedural rules for decision making and other
actions, and communication in writing. Large size is a function
of the broad range of policies and activities dealt with by the
administrative state.
Adorno, Theodor W.
Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno (19031969) was a German
music theorist, literary critic, philosopher, social psychologist, and sociologist. Born in Frankfurt to a family of musicians, Adorno started to write as a music critic at a very early
age. His name is, however, primarily linked to the Frankfurt
school, the group of intellectuals working within the framework of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, of which
he is considered to be one of the central exponents.The essays
he wrote in the 1930s in the Zeitschrift fr Sozialforschung, the
main organ of the institute, combine formal music analysis
with a sociological critique.
With Adolf Hitlers rise to power, Adorno, together with
other members of the institute, migrated to the United States,
first to New York and then to California. During these years
Adorno collaborated with philosopher and sociologist Max
Horkheimer, with whom he wrote the influential Dialectic of
Enlightenment (1944). In this book, written after the advent of
Nazism and their experience of American mass society, the
16 Advertising, Political
in the same activity or transaction, then adverse selection is
present.
Moral hazard is a possibility that informed actors might
undertake an activity or transaction more risky than uninformed actors original belief. If such activity or transaction
is undertaken, and uninformed actors cannot observe it, then
moral hazard is present. For example, if a state borrows money
from an international organization, then the state has more
information about its own current and future risks than does
the lender. Adverse selection arises from the possibility of using
borrowed funds in the ways that would lead to difficulties in
repaying the loan. Alternatively, moral hazard arises if that state,
which had intended to use borrowed funds in a less risky way,
experiences a change in government, and the new government
uses the borrowed funds for riskier purposes.
See also Ethics, Political.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TATIANA VASHCHILKO
Advertising, Political
Political advertising encompasses a broad array of strategies in
which paid media is used to communicate political messages
to the public. Although most commonly associated with candidates campaign commercials, political advertising has developed into a massive industry in which various political actors
(e.g., parties, advocacy groups) use a host of media such as
radio, television, and the Internet to deliver carefully packaged
messages directly to voters. Research has provided important
insights into the use and effect of political ads, although some
intriguing questions have yet to be fully resolved.
NEW VENUES
Political advertising also has expanded to new venues.
Campaigns are now using the Internet to create somewhat
unorthodox pieces, such as animated spots or comedic skits
that are intended to be distributed through a viral network
of supporters. Individual citizens also have started producing their own Web-based political ads, some of which have
gained considerable attention on the Internet. In addition, the
2004 U.S. presidential candidates pioneered a technique called
phantom advertising in which they created ads that, rather
than being aired, were sent to media outlets in the hopes
that they would be included in stories about the campaign.
American political advertising is an expanding enterprise that
appears to be on the cusp of another profound change.
These trends and practices have started to have some influence on political advertising in other Western democracies.
Growing similarities are due, in part, to the fact that American
political consultants have increasingly exported their strategies
to parties and candidates in other countries. While this has
raised concerns about the Americanization of campaigns in
places like Britain, Canada, and France, differences in campaign spending laws, party systems, and political culture have
kept political advertising in these countries from completely
replicating the American model.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. Going Negative: How Political
Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate. New York: Free Press,
1995.
Brader, Ted. Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in
Political Ads Work. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
Brians, Craig L., and Martin P. Wattenberg. Campaign Issue Knowledge and
Salience: Comparing Reception from TV Commercials, TV News, and
Newspapers. American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (1996): 172193.
Franz, Michael M., Paul B. Freedman, Kenneth M. Goldstein, and Travis
N. Ridout. Campaign Advertising and American Democracy. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2007.
Geer, John G. In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
Goldstein, Kenneth, and Travis A. Ridout. Measuring the Effects of
Televised Political Advertising in the United States. Annual Review of
Political Science 7 (2004): 205226.
Kaid, Lynda Lee, and Anne Johnston. Videostyle in Presidential Campaigns: Style
and Content of Televised Political Advertising. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001.
West, Darrel M. Air Wars:Television Advertising in Election Campaigns,
19522004, 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005.
20 Advocacy Groups
advocacy groups play a strong role in diffusing new ideas from
one governmental entity to another.
See also Coalition Formation; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Public
Policy Development.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DANIEL C. LEWIS
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. Agendas and Instability in
American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Burnett, Miles, and Charles Davis. Getting Out the Cut: Politics and
National Forest Timber Harvests, 19601995. Administration and Society
34, no. 2 (2002): 202228.
Heclo, Hugh. Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment.
In The New American Political System, edited by Anthony King,
87124. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978.
Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1984.
Mintrom, Michael, and Sandra Vergari. Advocacy Coalitions, Policy
Entrepreneurs, and Policy Change. Policy Studies Journal 24, no. 3 (1996):
126148.
Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank Jenkins-Smith. Policy Change and Learning: An
Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993.
Schlager, Edella, and William Blomquist. A Comparison of Three Emerging
Theories of the Policy Process. Political Research Quarterly 49, no. 3
(1996): 651672.
Advocacy Groups
In political science, advocacy groups form a subgroup of interest groups. Interest groups can represent the self-interest of
their members or a broader public interest. Public interest
groups also are called advocacy groups in that they seek to
promote a common or collective good. But this definition is
not universally shared. Some scholars, including Ross Stephens
and Nelson Wikstrom (2007), assign the term public interest
groups to lobbying organizations that represent the interest of
governmental entities, such as the National League of Cities.
Another ambiguity involves the legitimacy of advocacy
activities.Traditionally, scholars have accepted advocacy groups
as essential components of pluralist democracy, while more
recently issue advocacy has been associated with negative
forms of political communication.
BRIEF HISTORY
Advocacy groups can trace their origin to political movements in the nineteenth century. Organizations with dedicated leaders and dues-paying members emerged to pursue a
variety of political causes and seek fundamental constitutional
changes, such as the abolition of slavery or suffrage for women.
Improved literacy made it possible to print newspapers and
pamphlets to mobilize supporters and educate the public.
Advocacy groups survived over time by adapting their goals
and tactics to changing political conditions. The NAACP, for
instance, was founded in 1909 to promote civil rights, as well
as educational and economic opportunities, for people of
color. After women obtained the right to vote in 1920, activists reconstituted themselves as the League of Women Voters to
educate women about their new right, as well as to promote
good government reforms.
Affirmative Action 21
engage in election activities, by which the IRS means explicitly
supporting or opposing candidates running for political office.
However, for more direct electoral involvement, 501(c)(4) entities
can create political organizations under section 527. The Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended, limits the
amount of money section 527 entities can spend for or against
candidates. However, FECA created new ambiguities, which
the Supreme Court tried to resolve by distinguishing between
express advocacy, such as mentioning a candidate, and issue advocacy,
or focusing on a policy issue.The express form of political communication falls under FECA, but issue advocacy does not.
See also Interest Groups and Lobbies; Political Action Committee
(PAC); Public Interest Groups.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SIEGRUN FOX FREYSS
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Berry, Jeffrey M. The Interest Group Society, 3rd ed. New York: Longman, 1997.
Boris, Elizabeth T., and Jeff Krehely. Civic Participation and Advocacy. In
The State of Nonprofit America, edited by Lester M. Salamon, 299330.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003.
Dwyre, Diana. Campaigning Outside the Law: Interest Group Issue
Advocacy. In Interest Group Politics, 6th ed., edited by Allan J. Cigler and
Burdett A. Loomis, 141159. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2002.
Fowler, Linda L., Constantine J. Spiliotes, and Lynn Vavreck. Group
Advocacy in the New Hampshire Presidential Primary. In The Interest
Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington,
2nd ed., edited by Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde
Wilcox, 89111. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005.
ONeill, Michael. The Third America.The Emergence of the Nonprofit Sector in the
United States. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989.
Skocpol, Theda. How Americans Became Civic. In Civic Engagement in
American Democracy, edited by Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina,
2780. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999.
Smucker, Robert. The Nonprofit Lobbying Guide, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.:
Independent Sector, 1999.
Stephens, G. Ross, and Nelson Wikstrom. American Intergovernmental Relations:
A Fragmented Federal Polity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Affirmative Action
Redistribution of wealth and other benefits is a common function of government. Controversies over the extent of redistribution are the principal basis of politics in many countries.
When this redistribution is based on characteristics acquired at
birth, such as race, ethnicity, caste, or gender, controversy often
increases because the redistribution may exacerbate group
rivalries and be inconsistent with other values, such as equal
protection of the law. Such redistribution is often called affirmative action. Economist Thomas Sowell, the principal scholar
comparing such policies, has identified them in such diverse
counties as India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and the United
States. Additionally, more limited versions exist in Britain,
Canada, France, New Zealand, and Pakistan.
The origins of affirmative action vary by country. In the
United States, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and almost all civil rights laws prohibit discrimination and
require governments and many private entities to treat all persons
equally. As the civil rights movement changed from advocacy
of race-blind equal opportunity programs to race-conscious
22 Aflaq, Michel
programs as useful symbolic policies adding to social stability or
as marketing tools to obtain votes or to sell products. Beneficiary
groups seek to expand the reach of affirmative action programs.
As these programs become bureaucratically institutionalized,
they develop infrastructures supported by government, corporate, foundation, and educational funds. Opponents are rarely
so well organized or funded. They often have majority public
opinion support, however, and can invoke with some sympathy
in legal forums defending the principle of equal protection.
The global economy and the growing migration of peoples
are likely to leave most countries increasingly multiethnic and
multireligious.This will add to the difficulty of reconciling the
political value of eliminating inequalities with the legal value
of treating individuals equally.Whatever it may be called in the
future and whatever form it takes, something like affirmative
action programs will continue to be controversial in a number
of countries worldwide.
See also Caste System; Civil and Political Rights; Civil Rights
Movement; Discrimination; Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
Positive Discrimination; Racial Discrimination; Reverse Discrimination; Segregation and Desegregation; Xenophobia.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GEORGE R. LA NOUE
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Becker, Gary S. The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1971.
Callister, Paul. Special Measures to Reduce Ethnic Disadvantage in New Zealand:
An Examination of their Role. Wellington, N.Z.: Institute of Policy
Studies, 2007.
Galanter, Marc. Competing Inequalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
Graham, Hugh D. The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National
Policy 19601972. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Guinier, Lani, and Gerald Torres. The Miners Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting
Power,Transforming Democracy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2002.
Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights.
New York: Oxford University Press 1995.
Jesudason, James. Ethnicity and the Economy:The State, Chinese Business,
and Multinationals in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
1989.
Leiter, Samuel, and William M. Leiter. Affirmative Action and Anti-discrimination
Law and Policy. Albany: State University of New York, 2002.
Skrentny, John David. The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and
Justice in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Sowell, Thomas. Affirmative Action around the World: An Empirical Study. New
Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 2004.
Thernstrom, Stephan, and Abigail Thernstrom. America in Black and White:
One Nation Indivisible. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1997.
Aflaq, Michel
A Greek Orthodox Christian Syrian, Michel Aflaq (1910
1989) became one of two founders, along with his Muslim
countryman, Salah al-Din Bitar, of the Baath (Bath; rebirth
or resurrection) Party in the early 1940s. He was regarded
as the partys leading thinker. Aflaq considered Egyptian
president Gamal Abdel Nasser to be a charismatic leader
for the Arabs and, with the idea that Baathists could play a
leading role in what he saw as the beginning of a pan-Arab
Africa, Anglophone
See Anglophone Africa.
Africa, Francophone
See Francophone Africa.
Africa, Postindependence
See Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governance in.
PAN-AFRICANISM
The next major movement in African political thought,
pan-Africanism, was prominently promoted by the African
Diasporascholars and activists of African descent living
in other nations. Pan-Africanism is a political and cultural
ideal and movement born in the 1900s aimed at regrouping and mobilizing Africans in Africa and in the Diaspora
against foreign domination, oppression, and discrimination.
Political pan-Africanism is linked to African nationalism
(i.e., the struggle for independence), while economic panAfricanism is linked to the struggle against imperialism and
neocolonialism. The major proponents of pan-Africanism
in North America were W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey,
Paul L. Robeson, and George Padmore. The so-called back
social, and cultural progress of the people. This can occur only
when foreign domination has been totally eliminated.
AFRICAN SOCIALISM
Emerging in the early 1980s, African populism borrows elements of both African socialism and Marxism-Leninism, and
places the people at the center of democracy and development in Africa. Its main policy is to satisfy the basic needs
of the peasantry, the largest and poorest social class in Africa.
African populist regimes advocate popular democracy and
people-centered development. African populist regimes
include Burkina Faso (Thomas Sankara); Ghana (Jerry Rawlings); Libya (Muammar Qaddafi) since 1977; and Zimbabwe
(Robert Mugabe) since 1995).
IMPERIALISM
Africa was among the last regions of the globe to be subject to
imperial rule. In the so-called scramble for Africa, as described
by Thomas Pakenham in his 1991 book of that title, the British
and French seized major portions of the continent; Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain seized lesser holdings as
well. During the imperial era, most of Africas people were
subject to the rule of bureaucrats in London, Lisbon, and Paris
rather than being ruled by leaders they themselves had chosen. Two states in Africa had long been independent: Ethiopia
from time immemorial and Liberia since 1847. In 1910, the
NATIONALIST REVOLT
Among the first Africans to rally against European rule were
urban elites, whose aspirations were almost immediately
checked by resident officials of the colonial powers. Workers
who staffed the ports and railways that tied local producers to
foreign markets soon joined them. In the rural areas, peasants
rallied to the struggle against colonial rule, some protesting
intensified demands for labor and the use of coercion rather
than wage payment to secure it. Among the primary targets of
the rural population were the chiefs, who had been tasked by
colonial rulers with taxing the profits of farmers and regulating
the use of their lands. Thus did the Kenya Africa Union support dock strikes in Mombasa and the intimidation of chiefs
in the native reserves. Similarly, the Convention Peoples Party
backed strikes in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) port cities of
Tema and Takoradi, while seeking to destool chiefs inland.
Adding to the rise of nationalist protest was global inflation.
Reconstruction in Europe and rearmament in the United
States ran up against shortages of materials and higher prices in
global markets. Throughout Africa and the developing world,
consumers rallied to protest against these increases, tending
to blame them on European monopoliessuch as in Ghana,
where the people focused their anger on the United Africa
Companyor local trading communitiessuch as the Indian
merchants in Kenya or Lebanese traders in Sierra Leone.
After its independence, Kwame Nkrumah (second from right) became prime minister of Ghana. Within a few years, he amassed substantial
power before being toppled by a military coup in 1966.
SOURCE: Bettmann/Corbis
LATE-CENTURY POLITICS
The politics of late-century Africa was marked by two
major trends. The first was the return to multiparty politics;
No-party
Single Party
Multiparty
Percent Observations
50
40
30
20
10
0
19701974
19751979
19801984
19851989
19901995
ETHNICITY
Some have attributed Africas slow growth to ethnic diversity;
others attribute its political instability to conflict among ethnic
30 African Union
Collier, Paul. The Political Economy of Ethnicity. In Proceedings of the
Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, edited by B. Pleskovic
and J. E. Stigler, 387399. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1999.
Collier, Paul, Robert H. Bates, A. Hoeffler, and Steve OConnell.
Chapter 11: Endogenizing Syndromes. In The Political Economy of
African Economic Growth, 19602000, edited by B. Ndulu, Paul Collier,
Rorbert H. Bates, and Steve OConnell. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
Collier, Ruth Berins. Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy,
19451975. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine, Africas Growth Tragedy: Policies and
Ethnic Divisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (November 1997):
12031250.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.
American Political Science Review 97 (February 2003): 7590.
Hodgkin, Thomas. Nationalism in Colonial Africa. New York: New York
University Press, 1956.
Kaplan, Robert D. The Coming Anarchy. The Atlantic Monthly 273
(February 1994): 4476.
Meredith, Martin. The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence.
London: Free Press, 2005.
Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty. Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions,
and Public Goods in Kenya. Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 1112
(2005): 23252368.
Murshed, S. Mansoob, and Scott Gates. Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and
the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. Paper comissioned by the Department
for International Development, London, 2003.
Pakenham, Thomas. The Scramble for Africa:The White Mans Conquest
of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1991.
Uchendu,Victor C. The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria. New York: Holt, Rinehart,
and Winston, 1965.
World Bank. Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth.
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989.
. Governance and Development. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1991.
African Union
The African Union (AU) is an intergovernmental, international
organization created in 2002 with the purpose of securing
democracy, human rights, and a sustainable economy in Africa,
especially by bringing an end to intra-African conflict and
creating an effective common market. The AU was formed as
a successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The
OAU, founded in 1963 on the principles of state sovereignty
and noninterference, drew criticism throughout the 1990s for
its lack of intervention as conflicts erupted in several African
countries.
The idea of creating the AU emerged in the mid-1990s
and resulted in the adoption of the Sirte Declaration by the
OAUs heads of state and government. The declaration, issued
in September 1999, called for the establishment of an African
Union with a view to accelerating the process of integration
on the continent. In the following year, the Constitutive Act
of the African Union was signed in Lom, Togo, and the organization was officially launched in Durban in July 2002. Fiftythree countries in Africa are members of the AU (all African
countries but Morocco).
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
According to the Constitutive Act of the AU (2002) and the
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and
Security Council of the AU (2002), the organs of the organization are: (1) Assembly, comprised of heads of state. It meets
at least once a year and is the AUs main decision-making
body. Its members elect an AU chair, who holds office for
one year. (2) Executive Council, comprised of foreign affairs
ministers or other ministers designated by member states.
The Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly.
(3) Commission, composed by a chair, a deputy and the
commissioners holding individual portfolios, which manages
day-to-day tasks and implements AU policies. (4) Peace and
Security Council (PSC), a body set up in 2004, which serves
as a collective security and early warning arrangement to
respond to conflict and crisis (through preventive diplomacy,
early warning, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, and humanitarian action). The PSC has
fifteen member states, elected for two or three year terms,
with equal voting rights;.(5) Pan-African Parliament, established in March 2004 to ensure the participation of African
peoples in governance, development, and economic integration of the continent. This body debates continentwide issues
and advises AU heads of state. It currently exercises oversight
and has advisory and consultative powers only, but there are
plans to grant it legislative powers in the future. (6) Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), established in 2005, which seeks to build partnerships between
African governments and civil society. ECOSOCC includes
E U R O P E
AT L A N T I C
Tunis
OCEAN
Algiers
Rabat
Me
TUNISIA
MOROCCO
dite
A S I A
rran
ean Sea
Tripoli
Cairo
ALGERIA
Layoune
LIBYA
SAHARAWI ARAB
DEM. REP.
EGYPT
dS
ea
MAURITANIA
MALI
Nouakchott
NIGER
SENEGAL
Conakry
Freetown
CTE
DIVOIRE
SIERRA LEONE
Monrovia
LIBERIA
Yamoussoukro
Accra
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
NIGERIA
Abuja
Porto-Novo
Lom
Malabo
CA
TOGO
EQUATORIAL
GUINEA
Asmara
SUDAN
NDjamena
BURKINA FASO
GUINEA
So
Tom
Addis
Ababa
GUINEA-BISSAU
Bamako Ouagadougou
Bangui
Yaound
RE
P.
CO OF T
NG HE
O
Bissau
CHAD
Niamey
BENIN
THE GAMBIA
ERITREA
Khartoum
GHANA
Dakar
Banjul
ER
OO
CAPE
VERDE
Praia
ile
Re
Libreville
GABON
Brazzaville
SOMALIA
C o ng o
UGANDA
Kampala
D E M . R E P.
O F T H E Kigali
CONGO
Kinshasa
Cabinda
(ANGOLA)
ETHIOPIA
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
KENYA
Mogadishu
Nairobi
RWANDA
Victoria
BURUNDI
Bujumbura
Dar es Salaam
TANZANIA
SEYCHELLES
Luanda
Windhoek
BOTSWANA
Gaborone
Pretoria
Mbabane
Maseru
African Union:
SOUTH
AFRICA
Member country
Non-member country
Cape Town
BI
ue
C
mb
iq
NAMIBIA
MOZ
A
OCEAN
Harare
ZIMBABWE
COMOROS
UE
Lusaka
AT L A N T I C
Moroni
MALAWI
Mo
za
ZAMBIA
Lilongwe
ha
nn
el
ANGOLA
Antananarivo
MADAGASCAR
Maputo
SWAZILAND
LESOTHO
INDIAN
OCEAN
0
0
MAURITIUS
Port Louis
500 Mi
500 Km
Member states of the African Union focus on ending intra-African conflict and creating an effective common market.
32 Afro-Marxism
African social groups, professional groups, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and cultural organizations. (7) African
Court of Justice and Human Rights, which came about as
the result of a merger between the regional African Court
on Human and Peoples Rights and the AU Court of Justice.
The court is located in Arusha, Tanzania. And (8) financial
institutions. The AU charter names three bodies: the African
Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, and the African
Investment Bank.
Besides these key institutions, the AUs activities are supported as well by a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early
Warning System (CEWS), an AU Standby Force, a Peace Fund,
and the New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD).
NEPAD is a comprehensive development plan that addresses
key social, economic, and political priorities in a coherent and
balanced manner. It was adopted at the thirty-seventh session
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU
in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia.
The AU has adopted various key documents establishing
norms at the continental level to supplement those already
in force when it was created. These include the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003);
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003); the African
Union Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact (2005);
the African Youth Charter (2006); the Charter for African
Cultural Renaissance (2006); the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (2007); and the African Charter on Statistics (2009).
For an organization that only became operational in 2002,
and unlike the OAU, the AU has demonstrated a strong political
willingness to engage with decisive issues such as conflict resolution and economic development. Its resource capacity is limited, however, which encourages dependency on foreign funds.
See also African Political Economy; African Political Thought;
African Politics and Society; Pan-Africanism; Regional Security.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RODRIGO TAVARES
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
African Union. Constitutive Act of the African Union, Togo, July 11, 2000. Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, 2000.
. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security
Council of the African Union, July 2, 2002. Durban, South Africa: African
Union 2002, www.africa-union.org/root/AU/organs/psc/Protocol_
peace%20and%20security.pdf.
Francis, David. Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems.
Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2006.
Makinda , Samuel M., and Wafula Okumu. The African Union: Challenges of
Globalization, Security and Governance. London: Routledge, 2008.
Murithi, Timothy. The African Union; Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and
Development. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2005.
Afro-Marxism
Afro-Marxism refers to the adoption by postcolonial governments in Africa of Marxist-style models of social and
economic development supported through links with Communist Partyled governments such as the Soviet Union and
Agenda Control 33
The stalemate forced the South African government to take
part in negotiations that eventually led to the independence of
Namibia and indeed played a major part in the collapse of the
apartheid regime in 1994.
Afro-Marxism held out a promise of self-sufficiency, equality, economic development, and prosperity. In practice, most
examples of Afro-Marxism failed to deliver much in any of
these areas. Also, many leaders who had advocated the more
moderate African socialism fell back on authoritarian forms of
Soviet-style government when attempting to implement their
policies. Economic development primarily directed wealth
into the hands of the new elite, which consisted of leading
members of the ruling party.
Western versions of socialism, especially Soviet-inspired
systems, were often inapplicable to the specific social circumstances of less industrialized countries, whose labor base
was often concentrated in agricultural or resource-extractive
industries. Similarly, Afro-Marxism failed to draw on local
governance practices to organize social and productive life and
instead relied on the centralized statist models of Sovietism.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet systems
in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, along
with the passing of Maoism and Chinas embrace of capitalism by the late twentieth century, all dealt severe blows to
Afro-Marxist regimes. The loss of aid and trade ties with the
Soviet economies left Marxist governments in Africa desperate
for aid from Western capitalist governments and international
financial organizations like the International Monetary Fund
and World Bank. At the same time, China maintains aid and
investment in many African countries and seeks to expand
its influence on the continent. Chinas financial connections
with the regime in Sudan has been highly criticized by human
rights activists and commentators. While China has attempted
to develop its influence, it has not supported or encouraged
the development of communist regimes or parties as the Soviet
Union did. Governments also became more vulnerable to the
pressures of Western governments and institutions to accept
structural adjustment programs, including the privatization of
government works and lands.
See also Apartheid; Communism; Marxism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JEFFREY SHANTZ
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Babu, A. M. African Socialism or Socialist Africa? London: Zed, 1981.
Higgins, Nicholas P. Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion: Modernist Visions
and the Invisible Indian. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004.
Mbah, Samuel, and I. E. Irigariwey. African Anarchism:The History of a
Movement. Tucson, Ariz.: Sharp, 2001.
Nyerere, Julius. Freedom and Socialism: A Selection of Writings and Speeches,
19651967. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968.
. Ujaama: Essays on Socialism. London: Oxford University Press, 1977.
Agenda Control
Agenda control may be defined as the ability to affect the way
in which alternatives enter collective decision making. While
34 Agenda Setting
choice set of the voters drastically, it is not surprising that the
agenda controller can shape the outcome. It is not complete
control, however, as in the case where there is no majorityrule equilibrium. The final result reflects, in effect, a balancing
between the preferences of the median voter, the preferences
of the agenda controller, and what is called the reversion point
what would happen if the proposal of the agenda controller is
defeated. The reversion point is not always the status quo. To
use the school board example, if the school boards new tax
rate is rejected, the school budget may not revert to last years
budgetit may fall to zero. The prospect of essentially shutting down the schools would give the school board tremendous bargaining power as the agenda controller to obtain an
outcome it desires. In general, the more extreme the reversion
point, the greater the control held by the agenda controller.
WIDE APPLICATIONS
This relatively straightforward result has been applied in many
settings. For example, committees in the U.S. Congress have
gatekeeping power in their jurisdiction. That is, they have a
set of policies that are granted to them, their policy jurisdiction. In many circumstances, they decide whether there will
be any consideration of change to the status quo in their jurisdiction at all. By keeping the gates closedthat is, reporting
out no proposal for new policy in that areathe Congress as
a whole cannot change policy. (In reality, there are of course
limits to this power.) Conversely, they can open the gates
by reporting a bill out from committee to the floor. In some
cases, the bill has a closed rule, which means that no amendments are permitted. Thus, in such cases, the committee has
strong agenda control in the sense analyzed by Romer and
Rosenthal. Shepsle (1979) developed a model of Congress
along these lines.
Furthermore, when the two chambers in the U.S. Congress pass different forms of similar legislation, the bills are
often referred to a conference committee to work out the
differences. The bill designed by the conference committee
then returns to the floor of both chambers for final consideration with no amendments permitted, another instance of
such agenda control. In many parliaments, the government
(that is, the party or parties that form the operative majority
and appoint a cabinet of ministers) often reports bills from
the cabinet to the legislature with no amendments permitted.
Thus, this form of agenda control has many important applications to democratic institutions around the world.
See also Agenda Setting; Equilibrium and Chaos; New Institutionalism;Voting Behavior.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOHN H. ALDRICH
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Black, Duncan. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1958.
McKelvey, Richard D. Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models
and Some Implications for Agenda Control. Journal of Economic Theory
12 (1976): 472482.
McKelvey, Richard D., Peter C. Ordeshook, and Peter Ungar. Necessary
and Sufficient Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter
Distributions. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 39 (1980): 161168.
Agenda Setting
Agenda-setting theory rests on the assumption that while
most citizens depend on the news media for their political
information, the media seem to have surprising little impact
on actually altering voters attitudes about a given issue.
Instead, agenda-setting theory posits that the medias power of
persuasion is indirect in nature. According to Bernard Cohen
in his 1963 book, The Press and Foreign Policy, even though
the press may not be successful much of the time in telling
people what to think, it is stunningly successful in telling its
readers what to think about (13). That is, by covering certain
issues and ignoring others, the news media create a political
agenda (i.e., determine what issues are important and what
issues are not), which the public then internalizes as its own
set of priorities. Thus, the medias and the publics agendas
merge into one, so that what the media find to be noteworthy
and in turn promote as important through news coverage is
eventually mirrored by citizens.
Sociologists Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang (1966), two
of the pioneers of media effects research, put it this way: The
mass media force our attention onto certain issues by covering
or promoting certain issues and individuals, which then suggests what we should think about, know about, have feelings
about (468). Or in the simplest of terms, try not to think about
pink elephants after Good Morning America, the NBC Nightly
News, 20/20, and Nightline all run news segments on them.
EARLY RESEARCH
Although over a century ago journalist Walter Lippman captured the essence of agenda setting with his phrase the world
outside, and the pictures in our heads (referring to the fact
that people are more responsive to the pseudo-environment
of mental images created by the media than they are to reality), early communication research focused on assessing direct
media effects, not the more subtle indirect ones. Therefore,
empirical confirmation of agenda-setting effects did not occur
Agenda Setting 35
until the last few decades of the twentieth century. The classic
agenda-setting study was conducted by Maxwell McCombs
and Donald E. Shaw in 1972. McCombs and Shaw interviewed one hundred undecided voters in and around Chapel
Hill, North Carolina, combining voters attitudes about various policy concerns with a content analysis of television and
the print medias coverage on those same issues. Though the
authors found a strong correspondence between the medias
and the voters agendas, McCombs and Shaw could not fully
support their conclusion that news coverage was shaping voters policy agendas over an alternative explanation: that the
news media were simply successful in tailoring news coverage
to reflect the actual issue interests of audience members. More
research was needed.
Using experimentation, Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder
presented strong evidence that the news media set the public
agenda. In a series of experiments described in their now classic book, News That Matters (1987), the researchers manipulated
media content, thereby controlling which issues participants
were exposed to. Participants in the experiments were shown
what they believed were regular newscasts from the 6 oclock
evening news, when in fact the newscasts had been carefully
edited to include or omit specific stories. The results indicate
classic agenda-setting effects. For example, participants who
were exposed to stories about the inadequacy of funding for
the U.S. military were more likely to consider this issue to be
important, even though prior to the study they were unconcerned about military spending. For participants in the control
conditionthose who did not view the military spending storythe importance they assigned to military funding
remained unchanged.
ROLE REVERSAL
While an overwhelming number of legitimate issues and ideas
circulate at any one time, one of the major dilemmas journalists face is deciding what issues to cover and what not to
cover, and how much coverage to devote to any given issue.
As Michael Delli Carpini noted in 2005, given the inherent
constraints on covering everything of potential import, public
journalists argue that citizens themselves, rather than (or in
addition to) elites, should set the agenda. Thus, a reversal of
agenda setting occurs when journalists listen to citizens to
understand what aspects of the social and political world are
important to them.
In a comprehensive study of Britains 1997 general election campaign, Pippa Norris and her colleagues (1999) found
that political parties, not citizens, set the agenda, thus limiting
the power of the media to directly boost attention to an issue.
A similar study by Heinz Brandenburg (2004) of the 2002
Irish election campaign found that political parties such as
Fianna Fil are the main agenda setters and that the media
follow. Although media outlets such as The Irish Times also
influenced party communications, these effects were small and
infrequent. Thus, campaigns seem to foster different agendasetting dynamics.
In conclusion, most research to date has focused on either
documenting the actual phenomenon of agenda setting or
exploring the psychology of agenda settingthat is, the medias
impact on the public agenda and the subsequent consequences
for citizens attitudes and opinions. For the most part, thirty
years and more than 200 studies later, Bernard Cohens classic
observation still holds true: The press may not be successful
much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about
(1963, 13). And, to this we might add (in Cohens words) that
by altering citizens issue priorities and voters subsequent policy and vote choices, the media indirectly reshape the political
landscape and ultimately the democratic process.
See also Media and Politics; Media Bias; Media Effect.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KAREN CALLAGHAN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brandenburg, Heinz. Manipulating the Dimensions. A Comparative Study
of Campaign Effects on Media Agenda Formation. Paper presented at
the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Uppsala,
Sweden, April 2004.
36 Agrarianism
Cohen, Bernard. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1963.
Delli Carpini, Michael. News from Somewhere: Journalistic Frames and the
Debate over Public Journalism. In Framing American Politics, edited by
Karen Callaghan and Frauke Schnell, 2153. Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2005.
Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald Kinder. News That Matters. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1987.
Iyengar, Shanto, Donald Kinder, Mark D. Peters, and Jon A. Krosnick.
The Evening News and Presidential Evaluations. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 46 (1984): 778787.
Krosnick, Jon, and Donald Kinder. Altering the Foundations of Support
for the President through Priming. American Political Science Review 84
(1990): 497512.
Lang, Kurt, and Gladys Engel Lang. The Mass Media and Voting. In
Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, 2nd ed., edited by Bernard
Berelson and Morris Janowitz, 455472. New York: Free Press, 1966.
Lippman, Walter. Public Opinion. New York: MacMillan, 1922.
McCombs, Maxwell. A Look at Agenda Setting: Past, Present, and Future.
Journalism Studies 6 (2005): 543557.
McCombs, Maxwell, and Donald E. Shaw. The Agenda Setting Function of
the Mass Media. Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (1972): 176187.
Norris, Pippa, John Curtice, David Sanders, Margaret Scammell, and
Holli A. Semetko. On Message: Communicating the Campaign. London:
Sage, 1999.
Agrarianism
Agrarianism is a political and philosophical orientation that
emphasizes the purported moral virtue, practical wisdom,
environmental sustainability, and political usefulness of agricultural pursuits, in particular when such pursuits are practiced
by large numbers of people, preferably by their own labor on
land they own or who at least exercise some authority over
themselves. Many proponents of agrarianism do not embrace
all or even most particulars of this orientation, seeing it instead
as merely an appropriate label for those who see value in farming and a more rustic or simple rural life as opposed to more
commercial or urban transactions and lifestyles. However,
agrarianism as a broad challenge to various complex forms of
economic and political organization has deep roots, extending
back centuries to the writings of Roman landowners, as well
as having played a particularly important role in developing
approaches to modern republican thought in several nations.
the English colonies, an ideal perpetuated in early-nineteenthcentury America by republican thinkers like Thomas Jefferson
and John Taylor of Caroline. Other, more recent agrarian
thinkers have presented themselves as lamenters of a traditional, regional agrarian way of life lost in the midst of socioeconomic growth and demographic and technological change.
This would be the case in the United States of the Vanderbilt or Southern Agrarians, including poets and authors like
John Ransom, Allen Tate, and Robert Warren, who mourned
and, to a degree, raged against the passing of the primarily
agricultural Old South as President Roosevelts responses to
the Great Depression (19291939), such as the Tennessee Valley
Authority, used federal power and dollars to bring industrial
work in impoverished parts of the United States.
However, by looking to the capacity of individuals to own,
work, and make a sustainable living off of land labored upon by
themselves, agrarianism also is closely associated with populist
revolts; for example, the Peoples or Populist Party in the United
States from the 1880s through the early 1900s was overwhelmingly shaped by the hopes and demands of rural voters from
the American South, Midwest, and Great Plains. Consequently,
the agrarian orientation also may align with certain progressive
demands from that era, including greater democratic control
over banks, railroads, and other corporate institutions whose
decisions greatly affect the ability of farmers to independently
decide on their own economic actions. Hence, agrarianism is
both radical and reactionary, and it has historically encouraged
ambitious reforms aimed at limiting corporate power and distributing land, as well as rhetorical and political approaches to
civic life that privilege the countryside, the heartland, as more
authentic, closer to historical virtues, and thus a better gauge of
how people ought to use their freedom.
One common feature of both radical and reactionary ways
of speaking of agrarianism, however, is its localismits belief
in the importance of keeping human affairs limited to a scale
small enough that local knowledge will be sufficient to address
the concerns of daily life. Such localism is usually expressed
along with an anticorporate perspective, visible today in the
frequent hostility to globalization and free trade felt by those
who live in and represent the agricultural sectors of Europe,
North America, and East Asia, and in particular to a distrust
or at least an ambiguous relationship with agribusinesses and
large, often corporate farm and ranch operations. While such
industrial farms and feedlots in fact provide the great bulk of
the food consumed in industrialized nations around the world,
agrarian thinking usually sees the globalization of agriculture
as undermining the real value of farming.
AIDS, Politics of 37
others, be less demanding and less self-concerned in addressing problems, be more willing to share with others and form
associations with them to accomplish goals, be more generous
with their time and resources, and remain pious in the face of
challenges to their faith.
Second, practically, rural life and agricultural work teach
good physical and mental habits and instruct those who devote
themselves toor are at least raised in environments shaped
byfarming in a multitude of practical skills that involve animal husbandry, nutrition, construction, and so forth.
Third, environmentally, agrarian occupations teach one
about the needs of the planet and about nourishing soil, irrigation, crop rotation, and the like, and as such communicate ideas
of stewardship between natural resources and human beings
far more thoroughly than can those occupations that have
no contact with agriculture, thus leaving those so employed
to learn about the natural world through tourism or indirect
education at best, or perhaps not at all.
Fourth, politically, being a landowner (the ideal agrarian
arrangement) or a farm laborer teaches, through habituation,
personal responsibility but also civic humility, keeping the
mind focused on practical as opposed to abstract possibilities.
It also teaches, through the experience of tending to ones
stewardship and working visibly through the slow cycle of
growing food and feeding oneself, independence of mind and
an unwillingness to allow ones economic or social life to be
controlled by powers over which the individual has direct say.
CONCLUSION
The environmental claims made on behalf of the agrarian
orientation are for the most part a product of late-twentiethcentury reflections on the nature of the natural world and the
agricultural use of it. The three other sets of claims all have
direct antecedents in the writings of Roman agrarians such as
Cato the Elder, Cicero, Varro, Virgil, and others, all of whom
associated the ownership and operation of a farm (though not,
it should be noted, the life of the slaves who did most of the
work on said farms) with economic independence, humility,
a strong work ethic, physical heartiness, and a determination
to resist tyranny. These varying points, echoed down the centuries, have been used in the history of many Western nations
to suggest that the task of agricultural work must be preserved
for the sake of the moral health, political liberty, and environmental resources of the nation. Jefferson famously claimed that
those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God.
While relatively few advocates of agrarianism today would use
Jeffersons exact words, his sentiments remain prevalent.
See also Progressivism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RUSSELL ARBEN FOX
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Berry, Wendell. The Unsettling of America: Culture and Agriculture. San
Francisco: Sierra Club, 1977.
. The Art of the Commonplace:The Agrarian Essays of Wendell Berry.
Edited by Norman Wirzba. Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 2002.
Carlson, Allan. The New Agrarian Mind:The Movement toward Decentralist Thought
in 20th-Century America. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2000.
Agrarian Socialism
See Lipset, Seymour Martin.
AIDS, Politics of
From the discovery of a new epidemic disease among healthy
young men in the United States in 1981, acquired immune
deficiency syndrome, or AIDS, has been a very political disease. The new disease was first described as gay-related immune
deficiency, an association that has affected the course of the
disease ever since. The perception that AIDS was primarily a
disease of promiscuous male homosexuals slowed government
response in the United States and created considerable moral
panic worldwide.
Today perhaps thirty-five million people are infected with
human immunodeficiency virus or HIV, the cause of AIDS,
a minority of whom has access to the complex antiretroviral
drugs that can control, but not treat, the disease. In parts of
southern Africa, the virus has infected more than a quarter
of the young adult population, reducing life expectancy and
creating enormous strains on social and health services. The
long-term effects on social stability and development are not
yet well understood, and it is not known how deaths from
AIDS are a factor in ongoing instability in countries such as
the Congo and Zimbabwe.
While the first major medical and governmental responses
to HIV and AIDS came in developed countries where public
health and gay movements were more established, it became
apparent that AIDS was far more severe in some of the worlds
poorest countries, above all in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1986, the
World Health Organization established the Global Program
on AIDS, which in the early 1990s was replaced by UNAIDS,
a program intended to promote coordination across all United
Nations agencies. In 2000 there was a specific debate on the
impact of AIDS on the peace and security in Africa in the
UN Security Council, followed by two special sessions of
the General Assembly to address the global crisis. A commitment to combating HIV is specifically mentioned in the
United Nations Millennium Development Goals as well.
Responses to the AIDS epidemic were strongest in countries that combined government commitment to fighting
the disease with strong civil society organizations, and Brazil,
Thailand, and Uganda are often cited as exemplars of good
responses. However, the situation in Uganda has become far
38 Alienation, Political
more complex over recent years, as moralism has affected what
was originally a very effective prevention program.
The politics around treatments and prevention are rather
different. As antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) have become more
effective, access to them has become a major concern, with
considerable tension between major pharmaceutical companies and governments over supply and access to generic drugs.
The provision of ARVs are testing international trade and
property agreements, with a gradual acceptance that profits
and intellectual property should not be barriers to providing
lifesaving medicines.
Prevention, on the other hand, requires a change to intimate behaviors, mainly sexual but also drug-related and needle
usage, which many governments are reluctant to acknowledge.
Although intravenous drug and needle users and homosexual
men are the most vulnerable demographics in many countries,
especially in Asia, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union,
programs directed to educate and assist these groups are often
underfunded, as prevention is often hampered by laws and
social stigma. For example, the money made available by the
Bush administration through the Presidents Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief required an emphasis on abstinence education
as a preventive measure instead of promoting safe sexual practices, and there is considerable controversy about the effectiveness of abstinence on stemming sexual disease.
The most controversial responses to the epidemic came
in South Africa, where after years of dilatory response South
African President Thabo Mbeki expressed skepticism about the
role of HIV in causing AIDS and the effectiveness of ARVs. It
is estimated that President Mbekis denial resulted in more than
three hundred thousand deaths that could have been prevented
had the South African government made readily available
drugs, which generated the most significant grassroots AIDS
movement to date: the Treatments Action Campaign. AIDS
policies started to change toward the end of Mbekis term in
office, but it remains an unfortunate reminder of the negative
importance of government inaction and denial.
South African activism drew heavily on earlier examples of
AIDS treatment and prevention from Western countries, especially the United States, which pioneered community mobilization in result to the epidemic and introduced global symbols
such as the red ribbon and the label People living with
AIDS. The AIDS epidemic remains a case study of globalization, both in terms of the spread of discourses and treatment.
See also Gender and Politics; Health Care Policy; Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, and Transgender Rights; Mutiple Streams Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DENNIS ALTMAN
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Altman, Dennis. Power and Community: Organizational and Cultural Responses
to AIDS. London: Taylor and Francis, 1994.
Barnett, Tony, and Alan Whiteside. AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease
and Globalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
De Waal, Alex. AIDS and Power:Why There Is No Political CrisisYet. New
York: Zed Books, 2006.
Epstein, Helen. The Invisible Cure: Africa, the West, and the Fight against AIDS.
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.
Fourie, Pieter. The Political Management of HIV and AIDS in South Africa: One
Burden Too Many? New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Lieberman, Evan. Boundaries of Contagion: How Ethnic Politics Have Shaped
Government Responses to AIDS. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2009.
Pisani, Elizabeth. The Wisdom of Whores: Bureaucrats, Brothels, and the Business of
AIDS. New York: Norton, 2008.
Poku, Nana K. AIDS in Africa: How the Poor Are Dying. Cambridge, U.K.:
Polity Press, 2005.
Alienation, Political
Political alienation is an umbrella term that captures a set
of negative attitudes about politics that are distributed in
systematic ways across the mass public. Higher concentrations of alienated individuals are often located in socially
subordinated, marginalized, and politically under-represented
groups. Broadly defined as a loss of confidence in political
actors and institutions, mass political alienation can lead
citizens to challenge regime legitimacy and can compromise
regime stability over the long term. This entry provides an
overview of ongoing debates about how to define political
alienation, what causes it, how it influences individual and
mass political participation, the consequences for governance,
and prescriptive measures to restore citizens confidence in
elected officials. Although levels of political alienation have
varied historically and across different types of government,
this entry focuses on advanced industrialized democracies in
the postWorld War II era.
Though political alienation has a long intellectual history
and is particularly indebted to Marx, contemporary research
interest in political alienation deepened with the second wave
of democratization following World War II (19391945) as
political scientists tried to forecast potential for long-term
regime stability. The debate continued to flourish in the 1960s
and 1970s as political scientists and political elites sought to
understand the causesand predict the long-term consequencesof the mass movements for social justice unfolding
in Western democracies. Attributed to culture shift, characterized by an increase in elite-challenging attitudes about
government and more activist modes of political participation, these social justice movements became institutionalized
in new policies and government agencies. Nevertheless, public
confidence in government and voter turnout continued to
decline with each ensuing decade.
Alienation, Political 39
the game. Normlessness also is referred to as political distrust
or cynicism. Isolated individuals reject the norms and values
of the dominant political culture.
National and cross-national surveys of mass political attitudes
and behavior conducted over four decades commonly include
items designed to measure each of these four dimensions. In
their 2000 volume on disaffection in political life cross-nationally, Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton used The Harris Poll measures
of individual respondents disagreement or agreement with
the following statements to establish a common framework
that links how this concept is measured in North America to
analogous efforts in the European and Japanese contexts: The
people running the country dont really care what happens to
you;Most people with power try to take advantage of people
like yourself ; Youre left out of things going on around you;
The rich get richer and the poor get poorer; What you
think doesnt count very much anymore (9).
These basic survey questions have been used to probe
how much citizens perceptions of elites are an artifact of
the institutions and specific political contexts that determine
their range of action. Finifters (1970) definition of political
alienation captures both specific and diffuse (regime) support.
Specific support refers to attitudes about particular politicians
and parties; diffuse support captures attitudes about the political
regime and political processes. Scholars debate how closely the
two different types of support are related. Though correlated,
specific and diffuse support can vary independently of one
another; voters can distrust elected officials and still support
democracy. David Easton (1965) has argued that lack of specific support, left unaddressed for a long period, could translate
into a lack of regime support.
Governments that enjoy high levels of legitimacy and regime
support enjoy greater ease in making and enforcing unpopular
decisions in the short term that will be of long-term benefit
to the common good. High levels of diffuse support accumulate over time to constitute a reserve of goodwill that is slow
to exhaust and sustains regimes through times of political and
economic crisis. Similarly, political losers who are confident in
the knowledge that there will be political change in the longrun and can find alternative outlets for exercising political voice
are more likely to remain engaged with politics.
CONCLUSION
Research that attends to the behavioral outcomes of different
attitudinal dimensions of political alienation has found that the
demobilizing effects of powerless and meaninglessness, can be
offset by the mobilizing potential of political cynicism. Russell J. Dalton (2006) finds that contemporary political cynics
are also highly supportive of political rights and participatory
norms. Similarly, Ronald Inglehart (1990) finds that when
political alienation is characterized by a high level of political
cynicism, it is correlated with elite-challenging attitudes that
foster an increase in public demands for direct participation
in democracy. Despite a decline in public confidence in politics, overwhelming majorities (90 percent) across established
democracies agree that democracy is the best form of government. There is considerable evidence that alienated publics in
established democracies counterbalance potentially corrosive
effects of political distrust with mass actions that reinforce
and deepen democratic norms. The politically alienated in
democracies can take actions designed to hold officials publicly
accountable while demanding greater citizen participation in
making the decisions that govern them.
See also Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Democracies, Advanced Industrial; Democracy and Corruption; Mobilization,
Political; Protests and Demonstrations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SHERRY L. MARTIN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Almond, Gabriel, and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1963.
Anderson, Christopher, and Yuliya V. Tverdova. Winners, Losers, and
Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies.
International Political Science Review 22, no. 4 (2001): 321338.
40 Alighieri, Dante
Citrin, Jack. Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government.
American Political Science Review 68 (September 1974): 973988.
Dalton, Russell J. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in
Advanced Industrial Democracies. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006.
Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley, 1965.
Finifter, Ada W. Dimensions of Political Alienation. American Political Science
Review 64 (June 1970): 389410.
Herring, Cedric. Alienated Politics and State Legitimacy: An Assessment of
Three Neo-Marxian Theories. Journal of Political and Military Sociology
15 (1987): 1731.
Inglehart, Ronald. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1990.
. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political
Change in 43 Nations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Miller, Arthur. Political Issues and Trust in Government. American Political
Science Review 68 (September 1974): 951972.
. Rejoinder to Comment by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent
or Ritualism. American Political Science Review 68 (September 1974):
9891001.
Nachmais, David. Modes and Types of Political Alienation. The British
Journal of Sociology 25, no. 4 (1974): 478493.
Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Putnam, Robert D., Susan J. Pharr, and Russell J. Dalton. Introduction:
Whats Troubling the Trilateral Democracies? In Disaffected Democracies:
Whats Troubling the Trilateral Countries, edited by Pharr and Putnam, 330.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Schyns, Peggy, and Christal Koop. Political Cynicism: Measurement,
Characteristics and Consequences of a Growing Phenomenon.
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International
Society of Political Psychology, Classical Chinese Garden,
Portland, OR, July 2007, www.allacademic.com/meta/p204693_
index.html.
Southwell, Priscilla L. The Effect of Political Alienation on Voter Turnout,
19642000. Journal of Political and Military Sociology 36, no. 1 (2008):
131145.
Alighieri, Dante
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gilson, Etienne. Dante the Philosopher. Translated by David Moore. New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1949.
Shaw, Prue, ed. and trans. Dante: Monarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
Alker, Hayward R.
American scholar Hayward Alker (19372008) held the John
A. McCone Chair in International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC), where he specialized in
the history of international relations theory, computational
research methodologies, conflict resolution, and world order
studies. In his 1997 book, The Future of International Relations,
international affairs expert Iver Neumann named Alker one
of twelve most influential thinkers in international relations.
Alker was born in New York City in 1937 and raised in
Greenwich, Connecticut. He earned his bachelors degree
in mathematics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) in 1959 and a doctorate in political science from Yale
University in 1963. He stayed to teach at Yale and became
a full professor at the age of twenty-nine. In 1968, Alker
returned to MIT as a political science professor and remained
there until joining USC in 1995. His career was marked also
Allegiance 41
by distinguished visiting professorships, including a 1989
appointment as the first Olaf Palme professor at the universities of Uppsala and Stockholm and a 1996 fellowship to study
chaos theory at the Santa Fe Institute. Alker served as president of the International Studies Association from 19921993
and of the Institute of Defense and Disarmament Studies. He
was also an adjunct faculty member of the Watson Institute.
Alkers wide-ranging contributions to his field include pioneering work on North-South dynamics within the United
Nations, computational linguistics, mathematical modeling
in the social sciences, the analysis of complex systems, social
theory, and peace research. He was also responsible for pathbreaking work on bringing humanistic traditions back into
the study of international relations. His many publications
include Mathematics and Politics (1965), Rediscoveries and Reformations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (1996),
and the coauthored Journeys through Conflict: Narrative and Lessons (2001). He integrated mathematics and humanities into
his investigations of artificial intelligence, globalism, and game
theory. His last project, which he led at the Watson Institute,
was on the dialectics of world orders.
See also Conflict Resolution; International Relations; International
Relations Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Alker, Hayward. Mathematics and Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1965.
. Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for
International Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Alker, Hayward, Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel.
Mathematical Approaches to Politics. New York: Wiley, 1973.
Alker, Hayward, Ted Robert Gurr, and Kumar Rupesinghe, eds. Journeys
through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2001.
Alker, Hayward, and Bruce M. Russett. World Politics in the General Assembly.
New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 1965.
Neumann, Iver, and Ole Waever. The Future of International Relations, Masters
in the Making. New York: Routledge, 1997.
Allegiance
Allegiance, following Scottish philosopher David Hume, can
be defined as loyalty and obedience to magistrates. Allegiance, however, can be owed not just to leaders and states,
but to a range of institutions, ideals, and people. Examining
the concept of allegiance raises questions such as to whom
or what is allegiance owed; from what does allegiance derive;
is allegiance absolute; can one have multiple allegiances or
is there one that supersedes all others; and what happens
if allegiances conflict? Once such questions are raised, it
is clear that allegiance has a long history in Western and
Eastern philosophies, religions, and politics. In the ancient
world, questions of allegiance are examined and expressed
in Sophocles Antigone, the Confucian notion of filial piety,
Platos dialogues on the trial and death of Socrates, Diogenes
the Cynics declaration that he is a citizen of the world, and
Jesus edict to render unto Caesar the things which are
Caesars, and unto God what are Gods. In the modern era,
42 Allegiance
In 1778, George Washington signed an oath of allegiance to the Congress of the United States. Washingtons express consent granted authority
to and his obedience toward the new government.
Source: The Granger Collection, New York
Alliances 43
his allegiance to the Constitution if he were elected president
of the United States. However, despite some tensions caused
by plural allegiances, the federalist structure of Canada and the
European Union allow subnational, national, and supranational
allegiances to coexist.
See also Authority; Burke, Edmund; Civic Engagement; Civil
Society; Communitarianism; Hume, David; Liberal Theory;
Locke, John; Nation; Nationalism; Social Contract; Socialization, Political; Tradition.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GREGORY W. STREICH
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Hume, David. Of the Original Contract. In Humes Moral and Political
Philosophy, edited Henry D. Aiken, 356372. New York: Hafner, 1948.
Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government, edited by Richard Cox. Arlington
Heights, Ill.: Croft Classics, 1982.
Nussbaum, Martha. For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism,
edited by Joshua Cohen. Boston: Beacon, 1996.
Alliances
Alliances, or formal associations between two political bodies to
further their common interests, are one of the most recurrent
phenomena in the field of international politics. Most definitions of alliance focus on four basic elements: its formal nature
(based on a treaty signed by states), its cooperative dimension
(states agree to join forces to pursue some common goal), its
external orientation (alliances are usually against states outside
their own membership), and its military character (the content
of cooperation is related to security). Overall, this conception
is a correct one, albeit of a limited nature.
TOOLS OF MANAGEMENT
All those views, despite their differences, share the same conception of alliances as aggregation of power. Yet, alliances also
can be seen as something profoundly different; i.e., as tools of
management. A rapid survey of the most important alliances
from 1815 to 1945 led Paul Schroeder to conclude in 1976
that the wish to aggregate power against a threat is not always
of vital importance for the creation of an alliance; that all
alliances work, to a certain degree, restricting and controlling
the actions of the allies themselves; and that certain alliances
may be employed in order that even an adversary joins our
side and is thereby constrained by the alliance itself. Those
ideas have brought to the forefront the fundamental issue of
interallied relations, shedding light on their ambiguous nature.
Accordingly, some political scientists, such as Patricia Weitsman (2004), have expanded the role of threat in the creation
and functioning of alliances to include threats posed by ones
ally. Others, such as Jeremy Pressman (2008), have focused
on how states use alliances to restrain their partners, thereby
preventing war.
The most important contribution, however, comes from
Glenn Snyders (1997) alliance security dilemma. In every alliance,
states tend to oscillate between two opposite fearsabandonment and entrapment.The former concern is that an ally abandons us, either directly (by abrogating a treaty, for example) or
indirectly (by denying its diplomatic support during a crisis).
The latter refers to the risk of being drawn into a war provoked
by an intransigent or reckless ally. The common response to
the fear of abandonment is to get closer to the ally; that is, to
increase those incentives that may induce the ally into keeping its initial pledge. The usual response to the fear of entrapment is to get away; that is, to reduce ones obligations or
threaten to withdraw ones support. If a state chooses to get
closer, it reduces the risk of abandonment but increases the risk
of entrapment; on the other hand, if a state chooses to get away,
the opposite will be true. Thus, the policies adopted to prevent
44 Almond, Gabriel
abandonment make entrapment that much more likely, just as
the policies designed to avoid entrapment make abandonment
more likely.
A TYPOLOGY OF ALLIANCES
All this points at a striking variety of types of alliance, as can
be seen not only in the degree to which the various members
condition the behavior of the others, but also in the tone of
their relations, which may vary from tense to cordial, and
from a position of reciprocal support to one of mutual diffidence. One way of dealing with such a variety is by means of
a typology of alliances, based on two dimensions, one internal
and one external. The first allows one to distinguish between
symmetric and asymmetric alliances, according to whether power
relations between the allies are balanced or skewed in favor of
one of them, respectively. In the second dimension, we have
homogeneous and heterogeneous alliances, depending on whether
members respond to converging constraints and opportunities, or on whether they react to diverging constraints and
opportunities, respectively.
Combining these classes of alliance, four types are obtained.
In the aggregation alliance (homogeneous and symmetric),
decisions are taken by mutual consent, and both parties obtain
reasons for satisfaction from their collaboration. In the guarantee alliance (homogeneous and asymmetric), although the
weaker partys interests are safeguarded, the content of the
agreements reflects first of all the major allys preferences. In
the hegemonic alliance (heterogeneous and asymmetric), the
two parties are in divergent positions, and the imbalance in
power relations allows the major ally to drag the other ally
along, imposing solutions that are at least partially damaging
for the latter. And in the deadlocked alliance (heterogeneous
and symmetric), the members, who have equal bargaining
power and hold positions that are difficult to reconcile, end
up paralyzing each other.
See also Autonomy; Balance of Power; Bandwagoning; Power.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARCO CESA
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Cesa, Marco. Allies Yet Rivals: International Politics in 18th Century Europe.
Translated by Patrick Barr. Standford, Calif.: Standford University Press,
forthcoming.
Liska, George. Nations in Alliance.The Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962.
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations:The Struggle for Power and Peace,
5th ed., rev. New York: Knopf, 1973.
Pressman, Jeremy. Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008.
Schroeder, Paul W. Alliances, 18151945: Weapons of Power and Tools of
Management. In Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems,
edited by Klaus Knorr, 227262. Lawrence, Kan.: Allen, 1976.
Schweller, Randall L. Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist
State Back In. International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72107.
Snyder, Glenn H. Alliance Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1997.
Weitsman, Patricia A. Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace,Weapons of War.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004.
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1987.
Almond, Gabriel
Born in Rock Island, Illinois, American political scientist
Gabriel A. Almond (19112002) was one of the most influential scholars in comparative politics during the 1950s and 1960s,
when he was the first chair of the Social Science Research
Councils Committee on Comparative Politics. His work
stood out as a pioneering attempt to achieve a truly comparative framework for the study of politics, one that encompassed
non-Western countries and thus broke with the European
focus of much prior research in comparative politics.
Almond received his PhD in political science in 1938 from
the University of Chicago, where he studied with Charles Merriam and Harold Lasswell, two of the main representatives of
what became known as the Chicago School of Political Science.
After teaching at Brooklyn College (now part of City University of New York) and working for the U.S. government during
World War II (19391945), Almond returned to academia and
taught at Yale University (19461950, 19591963), Princeton
University (19501959), and Stanford University (19631976).
Almonds most important work consisted of a series of publications, starting in the mid-1950s, in which he formulated a
structural-functional approach to the study of political development. He saw the political system as comprised of structures,
such as political parties, legislatures, and bureaucracies, which
performed distinct functions, such as articulating and aggregating the preferences of citizens, making and implementing public policy, and maintaining overall political stability. Drawing on
the distinction between structures and functions, he developed
a broad typology of varieties of democratic and nondemocratic
political systems.This framework was applied by many researchers to developing countries in Latin America and particularly
to the countries of Asia and Africa that achieved independence
following World War II.
Almond also wrote a pioneering book on political culture.
The Civic Culture (1963), coauthored with Sidney Verba, was a
pathbreaking work that demonstrated the potential of comparative studies using survey research. It distinguished three
kinds of citizen orientation toward politics: parochial, subject,
and participant. It argued that a civic culture, composed of
a balanced mixture of individuals from all three orientations,
was the most conducive to democracy.
Later in his career, in Crisis, Choice, and Change (1973),
Almond sought to develop an integrated theory of political
change by combining his structural-functional approach with
other approaches that put more emphasis on the role of political leaders, choice, and contingency. The goal of this work,
he wrote, was to connect the theory of statics provided by a
structural-functional approach to a theory of dynamics.
Almond became a professor emeritus at Stanford in 1976 and
continued to write and publish. His later research included works
on the intellectual history of, and the ongoing debates within,
political science and comparative politics. Almonds prolific
career spanned seven decades, and his achievements were well
recognized.Among other things, he was elected to the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1961, served as president of the
Althusius, Johannes 45
American Political Science Association in 1965 to 1966, and was
elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1977.
See also Development, Economic; Politics, Comparative.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GERARDO L. MUNCK
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Almond, Gabriel A. A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science.
Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1990.
Almond, Gabriel A., and James S. Coleman, eds. The Politics of the Developing
Areas. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960.
Almond, Gabriel A., Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds. Crisis,
Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development. Boston:
Little, Brown, 1973.
Almond, Gabriel A., and G. Bingham Powell Jr. Comparative Politics: Systems,
Processes, and Policy. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978.
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture; Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1963.
Munck, Gerardo L., and Richard Snyder. Passion, Craft, and Method in
Comparative Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.
Alternate Delegate
An alternate delegate is someone appointed or elected to act as
a substitute if a delegate is absent or otherwise cannot fulfill
the required duties at a political meeting, conference, or session. Alternate delegates are seated with their delegation and
attend all meetings and functions. If they replace a delegate,
alternates also engage in debate and vote on matters. In the
U.S. political system, alternate delegates are chosen along with
delegates to participate in party nominating conventions.
Selection as an alternate delegate is generally considered an
honor or a reward for contributions to the party. For instance,
at the 2008 Republican National Convention, there were
2,380 delegates, with 2,227 alternates. Alternates may be
selected by the delegate they replace, by the state delegation,
or through a party election. Like delegates, alternates usually
have to commit to a candidate prior to the convention (unless
the candidate releases the delegates or unless they are formally
classified as uncommitted). Requirements to be an alternate
delegate vary from state to state, but generally candidates are
required to be at least eighteen years old, a party member, and
a resident of the district that they represent for a specified
time prior to their selection.
See also Candidate Selection; Political Participation.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Althusius, Johannes
Johannes Althusius (15571638) was born in Diedenshausen
in Westphalia. After studying in Cologne, Paris, Geneva, and
Basel, he took a doctorate in both civil and ecclesiastical law
at Basel in 1586. In the same year he accepted a position on
the law faculty at the Reformed Academy in Hebron. Upon
46 Althusser, Louis
Althusser, Louis
Louis Althusser (19181990) was a French philosopher who
attempted to reconcile Marxism with structuralism. His works
influenced Marxist thought in the West.
Althusser was born in Birmandries in French Algeria
and was educated in Algiers, Marseilles, and Lyon, where
he attended the Lycee du Parc. In 1939 he was admitted to
the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS), the French academy
for teachers, but he was conscripted into the French Army.
Althusser would later observe how Machiavelli thought conscription helped establish national identity. Althusser was captured and spent five years in a German concentration camp,
most of that time in Stalag XA, located in Schleswig. After the
war, he entered the ENS.
While at ENS, Althusser suffered from and was treated for
clinical depression. In 1948, Althusser joined the Community Party and completed his masters thesis on the German
philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.Althusser became
a tutor at ENS and spent his entire academic career there, eventually becoming a professor of philosophy.
Althusser rose to prominence in the mid-1960s through
the publication of his works in which he attempts to reinterpret the ideas of philosopher Karl Marx. For Marx (1969)
(first published as Pour Marx in 1965 by Francois Maspero,
Paris) was a collection of articles that had been previously
been published in La Pen and La Nouvelle Critique and was
regarded as the seminal text in the school of structuralist Marxism. Althusser viewed Marxism as a revolutionary
science. While Marx, in his writings, argued that all aspects
of life were dependent on the superstructure of economic
production (economic determinism), Althusser believed that
the foundations of societies were based on one of three processes: economic practice, politico-legal practice, and ideological practice. In the 1970 essay Ideology and Ideological
State Apparatuses: Notes toward an Investigation, Althusser
(2001) emphasizes the scientific aspects of Marxism, in particular its investigation of how societal structures determine
lived experience. These structures determined history, but their
importance and relationship to one another varied with circumstances. Therefore, at different times particular practices
might be dominant. He also cited the existence of ideological state apparatuses, which include the family, mass media,
religious institutions, and education. He suggested that these
apparatuses are agents of repression and inevitable. Therefore,
it is impossible to escape ideology.
Althusser contended that there were differences between
the young and the mature Marx, that what he called an
epistemological break had taken place in the 1840s, and that
the mature Marx was more scientific than he had been as a
younger writer. Althusser believed that Marx had been misunderstood because his work had been considered as a whole,
rather than as the product of distinct intellectual periods. However, Althusser would later backtrack on the timing of this
break in Marxs work. In his 1969 essay Preface to Capital
Volume One, Althusser (2001) concedes that the scientific
JEFFREY KRAUS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Althusser, Louis. For Marx, translated by Ben Brewster. London: Penguin,
1969.
. Elements of Self-Criticism. In Essays in Self-Criticism, translated by
Grahame Lock, 101162. London: New Left, 1976.
. The Future Lasts Forever: A Memoir, edited by Oliver Corpet and
Yann Moulier Boutang, translated by Richard Veasey. New York: New
Press, 1993.
. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes toward an
Investigation. In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, edited by
Vincent B. Leitch, 14831509. New York: Norton, 2001.
. 1971. Preface to Capital Volume One. In Lenin and Philosophy and
Other Essays. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001.
Althusser, Louis, and Etienne Balibar. Lier le Capital. Paris: Franois Maspero,
1965.
Elliott, Gregory. Althusser:The Detour of Theory. New York:Verso, 1987.
Ferretter, Luke. Louis Althusser. Routledge Critical Thinkers. London:
Routledge, 2006.
Montag, Warren. Louis Althusser. Hampshire, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Resch, Robert Paul. Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
Smith, Steven B. Reading Althusser: An Essay on Structural Marxism. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984.
Amendments, Constitutional
See Constitutional Amendments.
Americanization
The term Americanization refers to the perceived spread and
absorption of presumed American values, practices, methods, beliefs, and symbols. This definition is important because
some things taken to be American are not in fact of American origin. Further, critics of Americanization sometimes
wrongly overestimate the spread of Americanization, the rate
of absorption, and the American desire to promote presumed
American things.
In 1835, sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville laid out the essence
of American identity, comprising a combination of populism,
egalitarianism, liberty, individualism, and laissez-faire. Equally
important was a distrust of big government and a belief that
Americanization 47
local power was more responsive to peoples needs. These values have more recently been dubbed the American Creed,
based on a form of dissenting Protestantism. The creed comprises five elements, which Samuel Huntington (2004) lists as
individual rights, the people as the legitimate source of political
power, government limited by law and the people, a belief in
limited or small government, and private property.
DOMESTIC AMERICANIZATION
Americanization includes domestic and international variants. Domestically, the term refers to the socialization of
immigrants to the United States. Philip Bell defines it as a
process by which an alien acquires our language, citizenship,
customs, and ideals (1998, 1). Acculturation, however, does
not necessarily lead to assimilation, as studies of Jewish and
other immigrants have shown. Americanization domestically
is not as assimilatory as its founders originally suggested, and
some states such as Florida, California, and Texas have informal policies of Spanish-English bilingualism. In 2000, some
forty-seven million people, or 18 percent of the population,
spoke a language other than English at home. Images of the
melting pot have been replaced by the salad bowl or mixed
salad, suggesting tolerance for cultural diversity and multiculturalism. Ideals of religious and cultural freedom can
be seen as new forms of Americanization, where respect for
difference is celebrated.
Americanization must be seen as a two-way street. It involves
the assimilation of foreign cultures and peoples, the transformation of cultural products, and their export outside Americas
borders. The United States is a massive consumer of culture
as well as a producer of it. Americans have been highly receptive to foreign influences and immigrants, which has affected
the creation of new forms of culture, movies, food, fashions,
architecture, science, and so on. As Richard Pells (2005) argues,
It is precisely these foreign influences that have made
Americas culture so popular for so long in so many
places. American culture spread throughout the world
because it has habitually drawn on foreign styles and
ideas. Americans have then reassembled and repackaged
the cultural products they received from abroad, and
retransmitted them to the rest of the planet. (190)
INTERNATIONAL AMERICANIZATION
Americanization also has international dimensions. American
variants of democracy, trade liberalization, and culture are
often seen as attractive outside Americas borders, and perceived American practices are often spontaneously adopted
and reinterpreted in different cultural contexts. Thus, America
not only projects hard military power, as Joseph Nye (2008)
has shown, but the soft power of cultural attraction and diplomacy as well. Historically, Americanization involved the spread
of democratic institutions and the promotion of free trade.
This began in the 1850s with Americas opening of Japan for
international trade, later culminating in its open door policies for the Asia-Pacific in the 1890s. It also coincided with
the spread of Wilsonian liberal democracy after 1919. After
Analytic Narrative
The expression analytic narrative sounds like an oxymoron. A
narrative can be defined as a report of human actions and resulting events that makes the temporal order of these actions and
events clear, with the primary purpose of making them intelligible to the public. There seems to be no concept of analysis
that fits narratives; if anything, they are syntheses (of description
and account, art and knowledge, entertainment and instruction). Still, analytic narrative has become a tag in todays social
sciences, especially in the political economy literature that
flourishes at the crossroads of economics, politics, and history.
Usually, analytic narrative means little more than storytelling
with significant theoretical underpinnings (for an example, see
Dani Rodricks 2003 publication In Search for Prosperity: Analytic
Narratives on Economic Growth). A few users of the expression are
keenly aware of the paradox it raises, and for them it means no
less than a new approach to history, one that would be capable
of reconciling the narrative mode of this discipline with the
model-building activity of theoretical economics and politics.
Prominent in this group are Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif,
Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast,
whose 1998 Analytic Narratives is the most sustained attempt to
make sense of the tag, both in terms of methodological theorizing and concrete applications. This entry reviews this contribution before expanding on the issues more broadly.
Analytic Narrative 49
countries difference in fiscal structure. Given that the product
of taxes was mostly spent on wars, Rosenthal investigated how
a countrys style of warfare relates to its political regime. His
argument combines standard narrative parts with the use of an
extensive form game that is formalized in an appendix. The
two players, the king and the elite (an abstraction representing
the French and English parliaments, and the provincial estates
where they existed in France) enjoy separate fiscal resources
and try to make the best of them in fighting profitable wars.
The king alone has the power of launching a war, and if he
exerts it, the elite decide whether to participate financially.
Because most wars need joint funding, there is a free rider
problem that is more acute when the fiscal resources are shared
than when they are in one players hands; when the prediction
that wars are the more frequent, the higher the kings share of
fiscal resources. For Rosenthal, Frances absolutism was a case
of sharing, whereas Englands representative government was
one of near control by the elite. Rosenthals model can be
tested on the two countries and, if confirmed, will illuminate
the connection between their warfare and political regimes.
However, it is unclear what it contributes to the initial question of their different paces of political change.
In the nineteenth century, there was a trend in the West
to reform military service to more or less universal conscription. Standard histories emphasize democratization and military efficiency, but military efficiency is unclear, and against
democratization, reforms took place either before (in Prussia) or later (in France and the United States) than universal
suffrage prevailed. Starting from these objections, Margaret
Levi narrates the changes in French and American regulations,
attending not only to the chronological problem but also to
the technical forms of buying out ones military duty (substitution, replacement, commutation). Her narrative is analytic
to the extent that it relies on an informal model in the spirit
of formal political economy. The main actors are the government, which strives to employ the population efficiently, the
constituents, who are divided into social classes with distinctive preferences, and a pivotal legislator, who aligns himself
on the coalition prevailing among the classes. Hypothesized
changes in the preferences of the government and the middle
classes account for the observed change in regulations that is
sensitive to its fine-grained features.
Historians of the United States have long been puzzled by
the relative stability of the federation of the states through the
decades before the Civil War (18611865). Classical historians
argue that slavery became a divisive issue only after a certain
period, and that the Democratic Party following Andrew Jackson managed a successful coalition of Southern and Northern
interests. Others put forward local political issues and changing
economic conditions. Barry R. Weingast combines these factors into a narrative that stresses explicit political arrangements,
especially the rule of balance between slave and free states
(they should remain equal in number to preserve the Souths
veto power in the Senate). Crises typically occurred when a
new state was admitted. The first newly admitted state brought
about a compromise that helped resolve the second, but this did
50 Analytic Narrative
a clear scheme of alternation between narration and analysis,
with a ternary rhythm in Greif and more iterations in Bates
(and correspondingly, more modeling in the former than the
latter). In this conception, analytic narrative cannot mean a narrative that is also analytic but a dual genre in which narratives
and analyses cooperate for a common explanatory purpose
while keeping their distinct identities. The two components
exchange positionsthe problems stemming sometimes from
one, sometimes from the other, and similarly with the solutionsand influence each other linguistically but are never
blurred. What conceptions the other contributors promote is
not so explicit. Levi and Rosenthal introduce their technical
concepts and hypotheses before proceeding to the narrative,
whose foremost function seems to provide empirical evidence
to check the hypotheses. Faithful to this hypothesis-testing
conception, Levi carefully states the historical facts separately
from the explanation they contribute to, but Rosenthal blurs
the limits between the two, as if he were after the integrated
form that Greif and Bates precisely exclude, i.e., a narrativemade analytic. Exemplifying still another conception,Weingast
introduces his hypotheses at the outset, but without technicalities, and his later models serve only to clarify part of them.
In a sense, they confirm the narrative rather than the other
way round.
their involvement with game theory. Granting the plan of subjecting history to some theoretical framework, this one recommended itself to Greif, Levi, Weingast, and Rosenthal, given
their chosen cases. Empirical existence can be claimed for the
collectivesclans, states, countries, social classes, or interests
they deal with. Furthermore, in the historical circumstances,
these collectives could plausibly be endowed with feasible sets
of actions, preferences, and strategic calculations. Game theory
was perhaps not so appropriate for Rosenthals wide-ranging
explananda; he can employ it only after lumping together
e.g., in the elitea large number of very different actors.
Within game theory, Analytical Narratives claims a special status
for extensive forms of perfect information and subgame perfection. Granting that the latter is a powerful equilibrium concept
for the former, the two contentious issues are how analytic narrators would solve extensive forms under imperfect information and why they should not sometimes employ normal forms.
To see these alternative forms at work, take O. G. Haywoods
(1954) penetrating analysis of World War II (19391945) battles
in terms of two-person zero-sum gamesthe first application
ever made of a game-theoretic technique to history.
The Analytical Narratives contributors make occasional use
of social choice theory, and they could have resorted more to
decision theory, at least in the basic form of an expected utility
apparatus.These two blocks are integral parts of the mathematical corpus of rational choice theory (RCT), so it is appropriate
that the debate over analytic narratives has centered on their
association with the compound rather than just game theory.
Elster (2000) claims that Analytical Narratives fails because the
standard already-telling objections to RCT become absolutely
irresistible in the contributors case. For instance, the problem
of checking for the actors motivations, given that they are not
observed but conjectured from overt behavior, is dramatized
by the information lacunae that are the historians lot. Bates,
Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, and Weingast respond both by defending RCT for lack of better alternatives and arguing that their
applications do not worsen its case.
Some academics do agree with Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal,
and Weingast but would emphasize more than they do the relativity of success and failure. In social sciences generally, RCT
has preferential explananda: human actions and their proximate consequences, when the actors are individuals or can be
regarded as such, perform some deliberation or calculation, and
their desires can be disentangled from their beliefs.The closer its
case stands to this ideal point, the more promising the analytic
narrative, and conversely, cases that depart on too many dimensions are bound to failure. A paradoxical consequence is that
analytic narratives perform well in those areas in which ordinary
narratives already do; this is because RCT and ordinary narratives share roughly the same preferential explananda.
These are the objective conditions, as it were, and there are
others relative to the intellectual context. A convincing analytic
narrative needs rooting into traditional history.There should be
a problem neglected by the historians, but this problem, once
brought to light, should attract them, and their inadequate
records should be adequate enough for the solution arrived
Anarchism 51
at analytically to be double-checked. This is a knifes edge, and
there could be few candidates that survive in the end.
CONCLUSION
Philippe Mongins 2009 analytic narrative of the Waterloo
campaign in June 1815 in A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the
Waterloo Campaign and Some Comments on the Analytic
Narrative Project is meant to provide a decently favorable
case along these stringent lines. (Campaign narratives and military applications generally appear to be a fertile area for the
new genre.) Mongin starts from a gap in the extant narratives:
They do not properly explain why Napoleon weakened himself before his decisive battle against Wellington by sending
Grouchys detachment against Blcher. This failure at answering a major historical question by ordinary means suggests a
RCT model. Beside the contextual condition, the objective
conditions are met paradigmaticallythe explanandum being
a single mans action, taken deliberatively in a limited context
of uncertainty to achieve a seemingly transparent objective
of victory. Mongin introduces a zero-sum game of incomplete information in normal form. At the unique equilibrium,
Napoleons strategy consists in dividing his army, sending out
Grouchy to prevent Blcher from joining Wellington. Eventually, nature played against Napoleon, and Grouchy messed
up the orders, so the ex post failure is compatible with ex ante
rationality. This is the claim of the pro-Napoleonic literature
but rejuvenated by the technical apparatus. Here, the analytic
narrative plays an arbitration role between historians, but elsewhere, it will provide them with new conclusions and, most
importantly, new explananda to consider.
See also Discourse Analysis; Event History and Duration Modeling; Hierarchical Modeling; Historical Method, Comparative.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PHILIPPE MONGIN
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal,
and Barry R. Weingast. Analytic Narratives. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1998.
. The Analytic Narrative Project. American Political Science Review 94
(September 2000): 696702.
Brams, Steven J. Game Theory and Politics. New York, Free Press, 1975.
Elster, Jon. Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition.
American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 685695.
Ferejohn, John. Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in
Early Stuart England. In The Economic Approach to Politics, edited by
Kristen R. Monroe, 275305. New York: Harper Collins, 1991.
Gardiner, Patrick L., ed. The Philosophy of History. Oxford: Oxford Unversity
Press, 1974.
Greif, Avner. Institutions and the Path to Modern Economy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Greif, Avner, and David Laitin. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional
Change. American. Political Science Review 98, no.4 (2004): 633652.
Haywood, O. G., Jr. Military Decision and Game Theory. Journal of the
Operations Research Society of America 2, no. 4 (1954): 365385.
Hempel, Carl G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and Other Essays in the
Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press, 1965.
Levy, Jack S. Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914. International
Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 151186.
Maurer, John H. The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry and Informal Arms
Control, 19121914. Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (1992): 284308.
Anarchism
The term anarchism comes to us from the Greek anarkhos,
defined as without a ruler. While seemingly uncomplicated,
the question of whether and how societies might live peacefully without a ruler is at the core of anarchist theory and
practice.
HISTORICAL ROOTS
Until French writer Pierre-Joseph Proudhon embraced them
in his 1840 book What Is Property?, the words anarchy and
anarchism were pejorative terms for the chaotic and conflictual
condition said to result from the absence of a ruler. While
Proudhon was the first self-proclaimed anarchist, the political
theory of anarchism is conventionally traced back to William Godwins Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, published
in 1793. Although never using the label, Godwin rejected
the artificial and coercive authority of the state in favor of
a natural, egalitarian society. Anarchist thought can then be
traced through a number of European and American writers
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Benjamin Tucker, and
Emma Goldman.
Anarchism is much more, however, than the creation of
these individuals. Kropotkin himself argues that [a]narchy
does not draw its origin from . . . any system of philosophy
but represents one of two currents of thought and action
[that] have been in conflict in . . . [all] human societies . . . from
all times there have been Anarchists and Statists (Horowitz
1964, 145147).
AN ANARCHIST ORIENTATION
Understood in this way, anarchism is less an intellectual tradition than it is a distinctive spirit, or an orientation, defined
by antipathy to domination and coercionespecially, but
not solely, by the stateand a vision of an alternative free
of domination. This understanding casts a wide net, drawing
together not only avowed anarchists, but many earlier thinkers, activists, and movements. Various interpreters and historians have characterized Lao Tzu, Aristippus, Zeno, Diogenes,
Jesus, and the Anabaptists, for example, as sharing an anarchist
orientation. It is also reflected in many literary and cultural
works. Perhaps surprisingly, this understanding also expands
the scope of contemporary anarchism. While there has been
a notable reemergence of self-proclaimed anarchists in recent
52 Anarchy
years, the pejorative connotation of anarchy as chaos remains
influential. As a consequence, many in the alternative globalization, antiwar, indigenous autonomy, radical environmental,
and radical feminist movements share an anarchist orientation,
yet eschew the labeloften describing themselves as antiauthoritarian instead.
In contrast to the artificial, coercive power of the state and
other institutions that they reject, anarchists counterpoise a
more natural and informal basisKropotkin calls it mutual
aidfor social harmony and agreement. Although anarchists
characterize this alternative vision in diverse ways, its role is
vital. As a consequence, while some who are truly anarchists
do not identify themselves using with the label, others who do
promote the term are not properly understood as anarchists.
Philosopher Robert Paul Wolff s widely read In Defense of
Anarchism offers a prominent example of this.Wolff unequivocally rejects the legitimacy of the state, arguing that it conflicts
with individual moral autonomy, which he takes to be the
fundamental assumption of moral philosophy (Wolff 1970,
12). Yet Wolff makes no actual defense of anarchism; he offers
no sense of how a society might be sustained without the state.
As a result, he makes no argument for dismantling or overthrowing states or rulers, despite their avowed illegitimacy.
anarchists offered a remarkably prescient critique of the perils of the proletarian state envisioned by Marx. During the
twentieth century, anarchists have been a fount of energy and
inspiration to labor organizing and the creation of cooperative
institutions, to resistance during the Spanish Civil War (1936
1939), and to education reform movements. In recent decades,
as Uri Gordon has argued, an anarchist orientation has been
central to many grassroots political movements, opposing
domination in a wide variety of forms. It also has promoted an
ethos of direct action rather than attempting to influence policy
makers and other institutional actors.
Rather than condemning anarchism to the dustbin of history, the inability to truly liberate society has continued to
nurture anarchists critical and reconstructive vision. In this
sense, paraphrasing Kropotkin, there will always be anarchists.
See also Anarchy; Authority; Bakunin, Mikhail; Goldman,
Emma; Kropotkin, Peter.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOHN M. MEYER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carter, April. The Political Theory of Anarchism. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1971.
Godwin, William. 1793. Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971.
Goldman, Emma. Anarchism and Other Essays, 3rd rev. ed. New York: Mother
Earth, 1917, http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/Goldman/Writings/Anarchism/
anarchism.html.
Gordon, Uri. Anarchy Alive! Anti-authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory.
London: Pluto, 2008.
Horowitz, Irving Louis, ed. The Anarchists. New York: Dell, 1964.
Kropotkin, Peter. Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, edited and with an
introduction by Paul Avrich. London: Penguin, 1972.
Marx, Karl. After the Revolution: Marx Debates Bakunin. In The MarxEngels Reader, 2nd ed., edited by Robert C. Tucker, 542548. New York:
Norton, 1978.
Miller, David. Anarchism. London: J.M. Dent, 1984.
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1840. What Is Property? Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994.
Sheehan, Sean M. Anarchism. London: Reaktion, 2003.
Wolff, Robert Paul. In Defense of Anarchism. New York: Harper Colophon,
1970.
Woodcock, George. Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements.
New York: World Publishing, 1962.
Anarchy
The term anarchy derives from ancient Greek where it originally meant absence of a leader. In current usage we can
distinguish between two main meanings: anarchy in the strict
sense means absence of a chief or a government, while in the
broader sense it denotes a condition of disorder and chaos.
Anarchy 53
superfluous (other possible words for it being chaos, mess, and
disarray), the strict meaning is necessary because we otherwise
lack a single word to denote the third possibility between the
existence of a government and pure chaos. In other words,
anarchy is needed to denote the fact that order is possible even
in absence of an orderer.
This definition has three main corollaries. First, most
scholars agree that anarchy does not mean lack of organization, although disputes may arise as to the degree of centralization that is compatible with anarchy (e.g., for some a
noncoercive form of government is compatible with anarchy). This is very clear in primitive acephalous (literally,
headless) societies and in the case of the society of sovereign states: In both cases, we have anarchical societies that
display a high degree of organization even in the absence of
a common government.
Second, anarchy does not only mean absence of the state.
Anarchy means absence of coercive and centralized governments, of which the state is only one of the possible forms
(other examples being empires or hierarchically ordered tribes).
The reason why anarchy came to mean hostility to the state is
that, since its rise, the modern sovereign state appeared as the
culminating point of political life, the alternative to it being
anarchy. This is clear in social contract theories that counterpoise the civil society to a hypothetical anarchical state of nature,
thus supporting the passage from the denotation of absence
of government to its frequent connotation of disorder. Such
an opposition is however more a normative and therefore disputable model of social order than a description of the actual
origins of the state.
Third, anarchy is both a descriptive and a prescriptive concept. In the first sense, it denotes a state of things, such as
the condition of the acephalous societies mentioned above,
while, in the second, it means an ideal that must be pursued.
The anarchic ideal is characterized by the central emphasis it
puts on the concept of freedom, so much so that some have
claimed that this word summarizes the sense of the entire
anarchic doctrine.
and social approaches.The usual example of a strict individualist credo is the theory of the German philosopher Max Stirner,
who argued that freedom can have no other principle and end
than the self and its egoism. Individualist anarchism developed
mainly in the United States, where anarchism has often been
coupled with the free market (an example being the so-called
anarcho-capitalism).
On the opposite side stand those approaches that see the
realization of the self as possible only within and through
the society. Distinct approaches among these are communists, such as the Russian Peter Kropotkin, and collectivists,
such as Michael Bakunin, who favored a form of communism of production but recognized some space for the individual enjoyment of the fruits of labor. Behind the different
forms of anarchism stand radically different conceptions of
freedom: The idea that freedom is to be realized individually
(Stirner) or that it can only be achieved in common because,
as Bakunin observed, one cannot be free in a society of slaves
because their slavery prevents the full realization of ones own
freedom.
With regards to the means through which anarchy is to
be realized, most anarchists agree that they must be homogenous to the ends: If the aim is freedom, it can only be realized through free means. Differences emerge as to the way
in which they must be conceived: (1) Some favored forms
of rebellion or revolution, (2) others valued more nonviolent
means such as education, while (3) others, taking an intermediate route, looked for an alliance with workers organizations
such as trade unions, which can both educate the masses and
provide the infrastructures for the reorganization of society
(see in particular the French and Spanish anarcho-syndicalism).
Among the first, there must be a further distinction between
those who trust the spontaneity of revolution and others who
believe in the propaganda by the deeds; that is, either local
rebellions that could stimulate masses elsewhere toward a general revolution or single individual acts of violence, like assassination of political leaders. While the recourse to violence
is very much controversial among anarchists, most of them
agree on the importance of education for the creation of an
anarchical society. Among those who emphasized education
are antiviolence writers such as the Russian Leo Tolstoy or
contemporary pacifist and ecological movements.
In the decades surrounding the turn of the twenty-first
century, political and technological transformations have lead
to a resurgence of interest in anarchism. On the one hand, the
decline in popularity of Marxism in the 1990s created a sort
of vacuum in the radical left. This is linked also to the fact
that the collapse of the Soviet Union showed that the anarchists were right in their critique of Marxists: a workers state
cannot but reproduce the same logic of every state, where a
minority of state bureaucrats rule over the majority of people.
Nevertheless, the main reason for the resurgence of interest in
anarchism is linked to the technological developments of the
past few decades, which are usually referred to as globalization.
The rise of network forms of social, economic, and political
organizations, in particular through the World Wide Web and
54 Anglophone Africa
associated technologies, have somehow proved what modern
political theory has always been reluctant to recognize: order is
possible without an orderer.
See also Anarchism; Authority; Freedom; Social Contract; Tyranny,
Classical.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHIARA BOTTICI
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Bakunin, Mikhail. Bakunin on Anarchy: Selected Works by the Activist-Founder of
World Anarchism. New York:Vintage, 1972.
Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London:
Macmillan, 1977.
Call, Lewis. Postmodern Anarchism. Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2002.
Crowder, George. Classical Anarchism:The Political Thought of Godwin,
Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin. New York: Oxford University Press,
1992.
Day, Richard J. F. Gramsci Is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social
Movements. London: Pluto, 2005.
Gurin, Daniel. Ni dieu, ni Matre. Anthologie de lanarchisme. Paris: La
Decouverte, 1999.
Kropotkin, Pyotr. The Essential Kropotkin. London: Macmillan, 1976.
Malatesta, Errico. Errico Malatesta: His Life and Ideas. London: Freedom, 1965.
Miller, David. Anarchism. London: Dent, 1984.
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. What Is Property? Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1994.
Stirner, Max. The Ego and Its Own. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995.
Anglophone Africa
Anglophone Africa refers primarily to sub-Sahara African states
colonized by the British Empire in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century. English is the most widely spoken
language in independent Africa, and twenty of Africas fiftythree countries use English as their official lingua franca.
With the exceptions of South Africa (1700s1910dates for
colonization) and the island nation of Mauritius (18101968),
the British colonies scattered on the Western Coast of Africa
are the earliest: the Gambia (16641965), Sierra Leone
(17871961), and Nigeria (18611960), the largest country by
population in Africa, along with Ghana (18741957). Lesotho,
entirely landlocked within South Africa, was also an earlier
colony (18671966).
The later wave of colonization, following the Berlin Conference of 1885 (also referred to as the Scramble for Africa),
includes the southern countries of Botswana (18851966),
Zimbabwe (18901980), Malawi (18911964), Zambia (1891
1964), and Swaziland (19021968). The largest countries by
population, besides Nigeria, are all in east Africa: Kenya (1885
1963), Uganda (18851965), and Tanzania (19181964), while
the largest by land area is the Sudan (18991956). Of these sixteen countries, only Tanzania, the Sudan, and Zimbabwae are
not among the member states of the British Commonwealth.
Other countries may be included in Anglophone Africa
either due to their use of English or their colonial heritage.
Liberia is an English-speaking African country that was not
colonized by the British but was purchased by the American
colonization society to act as a homeland for freed African
American slaves.The northern portion of Somalia (though not
E U R O P E
AT L A N T I C
OCEAN
TUNISIA
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
Me
dite
rran
LIBYA
EGYPT
N
Re
ile
SAHARAWI ARAB
DEM. REP.
A S I A
ean Sea
dS
ea
MAURITANIA
MALI
NIGER
SENEGAL
CHAD
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
M
CA
Congo
GABON
UGANDA
Nairobi
RWANDA
BURUNDI
REP. OF THE
CONGO
Victoria
TANZANIA
Cabinda
(ANGOLA)
ZAMBIA
AT L A N T I C
Dar es Salaam
Lilongwe MALAWI
Lusaka
Harare
OCEAN
ZIMBABWE
NAMIBIA
Windhoek
SEYCHELLES
COMOROS
ANGOLA
BOTSWANA
Gaborone
Pretoria
Mbabane
Maseru
SOUTH
AFRICA
Anglophone country
KENYA
ha
nn
el
EQUATORIAL
GUINEA
SOMALIA
Q
BI
ue
C
TOGO
ETHIOPIA
UE
Accra
Abuja
mb
iq
LIBERIA
Addis
Ababa
ER
O
ON
Monrovia
DJIBOUTI
NIGERIA
BENIN
CTE
DIVOIRE
Freetown
SIERRA LEONE
GHANA
GUINEA
Asmara
SUDAN
BURKINA
FASO
MOZ
A
THE GAMBIA
GUINEA-BISSAU
ERITREA
Khartoum
Banjul
MAURITIUS
MADAGASCAR
Port Louis
Mo
za
CAPE
VERDE
Maputo
SWAZILAND
LESOTHO
Cape Town
INDIAN
OCEAN
0
0
500 Mi
500 Km
The term Anglophone Africa refers to English-speaking African nations influenced by British colonialism.
56 Animal Rights
Wave of Democratization spread to Anglophone Africa.
Zambias 19901991 prodemocracy Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 1991 was first to reestablish
democracy through the leadership of former union leader
Fredrick Chiluba, who replaced Kenneth Kaundas UNIP
one-party regime. Kenya formally restored multiparty elections in 1992 under President Daniel Arap Moi, but only in
2001 did the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) finally
oust KANU regime dominance and usher in a genuine
democratic transition. Nigeria underwent a redemocratization period between 1979 and 1983, and another in
1993, but did not truly reachieve democracy until its 1999
military-led elections that resulted in its fourth republic,
the Obasanjo regime. In the midst of these transitions, the
Gambia underwent a military coup in 1994, but soon reestablished multiparty elections in 1997.
South Africas transition to democracy was significant in
both African and world politics. The countrys 1948 establishment of a multiparty democracy for white settlers led
by National Party (NP) dominance and the establishment of
formal white minority rule was not truly a democracy, as it
excluded most of the nations population. Although the African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912 to embark
upon (black) majority rule, only in 1990, under the new leadership of President F. W De Klerk, did a pact between the NP
and the ANCs Nelson Mandela result in the first full-suffrage
election. The 1994 election was an ANC electoral victory,
installing Nelson Mandela as the first black African president,
and completing South Africas democratic transition.
LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY IN
ANGLOPHONE AFRICA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Edie, Carelene. Politics in Africa: A New Beginning. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth,
2003.
Edozie, Rita Kiki. Reconstructing the Third Wave of Democracy: Comparative African
Democratic Politics. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2008.
Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Country Report, 2009,
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1.
Animal Rights
The idea that animals have rights develops almost solely
within Western intellectual traditions. Vegetarianism based
on respect for animals in non-Western cultures was almost
always based on religious asceticism. Philosophical vegetarianism seems first to have appeared in classical Greek thought
with the quasi-theological work of Pythagoras and the
neo-Platonists, Plutarch, and Porphyry. Throughout ancient
antiquity and the Middle Ages, however, Western philosophy
and theology, under the influence of Aristotle and the Bible,
assumed that animals existed for the convenience of humanity.
Although heretical sects like the Jewish Christians in the early
church and several Manichean movements in late antiquity
and the Middle Ages were vegetarian, they sought purification of the human soul rather than the welfare of animals.
The Protestant Reformation gave greater recognition to the
earthly suffering and future resurrection of animals, especially
in the more radical sects, which were particularly strong in
Annexation
See Occupation and Annexation.
Anthems, National
See National Anthems.
Anticlericalism 59
included a cultural framing process that universalizes its shortcomings and alternatives to the movement itself.
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
Not only has the anti-globalization movement ushered in
new concepts and cultural frames, but it also emphasized new
forms of organization. Observers such as Carlos Azambuja
(2003) describe the movement as:
. . . [dis]organization that has no hierarchical structure
or operational center, consisting of just us, in whose
interventions thousands of organizations come together
horizontally to protest, in one way or another, the current world order. They can grow infinitely without
anyone having to give up his individuality to any hierarchical structure. (1)
The movement has been conceptualized as a network.
A network in this analysis is a wider concept that potentially includes social movements but also nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), professional unions, and the media.
Networks make great use of information technology and are
characterized by alliances forged between groups with disparate political and ideological affiliations, and by the great
diversity in the backgrounds of their members. These loose
horizontal forms of organization, the cross-class nature of
the movement (intellectuals, students, workers, professionals),
along with the diverse ideological leanings of participants and
their demands (environmentalists, feminists, Marxists, anarchists, liberal-humanists) put it within the category of new
social movements. Using changes in technology, innovative
protest styles, information politics, and analytical advances,
this movement created debates about the changing nature
of contentious politics in the new millennium. The debates
ranged from a postnation-state era to global policing and the
demise of political parties.
For instance, the WSF was a rallying point for worldwide dissent against the U.S. invasion of Iraq, with protests held in
different cities on February 15, 2003. Hence, what came to be
called the antiwar movement since 2003 is in fact an extension
of the anti-globalization movement in terms of participants,
tactics, and aspired universality. Thus, the emergence of antiwar movement, which was the biggest campaign and most
successful mobilization attempt (in terms of size at least) of
the anti-globalization movement, has marked the retreat of
the latter.
See also Contentious Politics; Globalization; Globalization and
Development; Modernization; Protests and Demonstrations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RABAB EL-MAHDI
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Azambuja, Carlos I. S. The New Face of the Anti-globalization
Movements, 2003, www.cubdest.org/0312/cazambuje.html.
Ayres, Jeffery. Framing Collective Action Against Neoliberalism: The Case
of the Anti-globalization Movement. Journal of World-Systems Research
(Winter 2004): 1134.
Broad, R., ed. Global Backlash: Citizen Initiatives for a Just World Economy.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
Cavanagh, John, Jerry Mander, Sarah Anderson, Debi Barker, and Maud
Barlow. Alternatives to Economic Globalization: A Better World Is Possible.
San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2002.
della Porta, Donatella, and Sidney Tarrow. After Genoa and New York: The
Anti-global Movement, the Police, and Terrorism. Items and Issues: Social
Science Research Council (Winter, 2001): 911.
Edelman, Marc. Social Movements: Changing Paradigms and Forms of
Politics. Annual Review of Anthropology 30 (2001): 285317.
Keck, Margret, and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks in International Politics. New York: Cornell University Press,
1998.
Khagram, Sanjee, James Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. Restructuring World
Politics:Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2002.
IMPACT
Anticlericalism
Anticlericalism is an attribute of a political movement or ideology that refers to animosity or opposition to the established
religious leadership, often associated with broad disapproval of
the public role of religion. While secularism describes the dissociation of religion and public life, anticlericalism seeks the
deliberate limitation and reversal of the influence of religious
leaders through legal and behavioral constraints. Anticlericalism was a foundational premise of many of the revolutionary
movements from the Protestant Reformation of the 1500s to
the Iranian White Revolution of the 1960s and continuing in
various forms to the present day.
Anticlericalism arose originally in European politics in
response to the power of the Roman Catholic papacy and
clergy in the Middle Ages. The Reformation challenged the
power of the Roman Catholic Church as the sole interpreter
of doctrine and practice, and it led parts of northern Europe
to break with the church, sparking almost a century of warfare.
For example, Martin Luthers major works beginning in 1520
directly challenged the authority and sanctity of the Roman
Catholic priesthood and the papacy. As a result, the Peace of
60 Anti-democratic Thought
Westphalia of 1648 committed the nations of Europe to refrain
from attempting to enforce Roman Catholic orthodoxy and,
more generally, introduced the principle of cuius regio, eius religio, under which the religion of the leader was made the religion of the people.
Nevertheless, the Roman Catholic Church remained a
powerful force in Europe and colonial areas up to the modern age. In countries such as France, Italy, and Spain that had
resisted the Reformation, the clergy was commonly associated
with conservative and monarchical power, while radical and
leftist forces typically espoused anticlerical attitudes as a form
of opposition to the dominant classes.
Enlightenment Europe brought many new anticlerical forces to power. The Jacobin movement that inspired the
French Revolution (17891799) was ardently opposed to the
established power of the church in addition to its opposition to
aristocracy and monarchy. Acts of the revolutionary National
Assembly up to and including the 1790 Civil Constitution of
the Clergy led to the confiscation of church property and dissolved religious orders.
Anticlericalism was equally a force in colonial resistance
movements. For example, a persistent theme of Mexican politics has been the limitation of the power of the Roman Catholic clergy through deliberate anticlerical policies, such as article
27 of the 1917 Mexican constitution (since amended), which
forbid the church from owning property. Early postcolonial
constitutions specifically laid out restraints on the church, and
church properties were held by the revolutionary governments
with a view toward redistribution of these assets.
The totalitarian movements of the 1930s brooked no dissent
from any societal force and the religious establishment was no
exception. Marxs famous dictum that religion is the opiate of
the masses inspired an antagonism toward religious authorities
in most all communist states from the Soviet Union to Cuba.
Fascist movements in Italy and Germany in the 1930s were
more ambiguously anticlerical, combining a vague tolerance
of religion with a desire to subordinate and persecute clergy
should they present a strong philosophical challenge to chauvinistic nationalism. In non-Christian contexts, movements of
both the left and the right have likewise pursued an anticlerical bent, from Maoist suppression of the Buddhist religion in
China to the enforced secularism in Kemalist Turkey and Iran
under Muhammad Reza Shah.
Anticlericalism remains a part of many modern and secularizing political movements and has had an important influence on many feminist and structuralist analyses. For example,
leading feminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether has
criticized traditional religion and the hierarchy of the Roman
Catholic Church and the Vatican. Likewise in critical texts on
colonialism such as that of Frantz Fanons The Wretched of the
Earth, organized religion is castigated for its role in perpetuating relationships of dominance. The resurgence of religion as
a militant force, beginning in the 1990s and demonstrated in
the attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, also has
led many to argue that it is inherently regressive and should be
subordinated to liberal norms.
Anti-democratic Thought
The term democracy originated in classical Athens and combines the ancient Greek words demos, meaning the people,
and kratein, meaning to rule. From that time, anti-democratic arguments have taken a variety of forms, though some
commentators (e.g., Dahl 1989) maintain that all of them are
reducible to knowledge claims, or the idea of guardianship,
according to which one person or group of people knows
better than the rest how to maximize the interests of the
community. This seems a rather simplistic way to characterize
anti-democratic thought. A more subtle approach is to make
use of the analytical categories developed by A. O. Hirschman
in his study of reactionary thought (1991): perversity, futility,
and jeopardy.
HISTORY
In classical Athens, where democracy originated, the people
of necessity encompassed the poor and uneducated, and
democracy was often identified with the rule of the mob or
the rabble. Both Plato and Aristotle held it in contempt as
a degenerate form of governance, subordinating reason to
passion, polarizing rich and poor, and generating both instability and imprudence. Instead, Aristotle and other writers
extolled the virtues of a mixed constitution, in which rule
by the many is balanced in some formal way by the influence
of the wealthy and literate minority. This was the model of
government that emerged from the ancient world, one where
popular power was restricted by mutual checks and the rule of
law. The word democracy fell into disuse, except as a synonym
for internal dissension and majority tyranny. Even the framers
of the American constitution drew a distinction between a
democracy, which they feared, and a republic, another name for
the mixed or balanced regime they favored.
The present vogue for democracy really dates from the
French Revolution (17891799), whose more radical protagonists appealed to the people as an undiluted source of
power. Democracy soon lost its toxic connotations and came
to be associated with the classical republican tradition that
had long challenged the monarchical institutions of Europe.
In its new incarnation, democracy could no longer be dismissed as mob rule. It was now seen to include representative
parliaments, the separation of powers, the rule of law, and civil
Anti-democratic Thought 61
rights. Gradually, the idea of democracy became a dominant
standard by which regimes were judged. But, despite the supposed taming of the democratic beast, the rehabilitation of
democracy led to the revival of anti-democratic thought.
PERVERSITY THESIS
The perversity thesis holds that radical reformers likely will
produce the exact opposite of what they intended. Society is
seen as an infinitely complex system of causal chains, making
the consequences of disruptive change entirely unpredictable. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, romantic
conservatives such as Edmund Burke formulated a version of
the perverse effect in their attacks on the revolution and its
egalitarian pretensions. They saw society as an organic whole,
more easily damaged than improved, and the divisive individualism, the incessant and ignorant questioning implicit in
democracy, wouldin their viewunleash chaos. But nature
abhors a power vacuum. A demagogic elite, unrestrained by
inherited customs, would seize power and rule with an iron
fist. Democracy would transmute into tyranny, albeit one that
might reflect the base and foolish preferences of the majority. The dream of liberation would become a nightmare of
repression.
In the middle part of the nineteenth century, even liberals
who were sympathetic to democracy fretted over its tyrannical
potential. It was commonly believed that the multiple sources
of authority in traditional society, which served to preserve a
measure of pluralism and individual eccentricity, would eventually be swept aside by the growing power of the people, who
would tolerate no activities that did not originate in popular
mandate. Alexis de Tocqueville argued that this dissolution of
the intermediate structure of authority could leave the individual isolated and vulnerable, unable to resist the ubiquitous
and absolute power of the state.
FUTILITY THESIS
By the end of the century, the fear of democratic tyranny
had receded, and a new type of critic emerged. Motivated
more by cynicism than anxiety, the classical elitists (Vilfredo
Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels) argued that the
oppressive effects of democracy had not come to pass because
democracy itself was impossible. No matter what the constitution says, the inherent dynamics of human interaction
always will prevent the masses from exercising power.This was
the futility thesis. Pareto used psychological factors to explain
this law of oligarchy, while Mosca and Michels stressed
organizational factors, but they all agreed on the existence of
an immanent hierarchical order of things, which meant that
so-called democratic institutions were, at best, exercises in
futility, and, at worst, expressions of rank hypocrisy.
JEOPARDY THESIS
The elitists seemed to understand democracy in a pure sense,
where all government decisions are presumed to emanate from
some clearly defined popular will.That democracy in this sense
could never exist was, to some observers, merely a statement
of the obvious. Nevertheless, the inexorable extension of the
CONCLUSION
The rising tide of democratization and democratic rhetoric that swept through the international community during
the latter half of the twentieth century has left the remaining explicitly anti-democratic regimes marooned in global
public disapproval. All of the reactionary criticisms that justify
such regimes are rarely taken seriously by political scientists
or indeed most educated people throughout the world.
Nevertheless, some observers, in contemplating how the
democratic ethos tends not toward excellence but rather toward
the lowest common denominator, point out that the tradition of
anti-democratic thought contains at least some grains of truth.
After all, even the most beneficial changes entail loss. However,
such is the power of the democratic idea that, nowadays, even
neofascists feel obliged to claim affinity with it.
See also Authority; Democracy; Democracy and Corruption; Democratic Theory; Greek Democracy, Classical; Tyranny of the Majority
and Minority Rights.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOSEPH FEMIA
BIBLIOGAPHY
Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven, Conn.:Yale University
Press, 1989.
Femia, Joseph. Against the Masses:Varieties of Anti-democratic Thought since the
French Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Griffin, Roger. The Nature of Fascism. London: Pinter, 1991.
Hirschman, Albert O. The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991.
Holmes, Stephen. The Anatomy of Antiliberalism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1993.
Meisel, James Hans. The Myth of the Ruling Class. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1958.
Saward, Michael. The Terms of Democracy. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity
Press, 1998.
62 Anti-Semitism
Anti-Semitism
Semites are both Jews and Arabs who emerged from a
common ancestral and geographical setting in the Middle
East. However, anti-Semitism refers specifically to prejudice
against Jews as a religious, ethnic, or racial body. It can
include a wide range of attitudes and expressions, from individual hostility to legal discrimination and violence against
Jews as a group.
Like so many stereotypes, anti-Semitism is based on a
mythone with the power to influence individual attitudes
toward Jews and their place in society and, collectively, to
impact the larger culture. It has no basis in fact or reason, but
its acolytes make vague references to historical or pseudoscientific genetic arguments in support of their prejudices.
Accusations against Jews of two millennia ago, or toward some
individual Jew today, are portrayed as the collective responsibility of all Jews as a people, who must be punished by strong
measures, up to and including genocide.
Religious anti-Semitism attacks Jews as being responsible
for the death of Jesus, and for practicing their minority faith,
which is portrayed as the devils product. It promises a cessation of persecution if Jews give up their faith and assimilate
into an approved religion.
Racial anti-Semitism identifies Jews as a genetically distinct race. They are an innately subhuman race that can never
assimilate with the superior culture but conspire to pollute
the more advanced Aryan race and control the world, its government, and its economy. They must be stopped at all costs.
A recent variant is geographic, based in opposition to Zionism
and the existence of the state of Israel. Radical Islam and its
allies use motifs from anti-Semitic Europe in pursuit of their
political goals. All forms of anti-Semitism have been used to
justify discrimination and persecution of Jews.
ORIGINS
The term anti-Semitism was concocted by German agitator
Wilhelm Marr in about 1880 to indicate hatred of the Jews.
Marr favored their forced expulsion from German soil. Jews
had faced persecution, enslavement, and dispersion for their
monotheism since ancient times. Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria,
and Alexandrine Greece were early conquerors. However,
modern anti-Semitism had its origins in the Roman Empire.
In protecting their rituals and beliefs from the Romans,
the Jews raised several rebellions against Roman rule, which
gave them the reputation of agitators who were threats to
imperial stability.When the Romans finally defeated the Jews in
70 CE, their temple was razed, and they were dispersed
throughout the empire.
Shortly before this, Jesus preached and died as a Jew living under Roman rule. He was tried in a Jewish court for
blasphemy and turned over to the Romans for punishment,
which the Roman governor decreed would be execution. By
the fourth century the belief emerged among Christians that
Jews who were not followers of Jesus were willful unbelievers
in the truth, and responsible for his death. After the Emperor
Constantine I began the process that made Christianity the
official religion of the Roman Empire, this belief was translated into persecution.
During the Middle Ages, nontoleration became a cornerstone of religious policy, and Jews were increasingly identified
as usurers and punished in many ways for their refusal to convert, culminating in the violence and murder committed by
mobs against various Jewish communities during eight Crusades (intermittently from 10961273). In 1215, Pope Innocent
III decreed that Jews were to wear a special badge to mark
their inferior status whenever they went out. In 1242, Pope
Gregory IX was persuaded by an investigating committee of
Paris theologians to denounce the Talmuda fourth-century
commentary on rabbinic tradition, Jewish life, and lawas
blasphemous and ordered all copies to be burned. Urban Jews
were forced to live in special areas, or ghettos, and they were
restricted in economic and social life; some of these restrictions lasted until the end of the nineteenth century. As early
as 1144, charges were brought against Jews of blood libel, the
supposed Jewish drinking of blood of murdered Christian
children. When the Black Death swept Europe in the fourteenth century, rumors spread that the Jews were the cause of
the plague, and many were massacred. During the Protestant
Reformation in the sixteenth century, German theologian and
religious reformer Martin Luther, disappointed that the Jews
would not convert to his religious views, denounced them
as severely as he denounced medieval popes, calling for their
property to be confiscated and for their expulsion.
LATER DEVELOPMENTS
Under Napoleonic rule, following the French Revolution
(17891799), Jews were offered the opportunity to participate
fully in European political, economic, and social life.The defeat
of Napoleon in 1815 brought such advances to a temporary
halt, but by 1870 many nations of western Europe granted full
citizenship to all Jews. However, anti-Semitism lingered. In
1893 Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the French army, was
falsely convicted of treason by a military court. The evidence
against Dreyfus had been faked by two fellow officer, and his
conviction was supported by leading French conservatives in
the army, the Catholic Church, and anti-Semitic writers, such
as Edouard Drumont. The efforts of the noted author, mile
Zola, played a central role in reversing Dreyfus unjust conviction in 1899, although it took another seven years for him to
be restored to the French army. If the Dreyfus affair indicated
that anti-Semitism was not eradicated, it came at a time when
the conditions of life for most Jews in western Europe had
vastly improved.
Destruction of property and massacres of Jews, called
pogroms, began in Russia in 1881.The pogroms were instigated
by the government to divert the discontent of dissatisfied
workers and peasants toward the usual convenient scapegoats, the Jews. Tsarist agents produced a notorious forgery,
the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which purported to reveal a
secret Jewish plot to dominate the world. This work emerged
in the United States, where anti-Semitism was so strong in
some powerful quarters that it became a factor in blocking the
immigration of Jews from Europe to the United States, which
Antitrust Policy 63
Nazi leader Adolf Hitler seemed willing to allow until shortly
before World War II (19391945) began.
The most virulent and systematically organized form
of government-sponsored racial anti-Semitism emerged in
Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945. Following a pattern of
gradual escalation, the regime passed the Nuremberg Laws
in 1935, which removed Jews from the protection of German
law. Jews were excluded from German public life, including business and education, intermarriage with Germans was
prohibited, their property was seized, and finally they were
imprisoned and forced into slave labor or murdered outright
in death camps. As Nazi forces conquered other nations, the
Jews in the rest of Europe were doomed, and by 1945 an estimated six million Jews were massacred, executed, or starved
to death.
CURRENT ANTI-SEMITISM
After the war, the exposure of the death camps led to the
framing of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
and a series of trials of former Nazis complicit in mass murder. Christian religious leaders also have made efforts to end
religious anti-Semitism.
Still, the racial variety persists today, perpetuated by Holocaust deniers, small gangs, and tiny political parties in many
parts of the non-Muslim world. In the Middle East, geographic anti-Semitism is encouraged by governments seeking
the destruction of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish
collectivity. This is intertwined with the activities of Muslim
extremists who denounce the Judeo-Christian West.
See also Genocide; Holocaust; Zionism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . DONALD G. TANNENBAUM
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Abel, Ernest L. The Roots of Anti-Semitism. Cranbury, N.J.: Fairleigh
Dickinson University Press, 1973.
Brustein, William I. Roots of Hate: Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Carmichael, Joel. The Satanizing of the Jews: Origin and Development of Mystical
Anti-Semitism. New York: Fromm International, 1992.
Hay, Malcolm. Thy Brothers Blood:The Roots of Christian Anti-Semitism. New
York: Hart, 1975.
Katz, Jacob. From Prejudice to Destruction, Anti-Semitism, 17001933. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Kleg, Milton. Hate, Prejudice, and Racism. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1993.
Laquer, Walter. The Changing Face of Antisemitism: From Ancient Times to the
Present Day. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Lewis, Bernard. Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice.
London: Norton, 1986.
Lindemann, Albert S. Esaus Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the
Jews. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Wyman, David. Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 19411945.
New York: Pantheon, 1984.
Antitrust Policy
Antitrust polices are government regulations prohibiting abusive
monopolistic practices of market power. A significant number
of countries have developed antitrust statutes and maintain
BACKGROUND OF TRUSTS
During the industrialization of the United States, the emergence of railroads afforded industries and individuals the ability to conduct business and travel in spite of distances that
previously had prevented such efforts. As transportation competition increased, the railroad industry consolidated finances.
In the late 1880s and early 1900s, powerful and influential
64 Antitrust Policy
financiers, such as Jay Gould, Edward H. Harriman, James J.
Hill, Leland Stanford, and Cornelius Vanderbilt, consolidated
their corporations, as competition during the age of industrialization increased. The outcome essentially was a form
of monopolization. When these trusts obtained a controlling share of an industry, they formed a monopoly that could
dominate the industry, preventing other companies from
competing against the monopoly. By 1890, the oil and railway industries in particular were restricting competition and
establishing price controls, organizing their networks of businesses in trusts that concealed the extent of the monopoly.
Apartheid 65
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
American Bar Association. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law
Developments, 6th edition. Chicago: ABA Book Publishing, 2007.
Armentano, Dominick T. Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy Failure.
New York: Wiley, 1982.
Bain, Joe Staten. Barriers to New Competition:Their Character and Consequences
in Manufacturing Industries. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.
Berle, Adolf A., Jr., and Gardiner C Means. The Modern Corporation and
Private Property. New York: Macmillan, 1932.
Brozen,Yale. Concentration, Mergers, and Public Policy. New York: Macmillan,
1982.
Chamberlain, Edward H. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933.
Howard, Marshall C. Antitrust and Trade Regulation. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1983.
Lai, Loi Lei, ed. Power System Restructuring and Deregulation:Trading,
Performance and Information Technology. New York: Wiley, 2001.
Letwin, William. Law and Economic Policy in America:The Evolution of the
Sherman Antitrust Law. New York: Random House, 1965.
Mason, Edward Sagendorph. Economic Cooperation and the Monopoly Problem.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.
Posner, Richard A. Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1976.
Robinson, Joan. The Economics of Imperfect Competition. London: Macmillan,
1933.
Stigler, George J. The Organization of Industry. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D.
Irwin, 1968.
Williamson, Oliver E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free
Press, 1985.
Apartheid
Apartheid is an Afrikaans word meaning separateness. It was
the official government policy in South Africa from 1948
until a negotiated transition that culminated in the first democratic elections in 1994. In 1976, the UN General Assembly
recognized apartheid as a crime against humanity. The idea
of racial segregation was not new; similar policies had been
introduced in different parts of South Africa long before the
Union of 1910.
KEY ASPECTS
Apartheid was adopted by the National Party (NP), which
came to power in South Africa in 1948. It was built on the
growth of Afrikaner nationalism and increasing economic
hardship for parts of the Afrikaner population. A new intellectual elite known as the Broederbond, which at the time
was a secret organization, was central to the promotion
of Afrikaner nationalism. The main architect of apartheid
policy was H. F. Verwoerd, who was Minister of Native
Affairs during the early 1950s and later became prime minister. One of the central tenets of the apartheid system was
the Population Registration Act introduced in 1950. This
law required all citizens to have their racial group officially
recorded. Decisions were clearly arbitrary in some cases and
often were disputed. Race was determined by skin color,
but other criteria, such as language and social status, were
considered also.
Another of the major laws passed was the Group Areas Act
in 1950. This clearly designated areas of land for each of the
four racial groups (white, coloured, Indian, and native). The
consequence of this law was that huge numbers of people were
OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID
Opposition to apartheid was strongly organized within South
Africa itself. During the 1950s, the African National Congress (ANC) forged an alliance with other organizations and
adopted a policy of defiance. One peaceful demonstration
against the pass law system resulted in the deaths of sixty-nine
people in Sharpeville on March 21, 1960. The government
reacted by banning all the major resistance groups in 1960.
The ANC then formed Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the
Nation), which developed a guerrilla warfare strategy. Soon
after, in 1963, many of the ANCs leaders, including Nelson
Mandela, were arrested and tried for planning a violent revolution against the state.
There was also international pressure from the antiapartheid
movement. However, key governments such as the United States
and United Kingdom continued to see South Africa as an ally
in the cold war. Moreover, many leading economies maintained
their economic links with South Africa, and it was only during
the 1980s that significant economic sanctions were imposed.
NEGOTIATED TRANSITION
In 1989, F. W. de Klerk became the final apartheid-era president and began negotiating a settlement. In 1990, he released
Mandela and the other political prisoners and unbanned all
the liberation movements. Despite high levels of political
violence, a period of negotiation ensued under the banner of
The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA).
66 Apparentement
The ANC, NP, and a number of other, though not all, South
African political organizations took part in CODESA. In
April 1994, South Africas first democratic elections were held,
and Nelson Mandela was elected as president.
See also Discrimination; Race and Racism; Segregation and
Desegregation.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . STEPHEN R. HURT
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Barber, James. 1999. South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political
HistoryIn Search of a Nation State. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1999.
Dubow, Saul. Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa,
191936. Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1989.
Guelke, Adrian. Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid. Basingstoke,
U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Lipton, Merle. Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 191086. Aldershot,
U.K.: Wildwood House, 1986.
OMeara, Dan. Forty Lost Years:The Apartheid State and the Politics of the
National Party 19481994. Randburg, South Africa: Ravan Press, 1996.
Sparks, Allister. The Mind of South Africa:The Story of the Rise and Fall of
Apartheid. London: Mandarin, 1991.
Waldmeir, Patti. Anatomy of a Miracle:The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the
New South Africa. London:Viking, 1997.
Apparentement
Apparentement is the French term for an electoral procedure
that is designed to increase the participation of small parties in
countries that use proportional voting systems. Proportional
electoral systems often have thresholds that require parties
to gain a certain percentage of the vote to secure representation. Small parties may be unable to gain the necessary 3 to
5 percent. Apparentement permits minor parties to form electoral coalitions or groupings. The parties continue to be listed
separately and generally campaign separately, but they combine
their total votes. This increases the chances that the parties
will gain representation. If the cartels win seats, those seats
are allocated according to predetermined agreements or by
proportionality, depending on the country. The system is used
in continental Europe, including Switzerland and the Netherlands, some areas of Latin America, and Israel. In France, prior
to electoral reforms in 1951, the system was used by centrist
parties in an effort to prevent parties at either political extreme
from gaining majorities in the Assembly. Studies reveal that
apparentement typically reduces disproportionality in electoral systems. Nonetheless, apparentement coalitions are often
unstable, especially if member parties find themselves excluded
from representation in successive elections.
See also Europe, Democracy in; European Parliament; European
Political Thought; Political Parties.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Appeasement
Appeasement is an influence strategy employed by states in
relations with adversaries. Most students of appeasement
define it as a policy of easing tensions and avoiding war by
Approval Voting 67
this interpretation. Arguing that Hitler regarded the outcome
at Munich as a crushing defeat in which he himself shrank
from the prospect of war, they contend that he found AngloFrench threats to defend Poland credible but, determined not
to back down again, he decided to attack anyway. In some cases,
appeasement has succeeded. Perhaps the most notable instance
involves British conciliation of the United States after 1895;
within a period of roughly a decade, the government of Great
Britain was able to fundamentally transform the relationship
between the two countries, not merely eliminating the possibility of an Anglo-United States war, but also securing diplomatic and strategic cooperation from the United States.
The success or failure of any effort at appeasement must be
evaluated in terms of its objectives. Frequently, an appeasement
policy has both minimum and maximum aims. Some may be
attained, while others may not, so that the policy may be a
partial success and a partial failure. Britain and France failed
to prevent war with Nazi Germany, but according to some
scholars, they did succeed in buying time for Britain to rearm.
American efforts to avoid war with the Soviet Union during the latter stages of World War II (19391945) secured that
goal, although the costSoviet domination of large portions
of eastern and central Europewas high and the U.S.-Soviet
cooperation in the postwar world so desired by U.S. President
Franklin Roosevelt never materialized.
Appropriation
Appropriation is the actual legislative act of designating money.
By constitutional design, the U.S. Congress must pass a law
in order to spend money: No money shall be drawn from
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9). Appropriations can occur through an annual appropriations act
accounting for discretionary spending or by permanent law
accounting for direct spending. Approximately two-thirds of
federal spending is direct spending that covers most federal
entitlement programs. The remaining one-third is discretionary spending that must go through an authorization process
before being funded. The House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations have jurisdiction over the appropriation bills.
Generally, there are three types of appropriations: regular,
continuing, and supplemental. Regular appropriations are the
annual budgetary appropriations (i.e., the setting of the annual
budget) and cover most of the federal spending. Continuing
appropriations are enacted if Congress cannot pass the regular
appropriations bill in time and allow for government entities
to continue functioning. Supplemental appropriations provide
for additional funds at a later date that is not accounted for in
the regular appropriations bills.The president also can exercise
his power over appropriations by vetoing the appropriations
law passed by Congress.
See also Budgeting; Legislative Hearings; Monetary Policy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUSAN MARIE OPP
Approval Voting
Approval voting is an electoral system that allows voters to indicate their preferences for multiple candidates in elections. All
candidates are listed on a ballot, and voters may indicate their
preference or vote for one or more of the candidates. Hence, in
a contest with five candidates, a voter could vote for between
one and five of the office seekers. The candidate who receives
the majority of votes is the winner. The system was designed
to provide a better means of indicating public sentiment in
elections by alleviating concerns that individuals might waste
their ballots by voting for a candidate that might not appear
capable of winning. In addition, if two or more candidates
appealed to the same group, voters could indicate their support for all of them. Proponents have argued that approval
voting would reduce the impact of negative voting because
voters are less likely to vote against a candidate. Advocates
also assert that approval voting would more strongly encourage
68 Aprismo
candidates to reach across party or ideological lines. The system
was first proposed in the 1970s, and has been used in some
nongovernmental bodies, but it has not been used extensively
at the governmental level.
See also Voting Behavior;Voting Procedures.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Aprismo
Aprismo is a political philosophy developed by Vctor Ral
Haya de la Torre, the dominant political figure of twentieth
century Peru. Derived from his political party (APRA
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, or Popular Revolutionary American Alliance), aprismo emerged in the 1920s and
the 1930s as a response to both imperial capitalism and European Marxism. Haya argued that for Indoamerica (Latin
America), imperialism had to be viewed as the first stage of
capitalism, and that the feudal class persisted in alliance with
imperial capitalism. Its strident anti-American tone emerged
in its maximum goals, enunciated in 1928, and then modified
as a minimal plan in 1932. Over the following decades, Haya
developed extensive modifications to his theory.
To Haya de la Torres followers, aprismo was a full-fledged
political philosophy that brought together the best ideas of
such disparate thinkers as Karl Marx, Albert Einstein, Arnold J.
Toynbee, and many others. To his detractors, aprismo was little
more than a hodgepodge of ideas that offered little to improve
Peru. APRAs image as a party rigidly unwilling to compromise prevented it from winning a presidential election until
1985, after Haya de la Torre had died.
See also Imperialism; Marxism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HENRY A. DIETZ
Aquinas, Thomas
See Thomas Aquinas.
Arab-Israeli Relations
The relationship between Arabs and Israel has been hostile
not only since the birth of the Jewish state in 1948, but from
the foundation of political Zionism in the 1890s. This resulted
from a fundamental conflict over Palestine, where the Zionist
movement aspired to establish Israel. Palestine had long been
Arab territory, and Arabs saw their existence there threatened.
The United Nations plan for the partitioning of Palestine in
1947 led to civil war between the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine. When the British completed their withdrawal
from Palestine in May 1948, Jewish forces already occupied
part of the proposed Arab state, and about two hundred thousand Arabs had become refugees. Upon the declaration of the
state of Israel, Egypt, Transjordan (Jordan), Iraq, Lebanon, and
Syria sent troops into Palestine, purportedly to protect the Arab
Palestinians. This First Arab-Israeli War (19481949) turned
Arab League 69
Arab League
The Arab League, the full name of which is the League of
Arab States, is a regional interstate organization headquartered
in Cairo. Founded in 1945 by seven Arab states to strengthen
their ties and preserve their independence, the League
now has twenty-two members: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros,
Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine (represented by the Palestine
Liberation Organization), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Three
member statesComoros, Somalia, and Djiboutiaccording
to the usual criteria, are not Arab countries, although they
Sea of
Galilee
20 Km
Jenin
Mediterranean
Tulkarm
Sea
Nablus
Qalqilya
WEST BANK
Tel Aviv
ISRAEL
Ramallah
JORDAN
Haifa
20 Mi
J o rd a n Ri ver
the process broke down six years later, it provided King Husayn
an opportunity to conclude formal peace with Israel. Under
American pressure, Mauritania also established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1999. An Israeli trade office was set up in
Qatar in 1996. Israeli offices established in Morocco, Oman, and
Tunisia were closed in 2000.The Arab boycott of Israel, declared
by the Arab League in 1945, has withered over time.
With militantly anti-Israel Islamist forces growing and
non-Arab Iran taking the lead in opposing Israel, unstable
Arab regimes have become desperate for a settlement in order
to appease popular passions. Consequently, a Saudi initiative
of 2002, adopted unanimously by an Arab League summit but
rejected by Israel, articulates the willingness of all Arab states
to establish normal diplomatic ties with Israel in return for
full withdrawal and a Palestinian state. Many Israelis fear that
continuing to rule Palestinians eventually will doom them as
a Jewish state, and yet they want to keep much of the West
Bank and to impose limits on the independence of any Arab
Palestinian state.They are also unwilling to consider the return
of a substantial number of Palestinian refugees to Israel.
Jericho
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Gaza
GAZA STRIP
Khan
Yunis
Rafah
Hebron
Dead
Sea
72 Arab Socialism
See also Al-Farabi; Islamic Political Thought; Middle-Eastern
Politics and Society.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SAMER N. ABBOUD
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim M. Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab
Intellectual History. London: Pluto, 2004.
Browers, Michaelle. Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political Thought:
Transcultural Possibilities. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2006.
Choueiri,Youssef M. Arab Nationalism: A HistoryNation and State in the Arab
World. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000.
Hourani, Albert H. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 17981939. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Arab Socialism
Arab socialism is the name given to an ideology that was particularly prevalent in the Arab world in the 1960s, combining Arab
nationalism with policies designed to favor the less privileged
segments of societynotably involving land reform, a planned
economy, subsidized prices for necessities, and the nationalization, in whole or in part, of large business enterprises. It
represented an attack both on economic underdevelopment
and extreme inequality. The term Arab socialism emphasized
the ideologys allegedly distinctive features in comparison with
other kinds of socialism. Although socialist ideas appeared in
the Arab world as early the late nineteenth century, the notion
of a specifically Arab kind of socialism seems to have originated
with the Baath Party and later was embraced by the regime
of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt (after 1958, the
United Arab Republic, UAR). The term also was applied in
Arab countries such as Libya and Algeria that at that time were
described as progressive, or liberated. It tended to be an
expression of Arab nationalism and, with its rejection of capitalism and communism, of nonalignment in the cold war.
Arendt, Hannah 73
Dekmejian, H. Hrair. Egypt under Nasir: A Study of Political Dynamics. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1971.
Hanna, Sami A., and George H. Gardner, eds. Arab Socialism: A Documentary
Survey. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1969.
Ismael, Tareq Y. The Arab Left. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1976.
Karpat, Kemal H., ed. Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle
East, 2nd ed. New York: Praeger, 1982.
Khadduri Majid. Political Trends in the Arab World:The Role of Ideas and Ideals in
Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970.
OBrien, Patrick. The Revolution in Egypts Economic System: From Private
Enterprise to Socialism, 19521965. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.
Arbitration
Arbitration is a long-standing form of adjudication that seeks
to provide more economical, less formal, quicker, and more
expert trial proceedings. The process was recognized in the
ancient world, mentioned in the Quran, and served asa model
for rabbinical courts. George Washington referred to it in his
will. Although it is meant to be an alternative to judicial litigation, arbitration more closely resembles court proceedings than
structured negotiation mechanisms, like mediation. Under
contemporary perceptions, arbitration is more than an ancillary
form of adjudication. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506 (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court deemed arbitration vital to
international commerce; in Rodriguez v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), it proclaimed arbitration instrumental
to fulfilling the promise of constitutional due process.
The improper operation of judicial processes has made
arbitration necessary. As former Chief Justice Warren Burger
stated, judicial litigation takes too long, costs too much, and can
decimate human relationships. Ordinary legal rights fall by the
wayside. Faced with dwindling social resources and political
deadlock, the Supreme Court chose to advocate for privatized
justice and the submission of civil disputes to arbitration.
Arbitration in the United States is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Enacted in 1925, the FAA contains
provisions establishing the validity of arbitration agreements
and enforceability of arbitral awards. The legislation embodies
a hospitable federal policy on arbitration. The case law has
added substantially to its content over the years. More than
forty U.S. Supreme Court opinions establish that the federal
law of arbitration preempts conflicting state laws (making the
FAA the exclusive national law of arbitration); the act applies
to the vast majority of employment arbitration agreements
despite the exclusion in FAA 1, and arbitral proceedings are
the equal of judicial trials for litigating claims. Moreover, arbitrations are isolated events with no general impact. The court
also has determined that statutory claims can be submitted to
arbitration, thereby substantially increasing the jurisdictional
range of arbitration. In Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456
(2009), for example, the Supreme Court ruled that arbitrators
could decide civil rights claims.
In a word, arbitration thrives in U.S. law. It is greatly favored
by courts and legal doctrine. The case law makes it exceedingly difficult to void arbitration agreements or nullify arbitral awards. California and neighboring states dissent from the
general consensus by invalidating arbitration in adhesionary
Archives, National
See National Archives.
Arendt, Hannah
Hannah Arendt (19061975) was born in Hanover, Germany,
to a secular Jewish middle-class family. Dedicated to study
early on, Arendt completed a doctoral dissertation in 1929
at Heidelberg University. During this same period, Arendt
became increasingly preoccupied with the issue of German
Jewish identity in response to rising anti-Semitism. She began
writing a biography of Rahel Varnhagen, who was a Jewish
salon hostess in Berlin in the early 1800s. Although the work
74 Arendt, Hannah
Armenian Genocide 75
Aristotle
Aristotle (384322 BCE) was born in Stagira, in Northern
Greece. His father, Nicomachus, was court physician to
Amyntas III, king of Macedon, and Aristotle maintained close
connections to the Macedonian regime throughout his life. At
the age of seventeen, he traveled to Athens, to study in Platos
Academy, where he stayed for twenty years, until Platos death
in 347. After he left the Academy, Aristotles travels included
returning to Macedon to tutor the future Alexander the
Great. He returned to Athens, in 336, to open his own school,
the Lyceum, where he stayed until the death of Alexander the
Great in 323.
The corpus of Aristotles works that have come down to
us are not finished products, prepared for publication, but
were composed in connection with his school, most likely for
use in lecturing. Aristotle also wrote dialogues, which were
renowned for their literary qualities, but aside from fragments
that have been recovered, these were all lost. Aristotles works
encompass an enormous range of subjects, including logic, scientific studies of the natural world, metaphysics, ethics, and
politics. His Politics has a strong claim to being the first extant
work of political science.
Aristotles moral and political philosophy shows the strong
influence of Plato, and he provides powerful, detailed answers
to important questions that Plato raised. But Aristotle clearly
broke with Plato in important respects, notably in rejecting the
latters conception of forms or ideas that exist apart from their
instances in the material world. In Politics, Aristotle departs
from Plato most significantly in detailed examination of existing political forms, which he is willing to consider more or less
on their own terms. In Book II of the work, Aristotle presents
a harshalthough frequently clearly misguidedcritique of
Platos Republic and Laws, generally in regard to what he views
as these works excessive utopianism.
In Politics, Aristotle explores the polis in its entirety, including different kinds of poleis and their distinctive features, factors that lead to the stability and instability of different forms.
He also subjects the polis to moral inquiry, including what it
means for human beings to live in it, and how it contributes
to their well-being. In addition to the polis as it exists, Aristotle considers ideal representatives at different levels, ranging
between ideal states unconstrained by actual circumstances,
to remedying defects in existing states. In Book IV of the
work, he presents a powerful argument for a relative ideal, a
state that achieves the important end of social-political stability, based on rule by the middle classas opposed to the
political instability occasioned by rule of either the rich or
the poor.
In composing Politics, Aristotle drew on studies of 158
different Greek constitutions. One of these studies, a booklength analysis of the constitution of Athens, by either Aristotle or his students, is extant. Aristotle demonstrates impressive
command of the history and workings of innumerable specific cases. The polis existed in myriad forms, while the Greek
world was torn by constant tumult, revolution, and change.
Armenian Genocide
The Armenian Genocide is often cited as the first genocide
of the twentieth century, carried out against the Armenian
population of the Ottoman Empire during World War I
(19141918). Many in Turkey, however, dispute that the event
should be considered genocide, and it remains a controversial
topic both within Turkey and internationally.
76 Armenian Genocide
Armenians en masse of being in league with the Russians,
making them an enemy of the state. This would provide the
pretext for the genocide.
The genocide began in 1915. First, Armenians in the army
were disarmed, placed into labor battalions, and then killed. On
April 24, 1915, Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul were arrested
and deported by the government. They were eventually executed. (April 24 thus serves as the day of commemoration by
those who acknowledge the genocide.) This was followed in
May 1915 by a Temporary Law on Deportation, which gave
the government the right to deport anyone it deemed a threat
to national security. Several months later, a Temporary Law of
Expropriation and Confiscation was passed, giving the government the right to seize Armenian property. Throughout 1915,
the Ottoman authorities expelled the Armenians in eastern
Anatolia from their homes, told them they would be relocated,
and then marched them off to concentration camps in the
desert between Jerablus and Deir ez-Zor, where many would
perish due to lack of food and water. In other cases, Armenians
were drowned, raped, or simply shot on sight by local Turks
and Kurds, who acted with impunity.
According to many sources, the CUP created an administrative unit (Teshkilai Mahusuna) and special butcher battalions, manned by violent criminals released from prison, to
ensure that actions against the Armenians were carried out.
Estimates are that between one and one and a half-million (of
the roughly two and a half million Armenians in the Ottoman
Empire) perished. Official Turkish records, published in 2008,
indicate that nearly a million Armenians disappeared between
1914 and 1918.
Hundreds of eyewitnesses, including American missionaries
and German military advisers (who were on the Ottoman side
during the war) documented various massacres. For example,
the German ambassador wrote to Berlin in 1916 that the
Ottoman government sought to resolve its Armenian question by the destruction of the Armenian race (Hovannisian,
1992, xii). U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Henry
Morgenthau wrote in 1915 that deportation of and excesses
against peaceful Armenians is increasing and from harrowing reports of eyewitnesses it appears that a campaign of race
extermination is in progress under a pretext of reprisal against
rebellion (Winter, 2003, 150). The New York Times ran more
than one hundred articles on the plight of the Armenians in
1915, and many prominent Americans, including former President Theodore Roosevelt and orator and politician William
Jennings Bryan, spoke out against it.
The Ottoman government, when not denying the massacres, claimed that they were driven by the needs of the war.
Some Ottoman officials who refused to comply with orders
were dismissed, and Turks who protected Armenians risked
death themselves. Survivors of the genocide would find refuge
in Russia, the Middle East, and, eventually, in Europe, North
America, Africa, and Australia, making Armenians one of the
worlds largest diaspora groups.
After the war, the Ottoman Empire was defeated, and its
wartime leaders were put on trial, often in absentia. In 1919,
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES
The Armenian genocide remains a very sensitive issue.
While Armenians have lobbied for international recognition
of the crime committed against them, the Turkish government refuses to acknowledge that the actions taken against
the Armenians consistute a genocide. In its view, the Armenian claims of more than a million dead are wildly inflated,
and those deaths that did occur among Armenians, Kurds,
and Turks were the result of localized activity carried out
during the war due to civil conflict. In this interpretation,
there was no systematic, centralized campaign to eliminate
Armenians. Others, however, would seek to justify actions
taken against Armenians as necessary for the Turkish war
effort, as Armenians were deemed to be unreliable. Many
individuals, such as the Nobel-prize winning Turkish author
Orhan Pamuk, who have spoken of the Armenian genocide,
have been brought before Turkish courts for insulting Turkishness. Efforts within Turkey to examine the issue have been
subjected to harassment by the government, although some
Turkish scholars, such as Turkish historian Taner Akcam, are
willing to acknowledge that a genocide against Armenians
did occur. Internationally, Turkeys refusal to acknowledge
the Armenian genocide is held up by some as a reason not to
admit Turkey to the European Union.
See also Genocide; Nationalism;War Crimes.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PAUL JAMES KUBICEK
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Akcam, Taner. A Shameful Act:The Armenian Genocide and the Question of
Turkish Responsibility. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.
Balakian, Peter. The Burning Tigris:The Armenian Genocide and Americas
Response. New York: Harper Collins, 2003.
Bloxham, Donald. The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and
the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005.
Hovannisian, Richard, ed. The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics.
New York: St. Martins, 1992.
. Remembrance and Denial:The Case of the Armenian Genocide. Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1999.
Suny, Ronald G. Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Winter, Jay, ed. America and the Armenian Genocide. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
Arms Control 77
Arms Control
Arms control is both a process and a result. On the one hand,
it involves the conscious and dedicated effort by two or more
parties (typically nation-states) to negotiate an improved security relationship. On the other, arms control is often manifested
by an agreement to regulate some aspect of the participating
states military capabilities or potential. The agreement may
apply to the location, amount, readiness, or types of military
forces, weapons, or facilities, but always presupposes cooperation or joint action among the participants regarding their
military programs.
While not as centrally important today as it was during the
second half of the twentieth century, arms control, in its broadest definition that encompasses not only traditional negotiations
and agreements but also nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
and disarmament, still has a role in a globalizing world that has
ongoing security concerns. Arms control and other cooperative security initiatives should be seen as part of a nation-states
foreign policy toolbox, available when necessary to enhance a
states security, but seldom the only tools available; they complement rather than substitute for diplomatic, economic, and coercive military actions.
Arms control was born during the cold war to stall the military conflict primarily between the former Soviet Union, and
its satellite states, and the United States long enough for the
West to win. With the end of the cold war in 1991, the world
experienced a flush of optimism and arms control activity that
reached its zenith in the mid-1990s as formal agreements and
cooperative measures were signed and entered into force with
astounding speed. Both sides codified lower numbers of forces
to ensure that the cold war was really over, but eventually arms
control found a place dealing with the new concerns of proliferation, regional instability, and economic and environmental
security. The value of arms control appeared to be growing
in the new world, as states attempted to stem the illegal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue nations or
groups and to meet their security needs in a multipolar, more
interdependent world.
By the late 1990s, arms control had lost its luster for the
United States and had become less important to a national
security stance that no longer recognized the importance
of such policies in the globalizing postcold war world. The
arrival of President George W. Bush in 2001 and the attacks of
September 11 put the country on a war footing against a dramatically different kind of enemy. Arms control, at least from
an American perspective, seemed pass, if not dead, a stance
the Bush administration encouraged.
With the 2008 election of President Barack Obama, however, the United States restored arms control to its formerly
central place in American diplomacy, and the international
security agenda facing the new president required renewed
attention to this policy approach. The Obama administration also saw arms control as a good way to try to restore
better relations with Russia after several years of increasing
antagonism.
78 Arms Control
Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev shake hands at the signing of the SALT II Treaty in Vienna, Austria. The treaty was part of a nuclear arms
control effort between the United States and the Soviet Union.
source: Bettmann/Corbis
Arms Control 79
1940s and early 1950s. International security specialists began
using the term arms control in place of disarmament, which they
felt lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The seminal
books on the subject published in the early 1960s all preferred
arms control as a more comprehensive term. Austrian scholar
Hedley Bull differentiated the two as follows: disarmament is
the reduction or abolition of armaments, while arms control
is restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy
not only the number of weapons, but also their character,
development, and use.
The concept and theory of arms control was developed by
a small number of academic study groups in the United States
and Great Britain, who published the three seminal works on
arms control in 1961. Strategy and Arms Control, by Thomas
Schelling and Morton Halperin, reflected the findings of a
1960 summer study group organized under the auspices of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The basic premise of
this book was that cooperative arrangements with adversaries
could have the same objectives as sensible military policies in
reducing the likelihood of war. The authors were influenced
by the work of another member of the summer study, Donald
G. Brennan, who served as editor of Arms Control, Disarmament,
and National Security. Similarly, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age, by Hedley Bull,
was based on a series of symposia held at Oxford University
in 1960. These three works form the essential basis for understanding modern arms control theory.
The arms control perspective was perhaps best expressed
by Schelling and Halperin when they framed the arms control
construct as follows:
We believe that arms control is a promising . . . enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. It rests essentially on the recognition that our military relation with
potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest
in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in
minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition,
and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the
event it occurs. (1)
Arms control in the nuclear age was framed as a component
part of an overall military and national security strategyan
instrument of policy and an adjunct to force posture, not a
utopian or moral crusade. It captured the more cooperative
side of policy, focusing not on imposition but on negotiation
and compromise, recognizing the shared interest in avoiding
nuclear conflict.
80 Arms Control
precedent for elimination of an entire category of weapon
systems, was its reliance on on-site inspection teams to verify
missile removal and destruction on the other sides territory.
The START talks began in 1982 and proceeded alongside
an extensive series of nuclear confidence-building measures
addressing risk reduction and data sharing. The 1992 START
I Treaty required measured reductions in both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, with intrusive verification provisions to ensure compliance. The bilateral nuclear arms control
process was so firmly established that even with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two sides were still able
to quickly negotiate the 1993 START II Treaty, in which both
sides agreed to further reduce their nuclear arsenals. In addition,
cooperative efforts succeeded in consolidating control of Soviet
nuclear systems in the Russian Republic and initiating a broad
effort known as cooperative threat reduction measures to reduce
the chances of proliferation from the former Soviet Union. At
the 1997 Helsinki summit meeting, both countries committed
themselves to continue the strategic arms reduction process to
even lower levels of nuclear warheads through a START III
round, but this plan was obviated by the 2002 Moscow Treaty
(officially the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT).
THE MOSCOW TREATY AND BEYOND
Arms control has not been solely focused on bilateral U.S.Soviet strategic issues since the 1970s. There have been parallel efforts under way in multiple other fields, often led by
the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. These
multilateral discussions were not as highly charged politically
as the bilateral efforts, but they did achieve several notable
accomplishments. For example, in 1972 the world agreed to
ban the production, stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin
weapons (the Biological Weapons Convention), and in 1993 it
agreed to a similar treaty on chemical weapons (the Chemical
Weapons Convention). NATO and the Warsaw Pact came to
an agreement on conventional force levels, composition, and
disposition in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in
1990. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed in Geneva
in 1996 (although it has not yet entered into force), and discussions are still ongoing regarding a global Fissile Materials Cutoff
Treaty. A series of nuclear-weapon-free zones has essentially
denuclearized the entire Southern Hemisphere. A coalition of
states and nongovernmental organizations led the effort to ban
landmines in 1997 (the Ottawa Convention), and several informal groupings of states were created to prevent the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction technologies through organizations such as the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group, the
Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Arms Race 81
technologies threaten massive destruction and suffering, nations
will continue to strive for humane and measured applications
of force. As long as weapons remain tools of international relations, citizens of those nations will be involved in arms control
and disarmament. For nearly three generations, policy development and intellectual advancement in the field of international
relations have focused on the role of arms control and used
the specialized language developed for that purpose. This field
of international policy will remain viable and vital into the
foreseeable future.
See also Arms Race; Conflict Resolution; Nuclear Club; Nuclear
Proliferation and Nonproliferation;Weapons of Mass Destruction.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JEFFREY LARSEN
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Arbotov, Alexei, and Rose Gottemoeller. New Presidents, New Agreements?
Advancing U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Control. Arms Control Today
(July-August 2008), www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/CoverStory.
Arms Control Association. Arms Control and National Security: An Introduction.
Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 1989.
Bernstein, Paul. International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Occasional Paper 6. Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University, May 2008.
Blechman, Barry, ed. Unblocking the Road to Zero: Perspective of Advanced
Nuclear Nations. Nuclear Security Series. Washington, D.C.: Henry L.
Stimson Center, February 2009.
Brennan, Donald G., ed. Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security.
New York: George Braziller, 1961.
Brown, Harold. Is Arms Control Dead? Washington Quarterly 23, no. 2
(2000): 171232.
Bull, Hedley. The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in
the Missile Age. New York: Praeger, 1961.
Burns, Richard Dean, ed. Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament,
3 vols. New York: Scribners, 1993.
Campbell, Kurt M., Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds. The
Nuclear Tipping Point:Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004.
Carter, Ashton B., William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner. A New Concept
of Cooperative Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992.
Daalder, Ivo, and Jan Lodal. The Logic of Zero: Toward a World without
Nuclear Weapons. Foreign Affairs 87 (November-December 2008):
8095.
Dunn, Lewis A., and Victor Alexxi. Arms Control by Other Means. Survival
42, no. 4 (2000): 223238.
Gaddis, John Lewis. Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy
Since 1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Gray, Colin S. House of Cards:Why Arms Control Must Fail. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1992.
Kaye, Dalia Dassa. Talking to the Enemy:Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East
and South Asia. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2007.
Krepon, Michael, and Dan Caldwell. The Politics of Arms Control Treaty
Ratification. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992.
Larsen, Jeffrey A., ed. Arms Control. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
. Neo-Arms Control in the Bush Administration. Disarmament
Diplomacy 80 (Autumn 2005): 4954.
. Arms Control and the Obama Administration: Coming in from
the Cold. Strategic Insights 8 (April 2009), www.nps.edu/Academics/
centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/larsenApr09.html.
Larsen, Jeffrey A., and Gregory J. Rattray, eds. Arms Control Toward the 21st
Century. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996.
Larsen, Jeffrey A., and James M. Smith. Historical Dictionary of Arms Control
and Disarmament. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow, 2005.
Larsen, Jeffrey A., and James J. Wirtz, eds. Arms Control and Cooperative
Security. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2009.
Levi, Michael A., and Michael E. OHanlon. The Future of Arms Control.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2005.
Lindemyer, Jeff. Memorandum to President-Elect Obama: A New Arms
Control and Non-proliferation Agenda. Washington, D.C.: Center for
Arms Control and Non-proliferation, June 2008, www.policyarchive.
org/bitstream/handle/10207/11816/Memorandum%20to%20Presidentelect%20Obama%20%20A%20New%20Arms%20Control%20and%20
Non-Proliferation%20Agenda.pdf?sequence=1.
Platt, Alan. The Politics of Arms Control and the Strategic Balance. Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, 1982.
Schelling, Thomas, and Morton Halperin. Strategy and Arms Control. New
York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961.
Schultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. A
World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html.
Sims, Jennifer E. Icarus Restrained: An Intellectual History of Nuclear Arms
Control 19451960. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990.
Trachtenberg, Marc. Arms Control: Thirty Years On. Daedalus: Journal of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences 120 (Winter 1991): 203216.
Woolf, Amy F., Mary Beth Nikitin, and Paul K. Kerr. Arms Control and
Nonproliferaiton: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements. CRS Report for
Congress no. RL33865. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research
Service, February 10, 2009.
Arms Race
An arms race is generally understood as a process of competitive acquisition of weaponry. The domestic and international
forces driving an arms race may be as era-defining as global
ideological rivalry or as idiosyncratic as the preferences of an
admirals spouse, but evidence of hostility between the racers
is a definitional requirement, usually including an assertion
on each side that the buildups are necessary because of the
growing arsenal of the opponent.
Arms racers are often pairs of nation-states, but interactive
arming may occur also between alliances, within nation-states,
between armed services, within armed services, or among
nonstate actors. One example of complex interactions among
more than two nation-states is trilateral arming among China,
the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war
era. Arms racing may precede war, substitute for war, or grow
out of unresolved issues following war, but as a rule, weapons
production during wartime is not considered arms racing.
Races are identified by the names of the participants
(e.g., U.S.-Soviet Arms Race) as well as by the nature of the
weaponry (e.g., the nuclear arms race). Arms races also may
be distinguished according to whether they are essentially
qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative arms racing means
that participants compete to develop higher quality, more effective arsenals. Qualitative races are characterized by weapons
whose accuracy, range, and lethality change quickly and by
rapid research and development of new weapons technologies. Quantitative racing is competition in numbers of existing weaponry. Arms control specialists find that quantitative
races are easier to limit by agreement than qualitative races.
Rapidly moving qualitative races also facilitate agreement, but
only in obsolescent technologies.
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS
Arms races are conceptualized in several ways. One view is that
arms racing can be understood as a mechanistic process like the
82 Arms Race
motion of billiard balls but capable of generating unanticipated
and undesired effects such as World War I (19141918), or a
nuclear war catalyzed by a crisis. Other analysts see arms racing
as tacit but intelligent communication, in which acquisition
of weapons systems becomes a coded conversation. This view
assumes that adversaries know and understand each others
political goals and that new weaponry becomes reasonably
well known on both sides, perhaps by open testing.
A policy instrument conceptualization views arms racing
as a device to achieve political-economic goals, foreign and
domestic, deliberately and rationally. Arms racing also may
be conceived as a less rational result of internal bureaucratic
forces: domestic political and economic bargaining, competition among military services, incremental decision making,
and failure to discard old programs, such as the U.S. horse
cavalry. In this view the arms buildup is a result of a militaryindustrial complex grafted onto the legislature. Large-scale
weapons systems are seen as fruit of a patronage system and
may have little to do with the outside world. Choice of adversary is then mostly a historical accident and may be altered to
meet domestic political, including electoral, needs.
Some scholars, such as Brian Eslea (1985), understand arms
racing in part or in whole as an aberrant consequence of psychological pressures on decision making, so that racing is propelled
by misperception, genuine psychopathology, or imperatives of
gender on decision making. Larger theoretical arguments about
interstate conflict dynamics have posited a role for competitive
armaments processes in catastrophe theory, in the intersection
of competition for resources and political alliances as well as in
escalation of disputes to crises and thence to war. The fact that
arms races often originate in or precipitate territorial disputes
leads to the inclusion of contiguity (close proximity, usually
understood as a shared border) and geostrategic data in many
explanations.
EXAMPLES OF ARMS RACES
Aron, Raymond 83
Eslea, Brian. Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear
Arms Race. Wolfeboro, N.H.: Longwood, 1985
Feshbach, Murray. Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the
Soviet Regime: A Twentieth Century Fund Report (Russia in Transition). New
York: Twentieth Century Foundation, 1994.
Gray, Colin. The Soviet-American Arms Race. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1976.
Hoffman, David. The Dead Hand:The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race
and Its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2009.
Holsti, Ole. Crisis Escalation War. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press,
1972.
Holt, Robert, Brian L. Job, and Lawrence Markus. Catastrophe Theory and
the Study of War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 22 (June 1978): 171208.
Huntington, Samuel. Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results. Public Policy 7
(1958): 4186.
Intriligator, Michael, and Dagobert Brito. Can Arms Races Lead to the
Outbreak of War? Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (March 1984):
6384.
Klare, Michael. The Next Great Arms Race. Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer
1993): 136152.
Mintz, Alex, and Michael D. Ward. The Political Economy of Military
Spending in Israel. American Political Science Review 83 (June 1989):
521533.
Richardson, Lewis F. Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes
and Origins of War. Pittsburgh: Boxwood, 1960.
Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of
War 18151945. In Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence,
edited by J. David Singer, 247286. New York: Free Press, 1968.
Smith, T. C. Arms Race Instability and War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 24
(June 1980): 253284.
Wallace, Michael. Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses.
International Studies Quarterly 26 (March 1982): 3756.
Wright, Quincy. A Study of War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
York, Herbert. Race to Oblivion. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.
Zinnes, Dina A. The Expression and Perception of Hostility in Pre-war
Crisis: 1914. In Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence,
edited by J. David Singer, 85119. New York: Free Press, 1968.
Aron, Raymond
Raymond-Claude-Ferdinand Aron (19051983) was a French
scholar and journalist who, in postwar France, opposed the
intellectual left.
Aron, the son of Gustave Aron, a Jewish law professor,
studied at the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS), the French
academy for teachers, from 1924 to 1928. In 1928 Aron had the
highest score on the aggregation in philosophy (a competitive
civil service examination offered in France). He was awarded
a doctorate in 1930.
In 1930,Aron went to Germany, where he was a lecturer at the
University of Cologne until 1931 and a researcher from 1931 to
1933 at the Maison Academique in Berlin. He married Suzanne
84 Articles of Confederation
Gauchon in 1933. Aron was awarded his doctorate during this
time, completing his thesis on the philosophy of history.
With the rise of Adolph Hitler and anti-Semitism in Germany, Aron returned to France. He became a philosophy professor at the Lycee of Le Havre. He returned to Paris in 1934,
becoming the secretary at the Center of Social Documentation at the ENS.
In 1939, Aron began teaching social philosophy at the University of Toulouse, but left to join the French Air Force when
World War II (19391945) began. Following the fall of France
in 1940, Aron escaped to London, where he became part of the
Free French movement and the editor of their newspaper, La
France Libre. He edited the paper until 1944.
Following the liberation, Aron returned to France to teach
sociology at the Ecole Nationale dAdministration (ENA) and
the Paris Institute of Political Studies. In 1955 he became a professor of political science as a member of the Faculty of Letters
at the Sorbonne, a post he held until 1968. He was an opponent of the French student movement of May 1968. In 1970 he
became a professor of sociology at the College de France.
In addition to his teaching, Aron became a columnist in
1947 for Le Figaro, a conservative daily newspaper. He wrote
for the paper for thirty years, becoming one of the nations
leading columnists. When the paper was purchased by Robert Hersant, a conservative newspaper publisher allied with
French President Valery Giscard dEstaing, Aron resigned. He
moved to LExpress, a weekly news magazine, where he wrote
columns from 1977 until his death.
Arons scholarship was in the fields of economics, philosophy, political science, and sociology. He wrote more than forty
books during his lifetime, in which he supported the classical
liberal tradition of freedom and private property, challenging
the views of those on the ideological left, especially those of
his classmate at the ENS, Jean-Paul Sartre.
In The Opium of the Intellectuals (published as Lopium
des intellectuels in 1957), Arons thesis was that Marxism is a
mental opium and was based on false myths. In particular he noted the Marxist belief that history was progressive
and liberating, although the Marx-inspired Soviet regime
was based on totalitarian controls. The second Marxist myth
he challenged was the role that philosopher Karl Marx
assigned to the proletariatthat of the saviors of humanity;
Aron contended that all most workers wanted was a middle
class (bourgeoisie) standard of living.
Scholar Reed Davis notes that, in international relations,
Aron subscribed to what he called the idea of reason, an
image of society that would truly be humanized. Aron hoped
that the possibility of nuclear war would lead to an end to
power politics.
See also French Political Thought; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Sartre,
Jean-Paul.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JEFFREY KRAUS
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Anderson, Brian C. Raymond Aron:The Recovery of the Political. Lanham, Md.:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
Aron, Raymond. The Opium of the Intellectuals. London: Secker and Warburg,
1957.
. Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflection. Translated by George
Holoch. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990.
Colquhoun, Robert. Raymond Aron. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1986.
Davis, Reed. Liberalism and Cold War Diplomacy in the Thought of
Raymond Aron. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
International Studies Association, March, 2006.
Mahoney, Daniel J. The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical
Introduction. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992.
Arrows Paradox
See Voting Cycles and Arrows Paradox.
Articles of Confederation
The Articles of Confederation were the original constitution
of the United States and were developed and adopted during
the conflict with Great Britain. In 1776, the delegates of the
thirteen colonies met as a Continental Congress to adopt the
Declaration of Independence and plan the Revolutionary
War (17761783). Led by John Dickinson of Delaware and
Pennsylvania, the Congress formed a committee to draft the
articles that would guide the new nation.
The document was ratified July 9, 1778, by ten of the original thirteen colonies. New Jersey later ratified the Articles of
Confederation on November 26, 1778, and Delaware followed
on February 23, 1779. Maryland ratified them two years later
on March 1, 1781, after seeking concessions from several large
states, including any claims on lands to Marylands west. With
the Revolutionary Wars resolution in April 1783, numerous
interest groups began to call for revision of the Articles.
Article II included the foundational principle of the document: Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is
not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United
States, in Congress assembled. The Articles, thus, granted
the national government limited powers and made it fiscally
dependent on the former colonies, now states, which also
controlled the militia.
The Articles constituted the U.S. Congress as a single branch
of government, and each state selected congressional delegates,
who voted as states, not as individuals. Measures needed nine
of thirteen votes to pass Congress, but any fundamental alterations in national policy or changes to the Articles required a
unanimous vote. Several attempts to change the Articles prior
to the adoption of the new Constitution were prevented by a
single state.
The weak central government created under the Articles
contributed to significant financial trouble for the new nation
because states could not be compelled to pay their debts.Without necessary resources, the government could not address
economic and military challengesfrom the encroachments
of the British on the borders set by the Treaty of Paris (1783)
to those of the Spanish on the southern borders of the United
States and raids by Native Americans on the western frontier. The United States also possessed only limited power to
WESTERN ORIENTALISM
Greek historian Herodotus made the first known mention
of the continent of Asia in his writings. The Persians, the first
Asians by this reckoning, were characterized as loving freedom
too little in comparison with the Greeks. The general tone of
Herodotus reflections would later reverberate throughout
Western scholarship on Asia. The most notable thinkers who
focused on Asia as a place lacking freedom were German philosophers Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel and Karl Marx.
Hegel viewed Asia as the place where only the despot was
free. Marx identified the Asiatic mode of production as being
a mode of production that differed from feudalism based on
the centralized control of the modes of production associated
with irrigation agriculture. German American historian Karl
Auguste Wittfogel built upon Marxs theory. Wittfogel argued
that the bureaucracies that were essential to Asias irrigation
works and managing large hydraulic works crushed civil society and resulted in a mode of government he called oriental
despotism. He contended that modern communist societies
followed the model of oriental despotism and would be even
more repressive.
Not all European understandings of Asian culture were so
negative. Jesuit missionaries found much that was admirable
in Chinese and Japanese society and tried to reconcile the
secular religion of Confucianism with Christianity. The Vatican rejected these attempts; the Magisterium, the governing
body of the Catholic Church, found ancestor worship to be
incompatible with Christianity. The Catholic condemnation
disrespectful of authority, destructive to the family, too contentious, too concerned about individual civil liberties and
not concerned enough about the rights of the community,
and too dismissive of the role of elites in creating the conditions that would serve the economic and cultural needs
of the community. These critics believed Asian values could
cure these Western maladies. The economic success of the
East Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan), Japan, Thailand, and Malaysia made many in the
West find much to admire in these Asian values.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 revealed some
of the weaknesses of the authority/family/community-based
paradigm previously credited for the strength of Asian societies and economies. Concerns about cronyism, the stifling of
innovation, and the inability of economies to respond to market conditions replaced previous admiration for social order,
family values, and harmony.
In recent years, strong economic growth rates in India and
China and the need to provide social stability in the midst of
economic development have led some to look to the traditional
cultures of Asia as an anchor in a storm. Chinas call for a harmonious society and its own peaceful rise in the global community most clearly owe a great deal to the traditional values of
Confucianism.The role of Hindu nationalism in India, Buddhist
nonviolence and social activism in Bhutan, Myanmar, Tibet,
Thailand, and other historically Buddhist countries, and Islamic
fundamentalism and the traditional and modern response to this
phenomenon throughout Southeast Asia, just to name a few
examples, make it evident that Asian political thought will continue to be an important and dynamic part of the Asian political
landscape.
It is also important to note that Western scholars are mining the political traditions of Asia for materials to deal with
contemporary political problems. Roger Ames and David
Hall find common ground between the Confucian tradition
and the thought of the American pragmatist and progressive
John Dewey to help further a universal democratic project.
Peter Hershock looks inside the Buddhist tradition and demonstrates the relevance of the conceptions of karma and emptiness for a full spectrum of public policy problems. Daniel
Bell explores the different meanings of human rights in a
Western and east Asian context. Richard Nisbett examines
the foundations for how Westerners and east Asians perceive
the world differently. His work lends scientific credibility to
those who discern profoundly different approaches to political and social problems in the various cultural regionseven
as he affirms the possibility of the convergence of Western
and Eastern values.
Asian critics of the Asian values thesis, such as former South
Korean president Kim Dae Jung and former Taiwan president,
Lee Teng-hui, give credence to Nisbetts hypothesis about
convergence.These advocates of democracy perceive the Asian
values argument as a means of attacking fundamental human
rights and perceive these rights to exist in the broader intellectual heritages of their respective civilizations. Coming into this
debate at the liberal end of liberal democracy, Chinese political
Mahbubani, Kishore. Can Asians Think? Understanding the Divide between East
and West. Southroyalton,Vt.: Steerforth, 2002.
Nisbett, Richard E. The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think
Differently . . . and Why. New York: Free Press, 2003.
Pines,Yuri. Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring
States Era. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009.
Pye, Lucian W. Asian Power and Politics:The Cultural Dimension of Authority.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985.
Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor, 2000.
Sharma, Jyotirmay. Hindutva: Exploring the Idea of Hindu Nationalism. New
York: Penguin Global, 2004.
Sivaraksa, Sulak. Conflict, Culture, and Change: Engaged Buddhism in a
Globalizing World. Boston: Wisdom, 2005.
Williams, David. Defending Japans Pacific War:The Kyoto School Philosophers and
Post-White Power. New York: Routledge Courzon, 2004.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TODD MYERS
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Ames, Roger, and David Hall. The Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius,
and the Hope for Democracy in China. Chicago: Open Court, 1999.
Angle, Stephen C. Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural
Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Aydin, Cemil. The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia:Visions of World Order
in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought. New York: Colombia University
Press, 2007.
Barlow, Tani E. New Asian Marxisms. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
2002.
Barr, Michael D. Cultural Politics and Asian Values:The Tepid War. London:
Routledge, 2002.
Bell, Daniel A. Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian
Context. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006.
. Chinas New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing
Society. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Berger, Mark T. The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization.
London: Routledge, 2003.
Bruun, Ole, and Michael Jacobsen, eds. Human Rights and Asian Values:
Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia.
Richmond, U.K.: Curzon, 2000.
Clarke, John James. Oriental Enlightenment:The Encounter between Asian and
Western Thought. London: Routledge, 1997.
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free
Press, 1992.
Gress, Daniel. From Plato to NATO:The Idea of the West and Its Opponents.
New York: Free Press, 1998.
Heisig, James W, and John C. Maraldo, eds. Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto
School, and the Question of Nationalism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1995.
Hershock, Peter. Buddhism in the Public Sphere: Reorienting Global
Interdependence. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998.
Jensen, Lionel M. Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and Universal
Civilization. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Loy, David. A Buddhist History of the West: Studies in Lack. Albany: State
University Press of New York, 2002.
is very different from the challenges facing newly democratizing states such as the Indonesia and the Philippines. These
states are more concerned with general governance issues. In
cases like these, note Jose Edgardo Campos and Joel Hellman
(2005), the decision to decentralize is sparked by strong reactions to a prolonged period of highly authoritarian rule (238).
But what specific measures have states adopted? Table 1
summarizes the key example countries for each of the major
categories. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan represent cases of
formal, institutionalized accountability measures (or vertical accountability). South Korea and Taiwan have formally
opened their bureaucracies much more extensively than Japan,
which has used the APL primarily to delegate some monitoring functions to the courts. Indonesia and the Philippines
have both followed a path of decentralization and increasing social accountability measures, largely with the aid of the
World Bank. The Philippines is further down this path, given
the length of time since transition, but Indonesia appears to be
following suit.
It should be noted that in none of these cases are such measures fully effective at preventing politicians or bureaucrats from
evading their intent. Perhaps it is inevitable that these measures
will never live up to their full potential, but the amount of slack
given and accepted is nonetheless noteworthy.
DECENTRALIZED
AND SOCIAL
Japan
Philippines (early)
Indonesia (late)
make at least biannual public updates and promptly disseminate information relating to public order or services.The World
Bank lobbied for this bill along with Indonesian civil society
organizations.
Other measures of note include anticorruption laws that,
since 1998, have provided access to information and freedom
of the press. As with the Philippines, there are active advocacy campaigns supported by IOs, but they are not yet as well
developed, given the relatively short time since transition.
THAILAND
government and empowered it to revoke or alter administrative dispositions as necessary (Administrative Appeals Act,
Article 62, in Ginsburg, 2001, 606).
The South Korean APA requires advance public notice and
comment, which opens up the policy process to those interests
that have not been previously aligned with the ruling party.
The 1996 Disclosure of Information Held by Public Authorities law, which is subject to judicial review, significantly opens
up policy making. Through these and other related reforms,
the South Korean bureaucracy and policy process have grown
much more open and are subject to greater oversight by a
wider range of actors, including courts and independent actors
such as ombudsmen.
TAIWAN
Like South Korea, Taiwans reforms have focused on formalizing institutional structures and processes for increasing
accountability. Administrative reforms were driven by the
need for the ruling party (the KMT) to change its image from
one of entrenched corruption and favoritism toward wealthy
private interests to one of clean government. To do so, the
party had to rein in the very bureaucracy that had long served
as the cornerstone of its power.
Taiwans 1999 APA requires public notice and comment of
all proposed regulations and that agencies investigate administrative action appeals and notify all relevant parties of their
decisions. A Freedom of Information provision is another
major feature of Taiwans APA. This requires that most agencies disclose information to the public upon request. The APA
also allows formal adjudication, whereby parties have the right
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses at an oral
hearing. Additionally, the 1994 amendments to the Administrative Litigation Law established an administrative court.
Taiwans 1998 Administrative Litigation Act, in turn, allows
judicial review of administrative actions.
CONCLUSION
There seem to be two primary paths for increasing accountability in the Asian experience during the past twenty years.
One pathfollowed by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwanis
highly institutionalized, although there is significant variation
between these three cases. The Japanese bureaucracy is still
relatively insulated compared with South Korea and Taiwan,
but these three countries nonetheless contrast sharply with the
more decentralized systems of Indonesia and the Philippines.
IOs, particularly the World Bank, appear much more willing
and able to assist with these more decentralized paths.
The literature has tended to focus on one or the other path
and variation within that path. Thus far largely unexplored
are the equally important questions of why these appear to be
substitutes and the conditions under which states select a particular set of tools. Are decentralization and social accountability chosen only out of necessity? Alternatively, if this proves to
be a more common path outside of Asia, the question arises as
to whether a Japan would ever choose such a path, and if so
when? Is social accountability really a second choice, behind
the more preferred alternative of an APA? Or is it more likely
Assassinations, Political 95
that these states prefer to pursue these types of good governance building measures and in doing so sometimes conclude
that IO assistance (particularly World Bank) will ease some
of their burden? Determining the circumstances under which
states will opt for administrative reform, the path they will
follow if they do pursue such reforms, and the particular tools
they will select under different conditions all represent potentially fruitful avenues for future research.
To some extent, time will tell about the progression of
the decentralized cases. Accountability along the decentralization path appears to hinge on two factors: the effectiveness
of decentralization and the strength of civil society groups,
including those with IO assistance. Presumably increases in
both of these should aid accountability, but in some countries
this seems like a lot on which to hang ones hat.
See also Accountability; Centralization, Deconcentration, and
Decentralization; Institutionalism, Comparative; International
Organization.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JEEYANG RHEE BAUM
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Ackerman, John M. Social Accountability for the Public Sector: A
Conceptual Discussion. In Social Development Paper 82. Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, 2005.
Baum, Jeeyang Rhee. Presidents Have Problems Too: The Logic of
Intrabranch Delegation in East Asia. British Journal of Political Science 37,
no. 4 (2007): 659684.
Baum, Jeeyang Rhee. Responsive Democracy: Increasing State Accountability in
East Asia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming.
Bennett, Colin J. Understanding Ripple Effects: The Cross-national
Adoption of Policy Instruments for Bureaucratic Accountability.
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 10, no. 3
(1997): 213233.
Campos, Jose Edgardo, and Joel S. Hellman. Governance Gone Local: Does
Decentralization Improve Accountability. In East Asia Decentralizes: Making
Local Government Work, 237252. Washington, D.C.:World Bank, 2005.
Geddes, Barbara. Politicians Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Ginsburg, Tom. Dismantling the Developmental State? Administrative
Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea. American Journal of Comparative
Law 49, no. 4 (2001): 585625.
. Comparative Administrative Procedure: Evidence from
Northeast Asia. Constitutional Political Economy 13, no. 3 (2002):
247264.
Goetz, Anne Marie, and John Gaventa. Bringing Citizen Voice and Client
Focus into Service Delivery. Working Paper 138. Brighton, U.K.:
Institute of Development Studies, 2001.
Iszatt, Nina T. Legislating for Citizens Participation in the Philippines.
LogoLink Report. Brighton, U.K.: Institute of Development Studies,
July 2002.
Kaufmann, Daniel. Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption.
In Global Competitiveness Report 20052006, 8198. Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 2005.
McGee, Rosemary. Legal Frameworks for Citizen Participation: Synthesis
Report. LogoLink Report. Brighton, U.K.: Institute of Development
Studies, 2003.
Moreno, Erica, Brian F. Crisp, and Matthew Shugart. The Accountability
Deficit in Latin America. In Democratic Accountability in Latin America,
edited by Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, 79131. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003.
ODonnell, G. Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. In The
Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, edited
Assassinations, Political
Political assassination involves the targeted killing of people,
often but not always those who hold positions of political
authority or political office.Typically, those who carry out such
killings have a political or ideological motivation, although
they range across the political spectrum, both right wing and
left. While some assassination attempts have been carried out
by individual sociopaths, the figure of the insane assassin has
often been used to downplay or marginalize the larger political
basis of the event. Political assassinations are directed or carried
out also by members of states against civilians.
The term assassin has its origins in a militant Islamic secret
society, Hashshashin, active in the Middle East between the
eighth and fourteenth centuries. Motivated by religious and
political reasons, this Shiite sect killed members of the Sunni
elite.The first organized group to systematically use murder as a
political weapon, they also were feared by invading Crusaders.
Assassination probably has always been a tool of politics.
Among the earliest documented attempts is the attempted
assassination of Chinese Emperor Qin Shi Huang around
210 BCE. The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE stands
as one of the most famous early recorded assassinations. The
number of political assassinations grew with the emergence
and development of the modern nation-state. In the early
modern period in Russia, four emperorsIvan VI, Peter III,
Paul I, and Alexander IIwere killed in a span of less two
hundred years. Democratic regimes have experienced political assassinations as well as totalitarian regimes. In the United
States, assassins killed four presidentsAbraham Lincoln, James
Garfield, William McKinley, and John F. Kennedyand made
attempts to kill others. Political assassinations are often tactics
used by insurgent groups that lack the means to challenge a
states military apparatus. Groups that have used assassination
as a tool in larger sociopolitical struggles in the late twentieth
century include, the Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army)
96 Assimilation
since 1969, the leftist Red Brigades in Italy in the 1970s and
1980s, and Hezbollah.
With the internationalization of politics, assassinations carried out for local reasons have had wide-ranging impacts. The
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serb nationalist
Gavrilo Princip in 1914 is generally viewed as the spark that
set off World War I (19141918). The assassination of Rwandan
President Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the
Hutu president of Burundi, in 1994, their airplane shot down
as it prepared to land in Kigali, is identified as the incident that
launched the genocide in Rwanda.
Activists also have been targets for political assassination. Human rights activist and philosopher of nonviolence,
Mohandas Gandhi, was shot on January 30, 1948, by Nathuram Godse for seeking peace between Hindus and Muslims in India. Civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. was
killed in 1968 by James Earl Ray while in Memphis to assist
striking sanitation workers. Kings assassination, which was
widely viewed as an attack on the civil rights movement as
a whole, set off waves of rioting in several major American
cities. During the 1970s, U.S. Senate hearings revealed that
political assassinations against leftist and black power activists had been carried out by agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) as part of their counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO).
Critics of state violence point out that more people have
been killed through state actions than have been killed by nonstate assassins. Critics of states are certainly not lacking when
it comes to martyrs. The Haymarket martyrs, Joe Hill, Frank
Little, Gustav Landauer, Sacco and Vanzetti, the Kronstadt sailors, and the Maknovists of Ukraine are only a few of the poor
and working-class victims of state violence. The administrations of U.S. presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have
sanctioned political assassinations, including against elected
political leaders such as Mullah Omar. State-sanctioned assassinations have been cloaked in euphemisms such as targeted
strikes or extrajudicial executions. Recent assassinations carried out by the U.S. government include the killing of Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi and Sheikh Abd-al-Rahman by guided
bombs against a so-called safe house outside of Baghdad.
Assassinations have long been advocated by political theorists, including those whose works are still highly regarded. Sun
Tzu argued, on military grounds, for the use of assassinations
in his book The Art of War. In his classic of political theory, The
Prince, Niccol Machiavelli argued the utility of assassination.
One of the most notorious treatises on political assassination comes from the anarchist Sergei Nechaev in his pamphlet
Catechism of the Revolutionist. Nechaevs work inspired Bolshevik leader Vladimr Lenin. Anarchism stands as the political
philosophy most associated with advocacy of political assassination in part because of the theory of propoganda of the deed
in which some anarchists proposed assassinations as means to
inspire the exploited to mobilize against elites. Figures like
Ravachol and Emile Henry during the nineteenth century
and Leon Czolgosz, who assassinated President McKinley in
1901, are among the most famous anarchist assassins. In fact few
Niccol;
NonvioSee also Anarchy; Coup dEtat; Machiavelli,
lence;Tolstoy, Leo.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JEFFREY SHANTZ
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gross, Michael L. Moral Dilemmas of Modern War:Torture, Assassination, and
Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010.
Iqbal, Zaryab, and Christopher Zorn. Sic Semper Tyrannis? Power,
Repression, and Assassination since the Second World War. The Journal
of Politics 68 (2006): 489501.
Lentz, Harris M. Assassinations and Executions: An Encyclopedia of Political
Violence, 18651986. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1988.
. Assassinations and Executions: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence, 1900
through 2000. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2002.
Nelson, Michael. Guide to the Presidency. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2008.
Snitch, Thomas H. Terrorism and Political Assassinations: A Transnational
Assessment, 196880. Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 463 (September 1982): 5468.
Assembly, Freedom of
See Freedom of Assembly.
Assimilation
Assimilation is the name of a process in which cultural minorities change their practices, values, or behavior in order to
become more like members of the majority or dominant
group among which they live. Assimilation may occur in the
absence of state intervention, as the result of choices made by
individual members of minority groups (albeit in a context
where there are often benefits that accompany assimilation
and that provide incentives to make that choice), or it may
be a product of state policies that are specifically designed to
bring it about; for example, when a state forbids the speaking
of a minority language in schools.
Assimilationist policies are often distinguished from integrationist policies or practices. Sometimes assimilation is regarded
as a process in which minority cultural groups abandon all of
their distinctive values and practices, in effect relinquishing their
particular identities, while integration involves members of these
groups merely giving up some of their particular values and practices to become more like members of the dominant group.
Alternatively, integration may be viewed as a two-way process
that, unlike assimilation, requires change on both sides. Whereas
assimilation requires minority cultural groups to change their
values, practices, or behaviors to fit in with those of the dominant group, integration involves a process of mutual adjustment.
Astell, Mary 97
An integrated society is in turn often contrasted with one in
which different cultural groups lead parallel lives in the same
society. So understood, integration requires members of different groups to come into meaningful contact with each other, to
lead more of their lives together. This is sometimes an effort to
promote community cohesion and greater trust between groups.
A powerful argument in favor of assimilationist policies is
that such policies may be required to foster a single, shared
culture, and that a single, shared culture is either necessary
for, or at least conducive to, the stability of a state. Theorists
of nationalism have sometimes appealed to this idea to justify policies that are designed to promote a shared national
identity among citizens and even to restrict immigration to
prevent that identity from being eroded. Those on the left of
the political spectrum also may have reason to value a shared
national identity, for it has been argued that such an identity is
important to secure widespread support for redistribution on
grounds of social justice.
Alternatively, a powerful argument against assimilationist
policies is that they are either oppressive or counterproductive. Political theorist Iris Young (1990), for example, claims
that assimilated groups suffer from cultural imperialism. When
a policy of assimilation is pursued, the dominant cultural
group will see themselves as objectively superior and cultural
minorities will internalize a sense of inferiority.This argument
may not always be successful, however. Assimilationist policies
can be directed toward practices that are themselves oppressive, such as forced marriage and female genital mutilation.
A policy of assimilation, however, need not be premised or
implemented on the idea that the dominant culture is superior, and may be pursued through a range of initiatives that are
not clearly oppressive. Examples include requiring immigrants
to learn the language in which public affairs are conducted or
requiring that state schools focus on the history, geography,
and literature of the dominant group.
See also Individual and Society; Segregation and Desegregation;
Xenophobia;Young, Iris Marion.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANDREW D. MASON
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Modood, T. Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 2007.
Young, Iris. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1990.
Association, Freedom of
See Freedom of Association.
Astell, Mary
English philosopher, educator, and theologian, Mary Astell
(16661713) was born in Newcastle, England, but moved to
London when she was orphaned by the age of 18. When she
was 23, William and Mary were crowned in England after the
Glorious Revolution of 1688. Astell had been educated by her
uncle, Ralph Astell, who influenced her royalist beliefs, and
she remained a loyal Tory.
98 Asylum Rights
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Hill, Bridget, ed. The First English Feminist: Reflections upon Marriage and Other
Writings by Mary Astell. Adlershot, U.K.: Gower, 1986.
Hunt, Margaret, Margaret Jacob, Phyllis Mack, and Ruth Perry, eds. Women
and the Enlightenment. New York: Haworth, 1984.
Smith, Florence M. Mary Astell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1916.
Springborg, Patricia. Mary Astell:Theorist of Freedom from Dominion. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Sutherland, Christine Mason. Eloquence of Mary Astell. Calgary, A.B.:
University of Calgary, 2005.
Asylum Rights
Asylum is protection offered by a government to persons who
face persecution in their home country for reasons including race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. It is possible to separate discussion
of asylum rights from the question of international refugee protection. Such a distinction is, however, unhelpful, and modern
analysis of asylum rights should be framed in the context of
wider global refugee debates.The treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers has become a defining feature of the modern age.
The protection and promotion of human rights have particular
significance for these groups. While the concept of asylum has
ancient origins, the right to seek asylum gained international
recognition in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1948. Article 14(1) provides that everyone has the right to seek
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. The
concept gained further acknowledgement in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948, the American Convention on Human Rights 1969, the Organisation for
African Unity Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa 1969, the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights 1981, the Arab Charter on Human Rights 1984,
and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000.
The right to seek asylum is to be found in a range of international instruments; the challenge is establishing whether refuge
is in fact being provided. Possessing a right to seek asylum, or
even a right to leave your country of origin, is important, but
states remain firmly wedded to notion that granting entry is a
foundational sovereign right of the state.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees are
the legal instruments that have gained widespread acceptance in
the international community. Provision is made for the definition of refugee, as well as protections and guarantees that attach
to that status.The definition contains several elements. First, the
person must be outside the country of origin and be unable or
unwilling to avail of state protection. Those displaced within
their own countries are therefore not refugees for convention
purposes. Internally displaced persons can be particularly vulnerable (and are more numerous globally), yet in international
legal terms they are not refugees. Second, the person must have
a well-founded fear of being persecuted. This test combines
the objective (well-founded) and the subjective (fear) with the
prospective being persecuted. Many refugee determination
systems are therefore concerned with establishing what might
happen to the person upon return to the country of origin.This
Asymmetric Wars 99
Hathaway, James C., and Colin J. Harvey. Framing Refugee Law in the
New World Disorder. Cornell International Law Journal 34, no. 2 (2001):
257320.
UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, 2010, www.unhcr.org.
Asymmetric Wars
Asymmetric wars are historically armed conflicts in which one
actor has significantly more power, usually a larger military
or navy, which subsequently compels a weaker opponent to
undertake unconventional strategies or tactics to overcome
the quantitative or qualitative power deficit. Asymmetric
wars were typically guerilla conflicts that emphasized the
use of insurgent attacks to disrupt supply lines and weaken
an enemys morale. Small groups would use the weapons or
materials at hand to attempt to inflict the maximum political and military damage. Consequently, asymmetric warfare
involves the use of limited resources to result in attacks or
impacts that are largely out of proportion to the weapons
used. In contemporary military doctrine, asymmetric warfare
is defined as any conflict in which an actor seeks to exploit
the weaknesses of an opponent by concentrating resources or
weapons against vulnerabilities.
Atlantic Charter
The Atlantic Charter was an agreement by U.S. President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that set forth the two countries war aims and
laid out their vision of a postWorld War II world.The charter
was drafted at the Atlantic Conference, a secret meeting held
August 9 through 12, 1941, aboard two warships (HMS Prince
of Wales and USS Augusta) anchored in Ship Harbour, Newfoundland, Canada. The secrecy was due to fears that German
submarines would target Roosevelt and Churchill.
The Atlantic Conference was the first of nine face-to-face
meetings that the two leaders would have during World War
II (19391945). Joining Roosevelt and Churchill were highranking government officials and military officers, who discussed military strategy and the challenges of supplying Great
Britain under the Lend-Lease Act (Public Law 7711).The law,
enacted by Congress in March 1941, allowed the United States
to transfer weapons to any nation vital to the defense of the
United States.
The Atlantic Charter was issued as a joint declaration by
the two leaders on August 14, 1941, at a time when the British
were fighting Nazi Germany and the United States was still
neutral. A statement that accompanied the declaration noted
that the leaders,
have considered the dangers to world civilization arising
from the policies of military domination by conquest
upon which the Hitlerite government of Germany and
other governments associated therewith have embarked,
and have made clear the stress which their countries are
respectively taking for their safety in the face of these
dangers.
The two nations agreed to eight common principles:
(1) the United States and United Kingdom would not seek
territorial gains from the war; (2) territorial changes would
not take place that were not in accord with the wishes of the
people affected; (3) people have the right to choose their form
of government, and national sovereignty should be restored
to those from which it was taken forcibly; (4) the lowering
of trade barriers for all nations; (5) global collaboration to
JEFFREY KRAUS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Borgwardt, Elizabeth. A New Deal for the World: Americas Vision for Human
Rights. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2005.
Brinkley, Douglas, and David R. Facey-Crowther, eds. The Atlantic Charter.
New York: St. Martins, 1994.
Morton, H.V. Atlantic Meeting. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1943.
Wilson, Theodore A. The First Summit; Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay
1941, rev. ed. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991.
At-Large Elections
In at-large elections, members are chosen to represent an entire
political unit, as opposed to a single district or ward. At-large
elections are most commonly used in the United States in local
or regional balloting. Proponents of at-large balloting contend
the system allows members to take a broader view of policy
and not become tied to the narrow interests of a single ward or
district. The system emerged in Great Britain in the eighteenth
century, but was replaced by the use of single district voting in
the 1800s in response to concerns over the capacity of at-large
representatives to respond to constituent needs in individual districts and wards. In the United States, the system became widespread in the late 1800s as a progressive reform to reduce the
power of corrupt political bosses. Later, during the civil rights
movement, at-large systems were implemented in the Southern
Attorney General
The role of the attorney general is to provide legal expertise
and support to the government. A number of nations, from
Canada to Kenya, possess an office or ministry of the attorney
general. The responsibilities and institutional constraints of
these offices vary by country and political context. In some
countries, the office is ministerial, dealing mainly with routine
litigation, while in others it is much more politicized with a
diverse array of functions.
Most nations formally under British rule established an
office of attorney general. Some countries codified the office
in their constitutions or by statute, while others did not.There
are also differences in terms of which branch of government
the office is located in and the appointment process. In the
United States, the attorney general is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. In contrast, the Canadian
attorney general is a member of Parliament appointed by the
prime minister.
The office of attorney general has a long history that has
roots in medieval England, when the kings attorney represented the Crowns interests in court. In 1472, the title of attorney general was used for the first time with the appointment
of William Hussee, and in 1673 the attorney general became
an official member of parliament in England.
Before independence from Britain, each American colony
had an attorney general who served as a liaison to the English
attorney general. Their duties varied from colony to colony.
The first recorded appointment to the office in America was
Richard Lee of Virginia in 1643. The English established similar offices in other locations throughout the British Empire to
serve the interests of the Crown.
The office of attorney general is not explicitly discussed in
the U.S. Constitution. It was established by the Judiciary Act of
1789 as part of the executive branch. Early in U.S. history, the
office of attorney general was informally structured, low paying, and undemanding. Over the years the responsibilities of
the office slowly increased. It was not until 1870, however, that
Congress established the Department of Justice. As head of the
department, the attorney general could better coordinate legal
policy by overseeing governmental litigation. In the twentyfirst century, the U.S. attorney general administers the Department of Justice, represents the government, and offers advice
on legal issues, as well as plays an important role consulting the
president on judicial nominations.
Auditing
See Program Evaluation and Auditing.
Augustine of Hippo
Aurelius Augustine (354430), or Saint Augustine, was a
theologian and father of the Christian church. His autobiographical Confessions (c. 397) and City of God against the Pagans
(413427) shaped medieval European ideas about political
order, freedom, soul, inner life, will, sin, evil, just war, history, time, religion, immortality, love, and God. His thought
is influential across all Christian denominations, especially
perhaps Calvinism, and extends into the contemporary age
even among secular thinkers. Examples of his influence
include French philosopher Ren Descartes meditations, the
question of contemporary politics when the appropriate relationship of religion and politics is considered, and the degree
to which communities of faith can share the same political
principles with those outside their communities.
See also Arendt, Hannah; Cicero, Marcus Tullius; Just War
Theory; Reformation Political Thought; Religion and Politics;
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques;Thomas Aquinas;Tocqueville, Alexis de.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOHN VON HEYKING
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Augustine. Confessions, translated by F. J. Sheed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1970.
Augustine. City of God against the Pagans, translated by R. W. Dyson.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Arendt, Hannah. Love and Saint Augustine, edited by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott
and Judith Chelius Stark. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo, rev. ed. London: Faber and Faber, 2000.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Augustine and the Limits of Politics. Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1995.
Fitzgerald, Allan D., ed. Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia. Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999.
Heyking, John von. Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World. Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 2001.
Australian Ballot
The Australian Ballot is one form of the secret ballot, a method
of voting where the voters choices are confidential. The purpose of the secret ballot is to ensure that voters will not be
subjected to undue influence, as their vote will not be known
to anyone else.
This voting method is known as the Australian Ballot
because it originated in Australia during the 1850s. With this
particular ballot, all candidate names are preprinted on a ballot
provided by the government and given to the voter at the poll
site. The voters then fill out their ballot in private.
In the United States, prior to the introduction of the Australian ballot, political parties and others would print ballots
and distribute them to voters. In Great Britain and Australia,
voters would hand in signed voting papers indicating their
choice and their own name and address. The open vote made it
possible to determine how voters cast their ballots, subjecting
voters to bribery or intimidation.
Autarky
Autarky means self-sufficiency, or nonattachment, especially
in relation to economics. In economic literature it refers to
a closed economy. The term should not be confused with
autarchia, which is the act of self-ruling. Autarky is understood
both as a theoretical construct of comparative advantage
and as economic self-sufficiency. Autarky is a foundational
concept in the doctrine of comparative advantage. David
Ricardo sought to enhance Adam Smiths theory of absolute advantage by means of the principle of comparative
advantage and trade that Robert Torrens originated. Ricardo
thereby introduced into economic literature the theory of
comparative cost advantage in international trade. For the
purpose of independence from international influence, autarkic countries should be self-sufficient and not engaged in
international trade. Historical examples of autarky just prior
to the beginning of World War II (19391945) include Fascist
Italy when the League of Nations sanctioned an embargo,
Hitlers expressed desire for Germany in the Hossbach Memorandum, and Spain following an Allied embargo subsequent
to its civil war.
Autarky, however, is quite rare in the current age. China
is an example of a country that pursued a policy of almost
entire autarky until recently, and it was not until the 1970s
that India began the process of eliminating powerful trade
barriers. Even North Korea, which is perhaps the only current autarky, practices some trade with China and Japan.
Modern countries that have pursued autarky through
the substitution of domestic production for imports have
reduced themselves to inefficiency and poverty, compared
to those countries that are competitive in foreign trade. The
population demand for production of a full range of goods
at competitive prices is impossible to be achieved by any
country. It is because trade is beneficial to society that higher
commodity prices do not eliminate the doctrine of comparative advantage.
Authoritarianism, African
Authoritarianism is a form of political governance in which a
ruler exercises absolute control over a state or group of people
with the ultimate goal being preservation of power. In Africa,
in addition to the elected presidents who have usurped power
and turned themselves into presidents for life, military dictators are another category of authoritarians. Wherever military coups have occurred and a military oligarchy (junta) has
taken power, a strong autocrat has always managed to emerge
with the help of supportive military forces. Three such cases
are those of President Muammar Qaddafi of Libya (1969
to present), former strongman Idi Amin Dada of Uganda
(19711979), and former president Jerry Rawlings of Ghana
(19792000). This prevailing style of autocracy has earned
African authoritarianism the alternative title of personal rule.
While authoritarianism can take many different forms,
African authoritarianism has three main characteristics.
The first is a high level of violence and political intimidation
against perceived opponents of the regime.Visible proof here
is the openly meted police brutality against perceived opposition. A related element is the denial of government services
and constitutionally guaranteed rights to those seen as opposing the regime.
The second distinctive feature is a high level of embedment
in the existing social and cultural environment. The third is a
remarkably low appeal to ideology. African authoritarian rulers have sought to portray themselves as cultural icons and to
embed their governments in preexisting cultural structures.
At the height of his authoritarian rule, former president
Daniel arap Moi of Kenya (19782002) sought to apply the
Nyayo philosophy of peace, love, and unity as a tool for
mobilization of the masses. Beyond rallying around the ruling
KANU party however, what most legitimatized his authority
to the masses was his appeal to the African traditional custom
of respect for elders. Posing as a traditional African elder, complete with the title mzee (Swahili for elder), Moi was able to
put in place a formidable patron-client system that strongly
legitimized his position and brought him support, even in the
face of increasing international pressure and a budding political
opposition to his rule. President Mois predecessor, President
Jomo Kenyatta, served for more than 14 years as a patron to
various localized constituencies, including ethnic groups and
104 Authority
womens organizations. In Libya, Muammar Qaddafi has successfully appealed to his countrys strong Islamic background
and has held on to power by portraying himself as one of the
respected Islamic prophets.
Although the development of authoritarianism in modern African states can partly be traced back to the colonial
administrations that preceded them and whose structures
they inherited, it can be argued that African authoritarianism preceded European colonialism. Precolonial Africa had a
fair share of authoritarian rulers like Shaka, head of the Zulu
people. In essence, what European colonialism did was to
introduce more political structures to endow the practice of
authoritarianism. Such emergent political structures include
restrictive economic and political structures, easy to manipulate court systems, a rubber-stamping legislature essential for
legitimizing the actions of an authoritarian leader, and even a
structured bureaucracy that could be employed to enforce the
whims of the authoritarian ruler.
Further, ensuing tribalism as a result of colonial divideand-rule strategies helped enhance the role of modern African
authoritarian rulers as defenders and all-able benefactors of
their people, regardless of constitutional stipulations. Through
a combination of hero worship, open nepotism, and corruption using the resources of the state, a formidable system of
client-patron relationships has taken shape in many African
states. In so doing, the authoritarian rulers have become
strongly entrenched in government.
A distinct outcome of African authoritarianism in almost
all cases has been the deterioration of African economies,
given the states incompetence and heightened corruption
that breeds restrictive monopolies to benefit the elite. Despite
the continents abundance of natural resources, noticeably few
African countries can claim a plausible takeoff in industrialization. African authoritarian rulers and their henchmen have
repeatedly stolen their countries resources and turned them
into personal property, to the detriment of their people. A
case in point is the late Mobutu Ss Seko of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) who presided over the
historical looting of his countrys natural resources and who
became one of the richest men on the continent at a time
when extreme poverty continued to ravage his country.
Agriculture, which is the backbone for many African
economies, has suffered also due to neglect and exploitation
of the mostly subsistent farmers based in the rural areas. With
no reliable means of income, many in the continent have sunk
to unprecedented levels of poverty. While President Robert
Mugabes country of Zimbabwe was once considered to be
Africas most successful agricultural state, more than twentyeight years of Mugabes authoritarian rule, and a no-holdsbarred approach to preservation of his power by eliminating
any source of organized opposition, has left the country dilapidated and scrounging for food, amid high levels of poverty.
See also African Political Thought; African Politics and Society:
Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governence in.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . HENRY KIRAGU WAMBUII
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ayittey, George B. N. Africa Betrayed. New York: St. Martins, 1992.
NDiaye, Boubacar, Abdoulaye Saine, and Mathurin Houngnikpo. Not Yet
Democracy:West Africas Slow Farewell to Authoritarianism. Durham, N.C.:
Carolina Academic Press, 2005.
Schraeder, Peter J. African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000.
Tordoff, William. Government and Politics in Africa, 4th ed. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2002.
Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic
See Bureaucratic Authoriatarianism.
Authority
Defining political authority is a useful exercise for it raises the
central problems of political theory. There is therefore no easy
way to discuss authority without encountering important
controversy. Rather than supply a settled definition of authority, what follows discusses the central questions that such an
attempt inevitably raises.
DEFINING POLITICS
To understand political authority, it is necessary first to try
to define politics. The most influential modern definition
described the modern state as a human community that
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory (Weber 2004). Weber
sought to define politics in a purely descriptive, value-free
manner. Notice that the state has authority not just because
it has a monopoly of violence, but because its monopoly is
claimed, successfully, to be legitimate. There seems to be a
difference, intuited by most, between genuine authority and
mere force. Where genuine authority obliges us, force alone
merely compels. But what adds legitimacy to force, and turns
it into authority? Whats the difference between authoritative
force and merely successful force? Weber abstains from giving
legitimacy value-content. Legitimacy may be viewed in many
ways, but the state, as a state, is successful in advancing its claim
to it, whatever that claim may be. Legitimate force is force that
has succeeded in advancing its claim to legitimacy.This applies,
therefore, to force that has merely succeeded in controlling
minds as well as bodies. But this means that, in Webers terms,
authority is power, or rather, that there is no intelligible content to authority, if by authority we seek something other than
power that has managed to mobilize or indoctrinate.
Authority 105
To investigate authority is to investigate justice, about
which there is a distinguished history of ideas. Rather than
attempt a survey here, it may be useful to suggest, as a preview
of such a survey, one point of comparison that sheds light on
the question of authority. The following presentation is meant
to be highly provisional, an invitation to first steps.
Arguments about justice, and therefore genuine authority,
are often grounded in assertions about the purpose of government. Justice means accomplishing a particular end, which then
defines the nature of authority and its limits. For example, the
purpose of Socrates utopian city in The Republic appears to be
the greatest possible fulfillment of the basic human types consistent with the greatest possible harmony of the types with each
other. To create and manage a city that accomplishes this, he
argues, a ruler is needed who has the greatest possible wisdom
about human types, their fulfillment and education, and their
relations to each other.This ruler also needs tremendous power
in the areas of education and procreation. True authority, then,
has to combine these particular powers with this particular wisdom: a philosopher-king. Both his particular wisdom (about
the human good) and these particular powers (to turn individuals into harmonious fellow citizens) are necessary to achieve
the citys purpose, which defines justice. Only this union of
power and wisdom then, embodied in a philosopher-king, has
genuine authority. It is precisely in the avowed unlikelihood of
such a union that Platos subtle subversion of all actual political
authority consists.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G. BORDEN FLANAGAN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, James Madison, and Clinton Rossiter. The
Federalist Papers, edited by Charles R. Kesler. New York: Signet Classics,
2003.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, edited by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett,
1994.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government, edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Machiavelli, Niccol. The Prince, translated by Harvey Mansfield Jr. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1985.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. In The
Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed., edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York:
Norton, 1978.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty and Other Writings, edited by Stefan Collini.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Montesquieu, Charles. The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge Texts in the History of
Political Thought), edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and
Harold Samuel Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil, translated by Walter Kaufmann.
New York:Vintage, 1966.
Plato. The Republic of Plato, translated and edited by Allan Bloom. New York:
Basic Books, 1991.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice: Original Edition. New York: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2005.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Basic Political Writings, translated and edited by
Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.
Weber, Max. The Vocation Lectures: Science as a Vocation, Politics as a Vocation,
edited by David S. Owen and Tracy B. Strong, translated by Rodney
Livingstone. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004
106 Autocracy
Autocracy
Autocracy is a form of government in which a single person
has unlimited authority to exercise power. The word comes
from two ancient Greek words, auto- (self ) and -cracy
(rule from kratia). Modern authors are more likely to use
the term authoritarian than autocracy, which is commonly
used by some to describe ancient regimes that prevailed in
backward societies without legal and political institutions to
protect individuals.
PREVALENCE OF AUTOCRACY
IN HISTORY
Until the advent of modern government, beginning with the
American Revolution (17761783), almost all governments
were autocratic governments ruled by tribal chiefs, kings, or
emperors, with the exception of the ancient Greek democracies. Autocratic rulers have usually been accepted as the sole
source of legitimate power, unless a competing autocrat were
accepted as more just or successful or legitimate. The autocrat
is not limited by constitutional or popular restraints or by
political opposition. If any opposition arises, it is usually not
tolerated and is eliminated.
The ancient empires of the Assyrians, Babylonians, Egyptians, and Persians were fully autocratic. Various dynasties of
ancient China were ruled by individuals in whom the power
of their political system was centered. The Inca in Peru or
various other empires around the world were without a doubt
autocratic. Many autocracies were also theocracies because the
exercise of power by the autocrat was based on some claim to
divine right. The Buddhist theocracies or those of the Mayans
were autocratic but also theocratic. It was mainly the Greek
democracies that opposed autocratic government.
Even today autocratic governments exist in many places.
Arab sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf region can be described
as autocratic; although their rule often appears to be benign,
it is still very strong. This can have administrative advantages
because decisions can often be achieved without having to
engage in exhausting battles with interest groups or opposition parties that exist in democratic states. Thus, a decision to
adopt green technology can be made by the ruler even if other
interests are hurt.
THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS OF
AUTOCRACY: ARISTOTLE TO HOBBES
Aristotle in his discussions of the forms or constitutions of
government in his books Ethics, Rhetoric, and Politics defined
monarchy and tyranny as rule by a single individual. The difference between a monarch and a tyrant lay in the object of
concern of the autocrat. It was the people in the case of the
monarch but self-interest in the case of the tyrant. Because
tyrants have often masked their political actions, it has been
difficult at times to distinguish them from monarchs.
Niccol Machiavelli supported absolutism, which was
similar to autocracy. He wanted a centralizing power in the
hands of an absolute ruler as a solution for the violent strife
between the various city-states that was wracking Renaissance
Autonomy 107
Autocracy can appear in areas of life other than civil politics. Religious organizations, businesses, management styles
(e.g.,Theory X), or family life may be dominated by autocratic
persons or groups.
See also Bodin, Jean; Hobbes,Thomas; Machiavelli, Niccol.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANDREW J. WASKEY
BIBLIOGRAPH Y
Downing, Brian. Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy
and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1993.
Friedrich, Carl J. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1965.
Roller, Matthew B. Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in JulioClaudian Rome. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Rotberg, Robert. Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy:The Tribulations of
Southern Africa, 19602000. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2002.
Tullock, Gordon. Autocracy. Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1987.
White, Ralph K. Autocracy and Democracy: An Experimental Inquiry.
New York: Harper, 1960.
Autogestion
Autonomy
Autogestion, a term used especially among French- and Spanishlanguage worker movements, refers to workers self-management
and workplace control. Forms of activity undertaken by
autogestion movements include workers cooperatives, workers councils, and syndicalism or revolutionary unionism.
The notion of autogestion makes an early appearance in
the works of the French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in
the nineteenth century. Perhaps the most extensive expression
of autogestion occurred in Barcelona under anarchist direction
during the Spanish Revolution (19361939). In France during
the 1960s and 1970s the writings of social theorist Andr Gorz
were particularly influential in mobilizations over demands for
workers self-control. The 1973 worker occupation and selfmanagement of the LIP clockwork factory in France was the
most influential moment in the autogestion movement during
the cold war period. It sparked international movements for
libertarian socialism and anarchist communism, which advocated autogestion as a grassroots working-class alternative to
party-led forms of socialism and communism.
During the twenty-first century, autogestion has become an
important working-class response to the closure of factories in
Argentina following the economic crisis of 2001. The recovered factory movement has involved the takeover of numerous
workplaces, which have restarted production on a democratically controlled, cooperative basis by employees, after employers had abandoned them.
Autogolpe
Autogolpe is a Spanish ter m translated as self-coup.
An autogolpe occurs when a seated president seizes power,
often with the assistance of the military, and shuts down the
POLITICAL AUTONOMY
Autonomy of the first kindthe autonomy of the selfgoverning political unitwas closely related in Greek thought
to the concept of autarky (from autarkeia), or self-sufficiency.
For a polis or state to be self-governing, according to the usual
argument, it must be free to chart its own course, independent
of the will of other political units. If it is to be truly independent, however, it will have to meet all, or almost all, of its own
material needs; otherwise it will find itself dependent on those
who provide it with food and other vital resources. Such a
polis will be autonomous in name only.
Contemporary discussions of political autonomy sometimes
touch on this connection between autonomy and autarky, but
108 Autonomy
they are more likely to concentrate on the relations of political
units and subunits. In some cases the question is how much
control over its own affairs a sovereign state can or should surrender, yet remain autonomous, when it joins an entity such
as the United Nations or the European Union. In other cases,
political autonomy is primarily a problem of the relations
between a region or subunit and the overarching political
unit in which it finds itself. Familiar examples include Quebecs relationship with Canada, the Kurds relationship with
Iraq, and the place of Scotland and Wales within the United
Kingdom. Often the region or subunit wants full autonomy,
to be achieved by secession, but sometimes arrangements are
made to keep it within the larger political unit while granting
it control over local matters that directly concern those who
inhabit the subunit. Arrangements of this kind recognize what
is often called regional or provincial autonomy.
PERSONAL AUTONOMY
Autonomy as a property of political units may have been the
primary sense in which ancient writers used the term, but
there is at least one important reference to personal autonomy in Greek literature. This occurs in Sophocles tragedy
Antigone, when the Chorus refers to the title character as
autonomos: true to your own laws (Sophocles 2001, 36). This
concept seems not to have played a major part in Western
philosophy, however, until the eighteenth century. French
Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau did not
use the term, but his brief discussion of moral liberty
has overtones of autonomy, as when he proclaims that the
impulse of appetite alone is slavery, and obedience to the law
one has prescribed for oneself is freedom (Rousseau 1978).
Rousseaus admirer, German philosopher Immanuel Kant,
developed this assertion into a distinction between autonomy
and heteronomy, or being ruled by othersincluding rule by
ones own irrational desires.
Whether autonomy is necessarily a good thingand what
exactly it ishas been the subject of much discussion and
debate in the past fifty years or so. The point of departure for
these debates is often British philosopher Isaiah Berlins lecture,
Two Concepts of Liberty. There Berlin connects the desire
for autonomy to the retreat to the inner citadel (Berlin 1969,
135)that is, the desire for self-mastery that is achieved by
withdrawing into isolation and self-denial. Most other writers,
however, take a more positive view of autonomy. In Stanley
Benns account, for example, autonomy is a character ideal that
leads the individual to try to form a consistent and coherent
set of beliefs, albeit a set that must continually be adjusted in
light of critical reflection.
Personal autonomy is frequently taken to be an ideal of
the liberal tradition. Autonomy is certainly at home within
liberalism, which greatly values individual liberty, but it is by
no means clear that it is an exclusively liberal ideal. Nevertheless, some critics of liberalism, including some feminists, have
complained that autonomy is an individualistic concept that
deflects attention from the importance of community and
social relations, especially caring relations. Parents, for example,
should be less concerned with their autonomy than with the
needs of their dependent children.
In response, supporters of autonomy as an ideal agree that
it is an individualistic concept, but they deny that it is the kind
of individualism that ignores or even erodes important social
relations. Personal autonomy is something that individuals exercise, but they can exercise it only when their capacity for selfgovernment has been sufficiently developed. Yet developing that
capacity is something that no one can do alone. In other words,
no person can be autonomous unless others help that person to
become autonomous. One of the things the autonomous person should realize, then, is the importance of protecting and
nurturing those relationshipsand the other conditionsthat
protect and promote autonomy. What the role of government
should be in this attempt to further autonomy has become one
of the principal concerns of political philosophers.
See also Autarky; Berlin, Isaiah; Greek Political Thought, Ancient;
Individual and Society; Kant, Immanuel; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques;
Self-determination; Sovereignty.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RICHARD DAGGER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Benn, Stanley. A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988.
Berlin, Isaiah. Two Concepts of Liberty. In Four Essays on Liberty, edited by
Isaiah Berlin, 118172. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.
Christman, John, ed. The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989.
Christman, John, and Joel Anderson, eds. Autonomy and the Challenges to
Liberalism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Dworkin, Gerald. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988.
Hannum, Hurst. Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination:The
Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, rev. ed. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1996.
Haworth, Lawrence. Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics.
New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 1986.
Kant, Immanuel. 1785. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated by
Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Lindley, Richard. Autonomy. Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1986.
Nedelsky, Jennifer. Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and
Possibilities. Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1 (Spring 1989): 736.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1762. On the Social Contract, edited by
Roger Masters and translated by Judith Masters. New York:
St. Martins, 1978.
Schneewind, J. B. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Sophocles. Antigone. Translated by Paul Woodruff. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001.
Young, Robert. Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty.
London: Croom Helm, 1986.
B
Baathism
The starting point for understanding the ideology of the
Arab Baath (also Baath or Bath; Arabic for resurrection or
renaissance) Socialist Party, is its slogan, Unity, Freedom,
Socialism. Generally known as the Baath, it emerged in the
early 1940s in Syria, but sometimes is considered a successor to another Syrian organization, the League of National
Action, which dates back to 1932. The party spread to other
Arab countries, particularly in the Fertile Crescent region.
Its ideology represents an articulation of Arab nationalist and
anticolonial thinking then ubiquitous in the area, especially
among young educated people of modest origin.
The precise date of the founding of the party is subject to
some controversy, as two separate groups, largely made up of
high school students, appeared almost simultaneously under
the name Arab Baath Party. One of these soon disappeared,
with its members joining the group led by two Syrian high
school teachers, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar. The
party added the word socialist to its name when it merged
with the Arab Socialist Party of Akram Hourani, a prominent agitator for peasants rights in the Hama district of Syria
(who broke away from that party in 1962). A national convention adopted a constitution for the Baath Party, which later
changed its name to Socialist Baath Party, in 1947.
The Baath eventually gained influence in electoral politics
in Syria during the mid-1950s and later became the ruling
party of Syria following a Baathist coup in 1963. Baathists also
took power in Iraq in 1963, only to be overthrown later in
the same year. Another coup in 1968 ushered in a period of
Baathist rule in Iraq that endured until the American invasion
of 2003, when the party was banned. Baathists (or ex-Baathists)
apparently have played a significant role in the anti-American
insurgency in the country since then.The Baath had considerable support in Jordan during the 1950s, particularly among
the Palestinian population, but declined as a result of the
regimes repressiveness and its own factionalism.
FREEDOM
The word freedom in Baath Party usage carries multiple implications. It connotes freedom from the colonialism that dominated much of the Arab world when the party first emerged,
as well as from continuing subordination to outside powers (that is, the freedom of the nation). Baathists have been
committed to the slogan of nonalignment while cooperating
pragmatically with particular big powers.
Freedom also seemed to refer originally to freedom for the
individual. Baathists gave strong support for such democratic
principles as the direct election of members to the Syrian
parliament and female suffrage in the late 1940s. But Baathist
109
SOCIALISM
Socialism always was subordinate to unity in the hierarchy
of Baathist goals. Baathist socialist ideology, like other versions of Arab socialism, stresses the need to end exploitation
and promote social justice. It advocates nationalization of big
enterprises while leaving much of the economy in the hands
of small owners. It calls for limits on ownership of agricultural
land. The partys constitution, adopted in 1947, declares property and inheritance to be natural rights . . . protected within
the limits of the national interest. In practice, the Baathist
regimes of Syria and Iraq brought formerly underprivileged
people to power and established relatively statist economies,
although both implemented some economic liberalization in
the 1980s.
Although Baathist regimes generally received much backing from communist countries, the Baath Party was always
anticommunist, due to the Baathists ideology and their
unwillingness to tolerate other political groups in their countries. They sometimes collaborated with Western powers
against communism, as in the case of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agencys 1963 help in bringing the Baath to power in
Iraq and implementing an anticommunist pogrom. Like other
proponents of socialism, both Baathist regimes pursued policies of land reform and nationalization but never attempted to
abolish all private ownership.
Bachrach, Peter
Peter Bachrach (19182007) was a political scientist and a
prominent analyst of participatory democracy.
Born in Winnetka, Illinois, Bachrach earned his bachelors
degree from Reed College in Portland, Oregon, and a PhD in
political science from Harvard University in 1951. He joined
the faculty of Bryn Mawr College in 1946. In 1968, he moved
to Temple University, where he remained until his retirement
in 1988. In 1980, he was a visiting professor at the Graduate
School of the City University of New York.
Bachrach is best known for his 1962 article, Two Faces of
Power, which he coauthored with Morton S. Baratz. Published in the American Political Science Review, it is the most
widely cited article in the discipline of political science. In
their article, Bachrach and Baratz argued that a lack of controversy may reflect latent power conflicts.
According to Bachrach, prevailing institutions and political processes could limit the decision-making abilities and the
JEFFREY KRAUS
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Bachrach, Peter. The Theory of Democratic Elitish: A Critique. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1967.
Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. Two Faces of Power. American
Political Science Review 56 (December 1962): 947952.
. Power and Poverty:Theory and Practice. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1970.
Bachrach, Peter, and Elihu Bergman. Power and Choice:The Formulation of
American Population Policy. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973.
Bachrach, Peter, and Aryeh Botwinick. Power and Empowerment: A Radical
Theory of Participatory Democracy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1992.
Bagehot, Walter
Walter Bagehot (18261877) was an economist and political
journalist and one of the most influential writers on the British constitution until recent times. Bagehot is so important
that other commentators have treated his doctrines, published
in 1867, as if they were part of the unwritten constitution
itself.
Bagehot was born into a banking family in Somerset in
southwestern England. Bored by banking, he turned to journalism and edited The Economist from 1861 until his death.
His main legacy is a pair of books: The English Constitution
(1865) and Lombard Street (1873), a study of the role of the
central bank. Bagehots writing is clear and persuasive, and his
influence is still apparent today: the United Kingdoms politics correspondent for the modern Economist writes under the
penname Bagehot (pronounced badge-ot).
In The English Constitution, Bagehots target is political philosopher Charles-Louis Montesquieus claim that the United
Kingdoms liberty is due to a separation of powers. He argues
that Montesquieu (and perhaps the American Federalists) got
England completely wrong. (Like many Victorians, Bagehot
failed to distinguish between England and the United Kingdom and was thus insensitive to Scotland and Ireland.) The
efficient secret of the English constitution was the cabinet,
a buckle that joined the dignified (the formal institutions
of governance: church, Parliament, and above all the monarchy) to the efficient part of the constitution. According to
Montesquieu and the Federalists, the key to liberty lies with
the separation of powers. According to Bagehot, it lies with
concealing the efficient part of government (the cabinet operating through its control of the House of Commons) behind
the dignified faade of crown and establishment. Power was
fused, not separated. The executive ran the country through
its control of both the permanent officials and (normally) the
majority of seats in the House of Commons. Because of the
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, whereby statutes trump
all other forms of law, the judiciary also occupied a subordinate role. There was no judicial review of either legislation or
executive acts in Bagehots constitution.
Bagehot was contemptuous of the monarch and her heir,
calling them a retired widow and an unemployed youth. But
he thought that having an ordinary family at the head of state
was advantageous to social order. People would, he believed, follow the lives of the retired widow and the unemployed youth
with interest, and not concern themselves with the efficient part
of government, which could be left to competent statesmen.
Curiously, successive British monarchs have learned their
constitution from Bagehot, despite his evident contempt for
the royal familys intelligence. Even more curiously, so have
most subsequent constitutional commentators. Though a liberal free trader, Bagehot was a profound anti-democrat. His
constitutional doctrine may be summarized as this:The royalty
and the aristocracy are too stupid to ruleIt is as great a
difficulty to learn business in a palace as it is to learn agriculture in a park(Bagehot 2008, 107)as are the working
and lower-middle class. Government should therefore remain
in the hands of educated people who are well-informed on
current events and politics.
See also British Political Thought; Enlightenment Political
Thought; Monarchy; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IAIN MCLEAN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bagehot, Walter. 1873. Lombard Street. Indianapolis: Library of Economics and
Liberty, 2001, www.econlib.org/library/Bagehot/bagLom.html.
. 1865. The English Constitution. Glenside, N.Z.: Forgotten Books,
2008.
Bahro, Rudolf
Rudolf Bahro (19351997) is principally known as a green
politician and thinker, and particularly as an advocate of ecosocialism and of a spiritual and psychological path to political
transformation. He was born in 1935 in Bad Flinsberg, Lower
Silesia, now part of Poland. He grew up in East Germany, and
lost his mother, sister, and brother in World War II (19391945).
As a youth he joined the East German Democrat Party and
studied at Humboldt University in Berlin. He then worked
as a journalist and as an official of the Union of Scientific
Employees, a post from which he was dismissed in 1967 for
publishing an article that was critical of the party.
Bakunin, Mikhail
Russian revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin (18141876), who
popularized the term anarchy and whose work was instrumental
in the early development of the anarchist movement, was born
in Tver, Russia, to an established noble family. He was primarily
Balkans 113
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Mendeel, Arthur P. Roots of Apocalypse. New York: Praeger, 1981.
Saltman, Richard P. Social and Political Thought of Michael Bakunin. Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood, 1983.
Balance of Power
Balance of power in international relations refers to the effort
by states, in the face of a threat to security projected by a
hostile, powerful third state, to offset aggression through
association. The balance of power operates most effectively
in a central system of three to five member statesneither
too few nor too manyand roughly equal power, so that
each state possesses enough weight to count in the balance.
Small or weak states bandwagon because they cannot balance
larger states. Historically, in a system of virtually perpetual
warfare among states, as occurred in the seventeenth century,
any increase in power would trigger a new balance. Modern
conditions, where peace usually prevails, require an increase
in both threat and power to trigger the formation of a new
balance. Powerful Germany is no threat to Belgium; Belgium
does not need to balance Germany and does not try. Nor does
Canada seek to balance the United States, which is ten times
its size in terms of gross national product or population.
Why do alliances form within a balance-of-power framework? Conservative-realists argue that alliances form to counter a common external threat. Liberal-idealists argue that
alliances form among like-minded governments with a similar
cultural and institutional outlook. Stressing instead the role
of institutions such as the United Nations, liberals, like postmodernists, tend to emphasize the shortcomings and contradictions of the balance of power to the point of rejection.
Constructivists replace interest with identity, making balanceof-power calculations difficult.
Neorealism subscribes to the idea of anarchy or independence among states, thus permitting a balance of power to
operate. But more recent theories of hegemony require that
the notion of hierarchy replace anarchy as a core concept;
one state is dominant, the others are subordinate. In terms of
assumption and operation, hegemony and balance of power
are incompatible.
When force is used to preserve security, peace may be
undercut. Critiques of the shortcomings of the balance of
power fail to distinguish its separate impact on security and
peace. Although the balance of power probably has deterred
many aggressors, it admittedly has failed to stop all wars. But
it has preserved the security of the major states, such as in the
alliance of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union
against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War II
(19391945). It also has preserved the decentralized nationstate system from military takeover.
When facing rising and declining power in the system,
the balance of power gives off the wrong signals. Rising
power internal to the state can never be halted; declining
power can never be permanently bolstered. Prior to World
War I (19141918), rising Germany should not have been
isolated and encircled; the war arose from an attempt by the
system to constrain Germanys power rather than accommodate Germanys rise with legitimate role adjustment before it
was too late, that is, before the bounds of the system shattered its expectations of continued rise and future opportunity for role gratification. Prior to World War II, declining
Germany should have been balanced immediately; it had no
role deficit, and Hitlers territorial demands were inherently
aggressive. While preserving security, such a dynamic equilibrium requires a strategy of adaptation to cope with the
legitimate role aspirations of rising power, and a strategy of
opposition and balance to deal with potentially expansionist
behavior. Democracies can use balance and dynamic equilibrium to their advantage, but, as Henry Kissinger has noted,
such thinking does not come easily to the democratic mind.
See also Alliances; Coalition Formation; Foreign Policy Role;
Power; Power Cycle Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHARLES F. DORAN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Doran, Charles F. Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Centurys
End. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Haas, Ernst B. The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, Propaganda.
World Politics 5 (1953): 446477.
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Touchstone, 1994.
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton,
2001.
Rosecrance, Richard. Action and Reaction in World Politics. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1963.
Walt, Steven. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1987.
Wight, Martin. Power Politics. London: Continuum International, 2002.
Balkans
The term Balkans is typically used to refer to the peninsula
in southeastern Europe that includes the present-day countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and the lands of
the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia). Once referred
to as European Turkey or Rumeli, the present appellation
comes from the Balkan mountains of Bulgaria, which were
mistakenly believed to divide the entire peninsula from continental Europe. Besides its geographical meaning, the Balkans
has, since the mid-nineteenth century, carried secondary connotations of violence, savagery, and primitivism that have led
some scholars to prefer the designation southeastern Europe.
114 Balkans
The region began to assume its modern form as a borderland of the Ottoman Empire, which became the main regional
power in the fifteenth century and was only gradually pushed
out over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. A distinctive characteristic of Ottoman rule was its
millet system, which granted a degree of self-government to
religious groups even as all state offices were held by Muslims.
One consequence of the millet system was the preservation of
the regions multiculturalism, as well as the creation of a significant Muslim minority made up largely of ethnic Slavs and
Albanians who converted.
In the nineteenth century, local intellectuals picked up
European concepts of the nation and nationalism and began to
apply them to the region. Though they initially encountered
difficulties in creating Croat, Greek, or Serb identities from
predominantly peasant and religious cultures, ultimately they
managed to cobble together the official cultures, languages,
and histories of the lands that exist today and at the same time
extinguish many of the microcultures that existed up until
then (e.g., Morlachs, Vlachs). These nationalists began to lead
increasingly successful revolts against the deteriorating Ottoman Empire, producing the independent states of Bulgaria,
Greece, Romania, and Serbia, while the territories of BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia were subsumed into the
Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The meeting of nationalist ambitions with the diversity of
cultures and the difficulty of classifying residents as members
of one or another national group led to frequent inter-Balkan
conflicts. As the great powers attempted to resolve these conflicts, they became entangled, and it was the assassination of
the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Slav
nationalist that helped to ignite World War I (19141918).
The end of the war led to a clarification of the regions
boundaries with the states of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and
Romania assuming near their modern forms, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (or the South Slavs) being created out of
Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Serbs, with the Serbs playing the leading role. It was
Yugoslavia that proved the most volatile of the Balkan states,
and it broke apart during World War II (19391945). The war
was marked by brutal score-settling, particularly between Serbs
and Croats, and frequently exceeding rational war aims. The
communist partisan leader Josip Broz Tito managed to restore
Yugoslavia to more or less its prewar borders by promulgating
a myth of national resistance to the Nazis and clamping down
on nationalist sentiment.
Ballot Design
Ballot design generally refers to the ways in which candidates
and contests are arranged on electoral ballots of various types.
Ballot design first received widespread attention in 2000,
when the U.S. presidential election was decided in part by
contested results in a county that used a butterfly ballot of
DESIGN FLAWS
Design flaws may lead voters to skip a contest or to vote
for the wrong candidate. In a 2006 congressional contest in
Florida, ballot designers placed the two-candidate congressional race on the same screen as a six-candidate gubernatorial
contest. Norden et al. (2008) reported that 13.9 percent of the
voters did not vote in the contest, compared to only 2.5 percent of voters who voted in the same contest on different ballots. Similarly, many King County, Washington, voters skipped
a 2009 referendum contest that appeared at the bottom of a
column of voting instructions.
A ballot that requires voters to behave in a counterintuitive way may mislead voters, despite the presence of accurate
instructions. Most voters obey their intuitive, automatic systems instead of reading directions. This kind of problem can
be exacerbated by overly complex voting technologies such as
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Design for Democracy, the Brennan Center, the ACE Project,
and others have recommended best practices to avoid design
flaws, including reducing visual clutter, using plain language
in voting instructions, and following design principles that
recognize how voters intuitively move through documents.
For example, electronic ballots should include only one contest on each computer screen. On a paper ballot, candidates
in a single contest should be listed in a single column. The
ACE Project specifically recommends using party symbols
in all environments and using photographs on ballots in
societies with lower literacy rates and where party affiliations
frequently change. Most importantly, best practices include
conducting usability testing to verify the effectiveness of the
ballot design. Rotation of candidate names, while not yet
widely recommended, can help to mitigate position impact, as
well as the impact of some design flaws.
Perfect ballots cannot be guaranteed, but elections officials
who follow best practices can greatly reduce the number of
design flaws and increase the effectiveness of and confidence
in voting systems.
See also Absentee Voting; Campaigns; Election Monitoring; Electronic Voting; Voting Behavior; Voting Machines and Technology;
Voting Procedures.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARY BETH BEAZLEY
BIBLOGRAP HY
Alvarez, R. Michael, Betsy Sinclair, and Richard L. Hasen. How Much Is
Enough? The Ballot Order Effect and the Use of Social Science Research
in Election Law Disputes. Election Law Journal 5, no. 1 (2006): 4056.
Bain, Henry M., and Donald S. Hecock. Ballot Position and Voter Choice.
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957.
Brady, Henry E., Michael C. Herron, Walter R. Mebane Jr., Jasjeet Singh
Sekhon, Kenneth W. Shotts, and Jonathan Wand. Law and Data: The
Butterfly Ballot Episode. PS: Political Science and Politics 34 (March
2001): 5969, www.jstor.org/stable/1350311.
Brockington, David. A Low Information Theory of Ballot Position Effect.
Political Behavior 25 (March 2003): 127, www.jstor.org/stable/3657312.
Bullock, Charles S., III, and Richard E. Dunn. Election Roll-off: A Test of
Three Explanations. Urban Affairs Review 32, no. 1 (1996): 7186, http://
uar.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/32/1/71.
California Electrical Code, sec, 13112(a) (2003).
Garber, Andrew. Thousands of King County Voters Apparently Missed
I-1033 on the Ballot. Seattle Times, November 4, 2009.
Herrnson, Paul S., Richard G. Niemi, Michael J. Hanmer, Benjamin B.
Bederson, and Frederick C. Conrad. Voting Technology:The Not-So-Simple
Act of Casting a Ballot. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008.
Ho, Daniel E., and Kosuke Imai. Shaken, Not Stirred: Evidence on Ballot
Order Effects from the California Alphabet Lottery, 19782002.
Harvard Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 89; Princeton University Program in Law and Public
Affairs, Paper No. 04001, http://ssrn.com/abstract=496863.
Krosnick, Jon A., Joanne M. Miller, and Michael P. Tichy. An Unrecognized
Need for Ballot Reform: The Effects of Candidate Name Order on
Election Outcomes. In Rethinking the Vote:The Politics and Prospects of
American Election Reform, edited by Ann N. Krigler, Marion R. Just, and
Edward J. McCaffery, 5174. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Laskowski, Sharon J., Marguerite Autry, John Cugini, William Killam, and
James Yen. Improving the Usability and Accessibility of Voting Systems and
Products. Special Publication 500256. Washington, D.C.: National
Institute of Standards & Technology, 2004.
Lausen, Marcia. Design for Democracy: Ballot + Election Design. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2007.
Miller, Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick. The Impact of Candidate Name
Order on Election Outcomes. Public Opinion Quarterly 62 (1998): 291330.
Norden, Lawrence, David Kimball, Whitney Quesenbery, and Margaret
Chen. Better Ballots. New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2008,
www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/better_ballots.
Ohio Const. art.V, 2a.
Ohio Revised Code, sec. 3505.03.
Reynolds, Andrew, and Marco Steenbergen. How the World Votes:
The Political Consequences of Ballot Design, Innovation, and
Manipulation. Electoral Studies 25, no. 3 (September 2006): 570598.
Roth, Susan King. Disenfranchised by Design:Voting Systems and the
Election Process. Information Design Journal 9, no. 1 (1998): 18.
Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. Nudge: Improving Decisions about
Health,Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press,
2008.
Baltic States
The term Baltic states refers to the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Formerly republics in the Soviet Union,
each became independent in 1991. Unlike most other former
Soviet states, they established liberal democracies and market economies, and they are unequivocally pro-Western in
their orientation. In 2004, all three states joined the European
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).
These countries are frequently grouped together because
of their geographic proximity on the southern shores of the
Baltic Sea, their common history under Soviet rule, and their
small size. Lithuania, about the size of West Virginia and with
FINLAND
Gu
lf
Fin
of
lan
Narva
Tallinn
R U S S I A
Tapa
EUROPE
Lake
Peipus
Haapsalu
ESTONIA
Hiiumaa
Viljandi
Vortsjarv
Lake
Pskov
Saaremaa
Valga
Gu l f
of
Kolka
Valmiera
Gulbene
Cesis
Ventspils
Stende
Velikaya
Ri ga
L AT V I A
Riga
Ogre
Baltic
Tukums
Da
Sea
av
Saldus
ug
Jekabpils
Jelgava
Liepaja
Siauliai
Kretinga
Rietavas
LITHUANIA
Utena
Klaipeda
Ukmerge
Kedainiai
Jonava
Taurage
Kaunas
Vi
liy
Nemunas
Ne
ris
Vilnius
BELARUS
RUSSIA
Pregolya
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P O L A N D
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The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were once republics in the former Soviet Union.
50 Mi
50 Km
Banana Republic
In his 1904 novel, Cabbages and Kings, the author O. Henry
first referred to a banana republic, and the resulting image
of a corrupt, fruit-dependent country came from his own
impressions of Honduras at the turn of the twentieth century. Over time, however, the term has transcended its specific historical, temporal, and geographical origins. It now
typically refers to a small and poor country (generally, but not
exclusively, Central American or Caribbean) that is deemed
backward, weak, and unequal, and is ruled by a corrupt elite
closely tied to foreign interests. Those foreign investors, in
Bandwagoning
In electoral politics, bandwagoning refers to supporting a
candidacy or political position because it is already popular.
This bandwagon effect can occur because the popularity of a
preference is seen as evidence for its rightness. Individuals
who join the bandwagon often free-ride by sharing the
benefits of the victory without having shared the costs to
accomplish it.
In foreign policy, bandwagoning is a strategy in which
states seek to increase their security or prosperity by aligning
with a strong regional or global power, whether through official alliance agreements or more informally through increased
economic and political ties. A term popularized by Kenneth
Waltz in his 1979 Theory of International Politics, bandwagoning
is often presented as the opposite of balancing, which can be
defined as a strategy of increasing national security by siding
against the dominant actors in the system.
Bandwagoning (in the foreign policy sense) may be undertaken for a number of reasons, ranging from self-preservation
in a crisis to an opportunistic desire to free-ride on the success of others. Historically, bandwagoning is more likely to be
undertaken by smaller and less powerful actors, which explains
why theories of great and middle powers focus on balancing behavior. Bandwagoning is also more likely to occur near
the end of major wars, when the winning alliance has nearly
secured its victory. Traditionally, fear of bandwagoning and
attempts to thwart it have influenced foreign policy far more
than the actual practice of bandwagoning. Superpower relations during the cold war, for instance, were shaped in part by
a fear of falling geostrategic dominoes at their periphery.
See also Alliances; Balance of Power.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VSEVOLOD GUNITSKIY
Banfield, Edward C.
Edward C. Banfield (19161999) was a political scientist who
is best known for three books: The Moral Basis of a Backward
Society (1958), The Unheavenly City (1970), and The Unheavenly
City Revisited (1974).
Banfield grew up on a farm in Bloomfield, Connecticut.
He attended the Connecticut State College at Storrs (now the
University of Connecticut) and received a bachelors degree in
English in 1938. Following graduation, Banfield held a variety
of government jobs. He began with the U.S. Forest Service,
then moved to the New Hampshire Farm Bureau in 1939.
From 1940 to 1947, Banfield worked in public relations for
the U.S. Farm Security Administration (FSA), a New Deal era
agency.
During his time at the FSA, Banfield was admitted to the
University of Chicago, where he studied planning and cities. He received his PhD in political science in 1952 from
the University of Chicago and then joined its faculty. He
remained there until 1959, when he moved to Harvard University. Banfield remained at Harvard until his retirement,
except for a four-year stint (19721976) at the University of
Pennsylvania.
While initially a supporter of Franklin Roosevelt and the
New Deal, Banfield increasingly became skeptical of governments growing social welfare role. Reviewing his experience
with the FSA, he concluded that assistance to the poor had
not improved the lives of the recipients, and in some cases had
made their lives worse.
He was critical of liberal ideas, especially the use of federal aid to relieve urban poverty. He argued that culture was
the cause of urban poverty, and that federal aid would ultimately fail because it targeted the wrong problem. Indeed, he
suggested that federal assistance could make the problems of
urban poverty worse. His work was often criticized as blaming the victim for their situation.
With scholar Martin Meyerson, Banfield challenged the
proliferation of high-rise public housing projects in Chicago
and other cities around the country, warning that they would
have the unintended consequence of racially isolating the
urban poor. His point of view would be vindicated during the
1990s, as public housing authorities around the country began
demolishing these high-rises, replacing them with less densepacked garden apartments and town houses.
Banfields The Moral Basis of a Backward Society is about
a poor village of Chiramonte in southern Italy. In explaining why the village was poor, Banfield coined the term,
amoral familism, a phenomenon that he described as families
in the village distrusting one another to the point where
they could not cooperate. He compared this town with
Gunlock, Utah, a small Mormon town he had studied in
the early 1950s. In contrast to Chiramonte, Gunlock prospered because the farmers of the town cooperated with one
another. This led Banfield to conclude that culture, not the
absence of financial support, explained why the Italian town
did not prosper.
Banks, Jeffrey S.
Jeffrey Scot Banks (19582000) was a scholar who made wideranging contributions to economics and political science. He
received his BA in political science from the University of
California Los Angeles in 1982 and his PhD in social science
from the California Institute of Technology in 1986. Banks
began his career at the University of Rochester and was promoted to full professor of economics and political science in
just five years. He left Rochester in 1997 to join the faculty
at the California Institute of Technology, where he remained
until his death due to complications from the treatment of
leukemia. Banks productivity as an academic was prodigious:
At the time of his death, he had published forty-three articles
and two bookswith an additional book and eight additional
articles published posthumously.
Banks work had an impact in a large number of fields,
including game theory, social choice theory, economic theory,
international relations, experimental economics, and political
economy. In game theory, his work with Joel Sobel produced
the concept of divine equilibrium, used to sharpen theoretical predictions in mathematical models of strategic interaction.
In social choice, Banks characterized the outcomes possible
as a result of varying the order in which bills are considered
Bargaining
See Negotiations and Bargaining.
Barker, Ernest
Sir Ernest Barker (18741960) was a British scholar of the
early twentieth century and a noted authority on classical
political philosophy. Barker was the oldest of seven children
born to a farm family in rural England. He was noted for his
hard work and exceptional intellect. Barker received his PhD
from Oxford University, where he was fellow of several colleges and served on the history faculty for twenty-one years.
Barker was principal of Kings College, London; held the first
Rockefeller funded chair in political science; and was fellow
of Peterhouse at Cambridge University from 1928 until his
retirement in 1939. Barker was knighted in 1944 for his contribution to the Books Commission of the Allied Ministers of
Education.
Barkers most noted work, The Political Thought of Plato
and Aristotle, was published when he was thirty-two years old
and became an enduring foundational work in classical political philosophy. Barker produced exceptional quality work
throughout his life. Forty years after The Political Thought of
Plato and Aristotle, Barker published his translation of Aristotles Politics, which remains a classic in the field and is still
widely read today. By the close of his career, his work was
published in canonical collections of current political thought,
alongside Peter Kropotkin, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,
and Bertrand Russell.
Barker, as underscored by Professor Jean Stapleton, lectured on the social and political ideas of European civilization in historical perspective and notably did so in a lecture
commemorating the 700th anniversary of Albertus Magnus
first lectures on Aristotle in a European university. Barkers
works on The Character of England and Traditions of Civility continue to reflect his European outlook on civilization,
which he held with ever greater conviction throughout his
life. The European perspective was the shared cultural foundation of the West and, was fundamentally combined, for Barker,
with a sense of Englishness. Barker was not only an English
patriot, but a Burkean intellectual whose politics were those
of the Liberal Party, though with a qualified conservatism.The
foundation of Barkers thought should be understood as being
twofold, first in his Platonism and second in his perspective on
Christendom.
As Barker noted in his introduction to Aristotles Politics,
the translation has been a labour of love, and a permanent
consolidation of such leisure as was left to the writer, from
the autumn of 1940 to the spring of 1945, among the anxiety
and duties of war. Barker credits Sir Richard Livingston for
the encouragement for his translation of Politics, and Barker
acknowledged the debt to Merton College by dedicating the
work to the Warden and Fellows of Merton College, for it was
they who gave him the opportunity of a scholars life, when it
elected him to a Prize Fellowship in Classics in 1898.
Barker is a foundational writer in the tradition of English political thought. Barkers work on classical political philosophy makes him a seminal authority in the discipline, but
his work on Western civilization and English political culture
Barrs, Maurice
Maurice Barrs (18621923), French novelist and nationalist
politician whose eclectic career exerted a major influence on
his generation, was born in Charmes sur Moselle, France, in a
traditionalist family. His father was a member of the Napoleonic imperial guard.
Barrs began legal studies at the faculty of Nancy (Lorraine) before continuing his academic training in Paris in 1883.
His work as a journalist in Jeune France (Young France) allowed
him to frequent the symbolist artistic circles of Paris. In 1888,
he published Sous loeil des barbares, the first volume of his trilogy Le culte du moi (The Cult of the Self), followed by Un
homme libre (1889) and Le jardin de Brnice (1891). He was considered the leading authority of the individualist, exalting the
quest of new sensations and the satisfaction of senses.
In parallel to his literary activity, Barrs was elected as a
deputy of Nancy at the French National Assembly in 1889 and
retained his seat in the legislature until 1893. Rebelling against
the establishment, he became a member of the nationalistpopulist party of Georges Boulanger. This political involvement was one of the expressions of his ideological evolution
toward patriotism and traditionalism. The lyrical transcendence of the ego by historical roots and the land and the
deaths was visible also in his new literary trilogy Le roman de
lnergie nationale (Les dracins, 1897; Lappel au soldat, 1900;
Leurs figures, 1902) and in La cocarde, the short-lived newspaper
he launched in 1894.
During the Dreyfus Affairin which a French Jewish military officer Alfred Dreyfus was accused of being a German
spy in 1894 and deported to GuyanaBarrs became one of
the leading authorities of the anti-Dreyfusards. He joined the
ultranationalist Ligue des patriotes (League of Patriots) created
by Paul Droulde and wrote a series of violent anti-Semitic
articles.
In 1906, Barrs was elected to the Acadmie franaise (French
Academy) and as deputy of Paris. In parliament, he opposed
Bartholomew of Lucca
See Ptolemy of Lucca.
Basque Separatism
The Basque region (Pas Vasco) lies in the northern part of
Spain on the border with France. Basque separatism reflects
the Basques desire to establish an independent state that
encompasses four Spanish regionsVizcaya, Guipzcoa,
lava (together Pas Vasco), and Navarraplus three French
regionsLabourdi, Basse-Navarre, and Soule. The father of
Basque separatism is Sabino Arana, founder of the Basque
Nationalist Party.
Several arguments are made for the creation of an independent Basque state. Supporters note that Basques are the oldest
European nation, constituting an independent ethnic group
that has historically inhabited four Spanish regions. Some
point to their unique language of unknown origin that lacks
any clear link to other languages.
In the Basque language, the name of their country is Euskal
Herria (the people of Euskare), the language is Euskara, and
one who speaks Basque is Euskaldun. What is not Euskara is
Erdara, and one who does not speak Euskara is Erdaldun.
The Basque language is one of the most powerful means of
enforcing separatism in the Basque region. For example, ETA
Bassett, Reginald
Reginald Bassett (19011962) was an English political scientist
who started out on the left, being a member of the Independent
Labour Party in his youth. He turned to the right in 1931, when
Labour Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald became head of
a coalition government dependent on the votes of conservatives and cutting public expenditure in the face of the Great
Depression (19291939). This political progression made Bassetts writings critical of the prevailing Marxist-inspired criticisms of parliamentary government put forth by British political
theorists Harold Laski; G. D. H. Cole; and Sir Oswald Mosley,
who led the British Union of Fascists from 1932 to 1940.
Bassett left school young to work as an office clerk, and at
the age of twenty-five he won a scholarship to study at Oxford.
After graduation he spent fifteen years as an Oxford extramural tutor. In 1945 he became a tutor for trade union studies
at the London School of Economics. In 1950 he received a
tenured post in the Department of Government and was a
professor there at the time of his death.
In The Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy (1935), Bassett
endorsed the value of parliamentary tradition of government
by discussion and consent. He interpreted parties as offering
contrasting alternatives for policy, which were then resolved by
compromises around a central position. Bassett offered a dynamic
interpretation of how parties and politicians adapted to events
rather than following ideologies to potentially revolutionary or
counter-revolutionary extremes. The result was that while policies altered, a cross-party political consensus was maintained.
The victory in World War II (19391945) revived respect
for established institutions of democracy among British academics. By the early twenty-first century, much of Bassetts
book appeared consistent with mainstream political science,
just as it was with Whiggish nineteenth century British views.
It shows its age in not allowing for the prospect of Parliament
turning into an arena in which parties competed for votes by
rancorously attacking their adversaries rather than deliberating about policies and party leaders, and television becoming more important than Parliament as the chief sphere of
politics. At the time of its publication, Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy was an overt challenge to class conflict theories
of British government and to Britons who sympathized with
undemocratic forms of government in the Soviet Union, Nazi
Germany, or fascist Italy. No attention is given in the book to
the New Deal, the domestic reform program instituted by U.S.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Bassett continued with his revisionist approach to contemporary history with studies of the absence of League of
Nations action against Japan when it annexed Manchuria
(Democracy and Foreign Policy, 1952) and of the events that led
Baudrillard, Jean
Jean Baudrillard (19292007) was a French social, cultural,
and political theorist; a philosopher; and a sociologist. Even
though he has usually been presented as a representative for
French postmodern theory and sometimes associated with
poststructuralism, post-Marxism, and other contemporary
schools of thought, Baudrillard was able to develop a very
particular frame of analysis, characterized throughout his large
collection of writings by a sharp and provocative critique of
the impact of consumerism, the media, and other technologies in the social and political arenas.
Baudrillard was born in Reims, France. After concluding his thesis in sociology, Le Systme des objets (The System
of Objects), he joined the faculty of the Universit de Paris-X
Nanterre, which was considered one of the most radically oriented French institutions during the 1960s. Baudrillard aligned
with colleagues and students in the buildup of the May 1968
events, which led to an unprecedented general strike that
brought the French government to the verge of collapse. He
remained at Nanterre until 1986, when he transferred to Institut de Recherche et dInformation Socio-conomique (IRIS)
at the Universit de Paris-IX Dauphine. Distancing himself
from academic orthodoxy, his works became increasingly popular and reached a wide international readership.
Beginning with his early works, Baudrillard took on the
structuralist semiotic tradition, further developing and applying the notion of self-referentiality. However, as he considered
objects could never be fully comprehended, they would produce a form of delusion (or seduction) among subjects seeking
absolute knowledge. As a consequence, individuals and societies would fall into a form of simulated reality or hyperreality
driven by a showcase of images, codes, information, and entertainment. This simulation shapes human behavior, providing
an experience of such intensity that actual life is shadowed.
In addition to explaining consumer dynamics (the acquisition
of symbols) and the associated reification of the self, Baudrillard applied this framework to political analysis. The cold war
(The Illusion of the End, 1992), the Gulf War (The Gulf War
Never Happened, 1995) and the September 11, 2001, attacks on
the United States (The Spirit of Terrorism, 2002) were examined
in three of his most controversial essays.
Bauer, Otto
Otto Bauer (18811938) was one of Austrias most prominent twentieth-century social-democratic statesmen. Born
in Vienna, Austria-Hungary, he was expected to take over his
fathers textile business but instead dedicated himself to the
cause of Marxism.
Bauer was both a brilliant theoretician and a man deeply
engaged in real-world politics. He earned a doctorate in law
from the University of Vienna in January 1906 and in the following year became secretary of the social-democratic faction
in parliament. He was editor of the social-democratic Arbeiterzeitung (Workers Newspaper), for which he also regularly wrote
articles, and helped found the influential Austro-Marxist journal Der Kampf (The Struggle). His first major work, The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy (1907), is considered a
classic Marxist study of the dual forces of socialism and nationalism. He viewed modern nations as communities of character
(Charaktergemeinschaften) that emerged out of communities of
fate (Schicksalsgemeinschaften) and argued that conflict among
the dozen nations comprising the Austro-Hungarian Empire
was due primarily to class struggle.
ELIOT DICKINSON
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Bauer, Otto. Kapitalismus und Sozialismus nach dem Weltkrieg. Vienna: Wiener
Volksbuchhandlung, 1931.
. The Austrian Revolution. New York: Burt Franklin, 1970.
. Fascism. In Austro-Marxism, edited by Tom B. Bottomore and
Patrick Goode. Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1978.
. The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
Braunthal, Julius. Otto Bauer: Eine Auswahl aus Seinem Lebenswerk. Vienna:
Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1961.
Bayesian Analysis
Bayesian analysis generally refers to statistical analysis that relies
on Bayes theorem. Bayes theorem provides a solution to the
general problem of induction, explaining how to rationally
update prior beliefs in light of evidence so as to yield posterior
Beard, Charles A.
Charles A. Beard (18741948), born to a prosperous family in
Indiana and educated at DePauw University, was one the most
important historians of the twentieth century. He was influential among scholars, a sought-after public speaker, and a writer
for the nonacademic world. Beard is probably most famous
for his ability to align significant academic research with a
progressive concern about politics. His most famous work,
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
(1913), looked past high-minded political theory or simple
hagiography of the Founders to assert that economic interests best explain the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and its
ratification. Indeed, throughout his life, Beard was insistent on
exploring the economic forces that could explain American
history. This often made him controversial among the public
audience that he sought. Although many later historians repudiated his ideas, he remains an important historian who influenced generations of readers to think more realistically about
American history and the men and women who shaped it.
Beard traveled to England and was a founder in 1899 of the
progressive Ruskin House at Oxford, which dealt with labor
education. Throughout his life, he remained concerned with
public affairs and maintained a progressive desire to end injustice. He eventually became a distinguished and popular professor of history at Columbia University. His resignation from
Columbia, in protest over the treatment of antiwar faculty in
Beauvoir, Simone de
French novelist and political activist and critic, Simone Ernestine Lucie Marie Bertrand de Beauvoir (19081986) was born
in Paris into a bourgeois family. She is best known for her
nonfiction work, The Second Sex (1949), in which she argued
that women had become the other after centuries of being
compared with the male norm. Like Mary Wollstonecraft
before her, Beauvoir observed that women were bullied into
viewing themselves as inferior beings dependent on the males
around them, and she proclaimed that women were not born
as such but became so through socialization. Her declaration has remained controversial as feminists and other scholars
debate the issue of nature versus nurture.
Published during the feminist wasteland that followed
the grant of womens suffrage in Western democracies in the
Beccaria, Cesare
Cesare Beccaria (17381794), a key figure of the Italian
Enlightenment, established his reputation as a political writer
with On Crimes and Punishments, published anonymously in
1764.Widely read in the eighteenth century, the pamphlet was
prominent in debates on penal reform in Europe and colonial
America.
Born in Milan, Beccaria was sent, at the age of eight, to
a Jesuit school in Parma, where his sentiments of humanity were stifled by eight years of fanatical and servile education (Beccaria 2008, xvii) as he later recalled. After studying
law at the University of Pavia from 1754 to 1758, he returned
to Milan and frequented the citys literary salons. There he
befriended Pietro Verri, a writer and intellectual who founded
his own circle in 1761, bringing Beccaria with him.
Beccaria traced his conversion to philosophy to this
milieu with readings of, among others, Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieus Persian Letters (1721) and Claude-Adrien
Helvtius De lesprit (On the Mind, 1759). Beccarias first work,
a study of currency problems in the Milanese state published
in 1762, grew out of this experience. His writings, like others of the coterie, aimed to influence a receptive Habsburg
administration in Lombardy.
In On Crimes and Punishments, Beccaria combined social
contract theories with utilitarianism to criticize existing
criminal jurisprudence, which he held to be unnecessarily
cruel, ineffective, arbitrary, and too often muddled with religious notions such as the expiation of sin. For Beccaria, laws
sometimes unfairly protected the particular interests of class
and clergy, in part through the terrible and perhaps unnecessary right (2008, 43) to property. A more just social order,
he argued, would craft laws to achieve the greatest happiness
shared among the greatest number (9).
In Beccarias view, laws should be written clearly and
enforced by impartial judges. Trials should be public and by a
jury of ones peers, and punishments prompt and proportional
to the crimes committed. Beccaria argued that detentions
prior to trial must be made on the basis of law rather than at
the sovereigns whim and that torture should be eliminated
because it was unreliable in securing accurate information and
constituted a punishment prior to the determination of guilt.
Long prison sentences and hard labor were to be used for
serious crimes. The death penalty was to be abolished as an
ineffective deterrent and gross spectacle that was illegitimate
under the very terms of the social contract.
In Italy, On Crimes and Punishments was attacked by a
Benedictine friar, Ferdinando Facchinei, who denounced
its contractualist postulates and branded Beccaria a socialist.
Nonetheless, the pamphlet saw several editions in the span of
two years. Parisian philosophes championed the text, praised
Beccaria as a defender of humanity, and invited him to
Paris in 1766. A French translation appeared in 1765, followed
shortly by editions in other European languages. A substantial
commentary by Voltaire further raised the books visibility.
Catherine II sought Beccarias guidance in reforming Russias criminal codes, but his shyness forced him to retreat from
the public spotlight. He taught economics in Milan for two
years, wrote briefly on aesthetics, and took various positions
in the Lombard administration, for which he wrote numerous
policy recommendations. In a 1792 report, Beccaria reaffirmed
the ineffectiveness of capital punishment and added a further
reason for its abolition: namely, its irrevocability in the event of
an erroneous execution.
See also Bentham, Jeremy; Capital Punishment; Social Contract;
Utilitarianism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AARON THOMAS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beccaria, Cesare. On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, edited by
Richard Bellamy, translated by Richard Davies. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995.
. On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, edited by Aaron
Thomas, translated by Aaron Thomas and Jeremy Parzen. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2008.
Maestro, Marcello. Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973.
Venturi, Franco. Italy and the Enlightenment: Studies in a Cosmopolitan Century,
translated by Susan Corsi. London: Longman, 1972.
Young, David. Cesare Beccaria: Utilitarian or Retributivist? Journal of
Criminal Justice 11, no. 4 (1983): 317326.
Behavior, Political
See Political Attitudes and Behavior.
Bellarmine, Robert
Cardinal and Doctor of the Church, Jesuit Robert Bellarmine (15421621) became a leading Catholic theologian and
controversialist who is best known for his defense of Catholic
doctrine and for his theory of indirect papal authority in temporal affairs. Born in Montepulciano, Italy, Bellarmine made
his first vow as a Jesuit in 1560. After studying Aristotelian
philosophy and Thomistic theology, Bellarmine was sent by
the Jesuit Father General to Louvain, where his focus on the
defense of Catholic doctrines took shape as he taught theology in a university city on the front line of the Catholic
response to Reformers.
In 1576, Bellarmine returned to Rome to teach English and
German Catholic missionaries. He continued in this position
until 1588, and it was during this period that he published Disputationes de Controversiis Christianae Fidei adversus hujus temporis
haereticos (15861593).This examination of Protestant theology
was an unusually balanced assessment for the time designed
to better equip Catholic missionaries in disputes rather than
score rhetorical points in polemical exchanges. The work also
was wide ranging and, in conjunction with his De translatione
Imperii Romani (1584), provided the first clear statement of his
ideas about the nature of papal authority.
In the 1590s, Bellarmine was appointed to important positions first within the Society of Jesus and then within the
papal court, culminating in his being named cardinal in 1599
by Clement VIII (15921605). Under Pope Paul V (16051621),
Bellarmine became a leading advocate for the church in a
series of controversies concerning papal authority, especially a
dispute caused by James I of Englands requirement of an oath
of allegiance from all his subjects in 1607.The issues at stake in
these disputes ultimately resulted in Bellarmine fully articulating his theory of papal authority, perhaps best expressed in his
Tractus de potestate Summi Pontificis in rebus temporalibus adversus
Gulielmum Barclaeum (1610), written in response to Scottish
royalist and Catholic William Barclays assertions in support
of absolute royal authority. In Tractus, Bellarmine advocated
a sophisticated theory of papal authority that granted the
pontiff indirect power in temporal affairs. Bellarmine defined
papal authority within narrow limits. He granted the pope
sovereign jurisdiction over all Christians and over all temporal
matters when they affected spiritual matters, but he carefully
distinguished between ordinary and direct jurisdiction and the
extraordinary jurisdiction that the pope possessed over secular
rulers. According to Bellarmine, the pope possessed temporal authority over secular rulers only to protect the souls of
the faithful and only after he had exhausted all other remedies. Even then the popes power remained indirect: he could
admonish, excommunicate, and, if all else failed, remove subjects from their obligations to their secular ruler, but under
Bentham, Jeremy
Jeremy Bentham (17481832), inventor of the term international, was one of the greatest political and legal philosophers
of his time. As the founder of utilitarianism, he has remained
a controversial figure in the history of political thought, subject to much praise and criticism at once. His greatest follower, John Stuart Mill, described him as a one-eyed man
who offered philosophy a new method of analysis, while his
most notable critic, Karl Marx, referred to him as an insipid,
pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the commonplace bourgeois intelligence of the nineteenth century. Whether or not
they approved of his views, none of the influential political
thinkers of the last two centuries could afford to ignore this
great philosopher.
Born in London, Bentham was the son of a wealthy lawyer.
He too studied law but never practiced it, preferring instead
to focus on law as it ought to be. He remained a committed
advocate of judicial and political reform throughout his life.
His Panopticon project, for example, is among the most innovative prison reform proposals of all time. His persistent criticism of and elaboration on political fallacies was intended to
pave the way for meaningful political reform. Benthams normative views were distinctively secular on the one hand and
grounded on an exploration of existing practice on the other.
During the American and French revolutions, he rejected the
idea of natural rights. Benthams thought is frequently associated with legal positivism.
Bentham is most famous (and notorious) for his concept of
utility aimed at calculating and, by implication, manipulating human motivations. For him, it is possible to rank order
the motives for human action according to their preeminence. Purely social motives are morally best, followed by
semisocial, asocial, and dissocial motives. Asocial motives (i.e.,
self-interest) are the most common, uniform, and powerful,
followed by semisocial, purely social, and dissocial motives.
Every human action, in Benthams view, is ultimately motivated by a desire to gain pleasure and avoid pain. Even when
one acts benevolently toward another, one does so because
one finds pleasure in helping the other person. Ultimately,
for Bentham, the degree of pleasure is calculable through
the use of such variables as intensity, duration, or extenta
Berelson, Bernard R.
Bernard R. Berelson (19121979) was an American behavioral
scientist who made significant contributions to communication research, voting studies, and population policy. Born in
Spokane, Washington, on June 2, 1912, Berelson graduated
from Whitman College in 1936 and received a PhD from the
University of Chicago in 1941. In 1944 he became a project
director at the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social
Research. In 1951 he joined the Ford Foundation in California and popularized behavioral sciences as a director. Berelson
also guided the establishment of the Center for Advanced
Study in Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University in California in 1952.
Berelson wrote or edited twelve books in social and behavioral sciences, including The Peoples Choice (1944; coauthored
with Paul E. Lazarsfeld and Hazel Gaudet), and published
more than ninety articles. He contributed a very important
chapter on the meaning of the voting process in a democracy in Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential
Campaign (1986), which he coauthored with Lazarsfeld and
William McPhee. He highlighted the fact that most voters are
not acquainted with political reality and respond to irrelevant
social influences. He stated that a democracy sets different
requirements for different individuals and an electoral system
must achieve a balance between various segments of society.
Berelson was highly organized and goal-oriented. He preferred writing in a direct and jargon-free style. He was greatly
concerned about the practical, ethical, and value implications
of scientific research. For example, in his last publication,
he dealt with various ethical issues involved in government
efforts toward influencing fertility. He showed great respect
for the rights of the people in studies such as Paths to Fertility
Reduction: The Policy Cube (1977) and The Condition of Fertility Decline in Developing Countries, 196575 (1978). He held the
firm belief that rapid population growth suppressed social and
economic development and, therefore, all efforts should be
made to lower population growth in global interest.
ASHA GUPTA
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Granberg, Donald, and Soren Holmberg. The Berelson Paradox
Reconsidered: Intention-Behavior Changers in the U.S. and Swedish
Election Campaigns. The Public Opinion Quarterly 54 (Winter 1990):
530550.
Mauldin, W. Parker. Bernard Berelson: 2 June 191225 September 1979.
Studies in Family Planning 10 (October 1979): 259262.
Ross, John A., and W. Parker Mauldin, eds. Berelson on Population. New York:
Springer-Verlag, 1988.
Sills, David L. In Memoriam: Bernard Berelson, 19121979. The Public
Opinion Quarterly 44 (Summer 1980): 274275.
Berlin, Isaiah
Born in the Latvian capital of Riga, Isaiah Berlin (19091997)
was a leading liberal political theorist and historian of ideas.
Focusing on themes of liberty and pluralism, Berlin contends
that because human life is characterized by incompatible but
equally legitimate goals, a just political order will embrace the
natural diversity of human choices rather than imposing one
fixed ethical system.
In 1917, Berlins family moved to Petrograd during the
Russian Revolution. They returned to Riga in 1920 and emigrated to London in 1921. Berlin attended Corpus Christi
College, Oxford, and was appointed a lecturer at New College
in 1932. That same year he received a Prize Fellowship at All
Souls, the first Jew to receive such a high honor. During World
War II (19321945), Berlin worked for the British government
in New York (19401942), Washington, D.C. (19421945); and
Moscow (19451946), but he remained at Oxford throughout
his academic career.
Berlin was knighted in 1957, the same year he was elected
Chichele professor of social and political theory at Oxford. In
1966 he became the founding president of Wolfson College,
Oxford, and from 1974 to 1978 served as president of the British Academy. He retired from Oxford in 1975. During his life,
Berlin also received the prestigious Order of Merit, as well as
the Agnelli, Erasmus, Lippincott, and Jerusalem prizes.
Berlins most well-known work of political theory is his
essay Two Concepts of Liberty (1958), in which he distinguishes between positive and negative liberty. He defines
negative liberty as the absence of external constraints on ones
behavior and positive liberty as the capacity for self-determination. Although these two concepts may appear similar,
negative liberty is characterized by the absence of external
obstacles, whereas positive liberty requires the presence of a
self-determining rational will.
According to Berlin, positive liberty carries a danger of
totalitarianism because its advocates are monists who contend that there is only one way of acting authentically human
and those who behave otherwise are slaves to their passions or
ignorance. This provides a justification for those who consider
themselves wise to oppress those they perceive to be enslaved
to their own appetitive impulses. When the enlightened have
overcome the irrational empirical selves of these misguided
individuals, their real selves finally will emerge to pursue their
true interests, which inevitably will harmonize with those of
their enlightened educators.Tracing the history of this positive
liberty, Berlin shows how dictators of all ideologies, from Platos philosopher-kings to the Nazis, have used this notion to
justify the suppression of diversity in the name of their monistic conceptions of the good life.
Berlin sees negative libertarians as pluralists who maintain
that there is a range of ways to act authentically human and
that persons should be as free as possible from external constraints to pursue their own ideas of the good life. Many of
the choices required may be incommensurable, yet for Berlin
the ability to decide for oneself from among these competing
values is the core of human dignity. Even so, Berlin argues that
the pursuit of negative liberty also may become oppressive, as
when a pure free market allows some actors to dominate others economically.
See also Liberal Theory; Libertarianism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RICK PARRISH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Berlin, Isaiah. The Power of Ideas, edited by Henry Hardy. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2001.
. Liberty, edited by Henry Hardy. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002.
Gray, John. Isaiah Berlin. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Ignatieff, Michael. Isaiah Berlin: A Life. New York: Henry Holt, 1998.
Bernstein, Eduard
Born in Berlin, Eduard Bernstein (18501932) was a leading
German social-democratic politician and theorist. His life
is a microcosmic reflection of the first century of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Like the German labor
movement itself, Bernstein started out as a socialist eclectic,
then converted to Marxist orthodoxy, only to return to an
eclectic position that espoused a nonrevolutionary, democratic
socialism that recognized Marxism as only one among several
important theoretical sources.
Bernstein grew up in Berlin in modest circumstances. After
a short career as a bank clerk, he joined the SPD in 1872 as a
campaign speaker and pamphleteer. Expelled from Germany
in 1878 as a result of German Chancellor Bismarcks repressive antisocialist laws, Bernstein settled in Zurich, Switzerland,
from where he edited Der Sozialdemokrat, the rallying point of
the underground SPD press. After his expulsion from Switzerland, Bernstein continued the periodical from London, where
he cultivated close contacts with Friedrich Engels and leaders
of the British socialist Fabian Society. When Engels died, Bernstein served as his literary executor and was widely regarded
as one of the leading Marxist voices in Europe.
Thus, it came as a shock to his party comrades when Bernstein launched a series of tough criticisms against Marxist
theory. In several articles and books between 1896 and 1900,
Bernstein rejected the central Marxist dogma of the inevitable collapse of capitalist society and the ensuing revolutionary seizure of power by the working class. In his view, Marx
and Engels had painted an unrealistic picture of a revolutionary final goal. Bernstein advocated an evolutionary road
to socialism through peaceful, parliamentary means centered
on success at the ballot box and gradual democratic reforms.
Stressing the tight connection between means and ends, he
insisted that the extension of democracy required democratic
methods. He argued that the SPD ought to broaden its narrow working-class base and appeal to the middle class as well,
becoming a genuine peoples party. Finally, rejecting the Marxist view that liberalism and socialism constituted diametrically
opposed worldviews, Bernstein urged socialists to consider
themselves the legitimate heirs of liberalism and embrace the
Bicameralism
See Unicameralism and Bicameralism.
Bill of Rights
A bill of rights is a list of legally protected rights or immunities
enjoyed by citizens or holders of public office.The English Bill
of Rights (1689) was drawn up during the Glorious Revolution of 1688 that ended repressive Stuart rule and brought William and Mary to the English throne. It lists such protections
as the right to trial by jury, freedom of speech (for members of
Parliament only), the right to keep and bear arms (for Protestants only), and other limited rights and immunities.
A century later, a more sweeping and inclusive Bill of
Rights was added to the United States Constitution in 1791, as
the first ten amendments to the Constitution. These amendments were added as an afterthought, for the Founders who
met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 did not believe
that a bill of rights needed to be included in the newly drafted
document. This view was, however, hotly disputed during the
course of the ratification debate of 1787 and 1788.
Most Anti-Federalist opponents of the proposed constitution, and some strong Federalist supporters of the new constitution, including Thomas Jefferson, decried the absence of
a bill of rights in the document drafted in Philadelphia. The
Anti-Federalists hammered the point home: Without a bill of
rights, the new constitution created a system that is republican
in name only. A bill of rights would serve as a reminder to rulers
and citizens alike that the governments authority is limited by
its citizens inviolable liberties. Didnt Englands Glorious Revolution result in a bill of rights to which King William agreed
to abide? Didnt the American Revolution of 1776 deserve no
less a guarantee? For what was the revolution fought, if not
to preserve American rights and liberties? The Anti-Federalists
believed that if rights and liberties are to be properly protected,
the nature and extent of those liberties must be fixed from the
outset. The goodwill or solicitude of rulers or representatives
was not to be relied on for very long, if at all. Unless checked
by the law and an active and vigilant citizenry, those to whom
power is entrusted will abuse it sooner or later. Without an
explicit declaration of rights to protect the democratical
part of the citizenry, wrote the pseudonymous Anti-Federalist
pamphleteer Brutus (thought by most to be Robert Yates), the
plan is radically defective in a fundamental principle, which
ought to be found in every free government (Brutus 2003,
453454). Because the arguments in favor of such a declaration
are so clear and compelling, its omission is an ominous portent,
revealing the malign designs of the Federalists: so clear a point
is this, Brutus added, that I cannot help suspecting, that persons who attempt to persuade people, that such reservations
were less necessary under this constitution, than under those of
the states, are willfully endeavoring to deceive, and to lead you
into an absolute state of vassalage (453).
Anti-Federalist objections to the absence of a bill of rights
grew louder over the course of the ratification debate. Writing
as Publius in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton first derided
these objections as confused and incoherent (No. 38). Later, in
Federalist (No. 84), he felt obliged to respond, albeit reluctantly
and under the heading of miscellaneous points. Hamilton
wrote, The most considerable of these remaining objections
is that the plan of the convention contains no bill of rights.
He replied by noting that several state constitutions, including
New Yorks, are also without bills of rights. Acknowledging the
force of the Anti-Federalists answer to this objectionnamely,
that no separate bill of rights is needed because provisions for
protecting those rights are incorporated into the texts of the
state constitutionsHamilton asserted that the same is true of
the new federal constitution as well. The truth is, after all the
declamation we have heard, that the constitution is itself in
every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF
RIGHTS. Yet the bill of rights that Hamilton tried to tease
out of the text is a motley assortment of legal guarantees, prohibitions, and definitions. The privileges of habeas corpus and
jury trials are affirmed (although there is no requirement that
the jury be composed of ones peers), and the prohibition of
titles of nobility (Art. I, sec. 9) Hamilton offered as positive proof
of the rights-respecting character of the new constitution. But,
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study of human behavior from an evolutionary perspective emerged from ethology, a discipline guided by the dictum
that, to understand how and why an organism acts as it does,
we must study its actual behavior in its natural setting. Both
mainstream political science and biopolitics accept experiments as a valid means of inquiry. The latter, however, insists
the experiment should mirror, to the extent possible, the
challenges and environment the subject(s) would encounter
under real-life conditions. For this reason, it is skeptical about
the validity of experiments in which subjects, human or other,
are placed in a patently artificial setting and are asked to perform tasks that lack meaningful consequences. Biopolitics,
with its ethologically derived emphasis on actual behavior,
sees survey research, by and large, as a research instrument of
last resort.
Bisexual Movement
See Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movement,
Comparative.
Blackstone, William
Sir William Blackstone (17231780) was an English jurist
and legal scholar whose exposition of English common law
continues to resonate in courtrooms in the early twenty-first
century. His Commentaries on the Laws of England, published
over four volumes beginning in 1765, was a comprehensive
yet accessible treatise on the history of common law that
proved critical to jurists in both England and the colonies of
America. Blackstones Commentaries is still cited in American
courts of law as one of the foremost influences on the American Founders and a cornerstone of the U.S. Constitution.
Born in London, Blackstone studied at Oxford before being
admitted to the bar in 1746. He both practiced and taught law
to little major public acclaim until the 1756 publication of his
An Analysis of the Laws of England, a work comprising many of
his lectures at Oxford. In 1761 he was appointed as a counsel
to the Crown and was elected to the House of Commons,
where he exhibited a mostly Tory ideology. He was knighted
in 1770 and appointed as a justice to the Court of Common
Pleas, the last formal position he would hold.
Many of these appointments can be traced to the fame
Blackstone experienced as a result of the success of his collected lectures. His Commentaries was well received in Europe,
where it was translated into many languages, and in America,
where its first publication in 1771 met with widespread acclaim
for its utility in summarizing the legal tradition of England
and how it might be applied to a new political landscape.
The work was divided into four legal subjects: the Rights of
Persons (or individuals), the Rights of Things (or property
law), Private Wrongs, and Public Wrongs. Taken together,
the volumes encompass an able introduction to the common
law tradition for the aspiring lawyers Blackstone instructed
and a ready framework for the American Founders in justifying the Declaration of Independence and, later, the construction of the Constitution. While luminaries such as British
philosopher John Locke, American founding father Thomas
Paine, and other Enlightenment thinkers provided abstract
justifications for the natural rights of the colonists, the Commentaries offered a crucial practical vindication of and design
for an independent legal system in America.
Blame Management
See Scandals and Blame Management, Political.
Blanqui, Louis-Auguste
Louis-Auguste Blanqui (18051881) was a French republican
activist and legendary revolutionary conspirator. Intellectually
precocious as a youth, he studied law and medicine at the University of Paris, though he never earned a degree. Coming of
age during the repressive Bourbon restoration, he abandoned
his studies in favor of the secret societies of the republican
underground, sealing his commitment to abet popular insurrections against all conservative governmental regimes. Despite
repeated arrests, trials, and lengthening prison sentences for his
subversive activities, Blanqui managed to participate in all of
the major Parisian popular uprisings of the early nineteenth
centurythose of 1830, 1832, 1839, and 1848. By mid-century
he had become widely known as an insurgent leader willing to
sacrifice himself for the republican cause.
Blanquis subversive political activism was a quasi-religious
vocation. As a professional revolutionary, he promoted not
only an egalitarian republic, but also a society free of religious
obscurantism that perpetuated social injustice. His politics
drew on the moral implications of his radical atheism: the
value of righteous struggle against oppression now, whatever
the odds. Sympathetic to a vaguely conceived notion of a
social republic, he had little interest in the theory of collectivism then gaining ground in Europe, and he kept his distance
from the First Workingmens International Association, whose
practical projects to advance the labor movement threatened
Bloc
A bloc is a coalition of individuals, groups, or parties in a democratic system. Electoral blocs are common in multiparty, parliamentary systems. Depending on the national political structure,
a bloc may be formed prior to an election through a formal or
informal agreement. The bloc then contests the balloting as a
unified group in an effort to gain a majority in the legislature.
Electoral blocs may be created for a single election, or they
may be more stable and span multiple cycles. The membership
of blocs can change from election to election. For instance, in
Ukraine, the core of the Yulia Tymoshenko Electoral Bloc was
the same two parties through three rounds of parliamentary
elections between 2002 and 2008, although other members
of the bloc joined other groupings. Parliamentary blocs also
Bloch, Ernst
Ernst Bloch (18851977) was a German-Jewish Marxist political philosopher. His work can appear overly esoteric at times,
infused as it is with what may be called a messianic political
theology that sits uncomfortably with standard versions of
Marxism and their dismissal of such idealist utopian dreaming. For Bloch, however, the limitless scope of the human
imagination is the very keynote of human beings continual
striving to reshape and remake the world as it is into what it
might yet be.
Bloch lived through the most tumultuous and bloody
decades of the twentieth century, over the course of which
he produced a vast body of work that has reached an arguably smaller readership than is deserved. His magnum opus
and most famous work, the monumental three-volume study,
The Principle of Hope (19541959), brings together a dizzying
array of conceptual and thematic motifs discernable throughout the rest of his writings. Blochs political philosophy can
be broadly described as nondoctrinaire, thoroughly heterodox
Marxism, but one richly textured by a messianic consciousness
that absorbs and refines the apparently utopian possibilities
glimpsed in the most everyday phenomena and the political
conclusions that can be drawn from them.
Blochs unorthodox and reflexive philosophy had a not
unproblematic reception during his own lifetime. It was curiously and somewhat incongruously accommodatedtemporarily at leastby the official state wisdom of East Germany.
Blochs actual political decisions sometimes were inconsistent
as well, the most notorious of these being his defense of the
Moscow Show Trials of 1937 (a series of staged trials of political opponents of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin) after his return
from exile in the United States. In 1961 Bloch finally fell out
with the German Democratic Republic for good, remaining
in West Germany for the rest of his life.
Central to Blochs political philosophy is his theory of
the not yet (noch-nicht); that is, the persistent and recurrent critical consciousness that indicts its own time as falling
short of the possibilities both real and imagined that could
yet come into being. This emancipatory demand of the notyet-become, so frequently and easily dismissed as wishful
thinking, is for Bloch an inescapable and elemental force
throughout human history. In this and other regards Bloch
shares a distinct affinity with German cultural critic Walter
Benjamins no less elusive messianic philosophy of hope. The
Block Vote
Block voting is an electoral system used by multimember electoral wards or districts in which voters cast as many votes as
there are seats in the area. In one form of the system, citizens
may cast their votes for candidates irrespective of the party
affiliation of the office seekers. In another form of block
voting, voters cast ballots for a party, and representatives are
chosen through proportionality. The system was developed
to increase the representation of smaller political parties and
reward groupings with effective organizations and popular
candidates. However, several countries that used block voting
discovered that the system weakened major parties and led to
the proliferation of smaller groupings. It also had the opposite effect and tended to result in overwhelming and decisive
electoral victories when voters concentrated their ballots on
a single popular party. For instance, in multiple block voting
elections in Mauritius, the winning party won every seat in
parliament despite only winning about 65 percent of the
vote. Consequently, during the twentieth century, countries
such as Australia, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom
either abandoned the method or created mixed systems that
combined block voting with first-past-the-post elections.
See also Electoral Systems; First Past the Post.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
CHARACTERISTICS
Blogs are the fastest growing sites on the Internet during the
first decade of the twenty-first century. Technorati, the leading blog tracking and searching site, has reported that as of
December 2007 they have counted the existence of 112 million blogs, with 120,000 new blogs being created every day.
Over the three-year period for which data is available, the
growth was from nine million in 2005 to thirty-two million
in 2006 to eighty million in 2007. There are believed to be
1.2 million postings per day, which amounts to seventeen per
second. The major languages of the blogosphere are Chinese,
English, Farsi, and Japanese.
POSITIVE ASPECTS
The attention garnered by blogs and their sheer numbers
signal their importance. Trend spotters listen to the key conversations among the informed and passionate writers and
readers of these blogs. The viral aspect of the blog (the ease
and speed at which posts zip around the Internet) shows
the potential for such a tool in politics as well as in business
communications.
Bloggers are some of the most cutting-edge content creators online at the beginning of the twenty-first century
because they state their opinions without fear. The power of
the blog comes from the ability to allow individuals to express
themselves worldwide almost instantly. It is indeed the cheapest, quickest, and easiest way to gain a Web presence. Through
blogs ordinary people have the (1) opportunity to share knowledge and experience, (2) potential to educate and entertain, (3)
ability to quickly disseminate news and information to a mass
readership, and (4) possibility of generating revenue.
As bloggers recount everyday experiences and exchange
advice on familiar problems, they often incorporate outside
sources, linking to interesting stories from both online and
offline publications. What takes place in blogs is not just personal journaling but also thinking and learning. Blogs present a
broad range of varied and contradictory opinions and a wealth
of information about topics from the minutia of life to global
issues. Activists use blogging as a means of fostering political
awareness, including blogathons wherein users can blog for a
good cause and for various charity events.
Other proponents of blogs see it as a great format for delivering up-to-the-minute news on constantly updated pages
across the World Wide Web. The community of bloggers acts
as a cadre of fast fact-checkers that quickly root out fraudulent claims. Bloggers can be faster than traditional media when
posting accounts of natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or how
well American Idol participants performed.
Some believe that blogs increase cultural diversity by allowing a wide variety of opinions to propagate and decreasing
barriers to cultural and political participation. Blogs have a
tendency to reflect our common humanity by showing us that
we can assert our individuality and yet we are not alone.
NEGATIVE ASPECTS
For all the good that blogs may provide, there are problems
associated with their constant use. With the millions of conversations taking place, information overload is inevitable.
How does one sort through the chatter to find relevant, substantive, and trustworthy conversations? Beyond the sheer
number, issues regarding the nature of the quality, reliability,
and finality of data and information obtained from these blogs
raise important questions. Their credibility, objectivity, and
representativeness also have been questioned. As a result, calls
to create guidelines or rules for blogging have been made, but
to many, this amounts to censorship.
OTHER ASPECTS
The world of the Internet is a ripe area for study, and attempts
to harness it are often seen as a way of curtailing the entrepreneurial spirit. The legal system has had to develop rules
for dealing with blogsusers must treat blog posts as business
records that can be subpoenaed and, therefore, posts need to
be saved, stored, and handed over to litigators in the event of
legal action. However, the world of the blog to date is largely
a free-for-all, with undefined rules and many players.
See also Internet and Politics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CECILIA G. MANRIQUE
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Armstrong, Jerome, and Markos Moulitsas Zniga. Crashing the Gate. White
River Junction,Vt.: Chelsea Green, 2006.
Barlow, Aaron. The Rise of the Blogosphere. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2007.
Bausch, Paul, Matthew Haughey, and Meg Hourihan. We Blog. Indianapolis:
Wiley, 2002.
Berkman, Robert. The Art of Strategic Listening. New York: Paramount
Market, 2008.
Bruns, Axel. Blogs,Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond. New York: Peter Lang,
2008.
Flynn, Nancy. Blog Rules: A Business Guide to Managing Policy, Public
Relations, and Legal Issues. New York: American Management Association
2006.
Forrester, Duane, and Gavin Powell. How to Make Money with Your Blog. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008.
Kelly, Christopher. Two Bits. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008.
Richardson, Will. Blogs,Wikis, Podcasts. Thousand Oaks, Calif.:
Corwin, 2006.
Social Web Sites Face Transparency Questions, Winona Daily News, March
23, 2009.
Bobbio, Norberto
Norberto Bobbio (19092004), a prominent legal and political philosopher, was instrumental in developing Italian legal
positivism and made significant contributions to democratic
theory. Committed to the rule of law, he was an important
voice of the reformist and liberal-democratic left in Italy.
Born and educated in Turin, Bobbio obtained degrees in
jurisprudence and philosophy in the early 1930s and taught
law and political science from 1935 to 1984, the year in which
he was nominated lifetime senator. Although raised in a
middle-class environment that welcomed fascism against the
Bodin, Jean
One of the most influential French political thinkers of the
sixteenth century, Jean Bodin (1529/15301596) was a product of his times. Born in Angers, France, he studied and then
taught law at the University of Toulouse in the decade before
the outbreak of the French Religious Wars (15591598). In
the 1560s, as France descended into political and religious
civil war, Bodin practiced law as an avocat in Paris. Two publications in the 1560s brought him public notoriety. The first,
Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem (Method for the Easy
Comprehension of History, 1566), advocated the comparative
study of all legal codes in the search for the strongest on a specific topic. The second, Response aux paradoxes de M. Malestroit
(Response to the Paradoxes of Malestroit, 1568), addressed the
relatively new but pressing problem of price inflation.
In 1571, Bodin entered the household of the Duc dAlenon,
the kings brother, and in 1576 he took part in a meeting of the
Estates General of France called by Henry III during a crisis
point in the sectarian and political conflicts of the religious
wars. In the same year he published his seminal work in political philosophy, Les six livres de la rpublique (Six Books of the
Republic), which advocated a political system that concentrated
power in a hereditary monarch. In 1587, he became procureur
au roi for the town of Laon and was an active participant in
the Catholic League, which first rebelled against Henry III and
then sought to thwart the accession of the Protestant Henry
Boff, Leonardo
Leonardo Boff (1938 ) is a recognized Brazilian theologian,
philosopher, ecologist, and social critic who has written more
than sixty books. He is best known for being one of most
outspoken and controversial pioneers of the Latin American Liberation Theology (LALT) movement, which argued
that the focus of theology should be the direct relationship
that exists between faith and liberating sociopolitical action.
In Salvation and Liberation (1984), Leonardo and his brother
Clodovis Boff posited that LALT is a novel way of approaching theology because it develops a rigorous theological discourse of social, political, and economic liberations. As such,
for Boff and the LALT movement, social and political theory
became an essential tool for theology, along with its more
traditional dialogue partner, philosophy.
Boff was born in 1938 in Concrdia, Brazil. In 1959 he
entered the Franciscan Order and in 1964 became an ordained
priest. Subsequently, he went to Europe to continue his studies
and received a doctorate in philosophy and theology from the
Bolshevism 145
Ludwig-Maximilian University of Mnich in 1970. He came
to the forefront of the liberation theology movement with the
publication of his Jesus Christ Liberator: A Critical Christology for
Our Time (1978), in which he examines Christology through
the historical Jesus and demonstrates the direct relationship
between spirituality and political commitment to the poor.
Following the arguments of Peruvian theologian Gustavo
Gutirrez in Gutirrezs seminal 1973 A Theology of Liberation,
Boff asserted repeatedly in his writings that the first step of the
theological process is historical praxis, which is only then followed by a second step of reflection on praxis in light of faith.
For this reason, he and other liberationists readily used political
theoryMarxism, dependency theory, and critical theory
to interpret the sociopolitical setting, asserting that theology
must reflect on orthopraxis (right practice) and not simply
orthodoxy (right doctrine). While critics charged this method
of politicizing the Christian faith and advocating communism,
violent revolution, and atheism, Boff and other LALT adherents responded that all theology is implicitly political and that
LALT, in contrast, simply speaks of politics explicitly.
Boff gained notoriety for applying the methods of LALT
not only to the social situation but also to the institution of
the church. In his Ecclesiogenesis:The Base Communities Reinvent
the Church (1977), he argued that the grassroots base ecclesial communities movement was revolutionizing the church.
However, in Church, Charism, and Power: Liberation Theology and
the Institutional Church (1981), he directly critiqued the Roman
Catholic Churchs appropriation of political and symbolic
power to control the masses, vehemently contending that this
power needs to be decentralized. The Vatican responded in
1984 through the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
led by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI),
by silencing Boff for ten months. Boff submitted, but when
he was threatened with silencing again in 1992, he refused
to abide and reluctantly left the priesthood. Undaunted, he
continued to write and further developed arguments he had
begun supporting feminism and the ordination of women in
The Maternal Face of God:The Feminine and Its Religious Expressions (1979). He also discussed the application of LALT to ecological issues in Ecology and Liberation (1993) and Cry of the
Earth, Cry of the Poor (1995).
Boff has taught at numerous universities in Brazil, been a
visiting professor at Lisbon, Basel, Salamanca, Heidelberg, and
Harvard universities, and served as an editor of numerous journals. He is currently professor emeritus of ethics, philosophy of
religion, and ecology at the State University of Rio de Janeiro.
See also Latin American Political Thought; Liberation Theology;
Religion and Politics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RYAN R. GLADWIN
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Boff, Leonardo. Jesus Christ Liberator: A Critical Christology for Our Time,
translated by Patrick Hughes. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1978.
. Church, Charism, and Power: Liberation Theology and the Institutional
Church, translated by John W. Diercksmeier. New York: Crossroad, 1985.
Bolshevism
Bolshevism refers to a movement for Marxist socialist revolution spearheaded by the Bolshevik Party in Russia. Its founder
was Vladimir Lenin, and as a consequence, Bolshevism is often
viewed as synonymous with Leninism. Leninism, however, has
more of a theoretical component than Bolshevism and aspires
to be a more complete political ideology.
Bolshevism was born at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) in 1903. Lenin
advocated a more active and committed party membership
of professional revolutionaries, which stood in contrast to the
trade unionbased membership of other social democratic
parties at that time. He forced a split in the party, and, after
political maneuvering that assured his faction the majority of
the seats in the RSDLPs leading bodies, he named his group
the Bolsheviks (from the Russian word bolshinstvo, meaning
majority). They were opposed by the Mensheviks (from the
Russian word menshinstvo, meaning minority) led by, among
others, Julius Martov and Grigorii Plekhanov. However, it was
not until the Seventh Congress of the RSDLP in 1917 that the
term Bolshevik officially appeared in the party title. In 1918 the
party was renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
and in 1925, under the Soviet Union, became the All-Union
Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The term Bolshevik officially
disappeared in 1952, when the party name was changed to the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
The basis of the Bolshevik position was a strategy that
emphasized the role of a vanguard party of professional
revolutionaries who were committed to a Marxist socialist
revolution. Those who were inactive or not wholly committed to the movement were excluded from membership. The
party committed itself to raising class consciousness among the
working class and rejected the view that the Russian workers
needed to cooperate with the middle class to bring political
change to Russia. It professed to be a party of a new type,
based on democratic centralism. This means that members
participate in the formation of policy and election of leaders, but after a policy has been decided, all party members are
commanded to carry it out loyally. In power, the Bolsheviks
aspired to create a dictatorship of the proletariat, in which
Bookchin, Murray
Murray Bookchin (19212006) was perhaps the most significant and widely read English-language anarchist thinker
of the postWorld War II era. His work also made significant
contributions to political thought in relation to a range of
issues aside from anarchism, including radical ecology, the history of the 1936 Spanish Revolution, neo-Marxism, and urban
studies. His writings influenced a variety of political movements and tendencies, including the New Left movement of
the 1960s and 1970s, environmentalism, and municipalism.
Bookchins most significant political contributions centered on his theoretical integration of ecological concerns
with anarchist philosophy. He argued that environmental
destruction was an outcome of authoritarian social relations
and class hierarchies within capitalist societies that allowed for
the massive exploitation of common resources to serve the
ends of privately controlled profit. Ending ecological damage
could not occur through statist reforms that left structures of
exploitation intact, but required a fundamental rearrangement
of social life along antiauthoritarian lines. Bookchin signaled
this concern in his groundbreaking work Our Synthetic Environment (1952), which was largely overlooked because of its
radical conclusions.
Bookchins anarchist approach to radical ecology is termed
social ecology and still provides an influential perspective within
environmentalist circles. As a social ecologist, Bookchin argues
that radical activism, to be dark green, must be informed most
decisively by the moral considerations surrounding each manifestation of struggle. He argues that the capitalist mode of
production and hierarchically rationalized workplaces have
only negative consequences for workers as a class and for the
environment. Bookchins critique further engages a direct
confrontation with productivist visions of ecological or socialist struggles that, still captivated by illusions of progress, accept
industrialism and capitalist technique while rejecting the capitalist uses to which they are applied. The ecological conclusion reached by Bookchin is revealed in the assertion that the
sources of conflicting interests in society must be confronted
and overcome in a revolutionary manner. This means that the
earth can no longer be owned and must become a shared
commons. These statements represent crucial aspects of radical alliances between ecological and labor movements beyond
a limited jobs versus environment construction. Bookchin
offers social ecology as an alternative to notions of deep
ecology that argued that humans as a species should be held
accountable for ecological destruction. Deep ecologists seek a
LOCATING A BOUNDARY
In its most technical form, boundary making consists of
the delimitation and demarcation of a boundary. Delimitation refers to the definition of a boundary in a treaty, map, or
other formal document. Improvements in survey techniques,
printing, and longitude measurement in eighteenth-century
Europe generated more detailed maps that proved essential
for state makers wishing to craft precise boundaries between
sovereign territories.
Demarcation refers to the physical marking of the boundary
on the ground with signs, pyramids, posts, or fences. Engineers,
diplomatic representatives, and local residents descend on the
border with maps and survey tools in hand after delimitation
is completed to physically mark where one states sovereignty
ends and anothers begins. While good survey teams are essential to a proper demarcation, so too are knowledgeable locals
familiar with topography and toponymy (place names). However, local populations arent always happy to have a new border in their vicinity and may resist state makers attempts to
partition territory and restrict access to it. In the nineteenth
century, locals along the newly delimited border between
Greece and the Ottoman Empire conspired to provide the
demarcation commission with false place names, with the
result that clusters of villages wound up on the wrong side of
the boundary.
Some borders are delimited but never complete demarcation. Many African state borders, for example, were affixed on
maps and certified in treaties but have been marked only at
official crossings.
While traditional approaches to boundary making focused
on geographic factors and mapping techniques, subsequent
approaches in political geography and political science shifted
the focus to boundary maintenancethe processes and strategies states use to regulate and restrict territorial access.
BOUNDARIES AS INSTITUTIONS
Before moving on to define boundary disputes, it is prudent
to note exactly what the term boundary means. Boundaries
or bordershave been defined as lines of separation or legally
binding divisions between modern states. Yet, boundaries are
also institutions of state authority. State authorities check passports at official crossings, collect customs taxes on imported
goods, police against border jumping and illegal migration,
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
Territorial disputes are defined as overlapping territorial claims
by one or more states. Ongoing boundary disputes in this category include conflicting Indo-Pakistani claims over Kashmir
and Israels occupation of the Golan Heights taken from Syria
in the 1967 Six-Day War. Territorial disputes are by no means
confined to large territories. Between 1895 and 1963, U.S.Mexican relations repeatedly soured because of the Chamizal,
a disputed stretch of land along the Rio Grande barely the
size of a few football fields.
The study of territorial disputes has rapidly expanded in
recent years, particularly in political science. While there is no
consensus on what causes or intensifies territorial disputes,
a number of prominent explanations include the following
variables: (1) the strategic value of territory (e.g., the British-Spanish dispute over Gibraltar); (2) resources contained
by the territory (e.g., the multicountry dispute over the oilrich Spratly Islands in the Pacific); (3) long-standing historical claims (e.g., Saddam Hussein once declared Kuwait to be
Iraqs long-lost thirteenth province); (4) the correspondence
between borders and ethnic-group boundaries (e.g., millions
of ethnic Albanians reside near, but outside Albanias boundaries); (5) a rulers likelihood of experiencing domestic backlash
for the handling of a territorial dispute (e.g., Kyrgyz government officials resolved a territorial dispute with China but
subsequently faced major political opposition and protest for
giving away national territory).
Not all territorial disputes are indivisible, and some
boundary disputes get resolved. In 1982, Israel handed back
the Sinai to Egypt following a United Statesbrokered peace
treaty. In the 1990s, the International Court of Justice adjudicated a long-standing dispute over the Aouzou Strip between
Chad and Libya. In the beginning of the twenty-first century,
China resolved border disputes with several neighboring
states in order to improve the security situation in its outlying provinces.
Bourdieu, Pierre
Pierre Bourdieu (19302002) was a French sociologist who
approached politics sociologically, outside of the perspective
of politicians, in order to study the social conditions of its
access.
Bourdieus interest in politics and sociology began in the
mid-1950s, during his military service in Algeria. During this
time, he adopted a militant posture toward the necessity of
Algerian independence. Neutrality was an impossible position
for Bourdieu; he felt that it led to the defense and strengthening of the status quo. An example of his militant attitude is
found in his book The Weight of the World (1993), which seeks
at once to unveil the suffering of those who are excluded by
society and to give them the possibility to understand and
express themselves.
According to Bourdieu, sociology has its own habitus
(set of physiological, psychological, and social habits) and
150 Boycott
Boycott
To boycott is to abstain from or act together in abstaining from
using, buying, or dealing with as an expression of protest or
disfavor or as a means of coercion. The term is derived from
a campaign of ostracism on Captain Boycott, leveled by the
Irish Land League in 1840. After refusing to lower tenant
rents, the Irish Land League, whose mission was to ensure fair
rents for all, organized all workers to cease granting services
to Captain Boycott, such as selling goods in stores, delivering
mail, and harvesting his land. This ultimately resulted in his
isolation and forced him to leave his position in Ireland to
return to England.
Boycotting continues to be seen by many as an effective
strategy, and it is employed in many forms. Most forms of
boycott are short term and used to rectify a single event of
injustice. However, some forms of boycott are long term and
are used as part of larger organizational or structural form of
protest. Examples include systematic disinvestment, such as the
international call for the withdrawal of businesses from South
Africa during the Apartheid era and the call for consumers to
purchase items based on fair trade.
See also Collective Action and Mobilization;Trade Diplomacy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JEFFREY N. CARROLL
Brinkmanship
In international politics, brinkmanship refers to the calculated
escalation of threats against adversaries to achieve foreign
policy aims.
The term was introduced by U.S. Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles, who advocated such a policy against the Soviet
Union, defining it as the ability to get to the verge [the brink]
without getting into the war. It is a challenge in the form of a
credible threat, whether real or perceived, designed to compel
an adversary to back down or to deter it from pursuing an
undesirable course of action. It also may involve a deliberately
created crisis to generate political or military leverage over an
opponent.
Brinkmanship is an important (if sometimes implicit)
component of bargaining models of war, and has parallels to
hostile bargaining models in economic theory, such as in the
widely cited ultimatum game. Soviet and U.S. nuclear policy
during the early decades of the cold war, culminating in the
1962 Cuban missile crisis, displayed elements of brinkmanship.
Crises that never erupt into full-scale conflicts are often cited
as instances of brinkmanship, although it is often difficult to
separate the influence of actor choices (e.g., deliberate threat
escalation) from other factors like the relative capability of the
states involved.
See also Cold War; Diplomacy; Negotiations and Bargaining.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VSEVOLOD GUNITSKIY
King John signs the Magna Carta in 1215. The Magna Carta set a
precedent for limited government and established the traditional
rights of English subjects.
source: The Granger Collection
The Levellers proposed constitution, an Agreement for the People, promised nearly universal male suffrage, reformed electoral
districts, a parliament popularly elected every two years, religious freedom, and an end to debtors prison. The majority of
the regiments of the army were eventually persuaded to accept
the more conservative The Heads of the Proposals, submitted by
Henry Ireton for the Army Council, which secured property
rights against redistribution and upheld traditional privileges.
Both of these assumptions about liberty are shared by Benthams most formidable nineteenth-century legatee, John Stuart
Mill. Like Bentham, Mill tried to elucidate principles of representative government, law, opinion, and political economy on
rationally defensible grounds. And again following Bentham,
the ultimate appeal on these issues for Mill was utility, albeit in
the somewhat broader sense of humankinds permanent interests as a group of progressive beings. As Mill argues in On Liberty (1859), although the state has a right to regulate activities
that inflict concrete harms on others, it has no business interfering in matters such as speech, expression, opinion, or other
actions that pertain only to individuals themselves. Liberty of
thought and opinion is most conducive to the spontaneity and
individuality that pull the human race forward.
The irony is that despite his theoretical and political efforts
on behalf of democratizing reforms, Mills arguments are in
important respects anti-democratic. Indeed his thought is illustrative of the fundamental tension between liberty and democracy
in nineteenth-century social and political thought. Inspired by
the writings of the French social theorist Alexis de Tocqueville,
whose Democracy in America Mill widely championed upon its
publication in 1835, Mill feared the vapid conformity and collective mediocrity that arises in a democratic age. The greatest
threat to liberty was no longer the overbearing influence of
democratic majorities but the sociological dynamics of tyrannical public opinion. Even if democratic individuals enjoy
legal freedoms of speech or expression, they are still subject to
the powerful coercion of society itself. Thus for Mill, true or
effective freedom requires more than just the absence of legal
coercion. While negative liberty is a necessary condition for
cultivation, progress, and development, it is not a sufficient condition, and for this Mill looks to a stimulating diversity of social
conditions. Mills concept of liberty marks a decisive advance
beyond Hobbesian or classical liberal definitions of freedom as
nothing more or less than the absence of restraint.
Nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberalism by and large
followed in the footsteps of Mill and other theorists of positive
liberty, who believed that the state had an active and affirmative role in cultivating the freedom, autonomy, and development of modern citizens. The new liberalism of Thomas Hill
Green and Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse, as well as various
strands of Fabian socialism, are premised on similar assumptions that true freedom requires underlying power or capabilities in order to make good use of formal liberties.
CONCLUSION
While ideas of liberty and popular government are recurrent
themes in the British tradition, there is enormous variation
even within that tradition itself. Liberty is variously conceived
as negative and positive, empirical and metaphysical, and as
originating from sources as diverse as historical traditions and
institutions, the common law, abstract natural laws and natural
rights, and the participatory republican traditions of antiquity. Despite the social conflicts that gave birth to these ideals
and practices, what can hardly be disputed is the profound
influence that the British tradition as a whole has had on the
Bryce, James
The career of British statesman and historian James Bryce
(18321922) covered the reign of Queen Victoria, the American Civil War (18611865) and its aftermath, and extended
until after the end of World War I (19141918). Bryce was born
in Belfast, Northern Ireland; raised in Scotland; and educated
at Glasgow, Heidelberg, and Oxford universities. His activities
spanned the worlds of scholarship, politics, and diplomacy.
He was a practicing lawyer, a professor of law at Oxford, a
liberal member of the House of Commons (18801907), a
member of the House of Lords as Viscount Bryce, and from
1907 to 1913 the British ambassador to the United States. In
an era when travel was slow and imposed many obstacles,
Bryce observed life and politics firsthand in many countries
throughout the world and published articles and books about
his travels.
Bryces two-volume The American Commonwealth (1888)
was a pioneering study for its time of the institutions of
American politics, drawing on his travels there from the
presidency of Ulysses S. Grant onward, as well as on written
sources. Like French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville,
Bryce was attracted to study America because it was the
CONCLUSION
Buddhist political thought, however, has struggled with the
emergence of democracy. Its conservative beliefs in hierarchy and support for the state offer little guidance to voters
comparing the policy agendas of competing parties. In both
Thailand and Sri Lanka, explicitly Buddhist political parties
collapsed under a public backlash; the Japanese Komeito party
officially disowned its religious heritage under public pressure
in 1970. Strains of engaged Buddhism, which stress compassionate public service instead of withdrawal or obedience,
are spreading across East Asia. If their growth continues, they
may provide a new Buddhist perspective on politics, but that
remains to be seen.
See also Asian Political Thought; Religion and Politics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GEORGE EHRHARDT
156 Budgeting
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Berkwitz, Stephen. Resisting the Global in Buddhist Nationalism:Venerable
Somas Discourse of Decline and Reform. Journal of Asian Studies 67
(February 2008): 73106.
Hardacre, Helen. State and Religion in Japan. In Nanzan Guide to
Japanese Religions, edited by Paul Swanson and Clark Chilson, 274288.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006.
Jackson, Peter. Buddhism, Legitimation, and ConflictThe Political Functions of
Urban Thai Buddhism. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1989.
Lewis, Todd. Buddhism: The Politics of Compassionate Rule. In Gods
Rule:The Politics of World Religions, edited by Jacob Neusner, 233256.
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003.
Ling, Trevor. Review Essay: Religion and Politics in South and Southeast
Asia. History of Religions 20 (February 1981): 281287.
Madsen, Richard. Democracys Dharma: Religious Renaissance and Political
Development in Taiwan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.
Philpott, Daniel. Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion.
American Political Science Review 101 (August 2007): 505526.
Reynolds, Frank. Dhamma in Dispute: The Interactions of Religion and
Law in Thailand. Law and Society Review 28, no. 3 (1994): 433452.
Queen, Christopher S., and Sallie B. King, eds. Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist
Liberation Movements in Asia. New York: State University of New York
Press, 1994.
Budgeting
The term budgeting refers to the process of allocating financial
resources to serve public purposes. A governments budget
is essentially a summary statement of all planned revenues
and expenditures for the coming fiscal cycle. This statement
enables the bureaucracy to collect and spend money. This
brief definition alludes to two fields of research on public
budgeting: political science and public administration.
Political science is interested in budgeting because a budget is a fundamental output of political systems and serves as
a key indicator of governments public policy commitments.
Because the process of budgeting entails taking away money
from some segments of society (taxation) and giving it to others (expenditures), budgets are contentious and the result of an
often hard-fought political process. Broadly speaking, political
scientists contend that the outcome of the budget process is
determined by the choices of political actors involved in budgeting as well as the formal and informal rules governing the
decision-making process.
In political science, the substantive focus of the vast literature concentrates on three major topics: (1) the size of the
budget, especially in relation to the overall size of the economy (i.e., government expenditures as percentage of gross
domestic product); (2) the balance of the budget: planned
revenues (mostly originating from taxation) minus expenditures; and (3) the composition of public budgets: spending
across governmental functions such as defense, social security,
and health care.
Similarly, the field of public administration is fascinated
by budgeting because of the formidable and complex task to
formulate, implement, and monitor the execution of a budget. The technical process of administering a budget entails
forecasting, accounting, reporting, and auditing of revenue
and expenditures streams. The organization of budgeting is
characterized by tremendously diverse and specialized programs and structures, as well as high technical demands. As a
consequence of an interest in the technical aspects of budgeting,
public administration generally focuses on specific budgeting
systems or detailed budgeting problems. Public administration
lags somewhat behind political science in developing a comparative and generalized theoretical framework of budgeting.
The public administration literature on public budgeting
concentrates on two major research topics: (1) policy analysis and (2) the study of institutional arrangements that provide
public services. Consequently, a substantial part of this literature attempts to fuse both topics and is concerned with devising appropriate and efficient budgetary systems. In the past
decades, some of the major budgetary systems can be classified
under the following labels: program-based budgeting, zero-based
budgeting, and, more recently, performance-based budgeting, which
attempts to bring businesslike practices, such as accrual budgeting, to public management. Moreover, a vast empirical literature, mostly generated by economists, is devoted to revenue
forecasting; that is, the attempt to predict future revenues by
identifying the consequences of future macroeconomic developments under existing laws (taxation). Forecasting serves as a
tool for medium-term and long-term planning.
Because scholarly work on budgeting in political science
and public administration overlap less and less, this entry concentrates on outlining core conceptual aspects and theoretical
advances on the politics of budgeting. The main focus, as in
much of the classic work on budgeting, is on the politics of public spending. Studies of the politics of budgeting move beyond
a simple vision of budgeting as devising a document on how to
collect and spend citizens monies and instead recognizes that
budgeting is a political endeavor. Budgeting is the allocation
of a scarce resourcemoney. This process demands trade-offs
among competing policy alternatives and political interests.The
outcome of these trade-offs is a manifestation of a governments
policy priorities, as well as a reflection of power among individual budget actors. Money spent according to the budget holds
two broad societal consequences: It allows citizens to observe
whether their preferences are fulfilled (accountability), and it
fuels the economy. Given these features of budgeting, political scientists are interested in the decision-making processthe
rules for confrontation and compromiseand in the actors
who determine budget outcomes.
TERMINOLOGY
In general, a governments commitment to spend monies is
outlined regularly (often annually) in one or a series of laws.
While there is some variation on the exact terminology across
countries, this commitment is a government output and called
appropriations. For the United States, researchers also refer to
budget authoritythat is the authority granted per congressional vote and presidential approval to an agent of government
to spend money. Once these commitments are honored and
the money is actually spent, we speak of outlays or expenditures
(i.e., outcomes). In general, fiscal policy, deficits, and surpluses
are captured by expenditures.
Budgeting 157
Some governments separate their current operations and
capital expenditures. A core function of this division is to identify how borrowing or current account surpluses are translated
into investments in capital assets, such as physical infrastructure. By doing so, governments can show that public spending moves beyond simple consumption. While advocates of
capital budgeting claim that this process encourages long-term
planning, critics argue that capital budgets misstate governments financial positions. Many developing countries and
most American states employ capital budgeting. However, in
practice, there is large variation on how the capital and operating budgets are related to each other.
Three more distinctions are noteworthy. Within a budget,
one can draw a distinction between entitlements and discretionary spending. Based on authorizing legislation, entitlements
mandate payments, often to eligible individuals, by an agency.
Thus, outlays depend on exogenous circumstances, such as
economic well-being, and are independent of the amount
appropriated to a program in the previous budget. For example, unemployment benefits comprise of a series of set eligibility requirements, but the economic climate and the number
of people claiming benefits determine the actual withdrawal
of financial resources. As a consequence for budgeting, entitlement spending needs to be forecast for the coming fiscal year
by government agencies. Moreover, an effective change in
entitlement spending is not pursued in the budget itself but in
separate legislation modifying existing eligibility requirements.
In contrast to entitlements, discretionary spending is public
expenditure over which budget makers decide by reoccurring
(mostly annual) appropriations.
Second, a governments budget may be delineated along
organizational units, such as ministries and departments, or
across programmatic functions. Budget items are grouped programmatically when they are identified by government activities in relation to a specific set of policy objectives. Proper
classification can be tricky. For example, should a nursing
school operated by a public hospital be classified under health
or education? To overcome these problems and generate internationally comparable standards, the United Nations, in corporation with the International Monetary Fund, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World
Bank, developed a conceptual structure, the System of National
Accounts, in 1993 to provide international standards for the
measurement of the market economy. Specifically for budgets,
classification of the functions of government (COFOG) categorizes activities according to socioeconomic objectives, such
as defense, health, and public order.
Finally, an increasing number of countries, especially developed ones, have moved from cash-based budgeting to accrual
accounting since the 1990s. Under the cash basis, a transaction is recorded at the time the payment or receipt occurs.
Accrual accounting, on the other hand, records a transaction
when an action producing revenues or spending takes place
and not when this action is paid for. In short, accrual accounting records change in ownership, while cash-based budgeting
tracks exchange of monies. Clearly, for large-scale governmental
infrastructure projects, the time difference between both occurrences might be large, thus making a comparison between cash
and accrual-based, or even mixed budgets, challenging.
POLITICS OF BUDGETING
In his famous call for a theory on government resource allocation, V. O. Key (1940) asked why government should allocate
a certain amount of money to a specific government function
over all others. While the normative element of this question
was initially addressed by economists based on the principles
of efficiency and equitye.g., Paul Samuelson (1954)a
seminal theoretical response by a political scientist was Aaron
Wildavskys (1964) The Politics of the Budgetary Process.
Wildavsky argued that budgets and the programs within
it change only incrementally over time. Incrementalism holds
that budget makers respond to the remarkable complexity of
distributing the shares of a budget across programs by making small corrections to the status quo. Given the financial,
temporal, and cognitive constraints on bureaucrats and policy
makers, the budgetary decision-making process is simplified
by the concepts of base and fair share. Base essentials mean that
previous allocation to a program are expected to be matched
in the current year. Fair share denotes the idea that new funding should be distributed roughly equally across agencies and
programs. In short, the current budget is largely determined by
last years size and content.
Incrementalism conceptualizes budgeting as a negotiation process among a regular set of political actors including bureaucrats, as well as policy makers from the executive
and legislative branches. While entitlements and budget rules
may contribute to incremental changes in budgets, bargaining
within the expectations of base and fair share among political actors is identified as the key feature for composing a new
budget. Because incrementalism builds on decision-making
theory, the budgeting process is perceived as open, pluralist,
and conflict-free.
Incrementalism has been challenged on empirical and theoretical grounds since the mid-1970s. First, scholars charged
that incrementalism is too conceptually vague and too descriptive for providing insightful theoretical contributions. Second,
scholars also discovered that large differences in the magnitude
of budget changes at both the programmatic and the overall
budget level occur. Some budgets rise and fall dramatically.
Incrementalism cannot account for the empirical reality of
large-scale changes in budgets.
Among the first to theorize on the occurrence of both
incremental and nonincremental change was John Padgett
(1980). He argued that budget decisions are made serially.
Decision makers engage in an ordered search through a limited
set of alternatives. They inquire sequentially through different
budget options until they can match a solution reflecting both
the merits of a program and the perception of the overall fiscal
climate. In aggregate, his decision-making model suggests that
most programs only change marginally in any given year, but
on some occasions, policy makers radically alter the size of a
program.
158 Budgeting
In public policy, Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner (2005)
contend that incrementalism is one element of a more comprehensive model of budgeting based on punctuated equilibrium theory. Their core argument is that individuals as well as
organizations possess a limited capacity to process information.
As a consequence, policy makers only concentrate on and prioritize a small set of budgetary issues. Budget issues that receive
disproportionate attention change dramatically because policy
makers are prone to under- and over-respond to changes in
the exogenous environment. Those unattended budget items,
however, remain largely unchanged. Overall, their model predicts that budgetary changes are characterized by periods of
stability that are occasionally interrupted by large-scale shifts
in resources. In short, the punctuated equilibrium model of
Baumgartner and Jones combines incrementalism and dramatic changes under a unified model of budgetary choice.
This model originated from insights on the American political system. Several other studies across a variety of advanced
democracies and levels of government find strong empirical
evidence that budgeting at the subnational and national level is
predominantly highly incremental but sometimes interrupted
by very large and often consequential budgetary changes. Jones
and colleagues (2009) assess the accumulated evidence across
several advanced industrialized democracies and assert that
the punctuated nature of budgetary changes offers a strong
empirical generalization. Taken together, these empirical verifications of the punctuated equilibrium model indicate the
need for theorizing on processes generating extreme change
in budgeting research.
A third approach studying the politics of budgeting
emerges out of comparative political economy and rational
choice institutionalism during the 1990s. The main focus of
this literature is on budget balance, while incrementalism
and public policy theories concentrate on spending patterns.
Comparative political economists aim to identify rules generating balanced budgets and conceive budgeting along two
problems: principal-agent and common-pool. In both cases, the
literature identifies the self-interest of policy makers as the
core problem of efficient and effective budgeting.
In the principal-agent framework, citizens (principal) delegate the authority to tax and spend to politicians (agent) and,
after making their spending decisions, politicians (principal)
delegate the implementation to bureaucrats (agent). In both
principal-agent relationships (citizen-politician and politicianbureaucrat), the literature assumes that the preferences between
principal and agent do not overlap. For example, voters may
prefer more education spending while politicians and bureaucrats would rather spend money on nice offices. Principalagent problems thus may lead to inefficient budgeting and
more public spending.
In the common-pool resource problem, the common
resource (money) is generated by general taxation of all citizens. However, policy makers are assumed to spend this money
on specific purposes without regard to the depletion of the
overall budget. For example, agricultural ministers are said to
obtain and distribute as many agricultural subsidies as possible
without considering the overall shape of the budget.Theoretically, the common-pool framework predicts that the aggregation of all individual excessive spending decisions lead to large
government budgets, deficits, and debt increases.
The political economy literature on budgeting argues that
both problemsprincipal-agent and common-poolcan
be alleviated by constructing the appropriate fiscal rules and
political institutions. Jrgen Von Hagen (2006) outlines three
sets of rules: legislative and constitutional constraints on budgetary aggregates, political institutions fostering accountability,
and procedural rules of the budgeting process.
Legislative and constitutional constraints on budgetary
aggregates entail balanced budget constraints, debt and deficit limits, as well as taxation and spending restrictions. Large
variation in the specifics and enforceability of these rules prevail across countries and subnational entities. While rare at the
national level, among the most prominent and widely studied restrictions are those imposed by the European Monetary
Union and American states. The empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of these rules, however, is weak.
A significant amount of scholarly work considers the
impact of political institutions, most prominently certain electoral rules of a political system, as a key influence on budgeting. This line of inquiry suggests that political competition
and accountability allow voters to resolve the principal-agent
problem of budgeting. When elections are competitive and
personal, voters are able easily to identify and punish politicians and political parties who diverge from citizens preferences. There is a lively theoretical and empirical debate on
other consequences of electoral rules. To a large extent, the
discourse concentrates on the distinction between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems.
Procedural rules of the budget process lay out the interactions within and between the legislative and executive
branches of government. Budgeting generally proceeds along a
tight time schedule of formulation, enactment, execution, and
assessment (the budget cycle). With some exceptions (most
notably the United States), the executive branch dominates all
four stages of the budget process and often manages the process within its hierarchical structures. In presidential systems,
as well as multiparty collation governments, budgets also are
formulated and enacted either via negotiation or by reliance
on established contracts, such as coalition agreements. Overall,
the process of budgeting might be fairly fragmented, specialized, and opaque to the outside observer. It is a common call
in the literature, as well as among international organizations,
to make the budgeting process more transparent.
Taken together, the political economy literature on budgeting proposes the following institutional solutions to the
principal-agent problem: increase the accountability of the
agents and increase the transparency of the budget process.
Greater accountability might be achieved through electoral
institutions that bring candidates closer to voters or by policy
makers screening viable candidates for the top bureaucratic
positions. How well these solutions works is still in debate.This
is partly due to the fact that cross-national data on budget
DISCUSSION
It is helpful to contrast the three approaches to the study of
budgetingincrementalism, punctuated equilibrium, and
political economyin regard to their conception of actors,
choice, and institutions. All three approaches ask how political
actors engage with each other in various institutional settings in order to decide on a budget. Substantively, the first
two approaches concentrate on appropriations, while political
economy is more interested in outlays and deficits.
Theoretical approaches to budgeting based on political
economy clearly name the actors in the budgeting process.
Most commonly, a game theoretical model identifies an interaction between a pair of the following actors: voters, government, spending ministers, and the bureaucracy. In contrast,
incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium scholarship relies
on the amorphous group known as policy makers or focuses
on the executive organization. The last two approaches often
understand budgeting as a fairly open process with different
actors providing diverse inputs at the various stages of the process. As a consequence of each approach, political economy
might miss important actors in the budgeting process due to
its restrictive assumptions, while the other two approaches
vagueness might hinder developing generalizable insights.
Political sciences theoretical development in budgeting research is accommodated by two models of individual
choice. Political economy relies on the postulates of rational
choice theory and assigns preferences and expected utilities to
individual budgeting actors. In contrast, incrementalism and
punctuated equilibrium develop within bounded rationality
and contend that, in budgeting, imperfect decision-making
conditions produce imperfect solution searches and foster a
reliance on temporally available heuristics. While its simplicity
and the ability to generalize self-interested strategic behavior
allow the political economy approach to develop a unified
body of research, bounded rationality more accurately reflects
on choices and actions of the actors in the budgeting process.
Finally, all three approaches also vary in their assessment
of political institutions. The political economy approach attributes core causal effects to the macro-institutional setting,
such as the system of government and electoral system. However, this approach is rightfully concerned with the possible
endogenity of institutions: governments can choose both budgets and the fiscal rules that outline the budgeting process.
Incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium theories follow
detailed fiscal rules more closely and often perceive institutions as part of the organizational features of the budgeting
process. In all of the research on budgeting, political scientists
and public administration scholars are searching for a budget process that produces efficient allocation and fair political
representation.
See also Incrementalism; Political Economy; Punctuated Equilibrium.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHRISTIAN BREUNIG
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Guess, George M., and Lance T. LeLoup. Comparative Public Budgeting: Global
Perspectives on Taxing and Spending. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2010.
Hallerberg, Mark. Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Policy. In Handbook of Public
Administration, edited by B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, 393401. London:
Sage, 2003.
Hallerberg, Mark, Rolf Strauch, and Jrgen von Hagen. Fiscal Governance in
Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. A Model of Choice for Public
Policy. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15, no. 3 (2005):
325351.
Jones, Bryan D., Frank R. Baumgartner, Christian Breunig, Christopher
Wlezien, Stuart Soroka, Martial Foucault, Abel Francois, et al. A
General Empirical Law of Public Budgets: A Comparative Analysis.
American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 4 (2009): 855873.
Key,Vladimer O., Jr. The Lack of a Budgetary Theory. American Political
Science Review 34, no. 6 (1940): 11371144.
Kraan, Dirk-Jan. Budgetary Decisions: A Public Choice Approach. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Padgett, John F. Bounded Rationality in Budgetary Research. American
Political Science Review 74 (1980): 354372.
Poterba, James M., and Jrgen von Hagen. Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal
Performance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Samuelson, Paul A. The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Review of
Economics and Statistics 36 no. 4 (1954): 387389.
Shah, Anwar. Budgeting and Budgetary Institutions. New York: World Bank,
2007.
Von Hagen, Jrgen. Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions. In Oxford
Handbook of Political Economy, edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald
Wittman, 464478. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.
Wehner, Joachim. Assessing the Power of the Purse: An Index of Legislative
Budget Institutions. Political Studies 54, no. 4 (2006): 767785.
Wildavsky, Aaron. The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Boston: Little, Brown,
1964.
. Budgeting : A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes. Boston:
Little, Brown, 1975.
Bull, Hedley
Hedley Bull (19321985) was one of the major figures in the
modern academic study of international relations and taught
at the London School of Economics, The Australian National
University, and Oxford University. One of the key figures
in the English School of International Relations, he is best
known for the idea that states form among themselves an
international society. Bull began his early work by analyzing
the common framework of rules and institutions that developed within the anarchical society of the classical European
state system. For Bull, this society was anarchical in that there
was no common power to enforce law or to underwrite
cooperation, but it was a society in so far as states were conscious of common rules and values, cooperated in the working of common institutions, and perceived common interests
in observing these rules and working through these institutions. As against the realist emphasis on the material structures
of the international system, Bull saw international society as
built around a historically created, and evolving, structure of
common understandings, rules, norms, and mutual expectations. But as against later liberal constructivists, he retained
realisms concern with power and its emphasis on the central
role of the balance of power.
Bulls approach in his most famous book, The Anarchical
Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (1977) involved three
elements. There is an analytical approach (what is order, and
what are the minimum conditions that would have to exist
before any society could be meaningfully so described?); a
historical approach (how far can one isolate and identify an
acceptance of these conditions in the evolving practices of
states?); and a normative approach (on which minimum conditions of coexistence might the holders of sharply conflicting
values be able to agree?). The subsequent task was to map and
explain the changing normative constitution of international
societyin particular the move from a limited pluralist society
of states built around coexistence to a liberal solidarist society
of states united by denser institutional forms and by stronger
moral and legal ties.
Bull also established a reputation as one of the most important early theorists of arms control. He was closely involved
in the early years of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London and, in The Control of the Arms Race (1961), he attacked
arguments for general and complete disarmament. He argued
instead that the most important goal should be the stability
of a strategic relationship rather than any particular level of
armaments and that the greatest efforts should be devoted to
stabilizing the structure of nuclear deterrence and agreeing on
the methodologies, technologies, and shared understandings to
produce that end.
Although his work on strategy was dominated by the cold
war, Bull believed that the transition from a European to a
global international society represented a more fundamental historical development. In his later workespecially The
Expansion of International Society (1985)he explored relations
between the European and non-European world. He traced
of Israel and its Arab neighbors. Over the next two decades,
Bunche presided over the UN conference on the peaceful
uses of atomic energy and organized and directed UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, Lebanon, the Congo,
Yemen, and Cyprus.
Bunche was an active scholar and participant in the civil
rights movement. In 1931 he helped organize a protest against
a segregated performance of Porgy and Bess at the National
Theater in Washington, DC. His work as codirector of the
Institute of Race Relations at Swarthmore College resulted in
his writing A World View of Race (1936). In 1935 he organized
a conference at Howard University on President Franklin D.
Roosevelts New Deal domestic reform program and its impact
on African Americans. In February 1936, Bunche cofounded
the Negro National Congress, which held its first meeting in
Chicago; Bunche would leave this organization in 1938 after
it was taken over by the Communist Party. From 1938 to 1940,
he worked with Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish sociologist, on
his study of African Americans that culminated with Myrdals
An American Dilemma:The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy
(1944). In 1949 Bunche was awarded the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP) Spingarn
Medal, the organizations highest honor. President Harry S.
Truman offered Bunche the position of assistant secretary of
state, but he declined because of the segregated life in Washington, DC. Bunche participated in the 1963 March on Washington, at which he introduced famed activist Martin Luther
King Jr., and he helped to lead the 1965 civil rights march
organized by King.
Bunche served as a member of the Board of Trustees of the
Rockefeller Foundation (19551971), as a member of the New
York City Board of Education (19581964), and as a member
of the Board of Overseers of Harvard University (19601965).
Suffering from heart disease and diabetes, Bunche resigned as
UN undersecretary-general on October 1, 1971. He died on
December 9, 1971.
See also Civil Rights Movement; Race and Racism; United
Nations (UN); U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Social
Movements.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JEFFREY KRAUS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bunche, Ralph J. French Administration in Togoland and Dahomey. PhD
diss., Harvard University Graduate School, 1934.
. The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR. Edited with an
introduction by Dewey W. Grantham. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1973.
Henry, Charles P., ed. Ralph J. Bunche: Selected Speeches and Writings. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
. Ralph Bunche: Model Negro or American Other? New York: New York
University Press, 1999.
Kugelmass, J. Alvin. Ralph J. Bunche: Fighter for Peace. New York: Julian
Messner, 1952.
Rivlin, Benjamin, ed. Ralph Bunche:The Man and His Times. New York:
Holmes and Meir, 1990.
Urquhart, Brian. Ralph Bunche: An American Life. New York: Norton, 1993.
162 Bureaucracy
Bureaucracy
Bureaucracy refers to an organization or a set of organizations
designed to carry out a specialized set of tasks, often on a
massive scale. In political science, as well as the general public
discourse, the term generally refers to the characteristics and
workings of government organizations, although studies on
bureaucracies have borrowed generously from research on
economics and business organization.
Bureaucrats are people who work in bureaucracies.Tasks that
are entrusted to bureaucrats range from simple administrative
ones, such as typing or photocopying, to the implementation
of complex policy goals, such as reducing air pollution or
maintaining national defense. Thus, the subjects of studies of
bureaucracy have ranged from street-level bureaucrats, such as
doctors, teachers, soldiers, and social workers, to very powerful
bureaucrats, such as army generals, monetary policy regulators,
and attorneys general.
While executive and legislative bodies are responsible for
making policy and judicial bodies are responsible for interpreting policy, bureaucracies are generally responsible for the
implementation of policy. Studies of policy implementation
examine how bureaucratic decision making is influenced by
policy-making preferences, as well as political, economic, and
social institutions. Within political science, such studies are
typically part of the subfield discipline known as public administration, although the term public management has been used
as well. However, some scholars have suggested that the term
public management applies more specifically to studies of how
to make public agencies more efficient and market oriented.
Although bureaucracies have been endemic throughout
history, the origin of their analysis in the social sciences is
generally traced back to the work of German social theorist
Max Weber. Weber stated in 1946 that the use of bureaucratic
organizations had grown over time because of their technical
superiority over any other form of organization. According to
Weber, several organizational features of bureaucracies ensured
their technical superiority, most notably the consistent application of rules and the placement of appointed officials with
expertise within a hierarchical structure. Most modern bureaucracies contain these features, but each feature receives different
emphasis, according to each country and bureaucratic culture.
Bureaucracy 163
The Rechtsstaat model of civil service has been contrasted
with the public interest model found in Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In these
countries, there is not the same emphasis on administrative
law as in Rechtsstaat countries, and consequently, there is less
adherence to the notion of rigidly following rules. According
to Hood, public employees act more as battle troops to carry
out the political will of the political incumbent. Despite this
characterization, the degree to which the civil service is politicized varies considerably across these countries. For example,
British civil servants have traditionally been considered to be
neutral, working for the incumbent government, whereas in
the United States, political appointees come and go with each
presidency, and often are added or subtracted from particular
agencies as presidents see fit.
HIERARCHY
Finally, according to Weber, expert bureaucrats applying a
rational-legal framework had to be placed in a hierarchical
setting to function properly. In a hierarchical setting, bureaucrats would work in a disciplined fashion toward common
objectives set forth by the head administrators. Any other setting might result in the failure of bureaucrats to work coherently toward the same goals.
Webers observations caused other scholars to seek to
explain why, over the course of history, hierarchies had
emerged as the most common type of organizational structure.
In his landmark 1937 article The Nature of the Firm, British economist Ronald Coase posited that, for private firms,
hierarchy was efficient because it limited the transaction costs
that business entrepreneurs would have to incur otherwise.
In the absence of a hierarchy, the business entrepreneur must
negotiate contracts with others to purchase input products
and labor. If extensive bargaining must take place to negotiate
each contract, time and resources are wasted in the process.
164 Bureaucracy
A hierarchical structure eliminates the need for costly bargaining by setting rules and, in the words of political scientist Terry Moe in his 1984 article The New Economics of
Organization, substitutes authority relations for market
relations.
Although hierarchies serve to promote efficiency by reducing transaction costs, they also introduce into public and private organizations a new range of organizational dilemmas,
known broadly as principal-agent problems. Moe states that
the principal-agent model is an analytic expression of
the agency relationship, in which one party, the principal, considers entering into a contractual agreement
with another, the agent, in the expectation that the agent
will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes
desired by the principal (756).
However, agents have an incentive to misrepresent their
true skills, and the manager may find it difficult to select the
best candidate. This is a problem of asymmetric information,
known as adverse selection. Second, the degree to which a principal can monitor the work behavior of the hired agent varies
considerably across jobs. For example, a police captain cannot
monitor what uniformed officers actually do on the streets
at all times, if at all. The less observable the agents behavior,
the more that agent can shirk the obligation to the principal.
Additionally, when the principal hires an agent with specialized expertise to perform a complex task, the agent can exploit
that information advantage to either shirk or perform the task
in any preferred manner.This problem, known as moral hazard,
is also a problem of asymmetric information.
The principal-agent framework has been employed
broadly throughout political science and public administration
research, particularly to depict the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. William Niskanen, applying economic
principles of utility maximization to bureaucrats, argued in his
1971 work Bureaucracy and Representative Government that information asymmetries between bureaucrats and legislatures were
particularly problematic because knowledgeable bureaucrats
could request exorbitant budgets from legislators, who, due to
their lack of expertise, do not know the true cost of performing the bureaucratic tasks. Niskanens work, although highly
influential, was criticized by many scholars as overly broad
and flawed. Patrick Dunleavy followed Niskanen by maintaining in Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Public Choice (1991) that,
rather than pursuing budget maximization, decision makers in
bureaucracies follow a bureau-shaping strategy, most notably
by separating the service delivery functions of the agencyor
line agency functionsfrom the policy-making aspects of the
agency. As a result, over time the agencys core functions are
more narrowly defined, and it actually faces fewer subsequent
budget constraints. In turn, Dunleavys research was criticized
by David Marsh, Martin Smith, and David Richards in their
2000 article, Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Reform in Whitehall: Analyzing the Bureau-shaping Model. Marsh, Smith, and
Richards found that the bureau-shaping model did not explain
the creation of many, highly specialized government agencies
BUREAUCRATIC REFORMS
In the latter half of the twentieth century, public management reforms were driven by high levels of government debt,
Bureaucracy 165
but also by the conservative ideals of leaders such as Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Many countries in Europe
and elsewhere implemented changes to the structure of civil
servant contracts and to budgeting decisions. These changes
also represented a desire to bring free-market principles into
governmentgreater flexibility was sought in civil servant
contracts to reward and punish bureaucrats according to their
performance. Thus, for example, countries such as Australia,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom introduced programs
whereby bureaucrats were hired according to performancerelated contracts for a variable number of years, as opposed to
being appointed for life. Moreover, budgeting procedures also
were transformed in order to stimulate agency performance
and enhance efficiency. Budgets are increasingly drawn up
according to evaluations of agency performance, and many
countries have instituted auditing procedures as well to monitor how money is spent once it is allocated. Finally, many
countries passed legislation, such as the Government Performance and Results Act in the United States in 1993, to allow
formal evaluation of bureaucratic behavior through the use of
performance indicators and measurement.
In western Europe, the regulation of business gradually
shifted away from direct control of nationalized industries by
the executive to the creation of independent regulatory agencies. The shift to autonomous agencies represented a decision
by governments to interfere less in markets while delegating
important regulatory decisions to bureaucrats with specialized expertise. In his 1996 book Regulating Europe, Giandomenico Majone documented the proliferation of independent
regulatory agencies as the European Unions emergence as a
regulatory state.The creation of such agencies also represented
a shift toward more market-oriented economies, as stateowned enterprises were jettisoned in favor of an arrangement
whereby the new agencies oversee private utilities and energy
companies. Similar changes occurred in the United States in
the late 1970s, despite the long-standing prevalence there of
independent regulatory agencies. Widespread deregulation in
transportation and utilities sectors of business resulted in the
dismantling of regulations that were considered favorable for
existing large businesses, but destructive to competition and
consumers.
While these elements of the new public management have
been widespread throughout the industrialized world, they
have been implemented to varying degrees across countries.
What accounts for this variation? In Public Management Reform:
A Comparative Analysis (2004), Christopher Pollitt and Geert
Bouckaert posit that in majoritarian and centralized (unitary) governments, public sector reforms tend to be implemented most rapidly and most broadly, while in consensual
and decentralized (federal) governments, such reforms move
more slowly and with more limited scope. First, because
everyones interests are represented in a consensual government, it is easier for those opposed to reforms to block their
passage. Second, because power is dispersed from the federal
government to regional governments in a federal system, it is
more difficult for the executive in a federal system to impose
nationwide reforms. Thus, majoritarian, centralized governments like New Zealand and the United Kingdom could
implement far-reaching reforms. An oft-mentioned instance
of such change occurred in the United Kingdom in 1986
when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responded to policy
disagreements with the Greater London Council by simply
abolishing it, along with several other county councils. On
the other hand, more consensual and federal systems, such as
Belgium and Germany, did not experience the same level of
change. Additionally, countries like Belgium, France, and Italy
are characterized as having risk-averse bureaucratic cultures in
which attempts to introduce performance-related civil servant
contracts are fiercely resisted by bureaucrats.
Public sector reforms such as privatization, contracting
out, pay for performance, and performance measurement
have helped some governments realize significant savings and
improve government performance, but public management
scholars also emphasize that these reforms can be difficult to
implement and may yield mixed results. For example, it may
be difficult to develop indicators that reliably assess public sector performance, which also makes it difficult to link salary
and budgets to performance.To the extent that reliable indicators can be developed, close linkage with budget or salary may
give bureaucrats incentives to manipulate their numbers or
ignore other important indicators. Finally, as numerous public
administration scholars have noted, the procedures of implementing public policy are often concerned with values other
than efficiency, such as equity or fairness.
See also Civil Service; Performance Management; Regulation and
Rulemaking;Weber, Max.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . COLIN PROVOST
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aberbach, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman. Clashing Beliefs within the
Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy. American
Political Science Review 70 (June 1976): 502522.
Carpenter, Daniel. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2001.
Coase, Ronald. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4 (November 1937):
386405.
Dunleavy, Patrick. Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Public Choice. New York:
Prentice Hall, 1991.
Epstein, David, and Sharyn OHalloran. Divided Government and the
Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and an Empirical
Test. Journal of Politics 58 (May 1996): 373397.
Gilardi, Fabrizio. Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent
Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis. Journal of
European Public Policy 9 (December 2002): 873893.
Hood, Christopher. Control, Bargains and Cheating: The Politics of PublicService Reform. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 12
(July 2002): 309332.
Horn, Murray. The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional
Choice in the Public Sector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Lewis, David. Staffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of
the Executive Office of the President. Presidential Studies Quarterly 35
(September 2005): 496514.
Majone, Giandomenico. Regulating Europe. London: Routledge, 1996.
Marsh, David, Martin Smith, and David Richards. Bureaucrats, Politicians,
and Reform in Whitehall: Analyzing the Bureau-shaping Model. British
Journal of Political Science 30 (2000): 461482.
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism
Bureaucratic authoritarianism is a type of authoritarian regime
that features rule by an alliance of military leaders, civilians
with technical expertise (especially in economic policy), and
leading business sectors. These regimes are hypothesized to
form under certain conditions where a nation is attempting to industrialize and faces popular agitation or unrest that
makes it difficult for elites to maintain order.The original paradigms of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime were Latin
American countries of the 1960s, Latin American regimes
in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as East Asian countries that
have provided the opportunity for political science to test the
theories proposed about their development.
FEATURES OF BUREAUCRATIC
AUTHORITARIANISM
Specifically, he suggested that in late-developing countries
following the import-substituting industrialization (ISI) model
which promoted economic development by protecting and
subsidizing local production of manufactured goods previously imported from already industrialized countriesthe
political power of lower-class and middle-class urban groups
(especially the urban working class) grew as their numbers
increased and as populist politicians developed coalitions that
relied on their support. As the market for consumer goods
became saturated due to the success of the first, horizontal
stage of ISI, those economies required deepening into the
production of capital goods and consumer durables in order
to further economic growth.
Such heavy industries required investments by foreign capital. International investors were discouraged from entering
these economies, however, where populist politics, featuring
popular sector agitation and economic nationalism, prevailed.
ODonnell identified an elective affinity between the military, concerned about the implications for domestic order in
the face of popular sector mobilization, and civilian technocrats, who sought military support for the adoption of orthodox economic policies. From this affinity, coup coalitions were
formed, leading to authoritarian regimes in which the military
chose to rule as an institution (rather than via personalist rule
by a single strongman), but brought civilian technocrats
especially economists and engineersinto key roles managing
the nations economic development.
This alliance of the military and civilian technocrats is the
key characteristic of bureaucratic authoritarianism. ODonnells
conceptualization of bureaucratic authoritarianism stresses
political exclusion of the masses, a highly technocratic policymaking process shared by the military and civilian experts, and
rule that benefits transnational business and permits the country to further engage in the global economy.
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS
Originally developed to apply to Argentina and Brazil, the
concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism was subsequently
used by many scholars of Latin America to apply to military
regimes that emerged in Chile and Uruguay in 1973 and to
a second military regime that came to power in Argentina in
1976. As the Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay regimes, and the later
military government of Argentina, evolved, attempts by scholars to refine the theory and to use it to predict the evolution
of Latin American dictatorships produced valuable empirical
CONCLUSION
While the classic examples of bureaucratic-authoritarian
regimes have given way to renewed democracies, the concept
has continued to be used as an ideal-type or a tendency
toward which certain regimes gravitate. The autogolpe (selfcoup) of Perus president Alberto Fujimori in 1992 is seen by
some as a variant on the bureaucratic-authoritarian tradition;
others have targeted postcommunist Russia under Vladimir
Putin as a regime whose democratic elections are in tension
Burke, Edmund
Irish statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke (17291797)
was born in Dublin, Ireland, to a Catholic mother and Protestant father. After graduating from Trinity College, Dublin,
and briefly studying law in London, Burke entered the British Parliament in 1756, where he served for several decades
among the Rockingham branch of the Whig party.
Burkes purely philosophical writings range from A Vindication of Natural Society (1756), widely read at the time as a
defense of anarchism, to his treatment of aesthetics in A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and
Beautiful (1757). Although Burkes philosophical writings are
worthy accomplishments, he is best remembered for his political speeches and writings in which he synthesized abstract
questions of political philosophy with the details and exigencies of practical politics.
On the basis of his Reflections on the Revolution in France
(1790), Burke is widely considered to be the founder of
Anglo-American conservatism. Even before the French Revolution (17891799) had devolved into the Reign of Terror
(17931794), Burke indicted the zeal of the French revolutionaries and accurately predicted some of the revolutions later
excesses. He objected to the French Revolutions irreligious
character, its invocation of metaphysical doctrines of natural
rights, and its hostility to custom or tradition. Reflections strikes
Burnham, James
American political theorist James Burnham (19051987) was
one of the most influential anticommunist thinkers of the cold
war era. Like many anticommunists, he started out as a Trotskyite, but eventually he moved away from Trotskyism and began
a slow journey to the right. He became a mentor to American
In a second phase of the political business cycle literature, models incorporated rational expectations, which rule
out systematic expectational errors. Rogoff and Sibert (1988)
developed a rational opportunistic model in which asymmetric information replaced voter myopia in explaining electoral cycles in macroeconomic policy variables. Voters have
rational expectations but are unsure of the competence of
politicians. The model can produce an equilibrium in which
incumbent politicians increase government spending in preelection periods in an effort to signal competence (ability to
produce a higher level of government services with a given
revenue). Rogoff (1990) later developed a similar model where
the incumbent strategically manipulates the composition of
expenditures in pre-electoral years, by favoring items that are
more visible to the electorate.
PARTISAN MODELS
OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
172 By(e)-election
for the purpose of exercising political pressure. The globalization of business life has made collective action both more
necessary and more difficult and has made more acute the
tension between global outlook and interests and national
jurisdictions. Second, business faces numerous new competitors and critics in civil society: environmental and consumer
organizations, critics of its employment practices, and intellectual critics of the very foundation of business life in parts
of the media and the higher education system. Finally, the
great global financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United
States damaged the claims of key parts of the business order,
in the financial sector, to be able to conduct its affairs prudently, greatly increased state control and ownership of many
enterprises, and raised large questions about the scale of
reward enjoyed by many in the business elite. For the first
time in a generation, business has found itself on the defensive
politically across much of the advanced capitalist world. Nevertheless, the largest business corporations have formidable
resources to organize that defense.
See also Business Preference Formation; Campaign Finance;
Capitalism and Democracy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICHAEL MORAN
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Graz, Jean-Christophe. How Powerful Are Transnational Elite Clubs? The
Social Myth of the World Economic Forum. New Political Economy 8,
no. 3 (2003): 321340.
Lindblom, Charles. Politics and Markets:The Worlds Political-Economic Systems.
New York: Basic Books, 1977.
. The Market System:What It Is, How It Works, and What to Make of It.
New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 2002.
Schumpeter, Joseph. 1943. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. London: Allen
and Unwin 1976.
Van Apeldoorn, Bastian. Transnational Class Agency and European
Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists.
New Political Economy 5, no. 2 (2000): 157181.
Vogel, David. Lobbying the Corporation: Citizen Challenges to Business
Authority. New York: Basic Books, 1978.
. National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and
the United States. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986.
. Fluctuating Fortunes:The Political Power of Business in America. New
York: Basic Books, 1989.
. Kindred Strangers:The Uneasy Relationship between Politics and Business
in America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996.
By(e)-election
By-elections (also spelled bye elections and known as special
elections in the United States) are used to fill legislative vacancies arising during a term and between regular elections. In
general the vacancy transpires due to the death or resignation
of the holder of a public office, but sometimes it may happen
when incumbents are deemed ineligible to continue their
public duties. By-elections also occur when the results of a
general election are invalidated due to voter irregularities or
recall. About sixty-four countries worldwide use by-elections
for all legislative vacancies, and this list includes various types
of political systems. Countries ranging from China to Poland,
New Zealand to Malta, and South Africa to Iran all avail byelections when needed.
Historically, by-elections played a crucial role. During the
time of Charles II, members of parliament in England had no
limit to their duration. For that reason, by-elections were the
prime source of recruiting new members to the parliament.
To better comprehend the significance of by-elections, one
has to acknowledge their functions for the political system.
By-elections perform several purposes, extending beyond the
apparent objective of filling vacant legislative seats.Voter turnout is usually low for most by-elections in comparison to general elections. Not all by-elections prove important, but some
have consequences for the legislature, political parties, election
campaigns, governance, and the media. By-elections can sometimes prove an important way of recruitment of new representatives; they have led to turnover of as much as 10 percent in
some British parliaments. By-elections also have created a route
for parties to bring back leading frontbenchers defeated in the
previous general election. The political ramifications following key contests have had considerable impact on subsequent
eventsand indeed on subsequent by-elections. The special
elections in the Unites States have a minor impact on the
political system due to a range of factors, namely, (1) the U.S.
system consists of periodic fixed-term elections; (2) particular
outcomes do not effect the timings of the general elections;
and (3) U.S. House of Representative elections for all members
are held every two years, with one-third of the members of the
Senate elected for six-year terms every two years. Additionally,
the United States is a two-party system in which special elections do not typically promote the minority party.
In general, by-election results are unfavorable for the
governing party. Though certain by-elections have proven
to be critical tests for minor parties, increasing their legislative strength, shaping expectations about party fortunes, and
increasing the credibility of challenges to the established twoparty system. By-elections, in contrary to general elections,
embolden citizens to vote for the other partythe less significant partywhich they would not vote for in general elections
when their vote might change the political party in power.
By-election victories for the governing party boost its popularity and support, while a loss leads to the disheartening of party
supporters and sometimes divisions in party lines. Nevertheless,
by-elections can provide significant political consequences for
the political parties as well as the political system.
See also Electoral Rules; Electoral Systems; Representation and
Representative; Representative Systems.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FARAH JAN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Butler, David. By-elections and Their Interpretations. In By-elections in
British Politics, edited by Chris Cook and John Ramsden, 112. London:
UCL Press, 1997.
Feigert, Frank B., and Pippa Norris. Do By-elections Constitute Referenda?
A Four-country Comparison. Legislative Studies Quarterly 15 (May
1990): 183200.
C
Cabinets and Cabinet
Formation
The British essayist Walter Bagehot, in The English Constitution,
famously defined the cabinet as a combining committeea
hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative part of
the State to the executive part of the State (Bagehot, 1867, 68).
As such, the concept does not travel far outside parliamentary
systems of government, but one needs to amend it only slightly
to give it wider applicability: It is the most senior constitutional body, politically responsible (to parliament or president
or both, depending on the political system) for directing the
state bureaucracy. The cabinet is part of the broader concept of
the government; not all (junior) ministers are cabinet ministers.
In the United Kingdom, for example, of over one hundred
ministers, only about a quarter are in the cabinet.
CABINET STRUCTURE
With regard to the cabinet function, the constitutional conventions are for it to deliberate collectively and for each
cabinet ministers voice to count equally. Together, collective
decision making and ministerial collegiality form an ideal type
of cabinet government, with existing cabinets often deviating
from one or both of these norms. Both collectiveness (the
arena of decision making) and collegiality (the distribution of
power) are dimensions of the cabinets structure.
Dutch coalition cabinets, for example, are still close to the
ideal type, with a cabinet that meets at least weekly for several hours, during which proposals are actually debated and
sometimes amended, and with a prime minister whose formal
powers are constrained by being the leader of only one of
the political parties in the governing coalition. In the United
States, the experience is completely different in both respects:
although there is a Cabinet Room in the White House, and
most newly elected presidents promise to use it, the president
primarily deals with individual department secretaries bilaterally, and the cabinet as such rarely meets to deliberate on government policy. In addition, since the president is not only the
chair of this cabinet but also the person to whom secretaries
answer, the president holds a very powerful position. In this
way, the U.S. cabinet is probably closest to the seventeenthcentury origins of the cabinet as a set of individual advisers to
173
174 Caciquismo/Coronelismo
TABLE 1: TWO DIMENSIONS OF CABINET
GOVERNMENT
DISTRIBUTION
OF POWER
Collective
Monocratic
Collegial
grown too large, but this need not be the only reason. Many
coalition cabinets have an inner cabinet or coalition committee, bringing together the leaders of the governing parties to
prevent intracoalition conflicts from threatening the survival
of the government.
CABINET FORMATION
By convention, a new cabinet is said to take office with each
parliamentary or presidential election, with a change of party
composition, or with a change of the head of government.
Although the latter two changes can occur without elections, this is rare and usually intended as an interim solution
after a cabinet crisis, to take care of government until the
next scheduled or early elections are held. If the cabinet is
monocratic, the president or the prime minister of a singleparty cabinet forms the cabinet without much interference
from others. In practice, however, even such cabinets are often
coalitions of sorts: prime ministers must unite their own party
and appease rival factions by appointing rival-party leaders to
cabinet positions; presidents in presidential systems often want
to broaden support in the legislature to ease passage of their
proposals by inviting politicians from outside their own party
to join the cabinet.
Where cabinets are based on a coalition of parties, their
formation usually involves intensive negotiations between
party leaders. An extensive body of literature, primarily
based on rational choice theory, seeks to explain the outcome of the formation process in terms of the cabinets
party composition. Much less attention has been given to
the allocation of particular portfolios to coalition parties.
In 1996, Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle argued that
the cabinets policies are determined by this portfolio allocation as each party sets the agenda for the government
departments that are led by a minister from its own ranks,
in fact assuming that all cabinets are both collegial and fragmented. Scholars who argue instead that collective decision
making plays an important role in cabinets have recently
drawn attention to the fact that, increasingly, the cabinet
formation results in a written coalition agreement replacing the individual parties election manifestos as the basis
for policy making; in the 1940s, 33 percent of European
coalition cabinets had such a document, compared with 81
percent of such cabinets in the 1990s. In some cases the
documents are quite comprehensive, with the record set by
a coalition agreement of 43,550 words in Belgium (Mller
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andeweg, Rudy B. On Studying Governments. In Governing Europe, edited
by J. Hayward and A. Menon, 3960. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003.
Andeweg, Rudy B., and Arco Timmermans. Conflict Management in
Coalition Government. In Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining, edited by
Kaare Strm, Wolfgang C. Mller, and Torbjrn Bergman, 269300.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Bagehot, Walter. The English Constitution, 1867. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins,
1963.
De Winter, Lieven, and Patrick Dumont. Uncertainty and Complexity in
Cabinet Formation. In Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining, edited by Kaare
Strm, Wolfgang C. Mller, and Torbjrn Bergman, 123157. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Helms, Ludger. Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Chancellors: Executive Leadership
in Western Democracies. New York: Macmillan, 2005.
Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. Making and Breaking Governments:
Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Mller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strm. Coalition Agreements and Cabinet
Governance. In Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining, edited by Kaare Strm,
Wolfgang C. Mller, and Torbjrn Bergman, 159199. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008.
Moe, Ronald C. The Presidents Cabinet: Evolution, Alternatives, and Proposals
for Change. New York: Novinka, 2004.
Neto, Octavio Amorim. The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policymaking
and Cabinet Formation in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies 39,
no. 4 (2006): 415440.
Webb, Paul, and Thomas Poguntke. The Presidentialization of
Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence, Causes, and
Consequences. In The Presidentialization of Politics, edited by
Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, 336356. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005.
Caciquismo/Coronelismo
Caciquismo and coronelismo refer to informal political boss or
chieftain systems in Latin America and Spain. The term cacique
derives from a Caribbean indigenous word used at the time
of the Spanish conquest. In Spain and Spanish-speaking Latin
America, caciques are local bosses exercising power in informal
and personalistic ways, often using violence or threats thereof
to buttress their power. National officials often recognize the
caciques de facto authority in a locality and work through
the cacique to distribute government largess. The officials
rely on caciques to provide effective policing of the area the
caciques control, which often leads to the determination that
the political cost of challenging a caciques authority would
be excessive. Caciquismo has flourished in the larger Latin
American nations, reflecting regionalism and the incapacity of
Caesarism
Named after the first Roman Emperor Julius Caesar (10044
BCE), Caesarism connotes absolute rule, dictatorship, and
use of military force. It is believed Franois Auguste Romieu,
in his Ere des Csars (1850), first coined the neologism. Caesarism is the phenomenon of a political rulers assertion of
great political and military force at a time of national crisis,
uniting the populace while avoiding constitutional limitations on executive power. As a political concept, Caesarism
came into being with the rise of mass democracy after the
French Revolution (17891799). Opposed to representative
institutions and mediating elements between ruler and ruled,
Caesarism, as Oswald Spengler stated in Decline of the West, is a
return to formlessness. As institutions are emptied of meaning,
the personal power of the Caesarist ruler becomes fundamental to the existence of the nation. Spengler calls Caesarism the
period of contending states when gigantic private wars are
fought to promote democracy for states without form and
a history. Caesarism characterizes the new modern politics
of mass democracy where the private individual absorbed in
money effaces the national identities of tradition, institutions,
and culture. The strong ruler steps into the anarchical abyss
of mass democracy and money appealing to the primitive
instincts of religion, race, and blood. Politics becomes infused
with mysticism and secular religious symbols expressed in the
mythic figure of the leader representing the people.
See also Authoritarianism, African; Charisma; Religion and Politics;West, Decline of the.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOANNE TETLOW
Calhoun, John
Leading American politician and theorist, John Caldwell Calhoun (17821850) served as a South Carolina state representative, U.S. representative, U.S. senator, secretary of war and
of state, and vice president of the United States. Calhouns
political writings reflect his responses to the great political
problems of nineteenth-century America: the conflict over the
Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832, the slavery crisis, and the concentration of political power in the national government under
President Andrew Jackson. All of these convinced Calhoun
that Americas constitutional foundations were in danger.
Calhoun addresses these dangers in his primary political writings. A Disquisition on Government (1851) looks at the
nature of man and government in addition to expounding the
doctrine of the concurrent majoritythe right of significant
interests to have a veto over the enactment or implementation
of a public law. A Discourse on the Constitution and Government
of the United States (1851) traces the constitutional foundation
for the concurrent majority within the American political
tradition and argued for its restoration. By recognizing and
incorporating natural social divisions into a coherent whole,
Calhoun contended that the concurrent majority ameliorates
social and political tensions through deliberation and compromise, distinguishing it from the numerical majority that deals
with these tensions through force.
Calhoun believed that the numerical majority fails to consider a political communitys natural diversity. As a result, it
can only assess preference through overall electoral victory,
which overrates the homogeneity of the political environment. Moreover, the majority system supposes that the apparatus of voting can resolve all conflict, even when no consensus
of opinion exists. The numerical majority attempts to control
government at any cost by emphasizing political party at the
expense of constitutional principles, and the numerical majoritys inability to assess the true preferences of the citizenry
threatens to undermine the electoral and constitutional foundations of republican government.
Calhouns critique has been interpreted as evidence of a lack
of concern for popular rule. He is seen as the protector of particular interests, especially slaveholders, and his defense of slavery as a positive good instead of a necessary evil is thought to
derail Americas liberal tradition. Calhoun is seen as overthrowing Americas Lockean origins through a purposeful rejection
of James Madisons politics, especially the emphasis on natural
rights. But his defense of slavery is neither the most important
nor the most consuming aspect of his political thought.
Focusing on the relationship between the Disquisition and
the Discourse shows that Calhouns focus is on liberty, the
nature of the American union, constitutionalism, and states
rights. British philosopher and political theorist John Stuart
Mill (18061873) applauds Calhouns understanding of federal
representative government as a means of providing for greater
participation while avoiding conflict. Calhoun also provides
a disincentive to the growth of a corruptive central governing authority. Lord Acton (18341902), British historian and
moralist, finds in Calhouns presentation of an authentic constitutional tradition a defense of democratic theory and the
American union. Calhouns political thought is central to an
understanding of Americas constitutional tradition.
See also Natural Rights; States Rights.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JORDON B. BARKALOW
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Coit, Margaret L. John C. Calhoun. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1970.
Hemphill, Edwin W., ed. Papers of John C. Calhoun, 24 vols. Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1969.
Calvin, John
John Calvin (15091564), the most systematic Protestant theologian of the Reformation, has, through his writings, influenced the nature and scope of secular authority and the right
of Christians to resist their rulers. Born in Noyon, France,
Calvin studied liberal arts in Paris, law at Orlans, and then a
humanist curriculum at the Collge Royal in Paris. In 1534,
he fled to Basel, Switzerland, because of his association with
evangelical figures. In Basel in 1536, he published a compendium of the Reformed faith titled Institutes of the Christian
Religion, a work that he would continue to revise and expand
throughout his life.
The Institutes success gained Calvin notoriety in evangelical
circles, and he was recruited by Guillaume Farel (14891565)
to help organize a Reformed church in Geneva. Enemies of
Farel and Calvin secured their expulsion from Geneva in 1538,
and Calvin moved to Strasbourg where he became leader of
the French Reformed community and participated in religious dialogues among participants. In 1541, supporters in
Geneva recalled Calvin who, using his practical experience
heading a community in Strasbourg, created a new church
ordinance and order of worship that became the basis of the
Genevan reformation. He remained at the center of the Genevan church until his death.
Calvins frequent revisions to his most important work,
the Institutes, reveal an evolution in his political thought. In
the first published edition in 1536, his views share much with
those of the mature Martin Luther (14831546). Calvin offers
a form of Luthers doctrine of the two kingdoms when he
asserts that the state is charged only with maintaining external
righteousness by regulating such acts as blasphemy and should
not interfere with a believers personal relationship with God.
Calvin also largely agreed with Luther that all subjects owe
political obedience to the authorities and should offer only
passive resistance to even tyrannical rulers because God places
all rulers in power. However, again following Luthers line of
thinking by the mid-1530s, he accepted that popular magistrates in some circumstances may collectively resist tyrants.
By the 1539 and 1543 editions of the Institutes, Calvins
thought had evolved, reflecting his experiences as a participant
in the civil life of Strasbourg and Geneva. Calvin expanded
several sections on church organization where he advocated
an aristocratic or mixed form of government.This shift had an
impact on his view of civil polity. For the first time, he fully
articulated a preference for mixed government, arguing that
the divinely ordained form for ecclesiastical government must
provide the model for civil polity. He also shifted his views
on secular authority. No longer did he advocate clearly separate secular and ecclesiastical spheres. Instead he presented the
Calvinism
See Calvin, John.
Cambridge School
The Cambridge school refers to that coterie of intellectual historians educated at Cambridge University, chief among whom
were Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, whose work
emphasized the importance of various contexts to the study
of political thought. They sought by their approach to offer
a new interpretation of the history of political thought that
would avoid the confusions to which, they alleged, prevailing
texualist modes of interpretation, above all, were prone.
Recent accounts of the schools genesis identify the work
of Cambridge historian Peter Laslett as seminal to its creation.
Laslett, who in 1949 published an edition of Sir Robert Filmers (15881653) Patriarcha, showed in his research that Filmers
Patriarcha had been composed perhaps as early as 1630 but
only published in 1679 to 1680, whereas his other writings
had appeared in 1648.Thus Laslett pointed to three contexts,
or historical moments, that had to be considered before the
historian could comprehend what [Filmer] had intended and
how he had been understood at the time. Laslett subsequently
established, with the publication in 1960 of his critical edition of John Lockes (16321704) Treatises on Government, that
the Treatises had been written perhaps as early as 1681, several
years before Locke published them anonymously in 1689. The
setting of this date called into question the thesis that Lockes
intention in writing the Treatises had been to make a post hoc
apology for the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and permitted
historians to consider the possibility that he had intended to
advocate rebellion in England from the outset.
The emphasis Lasletts work placed on context provided by
certain historical moments strongly influenced J. G. A. Pocock,
a New Zealandborn graduate student then at Cambridge
University under the tutelage of historian Herbert Butterfield.
Campaign Advertising
Campaign advertising is the use of paid-for political ads to
communicate a political party or candidates message to the
public, in an effort to influence decision making and win
votes. Campaign ads provide the opportunity to send carefully
crafted, unadulterated messages directly to the electorate and
are an integral component of the information environment
in an election campaign. While campaign advertising is primarily associated with American-style, candidate-centered
campaigns, campaign advertising also features in-party
centered systems found across Europe. In recent years however, nonparty-based organizations have increased their use
of paid-for political advertising to influence ballot measures
resulting from initiative or referendum processes. For example,
in November 2008 California voters passed Proposition 8, a
constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, after record
breaking spending on advertising funded largely by religious
groups, including $20 million from the Mormon Church.
Across Europe, campaign advertising for the European No
Campaign on the European Union (EU) Constitution was
managed outside traditional party organizations and funded
primarily by wealthy individuals from member states.
NEGATIVE ADS
While a dominant feature of recent
U.S. elections, the use of negative ads
is not a new phenomenon. In the 1964
presidential election, Lyndon Johnsons
Daisy Girl television ad capitalized on
Barry Goldwaters threat to use nuclear
weapons in the ongoing U.S. conflict in
Vietnam. The ad, which ran only once
(bowing to Republican Party protest),
Non-political party groups have become more active in political advertising, such as the
contrasted a young girl playfully countcampaign to pass Proposition 8 in California. Spending in support of the proposition to ban
same-sex marriage far surpassed those against it, and voters passed the proposition into law.
ing petals pulled from a flower in a field
source: AP Images
of daisies and a male voiceover counting down a nuclear launch; the girl was
eventually subsumed in the blackened
legislation including the Federal Elections Campaign Act
mushroom cloud. The controversial Daisy Girl, former
(FECA; 1971, 1974) and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
president George H. W. Bushs Willie Horton ad linking
(BCRA; 2002). The FEC is charged with maintaining transMichael Dukakis with murderer Willie Horton, and the 527
parency and accountability by regulating the source, disclosure,
groups Swift Boat Veterans campaign ad attacking John
and sponsorship requirements of campaign advertisements.
Kerrys Vietnam service record are now classic examples of
Since the BCRA, two standards are applied in regulating ads:
how negative ads can successfully influence the discourse,
express advocacy and electioneering communications. Howdirection, and outcome of election campaigns.
ever, the electioneering communications standard only applies
However, there is some risk to negative advertising, because
to campaign ads appearing on broadcast, cable, or satellite
ads can backfire. In Britain, the Conservative Partys Demon
transmission, exempting many other advertising media: newsEyes ad aimed to reframe Tony Blairs broad smile and wide
papers; direct mail; billboards or posters; and electronic media,
eyes, once considered positive attributes, to reveal his underlyincluding Internet websites, email, and social networking sites.
ing insincerity and untrustworthiness. Whilst the ConservaThe regulatory focus on broadcast advertising stems from
tives were censured by the Advertising Standards Agency for
the growing number of, resources allocated to, and unintended
portraying Blair as sinister and dishonest, the ad also crystalconsequences of (particularly) negative ads. The thirty-second
lized public opinion against the Tories, who, in the publics
television spot, the workhorse of campaign advertising, is the
eyes, were seen as out of touch, unduly negative, and desperate.
primary means by which citizens are exposed to campaign ads,
Scholarly evidence from experimental and survey research
and the use of spots for presidential and congressional elecon how negative ads impact mobilization and participation
tions has increased dramatically since 2000. Indeed, many critis mixed. Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengars (1995)
ics claim the costs associated with the production and airtime
benchmark study found that negative advertising suppresses
required for television ads are largely responsible for the signifiturnout, particularly for the nonpartisan electorate, which may
cant increases in campaign spending.This charge is not without
serve to incentivize candidates who benefit from low turnout
merit: Fundraising for the 2008 election totaled over $3 billion
to engage in this form of advertising. More recently, evidence
for federal candidates, with fundraising in the presidential race
suggests that negative advertising depresses the public mood,
alone up 80 percent from 2004. Presidential candidates Barack
which has indirect and unequal effects on turnout. While the
Obama and John McCain spent $440 million on national ads
thirty-second spot has been vilified for increasing the peralone, producing some six hundred thousand airings.
ceived superficiality of the information environment and the
Since 2000, the Wisconsin Advertising Project, using data
so-called dumbing down of political discourse, a number of
from TNS Media Intelligence/Campaign Media Analysis
studies have found positive effects of negative advertising.With
Group, has made available data on the content, targeting, and
this, scholars have disputed the demobilization hypothesis
frequency of political ads. This has helped provide some of the
with evidence suggesting that negative advertising can actually
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. Going Negative: How Attack Ads
Shrink and Demobilize the Electorate. New York: Free Press, 1995.
CNN Election Center. Election Tracker: Ad Spending. CNN Politics.
www.edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/map/ad.spending/.
Dolan, Christopher J. Two Cheers for Negative Ads. In Lights, Camera,
Campaign! Media, Politics, and Political Advertising, edited by David A.
Schwartz, 4571. New York: Peter Lang, 2004.
Finkel, Steven E., and John G. Geer. A Spot Check: Casting Doubt on the
Demobilizing Effect of Attack Advertising. American Journal of Political
Science 42, no. 2 (1998): 573595.
Freedman, Paul, and Ken Goldstein. 1999. Measuring Media Exposure
and the Effects of Negative Campaign Ads. American Journal of Political
Science 43, no. 4 (1999): 11891208.
Geer, John G. Assessing Attack Advertising: A Silver Lining. In Campaign
Reform: Insights and Evidence, edited by Larry M. Bartels and Lynn
Vavreck. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000.
. In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
Goldstein, Ken, and Paul Freedman. Lessons Learned: Campaign Advertising
in the 2000 Elections. Political Communication 19, no. 5 (2002): 528.
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, Paul Waldman, and Susan Scheer. 2000. Eliminate
the Negative? Defining and Redefining Categories of Analysis for
Political Advertisements. In Crowded Airwaves, edited by James Thurber,
Candice Nelson, and David Dulio, 4464. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000.
Lau, Richard, and Lee Sigelman. Effectiveness of Negative Political
Advertising. In Crowded Airwaves, edited by James Thurber, Candice
Nelson, and David Dulio, 1043. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000.
Norris, Pippa. A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial
Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Stevens, Daniel. The Relationship between Negative Political Advertising
and Public Mood: Effects and Consequences. Journal of Elections, Public
Opinion, and Parties 18, no. 2 (2008): 153177.
Campaign Finance
Campaign finance refers to money that is spent for purposes
of political competition. In modern liberal democracies, such
funds are not necessarily devoted to election campaigns.
When senior scholars James Pollock and Louise Overacker
began analyzing the role of money in politics, they started in
the United States, looking at the money spent to influence
the outcome of a federal election. Their starting point has
dominated perception of the subject ever after. Campaign
funds is the subject heading under which the Library of
Congress catalogs all books dealing with money in politics
and the classification is the major target of any U.S. scholar
who approaches the subject.
During the second half of the twentieth century, U.S.
political scientist Alexander Heard tried to bridge the glaring
gap of perception between U.S. and foreign scholars when he
created the broader term, costs of democracy. Arnold Heidenheimer, a European researcher, added the term party finance,
Campaigns 181
Based on spending data and election results, spending is
frequently analyzed as the cause of voting. However, it may
well be that donating is a means of support and a bellwether
of expected success, whereas spending is just a consequence of
cash at hand, not the cause of success. Thus, a simple correlation between political money and electoral success is misleading. Campaign money is most productive when other factors
make winning possibleand if so, it is definitely the voters
choice and not the politicians cash that will decide the out
come of an election.
See also Campaign Advertising; Campaigns; Nongovernmental
Organizations (NGOs); Party Finance; Political Action Committee
(PAC).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . KARL-HEINZ NASSMACHER
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1960 Election. Princeton, N.J.: Citizens
Research Foundation, 1962.
. Financing Politics. Money, Elections, and Political Reform, 4th ed.
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992.
Heard, Alexander. The Costs of Democracy. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1960.
Magleby, David B., Anthony Corrado, and Kelly D. Patterson, eds. Financing
the 2004 Election. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.
Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz. The Funding of Party Competition: Political Finance
in 25 Democracies. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlag, 2009.
Overacker, Louise. Money in Elections. New York: Macmillan, 1932.
Paltiel, Khayyam Z. Campaign Finance: Contrasting Practices and Reforms.
In Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National
Elections, edited by David Butler, Howard R. Penniman, and Austin
Ranney, 138172. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
1981.
Pollock, James K. Party Campaign Funds. New York: Knopf, 1926.
Sridharan, Eswaran. Electoral Finance Reform: The Relevance of
International Experience. In Reinventing Public Service Delivery in India:
Selected Case Studies, edited by Vikram K. Chand, 363388. New Delhi:
Sage Publications, 2006.
Campaigning, Negative
See Negative Campaigning.
Campaigns
A campaign is an effort on the part of a candidate or organized
group to convince a segment of the population to reach a
particular decision. Said differently, campaigns reflect competition over ideas. The goal of any political campaign is for a
candidate to be elected so that candidate can advance specific
policy goals or political ideals. In a democratic system, candidates interested in attaining political office find it necessary to
campaign in order to appeal to their respective constituencies
in the period preceding an election. In a presidential, congressional, statewide, or local campaign, for instance, that effort
typically involves convincing registered or likely voters to
support one partys political candidate over the alternative.
Ultimately, those candidates who are elected are often said
to have run an effective campaign, while those who lose are
viewed as running an ineffective or less successful campaign.
182 Campaigns
campaigns to signify that the incumbents have lost touch with
the voters and should be replaced with a new faceoften one
that represents change from the status quo.
While all of the above factorsname recognition, money,
and a message that resonates with the votersare necessary to
win an election, they are not sufficient. In nearly all cases, the
success of a candidates campaign is also contingent upon the
ability of staff, volunteers, and party activists to motivate people
to turn out to vote on election day. Even candidates with a wellrecognized name, lots of money, and a strong message are not
guaranteed victory unless their supporters are encouraged to
show up and vote.This is why voter registration efforts and getout-the-vote drives are important components to a candidates
electoral success. Clearly, a candidate can do only so much in
terms of motivating voters to participate in the election. Beyond
that, it takes a well-organized and highly structured campaign
staff as well as volunteers to encourage people to go to the polls.
Since both partys candidates seek to maximize turnout, it is
ultimately the candidate whose strategies and tactics are more
effective who will be the victor at the end of the day.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
In many respects, the presidential campaign has become the
focal point of elections in the United States. Every four years,
Americans focus their attention on the pomp and circumstance
associated with the presidential campaign. There is probably no
equivalent political event that generates as much attention and
interest in this country and around the world. Candidates vying
for the highest elective office in the land often are required to
start their campaign relatively early to have a chance of earning
the nomination during the primary stage of the campaign. In
recent years, it has almost become the case that as soon as one
presidential campaign ends, the next one begins. If a candidate
is to have a chance at raising the hundreds of millions of dollars
necessary to wage a successful campaign, securing the delegates
necessary to capture the nomination, and increasing ones
name recognition on a national level, it is not surprising that
candidates need to begin campaigning as early as possiblein
most cases, several years in advance.
Presidential campaigns occur in two stages. The first stage
involves securing the partys nomination for president during
the primary stage of the election, and the second stage pits both
parties nominees against one another in the general election.
During the primary stage of the campaign, those starting early
often have an advantage in terms of enhancing their name recognition, raising money, and securing commitments among
delegates at the presidential conventions. It is at this stage of the
process that candidates begin to craft a message for their campaign that will hopefully earn them the nomination. Although
a frontrunner may emerge early on, there are often a number
of potentially viable candidates seeking to earn the nomination
during the primary campaign. Unlike the general election, the
nomination stage is actually a series of elections.Thus, momentum plays a part in the primary processwinning a number of
early contests can help propel a candidate to the nomination.
As a result of limited resources, time, and other constraints, a
gradual winnowing process occurs the longer the primary campaign continues. Ultimately, the slate of candidates is reduced
to two or three after the initial caucuses and primaries occur.
With additional primaries and caucuses held on various days,
eventually only one candidate from each party is left, and that
candidate ends up earning the most delegates and the respective
partys nomination.
Once the nomination for each candidate is secured at the
partys national convention, the general election campaign
begins. This usually takes place around early September, right
after Labor Day. This is the stage of the process when each
partys presidential candidate attempts to seal the deal with
the American voters. This task is complicated by the fact that
many voters have already made up their minds about who they
intend to vote for well before the general election campaign
begins. Some evidence suggests that nearly two-thirds of the
American voters have already decided whom they will vote
for before the final two months of the general election campaign. As such, both partys candidates use whatever opportunities are available to reach out to undecided voters or weak
leaners who might be convinced to vote for the opposing
partys candidate. It is during this stage of the campaign process
that presidential candidates begin releasing television advertisements in, and traveling to, the competitive or battleground
states in an attempt to secure a majority of electoral votes to
eventually win the presidency.
The media plays an important role during both stages of
the presidential campaign, as they are the main audience for
much of what the candidates do when running for the presidency. Since media outlets want to attract as many readers
or viewers as possible, they tend to focus on the horserace
aspect of the presidential campaign. In other words, they focus
much of their attention on which presidential candidate is
currently in the lead, what presidential polls look like on a
day-to-day basis, and what issues emphasized by the candidates
seem to be resonating the most with likely or potential voters.
Given the enormous costs of political advertising, presidential
candidates value as much free media time as possible. If their
actions are being covered by the media on a daily basis, that
is less money that the candidates have to spend themselves in
order to get their names out or to advertise their positions to
voters. Nearly all presidential candidates travel with an entourage of press correspondents so they will be there when breaking news happens on the campaign trail. Despite the fact that
their messages are being filtered through the media, candidates
still value the access granted to them by various media outlets.
The presidential campaign has changed dramatically since
the early days of the American republic. During much of the
nineteenth century, presidential campaigns were carried out
primarily by the party organizations. Presidential candidates
were often said to wage what was known as a front-porch
campaignthey would sit on their front porches throughout
the fall greeting anyone who would come by to talk with them.
However, they rarely if ever campaigned themselves. President
Theodore Roosevelt was among the first to change this tradition as he traveled around the country by train during the 1904
Campaigns 183
presidential campaign. Several years later, Franklin Roosevelt
was the first presidential candidate to appear in person when the
Democratic Party nominated him at their convention in 1932.
Since that time, the presidential campaign has steadily evolved
into more of a candidate-centered system that is more familiar
in the modern age. As such, candidates are largely responsible
for selecting their own campaign staffs, paid consultants, and
advisers with less support from the political party organizations
than was the case during the nineteenth century.
DO CAMPAIGNS MATTER?
One question that repeatedly arises in the context of research
on presidential elections is whether or not campaigns
Camus, Albert
One of the most important figures associated with French
existentialism, the Algerian-born Frenchman Albert Camus
(19131960) made significant contributions to literature,
philosophy, political analysis, drama, and journalism. An
important critic of the capital punishment and totalitarianism,
Camus won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1957 and died in
a car crash three years later.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus, and Other Essays, translated by Justin
OBrien. New York: Knopf, 1955.
. The Rebel, translated by Anthony Bower. New York: Random
House, 1956.
. The Stranger, translated by Mathew Ward. New York: Knopf, 1993.
Sprintzen, David, and Adrian Van den Hoven, eds. Sartre and Camus: A
Historic Confrontation. New York: Humanity Books, 2004.
Candidate Recruitment
Candidate recruitment refers to the rules employed by political
parties through which possible candidates for elected office
appear on the official electoral ballots (be it in list as well as
in nonlist systems). Thus, the term has a more precise meaning in political science than recruitment to the legislature, which
includes parties rules for drafting elections as well as other
factors operating in accession to parliamentary functions such
as the legal rules governing eligibility or the electoral system.
The recruitment of independent candidates, for instance, does
not fall under candidate recruitment as political scientists
study it.
Candidate recruitment is both a matter of who appoints
candidates to run for elections and the effect of candidate
recruitment procedures on who actually appears on the ticket.
Within the former, political scientists analyze how many people are involved in the selection process and how much power
the centralized authority wields. In respect to the latter, scholars have paid attention to two elements: the effect of candidate
selection on the composition of parliaments, and its impact on
the flourishing or wilting of party mobilization and cohesion,
that is, on intraparty life.
Inclusive
CONCLUSION
Candidate recruitment has evolved significantly in the last
twenty years. Since the early 1990s, political parties in established democracy have decided to open up the procedures for
deciding who is going to stand for the party on the electoral
ballot. Party members in particular have gained influence in
the process, and in some cases voters have also been involved
through open primaries copying the U.S. primary system.
The change would be trivial if it was not expected to impact
the quality of democracy and representation. Recent studies
have shown that these changes have slightly affected the profile of candidates. Incumbents and well-known figures from
Candidate Selection
Candidate selection is one of the first things political parties
must do before an election. Those who are eventually elected
to office are the successful candidates whom the parties previously selected, and the ones who will subsequently determine
what the party looks like and does. Because it is relatively easy
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
Different candidate selection methods produce different consequences. For example, parties that use appointment methods balance representation better than parties that use voting
systems. Territorial decentralization could lead to increased
responsiveness of representatives to the demands of their particular constituencies. Concerning candidacy, parties can influence the composition of their party by adopting term limits.
The selectorate, however, determines the most significant and
far-reaching consequences. The political consequences of the
party
members
party
delegates
party
elite
single
leader
Exclusive
source: Hazan, Reuven Y., and Gideon Rahat. Democracy Within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences, p. 35. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010.
CONCLUSION
The study of candidate selection reveals that more intraparty
democracy does not necessarily lead to better democracy. For
example, parties that select their candidates through primaries
enjoy high levels of participation but have trouble balancing
representation, fostering competition, or maintaining cohesion. Candidate selection can thus affect the essence of modern democratic politics.
See also Electoral Rules; Political Participation; Political Parties;
Selectorate.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REUVEN Y. HAZAN
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Gallagher, Michael, and Michael Marsh, eds. Candidate Selection in
Comparative Perspective:The Secret Garden of Politics. London: Sage
Publications, 1988.
Hazan, Reuven Y. Candidate Selection. In Comparing Democracies, edited by
Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris. London: Sage
Publications, 2002.
Hazan, Reuven Y., and Gideon Rahat. Candidate Selection: Methods and
Consequences. In Handbook of Party Politics, edited by Richard S. Katz
and William J. Crotty. London: Sage Publications, 2006.
Capitalist Development
See Development, Economic.
Capital Punishment
The states levy and administration of the penalty of death
for criminal actions or conviction is called capital punishment.
Capital punishment follows from regular legal procedures
under due process of law, elements which distinguish it from
extrajudicial executions. Capital punishment is generally on
the decline around the globe, either because of a states abolition or growing tendency to constrict its use.
Despite international criticism, the United States continues to allow capital punishment in
states that have not outlawed it. A group in Columbia, South Carolina, demonstrates their
support just prior to an execution.
source: Bettmann/Corbis
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
AND AMERICAN POLITICS
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, capital punishment continues to have an important place in U.S. politics
and practice. Despite the recent reawakening of abolitionist
activity, a majority of Americans in opinion polls say they
favor capital punishment for persons convicted of murder.Yet
capital punishment is perhaps less of a national phenomenon
than it is a reflection of the distinctive history and politics of
the American states in the so-called death belt, states such as
Texas,Virginia, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Florida that together
account for approximately two-thirds of all executions in
the United States. Indeed, executions have become so commonplace that in some states, such as Texas and Virginia, it is
difficult for abolitionist groups to mount a visible presence for
every execution.
Motivations such as vengeance, retribution, and the simple
justice of an eye-for-an-eye sort provide the basis for much of
this popular support. This may reflect a growing sense that
capital punishment no longer needs to be defended in terms of
its social utility. . . .The current invocation of vengeance reflects
. . . a sense of entitlement to the death penalty as a satisfying
personal experience for victims and a satisfying gesture for the
rest of the community (Simon, 1997, 13).Yet, as legal historian
Stuart Banner rightly observes in Austin Sarats book, When the
State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition,
Capital punishment . . . presents several puzzles. It gets
more attention than any other issue of criminal justice,
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO
STUDYING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Much of the available research on the death penalty centers
on the United States, which permits the federal government
and state governments to use death as a punishment for
homicide. Research traditionally focuses on three topics: (1)
whether the death penalty deters, (2) whether it is compatible
with contemporary standards of decency, and (3) whether it
has been administered in a racially neutral or in a discriminatory manner.
DETERRENCE
Until relatively recently, the settled wisdom was that the death
penalty did not produce a greater deterrent effect than life
imprisonment. However, recent research has reignited the
debate about deterrence. Hashem Dezhbakhsh and his colleagues suggest that each execution prevents approximately
eighteen murders, while similar research by H. N. Macon and
R. K. Gittings and Joanna Shepherd purports to show similar deterrent effects. In response, John Donohue and Justin
Wolfers compare execution rates with homicide rates and
contrasted U.S. trends to Canadian trends and conclude that
there is considerable doubt about whether the death penalty
has any deterrence effect at all.
Deterrence studies traditionally have used many different
methodologies. Some examine murder rates before and after
well-publicized executions; others compare murder rates in
adjoining states, one with capital punishment, and the other
without. In the 1970s, the economist Isaac Ehrlich conducted
controversial research on the deterrent effect of capital punishment. It shows statistically significant deterrent effects and uses
sophisticated statistical techniques to control for confounding
variables. If Ehrlich is correct, execution did indeed save lives.
He claims in his 1975 article The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment, On the average the trade-off between the execution of an offender and the potential victims it might have
saved was on the order of magnitude of 1 to 8 for the period
193367 in the United States (398). Ehrlichs research has
been the object of sustained and rather persuasive criticism,
such as that by Lawrence Klein and Richard Lempert, most
of which focuses on the particular statistical techniques used.
Todays controversy has reignited the effort to determine if
the death penalty has distinct and discernible deterrent effects.
The final traditional interest of scholars studying capital punishment is in the compatibility of capital punishment with
democratic values. These researchers ask whether the state
administers capital punishment fairly and, more particularly,
in a racially nondiscriminatory manner. Efforts to answer this
question often focus on the race of the offender. Scholars
documented in rape and homicide cases, for example, that
between 1930 and 1967 almost 50 percent of those executed
for murder were black. However, this early research was
unable to disentangle the impact of race from other supposedly legitimate factors on capital sentencing. Merely showing
that the death penalty was more likely to be imposed on black
defendants could not, in itself, establish that that difference
was the result of racial discrimination.
In the mid-1980s, David Baldus and his colleagues undertook research designed to remedy this defect. Using sophisticated multiple regression techniques and a large data set, they
aimed to isolate the effect of race on capital sentencing. First,
they found no evidence of discrimination against black defendants because of their race in the period after Furman v. Georgia (1972). Second, they found strong effects for the victims
race. Taking over two hundred variables into account, Baldus
and colleagues concluded that someone who killed a white
victim was 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty
than if the victim was black. Even after the sustained efforts by
the Supreme Court to prevent arbitrariness or racial discrimination in capital sentencing, juries seemed to still value the
lives of white Americans more highly than the lives of African
Americans and were, as a result, more likely to sentence some
killers to die on the basis of illegitimate racial considerations.
The Baldus study was the highpoint of policy-relevant,
empirically rigorous social science research on capital punishment; it spoke directly to issues that the U.S. Supreme Court
had put at the heart of its death penalty jurisprudence and the
study used the best social science methods. However, it did not
persuade the Court. While the Court accepted the validity of
the Baldus study, it concluded in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) that
such statistical evidence could not prove discrimination in any
individual case.This rejection stunned those who believed that
social science could help shape policy in the area of capital
sentencing.
Caribbean 193
moral-political categories and distinctions which help shape
our symbolic universe (195). Punishment teaches people
how to think about categories like intention, responsibility, and injury, and it models the socially appropriate ways of
responding to injury. What is true of punishment in general is
particularly true for the death penalty. Scholars such as mile
Durkheim and George Herbert Mead, among others, contend that it is through practices of punishment that cultural
boundaries are drawn, and solidarity is created through acts of
marking difference between self and other, through disidentification as much as imagined connection.
The cultural politics of state killing has played a key role in
shoring up distinctions of status and distinguishing particular
ways of life from others. As a result, it is not surprising today
the death penalty in the United States marks an important
fault line in contemporary culture wars. Execution itself, the
moment of state killing, is still today in the United States and
some other nations an occasion for rich symbolization, for the
production of public images of evil or of an unruly freedom
whose only containment is in a state-imposed death.
See also Beccaria, Cesare; Bonald, Louis Gabriel-Ambroise de;
Crime Policy; Right to Life; Rule of Law; Sentencing Policy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AUSTIN SARAT
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Baldus, David C., George G. Woodworth, and Charles A. Pulaski Jr. Equal
Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis. Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1990.
Bowers, William. Capital Punishment and Contemporary Values: Peoples
Misgivings and the Courts Misperceptions. Law and Society Review 27,
no. 1 (1993): 157176.
Bowers, William, and Benjamin Steiner. Death by Default: An Empirical
Demonstration of False and Forced Choice in Capital Sentencing.
Texas Law Review 77, no. 3 (1999): 605715.
Council of Europe, and Renate Wohlwend. Europe: A Death PenaltyFree Continent. Council of Europe. http://assembly.coe.int/Main.
asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta99/ERES1187.htm.
Dezhbakhsh, Hashem, Paul H. Rubin, and Joanna M. Shepherd. Does
Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from
Postmoratorium Panel Data. American Law and Economic Review 5, no. 2
(2003): 344376.
Donohue, John J., and Justin Wolfers. Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence
in the Death Penalty Debate. Stanford Law Review 58 (2005): 791.
Doyle, James. The Lawyers Art: Representation in Capital Cases. Yale
Journal of Law and the Humanities 8 (1996): 417450.
Ehrlich, Isaac. The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment. American
Economic Review 65, no. 3 (1975): 397418.
Eisenberg, Theodore, and Martin Wells. Deadly Confusion: Jury Instructions
in Capital Cases. Cornell Law Review 79 (1993): 117.
Ellsworth, Phoebe, and Samuel Gross. Hardening of Attitudes: Americans
Views on the Death Penalty. Journal of Social Issues 50, no. 19 (1994):
4871.
Fijalkowski, Agata. Abolition of the Death Penalty in Central and Eastern
Europe. Tilburg Foreign Law Review 9 (2001): 6283.
Frankowski, Stanislav. Post-Communist Europe. In Capital Punishment:
Global Issues and Prospects, edited by Peter Hodgkinson and Andrew
Rutherford. Winchester, UK: Waterside Press, 1996.
Garland, David. Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of
Criminal Justice. Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 11 (1991): 191224.
Gibbs, Jack. Punishment and Deterrence: Theory, Research, and Penal
Policy. In Law and the Social Sciences, edited by Leon Lipson and Stanton
Wheeler. New York: Russell Sage, 1986.
Caribbean
The Caribbean is a geographical region of the Americas consisting of the Caribbean Sea, its islands, and the surroundings
coasts. Politically, the Caribbean consists of thirty-four territories, including sovereign states, departments, and dependencies.
The total population of the region is about 37 million, with
about 90 percent of the population situated in the regions
sovereign states. While the countries of the Caribbean demonstrate a great deal of social, ethnic, and cultural diversity, they
also share many common economic and political features that
have defined their contemporary struggle for development.
These features include a common history as plantation and
slave societies, a shared dependence on agriculture (especially
194 Caribbean
UNITED
STATES
N O RT H
A ME RI CA
THE BAHAMAS
Gulf of
Mexico
a
id
Stra
its
of
Fl
AT L A N T I C
OCEAN
Nassau
or
A T L A N T I C
O C E A N
Havana
Equator
SOUTH
AMERICA
PA C I F I C
Turks and
Caicos Islands
(U.K.)
CUBA
OCEAN
Grand
Turk
Cayman Islands
(U.K.)
George Town
HAITI
Port-au-Prince
VIRGIN ISLANDS
(U.S., U.K.)
DONIMICAN
REPUBLIC
San Juan
Santo
Domingo
Kingston
JAMAICA
PUERTO RICO
(U.S.)
Basseterre
St. John's
Plymouth
GUADELOUPE
(FR.)
MONTSERRAT
(U.K.)
Basse-Terre
DOMINICA
Roseau
HONDURAS
C a r i b b e a n
Fort-de-France
S e a
MARTINIQUE
(FR.)
Castries
ST. LUCIA
BARBADOS
Kingstown
ARUBA
(NETH.)
NICARAGUA
Oranjestad
Gulf of
Venezuela
Bridgetown
GRENADA
St. George's
Willemstad
Port-of-Spain
TRINIDAD AND
TOBAGO
COSTA
RICA
V E N E Z U E L A
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
0
PA C I F I C O C EA N
200 Mi
200 Km
GUYANA
The Caribbean is a diverse region comprised of sovereign states, departments, and dependencies, with influences from colonizers Spain,
England, France, and the Netherlands.
SETTLEMENT
By the late sixteenth century, Spain, England, France, and the
Dutch had colonized most islands in the Caribbean. The temperate climate of the new colonies was particularly conducive to
the development of lucrative agricultural exports, such as sugar.
Thus, by the late seventeenth century, a lucrative plantation
economy had developed in the region. As the European demand
for Caribbean sugar exports increased over time, the demand for
new sources of cheap plantation labor in the Caribbean also
increased. In order to meet these demands, the colonizers turned
to the slave trade in the eighteenth century. Massive numbers
of African slaves were imported and sent to work on Caribbean plantations. Although slave revolts were common during
this period, most were quickly suppressed. By the nineteenth
century, most Caribbean territories had abandoned slavery as
a practice. However, the legacy of African slavery continues to
shape contemporary life and politics in the Caribbean.
Caribbean 195
rests with the prime minister and parliament, which consists
of twenty-one members elected by direct, popular vote. The
Netherlands Antilles is a decentralized unitary state consisting
of a governor and an elected Council of Ministers, headed by
a prime minister. As a unified political entity, the Netherlands
Antilles was scheduled to dissolve in 2008. However, dissolution of the Antilles has been postponed pending further negotiation regarding the future status of the territories.
Haiti, a former French colony, was the first country in the
Caribbean to achieve independence in 1791 through a slave
revolt led by Toussaint LOuverture. In a cruel twist of irony, it
is the only French colony to achieve independence to date and
it was already the poorest of all Caribbean countries when a
2010 earthquake devestated the capital Port au Prince and the
surrounding area, killing hundreds of thousands.
The British case varies, with Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados,
and Guyana achieving independence in the mid-twentieth
century. Today, several islands remain British Overseas Territories, including Anguilla, Montserrat, the Cayman Islands, the
British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos. These territories
are under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, but do not
form part of the United Kingdom itself. Inhabitants have British citizenship, and the monarch appoints a governor to serve
as de facto head of state for each territory, but the governor
exercises little power over local affairs, which are governed
instead by an elected parliament.
Like Haiti, many of the Caribbean islands that achieved
independence, such as Guyana and Suriname, are also amongst
the poorest in the region. In contrast, British Overseas Territories, such as the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands,
along with Aruba, boast the highest per capita incomes and
account for 56 percent of the regions income. This trend has
discouraged some islands from seeking total independence.
THE ECONOMY
A significant economic challenge for most Caribbean states
and territories has been to break their dependence on primary
agricultural exports, most notably sugar.Traditionally, Caribbean
countries have relied heavily on a system of preferential access
to European markets for export commodities such as sugar and
bananas. Reliance on this export sector has limited financial
returns, wages, industrialization, and regional competitiveness
in global markets to the extent that, today, most Caribbean
countries have large and persistent trade deficits. However, some
countries have successfully diversified their markets. Curacao,
Aruba, and Trinidad and Tobago have begun producing or refining oil. Guyana, Suriname, and Jamaica have developed their
mining sectors. Puerto Rico is developing its manufacturing
sector.The Cayman Islands, Aruba, and Curacao have developed
a lucrative offshore banking sector, and almost all countries and
territories in the Caribbean have developed tourism as a major
industry, some to the virtual exclusion of almost any other economic activity.The economic result of this effort is mixed. Some
countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada, experienced significant economic growth during the late 1990s and
early part of 2000. Others, like Jamaica and Haiti, continued to
experience negative growth during this same period.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
By the 1990s, most countries of the Caribbean had attained
political stability, with most countries transferring power
through democratic elections (the notable exceptions being
Haiti and Cuba). Except for a few cases, Caribbean countries
have also experienced continuous economic growth, declining inflation rates, and climbing human development indexes.
The region also continues to make positive steps forward
through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which
came into effect in 1973. CARICOM establishes a common market for member states. Currently, the organization
196 Carr, E. H.
boasts fourteen full members, and five associate members. In
addition to establishing free trade and a common market in
the Caribbean, CARICOM members have recently begun
issuing CARICOM passports. CARICOM recently entered
into Petrocaribe, an oil alliance with Venezuela that permits
CARICOM members to purchase oil on conditions of preferential payments. Despite these significant political and economic achievements, more than one-third of the Caribbeans
population continues to live below the poverty line. Unemployment rates remain high, and many countries continue to
suffer under the weight of foreign debt.
See also Colonialism; Latin American Political Economy; Monroe
Doctrine; Poverty; Slavery;Trade Blocs.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICHAEL MCNAMARA
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Itam, Samuel, Simon Cueva, Erik Lundback, Janet Stotsky, and Stephen
Tokarick. Developments and Challenges in the Caribbean Region.
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2000.
Rogonzinski, Jan. A Brief History of the Caribbean: From the Arawak and Carib
to the Present. New York: Plume, 2000.
West-Durn, Alan, ed. African Caribbeans: A Reference Guide. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 2003.
Carr, E. H.
Edward Hallett (Ted) Carr (18921982) was a British
political scientist and historian noted for his contributions
to international relations theory. A graduate of Cambridge,
Carr had a varied career that included service in the Foreign
Office for more than twenty years and experience as a writer
and assistant editor for The Times. He held several academic
appointments and was the Woodrow Wilson Professor of
International Relations at the University College of Wales
and a fellow at Balliol College, Oxford.
Carr was a prolific author and his diplomatic experience
colored his writing. He served as foreign officer in Riga, Latvia, after World War I (19141918) and the Russian Revolution
of 1917 had a significant impact on his academic work. He
emerged as one of Britains foremost experts on Russian, and
later Soviet, history. Among his earlier significant works were
biographies of Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky, German
philosopher Karl Marx, and Russian revolutionary Michael
Bakunin, published between 1931 and 1937, each of which
received critical praise.
Although Carrs opinion of the Russian Revolution was
generally favorable, the Great Depression (1929) affirmed his
growing distrust of liberal capitalism because of the social and
economic inequalities apparent during it. In 1939, he published
The Twenty Years Crisis, an overview of international relations
between 1919 and 1939. In it Carr expanded on the work of
earlier theorists such as Thucydides and Niccol Machiavelli
and helped define the main tenets of classical realism within
international relations theory by differentiating between
realism and utopianism (idealism). Central to Carrs analysis
was the significance of power in the development of global
norms and ethics. He condemned idealism for its failure to
incorporate the realities of contemporary international relations in visions of a utopia or ideal world. He further asserted
that systemic war or revolution was often a necessary catalyst
for significant social change, a contention rejected by his critics.
However, he also initially advocated appeasement toward Nazi
Germany, a position he revised in later editions of the book.
Carrs other significant works on international relations
include The Future of Nations: Independence or Interdependence?
(1941) and International Relations Between the Two World Wars
(1955). In 1946, he began work on what turned out to be
the seminal fourteen-volume A History of the Soviet Union,
published over the next thirty-two years. Carr was criticized
for minimizing the brutality and totalitarianism of successive
Soviet regimes and for overemphasizing the progressive features of Soviet communism. Nonetheless, his work was one of
the most comprehensive overviews of the rise of the country
to superpower status, beginning with the revolution through
World War II (19391945).
A series of Carrs Cambridge lectures were published in
1961 as What is History? In the essays, Carr analyzed the major
contemporary schools of historiography. He argued against
empiricism and instead contended that all historians employ
a degree of subjectivity caused by their surroundings and the
influences of the time period in which they live. Consequently,
contemporary events and mores typically colored historians
perceptions of the past, a trend Carr warned strongly against.
The book proved highly influential and shaped historiography
for the next twenty years.
See also International Relations; International Relations Theory;
Machiavelli, Niccol; Marx, Karl;Thucydides.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cox, Michael, ed. E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal. London: Palgrave, 2000.
Haslam, Jonathan. The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 18921982. New York:
Verso, 1999.
Jones, Charles. E. H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Carter, Gwendolen M.
Gwendolen M. Carter (19061991) was a teacher, writer, and
Africanist scholar best known for her work on South African
politics. For over forty years, she was a pathbreaking authority
on the politics and economy of southern Africa.
Carter received her doctorate from Harvard University in
1938 and taught at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario,
Canada (19321935), Wellesley College (19381941), and Tufts
University (19421943) before joining Smith College (1943
1964), Northwestern University (19641974), and the University of Florida (19841987). She was the president of the
African Studies Association (19581959) and vice president of
the American Political Science Association (19631964). She
was also a trustee of the African-American Institute for over
twenty years.
Carters early work focused on European governance, but
her attention shifted to Africa following a trip to South Africa
Cartoons, Political
Political caricatures have a long traditionthe Egyptian
pharaoh Akhnaton is often considered the first monarch
caricatured, approximately thirty-three hundred years ago.
Throughout their history, political cartoons have raised
awareness and controversy, parodying important figures and
bringing issues to the attention of the public.
Case Studies
A case study is one of several ways to conduct social and political science research. The term has several meanings in the
research literature. Case study can be used to describe a unit
of analysis (e.g., for an organization, a country, an event, or a
person); a research method (generally as a qualitative inquiry);
or a research strategy that investigates single or multiple cases
using participant observations, interviews, surveys, and statistical data.
Some researchers have described the case study as an
umbrella term for a group of research methods that focus an
inquiry around a specific context. In this regard, for example,
single or multiple case studies can include quantitative evidence based on multiple sources of evidence. Robert Yin, one
of the prominent scholars who conceptualizes the term, points
out that case studies should not be confused with qualitative
research. He indicates that a case study can be based on any
mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence, including experiments, surveys, and archival information.This definition is also
supported by Siegfried Lamnek: The case study is a research
approach, situated between concrete data taking techniques
and methodological paradigms. Case studies clearly address
what (what happened) and who (who did it), and they
also (descriptively) address the how much question. In some
cases, instead of analyzing cause-effect relationships or generalizable truth within the study, researchers focus on the exploration and description of the situation. In other words, holistic
understanding of the situation is more important in case studies. This type of research is multifaceted because it commonly
involves analysis of data from multiple sources, with researchers examining single or multiple cases within a study.
Caste System
The Indian caste system is primarily a division of human
endeavor, yet the caste system also profoundly impacts Hinduism. A four-tiered system, the main castes of birth into
the Hindu social system include: Brahmin (priestly class),
Kshatriya (administrative class), Vaishya (mercantile class),
Shudra (worker class), and Dalit (untouchables). Karma
determines birth into one of the main castes, which means
all of humanity is created unequal. Dalits are Indias hidden
apartheid and constitute approximately 20 percent (three
hundred million) of Indias population. The exploitation and
oppression of the Dalits causes this population to occupy a
position of perpetual economic and physical vulnerability, and
condemnation of the Dalits varies from social ostracism to
punitive violence.
However, many people have rallied to give Dalits the same
rights as other Indians. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar was born
an untouchable and became one of the most outspoken
advocates for granting mutual rights to Dalits. He eventually
advocated conversion to other religions, and in 1956, he and
thousands of his followers converted to Buddhism as a rejection of Hinduism and its caste system. Udit Raj was also born
an untouchable, and he converted to Buddhism and labored
against the social injustice of the Dalits. Although he was
born Kshatriya, even Buddha condemned the caste system, as
illustrated when he said, Not by birth does one become an
outcast . . . by deeds one becomes an outcast. Christian missionaries have been active in outreach ministries to the Dalits,
and many Dalits converted to Christianity in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.
Shortly after Indias independence from Great Britain
in 1947, it technically became illegal to discriminate on the
basis of the caste system; however, such discrimination is not
uncommon in modern India.Today, the caste system has a prevailing influence both economically and socially, especially in
rural areas. In urban areas, the caste system is still defended but
is less observable.The Buddhist religion, which began approximately 552 BCE, is a consequence of Hinduism, and therefore, some aspects of the caste system are practiced in Buddhist
countries like Japan, Sri Lanka, and Tibet.
The caste system associated with Hinduism is not only the
worlds oldest social hierarchy; it is also an example of a traditional economy. Caste, custom, and heredity primarily determine allocation and ownership of available resources in this
economy. According to the Hindu caste system, one should
not attempt to alter ones destiny, but to commit life to ones
current degree or estate in a way that is similar to the European feudal system. As an economic structure, the caste system
is oppressive in restricting any opportunity to change ones
occupational or social status.
According to Hinduism, people strive to achieve release
from samsara, the cyclical process of death and rebirth, and
consequently, the notion of karma, which is the law of cause
and effect. The law of karma necessitates inevitable consequences in subsequent lives and is intimately associated with
Castoriadis, Cornelius
Cornelius Castoriadis (19221997) was a French economist,
psychoanalyst, and philosopher. A member of the Trotskyist Internationalist Communist Party at the end of World
War II (19391945), Castoriadis broke away from the Fourth
International due to its defence of the Soviet Union in 1948.
Castoriadiss name is linked to the journal Socialism or Barbarism, which he cofounded with Claude Lefort. The journal
was published between 1949 and 1965 and attracted activists
and intellectuals such as Jean-Franois Lyotard. In those years,
Castoriadis worked as an economist for the Organization for
Caucus 201
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Agora International. Cornelius Castoriadis Agora International Website.
University of Michigan Library. www.agorainternational.org/.
Castoriadis, Cornelius. Crossroads in the Labyrinth. Cambridge. Mass.: MIT
Press, 1984.
. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.
. Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press,
1991.
. Political and Social Writings, vols. 13. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 19881993.
Casus Belli
Casus belli (Latin for case for war or occasion for war) is
the specific event, policy, or action that a state cites to justify
going to war. Countries use a public justification for war in
order to gain international support and to rally domestic support. Philosopher Hugo Grotius helped popularize the need
to officially articulate a rationale prior to the start of hostilities
as part of the development of just war theory (jus ad bellum).
The existence of a casus belli, however, does not necessitate
armed conflict; nations may still resolve disputes through
peaceful means.
Traditional examples of widely accepted justifications for
war include self-defense or the defense of an ally. For instance,
Japans attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was the
casus belli for U.S. entry into World War II (19391945). The
use of force on behalf of an international body such as the
League of Nations or the United Nations is also widely now
regarded as a legitimate casus belli.
Nations may promulgate a false or questionable casus belli
in an attempt to gain global backing for military action. For
example, critics of the 2003 U.Sled invasion of Iraq assert that
the administration of President George W. Bush manipulated
intelligence reports in order to make the regime of Saddam
Hussein appear more of a threat.
See also Grotius, Hugo; Just War Theory; Legitimate Violence;
Statecraft; Strategy, Military.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Caucus
A caucus is a general meeting of a political party or group.
Within political science, the term has two distinct meanings.
First, a caucus may refer to a party convention to select candidates or establish consensus on issues. Second, a caucus can be
a policy- or issue-specific parliamentary grouping that exists
either within a broader party or that often crosses party lines
based on issue positions.
Causal Inference
The modern scientific approach is based upon the search for
answers to what causes observed phenomena. For instance, by
establishing the causes of a given problem (low voter turnout),
it is possible to seek answers for how to deal with or cure that
problem (lower the barriers to voting). Research that establishes that one factor directly, or in combination with other
factors, leads to observed effects is known as causal inference.
Causal inference is established through the construction and
testing of hypotheses. A testable hypothesis may come from a
theory seeking to explain why one variable (A) would have
an effect upon a second variable (B). If the theory is sound, it
will be supported by repeated observations where A causes B
because changes in A cause changes in B (known as covariation).
Causal inference is not equivalent to theory testing; for example, results from a randomized experiment may provide strong
evidence that a medical treatment causes an effect, even in the
absence of any underlying theory, but such controlled experiments are rare in political science. Without a solid theory, the
simple observation that A and B change in tandem is an insufficient explanation and would be considered mere correlation.
For example, voter records may indicate that individuals
in a particular constituency are relatively less likely to vote. In
order to explain this phenomenon, political scientists would
develop a possible causal hypothesis (e.g., people in this constituency are poorer or less educated and therefore are less
likely to engage in registration and voting) and then test it
using a data set. A causal relationship between income or levels
of educational achievement and the act of voting are plausible
in only one direction; the act of voting logically should have
no causal effect on income or level of education.
See also Causation and Correlation; Correlation; Experimental
Design; Inference; Survey Techniques and Design.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PAUL S. ROWE
Censorship 203
variable exerts causal influence on the dependent variable. To
demonstrate a causal relationship between independent and
dependent variables, one must show (1) that the two variables
are correlated, (2) that the independent variable precedes the
dependent variable in time, and (3) that the relationship is not
spuriousthe observed relationship between the two variables
is not due to the influence of a third variable. Making a case
for causality depends on strong theory that spells out how
variables are related and anticipates possible spurious relationships. Careful research design is also important, especially in
trying to account for time order of key variables.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JULIO BORQUEZ
See also Causal Inference; Correlation; Experimental Design;
Inference; Survey Techniques and Design.
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Babbie, Earl R. The Practice of Social Research, 11th ed. Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth, 2007.
Shively, W. Phillips. The Craft of Political Research, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2002.
Censorship
Censorship is the process of controlling or evaluating the
content of books, films, newspapers, or art in an attempt to
comply with social norms. It is usually overseen by a political,
religious, or familial authority and sometimes results in the
banning of content. It does not evolve with time; rather, this
process adjusts itself according to the norms and consensus of
a society. Often viewed as a negative, it is not necessarily bad;
for instance, society as a whole generally agrees that pornography should not be accessible to minors.
How a society reaches consensus in determining what
should be controlled or banned is a much discussed topic.
Who should draw the line and determine what is or is not
moral? Throughout the centuries, there have been leaders and
governments that have controlled the dissemination of information, art, and correspondence, but scholars such as Noam
Chomsky believe that even in democratic systems, pressure
from well-funded and vocal groups can affect what is communicated in the public sphere.
MOTION PICTURES
Motion pictures have faced censorship to varying degree since
their beginnings in the late nineteenth century, but for the
most part this existed at the local or state level. In the United
States, the Motion Picture Production Code, better known
as the Hays Code after its creator William H. Hays, was the
first nationwide set of guidelines enumerating what was and
was not acceptable material for a motion picture. The selfinstituted rules were an attempt by the industry to hold off
federal oversight and regulation following the Supreme Court
ruling in Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of
Ohio (1915).The justices determined that films were a business
and not an art form and, therefore, were not protected under
the First Amendment, and local and state censorship bans
proliferated in response. The guidelines were in place from
1930 until 1968 and mandated that films could not contain,
among other things, any nakedness, interracial marriages, or
depictions of homosexuality.
BOOK BURNING
One of the oldest forms of censorship is book burning.
According to author Judith Kohl, the earliest case of book
burning involved the Greek philosopher Anaxagoras, whose
scientific works were considered heretical to the established
religion of the time and were put to the torch around 450
BCE. This practice intensified with the invention of the
printing press in 1435, and books became easily and quickly
available to the general public.
204 Censure
In Nazi Germany of the early 1930s, minister of propaganda Josef Goebbels organized public book burnings that
included works by Jewish authors such as Albert Einstein,
Sigmund Freud, and Marcel Proust. In Censorship: A World
Encyclopedia, Kohl writes that during the Nazi regime, The
works of many non-Jewish but liberal or communist authors
were also consumed, including those of Thomas and Heinrich
Mann, Arnold and Stefan Zweig, Havelock Ellis, Jack London,
Upton Sinclair, and mile Zola.
The Nazis were not the last to organize public book burnings. Kohl writes, The Islamic revolution in Iran (1979)
included the destruction of more than 5 million books. On
February 14, 1989, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa, a kind of death warrant, after novelist
Salman Rushdie wrote in his Satanic Verses that he no longer believed in Islam. Many Muslim communities around the
world held public rallies at which copies of the book were
burned. It was banned in South Africa and in Rushdies
native India, and copies were destroyed in many public libraries worldwide. In Berkeley at the University of California, a
bookstore that carried the book was firebombed. The events
parallel those of Ray Bradburys novel Fahrenheit 451, first published in 1953, which depicts systematic book burning in a
futuristic, totalitarian society.
PURPOSE OF CENSORSHIP
Could society exist without some form of censorship? Would
values be protected without any form of control? Some family values groups are concerned about how prevalent violence
and obscenity are in the media, and some of the key issues
surrounding censorship in the early twenty-first century
involve the Internet, where pornography and extremists sites
proliferate.
The debate wages internationally. Journalism professor
Hussein Amin writes about the situation in Egypt and Arab
countries: Overt censorship and self-censorship are commonplace in the Arab news media today and journalism education programs, just as the media themselves have, in fact,
been recruited into a national enterprise for the production of
propaganda. Freedom of the press as defined by most Westerners
is not a universal value. According to international freedomof-the-press advocate Reporters Without Borders, Burma,
Cuba, the Maldives, the Seychelles, Tunisia, Vietnam, China,
Pakistan, and Iran are among the most restrictive in regard to
freedom of press.
Censure
Censure is the act of formally reprimanding a public official
because of unethical or illegal conduct. In most democratic
nations, censure is a legislative act, passed by majority vote
to express a bodys displeasure with a member or other public official. Censure is stronger than a rebuke, but is one step
short of impeachment or removal from office. In some systems, censure may be enacted by simple majority vote, while
others require a supermajority. The censure process may be
specifically detailed in a nations constitution, as is the case in
Canada, or it may have its roots in tradition or the acquired
powers of a legislature, as is true with the United States. In the
U.S. Constitution, there is no explicit power to censure, but
Congress does have the ability to approve nonbinding resolutions and establish rules of conduct and punish members. If a
member of Congress is censured, they are removed from any
leadership positions, including leadership of committees or
subcommittees. In 1834, the Senate, under the control of the
opposition Whigs, censured President Andrew Jackson, over
his removal of deposits from the Bank of the United States.
Center-periphery Relations
(Federalism)
The center-periphery relations of interdependence are of
the utmost importance for the understanding of politics in
modern social life. This relationship not only refers to local
and national contexts but extends to the international level
as well. There is a center, or central zone, that impinges in
various ways on those who live within the ecological domain
in which the society exists. According to this diffusionist
approach, the relationship to this central zone constitutes
membership in society.
Such a relationship ought to be analyzed from the double perspective of centralization and peripheral accentuation.
Center and periphery have often been considered in terms of
subordination of the latter to the former. Likewise, a double
dimension between horizontal and vertical relationships has
been drawn when referring either to the strict geographical dimension or to a system of functional interaction. In the
latter, a set of key decision-making powers form the center
and the periphery is composed of participants in the interaction system who have the least influence on the central group
and on the decision making. The relations of dominance and
dependence are not restricted to their political forms but can
also affect economic and social dimensions.
Theories of ethnocentrism and internal colonialism have
stressed those abilities of state cores to implement programs
of national assimilation over peripheral areas. William Graham
Sumner coined ethnocentrism as the technical name for which
ones own group is the center of everything, and all others are
scaled down and rated with reference to it. Applied to territorial
politics, ethnocentrism manifests in the disregard shown by the
state core toward the economic development of the periphery.
Internal colonialism is viewed as a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous groups within the state. Accordingly, the
superordinate, or center, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its
advantage over the subordinate, or periphery, by means of policies aimed at the institutionalization of a stratification system
(e.g., developmental priorities given to cities to the detriment
of resource-extractive rural areas). This is labeled as cultural
division of labor and produces a reaction heightening cultural
or ethnoterritorial distinctiveness in both core and periphery.
Modernization theory has pointed out that both processes
of state formation and nation-building were accelerated by
the development of industrial capitalism in Europe and North
America in the nineteenth century. The enforcement of one
central authority on peripheral regions or subordinated political groups, often socially and culturally different, seemed to be
necessary. But, contrary to what was originally suggested, such
Central Bank
Central banks are government or quasi-governmental agencies
with a long history. For example, the Bank of England was
chartered in the seventeenth century. But the prevalence and
extensive policy-making authority of modern central banks is
a postWorld War II (19391945) phenomenon. While modern central banks vary in their institutional relationships with
elected officials, their policy responsibilities typically include
the development and implementation of monetary policy
and regulation of the banking and, sometimes, the broader
financial industry.
Monetary policy focuses on currency management. Monetary policy instruments available to central banks vary, but
they may include authority over reserve requirements for
commercial banks; the ability to lend directly to banks and,
in some cases, other financial institutions; and the capacity to
participate in open market operations (the purchase and sale
of government securities). These responsibilities often include
serving as a lender of last resort. Each policy tool is designed
to influence the extent to which cash is available to commercial markets. Central banks manage the availability of financial
resources in an effort to achieve their statutory policy goals.
These goals often include stable prices, high employment, and
economic growth.
Some argue that politicians use monetary policy to boost economic growth near elections; others contend that politicians
manipulate monetary policy to achieve partisan goals. Political economists also argue that the political manipulation of
monetary policy tends to induce inflation without producing significant long-term increases in income or employment. Substantial empirical evidence supports the presence
of an inverse relationship between central bank independence
and inflation, the variability of inflation, and the variability of
interest rates.There is, however, little evidence of a strong relationship between central bank independence and real variables
such as employment or income growth.
Centralization, Deconcentration,
and Decentralization
Centralization, deconcentration, and decentralization are
concepts that describe different forms of administrative
organization. Administrative deconcentration is the transfer
of competences, or administrative powers, within the same
institution; administrative decentralization is the transfer of
competences between institutions with political and administrative autonomy. While centralization, or the concentration
of power within the central government, answers the need of
national unity, deconcentration and decentralization are two
different ways to address sociogeographical diversity inside the
country.
Most state structures include one or more subnational levels of administration, but states differ from each other in the
way administrative powers are organized and in the degree
of centralization of decision making. In recent decades, in
most parts of the world, the move from traditional hierarchical
forms of administration to forms of administration through
the networks of alternative public and private organizations
has reinforced previous trends towards deconcentration and
decentralization.
DECONCENTRATION
Deconcentration is the transfer of competences or administrative
powers between organizations inside the same entity, such as
the state or municipalities. Taking the example of the state,
deconcentration is the transfer of competences from central government entities or departmentsthose that have a
jurisdiction over the entire national territoryto peripheral
government entities, which have jurisdiction only over a part
of the national territory. The central level retains the most
important keys in the decision-making process, but its organs
in the lower tiers may make decisions on less important issues.
This is the case, for example, of central government departments in charge of the road network. They are responsible
for the overall strategy and main decisions concerning planning and construction, while its regional departments are
only in charge of road maintenance and implementation of
decisions taken by the central department. Deconcentration
only concerns entities inside the state. The states aim with
deconcentration is to bring public services closer to citizens
without losing control of the decisions and resources applied
by regional or local state departments.
In some cases, deconcentration can be used as a first step
in a decentralization process, for example, when the state creates a regional tier where it didnt exist before. In such a case,
the strategy can be to gradually deconcentrate those powers
and resourcesintended for transfer to the future regional
self-governmentto the regional departments of central government. In a second step, the new administrative tier is created and elections are held for its boards. In addition, other
central government departments may also deconcentrate to
peripheral regional departments; their competences will not
be decentralized to the newly created regional government,
DECENTRALIZATION
Decentralization is the transference of competences between
different entities. It connotes the transfer of responsibilities,
powers, and resources, from higher to lower level units of
self-government and the direct management of local affairs by
local populations through their elected local or regional representatives. The reasons to decentralize, the degree of decentralization, the number of administrative competences, and
the amount of public resources assigned to local and regional
governments vary from country to country. In most countries,
administrative decentralization is done for a combination of
political, economic, and social reasonsdifferent from case
to case. In some cases, the need to recognize and to respect
political and cultural differences can lead to adopting forms of
administrative or political decentralization (e.g., the creation
of autonomous regions in Spain). In other cases, the specific
geographical situation may require adopting these forms of
decentralization (e.g., the case of islands or metropolitan areas).
Decentralization increases the opportunities for citizens
to participate in local or regional public affairs, offering new
conditions for participation and for public-private partnership,
therefore reinforcing the involvement of local civil society
in the management of its own affairs. With increased participation and with direct election of local or regional representatives, decentralization improves political accountability
and increases transparency in public-policy decision making. Decentralization tends to increase institutional capacity
and local empowerment, making local governments and local
communities more competent to deal with their own affairs.
As a consequence, administrative decentralization is thought
to increase public service efficiency and responsiveness, and to
achieve a better adjustment between citizens preferences and
public services. However, the number of administrative units
or institutional fragmentation affect efficiency and responsiveness, since, for example, an excessive number of small units can
be detrimental for the achievement of scale economies. On
the other hand, large units may affect the relation between
citizens and administrators and therefore the responsiveness
of the regional government. Finally, decentralization may also
allow local communities to counterweight decisions taken by
the central government on issues likely to affect their local or
regional well-being.
Decentralization processes may also have negative consequences. For example, decentralization can be responsible, in
specific contexts, for macroeconomic instability, since the efforts
made by the central government to reduce public sector expenditures or to increase public revenues may not be followed by
similar efforts at the regional and local levels of self-government.
Decentralization can also produce inequity in the amount and
quality of public services delivered, according to the area of
CONCLUSION
Centralization and decentralization have alternated as political and administrative models for the vertical organization of
the state throughout the history of public administration. In
the three decades after the end of World War II (19391945),
administrative deconcentration prevailed in most industrialized countries as the preferred mechanism for the vertical
organization of the state. In that period, there was strong
state intervention with little or no delegation of powers and
resources to entities outside the direct control of central government departments. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the
renewal and the dominance of the free market ideology on
both sides of the Atlantic, as well as political demands for more
public participation in decision making, led to reforms in the
vertical organization of the state, which in part explains the
general move toward political and administrative decentralization. Political changes from the 1990s onward consolidated
political and administrative decentralization as the model for
the organization of democratic states. Decentralization was
seen, at the same time, as the best way for public administration to deal with the emerging forms of multilevel and multiactor governance, as the example of several member states of
the European Union illustrates well.
See also Centrally Planned Economy; Democratic Centralism;
Local Politics; Public-private Dichotomy; Regions and Regional
Government.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CARLOS NUNES SILVA
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Amaral, Diogo Freitas, Curso de Direito Administrativo, 3rd ed, vol. 1.
Coimbra, Portugal: Almedina, 2007.
Arzaghi, Mohammad, and J.Vernon Henderson. Why Countries Are Fiscally
Decentralizing. Journal of Public Economics 89 (July 2005): 11571189.
Aubry, Franois-Xavier. La dcentralistion contre ltat (Ltat
semi-centralis). Paris: Librarie Gnrale de Droit et de Jusrisprudence,
1992.
Bennett, Robert, ed. Decentralization, Local Governments, and Markets:Towards
a Post-welfare Agenda. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
Burki, Shahid Javed, Guillermo Perry, and William Dillinger. Beyond the
Centre: Decentralizing the State. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999.
Burns, Danny, Robin Hambleton, and Paul Hoggett. The Politics of
Decentralisation. Revitalising Local Democracy. London: Macmillan, 1994.
Caupers, Joo. A Administrao Perifrica do Estado, Lisbon, Portugal: Aequitas/
Editorial de Notcias, 1994.
Cohen, John, and Stephen Peterson. Administrative Decentralisation: Strategies
for Developing Countries. West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1999.
Oates, Wallace E. An Economists Perspective on Fiscal Federalism. In
The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism, edited by Wallace E. Oates.
Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 1977.
Page, Edwards, and Michael Goldsmith, eds. Central and Local Government
Relations: A Comparative Analysis of Western European Unitary States.
London: Sage Publications, 1989.
Tiebout, Charles M. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Journal of
Political Economy 64, no. 5 (1956): 416424.
Wolman, Harold. Decentralization: What It Is and Why We Should Care.
In Decentralization, Local Governments, and Markets:Towards a Post-welfare
Agenda, edited by Robert J. Bennett. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
CONCLUSION
In the early twenty-first century, pure central planning economies are rare; the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and China
210 Chancellor
determines the history of a people. At the center of world
history through the ages is the clash between the Aryan or
Germanic culture and the Semitic perspective, which Chamberlain regarded as materialistic and without cultural value.
The superiority of Western civilization stems largely from
the positive influence of the Germanic races on history. For
Chamberlain, these races included, inexplicably, Slavs, Celts,
Greeks, and Latins as well as Germansall heirs to ancient
Greece and Rome. Semitic races, particularly the Jews, and
institutions influenced by them, such as the Catholic Church,
have typically acted to undermine Germanic superiority, as
they once subverted the Roman Empire. Chamberlain uses
spurious conjecture to conclude that Jesus was not a Jew, and
he thinks that the Catholic Church diverted Christianity from
its true path, a mistake not corrected until the Germanic influence of thinkers like Martin Luther emerged.
After England entered World War I (19141918) as an ally
of those nations opposing Germany, Chamberlain accused his
native country of treason to the Germanic ideal, and during
the war he wrote a series of propaganda pieces favorable to the
German cause. For this work he was awarded an Iron Cross,
and the following year (1916) he became a German citizen.
In 1923, five years after Germanys defeat in World War I,
Chamberlain met with Hitler, who was then head of the fledgling Nazi party. Chamberlain considered Hitler to be the promised leader he had earlier prophesied would reinfuse Germany
with the spirit needed to reemerge as a world power. Later, in
Mein Kampf, Hitler expressed his high regard for Chamberlains
views. In addition to Hitler, other leaders of Nazi Germany
who claimed to have been influenced by Chamberlain include
Hess, Goebbels, Himmler, and Rosenberg.
See also Anti-Semitism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . DONALD G. TANNENBAUM
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Chamberlain, Anna. Meine Erinnerungen an Houston Stewart Chamberlain.
Munich: Beck, 1923.
Chamberlain, Houston S. Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, translated by
John Lees, 2 vols. London: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1910.
. Goethe. Munich:Verlag, 1912.
. Immanuel Kant. Munich: Bruckmann, 1905.
Field, Geoffrey G. Evangelist of Race:The Germanic Vision of Houston Stewart
Chamberlain. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.
Chancellor
Chancellor is a term used in some countries for a government
minister or official. The chancellor is the head of government
in Austria and Germany, having powers akin to a prime minister in a parliamentary system, but in other cases, the term is
reserved for a lesser, more specialized official.
In ancient Rome, the chancellors, or cancellarii, sat in the
courts of law at the cancelli, or lattice work screens, that separated the judge and council from the audience. Societies that
trace their history back to Roman times frequently employ
the term chancellor for ministers or judicial officials; however,
the term is also employed anachronistically to high-ranking
officials in the ancient Chinese and Egyptian empires.
Chartism 211
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Hancock, M. Donald, and Henry Krisch. Politics in Germany. Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2009.
Helms, Ludger. Institutions and Institutional Change in the Federal Republic of
Germany. New York: St. Martins Press, 2000.
. Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Chancellors: Executive Leadership in
Western Democracies. New York: Palgrave, 2005.
Chaos
See Equilibrium and Chaos.
Charisma
Charisma is an exceptional quality that makes the very few
people who possess it able to influence others by attracting their admiration and obedience. The term derives from
ancient Greek and originally meant gift. From Christian
theology, where it designates a special gift given by Gods
grace, the concept has entered the political vocabulary
through the reflection of German sociologist Max Weber.
Weber appropriated the term to mean a certain quality of
an individual personality by virtue of which the individual
is set apart from ordinary human beings and treated as being
endowed with exceptional powers.
Weber distinguished between three forms of authority
according to the different sources of their legitimacy: (1) the
rational authority is based on the belief in the legality of its
commands, (2) the traditional authority rests on credence given
to the sacredness of traditions, and, finally, (3) the charismatic
authority stems from the faith in the extraordinary quality of
a person. Whilst both the rational and traditional authorities
are ordinary, because they can be subsumed under, respectively,
discursively or historically grounded rules, charismatic authority goes beyond rules as it is based on the extraordinary gestures and qualities of the leader.
Examples of charismatic figures include Indian nationalist
Mahatma Gandhi, Russian Communist leader Vladimir Lenin,
British prime minister Winston Churchill, French president
Charles de Gaulle, and Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser.
See also Authority; Caesarism; Cult of Personality; Leadership;
Weber, Max.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHIARA BOTTICI
Chartism
Chartism was a democratic reform movement that emerged
in Britain in the second third of the nineteenth century.
The Chartists (those who advocated the Chartist program
of reform) derive their name from the Peoples Charter, a
document produced on May 8, 1838. The expressed purpose
of this charter was the compulsion of the lower house of
the British parliament toward political change and improvement through a restructuring of the constitution and citizens
rights. Historically, Chartism represents an important effort to
increase and transform political representation through suffrage, thereby repairing the ills of a society disabled by low
ORIGINS
Chartism emerged in the context of widespread economic
depression and political isolation of citizens outside the landed
class. In 1831, the British electorate was composed of roughly
half a million voters, as compared to a national population
of nearly fourteen million. Landed elites maintained control
of both economic development (even as Britain transitioned
towards an industrial economy), as well as political power,
through structuring districts and limiting the franchise. By
means of such legislation as the Importation Act of 1815
(informally known as the Corn Laws), these elites maintained
control over agricultural prices at the sacrifice of workers
wages and the balance of the economy writ large. A significant percentage of the British people were legally excluded
from the development and execution of acts of state, leaving
their interests underrepresented and creating conditions for
abuse and class conflict.
The success of reformist Whigs in the general election of
1831 opened the possibility to alleviate these tensions.With the
enactment of the Representation of the People Act of 1832
(the Reform Act), the British parliament ushered in transformations to the institutional arrangement of the political process. The new franchise extended political representation to
the burgeoning business class, while, in addition, reducing the
number of districts represented in the House of Commons.
Such reforms disabled the institutional parameters that had
encouraged the landed elites sustained political power.
212 Chauvinism
annual elections, secret ballots, abolition of property requirements for parliamentary service, pay allowances for all members
of Parliament, and equal districts. Chartists argued that these
transformations would correct the limitations of recent legislation, such as the First Reform Act and the New Poor Law,
rectifying social inequalities produced by the then unrepresentative electorate. They claimed that such reforms would help to
further the democratization of Britain, extending suffrage that
was protected by transparent electoral institutions, and allowing
all Britains representation in the House of Commons.
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE
While Chartists ultimately failed to meet their own political
goals, the movement itself was successful in furthering the use
of political channels for engaging in reformistas opposed to
revolutionaryaction. Moreover, the demands for universal
suffrage helped further conditions for democratization that
extended beyond the movement itself.
The Chartist ideology is perhaps best known as an important early example of the expression of working-class consciousness attempting improvement and political change.
Socialists and Marxists would later point to Chartism as evidence of sociological and world-historical transformations
that signaled the decline of capitalism. However, the distinction between Chartism as social reform guided by humanitarian concerns for the costs of low representation, versus one
of economic reform for workers rights, only emerged as the
national movement began to lose coherence and economic
conditions created differing incentives for classes that had previously been unified under the early banner of reform.
See also British Political Thought; Capitalism and Democracy;
Electoral Reform; Radicalism; Socialism;Voting Rights and Suffrage.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANDREW POE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Belchem, John. Industrialization and the Working Class:The English Experience
17501900. Portland, Ore.: Areopagitica Press, 1990.
Epstein, James, and Dorothy Thompson, eds. The Chartist Experience Studies
in Working-Class Radicalism and Culture, 18301860. London: Macmillan,
1982.
Lovett, William, and John Collins. Chartism: A New Organization of
People. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1969. Reprinted with an
introduction by Asa Briggs.
Taylor, Miles. The Decline of British Radicalism, 18471860. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995.
Thompson, Dorothy. The Chartists: Popular Politics in the Industrial Revolution.
New York: Pantheon, 1984.
Thompson, E. P. The Making of the English Working Class London:Victor
Gollancz, 1963.
Chauvinism
Chauvinism is extreme nationalism or excessive pride in an
individuals group. The term originated with Nicolas Chauvin,
a French soldier who exhibited a fanatical devotion to Napoleon Bonaparte and the French Empire. Initially the term
referred to extreme pride in militarism, but through the 1800s,
it became increasingly synonymous with patriotism and belief
in the superiority of ones group or place. The ultranationalism
of the 1800s among European states helped fuel imperialism
by building on the social Darwinism of the era to create public support for expansion and colonialism. Chauvinism also
contributed to the jingoism of the United States and other
nations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
This period of chauvinism culminated in the cult of offense
prior to World War I (19141918). During the cold war, political chauvinism developed an ideological component and was
a tertiary factor in the struggle between Soviet-style communism and U.S. free market capitalism. Chauvinism increasingly
has come to be used to describe extreme pride in ones race,
ethnicity, or gender. During the womens rights movement of
the 1960s and 1970s, male chauvinism was used to connote the
sense of male superiority and entitlement. The term chauvinism became increasingly linked to genderism or other forms of
discrimination toward women.
See also Cold War; Colonialism; Misogyny; Nationalism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
SUMMARY
The number of checks and balances in a political system has
a tremendous impact on the policy-making process, which
in turn affects other aspects of the political system, including
the independence of judges and the ability of bureaucrats to
implement policy. Lastly, checks and balances even impact
the likelihood of government collapse and regime stability.
In some circumstances, such as periods of strong economic
growth, policy stability may be desirable; at other times, it
may not be. Rather than constructing a normative argument
about whether checks and balances are either inherently
good or bad for democratic government, political science
today often takes a positive approach to analysis of checks
and balances, examining the underlying institutional sources
of policy stability.
Childrens Rights
Childrens rights have become enshrined in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Adopted in 1989, this declaration sought both to establish
a concept of rights specific to children (ages seventeen and
under) and to elaborate on that concept with regard to the
specific rights that should be conferred on children by the
state or society in which they live.
Although the principles underpinning these rights, and the
specification of some of them, have been strongly contested at
times, the UNCRC has nevertheless been adopted by most
nationsonly the United States and Somalia have not yet
ratified the conventionand the UNCRC has acquired force
POSTCLASSICAL THOUGHT
The general shape of political thought in the postclassical
period (221 BCE1911 CE) followed on the foundations classical political thought. Scholars have used the term imperial
Confucianism to describe the philosophy-cum-state ideology
that emerged. There was enormous institutional innovation,
partly because of great social changes, but the mainstream
Confucian discourse continued to see institutions and standards with secondary importance, compared to the cultivation of virtuous individuals. The language of sage ruler was
regularly applied to emperorsnot least by the emperors
themselvesand rulers efforts to educate or transform their
subjects sometimes led to horrific excesses. The idea that people were beholden to a standard of personal moral judgment
was fleshed out; the source and justification of the judgment
came to be seen as the underlying harmonious coherence (li)
(also sometimes translated as principle) of the cosmos.
One critical episode in this lengthy period was the failure
of an ambitious program of top-down institutional reforms
advocated by Wang Anshi (10211086), which led many subsequent Confucians to stress local institutions and local autonomy. A related trend, which both supported and was supported
by the flourishing commercial economy of the sixteenth century and thereafter, was the increasing emphasis on legitimate
personal (si) desires. A range of thinkers came to make explicit
the importance of a legitimate sphere of personal concern, and
this trend was one significant source of subsequent Chinese
reflection about rights. Indeed, the Chinese term that came
to be accepted as a translation of rights meant, to nineteenthcentury Confucian thinkers, something close to legitimate
powers and interests.
Among the most significant political texts of the entire
period was the trenchant manifesto Waiting for the Dawn,
completed in 1663 by Huang Zongxi. Huang argues that a
healthy polity is based on well-designed institutions (using fa,
or standard, in a broad sense) like schools, property regimes,
and ceremonies that train people to be social citizens, rather
than selfish egoists. Huang contrasts these institutions with
those promoted by recent rulers, which he characterizes as
anti-institutional institutions (fa that are not fa): In this case,
the educational system, property regime, and ceremonies are
designed solely to glorify the one family who happens to
occupy the thronewhether the family deserves it or not.
Huang then famously asserts, Should it be said that There is
only governance by men, not governance by institutions [fa],
my reply is that only if there is governance by institutions can
there by governance by men. He goes on to explain, If the
institutions of the early kings were still in effect, there would
EARLY PARTIES
The impact of the encyclical Rerum Novarum was not immediate or dramatic, but it did inspire a number of movements, and
the process of party-building, that was to come to fruition in
the mid-century, was under way. Early experiments in Catholic Democratic Parties included Marc Sagniers Sillon (founded
in 1899) in France and the Zentrum in Germany (which
Christian Socialism
Christian socialism is an ideological perspective that believes
that socialist political and economic policiesif not necessarily a fully socialist community or economyare essential
to living a Christian life. For Christian socialists, the message
of Christianity is strongly egalitarian, encouraging all human
beings to see themselves as brothers and sisters, condemning economic differences that allow the rich to exploit the
poor, and generally disdaining the profit mentality and the
principles of self-interest that are central to most defenses of
free market economy. Hence, they see socialism, or at least
some form of social democracy, as a natural concomitant to
the Christian message. Similarly, they believe that being a
member of a capitalist environment potentially implicates one
in un-Christian practices; thus, an active resistance to certain
elements of the liberal capitalist state, and attempts to reform
those same elements, is the duty of every Christian.
Christian socialist movements or individual Christian
socialist leaders, writers, or thinkers will occasionally explicitly link the practices of the original Christianity community
formed following the death of Jesus with socialist teachings
Boyer, John. Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power
18971918. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995.
Cort, John C. Christian Socialism: An Informal History. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis,
1998.
Holland, Joe. Modern Catholic Social Teaching:The Popes Confront the Industrial
Age, 17401958. Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist, 1993.
Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Gary Marks. It Didnt Happen Here:Why
Socialism Failed in the United States. New York: Norton, 2000.
Norman, Edward R. The Victorian Christian Socialists. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
Phillips, Paul T. A Kingdom of God on Earth: Anglo-American Social Christianity,
18801940. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.
Wilkinson, Alan. Christian Socialism: Scott Holland to Tony Blair. London:
SCM Press, 1998.
freedom to own property and proselytize. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution took the concept of
religious toleration to its logical conclusion by prohibiting the
establishment of any official state religion at the federal level.
While intense debate still surrounds what constitutes official
government promotion of religion in the United States, the
First Amendment created a model of church and state that
eventually became the standard of religious freedom in the
Christian world.
Despite an increasing trend toward religious freedom and
toleration in the Western world, a number of states in Europe
continue to maintain established churches either through
official endorsement or via governmental subsidization. For
example, Sweden recently ended the state church status
of the Reformed Church but the state continues to heavily subsidize the daily operations of the church. The German
government collects tithes (taxes) directly for the Lutheran
Church and the Catholic Church. While Britain has reduced
the amount of its financial subsidies to the Church of England, the archbishop of Canterbury, the head of the church,
is still appointed by the monarch with input from Parliament.
Low levels of church attendance in Europe have made relations between church and state a relatively moot policy issue.
Despite the low salience of church-state policy in the public
discourse, European governments continue to protect their
state churches by making it legally difficult for various missionary movements (typically from the United States) to create
a presence in the region. This is often done by prohibiting the
construction of church buildings or making it difficult to gain
tax-exempt status.
senatorial opposition to Marc Antony after Caesars assassination, delivering his famous Philippics against him in 44 BCE.
Though Cicero hoped to play Caesars adopted son, Octavian,
against Antony, he was killed December 7, 43 BCE, following
their reconciliation.
Cicero wrote many philosophical works dealing with a
wide range of issues; his most important political works are the
fragmentary On the Republic and On the Laws, and On Duties.
In On the Republic, Cicero argues that the Roman constitution, mixing monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, was the
ideal constitution, and he famously defined the republic (res
publica) as the res populi, or affair of the people bound by right
and advantage; its defense against corruption lay in civic virtue
and leadership. In On the Laws, Cicero describes the laws of his
ideal republic, articulating a conception of natural law rooted
in human and divine reason. In On Duties, Cicero discusses
the three problems of ethics: the honorable, the expedient, and
conflicts between the two. Cicero argues that the truly honorable is expedient; hence, there is no conflict between the two.
Cicero greatly influenced subsequent thought. Augustine of
Hippo (354430 CE) claimed that Ciceros Hortensius turned
him toward philosophy and referenced On the Republic in City
Citizen Knowledge
Political knowledge is the factual informationand the skills
for interpreting itneeded to act as an effective member of
the polis or political community. From Plato to John Stuart
Mill, political theorists have viewed political knowledge as
a precondition for exercising citizenshipfor taking part
in community decision making. Since modern democracies
extend citizenship to all adults, there is an expectation that
they possess the necessary information and skills. Minimally,
for representative democracy to function properly, those
entitled to select representatives (i.e., voters in elections) need
to have sufficient information and skill to evaluate leaders
performance, to compare parties commitments against their
own preferences, and to weigh the credibility of the commitments in light of their record in government.
TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Fulfilling the underlying principle of democracy, political
equality thus becomes more than the right to vote and take
part in politics; political equality requires being able to exercise the right knowledgeably. Traditionally, democratic theory
has been concerned mainly with the effects of the distribution of power on political equality: knowledge focused on
the manipulation of information by elites. As a result, political
institutions and state policies are critically analyzed in terms of
whether and how they block or distortrather than foster
the dissemination of political knowledge. Concern with such
dissemination was limited to policies and institutions involved
226 Citizenship
generally poorer, will give answers they think are expected
of them, and unrepresentative, since they are more likely not
to answer.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Althaus, Scott. Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Bartels, Larry. Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential
Elections. American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (February 1996):
194230.
Converse, Philip. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In David Apter
ed., Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press, 1964.
Delli Carpini, Michael, and Scott Keeter. What Americans Know about Politics
and Why It Matters. New Haven:Yale University Press, 1996.
Downs, Anthony J. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper, 1957.
Fishkin, James. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New
Haven:Yale University Press, 1995.
Lijphart, Arend. Unequal Participation: Democracys Unresolved Dilemma.
American Political Science Review 91, no. 1 (1997): 114.
Mill, John Stuart. Representative Government. London: Dent and Sons, 1910.
Milner, Henry. Civic Literacy: How Informed Citizens Make Democracy Work.
Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2002.
Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock. Reasoning and
Choice. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Zaller, John. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge,
1992.
Citizenship
Defining citizenship has preoccupied social scientists for millennia. It is clear that the first thing that must be sought is the
citizen, wrote Aristotle, for the city is a certain multitude of
citizens. Thus what ought to be called a citizen and what the
citizen is must be investigated (Aristotle, 3:1). Like the polis
of Aristotles time, a modern state is a collection of citizens,
defining citizenship requires investigation, and it is not always
easy to determine what or who ought to be called a citizen.
According to more recent commentary, there is no notion
more central in politics than citizenship, and none more variable in history, or contested in theory (Shklar, 1).
DEFINITION
In its most fundamental sense, citizenship refers to membership within a political community. Today, this membership is
most often expressed as a relationship between an individual
and a sovereign state; for example, an individual can be a citizen of Canada or Brazil, but not a citizen within a company
or private organization. Symbols such as a passport, or other
identification documents issued by relevant state authorities,
often represent citizenship as a form of state membership.
Most people acquire citizenship in a particular state, at birth
through the operation of nationality law.This means individuals are either commonly granted the nationality of the state in
which they are born or granted citizenship based upon their
father or mothers nationality. In the instance of individuals
who do not acquire citizenship of the state in which they
were physically born, such as immigrants, these persons may
eventually acquire this states citizenship through a process of
naturalization, in which they are often required to have spent
a minimum time period in the state, take an oath of allegiance,
and potentially renounce a previously held foreign citizenship
through denaturalization. Thus, the term citizenship, by these
definitions, is a legal relationship between an individual and a
political community (i.e., a state).
Citizenship 227
A related meaning of citizenship, going beyond the strictly
legal relationship between an individual and a sovereign state,
refers to the rights and duties that accompany a persons membership in a political community.This second meaning focuses
on the political obligations of the citizen, since it refers to the
individual not only obeying the states law but also participating in the political process. For Aristotle, citizenship meant
not only being ruled but also sharing in the rulinga notion
denouncing the proponents of absolute monarchy. For centuries, there have been debates about the distinction between
citizens and subjects. Today the term citizenship is generally
accepted in this political sense as restricted to individuals who
are citizens of democratic regimes, in which they are considered to be active participants in their own states political
process. Essentially, while a person may be a legal citizen in a
nondemocratic state retaining the proper passport proclaiming
such legal citizenship, these citizens do not typically have the
degree of influence or powers to exact political change within
their states as practiced in democracies.
Theoretical work on defining citizenship is varied and
voluminous; however, many authors distinguish between two
strands captured under the terms republican, which is occasionally conflated with communitarian, and liberal. The republican
concept of citizenship embraces Aristotles views on political
participation and civic self-rule. Italian Renaissance political philosopher Niccol Machiavellis description of Italian
city-states encouraging national unity and open political
engagement and debate, as well as 18th-century philosopher
Jean-Jacques Rousseaus advocacy of the publics collective
will to provide for the common good, also fall under the
republican concept. By contrast, the liberal view of citizenship
emphasizes an individuals adherence to the states rule of law
and the individuals liberty from state interference, thus a status
rather than an activity.
Both versions are subject to the criticism that the distinction between public and private citizenship is artificial. They
also fall prey to a multicultural critique that promotes differential rights for immigrants, minorities, or constituent nations;
the possibility of group rights inherent in aboriginal selfgovernment also arises. Such critiques question the extent to
which citizenship, albeit a unitary status or a shared engagement, can operate within pluralist societies in which there is
no singular entity with the ability to solely dictate the political
or socioeconomic climate.
However, during the next fifteen years, millions of individuals, not only in Germany but throughout Europe, were
stripped of their citizenship as consequence of World War II
(19391945). Due to the postwar large-scale European dena
turalizations, the United Nations agreed, in the aftermath of
the war, to limit sovereignty by specifying, in Article 15 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that everyone
is entitled to a citizenship and citizens cannot be arbitrarily
deprived of their citizenship or denied the right to change it.
Within such broad parameters of international law, however,
individual state policies on the attribution of citizenship continue to differ substantially. All states employ some combination of jus sanguinis (attribution on the basis of descent) and
jus soli (attribution on the basis of place of birth), but some are
more restrictive while others more liberal. States frequently
revise their laws and policies concerning such issues as dual
nationality, immigration, and naturalization, all of which help
determine who can acquire citizenship and who cannot.
Alongside varying policies on citizenship itself, the individual rights that comprise citizenship also change as state
policies change. Thus, the meaning of the social rights tied to
citizenship shifted in many states during the 1980s, away from
concrete redistributive entitlements toward a simple emphasis on social inclusion and equal opportunity. Such changes
altered the long-held perception that a states duty was to
provide basic economic entitlements to its citizens. Additionally, if shared citizenship implies an obligation to redistribute
resources to fellow citizens, then the term citizenship is continuously transformed as the nature of welfare entitlements
evolves.
EXAMINING THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
228 Citizenship
their community, regardless if they possess the political rights
associated with citizenship.
However, contemporary developments in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century have, at times, contradicted
this postnational thesis, at least in terms of social rights, as some
states have restricted social rights to noncitizens and legal citizenspossibly as a means to limit transnational migration or
reduce state expenditure and costs. Some states have excluded
noncitizens from automatic access to education, nonemergency health care, or social benefit funding. Since the midtwentieth and into the twenty-first century, certain states
within the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa are significantly
and frequently affected by cross-border refugee flows and
internally displaced persons seeking to evade ongoing armed
conflicts, ethnic violence, and insurgencies devastating their
home states. Rising global refugee rates challenge host governments to abide by international standards but limit natural
citizen rights. This challenge is heightened in many developing nations that cannot accommodate incoming immigrants
or refugees with social rights, especially since most developing
countries continue to struggle with supplying the basic, social,
and political rights for their own legal citizen population.
Conversely, even legal citizens have lost some of their perceived or promised rights associated with their states definition of citizenship or the international communitys list of
unalienable rights. Many state governments have privatized
major institutions, adopting market fundamentalism, or an
absolute reliance on a free market economy; this can interfere
with a citizens promise of equal and effective rights, as many
persons cannot financially compete with private sector costs
for health care or education. As such, while basic civil rights
may still be protected for individuals, it appears more common for citizens of a wealthy or powerful state to fare better
in retaining their social rights than those citizens residing in a
poor or weak state. Indeed, citizenship of a wealthy and powerful state can be viewed as a valuable commodity.
Common to both Marshalls definition of citizenship and
its postnational critiques is the premise that citizenship is a
collection of rights. By these interpretations, citizenship is
undeniably being challenged by the unbundling of rights
accelerated by the processes of globalization. Individuals can
increasingly choose services from different governments or
pursue alternatives, rather than be constrained to accept government dictates in the regions where they have citizenship or
reside. In the end, the tension between the universalist claims
of human rights and the particularism of local identities and
affiliations may be irreconcilable:The operation of every political community, short of a global one, involves processes of
inclusion but also of exclusion.
DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES OF
CITIZENSHIP
In terms of citizen attribution rules and the rights associated with citizenship, the historical trajectories of citizenship among different states demonstrate significant variances.
Such variation reflects the differences in historical processes of
Citizenship 229
amendments impact. As the federal government abdicated its
responsibility to protect rights, the Fourteenth Amendments
implementation and oversight reverted to the individual states.
Racial policy, in particular, continued to be determined by
separate states rather than the federal government. It was not
until the 1920s that the Supreme Court reversed its restrictive
doctrine and extended the range of citizenship rights for a
wide range of civil rights and libertiesextensions prompted
by social struggles for inclusion in the right to vote and right
to employment.
Presently, citizenship questions and struggles for specific
rights remain throughout the United States. Many social
movements, including those pushing for equality on the basis
of sexual orientation, continue to frame demands referencing the laws and definitions surrounding the term citizenship.
Other inconsistencies include Puerto Rico since most Puerto
Rican residents are U.S. citizens, but do not have full political rights, and nor do residents of Washington D.C. or several
other U.S. territories. Comparable anomalies exist worldwide,
highlighting the difficult nature of citizenship as a reflection of
sovereignty. At the same time, the United States, like other federations, faces continuing tension between the ideal of equal
citizenship and the reality of differential rights and privileges
(e.g., lower tuition fees for local residents, or waiting times for
access to health care or other benefits for citizens moving from
another jurisdiction) accruing to members of its constituent
jurisdictions.
CASE STUDY: EU CITIZENSHIP
The most dramatic development in the evolution of citizenship in postwar Europe has been the creation and growth of
supranational rights captured under the concept of European Union (EU) citizenship. Citizens of EUs twenty-seven
member states now hold EU citizenship as well as their own
member states national citizenship. Member states may no
longer discriminate between their own citizens and those of
other EU member states, who have acquired wide-ranging
civic, political, and social rights throughout the territory of
the European Union. Though treaties specify EU citizenship
will not replace national citizenship, the European Court of
Justice, in a series of judgments, has ruled, Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of Member
States.
In contrast to U.S. citizenship, or indeed the citizenship
of most contemporary states, the rise of EU citizenship is far
more recent, motivated by economic integration coupled with
a commitment to building a supranational political community.
Proponents of further European integration actively promote
the concept of an EU citizenship that supersedes member state
nationality.Whereas member state citizenship remains primary
in the European Union, in federal states such as the United
States, state or provincial citizenship long ago ceased to dominate. The meaning of citizenship is far from uniform across
Europe, however. Within national contexts, various views of
citizenship and political community were important in developing the specific forms that national citizenship takes when
230 City-republic
individuals have gained access to various forms of mobility. In
addition to the borderless movements of capital, goods, and
ideas, people too move around to a much greater extent and
with greater ease than was generally true in the past. Large
groups of expatriate communities have been established, and
members participate in the politics of their country of residence while at the same time sustaining connections to their
country of origin. Such individuals maintain ties with more
than one political community, and in many cases have access
to dual citizenship, with full legal recognition as members of
more than one political community.
In a world in which transnational moral and political obligations gain in importance and individuals claim membership
and participate in multiple political communities, the view
that territorially bounded sovereign states are the only source
of civil society may become untenable. By its very nature,
migration upsets the balance between insiders and outsiders,
as newcomers seek to enter the political community. Despite
universal or cosmopolitan hopes for a global citizenship, presently, achieving the legal status of citizen of the state remains
important for immigrants, because only then do they enjoy
full access to rights. More broadly, despite aspirations on the
part of some for nation-states to wither away, it appears likely
that for the foreseeable future the nation-state will remain the
primary locus of citizenship.
See also Citizen Knowledge; Dual Citizenship and Dual
Nationality; Immigration Policy; Migration; Naturalization.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WILLEM MAAS
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Aristotle. The Politics, translated by C. Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984.
Benhabib, Seyla. The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Elkins, David J. Beyond Sovereignty:Territory and Political Economy
in the Twenty-first Century. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press. 1995.
Jacobson, David. Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of
Citizenship. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Kettner, James H. The Development of American Citizenship, 16081870. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978.
Kymlicka, Will, and Wayne Norman. Return of the Citizen: A Survey of
Recent Work on Citizenship Theory. Ethics 104 (1994): 352381.
Maas, Willem. Creating European Citizens. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield,
2007.
Marshall, T. H. Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1950.
Shklar, Judith N. American Citizenship:The Quest for Inclusion. Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991.
Smith, Rogers M. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S.
History. New Haven:Yale University Press, 1997.
Somers, Margaret R. Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the
Right to Have Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Soysal,Yasemin Nuhoglu. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational
Membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994.
Tilly, Charles. 1995. Citizenship, Identity, and Social History. International
Review of Social History 40, no. 3 (1995): 117.
van Gunsteren, Herman. A Theory of Citizenship: Organizing Plurality in
Contemporary Democracies. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998.
City-republic
The city, from which the notion of citizenship derives, is the
most basic form of political community. In ancient, medieval, and early modern times, an array of self-governing cityrepublics existed where the vote of a broad electorate made
many collective decisions. Most city-republics shared the
following defining characteristics: small size in terms of both
territory and population; relatively high degrees of internal
harmony, as defined by the economic and ethnic characteristics of the members; and simple and soft forms of government based on the ease with which citizens could form a
social majority supporting collective, enforceable decisions.
The better-known cases can be found in Mesopotamia, the
poleis of Greece, the German and Swiss territories, as well as a
number of medieval Italian communes that have existed since
the late Middle Ages.
The typical medieval city was formed by private associations of households organized to provide public goods such as
the maintenance of a food supply, the administration of justice,
and military defense. Local autonomy was a Roman tradition
in some southern European towns, but it was also created by
the privileges given to certain communes by their lords.
Procedures like these aimed to promote the rotation of rulers, making manipulative strategies unviable and disallowing
the concentration of power into a single group. However, in
some cities, the association between popular participation in
increasingly complex communities and rising instability was
inescapable. Elections, factions or parties, and institutional
stability became a difficult combination. Factionalism, family
feuds, and class conflicts weakened republican self-government, as appropriate rules for consensus making were lacking.
Northern Italian cities, deprived of protection by the fading
Italian Empire, entered into frequent conflicts among themselves and with more powerful neighbors, including the duchy
of Milan, and the papacy and kingdom of Naples. In most
late medieval and early modern cities, the republican form of
government was replaced with authoritarian, aristocratic rules,
which eventually became supports for building new large and
centralized states.
See also Citizenship; Greek Democracy, Classical.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOSEP M. COLOMER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Babeau, Albert. Le village sous lAncien Rgime. Paris: Didier, 1882.
Brucker, Gene A. Renaissance Florence. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983.
Colomer, Josep M. Great Empires, Small Nations:The Uncertain Future of the
Sovereign State. London: Routledge, 2007.
Fazy, Henri. Les constitutions de la Rpublique de Genve: tude historique. Paris:
Librairie Fischbacher, 1890.
Finlay, Robert. Politics in Renaissance Venice. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press, 1980.
Fralin, Richard. Rousseau and Representation: A Study of the Development of
His Concept of Political Institutions. New York: Columbia Unversity Press,
1978.
Guidi, Guidubaldo. Il governo della cit-repubblica di Firenze del primo
Quattrocento, 3 vols. Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1981.
Lines, Marji. Approval Voting and Strategy Analysis: A Venetian Example.
Theory and Decision 20 (1986): 155172.
Tilly, Charles, and Wim P. Blockmans, eds. Cities and the Rise of States in
Europe, AD 1000 to 1800. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
Waley, Daniel. The Italian City-Republics. New York: Longman, 1988.
Civic Education
Civic education aims to promote and shape civic engagement
by developing citizens competencies (e.g., attitudes, skills, and
knowledge) needed for participation in community, government, and politics.
Civic Engagement
Civic engagement, as a concept, combines diverse forms of
involvement, ranging from political to leisure activities, under
one notion. The concept stresses activity oriented toward or
originating from society. It emerged in the 1990s when it
was used to refer to involvement in public affairs that creates
network relations among citizens. Yet, despite its increased
application, it lacks conceptual clarity. A narrow definition
equates civic engagement with political participation. As a
distinct concept, however, it is more useful when it more
broadly refers to voluntary, public activities that are oriented
toward society and carried out without the intention of profit.
In the Middle Ages, the notion of engagement referred to
an oral commitment to a contract. Later, it was used when
contracting artists, waging war, and purchasing stocks. In social
sciences, it emerged in the context of the civil society discourse
with the prefix civic indicating a commitment to public,
nonviolent, self-organized, discursive, and pluralistic activities.
RESEARCH AGENDA
Research typically focuses on the positive effects of civic
engagement. Robert D. Putnam refers to networks of civic
engagement as sources of social capital that promote good
governance and economic development. Other possible outcomes are the production of social services and, as a by-product, the promotion of social integration. More sociologically
oriented streams of research try to understand the occurrence of civic engagement and use surveys and register data
to explain individual motives and societal structures. Policy
research deals with infrastructures and policy measures that
advance civic engagement.
PROBLEMS
The lack of conceptual clarity leads to problems with measurement and comparability. There is no conceptual study that
Civic Humanism
Civic humanism is a political and philosophical orientation
emphasizing the value and importance of the practical and
moral virtues that may be inculcated in and passed along by
citizens through their active participation in the political life
of their polity. Its central aim is to defend and promote the
qualities believed as necessary for communities to effectively,
responsibly, and independently govern themselves; those
qualities include the virtues of patience, tolerance, patriotism,
self-sacrifice, duty, a commitment to the law, and forgiveness.
MODERN INTERPRETATIONS
Those who advocate civic humanism today most often to do
so in conjunction with a push for educational as opposed to
political reforms, thus grounding the orientation more firmly
in its purported origin in the classic learning of the Renaissance. (Classical republicanism, by contrast, is usually, when
the two terms are distinguished at least, more explicitly used
as a tool of political critique.) The civic humanist argument
generally asserts that human flourishing and happiness are
most likely to be realized through autonomous (though not
Civic Virtue
See Virtue Theory.
Civil Disobedience
Civil disobedience involves a conscientious, nonviolent, and
public violation of law or government policy with the intent
of affecting social change. Since acts of civil obedience involve
nonviolence and publicness, they are distinguished from illegal
acts, and therefore, easier to defend. The motivation for civil
disobedience is conscientious, as opposed to considerations
that are merely pragmatic or prudential. The decision to participate in such an act is typically for the benefit of society,
such as causing attention or interest to be directed toward
injustice, which thereby stimulates moral consciousness and
initiates the vigorous activity of social change.
The concept of civil disobedience traces to antiquity.
Socrates chose death rather than cease pursing truth and wisdom. Addressing his countrymen, he declared, I shall obey
God rather than you. Even the Bible provides lucid examples for civil disobedience. The Hebrew midwives refused
the command of Pharaoh to violate the sanctity of life (Exod
1:1522). Although the authority of a government may be vast,
a Christian understanding of human authority is that none is
absolute. Romans (13:112) teaches that the legal ordinances
and statutes of the state must be obeyed because God ordains
the powers. However, it would appear that Paul was referring
to legitimate governments and just laws. There are illegitimate
governments and unjust laws so that obedience to corrupt or
immoral practices is not an option. Obedience to the law of
God may require participation in civil disobedience, and those
who engage in such acts must be willing to accept the consequences of disobedience from the authority of the state.
Although there are ancient and biblical examples of civil
disobedience, the first modern exposition of such obligations is
written by Henry David Thoreau in his famous essay of 1849,
Resistance to Civil Government. Thoreau refused to pay his
poll tax as a protest against slavery and the United StatesMexico War (1848). He compared government to a machine and
the problems of government to friction. When injustice is the
major characteristic of government and people are forced to
follow injustice, thereby becoming the agent of injustice, then
principled people must let their life be a counter friction to
stop the machine. Thoreaus act of civil disobedience was not
the first in nineteenth-century America. During the years 1829
to 1839, missionaries to the Cherokee Indians were confronted
Civilizations, Clash of
See Clash of Civilizations.
Civil Law
There are two primary meanings for the term civil law. The
first definition refers to that branch of law within the legal
systems of common-law states such as the United States,
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which centers
on the noncriminal fields of law. Civil-law cases address disputes between individuals, rather than disputes involving the
state. Examples of civil law in this context include torts, wills,
property disputes, and contract disputes. The second meaning
attributed to civil law, and the focus here, is as a legal tradition
within the field of comparative law. Civil law in this instance
describes the dominant legal family in the worldone historically tied to the Roman and Canon law, built on Enlightenment principlesthat relies on written law and codification
rather than judicial decision as its primary form of law.
There are more countries with civil-law systems around
the world than any other system. France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
and most of the countries of Western Europe maintain civillaw systems. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and most of the countries of South America also maintain civil-law systems. There
are also many states that have adopted civil-law systems and
mixed them with other legal traditions. These include Turkey,
Egypt, Morocco,Tunisia, the states of French West Africa, Russia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The widespread adoption of civil
law as the legal tradition is largely the result of the civil laws
unique characteristics, including its extensive, written form;
minimal reliance on judge-made law; and ties to Roman and
Canon law, which facilitated its early prevalence. Unlike the
common law, which can be difficult to disseminate due to
its reliance on judge-made law, empires and colonizers from
Europe easily spread the civil-law tradition around the world.
The written form of the civil-law tradition makes it much
more portable and much more adaptable to different countries
and different cultures. Today, it is estimated that approximately
154 states maintain, either in whole or in part, elements of the
civil-law tradition (as opposed to 96 states with elements of
the common-law tradition and 36 states with elements of the
Islamic-law tradition).
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
The civil-law tradition dates to the time of the Roman
Empire and the Corpus Juris Civilis, and has three main
periods of influence: Roman law, Canon law, and the jus commune. Compiled by the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century
CE, the Corpus Juris Civilis was a comprehensive compilation of Roman law into a single, codified written form. This
is the foundation from which the core of the civil-law traditionwritten law and codificationoriginated. After the
disintegration of the Roman Empire, much of Europe entered
into the Dark Agesa period in which legal systems were
largely absent and law was predominantly customary. The rise
to power of the Catholic Church, however, kept the Roman
writings on law alive and scholars such as Augustine and Aquinas even added to these laws, updating and refining the legal
rules, while at the same time incorporating elements of morality and a communal purpose into the largely secular Roman
laws. Seeking to impose more significant order to facilitate the
rise in commercial transactions as the Middle Ages ended, the
University of Bologna, in the eleventh century, began to revive
the study of law. A group of scholars, known as the glossators,
began to lecture on Justinians codes, and more significantly,
they began to recodify the law in a manner which made it
applicable to Renaissance Europe. The new law was called the
jus commune because it was to be a law that was common to
all of Europe. This was possible because scholars from all over
Europe came to study law at Bologna, and when they left they
took the jus commune with them, incorporating it into their
own legal systems.
Modern civil-law systems maintain significant ties to this
historical development, and many states legal systems are even
further linked as a result of one of Napoleons primary accomplishments, which was to consolidate French laws into a number of comprehensive codes. Known as the Napoleonic codes,
the foremost of these was the Napoleonic civil code, which
addresses issues of personal status and property. Napoleon also
directed the creation of a penal code, a code of civil procedure,
a commercial code, and a code of criminal procedure.The goal
of these codes, which codified all existing laws and legal customs, was to ensure the clarity of the law for all French citizens.
As the foundation of the civil-law tradition, codes are
designed to be all-encompassing, providing not just a list of
legal obligations, rights, punishments, and remedies, but also an
overall guide for people on how to conduct their daily lives.
Civil-military Relations
Civil-military relations concern the interaction of the military and the state or, more broadly, between armed forces and
society. The relationship between civil authority and the military has evolved along with the nature of states, societies, war,
and the military profession, but the basic dilemma remains the
same: ensuring protection by and from the armed forces.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Avant, Deborah D. The Market for Force:The Consequences of Privatizing
Security. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Caforio, Guisepe, ed. The Sociology of the Military. Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar, 1998.
Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in
Wartime. New York: Free Press, 2002.
Feaver, Peter D. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-military Relations.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Feaver, Peter D., and Richard Kohn, eds. Soldiers and Civilians:The Civil-military
Gap and American National Security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001.
Huntigton, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State:The Theory and Politics of Civilmilitary Relations. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1957.
Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. New
York: Free Press, 1960.
Lasswell, Harold. National Security and Individual Freedom. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1950.
Civil Religion
Civil religion has been a political and theological problem
of enduring concern across the centuries and has become a
topic of renewed interest among social scientists in the last
fifty years.
There is a rich heritage of philosophical, theological, and
political reflection on the problem that extends at least as far
back as Platos Laws. There are at least two prominent views
of civil religion that characterize this heritage. According to
one view, civil religion is a civic ethos that recognizes and
cultivates beliefs supporting a societys moral-political commitments. This version of civil religion employs the force
of religious symbols, images, and language to garner political strength. This view of civil religion is manifested in some
works of Plato, Baruch Spinoza, Francis Bacon, John Locke,
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Another view of civil religion presents it as a civic ethos that
is driven by more explicitly theological beliefs, though it gains
power by political means and maintains itself through political
forms. This version of civil religion arises from an overlapping
theological consensus within a society and promotes a wider
recognition of its bond with God and his providence, typically
appealing to the language of national destiny and sacred purpose.
Some features of this view occur in certain ancient Roman and
medieval thinkers, while its other features manifest variously in
later figures such as Niccol Machiavelli, Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel, and certain American Puritan writers.
The past fifty years have seen numerous scholarly studies
on civil religion. Sociologists, historians, religious studies scholars, theologians, and political scientists have conducted most
of this work. Scholars have sought to define and explain the
phenomena of civil religion according to the contours of these
respective disciplines. For example, Robert Bellah has been one
of the most influential analysts and has invited a very welcome
reconsideration of civil religion as a phenomenon, especially in
its American historical and cultural context. One characteristic
feature of his work as a sociologist has been his attention to
the complexities and internal logic of religious and political
associations across the political and religious spectrum. Bellahs
supporters and critics alike recognize how well he classifies and
Civil Service
Civil service systems are composed of individuals who attain
their positions by virtue of their performance on competitive
examinations or by holding of specific qualifications such as
a bachelors degree. In contrast to elected officials who are
expected to be policy advocates, civil servants are expected
to embody expertise and neutral competence. Typical citizens
rarely come into direct contact with their elected officials
one reason for this is the often brief tenure of these officials.
In contrast, typical citizens have a good chance of frequently
personally encountering the multitudes of civil servants who
carry out government policies. Civil servants are present at
the national, state, and local levels and may hold their positions for long periods of time. While the size of the U.S. civil
service has been stable for the past fifty years, and has declined
as a percentage of the total U.S. workforce, the growth of state
and local civil service workforces has been steady.
Government service was originally understood to be the
domain of the educated gentry. Then in 1829, with the age
of President Andrew Jackson, as the U.S. government vastly
expanded and political parties took their largely present-day
composition, the spoils system flourished. In such a system, the
supporters of the winning political party receive government
jobs or other material rewards such as government contracts.
Anyone could do a government job, so the reasoning went,
and the United States should have a representative bureaucracy that mirrors the people it serves. Many a U.S. president
has lamented the performance of individuals whom he put
in office. Harlan Hahn wrote, Several years after he left the
presidency, William Howard Taft endorsed the familiar political maxim that the distribution of patronage often breeds one
ingrate and ten enemies (368).
The term civil service itself came into common usage in
the United States following the assassination of President James
Garfield by Charles Guiteau. Guiteau, a Stalwart Republican,
was seeking a government post in Paris, and he believed that
if he killed Garfield, a Mugwump Republican, Chester Arthur
(Garfields successor and a fellow Stalwart) would appoint
Guiteau to his desired position. Instead, Guiteau was executed
for his offense, and the spoils system was condemned with the
cry, Spoils equals murder. President Chester Arthur signed
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, which was authored by
U.S. senator George H. Pendleton (D-Ohio). Three months
later, Democratic governor Grover Cleveland of New York
signed into law a bill authored by Republican representative
Theodore Roosevelt, which established the first state civil service system. Roosevelt would go on to serve as a U.S. civil service commissioner from 1889 to 1895, his tenure overlapping
with the second administration of President Grover Cleveland.
The enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883,
also known as the Pendleton Act, meant that loyalty to particular politicians or political parties would no longer be a
prerequisite for government employment. The act prohibited mandatory campaign contributions and outlawed campaign and political party assessments of U.S. government
employees. It established the bipartisan, three-member Civil
Hahn, Harlan. 1966. President Taft and the Discipline of Patronage. Journal
of Politics 20, no. 2 (1966): 368390.
Rosenbloom, David H., Robert S. Kravchuk, and Richard M. Clerkin. Public
Administration: Understanding Management, Politics, and Law in the Public
Sector, 7th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2009.
Taft, William Howard. Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1925.
Theriault, Sean M. Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the Power of the
People. Journal of Politics 65, no. 1 (2003): 5068.
U.S. Office of Personnel Management. Biography of an Ideal: A History of the
Federal Civil Service. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
2003.
Civil Society
Having been dormant as a social science concept for most of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the term civil society
emerged in the 1990s as almost as fashionable a buzzword as
globalization. Yet there is nothing even resembling a commonly
agreed definition of the concept. Scholars at the Centre for
Civil Society, London School of Economics reflect some of
these ambiguities in a cautiously worded initial working
definition. They define civil society as
the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared
interests, purposes and values, but then go on to make
a distinction between its theoretical separation from
state, family and market and the blurred and negotiated
boundaries between these spheres in practice. (Centre
for Civil Society)
A nonexhaustive list of the sort of actors who populate this
sphere may be a less contested way to describe the concept than
a theoretical definition: Civil society is generally agreed to
comprise nongovernmental organizations, community groups,
faith-based institutions, professional associations, trade unions,
self-help groups, social movements, academics, and activists.
Following the genealogy of the concept of civil society and
its recent resurgence, a problematic conceptualization of the
civility of civil society emerged; civil society also relates to
democracy and democratization and to capitalism, with modern the debates relating to the existence and nature of a global
civil society.
rules, respect for others, or willingness to compromise as elements of civil society. A majority of the literature takes the
opposite view, however, insisting on an empirical definition of
civil society that includes uncivil society as a tendency within
it. Kopecky and Mudde, in their 2003 work, Uncivil Society?
Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe, give the most
extensive attention to this issue, adducing no less than five
interrelated arguments for eschewing the exclusion of uncivil
society from civil society. In summary,
1. To some extent, all civil society manifestations are
exclusivist in that they claim the moral high ground for
their own position in opposition to all others.
2. Civility towards the uncivil has historically been limited and hypocritical.
3. Adherence to liberal democratic goals does not necessarily equate with internal democracy, or vice versa. Uncivil
movements may have civil outcomes and vice versa.
4. Adherence to legal or even societal norms is far from
desirable in nondemocratic societies and proscribes
challenges to the status quo even in democratic ones.
5. Finally, narrow conceptions of civil society screen off
potentially vital ingredients of associational life and
democratic politics. Inclusion is therefore necessary to
progress in empirical knowledge.
network and link up across borders has exploded. But this is not
just an empirical shift. In stark contrast to the Enlightenment
concept, the discourses and identities of civil society actors have
become more transnational and even global. Human rights
defenders used a legal universalist frame to combat national
injustices, peace groups challenged national security policies
with concepts of solidarity across conflict divides, and environmentalists initiated talk of one world and global solutions.
More recently, normative cosmopolitan concepts of global civil
society have been opposed to ethnic nationalism and religious
fundamentalism, as well as a counterforce against predatory globalization. At the same time, some of the most common forms
of uncivil society in the twenty-first century may be based on
what Manuel Castells has called a resistance identity, based
solely on being against various (perceived) aspects of globalization rather than on a positive project for society.
See also Colonialism; Democracy and Democratization; Globalization; Gramsci, Antonio; Hegel, Georg W. F.; Kant, Immanuel;
Latin American Politics and Society; Locke, John; Marx, Karl;
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Rousseau, Jean-Jacques;
Soviet Union, Former;Tocqueville, Alexis de.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARLIES GLASIUS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abdel Rahman, Maha. The Politics of Uncivil Society in Egypt. Review of
African Political Economy 29 (June 2002): 2136.
Avritzer, Leonardo. Civil Society in Latin America: Uncivil, Liberal,
and Participatory Models. In Exploring Civil Society: Political and
Cultural Contexts, edited by Marlies Glasius, David Lewis, and Hakan
Seckinelgin, 5360. London: Routledge, 2004.
Baker, Gideon. Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices. London:
Routledge, 2002.
Berman, Sheri. Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic.
World Politics 49 (April 1997): 401429.
Centre for Civil Society. What is Civil Society? The London School of
Economics and Political Science. www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/
introduction/what_is_civil_society.htm.
Cohen, Jean L., and Andrew Arato. Civil Society and Political Theory.
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992.
Comaroff, John L., and Jean Comaroff. Civil Society and the Political
Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1999.
Fatton, Robert. Africa in the Age of Democratization: The Civic Limitations
of Civil Society. African Studies Review 38 (September 1995): 6799.
Howell, Jude, and Jenny Pearce. Civil Society and Development: A Critical
Exploration. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
Kaldor, Mary. Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Cambridge: Polity Press,
2003.
Kaldor, Mary, and Diego Muro. Religious and Nationalist Militant Groups.
In Global Civil Society 2003, edited by Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier, and
Marlies Glasius, 151184. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Keck, Margaret E., and Sikkink, Kathryn. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Kopecky , Petr, and Cas Mudde, eds. Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in
Post-Communist Europe. London: Routledge, 2003.
Lipschutz, Ronnie. Power, Politics and Global Civil Society. Millennium 33
(June 2005): 747769.
Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Seligman, Adam. The Idea of Civil Society. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995.
Civil Wars
In the debate over defining civil wars, factors taken into
account include the territory where the conflict occurs, the
parties involved, and the casualty rates. According to James D.
Fearon, a civil war is a violent conflict within a country fought
by organized groups aiming to take power at the center or
in a region, or to change government policies. According to
Fearon, if the threshold for a conflict to be labeled a civil war is
at least one thousand killed during the fighting, approximately
125 civil wars had occurred by 2007 since the end of World
War II (19391945). Scholars such as Nicolas Sambanis identify
other criteria. This can make it difficult to examine why such
conflicts occur, and to identify the best resolution methods and
hopefully prevent them. It can also cause controversy over the
legitimacy of international intervention.
Clash of Civilizations
The Clash of Civilizations (1993) is the well-known work
of Samuel P. Huntington, the late Harvard professor of political science, who argued that the primary cause of violent
and nonviolent conflicts in the postcold war period will be
civilizational differences.
assumed different forms at different epochs, then class conflict in a capitalist society emerges in several ways. First, Marx
asserts that the state serves class interests. The job of the state is
to enforce bourgeois authority. Workers battle the bourgeoisie
for state control. Second, the battle between workers and the
owners of the means of production replicates Hegels masterslave dialectic, with capitalism producing the seeds of its own
destruction (i.e., proletarian class consciousness).
In Marxs view, the bourgeoisie seek profit maximization
by purchasing the labor power of workers, extracting the surplus value from them for their profits. For Marx, surplus value
is the difference between the value the bourgeoisie pay the
workers for their labor power and what it is really worth. The
competitive drive for profits forces owners constantly to revolutionize the modes of production. Capitalists replace workers
with machines and other laborsaving devices. But as capitalism matures, the drive for profit accelerates, and there is a need
to replace organic or human capital with machines. This process results in an increasing loss of jobs, producing increased
misery and poverty among workers. The decline in the use of
human labor power also leads to a falling rate of profit because
surplus value cannot be extracted from machines in the same
way it can be from workers. To offset declining profits, even
more machines must be employed.
According to Marx, the displacement and resulting misery of workers encourages the demise of capitalism. It forces
ownership into fewer and fewer hands, thereby negating the
concept of private property. The development of monopolies
undermines market competition. Finally, the struggle with the
proletariat will cause the workers, who have developed consciousness of their class, to organize as a party. At some point,
the proletariat, with the Communist Party to lead them, will
develop the revolutionary self-awareness as a class and use their
political power to take political power from the bourgeoisie.
This final battle between the workers and owners results in a
victory for the former, with socialism and eventually communism structuring the new, classless society.
Class struggle is the heart of a Marxist analysis of political society. In Marxs works, the economic struggle between
workers and the owners of the means of production seems
to produce the requisite class consciousness for revolution,
but while Marx believed consciousness would emerge out of
struggles and the changing modes of production, his use of the
concept of class was more a tool of analysis than an iron law
that history would follow. In the political views of Friedrich
Engels, Marxs chief collaborator, there is more determinism as
to how class antagonisms would lead to a revolution. Engels
viewed Marxs claims about class struggles almost as if they
were scientific laws that had to be followed. In his analysis, the
class struggle of capitalism would necessarily produce a communist revolution.
whether parliamentary politics or revolution was the direction of class conflict.Yet among Marxists, Russian Communist
leader Vladimir Lenin is among the most important.
Lenin describes class struggle as a theoretical, political, and
practical economic battle. In What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement, Lenin contends that the
development of class consciousness is not automatic as Marx,
or at least Engels, suggest. Without outside intervention, class
consciousness may never rise beyond a level of trade union
consciousness, and it was the role of party to become the dialectic of change to bring class consciousness to workers. Class
consciousness can be brought to workers only from outside
the economic struggle (economism). In Two Tactics of Social
Democracy, Lenin proposes a role for the Communist Party:
to transform the bourgeois revolution against the tzar into a
proletarian revolution. This involved workers taking over the
battle and changing it into one that first fells the tzar and then
the bourgeoisie. Leon Trotsky, in his Permanent Revolution,
makes similar arguments.
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Abendroth, Wolfgang. A Short History of the European Working Class. New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.
Bernstein, Eduard. Evolutionary Socialism. New York: Schocken Books, 1978.
Bloch, Ernst. Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics. New
German Critique 11 (Spring 1977): 2238.
Dahrendorf, Ralf. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1957.
Durkheim, mile. The Division of Labor in Society, translated by George
Simpson. New York: Free Press, 1964.
Erickson, R., and J. H. Goldthorpe. The Constant Flux. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992.
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci,
Edited by Quintin Hoare and Geffrey Nowell Smith. New York:
International Publishers, 1980.
Harding, Sandra. What Is the Real Material Base of Patriarchy and Capital?
In Women and Revolution, edited by Lydia Sargent, 135163. London:
Pluto Press, 1986.
Hegel, Georg W. F. Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
. Hegels Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967.
Kautsky, Karl. The Class Struggle. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971.
Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy:Toward
a Radical Democratic Politics. New York:Verso, 1985.
Lenin,Vladimir. What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our
Movement. In The Lenin Anthology, edited by Robert C. Tucker, 12114.
New York: W. W. Norton, 1976.
Lukcs, Georg. History and Class Consciousness, translated by Rodney
Livingstone. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968.
Marshall, Gordon. Repositioning Class: Social Inequality in Industrial Societies.
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1997.
Marx, Karl. Communist Manifesto. In The Marx-Engles Reader, edited by
Robert C. Tucker, 473500. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978.
Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. New York: Free Press, 1951.
Poulantzas, Nico. Political Power and Social Classes. New York:Verso, 1978.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The First and Second Discourses, translated by Roger
D. and Judith R. Masters. New York: St. Martins Press, 1964.
Tucker, Robert C. The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978.
Weber, Max. Class, Status, Party. In From Max Weber, translated by H. H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 180195. New York: Oxford University Press,
1979.
Wright, Eric Olin. Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Young, Iris. Beyond the Unhappy Marriage: A Critique of the Dual Systems
Theory. In Women and Revolution, edited by Lydia Sargent, 4369.
London: Pluto Press, 1986.
Clientelism 253
interests of, for example, the salaried white-collar classes or for
those of the industrial middle class.
Clericalism
Clericalism is generally used as a pejorative term to describe
the position of church hierarchy in society and the attitude
of clerics toward the laity. It often denotes undue influence in
worldly affairs on the part of ordained religious functionaries,
but most commonlyespecially in contemporary usage
indicates an overemphasis on the status, privileges, and special
Clientelism
Clientelism is a form of political organization based on
informal dyadic relationships between patrons and clients.
The asymmetric relationship between patrons and clients has
both instrumental and affective dimensions. In instrumental
terms, patrons, typically powerful and wealthy, provide their
relatively weaker and poorer clients with material benefits,
protection, or both in exchange for political loyalty, personal
Clientelistic Parties in
Latin America
Clientelism is a pervasive feature of Latin American politics
and is exhibited in varying degrees by most parties. Douglas
Chalmers notes that clientelistic networks in Latin America
are vertically organized from top to bottom and rely on
the presence of brokers, political operatives who aggregate
demands from their communities and distribute the benefits
provided by the center. Although clientelism has been traditionally associated with face-to-face interactions, these brokers enable clientelistic parties to develop links with a broader
segment of the population without establishing personal
contact. After all, as Herbert Kitschelt argues, these face-toface interactions are only one extreme of the patron-client
relationship continuum; anonymous party machines provide
the other extreme. In both cases, however, communities rich
in votes but poor in resources receive selective material incentives in exchange for their votes. Clientelistic parties, Kitschelt
contends, build multilevel political machines that go from the
top of the political center down to remote municipalities.
These parties do not purse specific political or ideological
agendas (what Kitschelt calls programmatic linkages) but
instead rely on the provision of selective incentives to garner
electoral support.
The best representative of clientelistic parties in Latin
America is Mexicos Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI
(its Spanish initials). Founded in 1928 under a different name,
the PRI became the official party of the revolution and established a one-party rule regime that lasted until 2000. The PRI
successfully combined clientelism with a corporatist mode of
interest representation by incorporating many labor and civil
society organizations into the party, thus turning them into
de facto state organizations. The PRI used its governmental
monopoly to dispense favors to key constituents groups including labor, peasant, and state employee unions. Caciques, local
brokers with strong influence in their communities, became
crucial to the longevity of PRI rule. But caciques were not total
instruments of the party higher-ups as they retained significant
sources of local power. Other examples of parties that built
powerful clientelistic networks based on their access to state
resources include Venezuelas Accin Democrtica, Costa Ricas
Partido Liberacin Nacional, and the Peronist party in Argentina.
Many populist leaders created clientelistic parties as a result
of their efforts to build durable electoral support. Some of these
parties achieved a small degree of organizational consistency
and managed to survive the death of their leaders. In other
cases, the parties had no organizational structure and failed to
outlast their founders. In Brazil, for instance, Getulio Vargas, a
populist leader, created organizations that achieved some life
of their own. In 1945, after leaving office,Vargas founded two
parties (the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro and the Partido Social
Democrtico) that relied largely on the clientelistic networks
he developed during his Estado Novo (19371945) regime. In
Ecuador, by contrast, Jos Mara Velasco Ibarra, populist leader
par excellence, created vast clientelistic networks that supported
his five successful bids for the presidency but failed to create a
party of his own. His followers, known as Velasquistas, worked
in alliance with different parties that offered electoral support
to their leader at different points in time. Also in Ecuador, a
more structured clientelistic party was founded in 1949 by a
local caudillo in the city of Guayaquil under the name of Concentracin de Fuerzas Populares.
The dramatic changes that the region has undergone in
recent decades have weakened but not eliminated clientelism
or clientelistic parties. In the 1990s, neopopulist leaders resorted
to clientelistic practices in an effort to gain political support in
a time of painful economic restructuration. In an ironic twist,
radical market reforms implemented to reduce the role of the
state in the economy then provided governments with the
opportunity to establish state-funded food and job programs
that turned into vast clientelistic operations. In Mexico and
Peru, PRONASOL and FENDECODES, respectively, became
the best-known examples of state clientelism in the neoliberal era, working in close association with the PRI in Mexico
and Alberto Fujimoris electoral vehicles in Peru. The practices
were not clientelistic in all communities, yet, especially when
cash transfers were involved, clearly were clientelistic in some
of them. They were clientelistic to the extent that they provided selective incentives (scholarships, credit, granaries, livestock, and minor consumption goods) to some rather than to
all of the community members. In the Peruvian case, Norbert
Schady shows that clientelistic practices became more prevalent
as opposition to the Fujimori regime mounted. More recently,
Hugo Chvez replicated this model in Venezuela. His social
programs, known as the Misiones, resorted to clientelistic practices aiming to shore up his electoral support as he confronted
a tough recall election in 2004.
The well-documented demise of political parties in the
region has not eliminated clientelism; it has only decentralized
Environment Program (UNEP), and the International Council of Scientific Unions, the conference is seen as a major
turning point in climate change science and policy as it provided international scientific consensus as to the magnitude
of the issue, potential social and economic consequences, and
urged states to take action to develop policy recommendations to mitigate climate change.
A group of scientists emerging from the Villach conference
became active in developing a science and policy network that
was instrumental in organizing the 1988 World Conference
on the Changing Atmosphere in Toronto, sponsored by the
Government of Canada, WMO, and UNEP. The Toronto conference was the first with an explicit political dimension and
a strong conference declaration; this included a proposal that
governments cut the 1988 level of carbon dioxide emissions by
20 percent by 2005, and that eventually emissions would need
to be stabilized at 50 percent of existing levels.
What is notable about these first climate conferences is that
they were by invitation only and were predominantly attended
by scientists. The attendees were not official delegates of their
respective countries and the conference statements, while calls
to action, were neither negotiated nor agreed to by the participants home states, nor were they binding. Nevertheless, the
Toronto recommendations are cited as the basis for Germanys
25 to 30 percent carbon dioxide reduction goal affirmed in
1990, a key factor in generating concern for climate change in
Canada, and triggered congressional action in the Untied States.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE
Recognizing the need for climate change policies and recommendations to go through diplomatic processes, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was formed
through a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution after the Toronto Conference in 1988. Its goals were to
organize scientific information, evaluate risk from climate
change, and consider mitigation strategies to inform treaty
negotiations in establishing a convention on climate change.
Governments had much greater control over the IPCC, as
they selected experts and placed high-ranking foreign ministry officials in key positions.
Subsequent to the release of the first IPCC report, the
Second World Conference on Climate Change was held in
1990. This meeting had both scientific and diplomatic components, with declarations reflecting the two groups positions. The scientific, or technical, declaration was a strong call
for action.While the ministerial declaration advocated action,
it did not set time frames as more formal treaty negotiating process had been scheduled by the time the conference
was held. In December 1990, the UNGA established the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to negotiate the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). The convention was opened for signature at the
Rio United Nations Conference on the Environment and
Development Earth Summit in June 1992, where it received
155 signatures.
COP
LOCATION
OUTCOME
1995
COP1
Berlin
Berlin Mandate established a two-year period to analyze and evaluate a suite of policy instruments from
which member countries could choose initiatives to suit their needs and capabilities.
1996
COP2
Geneva
Parties endorsed the IPCC second assessment, agreed to flexible rather than harmonized solutions, and called
for medium-term targets.
1997
COP3
Kyoto
1998
COP4
Buenos Aires
Talks fell short of addressing unresolved issues from Kyoto Protocol, yet established two-year Buenos Aires
Plan of Action to develop implementation mechanisms.
1999
COP5
Bonn
2000
COP6
The Hague
Negotiations broke down over including areas as carbon sinks and appropriate sanctions. Meeting
reconvened six months later in Bonn.
2001
COP6, resumed
Bonn
Agreement reached in significant areas: (1) carbon sinks including reforestation and cropland management;
(2) sanctions for not attaining carbon reduction goals; (3) flexibility mechanisms, including emissions trading,
joint implementation and clean development mechanisms.
2001
COP7
Marrakech
Marrakech Accords included operational rules for the Kyoto Protocol and set the stage for ratification.
2002
COP8
New Deli
2003
COP9
Milan
2004
COP10
Buenos Aires
2005
COP11/CMP1
Montreal
Kyoto Protocol came into force; first Meeting of the Parties (CMP) follows COP11. Parties to UNFCCC who
had not ratified Kyoto Protocol were given observer status. Montreal Action Plan was developed, focusing on
deeper cuts to emissions and what to do after Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012.
2006
COP12/CMP2
Nairobi
Final technical details of Kyoto Protocol were decided. Progress for post-Kyoto strategy continued.
2007
COP13/CMP3
Bali
Bali Action Plan was adopted, setting stage for negotiations for COP15 in Copenhagen where new agreement
was to be negotiated.
2008
COP14/CMP4
Poznan
Agreements reached for work program and meeting plan for Copenhagen.
2009
COP15/CMP5
Copenhagen
Key elements of nonbinding Copenhagen Accord included: capping temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius
(3.6 F), verification procedures, US$10 billion/year transfer from richer countries to poorer countries for
adaptation and mitigation strategies, rising to US$100 billion by 2020.
Cloture
Cloture is a legislative procedure used to stop debate on a
motion or bill and force a vote. It was developed in France in
order to counter the filibuster, a parliamentary tactic used to
prevent passage of legislation through continued debate that
precludes a final vote. Cloture was introduced into the British
parliament in 1882 and requires a vote of at least one hundred
members to invoke it. However, the speaker has the authority
to disregard cloture. Within parliamentary systems, a restriction
on the length of time, or number of sittings, in which a bill
can be considered or debated is known as a guillotine. Program
motions that establish legislative timetables for bills have increasingly replaced guillotines. In the United States, cloture was first
used in 1919 and applied only to the Senate, since debate on a
bill or motion can be limited in the House of Representatives
by the Speaker of the House or the House Rules Committee.
In the Senate, cloture initially required a two-thirds majority,
or sixty-seven senators, but the rules were changed in 1975 to
reduce the required majority to a three-fifths majority vote,
or sixty senators. Once cloture is invoked in the Senate, a vote
must be taken on the measure within thirty hours.
See also Filibuster; Question Time; Rules of Order.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Coalition Formation
Coalition formation occupies a central place in the study of
party politics and behavior, as well as the formation of governments. Coalition formation in this context is understood
as the result of the process of bargaining between political
parties (and their leaders), either before or after elections, to
form alliances in order to attain and preserve power.
Early scholarship adopted rational choice theory as its
framework of reference to account for why and how coalitions
form. A key concern appeared to be the importance of size in
the formation of coalitions, with later studies shifting attention
to the coalitions internal bargaining process. In this regard,
office-seeking and policy-seeking theories have defined classical
research on coalition formation from the postwar period to
the early 1980s. In both approaches, the focus lies on who (or
how many) will form the coalition and how long this will last.
The most influential office-seeking theories are the minimalwinning coalition theory, the minimum-winning coalition
theory, and the bargaining proposition theory. According
to John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgensterns minimalwinning coalition theory, a coalition is expected to form at the
minimal level below which the coalition government would
fail if any of its members were to defect from the coalition
itself. Building on the minimal-winning coalition theory, William Rikers minimum-winning coalition theory contends that
parties would enter a coalition commanding just over 50 percent of legislative seats to secure office. In Michael Leisersons
bargain proposition theory, efficient coalitions would be those
where only the smallest number of parties join the coalition.
Policy-seeking coalition theories have contributed a
greater predictive and explanatory power to coalition formation scholarship. Robert Axelrods minimal connected winning theory (MCW) showed how coalitions would be formed
by those actors whose party of affiliation is minimally connected on a single ideological dimension; this kind of coalition would show greater durability, reducing the potential for
conflict between the coalition members. Abram De Swaans
closed coalition theory builds on the MCW and highlights
how coalitions would form between parties showing the
smallest ideological distance.
Two main theoretical innovations have contributed to the
growth of coalition formation scholarship in recent years. First,
since the 1980s a neoinstitutionalist critique to the dominance
of rational choice theory in the study of coalition formation
has emphasised that coalition bargaining power is constrained
by institutions, including cabinet formation and operation rules,
legislative and party rules, and external veto players. Institutions
influence the behavior of political actors in their bargaining or
decision-making procedures when they form coalitions and
allocate portfolios. According to Wolfgang Mller and Kaare
Strm, institutions such as investiture rules or other parliamentary rules have an effect on coalition formation and size.
In addition, multidimensional coalition formation models
have moved beyond the traditional single dimensionleft-toright scaleand propose that coalitions would form among
parties located within the smallest distance in multiple policies dimensions. According to the core theory, parties stay in
the core area of two dimensional policy spaces, and policies
can be predicted by observing the behavior of the core party.
Ian Budge and Hans Keman contend that if the core party or
parties are structurally stable, the coalition government would
be able to remain longer in office; unstable core parties would
otherwise generate short-lived coalitions and fluctuating policies. Seeking to identify the ideal points among parties policy
preferences in multidimensional policy spaces, Michael Laver
and Kenneth Shepsle argue that the ideal point of the median
voter is the only point where the majority of voters converge
on a given policy issue.
Although the literature has traditionally paid attention to
the formation of coalition governments in parliamentary systems, scholars have recently also begun to include the study of
coalitions in presidential and semi-presidential systems. One
of the central assumptions in coalition formation studies (that
political parties be viewed as unitary actors) has also come
under criticism due to its neglect of intraparty processes.
Coalition Theory
Coalitions are governments in which different parties commit
themselves to serving together in the same cabinet and sharing the portfolios that control of the chief executive affords
them, according to Kaare Strm, Wolfgang C. Mller, and
Torbjrn Bergman, editors of the 2008 Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe.
Between 1945 and 2003, nearly five-sixths of all cabinets in
Europes parliamentary and semi-presidential systems constituted such multiparty governments, usually formed in cases
where elections did not result in an overall parliamentary
majority for a single party.
Coalition theories are a body of propositions designed to
explain the dynamics of interparty cooperation in making,
running, and breaking multiparty governments. Most theoretical literature on coalitions focuses on their partisan composition; the distribution of executive offices between the
participating parties, or portfolio allocation; and variations in
their duration. Some of this scholarship has been inductive
and empirical, often influenced by normative concerns, such
as government stability and performance in representative
democracies. The more influential tradition has been a deductive and formal one, usually based on game theory, a rationalist theory derived from mathematics focusing on interactive
decision making involving at least two actors.
COALITION FORMATION
The key concerns of game-theoretic models of coalition
formation have traditionally been (1) the partisan composition of the coalition formed after negotiations between the
parties, and (2) the allocation of portfolios. Game theorists
have usually modeled political parties in coalition bargaining
as unitary actors, either seeking to maximize the number of
PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION
Like the literature on cabinet composition, early work on
portfolio allocation was based on the assumption that political
parties can be modeled as motivated by the pursuit of government office, neglecting the possibility of differential values of
different portfolios to different parties and possible trade-offs
between policy and office benefits. Empirical studies generally
confirmed William A. Gamsons 1961 law of proportionality:
members of a coalition are predicted to receive cabinet portfolios in proportion to their contribution to the governments
parliamentary majority. Models such as Laver and Shepsles
portfolio allocation model sought to overcome the limitations
of purely quantitative, office-driven models. For them, parties
are driven by policy as well as office motivations. Their model
predicts that cabinets will form in equilibrium consisting of
parties controlling the median legislator on the most important policy dimensions. These parties will be allocated the
relevant portfolio(s), giving their ministers control of policy
making in that particular area.
COALITION DURATION
Beyond questions of government membership and portfolio
allocation, coalition theories have focused on the decisions
of political leaders to continue coalitions to the end of their
natural term (usually the next election) or, alternatively,
to terminate them earlier by changing the coalitions partisan composition, or the person of the prime minister, or
by bringing the election date forward, known as strategic
parliamentary dissolutions. Early research largely followed the
empirical tradition and attempted to identify the main sources
of variations in coalition durability in the structural attributes of the coalitions themselves (e.g., number of parties or
ideological disagreement between them), or in the coalitions
bargaining environment (e.g., the size and polarization of the
party system). In the 1980s, influential work challenged this
structural perspective, arguing that the duration of coalitions
was largely a function of critical events such as crises or scandals. Since the 1990s, a number of game-theoretic models
have sought to incorporate such random shocks to coalition
government and explain variations in the duration of coalitions by modeling the party leaders decisions to maintain or
break coalitions as the result of strategic considerations, focusing on the utility of alternative opportunities of making or
influencing policy, the opportunity cost of early terminations,
the anticipated costs of early elections, and the anticipated
transaction costs of alternative forms of government.
COALITION GOVERNANCE
Finally, there has been a growing body of scholarship in coalition governance since the 1990s, seeking rigorously to model
the dynamics of coalition politics after cabinet formation. In
such endeavors, ministers are not conceived of as policy dictators (as in Laver and Shepsles model), nor do they have their
hands entirely tied by coalition agreements between the parties
in government. Their agenda powers may allow them some
leeway to move the policy from the agreement initially reached
in coalition bargaining towards their own preferred policy position. This potential for agency loss can be contained, depending
on institutional constraints such as the prime ministers powers,
the extent of ministerial autonomy enshrined in the constitution, and commitment and enforcement mechanisms agreed
between the parties in coalition treaties (for a survey, see Strm,
Mller, and Bergmans Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The
Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe, chapters 5 and 8).
Despite its very considerable advances since the 1960s, coalition theory faces a number of challenges. Most importantly,
there remains a significant gap between theoretical advances
and empirical work, the latter often lagging behind the former
in terms of measurement and appropriate statistical estimation
techniques. Other challenges include a number of implausible
and restrictive assumptions on which some models are still
based, for example, the modeling of parties as unitary actors.
See also Behavioral Game Theory; Cabinets and Cabinet Formation; Coalition Formation; Political Thought, Foundations of.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THOMAS SAALFELD
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Axelrod, Robert. Conflict of Interest. Chicago: Markham, 1970.
Diermeier, Daniel. Coalition Government. In The Oxford Handbook of
Political Economy, edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman,
162179. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Gamson, William A. A Theory of Coalition Formation. American Sociological
Review 26 (1961): 373382.
Laver, Michael. Government Termination. Annual Review of Political Science
6 (2003): 2340.
Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. Multiparty Government:The Politics of
Coalition in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Shepsle. Making and Breaking Governments:
Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Riker, William I. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven:Yale
University Press, 1962.
Schofield, Norman. Coalition Politics: A Formal Model and Empirical
Analysis. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 7 (1995): 245281.
Strm, Kaare. Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
Strm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Mller, and Torbjrn Bergman, eds. Cabinets and
Coalition Bargaining:The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Cohabitation
Cohabitation is an arrangement of split-executive government in
semi-presidential systems where the directly elected president
is forced to nominate the prime minister from the opposition
party that holds the majority in the national assembly. Cohabitation strongly impacts the power of the president, as the parliamentary component is reinforced and the prime minister takes
on far-reaching decision powers. This arrangement contrasts
markedly with that of unified government, in which a de facto
presidential logic prevails: The president is the undisputed head
of government and the prime minister is the presidents chief of
staff. Rather, in cohabitation, both officialsthe president and
the prime ministerhold a formal and informal veto power,
which leads to coalition-like politics based on compromise.
Consequently, the system oscillates between the two poles of
presidential and parliamentary regime features.
French political scientist Maurice Duverger introduced
the term cohabitation in 1980 by to explain divided government in the Fifth French Republic (1958present). In its history, cohabitation has occurred three times: from 1986 to 1988
and from 1993 to 1995, when socialist president Francois Mitterand was confronted with a center-right majority and had
to respectively nominate Jacques Chirac and Eduard Balladur,
and from 1997 to 2002, when Gaullist president Chirac had to
nominate Lionel Jospin, the leader of the victorious Socialist
Party, as prime minister.
See also Coalition Theory; Dual Executive.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DANIEL STOCKEMER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Duverger, Maurice. La Cohabitation des Francais. Paris: Press Universitaire de
France, 1987.
Elgie, Robert. Political Institutions in Contemporary France. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003.
Cold War
The term cold war is often given to the period of rivalry and
confrontation between the United States (and its allies) and
the Soviet Union (and its allies) from the end of World War
II (19391945) until relations thawed in the late 1980s, when
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev undertook reforms. Writer
George Orwell used the term cold war, and Bernard M. Baruch,
an adviser of U.S. president Harry S.Truman, in April 1947 said,
Let us not be deceivedwe are today in the midst of a cold
war. Our enemies are to be found abroad and at home. Baruch
himself credited the phrase to Herbert B. Swope, the former
editor of the New York World, and that same year the writer
and journalist Walter Lippman also used the term.
ORIGINS
There is debate over the cold wars precise start: Some scholars
identify its origins as predating 1945, but the periods initial
years are often associated with the immediate postWorld
War II period. By 1945, the United States and Soviet Union
had emerged as the two leading powers (they were frequently
called the superpowers), and by 1947 a general East (Soviet)West (American) division of states was developing. The West
believed the Soviets sought to undermine democracy and
establish puppet communist regimes in Eastern Europe, thus
increasing influence in their zone of occupation in Germany.
The Soviets defended their actions in terms of establishing
broadly based antifascist governments friendly towards them.
Other conflicts emerged elsewhere, and both states increasingly denounced each other. Events symbolic of the cold
wars early years include the Berlin blockade (19481949),
when the Soviets blocked access to West Berlin, and the 1949
Communist victory in China over the American-supported
Nationalist government.
INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS
Tensions continued in the 1950s, and their impact was felt globally. This was particularly the case as both countries had nuclear
weaponsthe United States from 1945 and Soviet Union
from 1949and built alliances. These included the Wests
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established in 1949, and
the Soviet-Communist European Warsaw Pact (19551991).
The Korean War (19501953) began in June 1950 when Sovietaligned North Korea sent forces across the 38th parallel of latitude dividing the Korean peninsula and invaded South Korea.
This led to U.S. and United Nations deployment of forces
and Chinas involvement. Fighting ultimately ended along the
original 38th parallel with an armistice agreement in July 1953.
Soviet domination over Eastern Europe during this time was
graphically illustrated by the crushing of the 1956 Hungarian
Revolution.
The United States and the Soviet Union came the closest to direct confrontation in the cold war during the thirteen days of the Cuban Missile
Crisis. The Soviet Union had established missile sites in Cuba in response to a U.S. presence in Turkey.
source: Corbis
Tensions increased in the early 1960s. In 1961, the Soviets constructed the Berlin wall separating East Germany from
West Germany, and the following year the Cuban missile crisis
occurred.This is generally regarded as the cold wars most dangerous event, with the superpowers coming close to a nuclear
war. In October 1962, a U.S. spy plane photographed missile
sites being built by the Soviets in Cuba. U.S. president John F.
Kennedy established a naval blockade to prevent the arrival
of additional Soviet military supplies, demanding the removal
of the missiles and the destruction of the sites. For thirteen
highly tense days, there was uncertainty over how the Soviet
leader Nikita Khrushchev would respond to the naval blockade and U.S. demands. Khrushchev ultimately ordered Soviet
ships to turn back and agreed to dismantle the weapon sites; in
return, the United States agreed not to invade Cuba. In a separate, unpublicized deal, the United States agreed to remove its
nuclear missiles from Turkey.
Cold war tensions decreased after the Cuban missile crisis, with a period of dtente emerging. In 1963 the hot line
was installed to provide direct communications between the
superpowers, and the Partial Test Ban Treaty outlawing nuclear
testing in the atmosphere was concluded. Preliminary discussions to limit long-range missiles and bombers began in 1967,
but ended after the Soviets suppressed the 1968 Czechoslovakian Revolution. In 1969, the discussion resumed under the
name of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and concluded in 1972.The numbers of strategic launchers (missiles or
bombers) were frozen for five years, although modernization
and increases in the number of warheads carried by launchers
were allowed. Relations between the United States and China
improved, and in 1979, the SALT II Treaty, focusing on the
total numbers and explosive power of warheads, was negotiated. Although it remained unratified after the 1979 Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the superpowers largely continued to
FINAL DECADE
Collective Action
See Collective Action and Mobilization.
In their emphasis on organization as the solution to the collective action problem, McCarthy and Zald deflected attention from how individuals make the decision to adhere to
a social movement. Dutch social psychologist Bert Klandermans tried to specify the process of adherence around both
the propensity to participate and the probability of success.
He eventually proposed a funnel of causation in which movement entrepreneurs look for support from within a broad
but inert protest potential. This is through what Klandermans
called consensus mobilization, and it narrows by action
mobilization; collective action then mounts with the support
of a subset of the potential participants who were originally
targeted.
MESOMOBILIZATION
But who is more likely to mobilize, and whose protest potential remains inert? This depends on more than individual
propensities; it also depends on the individuals location in
society. Social movement scholars soon observed that those
who decide to engage in collective action do not do so as
isolated individuals but from within networks of friends, family, roommates, and workmates. These scholars moved beyond
the determined individualism of Olson and his followers to
look at how groups themselves induce mobilization. Even in
high-risk situationslike French insurrections, freedom summer during the civil rights movement, and the Tiananmen
Square protestsparticipants embedding in social networks
encouraged mobilization. For network scholars, the group,
rather than being a source of collective action problems, actually helps to move individuals from inertia to mobilization.
MACROMOBILIZATION
Just as McCarthy and Zald, Klandermans, and the social network theorists were moving beyond Olson from the bottom,
other theorists were building downward from a structuralist perspective. Social movement theory emerged in dialogue
with Marxism, for which individuals mobilize as the outcome
of impersonal macrostructural processes: exploitation, proletarianization, and concentration. States hovered on the margins of these processes, entering abstractly as the executive
committee of the capitalist class or concretely as the agent of
repression. From this mechanical Marxism, historians like E.
P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm eventually departed, but it
took a historically trained sociologist, Charles Tilly, to specify a
number of mechanismsorganization, repression, facilitation,
opportunity, threat, and mobilizationto connect the interests
of a group with its collective action. A brief comment on each
of Tillys mechanisms is useful in placing work on the political
process alongside the collective action tradition.
Tilly argued that any collective action begins with the
interest of a group in acting collectively, which he defined as
270 Collectivization
Collectivization
Collectivization, a policy pursued in the Soviet Union and
most other communist countries, refers to a process whereby
private agricultural lands were seized by the state and transferred either to collective farms (kolkhoz in Russian) or state
farms (sovkhoz). The policy was unpopular with farmers and
was accompanied by violence. It also contributed to lower
agricultural output. Nonetheless, politically it helped consolidate communist authority in the countryside.
RATIONALE
Collectivization had both an ideological and a practical purpose. Its ideological justification can be found in Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engelss Communist Manifesto (1848), in which
they argue that farmers, like factory workers, should be organized into large-scale collectives to eliminate private property
and this, in their view, would lead to more efficient agricultural output. Collective farms would also foster the socialist
ethos upon which communist society could be built. Privately
owned farms and the emergence of a richer peasant class
were seen as incompatible with communism.
The practical goals of collectivization were threefold. First,
Soviet authorities wanted to ensure a steady supply of food
to burgeoning cities. Experiments with partially market-based
agriculture in the 1920s under the New Economic Policy had
led to increases in agricultural output, but the supply of food
depended on the willingness of Russian peasants to sell grain
at prices set by the state. A serious crisis in 1928 in securing
peasant cooperation compelled Soviet leaders to search for
alternatives, including forced seizures of food supplies. Second,
the Soviets wanted to launch a program of rapid industrialization but had little available resources to pay for such a program. Exporting food to pay for capital imports thus became
a central plank in the Soviet industrialization program. Third,
the Russian countryside traditionally had been the basis for
revolts against central authority. Soviet authorities therefore
wanted to ensure that they had political control over the rural
population, which in the 1920s constituted the vast majority
of the Soviet people.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
Collective and state farms were far larger than small private
holdings, and Soviet authorities brought in tractors and
machinery to increase efficiency. Stalin predicted that the
Soviet Union would become the worlds leading producer of
grain. However, because of poor infrastructure and distribution and lack of incentive for collective farm workers, grain
production never met expectations. The numbers of livestock
were still lower in 1950 than in 1928. Soviet authorities, in an
ideological and practical concession, allowed collective farmers to cultivate small private plots of land, which produced
a disproportionate amount of the Soviet total of fruits, vegetables, and milk. By the 1960s, the Soviets were compelled to
import grain from the United States, and bread lines remained
a constant in Soviet life. Although collectivization was a failure in economic terms, it was unquestioned on ideological
grounds and did establish communist authority throughout
the Soviet Union.
LEGACY
Collectivization became a key feature of the Soviet communist
model and was pursued in many communist states, including
most of Eastern Europe (except Yugoslavia and Poland), China,
Vietnam, and Cambodia. As in the Soviet case, it was often
resisted by farmers and was accompanied by violence.
Chinas economic reforms started in the 1970s by offering
market-based incentives to collective farmers to increase food
output. After the collapse of communism, land was eventually privatized in most postcommunist states, including Russia,
although turning collective farm workers into successful independent farmers has proven difficult and most Russian farmers
continue to work in large agricultural cooperatives.
See also Communism; Communism, Fall of, and End of History;
Marxism; Russian Political Thought; Stalinism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PAUL JAMES KUBICEK
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Conquest, Robert, ed. Agricultural Workers in the USSR. London: Bodley
Head, 1968.
. Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Davies, R. W. The Socialist Offensive:The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture
19291930. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Colonialism 271
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Stalins Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian
Village after Collectivization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Karcz, Jerzy. The Economics of Communist Agriculture. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1979.
Lewin, Moshe. Russian Peasant and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization.
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968.
Colonialism
Colonialism is a particular relationship of domination
between states, involving a wide range of interrelated strategies, including territorial occupation, population settlement,
and extraction of economic resources by the colonizing state.
Historically, colonialism also depended upon legal, cultural,
and political justifications of the colonial project in the metropole and the colonized state. While colonialism and imperialism share many of these characteristics, colonialism involved
significant amounts of settlement of citizens from the colonial
center in the colonized territory, as well as formal relationships of law and governance between colonial states and their
subjects. Variations in the colonizing power; the period and
region of colonization; local conditions of polity, economy,
society, religion, and culture; and global circumstances all
In this cartoon, English king Edward VII and French politician Theophile Delcasse negotiate their colonial holdings in Africa.
source: Getty Images
272 Colonialism
colonial powers and the settlement and exploitation of nonEuropean territories and subjects. Scholars of world systems,
colonialism, and state formation have sought in recent years to
decenter Europe and formal state visions of colonization, by
focusing on colonialism as a system whose local components,
state and nonstate, were shaped by transnational processes and
affected these processes in turn.
Colonialism 273
the natives along racial, moral, biological, and civilizational
lines. A prominent justification of European colonization
was that it represented the oversight by a stronger, advanced
civilization over a weaker, backward people, for whom the
introduction of stable institutions of government, rationalized economic relations, moral tutelage, and cultural example
would result in increased civilizational maturity.
Other rationales included imperial competition amongst
the great powers of Europe, social and cultural reformism, the
spread of Christianity, and the achievement of more targeted
objectives, such as the abolition of slavery, sexual purity, moral
reform, education, health and hygiene, temperance, law, and
order.This ideological orientation defined both the colonizing
and the colonized society, established a moral justification for
multiple interventions as well as rationalized their methods,
and posited difference (racial and cultural) along developmental and historical lines.
The violence of colonialism was multiple, and an indispensable part of the colonial project. This included warfare conducted on behalf of the colonial state against its subjects, local
opponents, and imperial competitors; the arming and support
of some local elites against others; forced labor, collective punishment and later aerial bombardment; and the application of
new techniques of biopower and knowledge. Brute force was
both a component of state strength, controlling subjects and
territories by superior force, and a symptom of its weakness,
reflecting the failures of administrative and cultural discipline.
Colonial power was never total, and colonialism itself never
a completed project; within the colonial center and in the
colonies themselves, colonization had its opponents. Within
European intellectual and moral debates, Christian theologians
lent moral strength to imperialism by casting it as a conduit for
Christianization, but also cast doubt upon the colonial impulse
through theologies of natural law and universal humanity.
Enlightenment figures such as Adam Smith, Denis Diderot, and
Immanuel Kant opposed imperialism based upon ideas of justice, pluralism, and human nature. Local actors deployed varied
strategies to resist, oppose, deflect, limit, and transform colonial
efforts. Anticolonial struggles and nationalist movements advocated a range of approaches, including preemptive modernization and westernization; deeper religious, ethnic, and national
commitments among colonized peoples; and appeals to ideals such as natural justice, democracy, and popular sovereignty.
Anticolonial figures such as Frantz Fanon advocated uprising
and violent resistance, arguing that the violence of colonialism was systemic, its effects both physical and psychological,
and that its overthrow required anticolonial recruitment in the
population least dependent on colonial resources.
The effects of colonialism extended to the colonial metropole and the global system as well as to colonized states and
subjects. Efforts required to maintain empire, and attain the
rewardseconomic, political and moralof colonial interventions were part of the domestic governing apparatus of European
colonial states. The efforts allowed establishment of hierarchies
of citizens and subjects, applying policies and experiences at
home that were initially developed in the colony, and vice versa,
THEORIES OF COLONIALISM
The study of colonialism has itself undergone multiple shifts
over time, and also evolved as more scholarship has been produced by, or been based on, the former subjects of colonial
rule. Political science, along with other social science and
humanities disciplines, has studied, facilitated, and critiqued
colonialism, while more recent scholarship like that by
Edward Said has been acutely aware of the manner in which
the production of knowledge is implicated in relationships of
power. However, current theories of colonialism continue to
occupy and draw from a wide range of philosophical, political,
and empirical sources.
Developmental theories of colonialism have in common a
sense that colonization was part of a historical progress from
one form of statehood and subjectivity to another. Early studies of colonialism were produced as part of the European colonial project, and worked to justify, assess, compare, and improve
colonial administration and policy, as well as communicate its
experience to European readers. Many early scholars of colonialism, such as John Stuart Mill, were themselves employees of
colonial companies (Mill of the British East India Company)
or colonial officials. For thinkers like Millwho combined a
liberal view of individuals as capable and deserving of rational self-government with a belief in history as a progression
along increasing levels of civilizationcolonialism provided
an essential bridge between the civilized and the savage subject, and the despotism of colonization the historical conduit
from the uncivilized state to one capable of self-government.
Modernization theorists, including Marxist-Leninists,
while they may reject the more paternalistic overtones of
earlier developmentalists, have tended to see colonization as
a part of the modernization process, through its integration
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abu-Lughod, Janet. Before European Hegemony:The World System AD
12501350. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Adas, Michael. Machines as the Measure of Men: Science,Technology, and
Ideologies of Western Dominance. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
Benton, Lauren. The Legal Regime of the South Atlantic World, 14001750:
Jurisdictional Complexity as Institutional Order. Journal of World History
11, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 2756.
Bhabha, Homi. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge, 1993.
Calhoun, Craig, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore, eds. Lessons of
Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power. New York: New Press, 2006.
Cohn, Bernard. (1985) The Command of Language and the Language of
Command. In Subaltern Studies:Writings on South Asian History and
Society, vol. 4, edited by R. Guha. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Comaroff, John, and Jean Comaroff. Of Revelation and Revolution.Vol. 1,
Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question:Theory, Knowledge, History.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
Fanon, Franz. The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Constance Farrington.
New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1963.
Mehta, Uday. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British
Liberal Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Merry, Sally. Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes. Annual
Review of Anthropology 21 (1992): 357379.
Mill, John Stuart. Principles of Political Economy, Edited by J. Laurence
Laughlin. New York: D. Appleton, 1891.
Mitchell, Timothy. Colonising Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1988.
Muthu, Sankar. Enlightenment against Empire. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2003.
Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York:Vintage, 1979.
Spivak, Gayatri. Can the Subaltern Speak? In Marxism and the Interpretation
of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg, 271313.
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988.
Colonialism, Internal
See Internal Colonialism.
Colonial Wars
The term colonial war is used to refer to conflicts fought to
determine the future status of potential colonies, or currently
held colonies, that generate at least one thousand battlefield
casualties per year. This definition may be applied to two distinct categories of conflict: wars fought between great powers
over a (potential) colony, and wars fought between a great
power and a colony over its future status, otherwise referred
to as asymmetric conflicts.
Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution lists the powers
of the U.S. Congress. Under the original design of the Constitution, the Framers attempted to achieve the paradoxical
objective of a strong government of limited powers by limiting
the range of powers of the new legislative branch to those
enumerated powers listed in Article I, Section 8, and then
granting plenary power over that list by giving Congress the
power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.
From the beginning, one of the most important of the
enumerated powers granted to Congress was the commerce
clause, which grants Congress the power To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes. Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, the national government did not have the legal authority under the Articles of Confederation to regulate commercial
activity, thus causing state governments to engage in trade wars
by placing tariffs and other taxes on out-of-state goods, and
some states conducted their own trade policies with foreign
nations. By granting the power to the federal government, the
Framers apparently intended to facilitate a national economy
and to minimize barriers to interstate commercial activity.
Undoubtedly, the commerce power has turned out to be one
the most important sources for the expansion of federal power
over time.
Nonetheless, the exact scope of the commerce clause has
long been a subject of debate and even controversy. In Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Chief Justice John Marshall sided with
the federal government over the issue of licensing navigation.
Marshall found that Congress had the authority to regulate
Common Goods
The term common good, or the term commons, both refer to
resources as well as to property rights institutions that govern
the appropriation, alienation, and management of the resource.
Analytically, however, it is important to differentiate between
the two concepts. A common-pool resource (natural or human
constructed) is available for appropriation to multiple users.
When one consumer uses a unit of these goods, this unit is
no longer available to other usersa characteristic commonly
referred to as jointness or rivalry in consumption. At the same
time, it is difficult (or costly) to prevent other users from appropriating these goodsa characteristic commonly referred to as
nonexcludability. Given its rivalry in use coupled with non
excludability, these resources are often overused and degraded.
In contrast, common-property institutions are rules regarding how
members of a community may access a resource, how much
they may appropriate or alienate the jointly owned resource,
and how they can devise new rules regulating its use. Common-pool resources and their physical characteristics influence
institutions devised to govern and manage them. Subsequently,
common-property institutions have been devised to successfully protect many common-pool resources.
COMMON-POOL RESOURCES
While some may view common-pool resources as small scale,
local resource systems and common-property institutions as
archaic arrangements, the truth cannot be further from this
notion. Though common-pool resources include prototypic
local, natural resources such as village pastures and fish harvesting areas, large-scale resources such as the oceans, the gene
pool, and the atmosphere all exhibit the characteristics of
common-pool resources as well. Further, humans create new
types of common-pool resources. Many urban families reside
in condominiumsa combination of private and common
INSTITUTIONS GOVERNING
COMMON-POOL RESOURCES
Common-pool resources have the analytical attribute of
nonexcludability. If users cannot be excluded, they have little
incentives to defray the cost of maintaining and governing
the resource. As economist and social scientist Mancur Olson
pointed out, free riding impedes the supply of collective
action. When nonexcludability couples with rivalry (e.g., if
I get the resource, you cannot), it creates incentives to overharvest rapidlya type of race to the overappropriation. For
example, why would countries unilaterally incur costs to protect a global common-pool resource, the global atmosphere,
from being overused as a sink for greenhouse gasses? Given its
physical characteristics, users in other jurisdictions cannot be
prevented from appropriating the benefits of this global pollution sink, a condition ripe for free riding. Thus, to manage
common-pool resources, institutions (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol
to mitigate global climate change) must be put in place to
enforce exclusion. Indeed, as the rich literature on this subject
attests, resource users at various scales, local to global, have
sought to create institutions with varying levels of success to
enforce excludability (i.e., regulate resource use), and thereby
support resource governance.
As carefully documented by Nobel Prize-winning economist Elinor Ostrom in her book Governing the Commons as well
as in several other volumes surveying common-pool resources,
such as The Questions of the Commons edited by Bonnie McCay
and James Acheson or in the Drama of the Commons, a volume
edited by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues appropriate institutions can and have altered actors incentives in the ways that
they practice forbearance and appropriate resources sustainably. Communities across the world have devised rule systems
to sustainably use communal pastures and forests for hundred
of years; just because some these local institutions might have
less visible, nontraditional featuressuch as a reliance on
informal norms or cultural practices to encourage forbearance
and regulate resource exploitationexternal observers should
not view them as open access resources.
Crafted institutions can increase the efficiency and sustainability of common-pool resource use over time. They can be
thought of as the dos and donts that are commonly understood in regard to the entry, harvesting, and management of
a resource, and how individuals acquire or transfer rights to
use a resource. Three broad forms of ownership could be used
to govern common-pool resources: government-, private-, or
common-property ownership. There is no consistent evidence
that any one of these ownership types is best suited for all types
of common-pool resources, even though considerable debate
about the relative advantages exists in the academic literature.
National governments have established a variety of institutions using government and private property ownership. Governments can decide to manage the resource on behalf of
citizens in their jurisdictions. In the United States, federal, state,
and city governments have established national parks, national
forests, state forests, and city forests. Further, governments have
regulated the use of common-pool resources by prescribing
technologies users must employ either to withdraw the resource
from the pool (e.g., fishing) or to deposit pollution in commons
(e.g., emission filters and scrubbers to clean up exhausts). In
addition, governments have adopted other instruments to influence responsible resource use. For example, governments have
required for-profit organizations to provide information to consumers regarding the impact of their production processes and
products on common-pool resources.Various labeling initiatives
as well as pollution registries, such as the Toxics Release Inventory Program established by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, are examples of such initiatives. The idea behind such
information-based regulation is that informed consumers will
vote with their dollars and informed stakeholders will bestow
goodwill benefits on firms that minimize use of environmental
common-pool resources. Finally, governments have developed
market incentives, such as taxes and fees to increase the cost of
common-pool resource withdrawal. For some common-pool
resourcessuch as fisheries, water bodies, and the airgovernments have sought to partition the resource use and impose an
upper limit to each users overall appropriation by devising and
allocating quantified rights to the use of this resource. The latter
approach has drawn much attention, especially in the context of
the ongoing global climate change debate.
Common Law
Common law developed not at a single moment by the proclamation of a single individual, but as a result of accumulated
traditions and laws over many centuries. The first statement
of common-law principles can be found in the Magna Carta.
Embodied in these rules was protection of subjects from rulers by preserving the rule of law via a system of due process. It took nearly four centuries for Sir Edward Coke, who
became lord chief justice of England, to create a theoretical
understanding of the common law and place the courts at
the center of the common-law system. Following Coke was
Sir William Blackstone, author of Commentaries on the Laws of
England, who made modifications in Cokes philosophy but
stayed faithful nonetheless. American iterations of the common law were professed most famously by American jurist
and Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who
stated that the common law is judge-made law. However, this
definition departs from the original conception of the common law. The role of judges within the original conception of
the common law was to decide law in accordance with existing statements of the law. Common-law judges had to balance
canon law, parliamentary law, and precedent. In the absence of
a clear and authoritative statement of the law, judges would
hand down decisions that filled in the gaps by interpreting the existing law. In addition to precedent, a number of
institutional arrangements and legal principles characterize
the common law, and these differentiate common-law legal
systems from other legal systems.
CRITICISMS
The common-law system is often criticized for being wrought
with procedural strictness that becomes burdensome to all
Commonwealth 281
involved. One of these features is the separation between
courts of law and courts of equity. Charles Dickenss novel
Bleak House criticized this cumbersome feature of the common-law system. Courts of law apply the law as established
to a particular case. In some instances, the law may provide
a remedy that is inadequate for a particular situation. When
such an instance arises, then one of the partys may take the
suit to be heard in an equity court, sometimes referred to as
courts of chancery. Equity courts can exercise more latitude in
granting rewards to the victim. Until 1873, England maintained separate courts of law and equity. The federal judiciary in the United States ended such a formal distinction
with the ratification of the Constitution. Until 1937, with
the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in which
law and equity were combined into one form of action, the
courts of the U.S. federal judiciary maintained a distinction
between law and equity in one court. This reform came one
year before the landmark decision in Erie Railroad Company
v. Tompkins, in which the Supreme Court stated there is no
federal general common law.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hogue, Arthur R. Origins of the Common Law. Reprint, Indianapolis, Ind:
Liberty Fund, 1986.
Horwitz, Morton J. The Transformation of American Law: 17801860.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.
Stoner, James R. Common-Law Liberty: Rethinking American Constitutionalism.
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.
Stoner, James R. Common Law and Liberal Theory: Coke, Hobbes, and the
Origins of American Constitutionalism. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1992.
Commonwealth
Dating from the fifteenth century, the phrase common wealth
reflects the old meaning of well-being; hence commonwealth,
as often used by seventeenth-century writers, meant an organized political community governed for the common good,
on occasion implying an interest, or say, for all members. The
term has evolved to denote a polity that is law-based, contractual, and consensually united with supreme authority vested
in the populace; especially capitalized, it can also designate
an association of sovereign states more or less loosely associated in a common allegiance, or an autonomous political unit
voluntarily associated with another. Used most prominently
at the international level today, a few cases of national and
subnational commonwealths remain.
HISTORICAL COMMONWEALTHS
In various parts of the world, historical cases of commonwealths, to some extent, foreshadow their modern counterparts in displaying elements of contractual self-government.
These cases include:
The medieval Icelandic Commonwealth or Free State
(9301262), which ended with a pledge of fealty to the Norwegian king;
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (15691791),
one of the largest and most populous polities in seventeenthcentury Europe, which, as a semifederal republic centered on a
gentry-controlled parliament and an elected, contract-bound
monarch, can be considered a precursor to modern concepts
of constitutional monarchy and federation;
The Commonwealth of England, which replaced the
kingdoms of England and Scotland in the period of the English Interregnum (16491660) after the Civil War. Formally the
first republic in the English-speaking world, under the rule of
Lord Protectors Oliver and Richard Cromwell, the Commonwealth of England effectively amounted to military rule
in the name of parliamentary supremacy;
The Commonwealth of the Philippines (19351946), a
transitional, self-governing political entity in free association
with the United States, created in preparation for the Philippiness independence.
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
The Commonwealth of Nations is the voluntary confederation of former parts of the British Empire (plus Mozambique),
a group of fifty-three sovereign states and their dependencies
linked by common objectives and interests. Members include
both republics and monarchies, and in 2010 the (appointed,
282 Commonwealth
not hereditary) head of the Commonwealth of Nations is
Queen Elizabeth II, who is also reigning monarch in the
commonwealth realms, notably the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
The roots of the modern commonwealth lie in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when certain colonies
Canada (1867), followed by Australia (1900), New Zealand
(1907), South Africa (1910), and the Irish Free State (1921)
became self-governing dominions, a newly constituted status
implying equality with Britain. After World War I (19141918),
the dominions relationship with Britain was developed further, and in 1926 the Imperial Conference defined them
as autonomous and equal communities within the British
Empire, united by common allegiance to the Crown and
freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of
Nations. After World War II (19391945), decolonization led
to the London Declaration of 1949, which, in order to enable
newly independent republics like India to join, dropped allegiance to the Crown as a requirement for membership as well
as the designation British. From the late 1950s, new members
from the Mediterranean, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific
joined, extending the communitys spectrum of activities, and
in 1965 the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat
in London furnished the organization with an independent
civil service. The Commonwealth Foundation (1966), the
Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles (which,
in 1971, introduced a formal code of ethics and a commitment to human rights, racial, and economic justice), and the
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation completed
the modern Commonwealth of Nations. Its biannual summits are the associations ultimate policy- and decision-making
forum, at which it reviews international developments, issues
positions, and decides on any action, particularly in terms of
priorities and programs for development cooperation. These
summits, held in a different member state each time, are also
considered an opportunity to strengthen the idea of the Commonwealth of Nations as an association providing friendship,
business partnership, and stabilization for its members.
The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) signaled the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
A loose confederation of twelve of the fifteen former Soviet
Republics on the basis of sovereign equality, it has evolved
from its initial purpose of facilitating their civilized divorce
into a forum for economic, foreign policy, and defense cooperation, coordinated through an array of CIS institutions.
Various institutional steps have been aimed at deepening integration among some of its members. In 1993, the CIS created an Economic Union modeled on the European Unions
Common Market, notably also aiming for the coordination
of tax and price policy. In 1995, Russia and Belarus agreed
to form the Commonwealth of Sovereign Republics and to
deepen integration in the humanitarian and economic fields
with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with an interstate council,
which later also included Tajikistan. In 2000, these five formed
the Eurasian Economic Community, with which some other
CIS members have associated themselves to various degrees.
NATIONAL LEVEL
The Commonwealth of Australia was formed in 1901 with
the federation of six states under a single constitution. After
the first Europeans had begun exploration in the seventeenth
century, Captain James Cook took possession for Great
Britain in 1770, and subsequently, six coloniesNew South
Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and
Western Australiawere created. Early efforts at federation
in the 1850s and 1860s, also involving Fiji and New Zealand
who later decided to opt out, lacked popular support. The
1901 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act created
a federal system dividing power between the national government and the six former colonies, designating Australia a
constitutional monarchy where a governor-general represents
the royal head of state at the federal level, and six governors
represent at the state level.
Other national commonwealths include the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, which adopted the title upon independence from Britain in 1973 and also remains a commonwealth
realm within the Commonwealth of Nations; and, since 1970,
the Commonwealth of Dominica, after it obtained associated
statehood (virtual independence from Britain) in 1968.
SUBNATIONAL LEVEL
The United States of America contains four commonwealths:
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. While
not used in common parlance, the designation, which has
no constitutional effect, emphasizes their government based
on the common consent of the people, as opposed to
one legitimized through their earlier royal British colony
status. In addition, commonwealth is also used to describe
the political relationship between the United States and its
unincorporated, self-governing overseas territories of Puerto
Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, indicating their
consensual association as well as their status outside of the
federal hierarchy.
In general, use of the term commonwealth has tended to
underline the voluntary and consensual nature of a political
community or an association among political entities; in some
cases, it has additionally been used to indicate that such an
association, while more than an alliance, constituted less than a
confederation or federation.
See also Allegiance; Federalism; Federation and Confederation.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DOREEN K. ALLERKAMP
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Commonwealth Secretariat. The Commonwealth Yearbook. London: Nexus
Strategic Partnerships, 2009.
Lloyd, Lorna. Diplomacy with a Difference:The Commonwealth Office of High
Commissioner, 18802006. Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff,
2007.
Commune 283
Lundan, Sarianna M., and Geoffrey Jones. The Commonwealth Effect and the
Process of Internationalisation. World Economy 24, no. 1 (2001): 99118.
MacCormick, Neil. Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the
European Commonwealth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Mayall, James. Democratizing the Commonwealth. International Affairs 74,
no. 2 (1998): 379392.
Shaw, Timothy M. The Commonwealth(s) and Global Governance. Global
Governance 10, no. 4 (2004): 499516.
Communalism
Communalism refers to a range of diverse perspectives, theories, and movements in which social change is founded in
the redevelopment of community as a site of close, personal,
face-to-face relationships as opposed to the anonymity and
impersonal character of industrial capitalist society. One of the
most influential early notions of communalism can be found
in the works of German sociologist Ferdinand Tnnies, who
presented the community as an alternative to the cold calculation of market-based society (Gesellschaft) that was replacing
the close ties of rural life (Gemeinschaft).
The term communalism became increasingly popular in
the late twentieth century, especially among progressive activists and leftists seeking an alternative discourse on communal
societies beyond the discredited forms of authoritarian Communism, Marxism, Sovietism, and Leninism. It has become
particularly popular among contemporary anarchists, notably
those influenced by American anarchist philosopher Murray
Bookchins writings on social ecology and libertarian municipalism. Bookchin saw communalism not only as the development of a new public sphere that might oppose the state and
capital, but also an alternative to the anticollectivist emphasis
on individualism and personal autonomy in libertarianism and
much of contemporary anarchism.
For communalism, social life is organized primarily in small
communes where community decisions are based on consensus and participatory democracy in face-to-face meetings
involving all members. In place of a national statea central decision-making body consisting of professional governors who make decisions for communities they do not belong
tounder communalism, local communes come together in
a confederal association of recallable delegates to address issues
of mutual interest and concern, such as trade.
Communalist movements have included communal living arrangements in urban centers, back-to-the land movements such as the hippie movement that began in the United
States in the 1960s, utopian communities such as Scotlands
New Lanark, and present-day land trusts, in which property is
owned collectivity.
Anarchists view communalist arrangements as a precursor
to a large-scale transformation of society, as the idea of a confederation of communesthe commune of communes
comes to pose an alternative to the state for a growing number
of people. Eventually, having been rendered obsolete, the state
will wither away.
Communalism has also gained popularity as a perspective within conservatism in North America. For conservatives,
Commune
In its most technical sense, the term commune refers to a local
level of social organization that became rooted in the administration of many European nations, especially France, where
it represents the lowest level of government. When used in
this sense, it is roughly equivalent to a township, civil parish,
or municipality. In its more familiar usage, the term describes
a voluntary association of people who seek to realize a common end through cooperative communal living.
Communes as vehicles of low-level social coordination
flourished in medieval Europe, most notably in northern Italy.
These communities initially banded together principally for
the sake of common defense. Modern conceptions of commune reflect this notion of unity around a common end,
though in more recent centuries this common end has tended
to be spiritual or ideological rather than defensive. Consequently, modern communes are often referred to as intentional
communities where intent implies not only the conscious
design of living arrangements, but also a commitment to adopt
a particular way of life; typically, this involves the pooling of
property and consensus decision making. Usually communes
are established and overseen by the grassroots initiative of a
core group and supported by the like-minded consent of their
membership, though occasionally the establishment has been
imposed from above (like the Maoist peoples communes).
Communication, Two-step
Flow of
According to the two-step flow of communication theory,
the mass media do not directly influence political behavior.
Instead, opinion leaderspeople in the community with
more knowledge and expertise in politics and whom average
citizens trusttake in information about politics in the media
and share that information with others in the community. As
such, mass-mediated information has little direct influence on
most citizens, but interpretations of media messages provided
by opinion leaders, who filter mass-mediated information
along with other information available about politics, do
influence the opinions of citizens. This theory is based on
Communism
Communism (from the Latin communis, meaning shared or
common) advocates public ownership and communal control of the major means of production, distribution, transportation, and communication.
Communism 285
required to produce it. Under capitalism, workers are not paid
fully or fairly for their labor. This enables capitalists to siphon
off a portion that Marx calls surplus value, the difference
between what the workers are paid and the price paid by buyers of the product.This surplus is invested to yield even greater
returns. This in turn enables the bourgeoisie to amass enormous wealth, while the proletariat falls further into poverty.
The capitalist ruling class passes laws that benefit its members
and disadvantage the proletariat. The state thus becomes an
instrument for doing the bidding of the wealthy and powerful.
The exploitation of one class by another remains hidden,
however, by a system or set of ideas that Marx and Engels call
ideology. The ruling ideas of every epoch, they write in
The Communist Manifesto, are the ideas of the ruling class.
That is, the conventional or mainstream ideas taught in classrooms, preached from pulpits, and communicated through the
mass media are ideas that serve the interests of the dominant
class and disserve those of the subordinate class.
Communitarianism 287
vengeance. Religious divides from the premodern era were
fueling new violent social movements. Robert Kaplan, in the
2000 book The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the
PostCold War, made similar arguments.
However, Fukuyamas analysis does seem to fit developments in Europe and most postsocialist societies, including
China. In this context, ideology really does seem to have
come to an end. In Eastern Europe, Communist parties have
renamed themselves, shelved their millenarian rhetoric, and
donned business suits. Nationalist parties have been established
but rarely poll more than 10 percent of the voteroughly
what they get in Austria, France, or Italy. Elsewhere in the
world, only a small number of rulers in the early twenty-first
century directly challenged the idea that the market is the
most efficient generator of wealth or that democracy is the
best form of rule.
See also Clash of Civilizations; Communism; Huntington,
Samuel; Leninism; Postcommunism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PETER RUTLAND
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the
Fifties. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960.
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History. The National Interest, no. 16
(Summer 1989).
. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.
. The End Of History Twenty Years Later. New Perspectives
Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2010): 710.
Huntington, Samuel. Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3
(Summer 1993): 2249.
. The Clash of Civilizations Revisited. New Perspectives Quarterly 24,
no. 1 (2007): 5359.
Kaplan, Robert. The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the PostCold
War. New York:Vintage, 2000.
Communitarianism
Communitarianism, like many political terms, has both a general and a specific meaning. In the general sense, a communitarian is anyone who believes that community is so vital to
a worthwhile individual life that it must be protected against
threatening trends and tendencies of the modern world. In
the specific sense that emerged from the so-called liberalcommunitarian debate of the 1980s and 1990s, a communitarian is someone who maintains that the excessively abstract
and individualistic theories of liberal philosophers have been
among the most threatening of these trends. This specific
sense seems to be what most writers have in mind when they
now refer to communitarianism.
A BRIEF HISTORY
The word communitarian first appeared in English in the early
1840s, when it was roughly synonymous with socialism and
communism. These other words acquired more precise meanings in the ideological battles of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, but communitarianism remained a vague
term, signifying little more than a desire to defend the traditional rural community or small town from the supposedly
288 Community
The liberal-communitarian debate has not been clear-cut
because some of those labeled communitarian have seen themselves as liberals trying to correct an atomistic tendency within
liberalism (e.g.,Taylor). Moreover, those who seemed the most
severe critics of liberalism, MacIntyre and Sandel, have either
forsaken communitarianism in favor of republicanism, like
Sandel, or denied ever being a communitarian, like MacIntyre.
Communitarianism in the specific sense survives, however,
although it most often takes the form of a political communitarianism, less concerned with philosophical criticism of liberalism than with attempts to revive and defend community by
calling attention to shared values, encouraging participation in
civic life, and reinvigorating politics at the local level.
See also Communism; Individualism; Socialism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RICHARD DAGGER
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Avineri, Shlomo, and Avner de-Shalit, eds. Communitarianism and
Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Bell, Daniel. Communitarianism and Its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993.
Etzioni, Amitai. The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a
Democratic Society. New York: Basic Books, 1996.
Frazer, Elizabeth. The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
MacIntyre, Alisdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.
Mulhall, Stephen, and Adam Swift. Liberals and Communitarians. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992.
Nisbet, Robert. The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1953.
Ortega y Gasset, Jos. The Revolt of the Masses, translated by T. Carey. New
York: W. W. Norton, 1932.
Sandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982.
Taylor, Charles. Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985.
Tnnies, Ferdinand. Community and Civil Society, translated by J. Harris and
M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New
York: Basic Books, 1983.
Community
Community usually refers to an integrated set of human
relationships generally based on close ties, kinship, or ethical
solidarities. These are often contrasted with the impersonal
relations of modern society. Political community refers to ideas
of political deliberation, solidarity, civic attachment, and common norms; political community also often rests upon ethical
community.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
For Aristotle, political community was the highest goal of
human activity. Community was rooted in human nature,
and the ends of human nature were determined by the order
of the cosmos. Political community rested on an ethos that
guided practical activity, and aimed at more than mere protection or peaceful association. It required a deliberative community guided by reason. Political justice existed between
NINETEENTH-CENTURY IDEAS OF
COMMUNITY
Romantics mounted a critique of Enlightenment rationalism,
its abstract universalism, and its mechanical and lifeless spirit
that separated humans from nature and communal solidarities.
While romanticism looked to the past, especially the medieval
era, for models of integrated community, it was not uniformly
conservative or backward looking. Early German romantics
embraced republican political theories supportive of the French
revolution, believing individual creativity and community could
Community 289
flourish through a renewed reason. Romantics also championed national identity. Johann Gottfried Herder, for example,
saw national community as an integral unity based in a national
language. Human nature, Herder argued, is historical, not an
ideal of absolute, unchanging happiness. It is relative to linguistic, cultural, and social conditions. Early Marxist views can
be seen as a variant of romanticism. Human alienation, which
separated humans from their communal roots and the full
development and expression of their creative powers, reached
its greatest heights in industrial capitalism. The recovery of true
community and creative human powers meant transcending
the limits of nations for international communism.
Thinkers who rejected the achievements of French Revolution (17891799) looked to the failures of the terror as a
caution against applying Enlightenment ideals to social life.
Conservatives like Edmund Burke took a moderate path.
Burke looked to the wisdom of tradition as source of gradual
nonrevolutionary change. Tradition was the voice of history
and community, which, while of human origin, was not a
product of human will. Reactionary Joseph De Maistre saw
the monarchy as the best form of association and rejected the
Enlightenment idea of community as human artifice. God
reveals constitutions, Maistre argued, according to gods plan.
Others took the idea of national community in a less innocent
direction believing that in the late nineteenth century, nationalism was linked to imperialism and power politics.
Developmental liberals such as John Stuart Mill, T. H.
Green, and John Dewey recognized that the social conditions
of modern freedom required not just civil rights but social
rights. Rejecting the atomism of liberal theory, they argued
that human life is essentially social and requires the guarantee
of basic conditions such as education, social welfare, and protection from the fluctuations of the economy. While the latter
arent equivalent to the strong solidarities and moralities of the
community, they are conditions that need to be in place for
such communities to flourish.
Sociologist mile Durkheim also sought to formulate
a notion of community suitable for modern conditions.
Mechanical solidarity was based on the similarity of tasks in
older societies, while organic solidarity was the more complex
integration of a modern division of labor and rested on pluralism. While not rejecting individualism, Durkheim held, like
developmental liberals, that society needs to complete individualism. Political community, promoting a positive notion of
liberty, differentiates from the state and community promotes a
modernist sense of solidarity by integrating secondary groups
(contra Rousseau) like the church, the family, labor, industry,
and professions into the larger community. In contrast, anomie,
in Durkheims view, is a disconnection with community. Lacking in norms or attachments, Durkheim saw rootless, normless (largely urban) anomie as the main source of disorder and
social disintegration.
CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITARIANS
The contemporary debate between communitarians and
liberals has revived debate over the role community plays in
Community Power
Community power addresses the question of whether, and to
what extent, power is distributed, and how power should be
measured within local communities.
In the United States, the debate on community power
coincided with the debate between elitists and pluralists. Elitist scholars took a stratification theory of power as a point of
departure, viewing power as subsidiary to the social structure
in a community. Thus, according to Floyd Hunter in 1953, a
small financial and economical elite ruled the city of Atlanta,
Georgia, at that time. Hunter arrived at this conclusion by
first asking organizations representing four domains of Atlanta
to provide him with a list of leaders in their domain. Subsequently, fourteen judges were asked who, from their individual
perspectives, were top leaders on each of the lists of 175 persons. This resulted in a list of forty top leaders.
Similarly, in 1956, C. Wright Mills detected a power elite
in the American society of his time. According to Mills, several developments taking place during and after World War
II (19391945) resulted in increasingly enlarged, centralized,
and interlocking hierarchies in the economic, political, and
military realm of the United States. The power elite consisted
of persons occupying the top positions in these three hierarchies and, as such, made or failed to make decisions with more
consequences for more people than ever before. The methods
Hunter and Mills applied to measure power are known as the
reputation method and position method, respectively.
Pluralist scholars, however, criticized these studies for measuring actor properties and thus only potential power instead
of actual, exerted power. The elitists findings would follow
from the methods they applied. Robert Alan Dahl and Nelson
W. Polsby argued that studying the contribution actors make
to specific decisions on key issues in a community could measure the actual, exerted power. In his study of New Haven,
Connecticut, Dahl examined, for several decisions in three
issue areas, which of the participating actors had most frequently initiated proposals that were later adopted (without
or despite opposition of the other actors) or vetoed proposals
of other participants. Only three of the fifty persons meeting
the test of successfully initiating or vetoing proposals did so in
more than one issue area. Among the actors who successfully
NONDECISION MAKING
Dahls method became known as the decision method, and in
1970 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz upheld criticism for
the method not providing an objective criterion to discriminate between important and unimportant issue areas. As the
notables were not interested in two of the three issue areas
Dahl had selected, it was not surprising that he ended up with
pluralist rather than elitist conclusions. Bachrach and Baratz
argued that power was exercised during the process of decision making, which they called the first face of power, and also
during the process of nondecision making. This second face
of power concerned setting the agenda of available options
for decision making, where some issues become part of the
agenda, whereas othersthe nonissueswere kept from the
agenda, resulting in nondecisions. Just as in case of the elitists,
the pluralists research method would thus predetermine their
empirical findings.
In 1971, Matthew Crensons comparative study of air pollution in American cities falsified the objection that nondecisions were nonevents and could thus not be empirically
studied. His study examined two nearby urban areas with similar population characteristics and dirty air levels, and aimed at
explaining why east Chicagos air pollution became an issue
and resulted in local policy in 1949, whereas Gary, Indianas, air
pollution remained a nonissue, and no action was undertaken
until 1962. Crenson argued that Gary was dominated by one
steel company, U.S. Steel, and had a strong party organization,
whereas east Chicago had several steel factories and no strong
party organization. U.S. Steel managed to circumvent the dirty
air issue, backed by its reputation for power, without having
to do anything.
More recently, the debate on community power has been
continued by regime theory scholars on the one hand, such as
Davies and Imbroscio, and rational choice theory scholars on
the other, such as Dowding and colleagues, from an increasingly integrative and comparative perspective.
See also Elite Decision Making; Pluralism; Power; Power Indices;
Rational Choice Theory; Regime; Regions and Regional Government; Relative Power.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SANDER LUITWIELER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. Power and Poverty:Theory and Practice.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
Clark, Terry N., ed. Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative
Analyses. San Francisco: Chandler, 1968.
Crenson, Matthew A. The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of NonDecisionmaking in the Cities. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1971.
Compacts, Interstate
See Interstate Compacts.
Compulsory Voting
Compulsory voting is the legal obligation for registered eligible
voters to participate in elections. It is estimated that some
thirty countries in the world have, or have had, such a legal
obligation, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and
Italy. Especially in Latin America, systems of compulsory
voting are widespread, but usually only weakly enforced.
Strictly speaking, compulsory voting only applies to the act of
appearing in the polling station, since the vote itself is secret.
In countries with this system, this can lead to a substantial
percentage of spoiled or invalid votes.
Evidence suggests that a strictly enforced system of compulsory voting raises turnout, and in countries such as Australia or Belgium, turnout remains stable at well over 90 percent.
When the Netherlands abolished compulsory voting in 1971,
voter turnout decreased by almost 15 percent. Some nations,
therefore, have considered adopting compulsory voting in
order to stem the trend toward declining voter turnout. In
recent history, however, not a single country has introduced
compulsory voting. In some countries where the system exists,
it is the topic of political controversy. Policy makers hesitate
to implement sanctions against those who do not show up,
while on a normative level, it is questioned whether states are
entitled to impose this obligation on their citizens.
See also Voter Registration Drive; Voting Behavior; Voting Procedures;Voting Rights and Suffrage.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARC HOOGHE
Computational Modeling
In political economy, computational models simulate the
behavior of institutions or individuals, allowing researchers
to explore emergent patterns in individual and institutional
behavior over time. Computational models complement
mathematical models, and also serve as a form of independent
theory construction in their own right. This distinguishes
computational models from statistical computation for data
analysis, because although statistical models may involve
simulation of mathematical functions, they use simulation
Comte, Auguste
Isidore Auguste Marie Francois-Xavier Comte (17981857)
was a French philosopher credited as the founder of positivism and, by many standards, considered the father of sociology.
In Europe, and especially in France during his early years,
there were no sociologists; rather, philosophers were beginning to venture into scientific and empirical terrain. It was
Comte who laid the foundation for sociology to become a
scientific discipline firmly embedded in empirical and theoretical grounds.
Though no monarchist himself, Comte was nonetheless
critical of the French Revolution (17891799), its intellectual
figures such as author Voltaire and philosopher Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, and the chaos it unleashed. He was equally critical
of the Catholic Churchwhich could not prevent the revolutionand what he termed the metaphysical age (of uncertainty). Yet Comte himself is an Enlightenment figure. His
positive philosophy details a hierarchy of sciences in which,
ultimately, sociology will become the scientific discipline
through which all other sciences can be integrated into one
systematic body of knowledge.
The idea of progress and development is also evident in
his so-called law of three stages, which is perhaps Comptes
most famous formulation of societal change. Accordingly, all
societies develop along a path that includes three stages. Presumably, all societies depart from the same stagethe theological stageand, given the right (scientific-sociological
knowledge), arrive at the same end point of history: The
positive society, once the intermediate metaphysical stage, is
overcome. Despite its simplicity and its evidently Eurocentric view of societal change and development, Comtes law
of three stages does invite serious questions from both political science and sociology: How do societies change, and what
are the major forces of change? Are these forces primarily
Concept Analysis
Concept analysis, or formal concept analysis, allows researchers to identify and visualize specific structures in information.
This data analysis method utilizes algebra and order theory
and can enhance statistics and modeling analysis. When modeling through concept analysis, representations of concepts
within a particular domain are derived from object-property
matrices by using data-clustering algorithms. These algorithms use established and hierarchically ordered patterns
to expose clusters within a larger data set, but the different
algorithms delineate clusters in various ways. Concept analysis may be used to create concept lattices (known as Galois
lattices) that allow identification and display of relationships.
These lattices may further be developed into classification
systems.
German scholar Rudolf Willie developed concept analysis
in 1982, but its use initially remained limited because of its
highly technical nature. In the 1990s, the popularity of concept
analysis increased dramatically as new computer applications
were integrated with the approach. By the twenty-first century, there were a variety of concept analysis software packages
and open source software available for research. Fields ranging from medicine and psychology, to software engineering
and library information science, use concept analysis, and it is
also increasingly used in social sciences such as anthropology
and sociology. Intelligence agencies in the United States and
Western Europe have also used concept analysis as a means to
possibly identify terrorist sleeper cells or other security threats,
based on attributes and patterns.
See also Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Concordat
A concordat is an agreement between ecclesiastical and civil
powers. The popes have widely used concordats to obtain
recognition and privileges for the Roman Catholic Church
and, in order to secure the states promise to refrain from
encroachment upon religious life, to terminate dissension
with national civil powers by foregoing some of the churchs
traditional privileges and immunities. The concordats cover
spiritual and temporal matters such as the nomination of
bishops, the establishment of parishes, religious instruction,
religious marriage, and church property.
The first concordat was Pactum Callixtinum of 1122, allowing the church to control the investiture of priests in exchange
for important concessions permitting the emperor to assist at
Episcopal elections and to exact an oath of vassalage from bishops that greatly restricted the rights and liberties of the church.
In the nineteenth century, concordats became a preferred tool
of the Roman Catholic Church to regulate ecclesiastical affairs
in different lands. While concordats have provided the church
with important benefits, the 1933 concordat with Germany
granted international recognition to dictator Adolph Hitlers
regime.
Since 1965, over 115 agreements have been concluded
between the Vatican and various countries. This proliferation,
and the implicit recognition concordats bestow on sometimes
undemocratic political regimes, came under fire in the early
twenty-first century.
See also Religion and Politics; Roman Catholic Political Thought.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LAVINIA STAN
Condorcet, Marquis de
Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet
(17431794), was an influential French philosopher, mathematician, political activist, and political scientist. Condorcet
is a typical representative of the French Enlightenment tradition, bringing scientific and rational arguments into political
and philosophical debates. Educated as a mathematician, he
tried to promote moral and political progress by approaching
political debates from a scientific point of view. Especially
with regard to education and elections, his work has been
hugely influential. Condorcet worked as a senior administrator before the French Revolution (17891799) and was
elected a member of parliament in 1791. In the assembly, he
championed moderate and liberal causes, argued in favor of
equal rights for women, for the abolishment of slavery, and for
the advancement of general education in France. In October
1793, he was prosecuted for his opposition to the death penalty for the former King Louis XVI. In March 1794 he died
in prison, leaving the young philosopher Sophie de Grouchy
(17641822) as his widow. In 1989, Condorcet was symbolically reburied in the Pantheon in Paris, the burial place for
the most important figures in French history.
Condorcet is best known for his work on elections. In
particular, his Jury Theorem states that large juries are an ideal
mechanism to arrive at right answers to policy questions. The
larger the number of votes being cast (in a jury or in a general
election), the higher the probability the assembly will arrive at
the right decision. The mathematical evidence for this claim
basically rests in large numbers: If every single juror has slightly
better than 50 percent chance of arriving at the right decision,
a high number of jurors makes it all the more likely that there
will be a majority for the right decision within the assembly.
As such, the theorem has been used to legitimize the use of
juries in courts, or to advance general suffrage (thus maximizing the number of voters). Condorcet himself indicated
some limitations to the jury theorem, asserting that if the same
jury has to reach a series of decisions, there is no guarantee
that there will be logical order in these decisions. Condorcets
Confederation
See Federation and Confederation.
Confessional Parties
Confessional parties are parties organized around a shared
religion. They can incorporate religious identity as an ethnic marker, socioeconomic agenda, or vehicle to advance an
increased role for religion in the state. Although modernization theory predicted a decreasing relevance of religion,
confessional parties continue to play an important role around
the world. As a result, confessional parties are sometimes
viewed as an anomaly and explained on an ad hoc basis, heavily emphasizing particular characteristics of faiths assumed to
be resilient to reform (e.g., Catholicism and Islam). However,
many recent scholars have instead treated confessional parties
as explicable by a variety of social scientific theoriessuch as
rational choice, social movement, and institutionalismthat
apply to other aspects of sociopolitical life.
In Europe and Latin America, Christian Democratic parties
are key actors; in South Asia, both Hindu and Islamic parties have eclipsed nationalist movements. In the Middle East,
Islamic parties have participated extensively in the new electoral politics of the last two decades. Moreover, Lebanon and
Iraq allocate political offices along sectarian lines, thus encouraging religious parties.
Conflict Resolution
Conflict resolution is the process of ending, changing, alleviating,
or preventing conflict among different parties. In international
politics, conflict is ever present in several forms, ranging from
simple disagreement to outright genocide. Johan Galtung
identified three components to conflict resolution: (1) peacemaking, (2) peacekeeping, and (3) peace building. According to William Zartman, conflict resolution depends upon
removing the causes as well as the manifestations of conflict
between parties and eliminating the sources of incompatibility in their positions.
Because of the permanence of conflict in politics, conflict
resolution specialists suggest that those engaged in a particular
conflict must disconnect a given conflict from the concept of
justice as well as accept that involved parties have legitimate
concerns. Separating the legitimate concerns from the notion
of justice is necessary because justice is subjective and sometimes clashes with the notion of peacemaking. Conflict resolution is a long-term prospect, and thus it can involve numerous
methods such as mediation, negotiation, peacekeeping, and
diplomacy. All of these methods have several prerequisites.
First, the people engaged in conflict resolution need to recognize the legitimacy of claims of all parties involved in the conflict. Another prerequisite is for practitioners to recognize the
impact of personalities, personal beliefs, and ideologies upon
the conflict.Yet another prerequisite is to understand that conflicts can be transformed, albeit after the process of conflict
resolution has started. Finally, people engaged in conflict resolution must recognize that third parties not directly involved
in the conflict could be vital in the outcome of the resolution.
Various mediation strategies, according to Jacob Bergovich,
can be grouped in the following categories. First, communication strategies include making contact with the parties,
being neutral, gaining the trust and confidence of the parties,
and clarifying the issues at stake. Second, formulation strategies include various protocol issues such as the time, place, and
order of the meetings; controlling the physical environment;
and establishing mutually accepted procedures. And third,
manipulation strategies include altering the expectations held
by the parties, manipulating the time, making the parties aware
of the cost of nonagreement, promising resources for agreement, and threatening withdrawal.
Individuals comprise the first actor in conflict resolution
by acting as mediators. For example, former president Jimmy
Carter, on behalf of his Carter Center, has acted as a mediator
in several conflicts, most recently in the Sudan. Groups such as
the Quakers in the Cyprus dispute or organizations such as the
International Negotiation Network (INN) can also provide
assistance to the parties engaged in conflict resolution.
States are the most common actors in conflict resolution.
States can be invited to become mediators in a given conflict
such as former U.S. secretaries of state Warren Christopher
and Cyrus Vance and former British foreign secretaries Peter
Carrington and David Owen in Yugoslavia as well as several
presidents of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Several world-renowned state mediated agreements have
been reached, most famously the Camp David Accords, which
led to the sharing of the Nobel Peace Prize by the leaders of
Israel and Egypt.
Institutions and organizations can be engaged in conflict
resolution, especially since some conflicts are complex and
include several parties. International organizations have conducted conflict resolution negotiations, especially the United
Nations (UN). Regional organizations have also played an
active role in conflict resolution, such as the Organization for
American States, which has been involved in conflict resolution between the United States and Venezuela, or the Arab
League, which is involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Transnational organizations are also involved in conflict resolution; these include nongovernmental or quasi-governmental
organizations such as Amnesty International, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, or the INN. State sponsored
organizations, such as regional or international courts, also
conduct conflict resolution. For instance, the European Court
of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice
are entities that often help resolve conflicts after they have
occurred by holding the perpetrators of human rights violations accountable.
Yet another group of theorists believe that war itself can be
a tool of conflict resolution since the end of wars is ultimately
peace. In his seminal work Give War a Chance, Edward
Luttwak argued that outside intervention to resolve conflicts
usually tends to perpetuate war, not stop it. In Luttwaks opinion, most low intensity wars would run their normal course,
ending in either capitulation on one side or the exhaustion
of both and, thus, leading to a lasting peace. When the international community interrupts this, they basically allow the
regrouping and rearming of warring factions and, thus, the
wars continuation. Joseph Nye reached a similar conclusion, from a different perspective, in his call for the United
States to scale down interventionism in small regional wars,
which ultimately may not serve the U.S. national interest.
There is, however, serious disagreement on what constitutes
a small war, and whether such wars pose a threat to the wider
international community, as well as what constitutes national
interest.
During the twenties and the thirties, a new culture movement evolved that challenged the legitimacy of the old ways
in name of nationalism, democracy, and science. Lu Xun
(18811936) argued that the tradition was eating its children,
and Confucianism should not be saved because it was unable
to save the Chinese people. Lus criticisms occurred as warlords, Nationalists, and Communists battled to govern the
land. The Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek (18871975),
loosely embraced the Confucian tradition through the New
Life Movement in 1934, whereas the Communists were more
sympathetic to the radicalism of Lu.
The end of World War II in 1945 and the breakdown of
the united front of Communists and Nationalists against Japanese aggression that started in 1937 unleashed a civil war in
China that would send the followers of Confucius to Taiwan
and leave his critics in control of mainland China. Confucianism was most aggressively attacked on the mainland during the
Cultural Revolution (19661976). Mao Zedong (18931976),
the chairman of the Communist Party and the founder and de
facto political leader of the Peoples Republic of China, used
Confucius as a symbolic stand-in for the forces that posed a
political threat to him. Confucius was painted as desiring to
return to the conditions of a feudal slave state, and his teachings and images were to be eradicated as emblems of counterrevolutionary forces.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The rejection of Confucianism in the land of its origins
raised questions about the traditions viability into the future.
On the surface, Confucianism appeared too complacent in
dealing with authority in its search for social harmony, slow
to reform and adapt to changing circumstances, antidemocratic, antifeminist, and anticapitalist. This pessimism about
the potential of Confucianism to contribute to the modern
world was rooted in a Western social science that identified
Confucianism as being particularly antagonistic to capitalist
development, and the experience of East Asians who viewed
Confucianism as an impediment to modernization. The
unexpected economic success of East Asian societies in the
1980s led Western scholars such as Ezra Vogel, a professor of
East Asian studies at Harvard, to reappraise the economic and
social potential of the Confucian tradition.
The movement to justify Confucianism on economic
grounds was preceded by an attempt to redeem the humanistic value of the tradition. In 1958, Mou Zongsan, a major
exponent of the neo-Confucian tradition, and several of his
intellectual peers issued A Declaration to the World for Chinese Culture, agreeing that Chinese culture needed to learn
science and democracy from the West but also arguing the
West needed to learn a more all encompassing wisdom from
China.Tu Wei-ming, a Harvard professor of Chinese studies, is
a prominent advocate of this holistic and humane vision of the
Confucian tradition.
Academic commentators on Confucianism such as Roger
Ames, William Theodore de Bary, Daniel Bell, Hahm Chaibong, Joseph Chan, Herbert Fingarette, David Hall, Philip
Congress, Contempt of
The two houses of the U.S. Congress, much like the courts,
possess the power to protect their proceedings by deeming
a person in contempt for obstructive or disorderly conduct.
The power to hold nonmembers in contempt of Congress
is not addressed in the U.S. Constitution but is an inherent
Consensus 299
congressional power, as recognized in 1821 by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Anderson v. Dunn. (By contrast, each
houses power to discipline its own members is expressly conferred by the Constitution.) A typical offense is the failure to
provide testimony or documents requested by a congressional
committee, but acts such as bribing or assaulting members
have also been punished as contempts.
Although Congress has the power to impose contempt
sanctions unilaterallyoperating in effect as both prosecutor
and judgetoday Congress typically refers alleged contempts
to federal prosecutors to pursue criminal proceedings in the
courts under a federal contempt statute, which authorizes fines
and imprisonment. Most persons charged with contempt of
Congress are private citizens who refuse to cooperate with
congressional investigations or hearings, but executive branch
officials reluctance to provide information to Congress sometimes results in threatened or actual contempt proceedings,
especially in times of divided government.
See also Parliamentary Privilege.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL
Conscience, Freedom of
See Freedom of Conscience.
Conscientious Objection
See Pacifism and Conscientious Objection.
Conseil dtat
Conseil dtat (Council of State) is the supreme judicial body
in France for matters of government and public administration. The Conseil dtat decides cases on administrative or
legislative issues and offers advice to the government and
French National Assembly on constitutional affairs. It also
serves as an appellate court for cases brought against the government by citizens or groups, including disputes arising from
local or regional elections. Members of the Conseil dtat are
senior or distinguished jurists, and the body is divided into six
administrative sections. There are thirty-seven regional courts
that serve as trial courts, and eight appellate courts under the
Conseil dEtat. The origins of the body date to the 1300s,
but its modern functions and organization were established
in 1799, with major reforms in 1872. The prime minister
and the minister of justice formally preside over the Conseil
dtat, but an appointed vice president oversees its day-to-day
operations. As part of its advisory function, the Conseil dtat
issues annual reports on legal and political matters and reviews
draft legislation, decrees, and certain government projects or
policies. A range of other countries have a Conseil dtat, or
similar body, including Belgium, Spain, and Turkey.
See also Judicial Review; Judicial Systems, Comparative.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Consensus
Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary defines consensus as
general agreement: unanimity, or the judgment arrived
at by most of those concerned. Consensus may be used
broadly to describe decisions reached in a spirit of compromise, regardless of what process is followed. More significant
for political science, consensus denotes a specific decision rule
whereby all participating agents possess veto rights over the
collective outcome; the purpose is to ensure decisions that
are genuinely supported by all members of a community.
Consensus decision is designed as an alternative to majority
rule, which permits the views or interests of the majority
to override those of minorities. Whether consensus decision
rules in practice produce more just outcomes than majority
rule is debated.
Small groups often decide informally by consensus; consensus decision is formalized in some religious communities,
including the Quakers; in Anglo-American law, jury verdicts
must be unanimous. The practice in some ancient republics
of voting by acclamation created the appearance of unanimity while veiling real divisions. Some contemporary anarchists
insist that anything short of unanimous consent by all individuals to collective decisions violates personal autonomy.
None of these are adequate models for consensus decision
making in large modern territorial states or federations. Most
consensus theorists reject individual veto rights as impractical in large political communities and instead allocate veto
powers to a relatively small number of corporate agents. The
veto-bearing agents might be organized economic interests;
religious, linguistic, or ethnic communities; or, in a federal system, states or provinces with their own peculiar history and
traditions.
The most thorough advocate of the consensus model of government was John C. Calhoun of South Carolina (17821850).
In A Disquisition on Government (1851), Calhoun argued that
over time majority rule will inevitably produce entrenched,
geographically concentrated majorities and minorities, and
that the majority would systematically violate the rights and
interests of the minority. Calhouns proposed solution was to
arm each significant interest with veto rights: to give to each
division or interest . . . either a concurrent voice in making and
executing the laws, or a veto on their execution. He denied
that this would produce deadlock or anarchy, claiming instead
that it would force all interests to cooperate in the common
good. Calhouns principal successor among twentiethcentury
political scientists is Arend Lijphart, whose theory of consociational democracy bears a close though not exact resemblance to
Calhouns model.
Institutions practicing consensus decision have existed in
the past and continue to exist today. The U.S. Articles of Confederation (17811788) enabled a single state to block decisions supported by all others. The United Nations Security
Council allocates permanent veto rights to a handful of privileged powers. The 1998 Northern Ireland settlement grants
the two largest parliamentary groups, the Nationalists and the
Conservatism 301
Kant, Immanuel. On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory,
But It Does Not Apply in Practice. In Kants Political Writings, translated
and edited by H. Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government, edited by P. Laslett. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Simmons, A. John. Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979.
Consequentialism
Consequentialism is a philosophy that an act must be assessed
as either good or bad depending upon its results. Hence, consequentialism holds that policies are good or just depending
on their consequences. Undergirding consequentialism is
the notion that values precede morality and even without a
moral code, some things would still be good and others bad.
Pleasure is judged to be the ultimate good result, and pain the
ultimate bad. The main political strand of consequentialism
was utilitarianism, as developed by the British philosopher
Jeremy Bentham and later refined by British economist and
philosopher John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism posits that acts
are morally correct only if they maximize the greatest good
for the largest number of people. A variety of other forms
of consequentialism have also emerged. Consequentialism as
refined by the British philosopher G. E. Moore added intrinsic notions, such as beauty, to what could be considered good.
Moores ideas were dubbed ideal utilitarianism. In the preference utilitarianism of English philosopher R. M. Hare, acts
are considered to be good if they meet or enhance the preferences of individuals or groups, whatever those preferences
may be. Total consequentialism is predicated on the premise
that goodness is dependent on the overall good of the action
(even if it causes pain or displeasure to subsets of a group).
See also Bentham, Jeremy; Mill, John Stuart; Utilitarianism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Conservatism
The disposition to preserve what one has attained, received,
or inherited, and to defend against the losses that inevitably befall human beings in our time-bound existence, is
undoubtedly observable universally in all times and places.
This disposition to conserve, insofar as it is a natural response
to contingent circumstances, is not conservatism. Conservatism
is a self-conscious affirmation of this disposition with a selfconscious expression of resistance to the alternative, which
welcomes change, by premeditated design, to the environment
in which one finds oneself. Conservatism resists the readiness
to explore, more or less adventurously, and the possibilities
of an imagined, alternative future existence. Self-conscious
conservatism theorizes the natural disposition to preserve,
raising it to the level of a conscious affirmation that may lead
to the formation of principles or rules that serve more or
less as guides to ones conduct in personal life and political
views and activities. A conservative disposition often manifests
itself as considered points of view, even doctrines, engaging in
ORIGINS OF CONSERVATISM
Traditionally, in histories of the concept, it is said that conservatism begins with Irish statesman and political theorist,
Edmund Burke (17291797), especially in his critique of the
French Revolution (17891799) in his celebrated Reflections
on the Revolution in France (1790). There is no doubt Burkes
critique was both powerful and prophetic about many of
the consequences that would follow from the revolutions
upheaval in Europe, and his work figures centrally in the study
of the development of conservatism. Alongside Burke, we recognize Alexis de Tocquevilles analysis of Democracy in America
(18351840), and his penetrating analysis of the French Revolution, as central to our understanding of these conditions.
However, prior to the French Revolution and Burkes
theories, conservatism was conceptualized parallel to Europes
transformation from the Middle Ages in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries to the religious Reformation in the sixteenth century, to the birth of the Age of Enlightenment and
the Industrialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
These centuries saw the advent of a revolutionary era on every
front, proceeding in varying forms in different regions and
countries, but proceeding nonetheless to radically revise the
reigning ideas of political order, symbolized profoundly in
the emergence of the social contract theory with European
philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, JeanJacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and others.
Contractarian philosophy espoused a social order in which
a community would be granted civil and social rights adhering
to the rule of law of a political authority.The seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century social contract theories complemented
and influenced Europes emerging modern commercial society
and free market economy in what Scottish philosopher, Adam
Smith, its greatest theorist, called, in The Wealth of Nations
(1776), the system of natural liberty. Smith proposed for the
free, equal, and independent individual; the value of individual liberty as a common commitment; and the commitment
to progress in terms of ever-expanding economic growth, all
of which were increasingly accepted concepts in eighteenthcentury Europe and the newly established America.
While conservatives were historically receptive with the
evolving social contract theories and subsequent free market
economics originating in the later seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, conservatives wereand remainambivalent on
these economic concepts, given their historic affinity to the
ancient and medieval ideas of virtue and noble character.
Such modern propositions, stating wealth and virtue can be
complementary, increasingly challenged the ancient prejudice
that wealth and virtue conflict. Essentially, when an individual
302 Conservatism
or societys wealth accumulates, the individuals moral virtue
decays. According to conservatives, although economic growth
is good and required, materialism and ostentation threaten
societys moral virtue. Further, with the onset of advances in
modern science and technology incited by Europes modernization, it became plausible human beings could begin to
take their destiny into their own hands, causing persons to
either reject old theological doctrines of Gods providence, or
become self-determining agents who will fulfill that providence through creative renovation of human existence on
earth. Conservatives have been historically reserved about
such topics pertaining to science and religion.
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were also witness to increasingly centralized political authority as the modern state came to be seen as the primary political agent of
world history. The division between Catholics and Protestants
undermined the traditionally independent authority of the
medieval church, rendering claims to independent ecclesiastical authority ambiguous or suspect. The creation of the
modern state was as revolutionary a development as any of
the other events of the aforementioned periods. This modern
state was established by the aggregation, centralization, and
deployment of power, together with increasingly sophisticated
bureaucratic management, to an extent unimaginable in the
medieval world.
Given these revolutionary changes in a relatively limited
time span, it is not surprising that, as historical and philosophical assessments of what was happening evolved, extraordinary
efforts to theorize the significance of these transformations
appeared, either embracing or lamenting the events. Regardless of the responses, the changes between the seventeenth
to nineteenth centuries were irreversible, as the democratic
age supplanted the aristocratic age in Europe, America, and
the European colonies worldwide. The American Revolution
(18761883) and the French Revolution are revelatory of the
implications of what had been developing over a long time.
Notably, it can be understood conservatism was a response to
this modern agenot merely as a rejection of the modern age,
but as a response to certain terms and concepts of the modern
age. Therefore, conservatism is a distinctly modern intellectual
and political phenomenon.
CONSERVATISM IN POLITICS
SELF-CONSCIOUS CONSERVATISM
Burke did not use the term conservatism, as the word first came
into use around 1819 by French writer Franois-Ren de
Chateaubriand, following the rise and fall of French emperor
Napoleon Bonaparte. Burke does offer, however, a deliberate or self-consciously chosen viewaffirming the intention
to conserve and, while allowing for necessary adjustments
as circumstances alter, to respect traditional waysmore
commonly referred to as self-conscious conservatism. A primary
theme of self-conscious conservatism is requiring prudential
judgment; it cannot be merely antiquarian or simply set in
its way since with all modern conditions, conservative ideals must deal with the need of adjustment and alteration as
Conservatism 303
inherently illegitimate and must be rectified by revolution or
gradual reform. In this sense, the democratic principle seeks
universality and remains unsatisfied to the extent that it has
not yet achieved universality. However, even if conservatives
express agreement on the democratic principle as the basis of
political legitimacy, there is far less agreement on the scope of
power to be exercised even by legitimate governments. While
democracies can limit the exercise of political power, democracies can also serve as a plebiscite to empower governments
to act virtually without limit.
Conservatism is skeptical about expanding the scope of
governmental power beyond what is minimally required to
maintain law and order. Since there is no fixed definition of
the limits to governmental power, hence modern political life
evidences incessant debates on what the limits are, and, since
these debates are central to the way in which modern people
understand political life, there can be no conceivable end to
them. Conservatism is thus a manner of participating in these
debates, and not simply a fixed and settled doctrine, as at times
mistakenly characterized. The question for conservatives is not
necessarily whether change is desirable, but a question about
the means employed to affect change, coupled with skepticism
about exaggerated claims as to how much good will result from
change. It is precisely because conservatives understand that
change is inevitablethere is no static worldwhich explains
why conservatives tend to refrain from excessive enthusiasm
about change.The conservative is sensitive to loss as well as gain,
and believes that whatever the gains, there will be loss as well.
304 Conservatism
in which governmental power will exceed its justifiable authority. In this respect, Burke maintains a strong defense of limited
government, and is more compatible with what developed as
classical liberalism in the nineteenth century, with its emphasis
on free markets and international free trade. Today there is a
strong affinity between classical liberals who defend free markets as the principal safeguard of liberty, and conservatives who,
while prone to attack materialism, nevertheless acknowledge
the importance of civil society and its foundation in the rights
of private property and self-determination.
There is also a greater degree of individualism in Burke,
and, ultimately, an acceptance of the need to come to terms
with the new world post-1789; he is not a nostalgic, longing for a return to a vanished world; he deals with the new
without glorifying it. In this sense, Burkes counterparts are
John Adams in America, Alexis de Tocqueville in France, and
Winston Churchill in England.
CONSERVATISM AS PRAGMATISM
Conservatism combines discernible characteristics in varying ways, with varying emphases, by different exponents.
Conservatism, in its political skepticism, reflects the Augustinian Christian notion of original sin, sometimes expressed
in theological terms, and sometimes transposed into more
secular terms. Religious and secular conservatives can agree
on human limitations, even though they may disagree on the
importance of religious belief for a well-ordered society. Conservatism exhibits a moral imagination which, implicitly or
explicitly, acknowledges a transcendent reality that is beyond
human control; thus, scientific and technological innovation is
to be treated with restraint because conservatives know that
we can initiate many things but we cannot know in advance
what all the consequences will turn out to be, nor how much
we will like the results even of our successes. Untested innovation should be approached with caution. Conservatives typically stress to enjoy the opportunities of the present moment,
to diminish the anxieties that follow from obsessive concern
for, or guilt about, the past and, in addition, to restrain anxiety
about what the future may bring.
This bespeaks a certain disposition of gratitude for what
they havedefying resentment, envy, or alienation. This further suggests either a capacity for enjoyment of life, or Stoic
patience with the human condition, or elements of both at
once. It is these very characteristics that are criticized or commonly misinterpreted as complacency, as indifference to the
plight of others, or as an unmerited sense of superiority or
self-righteousness.
However, in the conservatives opinion, this is, rather, to
acknowledge that human action is never complete by design.
Conservatives deny political action can be made entirely rational to all of its public-serving interests. Therefore, the goal of
the conservative is neither to be deceived nor to engage in
self-deception and wishful thinking. If, as a result, conservatives are sometimes perceived as too reticent about change,
conservatives will defend their stance citing it is because their
opponents are too enthusiastic about claims, which allege to
Further, conservatives celebrate the rule of law and constitutional government. The rule of law is first and foremost a
fundamental principle expressing a vision of how individuals
should be formally organized in relation to each other. The
principle suggests individuals should live in relation to each
other as law-abiding citizens, free to enter into voluntary agreements with each other in pursuing their self-chosen lives.There
need to be rules of this game. The rules are primarily procedural in character, as they do not tell individuals what to do;
rather, they establish a set of limitations by informing individuals, whatever they are doing, to conduct themselves in a certain
manner in the course of doing it. A classic and obvious example
would be the rules of the road.The rules of the road do not tell
one where to travel or, indeed, whether to travel at all. They do
prescribe that, wherever one decides to go, one should observe
basic procedures designed to facilitate getting there safely. All
are equally subject to these rules; they do not favor one traveler
over another, nor do they specify destinations.
As such, these rules are compatible and with a wide range
of differing socioeconomic conditions among individuals,
complementary to a modern world characterized by continuous diversity. These rules are practical implementations of the
idea of the rule of law, meaning how individuals of widely
differing backgrounds and interests may nevertheless interact
with each other safely while pursuing what are often entirely
different goals and aspirations. Adherence to the law is a fundamental idea in the conservative moral disposition.
For conservatives, the primary purpose of government will
be to maintain the rule of law, to safeguard property rights,
to provide a judicial structure for adjudicating disputes, and
to provide a national defense. Of course, there must be an
enforcement power to punish those who do not live up to the
responsibility to be law-abiding. Law enforcement faculties are
to focus on maintaining the rule of law, not to engage in imposing social changes deemed desirable by some, and not by all.
As commonly associated with conservatism, the rule of law of
the state should be strong but its scope limited and in contrast
to the idea of the administrative state. An administrative state
emphasizes the use of political power to renovate and perfect
the social order, involving the supersession of rules by the exercise of discretionary judgment entrusted to bureaucratic agencies seeking to implement the goals of various policies in detail.
For conservatives, this poses significant perils: first, forgetting or
downplaying the limits to human wisdom and insight, and the
danger of enabling specific persons to determine what is best
for everyone else; and secondly, the aggregation of power to
micromanage the manner in which individuals conduct their
lives, compromising individual liberty for the potential but
unlikely perfection of the social order.
See also Burke, Edmund; Conservative Parties; Fiscal Conservatism; Neoconservatism; New Conservatism; Property Rights; Religious Right; Rule of Law; Social Conservatism; Social Order.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TIMOTHY FULLER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allitt, Patrick. The Conservatives, Ideas and Personalities Throughout American
History. New Haven:Yale University Press, 2009.
Burke, Edmund. Freedom and Virtue:The Conservative/Libertarian Debate,
edited by George W. Carey. Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 1998.
. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Oxford: Oxford Worlds
Classics, 1790.
de Jouvenel, Bertrand. The Ethics of Redistribution. Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty
Fund, 1990.
Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot. New York: BN
Publishing, 2008.
. Liberty for the 21st Century: Contemporary Libertarian Thought, edited
by Tibor Machan and Douglas B. Rasmussen. Lanham, Md.: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1995.
Meyer, Frank S. In Defence of Freedom and Related Essays. Indianapolis, Ind.:
Liberty Fund, 1996.
Muller, Jerry. Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from
David Hume to the Present. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Nashe, George. The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945.
Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 1998.
Nisbet, Robert. Conservatism: Dream and Reality. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1986.
Oakeshott, Michael. The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism. New
Haven:Yale University Press, 1996.
. Rationalism in Politics. Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 1991.
Pieper, Josef. Tradition: Concept and Claim, translated by E. Christian Kopf.
Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2008.
Schneider, Gregory, ed. Conservatism in America Since 1930. New York: New
York University Press, 2003.
Stelzer, Irwin, ed. The Neocon Reader. New York: Grove Press, 2004.
Weaver, Richard. Ideas Have Consequences. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984.
Conservative Parties
In the Western world, conservative parties are traditionally
the parties of landed interest. They generally represent the
preservation of traditional moral teaching and a belief in a
transcendental order, a denial of uniformity and equalitarianism, an acceptance of the organic structure of society, and a
subscription to evolutionary rather than revolutionary change
in societies. In short, rather than being an ideology, conservatism represents a way of life or accumulation of values as
opposed to those ideologies that emerged after the French
Revolution (19891799) and Industrial Revolution in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
ORIGINS OF CONSERVATISM
The term conservatism is often used to describe tradition
and traditional values, beliefs, and institutions. Although the
origins of some conservative parties, such as the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, can be traced back to
the seventeenth century, the term conservative is exclusively
modern, having developed after the Enlightenment and the
French Revolution with its reactionary tone to occurrences
in rapidly industrializing Western societies.
Consociational Democracy
Consociational democracy is an electoral and civil arrangement
that attempts to incorporate and share power throughout the
various politically salient subgroups within a given society.
Constitution writers and politicians in deeply divided countries such as Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Cyprus,
India, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Netherlands, South Africa, and
Switzerland used consociational arrangements to deal with
the fragmentation within their societies many years before
scholarly interest in power-sharing democracies developed.
Consociational arrangements were implemented as a means
of addressing internal, enduring conflicts that had frequently
erupted into violence. These cleavages often form along class,
linguistic, religious, or race lines. For the states mentioned
above, and other countries throughout the world, consociationalism represented an alternative to majority-rule democracy and a belief that pursuing policies of accommodation
could best reduce the potential for conflict within a given
society.
Consociational democracy rests on four principles: (1) grand
coalition as a means of achieving broad representation in political decision making, particularly at the executive level; (2) segmental autonomy in matters of self-interest for the subgroups
(e.g., schools and culture); (3) proportional representation in
the legislature; and (4) veto rights for all subgroups on matters
of substantial importance to the subgroup. Although the first
modern researcher to use the term as it is understood today
was the economist Sir Arthur Lewis (1965), Arend Lijphart
and Gerhard Lehmbruch introduced consociational democracy to political science in 1967. Emphasizing the importance
of institutional configurations, they broke with the dominant
belief within the discipline that ethnic homogeneity was the
most important element in societal stability. The early work of
these scholars focused on the consociational practices of several
smaller countries in Europe. To date, political science research
on consociational democracy is still most readily associated
with Lijphart.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In Western Europe, the track record of consociational democracy has been largely successful (except perhaps in Belgium).
Indeed, in several countries such as Austria, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg consociational arrangements proved so successful that the prominence of consociational democracy has
receded as it has become less necessary to stem conflict. In
other parts of the world, the record is mixed. While Colombian, Indian, Malaysian, and South African experiments with
consociationalism can be seen as largely successful, Cyprus
and Lebanons consociational systems each ended in civil
war. After shifting from consociational or semiconsociational
systems to more majoritarian patterns of governance, Uruguay in 1973 and Suriname in 1980 each became subject to
martial rule. In the case of Lebanon, outside factors brought
extraordinary pressure to bear on the consociational system
that had worked rather well up to that point. In Uruguay
and Suriname, each countrys movement toward majority
Constant de Rebeque,
Henri-Benjamin
French politician and writer Henri-Benjamin Constant de
Rebeque (17671830), born in Switzerland and educated in
Scotland and Germany, was an important advocate of liberal
politics in postrevolutionary France.
Although Constant was not in France during the French
Revolution (17891799), he returned soon after the Reign
of Terror and dove into political life. He opposed Napoleon
Bonaparte strongly enough that the dictator ousted him from
the government and exiled him for more than ten years. During his exile, Constant wrote some of his most important
political theory (including Principles of Politics in 1810), as well
as an influential romantic novel (Adolphe in 1816) and much
of his lifelong project on the history of ancient religion (De
la religion from 18241831). He also wrote a powerful critique
of Napoleons rule in 1814 that would strike a chord with
twentieth-century readers contemplating the totalitarianisms
of their time (The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation). Despite
his long opposition to Napoleon, he agreed to write a constitution for the new imperial regime when Napoleon returned
to power briefly in 1815. Although never implemented, his
plan influenced later constitutional experiments in France and
elsewhere. Following the Bourbon restoration in 1814, Constant returned to politics, occupying a seat in the Chamber of
Deputies from 1819 to 1822 and 1824 to 1830, where his spirited rhetoric helped to create a strong opposition and foster a
partisan style of politics on the British model.
Constant was one of the first writers to use the word liberal to describe his political stance. Strongly influenced by
the example of Britains constitutional monarchy, he spoke
out forcefully on behalf of limited government, a free press,
and religious toleration. In his more theoretical writings, he
followed Scottish thinkers David Hume and Adam Smith in
praising commercial society, but he was more interested in the
political challenges of instituting and governing such societies
than these thinkers had been, and he explored questions about
institutional design in more detail. He defended a system of
representative government that would be resistant to the consolidation of authority and the arbitrary use of power. His
institutional scheme included checks and balances between
parts of government, a gradual expansion of suffrage in conjunction with a property requirement, a neutral power in the
monarch to help adjudicate among the various active powers,
and a new style of federalism that would leave decisions in
the hands of local institutions whenever practicable. The July
Revolution of 1830, just months before his death, finally realized some of the measures that he had advocated.
Among political theorists, Constant is best known for his
1819 lecture On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared with
That of the Moderns, which argued that modern peoples
should not pursue the form of liberty associated with ancient
Sparta and Rome. Instead of requiring constant involvement
in politics, sacrifice for the public good, and warlike virtues,
Constituency
A constituency has two central meanings in the context of electoral systems. The first is also known as an electoral district,
riding, or voting area. It refers to a geographical area of a
country or region, or a local area, that is legislatively divided,
usually for electoral purposes. Single-member districts elect
one representative to a legislative body, while multimember
districts elect more than one representative. The number of
representatives elected per district is known as the district magnitude. The geographic size and number of representatives
elected in each constituency are determined by the electoral
system in place. Constituency boundaries, or electoral boundaries, are also often distributed and readjusted based on geographic and population considerations, including population
parity or equality; regional population features; and in order
to recognize community and diversity interests.
The second meaning of constituency refers to any particular group of electors, bound by a shared geography for the
purposes of electoral districting, or bound by shared demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, ethnicity or nationality, culture, language, religion, or other attributes. Within this
meaning, a constituent is a single individual who is part of the
larger constituency, or group.
See also District Magnitude; Districting; Electoral Geography;
Gerrymandering.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JENNIFER E. DALTON
Constituency Relations
When legislators are elected from specific geographic districts, significant resources are typically devoted to constituency relationsactivity characterized by interaction between
REPRESENTATION
Constituency relations serve two distinct functions for a
legislator. First, a legislators interactions with constituents
can facilitate representation by providing crucial information
about the represented citizens. As political scientist Richard
Fenno notes in his 1978 book Home Style: House Members in
Their Districts, regarding constituents, it is critical for a member of Congress and, implicitly, a member of any representative body, to know who they are, what they think, and what
they want (233). Constituency relations are an important way
for legislators to gain such knowledge. Sometimes a legislator
will gather information directly, meeting with constituents
individually or in small groups.
When legislators are in their home districts, their schedules
are filled with community events; for example, representatives
often give speeches at graduation ceremonies, present awards
for civic organizations, and hold town-hall-style meetings for
the public. Such occasions give legislators ample opportunities
to hear the views and concerns of the people they represent.
They also offer opportunities to curry favor with the people
they represent, thus serving a second purpose, helping legislators reelection efforts.
IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUENCY
RELATIONS
Constitutional Amendments
Article V of the U.S. Constitution provides two processes
for proposing and two processes for ratifying amendments.
Consistent with the role of the Constitution as a superior
law designed to rein in legislative and other governmental
powers, both processes are designed to be more difficult than
the processes for ordinary legislation. Congress must either
muster a two-thirds majority to propose amendments, or, in
a still unused provision, two-thirds of the states can request
Congress to call a convention to propose amendments.Threefourths of the state legislatures, or special conventions within
three-fourths of the states (a mechanism used only in the case
of the amendment repealing national alcoholic prohibition),
must subsequently approve them.
MODERN AMENDMENTS
Subsequent amendments have been largely inconsequential
by comparison. The Twentieth Amendment (1933) shortened
the so-called lame-duck service of the president and members
of Congress after new elections.The Twenty-first Amendment
(1933) repealed the Eighteenth. The Twenty-second Amendment (1951), adopted in the wake of Franklin D. Roosevelts
unprecedented election to four terms, capped future presidential service at two full terms or no more than ten years. The
Twenty-third Amendment (1961) provided for representation
in the electoral college for the District of Columbia while the
Twenty-fourth (1964) prohibited the poll tax in national elections. The Twenty-fifth Amendment (1967) made provision
for presidential disability, the Twenty-sixth (1971) provided for
national voting at age eighteen, thus effectively negating the
Supreme Court decision in Oregon v. Mitchell (1970), which
had ruled that Congress could only legislate on this matter relative to national elections. Finally, the Twenty-seventh
amendment, originally proposed as part of the Bill of Rights
and limiting the timing of congressional pay raises until after
intervening elections, was putatively ratified in 1992.
Constitutional Courts
Constitutional courts are judicial bodies that possess the authority to nullify or invalidate actions taken or laws enacted by
governmental officials on the grounds that those actions or
laws are violations of that countrys constitution. This power
of a court to authoritatively determine whether a legislative
enactment or executive action is constitutional or unconstitutional is known as judicial review. The origin of judicial review is commonly considered to have come from the
United States and the U.S. Supreme Courts landmark and
politically critical decision in Marbury v. Madison (1803). It is
in this case that Chief Justice John Marshall carved out this
power of judicial review for the U.S. Supreme Court, even
though the U.S. Constitution does not specifically enumerate
this authority in the first place, nor does it attach such a power
CONTROVERSIES
There are several inherent controversies with constitutional
courts (as well as supreme courts) as they engage in judicial
review. The first revolves around unelected, relatively politically unaccountable judges striking down and invalidating
actions or measures taken by the peoples elected representatives. With its judicial second-guessing, this antimajoritarian
posture strikes some as problematically antidemocratic. The
second controversy engages the challenging conundrum of
how exactly these judges are supposed to go about interpreting their nations constitution to help them decide whether
a statute or governmental activity is truly unconstitutional.
The ongoing debate between judicial activism and judicial restraint manifests directly in these types of questions.
How much deference these judges should show the elected
Constitutional Democracy
A constitutional democracy is a form of representative, democratic governance, in which the constitution, or rule of law, is
supreme. This type of democracy is premised on the doctrine
of the separation of powers, resulting in a system of checks
and balances. The separation of powers manifests through the
constitutional authority that each branch of government exercises in checking and balancing the other branches of government. A constitutional democracy normally consists of three
largely independent branches; the functions of each, however,
do not operate in complete exclusivity. The executive branch
is responsible for the administrative implementation of legislation; the legislature enacts and amends laws; and the judiciary
interprets, and applies, the law based on precedence and legislative statutes. Each branch may be elected or appointed.
Constitutional democracies may be unitary, federal, or
confederal, but most states are unitary. Unitary states are constitutionally governed as one single unit with authority stemming from a single legislature. In a unitary state, there may
be subgovernmental units, but they are created and abolished
by the central government. Any powers that subgovernmental units hold are granted and amended by the central government without the need for formal agreement from the
subgovernmental unitsa process known as devolution. A
devolved state is unitary in nature, but the subgovernmental units have a great deal of autonomous decision-making
authority, much like federal systems. Nevertheless, the subgovernmental units do not have any constitutional authority
to override national legislation or to protect the powers they
have been granted.
Federal governments consist of a central or national government alongside other autonomous legislatures, such as state
Constitutional Law
From a formal point of view, constitutional law is a normative
fountain from which all other secondary norms are derived. In
a pure theory of law, a constitution is the fundamental norm
of the state. It represents simply the basic authorizing norm of
a legal system, being at the top of a coherent and hierarchical
order, as described by legal philosopher and international jurist
Hans Kelsen in his various works during the 1960s. Constitutional rules are often collected in a written chart, especially in
countries with Roman legal tradition, characterized by a clear
distinction between constitutional law and other branches of
law. Yet, the presence of a code is not an essential element: As
Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori observed in 1962,
although most countries have a constitutional text, only a few
of them have a form of constitutionalism.
To understand such a key pointand paradoxthe formal
interpretation of constitutional law is not enough. Turning to
a functional perspective, only the idea of restriction of powers connotes the specific function of constitutional law. First,
modern constitutions interpret the liberal aspiration to protect
citizens against the arbitrariness of political powers: They limit
political power by defining rules of its exercise, and according
to Samuel E. Finer in Five Constitutions, regulate the allocation
of functions, power, and duties among the various agencies and
offices of government, and define the relationships between
these and the public (15). Starting from the eighteenth century,
the presence of a garantiste component characterizes constitutional law on the basis of its telos: the constitution guarantees
itself to the citizens by providing a frame of government and
the institutional devices that would structure its observance.
Modern constitutionalism is new in the sense that in any state
in which the will of the government has no check upon it from
the constitution, there is in reality no constitution, and that
state is in fact a despotism, as explained by Charles H. McIlwain
in his 1940 book Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern.
Procedural conception of constitutional law has emphasized, especially in the new world, the definition of a system
of separate institutions competing for powers. According to
See also Checks and Balances; Constitution Amending Procedures; Constitutional Democracy; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Hume, David; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FORTUNATO MUSELLA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bogdanor,Vernon. Constitutions in Democratic Politics. Aldershot: Gower, 1988.
Elkin, Stephen L., and Karol E. Soltan. New Constitutionalism: Designing
Political Institutions for a Good Society. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1993.
Finer, Samuel E. Five Constitutions. New York: Penguin Books, 1979.
Fredrich, Carl J. Constitutional Government and Democracy:Theory and Practice
in Europe and America, 4th ed. Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell, 1968.
Habermas, Jrgen, and William Rehg. Constitutional Democracy: A
Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles? Political Theory 29, no. 6
(2001): 766781.
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers,
edited by Charles R. Kesler. New York: Signet, 1999.
Jennings, Ivor W. The Law and the Constitution. London: University of
London Press, 1933.
Jones, Charles. The Separated Presidency. The New American Political
System, 2nd ed., edited by Anthony King. Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1990.
Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of State and Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1945.
. Pure Theory of Law, translated by Max Knight. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1967.
Marshall, Geoffrey. Constitutional Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1971.
McIlwain, Charles H. Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1940.
Mortati, Costantino. La Costituzione in senso materiale. Giuffr: Milano, 1940.
Murphy, Walter F. Constitutionalism. In International Encyclopedia of the
Social and Behavioral Sciences, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes,
26412643. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2001.
Sartori, Giovanni. Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion. American
Political Science Review 56, no. 4 (1962): 853864.
Wills, Garry Explaining America:The Federalist. Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1981.
Constitutional Monarchy
Constitutional monarchy is a type of government in which a
sovereign can rule under the limits of a constitution. The text
of the constitution or its principles limit the sovereign power,
and subsequently, government ministers formulate parliamentary acts and assume responsibility for the government.
However, the sovereign has to sign these acts, and constitutionally, they are considered to be acts of the sovereign, which
is politically neutral authority. Aligned with the idea that the
king can do no wrong, in a constitutional monarchy, the
sovereign still keeps some ceremonial and formal powers (e.g.,
nomination of a prime minister or dissolution of parliament),
as well as prerogative powers. The most important of the sovereigns rights are the following: the right to be consulted,
the right to encourage, and the right to warn (from Walter
Bagehots trinity of rights).
Constitutional Systems,
Comparative
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEMS
Most countries of the world have written constitutions establishing basic rights and regulating the relationships between
public offices, and between these public offices and the public.
During the late middle ages and early modern times, constitutions were mainly devices for establishing local, sectoral, or
individual rights and limiting powers. But as those old powers to be limited were autocratic, constitutionalism almost
naturally advanced with the expansion of suffrage rights
and democratization. Nondemocratic constitutions are still
relatively abundant in some parts of the world. As of 2005,
of the 126 independent countries with information on their
constitutional laws collected, only 62 percent were considered
electoral democraciesand only 46 percent were called
free countries, according to separate data lists provided by
Axel Tschentscher and Freedom House. But the number of
constitutional democracies rose enormously during the last
quarter of the twentieth century, encompassing for first time a
majority of total world population by 1996. (Major exceptions
are China, the Arab region, and the Middle East.) Thus, constitutionalism has been increasingly linked to democratization.
With broadening suffrage and democratization, the nonelected monarchs powers were reduced, while those of the
elected assembly expanded, especially regarding the control
of executive ministers, thus moving towards a parliamentary
regime. The powers of the one-person monarch were largely
transferred to the prime minister elected by the parliament. In
recent times, there are parliamentary regimes in about half of
the democratic countries in the world. Some of these regimes
are British-style monarchical variants, such as Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. Others are of the republican
variant, such as Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, and Switzerland.
DUAL-EXECUTIVE REGIMES
After World War I (19141918), Finland and Germany
experimented with a different variant of political regime with
separate elections and divided powersusually called a semipresidential or dual-executive regime. This variant was more consistently shaped with the 1958 constitution of France. With
this formula, the presidency and the assembly are elected
separately, as in a checks-and-balances regime, but it is the
assembly that appoints and can dismiss a prime minister, as in
RECENT TRENDS
Recent trends favor democratic constitutional formulas permitting relatively high levels of social inclusiveness, political
pluralism, policy stability, and democracy endurance. Actually,
almost no new democracy established in the world during
the broad third wave of democratization starting in 1974 has
adopted the British-style constitutional model of parliamentary regime with majoritarian electoral rules and single-party
cabinets. Of the democratic countries with more than one
million inhabitants, fewer than one-sixth use parliamentary
constitutional formulas with a majoritarian electoral formula,
while more than one-third are parliamentary regimes with
proportional representation electoral rules and multiparty
coalition cabinets, and about one half are checks-and-balances
regimes or its presidentialist and semi-presidential variants.
See also Checks and Balances; Constitutional Democracy; Constitutional Monarchy; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Dual
Executive; Parliamentary Democracy; Presidencialismo; Prime Minister (Head of Government); Semi-presidential System.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOSEP M. COLOMER
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Bogdanor,Vernon, ed. The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Colomer, Josep M. Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001.
Dahl, Robert A. How Democratic is the American Constitution? New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2002.
Duverger, Maurice, ed. Les rgimes semi-prsidentiels. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1986.
Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2005. Washington: Freedom House,
2005.
Grofman, Bernard, ed. The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism. New
York: Agathon, 1989.
Lijphart, Arend, ed. Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992.
Sartori, Giovanni. Comparative Constitutional Engineering. London: Macmillan,
1994.
Tschentscher, Axel. International Constitutional Law. University of Bern,
2005. www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl.
Constitution Amending
Procedures
From early Greek history, as scholar Melissa Schwartzberg
has observed, democracies were associated with constant legal
change. Like legislation, constitutions also require change as
circumstances alter and as flaws reveal themselves.
CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
Amending processes seek to promote deliberation and reflect
consensus; federal systems also provide input for national and
subnational actors. In the United States, for example, these
goals are reflected in the mechanisms that Article V of the U.S.
Constitution established for proposing and ratifying amendments. Two-thirds of the state legislatures under the Constitution have never yet requested that Congress call a convention
to propose amendments. Instead, two-thirds majorities in
both houses of Congress have proposed all twenty-seven U.S.
amendments. They have all been ratified by three-fourths of
the states, acting in all cases but one through their legislatures.
ENTRENCHMENT CLAUSES
Some constitutions attempt to entrench certain institutions or
values against regular alteration. Article V of the U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits any state from being deprived of
its equal representation in the U.S. Senate without its consent.
The U.S. Constitution does not mention any other substantive
limits on the process, but courts in some countriesIndia and
Germany, for examplehave struck down some proposed
constitutional changes as inconsistent with the document as a
whole, and hence unconstitutional.
Constitutions, Unwritten
An unwritten constitution is the body of legislation, rules, regulations, and common law recognized by legislators, executives, and courts as the binding laws that legitimize, guide,
and limit a governments powers and authority as well as the
publics rule of law. With an unwritten constitution, the body
of laws are not enumerated within a single, formal document
as witnessed in Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Unlike a written constitution, an unwritten constitution is modified gradually, changing by accretion of new laws,
often in response to the evolving needs and environment of
its sovereign state. Of note, there are numerous statutes of an
unwritten constitution that do exist in written form, causing
some to prefer the term uncodified constitution, on the premise
so much of these unwritten constitutions have been documented but not itemized. For example, the United Kingdoms
Houses of Parliament have the ability to approve an act of
Parliament, which is a specific primary written piece of legislature serving as an addendum to previous laws or establishment of an entirely new law.
A primary trait of the unwritten constitution is the flexibility by which these constitutions have to effectively adopt new
statutes or modernize existing legislature addressing emerg
ing political prerogatives. Governments ruled by unwritten
constitutions do not typically have sovereign executives or legislators with constitutional supremacy; therefore, the political,
legislative, and civic institutions grew up together as the result
of continuous adaptation and accretion of customs rather than
abiding to a deliberate, static set of limited powers. There is no
singular institution designed specifically to control the principles and implementation of legislation as demonstrated by
the U.S. Supreme Court, which not only is the highest appeals
court but is responsible for upholding judicial review and the
system of checks and balances on congressional and executive
powers. Moreover, an evolutionary democratic system based
on an unwritten constitution does not mean a flexible constitution equates to unstable governance as demonstrated by the
United Kingdom. Stability prevails in this system by depending on the peoples feeling about the fundamental political
values the legal system ought to honor.
From a constitutional perspective, the U.K. unwritten constitution is a special case of combining legal and nonconventional rules that provide the framework of government and
dictate the behavior of the main political institutions. Juridical
supremacy is practiced among all the supreme powers of the
state, to include the Crown, Parliament, and cabinet, which
can modify or abrogate British constitutional institutions and
rules. This parliamentary supremacy and sovereignty in lawmaking make it difficult to distinguish between laws considered to comprise the original unwritten constitution and
those laws that have gradually become part of it. Many contemporary political scientists even question the possibility to
enumerate the exact number of constitutional laws embodied
in the British unwritten constitution.
Constitutions and
Constitutionalism
A constitution is a set of basic rules for making collective
decisions. Rules producing enforceable decisions can solve
coordination and cooperation dilemmas, which may induce
individuals to prefer constraining rules to settings in which
every human interaction should be adjusted independently.
However, different rules may favor different decisions with
differently distributed benefits among individuals and groups.
TWO CATEGORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
Two categories of constitutional rules can be distinguished:
(1) those to regulate the division of powers among the
The parliamentary regime resulted historically from the process of enhancing the role of the elected assembly and limiting
the monarchs powers. According to the English or Westminster model, parliament became the sovereign institution, also
assuming the power of appointing and dismissing ministers,
while the monarch remained a ceremonial although nonaccountable figure. The Third French Republic established in
the late nineteenth century was the first democratic republic
with a parliamentary regime. This type of regime produces
political congruence between the legislative and the executive
and some fusion of institutional powers.
Specifically, in parliamentary regimes with majoritarian
electoral rules, a single party, even with a minority electoral
support, usually can find sufficient institutional levers to win
an assembly majority, appoint the prime minister, and form a
government. In these situations, power tends to concentrate in
the hands of the prime minister, which led to an interpretation of the development of political parties as a force eroding
The more direct political consequences of different constitutional formulas regard the type, party composition, and degree
of stability of governments. The rest of political, economic,
and social consequences from constitutions should be considered relatively remote, indirect and identifiable in terms of
constraints, limits, and opportunities, rather than determining
Constructivism 323
on different congressional issues. This second mechanism creates different but enduring political supports to decisions on
each issue and also tends to produce relative policy stability.
A number of empirical studies show that parliamentary
regimes with proportional representation perform better
regarding electoral participation, low levels of politically motivated violence, womens representation, and social and environmental policies. They also appear to be associated to better
growth-promoting policies, although they tend to imply relatively high taxes and public spending, which do not necessarily favor growth. Parliamentary regimes with proportional
representation tend to develop broad programs benefiting a
majority of the voters, including redistribution through social
security and welfare policies, in contrast to narrower targets in
both parliamentary regimes with majoritarian elections and
presidential regimes. Other favorable conditions for economic
growth include administrative effectiveness and an independent judiciary, which may be favored by a robust and pluralistic democratic regime. However, economic performance
also depends on other factors, such as economic institutions
(including those regulating property rights, contracts, and
finances) and an educated population able to make technological innovation available and operational, which may not be
directly associated with specific constitutional formulas.
Different constitutional alternatives have been linked to
different rates of success in attempts of democratization and
the duration of democratic regimes. Strategic choices of different constitutional formulas may be driven by actors relative bargaining strength, electoral expectations, and attitudes to
risk. Citizens and political leaders tend to support those formulas producing satisfactory results for themselves and reject
those making them permanently excluded and defeated. As a
consequence, those constitutional formulas producing widely
distributed satisfactory outcomes can be more able to develop
endogenous support and endure. Widely representative and
effective political outcomes can feed social support for the
corresponding institutions, while exclusionary, biased, arbitrary, or ineffective outcomes might foster citizens and leaders
rejection of the institutions producing such results.
Generally, constitutional democracies favoring power sharing and inclusiveness should be able to obtain higher endogenous support and have greater longevity than those favoring
the concentration of power. Empirical accounts show that
democratic regimes are the most peaceful ones, while semidemocratic or transitional regimes are most prone to conflict,
even more than exclusionary dictatorships (basically because
the latter increase the costs of rebellion). Among democracies,
parliamentary constitutional regimes are more resilient to crises
and more able to endure than presidential ones. More specifically, parliamentary regimes with majoritarian electoral systems
appear to be associated to higher frequency of ethnic and civil
wars than presidential regimes, while parliamentary regimes
with proportional representation are the most peaceful ones.
See also Coalition Theory; Cohabitation; Constitutional Law;
Constitutional Monarcy; Constitutional Systems, Comparative;
Constructivism
The term constructivism encompasses several schools of
thought that emphasize the role of social constructions in the
study and practice of politics. Social constructions are defined
as shared interpretations or ideas on how the material world
is or should be ordered. Constructions are neither objective,
since they exist only by virtue of being agreed on by more or
less extended groups of individuals, nor subjective, given their
collective nature. Rather, they are intersubjective.
Social constructions operate at the epistemological as
well as the ontological level. On the one hand, they provide
324 Constructivism
communities of scholars with common understandings of the
reality they face; on the other hand, they are intersubjective
structures influencing political life. While most, if not all, constructivists acknowledge the existence of both dimensions,
they are divided as to which dimension should be assigned
more weight in the analysis of political phenomena. This disagreement underlies the main cleavage in the constructivist
campthat between postmodern and modern constructivism.
POSTMODERN CONSTRUCTIVISM
The most radical of the two variants, postmodern constructivism, points to the role of constructions in the so-called
scientific process to attack the positivist underpinnings of
mainstream political science. Positivism asserts the existence
of an objective political reality whose laws can be progressively discovered through the formulation and testing of theories. For postmodern constructivists, conversely, the presence
of unobservable elements in any account of politics, and the
need to replace these elements with assumptions and mental
constructs, makes theory building necessarily a socially laden
enterprise: one in which the formulation of hypotheses on
the political world hinges to a large extent on the researchers
cultural, ideological, and political convictions. Empirical work,
according to postmodern constructivists, can do very little to
increase the objectivity of research. For one thing, the complexity of the sociopolitical reality, where perfect empirical
tests are rare, and the ever-present possibility of formulating
ad hoc explanations make it very hard, if not impossible, to
disprove any theory. Second, and perhaps more important,
most testing methods and procedures are themselves theory
driven, and hence biased in favor of the hypotheses they are
meant to evaluate.
The resulting view of science is very far from the positivist
ideals of neutrality, universality, and progress. For postmodern
constructivists, the subjects (i.e., researchers) and the objects
of political research can never be fully separated. If there are
dominant theories in certain historical periods, this is due less
to their actual validity than to their consistency with prevailing cultures or professional orientations influencing scholars
interpretation of the political reality. To the extent that any
meaningful political research can exist at all, the postmodern
constructivists conclude that it can only be a theoretically and
methodologically anarchic activity, in which no approach
can be deemed more scientific than others and, ultimately,
anything goes.
MODERN CONSTRUCTIVISM
Unlike their postmodern counterparts, modern constructivists do not take their concern with the intersubjectivity
of the scientific process as far as rejecting positivism altogether. While partially constructed, they contend, competing
accounts of the political world are not all the same, and careful empirical research, combined with theoretical debate, can
help the scholarly community distinguish between plausible
and untenable explanations. At least in the long run, in sum,
positivist research methods can result in a faithful depiction of
the sociopolitical reality.
Consultants, Political
Political consultants are professionals who assist candidates
running for office by providing one or more specialized services. They work on an ad hoc basis, taking a different set
of clients each election cycle. The work is typically done on
a fee-for-service basis and confined to the specific election
cycle. Consultants may work individually, or more typically, as
part of a political consulting firm comprised of many professionals who provide the variety of service(s) the firm offers.
Consultants are fixtures in campaigns at all levels in modern American electoral politics. Presidential candidates have
Consumer Society
The term consumer society refers to modern capitalist societies
that are organized around increasing levels of consumption.
The key features generally include a culture dominated by
fashion, advertising, and mass marketing; aspirations, lifestyles,
and identities tied to conspicuous consumption; and a lack of
traditional moral restraints on individual desires. While some
scholars see the emergence of consumer societies as part of
the natural trajectory of capitalist development, most who
use the term critique what they see as the irrationality and
wastefulness of consumer capitalism.
Containment 327
unsustainable and immoral. Many religious traditions have long
been critical of the morality of consumer societies in which secular, materialist values of pleasure seeking and profligacy crowd
out traditional values of restraint, spirituality, and charity. The
effects of advertising and consumer culture on the family, particularly children who are subjected to thousands of messages promoting consumption and instant gratification every day, have
also traditionally been areas of concern. These criticisms have
inspired a small but growing number of anticonsumerist rebels
to reject the consumer societyto get off the treadmilland
embrace voluntary simplicity.
More radical critics paint a darker picture. German philosopher-sociologists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno,
seeking to understand why workers in capitalist nations were
not revolutionary, found one answer in the ideological functions of consumer culture. In capitalist societies, the culture
industry indoctrinates and manipulates consumers; creates
false needs; and produces passive, alienated individuals who are
incapable of critical thought or resistance. Taking the criticism
to the next level, French sociologist Jean Baudrillard argues
that consumer culture has imploded into every aspect of life to
the extent that there are no longer true needs to be alienated
from or manipulated.
REACTIONS
Theories of the consumer society have come under criticism
from both the right and the left. For libertarians, these perspectives are elitist and paternalistic for asserting that consumers make choices that are not in their interest (i.e., if consumer
goods do not make people happy, why do they buy them?),
and moralistic for assuming that a simple life is superior to
other freely chosen lifestyles. American sociologist Michael
Schudson defends advertising from charges of manipulation
by pointing out that many advertising campaigns are unsuccessful. These critics point to another paradox: If we are all
manipulated by the forces of the consumer society, then how
is it that an enlightened few have escaped its grasp, and can see
how the rest of us are manipulated?
While the left largely accepts the critique of consumer
capitalism, many are uncomfortable with what they see as the
essentially conservative (or even puritanical) nature of perspectives that advocate simplicity and frugality. Others fear that
the radical theories are fatalistic and disempowering, leaving
little space for opposing the consumer society or constructing an alternative. Some feminists argue that the depiction of
consumers is genderedsince women have historically been
associated with consumption and have been stereotyped as
irrational and easily manipulated.
See also Critical Theory; Environmental Political Theory; Veblen,
Thorstein.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ALLAN MACNEILL
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Baudrillard, Jean. Consumer Society. In Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings,
edited by Mark Poster. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
Durning, Alan. How Much Is Enough? The Consumer Society and the Future of
the Earth. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992.
Containment
At the outset of the cold war, George F. Kennan developed
the containment concept in a major formulation of how the
United States should handle the threats posed by Joseph Stalins Soviet Union. Kennan first discussed his ideas in The
Sources of Soviet Conduct, which he authored anonymously
in 1947 under the name X in Foreign Affairs. In later years,
there have been references to an American policy in the 1990s
of a dual containment of both Iran and Iraq, as well as some
debate about whether American policy toward China should
amount to containment or to engagement.
Some interpreters of Kennans formula vis--vis the Soviet
Union might have seen this as nothing more than the traditional
Contempt of Congress
See Congress, Contempt of.
Content Analysis
Content analysis refers to a method for classifying textual material that involves reducing it to more manageable, categorical,
or quantitative data for use in comparative analysis. The basic
goal of content analysis is to apply a set of explicit procedures
to the analysis of texts to make systematic inferences possible
about the text, the authors, or the intended recipients of the
text. Content analysis differs from discourse analysis in that
the latter typically focuses more on the qualitative interpretation of the meaning of language in texts, paying special attention to how context and conventions are represented through
language. While text typically refers to written documents, it
applies quite generally to recorded verbal behavior of almost
any kind. Commonly analyzed examples include political
speeches, media broadcasts, newspaper editorials, court decisions, business reports, psychological diaries, draft legislation,
correspondence with companies, and the transcripts of customer service phone calls.
Content analysis is commonly used in the study of politics,
media, business, law, psychology, and public administration.
For instance, a political scientist might be interested in analyzing the policy positions of political parties and would turn to
content analysis of the official political programs, known as
manifestos, published by the parties. In fact, the long-standing
Comparative Manifesto Project does just this, unitizing party
manifestos into discrete quasi-sentence units and then assigning
each quasi sentence a policy category from a predefined, fiftysix-category coding scheme.
See also Discourse Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KENNETH BENOIT
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Krippendorff, Klaus. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, 2nd
ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2004.
Weber, Robert Philip. Basic Content Analysis, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif:
Sage Publications, 1990.
Contentious Politics
Contentious politics, in the context of political science, means
episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims
and their objects when: (1) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, and (2) the
claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of
the claimants or objects of claims. Roughly translated, the
definition refers to collective political struggle.
Of course, each term in the definition cries out for further
stipulations. The term episodic, for example, excludes regularly
scheduled events such as votes, parliamentary elections, and
associational meetings. The term public excludes claim making that occurs entirely within well-bounded organizations,
including churches and firms. Contention, of course, occurs
both inside and outside of public politics, but political contention involves government, however peripherally, and thereby
increases the likelihood of intervening coercive agents such as
police and, on the average, increases the stakes of the outcome.
Not all forms of politics are necessarily contentious. Much
of politics consists of ceremony, consultation, bureaucratic process, collection of information, registration of events, educational activities, and the like; these actions usually involve little
if any collective contention. This does not imply that all forms
of contention conform to a single general model. Drawing
upon definitions from Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrows Contentious Politics (2006), Tillys European Revolutions, 14921992
(1993), and Nicholas Sambaniss What Is a Civil War? (2004)
the differences among three major forms of contention clarify
this lack of a general model:
Social movements: sustained challenges to power holders
in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of
those power holders by means of public displays of that populations worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment;
Civil wars: sustained large-scale reciprocal armed conflict between two or more social actors in a populationhowever definedover control of a state or over the demand of
one of the actors to establish its own state;
Revolutions: attempted transfers of power over a state in
the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders
make incompatible claims to control the state, and some significant portion of the population mobilizes on behalf of the
claims of each bloc.
These forms of contention have different dynamics, involve
different combinations of performances, and produce different
levels of violence. Although they can overlap empirically and
easily shift from one to another, they are best understood by
examining what they have in common; they share contentious interaction between makers of claims and others who
recognize that these claims bear on their interests and bring
in government as mediator, target, or claimant. Considering the forms of contention in the same framework helps to
understand three important properties of contentious politics:
(1) the rapid formation and transformation of different forms
of contention; (2) the interactions between actors that form
STRUCTURAL APPROACHES
Structuralism took two forms: classical macrostructural models descended from Marx, in which major societal changes
directly produce shifts in contention; and models of political
structure focusing on the opportunities and threats, along with
the facilitation and repression induced by political institutions
and regimes. Macrostructural models were more popular in
Europe, while political structural models developed in the
United States, especially after the civil rights movement.
But the political process model that resulted soon became the
common property of Americans such as Doug McAdam and
Europeans including Donatella della Porta, Dieter Rucht, and
Hanspeter Kriesi.
Most scholars who focus on the political intermediation
of contentious politics center on a cluster of variables called
political opportunity structure. Opportunity structures are features
of regimes that affect the likely outcomes of actors possible
claims. A reasonably consensual list of those features, noted by
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, include:
1. Multiplicity of independent centers of power within
the regime.
2. The regimes openness to new actors.
LETHAL CONFLICTS
Civil wars and most revolutions involve large-scale lethal
conflicts with special features that set them off from other
forms of contentious politics. Two features in particular make
MECHANISM-AND-PROCESS APPROACHES
Mechanism-and-process-based accounts of contentious politics attempt to specify links among actors, their opponents,
third parties, and institutions in studies of entire episodes of
contention. Relevant mechanisms can be found in the general environment of the actors, in actors dispositions toward
significant others, or in their relations to significant others.
Familiar environmental mechanisms include population shift
or resource increase or depletion. Important dispositional
mechanisms include the attribution of similarity (e.g., identification of another political actor as belonging to the same
category as ones own, a key mechanism in coalition formation). Significant relational mechanisms include brokerage
(e.g., the production of a new connection between previously
unconnected or weakly connected sites). Processes can be
either combinations of simultaneously developing mechanisms or regularly linked sequences of mechanisms.
Some combinations of mechanisms are fortuitous or idiosyncratic, but others combine regularly in robust processes that
can be observed in a wide variety of contentious episodes.The
most fundamental one is mobilization, or the shift of resources
from individuals to collectivities through a combination of
mechanisms.
OPEN QUESTIONS
As in any evolving field, a number of contested issues score
the surface of the study of contentious politics. A brief sketch
of the most important questions include:
Do social movements that do not target the state fall
outside the range of contentious politics?
Are the major outcomes of contentious politics limited
to the policy terrain, or do they also involve cultural change
and biographical impacts?
Do new forms of collective actionparticularly Internet-based campaignschallenge existing approaches to contentious politics, or will they eventually be absorbed into the
repertoire of contention, much as the newspaper and tele
vision were?
Does globalization shift the targets of contention from
national states to something beyond the state, or does it simply add the possibility of forum shopping to claim-making
strategies?
See also Civil Wars; Collective Action,Theory of; Collective Action
and Mobilization; Protests and Demonstrations; Olson, Mancur;
Revolutions; Social Movements; Structuralism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SIDNEY TARROW
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aminzade, Ron, and Doug McAdam. Emotions in Contentious Politics.
In Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, edited by Ron
Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William
H. Sewell Jr., Sidney Tarrow, Douglas McAdam, and Charles Tilly. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal.
Analytic Narratives. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Chong, Dennis. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991.
della Porta, Donatella. Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State:
A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995.
Diani, Mario. Green Networks: A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental
Movement. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.
American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 91106.
Gamson, William. Political Discourse and Collective Action. In From
Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures,
edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow,
219244. Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1988.
Goldstone, Jack, and Charles Tilly. Threat and Opportunity. In Silence and
Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, edited by Ron Aminzade, Jack
A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell
Jr., Sidney Tarrow, Douglas McAdam, and Charles Tilly. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Goffmann, Erving. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.
Goodwin, Jeff, and James Jasper, eds. Rethinking Social Movements: Structure,
Meaning, and Emotion. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.
Klandermans, Bert. Mobilization and Participation in a Social Movement:
Social Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory.
American Sociological Review 49 (1984): 583600.
Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G.
Giugni. New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.
McAdam, Doug. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,
19301970, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Dynamics of Contention.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
McCarthy, John, and Mayer N. Zald. Resource Mobilization and Social
Movements: A Partial Theory. American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977):
12121241.
Melucci, Alberto. Getting Involved. In From Structure to Action: Comparing
Social Movement Research Across Cultures, edited by Bert Klandermans,
Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1988.
Olson, Mancur, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1965.
Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard Cloward. Poor Peoples Movements:Why They
Succeed; How They Fail. New York:Vintage, 1977.
Rochon, Thomas R., and David S. Meyer, eds. Coalitions and Political
Movements:The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1988.
Rucht, Dieter, ed. Research on Social Movements:The State of the Art in Western
Europe and the USA. Frankfurt/Boulder: Campus Verlag/Westview Press,
1991.
Rucht, Dieter, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Neidhardt, eds. Acts of
Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest. Lanham, Md.: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1999.
Sambanis, Nicholas. What is a Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical
Complexities of an Operational Definition. Journal of Conflict Resolution
48 (2004): 814858.
Scott, James. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New
Haven:Yale University Press, 1985.
Smelser, Neil. A Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press, 1962.
Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert
D. Benford. Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and
Movement Participation. American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 464481.
332 Contractarianism
Tilly, Charles. European Revolutions, 14921992. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1978.
. The Politics of Collective Violence. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
. Popular Contention in Great Britain, 17581834. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1995.
Tilly, Charles, and Sidney Tarrow. Contentious Politics. Boulder: Paradigm
Press, 2006.
Contractarianism
Contractarianism is a theory of the development of social
institutions and political morality based on the consent of
free and equal people. It is primarily associated with both the
descriptive and prescriptive elements of liberal political theory.
Descriptively, it aims to explain the origins of political authority and why people form political communities. Prescriptively,
contractarianism provides an account of the legitimate functions of the state and the conditions of political obligations. Its
most well-known historical exponents are Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Its contemporary
adherents include John Rawls and David Gauthier.
Contractarianism is an egalitarian approach to political
morality because all individual interests are taken into account
in the bargaining process. It provides a conventional view of
politics and justice in which the state is created to advance
individual interests, and it contrasts with naturalistic or organic
accounts of politics. Despite these foundations, contractualists
differ significantly as to the legitimate functions of the state and
the extent of ones obligations in political society. Contractarianism is also the subject of significant critical treatment, including
pluralist, associative, and feminist theories of political morality.
Contractualists theorize social cooperation and political
institutions as systems of mutual advantage because rational
people can be expected to consent only to arrangements from
which they benefit. According to Hobbes, life without political institutions is insecure, violent, and underdeveloped. Sovereign individuals pursuing their own interests will inevitably
come into conflict with one another, and without a coercive
third party, find themselves in a ceaseless war of all against all.
In time, their interests and rationality will lead them to form
a contract among each other to mutually transfer their natural
rights to self-preservation, creating the sovereign state charged
with maintaining the conditions of social peace. For Hobbes,
the contract is constitutive of society, politics, property, and
justice; it is also the precondition of peoples capacities to pursue any human goods beyond survival. However, Hobbess
theory is not fully liberal because the social contract creates
an absolute state as opposed to a constitutionally limited state.
Lockes state of nature, in contrast to Hobbes, is a much
more developed situation and comes to include a fully functioning market economy. It is only after time, as inequality
deepens and property becomes less secure, that individuals
enter a social contract to create political authority to avoid
the inconveniences of the state of nature. However, because
individuals enter into the social contract in unequal circumstances, the contract solidifies differences in advantages by
Convenience Voting
Convenience voting is the term used to describe the broad
array of methods used in contemporary democracies to make
it easier for citizens to cast ballots. Types of convenience
Convergence Theory
The central questions for students of convergence begin with
whether, after centuries of industrialization, currently rich
countries become more alike in social structure, culture, and
politics. If they converged, the specific ways that they became
alike are then pondered, followed by explanations for deviations from the common patterns. In this theory, the driving
force that moves modern societies toward common structures,
values, and beliefs is continuing industrialization. Industrialization is defined as the increasing and widespread use of tools
that multiply the effects of their initial applications of energy
and inanimate sources of energy.
High-energy technology is similar to how a hoe increases
the effects of human energy far more when digging a hole for
planting than the stick that preceded it; how a horse-drawn
plow continues to multiply the effects of the human hand;
how the tractor continues the escalation of effects; and how
an atomic bomb can move a mountain, or destroy a city, with
a push of one finger. This idea also applies to recent information technology. The same fingers that operated the keyboard
for a statistical report using the IBM mainframe of the 1950s
can, with the same energy expenditure, now process gargantuan amounts of informationa continuous process of making smaller microprocessors do ever-increasing work. Before
the early modern period, with inanimate sources of energy,
perhaps 80 to 90 percent of the total energy consumed at any
one time was derived from plants, animals, and humansan
intractable limit on their productivity.
The concept of industrialization is most attainable when confined to this technological idea. If all the correlates, along with
CONVERGENT TENDENCIES OF
INDUSTRIALIZATION
Nine major structural and demographic shifts, all rooted in
industrialization, characterize what is truly modern about
modernadvanced industrialsociety. However, as the range
of per capita income from developing to developed countries
For more than a century, education has been the main channel for upward mobility in occupation, income, and social
status. The ambivalent mass demand for some combination of
absolute equality and equality of opportunitywhich often
takes the form of demands for affirmative action or quotas for
those groups presumed to be deprivedhas had little effect
on the essential character of higher education. Colleges and
universities remain meritocratic, very much attuned to the
demands of the economy, and quite vocational in emphasis. Education for alert citizenship and critical thoughtfor
making moral judgments, for the pursuit of wisdom, for the
enhancement of capacities of appreciation and performance
in the arts, and for broader understanding of the individual
in societyall tend to take second place. In recent decades,
the laggards in mass higher education have moved toward the
leader, the United States, and in a few cases have surpassed
it in enrollment ratios. Finally, in response to the intensified
demand for skilled or professional labor and the great variety
of people to be processed, all rich countries now share the
twin trends toward universality, along with specialization of
institutions and curricula in higher education.
With all its variety within and across nations, the technical
and social organization of work is still an area of convergence. Continuing industrialization brought a steady decline
in annual average hours of work from the late nineteenth
century up to about 1960, with a divergence since then as the
At first glance, change in the polity is an area of least convergence; a high level of economic development may not be a
decisive determinant of political systems. But the first eight
areas of most convergence may well foster some convergence
in polities. Among the most solid findings in the literature of
comparative politics are that affluence brings a decline in civil
violence, a decline in coercion as a means of rule, an increase
in persuasion and manipulation, an increase in pluralism, and
less surely, an increase in democracy. All democracies focus on
the market, though all market-oriented political economies
are not democracies.
Economic development at the level of the rich democracies
brings a sharp decline in internal collective political violence,
and even a decline in the intensity of peaceful demonstrations.
The most extensive analysis of this relationship, carried out by
Ted Robert Gurr and published in his 1979 article Political
and Harold Wilensky focus fruitfully on the interaction of economic and noneconomic forces shaping diverse paths of development among nations and regions of the worlda continuing
challenge for researchers today.
See also Democracies, Advanced Industrial; Democratic Transition;
Equality and Inequality; Industrial Democracy; Postindustrial Society;Welfare State.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HAROLD L. WILENSKY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bendix, Reinhard. Work and Authority in Industry: Ideologies of Management in
the Course of Industrialization. New York: John Riley, 1956.
Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical
Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven:Yale University Press,
1989.
. Some Explanations. In Political Oppositions in Western Democracies,
edited by R. A. Dahl, 348386. New Haven:Yale University Press,
1966.
Diamond, Larry. Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered.
American Behavioral Scientist 35, 45 (1992): 450499.
Dore, Ronald. Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in
the Japanese Economy, 197080. London: Athlone, 1986.
Evans, Peter B. Dependent Development:The Alliance of Multinational, State
and Local Capital in Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Frank, Andre Gunder. Capitalism Under Development in Latin America. New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
Gurr, Ted Robert. Political Protest and Rebellion in the 1960s: The U.S.
in World Perspective. In Violence in America, edited by Hugh Davis
Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, 4976. London: Sage Publications,
1979.
Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, eds. Varieties of Capitalism:The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Inkeles, Alex, and David Smith. Becoming Modern: Individual Change in
Six Developing Countries. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1974.
Kerr, Clark, Frederick H. Harbison, John T. Dunlop, and Charles A. Myers.
Industrialism and Industrial Man:The Problem of Labor and Management in
Economic Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East.
Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1958.
Lijphart, Arend. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government
in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven:Yale University Press, 1984.
Lindblom, Charles E. Politics and Markets:The Worlds Political Economic
Systems. New York: Basic Books, 1977.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited.
American Sociological Review 59 (1994): 122.
Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.
Moore, Wilbert E. Industrialization and Labor: Social Aspects of Economic
Development. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951.
ODonnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule:Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986.
Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens.
Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1992.
Cooperation, International
See International Cooperation.
Cooperative Security
The concept of cooperative security arose in the United States
during the later stages of the cold war period as it became
apparent that the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev
was not as inclined to imperial aggression as had been earlier
assumed. Although Soviet forces in East Central Europe were
evidently configured to attempt to occupy Western Europe in
the event of war, it was conceded that such a posture could
reflect an underlying intention not to initiate war, but simply to defend Soviet territory in a manner informed by the
experience of World War II (19391945). If so, then it might
be possible to stabilize the situation by negotiating measures
designed to prevent surprise attack. These were officially
termed confidence-building measures, but the phrase cooperative
security was used as an expression of the underlying principle,
namely, that each side would cede the legitimacy of territorial
defense and would cooperate to impose restraint on offensive
operations.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its alliance
system, the original focus of concern essentially disappeared. A
combined arms assault was no longer possible on continental
scale, and the engagement of nuclear weapons in such an event
was no longer the potential trigger for global catastrophe it
was once considered to be. Primary security concerns shifted
to more localized forms of conflict and to the process of weapons proliferation. In particular, it was recognized that the Russian Federation as principal successor to the Soviet Union had
inherited a nearly intractable set of security burdensmost
notably, a contracting economy that could not support the
remnants of Soviet conventional forces redeployed from East
Central Europe, deterrent forces still actively engaged with the
increasingly more capable American forces, and a fractured
system for exercising managerial control over the massive arsenal of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union had assembled.
In this new context, the Carnegie Corporation of New
York, a leading American foundation, initiated a special project
Copyright 339
the primary source of threat is said to come from civil violence and associated terrorism, apparently arising from conditions of endemic economic austerity. Those forms of violence,
the argument holds, undermine basic legal order necessary to
support global economic performance and thereby threaten
the dominant common interest all countries have in assuring
their own economic performance. If so, then cooperation for
mutual protection can be expected to emerge as the primary
imperative of security policy, even for the United States.
It may take some time before the viability and endurance
of the cooperative security idea can be reliably judged. Both
its conceptual and its practical standing appear to depend on
the eventual fate of the realist and the globalist perspectivesa
contest that, at least in the United States, is yet to be decided.
NEW CHALLENGES
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Carter, Ashton B., William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner. A New Concept
of Cooperative Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992.
Goodby, James E. The Stockholm Conference: Negotiating a Cooperative Security
System for Europe. Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Foreign
Affairs, 1986.
Nolan, Janne E. Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st
Century. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994.
Posen, Barry R., and Andrew L. Ross. Competing Visions for U.S. Grand
Strategy. International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 553.
Steinbruner, John Consensual Security. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64,
no. 1 (2008): 2327, 55.
Copyright
Copyright prohibits people from copying a wide range of
worksmusic, books, movies photographs, computer code,
and so onwithout prior permission. By putting restrictions
on use, copyright attempts to provide content creators with
financial compensation in an effort to ensure they have an
incentive and the means to continue creating work in the
future. It also helps prompt investment in their works.
Copyright legislation creates intellectual property, which
recognizes works as the expression of ideas; it is the physical manifestation that is protected through legislationnot
the ideas themselves. The history of copyright is long and has
been turbulent at times. The first copyright legislation was the
United Kingdoms Statute of Anne passed in 1709, which gave
authors control over the use of their work and took some
power away from publishers.
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
Understanding copyright law is complicated as it varies from
country to country. However, an international legal system
exists to tackle disputes arising from differences in national legislation. International cooperation has been ongoing for more
than two hundred years, starting, most notably, with the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
in 1886. Today, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) is tasked with administering international copyright
While it was technological advancement that brought copyright into being, such advancements led to great challenges
for owners of copyright. With technology like the printing
press and the photocopier, exact copies of works could be
reproduced relatively easily. Today, the Internet facilitates the
ease of copying, lowering costs and making the process faster.
As a result, the unauthorized copying of many worksor
piracyhas been on the rise.
In spite of the challenges raised by technology and the
concerns of copyright owners over piracy and loss of revenue, technological advancements have also contributed to
ease when it comes to the management of copyright. Programs that allow for the legal downloading and purchasing
of music not only make work easier to distribute, but also
help to ensure that compensation is received when work is
accessed. Growing attention has been paid to the development of digital rights management (DRM) strategies because
many copyright owners look toward encryption as a means of
protecting their work.
The protection of digital work has not been without controversy and complication. Critics claim that some DRM strategies undermine privacy and in some cases even compromise
our personal property, as Sony BMG found out when its CDs
were found to make computers vulnerable to viruses. DRM
has also been frowned upon as it clashes with the fair use doctrine built into the copyright system that allows copyrighted
material to be used for specific purposes such as teaching.
The challenges posed by new media prompted copyright
owners to call for changes to copyright legislation, and WIPO
responded with two Internet treaties in 1996: the WIPO
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Individual countries followed with legislative
change to implement the measures outlined in the treaties.
The United States, for example, passed the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act in 1998. As technology continues to evolve, we
can anticipate further changes to ensure a balance among the
rights of copyright owners, creators, and consumers.
See also Digital Democracy; Intellectual Property Rights.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARY FRANCOLI
340 Corporation
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Gillespie, Tarleton. Designed to Effectively Frustrate: Copyright, Technology
and the Agency of Users. New Media and Society, 8, no. 4 (2006): 651669.
Goldstein, Paul. Copyrights Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
Gurnsey, John. Copyright Theft. London: Aslib Gower, 1995.
Kretschmer, Martin. Trends in Global Copyright. Global Media and
Communication 1, no. 2 (2005): 231237.
Litman, Jessica. Digital Copyright. New York: Prometheus Books, 2001.
Corporation
Large corporations affect the lives and livelihoods of hundreds
of millions of people around the world. They employ a large
portion of the worlds population, own the rights to most
global technology patents, and yield tremendous influence
over governments. The history of the modern corporation
reflects a continued path towards greater wealth, influence, and
international powera power that critics contend is wielded
with little regard to the social, environmental, or public local
costs. As such, a variety of advocacy groups, watchdog organizations, and nongovernmental organizations have mobilized
against large corporations intent to force corporate reforms
toward more socially and environmentally conscious ends.
While for some, social pressures may foreshadow a new age
of tempered capitalism and diffuse power, for others, corporate changes are regarded as superficial and do not limit their
power or influence nor alter their profit-seeking goals.
BRIEF HISTORY
In many ways, the nature of the corporation parallels the
evolving political relationship between the state and the
market. In the days of monarchic rule, as seen in sixteenthand seventeenth-century Europe, the states economy and
resources were regarded as extensions of the states authority.
During this period, a corporation would have to obtain permission from the state to come into existence. In an attempt
to curry favor with the monarch to ensure passage of its charter, corporate founders would frame their mission as being in
the service of the state while highlighting explicit benefits to
the monarch. Describing the role of the corporation during
mercantilist time, Frederick Maitland in Political Theories of
the Middle Ages (1900) noted, The corporation is, and must
be, the creature of the State. Into its nostrils the State must
breathe the breath of a fictitious life.
This relationship evolved with philosophical developments
in political and economic theory in subsequent centuries. In
the eighteenth century, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, Adam Smith, extolled the virtues of a self-organizing
marketplace unrestricted by the intrusive power of the monarch. Individual liberty within the marketplace was now cast
as the necessary component for not only the individuals but
the states greater economic prosperity. While Smiths classical
economics did not explicitly extend this concept to corporations, since Smith perceived corporations as a potential risk
to market competition, free market advocates and neoclassical
economists after him often refer to Smiths ideas to advocate
limited government interference within a free marketplace
and specifically on corporations. Toward the middle of the
NEW HORIZONS
Today we observe the proliferation of corporations engaged
in voluntary self-regulation, self-auditing, and various other
programs of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Even with
little empirical evidence of a direct link between profits and
CSR, corporations continue to adopt these practices, according to David Vogel in The Market for Virtue: The Potential
and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (2005). Benjamin
Cashore, in his 2002 article Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance, states the emergence of
nongovernmental organizations, advocacy groups, corporate
watchdog organizations, and nonstate market based governance systems create an institutional network of interests
aiming to shift, yet again, the relationship between the corporation and the state. This shift, however, is not identical to the
role corporations held centuries earlier, in which they were
compelled to serve a role more aligned with larger public
interests. While corporations may engage in more social and
environmental responsibility, it is not necessarily born out of
pressure or negotiations with states, but rather to appease the
variety of actors and civil society groups, some of which are
active stakeholders.
See also Business Pressure in Politics; Capitalism and Democracy;
Economic Interdependence; Multinational Corporation (MNC).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RABIH HELOU
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Cashore, Benjamin. Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental
Governance: How Non-state Market-driven (NSMD) Governance
Systems Gain Rule-making Authority. Governance: An International
Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 15, no. 4 (2002):
503529.
Frederick W. Maitland. Introduction. In Political Theories of the Middle Ages,
edited by Otto von Gierke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1900.
Gabel, M., and H. Bruner. Global Inc.: An Atlas of the Multinational
Corporation. New York: W. W. Norton, 2003.
Friedman, Milton. The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970.
Vogel, David. The Market for Virtue:The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social
Responsibility. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005.
Correlation
In political science, two variables are said to correlate when
they tend to vary together. More precisely, correlation can
be positive if the variables move in the same direction (they
both increase or decrease at the same time), or negative if they
Corruption
See Democracy and Corruption.
Corruption, Political
Most definitions of corruption emphasize the abuse of public power or resources for private benefit. Many basic terms
of that definition, however, are themselves contested: Legal
standards, public opinion or social values, or the public good
may judge abuse. Terms such as public, private, power, and benefit may also be matters of dispute. Variations on the theme
emphasize public office dimensions (duties, powers and their
limits, process issues, accountability), market processes (using
public power to extract rents, or allocating public goods on
the basis of demand rather than need), and the public interest,
among other factors, as defining characteristics. A continuing
debate has to do with the role, if any, that cultural differences
should play in defining corruption. Thus, there is no universally agreed upon definition of corruption.
As a concept, corruption has a long lineage. In classical
times, it referred to a collective state of being. In this state,
leaders forfeit, by their conduct, their claims to virtue and
thus their right to lead; citizens or followers fail to play their
roles in society; and the overall political order loses its moral
structure and justifications. Modern conceptions of corruption originate not only in the works of thinkers like French
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau but also out of political
contention over accountability and the limits of power. These
REFORM SOLUTIONS
The past generations policy recommendations and reforms
have often beenbroadlyconsistent with the Washington consensus view, and neoliberal outlooks that revived the debate.
The worldview that emerged, first of all, sees corruption
primarily as bribery, and thus as a transaction that is quid
pro quo and amenable to economic modeling. It holds that
smaller governments, by reducing interference in the marketplace, will produce less corruption as well as more growth;
that democratic politics is another, parallel sort of market; and
thatthe states proper functions, often termed good governance,
should be primarily technical and administrativein effect,
a referee role in liberalized societies. Much theory and data
support such views, particularly to the extent that we conceptualize corruption in terms of rent-seeking, regard public
institutions more as obstructions to market processes than as
foundations for them, and idealize the ways markets and governments would work in the absence of corruption. Indeed,
evidence does suggest that where corruption is apparently
more common, inspections, delays, and red tape are more
extensive, and economic processes less vibrant, than in societies where it is less extensive, and that corruption is a major
factor keeping poor people poor.
More recent research, while accepting the basic view of
corruption as broadly harmful, has reemphasized the value of
politics and public institutions. It suggests that the consensus
viewand international corruption indicesoverlook variations among and within societies and in the kinds of corruption problems they experience. Cultural variables resurfaced
too, less as definitions than as clues to the origins of certain
forms, and clues to the social significance, of corruption. Mediating cultural institutions such as guanxi in Chinese societies
and middlemen in India, have major implications at those levels.
Such arguments remind us that active markets and democratic
politics require social and institutional foundations, rather than
just liberalized processes, and that we have no way of knowing
how real economies and governments would function without corruption.
In the United States, reform has been a long-running
research and policy concern shaped by both the abolitionist movement and the struggle against machine bosses like
William M. Tweed of New Yorks Tammany Hall. Both that
struggle, and the Progressive Era more generally, gave rise to
administrative and civil service reforms that undercut many
corrupt practices; New Deal social services likewise weakened
the power of machine politicians petty favors and gifts. Critics see these reforms, however, as introducing fragmentation,
rigidity, and new costs into government.
CORRUPTION
Corruption describes a relationship between the state and
the private sector. Sometimes state officials are the dominant
actors; in other cases, private actors are the most powerful
forces. The relative bargaining power of these groups determines both the overall impact of corruption on society and
the distribution of the gains between bribers and bribe payers.
The nature of corruption depends not just on the organization of government but also on the organization and power
of private actors. A critical issue is whether either the government or the private sector has monopoly power in dealing
with the other.
In Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and
Reform (1999), Susan Rose-Ackerman distinguishes between
kleptocracies, where corruption is organized at the top of government, and other states, where bribery is the province of a
large number of low-level officials. On the other side of the
bribery market, there is a difference between cases with a
small number of major corrupt private actors and ones where
the payment of bribes is decentralized across society. Table 1
from Rose-Ackermans book illustrates four polar cases: kleptocracy, bilateral monopoly, mafia-dominated states, and competitive bribery.
KLEPTOCRACY
FEW BRIBERS
BRIBE RECIPIENTS
CONCENTRATED AT TOP OF
GOVERNMENT
Kleptocracy
Bilateral
monopoly
MULTIPLE BRIBE
RECIPIENTS AT LOW LEVELS
OF GOVERNMENT
Competitive bribery
with a possibility of
spirals
Mafia-dominated
state
The two cases where private interests exert power over the
state differ depending upon whether or not the state is centrally organized to collect bribes. In the first, bilateral case, a
corrupt ruler faces an organized oligarchy so that the rent
extraction possibilities are shared between the oligarchs and
the ruler. Their relative strength will determine the way gains
are shared. Each side may seek to improve its own situation by
making the other worse off through expropriating property,
on the one hand, or engaging in violence, on the other.
In The Sicilian Mafia (1993), Diego Gambetta defines a mafia
as an organized crime group that provides protective services
that substitute for those provided by the state in ordinary societies. In some bilateral cases, the state and the mafia share the
protection business and perhaps even have overlapping membership. Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, in Corrupt
Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption (1999), provide examples from Italy. Louise I. Shelley highlights this feature in a 2001 article,Corruption and Organized
Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition, and Shelly and
Svante E. Cornell, in a 2006 article, document state and mafia
interpenetration in The Drug Trade in Russia.
A powerful corrupt ruler extorts a share of the mafias gains
and has little interest in controlling criminal influence. If the
CONCLUSIONS
All political systems fall short of the democratic ideal. Constitution writing and legislative drafting are pragmatic exercises
requiring compromise and a realistic appreciation of the limits
of institutions to control self-seeking behavior. Nevertheless, some political systems are worse than others. They have
crossed the line into kleptocracy or into state capturebe it
by mafias using intimidation and violence or by large business
corporations leveraging their economic clout. Some states
risk slipping into such pathologies and into outright failure,
but one also needs to acknowledge the more subtle ways in
which private wealth and public power can interact in more
advanced systems. These interactions can undermine government legitimacy and divert the benefits of state action
to narrow, unrepresentative groups. The policies required
may not be as drastic and transformative as in kleptocratic or
fully captured states, but they, nevertheless, require difficult
confrontations with powerful vested interests both inside and
outside of government.
See also Accountability; Campaign Finance; Corruption, Political;
Democracy and Corruption; Organized Crime and Mafia; Public
Good; Public Interest Groups; Public-private Dichotomy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Ackerman, Bruce, and Ian Ayres. Voting with Dollars. New Haven:Yale
University Press, 2000.
della Porta, Donatella, and Alberto Vannucci. Corrupt Exchanges: Actors,
Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption. New York: Aldine de
Gruyter, 1999.
Gambetta, Diego. The Sicilian Mafia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1993.
Jain, Arvind K., ed. The Political Economy of Corruption, London: Routledge,
2001.
Cosmopolitanism 347
Constitution and What It Means Today, was first published in
1920 and is now in its fourteenth edition.
One of Corwins most famous essays is The Higher Law
Background of American Constitutional Law, which was
published in 1928. In this article, he examines the intellectual
roots of American constitutional thought and explanations
relating to the Constitutions dominance. The importance of
this article is underscored by the fact that scholars continue to
debate its merits many years after its publication.
Corwin was a frequent commentator on public issues of
the day. He was not shy about writing for the popular press or
granting newspaper interviews. He advocated U.S. entry into
World War I (19141918) and was a vocal supporter of Franklin
Roosevelts New Deal.
Corwin provided guidance in different capacities to two
presidents. The advice he gave to Woodrow Wilson was more
informal and not always implemented. During Roosevelts
administration, Corwin served as an adviser to the Public
Works Administration. Corwin then worked in a consulting
capacity for the attorney general.
The most controversial aspect of Corwins career was his
defense of Roosevelts court-packing plan, which included
testifying before the Senates Committee on Court Reorganization. He had difficulty defending his views before the committee because, earlier, he was quite critical of the plan. It has
been suggested that Corwins support of the court-packing
plan and his lackluster Senate testimony ended any reasonable chance of him receiving an appointment to the Supreme
Court. After these events, Corwin became more politically
conservative and openly critical of Roosevelt.
Corwin retired from Princeton in 1946, but continued to
pursue an active research agenda, publishing several books and
a handful of articles. The APSA offers an annual award in his
name for the best doctoral dissertation in public law.
See also Constitutional Courts; Constitutional Law; New Deal;
Supreme Court.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ADAM W. NYE
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Clayton, Cornell W. Edward S. Corwin as Public Scholar. In The Pioneers
of Judicial Behavior, edited by Nancy Maveety. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2003.
Corwin, Edward S. Edward S. Corwins the Constitution and What It Means
Today, 14th ed, edited by Harold W. Chase and Craig R. Ducat.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
. The President: Office and Powers. New York: New York University
Press, 1940.
Crews, Kenneth D., ed. Corwins Constitution: Essays and Insights of Edward S.
Corwin. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986.
. Edward S. Corwin and the American Constitution, Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1985.
Loss, Richard, ed. Corwin on the Constitution, 3 vols. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 19811998.
Mason, Alpheus T., and Gerald Garvey, eds. American Constitutional
History: Essays by Edward S. Corwin. New York: Harper and
Row, 1964.
McDowell, Gary L. The Corrosive Constitutionalism of Edward S.
Corwin. Law and Social Inquiry 14 (1989): 603614.
Cosmopolitan Democracy
See Cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitanism, a term derived from the Greek word kosmopolits meaning citizen of the world, is used to refer to a
variety of beliefs and attitudes about the relationship between
the individual and humanity (or the world) as a whole.
From a Stoic point of view, the citizen of the world is indifferent to particular places and detached from particularistic
commitments. In other words, the citizen of the world is at
home nowhere, except perhaps in the realm of ideas, where
goodness in its purist form is to be found and where justice reigns unchallenged by the ignorance and selfishness of
humankind. In this light, cosmopolitanism has less to do with
the transcendence of national boundaries than it does with an
allegiance to the kosmosmeaning, the intelligible realm of
formsabove and beyond the visible world of endless cruelty
and conflict. This may be what Plutarch means when he attributes to Socrates the designation of citizen of the world in his
essay On Banishment.
From a cultural point of view, the world citizen is world
traveler who appreciates variety in culture, art, literature, cuisine, and so on, and who is open to different ideas and ways
of life. From this perspective, articulated by Jeremy Waldron,
the citizen of the world is at home everywhere, including
the realm of contested truths and hybridized identity. Like
Stoic cosmopolitanism, cultural cosmopolitanism requires a
level of detachment from ones own culture and context. But
unlike Stoic cosmopolitanism, the wider world exists both to
be appreciated and to be learned from by the world citizen,
not to be renounced in its entirety in favor of a higher level
of existence.
What is generally meant by political cosmopolitanism is
the recognition that the activities of ones own state affect the
lives of people living in another state and the belief that these
people are worthy of consideration and respect. It does not
mean that an individual is devoted to all states (or peoples)
equally or to the idea of a world state. Immanuel Kant, in
Perpetual Peace, looked to humanitys unsociable sociability
as the engine that would drive the emergence of political cosmopolitan and an international federation of free nations. But
there is nothing inevitable about the historical development of
political cosmopolitanismor cosmopolitanism of any kind,
although imagining rationally self-interested states as the drivers of cosmopolitan change, as Kant did, does go against a
utopian basis for such speculation.
Some contemporary philosophers, including Martha Nussbaum, argue that people should owe their primary allegiance
to the world, not to any association more limited or local,
while others, such as Kwame Anthony Appiah, have argued
more modestly for a rooted cosmopolitanism that allows
individuals to preserve a special or prior obligation to a local
Cost-benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis is a technique to determine the best
alternative out of many available options by comparing the
expected costs and benefits. It can be applied to the analysis of
almost any course of action characterized in terms of its benefits and costs, including opportunity costs. The comparison
of one alternative course of action to another is based on their
net present values. The net present value of an alternative is
the difference between the sum of all future benefits brought
by the course of action and the sum of all future costs resulted
from that course of action. A discount rate must be chosen in
order to calculate future costs and benefits in present terms.
For actions with long-term consequences, this choice is
controversial because it requires predicting financial market
performance, and often evaluating the value of the welfare of
future generations.
The cost-benefit analysis is used in many areas. In finance
applications, the cost-benefit technique helps to determine
the most profitable projects. In government policy applications, the cost-benefit tool is often used to judge the effectiveness of government regulations for preventing market failures.
The international relations between countries are also based
on cost-benefit calculations. For example, the choice of a
certain foreign policy action takes into account the expected
subsequent positive and negative reactions of other countries,
which generate the benefits and costs. However, where perfect
markets for the inputs to the analysis do not exist, deriving the
required costs and benefits is controversial.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TATIANA VASHCHILKO
Council, Constitutional
See Constitutional Courts.
Counter-Enlightenment
Political Thought
Counter-Enlightenment political thought refers to a range of
views that share the belief that the eighteenth century Age
of Enlightenment in the West was fundamentally mistaken in
ways that have seriously damaged religion, morals, and society.
The Enlightenment was a period of reform when prominent
and influential European and American philosophers, historians, economists, and politicians challenged many traditional
beliefs and institutions in the name of reason, science, and
progress. Critics of this movements emphasis on the power
and centrality of reason in human affairs have sought to depict
it as both exaggerated and dangerous.
Over the past 250 years, the Enlightenment has attracted
critics from across the ideological spectrum, ranging from
devout conservative Catholics to radical feminists, from
nineteenth-century romantic poets to twentieth-century
neo-Marxists and even liberals. Most disagree on their interpretation of what the Enlightenment was; however, there is
broad agreement among its adversaries that the period was
socially and politically harmful, if not disastrous. There have
been, and still are, many Counter-Enlightenments, from the
eighteenth century to the present, covering not only a wide
range of specific criticisms of the Enlightenment, but also
many different, and sometimes incompatible, depictions of the
Enlightenment by its critics, each of which suits their own
beliefs, agendas, and interests.
had done. But it was not until the end of World War II
(19391945) that Counter-Enlightenment thought became
as widespread as it had been during and after the French
Revolution. According to a generation of intellectuals born
at the turn of the century, the Enlightenment played a
central role in the emergence of twentieth-century totalitarianism, epitomized by Adolf Hitlers Germany and Joseph
Stalins Soviet Union. After World War II, German critical
theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno associated
the Western conception of Enlightenment with a narrowly
instrumental form of reason that was repressive and totalitarian in their very influential book Dialectic of Enlightenment
(1947). Coldwar liberals of the same generation, such as
philosophers Jacob Talmon and Isaiah Berlin, saw the legacy
of the Enlightenment as directly linked to twentieth-century
communism. In addition, their conservative contemporaries
Michael Oakeshott and Eric Voegelin restated earlier, orthodox attacks on Enlightenment rationalism for its disastrous
political and spiritual effects.
Among later generations of thinkers, postmodernists have
been the Enlightenments most vociferous critics. Works such
as Madness and Civilization (1961) and Discipline and Punish
(1975), by French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault,
chronicle the emergence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of a new disciplinary society that was liberal
and humane in name and rhetoric but sinister and highly controlling in practice. Postmodern feminists such as Sandra Harding have attacked the Enlightenment for its supposedly pure
conception of reason in which important gender differences
are suppressed in the interests of men.
New forms of Counter-Enlightenment thought continue
to proliferate today, for example, among some environmentalists critical of the modern Wests faith in science and technology. Given that so many of the values, practices, and beliefs
of modern Western civilization are rooted in the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment, it is certain that its assumptions
and consequences will remain matters of deep and abiding
contestation.
See also Conservatism; Critical Theory; Enlightenment Political
Thought; Foucault, Michel Paul; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Scottish
Enlightenment.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GRAEME GARRARD
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Berlin, Isaiah. The Counter-Enlightenment. In Against the Current: Essays in
the History of Ideas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Garrard, Graeme. Counter-Enlightenments: From the Eighteenth Century to the
Present. London: Routledge, 2006.
Mali, Joseph, and Robeert Wokler, eds. Isaiah Berlins Counter-Enlightenment.
Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2003.
Masseau, Didier. Les ennemis des philosophes: Lantiphilosophie au temps des
Lumires. Paris: Albin Michel, 2000.
McMahon, Darrin. Enemies of the Enlightenment:The French CounterEnlightenment and the Making of Modernity. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001.
Norton, Robert E. The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment. Journal of the
History of Ideas, 68 (2007): 635658.
350 Counterfactual
Counterfactual
A counterfactual, also contrafactual, is a hypothetical situation
usually created to examine what may have happened given a
different course of events or set of conditions. Counterfactual
experiments substitute variables of the historical context and
analyze how these changes would have affected outcomes; for
example, If the United States had not gone to war against
Iraq, it would have been able to fight terrorism worldwide
more effectively. Counterfactual reasoning is used in any field
in which researchers want to draw cause-effect conclusions
but cannot perform controlled experiments in which they
consider conditions that differ only in the presence or absence
of the hypothesized cause. It is assumed that good counterfactuals should rest on multiple factuals, and, as sociologist Max
Weber (18641920) claimed, they should make as few historical changes as possible. Counterfactuals are often crucial
for theory building and interpretations, may provide analytical insight, help to acknowledge the role of chance, and can
facilitate, in Philip Tetlocks words, learning from history.
Limitations of this method are associated with the inherently
subjective process and the certainty-of-hindsight effect.
See also Critical Juncture; Forecasting, Political; Path Dependencies; Politics, Comparative; Qualitative Methodologies.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JIRI S. MELICH
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Ferguson, Niall, ed. Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals. New York:
Basic Books, 1999.
Tetlock, Philip, and Aaron Belkin. Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World
Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Counterterrorism
See Crime Policy.
Coup dtat
A coup dtat involves the sudden, often violent, overthrow of
an existing government by a small group. In contrast, revolutions are achieved by large numbers of people working for
basic social economic and political change. In almost all cases,
a coup dtat is essentially identical to military coup because it
either replaces a civilian government with the military or one
military group with another.
There are three kinds of coups. The first is a breakthrough
coup dtat that occurs when a revolutionary group overthrows
a civilian government and creates a new elite. Examples of
this type of coup include China (1911), Egypt (1952), Greece
(1967), and Liberia (1980). A guardian coup dtat takes place
when a group comes to power to ostensibly improve public
order, as occurred in Pakistan with Prime Minister Zulfikar
Ali Bhuttos overthrow by Chief of Army Staff Muhammad
Zia-ul-Haq in 1979. Finally, a veto coup dtat occurs when the
army vetoes democracy. The most famous example took place
in Chile in 1973 when the military overthrew the elected
socialist President Salvador Allende Gossens.
Covenant 351
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Decalo, Samuel. Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style. New
Haven:Yale University Press, 1976.
Gershoni,Yekutiel. The Changing Pattern of Military Takeovers in SubSaharan Africa. Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 234248.
Kandeh, Jimmy. Coups from Below Armed Subalterns and State Power in West
Africa. New York: Palgrave, 2004.
Mbaku, John. Military Coups as Rent-Seeking Behavior. Journal of Political
and Military Sociology 22 (1994): 241284.
McGowan, Patrick. African Military Coups dtat, 19652001: Frequency,
Trends, and Distributions. Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 3
(2003): 339370.
McGowan, Patrick, and Thomas Johnson. Sixty Coups in Thirty Years
Further Evidence Regarding African Military Coups dtat. Journal of
Modern African Studies 24, no. 3 (1986): 539546.
Courts, Administrative
See Administrative Courts.
Courts, Constitutional
See Constitutional Courts.
Covenant
THE BIBLICAL COVENANT
The biblical covenant is a mutual and voluntary pledge between
God and humankind for the attainment of the common
good and justice. A congregation of equals (since people were
created alike and in Gods image) consents to a covenant;
God does not force them to obey (Deuteronomy 4:1). A
transcendent sovereign oversees the content of the covenant,
and intervenes occasionally to ensure all act according to its
terms. God submits to the same law he proposes for humans
(Deuteronomy 7:12), limiting his omnipotence. Subsidiary
covenants establish different sets of rights and obligations:
between rulers and the ruled, under Gods supervision
(2 Samuel 5:3, Joshua 24), or international treaties (Genesis
21:2732, Joshua 9).
Failure to comply with these stipulations leads to internal
collapse, preceding the destruction of Israel by a foreign power.
This causes the replacement of the original covenant (Jeremiah 31:3132) and the introduction of a mediator between
God and humankind, which warrants Christ, the new covenant in the New Testament (Hebrews 12:24). The new bond
is anchored on grace and faith and sealed with baptism, which
replaced circumcision.
Gods will for the benefit of the population, which corresponded to a subsidiary double covenant between the people
and the political leader and between the political leader and
God. Violation of these conditions would lead to tyranny,
which would contradict the biblical horizontal paradigm. This
paradigm is based on a democratic republic moderated by the
aristocracy of magistrates, such as Moses and pious kings. The
Christian magistrate, a man of staunch faith answerable only
before God, would adapt this model.
SECULAR VERSIONS
In the following two centuries, establishing a parallel between
the biblical episodes prior to the covenant God made with
Abraham and the condition without government, contractarians identified both with the state of nature. For Thomas
Hobbes, this is a state of war of one against the other that
can be overcome only by a covenant, through which people
irreversibly deliver all rights to a sovereign whose powers are
absolute. John Locke acknowledges the inconveniences of the
state of nature, given the absence of a universally accepted
law and coercive power. This creates a need to transfer certain rights to a sovereign with power that is conditional upon
fulfillment of the compact with the people who can always
depose the sovereign. For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in the state
of nature, humans were noble savages who were later corrupted by society. The social contract, signed by the people
who collectively exercise sovereignty and obey no one but
themselves, is the means to restore the freedom enjoyed in an
idyllic state of nature.
AMERICAN SYNTHESIS
Religious and secular versions merged in the foundation
of the early American Republic. The country was built by
religious confessionsPuritans, Baptists, Presbyterians, Quakers, German Sectarians, Huguenotsin the name of liberty.
The means to that end lay in the covenant paradigm; just as
the Israelites had entered freely into a covenant with God,
so did early Americans voluntarily agree to the creation of a
church or a political society. That rationale was extended to all
domainslabor unions, businesses, professional associations,
towns, cities, states, the federal Unionthrough a network of
secularized versions of the covenant. Saintly conductcharity, interdependence, self-discipline, submission of the private
interest to the community, obedience, virtueensured by
influential churches, was translated in the political realm. This
resulted in limited government, popular sovereignty, equity,
and an equal share in the decision-making process.
See also Contractarianism; Federalism; Protestant Political
Thought; Reformation Political Thought; Social Contract; U.S.
Political Thought.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ISABEL DAVID
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Elazar, Daniel J., ed. The Covenant Connection: From Federal Theology to
Modern Federalism. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2000.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. New York: Touchstone, 1997.
Holy Bible: Contemporary English Version. New York: American Bible Society,
2000.
Credibility
See Trust and Credibility.
Crime Policy
Government response to crime begins first with defining what
constitutes criminal behavior. In totalitarian regimes, crime
is often defined as any behavior that threatens the authority of the state. In liberal democracies, crime often mirrors
the publics judgment of right and wrong behavior. Although
these judgments may vary from state to state, most democratic
nations condemn behavior that threatens the life, liberty, and
property of others.
Crisis Rhetoric
Rhetoric is the use of persuasive language or other symbols,
while crisis is a type of rhetorical terminology that conveys a
sense of urgency and suggests that a threatening event, different from routine events, has occurred.
Critical Juncture
A critical juncture is an episode of pivotal transformation,
during which an institution undergoes fundamental and
revolutionary change. Critical junctures are unlike other
changes because critical junctures are not incremental: They
are one-time episodes with lasting consequences. The critical juncture secures a choice or a path through which the
institution continues after the juncture has passed. The choice
is secured, or locked in, because other choices are either
excluded from later analyses or because other options are
eliminated through cost-benefit comparison. As part of the
path-dependency analysis, a critical juncture helps establish
the trajectory of a society.
Identifying a critical juncture is, strictly speaking, only possible after the fact. Analysts cannot know that a critical juncture is in fact critical until afterwards, because it requires that
the institution(s) it fosters become self-reinforcing. Identifying
an event as a critical juncture often involves creating counterfactual projections as to what might otherwise have occurred.
In this way, an episode may be identified as critical to an institutions creation, it or contributes to how an institution has
changed. Counterfactual arguments explain how a moment
was critical by creating possible alternatives to history.
Of course, journalists and politicians often see particular
movements as historic even as they happen, but a historic
moment is not necessarily a critical juncture. At times, it seems
that social forces move inexorably toward a certain outcome.
For instance, given the preceding rise in womens status in
the legal profession, the appointment of a woman to the U.S.
Supreme Court in the twentieth century seemed inevitable at
some point, if not exactly when it would occur.
By contrast, critical junctures are contingent on preceding events, but yield unexpected outcomes of these events. A
crucial facet of critical junctures is that, though proceeded by
enabling social conditions, they are context specific and differ
from society to society. These episodes may last moments or
linger on for years, depending on the circumstances. Critical
junctures interrupt or profoundly influence existing institutions, but are unpredictable even by those familiar with a societys institutions.
Scholars who employ path dependency as an explanation of
events therefore investigate antecedent conditions to a critical
juncture, but rely more heavily on posterior events. Not only
do different environments and actors within societies affect
how critical junctures affect the development of an institution,
but different institutions and processes are more susceptible
to change than others. Antecedent conditions cannot reliably
predict if there will be a critical juncture, what will change, or
how the institution will change. Following a critical juncture
is a period of historical legacy in which the effects of the juncture persist. This legacy may become evident directly after the
juncture, or it may become evident only long after the event
has transpired. For instance, the Magna Carta in 1215, which
established certain rights of the nobility in England, is now
recognized as a critical step toward universal human rights.
Critics of analyses that employ critical junctures argue
that the concept is either too broad to be useful or too vague
to explain anything. The idea of a critical juncture may be
applied to different contexts, but it may also be so context
specific that it cannot be generalized to other circumstances.
The same scenarios, actors, and processes are unlikely to occur
RYAN GIBB
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical
Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mahoney, James. Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. Theory and
Society 29, no. 4 (2000): 507548.
Pierson, Paul. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of
Politics. American Political Science Review 94, 2 (2001): 251267.
. Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003.
implicit social compact existed between liberals and conservatives in the American intelligentsia about how racial justice
would be debated and understood. As described by Kimberl
Crenshaw and her colleagues in Critical Race Theory: The Key
Writings that Formed the Movement, liberals and conservatives
together would exclude radical or fundamental challenges to
[the] status quo . . . by treating the exercise of racial power as
rare and aberrational rather than as systemic and ingrained
(xiv). Racism would be conceived as the intentional, albeit
irrational, deviation by a conscious wrongdoer from otherwise neutral, rational, and just ways of distributing jobs, power,
prestige, and wealth. The adoption of this perspective allowed
a broad cultural mainstream both explicitly to acknowledge
the fact of racism and, simultaneously, to insist on its irregular occurrence and limited significance (xiv). The intended
effect of this tacit agreement was to forestall radical challenges
to de facto white supremacy and to confine racial reform to
liberal incrementalism.
The radicalism of CRTs critique of American white
supremacy elicited shock, outrage, and even ridicule from both
the law school establishment and the American intelligentsia.
But as CRT produced a steady stream of law review articles
deconstructing the conventional wisdom of American legal
liberalismillustrating the gap between that conventional
wisdom and real-life minority experiencethe movement
won adherents. Closely allied with critical legal studies (CLS),
which sought to expose the ways American law systematically
perpetuated and legitimated economic exploitation, CRT
drew sustenance from the Marxist and poststructuralist insights
of CLS while at the same time forcing it to move race closer
to the center of its inquiry. CRT thus constituted of both a
left intervention into race discourse and a race intervention
into left discourse (Crenshaw et al., xix). Today CRT scholars
hold tenured professorships in prestigious law schools and are
making inroads in the disciplines of history, sociology, political science, and philosophy. While there is less resistance to
CRT today than there was at its inception, many scholars and
pundits still consider CRT to be conspiratorial and antiwhite.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bell, Derrick. And We Are Not Saved:The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice.
New York: Basic Books, 1987.
. Faces at the Bottom of the Well:The Permanence of Racism. New York:
Basic Books, 1992.
Crenshaw, Kimberl, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds.
Critical Race Theory:The Key Writings that Formed the Movement. New
York: New Press, 1995.
Delgado, Richard, and Jean Stefancic, eds. Critical Race Theory:The Cutting
Edge, 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000.
. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction. New York: New York University
Press, 2001.
Guinier, Lani. Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative
Democracy. New York: Free Press, 1994.
Guinier, Lani, and Gerald Torres. The Miners Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting
Power,Transforming Democracy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2002.
Haney Lpez, Ian F. White by Law:The Legal Construction of Race, rev. ed.
New York: New York University Press, 2006.
Williams, Patricia J. The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Mad Law
Professor. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991.
. Seeing a Color-Blind Future:The Paradox of Race. New York: Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux, 1998.
Wing, Adrien Katherine. Critical Race Feminism: A Reader, 2nd ed. New York:
New York University Press, 2003.
RICHARD M. YON
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Burnham, Walter Dean. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American
Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.
Campbell, Bruce A., and Richard J. Trilling. Realignment in American Politics:
Toward a Theory. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980.
Key,V. O., Jr. A Theory of Critical Elections. New York: Irvington, 1993.
Mayhew, David. Electoral Realignments. New Haven:Yale University Press,
2002.
Schattschneider, E. E. Party Government. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1967.
Critical Theory
Critical theory as a philosophical tendency was formed within
German culture, but the term was actually coined in the
United States. The critical theory project took shape at the
Institute for Social Research, founded in 1923 in Frankfurt.
The first director of the institute, Carl Grunberg, and many of
its early members like Henryk Grossman, Fritz Sternberg, and
Felix Weill were primarily interested in the study of political
economy, imperialism, and the history of the socialist labor
movement.
and liberation thus provided the basis for the social critique
of the existing order. In the United States, however, the character of this engagement changed dramatically from that of
the early days. The most compelling reasons were connected
with the failure of the proletarian revolution, the increasingly
stark reality of totalitarianism, and the looming shadow of
McCarthyism.
Major scholars associated with the Institute for Social
Researchalbeit often at the fringesadded much to an
understanding of the ideological forces behind the new totalitarian phenomenon and its structure. Its emergence in Germany was analyzed in diverse works of an interdisciplinary
character. Escape from Freedom (1941) by Erich Fromm, which
proved enormously popular, analyzed the psychological appeal
of Nazi totalitarianism. Siegfried Kracauer, who was close to
Adorno and Benjamin, offered what would prove a classic
examination of German film in the Weimar Republic in his
work entitled From Caligari to Hitler (1947). In a more social
scientific vein, Otto Kirchheimer contributed Political Justice
(1961) and Franz Neumann, with Behemoth (1942), introduced
the first significant work that analyzed the structure of the
Nazi state. Horkheimer himself edited a five-volume work,
Studies in Prejudice (1949), for the American Jewish Committee while Adorno led a team of researchers in producing the
classic book The Authoritarian Personality (1950). In the context of the United States, both looking backward to the 1930s
and forward to McCarthyism, Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the
Techniques of the American Agitator (1948) by Leo Lowenthal and
Norbert Guterman as well as Lowenthals work on American
anti-Semitism, Images of Prejudice (1945), are significant works.
Following the Hitler-Stalin Pact that unleashed World War
II (19391945), the proletarian revolution ceased to serve as
the ultimate aim of the critical enterprise. The working class
lost its standing as the revolutionary subject of history and
the Frankfurt school no longer saw its interests as sufficient
for generating a critique of the status quo. A new phase in
the development of critical theory began with the completion
of Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), including a sensational last
chapter Elements of Anti-Semitism, in 1947. Horkheimer
and Adorno, its authors, called into question the old belief in
progress, science, and the benefits of modernity. They insisted
that by privileging mathematical reason, the Enlightenment
not only assaulted reactionary forms of religious dogma, but
also, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the more progressive normative ways of thinking. Scientific rationality
divorced from ethical concerns was, indeed, seen as culminating in the number tattooed on the arm of the concentration
camp inmate.
Dialectic of Enlightenment offers less the vision of a better
world emerging from the Enlightenment than one increasingly defined by the commodity form and bureaucratic rationality, in which the individual is stripped of conscience and
spontaneity. Stalinism on the left, Nazism on the right, and
an increasingly bureaucratic and robotic mass society emerging in the United States inspired this book: mass society, the
horror of war, andperhaps above allthe concentration
living in the United States, they sought to hide their indebtedness to Marx by substituting the highly abstract language
of Hegel. But also noteworthy about the style of Adorno
and Horkheimer, their famous analysis of the culture industry developed in Dialectic of Enlightenment, written while they
were living in Los Angeles, implied that popularity would necessarily neutralize whatever critical or emancipatory messages a work might retain. Nevertheless, there was nothing
ambivalent about the willingness of Erich Frommor Herbert Marcuseto engage the public in a radical fashion.
Croce, Benedetto
Benedetto Croce (18661952) was an Italian philosopher of
history and aesthetics who emphasized the importance of the
human imagination, consciousness, and intuitive understanding in the concrete experiences of living. Born near Naples,
Croce was raised in a wealthy family. In 1883, only Croce and
his brother survived the earthquake of Casamicciola, which
killed his parents and sister. At age sixteen, he went to Rome
to live with his uncle, Silvio Spaventa, who introduced Croce
Crossman, Richard
Richard Howard Stafford (Dick) Crossman (19071974)
was a writer, diarist, and British Labour Party politician who
served as member of British parliament for Coventry East
from 1945 to 1974. He held high ministerial positions in
Harold Wilsons Labour governments from 1964 to 1970, but
his most lasting contribution to British political life was the
publication of three volumes of his controversial ministerial
diaries.
In his youth, Crossman won a scholarship to Winchester
College and later a scholarship to Oxford Universitys New
College to read classics. After taking first-class honors, in
1930 he became a don and tutor at New College, where he
taught and published books on political philosophy. In the
late 1930s, he left Oxford for Labour Party politics, working
364 Cryptography
Cryptography
Cryptography, from the Greek krupto-, meaning to conceal,
and grapho-, meaning to write, is the science of concealed
writing; it is a technical term referring to the translation of
messages into ciphers or codes. Cryptology is the study of both
cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptanalysis is the science of
decrypting ciphers and codes without a key. Within modern
cryptology, there are many theories and practices, particularly
focusing on the basic infrastructure used in cryptographic
systems.
The fundamental intention of cryptography is to enable
two individuals, normally called Alice and Bob, to communicate information securely. Oscar is the potential thirdparty adversary who wants to intercept the message.
A general model of a cryptosystem can be visualized as
follows: Alice wants to communicate a plaintext message to
Bob. She ciphers the plaintext message using a key according to the encryption rule of the system. Bob receives the
ciphertext, which can also be received by Oscar, who can be
either a passive observer intending to gain the key for reading
all the communication messages or an adversary intending to
impersonate the original messenger and to modify the message to the receiver. Cryptosystems are intended so only Bob
is able to decode (decrypt) the ciphertext because he possesses
the key that reconstructs the message into plaintext, thereby
preventing Oscar from receiving any information from the
message. The difference between enciphering and encoding
is enciphering requires each letter (or numeral) of a message
to be replaced by another letter (or numeral), whereas encoding replaces entire sentences, syllables, or words. The code is
the predetermined rules for converting the messages from one
representation to another. A cryptosystem using an encryption key for message communication is specified by a fivetuple representing P, C, K, E, and D. P is a finite set of every
possible plaintext; C is a finite set of every possible ciphertext;
K is a finite set of every possible key; E is the space of the
encryption rule; D is the space of the decryption rule; therefore, k K, eK: PC. Conversely, each k K and each x P
contain a dK, such that dK(eK(x)) = x for all plaintexts x.
The antiquity of cryptology is well attested in the history of
civilization.The beautiful hieroglyphic script of ancient Egypt,
for instance, would have been impossible to decipher without
discovery of the Rosetta stone by French soldiers in 1799.The
Spartans used a cryptographic device called a scytale, wherein
a sheet of papyrus with a message relating to their military
campaign was wound around a cylinder; to read the cipher, the
recipient had to possess a staff of the same diameter on which
the papyrus could be unwound. The Greek historian Polybius created a 5 5 grid using the twenty-four letters of the
Greek alphabet, known as the Polybius square. During World
War I (19141918), the Germans used the ADFGX cipher for
communication. The German cipher used a 6 6 grid based
on the Polybius square. The cipher of Julius Caesar encrypted
messages in a rotated alphabet that used a shift of three letters to the immediate right. In the New Testament, the name
Babylon was sometimes used as a designation for Rome. Jewish literature equated Edom, Egypt, Kittim, and Rome with
Babylon as a type of cipher.
Ancient ciphers and codes, however, were much more simplistic than those of the computer age. Crypotological progress was essentially halted between the decline of the Roman
Empire and the rise of Islam. Cryptanalysis among Arabs was
pioneered in the eighth century and subsequently continued.
The necessity of mathematical advances, which had not yet
occurred, meant that cryptology would not be developed further until late in medieval history. In 1412, Arabic knowledge
of cryptology was described in the Subh al-Asha, the classical
fourteen-volume encyclopedia, with tremendous detail. Francis Bacon developed a biliteral alphabet, known as the biliteral
cipher, in his De Augmentis Scientiarum (1624) using the two
characters, a and b, in groups of five letters. Edgar Allan Poe, in
his 1843 short story, The Gold Bug, popularized cryptanalysis with a detailed description of methodology to decipher any
monoalphabetic substitution cipher. Additional development
in cryptology occurred in harmony with the emergence of
modern armies and intelligence services throughout the nineteenth century. The end of the world wars and invention of
the computer advanced cryptology even further. The ciphers
and codes of the present age are so advanced that it is impossible to decode them without the combination of both human
ingenuity and computer proficiency.
See also Cybersecurity.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beutelspacher, Albrecht. Cryptology: An Introduction to the Art and Science of
Enciphering, Encrypting, Concealing, Hiding, and Safeguarding Described
without Any Arcane Skullduggery but Not Without Cunning Waggery for
the Delectation and Instruction of the General Public. Washington, D.C.:
Mathematical Association of America, 1994.
Deavors, Cipher A., and Kruh, Louis. Machine Cryptography and Modern
Cryptanalysis. Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, 1985.
Denning, Dorothy Elizabeth Robling. Cryptography and Data Security.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1982.
Gaines, Helen F. Cryptanalysis: A Study of Ciphers and Their Solution. New
York: Dover, 1956.
Kahn, David. The Codebreakers, rev. ed. New York: Scribner, 1999.
Konheim, Alan G. Cryptography: A Primer. New York: Wiley, 1981.
Menezes, Alfred J., Paul C. van Oorschot, and Scott A.Vanstone. Handbook of
Applied Cryptography. Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, 1996.
Singh, Simon. The Code Book:The Science of Secrecy from Ancient Egypt to
Quantum Cryptography. London: Fourth Estate, 1999.
Van der Lubbe, Jan C. A. Basic Methods of Cryptography, translated by Steve
Gee. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Wolfe, James Raymond. Secret Writing:The Craft of the Cryptographer. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.
Cube Law
Cube law is a theory about democratic politics positing that
in single-member electoral systems with two dominant parties, there is overrepresentation by the party or grouping that
receives the most votes in elections. Concurrently, the party
that secures the least number of votes is underrepresented.
Cue Taking
The cue taking model centers upon how a member of a legislative body makes thousands of decisions every term, including those on bills requiring a high level of technical expertise
but falling outside particular areas of interest. There is an
opportunity cost of time and resources if the representative
tries to learn more about those issues. Hence, in order to cope
with the volume of decisions, legislators need a technique to
deal with the information overload.
There are two sets of actors in the system: cue takers and cue
givers. When a members must cast a roll call vote on a complex issue outside their expertise, they behaves as cue takers.
Cue takers look for cues provided by cue givers. Cue givers
are trusted colleagues whobecause of their formal position
in the legislature or policy specializationare more informed
on the issue; in addition, cue givers are those individuals with
whom the cue taker would probably agree if their own individual research was completed. In that sense, legislators efficiently allocate their resources since they do not need to know
about every single bill being voted, and they can trust other
legislators who know more about the issue. Many representatives act as cue givers on some issues and cue takers on others.
From this classical usage as proposed by Donald Matthews
and James Stimson, political scientists have expanded the study
of cue taking to include voters, who take cues from political elites, and outer ring media outlets, which take cues from
prestige media outlets. These studies show that cue taking is
a pervasive phenomenon, but the extent of its importance varies in different populations and must be verified empirically.
See also Heuristics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARCIO A. CARVALHO
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Bianco, William T. Reliable Source or Usual Suspects? Cue-Taking,
Information Transmission, and Legislative Committees. Journal of Politics
59, no. 3 (1997): 913.
Cult of Personality
Cult of personality refers to the common practice among
twentieth-century dictatorships of promoting religious types
of devotion to their national leader. As described in George
Orwells novel 1984, through skillful use of the mass media
and pervasive secret police monitoring, a modern state can
create fanatical mass adulation of its leader on a scale not possible in premodern dictatorships. In the absence of democratic
elections, this provides a mechanism to secure the loyalty of a
states subjects.
The practice arguably began with Russian leader Joseph
Stalins decision to place the corpse of revolutionary Vladimir
Lenin, the founder of the Russian Communist Party, on public
display after Lenins death in 1924. By 1930, the public veneration of Lenin had expanded to include Stalin. Similar cults
developed in the fascist regimes of dictators Adolf Hitler in
Germany and Benito Mussolini in Italy, and in the later communist regimes of Chinas Mao Tse-Tung, North Koreas Kim
Il-Sung, Cubas Fidel Castro, and others.
The term itself originated with the February 1956 speech
by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in which he denounced
Joseph Stalins cult of personality. Although Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet president from 1964 to 1982, did not wield
Stalins power, he did generate a so-called cult of personality, as
did some post-Soviet leaders, notably Saparmurat Niyazov in
Turkmenistan. One open question is to what extent personality
cults are the result of pressure from below, from local officials
and ordinary citizens, rather than being simply constructed
from above by the national leadership.
See also Caesarism; Charisma; Stalinism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PETER RUTLAND
Cultural Policy
Broadly defined, cultural policy deals with institutional support and guidance for ways of life or culture as understood
in anthropology. Such support can include the diffusion of
governance to make possible the cultivation of specific tastes
and habits, through educational and other means. Examples
of cultural policy include the support of particular languages
and other symbols of nationhood to foster patriotism and
nationalism. Cultural policy can be viewed in the narrow
sense of institutional support for creative and aesthetic human
INTERNATIONAL MINISTRIES OF
CULTURE
Most countries in the world boast of ministries of culture
even though, as in the United Kingdom, they might have
independent funding agencies for the arts. Thus, the ministry
of culture in France has been historically important not only
for inculcating a sense of French identity but also for supervising important funding organizations such as Centre National
de la Cinmatographie (CNC), a crucial pillar in the support
of French cinema. Public support for the arts is difficult to
calculate because of the myriad instruments and institutions
involved, and thus comparative estimates are difficult. It is estimated that France and Austria have some of the highest yearly
arts expenditure per capita at 180 and 179, respectively.
Ministries of culture are also gaining importance in the
developing world after years of neglect in the postcolonial era,
due to lack of resources or relegation of culture to recessive
tradition, as opposed to the impetus given to modernization
through industrialization. Countries like China and India have
now prioritized creative industries in their economic development while cities that thrive on arts and creativity and derive
their identity from it are coming up all over the world. Centers
of music production are flourishing in places such as Bamako,
Mali, and Bogot, Colombia, while film production takes off
in Mexico, South Africa, and India. The spectacular opening
ceremonies at the XXIX Olympiad in Beijing directed by
film director Zhang Yimou, choreographer Zhang Jigang, and
composer Tan Dun presented a culturally confident China to
an estimated global television audience of between two and
four billion people.
At the international level, many countries feel threatened
by foreign, especially U.S. or Hollywood, creative industry
exports. The Uruguay Round of trade talks (19861994) at
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) galvanized the debates on cultural exports. The European Union
(EU), especially with French backing, vigorously contested the
market liberalization that would ensue from GATTs measures,
fearing that Hollywood would further dominate their cultural
CONCLUSION
Cultural policy is intricately tied with cultural identity and
politicians, and cultural industry elite often exploit this link to
their advantage in trying to restrict or ban particular cultural
expressions or flows of cultural products. For example, the
EUs Television Without Frontiers directive that went into
effect in 1992 has tried to reserve a majority of the television broadcast content in its twenty-seven member states
to national or EU programming for the explicit purpose of
promoting European cultural identities. Nevertheless, cultural
products and flows continue to grow globally. Cultural identities, as a result, continue to assimilate many influencesas
they always have.
See also Free Trade; Political Culture; Politics, Literature, and
Film; Public Policy;Trade Diplomacy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J. P. SINGH
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Anheier, Helmut A., and Yudhishtir Raj Isar, eds. Cultures and Globalization:
The Cultural Economy. London: Sage Publications, 2008.
Cherbo, Joni Maya, Ruth Ann Stewart, and Margaret Jane Wyzsomirski, eds.
2008. Understanding the Arts and Creative Sector in the United States. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008.
Cowen, Tyler. Creative Destruction: How Globalization Is Changing the Worlds
Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Cummings, Milton C., Jr., and Richard S. Katz, eds. The Patron State:
Government and the Arts in Europe, North America, and Japan. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Florida, Richard. The Rise of the Creative Class. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
Miller, Toby, and George Yudice. Cultural Policy. London: Sage Publications,
2002.
Singh, J. P. The Arts of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press,
2010.
Van Der Ploeg, Frederick. The Making of Cultural Policy: A European
Perspective. In Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, edited by
Victor A Ginsburgh and David Throsby, 11831221. Amsterdam: North
Holland, 2006.
Cultural Relations
In terms of foreign relations and policies, cultural relations
exist at various levels. Cultural relations can be set between
a given government and its artists, writers, and producers.
Cultural relations can exist within the private sector; between
countries; ministries between universities in different countries; or involve states, nongovernmental organizations and
institutions like the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a promoter and
facilitator of cultural endeavors. Cultural relations may
include the arts and artists, producers and distributors, but also
museums and donors.
Over the past twenty years, the balance of cultural relations
has been faced with the issue of diversity of cultural expressions, which seeks to promotein a single placea broader
horizon of artists and works from various cultural backgrounds
and countries. Since the 1990s, diversity of cultural expressions
has become a significant issue for many states where the cultural landscape is heavily influenced by a significant proportion of products (movies, popular music, magazines, television
programs) from the United States, in particular, through the
phenomenon of cultural dumping. The commerce of culture
is not like others because art and culture cannot be reduced
only to mere merchandise. In 2005, UNESCO approved a
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in recognition of the importance
of cultural diversity around the world.
The basic notion of cultural relations as a dialogue of cultures can take many forms of expression, sometimes unsuspected or unpredictable. The Olympic Games with official
ceremonies and national anthems, an exhibition about a foreign country in a national museum, the world tour of the
Red Army Choir, and the banning of Salman Rushdies novel
The Satanic Verses are all examples of cultural relations that
simultaneously carry, at an international level, a strong political dimension within the expressions of art and culture. Here,
culture is understood as the expression of a nations specificity and uniqueness through its art, language, literature, history,
symbols, and traditions.
Scholars in political science and international relations have
mixed perspectives about cultural relations: Some academics in
North America often neglect these aspects as being outside of
their discipline, while others, especially in Europe, would likely
consider cultural relations as a core, although overlooked, part
of their field.
The relationship between powerthat is, the governmentsand artists, has sometimes been in conflict. In the former Soviet Union, Josef Stalin persecuted composer Dimitri
Shostakovich (19061975), who had a love-hate relationship
with the dictator. Incidentally, the genius composer once dedicated his Tenth Symphony as a musical tribute to the life of
Stalin. Also in the former Soviet Union, abstract artists like
Kazimir Malevich were rejected by the regime during the
1930s because their art was too far from the official social realist trend. During the same period, expressionist painters like
PEACE PARKS
Borders are sometimes seen as zones appropriate for cultural
relations, as international frontiers can create special forums
of exchange between countries. There are times, however,
that frontiers are so imbued with conflict that the only possible use is a demilitarized zone, and sometimes a peace park.
Such peace a park exists, for example, between the North and
South Korea, which used to be considered a no-mans-land.
Peace parks can exist either between good neighbors or
between states in conflict; they are built by two countries (or
sometimes more) that agree to dedicate a region to a common cause, in many cases in order to protect first the environment and wildlife, but sometimes to avoid unwanted uses.
Museums are not just houses for exhibitions about old objects
and the past; in their narratives on history, these institutions
acknowledge and interpret how past events, including conflicts and wars, should be understood now and tomorrow.
Since any museums mission is to educate citizens and visitors
(in addition to preserving its collections), a countrys history
museum can be a challenging place to highlight and explain
both sides of sensitive issues such as colonialism, slavery, ethnic
tensions, and warfare. Hence, visitors can visit the Hiroshima
Peace Memorial Museum, in Hiroshima; the Maison des
esclaves (House of the Slaves) on the Gore Island in Senegal;
and the recent Museum of Genocide Victims in Vilnius, Lithuania. All of these sites serve as tangible proof of the human
rights violations that occurred there. The transition from one
political regime to another can be told by museums as well,
as Steven Dubin explained in his analysis of the South African
museums that dealt with colonialism and apartheid.
Cultural Rights
DEFINING CULTURAL RIGHTS
Cultural rights as identified in the International Bill of
Rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR
1948], the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights [ICCPR 1966], and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESC 1966]) appear
as a discrete category of human rights, separate from political,
civil, economic, and social rights. Cultural rights in international law include the right to education; the right to take
part in cultural life; the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; the right to benefit from
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which
he [the person] is the author; and the freedom to pursue
scientific research and creative activity (UDHR, Articles 26
and 27; ICESC, Articles 13, 14 and 15).
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CULTURAL RIGHTS
In the arena of global human rights, political and civil rights
are often referred to as the first-generation rights while economic, social, and cultural rights are referred to as the secondgeneration rights. This sequencing of rights has understandably
led to endless debate over whether these rights can and
should be ranked by way of priority. Yet regardless of where
one stands on the issue, the reality is that cultural rights were
a much neglected category of rights until the 1990s, especially
as they pertain to culture in both the material and the anthropological senses of the word.
The change appeared to be closely associated with the
dynamics of global politics since the collapse of communism
in the early 1990s. The reign of free market economy has triggered an unprecedented scale of movement among people in
search of economic opportunities and improved livelihood,
while some are simply dislocated by development. In addition, with the end of the cold war, multifarious identity-based
conflicts, often of ethnic origin, have emerged to replace the
previous wars of polarized ideologies. Given the enormous
changes that took place in the last two decades and the speed
with which preindustrialized societies and nonmarket economies are being displaced, it is no wonder that cultural rights
have quickly emerged as a category of human rights that need
much rethinking.
liberal democracy and communism, we now have a comparably uncompromising cultural divide between the West and the
non-Western world.
See also Civil and Political Rights; Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights; Human Rights; Individual and Society; International Bill of
Rights; Multiculturalism; Relativism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THERESA M. LEE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Appiah, K. Anthony. The Ethics of Identity. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2004.
Bauer, Joanne R., and Daniel A. Bell, eds. The East Asian Challenge for Human
Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Benhabib, Seyla. The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global
Era. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Jones, Peter. Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples Rights. Human
Rights Quarterly 21 (1999): 80107.
Okin, Susan M. Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women? Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999.
Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992.
Tully, James. Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Cultures, Endangered
See Endangered Cultures.
Culture Wars
Culture war refers to a situation of radical conflict between
opposite values or worldviews. The term derives originally
from the German Kulturkampf, which denotes the policies
enacted between 1871 and 1878 by Otto von Bismarck,
chancellor of the German Empire, to fight the influence of
Catholicism. By extension, the term came to mean not just
the opposition between secular and religious worldviews,
but more generally all situations of confrontation of radically
conflicting values. In the United States, the term has been
used in this sense by sociologist James Davison Hunter, who
argues that a culture war on divisive issues such as abortion,
homosexuality, and guns is currently taking place in America.
METAPHOR OR REALITY
The objects of a culture war are potentially unlimited. All
cultural values can become the object of a radical opposition
among social actors, including both individuals and communities. A few possible objects of culture wars include diverging
religious faiths; secularism as opposed to religious worldviews;
contrasting political ideologies; arguments in favor of or
against gender discrimination; same-sex marriages; and other
controversial issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and stem-cell
research.
Different forms of culture wars can be grouped according
to the intensity of the conflict. The intensity of conflict ranges
Cumulative Voting
Cumulative voting is an electoral procedure in which instead
of being limited to casting a ballot for a single candidate, voters are given multiple votes and may divide those votes any
way they chose. Voters may cast all of their votes for a single
372 Cybersecurity
candidate or divide them among two or more office seekers.
The number of votes given a citizen is dependent on the
number of candidates. Hence, in an election with four candidates, a voter would receive four votes and could cast them in
one of sixteen possible combinations.
By encouraging participation by small or minor parties,
cumulative voting has been touted as a means to increase voter
turnout and enhance the diversity of political systems. Voters
do not face the dilemma of the wasted ballot in which they
avoid voting for their preferred candidate because they dont
believe that office seeker can win the election. In addition,
the system lessens the negative impacts of the winner-takeall system. Proponents of cumulative voting argue that it can
mitigate political gerrymandering. Some scholars have proposed using cumulative voting to increase the political representation or participation of disadvantaged groups by granting
some voters additional points or votes during elections.
See also Electoral Systems;Voting Behavior;Voting Procedures.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity concerns keeping the space provided by the computer and the Internet safe for the various users of the technology. Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 clearly
outlines the concerns of the U.S. government when it comes to
cybersecurity in the following words: The term cybersecurity
means the prevention of damage to, the protection of, and the
restoration of computers, electronic communications systems,
electronic communication services, wire communication, and
electronic communication, including information contained
therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. Such a concern operates on
several different levels and indicates how various activities bordering on the illegal and the criminal are within the purview of
what constitutes the concern of cybersecurity.
ISSUES
Protecting users from criminal and illegal activities in cyberspace necessitates determining what these activities are.
Michael Margolis and David Resnick outline two types of
cybercrimes: network crimes and computer crimes. Network
crimes are activities that use the Internet but do not necessarily
entail corrupting or breaking into computers. People are the
victims of these crimes, such as gambling and pornography,
in much the same way as those committed in the real world.
Various crimes committed in cyberspace, such as consumer
fraud, stock manipulation, and various types of sexual predation, resemble life offline with their share of scammers, crooks,
and predators.Thus law enforcement officials and government
agencies have had to develop expertise in fighting particular
types of crimes that follow crooks into cyberspace, such as
hacker hunting.
In contrast, computer crimes may or may not employ the
Internet in committing the crime; a computer is its target.
People are victims only in the sense that the computer is the
REMEDIES
Cybersecurity standards have also been created because sensitive information is now frequently stored on computers that
are attached to the Internet. This affects the individual, businesses, and governments equally. Many tasks that were once
done by hand are now carried out by computer, thus the need
for security to guard against information theft, which leads to
identity theft. Businesses need security to protect trade secrets,
proprietary information, and customers personal information.
The government also needs to secure their information. This
has been particularly critical after 9/11, since some terrorist
acts are organized and facilitated by using the Internet.
Various protection programs address the protection of data
against unauthorized access. Data can be secured by issuing passwords and digital certificates to authorized users. To go beyond
authorization to authentication, the use of digital certificates
and biometric techniques (fingerprints, eyes, voice, etc.) provide
a more secure method. Beyond user authentication, sensitive
data can be further protected through encryption, which prevents information from getting into the wrong hands.
Computer systems use various cybersecurity technologies
to remedy threats; these include the use of routers, firewalls,
antivirus protection software, intrusion detection systems,
intrusion protection systems, and auditing and monitoring
computer usage.Various risk management strategies and techniques, as well as training and education, are valued in protecting the network.
Cyberterrorism 373
See also Cyberterrorism; Intellectual Property Rights; National
Security Policy; Privacy; Privacy Rights.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CECILIA G. MANRIQUE
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Crumlish, Christian. The Power of Many. Alameda, Calif.: Sybex, 2004.
Klotz, Robert J. The Politics of Internet Communication. Lanham, Md.:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.
Margolis, Michael, and David Resnick. Politics as Usual. Thousand Oaks,
Calif.: Sage Publications, 2000.
Rheingold, Howard. Smart Mobs. Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Group, 2002.
Speed, Tim, and Juanita Ellis. Internet Security. Amsterdam: Digital Press, 2003.
Thomas, Tom. Network Security First-step. Indianapolis, Ind.: Cisco Press, 2004.
Cyberterrorism
Cyberterrorism is the use of modern communication technology in the commission of terrorist activities. Although not
strictly limited to the Internet, there is a strong bias toward
using the Internet to exemplify the concept of cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism does not have a single definition:
In some instances, it refers to use of the Internet to disrupt
information systems by formal, recognized terrorist organizations. In other instances, cyberterrorism refers to Internet use
by recognized governments that may be seen as supporting
or encouraging terrorist activities. When states launch attacks
using the Internet, it is usually referred to as cyberwarfare.
Sometimes cyberterrorism refers strictly to activities carried
out by organizations, other times to activities carried out by
individuals pursuing a common goal but without a formal
organization. Cyberterrorism may refer to activities executed
across international borders or within a single country.
Cyberterrorists go beyond the law and the general norms
of the countries they attack to accomplish a political agenda
agreed on by only a small minority within the country, and
with which the majority of the country usually disagrees.
Cyberterrorism is undertaken through such avenues as worms,
viruses, and backdoors and has several important purposes for
which it is undertaken, including extortion, the creation of
economic disruption, and identity theft. The actual use of the
Internet in cyberterrorism ranges from preparative acts to
propaganda to carrying out an act of terrorism. Preparative
acts of cyberterrorism include buying airline tickets, researching building plans, and acquiring weapons. Propaganda acts
of cyberterrorism are generally limited to exhorting potential recruits into joining terrorist organizations and exhorting
sympathizers to contribute money and resources. Carrying
out acts of cyberterrorism on the Internet is generally limited
to deluging opponents with threats or attacking computers
and networks.
Much cyberterrorism is international in nature. Many
groups recruit from and are active in a number of countries,
and try to change the international activities of a specific
country. Individuals within one country, or a small number
of countries, use cyberterrorism to try to exact vengeance
against another country for a perceived affront against either
D
Dante Alighieri
See Alighieri, Dante.
Davos Conference
The Davos Conference, or World Economic Forum, is an
annual meeting of political and business leaders, representatives of nongovernmental and private-volunteer organizations,
and scholars. On average, there are about 2,000 attendees,
including 20 or so heads of state that attend the week-long
series of meetings. The meeting was originally organized in
1971 by German scholar Klaus Schwab and was subsequently
sponsored by the European Management Forum, a Swiss
nonprofit organization. The meeting was created as a means
to enhance European economic cooperation and competitiveness. The conference expanded its scope in the late 1970s
and became the World Economic Forum in 1987. In 1988,
the forum expanded its portfolio to include efforts at peace
building and conflict resolution. It was instrumental in the
negotiations between Greece and Turkey that resulted in the
Davos Declaration, which averted a conflict between the two
countries. In 1992, the conference was the site of the first
face-to-face meeting between South African President F. W.
de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, which helped accelerate the
end of apartheid. Two years later, the forum was instrumental
in mediating the initial draft agreement on Gaza between
Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
See also Apartheid; Economic Development, State-led; Economic
Policy Formulation.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Dealignment
Dealignment is a weakening of partisan attachments that leads
to a decline in the portion of the electorate affiliated with
political parties. During periods of partisan dealignment, party
coalitions dissolve, leaving larger shares of the electorate as
independents.
There are individual and group dimensions of dealignment. In terms of groups, the concept of partisan alignment
as developed by early scholars of electoral behavior is based
on the notion that political parties social bases were built on
strong class, ethnic, or religious identities in Western democracies. Hence some scholars have attributed dealignment to a
weakening of those core group identities due to socioeconomic modernization. At the individual level, modernization
has been associated with increasing levels of education. More
educated individuals can more easily make political decisions
without relying on the cues given by parties, leading to the
detachment of younger, better-educated generations from
parties. Changes in communications technology, particularly
the rise of television, have reduced individuals reliance on
parties to interpret political reality.
Dealignment contrasts with realignment, which signifies the
movement of group attachments from one party or coalition
to another. A significant empirical issue is whether dealignment is a secular trend unlikely to be reversed or whether
parties can reestablish strong social bases.
See also Political Parties; Realignment, Partisan.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOSEPH L. KLESNER
Debates, Political
Political debates allow candidates for a particular office to
directly exchange and discuss ideas in a formalized and
structured environment. Voters seem to find political debates
particularly compelling because of the possibility for spontaneous occurrences that could give them a greater sense of the
candidates true character and abilities. Indeed, the history of
political debates in the United States is full of memorable and
defining moments that help to explain why candidates seem
so eager to control the exact number, format, and timing of
these exchanges. Research has shown that political debates
can have important effects on the opinions of those who
watch them and thus on eventual election outcomes.
375
Decisionism 377
of the candidates beforehand. Moreover, early debates (e.g.,
during the primaries) help establish perceptions of viability
and electability, which can shape a candidates eventual success
or failure. A good debate performance can produce a bounce
in public support as the candidate gains more favorable media
attention, and previously undecided voters start to express
clearer preferences. History has shown that some of these
bounces have given candidates critical momentum while others have quickly faded with the next political event.
While most studies suggest that strict partisans are resistant to persuasion effects and typically have their opinion
reinforced by debates, there is reason to believe that debates
could still affect them by priming certain considerations that
are then given increased weight in subsequent evaluations. Of
course, for those who are less devoted to a party, debates can
be an important determinant of vote choice, especially if little
attention is paid to other campaign events. Finally, an intriguing line of research shows that viewers often react as much
to postdebate commentary as they do to the actual debate
performance. For many who watched a particular debate, they
may rely on the media to interpret the performance or at least
confirm their impression. Postdebate commentary and coverage can even influence those who watched little or none of
the exchange by providing a summary judgment.
Political debates give candidates an opportunity to directly
engage each other on important issues.While debates are often
seen as spectacles with memorable moments, research confirms
that they can play an important role in helping inform voters
and enabling them to make important political decisions.
See also Campaigns; Media, Political Commentary in the; Media
and Politics; Primaries; Spin
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICHAEL PARKIN
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Druckman, James N. The Power of Television Images: The First KennedyNixon Debate Revisited. Journal of Politics 65, no. 2 (2003): 559571.
Holbrook, Thomas. Political Learning from Presidential Debates. Political
Behavior 21, no. 1 (1999): 6789.
Hollihan, Thomas A. Uncivil Wars: Political Campaigns in a Media Age. Boston:
St. Martins Press, 2009.
Schroeder, Alan. Presidential Debates: Forty Years of High-Risk TV. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2000.
Decentralization
See Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization.
Decisionism
Decisionism is a concept that gained currency in political
discourse shortly after World War I (19141918). In general
terms, it is the doctrine that ultimately political choices are
based only upon rationally ungrounded beliefs or political
interests. It arose in response to the beginnings of the decline
in faith in the Enlightenment and liberalism. Until World
War I, the political thinkers and statesmen in the West generally presumed that the Enlightenment, and liberalism in
Decision Making
See Judgment and Decision Making.
Decision Theory,
Foundations of
People have been consciously coping with decision problems
for at least as long as history has been recorded. Some of the
best advice modern theory can offer appears to have been
known to the ancients. For example, the biblical Jacob, fearing
his brother Esaus might, divides his camp into two bands, saying, If Esau come to the one company and smite it, then the
other company which is left shall escape (Genesis 32:8)
thereby holding a claim to having invented diversification.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Yet decision theory, and, in particular, decision under uncertainty, was not explicitly studied until the mid-seventeenth
century, when probability theory was introduced. The person most associated with the concepts of probability and
expectation, Blaise Pascal, also introduced decision theory in
his famous wager. In this argument, designed to convince
nonbelievers that they will be better off becoming believers,
Pascal introduced several basic notions of decision theory:
(1) the decision matrix, in which ones acts are independent of
natures choices, or the states of the world; (2) domination
between acts, in which one act is better than another no matter which state obtains the goal; (3) expected utility maximization, according to which the choice between undominated
acts should be made according to the mathematical expectation of the utility of the outcomes they yield; (4) subjective probability over the states, which is an application of the
mathematical probability model as a way to capture ones
beliefs; and (5) nonunique probabilities, in which ones beliefs
are too vague to be captured by a single probability vector.
But even after this dramatic inauguration, decision theory
was largely neglected until the twentieth century, with the
exception of Daniel Bernoullis (1738) explicit introduction
AXIOMATIC FOUNDATIONS
Whether all uncertainty can be quantified probabilistically
has remained a topic of dispute from the very early writings
on probability to the present. Frank Knight (1921) famously
argued that this is not the case, and he distinguished between
situations of risk, in which probabilities can be assumed given,
and situations of uncertainty, in which probabilities are neither
given nor can they be inferred from past statistical data. A
major proponent of the opposite view was Frank Ramsey
(1931), who, in the spirit of logical positivism, suggested defining and measuring ones subjective probability by ones willingness to bet. He suggested that reasonable decision makers
will behave as if they had a subjective probability that guided
their decisions, even if objective probabilities are not part of
the description of the decision problem. Bruno de Finetti
(1931, 1937) offered an axiomatization of subjective probabilities in the context of maximization of expected monetary
value. That is, he provided a set of conditions on presumably observable choices and showed that they are equivalent
to the claim that the decision maker maximizes expected
value relative to some probability vector, which is taken to
be that persons subjective probability. The conditions are
called axioms partly because they are presented as intuitive,
if not compelling, and partly because they are in line with
the logical positivist dictum of defining theoretical concepts
(subjective probability) with observations (pairwise choices
between bets).
A similar axiomatic derivation of the concept of utility
was offered by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
as a by-product of their introduction of game theory in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944). They considered
a presumably observable preference relation between pairs of
lotteries, namely random variables with known distributions, and they showed that a set of axioms on the relation is
equivalent to the claim that this relation can be represented by
a utility function such that, confronted with any two choices,
the decision maker would opt for the one that has a higher
expected utility.
von Neumann and Morgenstern provided a definition of
utility, coupled with the expected utility paradigm, based on
a primitive notion of probability, whereas de Finetti did the
opposite: He defined subjective probability based on a primitive notion of utility. However, when neither utility nor
probability is well defined, it is not obvious that the theory
of expected utility maximization relative to a subjective probability is very convincing, whether interpreted descriptively or
normatively. This problem was rectified by Leonard J. Savage
(1954), who showed that both utility and subjective probability
CHALLENGES
One of the earliest, and perhaps the most radical, objection
to the theory was raised by Herbert Simon in 1957. He
coined the term bounded rationality and argued that people do
not optimize; rather, they satisfice; that is, as long as their
performance is above a certain aspiration level, they stick to
their previous choice. Only when their performance is below
that threshold do they experiment with other choices. Simon
thus challenged the very paradigm of optimization, and
while his theory is seldom incorporated into formal decision
models, it has had a remarkable impact on the thinking of
many decision theorists, who have developed models that
are classified as bounded rationality, even if their departure
from the basic paradigm is much less dramatic than that of
satisficing behavior.
Expected utility maximization was also attacked based on
concrete examples in which it turned out to provide a poor
prediction of peoples choices. Maurice Allais (1953) provided a paradox in the context of decision under risk (with
known probabilities). In this example, many people violate
a key axiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern (the independence axiom), and therefore behave in a way that cannot
be captured by expected utility maximization (for any utility function). Allaiss example showed that people tend to put
more weight on certainty than the standard theory predicted.
In other words, people tend to behave in a way that is nonlinear in probabilities. Daniel Ellsberg (1961) proposed examples
(also dubbed paradoxes), in which many people violate one
of Savages basic axioms (the sure thing principle). In Ellsbergs examples, many people behave in a way that cannot be
described by subjective probability. Specifically, people tend
to prefer situations with known probabilities to situations
with unknown probabilities. This phenomenon is referred to
as uncertainty aversion, or ambiguity aversion (following Knights
and Ellsbergs terms, respectively). Expected utility theory
was generalized to deal with uncertainty aversion by David
Schmeidler (1989) and Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler
(1989), among others.
Starting in the late 1960s, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky launched a systematic experimental study of decision theoretic axioms. In carefully designed experiments, they have shown
that practically any axiom of decision theory is violated in some
examples. Moreover, they uncovered several implicit assumptions
CONCLUSION
Formal decision theory has been extremely powerful in
providing important insights into the behavior of agents in
social and political environments. Formal models help analyze
real-life situations and reveal analogies that might otherwise
be difficult to identify. At the same time, formal models have
been justifiably criticized on various grounds. Some of these
criticisms have to do with assumptions of decision theory per
se, such as the existence of probabilistic beliefs, and some have
to do with assumptions of related fields, such as the concept of
equilibrium in games. It is important not to discard the powerful insights that formal analysis might generate on account
of some assumptions that need to be refined or replaced. It is
to be hoped that future research will improve understanding
of political phenomena using formal models, while taking
each assumption thereof with a grain of salt.
See also Behavioral Game Theory; Decisionism; Game Theory;
Political Risk Assessment; Prospect Theory; Rational Choice Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ITZHAK GILBOA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allais, Maurice. Le Comportement de LHomme Rationnel devant le
Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de lEcole Americaine.
Econometrica 21 (1953): 503546.
Bayes, Thomas. An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of
Chances. Communicated by Mr. Price. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society of London 53 (1763): 370418.
Bernoulli, Daniel. Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of
Risk (1738). Econometrica 22 (1954): 2336.
Bernoulli, Jacob. Ars Conjectandi. Basil: Impensis Thurnisiorum, fratrum, 1713.
de Finetti, Bruno. La Prevision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.
Annales de lInstitute Henri Poincare 7 (1937): 168.
______. Sul Significato Soggettivo della Probabilit. Fundamenta
Mathematicae 17 (1931): 298329.
Ellsberg, Daniel. Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 75 (1961): 643669.
Gilboa, Itzhak, and David Schmeidler. Maxmin Expected Utility with a
Non-Unique Prior. Journal of Mathematical Economics 18 (1989): 141153.
Hacking, Ian. The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1975.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision under Risk Econometrica 47 (1979): 263291.
Knight, Frank H. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Boston, Houghton Mifflin,
1921.
380 Decolonization
Ramsey, Frank P. Truth and Probability. In Foundations of Mathematics and
Other Logical Essays, edited by R. B. Braithwaite. New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1931.
Savage, Leonard J. The Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley, 1954.
Schmeidler, D. Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without
Additivity. Econometrica, 57 (1989): 571587.
Simon, Herbert. Models of Man. New York: Wiley, 1957.
von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.
Decolonization
Decolonization refers to the process through which subject
territories acquire independence. It forms the converse of
colonialism, which entails the extension of formal and informal control over dominated polities. While colonialism establishes a hierarchy between polities, decolonization severs that
relationship. When the international community recognizes
this severing of ties as legitimate, the formerly subject polity
becomes an independent sovereign state.
Historically, the subjugation of one entity by another has
been a feature of every empire. However, the term colonialism is
more commonly used to describe the expansion of the European maritime powers. From the end of the fifteenth century,
technological breakthroughs and emerging capitalism allowed
Spain and Portugal to expand their influence to all corners
of the globe. They were soon followed by the British, Dutch,
and other European powers. During this expansionary phase,
the colonial powers formally annexed all of the Americas and
much of Asia. This annexation reached its apex with the division of the African continent in the Treaty of Berlin (1885).
History is replete with incidences of resistance to European domination.Whereas many of the indigenous populations
lacked the technical and military means to resist the colonial
powers, the American settlers succeeded. The United States
declared its independence first and was soon followed by the
Latin American colonies after the Napoleonic wars ended. The
rhetoric used by these revolutionaries would later inform some
of the decolonization efforts after World War II (19391945).
Nevertheless, although such independence movements
might be considered examples of decolonization, in that they
shed their hierarchical subjugation, decolonization usually
refers to the end of European domination in the twentieth
century. Some of the more prominent white settler colonies,
for example, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, early on
gained a considerable measure of independence, transforming
their status to that of dominions prior to World War I (1914
1918). After 1918, the colonies of the defeated imperial powers, particularly those of Germany and the Ottoman Empire,
were not given outright to the victorious powers but were to
be managed as mandates. Thus, the international legitimacy of
imperial control had begun to change at the same time that
indigenous nationalist movements became more effective. The
Asian nationalist movements, such as the congress movement
in India, were particularly well organized.
Delegated Legislation
All countries that adhere generally to separation of powers
find themselves in a dilemma. To an increasing extent, law in
these countries is made not by the proper legislature, that is,
the elected parliament, but rather by the executive branch.
With the blessing of courts, legislators have delegated much
of their lawmaking powers to administrators. Constitutional
purists mourn that separation of powers is a major guarantee for freedom and that the shift of lawmaking authority
from the legislative to the executive branch departs from the
basic principle that delegatus non potest delegare (a delegate
cannot delegate).These considerations, however, have long
been bypassed by the need for administrative institutions to
exercise lawmaking authority. The U.S. Supreme Court, for
example, acknowledges that In our increasingly complex
society, replete with ever-changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate power. These developments have placed administrators in a very powerful position. Thus, it has become one of
the major tasks of constitutional and administrative law to
channel this power. Above all, delegated legislation is further
remote from the source of legitimation, the people, than parliamentary lawmaking. In a comparative perspective there are
three approaches of ensuring that delegated legislation carries
sufficient democratic legitimation.
A first means is parliamentary predetermination of the
executive rule. German law, for example, proves that the
proper legislature under the sword of Damocles of unconstitutionality is in most cases well able to prescribe for the
executive a substantive program of delegated legislation. As the
German Federal Constitutional Court puts it, the legislature
is obliged itself to make the essential decisions to guarantee
that parliament elected by the people bears political responsibility for all laws, including those created by the executive.
This requirement can also be found in the judicature of the
European Court of Justice. Originally American law was similar. The Supreme Court once forced Congress to make the
important choices of social policy. The parallel is striking
but not surprising, since American law was to a certain extent
godfather at the birth of the actual German constitutional law
after World War II (19391945).
In the meantime, however, American law allows more-orless unfettered legislative delegation. The so-called nondelegation doctrine, once developed to restrict the delegation
of lawmaking power, is moribund, as described by Chief
Justice Marshall in Federal Power Commission v New England
Power (1974). American courts generally are willing to accept
meaningless formulas such as public interest to avoid the
Delegation, Theories of
Delegation of power is a ubiquitous feature of political life
at all levels, reflected in the delegation of governing powers from electorates to legislatures (in democratic systems);
from legislatures to governments (in parliamentary systems);
from legislatures and governments to various nonmajoritarian
institutions such as independent regulatory agencies, central
banks, and courts; and in international politics, from states to
international organizations, courts, and tribunals.
Such diverse acts of delegation raise two fundamental questions for political scientists: First,Why delegate? Why do political principals ever delegate power and authority to agents?
Second, How can political principals, whether electorates or
legislatures or states in the international system, control the
discretion of their agents such that those agents will use their
powers in the interests of the principals and not their own
private interests?
Contemporary theories of delegation in political science
have drawn largely, though not exclusively, from the rationalchoice tradition and in particular from principal-agent analysis. The question of delegation cannot be divorced completely
from that of the agents discretion and subsequent behavior,
but theories of delegation tend to focus on delegation of
powers from legislatures and governments to various types of
domestic and international agents.
WHY DELEGATE?
Delegation in politics has been defined as a conditional grant
of authority from a principal to an agent, in which the latter
is empowered to act on behalf of the former (Hawkins et al.
2006, 7, emphasis in original). Such an action, however, raises
the question as to why any political principal or principals
would delegate such power to another actor whose interests
might not be identical with their own. The basic approach of
rational-choice theories to this question is functional: Institutional choices, such as the choice to delegate, are explained in
terms of the functions that a given institution is expected to
perform and the effects on policy that it is expected to produce
subject to the uncertainty inherent in any institutional design.
Within American politics, a pioneering literature on political delegation examines the transaction costs involved in the
making of public policy, which make it difficult for reelection-minded members of Congress to produce efficient policies and satisfy their constituents without delegating powers
to an agent or agents. Such models of delegation emphasize
Deliberation 383
DELEGATION IN DOMESTIC,
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS
The contemporary study of political delegation derives in
large part from the study of American congressional politics,
but delegation is a much more widespread and timeless phenomenon that raises questions for all four subfields of political
science. From its American beginnings, the study of delegation has moved to comparative politics, where scholars have
attempted both to map and explain cross-national variations
in patterns of political delegation to governments, regulatory agencies, private and public-private bodies, and courts.
In recent years, the study of delegation has traveled from
domestic to international politics, where scholars have applied
both rationalist and constructivist theories to delegation in
the European Union and other international organizations.
Finally, at the risk of stating the obvious, the delegation of
powers raises normative questions about democracy, accountability, and legitimacy that have been at the core of political
theory for millennia.
See also Accountability; Delegated Legislation; Devolution; Distribution of Powers (in a Federation); Legislative Systems, Comparative; Principal-agent Theory; Rational Choice Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARK A. POLLACK
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Bergman, Torbjrn, Wolfgang C. Mller, and Kaare Strm, eds.
Parliamentary Democracy and the Chain of Delegation. European
Journal of Political Research 37, no. 3 (special issue) (2000): 255429.
Bradley, Curtis A., and Judith Kelley, eds. The Law and Politics of
International Delegation. Law and Contemporary Problems 71, no. 1
(special issue) (2008): 1312.
Epstein, David, and Sharyn OHalloran. Delegating Powers: A Transaction
Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Finnemore, Martha. International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and
Science Policy. International Organization 47, no. 4 (1993): 565597.
Franchino, Fabio. The Powers of the Union: Delegation in the EU. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielsen, and Michael J.
Tierney, eds. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. Deliberate Discretion:The Institutional
Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2002.
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Matthew D. McCubbins. The Logic of Delegation:
Congressional Parties and the Appropriation Process. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991.
McNamara, Kathleen R. Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence
and the Social Logic of Delegation. West European Politics 25, no. 1
(2002): 4776.
Pollack, Mark A. The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and
Agenda-Setting in the European Union. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003.
Simmons, Beth A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett. Introduction: The
International Diffusion of Liberalism. International Organization 60, no. 4
(2006): 781810.
Thatcher, Mark, and Alec Stone Sweet. Theory and Practice of Delegation
to Non-Majoritarian Institutions. West European Politics 25, no. 1 (special
issue) (2002): 1219.
Deliberation
A number of political theorists, notably Joshua Cohen, Amy
Guttmann and Dennis Thompson, and Jrgen Habermas,
have sought to define the nature and purposes of deliberation,
identify prerequisites for its existence, and construct models of
ideal deliberation. Central to most definitions of deliberation
is giving reasons and weighing arguments and information in
favor of, or against, public policies. Most models of deliberation
also assume that citizens share a basic level of agreement on
issues before they can deliberate effectively. Because deliberation includes a variety of dimensions, however, no consensus
exists about the precise definition of deliberation. In The Mild
Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National
Government (1994), government scholar Joseph M. Bessette
provides a common definition as reasoning on the merits
of public policy. Some definitions of deliberation, however,
do not require public-spiritedness or other motivations as
requisites for deliberation. Individuals deliberate as long as
they acquire and use substantive information related to public
policy, even if their goals are narrowly self-interested. Scholars
have put forward a variety of criteria to judge deliberation,
including fairness, inclusiveness of participation, the breadth of
viewpoints considered, responsiveness to popular desires, the
logical and empirical validity of arguments, and contributions
to democratic legitimacy.
384 Deliberation
ideas and evidence. According to this view, policy making is a
nondeliberative process of bargaining and compromise driven
by self-interest.
ELITE DELIBERATION
Literature on the subject of deliberation identifies legislative
bodies as quintessential deliberative institutions. In his review
of over two dozen case studies of policy making in Congress
and the careers of several key congressional leaders, Bessette
(1994) interpreted much of what goes on in the U.S. Congress as deliberative activity and contended that bargaining
plays only a limited role in legislation. In Deliberative Choices:
Debating Public Policy in Congress (2006), Gary Mucciaroni and
Paul J. Quirk studied the empirical claims about the effects
of existing and proposed policies that members of Congress
make when they debate public policy issues. Analyzing debates
over welfare reform, estate tax repeal, and telecommunications
deregulation, they found that debate was more realistic and
informative in the Senate than the House, under bipartisanship, when interest groups were active on both sides of the
debate, and when legislators spent more time debating issues.
The focus of much of the empirical literature on deliberation is on the United States, perhaps because of alleged
shortcomings with liberalism or because explanations of
policy outcomes in the United States have emphasized nondeliberative forms of political behavior, such as the exercise
of power and bargaining. However, in 2005, political scientist Jrg Steiner and colleagues examined floor debate in
four nations using political philosopher and sociologist Jrgen Habermass discourse ethics as a theoretical framework.
Steiner and colleagues noted that students of consociational
democracies in Europepolities characterized by elite consensus despite deep social divisionsalluded to a spirit of
accommodation among elites as essential to such systems, but
they did not make clear the key role of deliberation in those
systems. Steiner et al. found variation in the quality of deliberation across institutions and issues. Deliberation was better in
polities with more consensual than competitive political institutions (such as broader cabinet coalitions and multiparty systems), second (upper) chambers, more veto players, and with
nonpublic deliberative arenas.
Deliberation takes place in other institutions as well. Benjamin I. Page, in Who Deliberates? Mass Media in American Democracy (1996), found that the quality of deliberation through the
mass media varied according to the issue on the agenda, but
that overall, the diversity and decentralization of media sources
of information approximate a well-functioning marketplace
of ideas. John Burke and Fred I. Greenstein compared decision making over the Vietnam War during the Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations in their
1989 study of how well presidents test reality. Eisenhowers
deliberation was more disciplined and realistic, because his
leadership style and advisory system encouraged more rigorous and careful discussion of a broader range of alternatives.
Public policy scholar R. Shep Melnick (1983) and others
find that courts have limited institutional capacity for policy
CITIZEN DELIBERATION
Before the advent of mass democracy, theorists viewed deliberation as an elite endeavor. James Madison and other framers
of the U.S. Constitution saw elite deliberation as a bulwark
against the publics impulses and uninformed opinions. Legislators were responsible for filtering and refining public opinion in such a way that they would discover their constituents
true opinionswhat the public would think if citizens had
the same capabilities to deliberate as their leaders. Today, many
observers consider citizen deliberation a vital component of
democratic participation and a mechanism for maintaining
democratic accountability. Citizens cannot limit their participation to voting, leaving policy deliberation to their leaders.
The quality of citizen participation may improve with
deliberation. In a study of individuals who attended a forum
on Social Security reform, individuals who attended the
forum gained more knowledge about the program than similar individuals who did not attend. Second, deliberation produced opinion change over policy options for which there
was already some consensus. For policy options on which citizens had little consensus at the outset, opinions changed only
among citizens who held their opinions weakly, according to a
2004 study by public opinion and policy scholar Jason Barabas.
Properly designed institutions may help to develop citizens
capacities for deliberation without sacrificing the political
equality and legitimacy that are the hallmarks of modern mass
democracy. Among the ideas for building citizens capacity
for deliberation are deliberative opinion polls and holding
deliberation days just before elections.
Whatever the potential drawbacks to deliberation, few
people seem to be concerned that we run the risk of having an
excess of it. Given the proliferation of economic and foreign
policy calamities of recent decades, it may be more plausible
that governments suffer from too little careful deliberation
than too much of it.
See also Deliberative Democracy; Policy Theory; Political Participation; Public Policy Development.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GARY MUCCIARONI
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ackerman, Bruce A., and James S. Fishkin. Deliberation Day. New Haven:Yale
University Press, 2004.
Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy denotes a normative model of democracy that rests on the belief in the persuasive power of systematic argumentations and resolutions reached in public debates
and in the central role of understanding-oriented communicative action. Thus, this model of democracy is intimately
connected with the discourse theory of philosopher Jrgen
Habermas.
On an ideal level, Habermas defines deliberative democracy as a third kind of democracy, different from the liberal and
republican models but integrating aspects of both. The main
distinction among these three types of democracy bears on
the role assigned to the democratic process. The deliberative
model of democracy draws on the conditions of communication, under which it is assumed the political process tends to
generate reasonable results, because the process takes place in
a deliberative manner. Like the republican model, the deliberative model places emphasis on the process of forming the
political opinion and will but does not consider a collectively
acting citizenry as a condition for the realization of deliberative politics. This kind of politics depends instead on the institutionalization of the required procedures.
Discourse theory stresses the intersubjectivity of the
understanding processes, which take place in parliamentary
Democracies, Advanced
Industrial
The label advanced industrial democracy (AID) is difficult to
define. At its most basic, the label would seem to apply to
democracies that are both advanced and industrialized. Yet
Democracy 387
this manner, determining whether or not a country is an AID
becomes relatively straightforward and allows for meaningful
analyses of the relationships between democracy and economy,
between market and state, between democratic politics and
welfare state development, and between economic development (or growth) and the role of the public economy. These
four relationships represent the main, often contested, themes
within comparative politics and political economy.
See also Human Development Index; Industrial Democracy; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD);Welfare State.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HANS KEMAN
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Esping-Andersen, Gsta. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Keman, Hans. Comparative Democratic Politics: A Guide to Contemporary Theory
and Research. London: Sage, 2002.
Lane, Jan-Erik, and Svante, Oberg. Government and the Economy: A Global
Perspective. London: Continuum Books, 2002.
Olson, Mancur. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation,
and Social Rigidities. New Haven:Yale University Press, 1982.
Schmidt, Manfred. Demokratietheorien. Wiesbaden, Germany:VS Verlag, 2008.
Democracy
Democracy is a political regime form based on the rule of
the many, in contrast to the rule of the few (e.g., oligarchy or
aristocracy). What exactly the term denotes is the subject of
dispute among both scholars and politicians. The multitude of
forms that existing democracies take is mirrored by an abundance of theoretical concepts and models of democracy in the
social sciences. Essentially, this makes it a contested concept.
THEORY
The history of democratic theory can be divided into classic
(500 BCE) and modern (since the seventeenth century CE)
schools of democratic thought. The same term underlies these
schools: The word democracy is of Greek origin and consists
of the words demos (often translated as full citizens) and
kratos (to rule). Despite their common terminological base,
the two schools are very different with regard to how and
by whom popular rule should be exercised. While modern
democratic thought stresses that political power must lie in
the hand of all adult nationals, the demos in ancient Greece
consisted only of the adult, male, and free population of a city
(in ancient Athens, the demos formed only about 10 percent
of the total population). Here, popular rule was exercised collectively, directly, and in rather small communities. Modern
democracies, on the other hand, tend to be nation-states in
which popular rule is exercised by representatives selected in
competitive elections.
1. Classic understanding of democracy. Classic democratic
thought was nurtured by a specific form of political rule in
ancient Greece. Here, democracy (demokratia) denoted the
form of government practiced in the city of Athens about 500
BCE. It was a regime form that incorporated the demos in the
388 Democracy
and other forms of political rule, individual and minority rights
are protected by a constitution and can be asserted against the
government. Checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches (horizontal accountability) and
federalism (vertical accountability) serve further to prevent
democratic governments from abusing their powers.
The precondition for meaningful democratic participation
in and beyond elections is a vivid civil society; that is, citizens
can form or join parties and interest groups, and they are able
to exercise their other democratic rights. Therefore, modern
democratic theory views individual freedom, personal responsibility, and the rule of law as cornerstones of a democratic
system.
CONCEPTS
Three issues are prevalent in the empirical study of democracy.
The first is defining the features that separate democracies
from nondemocracies. The second is classifying those regimes
that have been identified as democracies. The third issue pertains to the classification of so-called hybrid regimes, which
are neither clearly democratic nor clearly nondemocratic.
1. Democratic procedures. Scholars do not agree on what
procedural characteristics a regime needs to display in order
to be called a democracy. The minimalist electoral democracy concept, for example, demands elections that are free,
fair, inclusive, and meaningful. Such elections not only entail
a real chance for the opposition to come to power, but they
also presuppose a range of civil liberties, such as freedom of
organization, speech, and information. Some scholars believe
this is not enough and add to these characteristics a wide range
of civil rights, the absence of veto players not legitimized by
democratic procedures, horizontal accountability, and the rule
of law.
Among the many existing concepts of democracy, the most
cited procedural one is political scientist Robert Dahls polyarchy. In the Dahlian understanding, polyarchy (Greek for rule
by the many) denotes a modern representative democracy
with universal suffrage and refers explicitly to modern representative democracy as a historically unique form of government, as opposed to Athenian democracy. Public contestation
and participation are the two main polyarchal attributes. Dahl
defines eight minimal criteria that a political regime must fulfill to be considered a polyarchy: (1) freedom to form and
join organizations, (2) freedom of expression, (3) right to vote,
(4) eligibility for public office, (5) right of political leaders to
compete for support, (6) alternative sources of information, (7)
free and fair elections, and (8) preservation of governmental
accountability.
Different as all these concepts may be, they have two features in common that pose considerable difficulties in the
process of separating democracies from non-democracies: (1)
They are made up of several criteria, which are all necessary
elements of a democracy, and (2) more problematically, most
of these indicators relate to phenomena that are not either/
or conditions, but matters of degree. In consequence, the
researcher must decide on artificial thresholds that separate
Democracy 389
strongest party (for instance, by means of a majoritarian electoral system often resulting in a two-party system) and by a
political process in which power is concentrated.The enforcement of majoritarian interests, as opposed to the equal representation of all societal and political forces, characterizes this
democratic subtype.
3. Gradual concepts (diminished subtypes). Arguably the most
prolific reaction to the conceptual difficulties of distinguishing
democracies from nondemocracies is the creation of ad hoc
concepts to characterize regimes that share most, but not all,
attributes associated with a liberal democracy. In most cases,
the deficiency is expressed with an adjective, resulting in terms
such as tutelary democracy, illiberal democracy, neopatrimonial
democracy, and delegative democracy. In their famous treatise
on conceptual innovations in comparative politics, David Collier and Steven Levitsky call these concepts diminuished subtypes of democracy.
In contrast to classic subtypes, diminished subtypes are characterized by the lack of one or more of the defining attributes
of a liberal democracy. This results in the root concept being
diminished to increasingly resemble the minimalist concept
of an electoral democracy. For example, a regime in which
horizontal accountability is absent is no liberal democracy
anymore, but might still be more democratic than an electoral
democracy. Hence, a fluid conceptual boundary encompassing both the minimalist and maximalist concepts is imposed
between democracies and authoritarian regimes, and various
defects or deficits mark the difference between electoral
and liberal democracy.
The advantage of creating diminished subtypes is that the
perceived deficiencies of individual regimes are highlighted
and that democracy can continue to serve as the root concept
where a regime is perceived to verge closer to democracy than
to authoritarianism. However, there are several notable disadvantages in this strategy. First, some scholars argue that it is
unethical to classify one-third of the countries in the world by
what political scientists perceive to be their deficits. The more
serious disadvantage, however, is the conceptual dilemma this
strategy poses. In terms of the strict demands of a typology,
since these diminished subtypes do not possess all the necessary attributes of a liberal democracy, they should not be called
democratic if liberal democracy is the root concept. In this
case, it might be better to take electoral democracy as the root
concept and create categorial concepts. Finally, the proliferation of such democracies with adjectives (according to one
count, the number reached the hundreds) has created confusion and makes systematization difficult.
At first glance, they seem more impartial and correct and less
corruptible than qualitative analysis. But critics have provided
evidence that they are less reliable than they appear. There
are three common pitfalls in the building of indices. First,
there are methodological problems in the conceptualization,
measurement, and aggregation of data. For instance, indices
are often subject to measurement error due to a lack of equal
access to data over time. Moreover, the high aggregation levels
of data often result in loss of information. Second, country
cases are frequently miscoded because of limited knowledge
of cases. Third, indices measure only certain elements of concepts of democracy, rather than democracy as a whole.
Three frequently updated and often-cited indices measure democratic attributes: the Freedom House (FH) index,
the Polity IV dataset on political regime change, and the Bertelsmann transformation index (BTI). (Although the World
Banks governance data set comprises democratic features,
it is more often referred to when measuring corruption or
efficiency.) The correlation between the three scales is high
despite their differences in conceptualization, operationalization, and aggregation. However, scales based on highly aggregated scores easily blur the existing differences between the
political regimes under scrutiny. This deficit is partly addressed
by the individual country reports that come with each dataset.
1. Freedom House (FH) index. This international watchdog
organization has worked to promote freedom throughout the
world since 1941. In 1972, FH began measuring freedom, an
integral element of democracy. Using twenty-five indicators,
FH annually classifies the status of political rights and civil
liberties in all countries and some disputed and related territories around the world (all are referred to as countries,
a total of 194 in 2009) on a scale of 1 (free) to 7 (unfree). FH
considers countries free that rate 1.0 to 2.5 on scales that
measure political rights and civil liberties (eighty-nine countries in 2009); those that rate 3.0 to 5.0 are considered partly
free (fifty-eight countries in 2009); and those that rate 5.5 to
7.0 are not free (forty-seven countries in 2009).
These ratings are based on the operationalization of seven
attributes of political rights (electoral process, political pluralism, and functioning of government) and civil rights (freedom
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights,
rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights).
Although FH is well known for its parsimony, a closer look
shows that the underlying concept of democracy entails not
only procedural but also substantial features, such as economic
rights, property rights, and social rights. Scholars frequently
criticize the lack of transparency of FHs disaggregated data
and measurement process. Whereas such indices as Polity IV
and BTI provide a codebook, FHs standards of measurement
are not made public. This is especially noteworthy since critics report that the organization has adjusted ratings according
to political considerations of respective U.S. administrations.
Thus, FH must be accepted largely on faith.
2. Polity IV dataset. The Polity IV index of political scientists Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers of the Center of
390 Democracy
Systemic Peace leads back to University of Maryland distinguished professor Ted Robert Gurrs Polity I conceptualizations of 1975. Polity IV captures the degree of contestation
and transparency of 163 political systems on an annual basis
and provides a time series that dates back to 1800. It codes
five dimensions of political rule (competitiveness of participation, regulation of participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and
constraints on executive). Polity IV classifies countries on a
scale of -10 to +10. Countries with a score from -10 to -6
(twenty-three countries in 2009) are generally considered to
be autocratic; -5 to +5 are called anocracies, regimes that are
considered neither full democracies nor full autocracies (fortyeight countries in 2009); and a score between +6 and +10
indicates a democracy (ninety-two countries in 2009). Critics of
Polity IV contend that the index fails to include participation
in its various facets. Polity IV does not measure the right to
vote, which is normally an uncontested constitutive factor of
democracy.
3. Bertelsmann transformation index (BTI). In 2003, the
Bertelsmann Foundation launched the BTI, which is based
on the concept of a market-economic democracy. It began
a biannual publication schedule in 2006. The complex index
examines and assesses political and economic transformation
processes as well as political management in 125 nations in two
sets of rankings, the status index and the management index.
The third index, the BTI status of democracy, measures the
progress toward democracy along five criteria (stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions,
and political and social integration) and seventeen indicators
(subdivided into fifty-two questions) in international comparison. Scores given along each of the seventeen indicators range
from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 10. The BTI does not
explicitly mark a cut-off point between democracy and nondemocracy. Nevertheless, in its 2010 summary, the BTI stated
that in 2009, seventy-six of the 128 countries under scrutiny
were democracies, while fifty-two were autocracies. The BTI
builds no extra category (as the FH index and Polity IV dataset
do) for so-called hybrid regimes. Instead, it identifies defective
democracies, or democracies with flaws (fifty-three in 2009).
In doing so, the BTI blurs the conceptual border between
democracy and nondemocracy. BTI critics further emphasize
that the underlying concept of market-economic democracy
induces a high degree of normativity that lowers the analytical value of the BTI. In addition, the BTI cannot be used
for cross-time analysis, and it studies fewer countries than the
other indices. In 2009, the Bertelsmann Foundation launched
the sustainable governance indicators. They include thirty
OECD member nations and aim at capturing the differences
between established democracies.
See also Anti-democratic Thought; Capitalism and Democracy;
Consociational Democracy; Constitutional Democracy; Deliberative
Democracy; Democratic Theory; Democratic Transition; Digital
Democracy; Emerging Democracies; Empire and Democracy; Europe,
Democracy in; Global Democratic Deficit; Greek Democracy,
Democracy, Constitutional
See Constitutional Democracy.
Democracy, Cosmopolitan
See Cosmopolitanism.
Democracy, Deliberative
See Deliberative Democracy.
Democracy, Direct
See Direct Democracy.
Democracy, Emerging
See Emerging Democracies.
Democracy, Future of
In the aftermath of the cold war, democracy became the most
common form of government in the world. Policy makers,
the general public, and scholarsespecially those who followed arguments such as Francis Fukuyamas in his book, The
End of History and the Last Manembraced the notion that
the end of the superpower conflict marked the triumph of
liberal democracy as the preferred form of government and
the means by which many of the globes economic and social
problems would be ameliorated. Although democratic revolutions transformed regions such as Eastern Europe, as of the
early twenty-first century, democracy had failed to achieve
its promise or potential in many states. Such disappointments
highlighted current challenges within representative systems
and obstacles to the future spread of democracy. The success
of democratization in the Middle East and the ability of large
developing countries like China to succeed in establishing
full democracy are at the forefront of current debates on the
future utility of the concept.
Democracy, Representative
See Representative Democracy.
COUNTRY STUDIES
Historical studies of American urban machine politics by
James Scott and Rebecca Menes should give pause to those
who assume that election fraud is somehow inconsistent with
American democracy. Research by Donatella della Porta and
Alberto Vannucci, Byeong-Seog Park, and Steven R. Reed
on Italy, Korea, and Japan, respectively, illustrates the global
pervasiveness of quid pro quo politics. Reform presents
a puzzle. How can a system reform when corrupt officials
benefit from its preservation? Barbara Geddes explores this
question in Latin American democracies and concludes that
reform is most likely under a grand coalition that can share
both the gains and the losses. Ronald Johnson and Gary
Libecap study the roll-call votes that led to the passage of the
U.S. civil service act in 1883 and show that supporters tended
to come from districts with customs offices or major post
offices, whose constituents would benefit most from reform.
Economic interests supplemented progressive calls for change.
Case study research in the United States in a book edited
by Bruce Stave also shows how economic interests collaborated with ideological reformers to effect political change in
machine-dominated cities.
CROSS-COUNTRY RESEARCH
Cross-country research on the association between corruption and constitutional structure misses the nuance and detail
of the more fine-grained and case-oriented research, but it
compensates for this in its ability to capture broad regularities.
Thus, Jana Kunicov and Susan Rose-Ackerman find that
presidential systems that elect their legislatures through proportional representation (PR) tend to be the more corrupt
than other democracies. PR, especially closed-list PR, tends
to produce strong parties whose leaders can make credible
corrupt bargains with the president. The multiple parties typically produced by PR limit the incentives for opposition party
candidates to police the corruption of incumbents. Parties
Democracy and
Democratization
Modern conceptions of democracy focus on what Robert
Dahl calls contestation and participation. A modern
democracy (which Dahl prefers to call a polyarchy to
distinguish it from ancient or direct democracy) allows the
opposition to contest incumbents for control of the state. A
state is also democratic if all adults have the right to express
their views and to shape the behavior of public officials. The
central component of participation is the right to cast ballots
in regularly scheduled and fair elections. Participation also
includes the freedom to publicize antigovernment views and
to assemble in public and in private spaces. This minimalist
definition is commonly traced to Joseph Schumpeter, who
famously discussed democracy as a struggle among elites for
electoral support.
The conventional definition of democracy comes with
at least three assumptions. First, it is threadbare. It says little
about basic rights and liberties. For instance, it is not clear
whether a government that is a product of free and fair elections can inspect personal correspondence in wartime. Nor
does the conventional definition say much about the limits of
public gatherings. For example, it does not say whether protest
marches that block street traffic and thus affect the rights of
third parties are acceptable ways of participating in politics.
The conventional definition is thin because it distinguishes
between democratic and nondemocratic regimes. It does not
offer a measure of how a democratic political system is or can
be more or less democratic.
Second, the conventional definition is in fact an empirically
oriented definition, and it has little to say about the normative importance of democracy. Dahls characterization at least
implies that democracies are desirable, because they permit
citizens to choose their leaders. Making key public officials
win elections forces them to listen to public concerns, because,
among other reasons, the opposition will inform voters when
incumbents are not representing citizens effectively. However, there is nothing in minimalist conceptions that rules out
the developmental or participatory virtues of democracy. In
Considerations on Representative Government, John Stuart Mill
argues that talking about politics, making demands of government, and otherwise participating in democratic government not only keeps public officials honest but also is part of
the good life. Deliberation requires contemplating alternatives
and reaching conclusions, characteristics that help humans to
become autonomous individuals.
Third, modern understandings of democracy assume that
the values of democracy have fixed empirical manifestations.
Though a newly democratic regime can no longer curb the suffrage rights of women or of illiterates, democracies of the past
had little problem in restricting these rights. Lowering the
minimum voting age to 18 is a development of the second
half of the twentieth century; a handful of political systems,
such as Austria or Nicaragua, have lowered it further to 16.
The history of democratic regimes, however, is full of age
thresholds that exceed either of these minimums. And, while
parliaments seem to be integral parts of democracy, because
they are key deliberative arenas, there is nothing in minimalist conceptions of democracy that prohibits constitutions
from marginalizing legislatures and strengthening executives.
TYPES OF DEMOCRACY
There are at least three important schemes for classifying
democratic systems. The first (and perhaps most basic) way
of sorting democracies is by the procedure for choosing the
chief executive. The second uses alternative counting schemes
to identify the fragmentation of political systems. The third
empirically measures central features of political systems to
create two- or three-category classifications of political systems. The existence of more than one classification suggests
that democracies come in a variety of shapes and sizes that
complicates efforts to catalog them. Nevertheless, each classification scheme seeks to sort democracies by how centralized
their lawmaking authority is.
The first scheme to classify democracies draws a distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems. In parliamentary systems, the parliaments select heads of government,
typically called prime ministers. Though prime ministers can
typically remain in office for no more than four or five years,
they can lose the legislatures confidence and be forced to
leave office before their mandates expire. In presidential systems, presidents are elected independently of the legislature and
are simultaneously heads of government and heads of state.
Semipresidential systems have both prime ministers (as selected
by parliaments) and independently elected presidents.
Differences regarding the election of executives do lead to
dissimilar outcomes. Research shows that parliamentary systems last longer than presidential ones. Using a database of all
democracies that existed between 1946 and 2002, Jos Antonio
Cheibub calculates that the expected life of a parliamentary
system is 58 years and that of a presidential system is 24 years.
Presidential systems also tend to run budget surpluses more
to tyranny. Unlike the theory of checks and balances, functional specialization reduces conflict and allegedly leads to a
more efficient running of the state. By empowering each part
of government to pursue a specific function of government,
the new separation of powers enables the state as a whole to
remain democratic, to protect individual liberty, and to have a
unity of purpose often lost with the old separation of powers.
Two prominent classification of democratic government
build upon these notions. Arend Lijpharts distinction between
majoritarian and consensual democracies pits Westminster
political systems against the new and old separation of powers systems. Lijphart argues that consensual systems (which
require the consent of multiple centers of power to change
the law) perform better on a host of economic, political, and
social indicators than majoritarian systems. George Tsebelis
eschews the development of any such typology and instead
develops a set of rules to identify the institutions and parties in
each political system that can block policy change, actors that
he usefully classifies as veto players. Tsebeliss central claim is
that changing policy is more difficult as the number of veto
players increases, a hypothesis that builds upon and extends
thinking about comparative government since the eighteenth
century.
The final scheme for classifying democratic governments
is more empirical in nature. It is a product of efforts to distinguish between democracies and dictatorships. Though one
major effort simply differentiated between democracies and
authoritarian systems, most subsequent efforts create a third
category of regimes to recognize that a wide range of countries have political systems that combine features of democratic and autocratic regimes. Partial or semidemocracies hold
competitive elections but systematically bias participation
against certain interests in society. They often also have dysfunctional political institutions, that is, institutions that undermine the accountability so characteristic of well-functioning
democratic systems. Using Polity IV data, Figure 1 shows that
more dictatorships existed in the world (in countries with
more than half a million people) than democracies until the
early 1990s, when mobilization and political reform reversed
this trend. By 2001, more than half of all nation-states had
democracies.
DEMOCRATIZATION
Democratization refers to the shift from nondemocratic to
democratic forms of government. Samuel P. Huntington suggests that there are three waves of political change through
which regimes have become more competitive and inclusive.
The first and longest wave started in 1828 with the elimination of property requirements in many states of the United
States, so that nearly half of (white male) voters cast ballots
in the presidential elections of that year. The first wave ended
in 1926 with the fascist coups in several European countries.
Political systems in the first wave began to contest control
of the state before they gradually extended suffrage rights to
the rest of the population. The second wave runs between
1943 and 1962. The third wave begins with the Portuguese
75%
Semidemocracies
Autocracies
50%
25%
0%
1946
1951
1956
1961
1966
1971
1976
1981
1986
1991
1996
2001
2006
source: Polity IV
note: Semidemocracies (or anocracies) are regimes with scores between -5 and 5. Autocracies score between -10 and -6, and democracies score
between .6 and 10.
between the two factors is a product of how long countries have been independent, how many checks and balances
exist on executive authority, and religion. Though Epstein
et al. argue in favor of Lipsets thesis, their findings are contingent upon a threefold classification of democracy: While
development does not encourage autocracies to become demo
cracies, departures from autocracy into partial democracy and
transformations from this hybrid regime into democracy are
highly contingent upon the dynamics of partial democracies.
Second, authoritarian regimes in the postWorld War II
era have different propensities to turn over power to democratically elected politicians. Barbara Geddes shows that personalist dictatorships end up being overthrown, either in a
coup or revolution. One-party regimes like Mexicos survive
the longest. But, when opposition movements threaten their
survival, they negotiate a transition to democracy in the hopes
of continuing to win in what will be more competitive elections. Finally, military regimes are the most likely to negotiate agreements with civilian politicians, because factionalism
makes them the least stable of authoritarian systems. As economic downturns or social movements threaten their unity,
they often reach agreement to bargain with their opponents.
Third, the decision to democratize presents both autocrats
and opposition movements with a strategic dilemma whose
resolution determines both the pace and final outcome of
regime liberalization. Przeworski contends that hard-liners on
rational to invest their resources overproportionally in nonexclusionary public goods that benefit large fractions of society.
Therefore, the different incentive systems of different kinds
of political order have strong implications for public policy
making, which strongly affects overall economic development.
Still, this theoretical perspective does not neglect the possibility of development under autocratic rule and makes a case for
a more gradual differentiation between the economic impact
of different levels of democracy and autocracy.
Finally, there is a third alternative for explaining the correlation between democracy and development; it focuses upon the
importance of crucial events in history. Accordingly, the correlation between democracy and development is a result of endogeneity.The emergence of democracy and economic development
are both caused by crucial events in a societys past. Historic path
dependency becomes a critical factor from which single countries cannot easily escape. For instance, the varying quality of
political institutions and the different levels of economic development in developing countries today are said to be heavily
influenced by different types of colonization dating back centuries. Therefore, societies political and economic development
reflects critical junctures in history that are difficult to neutralize
by ordinary political changes. While it is certainly true that
history matters, the difficulty consists in making terms such as
critical junctures or path dependency operational. What kind
of historic events constitute tipping points that drive a society
toward a new pathway from which it cannot easily deviate?
Altogether, the debate about democracy and development
can easily appear as a whirlpool of interdependencies, where
different scientific schools fiercely defend their claims. These
competing perspectives have, nevertheless, generated most
valuable insights about the relations between politics and economics. Today, the challenge consists in providing more finetuned explanations for the correlation between democracy and
development that provide context sensitivity and show under
which specific conditions the different theoretical approaches
are of particular importance.
See also Capitalism and Democracy; Development Administration;
Economic Development, State-led; Globalization and Development;
Millennium Development Goals.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JRG FAUST
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared.
Income and Democracy. American Economic Review 98, no. 3 (2008):
808842.
Faust, Jrg. Democracys Dividend: Political Order and Economic
Productivity. World Political Science Review 3, no. 2 (2007): 128.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. What Do We Know About
Modernization Today? Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (2009): 3348.
Lake, David, and Matthew Baum. The Invisible Hand of Democracy:
Political Control and the Provision of Public Services. Comparative
Political Studies 34, no. 6 (August 2001): 587621.
Lipset, Seymour. Some Social Prerequisites for Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science
Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69105.
Olson, Mancur. Dictatorship, Democracy and Development. American
Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 567576.
Democratic Centralism
Democratic centralism is a form of internal organization and
party discipline associated with Leninist political parties. Its
democratic aspect is the idea that party members discuss
and debate proposals and that decisions are taken by majority vote. Centralism means that once a decision is reached,
all members, even those that disagree with the decision, are
obligated to uphold it. Democratic centralism also has a vertical or hierarchical dimension: Lower organs in the party may
offer input in decision making, but decisions from higherranking party bodies must be followed by the lower-level
structures. Its defenders would maintain that democratic centralism allows an organization to reflect the preferences of its
members while maintaining unity in action.
The origins of the term democratic centralism lie with the
German Social Democratic Party in the late 1800s, but it
gained more currency after being endorsed by Vladimir Lenin
in What Is to be Done? (1902), in which he formulated the
requirements for a professional, revolutionary party. Among
Russian Marxists, Lenins ideas were not universally accepted,
and Lenins advocacy of democratic centralism was one reason
for the 1903 schism between Lenins Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, who preferred looser party discipline.
In 1921, after gaining power in Russia, Lenin used the idea
of democratic centralism to ban factions within the Bolshevik Party. Lenins goal was to establish his authority, promote
party unity, and prevent the emergence of counterrevolutionary tendencies. Later, under Joseph Stalin, alleged participation
in anti-Stalin factions led many individuals to be dismissed
from the party and ultimately put on trial and executed. Leon
Trotsky, himself accused of leading such a faction, decried
Stalins approach, maintaining that freedom of criticism was
essential for party democracy. Stalin prevailed over his critics,
and under his rule, democratic elements effectively ceased to
exist, as political decisions were made at the top with little or
no input from below. Few dared to speak out against Stalins
preferences.
Democratic centralism was formally enshrined in Article
3 of the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union, which read,
The Soviet state is organized and functions on the principle of democratic centralism, namely the electiveness
of all bodies of state authority from the lowest to the
highest, their accountability to the people, and the obligation of lower bodies to observe the decisions of higher
ones. Democratic centralism combines central leadership with local initiative and creative activity and with
the responsibility of each state body and official for the
work entrusted to them.
Critics of Soviet practices, however, noted that the principles of democratic centralism were contradictory and necessarily led to concentration of power at the top. For example,
while democratic centralism prescribes a collective approach to
the work of all organizations, criticism of agreed-upon policies
is permissible only for the top leadership, not for rank-and-file
Democratic Peace
Democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.
Instead, they traditionally opt to build stable zones of peace or
rely upon diplomatic engagement. This concept is called the
democratic peace. Although some scholars have cited instances of
wars between democracies, the concept of democratic peace
is statistically supported. Today, the claim of a joint, separate
peace between democracies has become, as one scholar puts
it, as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations (Levy: 1988).
Democratic Socialism
Democratic socialism is a term meant to distinguish a form of
socialism that falls somewhere between authoritarian and
centralized forms of socialism on the one hand and social
democracy on the other. The rise of authoritarian socialism in
the twentieth century in the Soviet Union and its sphere of
influence generated this new distinction. Authoritarian versions of socialism are generally forms of state socialism that
are highly centralized, equating state and society, and they
employ extensive intervention into, and control of, public and
private life, including communications, culture, and social life,
in addition to centralized control of the economy.
Democratic socialists reject this authoritarian version of
socialism. They contend that socialism is not a transitory state
(a dictatorship of the proletariat) to a communist society but
rather that it is an autonomous form that requires democracy. The idea of a transitory state was often used to justify
undemocratic and even authoritarian measures as required by
the initial stages of a states transition to communism.
Though democratic socialists reject the revolutionary
model and advocate a peaceful transformation to socialism
carried out by democratic means, they also reject the social
democratic view that capitalist societies can be successfully
reformed through extensive state intervention within capitalism. In the view of democratic socialists, capitalism, based on
the primacy of private property, generates inherent inequalities
of wealth and power and a dominant egoism that are incompatible with the democratic values of freedom, equality, and
solidarity. Only a socialist society can fully realize democratic
practices. The internal conflicts within capitalism require a
transition to socialism. Private property must be superseded by
some form of collective ownership.
institutions such as constitutionalism, parliamentary government, and a multiparty system with socialism. Belgian political
theorist Chantal Mouffe, while accepting Bobbios stress on
liberal democracy, takes him to task for excessive individualism. She argues that liberal democratic socialism still has to
take into account the question of social cohesion. Other notable contributions include John Keanes work on civil society
and David Helds work on democratic autonomy. Merging
the concept of liberalizing institutions with the concept of
decentralizing economic self-governance, British sociologist
Paul Hirst proposed an associational democracy. Hirsts proposal combined flexible specialization with regional economic
regulation and extensive pluralism and self-government.
Other democratic socialists have responded to the issues
that arise with a centralized command economy with notions
of market socialism. This group advocates a market mechanism for prices that can be combined with public ownership and direction by market planners. Regulated in this way,
proponents argue, markets do not produce the large-scale
inequalities of the capitalist market. For this idea first proposed
by Polish economist Oskar Lange in the 1920s, economists and
political theorists such as Alec Nove, John Roemer, and David
Schweikart are among the major proponents.
See also Bernstein, Eduard; Bobbio, Norberto Democratic Theory;
Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Liberal Democracy; Market Socialism; Marxism; Mill, John Stuart; Nove, Alec; Russell, Bertrand;
Saint-Simon, Claude-Henri; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Social
Democracy; Socialism; Utopias and Politics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BRIAN CATERINO
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bernstein, Eduard. Evolutionary Socialism. New York: Schocken, 1972.
Bobbio, Norberto. Which Socialism: Marxism, Socialism and Democracy,
translated by Roger Griffin. London: Polity Press, 1987.
Crocker, David. Praxis and Democratic Socialism:The Critical Social Theory of
Markovic and Stojanovic. Brighton, Sussex, U.K.: Harvester Press, 1983.
Cunningham, Frank. Democratic Theory and Socialism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987.
Gould, Carol. Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics,
Economy, and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Held, David. Models of Democracy, 2nd ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1996.
Hill, Christopher. The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the
English Revolution. London: Penguin Books, 1975.
Hirst, Paul. Associative Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.
Keane, John. Democracy and Civil Society. London:Verso, 1988.
Lichtheim, George. A Brief History of Socialism. New York: Praeger, 1970.
Macpherson, C. B. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977.
Markovic, Mihalio. Democratic Socialism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1982.
Marx, Karl. Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970.
Mill, John Stuart. Chapters on Socialism. In On Liberty and Other Writings,
edited by Stephan Collini, 219279. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989.
Mouffe, Chantal. The Return of the Political London. New York:Verso, 1993.
Nove, Alec. The Economics of Feasible Socialism. London: Macmillan, 1983.
Roemer, John. Egalitarian Perspectives: Essays in Philosophical Economics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Schweikart, David. After Capitalism. Latham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield,
2002.
Democratic Theory
The field of democratic theory can be divided into two subfields: descriptive and normative theory. The role of descriptive
democratic theory is to characterize and study certain features
of political systems that are considered democratic. Normative
democratic theory focuses less directly on describing existing
institutions and systems and instead inquires into the moral
basis for democracy as a method of political decision making
and governance. While this essay will focus primarily on normative aspects of democratic theory, descriptive theory must
also play a significant role if one takes a democratic system to
be normatively desirable only if it is in some significant way
feasible.
Theorists do not agree about what they mean when they
invoke the term democracy. A working definition is that it is
a process of decision making in which all participants enjoy
equal standing in some form. The etymology of the word
democracy is simple enough; it is derived from the Greek term
(de-mokrata), which translates as popular power.
However there is much contention among democratic theorists over what such a power amounts to. For some democratic
theorists, like Joseph Schumpeter, democratic power means
minimally that rulers are selected through a competitive electoral procedure. For others, like Carole Pateman, democracy
demands not only democratic political institutions but also a
civil society based on participation, equality, and liberty. The
role of democratic theory is less to resolve definitional disputes
and more to ascertain whether there is a form of democratic
governance that is legitimate and morally desirable given
existing political conditions.
MAJOR THEMES
Among the central themes of democratic theory, the first is
democratic legitimacy. Since it is rare that a political decision
is reached unanimously, democratic theory must account for
how collective decisions can be legitimately authoritative
and have coercive power over dissenting participants. There
is also the general project of justification of democracy: Why
is democracy a better form of government than others?
Theorists provide both instrumental and intrinsic arguments
in answering this question. Instrumental arguments, like that
of John Stuart Mill, point out that democracy brings about
good political outcomes such as just social or economic conditions as well as a more tolerant, informed, and engaged
citizenry. Amartya Sen invokes an instrumental justification of democracy when he argues that famine has never
occurred in a democratic state with a relatively free press.
David Estlund has argued that democracies have epistemic
advantage over other forms of government, since democratic
procedures that involve many have a tendency to produce
good political decisions, which are more legitimate than the
decisions of the expert few. To supplement the instrumental
benefits that democracy offers, there are intrinsic justifications as well. Many theorists such as Joshua Cohen and Jeremy Waldron have argued that given the pluralistic nature of
HISTORICAL CRITICS
Normative democratic theory need not be an affirmative
project; those who are engaged in the discipline may be critical of its feasibility or normative advantage. Many criticisms
of democracy are instrumental arguments; in some way or
otherperhaps because of human fallibility, or the structure
of the democratic process itselfdemocracy does not produce just outcomes. Both Plato and Aristotle argue that democracyas Plato defines it ,the rule by the governedwas a
less favorable form of government than monarchy (rule by an
individual) or oligarchy (rule by the elite class). Plato believed
that democracy tended to conflate expertise in governance
with expertise in winning elections. In order to win elections,
statesmen must appeal to the base beliefs of their constituents
rather than pursue legislation that promotes justice and the
common good. Hence Plato worried that democratic systems
reward those who are talented at winning the favor of the
public and disadvantage those who have the temperament and
judgment to govern properly.
Thomas Hobbes likewise believed democracy to be an
inferior form of government, because it encourages dissention
and instability among citizens. According to Hobbes, a monarchy furthers the common good, since the monarchs private
and public interests are entangled, forcing political decisions
by the monarch to track the interests of all subjects. Hobbes
could be understood as criticizing democracies for cultivating
subjects and politicians whose private interests cannot be integrated with the common good. Anthony Downs and other
contemporary public-choice theorists echo both Platos and
Hobbess criticisms, arguing that citizens are not adequately
informed about political matters and are too often motivated
CONTEMPORARY STRANDS
Contemporary democratic theories continue engaging in the
historical debates of the discipline and can be grouped into
three major strands: procedural, substantive, and deliberative
democratic theories. Procedural (or minimal) theorists, such
as Dahl, Schumpeter, and Waldron, focus primarily on the
democratic processes themselves rather than on the fairness
of their outcomes or the development of citizens preferences
that are inputs into the decision-making procedure. Substantive theorists, such as Pateman, argue that while democratic
procedures are an important component to bringing about
just results, they are not sufficient and must be supplemented
with, among other things, institutionally guaranteed rights.
Deliberative democrats, such as Gutmann, Thompson, and
Cohen, concentrate on the individual preferences of citizens
and contend that deliberative procedures foster the development of appropriate and public-minded participants.
See also Burke, Edmund; Democracy; Hobbes, Thomas; Madison, James; Mill, John Stuart; Normative Theory; Plato; Representative Democracy; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Schumpeter, Joseph
Alois.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DANA HOWARD
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Christiano, Tom. The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.
Cohen, Joshua. Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy. In
Philosophy and Democracy, edited by Tom Christiano. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Dahl, Robert. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1959.
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and
Row, 1957.
Estlund, David. Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007.
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. Democracy and Disagreement.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, edited by C. B. Macpherson. Harmondsworth,
U.K.: Penguin Books, 1968.
Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers,
edited by Isaac Kramnick. Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1987.
Mill, John Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government. In On
Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998.
Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970.
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1967.
Plato. The Republic, translated by Desmond Lee. Harmondsworth, U.K.:
Penguin Books, 1974.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract, translated by Maurice Cranston.
London: Penguin Books, 1968.
Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper
and Row, 1956.
Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf, 1999.
Waldron, Jeremy. Law and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999.
Democratic Transition
Democratic transition is the process of changing, without major
violence, from a nondemocratic regime to a democratic one.
It can be distinguished from other paths to democratization
that involve higher levels of violent conflict: revolution,
as occurred in late eighteenth-century France, and foreign
intervention, such as that undertaken by American and allied
troops in Western Europe and Japan at the end of World War
II (19491945).
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
peaceful processes of democratization took place in a number
of countries that already had multicandidate elections. This
democratization was done by enlarging the eligible electorate
within the country. In the United Kingdom, the United States,
and other former British colonies, suffrage rights were allocated gradually to different minority groups through a slow,
lengthy process of moderate reforms. By a different path, in
Germany and in northern European countries, such as Sweden, Norway, and Finland, enfranchisement of the electorate
was sudden. Such a rapid change could have created political
instability, but this shift was made in conjunction with the
establishment of proportional representation electoral rules
and other institutional inclusive devices.
New ways of democratization advancing more directly from
dictatorial or colonial regimes developed in the late twentieth
century. Social mobilization and bargaining among the elites
have led to democratic transitions in southern Europe since the
mid-1970s, in Latin America and Eastern Asia since the early
1980s, and in eastern Europe since the late 1980s. As a result of
these processes, a majority of the worlds population now lives in
democratic or liberal regimes for the first time in human history.
A democratic transition requires three components. First,
there must be a variety of political actors with different political regime preferences. The incumbent government may be
split between hard-liners and soft-liners who promote different responses to the threat of opposition movements. Within
each of these groups, radical and moderate elements can be
distinguished for their propensity to either reject or accept
intermediate compromises with other actors.
Second, the dictatorial regime can be successfully challenged following a triggering event, such as the death of the
dictator, an economic crisis, the failure of authoritarian rulers
to deliver on their promises and meet the peoples expectations, or a foreign military defeat.
Third, opportunities for choice appear. On the incumbent rulers side, the costs of implementing repression against
the opposition can be compared with the potential benefits
of opening the system or calling an election under relatively
favorable conditions to retain or share power. On the oppositions side, the costs of fighting, including the risks of provoking a civil war and the subsequent losses and destruction,
can be compared with the potential benefits of accepting a
provisional compromise that establishes better conditions for
further action and organization. In the end, the government
and the opposition may come to an agreement because of
their different expectations and uncertainty about the future.
Different models of democratic transitions can be distinguished by the roles of their actors, the paths that the transitions take, and the consequences of the transitions. First, the
transaction model, also called establishment of democracy without
democrats, transition from inside, transformation, and agreed reform,
implies significant exchanges between factions of rulers while
keeping the opposition in a weakened state, the introduction
of liberalization before democratization, and the enjoyment of
relatively advantageous conditions by former authoritarians to
survive and evolve in power. Cases of initial liberalizing reforms
launched from above in a nondemocratic regime include Brazil
and Spain in the second half of the 1970s and the Soviet Union
in the second half of the 1980s.
Second, the round table model, also called extrication or transplacement, involves more formal and balanced negotiations
between reform rulers and opposition movements, as happened in Chile as well as in Poland and Hungary in the late
1980s.
Finally, the collapse model, also called breakdown, defeat, or
replacement, implies sudden changes imposed by an unexpected
crisis, improvised conversations between former persecutors
and the persecuted, and quick, dramatic decisions. Changes
in Portugal and Greece in the 1970s, Argentina in the early
1980s, and East Germany and Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s,
among others, can fit this model.
The focus on actors strategies might complement more
traditional discussions on structural conditions for democracy.
The strategic approach permits the use of tools from game
theory to identify crucial actors, bargains, and decisions. Studies
of democratic transitions also consider the role of international
organizations and information as well as the relations between
the path of change and institutional choices, economic reforms,
and further degrees of democratic consolidation and stability.
See also Democracy and Democratization; Democracy, Future of;
Democratic Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOSEP M. COLOMER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alexander, Gerald. The Sources of Democratic Consolidation. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2002.
Colomer, Josep M. Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy:The Spanish
Model. Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1995.
. Strategic Transitions. Game Theory and Democratization. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
. Transitions by Agreement. American Political Science Review 85, no.
4 (1991): 12831302.
Hayden, Jacqueline. The Collapse of Communist Power in Poland. London:
Routledge, 2006.
Higley, John, and Richard Gunther, eds. Elites and Democratic Consolidation
in Latin America and Southern Europe. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1992.
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
ODonnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds.
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986.
Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991.
Rustow, Dankwart. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.
Comparative Politics, no. 2 (1970): 337363.
Democratization
See Democracy and Democratization.
Demonstrations
See Protests and Demonstrations.
Deontology
Deontology derives from the Greek deon, duty, and logos,
science. The term refers to a branch of ethics concerned
with actions as guided by moral obligation or duty. The tradition is associated with the work of the German philosopher
Immanuel Kant, who argued that there exist ethical values
that require morally obligatory actions, regardless of their
consequences. According to Kant, duty is effectively based
on logical, universal unchanging sources, formulated in his
principle of the categorical imperative. In the same way, in
deontological ethics, an action is considered good because of
its commitment to higher-order moral values of the action
itself, not because its product is good. (One cannot undertake immoral acts like torture of spies even if the outcome is
morally preferable.) The emphasis on the type of motivation
for action contrasts the deontological approach with consequentialism and utilitarianism. More extreme versions of
deontology have been criticized as ignoring the goals and
consequences of actions and/or leading to impossible situations, sometimes even producing harm. Neo-Kantian theories
have been developed that try to resolve these difficulties, for
example, by combining deontology with utilitarianism or
additional values (such as equality and social justice).
See also Kant, Immanuel; Utilitarianism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JIRI S. MELICH
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. 1785, translated by
H. J. Paton. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.
Dependence
Dependence is an unequal relationship in which an actor, group,
or nation is forced to rely on an external power for resources,
economic activity, or security. Dependence creates vulnerability and the potential for exploitation among the dependent actors. Within domestic political systems, dependence
may emerge when individuals or groups become reliant on
policies or resources. In international relations, dependency
theory emerged in the 1950s as an approach to explain
unequal patterns of development. Dependency theory posits
that the world is divided into dominant and dependent states
(also known as core and periphery states). Dominant states are
economically advanced and have diverse economies and high
standards of living. Dependent states have low gross national
products and often have economies that are tied to the
export of a narrow band of resources to the developed states.
The economic inequality is the result of the actions and
policies of external actors, such as multinational corporations,
Dependency Theory
Dependency theory was a critical reaction to the conventional approaches to economic development that emerged
in the after math of World War II (19391945). There
are two dependency schools: the Marxist, influenced by
Paul Baran and developed by Samir Amin, Theotnio
dos Santos, Arghiri Emmanuel, Andr Gunder Frank, and
Anbal Quijano, and the structuralist, built on the work of
Ral Prebisch and others at the Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean, and best represented
by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Peter Evans,
Osvaldo Sunkel, and Maria da Conceio Tavares.
Both groups would agree that at the core of the dependency relationship between industrialized countries, referred
to as the center, and less-developed countries, referred to as
the periphery, lies the inability of the periphery to develop an
autonomous and dynamic process of technological innovation.
The main contention between them was related to the possibilities of economic development in the periphery.
CONCLUSION
More recently, dependency authors emphasized that industrialization and technical progress in the periphery were
insufficient to break the dependency ties with the center.
Financial dependency is reflected in the inability of peripheral
countries to borrow in international markets in their own
currencies, and constitutes the real obstacle to development.
The inability to borrow in international markets in their own
currencies reflects the inability of the domestic currencies of
peripheral countries to acquire all the functions of money as
a reserve of value, unit of account, and medium of exchange.
The ability of a currency to function as international money
is a question of degree. The main problem associated with the
inability to provide all the monetary functions is that financial
markets remain underdeveloped in peripheral countries, and
the process of capitalist accumulation is hindered.
Interestingly enough, mainstream economists have also
dealt with financial dependency. Ricardo Hausmann argues
that, in part, underdevelopment results from the so-called
original sinthat is, the fact that the currencies of developing countries are inconvertible in international markets. In
this view, the external instability of domestic currencies in the
periphery hinders the process of development. While mainstream and dependency authors agree on the importance of
currency inconvertibility, they would disagree on the solutions. Mainstream authors would emphasize the importance
of sound fiscal policies and monetary rules that promote credibility, while dependency authors would emphasize the need
for capital controls and reduced integration with international
financial markets.
See also Capitalism and Democracy; Development, Economic;
Economic Development, State-led; Free Trade; Globalization and
Development; Monetary Policy; Political Economy, Comparative.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MATAS VERNENGO
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cardoso, Fernando H., and Enzo Faletto. Dependncia e Desenvolvimento na
Amrica Latina. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1970.
Cohen, Benjamin. The Geography of Money. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1998.
Dos Santos, Theotnio. La Teora de la Dependencia: Balance y Perspectivas.
Buenos Aires: Plaza and Janes, 2002.
Eichengreen, Barry, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza. Currency
Mismatches, Debt Intolerance, and Original Sin. NBER Working Paper
no. 10036. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research,
2003.
Frank, Andre Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America:
Historical Studies of Brazil and Chile. New York: Monthly Review Press,
1969.
Prebisch, Ral. The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal
Problems. New York: United Nations, 1950.
Tavares, Maria da Conceio. Subdesenvolvimento, Dominao e Luta de
Classes. In Celso Furtado e o Brasil, organized by Maria da Conceio
Tavares. So Paulo: Fundao Perseu Abramo, 2000.
Topik, Stephen. Dependency Revisited: Saving the Baby from the Bathwater.
Latin American Perspectives, 25. no. 6 (November 1998): 9599.
Vernengo, Matas. 2006. Technology, Finance, and Dependency. Review of
Radical Political Economics 38, no. 4 (2006): 551568.
Deregulation 409
Deracialization
Deracialization is the process of breaking with practices of
representing the Other (individuals or groups) as racialized.
Racialization can be understood as a historical and cultural process that leads to the classification, distinction, and
qualification of humanity into races, and it consists of representational practices that mark racial difference and signify
the racialized Other. French philosopher Michel Foucault
refers to this process as fragmentation, which is one of the
functions of racism, a technology of power that permitted
modern European colonization. In other words, colonial
institutions exercised their power and their domination on
colonized societies by creating a racialized Other as different
from the Self.
The concepts of race and nation developed in connection
with one another. In countries such as the United States,
these relationships of power are still expressed in contemporary categories such as those of people of color, community of color, and racial minorities, with which nonwhites
are classified as systematically different from whites. Therefore,
the process of deracialization would imply the dismantling of
both social relationships and the practices of representation
that were built on racism, as well as practices that construct
or perpetrate stereotypes and binary oppositions, and naturalize difference. The election of President Barack Obama might
illustrate the process of deracialization of social relationships in
the United States.
See also Colonialism; Foucault, Michel Paul; Race and Racism;
Racial Discrimination.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PATRICK CLOOS
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Foucault, Michel. Cours du 17 mars 1976. In Il Faut Dfendre la Socit:
Cours au Collge de France (19751976), by Michel Foucault, 213235. Paris:
Seuil/Gallimard, 1997.
Hall, Stuart. The Spectacle of the Other. In Representation: Cultural
Representations and Signifying Practices, edited by Stuart Hall. London:
Sage, 1997.
. The Work of Representation. In Representation: Cultural
Representations and Signifying Practices, edited by Stuart Hall, 1364.
London: Sage, 1997.
Loomba, Ania. Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2005.
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York:Vintage Books, 1979.
Deregulation
Deregulation is the removal of businesses or whole industries
from the process of government regulation. Deregulation can
also refer to the sale of state-owned enterprises, known as
privatization, but privatization may entail the creation of new
regulatory institutional arrangements and does not necessarily
represent an absence of regulation. In theory, the term can be
used broadly to refer to businesses becoming exempt from
all types of regulation, from price controls and competition law to pollution abatement rules to equal employment
opportunity law.
410 Deregulation
that regulation benefited regulated interests first and foremost,
he analyzed market entry regulations in the trucking industry
as well as occupational licensing requirements. According to
Stigler, such regulations hindered competition by inflating the
profits of established competitors while blocking market entry
to smaller firms, ultimately resulting in higher consumer prices.
The situation could sustain itself, argued Stigler, only because
the costs of regulation to each consumer was not worth the
cost of organizing other consumers in order to bring about
change. Stiglers highly influential work served as the basis for
other important articles on the social costs of regulation by
Gary Becker (1983), Sam Peltzman (1976) and Richard Posner
(1975). James Q. Wilson also built on this research by arguing
that capture was more likely to occur in situations where the
benefits of regulation were narrowly concentrated on industry,
while the costs were widely dispersed across consumers (1980).
Derthick and Quirk showed that demand for deregulation
often came from agency staff. Economists within the Civil
Aeronautics Board recommended against continuing regulations that erected significant barriers to market entry against
smaller airline companies. Additionally, future Supreme Court
Justice Stephen Breyer, who worked then as special counsel
on the Senate Judiciary Committee, convinced Senator Ted
Kennedy of the anticompetitive effects of airline regulation,
and, therefore, of the need to deregulate. Thus, the ideas of
economists brought together a coalition of market-oriented
Republicans, inflation hawks, and consumer advocates, such as
Ted Kennedy and Ralph Nader.
Competitive reforms were passed in the airline industry
with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, in the trucking
industry with the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, and in telecommunications with the breakup of AT&T into the regional
baby bells in 1984. The irony of the success of Stigler and
others was that their theories dictated that deregulation could
only occur if regulated firms no longer wanted to be regulated.
Indeed, in his 1989 retrospective examination of the theories
behind deregulation, economist Sam Peltzman suggested that
regulated firms had come to believe that, by the late 1970s,
the benefits of regulation no longer outweighed the costs. It
is important to note that deregulation in the United States
had its limits. The Reagan administration wanted to scale
back environmental, worker safety, and health regulations, but
Congress was divided over such plans. Additionally, there was
variation in the extent to which the states implemented the
reforms. Public policy scholar Paul Teske showed in a 1991
article that after the AT&T divestiture, not all the states followed the advice of economists, and in a 1994 article, Teske
and colleagues demonstrated that the trucking industry was
able to move to the state level to capture regulators and secure
beneficial regulation.
In the 1990s, the financial sector also witnessed a strong
movement toward deregulation with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999, which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of the Great
Depression era. Proponents of the Glass-Steagall Act claimed
that it eliminated conflicts of interest in finance by keeping
a firm barrier between commercial and investment banking.
The banking industry, on the other hand, had sought its repeal
in order to expand the operations of individual financial institutions. Additionally, Congress passed the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, which outlined the regulation of broadcast spectrum and further reformed the regulation of telecommunications. However, critics such as Ralph Nader have maintained
that the law has allowed large media companies to further consolidate and reduce competition in media markets.
Derrida, Jacques
Jacques Derrida (19302004) was an Algerian-born French
philosopher. He is considered the founder of deconstruction,
an approach to textual analysis (used mainly in the fields of
philosophy and literary theory but also in the study of political discourse) that seeks to understand the meaning of texts
by unveiling the inherent oppositions between the apparent
features and the essential message. Issues such as sovereignty,
otherness, and decision making are present in many of his
works, but his political criticism went beyond theory, actively
questioning and engaging in issues such as the Vietnam War
(19591975), apartheid, and the death penalty.
Born in El-Biar (close to Algiers), Derrida grew up in a
Sephardic Jewish family. In 1952 he was admitted to the cole
Normale Suprieure in Paris, France, where he defended his
masters dissertation (The Problem of Genesis in Husserls
Philosophy) in 1954. His 1966 lecture at Johns Hopkins University was followed by a long list of visiting appointments
in renowned institutions, and he presented his doctoral thesis
in 1980. In 1982 he cofounded and served as first director of
the Collge Internationale de Philosophie in Paris, and a year
after that he joined the cole des Hautes tudes en Sciences
Sociales. In 1987 he also started lecturing at the University of
California.
In 1967 Derrida published three works that introduced the
concept of deconstruction: Writing and Difference, Speech and
Phenomena, and Of Grammatology. The basis of deconstruction
is that any text always has more than one possible interpretation, making interpretative reading a complex task constantly
limited by the simultaneous existence of incompatible but at
the same time closely woven meanings. Derrida, in his literary approach, suggests than it is by prioritizing appearance
over essence that deconstruction operates and is able to unveil
these textual oppositions. Deconstructive strategies include
the diachronic or genealogical study of conceptual term usage
and the critical identification of the aporias (contradictions or
paradoxes) and ellipses contained in writing and thought.
Significant applications of deconstruction to political
phenomena can be found in Derridas Force of Law (1989),
Specters of Marx (1993), and Rogues (2003), in which the tensions among democracy, sovereignty, and power are explored.
Derrida argues that in a democracy, power is always abused,
as it inevitably requires force, freedom, decision making,
and, ultimately, sovereignty. But as democratic universalized
Descriptive Representation
decision making is necessarily a slow process, and many governmental decisions need to be made immediately, there is
always a tendency to concentrate and unify power, to move
toward imperial hegemony, excluding others from the process
of decision making.
The most recurrent criticisms of Derrida and his works are
usually linked to his lack of clarity and, in some instances, what
has been viewed as intentional obfuscation (intent to confuse). His style was often more literary than analytical, leaving
argumentation aside and opening the doors for contradictory
interpretations. Derrida himself admitted that his notion of
deconstruction was not easy to explain through discourse, as
its object of critique is writing itself.
See also Decision Theory, Foundations of; Democratic Theory;
Sovereignty.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOM EVANS PIM
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Beardsworth, Richard. Derrida and the Political. London: Routledge, 1996.
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
Dtente 413
experiences of women or minorities that can only be represented by members of those groups themselves; implicit here
is the idea that decisions will be made in the common interest
based on the interplay of ideas, so that an effective voice is
more important that a strictly proportional voice.
Whichever rationale is accepted, however, at least three
questions remain to be answered. First, what groups are to
be represented? On the one hand, this means specifying the
dimensions of difference to be taken into account. In racially
or linguistically divided societies, these categories almost
always are considered relevant, as increasingly is gender. But
what about age or social class (the latter having been widely
considered relevant in the early decades of the twentieth
century, but much less so in the twenty-first)? Moreover, are
dimensions such as race and gender to be considered independently (i.e., black versus white and male versus female)
or must they be considered jointly (black male versus black
female versus white male versus white female)? Second, does
demographic representation require proportionality (as suggested by the argument concerning equal citizenship and the
term mirroring), or does it require adequacy (as suggested by
the politics of presence), even if this means that some small
groups would require more than their proportionate share of
the representatives?
The third question is how, institutionally, demographic
representation can be furthered or assured. Most directly, this
can be done through the use of reserved seats (e.g., for Maori
in New Zealand or scheduled castes and tribes in India) or
quotas for nominations, whether applied in law (e.g., Belgium
or France) or by internal party decision (e.g., Sweden). In
closed list proportional representation systems, not only is the
number of minority nominees crucial but also their placement on their partys list. With regard to women, some quota
systems go beyond simple proportions, instead requiring zipperingthe alternation of men and women on the list.
Beyond these direct actions, the choice of electoral system
more generally can have an impact on the degree of demographic representation. This impact, however, depends on the
kind of group involved. Provided that the parties decide that
they want demographic representation, closed lists are more
effective than open lists; if parties are merely paying lip service
to representation, however, open lists may be superior. Having
large legislative districts with many representatives for each
is generally conducive to representativeness, because it allows
parties to present more balanced lists, but if a minority is
geographically concentrated, single member districts may be
advantageous.
See also Representation and Representative; Representative
Democracy; Representative Systems.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RICHARD S. KATZ
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Krook, Mona Lena. Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate
Selection Reform Worldwide. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Kymlicka, Will. Group Representation in Canadian Politics. In Equity and
Community:The Charter, Interest Advocacy, and Representation, edited by F.
Despotism, Oriental
See Oriental Despotism.
Dtente
Dtente, a French term meaning the easing of strained relations, was used by Henry Kissinger to describe the Richard
Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations (19691977) goals
for American-Soviet relations. Dtente would result from
a revised foreign policy that recognized the limitations of
American power; addressed relations with other countries
based upon their foreign policy behavior rather than their
ideology, domestic institutions, or treatment of their citizens;
and attempted to entwine the Soviet Union and the Peoples
Republic of China in the Western-dominated international
order. In short, America would engage its adversaries unsentimentally and privilege international stability over the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad to reduce
tensions.
Dtentes architects recognized that the Soviet Union had
achieved rough parity in strategic nuclear capabilities while
retaining a quantitative advantage in conventional military
forces, yet its leaders craved recognition as equals, required
trade and credit from Western countries, and were becoming estranged from their Chinese allies. The United States
desired the Soviet Union to halt its military buildup, recognize
Western rights in Berlin, facilitate American withdrawal from
Vietnam, and establish principles for managing conflicts in the
third world. The Nixon and Ford administrations engaged the
Soviet Union in substantive negotiations that addressed these
issues simultaneously, linking progress in one area with progress in others so as to maximize leverage and generate qualitative changes in East-West relations.
Dtente achieved many of its goals. The United States and
Soviet Union concluded two strategic nuclear arms control
agreements: The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT)
froze the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
for five years, and the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited
each country to two batteries of 100 defensive missiles (soon
reduced to one) deployed to protect their national capitals or
an ICBM field. An agreement effectively tying West Berlin to
the Federal Republic of Germany and guaranteeing western
access removed a constant irritant from East-West relations.
The parallel warming of relations with both the Soviet Union
and the Peoples Republic of China facilitated American
withdrawal from the Vietnam War and reset the geopolitical
414 Deterrence
stage for American foreign policy. And Nixons official visits
to Moscow and Peking, firsts for an American president, were
symbolic ofand drovesuperpower cooperation.
Dtente did not secure lasting cooperation, however.
Domestic critics, such as Senator Henry Jackson, emphasized
the concessions granted in these agreements, downplayed the
benefits, and demanded better terms while also rejecting the
notion that the United States should negotiate with a totalitarian enemy without explicitly linking progress on international issues to changes in the treatment of its citizens. Such
pressure for increased demands, along with the loss of presidential power caused by the Watergate scandal, Nixons resignation, and subsequent legislation, eviscerated the ability of
the executive to threaten sanctions or promise inducements in
its dealings with the Soviets and thereby undermined dtente.
Although presidents Ford and Carter continued the policy,
seeking further arms control agreements and the atmospherics of superpower summitry, U.S.Soviet relations soured. The
Soviet Union took advantage of the situation by promoting
third world allies, culminating with its deployment of Soviet
forces to support its client in Afghanistan in 1979, which effectively ended the policy of dtente.
See also Arms Control; Cold War; Foreign Policy; Institutionalism, Comparative; New Institutionalism; Realism and Neorealism;
Soviet Union, Former; Statecraft.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GARY SCHAUB JR.
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Cleva, Gregory D. Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy.
Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1989.
Froman, Michael. The Development of the Idea of Dtente. New York: St.
Martins Press, 1991.
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.
Nelson, Keith. The Making of Dtente. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1995.
Deterrence
Deterrence usually refers to deterrence by punishment
(where an attacker might be able to take over a territory
but is dissuaded by the prospect of suffering retaliatory damage at home), rather than deterrence by denial (where the
aggressor is dissuaded from attacking simply by the knowledge that his attack would failwould be repulsed by the
local opposing defenses). This kind of deterrence is often
assumed to be tied to the invention of nuclear weapons and
the means to deliver them over the top of any battlefield,
as the winner on the land or sea would still suffer horrendous damage to its cities, inflicted by the losing sides
airplanes or missiles. But there were some similar discussions
of such deterrence as early as the aftermath of World War
I (19141918), when it was assumed that conventional air
raids would soon be catastrophic enough to be a deterrent.
And the emergence of global oceanic commerce had even
Deutsch, Karl W.
Karl Wolfgang Deutsch (19121992) was a social and political scientist, born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, who became a
naturalized U.S. citizen. He earned degrees from the Deutsche
Universitt and Charles University in Prague and a doctorate
from Harvard University in 1951. After teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Yale University, Deutsch
returned in 1967 to Harvard, where he became Stanfield
Professor of International Peace. He was elected president of
the American Political Science Association in 1969, the International Political Science Association in 1976, and the Society
for General Systems Research in 1983. Deutsch was a member
of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the academies
of sciences of Austria and Finland. He received honorary doctorates from seven universities in the United States, Germany,
and Switzerland, and the Commanders Cross Order of Merit,
with star, of the German Federal Republic.
Deutschs dedication to social science was linked to a moral
passion for improvement in the world. His dissertation and
first book, Nationalism and Social Communication, sought to
explain the impact of the process of social mobilization, an
expression that he coined, whereby people become uprooted
from their traditions and become available for new patterns
of communication and behavior. Deutsch analyzed literacy,
mass media exposure, urbanization patterns, language usage,
religious belief, and other indicators, preferring quantitative
analysis. Social mobilization, he argued, was likely to accelerate the fragmentation of states whose peoples did not already
share the same language, traditions, and basic social institutions,
but it would increase the likelihood of political integration
among peoples in states whose people did so share. Published
in 1953, this research helps us understand the forces that contributed to the decomposition of the Soviet Union and the
unification of Germany.
In The Political Community and the North Atlantic Area,
Deutsch sought to specify the background conditions for the
political integration of what he called security communities
in the North Atlantic world through a series of conditional
hypotheses, which he sought to test with empirical qualitative evidence. He introduced the concept of security communities to describe relations between states where war had
become unthinkable notwithstanding a history of severe interstate conflict. From that concept, he derived empirical propositions to be tested on the historical experience of peoples on
both sides of the North Atlantic, though especially to understand political integration in Europe. This analysis, in fact, pertains to international politics worldwide.
Deutschs Nerves of Government was a more theoretical
work. In his own prospectus for this book, he noted that he
based it on the comparative study of many systems of communication and control, ranging from electronic computers to
biological and nervous systems, and to human organizations
and societies.The book aimed, he wrote, to reorient political
thought toward a greater interest in seeing government and
Development, Economic
Economic development is a multifaceted concept with no universally agreed-upon definition. It broadly refers to a process
of economic transformation leading to increased levels of
prosperity in a region or country. While increased prosperity
is typically associated with increases in per capita income in
the region or country of interest, development is considered
to encompass more than income. Because of the insufficiencies of a simplistic definition of development based solely on
income per capita, new approaches such as human development or capabilities have been envisioned. Despite these
critiques, per capita income level remains the most popular
metric for economic development, as it is highly correlated
with other indicators commonly believed to characterize
development. Thus, even if usefulness of income per capita
as a proxy for economic development is often challenged, it
continues to be the indicator most frequently used by scholars, policy makers, and international organizations.
Economic development became a major concern in the
postWorld War II (19391945) era following the process of
decolonization that led to the emergence of many countries
with low living standards; these countries were categorized as
underdeveloped or developing countries, in contrast to
advanced countries. Although the general tendency has been
to lump these countries together in the same developing
countries category, the World Bank disaggregates this category
into low-income, lower middle income and upper middle
income categories.There is substantial variation amongst these
countries with respect to their resources, sociopolitical structures, and institutional arrangements. These differences, in turn,
lead to varying outcomes regarding economic development.
Since the postWorld War II era, there has been notable crosscountry variation in development outcomes: Some countries,
especially those in East Asia, have almost converged into the
category of advanced countries, while many in Africa, Latin
America, and Southeast Asia have lagged behind.
Theories of economic development were initially set forth
by economists in the subfield of development economics,
which emerged in the 1950s. Undermining the differences
between developing countries, these theories aimed to explain
causes of underdevelopment while offering models of development. For many years, the field of political science largely
viewed economic development as an exogenous determinant
of political institutions and processes. A dominant perspective
was that economic development was causally prior to democracy. For the last three decades, however, political scientists have
increasingly studied factors explaining variation in the levels of
economic development and increasingly focused on political
and institutional determinants of economic development.
There has been considerable interaction between development strategies implemented by developing countries and the
scholarly debate on development. Changes in development
thinking and shifts in policy making are usually reflected in
and affected by international organizations such as the United
Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
the World Bank.
Development, Political
Economy of
The political economy of development looks into the fundamental question of why some countries and regions of the
world are rich and others are poor. A variety of competing
schools of thought seek to explain the main reasons for underdevelopment and how to overcome development challenges.
The political economy of development deals with economic
considerations, but it also includes political dimensions as key
factors for development prospects of countries and regions.
Defining and measuring development and underdevelopment are crucial for the political economy of development.
As a rule, development indicators are used in an attempt to
measure levels of poverty. Traditionally, gross domestic product and related growth rates were used almost simultaneously
to define development. In the 1980s and especially the 1990s,
various efforts were made to define development in a much
broader sense. Such new indicators and indices as the Human
Development Index (HDI) were developed.
Explaining underdevelopment and development through
different theories and approaches has a long tradition that can
even be traced back to early research on different levels of
industrialization in Europe. Especially since the 1960s, a number of schools have been established to explain development
and underdevelopment. One of the main features of these
schools has been their universal approach. Influential debates
were sparked by Walt Whitman Rostows model of the five
stages of growth. He tried to explain the stages of economic
development that are needed before high mass consumption
is reached. Other schools were looking at structures of global
exploitation. The Independencia schools, originating mainly
in Latin America, were influential in this context, especially
Development Administration
Development administration became a strategic concern in
American social sciences and to policy makers during the late
1950s, with Walter Rostows The Stages of Economic Growth:
A Non-Communist Manifesto. Western development literature
tried to identify the noneconomic conditions for accelerated
and orderly economic growth. Development administration
was understood as a mechanism contributing to economic
growth, stability, and systems maintenance, along with its
traits of efficiency, stability, and legitimacy for nation and state
building. It offered an institutional framework to convert
inputs of objectives, capital, and know-how into developmental outputs. Even after the idea flagged in the West in the
1970s, it left its imprint in the lesser-developed countries of
the Middle East, East and South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These were countries either emerging from decolonization, seeking to secure the benefits of bilateral and multilateral
aid for of economic and social development, or both.
Development administration so conceived emphasized the
formal and technical aspects of government machinery. Developmental goals were assumed to be self-evident and, therefore,
agreed on by local Westernized elites.These goals were broadly
defined as nation building and socioeconomic development.
Authors like Irving Swerdlow identified two interrelated tasks
in the development process: institution building and planning. Still others emphasized numerous development oriented
activities, such as the management of change, establishing an
interface between the inner environment and the larger
intra- and extrasocietal context, and mobilization of human
and physical capital for development objectives and related
democratic politics.
During the 1970s and 1980s, worldwide prosperity
increased, especially among the industrialized nations. It was
expected that by applying modern technology, developing
nations would overcome the challenges of poverty and lack
of development that lay at the heart of instability, insurgency,
and the appeals of communism, and this belief was reinforced
by the strong evidence of successful rapid postWorld War
II (19391945) reconstruction. The approach was essentially
clothed in pragmatism in the vein of scientific management.
The assumption was that problems, whatever their nature, lay
with and at the periphery. By contrast, the solution to all problems was always in the developed world.
The developmental creed that emerged posited that to
attain development, a countrys administrative structure
needed to be overhauled and revamped to conform to the
standards of the most advanced industrial societies. The issue
thus consisted in the reorganization of the existing traditional machinery into a new entity. This process was known
as administrative development: the modernization of the public
service machinery through exogenous inducement, including the transfer of technology and the training of local staff
by foreign experts. For this task, there was already a prescriptive bureaucratic model to be found in Western traditions:
the administrative state. This administrative state was based
on the dichotomy between politics and administration, a
pyramidal hierarchy, unity of command, political neutrality,
recruitment and promotion based on merit, public service
accountability, objectivity, and integrity. In reality, a parallel value system encompassing these traits often coexisted in
those parts of the world where Western models were set up
that operated concurrently with traditional cultures, economies, and markets.The principles of development administration were generally accepted at face value by the indigenous
elites, especially in those countries in Asia, Africa, and the
West Indies, where a relatively peaceful transition to nationhood had taken place.
The postindependence political and bureaucratic elites rapidly moved to replace colonial administrators. Western education was widely perceived to be the vehicle both for personal
advancement and for acceptance into the global community of
Western-trained professionals, and these postcolonial administrative systems continued to be imitative and ritualistic. Practices, styles, and structures of administration generally unrelated
to local traditions, needs, and realities succeeded in reproducing the symbolismbut not the substanceof British, French,
or American administrative traditions. Even where a relatively
large contingent of trained functionaries existed, as in India,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Nigeria, or Ghana, the old lawand-order colonial administrative culture prevailed. For most
of the local elites, technical solutions and formalism appeared
more palatable than the substantive political options needed to
bring about real socioeconomic change. Reorganization and
rationalization soon became ends in themselves, displacing the
developmental features of development administration.
address the needs of countries in the third world. As onesizefits-all solutions, NPM recipes seldom availed the countries for
which they were intended. Poorer nations ceased to be treated
truly as recipient countries; they were compelled to make net
transfers of their meager resources to the West. Led by the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, a new
economic and financial orthodoxy (called structural adjustment)
resulted in severe setbacks to development and living standards
in poorer nations.To service their debt, several countries came
close to bankruptcy, and their governments became receiver
states. Despite exhortations for freer trade, restrictive global
trade practices and biases prohibited poor nations from really
taking advantage of the so-called comparative advantages.
The problem was further compounded by commodity prices
falling to their lowest level in fifty years, while the prices of
manufactured goods from rich countries, as well as foreign
debts, kept rising. In this context, it is not surprising to see that
poverty, inequality, repression, and despair continued to rise in
the southern hemisphere.
As had happened with the calls for a new international economic order in the 1970s, the new expanding global inequity
brought about a growing awareness of the need for reform, as
displayed at the Earth Summit in 1992 and the Millennium
Summit at the United Nations in New York in September
2000, which resulted in the Millennium Development Goals.
Both events affirmed the imperative for greater solidarity
worldwide and shared responsibility in meeting and addressing the challenges confronting all countries and all peoples in
this twenty-first century.
Devolution 423
Jolly, Richard, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss. UN Ideas That Changed
the World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.
Nef, Jorge, and O. P. Dwivedi. Development Theory and Administration: A
Fence around an Empty Lot? Indian Journal of Public Administration 27,
no. 1 (January-March 1981): 4266.
Rostow, W. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
Swerdlow, Irving. The Public Administration of Economic Development. New
York: Praeger, 1975.
Devolution
Devolution refers to the transfer of power from a central
government to subnational units of government. The term,
which is derived from the Latin word devolutio, is often used
interchangeably with decentralization in political science literature. The concept of devolution originated in the modern era
and drew increased interest during the late twentieth century.
Historically, devolution followed a long period of centralization that began with the political development of nationstates during the Renaissance (1300s to the 1600s) throughout
Europe and continued through the era of colonialism (1400s
to the 1800s), with its transformation of national economies.
The development of complex economic, societal, and governmental organizations increased, sustained, and institutionalized the highly centralized power that defined the modern
nation-state. Ultimately, the centralized nation-state governments faced increased complexity and interdependence that
obscured accountability and introduced inefficiencies, which
in turn led to demands for decentralization, or devolution.
Dewey, John
John Dewey (18591952) was a leading American psychologist,
philosopher, educator, and political activist. The central focus
of his work is epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. His
seminal contributions in this area provide the inspiration for
numerous movements in social and philosophical thought,
including functionalist and behavioralist psychology, empiricism, naturalism, pragmatism, and humanism.
Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, on October 20,
1859. He completed his undergraduate studies at the University of Vermont in 1879 and received his doctorate from
Johns Hopkins University in 1884, under George S. Morris,
an adherent to the ideas of German philosopher Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel. Dewey started his career as an instructor
in the philosophy department at the University of Michigan
in 1884, where he joined Morris. During his nine years at
Michigan (18841888, 18891894), Dewey expressed his commitment to Hegelian idealism while beginning to explore a
synthesis between Hegels idealism and experimental science.
Dhimmi 425
In 1937, he presided over the Commission of Inquiry into the
Charges Against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials. Following
his retirement from active teaching in 1930, he continued to
work and publish vigorously until his death.
See also Hegel, Georg W. F. Pragmatism;Trotsky, Leon.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICHAEL MCNAMARA
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Boisvert, Raymond. John Dewey: Rethinking Our Time. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY
Press, 1998.
Field, Richard. John Dewey (18591952). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
July 14, 2005, www.iep.utm.edu/d/dewey.htm.
Sleeper, Ralph. The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Deweys Conception of
Philosophy. New Haven:Yale University Press, 1986.
Tiles, J. E., ed. John Dewey: Critical Assessments. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Dhimmi
Literally meaning protected person, dhimmi is the term
applied in early Islam to Christians, Jews, and others (ahl alkitab, people of the book) under Muslim rule who were
subjected to various restrictions but allowed to practice their
own religions and follow their own legal systems. As dhimmis
generally did not serve in the military, they had to pay a special tax, the jizyah or poll tax. While this exemplified a kind
of discrimination objectionable from a modern liberal point
of view, and while over the centuries some cases of harsh
treatment occurred (belying portrayals of an Islamic utopia),
there is widespread agreement that dhimmis enjoyed a kind
of toleration that was rare elsewhere in earlier centuries,
particularly in the Christian world. In general, various religious communities preferred their status under Muslim rule
DHondt Method
The DHondt method is a way of allocating parliamentary seats
in a political system with a party-list system of proportional
representation. The goal is to allocate seats in a manner that
closely resembles the proportion of votes cast for a particular
party. It was invented by the Belgium mathematician Victor
DHondt (18411901) in 1878. To use this method, one does
the following: (1) Award one seat to the party with the highest
number of votes. (2) Calculate a new number of votes for
the party just awarded a seat by dividing the number of votes
cast for the party by the number of seats awarded so far plus
one. (3) Award a seat for the party with the most votes after
completing step 2. (4) Repeat until all seats are filled. This
system can be used with a single national party list or with
subnational multimember constituencies, and with either a
closed or an open list system. It is used (with some variations
on thresholds for winning seats) by over twenty countries,
including Austria, Argentina, the Czech Republic, Finland,
the Netherlands, Poland, and Turkey.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PAUL JAMES KUBICEK
Dialectical Materialism
Dialectical materialism is the name given (later, by others) to
Karl Marxs method of analyzing history, which combined
Hegelian dialectics with a materialist ontology. In dialectics,
historical periods are considered to be driven by tension
between opposing forces, sometimes referred to as thesis and
antithesis. This tension resolves into a new force (the synthesis), which then defines a new period and arouses its own
opposing force. For Georg Hegel, these forces are ideas; for
Marx, however, they are material phenomena: opposing social
classes, productive forces, and nature.
Marx used this method in The Communist Manifesto, The
Eighteenth Brumaire, Critique of the Gotha Program, and other
works, but more commonly, it is simply an underlying framework that informs Marxs analysis of particular situations.
Marx never reduces dialectics to a formula and rarely resorts to
the technical vocabulary of thesis. However, in the hands of
Marxs followersnotably Friedrich Engels, Joseph Stalin, and
Mao Zedongthe method developed into a formula, then a
Diasporas 427
politics, and ideology were relatively autonomous from each
other.The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union by the early
1990s and the restoration of capitalism in most of the formerly
socialist countries shortly after greatly reduced the practical
relevance of dialectical materialism in world affairs. However,
it continues to inspire study, debate, and insight among large
portions of the left intellectual world.
See also Marx, Karl; Marxism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOHN C. BERG
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Althusser, Louis, and tienne Balibar. Reading Capital, translated by Ben
Brewster. London:Verso, 1979.
Engels, Friedrich. Dialectics of Nature, translated and edited by Clemens Dutt.
New York: International, 1940.
______. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. 1848. In The Marx-Engels
Reader, 2nd ed., edited by Robert C. Tucker,683717. New York:
W.W. Norton, 1978.
Mao Tse-Tung. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. Peking: Foreign Language
Press, 1965.
Ollman, Bertell. Alienation: Marxs Conception of Man in Capitalist Society.
2nd ed. Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Stalin, Joseph. Dialectical and Historical Materialism. Moscow: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1952.
Diasporas
The term diaspora comes from the ancient Greek
(scattering of seeds), and in its common usage it refers to
the process of dispersion of a religious or ethnic community
from the original homeland.
EXAMPLES
Classical examples are the Jewish, Greek, and Armenian communities, often referred to as ideal types of diasporic communities. More recently other groups, ethnic (Irish, Italians,
Koreans, Chinese) and nonethnic (African Americans), have
been referred to as diasporas. In addition, because the term
now tends to share meaning with cognate groups ranging
from immigrants to refugees and from guest workers to ethnic communities, the world has truly witnessed a proliferation of diasporas. A key problem arising from the increasingly
loose use of the term is, according to Rogers Brubaker in his
2005 article The Diaspora Diaspora, its dispersion ... in
semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space. The conceptual
overstretching implies that if everythingall sorts of communities more or less dispersedbecome diasporas, then nothing
is distinctively so. The term therefore loses its discriminating
power, making it impossible to distinguish diasporic from
nondiasporic communities, (im)migrants in primis.
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS
Conceptualizations of diasporas can be divided into two broad
approaches. On the one hand are those, such as political scientists William Safran (1991) and Gabriel Sheffer (2003), who
think of diasporas in a more classical sense, as communities
or bounded entities. Here diasporas can be seen as groups,
CONCLUSION
In terms of the substantive focus of diaspora studies, attention
has been paid to various aspects of collective identity transformation; the maintenance of ties with the homeland and the
adaptation to the host society; the economic significance of
transnational networks (including remittances); and the impact
of diasporas on both home and host countries politics, especially with regard to their influence on foreign policy conduct.
See also Essentialism; Mass Immigration; Migration; Refugees;
Transnationalism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MATTEO FUMAGALLI
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Brubaker, Rogers. The Diaspora Diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no.
1 (2005): 119.
Clifford, James. Diasporas. Cultural Anthropology 9, no. 3 (1994): 302338.
Hall, Stuart. Cultural Identity and Diaspora. In Identity: Community, Culture,
Difference, edited by J. Rutherford, 222237. London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1990.
Safran, William. Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and
Return. Diaspora 1, no. 1 (1991): 8399.
Shain,Yossi, and Aharon Barth. Diasporas and International Relations
Theory. International Organization 57 (Summer 2003): 449479.
Sheffer, Gabriel. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
Tllyan, K. The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface.
Diaspora 1, no. 1 (1991): 37.
Dictatorship
See Autocracy.
Diderot, Denis
Denis Diderot (17131784) was a leading philosophe and the
chief editor of the great monument of the French Enlightenment, LEncyclopedie. A man of letters of extraordinary
breadthphilosopher, novelist, dramatist, polemicist, critic,
Digital Democracy
Digital democracy is one of many terms used to describe the
use of information and communication technologies (ICTs)
to facilitate and enhance engagement between citizens and
government. E-democracy and cyber-democracy are also commonly used to refer to the same phenomenon. Much of the
literature stems from concern over declining levels of voter
turnout in many democratic countries. ICTs are seen as a
means of reconnecting citizens with their representatives by
making government more transparent and accountable and
thus inspiring participation.
The link between technology and democracy is not new. In
the 1940s, futurist Buckminster Fuller discussed the potential
of the telephone as way for people to participate in referendums. Later, in his 1992 bid for the American presidency, Ross
Perot advocated the combined use of telephones and television to conduct electronic town halls to give people a direct
voice in policy development.
Diplomacy 431
thoughtful dialogue.The anonymous nature of many ICTs may
make some more comfortable to become engaged but also may
encourage some to drop the civility and accountability associated with face-to-face debate. Some skeptics also point to the
digital divide, or inequalities in access and ability to use ICTs, as
a fundamental problem for digital democracy. However, there
have been a number of efforts to bridge the digital divide and
to ensure that all citizens have some sort of access to ICTs and
the ability to use them.
CONTEMPORARY STUDIES:
QUESTIONING THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF ICTS
Much of the current work however, has moved beyond this
divide and has become increasingly involved in identifying
the democratic potential of ICTs, while at the same time
questioning their significance and their potential for harm
within the confines of existing structures of representative
government. Some of the literature examines the ways that
legislatures are using technology to engage with citizens,
whereas some focuses specifically on the efforts of individual
members of parliament and political parties.
Electronic consultations are one of the means used to try to
draw people into the policy process that have received attention.
The consultations on the U.K. Draft Communications Bill in
2002 are a relatively early and good example.The consultations
received a lot of attention and commentary, and policy makers
were briefed about the issues being raised online. However,
some studies have shown that policy makers are unsure of how
to incorporate and make use of the feedback that is received
electronically. This can be problematic, as Stephen Coleman
and John Gtze caution in their 2001 book Bowling Together:
Online Engagement in Policy Deliberation: Governments should
not offer online consultation as a gimmick:They must be committed to integrating evidence gathered into the policy process
and being responsive. This warning can be applied to other
online efforts to engage citizens as well as people who may be
reluctant to engage in future digital democracy initiatives if
they do not feel they are being heard.
E-consultations are not yet commonplace, and the wider
literature on the use of ICTs for citizen engagement indicates
that we are just starting to see the incorporation of such interactive features. Most individual representatives and legislatures,
for example, have a basic online presence in the form of a Web
site, but relatively few include interactive technologies such as
polls, surveys, or blogs.
CITIZEN ACTION
It should be noted that digital democracy does not refer just to
the attempts by government to connect with citizenry. It also
includes citizens use of technology to become further engaged.
A growing body of literature on cyberactivism discusses such
use. (An example is Martha McCaughey and Michael Ayers
2003 book, Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice.)
Interest groups are increasingly using ICTs to raise awareness
and to attract members. Letter-writing campaigns have been
made quicker and easier with prewritten text and the addresses
DIGITAL DEMOCRACY?
Some argue that while the Internet does have the potential to
facilitate the type of citizen engagement discussed above, the
persons keen to make use of such new means of participation are those who would be politically active in the offline
environment. In this sense, it is argued, little has changed, and
techno-optimists are in effect preaching to the converted.
There is still considerable debate over the significance and
utility of various ICTs when it comes to the improvement of
democracy. However, it is clear that cyberactivism is becoming
increasingly common. Legislatures, political parties, and individual representatives are moving toward the adoption of ICTs,
and most now have some sort of a basic online presence. Being
digital is becoming the norm, so much so that some question the relevance of differentiating digital democracy from
simply democracy. However, the Internet does pose some
unique challenges. Removing geographic barriers for example,
does facilitate activism, but representative politics is still very
much geographically based, and many representatives find it a
challenge to keep up with the growing correspondence being
received from both within and outside of their constituencies. Learning how to best incorporate feedback received from
citizens electronically also makes digital democracy somewhat
unique, and it will continue to be a topic of interest for those
interested in the state of representative democracy.
See also Democracy, Future of; E-governance, E-voting, E-democracy,
E-politics; Representative Democracy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARY FRANCOLI
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barber, Benjamin. The Uncertainty of Digital Politics: Democracys Uneasy
Relationship with Information Technology. Harvard International Review
23, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 4247.
Coleman, Stephen, and John Gtze. Bowling Together: Online Engagement in
Policy Deliberation. London: Hansard Society, 2001.
Francoli, Mary. E-Participation and Canadian Parliamentarians. Encyclopedia
of Digital Government, edited by Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko and Matti Malkia.
Hershey, Pa.: IGI, 2007.
Margolis, Michael, and David Resnick. Politics as Usual:The Cyberspace
Revolution. London: Sage, 2000.
McCaughey, Martha, and Michael Ayers, eds. Cyberactivism: Online Activism in
Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, 2003.
Ward, Stephen, and Wainer Lusoli. From Weird to Wired? MPs, the Internet,
and Representative Politics in the UK. Journal of Legislative Studies 11,
no. 1 (2005): 5781.
Diplomacy
Diplomacy is conventionally understood to be the practice by
which states represent themselves and their interests to one
another. However, because something like diplomacy clearly
predates the modern European system of states, because other
actors in addition to states are increasingly said to engage in
432 Diplomacy
U.S. president George W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin reach out to shake hands after a round of diplomatic talks in 2001.
Diplomacy is the means by which states represent themselves and their interests to one another.
source: AP Images
PRESTATE DIPLOMACY
Accounts of diplomacy often imagine its origins in encounters between prehistoric groups of human beings. The accuracy of these efforts is doubtful. Nevertheless, they highlight
the problems posed by the presence of strangers in a community and the development of what we would recognize
as notions of immunity to address this problem. There seems
to be a near-universal value that strangers carrying messages
between communities should be protected and well treated,
even when relations with those who sent them are not good.
The Amarna tablets contain an archive of messages that were
sent to Pharaohs Amenophis III and Akhenaten in the fourteenth century BCE from the leaders of their clients in the
Levant and from the rival great kings of Babylonia, Assyria,
Hatti, and Mitanni. The correspondence deals with attempts
to arrange marriages, the exchange of gifts, visits of senior
advisors, and appeals for help.
Diplomacys relationship with commerce is highlighted by
the fact that missions traveled along caravan routes. We get
Diplomacy 433
intimations of the importance of prestige and intelligence but
less sense of a system of continuous relations incorporating
shared values. Diplomacy also can be seen in some of the great
religious texts; for example, the Assyrian use of Hebrew, rather
than Aramaicthen the language of diplomatic intercourse
in a parlay so that the inhabitants of Jerusalem might hear
their fate debated (2 Kings 1:67). More recent diplomacy
can be read of in the Koran, and between it and the Biblical
example above, extensive evidence and records exist of relations between peoples of the ancient empires of the Middle
East, South Asia, and East Asia. These accounts culminate in
the Greek experience, plural in character and interesting, with
its use of locals (proxenos) to represent other cities and the rarity of representatives with plenipotentiary negotiating powers.
Rome and China are presented as less interesting because of
universal ambitions and self-preoccupations that are said to be
inimical to both diplomacy and their own well-being.
DIPLOMACY OF STATES
Contemporary developments have rekindled interest in the
diplomacy of the ancient world. Nevertheless, the story of
states and what is confusingly called modern, classical, traditional,
or old diplomacy remains central to the story of diplomacy as
a whole. This began to emerge in fifteenth-century Italy with
the decline of the empires and the papacys secular power and
flourished in eighteenth-century Europe before spreading,
while mutating, to the rest of the world. The story is dominated by questions about who is to be represented, how, and
with what sort of problems for those representing them. The
answer, that it should be sovereigns, and increasingly sovereign
states, was more asserted than argued. The sense that it could
be something bigger than states receded into a concern with
peace and the dilemma presented when sovereigns asked their
servants to threaten the latter. This gave rise to a literature on
the qualities required by those representing sovereigns, the art
of negotiation, and the conditions in which diplomats might
be most effective.
The value of this literature has been doubted as anachronistic in its focus on the conduct of gentlemen at court, platitudinous in its appeal to common virtues, and ingenuous in
suggesting these virtues actually prevail in effective diplomacy.
There is something to all these criticisms, as there is to the
rejoinders that tact and intelligence remain important, and
many contemporary insights, for example on the importance
of ripeness or body language in negotiations, are not new. As
the site of sovereignty shifted from the monarch to the state
and the people, this was reflected in discussions of the qualities
of diplomats. So too was the emerging sense of diplomats as a
distinct class of persons with their own outlook on, requirements in, and priorities for international relations. Concerns
about the immunities and privileges needed to protect the
work and the reputations of individual diplomats increasingly
found expression in terms of how the whole body or corps of
diplomats might to be safeguarded and facilitated. By the seventeenth century, this corps or freemasonry was seen as giving
expression to a European republic of shared interests and ways
434 Diplomacy
types of diplomacy and diplomats. Consular diplomacy, concerned with private citizens, attracted more resources and began
to lose the secondary status it had enjoyed when compared to
political work. The broadly educated generalists gifted at a
certain kind of human relations were supplemented by experts
who had a grasp of the complex technical issues that increasingly became the subjects of negotiations. And the autonomy
and negotiating capacity of the resident ambassador were widely
seen to decline as a result of the emergence of the telegraph, the
telephone, and air travel.A profession based on information scarcity and the costliness of communications was often presented
as facing existential challenges from these innovations that made
information accessible, communication cheap, and travel swift.
These changes were not matched by developments in
diplomatic theory. The great burst of innovative thinking in
diplomacy, beginning in fifteenth-century Europe and developing over the course of the next two centuries, ended with
Cardinal Richelieus Testament Politique around 1688, and its
practical expression was completed with the codifications of
the Vienna rglement of 1815 and the modifications of Aixla-Chapelle three years later. What followed may be broadly
interpreted as application (in the form of diplomatic history),
exposition (to aid in the training of diplomats), and refinement
(in response to critics). Innovations in diplomatic theory and
practice came from outside the profession. The construction
of international organizations, for example, may be presented
as driven by the concerns of politics and political theory with
how to escape from anarchy. The concern with commercial
diplomacy and economic statecraft can be rooted in the rise of
political economy. The focus on how foreign policy is actually
made can be traced back to research into individual and group
psychology, the operations of complex organizations, and
rational choice models, as these have been applied to political behavior. Most recently, attempts to create a more open
and representative diplomacy have applied the insights and
understandings of marketing and public relations. Diplomatic
studies certainly, and diplomacy and diplomats probably, have
suffered as a result. Indeed, for much of the postwar period,
it was possible to maintain that all three might be in terminal decline. Since the end of the cold war, however, this state
of affairs has undergone an almost complete transformation,
for reasons that are both surprising and paradoxical. Somehow,
as our sense that a states system provides the basic political
framework of the world has weakened, interest in diplomacy,
diplomats, and the study of both has revived.
Diplomacy 435
action that closed and archaic social structures can impose
upon those trapped within them. These approaches have
introduced diplomatic studies to the constructivist and constitutive approaches to explanation and understanding in the
broader field of international relations. They have also demonstrated how modes of thought associated with diplomats
and diplomacy can enrich our accounts of international and
social realities in general. Diplomats have long been familiar
with the extent to which social realities are constructed, in the
sense of being produced and reproduced with varying degrees
of self-consciousness by the ways in which people live and the
necessarily ambiguous consequences of this being so.
Far from fading, therefore, at a time of great change, we
should expect diplomats, diplomacy, and diplomatic theory to
prosper as new constellations of actors and new identities seek
to establish the terms of their own existence and recognition
of them as such, just as they did in fifteenth-century Europe.
This is illustrated by the emergence of the new public diplomacy. Previously regarded as poor diplomacy of low standing
or propaganda, because it violates the principle of nonintervention, public diplomacy in its new iteration is presented as
reempowering everybody (including states) and transforming
international relations into a genuine dialogue of peoples and
people. A major research effort has developed, with the funding to support it, exploring how to make public diplomacy
more effective and evaluate it. The enthusiasm for this effort
is prompted by the need for economic competitiveness and
the need to manage the cultural and civilizational dislocations
engendered by globalization, especially since the 9/11 attacks
on the United States. In America in particular, agencies like
the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (www.
state.gov/r/adcompd/) and the U.S. Information Agency/U.S.
Public Diplomacy Office (http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/)
have been strengthened to address this latter challenge. The
success of the campaigns to ban landmines, to press banks to
provide debt relief for poor countries, and to persuade others
to reduce the carbon footprints of their economies demonstrate elements of a global civil society already talking to one
another and acting to make their own contribution to what
happens in international relations. Outsiders, as traditionalists point out, may have always been engaged so. What is novel
and important, however, is the high importance attached to
these activities by nearly everyone in the study of diplomacy.
Ever since Burke anglicized the term diplomatique in 1796,
diplomacy has been a practice characterized by oppositions:
universal yet specialized, commonsense yet esoteric, in decline
yet in short supply, admired yet distrusted, and important yet
neglected. In one sense, it involves representations to one
another of collective identities that are necessarily ambiguous. In another, it merely refers to the state of affairs that
arises between people who wish to live separately and maintain their own identities but who want or believe they must
have relations with each other. Either way, general interest in
diplomacy, diplomats, and how to act diplomatically always
increases when, as now, the tensions between the pluralist and
solidarist aspirations of human beings, on the one hand, and
Direct Democracy
The term democracy is derived from two Greek words (de.mos
and kratein) meaning power of the people. The most common form of democracy is an indirect democracy or republic
in which unassembled voters are confined to examining the
qualifications of candidates and casting ballots to elect officers
to represent the citizenry, and occasionally to decide referendums questions. Direct democracy is viewed in theory as
the most democratic form, as voters in an assembly make all
political decisions.
Direct democracy dates to the age of Pericles in fifthcentury BCE Athens in present-day Greece. A number of
philosophers at the time, expressed fear that a citizen legislative assembly would develop into mob rule, and some, such as
Plato, favored rule by philosophers. In contrast, Pericles viewed
the citizen assembly as limiting the power of the government,
thereby providing for individual freedoms.
Direct democracy was revived in the Landsgemeinde in
Canton Appenzell in Switzerland in 1378. Subsequently, the
canton split into two half-cantons. Today, this form of direct
democracy is found only in the Swiss canton of Glarus, the
half-canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, and in New England open town meetings and school district meetings in the
United States. The early Athens meetings occurred in a sovereign city-state in contrast to the meetings in Swiss cantons and
contemporary New England towns and districts with open
meetings.
An important form of direct democracy employed in many
nations in modern times is the referendum, which allows
unassembled voters to make certain political decisions and
assumes many forms. In the Republic of Ireland, for example,
the national parliament or the president, with the approval of
THEORIES OF ORIGIN
Late nineteenth-century historians engaged in disputes relative to whether the Massachusetts Bay town was indigenous
in origin, a descendant of the ancient Anglo-Saxon tun, or
derived from English institutions adapted to conditions in the
New World. Evidence is lacking to support the theory that
the town developed spontaneously as a new political institution. There are certain similarities between a town meeting and the primordial field meeting of farmers in southern
Germany to distribute land and regulate crops with village
MODIFICATIONS
The open town meeting generally is entrenched in small
towns, but since 1822 has been replaced by a city charter, a
town charter providing for a mayor and a council, a representative town meeting (RTM) or limited town meeting, or a
referendum town meeting when the population has reached
a point that makes it impossible to conduct an efficient town
meeting.
Brookline, Massachusetts, had experienced a large increase
in population by the early part of the twentieth century that
created problems in conducting meetings, yet the town desired
to keep the meeting format. Alfred D. Chandler developed the
RTM and persuaded the General Court to authorize its adoption by Brookline voters in 1915. The only change in the traditional meeting is the confining of the right to vote at town
meetings to elected town meeting members; all other citizens
may attend and speak. Forty-one other Massachusetts towns,
nine Connecticut towns, one town in Maine, and one town in
Vermont have adopted the RTM.
THE REFERENDUM
The referendum activates the key of democratic theorythat
sovereign authority resides in the unassembled electorate. The
referendum dates to the Landsgemeinde in Switzerland in the
fifteenth century, and it allows national, state, regional, and
local voters to provide advice to officers or to make policy
decisions at the polls. The referendum in the United States
can be viewed as an extension of the town meeting and was
first employed in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1640.
Today, the referendum is used in many nations to amend the
national constitution and regional or state constitutions in
federal nations, and to make certain other decisions, such as
whether the Republic of Ireland should ratify a European
Union treaty and whether the term limit on the office of
president of Venezuela should be removed. Some parliamentary democracies decided all decisions should to be made by
the government (cabinet). The United Kingdom historically
followed this policy, but more recently it has allowed referendums in Scotland and Wales.
Referendum questions may be placed on the general election ballot or on a special election ballot (1) by the legislature, (2) automatically at periodic specified times, and (3) by
the initiative that permits the electorate by petition to place a
question on the ballot. The recall, a type of referendum, allows
voters by petition to place on the ballot the question of the
removal from office of an elected officer prior to the expiration of the term of office.
Referendums are classified as follows:
A constitutional referendum involves a new constitution or
an amendment.
A statutory referendum involves a proposed law.
An acceptance referendum allows local government voters
to decide whether to adopt a state law.
An automatic referendum question appears on the referendum ballot at specific times.
A mandatory referendum must be held to initiate an action
such as the borrowing of funds.
A market basket referendum provides voters with a choice
of one of several local government charters.
An opt-out referendum allows local voters to opt out of a
state law.
A protest referendum authorizes voters by petition to suspend a recently enacted law until a referendum is held
on the question of its repeal.
Proponents of referendums are convinced the voters will
make superior decisions on issues (compared to a legislature
beholden to special interests), facilitate governmental reform,
make elected officers more responsive to the wishes of the
438 Dirigisme
people, promote voter interest in public affairs by reducing
alienation, and educate citizens. Opponents argue that referendums weaken representative democracy and may lead to
tyranny of the majority. According to the opponents, problems
are as follows:
Many voters are uninformed and overburdened by the
number of questions and officers to be elected.
The process may produce a long ballot and voter fatigue.
A small minority often decides the issue.
Special interest groups can repeal laws.
Innovative leaders are discouraged from seeking election, because their decisions can be overturned readily
by referendums where the initiative and protest referendum are available.
The weight of the evidence favors the referendum. There
is a general agreement that proposed constitutional and local
government charter changes should be subject to the sovereign will of the people, but there are exceptions as noted above.
Although the initiative, the protest referendum, and the recall
have been controversial, it is apparent that, lacking such devices,
many reforms would not have been adopted; many unpopular
laws would have remained on the statute books; and a significant
number of elected officers guilty of malfeasance, misfeasance,
and nonfeasance would have remained in office.
The process of enacting important laws should reflect the
views of citizens, interest groups, elected representatives, and
bureaucrats. The referendum actualizes the views of the citizens, fulfilling a need for a policy-making theory inclusive
of elements of the theories of representative democracy and
direct democracy.
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Platos fears have not materialized, but citizen apathy results in
the town meeting becoming a de facto representative democracy with attendees casting ballots representing nonvoters.
Town meeting participants, with the exception of very small
towns, are a minority of the voters. Nevertheless the meeting, based upon equality and openness, welcomes all citizens,
scrutinizes town administrators, and has a high rate of participation when controversial articles appear in the warrant.
The meeting has its shortcomings, but voter participation
compares favorably with participation in city council elections, and the quality of its decisions is as high as the quality of
city council decisions.
A similar criticism is leveled at the referendum, as a minority of the voters may cast ballots, and participation is dependent upon the degree of controversy involving the question.
See also City-republic; Democracy; Participatory Democracy; Representative Democracy;Voting Behavior.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Adams, Charles Francis, et al. The Genesis of the Massachusetts Towns, and the
Development of Town Meeting Government. Cambridge, Mass.: John Wilson
and Son, 1892.
Dirigisme
Dirigisme is an economic term used to describe a state-directed
economy in which economic planning and other kinds of
government intervention work to regulate and coordinate
the production and allocation of resources. Dirigisme comes
from the French word diriger (to direct), and economies that
operate under such conditions are referred to as dirigiste. As an
economic policy or a description of an economic state, it is
the opposite of laissez-faire.
Unlike a centrally planned economy, where the government controls the production and distribution of resources, a
dirigiste economy has mostly private ownership of the means
of production. Nonetheless, dirigisme implies a prominent
degree of government regulation and structure to direct the
workings of both publicly and privately owned companies.
Most economic systems contain at least some aspect of dirigisme. A government contract that subsidizes specific scientific and technological research is one particular example of
dirigisme.
As an economic theory, dirigisme is most commonly
associated with the economic recovery of postWorld War
II (19391945) France and the center-right governments of
Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. When Francois
Mitterand attempted to introduce more state intervention
into the French economy in the early 1980smoving away
from dirigisme and toward socialismthe resulting economic downturn prompted the French government to reject
Disability Rights
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a disabled person as someone whose physical or mental condition limits the persons
activity, movement, sensation, etc. Relative to labels such
as crippled and handicapped, disabled is considered to be less
derogatory, and it is now the preferred way of identifying
individuals who have restrictive conditions.
However, underlying this change in labelling is a more
profound shift in social attitudes toward the disabled. Historically, in both Western and non-Western societies, the disabled
were typically seen as dysfunctional human beings who should
either be treated as despicable outcasts or as helpless victims
of fate. Consequently, contempt and pity were the two most
commonly expressed social attitudes toward the disabled, rendering them isolated and marginalized.
Against this background, the United Nations (UN) first
identified the plight of the disabled as a human rights cause
that warranted global attention with the Declaration of the
Rights of the Disabled in 1975. Just over 30 years later, the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was
adopted in 2006. Hailed as a major landmark in international
law, this convention obliges signatory states to ensure that the
disabled have the full range of human rights afforded to ablebodied persons and to remove any discriminatory practices,
both official and customary, against the disabled.
However, the momentous shift that set the normative
groundwork for the current rights-based approach to disability
was the adoption of The World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons in 1982, which considered disability
a social rather than a biomedical condition. Building on the
definition of handicap used by the World Health Organization,
which emphasizes the terms contextual dimension, the UN
identified a handicap, in General Assembly Resolution 37/52,
as first and foremost a function of the relationship between
disabled persons and their environment. Consequently, a
handicap is not the equivalent of a permanent physiological
condition. Rather, a handicap occurs when there is a breakdown in what should have been an interactive relationship.
By far the most common and concrete form of this breakdown is when the disabled encounter cultural, physical, or
social barriers which prevent their access to the various systems of society that are available to other citizens. A handicap
as such represents a loss or limitation of opportunities for
the disabled to take part in the life of the community on
an equal level with others. This characterization of disability
as a sociopolitical issue meant that the disability movement
became fundamentally about the restoration of social justice
to a group of individuals who share the experience of oppression and marginalization. The movement has evolved to such
a point that some of its advocates are starting to use disability as the basis for positive identity. Accordingly, for the first
time in the history of the movement, the rights of the disabled
are defended on cultural grounds, based on the claim that the
disabled constitute a minority whose identity is forged by a
shared history and culture of living the life of the disabled.
Cultural and otherwise, disability rights are generally claim
rights that necessarily entail legal obligations to provide for the
claimants. Disability rights have therefore opened all kinds of
doors for the disabled in the last two decades. Taken literally,
this means that wheelchair ramps that facilitate accessibility of
physical space are fast becoming the global standard. Less visible and more controversial are measures that oblige employers
to modify work conditions for the disabled, making workplace
accommodations that go beyond physical accessibility.
It is these kinds of accommodations that perhaps pose the
most challenge to the advancement of disability rights.According to the UN, chronic unemployment among the disabled is
a global problem. It is estimated that in developing countries,
about 80 percent to 90 percent of the disabled, who are otherwise of working age, are unemployed; in developed countries, the figure is between 50 percent and 70 percent. These
are significant numbers given that by UNs count, there are
about 650 million disabled persons in the world. They, therefore, constitute about 10 percent of the worlds population,
making them the largest minority group, 80 percent of which
live in the developing world.These figures suggest that the disabled are far from being full participating members of society.
Among other things, their right to work, which is guaranteed
by both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural
Rights, is being consistently violated.
The disabled, therefore, stand a much higher chance than
the general population of being caught in the vicious cycle of
unemployment, poverty, and dependency. Against this reality,
it is unclear how the living condition of the disabled can be
improved by the growing grassroots movement to represent
the rights of the disabled as the cultural rights of a minority. This political trend is arguably the result of the move to
demedicalize disability.Yet by emphasizing the unique identity
of the disabled, the advocates of this position may run the risk
of ghettoizing the disabled even more.
See also Human Rights; United Nations (UN); Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THERESA M. LEE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brown, Steve E. What Is Disability Culture? Disability Studies Quarterly 22
(2002): 3450.
Devlin, Richard, and Diane Pothier, eds. Critical Disability Theory: Essays
in Philosophy, Politics, Policy, and Law. Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2006.
Linton, Simi. Claiming Disability: Knowledge and Identity. New York: New York
University Press, 1998.
Lynk, Michael. Disability and the Duty to Accommodate: An Arbitrators
Perspective. In Labour Arbitration Yearbook 20012002, vol. 1, 51122.
Toronto, ON: Lancaster House, 2002.
Disaster Relief
Disaster relief is the assistance provided to individuals, families,
and communities to help them cope with disruptive, disorienting events. These events can be caused by natural hazards,
like hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, or tornadoes, or they
can be triggered by humans, such as nuclear accidents, health
epidemics, or terrorist attacks. Thus, the scope of disaster
assistance has expanded to encompass a wide variety of emergency situations.
Discrimination 441
governmental policies place much greater emphasis on proactive measuressuch as preparing society and specific local
communities for emergencies before they ariseand they
cover a broad range of operations.
Perhaps, the most common element of contemporary disaster relief policy is the use of an all hazards or generic approach
to emergency management. Instead of creating a multitude of
policies to deal with different types of disastersfor example,
one for hurricanes or typhoons, another for earthquakes, still
another for terrorist activity, and so onnations develop a general set of procedures to cover any type of emergency situation.
This enables them to respond to a wide variety of situations in
a more coordinated and effective manner.
Discourse Analysis
Discourse analysis is not a theory but rather a method of inquiry
and research that seeks to understand the coherenceand
sometimes the contradictionswithin the discourse (the
spoken or written communications) of individuals, groups,
and organizations. Materials that may be subjects of discourse
analysis include books, speeches, interviews, conversations,
debates, articles, literature, TV programs, and even movies or
documentary films. Scholars and sociologists using discourse
analysis can focus on quantitative elements (the number of
occurrences of certain words) or can try to interpret specific
Discrimination
Discrimination, in its modern usage, means treating someone
unfairly or unfavorably and denying individuals or groups of
people equality of treatment. International labor organizations; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization; and various United Nations (UN) treaties
define discrimination as any distinction, exclusion, or restriction of preference based on race, color, descent, or national
or ethnic origin that has the purpose or effect of nullifying
or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural, or any other field of
public life.
Discriminatory practices are those detrimental distinctions that do not take account of the particular characteristics
of an individual as such but instead consider only collective
qualifications deriving from membership in a certain social or
other group such as race, color, religion, or gender. Four forms
of discrimination include inequality in treatment, imposing disabilities, granting privileges, and imposing obligations.
Discrimination as denial of equality has many faces, including denial of economic opportunities, power, status, access to
education, and career opportunities. All of these are naturally
reinforcing. People can suffer discrimination at work, school,
or college or while shopping, looking for accommodations,
participating in public activities, or dealing with authorities.
442 Discrimination
DISCRIMINATION IN PRACTICE
UN Special Rapporteur Elizabeth Odio Benito notes in her
work that manifestations of discrimination, intolerance, and
oppression sometimes occur in isolation and sometimes in
combination. Michel Banton points out that experimental
research in social psychology has established that even meaningless information suggesting that some individuals constitute a group can be sufficient to initiate processes of group
inclusion or exclusion. Discrimination, thus, also occurs
without anyone intending to discriminate. The international
convention therefore defines discrimination as any action or
inaction that has either a discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory effect. It is generally believed that since 1949, de
jure discrimination has been abolished in most parts of the
world. However, the practice continues in most parts of the
world, most frequently in the form of racism.
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Racism is the combination of the power of one race to dominate other races and a value system that assumes that the
dominant race is innately superior. Race is an arbitrary and
therefore problematic term employed in the classification of
human beings on the basis of appearance, and it is a primary
determinant of human traits and capacities. Thinking that differences are hereditary and unalterable, one ethnic group or
historical collectivity dominates, excludes, or seeks to eliminate another. Its varied usages have resulted in race being seen
as an objective biological fact and/or a social fact that operates through independent characteristics. According to studies
by geneticists and biologists, racism has no scientific basis.
Racial discrimination operates in different forms and at
different levels. It can be overt or covert, personal or institutional. Personal racisms are manifested through the individual
expression, attitudes, or behaviors that accept the assumptions
of a racist value system. Institutional racism is the established
social pattern supported by policies, rules, and regulation that
support implicitly or explicitly the racial value system. For
example, in many societies, commitment to and investment in
the health and welfare of different groups of people is quite
disparate. There are also cases of social exclusion and isolation
of minority and indigenous groups from access to economic
resources and social and political processes.
One regime that continued institutional racism after 1949
was that of South Africa, with its use of apartheid. Apartheid
was introduced in 1948 by the National Party as a system of
social segregations designed to maintain a situation of inequality
between whites and the other ethnic and social groups in economic, social, political, and cultural spheres. This ended in 1993.
The practice of racial discrimination continues in many
parts of the world in a covert manner, more at personal and
social levels than by the state, although in many cases discrimination by the state is also visible. It has been observed that
victims are no longer discriminated against in the name of
biological inferiority, but instead they are discriminated against
socially because of religious or cultural traditions. Racial distinctions have been incorporated into a system of social class
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
Somewhat similar to racial discrimination is discrimination
based on religion, and the two sometimes overlap. Religious
discrimination is valuing a person or group less because of
religious beliefs or treating someone differently because of
these beliefs.
Elizabeth Benito (1989) quotes Gordon Allport, who
argues that deviation in creed alone does not account for the
persecution. The discrimination is not caused by the doctrines
or teachings of religions. Instead, he argues that there is usually a political or historical reason or a stereotype that fosters
religious persecution. Religious intolerance thus occurs when
religion and prejudice are merged. Persecution occurs when
countries, governments, and individuals use or attack religion
to justify the pursuit of power, prestige, wealth, or ethnic selfinterest. In many cases, the compulsions to create a national
identity and pursue a collective destiny have been murderously homogenizing, with religion playing a crucial violent
role. Charges of religious discrimination have been made even
against liberal, secular, and democratic states, including countries in the Western developed world.
GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION
Another common basis for discrimination throughout history has been gender. The International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(1979) defines it as
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the
basis of which has the effect or purpose of impairing
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis
of equality of men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil, or any other field.
Disenfranchisement 443
Gender discrimination exists in families, in communities,
and in the workplace and can take many different forms. The
treatment accorded to women in terms of property rights,
rights of inheritance, laws related to marriage and divorce,
rights to acquire nationality, and the right to seek employment reflects discrimination both in law and in fact. Many
women face additional discrimination and denial of equality
because of their race, language, ethnicity, culture, religion, or
socioeconomic class. They, thus, suffer compounding affects of
discrimination.
OTHER FORMS
In addition to the above well-defined groups, people also face
discrimination, particularly in employment, on the basis of
language, age, and disability. Gays and lesbians are discriminated against socially and in the workplace because of their
sexual orientation. In the present era of globalization in which
the global economy has stimulated high levels of migration,
complaints of discrimination against immigrants and asylum
seekers have also become common. Discriminating police
behavior and visible ghettoization characterize many metropolitan cities of Europe and North America.
Concerns about discrimination have been expressed by the
international community at various levels, and efforts are ongoing to eliminate it. Particularly since the adoption of Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the international community has made important strides in the flight against racism. Beginning with the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the UN has
adopted a series of conventions and declarations, proclaimed
an International Year of Mobilization against Racism (2001),
and organized three decades against racism (19731982, 1983
1992, 19942003) along with two world conferences on the
same theme (1978 and 1983). The World Conference against
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance held in Durban (South Africa) from August 31 to
September 7, 2001, debated an array of questions reflecting
the complex interplay of prejudice and intolerance: political,
social, and economic exclusion; migration; human trafficking;
and indigenous peoples and minority rights.
A number of states have also incorporated provisions for
equality and prohibitions against discrimination in their constitutions. Steps have also been taken for reparations, which
include the concept of reverse discrimination.This concept refers
to current discriminatory policies or acts that benefit a group
that has historically been discriminated against, generally by
giving preferences to that group, or discriminating against
individuals not in that group or against dominant groups. It
is now well recognized that discrimination not only denies
groups of human beings dignified existence, marginalizes productive individuals and groups, and depresses their creativity
and initiative, it also is a negative manifestation of integrative
power. Instead of bringing or holding people together, prejudice and discrimination push them apart. Those discriminated
against may find society or the state responsible for the disparities in their lives and may join militant, extremist, or fundamentalists forces justifying even terrorism.
Discrimination, Positive.
See Positive Discrimination.
Discrimination, Reverse.
See Reverse Discrimination.
Disenfranchisement
Disenfranchisement refers to the removal or refusal of the right
to vote, or the right of suffrage, to an individual or group of
individuals. Direct disenfranchisement involves explicit, intentional denial of the right to vote, usually through legislative
measures. Indirect disenfranchisement occurs when attempts
are made to prevent votes from having an impact on the final
electoral outcome, as can occur in gerrymandering or stuffing
ballot boxes. Entire groups of people have and continue to be
disenfranchised purposefully. These groups include women,
indigenous peoples, racial and ethnic minorities, and religious
minorities, depending on the country and political and/or
religious climate. Felony disenfranchisement refers to refusal of
the right to vote for individuals who are incarcerated or who
have prior felony convictions.
444 Disinformation
Full suffrage refers to the right to vote and run for office.
In 1893, New Zealand was the first independent country to
give women the right to vote. Australia followed in 1902,
but suffrage was provided only for non-Aboriginal women.
Women gained the right to vote in Canada in 1917, in the
United Kingdom in 1918, and in the United States in 1920,
although not all women could vote at these times; full suffrage was granted incrementally. Historically, indigenous
peoples have been denied the right to vote longer than any
other group.
See also Voting Rights and Suffrage,Womens Suffrage.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JENNIFER E. DALTON
Disinformation
Disinformation is the deliberate propagation of misleading
or false information. The term developed within the world
of intelligence and international politics, and the Russian
KGB first used the word dezinformatsiya, which is likely the
origination of the English word. A government engages in
disinformation to affect public opinion or another nations
leadership. For example, during World War II (19391945),
the Nazi party was notorious for disinformative anti-Semitic
speeches and writing.
Because it is intentional, disinformation should not be
understood as merely false information. In C. S. Lewiss The
Screwtape Letters, one devil writes to another:
The fact that devils are predominantly comic figures
in the modern imagination will help you. If any faint
suspicion of your existence begins to arise in his mind,
suggest to him a picture of something [fantastical], and
persuade him that since he cannot believe in that he
therefore cannot believe in you. (2001, 3)
Similar to Lewiss devils, a government can spread fantastical rumors that are easily dismissed, which causes people to
disregard accurate reports of the governments real motives or
actions as equally unbelievable. Disinformation often succeeds,
because it makes a realistic appraisal of ones enemies hard to
achieve.
See also Propaganda; Soviet Union, Former.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Baran, Stanley J., and Dennis K. Davis. Mass Communication Theory:
Foundations, Ferment, and Future, 4th ed. Belmont, Ca.: Thomson
Wadsworth, 2006.
Gifford, Clive. Espionage and Disinformation. Chicago, Ill.: Heinemann, 2006.
Jackson, Brooks, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. UnSpun: Finding Facts in a
World of Disinformation. New York: Random House, 2007.
Kick, Russell. Everything You Know Is Wrong:The Disinformation Guide to
Secrets and Lies. New York: Disinformation Company, 2002.
McGonagle, John J., Jr., and Carolyn M.Vella. A New Archetype for Competitive
Intelligence. Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1996.
Miniter, Richard. Disinformation: 22 Media Myths that Undermine the War on
Terror. Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2005.
Dissolution
Dissolution is a parliamentary procedure in which a session of
a legislature is ended and new elections follow. It is considered
one of the most significant aspects of parliamentary systems.
Dissolution ensures regular elections, although, unlike systems
with fixed electoral dates, there is some discretion on the timing of the next round of polling.
Dissolution usually occurs within a set period of time. For
instance, in Canada or the United Kingdom, the House of
Commons must be dissolved within five years of its first sitting.
Parliaments may also be dissolved following a vote of no confidence in the government, or a motion may be made for a parliament to dissolve itself. Some systems require a simple majority
vote for dissolution, while others require supermajorities of up
to two-thirds of the members. In some systems, legislatures may
also be dissolved by the head of government or head of state.
Dissolution commonly occurs in response to a political crisis
that undermines political support for an existing government,
such as the loss of a coalition partner or a political scandal. Dissolution can also be use as a political tool to build parliamentary
majorities. Hence, governments may dissolve a legislature early
in order to capitalize on public popularity or to ensure an election before the implementation of unpopular policies.
See also Parliamentary Democracy; Parliamentary Government.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Distribution of Powers
(in a Federation)
Although not all definitions of federalism emphasize the formal distribution of powers between two levels of government
as an essential attribute of a federal government, all federal
constitutions make reference to the distribution of powers by
enumerating the legislative powers and responsibilities of at
least one level of government, and sometimes of both levels.
In most federations, a supreme or constitutional court is occasionally called upon to interpret the meaning of these powers,
either because of jurisdictional conflicts between the two levels of government, or more frequently because an individual
or corporate person questions the constitutionality of legislation that is deemed contrary to the interests of that person.
The legislative powers of one level of government may be
exclusive, meaning that the other level of government may not
legislate at all about the same subjects, or concurrent, meaning that either level can legislate about a subject. In the event
of concurrency, there is an explicit or implicit provision that
one level of government, usually the central or federal level,
has paramountcy, meaning that its legislation takes priority over
legislation by the other level in the event that both levels have
legislated and that conflict exists between the provisions of
their respective laws.Very rarely, as in the case of old age pension legislation in Canada, there may be a paramountcy rule
that favors the lower level of government.
Federal constitutions also contain a rule that one level of government, usually (although not always) the lower level, may
legislate about all matters not explicitly provided for in the
constitution. This allocation of power over unspecified matters is known as the residual power. In the U.S. Constitution,
the Tenth Amendment provides such a rule, assigning residual
power to the states or to the people. Canada and India are
unusual among federations in assigning residual power to
the central government. Most others, including Argentina,
Australia, Germany, Mexico, Russia, and Switzerland, assign
residual power to the provinces or states. The significance of
the residual power depends in part on the comprehensiveness
of the list or lists of enumerated powers.
Constitutional distributions of powers have tended to
become more detailed and complex in modern times, as the
scope of public policy has broadened. For example, the Constitution of the United States lists only eighteen subjects about
which Congress may legislate, while the Constitution of Australia, largely inspired by that of the United States but drafted
more than a century later, lists thirty-nine subjects about
which the national Parliament may legislate. Neither of those
constitutions specifies the legislative powers of the individual
states, on the assumption that the individual states retain the
residual power and that specification is therefore unnecessary.
Some other federal constitutions include several categories of enumerated powers. For example the constitutions of
Canada and India both include separate lists of exclusive federal powers, exclusive powers of the individual states (provinces in Canada), and concurrent powers shared by both
levels. The lists are much longer in the Indian constitution,
reflecting its more recent origin, than in the Canadian constitution, on which Indias is largely modelled. In Canada, as
already noted, the concurrent power over pensions is subject
to a rule of provincial paramountcy. However, other concurrent powers in Canada, over agriculture, immigration, and
the export of natural resources, are subject to a rule of federal
paramountcy.
The German constitution has separate lists of exclusive
federal powers, concurrent powers with federal paramountcy,
and subjects about which the federation may enact skeleton
or framework provisions, with the individual states (the plural term for which is Lnder in German) being left to fill in
the details. The list of concurrent powers is by far the longest
of the three lists. Like the constitutions of Australia and the
United States, that of Germany leaves the residual powers of
the lower level of government unspecified. The constitution
of Brazil follows a somewhat similar pattern, except that the
concurrent powers are referred to as common powers, and
the fields in which federal legislation can only establish general
principles are referred to as concurrent.
The constitution of South Africa is unusual in that it
includes a list of concurrent powers and a list of exclusive
provincial powers but not a list of exclusive powers for the
central government.
Although distributions of powers vary from one federal constitution to another, some common features may be observed.
Military and naval defense, foreign and interstate trade,
currency and monetary policy, and weights and measures
are responsibilities of the central government in all federations. Citizenship is normally a federal responsibility, except
in Switzerland. Education, health, and municipal affairs are
almost always assigned to the states or provinces in federal
constitutions, either explicitly or otherwise. Criminal law is
exclusively federal in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Russia, and
Switzerland, concurrent in Germany, and left to the subnational governments in Australia. In the United States, most
criminal law is made by the states, but Congress has established a number of federal offenses. Authority over the
environment, taxation, transportation, and communications
may be allocated in various ways.
In most federal constitutions, it is assumed that executive and
administrative powers are divided in the same way as legislative
powers, but this is not always the case. In Germany, legislation in
the concurrent fields is implemented and administered by the
Lnder, although mainly legislated at the national level. In Canada, the uniform code of criminal law, legislated at the national
level, is administered by the provinces. Another complication is
that the making of treaties, an executive power exercised at the
national level, may override the legislative powers of the states,
as it does in the United States, India, and Australia, but not in
Germany or Canada. Canada and India also give the federal
executive the power to disallow legislation by the lower level
of government, although in Canada this power has fallen into
disuse and is not likely ever to be revived.
In practice, the scope of the central governments authority
has tended to expand in most federations at the expense of the
authority of the states or provinces, particularly, but not only, in
times of war or economic crisis. Geographical mobility of the
population and the growth of the welfare state have reinforced
this trend. In some cases federal authority has been formally
increased by amending the constitution. More typically it has
been increased by permissive judicial interpretation of federal
powers or because central governments have used their greater
financial resources to intervene in areas of jurisdiction formally reserved to the states and provinces. Conditional grants
to subnational governments have been a particularly effective way to impose federal priorities and policy preferences
on them. Allocation of the residual power to the subnational
governments, as in the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. constitution, has proved to be almost totally ineffective in resisting this
tendency toward greater centralization of power.
See also Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Federalism,
Comparative.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GARTH STEVENSON
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Corwin, Edward. The Constitution and What It Means Today, 9th ed.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947.
Distributive Justice
The term distributive justice refers to theories that address the
fairness of allocation of economic resources and social welfare
within a society. Such theories both criticize and prescribe
basic institutional arrangements in society. The term goes
back as far as Aristotle, but his use of it does not conform to
modern usage. Aristotle saw distributive justice primarily in
political terms, as those principles that ensure that deserving
people are rewarded in accordance with their merit. Modern
conceptions of distributive justice begin from postulates of
equality rather than merit or status. Everyone is entitled to a
minimum of freedom from need regardless of merit. Theories
of distributive justice are also distinct from religious and secular conceptions of mutual aid, compassion, or charity. The former rely on the ethics of care; distributive justice also includes
state intervention to remediate the side effects of social and
economic inequality.
Districting 447
making others worse off. Inequalities are not justified simply
by their contribution to the greater good, but because these
inequities benefit everyone, especially the least advantaged.
Rawls contended that utilitarian calculation of social needs
isnt compatible with basic reciprocity. The cost of helping the
poor would always be too dear in strict economic terms to
justify. Rawlss position justified a very strong version of welfare state liberalism with extensive equality and redistribution
of wealth and power.
Rawls argued those who are better endowed or who have
a more advantageous social position are so not by merit alone.
Rejecting this position, and Rawlss defense of the welfare
state, Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, challenged
the notion of distributive justice on libertarian grounds.
Reviving the neoliberal idea of the watchman state, Nozick
held that the state should only be concerned with safety and
security of citizens and that much taxation was illegitimate.
He rejected equality for a conception of desert: One deserves
what one achieves through ones own effort. Inequalities that
are a result of lack of effort or ability are fair and just, because
they are deserved.
Other important critics of Rawls include Susan Moller
Okin, who criticized Rawls for his neglect of gender and the
family, and communitarian Michael Sandel, who criticized
Rawls for employing a Kantian conception of the abstract
individual, a purely cognitive subject without substantive
qualities. Sandel held that this separates the right from the
good. We cannot make sense of questions that Sandel argued
without reference to our situated set of values and sense of
the good. Economists like Kenneth Arrow and John Harsanyi
criticized Rawlss maximin principle on the grounds that it
was designed to yield the principles Rawls desired, was circular, and that it otherwise prejudged outcomes.
While Rawls himself saw his theory as neutral in the contest between capitalism and socialism, there was lively debate
whether Rawlss conception of justice could in fact be applicable to a socialist order or whether it was more limited. Marxist
critics like C. B. Macpherson argued that Rawlss presumption
that class-divided societies are inevitable limited the scope of
distributive justice.
Rawls attempted to answer these critics and modify his
position somewhat in series of essays later published as Political
Liberalism. There he attempted to argue, for example, that the
use of the original position was not metaphysic (and hence
separating right and good) but was instead a political device
for making decisions and that it has weakened the terms of
the veil of ignorance. In so doing, he hoped to show that the
subject of his theory of justice is a social one.
While drawing on earlier criticisms, analytical Marxists such as John Roemer, G. A. Cohen, and John Elster have
extensively criticized Rawlss approach to distributive justice
for being insufficiently egalitarian. G. A. Cohen for example
argues that Rawlss egalitarianism should not apply simply to
the basic structure of society but to the whole of society. It
requires an egalitarian ethos among citizens. Even a just basic
structure will not eliminate all the inequalities, nor are there
inequalities that do not hurt the worst off. Roemer has tried
to recast equality of opportunity so as to eliminate the contingencies of circumstances and allow equal effort to yield equal
outcomes. Roemer is an instrumental egalitarian. Equality is
not an intrinsic good but a means to bring about a reasonable
quality of life.
See also Aristotle; Kant, Immanuel; Macpherson, Crawford
Brough; Marxism; Mill, John Stuart; Nozick, Robert; Pareto,
Vilfredo.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BRIAN CATERINO
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Amatae, S. M. Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy:The Cold War Origins of
Rational Choice Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
Cohen, G. A. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008.
Daniels, Norman. Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls A Theory of
Justice, new ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989.
Fleischacker, Samuel. A Short History of Distributive Justice. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2004.
Freeman, Samuel. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge, Mass.:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Green, T. H. Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Macpherson, C. B. Revisionist Liberalism. In Democratic Theory: Essays in
Retrieval, 8794. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Okin, Susan Moller. Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic Books,
1989.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, expanded ed. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005.
. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Roemer, John. Theories of Distributive Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1996.
Sandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982.
Districting
There are two stages to the process of determining the boundaries of electoral districts. In the first, the number of districts
in a legislative assembly is established. In the United States,
this phase is referred to as apportionment or reapportionment; in
countries with a Westminsterstyle parliamentary system, it is
generally known as redistribution. For federal countries such as
Germany, India, and Canadabut not for unitary states such
as New Zealand and the United Kingdoman essential part
of the first stage is the allocation of districts to their lower
house of parliament according to the share of the nations
population of their respective Lnder, states, or provinces.
Once the number of districts has been established (as a result
of either a governing statute or, in rare instances, a constitutional provision), the second part of the process gets under
way. This is known as the districting, boundary readjustment, or
boundary delimitation stage.
Statutory law is commonly used to establish the total number of seats in a legislative assembly. That is the case in the
United States, where 435 districts in the House of Representatives has been a fixed number since 1929. In other countries,
District Magnitude
District magnitude refers to the number of representatives
elected in a single electoral district, riding, or constituency.
Equal district magnitude occurs when the same number of
representatives is elected to each electoral district and ensures
that proportionality is the same from one district to the next.
Variable district magnitude allows for differing numbers of
representatives per electoral district and is often based on geographic representation and population size, but it can result in
lower proportionality in some districts. The average district
magnitude is determined by dividing the number of representatives to be elected by the number of electoral districts.
Along with electoral formula and ballot structure, district
magnitude is one of the three most important components
of an electoral system. District magnitude also varies among
electoral systems. For instance, first-past-the-post, alternative
vote, and two-round systems each has a district magnitudes
of one, with only one representative elected to each riding.
Divided Government
Divided government exists when one political party controls
the executive and the opposition party controls one or both
houses of the legislature, which can occur at both the state
and national levels. The existence of divided party control
of government institutions is a phenomenon that captured
the attention of academics, the media, and average citizens in
the 1990s. Although it is not a new occurrence in American
politics, divided party control of the legislative and executive branches was increasingly blamed for the stalemate and
gridlock that seemed to handicap the federal government,
especially in the 1990s.
Since the end of World War II (19391945), the existence
of divided government has been an almost persistent feature
of the American political system. From 1952 to 1992, seven
elections produced unified government, and thirteen elections
produced divided government. The gridlock associated with
divided government is not only representative of periods in
which divided partisan control exists but can also manifest
itself during periods of unified government as well. Nonetheless, academics have spent considerable time and energy in
determining the effects, if any, that divided government has on
relations between the executive and legislative branches and
the nation as a whole.
The return of unified government with the election
of Bill Clinton as president initially witnessed legislative
acceptance for presidential proposals; however, with time,
the Democratic Partycontrolled Congress became a vocal
opponent of the president, thereby casting doubt on whether
unified government was much different than divided government. Divided government derives from the manner in
which the legislative and executive branches function and are
constituted. Different constituencies and terms of office and
the separation of the branches, which are evaluated at separate times, produce conflict and division. Introducing different partisan controls of the presidency and Congress further
exacerbates the situation.
This, however, should not preclude the possibility that presidents and Congress can reach agreement during both periods of divided and unified government. Divided government
happens to be just one of a host of factors that may create
gridlock in the legislative process. For instance, policy-making
RICHARD M. YON
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fiorina, Morris P. An Era of Divided Government. Political Science Quarterly
107, no. 3 (1992): 387410.
Galderisi, Peter F. Introduction: Divided Government Past and Present.
In Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order,
edited by Peter F. Galderisi, Roberta Q. Herzberg, and Peter McNamara.
New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996.
Mayhew, David. Divided We Govern. New York: St. Martins Press, 1980.
450 Doctrines
bound to care for the nourishing, education, and virtuous government of his children, even so is the King bound to care
for all his subjects. James made his 1616 speech in the Star
Chamber to assert the political realization of royal authority
and the regal policy prerogative, which he had written about
theoretically. But for James, the practice of divine right proved
more complex than the theoretical clarity of the doctrine.
Probably the greatest theoretical statement on the divine
right of kings was made in 1680 by Sir Robert Filmer in Patriarcha: A Defense of the Natural Power of Kings against the Unnatural Liberty of the People. Filmer utilized a biblical foundation for
his theory similar to that of James I and placed the authority
of the divine right of kings as equal to the family and society.
Divine royal authority was combined with the duty of passive
obedience by Filmer to describe the natural political order.
This stands in opposition to contract theories and theories of
consent. John Lockes First Treatise is the most famous critique
and counterpoint to Filmers theory.
The divine right of kings built on previous theories of
the monarchial form from Aristotle to John of Salisbury. The
influence of this constitutional line of royal authority created
a modern foundation for sovereign prerogative powers that is
still evident in modern executives with such doctrines as the
executive pardon power and sovereign immunity.
See also Filmer, Sir Robert; Locke, John; Monarchy; Sovereignty.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICHAEL W. HAIL
BIBLIOGRAP HY
James I. The True Law of Free Monarchies. Edinburgh: Robert Waldegrave,
1598.
Figgis, John N. The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings. Cambridge: University
Press, 1898.
Filmer, Robert. Patriarcha: A Defense of the Natural Power of Kings against the
Unnatural Liberty of the People. London: Walter Davis, 1680.
Laslett, Peter. Patriarcha and Other Political Works. Oxford: Blackwell, 1949.
McIlwain, Charles H. The Political Works of James I. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1918.
Doctrines
Foreign policy doctrines are broad articulations of interest and
objectives that serve both to guide the domestic formulation
of policy and to communicate a states policy intent to other
actors in the international system. The doctrines contain
principles to guide actions rather than specific prescriptions
for action. It has become customary to name doctrines after
the national leader that promulgates the guidelines, although
some countries simply identify doctrines by number. For
instance, one of the oldest continuous doctrines is the 1823
Monroe Doctrine, named after U.S. president James Monroe. Its aim was to halt European colonization of the Western
hemisphere, and it asserted that the United States would not
interfere with existing European colonies or countries. Other
prominent U.S. doctrines include those named after presidents
Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan, all
of which were designed to contain the spread of Soviet influence. Meanwhile, the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine affirmed the
Dollarization
See Numeraire and Dollarization.
Domino Theory
President Dwight Eisenhower described domino theory in a
1954 press conference on the importance of U.S. involvement in Indochina. Eisenhower, engaged in a containment
strategy to limit expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union
at the height of the cold war, explained that Soviet goals of
spreading communism and absorbing client states had to be
countered. China fell to the Communists in 1949, North
Korea invaded South Korea to unify the country under the
Communist banner, and the Soviets and Maos China sought
to stir up revolution throughout Europe and the third world.
Maos revolutionary fervor appeared especially virulent, and
Laos and Vietnam appeared vulnerable to Communist takeover. Eisenhower wanted these countries kept out of Communist hands, for fear that, if the United States failed to act,
these and other states would fall like dominos.
This fear and doctrine, which gained metaphoric fame
during Eisenhowers tenure, actually evolved from Harry Trumans containment policy intended to prevent the expansion
of Soviet influence. The doctrine motivated presidents from
Truman (who wanted to defend free peoples threatened by
communism) to all cold war presidents (who wanted to prevent Vietnam from precipitating further dominos) and to Reagan (who wanted to overturn Communist victories to inspire
a reverse domino effect in the third world). Presidents from
Clinton to Obama have referred to another reverse domino
notion (democratic enlargement) to convey the hope that
increasing numbers of democratic states would cascade into
free states everywhere. While responsible for U.S. overextension on occasion, the original domino theory also provided an
American explanation or rationalization for the necessity of
intervention to contain global communism.
See also Cold War; Communism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LOUISA HULETT
Droop Quota
In single transferable vote systems that allow voters to rank
order their preferred candidates, the Droop quota establishes
the minimum number of seats necessary to be elected. In
this electoral procedure, once a candidate meets the minimum number of ballots necessary for election (the Droop
quota), any excess votes are transferred to other candidates.
The system was created by Henry Richmond Droop in
1868 as an alternative to the existing Hare quota, which was
criticized for its ability to return results in which the largest
voting groups elected only a minority of seats. The Droop
quota is usually expressed as number of votes (V) divided by
number of seats plus one (S+1) plus one, or [V/(S+1)] +1.
The resultant number from the quota is rounded upward as
a whole number, or the fraction may be ignored, depending
on the system. For instance, if an election is held for four
seats, and there are 100,000 votes, the Droop quota would be
[100,000/(4+1)] +1 or 20,001. Any candidate receiving more
than 20,001 votes would be automatically elected, and excess
votes would be transferred to the next leading candidate until
all seats are filled. Countries such as Australia, Ireland, and
Malta use the Droop quota.
See also Electoral Quotas; Electoral Systems, Comparative.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Drug Cartels
In modern commercial usage, the term cartel draws from the
German word Kartell, which has earlier uses derived from
Latin, French, and Italian. In the conventional sense, a cartel
refers to formal agreements among business associations, or
firms, to control production, fix prices, limit competition,
and/or segment markets (by product, clientele, or territory).
Cartels are often considered to be illegal because of antitrust laws and regulations that seek to restrict monopolistic
practices.
The term drug cartel is frequently used to describe organized
crime syndicates involved in the production, distribution, and
sale of psychotropic substancesincluding heroin, cocaine,
marijuana, and synthetic drugsthat have been prohibited in
many countries since the early twentieth century. While such
organizations, also known as drug trafficking organizations
(DTOs), have existed in multiple contexts, the term drug cartel came into vogue primarily in reference to Latin American
DTOs in the later part of the twentieth century. Such DTOs
typically employ their substantial capacity for corruption and
violence to advance their goals.
Among the earliest DTOs to earn the cartel label were two
major trafficking organizations based in the cities of Medelln and Cali in Colombia. The Medelln cartel, for example,
achieved such power and wealth that Pablo Escobar, its main
leader in the 1980s, was elected as an alternate in the federal
legislature in 1982 and was named by Forbes magazine as one
of the worlds ten richest men (#7) in 1989.
After Escobars death in 1993 and the Medelln cartels subsequent downfall, the Cali cartel rose to prominence in the
1990s. The Cali cartel was developed by Gilberto Rodrguez
Orejuela and Jos Santacruz Londoo, who operated their
organization through independent groups or cells. Each cell
had specialized functions related to some specific aspect of the
organization, such as production and distribution, finance and
money laundering, protection and enforcement, or legal and
political influence.
As the Medelln and Cali cartels fell into decline, other
cartels began to develop elsewhere in the region, with substantial transnational supply chain networks. Among these
were organizations that rose to prominence in major cities
in Mexico, notably the Guadalajara cartel in the 1970s and
1980s; the Jurez cartel, the Tijuana cartel, and the gulf cartel in
the 1990s; and the Sinaloa cartel (also known as the Federation) in the 2000s. Substantial trafficking organizations also
developed in Brazil, where Luiz Fernando da Costa operated a
major DTO within a larger gang network known as the Red
Command (Comando Vermelho) until his capture in 2001. Like
several other well-known drug kingpins elsewhere, da Costa
continued orchestrating criminal activities from his jail cell
until he was extradited to the United States in 2008.
In reference to DTOs, many experts avoid the use of the
term cartel, because DTOs demonstrate significant differences from cartels in the conventional business world. Notably,
despite their frequent efforts to limit the entry of new competitors, most DTOs do not deliberately conspire to maximize
prices. Moreover, while DTOs frequently engage in other
cartel-like behaviors, such as negotiating territories, such collusion requires substantial organizational coherence. Cooperation among DTOs is especially difficult to achieve in the face
of intense competitive pressures, shifting market trends, and
law enforcement efforts.
See also Organized Crime and Mafia.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DAVID A. SHIRK
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Astorga, Luis. Seguridad,Traficantes y Militares: El Poder y la Sombra. Mexico
City: Tusquets, 2007.
Donnelly, Robert A., and David A. Shirk. Police and Public Security in Mexico.
San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, 2009.
Levenstein, Margaret C., and Valerie Y. Suslow. Cartels. In The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics, volume 1, edited by Steven N. Durlauf and
Lawrence E. Blume, 698699. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Drug Policy
Drug policy covers an extensive range of governments respon
ses to the problem of illegal drugs. This entry will identify
the drugs in question, explain the origins of national drug
policy, examine the development of international drug policy,
and identify the range of policies employed. As illegal drug
cultivation, production, and consumption can occur on different continents, international cooperation took hold in the
twentieth century to curb supply and disrupt movement of
drugs to market.
Dual Executive
Among democratic political systems across the world, three
models of organizing relations between the executive and
legislative branches of government exist: parliamentary,
presidential, and dual executive systems. In a parliamentary
system, the executive consists of a cabinet that is headed by
the prime minister and arises directly from the legislature.
The cabinet is responsible to the legislative majority, which
can dismiss the executive by means of a motion of no confidence. In presidential systems, on the other hand, a popularly elected president appoints and directs the cabinet. The
executive and the legislature have separate popular mandates,
and they are mutually independent for their survival in
Due Process
Generally speaking, due process of law constitutes the normal
course of legal administration through the courts or some
other adjudicatory mechanism with the appropriate safeguards
in place to protect individual rights. At the heart of due process is a framework of principles and rules that structure legal
proceedings; this framework has been established over time
and functions to ensure that private rights are shielded from
improper infringement by the state or other private parties.
The steady realization over time of the rule of law and the
accompanying due process protections in liberal polities constitute two of the most important features distinguishing such
polities from authoritarian regimes and otherwise illiberal
governmental systems. Due process is a critical constraint and
restriction on the ability of governing elites to run roughshod
over fundamental liberties of individuals within a free society.
It helps to ensure consistent and fair application of the law by
minimizing the potential influence of capriciousness or arbitrariness on the part of government officials on such matters.
The Miranda warning informs people of their constitutional rights after being taken into police custody. The warning is one of several measures
taken after rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the due process of law.
source: The Granger Collection, New York
Duration Model
Duration models explain the longevity of a process or predict
when an event will occur. These models are also referred to
as survival, failure time, and event history models by various disciplines. Such models are uniquely suited to address questions
about when an event will occur, since originally they were
used to study how long light bulbs last, and, therefore, they
provide an appropriate set of tools for similar applications.
Analysis is based on the estimation of a survival functionthe
probability that a certain process will last at least a certain
number of time periods, and a hazard rate functionthe probability that the process will end at a particular time, given that
it has lasted for at least a certain number of time periods.
There are nonparametric and parametric approaches to
estimate a survival function. For example, Kaplan Meiers
nonparametric estimates of a survival function are derived by
writing the survival function for discrete data as the product of
the conditional probabilities of surviving in each time period.
Duration models in political science are widely used to investigate questions on the duration of a justices career (American
politics), the duration of a militarized interstate conflict (international relations), the survival of a political regime (comparative politics), and many other questions.
See also Event History and Duration Modeling.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TATIANA VASHCHILKO
Duration Modeling
See Event History and Duration Modeling.
Durkheim, mile
Together with August Comte, mile Durkheim (18581914) is
often considered the founder of sociology. Durkheims significance is also felt in anthropology, philosophy, religious studies, and political science. His four major works are Division
of Labor in Society (1893), The Rules of the Sociological Method
(1895), Suicide (1897), and The Elementary Forms of Religious
Life (1912). The principle argument that connects all these
books is this: As societies (his Euro-centrist perspective is often
criticized) enter into a transition from feudalism to capitalism,
what are the social consequences for the individual as well
as for society? How can a society afford individuals greater
freedom of choice without undermining their attachment to
institutions? Hence, integration, and how it is reproduced, is
Durkheims central concern.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Durkheim, mile. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press, 1947.
. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Free Press, 1947.
. The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York: Free Press, 1938.
. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. New York: Free Press, 1951.
Giddens, Anthony. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. An Analysis of the
Writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1971.
Huntington, Samuel, P. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3
(1993): 2249.
Parsons, Talcott. Structure and Process in Modern Societies. New York: Free Press,
1965.
. Toward A General Theory of Action. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard
University Press, 1967.
Schmitter, Philippe. Still the Century of Corporatism? In Trends Towards
Corporatist Intermediation, edited by P. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch,
749. London: Sage, 1979.
Duvergers Law
Formulated in 1956 by French political scientist Maurice
Duverger, Duvergers Law states that the simple-majority
single-ballot system favors the two-party system. From this
law Duverger derived a hypothesis that the simple-majority
double-ballot system and proportional representation favor
multipartyism. Both Duvergers Law and hypothesis suggest a
kind of institutional determinism, in which a specific set of
electoral rules create a particular party system.
There are two main classical controversies concerning
the validity of Duvergers Law. First, political scientists have
not unanimously approved the direction of causality from
electoral systems to party systems. Second, the sociological
perspective postulates that not the electoral system but rather
the number and type of social cleavages in a society primarily determine the party system. More recent scholarship
has tried to combine the institutional and the sociological
perspectives. In heterogeneous countries with cross-cutting
cleavages such as Canada, simple plurality rule does not lead
to a two-party system at the national level. Yet, at the district level, Duvergers hypothesis generally holds; the large
majority of districts in single plurality systems are dominated by two parties. Strategic votingvoters might desert
all candidates except the two top placed contenders (M+1
rule)and elite coordinationelites may retire hopeless candidaciesaccount for the better fit of Duvergers Law at the
district level.
See also Ballot Design; Political Parties;Voting Behavior.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DANIEL STOCKEMER
Dyarchy
See Dual Executive.
E
Eckstein, Harry
Harry Eckstein (19241999) was born in Schotten, Germany.
Eckstein, who was Jewish, was brought to the United States
when he was twelve as part of the exodus from Nazi Germany that became known as the One Thousand Children.
This was a program administered by the U.S. government that
brought intellectually gifted children to the United States.
While his sister, Ilsa, eventually escaped from Germany, the
rest of his family perished in the Holocaust.
Eckstein spent his adolescent years in Columbus, Ohio. He
then attended Harvard University, where he received his bachelors degree (1948, summa cum laude), masters degree (1950),
and doctorate (1953) in political science.
He began his teaching career at Harvard University as an
instructor and then as an assistant professor (19541958). Eckstein then moved to Princeton (19591980), where he became
the IBM Professor of International Studies in 1969. In 1980, he
moved to the University of California, Irvine, where he taught
until his death in 1999.
His dissertation was published as The English Health Service
(1958). He followed this with his study of the British Medical Association, which was published as Pressure Group Politics
(1958). In A Theory of Stable Democracy (1961), Eckstein presented what he called congruence theory, which states that
governments perform well to the extent that their authority
patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of other
units of society. Later works include Internal War (1964), Division and Cohesion in Democracy (1966), Patterns of Authority
(1975), Regarding Politics (1992), and Can Democracy Take Root
in Post-Soviet Russia? (1998). Ecksteins contributions to the
field of political science include his work on interest groups,
his work on civil strife, and his use of case studies to explain
comparative politics.
Eckstein was a political scientist who argued that the
authority patterns in a society were a critical variable in determining whether democracy would succeed in a nation-state.
See also Interest Groups and Lobbies; Politics, Comparative.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JEFFREY KRAUS
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Eckstein, Harry. Congruence Theory Explained. In Can Democracy Take
Root in Post-Soviet Russia? edited by Harry Eckstein, Frederic J. Fleron,
Ecological Analysis
Ecological analysis is an effort to incorporate environmental
and natural science notions into traditional political analysis.
It is based on the premise that the study of government and
societies can be enhanced by progress in understanding the
planets ecology. Ecological analysis argues that most existing
political ideologies are based on the acquisition and exploitation of natural resources to improve the standard of living of
the ideologies respective societies or to increase their military
or economic security. Because of the drive to gain resources,
groups developed stratified societies in which elites established
control over, first, agricultural production and, later, industrial
production. As agriculture spread, there was a concurrent
expansion in the population. Some scholars trace ecological
analysis to the work of Thomas Malthus, who blamed population growth on poverty and impoverishment. The result of
these aggressive, resource-exploitive ideologies was highly
stratified societies, even among political philosophies such as
Marxism and Leninism, which sought egalitarianism. Elites
were able to gain control of surpluses and use those additional
resources to bolster their political and economic power. In
contrast, political structures based on sustainable development
and environmentally friendly practices will result in more
egalitarian and balanced societies.
See also Biology and Political Science; Equality and Inequality;
Leninism; Marxism; Sociobiology and Politics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
459
Ecological Fallacy
The ecological fallacy is a concept first introduced in 1950
by William S. Robinson in a paper published in the American
Sociological Review. Through a statistical analysis of the relationship between immigration and literacy rates, he illustrates
that we cannot extend patterns found at the aggregate level to
make inferences about individuals. He finds that being foreign
born correlates positively with a lower literacy level. At the
aggregate level, however, he finds that the higher the population of immigrants in a state, the higher is the literacy rate in
that state. His analysis illustrates that if we extend the findings
at the aggregate level to the individual level, we would incorrectly conclude that a given foreign-born individual would be
more literate rather than less literate.
In Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative
Research, Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba warn
against the dangers of the ecological fallacy and suggest that in
general, if one is seeking to draw conclusions at the individual
level, one ought to look at individual-level data. However,
they do note that there are circumstances in which obtaining and analyzing data at another level of aggregation is useful, for example, when individual-level data are not available
and when our theory has implications at more than one level
of analysis. In these circumstances, they suggest, we can best
determine the reliability of our theory by obtaining as much
information as possible, at all levels of analysis. Gary Kings
later (1997) path-breaking work deals with the problems of
the ecological fallacy in more depth. In his book, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual
Behavior from Aggregate Data, King demonstrates the inability
of previous statistical models to accurately capture the impact
of aggregate-level variables and introduces a new statistical
model that is able to overcome some of the methodological
problems associated with ecological inferences. King continues to argue (as he did with Keohane and Verba in 1994) that
more information available to the researcher is better (at all
levels of aggregation) as it can help to increase the robustness
and reliability of our findings.
See also Quantitative Analysis; Statistical Analysis.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AMANDA BITTNER
BIBLIOGRAP HY
King, Gary. A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing
Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1997.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry:
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1994.
Economic Development
See Development, Economic.
Economic Development,
State-led
State-led economic development is an institutional approach
to development emerging from cold warera debates about
how poor countries can achieve economic development.
Drawn largely from the experiences of successful developing
INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF
SUCCESS
Economic Interdependence
Economic interdependence is a concept from the international political economy area of study, and it relates to the
level of interconnectedness between two nation-states. The
idea of political economy dates back to the birth of liberalism in the seventeenth century and is further discussed by
eighteenth-century European philosophers Immanuel Kant,
Baron de Montesquieu, and Adam Smith. The modern discussion of economic interdependence dates primarily to the
1970s. States may be dependent on each other for trade and
investments but may also be sensitive and vulnerable to events
and trends in the global economy. The world financial crises
of 1997 and 2009 are contemporary evidence demonstrating the large degree of economic dependence between states
and the global economy, as these financial crises spread like a
contagion from state to state. States today are typically economically interdependent on other states, although the degree
of dependence varies across states. North Korea is relatively
isolated and is the least economically dependent state in the
global economy, whereas small export-based economies, such
as Singapores, rank as highly dependent on other states.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nyes Power and Interdependence (2001) discusses two dimensions of interdependence:
sensitivity and vulnerability. Some nation-states may be sensitive to events or trends in other states and thus alter their
domestic and foreign policies in response. However, states that
are highly interdependent economically may be vulnerable to
shifts in the global economy and the specific economic actions
taken by sensitive states. As such, the level of economic interdependence between states may not be symmetric. For example, one state may be highly dependent on and thus vulnerable
to another state for energy, such as Ukraine has been vis--vis
Russia in recent years. In this situation, Ukraine is vulnerable
to any fuel embargo by Russia, which provides political leverage for the latter.
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC
INTERDEPENDENCE
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the concept
of economic interdependence is intermixed with the term
globalization. While the economic dependence of states has
grown in the past sixty years, so have the global connections
between people as a consequence of significant increases in
direct foreign investments, portfolio investments, trade, telecommunication technologies, and foreign travel. This growth
in economic interdependence is a by-product of classical liberalism, emphasizing free economic markets and trade with
limited government oversight, returning to the economic
theories emerging in the eighteenth century, and moving
away from the broader theoretical perspectives of realism and
Marxism in international relations theory at times witnessed
in the twentieth century. Thus, the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs was replaced by the member states in 1995
in an effort to improve the enforcement of international free
trade through the creation of the World Trade Organization.
Furthermore, the emergence of economic integration treaties
and regional organizations as characterized by the 1993 European Union model reinforces modern liberalism concepts.
While the European Union created a single common market
for goods, labor, and investments contributing to prosperity,
it also provided a means for the once war-prone European
states to form common preferences and negotiate peace terms.
Similarly, examples of geopolitical organizations are the Gulf
Cooperation Council, formed in 1981, and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, formed in 1967. The Gulf Cooperation Council continues to seek to strengthen economic cooperation among its six member states in areas of agriculture,
industry, investment, security, and trade. The Association of
Economic Peace
See Economic Interdependence.
Freeman, John. Democracy and Markets. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1989.
Hall, Peter. Governing the Economy:The Politics of State Intervention in Britain
and France. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Heidenheimer, Arnold, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn Teich Adams. Comparative
Public Policy:The Politics of Social Choice in America, Europe, and Japan.
New York: St. Martins, 1983.
Katzenstein, Peter. Small States in World Markets. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1999.
Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.
New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936.
Shonfield, Andrew. Modern Capitalism:The Changing Balance of Public and
Private Power. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
Wilensky, Harold. The Welfare State and Equality. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975.
Economic Systems,
Comparative
Economic systems are popularly classified into various ideological types, with supplementary modifications for stages
of economic development and productive structure. Until
recently, the great ideological divide counterposed capitalism and socialism, each with subtypologies. Communism was
given pride of place as an important socialist variant.
Development divided the world into advanced and backward categories, allowing scholars to debate whether the gap
between rich and poor was narrowing or widening. Productive structure served as an indicator of modernization. The
economies of advanced countries once were highly industrialized, but as of the late twentieth century have stressed hightech services. Agricultural economic systems for the most part
were viewed as premodern.
These taxonomies are becoming increasingly obsolete as
ideological concerns fade, displaced by concepts such as globalization, which imply that all economic mechanisms will
be more or less the same in the future, characterized by statesupervised competitive markets and harmonized by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank. Also, many less-developed nations now possess advanced industrial high-tech sectors with cosmopolitan
enclaves. Backwaters of the colonial type are vanishing. Globalization, however, should not be conflated with the reality of
world government and a common economic mechanism. Systems remain diverse, but the cultural, political, and institutional
forces distinguishing them have become more subtle.
SYSTEM DIFFERENCES
Communism not only is wary of freehold property but insists
on one-party political control (autocracy), privileged-party
rent granting in the state and private sectors, and civic repression wherever social action jeopardizes party rule. The model
installs the rule of men over the rule of law. Laws, including
private contracts in communist countries, are predominantly
instruments of state/party administration rather than universal principles to which the regime itself is held to account.
Communist regimes reject democracy, the common law, and
free markets in favor of insider rent granting and party rule
with or without the facade of balloting, embellished with
the rhetoric of prosperity, harmony, and social justice. The
model is internally inconsistent and corrupt, with inferior
long-run potential after advantages of economic backwardness in nations like China are exhausted.
The EU economy, by contrast, is a democratic, open society
that prioritizes workers and minorities rights and empowerment, a broad social safety network, and soft power. It tolerates some individual liberties that conflict with this agenda
but tends to restrain private ownership, business, and entrepreneurship whenever they limit social justice and political
discretion, including rent-granting insider privileges. The net
result has been what is often called Eurosclerosis: feeble economic growth, converging toward stagnation. The repercussions of the 20082009 global financial crisis and depression
are likely to exacerbate the tendency.
The administration of Barack Obama, for a multiplicity
of reasons, is pushing the U.S. free enterprise system toward
EU collectivism, especially with regard to old-fashioned
state-provided basic services such as health care. The comparatively feeble influence of trade unions and the working
class in American politics, coupled with a stronger tradition of
private-sector entrepreneurship, however, continues to make
the two systems distinct. Long-term economic growth in the
United States is apt to outpace its EU rival.
from conflict views of the state, which theorize it as an instrument of class domination. Also, the idea of its instrumental
value with respect to individual interests contradicts the view
of the state that theorizes its purpose as realizing a collective
ideal or public interest beyond the individual well-being of its
members.
Eco-terrorism 469
remedy is to place the industry in public ownership. The state
is also able to internalize the full costs of an economic activity in the producers; without its regulatory capacity, the costs
could be imposed, or externalized, onto the population at
large. The pollution resulting from industrial production is an
example of a production cost that can be externalized onto
society without state action.
Eco-terrorism
Eco-terrorism is a type of terrorism directed at changing
environmental policy. Terrorism, by definition, is a violent or
forceful act that targets civilians to create fear and motivate
political change. Theoretically, this fear creates political pressure on governments to change policy. Eco-terrorists create
situations in which the costs of pursuing an environmental
policy outweigh the benefits of that policy. Eco-terrorists may
target states, but many eco-terrorist organizations also target
private firms. Eco-terrorism and environmental terrorism
are two different ideas. Eco-terrorist groups aim to protect
the environment through terrorist actions against firms and
states. Environmental terrorism describes a terrorist attack
whose target is the environment. Terrorist groups engage in
environmental terrorism when they attack a states natural
resources. For instance, terrorist attacks on a countrys water
supply and setting fire to national forests are both acts of environmental terrorism. Generally, eco-terrorists do not engage
in environmental terrorism. Eco-terrorist organizations work
to protect the environment, and therefore deliberately harming the environment is against their raison dtre.
The term eco-terrorist is contested by groups defined as ecoterrorists. Members view themselves as activists rather than
terrorists. Eco-terrorist groups engage in activities similar to
those of other activist groups. Eco-terrorists conduct peaceful
demonstrations and civil disobedience with marches, sit-ins,
and protests. Furthermore, eco-terrorist groups serve as information providers, describing the effects of the state and firms
on the environment. They lobby governments and businesses
to change their operations to end environmentally harmful
activities or adopt other sites for programs to protect animal
habitats. However, what separates eco-terrorists from regular
activist groups are violent acts against people and property.
Eco-terrorist organizations destroy property and threaten
people to pursue political goals. Furthermore, members of
eco-terrorist groups justify destruction caused by their organizations as a small price to guard against larger environmental destruction. Eco-terrorist organizations claim that they are
inappropriately labeled terrorists to undermine their cause.
The label terrorist diminishes their public credibility and
legitimacy as organizations.
The theoretical underpinnings of eco-terrorist organizations have their roots in environmental movements. Many
scholars cite Rachel Carsons Silent Spring as the book that
launched the U.S. environmental movement. Members of
eco-terrorist groups often espouse deep ecology values, either
explicitly or implicitly. Deep ecology is a system of values
that at its base claims each living being has equal value. Deep
ecologists object to a hierarchy evaluation of animals, making the normative claim that each animal has an equal value.
While many deep ecologists are peaceful, the philosophy of
deep ecology has been used to mobilize and galvanize support
for eco-terrorist movements. Eco-terrorists are distinct from
other environmentalists in their commitment to violence to
achieve political goals and their dissatisfaction with mainstream
Edelman, Murray J.
Murray J. Edelman (19192001) integrated insights from linguistics, rhetoric, semiotics, psychology, and philosophy into
the discipline of political science in the United States. Edelman was born in Pennsylvania, received his bachelors degree
from Bucknell University in 1941, his masters degree from the
University of Chicago in 1942, and his PhD from the University of Illinois in 1948, where he subsequently taught until
joining the faculty of the University of WisconsinMadison in
Education Policy
Education policy in the United States is divided into two
areas: (1) elementary and secondary education and (2) higher
education. Elementary and secondary education policy has
historically been handled by local government, according to
state guidelines and with funding from state and local taxes.
Federal involvement began with the effort to desegregate
schools in the landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka case, and continued in a series of desegregation cases in
the 1960s and 1970s that followed passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Federal funding of elementary and secondary
education increased through the Elementary and Secondary
Schools Act of 1965, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1971, and the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)
of 2002. Higher education policy has largely been handled as
a mix of privately run colleges and universities that are paralleled by state systems of higher education.The federal government has had some involvement in higher education policy
making, beginning with the Morrill Act of 1862, which set
aside lands for state universities. Federal involvement grew
in the postWorld War II era with the significant funding of
university research, provision of education grants, and creation of the guaranteed student loan program. Affirmative
action policy, in particular Title IX, helped to expand access
to higher education by women and minorities.
NCLB OF 2002
President George W. Bush campaigned for increased accountability of schools for student performance, in particular, the
performance of students of color living in urban districts. His
plan for accountability resulted in the creation and passage
of NCLB. NCLB added new requirements to maintain eligibility for federal funding. These involved mandatory tests
of students at different grade levels to measure proficiency
in math, reading, and writing as well as subject area tests in
science and social studies. NCLB requires public notification
of the test results aggregated by individual school building.
School districts are rated on a set of standards called Adequate
Yearly Progress, which measures the degree of improvement
of test scores over the prior year. Districts are also required
to report student attendance rates, graduation rates, and incidence of violence. Schools deemed at risk receive additional
federal funding to be used to improve student performance.
If Adequate Yearly Progress scores do not improve during the
following two years, the DOE can require the school district
to reorganize or close the school or risk losing federal funding. States are required to align their curricula with testing
standards as well as align teacher certification requirements
with guidelines stipulated by the DOE.
been implemented concurrently with other reforms, including the introduction of tuition fees in the United Kingdom
and the internal reorganization of universities in France under
the Universities Freedoms and Responsibilities law. This has
encouraged opposition, but central government control is still
dominant across the sector.
UNITED STATES
In contrast, HE in the United States is not regulated directly
by central government.There are a wide variety of institutions;
some are among the most prestigious in the world, and others are little more than degree mills. According to the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), the United States has the second largest number
of HE institutions after India, and 82 percent of the population
of tertiary age are HE students (compared with 59 percent in
the United Kingdom, 22 percent in China, and 75 percent in
Australia). Universities are large by European standards, and
those that are not private are operated by individual states.
Tuition is charged everywhere, although public universities
have lower fees and most have considerable endowments. In
policy terms, capacity remains an issue as demand increases
during and immediately after recessions, and states such as California are prioritizing the development of appropriate policies
in the face of likely legal challenges. An allied issue is that of
undocumented students, those who are not U.S. citizens or
legal residents, who receive free secondary education but face
legal and financial barriers when trying to access HE.
UNITED KINGDOM
EUROPEAN UNION
Policy in the European Union and in countries allied to the
European Cultural Convention is driven by the Bologna
Declaration, a voluntary agreement aimed at harmonizing
HE architecture across Europe. Further intergovernmental
meetingsin Prague (2001), Berlin (2003), Bergen (2005),
London (2007), and Louvain (2009)have reaffirmed the
Bologna process, which currently has forty-six signatories.
The basic three-tier framework aligns mainland European
and American HEalthough in many ways it represents
a subordination of the formerand is closely allied to the
World Trade Organization General Agreement on Trade in
Servicestoo closely, in the minds of critics. The process has
CHINA
Funding is not the major issue in China, which has more than
two thousand universities and colleges and fifteen million
students. The university system was developed at the end of
the nineteenth century to take advantage of Chinas growing engagement with Western techno-scientific advances, but
the system incorporates an older Confucian philosophy. The
Cultural Revolution devastated the sector as student numbers and standards plummeted, but in 1977, the HE entrance
AUSTRALIA
HE in Australia, Chinas Western neighbor, also dates from
the nineteenth century and is not surprisingly modeled on
the British system. There are more than forty universities, all
but two of which are public bodies in receipt of central funding under the Higher Education Support Act. The federal
government has primary responsibility for policy, while governance is shared with individual states and the institutions
themselves, which have a high degree of autonomy. During
the 1970s, tuition fees were abolished, but a decade later they
were reintroduced through the Higher Education Contribution Scheme, which, like the current UK system introduced
twenty years later, enables students to defer repayment until
they gain meaningful employment. More recently, government
policy has sought to encourage collaboration with industry,
but inconsistent funding mechanisms and poor governance
has meant that results have been mixed. Far more successful
has been Australias role in the burgeoning Asian HE market
and the huge overseas fee income thus generated, but serious
structural and policy issues remain, including the lack of niche
institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (United States), cole Normale Suprieure (France), and
London School of Economics (United Kingdom); a dearth of
high-quality research academics; insufficient funding; and as
the Bradley Review indicated, widening participation. Proposed funding innovations, such as the Melbourne model, a
shift to U.S.-style generic undergraduate degrees followed by
postgraduate professional degrees, seem more like circumventions than solutions. However, government policy to align
with the Eurocentric Bologna process seems sensible because
the attractiveness of Australian universities to overseas markets
would otherwise be compromised.
CONCLUSION
Despite differences in HE policy around the world, some
common themes emerge as a result of globalization, including
E-governance, E-voting,
E-democracy, E-politics
The Internet has permeated the business of politics in society, and the various activities within government undertaken
by political actors, including citizens, politicians, journalists,
and activists, fall within the realm of e-politics. One of these
activities is voting online, or e-voting. Beyond the act of voting, other activities such as paying taxes, registering motor
vehicles, obtaining drivers licenses, completing forms, and
obtaining materials from the government via the Internet
constitute what is known as e-governance. Should the Internet become successful in the democratization of political systems it can be said that electronic democracy, or e-democracy,
has been instrumental in such a process.
E-GOVERNANCE
E-governmentshort for electronic government but also
known as e-gov, digital government, online government, or
transformational governmentrefers to the use of information and communication technology to provide and improve
government services, transactions, and interactions with citizens, businesses, and other agencies of government. As early
as 2000 some of the most visited Web sites were in the governmental realm, including the Internal Revenue Service,
the U.S. Postal Service, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the National Institutes of Health, and the
Census Bureau.
The U.S. federal government, starting with the White
House under Bill Clinton, encouraged the use of the Internet
as early as 1993 as a means of providing information. Congressional sites for both the U.S. House of Representatives and
the Senate provide biographies of members, press releases,
legislation sponsored and cosponsored, floor speeches, recent
legislation, the status of legislation, and newsletters. Individual
officeholders have a Web presence to facilitate and promote
fund-raising, continuous campaigning, and constituent interaction. Information on the Supreme Court site includes court
cases, rulings, and opinions.The major, and even minor, political parties have their own Web sites that encourage partisans to
contribute funds, no matter how small, and engage in activities, no matter how trivial, to bring the partys and candidates
name out in the general public. This was the method used by
the Obama campaign to obtain the involvement of millions of
people in its call for change.
In the United States state and local governments have also
gone online to varying degrees. Numerous groups and organizations, such as the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People and the National Organization for Women,
and magazines such as Government Technology are dedicated to,
and have undertaken the monitoring and measurement of,
what is going on in the use of information technology in the
states and in government. Since 1997 Government Technology
has undertaken a digital state survey. In the 2008 survey Utah
came in on top, followed by Michigan,Virginia, and Arizona.
At the international level, countries use the Web to inform
the world about themselves, to entice those who have the
money and the curiosity to visit them, or to facilitate communication with the rest of the world formally by governmentto-government transactions or informally by citizen-to-citizen
exchanges of e-mails and the sharing of audio and video.
Although the state of a countrys technological development
measured by the Globalization Index or the E-Readiness
Index may provide insight into the usefulness of the Internet
for delivering basic needs to its citizens, the digital divide is a
constant reminder that the gap between the wealthy and the
poor prevents billions of people from utilizing the advantages
of connectivity.
Nevertheless, efforts are constantly being made to bring
government connectivity to constituents. Various activities that constitute political connectivity, including e-voting,
e-campaigning, and e-fund-raising (found in the articles about
voting and blogging), have captured the attention of those
who study progress in engaging the citizenry with the functions of government in a democracy.
E-VOTING
Electronic voting, or e-voting, has become quite controversial
among those who favor it and those who want to hold on to
old ways of participation in the political choice of leaders and
representatives. The U.S. states of Oregon and Arizona have
paved the way in experimenting with the use of electronic
voting. Aside from peoples reluctance to trust a computer
to accept their voteat times without a paper record of that
votethere is also the fear associated with the reliability and
validity of using the Internet for choosing a nations leaders. Surveys in the late 1990s indicated that about 51 percent
of surveyed netizens favored online voting as long as it was
safe, while 42 percent disagreed with online voting. Younger
citizens who are more tech savvy may be more inclined to,
and more comfortable with, voting through a computer or
the Internet.
E-DEMOCRACY
The online activities of governments have led to a debate
about the ability of this medium of political communication to bring about greater and better democracy. Political
life online may seem to be a mere extension of political life
offline; however, being linked through the Internet provides
an additional medium through which individuals can pursue
the privileges and obligations of citizenship. It is a good way
of communicating one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-tomany and improves on the conventional ways of dealing with
government. This direct democracy brought about by Web
connectivity has been billed as what will connect citizens
to mass decision-making processes, such as the election of
Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency. Obamas Web presence
mobilized millions of Americans to campaign and fund-raise.
Politicians have been using, and will continue to use, online
formats to maintain and enforce their existing power. They
cannot help but be more responsive to citizen demands since
it would be difficult to withhold information as well as censor
information in an open society where information is available
online. Misinformation, deception, and manipulation can still
come about, but overall, proponents of government presence
on the net see it as a factor in the revitalization of democracy
everywhere.
When evaluating e-government from a balanced perspective, it is true that as of the early twenty-first century
there exist many gaps in online government service delivery,
some of which are the result of security issues. The Internet
is merely another mode of delivery and participation; despite
Elazar, Daniel J.
Born in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Daniel J. Elazar (19341999)
was a leading American political scientist specializing in the
study of federalism and federal political systems and arrangements. He was also a scholar of political culture and the Jewish political tradition. Throughout his career, he attempted to
link the study of politics and public policy with its practice
and has served as a consultant to numerous governments
throughout the world.
While studying at Wayne State University, Elazar worked
as a librarian at the United Hebrew Schools. In this capacity,
he and his brother developed a system for cataloguing Judaica, which they published in 1968 as A Classification System
for Libraries of Judaica. Elazars Jewish roots both informed and
influenced his study of politics.
Elazar next studied at the University of Chicago, earning a masters degree (1957) and a doctorate (1959). Under
the tutelage of Morton Grodzins, Elazars understanding of
Election Commission
Election commissions are a special category of electoral management bodies emerging after World War II (19391945).
They also appear in the form of a department of elections,
an electoral council, an electoral unit, or an electoral board. A
precise definition of electoral commissions is elusive because
they are institutionalized on a wide spectrum, for example,
a government-administered body (like Zimbabwes before
2008), a board of judges managing the election (as in Turkey),
an independent electoral commission (IEC) of civil society
members (as in India or South Africa), and a commission
mainly concerned with managing campaign financing (as in
the United States).
DEFINITION
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance defines an electoral management body as an organization or body which has the sole purpose of, and is legally
responsible for, managing some or all of the elements that are
essential for the conduct of elections and of direct democracy
instrumentssuch as referendums, citizens initiatives and
recall votesif those are part of the legal framework (quoted
in Alan Wall et al.s Electoral Management Design 2006, 5). It may
be a stand-alone institution, or it may be a distinct unit within
a larger body, which also may have nonelectoral responsibilities. The essential tasks of electoral commissions are to determine who qualifies as a voter, specify all the aspects of the
nomination procedure, conduct the polling, count the votes,
and tabulate the votes.
Shaheen Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler, in The Comparative Study of Electoral GovernanceIntroduction (2002),
and Robert Pastor, in his essay A Brief History of Electoral
Commissions (1999), draw a distinction between established and new democracies regarding electoral management.
Mozaffar and Schedler observed the tendency in established
democracies to overlook the importance of electoral governance in securing the credibility and continued legitimacy of
elections. According to Pastor, these systems are characterized
by high levels of administrative competence, and therefore
little suspicion arises regarding the governments management
of elections. In new democracies, on the other hand, the need
to focus on electoral management is much more pronounced.
It is exacerbated by a lack of administrative capacity in the
governance institutions and continuing deep-rooted suspicion between different parties and interests in the emerging
democracy. Hence, an independent body is needed to level the
electoral playing field.
A group of election commission workers prepare to count paper ballots after the 2002 presidential election in South Korea. An election
commissions function varies throughout the world, from managing an election to managing campaign finances.
source: AP Images
Election Monitoring
Election monitoring is the process by which external or noninterested actors evaluate the legitimacy of balloting. Credible
elections are central to democracy, and election observers aid
in the acceptance of polling as relatively free of manipulation or free and fair. Among the benefits of election monitoring are acceptance of the results by both domestic and
international audiences and validation of democratic efforts.
International observers can also provide training and technical assistance to local populations and thereby strengthen
the internalization of democracy in transitioning states. Both
international and domestic monitoring usually involve the
deployment of observers six to eight weeks before balloting,
although some missions arrive up to a year prior to elections.
The observers assist with the development of electoral laws,
voter registration, and oversight of balloting, including the
creation of independent voter tallies. Monitors must be perceived as neutral by the parties participating in the polling.
Favoring one candidate or party over others is one of the
greatest potential flaws in the system. Another is that monitors
may not be deployed early enough to identify all corrupt
practices, including media manipulation or problems with
voter registration.
Election monitoring may be conducted at either the
international or the domestic level. International monitoring occurred in 1857 when Austrian, British, French, Prussian,
Russian, and Turkish observers assessed plebiscites in Moldova
and Wallachia. These efforts accelerated in the aftermath of
World War II (19391945) and during the rise of international
organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of
American States, and the European Union, and the concurrent period of decolonization. Election monitoring emerged
as one of several strategies in conflict resolution efforts and was
often part of peace agreements and international peacekeeping operations. The end of the cold war and the subsequent
wave of democracy led to a dramatic expansion of the use of
international election monitoring as advocates, such as former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, championed the practice as a
means to legitimize new regimes and new democracies. Typically, election monitors are invited by host states to supervise
polling or are deployed as part of a peace agreement in postconflict states. Between 1989 and 2009, international monitors
oversaw balloting in more than ninety emerging democracies or countries in transition. The widespread use of monitors reflects both efforts to secure international acceptance
of regimes and the trend by which donor states and international organizations tie aid to successful elections. Among
the organizations most commonly involved in monitoring
are the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
the European Council, and the African Union. For instance,
since 2000, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe has sent more than three thousand monitors to supervise fifteen separate elections.
Domestic monitoring has existed in various forms since
the 1800s but became formalized only in the mid-twentieth
Electoral Administration
As a topic for political science, electoral administration
is a relative newcomer. While democratic theorists such as
nineteenth-century British philosopher John Stuart Mill were
interested in electoral systems, they had little interest in the
administrative underpinnings of democratic elections or what
was needed to make them free and fair in practice.
GROWTH
All this changed in the last quarter of the twentieth century,
when there was a tripling of the number of democracies in
the world. The introduction of competitive elections required
the development of electoral authorities that could be trusted
to administer elections impartially. At the same time, electoral administration was acquiring a more professional and
independent status in many established democracies, and a
new premium was being placed on expertise in the field.
Internationally there was increased networking and sharing of
knowledge in addition to the provision of election assistance.
Bodies such as the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the
Washington-based IFES (formerly the International Foundation for Election Systems) have played an important role in the
development of international standards and the dissemination
of good practice models. IDEA is an intergovernmental body
launched in 1995, while IFES is a nongovernmental organization dating from 1987. Together with the United Nations
and some national election bodies, they have joined in sponsoring the Administration and Cost of Elections Project.
The Administration and Cost of Elections Electoral Knowledge Network provides comparative resources and data, practitioner networking, and capacity building. While the focus of
international work on electoral administration has tended to
be on assisting new democracies, the criteria that have been
DIVERSITY
Examples of a single bodys managing most aspects of
national elections include the Australian Electoral Commission and Elections Canada. These bodies differ in the manner of appointment and tenure of the chief electoral official
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Campaign finance is a major issue in terms of a level playing field for elections, and many democracies have moved
to tighten control over the source and level of donations to
political parties and candidates. Canada has recently banned
all corporate or union donations, while the United Kingdom
has tightened its disclosure requirements. One fear on the part
of electoral management bodies is that through the auditing
of political party and third-party finances, the electoral management bodies will be drawn into partisan controversy, hence
undermining public confidence in the integrity of electoral
administration. This is but one of the many dilemmas that
arise within electoral administration; all models have both
strengths and weaknesses that deserve greater attention from
political science.
See also Election Commission; Election Monitoring; Electoral Systems, Comparative;Voting Procedures.
. . . . . . . . . NORM KELLY AND MARIAN SAWER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, www.aceproject.org.
Hughes, Colin, The Independence of Electoral Administration, Senate
Occasional Lecture Series, March 23, 2007, www.aph.gov.au/Senate/
pubs/occa_lect/transcripts/230307/230307.pdf.
International Foundation for Election Systems, www.ifes.org.
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Code
of Conduct: Ethical and Professional Administration of Elections. Stockholm,
Sweden: International IDEA, 1997.
, www.idea.int.
Maley, Michael. Administration of Elections. In International Encyclopedia of
Election, edited by Richard Rose, 614. London: Macmillan, 2000.
Massicotte, Louis, Andr Blais, and Antoine Yoshinaka. Establishing the Rules
of the Game: Election Laws in Democracies. Toronto, Canada: University of
Toronto Press, 2004.
Wall, Alan, Andrew Ellis, Ayman Ayoub, Carl W. Dundas, Joram Rukambe,
and Sara Staino. Electoral Management Design:The International IDEA
Handbook. Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA, 2006.
Electoral College
The College of Cardinals, which meets in Rome to elect
the pope when the papacy is vacant, is probably the oldest
electoral college. In 1787 the framers of the U.S. Constitution
adapted the concept to create the electoral college, a body
of electors chosen to elect the president and vice president
of the United States. The decision to use presidential electors was a compromise that took into account the difficulties
inherent in a direct election and attempted to balance power
between large and small states. The system is intended to protect elections from mass hysteria by relying on wiser minds.
The electoral college consists of 538 electors: 3 for the District
of Columbia, 2 for each of the fifty states, and 435 divided
among the states, equal to the number of their representatives
in the House of Representatives. The candidate who wins
each states popular vote typically receives all of the states
electoral votes (unit rule).
Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution makes provision for choosing a states presidential electors, which allows
for a number of electors equal to a states number of senators and representatives in Congress. None of these electors
can hold office in the U.S. government. Electors vote in their
respective states. The votes are then sent to Congress to be
counted by the president of the Senate in the presence of a
joint session of the House and Senate on January 6; if that date
falls on a Sunday, the votes are counted on the next day.
See also Indirect Elections;Winner-Take-All.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.
Electoral Cycles
An electoral cycle is the period of time between two elections. Subject to specific electoral laws, electoral cycles are
usually four or five years in length. Important components of
an electoral cycle are the honeymoon, the period right after
Electoral Formulas
Electoral formulas determine the allocation of representation
to candidates or parties, given the tally in an election. They
can be simple, with the candidate receiving the most votes
winning the seat in a single-member district, or complex,
with an elaborate mathematical formula in multimember
districts. Indeed, because seat allocation is so straightforward
in plurality systemsthe candidate with the most votes in a
given district wins the seatthe term electoral formula is generally used with respect to proportional representation systems.
The simplest element of an electoral formula is the threshold of votes required to qualify for at least one seat, although
some formulas do not set a threshold. For example, in state
primary elections to allocate delegates to the 2008 Democratic
National Convention, the body that formally nominated the
Democratic candidate for president of the United States, 15
percent of the state primary vote was required to earn delegates from that state. Where thresholds are set, they typically
vary with the number of seats allocated. In elections for the
European Parliament, which use variants of proportional representation from country to country, thresholds vary from
none to 5 percent.
There are two major families of electoral formulas: high
est-averages and largest-remainder methods. Under highestaverages methods, the first step after votes are tallied is to calculate a quotient for each party with the numerator equaling
the number of votes received by that party. The formula for
the denominator varies across specific methods. For example,
in the DHondt formula, a highest-averages method used in
most European systems, the denominator for each party is the
number of seats already allocated to that party plus one. Initially, all parties start with zero seats allocated and a denominator equal to one. The first seat is assigned to the party with
the highest quotient; then its quotient is recalculated using the
new denominator (two). The second seat is assigned to the
party that now has the highest quotient, which could be the
party with the first seat if it received more than twice as many
votes as its nearest competitor but otherwise will be the party
with the second-highest vote total.The quotient is again recalculated, and the process is repeated until all seats are allocated.
An alternative to DHondt is the Sainte-Lagu formula, for
which the denominator equals two times the number of seats
already allocated, plus one. This variation makes Sainte-Lagu
more favorable to smaller parties than DHondt.
The key element of the largest-remainder
method is the
votes cast
1
quota. In wide use are the Droop
quota
seats to allocate 1
votes cast
and the Hare (or simple) quota seats to allocate . Each partys vote
tally is divided by the quota, and the result is a whole-number
quotient plus a remainder (it is possible for a partys remainder
to equal zero). Each party receives, at a minimum, the number of seats equal to the whole-number quotient. Unallocated
seats are then awarded sequentially to the party with the largest remainder. As with the denominator of a highest-averages
method, the choice of a specific quota in a largest-remainder
method can alter the seat allocation. To wit, the Hare quota
Electoral Geography
Electoral geography is the presentation and analysis of geographic information related to elections. Electoral geography
can be both descriptive and analytical. Political scientists can
use geographic units to display differences in political behavior (such as election results presented on a map of the states),
and they can use geographic information to test theories
about election behavior. Tools used can range from simple
color-coded maps to computerized geographic information
systems.
Elections everywhere in the world take place in a geographically definable space, and electoral geography is about
how that space affects and responds to elections and the interests, incentives, and results they create. At the simplest level,
elections take place in nations. Since national elections are
contests that determine political outcomes for the geographically defined nation, summary electoral information can be
displayed on a map. For example, a map could be constructed
that shows the number of female elected representatives in
each of the countries in Latin America or that shows the percentage of support for European Union membership in referenda in various countries in Europe.
Geography at the subnational level can also be used to
present electoral information. Presenting candidate support by
region, federal districts or states, or administrative governmental units can show where a candidates support lies as well as
suggest reasons for candidate success or failure. Such presentations can rely on states to show where a presidential candidates
support lies, or they can rely on smaller units such as counties
or even voting precincts to display more detailed variations
in candidate support, perhaps demonstrating that a candidate
generates support more effectively in cities than in rural areas.
ANALYZING ELECTORAL
GEOGRAPHIC UNITS
As suggested above, political science researchers are often
interested in the display of electoral information by geographic units, but they are also interested in making inferences
ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES
Electoral boundaries can influence electoral outcomes in several ways. Candidates running for political office, for example,
can be expected to pay close attention to the geography of
their districts and to structure their behavior to accommodate
the geographic realities of their districts. In Home Style (1978),
political scientist Richard Fenno notes that candidate behavior depends to a great deal on the layout of election districts.
Sprawling, rural districts demand a different sort of attention than do geographically smaller urban districts. Suburban
districts require different sets of candidate behaviors than do
districts made up of older, more established communities.
Voters also can be expected to react to electoral boundaries.
Some of these reactions may follow from candidate behaviors,
but several scholars suggest that boundaries themselves can
influence the attitudes and behavior of voters. Boundaries can
conform to other geographic structures in a voters environment, which in a 1985 article, Bernard Grofman argues gives
the voter the ability to think about the district. John H. Ely
(1997) expects that voters can recognize when a district has
been drawn to the advantage of one group and disadvantage of
another, which can affect the voters interest in participating in
the election. In a 2005 article, Richard N. Engstrom finds that
Electoral Quotas
Electoral quotas has two distinct meanings. The first refers to
the number of votes required in an election to ensure that a
party or candidate will win under a proportional representation electoral system. There are four types of quotas under
this rubric. The Hare quota, the simplest of the measures,
is determined by dividing the number of votes cast by the
number of seats for election. The Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
requires that the number of votes be divided by the number
of seats plus one. Under the Droop quota, the number of
votes is divided by the number of seats plus one, but one is
also added to the quotient, or final result. The Imperiali quota
is determined by dividing the number of votes cast by the
number of seats plus two.
Electoral quotas can also refer to the proportional representation of a particular groupsuch as women or ethnic
minoritieson party lists, for constituency nominations, or as
representatives in legislatures or other elected bodies.The purpose of this type of quota is to ensure the nomination, election, and representation of a minimum number or percentage
of candidates from the designated groups. This quota is most
commonly used to promote the participation of women in
politics. It has been successful to varying degrees around the
world through various mechanisms, including constitutional
entrenchment and legislation; in electoral models; and through
voluntary use, through party quotas.
See also Droop Quota; Gender Quotas; Quotas.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JENNIFER E. DALTON
Electoral Reform
Electoral reform is the change of some element of an electoral system, including suffrage rights, the size or number of
seats in the assembly, the magnitude or number of seats in the
districts, the formula to allocate seats or make a winner, and
the ballot form permitting or restricting the voters choice
of parties and candidates. In the long term, major electoral
reforms have expanded suffrage rights, replaced indirect elections with direct elections by majority rule, and done the latter with mixed systems and proportional representation rules.
Traditional electoral systems based on plurality or relative
majority rule in multiseat districts were used in traditional
compact communities in late medieval and early modern
times. They are still used in a significant number of local government elections in which it can be presumed that citizens
share some clearly identified, broad common interest. However, single-seat districts were diffused during processes of
building or reforming large-scale parliaments in large states
with more heterogeneous societies and accompanying the
broadening of suffrage rights. Specifically, single-seat districts
were widely introduced in Scotland and Wales, and in lower
proportions in England, during the eighteenth century, and
they became a general norm for the British House of Commons by the end of the nineteenth century. They were also
introduced in the U.S. state of Vermont by the late eighteenth
Electoral Rules
Electoral rules are criteria to transform votes into collective
decisions. They are generally inspired by one of three main
principles: unanimity, which requires maximum consensus;
majority, which makes a decision supported by half the voters
valid; and proportionality, which gives every group a share of
representation for further negotiations and broad agreements.
Different electoral rules can be used for different purposes,
involving both mass political elections and small-group and
committee voting and decisions, because they induce the formation of different alternatives and different agendas and may
produce diverse results, as will be discussed below.
UNANIMITY
Election of delegates and approval of proposals by unanimity are almost instinctive procedures in simple, homogeneous
gatherings and assemblies with easily identifiable common
interests and priorities. Families, groups of friends, urban
gangs, neighborhood meetings, corporation partners, and club
members tend to make collective decisions under conditions
of general agreement. In the ancient world, the Justinian code
of Rome established the principle that what concerns similarly all ought to be approved by all, which was adopted by
the Christian Church in the fifth century as the following:
He who governs all should be elected by all. In medieval
Europe, consuls were elected by traders, bishops by priests
and believers, magistrates by citizens, and so forth, on the
basis of large consensus. Many medieval assembly regulations
established that decisions should be made by consensus and
acclamation, approval and consent, with no discrepancy
or no contradiction, by free veto, and so on.
However, the requirement of unanimity made it difficult to
reach many decisions, especially as communes and countries
became more open and socially heterogeneous, which provoked conflicts and schisms. A variety of medieval institutions
provided procedures to create unanimity where it did not exist,
including silent acquiescence; shouts of commendation or
acclamation; murmurs in favor of or cries against the proposer;
explicit acceptance of the elected by the dissidents; preliminary
voting followed by formal, public expression of the decision
MAJORITY
The majority principle was first introduced in medieval Germanic law and the Christian Churchs canon law as a consequence of failures in making decisions by unanimity. When
dissident members or minority groups were sufficiently large
or determined and could effectively resist the imposition of
the dominant groups will, there was a strong incentive to
adopt a less-than-unanimity, typically majority, rule. With the
formation of two or more fractions or parties, decisions made
by acclamation were replaced with more formal procedures
requiring counting votes and the achievement of a majority
threshold. In contrast to the unanimity-based organizations
mentioned above, majority rule usually requires individual
suffrage and implies that the winner takes all.
It has been argued that the majority principle is the only
one that satisfies these few reasonable criteria: (1) decisiveness,
but only if there are no more than two alternatives (candidates,
parties, or policy proposals) to choose from; (2) anonymity or
voters equality; (3) neutrality with respect to issues, not giving
advantage to the largest group or to the status quo (in contrast
to unanimity rule, for instance, as discussed above); and (4)
positive response to changes in voters preferences or monotonicity (but only if one alternative obtains an absolute majority
support based on voters first preferences).
In practice, different procedures have been invented to try
to make the majority principle viable in real elections. Two
late-eighteenth-century French academics made sophisticated
proposals. Marquis de Condorcet proposed that the winner in
an election should be the alternative (candidate or proposal)
preferred by a majority against every other alternative, which
may require multiple rounds of voting or comparisons between
pairs of alternatives. When the alternatives are located along a
single issue or ideological dimension, exhaustive pairwise comparisons or the Condorcet voting procedure makes the median
voters preference the winner. By definition, the median voter,
that is, the voter whose preference is located in an intermediate
position with less than half of voters on both sides, is always
necessary to form a consistent majority on a single dimension. Since the median voters preference minimizes the sum of
distances from all other individual preferences, it can be considered a socially efficient outcome. But in a more dispersed
set of alternatives forming multiple dimensions, the Condorcet
procedure may not produce a winner, thus lacking decisiveness.
A variant gives the victory to the alternative that wins a higher
number of times (as divulgated by the Catalan philosopher
Ramon Llull in the Middle Ages).
In turn, another eighteenth-century French academic, JeanCharles de Borda, proposed a rank-order count procedure by
which the voter should order preferences and give zero, one,
two, and successive points to the alternatives; the winner should
be the one with the highest sum of points (the German philosopher Nicolas of Cusa had also proposed this procedure a
few centuries before). A more traditional procedure, also with
medieval precedents, is approval voting, which allows voters
to vote for all those alternatives that they consider acceptable,
from a minimum of one to a maximum of all minus one; the
alternative with the highest number of votes becomes the winner.There has been much discussion about how different results
may be produced by these different procedures, depending on
voters distribution of preferences and their degree of homogeneity. But as has been shown recently, in most real-world settings, exhaustive pairwise comparisons, rank-order count, and
approval voting tend to select the same winner.
In mass political elections, relatively less-demanding procedures are more frequently used. With a simple plurality
rule, the winner is the candidate supported by only a relative
majority, that is, by a higher number of voters than any other
candidate but not requiring any particular number, proportion, or threshold of votes. In practice, this makes it possible for
generally binding decisions presumably decided by the majority to actually be won with the support of only a minority
of voters. In fact, in mass parliamentary elections by plurality
rule, a single party has received a majority of seats on the basis
of a minority of votes in about two-thirds of the cases in the
United Kingdom and some former British colonies (out of
126 democratic elections in Canada since 1878, the United
Kingdom since 1885, New Zealand from 1890 to 1993, and
India since 1953) as well as in about one-third of the cases in
the U.S. House of Representatives since 1828. In presidential
elections, plurality rule has given the victory to minority-vote
candidates in about two-fifths of the cases in the United States
(through the plurality-based electoral college) and in more
than two-thirds of the cases in eight countries in Latin America (out of 54 democratic elections during several democratic
periods from 1945 on in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela).
In contrast, majority runoff requires an absolute majority
(more than half) of votes at the first round, while in a second
round of voting the choice can be reduced to the two mostvoted-for candidates to secure majority support for the winner. A variant requires the voters to rank all candidates and
proceeds to several counts of votes (instead of several rounds
of voting) until a candidate obtains the most preferences, as in
the majority-preferential vote (also called alternative vote or
instant runoff ).
PROPORTIONALITY
Proportional representation rules allocate different numbers
of seats to multiple parties competing in an election on the
basis of the votes received. They were invented with the aim
of reducing single-party sweeps and exclusionary victories
and preventing actual minority winners with the previously
existing rules. As mentioned, majoritarian electoral rules had
been widely used in contexts of simple societies with rather
homogeneous electorates dealing with local issues. But the
expansion of suffrage rights, the emergence of new political
demands, and the creation of new parties trying to politicize new issues in newly complex societies made traditional
results with majoritarian rules increasingly dissatisfactory for
both voters and candidates. The winner-takes-all character of
majority rule and the frequency of actual minority winners
were at odds with increasing political and social pluralism.
In a number of countries the introduction of proportional
representation rules in the early twentieth century ran parallel
to the introduction of other regulations favoring citizens participation and fair competition, such as more reliable electoral
censuses, the written ballot, secret vote, and an independent
electoral authority validating the results.
The basic mathematical formulas that would make the
principle of proportional representation operable were
invented in the late eighteenth century for apportioning seats
in the U.S. House of Representatives among the differently
populated states. But they were reinvented in Europe in the
late nineteenth century for the allocation of parliamentary
Electoral Systems
Electoral systems, often referred to as voting systems, systematize the election of candidates for public office. Inherent
in these systems are explicit rules for executing the voting
process. These rules govern voting eligibility requirements for
the populace, tabulation of the results, and voting methods.
The electoral system specifies the type of ballot, the size of
permissible votes, and the method for tabulating votes. These
specifications are what distinguish one electoral system from
another. Thus, elections in countries will vary as a result of the
adopted electoral system.
Electoral systems can differ with regard to the manner
in which individuals articulate their voting preferences. This
mostly concerns the structure of the ballot. Electoral systems
can be considered single-winner systems and multiple-winner
systems. Single-winner systems elect a single person for an
elected office, whereas multiple-winner systems produce elections that generate multiple winners. Several methods exist for
achieving a single-winner system; the most popular are as follows. Voters participating in a ranked ballot system will rank
order their preference for candidates from most preferred to
least preferred. This method allows each voter to express his or
her opinion about all public office candidates as a result of rank
ordering. Alternately, range voting allows voters to rate or score
each candidate individually along a prespecified range articulated by the voting system. The scores for each candidate for
public office are tabulated, and the candidate with the greatest
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Diamond, Larry Jay, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. Electoral Systems and Democracy.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.
Farrell, David M. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. New York: St.
Martins, 2001.
Gallagher, Michael, and Paul Mitchell. The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Lijphart, Arend. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-seven
Democracies, 19451990. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Taagapera, Rein, and Matthew S. Shugart. Seats and Votes:The Effects and
Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, Conn.:Yale University
Press, 1989.
Electronic Voting
Electronic voting may be described as the use of a specific
system that allows members of Congress or other legislatures
to cast their votes on roll calls on the floor from their seats or
other specific locations. The results may be seen on a panel as
yes, no, or abstention. Names appear with indications
of party and state or another configuration according to the
members desire. Representatives names and votes may be
displayed if the voting is open. If the voting is secret, only the
final result appears. There are two main advantages to using
electronic voting systems in parliaments. The first is accountability: constituencies and civil society may have immediate
direct access to their representatives positions related to legislative bills. The second is speed: single votes do not need to be
counted by hand, which also precludes counting errors.
Electronic voting is also used in general and parliamentary elections in several countries. Electronic voting machines
Elite Interview
Elite interviewing is a method of obtaining information
about a specific sample considered to be elite members of
society who may be politicians or civic, economic, social,
cultural, military, and intellectual leaders. The classic work on
the topic of elite interviewing was written by Lewis Anthony
Dexter in 1970. One example of elite interviewing is Harriet
Zuckermans detailed interviews with Nobel laureates who
won prizes from 1907 to 1972 and were living in the United
States at the time.
A researcher should ensure that the information about
and from this sector of society cannot be obtained elsewhere
before embarking on elite interviewing so as not to waste time
and effort. Elite interviewing requires being well prepared for
the interview. Direct verbal interaction between individuals
is used when face-to-face contact is imperative, when immediate responses are desirable, and when such use is feasible,
meaning that there is a small sample, adequate financial support, and an availability of well-trained interviewers.
In elite interviewing, the usual interviewing rules do not
apply. Because elites are used to being the focus of attention,
standardized questions that are not tailored directly to them
should not be asked. The interviewer(s)an individual, a
team of two or more interviewers, or a groupshould do
their homework, memorize the questions, and ask them in
whatever order the conversation allows, letting the questions
drive them to the heart of the research question. Elite interviewing allows the researcher flexibility to deviate from the
set pattern of questions and probe areas of interest or vagueness. The greater communication between the interviewer
and interviewee permits immediate checking on information,
thus ensuring the reliability of the content by using rephrased
questions or asking questions again.
There are certain drawbacks of the elite interviewing
method, including cost in terms of time and money, problems
determining the worthiness of the information obtained and
the truthfulness of that information, and problems that arise
from the interviewers bias and subjectivity.
Elite interviewing entails taking down quick keynotes to
capture core issues because writing down answers during the
interview process may be viewed as a discourtesy and a distraction that takes away from the flow of the interview. The
interviewer therefore should jot down a few key terms and
transcribe those notes immediately after the interview. Taping
(audio or video) becomes acceptable as long as the interviewee
is sure of the purpose and is guaranteed confidentiality.The key
to a successful elite interview is making sure that nothing in
the process is threatening or damaging to the interviewees selfesteem. A good elite interview benefits not only the researcher
but also the respondents when they are able to speak to a good
Elites, Political
In contemporary social analysis, the term political elites refers
to the segments of national elitesthe groups of powerful
individuals influencing the political outcomes on the national
level in a systematic and significant waythat control the
government and other political institutions of the state. In
liberal democracies they typically include political leaders,
top parliamentarians and government officials, and leaders of
the major political parties. Their power and influence reflect
control over political power resources concentrated in the
state as well as mutual access and the capacity for solitary
action. Members of the political elite are typically identified
as holders of the top power positions in government and
the key organizations of the state, by involvement in making key political decisions, by reputation among their peers,
or finally, by a combination of the three methods. Political
leaders are typically placed at the apex of national elites (the
latter including also elite groups heading business, mass media,
military, trade union, and other organizations). At the other
end of the power spectrum are the masses (or nonelites).
In democratic regimes, political elites operate electoral
systems in which their members compete for leadership (top
movements, and politically organized groupsand their control over political succession.
MODERN ELITES
Robert Putnam provided a comprehensive overview of
modern elites, including political, administrative, and business. He highlighted elite anchoring in social and institutional
structures and saw elite conduct as heavily circumscribed
by ideologies (revolutionary elites) and by national legalconstitutional frameworks (liberal elites). John Scott studied
modern corporate elites and edited a major sociological overview of modern elites that stresses the importance of power
networks. Other contemporary elite theorists, such as John
Higley and his collaborators, surveyed contemporary elites
in stable democratic regimes. They linked political stability
and democracy with elite consensus on the rules of political
rivalry. By contrast, Eva Etzioni-Halevi identified effective
coupling of political elites with lower/working classes as a
key condition of democracy.
More recently, there has been a shift in elite research that
can be summarized in four points:
The emergence of transnational power networks and
elite alliances: while nation-states remain the most
important institutional loci of power, other (and more
diffuse) power concentrations emerge in the process
of globalization. Faced with increasingly transnational/
global problems (e.g., terrorism, environmental degradation, climate change, declining oil supply, water shortages, drug trade, uncontrolled migrations) state political
elites consult, collaborate, and form ad hoc and lasting,
typically regional, alliances (e.g., Coalition of the Willing, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).
Widening elite autonomy and prodemocratic orientations: the arguably most momentous events of the twentieth century, such as the dissolution of the USSR, the
collapse of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe, and
the subsequent democratization of regimes in Eastern
Europe and East Asia, have been engineered predominantly from above by political elites, often with only
halfhearted support of mass populations.
Increasing focus on strong political leaders combined
with a heightening of this focus by electronic media:
these trends reinforce each other and change the physiognomy of liberal democracies to leader democracies.
The declining impact of ideologies: Western political
elites engineer and cultivate mass support in a pragmatic,
opportunistic, and ad hoc manner, often through media
spin and campaigns focusing on the personalities of the
leaders.This reflects the fact that the support constituencies of Western elites are more fickle and less anchored
in specific classes, ethno-segments, racial minorities, or
religious groups.
See also Elite Decision Making; Elite Theory; Leadership.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JAN PAKULSKI
Elite Theory
Although the elite concept is often employed broadly and diffusely, it best refers to persons who are able, by virtue of their
strategic decision-making positions in powerful organizations
and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and
substantially. At the national level in modern polities elites
number a few thousand people spread across the tops of all
important sectorspolitics, government administration, business, trade unions, the military, pressure groups, major mass
movements, and so forth. Holding that such power concentrations are inescapable, elite theory seeks to explain political
outcomes principally in terms of elite conflicts, accommodations, and circulations.
The theorys origins lie most clearly in the writings of
Italian political scientist Gaetano Mosca (18581941), Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (18481923),
and German-Italian sociologist Robert Michels (18761936).
Mosca emphasized the ways in which tiny minorities outorganize and outwit large majorities, adding in The Ruling Class
(1923/1939) that political classeshis term for elites
usually have a certain material, intellectual, or even moral
superiority over those they govern. Pareto postulated that in
a society with truly unrestricted social mobility, elites would
consist of the most talented and deserving individuals but that
in actual societies they are those who are most adept at using
the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, and who
usually enjoy important advantages such as inherited wealth
and family connections. Pareto sketched alternating types
of governing elites, whom he likened, following sixteenthcentury Italian political philosopher Niccol Machiavelli, to
lions and foxes. Michels rooted elites (oligarchies) in the
need of large organizations for leaders and experts to operate
efficiently; as these individuals gain control of funds, information flows, promotions, and other aspects of organizational
functioning, power becomes concentrated in their hands.
Emphasizing the inescapability and also the relative autonomy
of elites, all three men characterized visions of fully democratic and egalitarian societies as utopian.
Embargo
See Sanctions and Embargoes.
Emergency Powers
Emergency powers generally refers to the temporary suspension
of the normal rules and proceedings in an organized political
system and the provision of special discretionary authorities
to a specific agent to respond to extraordinarily dangerous
situations that threaten public safety. Such situations may
include foreign invasion, internal rebellion, economic depression, or a severe natural disaster. Examples of emergency provisions include the curtailment of individual rights such as
speech, press, and assembly; suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus; imposition of curfews and restriction of movement;
unrestrained search and seizure of private property; central
government management of the economy; and use of military
forces alongside or in place of civilian legal and public safety
institutions. Central to the concept of emergency powers is
that they are legally invoked, temporarily assigned, intended
to achieve immediate decisive action in response to specific
circumstances that threaten the survival of the political entity,
and designed to restore the political order to status quo ante.
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
EMERGENCY POWERS
The constitutional dictatorship of the ancient Roman republic is perhaps the most famous, and clear-cut, example of
emergency powers. When the survival of the republic was
threatened, the Roman senate would name a citizen the
dictator and grant him extensive military powers for six
months for the sole purpose of acting decisively to meet the
demands of the crisis. In addition to initiating and terminating the dictatorship, the senate also checked the abuse of
the extraordinary powers by maintaining control over the
republics finances.
MODERN EMERGENCY POWERS
Emerging Democracies
Democracys practically uncontested status as the single legitimate regime type conceals how extraordinary an achievement
its emergence has been. Emerging democracies face the task
of institutionally redistributing power and of normatively
legitimizing a peoples self-government. They need to reconcile the urge to individual freedom and the hope for equality
by ensuring that the exercise of power in the peoples name
becomes accountable and transparent. This emancipation of
the people into a political subject implies complex social and
institutional, but also ideational and symbolic, transformations.
Turning the poor, the many, or the low into masters of their
own affairs raises the question of the availability and the role
of models in shaping institutions and moral-normative values.
MODELS OF DEMOCRACY
The ancient Greeks had no model of democracy to inspire
them. Neither the Founders in the United States nor the
French revolutionaries had dispositions toward the establishment of a representative democracy in its contemporary guise.
Only the prolonged political stability, economic welfare, and
moral purpose of freedom in the Western hemisphere after
World War II (19391945) shaped democracy as a model in
Emerging Democracies,
Political Parties in
Emerging democracies are countries that experience a
peaceful transition to democratic rule despite a history of
authoritarianism or civil conflict. Political parties in emerging
democracies are difficult to classify as unitary entities since
emerging democracies often have little in common due to
differences in their geography, history, culture, religion, previous regimes, and transition process to democracy. Even when
their party systems have common traces, the parties are often
quite different. Nonetheless, these countries have some interestingly similar common ground.When facing the democratic
transition, most political parties in emerging democracies
form around a few leaders, unions, associations, or even clandestine terrorist organizations. Some of these organizations
become so strong as political parties that they are able to elect
the majority of congress membersas it happened to Hamas
Emotions in Politics
The role of emotions in politics is pervasive. In political psychology, a number of studies show that emotional reactions
have an impact on the way citizens organize information,
learn facts about politics, form impressions, and make political
decisions. Parallel lines of work have developed in political
sociology, examining macro-level emotions in social processes
such as traumas, collective action, social movements, rituals,
and institutions. Cognitive studies in psychology also make
explicit the affective content of social information, concluding that cognition and affect are interdependent in such a way
that virtually all things people think about have an affective
reaction linked to them. Neuroscience provides similar evidence challenging the traditional dichotomy of feeling and
thinking. Affective reactions are basic and inescapable, and
there can be no decision making without emotions.
DEFINITION OF EMOTIONS
Research on emotions has not settled on a commonly
accepted definition of the term that is used loosely and interchangeably with terms such as feelings, sentiments, affect, mood,
and passions. The word emotion originates from the Latin emovere, which means to excite, to move, to agitate, and in common language we refer to emotions such as love, hate, anger,
fear, hope, and pride. Feelings refers to experiences or sensory
impressions such as warmth, cold, or pain or more general
affective states such as desire, boredom, or depression. Because
every person experiences and interprets the world differently,
feelings are personal and biographical interpretations of sensations. Emotions are displays of feeling, and because they are
expressions, they can be bound to social expectations and
can be genuine or disingenuous. Emotions have intentionality; they are in other words about something, and they can
ON THE MEASUREMENT OF
EMOTIONS IN POLITICS
The accurate measurement of emotional reactions to political
stimuli is not an easy task. Political scientists often work with
subjective reports of affective reactions where direct physiological measures are not possible. As W. Russell Neuman and
his colleagues (2007) explain, early survey sampling studies
adopted a discrete terms approach and asked open-ended
questions about likes and dislikes to approximate emotionality.
Affect checklists of the basic emotional reactions identified
by Ira Roseman (1984) in his structural theory of emotion
were also used to select the basic items of anger, fear, pride,
and hope that have been present in the American National
Election Studies since the 1980s. A second group of studies
adopt valence models. They treat emotional reactions as a single
valence system with a positive or negative evaluation on an
approach-avoidance continuum and use feeling thermometer
items to record overall evaluations. Circumplex models offer a
third alternative by adding an arousal dimension to the bipolar positive-negative continuum. The three approaches are not
mutually exclusive, but since they rely on self-reports they
share a limitation: they can identify the evaluative content
but not the physiological changes or unconscious emotional
experience, which cannot be verbalized.
New studies combine the traditional measures with measures of reaction time and also psychophysiological measures
such as galvanic skin response, measures of heart rate, functional
magnetic resonance imaging, and facial electromyography.
While these techniques do not provide information regarding
the processes that are responsible for the emotion generation,
they can provide a good indicator of emotional intensity.Traditional and new methodological perspectives add to the systematic study of this complex and challenging topic and provide
opportunities for analysis and reflection of the neurological,
personal, group, and societal levels of emotionality in politics.
See also Charisma; Mass Political Behavior; Political Psychology;
Political Sociology.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TEREZA CAPELOS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abelson, Robert P. Computer Simulation of Hot Cognitions. In Computer
Simulation of Personality, edited by S. Tomkins and S. Messick, 277298.
New York: John Wiley, 1963.
Abelson, Robert P., Donald R. Kinder, Mark D. Peters, and Susan T. Fiske.
Affective and Semantic Components in Political Person Perception.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42, no. 4 (1982): 619663.
Brader, Ted. Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in
Political Ads Work. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
Capelos, Tereza, and Joshua Smilovitz. As a Matter of Feeling: Emotions
and the Choice of Mediator Tactics in International Mediation. Hague
Journal of Diplomacy 3 (2008): 6385.
Goleman, Daniel. Emotional Intelligence. New York: Bantam, 1995.
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Tereza Capelos, and Colin Provost. The
Consequences of Terrorism: Disentangling the Effects of Personal and
National Threat. Political Psychology 23, no. 3 (2002): 485510.
Kinder, Donald R. Reason and Emotion in American Political Life. In
Beliefs, Reasoning and Decision Making, edited by Roger Shank and Ellen
Langer, 227314. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994.
the iron fist in the velvet glove. Some analysts of globalization theory, for example, Joseph Stiglitz, have also discussed
democratization, arguing that neoliberalism has promoted free
markets and democratization. Most writers on globalization,
however, such as Zygmunt Bauman and David Held, have
been staunch critics of globalization, arguing that it has narrowed life opportunities for most, has weakened the nationstate, and is an entirely new phenomenon.
The empire and globalization models are essentially dichotomous in nature, understanding reality in terms of winners
and losers (globalization) or centers and periphery (empire).
It is suggested here that the processes of globalization and of
empire are contradictory and paradoxical. In contemporary
times the unfettered processes of globalization, according to
somesuch as Stiglitzhave also generated market failures
domestically in the United States. To put it another way, the
invisible hand of the market has created problems domestically and internationally, and the visible hand needs to be reinstated. Calls for a third way between unfettered capitalism and
state socialism have gained greater force since the economic
recession of 2008. Whereas in the late twentieth century the
third-way approach was specifically related to the political
programs of specific labor parties, especially the Labour Party
in the United Kingdom under Tony Blair, in the early twentyfirst century the third-way model is linked with the project of
democratizing international agencies, such as the International
Monetary Fund.
Arguments around the implications of imperialism were
prefigured by the dependency theorists of the 1970s, notably
Andre Gunder Frank, who argued that imperialism necessarily
stifled future industrialization and economic growth, and postcolonial scholars who maintain that imperialism stifles political
developments. And in the same way as research has discovered economic growth and industrialization under British and
other nineteenth-century imperialismssuch as in valuable
work on the political economy of the Commonwealth Caribbeanpolitical research on Australia, Canada, and New Zealand has discovered that political experimentation flourished
in those colonies, often to be exported back to the so-called
mother country of Britain.
Another example of the paradoxical nature of empire at the
political level is the uneven experience of politics that continues into the twenty-first century. For the settler fragments, the
process of settlement created an enhanced democratic experience; this was not usually so for the indigenes of those places
according to scholars such as Nira Yuval-Davis. British imperial processes also created political and constitutional experimentation, whether through new models of federalism, early
enfranchisement of women, proportional and fairer electoral
systems, and in some places, new types of political rights for
indigenes.
See also Colonialism; Democracy; Dependency Theory; Empire
and Democracy; Globalization; Imperialism; Postcolonial Theory;
Third Way and Social Democracy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARIAN SIMMS
502 Empiricism
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Ferguson, Niall. Empire:The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the
Lessons for Global Power. New York: Basic Books, 2004.
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2001.
Held, David, and Anthony G. McGrew. The Global Transformations Reader.
Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003.
Johnson, Allan G. The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology. Malden, Mass.: WileyBlackwell, 2000.
Payne, Anthony, and Paul K. Sutton. Dependency under Challenge:The Political
Economy of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Manchester, UK: Manchester
University Press, 1984.
Simms, Marian. Gender, Globalization and Democratization: Some Lessons
from Oceania. In Gender Globalization and Democratization, edited by
Rita Mae Kelly, Jane H. Bayes, Mary E. Hawkesworth, and Brigitte
Young, 1526. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001.
Stiglitz, Joseph. Globalization and the Economic Role of the State in the
New Millennium. Industrial and Corporate Change 12, no. 1 (2003): 326.
Yuval-Davis, Nira. Gender and Nation. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997.
Empiricism
Empiricism is an epistemology, or theory of knowledge, that
claims that the foundation of all knowledge is ultimately
located in the human sense experience of the world. Invariably, empirical theories offer a method for distinguishing
between those forms of experience that are valid, reliable, and
fundamental and that represent how the world really is from
those forms of experience that tend to mislead us about the
world. In addition to being a form of foundationalism, empirical theories of knowledge have tended to essentialism as well.
Essentialism is the idea that there is a single quality or set of
qualities that define an object, phenomenon, or experience,
that is, that constitute the phenomenon as it is most essentially.
Empiricism is often contrasted with rationalism. Rationalist
theories of knowledge claim that the foundation of all knowledge is ultimately traceable to the ability of human reason to
identify the essential truth of the world by pure reason alone.
In other words, the foundations of knowledge, as Rene Descartes tried to prove, are knowable a priori, prior to experience. It is important to keep in mind that empiricists do not
deny the usefulness of human reason. They claim only that
pure reason alone cannot identify what is most foundational
in knowledge. Similarly, rationalists do not deny the usefulness
of empirical observation. They do insist that observation does
not represent what is most essentially true about the world.
MODERN EMPIRICISM
Modern empiricism begins with the work of John Locke.
Locke argued in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1690) that when human beings enter the world, their
minds are blank slates, void of any ideas or understanding.
Through contact with the world by means of the senses,
the human mind becomes inscribed with experience of the
world around it. In recording this experience, or sense data,
the human mind often reflects on it, combining or dividing
various sensations, examining those sensations from a variety
of perspectives or in light of other sensations. But the human
mind cannot provide anything new to the collection of sense
data with which it is inscribed.
David Hume, a Scottish philosopher, offered a more thorough account of empiricism. Hume argued in his similarly
titled 1766 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that all
statements that claim to embody knowledge can be divided
into two categories, statements about relations between ideas
(e.g., logic or mathematics) and statements of fact about the
external world that could be tested for their truth and error.
Statements of fact were tested relying on sense impressions,
which themselves are organized in the human mind by three
principles of association. Associations of resemblance cause us
to connect sense impressions that resemble one another. Associations of contiguity enable us to connect sensations of objects
or experiences that are in close proximity to one another. But
most important are associations of cause and effect. Our experience of the world leads us to recognize that some events are
always or very often preceded by other events. In such cases
we are led to associate the first with the latter, which is understood as the cause of the former.This, for Hume, was what was
most important in science, the accumulation of experience
based on causal relationships.
In the twentieth century, empiricism was updated in the
work of logical positivists. Logical positivists claimed that many
of the traditional problems of knowledge, including empiricism, were problems related to language. Drawing on both
Hume and Immanuel Kant, they argued that all meaningful
statements are of two types: analytic or synthetic. Analytic
statements are those that are true by virtue of the meaning of
the terms (e.g., all bachelors are unmarried). Synthetic statements are those that claim to tell us something substantive
about the world and are open to verification. Logical positivists argued that statements that fall into neither category are
meaningless because they have no cognitive value; they convey
no factual information about the world. Among those statements that they deemed to be meaningless are statements of
ultimate principles concerning values, ethics, religion, politics,
aesthetics, and morality.
Empiricism 503
single, theoretical perspective could be adopted by the entire
profession of political science, including fundamental, shared
concepts, then political science could become a cumulative science in much the same way the natural sciences had
become. Toward that end, behavioralism stressed the importance of the operationalization of the terms of political discourse. This required that concepts be defined in ways that
allowed investigators to use them to describe precisely the
political world. As such, they had to demonstrate two qualities:
reliability and validity. Validity refers to the idea that a concept actually describes what it claims to describe. Reliability
refers to the idea that a concept can be used to achieve the
same results by a range of investigators. For example, in physics,
Force = Mass Acceleration (F = ma) would be an example
of a term that both is valid (it measures force rather than some
other quality such as momentum) and is used by physicists
throughout the world. By the late 1960s behavioralism had
become the dominant theoretical perspective in the profession of political science. Despite the substantial presence that
it had, however, several reservations remained, and competing
theoretical perspectives emerged to challenge behavioralism
and the empiricist philosophy of science on which it relied.
COMPETING PERSPECTIVES
First, no sooner had logical positivism established itself as a
dominant theory of knowledge than it was challenged internally. Specifically, Willard Van Orman Quine argued that the
analytic-synthetic dichotomy that was the basis for distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless statements was
linguistically unsustainable. One implication of this is that a
dichotomy between facts and values, between descriptive and
normative discourse, is similarly unsustainable. Moreover, the
assumption that truth claims can be reduced to statements in
a neutral vocabulary about an independent, objective world
is similarly unsustainable, according to Quine. Adding to this
line of argument, Wilfred Sellars argued that empiricism was
mistaken in assuming what he referred to as the myth of the
given. This is the assumption that the knowable world exists
prepackaged in ways that our language can merely represent.
In effect, both Quine and Sellars were challenging the very
foundations of empiricism. These and similar developments
led philosophers such as Richard Rorty to argue that the
entire foundationalist and essentialist projects that characterized empiricism needed to be abandoned.
Second, and drawing in part on the work of Quine,Thomas
Kuhn argued that the empiricist philosophy of science was
inconsistent with the historical record of scientific revolutions.
This is because empiricism failed to take seriously enough the
ways in which theory determines evidence and disqualifies or
ignores those truth claims that are inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions of a given paradigm.
Third, from within the behavioralist ranks, some political
scientists argued that the drive for basic science made much of
political science irrelevant in addressing pressing problems that
the United States faced. David Easton, one of the leading proponents of behavioralism, made a case for what he called postbehavioralism. The latter, while not abandoning the scientific
principles that behavioralism embraced, would turn its attention to issues that the United States and the world faced, such
as poverty, civil rights, the Vietnam War (19591975), nuclear
proliferation, and so forth.
Finally, a range of competing theoretical perspectives
emerged to challenge the very foundations of behavioralism
and its empirical approach to the description and explanation
of political life. Rational choice theory, Straussianism, critical social theory, genealogical (sometimes referred to as postmodern) theories, and interpretive or hermeneutic approaches
combined to challenge empiricism, and positivism generally,
on a number of issues. Among these are the nature of political
explanation; the essential contestability of the vocabulary of
political science, the fact-value dichotomy; issues of culturalconceptual imperialism; and the significance of history for the
nature of political life. The result has been the emergence of
a theoretical and methodological pluralism that contests the
older positivist will to a methodologically defined discipline
of political science.
Despite these challenges, empiricism remains one of the
dominant, if not the dominant, paradigm in political science.
What remains to be answered is how it will respond to the
growing challenges to its preeminence, whether its proponents
will pursue an ethos of exclusion of other perspectives or an
ethos of engaged dialogue with other perspectives.
See also Cognitive Theory and Politics; Hume, David; Kant,
Immanuel; Locke, John; Positivism; Rational Choice Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICHAEL T. GIBBONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ayer, A. J. Language,Truth and Logic. New York: Dover, 1952.
Connolly, William E. Appearance and Reality in Politics. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1981.
. The Terms of Political Discourse. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1983. First published 1974.
Easton, David. The New Revolution in Political Science. American Political
Science Review 63, no. 4 (December 1969): 10511061.
. The Political System. New York: Knopf, 1953. Reprint, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. New York: Seabury, 1975.
Habermas, Jurgen. Truth and Justification. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005.
Hume, David. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Eric
Steinberg. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1993.
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962.
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Peter H.
Nidditch. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Monroe, Kristen Renwick, ed. Contemporary Empirical Political Theory.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. In From a Logical
Point of View, 2046. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1971.
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1979.
Rudolph, Suzanne Hoeber. The Imperialism of Categories: Situating
Knowledge in a Globalizing World. Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 1
(March 2005): 513.
Sellars, Wilfred. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2007. First published 1956.
504 Empowerment
Shapiro, Ian, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud. Problems and Methods in
the Study of Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Strauss, Leo. What Is Political Philosophy? and Other Essays. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1959.
Taylor, Charles. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2, Philosophy and the Human Sciences.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Winch, Peter. The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.
Wolin, Sheldon. Political Theory as a Vocation. American Political Science
Review 63, no. 4 (December 1969): 10621082.
Empowerment
Most definitions of empowerment refer to the ways in which
disadvantaged groups get access to political and social power. If
power is conceived in distributive terms, that is, as something
such as resources, capabilities, or elected positions that can be
obtained and more or less fairly distributed, then empowerment refers to the process of transferring resources, capabilities,
and positions of power to those groups or individuals who
do not have it. Examples of such conceptions of empowerment include access to power structures, for example, political
offices. Once power is achieved, then it becomes important
to assess the effects of empowerment on the disadvantaged
group and its behavior as well as the policies designed to benefit the disadvantaged group.
If power is conceived in relational terms, then empowerment
refers to the transformation of social, economic, cultural, and
political relations and to challenging the structures related to
domination and oppression. This perception of empowerment
embraces Michel Foucaults concept of power as something
that exists only in action. As argued by theorists such as Iris
Marion Young and Amy Allen, empowerment necessitates the
destruction of structures that impede self-determination and
self-development. It is a process consisting of dialogic relations including relatively powerless persons who come to
understand the sources of their powerlessness and who discover the possibilities of transforming the oppressive environment through collective action. According to this perspective,
it is important to understand the ways by which powerless
individuals can raise collective consciousness, transform social
environments, and challenge the hierarchies that perpetuate
inequalities.
EMPOWERMENT AS ACCESS TO
POWER STRUCTURES
In the United States, literature exploring the access of disadvantaged groups to the political arena analyzes the impact
of the civil rights movement on power structures and voter
behavior. According to Michael Bonds (2007), the assumption was that black registration and voting would produce
candidates, especially blacks, who would be more responsive
to the needs of black citizens. Bonds argues that although
there is no consensus on whether an increase in political
power directly translates into benefits for the African American communities, there is evidence proving a positive relationship between political empowerment and favorable public
policies.
EMPOWERMENT AS TRANSFORMATION
OF RELATIONS
The conceptualization of empowerment as transformation of
cultural, economic, and political relations is often embraced
by critical theorists and feminist analysts. Empowerment is
seen both as a process geared to bring about positive change
and as an outcome. According to Jane Parpart et al. (2002),
empowerment must be understood as including both individual conscientization (power within) as well as the ability to
work collectively, which can lead to politicized power with
others, which provides power to bring change.
According to feminist literature, the goals of womens
empowerment include challenging the subordination of
women, transforming state institutions that have perpetuated
gender discrimination and inequality, and identifying and recognizing institutions that support gender equality. This vision
of empowerment is more radical than the first one outlined
in this article. It implies that achieving empowerment brings
about an ability to transform ones environment and power
structures instead of merely gaining access to the existing
structures of power.
For example, a collection of essays edited by Peter H. Smith,
Jennifer L. Troutner, and Christine Hnefeldt outlines some
Encuentros 505
common strategies of empowerment that have been employed
by womens movements in Asia and Latin America. These
strategies include large-scale political mobilization, increasing
involvement in commercial (economic) activities, and use of
governmental economic development policies.
Smith et al.s volume and other works analyzing the empowerment of women offer an interesting insight. The construction of a women-friendly state apparatus that may include the
creation of government positions dealing with womens issues
or quotas for womens representation in government usually
weakens grassroots feminist movements.Thus, it is not entirely
clear whether engineered womens representation in government helps improve the status of all women in a country,
including those from lower socioeconomic classes.
Feminist perspectives exploring empowerment raise questions about the roles of international actors and social change.
Well-wishing outsiders often believe that they can promote
certain empowerment strategies, such as democratic elections,
and thus give power to the powerless. However, case studies
of womens empowerment draw attention to the importance
of local participatory efforts. These efforts, however, need
to be supported by national governments and international
organizations.
A survey of the important insights of the two perspectives on empowerment suggests that (understood as a process)
empowerment may occur at many levelsindividual (micro),
community, or national (macro)and that it can be analyzed
as a phenomenon with several dimensionspolitical, social,
cultural, and economic. In both cases, the term implies an outcome, not merely a strategy; however, it is very difficult to
measure this outcome. Linking empowerment to national and
global power structures and relevant institutions instead of trying to address several levels of analysis may be beneficial.
See also Advocacy Groups; Affirmative Action; Alienation, Political; Community Power; Discrimination; Mobilization, Political;
Representation and Representative; Voting Rights and Suffrage;
Womens Representation;Young, Iris Marion.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DOVILE BUDRYTE
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Allen, Amy. Power and the Politics of Difference: Oppression,
Empowerment and Transnational Justice. Hypatia 23, no. 3 (2008):
156172.
Banducci, Susan A., Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp. Minority
Representation, Empowerment and Participation. Journal of Politics 66,
no. 2 (2007): 534556.
Bonds, Michael. Black Political Power Reassessed: Race, Politics, and
Federal Funds. Journal of African American Studies 11 (2007): 189203.
Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Essays 19721977.
Edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon, 1980.
Grofman, Bernard, and Arend Lijphart. Electoral Laws and Their Political
Consequences. New York: Agathon, 1986.
Johnson, Phylis. Black Radio Politically Defined: Communicating
Community and Political Empowerment through Stevie Wonders
KJLH-FM, 19922002. Political Communication 21 (2004): 353367.
Mansbridge, Jane. Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent
Women? A Contingent Yes. Journal of Politics 61, no. 3 (1999): 628657.
Nelson, W. E., and P. J. Meranto. Electing Black Mayors. Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 1977.
Encuentros
Encuentros, a Spanish-language term for encounter, is most
closely associated with the indigenous rights and alternative globalization movements of the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries. The term came to international political
prominence in reference to assemblies supporting the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in its fourteen-year uprising
against the Mexican government beginning January 1, 1994, the
date on which the North American Free Trade Agreement was
implemented. It has become a regular feature of the parlance of
activist and community advocacy groups involved in alternative
globalization struggles and opposition to capitalist globalism,
neoliberal policies, and free trade. Groups from a variety of
backgrounds use this term rather than the term of their native
language to describe fora, meetings, and gatherings of alternative globalization groups and/or indigenous rights movements.
In July 1996 approximately two thousand activists from
forty-four countries met in Chiapas, Mexico, for the First
International Encuentro for Humanity and against neoliberalism. Hosted by the Zapatistas and five indigenous communities, the meetings initiated a global network that would
play a significant part in the alternative globalization protests,
beginning with the Seattle demonstrations against the World
Trade Organization in 1999. A second encuentro was held in
Spain in 1997, with almost four thousand participants from
countries representing each continent.This gathering was held
to express solidarity with the ongoing Zapatista struggles, to
develop strategies and tactics for supporting those struggles,
and to strategize broader opposition to capitalist globalism.
Encuentrosintended to have a nonhierarchical and
decentralized structurehave emphasized the political significance of organizing through networks rather than through the
vanguard party model of the Socialist and Communist Internationals. Issues addressed have included indigenous rights,
women and struggles against patriarchy, and the relations of
activists in the global North with activists in the global South.
The recovered factory movements in Latin America, in
which workers take over and self-manage their workplaces,
have also initiated encuentros, including the Encuentro Latinoamericano de Empresas Recuperados (Latin American
Encounter of Recovered Companies).
See also Anti- and Alter-globalization Movements; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA);Workers Rights.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JEFFREY SHANTZ
Endangered Cultures
Endangered cultures are cultures that are threatened by
extinction. Cultures become extinct when few people practice a culture and the number of participants is declining.
While cultures have historically changed in size and composition, contemporary anthropologists, cultural community
members, and cultural admirers work to restore and preserve
endangered cultures. The term endangered cultures describes
both those who are threatened by systemic changes and those
affected by proximal effects.
Engels, Friedrich
German writer Friedrich Engels (18201895) is best known
as the life-long friend and sometime collaborator of the
revolutionary social theorist Karl Marx (18181883), whose
ideas produced epochal changes in the way that politics is
conceived and practiced.
Engels was born in what is now Wuppertal near Dsseldorf in Prussia. His family were pious Christians who had
become moderately wealthy over several generations of factory ownership and commercial trading. His education was
terminated at sixteen so he could enter the family firm, and
he worked at their enterprises in the port of Bremen and also
in Manchester, England. However, young Engels was a rebel
and autodidact, sympathizing with liberal resistance to the
authoritarian regimes of the German states. While this was
confined by monarchical governments to the cultural spheres
of literature and philosophy, Engels was unusual in publishing an anonymous expos titled Letters from Wuppertal in
a Hamburg journal at the age of eighteen. In this prescient
work he detailed, with great sarcasm, the pious hypocrisies
of mill owners whose wealth derived from the sufferings of
subsistence laborers and whose factories spilled waste into
local streams. This outlook permeates Engelss impressive and
influential book The Condition of the Working Class in England,
published in Leipzig in 1845 and praised by Marx. Engelss
more theoretical article, Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy, was accepted by Marx for a radical Germanlanguage volume published in Paris in 1844. It clearly
influenced the then-obscure Marx, who later wrote Capital:
Critique of Political Economy (1867).
Together Marx and Engels produced only three major
works: the little-read book The Holy Family with separately
authored chapters, published in Frankfurt am Main in 1845;
the voluminous manuscripts written in 18451846 and only
posthumously published as The German Ideology (1932); and the
eventually well-known Manifesto of the Communist Party, published anonymously in London in 1848. From 1845 onward
the two had an intensive political collaboration, a very extensive correspondence, and an important monetary relationship.
After 1850 Engels supported the Marx family out of his earnings and pension.
From 1859 Engels functioned as Marxs chief reviewer and
publicist, setting a biographical, intellectual, and political frame
around Marxs works and ideas. While on occasion Marx provided brief summaries of his outlook and conclusions, Engelss
popularizations created a systematizing conceptual structure.
This gave currency to the terms that made Marxism a distinctive intellectual system: materialism, idealism, dialectic, and contradiction. According to Engelss influential accounts, Marx was
the equal of German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel because Marx
was said to have similarly generated a philosophy of nature, history, and thought itself and of British naturalist Charles Darwin
because both were said to have constructed a positive science
through which the progressive development of human history
could be understood. After Marxs death Engels edited and
republished numerous works by Marx with new introductions.
Engels presented his relationship to Marx as that of junior
partner or second fiddle. However, this is perhaps somewhat disingenuous and has been under scrutiny almost since his death.
See also German Political Thought; Marx, Karl; Marxism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TERRELL CARVER
Enlightenment Political
Thought
The Enlightenment was a broad movement of reform that
swept through Europe and the United States from (roughly)
1690 until the start of the French Revolution (17891799)
a century later. The intellectual leadership of the Enlightenment came from prominent men of letters (as they called
themselves) such as French philosophers Voltaire, Denis
Diderot, and Jean le Rond dAlembert; Swiss writer JeanJacques Rousseau; Scottish philosophers Adam Smith and
David Hume; German philosophers Moses Mendelssohn,
Immanuel Kant, and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing; U.S. politician and philosopher Thomas Jefferson; and Italian politician
and philosopher Beccaria (Cesare, Marquis de BeccariaBonsan); to name just a few. The best overall expression of
the mainstream Enlightenment outlook on religion, history,
science, philosophy, and epistemology during the eighteenth
century is dAlemberts Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia
of Diderot, published in 1751.
Shadowing this high Enlightenment was a low Enlightenment of Grub Street writers and pamphleteers who popularized Enlightenment ideas in lodges, salons, and coffeehouses for
a broad and less tutored audience. Also, there were important
variations in emphasis and outlook between the Enlightenments proponents in different national contexts. For example,
philosophers of the French Enlightenment such as Voltaire
were much more anticlerical than their counterparts in Germany and Britain. Recent scholarship has emphasized this
internal diversity within the Enlightenment and made serious
scholars much more cautious when generalizing about it. The
diverse eighteenth-century proponents of the Enlightenment
shared a general outlook and some basic beliefs rather than a
commitment to a single project, as many of its contemporary
opponents allege.
In English, the expression the Enlightenment was not used
to designate a specific historical period until the late nineteenth century, long after the movement had ended, leading
some scholars (still a small minority) to reject the term as
anachronistic.The same is true in French (le Sicle des Lumires)
and German (die Aufklrung), although the nonhistorical use
of enlightenment as a general term for the process of replacing ignorance with knowledge was used throughout the eighteenth century (and before) in all three languages.
Entitlements
Although the majority of entitlement programs are dated to
the Social Security Act of 1935, the concept of entitlement is
of rather contemporary derivation. The development of the
concept is a consequence of what Yale Law School professor Charles A. Reich called the New Property theory in
legal activism in the 1960s. Reich believed that protection
of individual autonomy in an age of governmental largess
demanded recognition of a new property right in governmental benefits. According to the Social Security Act, welfare
recipients did not possess the legal right to obtain welfare;
rather, states could provide or deny welfare in accordance
with federal laws and if the fundamental constitutional rights
of a recipient were not violated by the method in which it
distributed its generous assistance. Historically, welfare has
been largesse from the state to the poor. The rulings of the
courts, such as in regard to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, have progressively asserted welfare benefits as more
akin to property rights than gratuities that could be withdrawn at will.
In Goldberg v. Kelly (397 U.S. 254), states were required
to provide a particular recipient with public assistance payments, which would satisfy the constitutional command of
the Fourteenth Amendments due process clause. Justice Brennan delivered the majority opinion of the Court and stated
that such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for
persons qualified to receive them. His footnote to the opinion
reflected his acceptance of the New Property theory: It may
be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
property than a gratuity. Much of the existing wealth in the
United States takes the form of rights that do not fall within
traditional common-law concepts of property. Determining that the due process clause provides protection to welfare
recipients creates a unique dilemma as to the constitutional
right of an individual to due process only if the state either
Environmental Policy
Environmental policy encompasses a wide range of governmental actions that deal with environmental quality or the
use of natural resources. It includes the traditional focus on
the conservation or efficient use of natural resources such
as public lands and waters, wilderness, and wildlife. Since
A man in China carts plastic containers to a recycling center. Environmental policies such as
recycling aim to protect air and water pollution as well as public health and other aspects
that affect people and governments.
source: Corbis
Environmental Political
Theory
Viewed from one perspective, perhaps the most curious thing
about environmental political theory (EPT) is that it should
exist at all. Environmental concernsclimate change, species and forest destruction, toxic pollution, and so forthare
characteristically viewed as discrete interests or preferences to
be weighed against others in the making of policy by liberal
pluralist states. One might study public opinion regarding
such concerns or examine the influence of interest groups in
promoting them within the policy-making process. But from
this perspective, there appears to be little place for normative
theory. Even from a point of view critical of this liberal pluralism, environmental concerns would not seem to represent
anything more than a particular application of a critique to
this policy domain.
The very existence of EPT is therefore premised on the
conviction that environment is something more than a particular set of issues or interests to be represented in political
debate.Yet what this something more is has been contested.
In the early 1970s, the popularization of the idea of limits to
growth provided a provocative basis for this conviction. Perception of impending biophysical limits to human production
and consumption highlights human embeddedness within
and dependence ona larger nonhuman world. An outpouring of early writings, such as William Ophulss 1977 book
Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity: Prologue to a Political Theory
of the Steady State and Robert Heilbroners An Inquiry into the
Human Prospect (1980), supposed that biophysical limits would
necessitate the authoritarian imposition of social and political
limits on human societies.Yet then and now many others distanced themselves from this supposition, arguing for participatory and democratic approaches to environmental challenges
while retaining the conviction that the recognition of human
embeddedness required the sort of systematic reflection that
normative political theorizing could provide.
The label environmental political theory itself, along
with such related ones as green political theory, has been in
play only since the 1990s. It is only beginning to become recognized within the broader disciplinary community of political theorists and political scientists. EPT is more than the mere
application of political theories to environmental issues. The
questions at its core could hardly be more pressing or encompassing: given what we know about the nonhuman world,
how should we organize human communities? What is the
relationship between the long-standing quest for such human
values as liberty and justice, on one hand, and the quest for
what has come to be termed environmental sustainability, on
the other? If we accept the urgent need to address far-reaching ecological challenges including global climate change,
what sort of political values and institutions can facilitate
or impedethese efforts? Are elite-driven processes required
to ensure that authoritative scientific knowledge is the basis
for change? Or can democratic values and institutions more
effectively meet the challenge? Finally, to what extent do all
POLITICAL CONCEPTS
In his seminal work A Sand County Almanac, Aldo Leopold
famously writes that a new land ethic could change the role
of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to
CONCLUSION
While the contours of EPT are increasingly clear, this must
not be mistaken for widespread agreement among theorists.
In fact, the recent outpouring of writing in this field has
resulted in a proliferation of perspectives. At present, EPT is
a cacophonous conversation of increasingly diverse voices.Yet
this takes place in an era when the environmental challenges
we face require ever more urgent action. To some, this may
appear exasperating: EPT is fiddling while the world burns.
While EPT strives to remain relevant to practice, however,
its success ought not to be measured by its ability to agree
on answers. Instead, it offers the promise of all good political
theorizing: of calling our attention to the most important
questions and of unsettling our assurance that we already have
the answers we need. As human societies grapple with the
urgent yet complex problems of climate change, biodiversity
loss, toxic pollution, and many others, bringing these critical perspectives into the conversation is demanded by both
theory and practice.
See also Critical Theory; Democratic Theory; Ecological Analysis;
Environmental Policy; Green Parties; Normative Theory; Political
Ecology; Political Theory; Science Policy; Science, Technology, and
Politics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOHN M. MEYER
entails only that each person should have enough; no necessary implication about the degree of inequality that is morally
acceptable follows from it. Another line of argument, which
has been most highly developed by twentieth-century American philosopher John Rawls, originates in the idea that society should be conceived as a fair system of social cooperation.
Rawlss thought, borrowed from eighteenth-century Scottish
philosopher Adam Smith, is that the principal factor enabling
a society to generate large amounts of wealth is its division of
labor, which is a collective rather than an individual creation. If
that is the case, he reasons, then it follows that the products of
that creation should be distributed equitably among all those
who play a role in the division of labor.
Many writers have objected to the idea that inequalities of
condition should be limited. Eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume suggested, in contrast to Hobbes, that
attempts to render a society more equal would be disruptive of
order by calling into question established entitlements, which
he saw as the basis of social order. Nineteenth-century English philosopher Herbert Spencer believed that goods should
accrue to persons in proportion to their desert, without regard
to the degree of inequality to which this principle might lead;
American political philosopher Robert Nozick argued similarly that any attempt to redistribute goods for the purpose
of reducing inequalities would violate individuals rights. Austrian economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek and others have argued vigorously that attempts to implement social
justiceto limit inequalities or to bring the distribution of
income or other sources of advantage into line with any centrally enforced patternnecessarily lead to unacceptable concentration of power and ultimately to despotism.
The last of these arguments is the most disturbing. If
inequalities of condition could be limited only through great
concentration of powerconcentration considerably greater
than would otherwise be required to maintain effective
national defense, to sustain an effective government, to support
a productive economy, and to enforce lawsthen we would,
paradoxically, achieve reduced inequality of condition at the
high cost of increased inequality of power. It is reasonable to
regard the threat to liberty that would result as unacceptable.
Although many modern writers have accepted the assumption that limits on inequality of condition could be achieved
only through considerable concentration of power, this assumption is not compelling. In many cases the degree of inequality
can be affected by variations in laws that have no discernable
impact on the concentration of power. For example, in the
late eighteenth century, nearly every state in the new United
States of America adopted legislation repealing primogeniture
and guaranteeing the equal division of estates among lineal
descendants in cases of intestate succession. The aim of this
change was to decrease inequality in property holdings, yet the
change involved only the replacement of one law of succession with another, not the imposition of new laws where none
had existed before. Similarly, although laws that are designed to
mitigate inequalities in bargaining power between contracting
parties are sometimes decried as unacceptable intrusions by
Equal Protection
The United States of America is considered one of the beacons of civil rights among modern civilized nations. These
civil rights are expressed in three documents: the Declaration
of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights.
One of the most important aspects of civil rights involves the
concept of equal protection.
UNACCEPTABLE CLASSIFICATIONS OF
MINORITIES
Under the second aspect, equal protection does not prohibit
the government from classifying or categorizing people.
Rather, it prohibits classification or categorization of people
from three perspectives. The first level of classifications or categorizations subject to equal protection analysis includes those
that are considered the most suspect. The judicial examination
of laws that employ race or nationality as a classification or
category are judged under what is called strict scrutiny. For
example, it violates equal protection to classify or categorize a
person according to race or nationality unless there is a compelling or overriding government interest at stake. A primary
example of this type of prohibited classification and race is the
doctrine of separate but equal, recognized in Plessy v. Ferguson
and subsequently overruled in Brown v. Board of Education.
The second level of classifications or categories subject to
equal protection analysis includes those that are questionable.
The judicial examination of laws that employ gender or illegitimacy as a classification or category are judged under what
is called intermediate scrutiny. For example, it violates equal
protection to classify or categorize a person according to gender
or illegitimacy unless the classification has a substantial relationship to an important government interest. A primary example
of the prohibited use of gender as a classification or category is
United States v.Virginia, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court found
that it violated equal protection to admit only men into the
Virginia Military Institute, a previously all-male, state-operated
military educational institution. A primary example of the prohibited use of illegitimacy as a classification or category is Clark
v. Jeter, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court found that it violated
equal protection to apply a statute of limitations concerning
paternity actions by illegitimate children.
The third level of classification or categories subject to
equal protection analysis includes those that are not generally
prohibited by the Constitution. The judicial examination of
laws that employ economic differences or social welfare legislation are judged under what is called rational relationship.
For example, there will be no violation of equal protection if
the law in question has a rational relationship to any legitimate
government interest.
In Griffin v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
that equal protection in American law is applicable in criminal prosecutions under the principle that all people must
stand equal before the courts and receive a fair trial. However, American courts have widely recognized that selective
prosecution does not raise a constitutional claim of violation
of equal protection unless the difference in prosecution is
based on an improper class or motive, such as race.Thus, some
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brown, Courtney. Serpents in the Sand: Essays on the Nonlinear Nature of Politics
and Human Destiny. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
Ekeland, Ivar. Mathematics and the Unexpected. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988.
Kiel, L. Douglas. Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A New
Paradigm for Managing Change, Innovation and Organizational Renewal. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994.
Kiel, L. Douglas, and Euel Elliott. Exploring Nonlinear Dynamics with a
Spreadsheet: A Graphical View of Chaos for Beginners. In Chaos Theory
in the Social Sciences: Foundations and Applications, edited by L. Douglas
Kiel and Euel Elliott, 1930. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1996.
Saperstein, Alvin. The Prediction of Unpredictability: Applications of the
New Paradigm of Chaos in Dynamical Systems to the Old Problem of
the Stability of a System of Hostile Nations. In Chaos Theory in the Social
Sciences: Foundations and Applications, edited by L. Douglas Kiel and Euel
Elliott, 139164. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
Essentialism
Essentialism is a philosophical movement that asserts that
objects have certain universal properties that are common
(essential) to all members of that group. The concept, however, is associated not only with the identification of groups.
Differing perspectives of essentialism are reflected by pragmatists, such as Richard Rorty, who reject the traditional
foundationalist theory that knowledge is justified based on
foundational beliefs. Ultimately, essentialism is a perspective of
different forms of knowledge or understanding that exposes
the world and individuals through their essential components,
highlighting attributes that are essential to a particular world.
These attributes are unchanging and necessary for inclusion
in a certain group. Without that particular property, an object
or individual cannot be part of the group. There may be other
characteristics that can be acquired or lost, but these are not
Estates
The estates were the classifications of the divisions of society that emerged in Europe during the Middle Ages. While
there was variation from country to country, in general the
estates were the aristocracy (the first estate), the clergy (the
second estate), and the commoners (the third estate). In some
countries, including France and Scotland, the clergy were
considered to be the first estate, and the nobility, the second.
There were often subgroups within each of the estates. For
instance, the clergy was typically divided between the higher
ranks, such as bishops or cardinals, and common priests or
monks. Commoners were frequently divided between the
small middle or business class (collectively known as the bourgeoisie or the burghers) and the peasants. In Sweden, there
were four estates: the nobility, the clergy, the burghers, and
the landowners. Serfs and urban dwellers who did not own
land or were not free men were not considered part of any of
the estates. Early parliaments comprised representatives of the
estates, including the French Estates-General and the Scottish
Three Estates. These bodies had elected representatives who
were summoned periodically to advise the monarch or to
approve taxes or levies.
See also Press Fourth Estate.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Ethics, Political
The Prince, Niccol Machiavelli (1532) famously wrote,
must learn how not to be good, by which he meant, to
act in a manner deemed unethical according to the ethical
standards of his time. Cynics might claim that this is hardly
Ethnic Cleansing
Ethnic cleansing is the intentional act of removing by force or
threat of force any national, ethnic, religious, racial, or socioeconomically homogeneous group from a specified area of
land, usually within the borders of a sovereign state, up to
Ethnic Parties
The main object of an ethnic party is to serve the interests of
a specific ethnic group; however, the party may not represent
all members or every preference. The party may be made up
entirely of members of the group, or it may include other
individuals who have won the trust of the ethnic group.
Whether ethnic parties emerge, the number of parties
that emerge, their relative strength, and their interactions are
largely determined by the strength and cohesion of the ethnic
groups in a state. Strong ethnic loyalty can create intensely
loyal party members, and divisions between ethnic groups may
be formalized in ethnic party platforms.
as to rid a territory of a colonial power. Prior to independence, such political parties often had wide support but few
active members. After states won their independence, victorious political parties controlled the government. This sparked
debate among other ethnic groups that then sought a stake
in the government by developing their own ethnic parties.
In many newly independent states, established and dominant
politicized ethnic groups helped spur other ethnic groups to
politicize and contest for state resources and political space.
Ethnic parties may also be born of internal impulses. An
ethnic party may embrace ethnic demands to serve the interest of its constituents. Such a party is identified with the particular concerns of the ethnic group that supports it and may
polarize around a narrow set of issues. These parties appeal
to ethnic group members by evoking an ethnic identity and
represent a broad set of interests under a singular identity. This
identity serves as an information tool: in ethnically politicized
systems, individuals may not know any more about candidates
than their ethnicity. By virtue of a shared ethnicity, constituents may vote for candidates with the assumption that they
would better represent and defend constituent interests. Ethnic
groups often vote on the basis of this ethnic identity and do
not pursue other information about candidates.
CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY
ETHNIC PARTIES
However, ethnic parties make conciliation among groups difficult. Especially in states with scarce resources, ethnic party
elites frequently frame public goods as a zero-sum payoff. In
an effort to activate the support of an ethnic group, mobilizers
and elites use kinship ties, shared history, or other cultural
attributes that may be particular to a specific ethnicity. Indeed,
ethnic groups are by nature exclusive: there are definite ethnic
insiders and outsiders. Ethnic parties allow for the stronger
promotion of narrow group claims, and these claims may have
absolute winners and losers. In a government defined by ethnic parties, political cleavages may enforce existing cultural
cleavages in society and serve as destabilizing institutions, for
example, by encouraging differences through an unwillingness to negotiate and compromise rather than encouraging
unity that would produce legislation that would benefit the
entire population.
The tendency to organize parties along ethnic lines is strong
in deeply divided societies, particularly those in which several
major ethnic groups are represented at the national level. Once
one party organizes along ethnic lines, other ethnic groups are
likely to mobilize. Ethnic elites may realize the potential payoffs from group organization and may be threatened by rival
ethnic group mobilization. However, ethnic party systems can
emerge contrary to party leaders efforts. Party leaders, working for electoral victories, make compromises with different
social groups to win a majority or votes for seats. Opportunistic
political elites may take advantage of inherent weaknesses in
ethnically diverse parties. Within a party, different elites may
seize the opportunity to gain power by mobilizing ethnic identities and jockey for position within the party. The ethnically
526 Ethnocentrism
diverse party may then fracture as other party leaders emulate
a successful subparty split, resulting in the creation of multiple
monoethnic parties from a system once characterized by multiethnic parties.
Scholars debate whether ethnic parties within a political
system can cooperate, share public goods equally, and act in
the interest of the general population. It may be difficult for
an ethnic party to pursue policies that benefit people outside
the group. Even if political leaders try to diversify the partys
interest, members of the ruling ethnic group may only see
state resources going to an ethnic rival. Ethnic group members
may obstruct conciliatory political measures.
CONCLUSION
The adverse effects of ethnic parties can be ameliorated by
individuals, parties, and institutions. Individuals and parties
build interethnic alliances to win elections and pursue policy
changes. A larger ethnic group may ensure a victory by adding
voters from smaller ethnic groups, whereas ethnic groups of
similar size may ally to challenge a larger ethnic group instead
of entering political battles and maintaining their permanent
losing status. Institutions can facilitate interethnic allegiances
by requiring parties to win elections from multiple electoral
districts. Also, some political systems have forms of affirmative
action policies guaranteeing an ethnic group some minimum
level of state participation.
See also Consociational Democracy; Emerging Democracies, Political Parties in; Ethnocentrism; Fringe Parties; Nationalism; Nationalist Parties; Nationality;White Supremacy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RYAN GIBB
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Boone, Catherine. Political Topographies of the African State:Territorial Authority
and Institutional Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Chandra, Kanchan. Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head
Counts in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985.
Reilly, Benjamin. Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for
Conflict Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Tordoff, William. Government and Politics in Africa. 4th ed. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2002.
Waters, Mary. Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990.
Weiner, Myron. Party Building in a New Nation. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1967.
Ethnocentrism
Ethnocentrism is the inability to understand other countries except through the lens of ones own countrys culture,
customs, values, and institutions. Ethnocentrism plagues all
peoples and countries, but its consequences are particularly
important for a global power such as the United States.
Americans tend to view the rest of the world from the presumption that U.S. institutions and practices are superior.
Ethnocentrism pervades all aspects of American life, including
scholarly works in the field of comparative politics as well as
U.S. foreign policies and practices.
Europe, Democracy in
Democracy in Europe is a contested concept. It divides those
who argue that the European Union (EU) has a democratic
deficit from those who argue the contrary and divides those
who would remedy the deficit through greater politicization
from those who would not. Underpinning these divisions are
different understandings of what democracy in the EU is or
should be and how much it can be improved.
POLITICS OF THE EU
The EUs democratic institutions have much in common
with national federal systems. They are characterized by a
horizontal separation of powers, making for checks and balances among EU-level authorities, and a vertical division
of powers between the EU and its member states, making
for multilevel governance. However, unlike in federal systems, the national-level periphery has more power than the
EU-level center, given member-state control of legislation.
Legislation is approved by member-state executives in the
Council of Ministers and by member-state representatives in
528 Europeanization
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EU
As a result of this wide range of political issues, the majority
of EU scholars argue that the EU suffers from a democratic
deficit. Only a few scholars defend the EU as already democratic enough. Majone (1998) argues that as a regulatory
state, the EUs legitimacy is based on the delegated responsibility of its expertocracy. Moravcsik (2002) adds that the EU
is no worse than other democracies, with legitimacy ensured
through its checks and balances and delegated authorities. The
problem with this emphasis on output democracy through
governing effectiveness, as Scharpf s (1999) arguments suggest,
is that it fails to deal with the input democracy expectations
of citizens through representative democracy. Schmidt (2006)
takes this point further by showing that unlike nation-states
mature democracies that have a full range of democratic legitimizing mechanisms, the EU has a fragmented democracy,
split between output governing effectiveness for the people
and interest consultation with the people at the EU level and
input political participation by the people and citizen representation of the people at the national level.
Many scholars see the main solution to the EUs democratic deficit in the development of EU-level institutions that
are more participatory and representative, but some argue they
also need to be more redistributive. The EU itself has sought
to increase its transparency and accountability and to do more
to bring civil society into the policy-making process.The EUs
ill-fated initiative on a constitutional treaty during the constitutional convention has been generally hailed as one of the
first instances of deliberative democracy in the EU.
Some scholars argue that the EU needs to be politicized
further to solve the democratic deficit, for example, by having the EP elect the commission president, hold EU-wide
elections on the same day, and schedule transnational policy
forums on issues of general concern. Others worry that it is
too soon for any such politicization given the lack of a collective will in the EU or of a European public sphere. However, the main concern is that politicizing EU institutions will
undermine the EUs ability to deliver policies efficiently and
effectively. The problem is threefold: how does one maintain
the effectiveness of the EUs output democracy for the people
if one increases input democracy by and of the people at the
EU level, since this would politicize decisions that were efficiently dealt with as technocratic in the past? By the same
token, if one does not increase the input side through politicization, how does one respond to citizens dissatisfaction with
the lack of political debate about contested policy decisions?
Yet if one does increase input democracy at the EU level, can
one do this without undermining it at the national level? Any
recommendations for the politicization of the EU have to face
up to these questions and to the real limits to EU democratization today.
See also Europeanization; European Parliament; European Political Thought; European Politics and Society; European Union (EU);
New Europe.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Greven, Michael. Can the European Union Finally Become a Democracy?
In Democracy beyond the State? The European Dilemma and the Emerging
Global Order, edited by Michael Greven and L. W. Pauly. Lanham, Md.:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
Hix, Simon. Whats Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It.
Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008.
Magnette, Paul. European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond
Elitist Citizenship? Political Studies 51 (2003): 144160.
Mair, Peter. The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems. In
Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems,
edited by Klaus Goetz and Simon Hix. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
Majone, Giandomenico. Europes Democratic Deficit. European Law Journal
4, no. 1 (1998): 528.
Moravcsik, Andrew. Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union.
Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (2002): 603624.
Reif, Karl-Heinz, and H. Schmitt. Nine Second-order National Elections: A
Conceptual Framework or the Analysis of European Election Results.
European Journal of Political Research 8 (1980): 344.
Scharpf, Fritz W. Governing in Europe. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
1999.
Schmidt,Vivien A. Democracy in Europe:The EU and National Polities. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Schmitter, Philippe C. How to Democratize the European Union and Why Bother.
London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
van der Eijk, C., and M. Franklin. Potential for Contestation on European
Matters at National Elections in Europe. In European Integration and
Political Conflict, edited by Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Weiler, Joseph H. H. The Constitution of Europe: Do the New Clothes Have
an Emperor? and Other Essays on European Integration. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Europeanization
The theoretical approach to Europeanization defines it as
the outcome of a long historical process in which western
European culture and civilization have influenced the rest of
Europe. Besides cultural traditions and a capitalist way of life,
such values as democracy, solidarity, liberty, and tolerance are
promoted. As Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (2000) argue,
the result of being Europeanized is the development of
democratic values by implementing democratic human rights
regimes and open political systems.
The pragmatic interpretation of the term Europeanization emphasizes the policies and institutions of the European
Union (EU), their influences on member states and candidate countries, and the impact of the national systems on the
political and administrative structure of the EU. In this narrowed context, Europeanization can be used interchangeably
with the notion of European integration process. However,
two other points of view contribute to an exhaustive picture
of the conceptual reality of the term: the top-down and the
bottom-up perspectives.
Europeanization 529
political and institutional influence. Moreover, the top-down
perspective reflects the reality that the political actors from the
EU level are the individuals promoting the values of Europeanization, whereas national political actors are less involved in
the process.
Claudio Radaelli (2000) sketches an even more pragmatic
definition: Europeanization is a process through which the
political, economic, and social dimensions of the EU become
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities,
political structures and public policies. Hence, the overarching European structure determines obvious changes in
national systems.
Second, this downloaded Europeanization implies a
whole new procedure of regulation through which European
institutionsespecially the legislative and executive bodies
gradually transpose different areas of policy making from the
national level to the supranational dimension. Consequently,
new secondary legislation (i.e., directives, regulations, decisions) agreed on by the member states must be implemented
by subnational and national governments alongside domestic
laws or even modifying the latter as necessary.
Third, the top-down dimension can also be explained by
the shaping of domestic institutional structures. On one hand,
the EU brings about the creation of new agencies and new
types of cooperation; on the other hand, it affects administrative reform, public procurement, regional development, and
budgetary procedures within the domestic sphere.
Thus, the EU affects the relationship between legislative
and executive bodies by widening the scope of technocrats
and executive leadership, especially due to their role in the
economic and monetary union, and limiting the functions
of traditional parliaments. In addition, during the accession
process, the main actors in the negotiations with the EU are
the national elites of the candidate countries, that is, the chief
negotiators and their teams, some ministers, and key officials
of the central civil service. Furthermore, when EU membership becomes the primary foreign policy goal, governments
allocate to this purpose considerable human resources, especially from the central administration, personnel who are well
trained and in possession of technical expertise. Once accepted
into the EU, these administrative elites continue to have a primary role in the process of European funds absorption. In this
context, it can be asserted that European integration creates
new technical elites within central and regional governments.
EUROPEANIZATION AND
REGIONALIZATION
In line with the idea of the top-down approach, the phenomenon of Europeanization cannot be analyzed without
at least mentioning the concept of regionalization. From a
broad point of view, these two concepts can be perceived as
contradictory: the EU is a complex extranational network of
member and candidate countries, institutions, and political
actors, whereas regionalization strengthens the idea of regions
as actors, underlining the importance of being as close as possible to citizens and their concerns. However, Europeanization
European Parliament
The European Parliament, a 785-member body, is the only
European Union (EU) institution that is directly elected by
the voters of the EUs twenty-seven member nations. The
European Parliament, along with the Council of the European Union, constitutes the legislative branch of the EU. The
parliament meets in Strasbourg, France (the official seat of the
parliament) and in Brussels, Belgium. The secretariat of the
parliament, the parliaments administrative arm, is headquartered in Luxembourg.
Since 1979, members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
have been elected for five-year terms. The legislative jurisdiction of the parliament includes environmental protection, consumer rights, equal opportunities, transportation, and the free
movement of workers, capital, services, and goods. However,
this jurisdiction is limited in that issues must be referred to
the European Commission, the EUs executive branch, which
must draft legislation for the parliament to consider.
The European Parliament is presided over by a president,
who is elected by the MEPs for a two-and-one-half-year term
(one-half of the parliaments term) and can be reelected. Election is by secret ballot, with the candidate receiving an absolute majority (393 votes) being elected. If after three ballots
no candidate receives an absolute majority, a president will be
elected by simple majority (those present and voting) on the
fourth ballot. In addition to chairing the bodys plenary sessions, the president represents the European Parliament in its
dealings with other EU institutions.
HISTORY
The European Parliament dates back to September 10, 1952,
when the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel
Community met for the first time. This was a seventy-eightmember body drawn from the national parliaments of the
member nations. Initially, the body had no legislative powers.
With the Treaty of Rome (1958), the European Economic
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community
were established, and the Common Assembly was renamed
the European Parliamentary Assembly and became the consultative body for all three communities. In 1962, the body
took its current name, the European Parliament. In 1970, the
parliament was given authority over some parts of the European Communitys budget, with power over the entire budget
being granted to the body in 1975.
In 1979, the first elections were held for MEPs. The body
elected Simone Veil, a French MEP, as the first female president of the European Parliament; she served until 1982.
It was not until 1992 that the seat of the parliament was
firmly established. While the parliament had been headquartered in Strasbourg, in 1985 a second chamber was built in
Brussels, and some of the parliaments work was moved there,
notwithstanding protests from member states. Under the
agreement reached by the European Council, the European
Parliament meets twelve times a year in Strasbourg, its official home, with all other parliamentary activity taking place
POWERS
In addition to the legislative powers already cited, the body
also approves the president of the European Commission
(who is proposed by the European Council) and the other
members of the commission. It can also censure the commission by a two-thirds vote, which will force the commission
from office.
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 gave the parliament additional powers. It can establish committees of inquiry and can
challenge other EU institutions if they violate EU law or treaties. The parliament receives an annual report from the European Central Bank and elects the European ombudsman, who
deals with public complaints against all EU institutions.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The European Parliament is organized as follows:
The Conference of Presidents consists of the president of
the European Parliament and the political group chairs. Two
representatives who are not attached to political groups have
seats in the conference but do not have voting rights. This
body is responsible for the organization of the parliaments
business, which includes establishing the charges of the parliaments committees and their membership. It is also the
body responsible for relations with other EU institutions, the
national parliaments, and non-EU countries.
The Conference of Delegation Chairmen oversees the
operation of interparliamentary delegations and delegations
to joint parliamentary committees. It elects a chair from its
membership.
The Conference of Committee Chairmen facilitates cooperation between the standing committees. It consists of the
chairs of all the standing and temporary committees and elects
its chair from among its members.
The Bureau is the body responsible for drafting the parliaments preliminary budget and decides all administrative matters. It consists of the president of the European Parliament,
the fourteen vice presidents, and the six quaestors (who are
nonvoting members) selected by the parliament for a twoand-one-half-year term. The Bureau appoints the secretarygeneral, the parliaments chief administrative officer.
Standing committees prepare work for the parliaments plenary sessions. They draw up reports on legislative proposals
that have been referred to the parliament as well as their own
initiatives. As of June 2009, there are twenty standing committees covering such areas as foreign affairs, international trade,
European political thought is the study of the contents, values, beliefs, and institutions of political thought, one of the
most peculiar productions generated by European culture, in
Europe. Accordingly, this article will provide the reader with a
historical look at this phenomenon.
goal of work on this topic is to identify the factors accounting for democratic stability as opposed to democratic breakdown, given that Europes dark twentieth century was deeply
marked by the eruption of dictatorship and authoritarianism. As with state- and nation-building, democratic stability
appears to be the result of a complex historical configuration
of factors. Barrington Moore proposed a model of different
paths to democracy and dictatorship, with the democratic path
depending on a balance of power between crown, nobility,
and bourgeoisie in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
and an early development of commercialized agriculture and
markets. More recently, the works of political scientists Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and John Stephens have
shown that a strong but not radicalized working-class movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was
also an important driver of stable democratization.
F
I N
N o rweg i a n
S ea
ICELAND
Y
S W
Gulf
of
Bothnia
Non-member
A
W
Member
N D
European Union:
Helsinki
R U S S I A
Tallinn
Stockholm
ESTONIA
Gulf of
Riga
ATL AN TI C
Gotland
OCEAN
North
Sea
Baltic
Sea
Copenhagen
DENMARK
UNITED
LATVIA
Riga
LITHUANIA
Vilnius
RUSSIA
IRELAND
KINGDOM
Dublin
BELARUS
NETHERLANDS
Amsterdam
London
POLAND
ine
BELGIUM
Prague
CZECH REP.
Luxembourg
Paris
UKRAINE
Rh
el
Chann
Berlin
GERMANY
Brussels
English
Warsaw
ube
Dan
LUXEMBOURG
SLOVAKIA
Vienna
AUSTRIA
SWITZ.
FRANCE
Bay of
Biscay
ITALY
PORTUGAL
Corsica
ROMANIA
ic
Bucharest
B lac k
Danube
Se a
t
ria
Ad
SAN MARINO
Budapest
HUNGARY
Ljubljana
CROATIA
SLOVENIA
ANDORRA
MOLDOVA
Bratislava
Se
a
Rome
MONTE- KOSOVO
NEGRO
MACEDONIA
BULGARIA
Sofia
(FR.)
Madrid
ALBANIA
Lisbon
S PA I N
TURKEY
GREECE
Sardinia
(IT.)
Athens
M e d i t
e r r
Sicily
a n
e a
n
MALTA
ALGERIA
TUNISIA
S e
a
TURKEY
MOROCCO
Mediterranean
Sea
Nicosia
0
0
CYPRUS
300 Mi
300 Km
L I B YA
Under the European Union, independent member states have integrated political and economic systems to create a supranational organization.
presented by developments within Europe itself. French president Charles de Gaulles 19651966 refusal to countenance
further integrative steps laid out in the Treaty of Rome posed
a special challenge to the theory, which had been predicated
on continuous progression toward deeper integration. The
resulting proliferation of concepts, variables, and measures suggested that neofunctionalism was an increasingly degenerating
research program.
The last approach in this wave (and the major alternative
to neofunctionalism), intergovernmentalism, insisted on the
primacy of nation-states and national experiences in delimiting European integration. Most forcefully articulated by
Stanley Hoffmann (1966), it argued that integration would
proceed only as far as national governments conspired to work
together, as national interests would always retain precedence
and thereby hinder the emergence of a truly supranational
organization. This would be especially true in areas of high
politics, including political and security issues, where the
absolute sovereignty of nation-states would remain intact.
Intergovernmentalism drew its inspiration from realist theories of international relations (IR), imbuing national governments with concrete security preferences that, in conjunction
with uncertainty over other states future intentions, would
constrain their willingness to put European interests above
national ones. Supranational and transnational efforts to transcend these hard constraints would only antagonize states and
further retrench state sovereignty in core areas.
All three first-wave approaches aspired to general theoretical accounts of European integration. Deutsch and colleagues worked from the outside in, assimilating the postwar
North Atlantic experience to patterns of community formation identified from other times and places. By contrast,
Haas approached generalization from the inside out, analyzing the ECSC to advance generalizations about the processes
by which political communities are formed among sovereign
states (Haas 1958, xi). Hoffmann held the middle ground.
While he sought to draw inferences from the European experience to contemporary world politics and unification
movements elsewhere (Hoffmann 1966, 867), his major contribution was arguably to bring general IR theory (in his case,
realism) into the study of the EU. In all three cases, theoretical
elaborations and limitations, while aspiring to generality, mirrored facts on the ground, with the relatively optimistic neofunctional and transactionalist approaches holding sway when
the EU was working well as a supranational organization and
intergovernmentalism ascending when it was not.
540 Euthanasia
CONCLUSION
The analysis above documents the main approaches to the
study of the EU along two complementary dimensions: the
scope of their theoretical aims (general or particular) and
the direction of theoretical application (inside-out or outsidein). While not necessarily exclusive to any one period, the
categories produced by this division allow us to capture the
many ways in which EU scholarship has evolved and progressed over the years. The first period attempted to develop
generalizable theories of integration, both from the inside
out and from the outside in. Scholarship eventually moved
to a second, more sui generis period concerned with EUspecific affairs when real-world integration decelerated. The
third period witnessed the resurgence of prior integration
theories, the development of entirely new exportable theoretical explanations, and the application of imported explanatory frameworks to EU data. Over the long haul, and in the
present fourth wave, all of these trends have come to coexist.
While the EU is still undeniably unique, political scientists
now view it as a means for acquiring both general and specific knowledge.
Having summarized the main trends in EU-related political science, we here conclude with some final thoughts on its
future. We expect the EU, as the most advanced regional integration project worldwide, to remain an important fixture of
political science research for three reasons. First, the EU continues to evolve, providing a living laboratory within which to
study rigorously a great many political phenomena. Second,
this evolution inspires political scientists insofar as it reveals
both an EU specificity and suspected similarities to politicaleconomic, institutional, and behavioral processes operative
elsewhere. Third, new regional integration efforts under way
around the world may look to emulate the EUs model of
supranational governance and economic union, giving rise to
an already-bourgeoning field of comparative regionalism. Precisely because it is so distinctive and seductive, the EU provides
scholars with endless options for engaging in both inside-out
and outside-in theoretical work, either of which satisfies the
aspirations of general political science.
See also Deutsch, Karl W.; Economic Policy Formulation; European Parliament; Institutionalism, Comparative; Judicial Systems,
Comparative; Legislative Systems, Comparative; Monetary Union;
Regional Integration, Comparative.
. . . . . . . . K. AMBER CURTIS AND JOSEPH JUPILLE
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Burley, Anne-Marie, and Walter Mattli. Europe before the Court: A Political
Theory of Legal Integration. International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993):
4176.
Caporaso, James A., and John T. S. Keeler. The European Union and
Regional Integration Theory. In The State of the European Union:
Building a European Polity? edited by Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey,
2962. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995.
Deutsch, Karl W., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, et al. Political
Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the
Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1957.
Euthanasia
Euthanasia (good death, from the Greek eu, meaning good
and thanatos, meaning death) refers to any medical act with
an intended consequence of inducing the death of the patient
(usually a terminally ill patient) in a painless manner. Euthanasia is a hotly debated topic in the field of medical ethics.
Some doctors argue that the primary duty of medical doctors
is to preserve human life under all circumstances. Indeed, the
traditional Hippocratic oath (dating in its original form from
the fourth century BCE) claims that medical doctors should
never prescribe a deadly drug. Especially in the twentieth
century, however, various authors and legal and moral authorities have claimed that medical doctors have a moral and legal
right to prevent their patients suffering by helping them to
die in a dignified and painless manner.
Euthanasia 541
ranging from not prolonging a life-sustaining (but also not
curative) treatment to providing prolonged and possibly
lethal sedation to dying patients to administering an active
life-terminating treatment. It should be noted that euthanasia
typically refers to the life-ending act among chronically or
terminally ill patients. Although during the Nazi era in Germany (19331945), the indiscriminate killing of mentally ill
patients was labeled euthanasia, this in no way falls under
the current definition of the practice.
In various countries, laws and policy measures on euthanasia are a salient political issue. While liberal and progressive
parties and groups normally are in favor of allowing euthanasia, the reverse is the case for conservative political parties.
The topic of euthanasia is salient because it raises fundamental bioethical questions among the population, in the same
manner as abortion or gay marriage tend to do. Often, the
laws on euthanasia rise high on the political agenda because of
the media focus on specific cases in which terminally ill and
suffering patients were denied a physician-assisted death. In
various countries, finding a compromise on the legal status of
euthanasia has proved to be quite difficult.
EUTHANASIA IN EUROPE
The Netherlands was the first Western country to legalize
euthanasia in a law of April 2001, which took effect on April
1, 2002. The 2001 law proclaims that every patient has an
inalienable right to determine the manner and conditions in
which he or she wants to end life. The law installs a specific
procedure to allow patients to request euthanasia if they are in
a state of incurable and unbearable suffering. Healthy persons, too, can file formal statements indicating that they opt
for euthanasia if, at some point in the future, they end up in
such a position and are no longer able to express themselves.
Medical doctors in the Netherlands who perform euthanasia
will not be prosecuted if they follow a specific procedure. The
doctor must be certain there is no standard medical solution
for the suffering and that the patient has made the decision in
a voluntary manner; the doctor must also have provided the
patient with all necessary and relevant information and consulted another medical doctor before actually performing the
act of euthanasia. Since 2002, the law has been implemented
without any major incidents. There is some political discussion, however, about whether the law should be broadened
to apply to patients who are not yet sixteen years old or to
patients who are suffering mentally but not physically.
Neighboring Belgium followed suit in September 2002.
Belgium basically copies the Dutch law, but the country
installed an administrative procedure to report all cases of
euthanasia to a central authority. In Belgian politics, euthanasia
for minors remains a hotly debated question; there have also
been some political debates about whether Catholic hospitals
(which are the only hospitals available in some regions) should
provide this service.
542 Evangelicalism
Evangelicalism
A religious movement born in Great Britain and colonial
America, Evangelicalism has been politically significant for
over two centuries. It is largely a Protestant spiritual renewal
movement, emphasizing religious conversion, doctrinal
orthodoxy, personal piety, and public morality.
The best definitions of Evangelicalism (e.g., David Bebbingtons 1989 Evangelicalism in Modern Britain) focus on four
hallmarks: (1) respect for the authority, perspicuity, and truthfulness of the Bible; (2) an emphasis on a personal acceptance
of the faith, commonly described as conversion, a faith commitment, or being born again; (3) a belief that religious faith
should permeate ones life, be shared with others, and be manifested in love for others; and (4) an affirmation of orthodox
teachings about Jesus Christ, including His deity, virgin birth,
atoning death on the cross, bodily resurrection, and eventual
earthly return.
Evangelicalism 543
Republican organizers helped Jerry Falwell, a Baptist television minister with a largely fundamentalist audience, form
the Moral Majority in 1979. Similar organizations developed
around the same time: Focus on the Family (1977), Christian
Voice (1978), Concerned Women for America (1979), Religious Roundtable (1979), and the Traditional Values Coalition
(1980). During the Reagan years, these groups mailed millions of voter guides, registered hundreds of thousands of voters, and enlisted thousands of campaign workers. Their actual
influence, however, is contested, and the most visible of the
lot, the Moral Majority, eventually fell on hard times and was
disbanded in 1989.
The third wave of evangelical activism surfaced when
another television evangelist, Pat Robertson, mounted a campaign for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination. His
campaign brought the Pentecostal/Charismatic wing of Evangelicalism into politics. Defeat did not dampen Robertsons
ardor for politics; he soon formed the Christian Coalition
(1989), which employed a grassroots strategy, helping evangelicals achieve new levels of success.
The cumulative effect of these three waves is clear: evangelicals across the board are more likely to vote and more likely
to vote conservatively. Despite limited electoral success and
frequent public ridicule, evangelicals remain, for the foreseeable future, a force to be reckoned with in American politics.
Executive Immunity
Executive immunity aims to protect members of the executive branch by providing them the discretion needed to
execute duties without fear of reprisal or civil liability. The
U.S. Constitution fails to address the concept of executive
immunity. Instead, the issue of granting immunity to members of the executive branch is often based on its adherence to
RICHARD M. YON
Executive Order
Executive orders provide presidents with the unilateral
authority to make decisions and, in many cases, law. The
power to hand down executive orders, although not specifically stated in the U.S. Constitution, is implied through
its grant of executive power to presidents and its requirement
that laws be faithfully executed. In executing their duties, all
presidents have issued executive orders to control and guide
executive branch agencies and departments. Congressional
authorization is not required, but executive orders provide
the same authority as laws passed by Congress and can be
controversial.
Presidents have used executive orders to desegregate the
military and schools and to end racial discrimination in federal
housing and hiring. Congress provides the president with a
considerable amount of discretion in executing laws, and, in
many cases, Congress is not explicit as to how a law or program should be implemented. Therefore, presidents fill in the
gaps and provide details for their execution by issuing executive orders. However, a presidents actions are still checked.
Executive orders can be overturned by the president or made
invalid by the passage of a law. In addition, the U.S. Supreme
Court can declare executive orders unconstitutional.
See also Executive,The.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RICHARD M. YON
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Mayer, Kenneth R. With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential
Power. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Executive Pardon
The Constitution provides the chief executive (the president)
with the power to pardon: he [the president] shall have power
to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States, except in cases of impeachment. Three qualifications
RICHARD M. YON
Executive Privilege
Executive privilege is the right granted to the president and
executive branch officials that permits them to refuse to
release information to Congress, the courts, and the public.
Although the U.S. Constitution is not explicit in the provision of this right to the president, presidents have justified its
use through the separation of powers doctrine that is inherent
in the Constitution and the primacy of the executive branch
in certain governmental activities, namely, foreign policy.
Scholars believe that the concept of executive privilege is
based on common law and derived from the English crown.
Thus, crown privilege, as it was referred to in England, was
commonplace in monarchical systems.
Presidents frequently cite the precedents established by their
predecessors in claiming executive privilege.The issue of executive privilege is quite perplexing. First, the American public
and press genuinely encourage a strong presidency model. As
such, presidential claims to executive privilege may at times
be encouraged or implied by Americas conventional support
for a strong or activist presidency. Second, even though critical factions exist that challenge an activist president, seldom is
there agreement on what is legitimately covered by executive
privilege and what is not. Third, the Constitution lacks specificity on the subject, thereby making determinations of the
constitutionality of a presidents claim of executive privilege
all the more difficult and indeterminate. Fourth, the Supreme
Court usually defers to the president. Fifth, claims of executive
Executive, The
The word execute means to put into effect; thus, executive
agencies are those institutions of government that carry out
the will of whoever controls government. In a democracy,
the executive is expected to follow the direction of popularly
elected leaders; in a dictatorship, the executive is expected
to do whatever the dictator commands. Every type of government relies on organizations that ensure that its laws are
faithfully executed. In an era of big government, this means
not only enforcing laws that require citizens to pay taxes but
also executing laws that deliver benefits to citizens, such as
education and social security checks.
Every state has a multiplicity of organizations to execute
its many programs; otherwise the intentions of rulers would
be only invocations of what they would like to see happen.
To turn intentions into public policies that affect citizens, a
government must have the organizational means to get things
done. Without a functioning executive, a government would
be little more than courtiers in the household of a monarch
whose will has little or no effect outside the gates of the royal
palace. With an effective executive, the Pharaohs of ancient
Egypt were able to build pyramids and control the floodwaters of the river Nile. Today, the executive is used to deliver
the public policies that collectively affect every household
and every citizen. If executive institutions ceased to carry out
their tasks, for example, in the aftermath of military defeat, this
would result in a failed state. This occurred in Baghdad, Iraq,
immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2003.
The organizations that put the intentions of governors into
effect are described as the executive branch of government.
Executive is a collective noun, and the organizations that can be
grouped together under that heading differ in many respects.
They can be headed by elected officials, political appointees,
or individuals chosen because they are experts, for example, a
medical doctor in charge of a public health agency. Some executive institutions are located in the national capital, while others
are part of local government, and some have offices nationwide.
Executive agencies provide continuity in the work of government. Because a constitution is difficult to amend, the
institutional structure of government changes little when an
election replaces one president with another or when parties
alternate between controlling the cabinet or being in opposition in a parliamentary system. In public policy whatever
an election outcome, executive agencies maintain activities
laid down in laws enacted by administrations in the past. The
money to pay for these activities comes from public budgets
German chancellor Angela Merkel and U.S. president Barack Obama shake hands at a November 2009 meeting. As the national executives of
their nations, Merkel and Obama follow the direction of those who voted them into office.
source: Corbis
ORGANIZING TO DO THINGS
In the introverted world of politics within the national capital,
the most important concerns are those affecting power struggles and bargaining within the core executive. But for the
outcome of such struggles to influence society, those powerful
within the core executive must reach out to deliver programs
to citizens far from the corridors of power in cities, suburbs,
and rural areas that are hundreds or even thousands of miles
from the national capital.
To understand the execution of public policy requires
broadening attention from the core executive within central
A comprehensive map of the executive branch, like a geographical relief map, needs to take into account both peaks in
the national capital and valleys where most citizens live and
where most public employees work. It must also take into
account differences between programs. Those concerned with
problems that are collective, such as the ministry of defense
and the central bank, must be in the national capital. However,
those concerned with delivering services such as health care,
trash collection, and roads must operate wherever citizens live.
While most of the money spent by executive agencies comes
from national taxation, most of the people employed in delivering public goods and services are employed by local and
regional government or by hospitals, schools, and universities.
The functional and geographical diversity of executive institutions creates the problem of joining up government. President
Woodrow Wilson reflected, I live in the midst of the government of the United States, but I never saw the government
of the United States. A half century later a report commissioned by President Lyndon Johnson concluded, The federal
government remains largely a collection of fragmented bureau
fiefdoms unable to co-ordinate with themselves intelligently.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Book of the States. Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, 2008.
Finer, Samuel E. The History of Government. 3 vols. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
Kettl, Donald F. The Transformation of Governance: Public Administration for the
21st Century. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.
Lipsky, Michael. Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public
Services. New York: Russell Sage, 1980.
Page, Edward C., and Bill Jenkins. Policy Bureaucracy: Government with a Cast
of Thousands. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Pierre, Jon, and B. Guy Peters. Governance, Politics and the State. New York: St.
Martins, 2005.
Rose, Richard. The Growth of Government Organizations: Do We
Count the Number or Weigh the Programs? In Organizing Governance,
Governing Organizations, edited by Colin Campbell and B. Guy Peters,
99128. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988.
. Understanding Big Government:The Programme Approach. London:
Sage, 1984.
Exit Poll
An exit poll is a public opinion survey that is undertaken as
voters leave polling facilities. Its goal is to provide an early
approximation of who won balloting. Exit polls typically ask
voters whom they voted for and record basic demographic
data. They may also endeavor to measure voter attitudes on
Election Day. Such polls are generally conducted by media
outlets and provide indications of factors such as turnout and
voter sentiment. In some countries, exit polls have been used
to assess electoral fraud. If official results vary too greatly from
the exit polls, it can be an indication of problems in the voting or counting systems. Exit polls have been criticized for
providing inaccurate data since voters are not always truthful
in their responses and problems with sampling points may
skew the results. Increasingly, media outlets have pooled their
exit polls or participated in joint polling in an effort to bolster
the accuracy of their information. The early release of exit
poll data has been criticized for depressing voter turnout: if
early results indicate one candidate or party won, the supporters of the opposing candidates or parties may not vote. As a
result, some countries, notably New Zealand, have outlawed
the practice.
See also Polling, History of;Turnout.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Experimental Design
Experiments offer a unique opportunity to examine the
nature and direction of causal relationships between variables.
Experiments represent a particularly effective and useful
method when investigators need clear causal information, past
studies have generated inconsistent or contradictory findings,
multimethod validation is desired, or methodological triangulation may prove helpful in uncovering complex or subtle
underlying processes.
Experiments typically refers to laboratory studies in which the
investigator retains control over the recruitment, assignment to
random condition, treatment, and measurement of participants.
There are three important ways in which experiments differ
552 Extradition
from other forms of social measurement. First, experimenters
do not wait for events to occur and then observe and measure them; rather, experimenters create such situations, capture
exactly what they are interested in studying, and measure those
variables. Second, experimenters manipulate conditions so that
some participants receive a control condition while others
receive the treatment condition; then experimenters observe
any systematic differences between groups or individuals, keeping everything the same except the manipulated variable.Third,
experimenters randomize participants to conditions to ensure
that observed differences do not result from preexisting differences between participants. Experimenters typically report
average treatment effects and remain less concerned with the
effect of a particular treatment on a given individual.Therefore,
in analyses of results, demonstrating no effect may reflect a true
finding but may result from additional factors that exert opposite effects on different kinds of people.
Experiments offer several important advantages. In addition
to the ability to determine causal connections and randomize participants to conditions, experiments also allow scholars to take precise measurements of variables. Whether such
measurements involve paper-and-pencil tests, physiological
or behavioral measures, or other forms of self-report, experimenters can design and test the measurement strategies best
suited for the scale and topic they are investigating. In this way,
experiments allow researchers to begin to explore the microfoundational processes underlying a wide variety of social and
political processes.
Experiments do not come without certain disadvantages.
Experiments often present seemingly artificial situations and
environments to unrepresentative participant pools. Artificial
environments often result because it is either impossible or
unethical to create the situation that the investigator wants
to study. In addition, certain participants may or may not be
suitably representative of the population most relevant for
application.
Another important concern relates to the consequences of
noncompliance among participants. Most experiments analyze data according to intent to treat, wherein participants are
randomly assigned to treatment or control and the data are
analyzed regardless of adherence to treatment or subsequent
noncompliance or deviation from the experimental protocol. This can bias results if a participants withdrawal from the
experiment resulted from the treatment itself and not from
some extraneous factor.
Experiments possess two kinds of validity, internal and
external. Internal validity refers to whether a researcher is actually getting at the variables he or she claims to be investigating. External validity refers to whether particular findings can
generalize to a larger, external reality. In general, psychologists
are much more concerned with maintaining internal validity, whereas political scientists care much more about external
validity.
Basic experimental design can take one of several forms.
Within-subject studies examine changes within an individual
as the result of a manipulation over time. Between-subjects
Extradition
Extradition is an action of international cooperation in handing over a person accused of criminal activities. In this process
one sovereign state delivers an accused criminal or fugitive to
another sovereign state at the request of the latter state. There
are two major reasons for this transfer: first, to repress criminal activities, and second, to allow for the lawbreakers being
Extraterritoriality 553
punished according to the penal laws of the state where the
crime was committed.The process of extradition has advanced
among nations to maintain law, order, and tranquility, thus
promoting a general sense of peace and happiness in society.
The history of extradition treaties dates back to 1280 BCE
between Ramses II of Egypt and the Hittite prince Hattusuli
III. It was signed after Ramses defeated Hattusuli. Originally it
was a peace treaty between the two rival kings, but provisions
were put in place for the return of criminals of one party who
had fled and taken refuge in the territory of the other. The
word extradition is derived from a Latin word extradere, which
means forceful return of a person to his or her sovereign.
The term extradition was first used in a French decree of 1792;
this is refuted by some scholars who argue that the term was
employed as early as 1555 by the parliament of Paris against the
extradition of its nationals.
Historically, extradition was sought not only in criminal
cases but also for the handover of political and religious opponents of the ruling party or the reigning families. In European
history, religious and political opponents were delivered by the
formal procedure of extradition. Sovereigns obliged other sovereigns by surrendering a person or a group of people who
were responsible for affecting the stability of the political order
of the requesting state. By the nineteenth century Western
Europe turned against the extradition of fugitives accused of
political offenses. Belgium was one of the first states to enact a
law, in 1833, that incorporated the principle of nonextradition
for political offenses.
In international law extradition is generally defined as the
surrender of an individual by the state within whose territory he is found to the state under whose laws he is alleged to
have committed (or already have been convicted) of a crime.
In the United States, international extradition is governed by
federal law, leaving the states with no power to extradite persons to foreign countries. The European Union (EU) adopted
the European Arrest Warrant Act in 2002, which was designed
to harmonize EU state responses to threats of terrorism and
cross-border crime. The European Arrest Warrant Act also
abolishes the system of extradition among EU members and
replaces it with obligations of mutually recognized arrest warrants issued by judicial authorities of the member states.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bedi, Satya Deva. Extradition: A Treatise on the Laws Relevant to the Fugitive
Offenders within and with the Commonwealth Countries. Buffalo, N.Y.:
William Hein, 2002.
Damrosch, Lori F., Louis Henkin, Sean D. Murphy, and Hans Smit.
International Law: Cases and Materials. 5th ed. St. Paul, Minn.:
West, 2009.
Extraterritoriality
F
Fabianism
Fabianism has been one of the most discussed and controversial issues in political theory and practice in the later half
of the nineteenth century and twentieth century. In England, the Fabian socialists, such as Sydney and Beatrice Webb,
Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, G. D. H. Cole, William Clarke,
and Annie Besant, realized the importance of the working
class and visualized the possibilities of establishing socialism
through a gradual process by increasing public ownership
in industry and more representation of labor in the legislature, trade unions, and cooperatives. Whereas Eduard Bernsteins revisionism, influenced by the ethical philosophy of
Immanuel Kant, was a direct attack on Marxism, Fabianism
attacked Marxism indirectly. Fabian socialists believed in a
gradual approach toward socialism through democratic means
instead of revolutionary socialism. They were guided by the
philosophy of the Roman general Q. Fabius Maximus, surnamed Cunctator, which means delayer. Fabians believed
in the philosophy, For the right moment, you must wait as
Fabius did most patiently when warring against Hannibal,
though many censured his delays; but when the time comes
you must strike hard as Fabius did, or your waiting will be in
vain and fruitless (see Mehrotra 1984, 246).
AN EVALUATION
The Fabians forgot the hard fact that the masses do not live on
ideology alone, however sound or logical it might be.They also
failed to realize that the parliamentary method is not a way
of confrontation but of constant adjustment, compromise
and tactics (see Dwivedy 1984, 348). The Fabians proved to be
more ideological than pragmatic.They were generally criticized
for their reformist attitude. J. Ellis Barker criticized Fabianism
for being the least clear of a definite type of social order, and
Friedrich Engels criticized the Fabians for their tactics to fight
the liberals not as decided opponents but to drive them onto
socialistic consequences (Mehrotra 1984, 253).
The Fabians were essentially reformers who believed in
reforms without resentment and social reconstruction without
dogma or fanaticism. Their socialism was the socialism of the
simple minded; it signified indefinite extension of state activity. For most of the Fabians, it was a journey with no assigned
destination, wrote Alexander Gray (1946, 349). The Fabians
played a significant role in practical politics by putting forward
many workable schemes, such as social legislation, public ownership of basic industries, radical taxation, and welfare state.
See also British Political Thought; Marxism; Socialism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ASHA GUPTA
555
556 Faction
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Coker, Francis W. Recent Political Thought. London: Appleton-Century, 1934.
Dwivedy, Surendra Nath. Quest for Socialism: Fifty Years of Struggle. New Delhi,
India: Radiant, 1984.
Gay, Peter. The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: E. Bernsteins Challenge to
Marx. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952.
Gray, Alexander. The Socialist Tradition: Moses to Lenin. London: Longmans,
Green, 1946.
Gupta, Asha. Fabianism and Indian Socialism. In Essays on Fabian Socialism,
edited by M. M. Sankhdher and Subrata Mukherjee, 5065. New Delhi,
India: Deep and Deep, 1991.
Mehrotra, Nanak Chand. Todays Isms. Delhi, India: Atma Ram and Sons, 1984.
Rush, Thomas A. Role on the Congress Socialist Party in the Indian
National Congress 193142. Doctoral diss., University of Chicago,
19551956.
Sankhdher, M. M., and Subrata Mukherjee, eds. Essays on Fabian Socialism.
New Delhi, India: Deep and Deep, 1991.
Shaw, Bernard, ed. Fabian Essays in Socialism. 1891. Reprint, New York:
Humboldt, 1908.
Webb, Sidney, The Historic Basis of Socialism, in Fabian Essays in Socialism,
edited by George Bernard Shaw, 33-35, 58-61. London, 1889.
Faction
A faction is an informal or unofficial group within a political
party or other body. Factions are typically formed to pursue
specific policy or legislative goals. Factions may also be organized on a regional basis. These groups pursue objectives that
may not initially be shared by the broader membership of
the organization. They differ from caucuses or other formal
groups because of their ad hoc basis. The groupings usually
do not have a formal structure or leadership system, although
some political parties systems grant formal recognition to
factions. Factions generally do not conduct regular meetings or conventions or prepare policy platforms. Factions can
weaken the stability and solidarity of a political party. Their
pursuit of narrow goals can undermine the broad appeal of a
party or grouping. They may also create infighting within the
party. Early proponents of democracy, including the Baron de
Montesquieu, argued that factions and political parties would
undermine democracy by subverting the general good to
special interests. In the United States, factions dominated the
political system before the rise of the formal party system.
The early factions, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists,
later evolved into the Federalist Party and the DemocraticRepublican Party.
See also Caucus; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Montesquieu,
Charles-Louis.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Failed States
See Collapsed and Failed States.
Fainsod, Merle
Merle Fainsod (19071972) was a prominent American
scholar in the field of Soviet studies. He taught at Harvard
University for forty years and produced influential works that
described and analyzed the Soviet system.
Fairness 557
Fairness
The distinctive domain of fairness is decision-making processes or institutions. The concept of fairness is closely linked
to a number of other moral concepts, including justice,
equality, and impartiality. Like these other notions, fairness
centers on how people are treated by others, especially the
requirement that everyone be treated alike unless there are
good reasons to treat particular people differently. Thus, a fair
procedure makes decisions or allocates benefits or burdens on
the basis of appropriate criteria, which are applied similarly to
all cases unless exceptions can be justified. Fairness is appealed
to in assessing both means through which decisions are made
and the outcomes decisions bring about. The former is generally labeled procedural fairness, the latter distributive fairness. Although these two dimensions of decisions frequently
run in tandem (i.e., fair procedures give rise to fair outcomes,
and unfair procedures to unfair outcomes), this may not
always be true. While the notion of fairness pertains to both
dimensions, it is more closely associated with procedures,
whereas the notion of justice (distributive justice) is generally
more closely associated with outcomes.
Specific qualities that constitute fairness vary across contexts, in accordance with the nature of different decision processes or institutions. The variety of relevant contexts requires
a corresponding range of criteria of fairness. For instance, in a
fair election, candidates compete on even terms. In a fair bargain, participants reach an agreement under conditions that are
similar for all, with no one having an advantage over others. In
a fair trial, court officials are not biased toward one or another
of the parties involved. In these and countless other cases, fairness turns on peoples being treated equally, with departures
from equality requiring justification, although exactly what
constitutes equal treatment varies according to context.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
The concept of fairness has a long lineage. The Oxford English
Dictionary gives examples of fairness and cognate words used
in English with their present sense as far back as 1460. But
we find clear instances in other languages many centuries
earlier. For example, although the Greeks lacked a word that
clearly means fairness, Thucydides uses the concept in his
History of the Peloponnesian War (late fifth century BCE). He
describes the besieged people of Melos asking their Athenian
besiegers to consider that in the case of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and just dealing
(ta eikota kai dikaia) between people. In other words, they
request that similar rules apply to the strong and the weak
without regard to differences in power. In his Politics (late
fourth century BCE), Aristotle argues that standards of justice
or fairness differ in different regimes. In democratic regimes,
ruled over by the many who are poor, the governing idea is
that people should be treated alike, so political offices should
be distributed through a lottery system, while according to
this view, free birth and citizenship constitute being alike. In
contrast, in oligarchical regimes, ruled over by the rich, fairness is treating people differently, according to their merits,
RECENT USAGE
In recent years, fairness has received considerable attention
because of the work of John Rawls and his theory of justice
as fairness. In A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls argues that specific principles of justice can be justified by showing that they
would be chosen by representative individuals placed in a
carefully constructed, artificial-choice situation. To ensure that
peoples particular interests do not influence their choice of
principles, Rawls places the representative individuals behind
a hypothetical veil of ignorance. They are to choose principles without knowing about their own specific identities
or attributes (e.g., social position, talents, religion, sex, age).
Rawls calls his theory justice as fairness because this designation conveys the idea that the resultant principles of justice
are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair. In recent years,
different aspects of fairness have figured prominently in social
science research. Researchers have examined peoples views
about procedural fairness in political, business, education, and
other settings. Numerous studies support the strong effects
of procedural considerations, which are not only distinct
from outcome considerations but frequently more influential,
even in cases with highly unfavorable outcomes. In assessing a variety of institutions, participants have been shown
to place greater weight on their views of how decisions are
made than on how the outcomes of the decisions affect them.
An important implication of this so-called fair-process effect
is the realization of peoples willingness to accept undesirable
decisions if they believe that the decisions have been made
fairly. This has special salience with regard to political or other
systems that require sacrifice of their subjects. Contrariwise,
people have been shown to react strongly against decision
processes they view as unfair, especially when decisions have
outcomes they also view as unfavorable.
Concerns about fairness are also appealed to in order to
ground moral requirements to support cooperative associations. The principle of fairness (or fair play), developed by H.
L. A. Hart in 1955, is based on fair distribution of benefits and
burdens. When a number of people join in cooperative activities to produce and receive common benefits, other people
who receive the benefits but do not share the burdens of providing them (i.e., free riders) may be viewed as treating the
cooperators unfairly. To remedy this situation, they too should
cooperate, even if they would prefer not to. Developed along
these lines, the principle of fairness grounds an influential
recent account of why people should obey the law. Given the
large-scale cooperation necessary to produce essential benefits
of contemporary societies that include national defense and
law and order, people who receive the benefits incur moral
requirements to bear their fair share of the burdens required to
produce them. Since important state benefits are coordinated
Faith-based Initiative
President George W. Bushs faith-based initiative had three
primary componentsregulatory reform, technical assistance,
and tax reformeach designed to help religious social service
providers partner with government.
The regulatory reform component included legislation
designed to expand charitable choice to nearly all federal
social service programs. These provisions, originally added
to the 1996 welfare reform legislation and included in three
subsequent laws, reduced barriers, thereby allowing religious
organizations to apply for federal funding while maintaining
their religious character. The second part provided technical assistance to smaller social service providers to help them
navigate the federal grant process. The final piece, tax reform,
sought new tax incentives to help charities.
The faith-based initiative was a high priority for Bush.
Issued on January 29, 2001, Bushs first executive order created the White House Office of Faith-based and Community
Initiatives (WHOFBCI) to help coordinate and implement
faith-based initiatives. His second executive order created
faith-based centers in five cabinet-level departments; two later
orders added five more.
The regulatory and tax proposals attracted controversy and
failed in Congress, but the WHOFBCI and its satellites succeeded behind the scenes in changing regulations, earmarking
money for faith-based organizations, and generally transforming the relationship between the executive branch and religious groups.
President Barack Obama retained the faith-based office,
changing its name to the Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships and creating an interfaith advisory council.
See also Church and State; Religion and Politics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AMY E. BLACK
False Consciousness
False consciousness is a concept often attributed to Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engels that explains the oppressive processes
and the possible misguiding effects of the dominant ideologies
on individuals and masses. In fact, Marx and Engels do not use
Family Values
Although family values can, in theory, apply to any of the
worlds many culturesentailing an endorsement of traditional families as the building blocks of strong societiesthe
term has special importance for students of American politics and the American culture wars, which characterized the
political landscape during the 1980s and 1990s. While never a
strictly partisan term, family values played an important role in
the Republican Partys efforts to gain and keep the support of
social conservatives during those years and into the twentyfirst century. Vice President Dan Quayles address to the
Commonwealth Club of California in the spring of 1992in
which he criticized television character Murphy Brown for
bearing a child out of wedlock, connecting a post-1960s
poverty of values with the hopelessness of urban poverty
that fed the Los Angeles riots of that yearrepresents perhaps
the most noted example of the rhetoric of family values.
Family values is an umbrella term referring to issue positions
that combine a rejection of the many changes in post-1960s
sexual morality with a defense of traditional family structures.
It emerged out of opposition to the rise of modern feminism,
Roe v. Wade, and the proposed Equal Rights Amendment,
each of which was presented as part of a wider assaultpursued by a countercultural eliteon traditional values. (The
Family Research Council, the American Family Association,
and Focus on the Familythree of the most prominent groups
promoting a family values agendawere formed between
1977 and 1983.) Just how closely such family values resemble
actually existing families in the nations pre-1960s past remains
a contested question, as Stephanie Coontz argues in The Way
We Never Were (1992). The positions generally subsumed
under the category of family values include a defense of traditional heterosexual marriage and support for legislation or
a constitutional amendment defining marriage as the union
of one man and one woman; opposition to abortion and support for adoption alternatives; support for public policies that
encourage intact, two-parent families and discourage divorce;
and opposition to media violence and pornography. Somewhat more broadly, family values evokes such character traits as
deference toward authority, self-discipline, sexual restraint,
and respect for ones elders.
Although, as mentioned above, the politics of family values in the United States does not divide evenly along partisan
lines, it is undeniable that the Republican Party has been far
more adept than the Democratic Party at building alliances
based on such an agenda, and strong Christian right support
for Republican candidates throughout the 1980s and 1990s
provides evidence of this Republican success in speaking the
language of family values. (More generally, Bill Clintons critics often cited his admission of marital infidelity as evidence of
his lack of commitment to traditional family values.)
Democrats speak of family values as well, but with far less
attention to sexual behavior and far more attention to economics, often stressing a commitment to such issues as a living
wage for working families threatened by poverty, universal
Fanon, Frantz
Frantz Fanon (19251961) was an ethno-psychiatrist and
political theorist who spent his adult life fighting racism and
promoting social justice. He was a Renaissance man who
practiced medicine, actively resisted French imperialism, and
wrote prolifically on a range of issues across the disciplines of
political science, psychology, sociology, and economics. He is
560 Al-Farabi
widely known in the early twenty-first century as an antiracist
revolutionary who advocated violence as a means of liberating the third world from European colonialism.
Fanon was born in Fort-de-France, Martinique. He was the
fifth of eight children born into a middle-class black family that
had the means to send him to the Lyce Schoelcher, where he
received a French-colonial education. As an Afro-Caribbean
growing up in a French colony, he witnessed at an early age
white condescension and racism toward blacks. At the same
time, he was taught by the Ngritude poet Aim Csaire, who
challenged the dominance of French culture and advocated
black pride. The psychology and politics of colonialism thus
became dominant themes in Fanons life and work.
In 1943, at the age of eighteen, Fanon joined the Free
French forces led by Charles de Gaulle and was sent to fight
in North Africa and Europe during World War II (19391945).
After the war Fanon returned to France and studied psychiatry at the University of Lyon. He defended his dissertation
in November 1951 and in the following year married MarieJosephe Dubl, with whom he had one son. While working
at a hospital in Saint-Alban, France, Fanon observed a variety of psychiatric problems among Algerian and Moroccan
immigrants resulting from French racism, which he called the
North African syndrome.These experiences provided material for a collection of essays on language, sexuality, racism, and
black identity that were published in a seminal book titled
Black Skin,White Masks (1952).
In 1953 Fanon was appointed chief physician at the state
hospital in Blida-Joinville, Algeria, which was then part of
France. While caring for patients there he again observed the
many pathological effects of French racism against the Algerians. Deciding that he could no longer work for the French in
their colonial hospital, he joined the Algerian independence
movement Front de Libration National (FLN) and resigned
from his post. The French subsequently expelled Fanon and
his wife and son from Algeria. Exiled in Tunisia, he continued practicing psychiatry and began writing for El Moudjahid
(The Freedom Fighter), the underground newspaper of the
FLN. He became the spokesperson for the FLN, twice narrowly escaped assassination, and in 1960 served as the Algerian
ambassador to Ghana.
Fanon was diagnosed with leukemia in late 1960 and
sought treatment first in the Soviet Union and then in the
United States. While sick and dying, he hurriedly finished The
Wretched of the Earth (1961), a masterpiece for which French
existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre wrote the preface.
This book, in which Fanon wrote that colonized peoples are
emancipated through violence against their oppressors, quickly
became an iconic handbook of third world liberation. When
Fanon died on December 6, 1961, at the age of thirty-six, he
was hailed by many as a revolutionary prophet.
See also Colonialism; Race and Racism; Racial Discrimination;
Sartre, Jean-Paul.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ELIOT DICKINSON
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Caute, David. Frantz Fanon. New York:Viking, 1970.
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin,White Masks. New York: Grove, 1968. First
published 1952.
. A Dying Colonialism. New York: Grove, 1967.
. Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays. New York: Grove, 1967.
. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove, 1963. First published
1961.
Geismar, Peter. Fanon. New York: Dial, 1971.
Al-Farabi
Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Uzalagh ibn Tarkhan Abu
Nasr al-Farabi (c. 870950) probably was born in Wasij, a village area of the city of Farab in Transoxiana. Likely of Turkic
origins, he has become known in modern times as al-Farabi
after his city of origin rather than as Abu Nasr as was traditional among Muslim scholars.
Many of the details of al-Farabis life are unclear. One source
is his short semiautobiographical history of philosophy, Kitab fi
zuhur al-falsafah (Book on the Rise of Philosophy), which survives as
a few fragments documenting several events in his life.
A prolific author, al-Farabi completed more than one hundred books dealing with logic, literary theory, politics, philosophy, and all the sciences known to the medieval world,
with the exception of medicine. Al-Farabi was fluent in
Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Syriac, and Greek. As a linguist he
wrote several commentaries on Aristotles Poetics, Rhetoric, and
De Interpretatione.
Al-Farabi probably completed his Quranic studies in
Bukhara, where he became an Islamic judge (qadi). He was a
practicing Sufi whose musical writings included discussions
of the therapeutic benefits of music on the soul. These discussions were allied with his writings on psychological matters.
To complete his mastery of Arabic, al-Farabi studied in
Baghdad. He also mastered the subject of logic, surpassing
his teachers in the subject and dominating the field during
his lifetime. One of his logic teachers, Yahanna ibn Haylan,
a Nestorian Christian, made the writings of Neoplatonism
available to him.
Al-Farabi traveled to Egypt and Ascalon after his stay in
Baghdad. He then moved to Aleppo, where the Hamdani ruler
Sayf al-Dawlah, a patron of the arts, took al-Farabi into his
court.
Because of the importance of his work in philosophy, alFarabi is called the Second Teacher (al-Muallim al-Thani) in
the history of Islamic philosophy, with the first teacher or
major philosopher being al-Kindi. As a philosopher, al-Farabi
was greatly influenced by Neoplatonism, expressing his metaphysical views in his work, Ibsa al-Ulum (The Enumeration of
the Sciences).
Al-Farabi was the first Muslim to write works on political philosophy. He was also the greatest political philosopher
of the early Middle Ages. His political works were the last of
his writings and include al-Siyash al-Madaniyah (Civil Polity),
al-Sirah al-Fadilah (Virtuous Regime), and al-Madinah al Fadilab
Farm Lobby
The farm lobby is a collection of interest groups representing
agricultural producers in the United States. It held sway in
U.S. agricultural policy for most of the twentieth century and
continues to be influential today.
The political organization of farmers in the United States
began with the Granger movement, which lobbied successfully in state legislatures for the regulation of railroads in the
1870s and 1880s. The movement produced several state associations and the first national organization of farmers, the
National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry, which
was founded in 1867. However, farmers organizations did not
establish a permanent presence in Washington until World War
I (19141918) when the National Grange, the National Farmers Union, and the American Farm Bureau Federation opened
offices in the nations capital. Of the three peak associations,
the Farm Bureau had the largest, most prosperous, and most
broadly dispersed membership, and it was the most significant
by a good measure.
The farm lobby rose in access and influence during the
interwar period. In one notorious instance in 1921, it enlisted
a farm bloc of sympathetic senators and representatives and
ambushed the congressional leadership on the eve of adjournment, winning several concessions, including passage of the
Packers and Stockyards Act and the Futures Trading Act. Motivated to address a postwar economic crisis, it invested most
of its energy in a campaign for economic aid to its core constituency, farmers of corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco, and milk.
Unsuccessful in the Republican era, its lobbying efforts paid
off with the passage of the New Deal Agricultural Adjustment
Act in 1933. The farm lobby played a central role not only
in Capitol Hill committee rooms but also in the offices of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture and in the farmer-elected
Agricultural Adjustment Act committees that administered the
subsidy program in the countryside.
For its first three decades, the farm lobby maintained a
bipartisan posture, working with farm state representatives and
senators on both sides of the aisle. However, after the Second World War, debates about the nations agricultural policy
became politicized, and the farm lobby split on ideological
lines. During the Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson administrations, the Farm Bureau and other conservative elements
of the farm lobby supported Republican reforms in the agricultural subsidy programs that were opposed by the Farmers
Union and other liberal groups. As interest groups representing producers of particular commodities proliferated, the farm
lobby also fragmented. In the 1970s, the farm lobby patched up
its ideological divisions, but it no longer speaks in one voice to
the extent it did at midcentury. Still, the farm lobby remains a
formidable presence in its domain. Since the Reagan administration, it has successfully resisted Republican attempts to curtail agricultural programs and Democratic initiatives to turn
them to broader, progressive purposesdespite the dramatic
decline in the economic and electoral importance of farmers.
Because of the farm lobbys political prowess, political science scholarship has taken an active interest in it. The
farm organizations were among the earliest mass-membership
advocacy groups, and they are a subject of many leading studies of interest group mobilization and membership. Truman
(1951), for example, uses the agricultural sector to illustrate
the way destabilizing disturbances in social relations propel the
formation of lobbying groups, and Olson (1971), in critique,
draws on the history of the Farm Bureau to show the importance of selective incentives in the maintenance of collective
action. The farm lobbys interventions in the political process
are textbook cases of the ways and conditions of interest group
influence in American politics. With studies of agricultural
politics, political scientists have analyzed the methods of group
representation in Washington, influence of group cohesion
and governmental structure, patterns of cooperation and conflict, exchanges of political intelligence and support, financial
contributions to election campaigns, logrolling and coalition
building, and organizational repertoires and governmental
reforms on interest group access and influence.
The farm lobby also figured in the development of the
pluralist model of American democracy and critiques thereof.
In a classic statement of pluralist theory, Truman (1951) used
the activities of the farm lobby to develop a group interpretation of American politics, depicting the political system as an
equilibrium among organized and potential interest groups.
In an early critique, McConnell (1953) related the decline of
broad, inclusive, and democratic agrarian politics to the rejection of party mobilization and the embrace of interest group
politics in the formation of the Farm Bureau. Likewise, Lowi
(1979) used the farm lobbys involvement in legislation and
administration of agricultural policy as a prime exhibit of the
pathologies of pluralisms progeny, interest group liberalism.
See also Agrarianism; Coalition Formation; Interest Groups and
Lobbies; Lobbying; Pluralism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOHN MARK HANSEN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Browne, William P. Cultivating Congress: Constituents, Issues, and Interests in
Agricultural Policymaking. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995.
Clemens, Elisabeth S. The Peoples Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the
Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 18901925. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997.
562 Fascism
Ferejohn, John A. Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of
Food Stamp Legislation. In Congress and Policy Change, edited by Gerald
C. Wright Jr., Leroy N. Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd, 223253.
New York: Agathon, 1986.
Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. Buying Time: Moneyed Interests
and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees. American
Political Science Review 84 (September 1990): 797820.
Hansen, John Mark. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 19191981.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H.
Salisbury. The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.
Herring, E. Pendleton. Group Representation before Congress. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1929.
Lowi, Theodore J. The End of Liberalism:The Second Republic of the United
States. 2d ed. New York: Norton, 1979.
McConnell, Grant. The Decline of Agrarian Democracy. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1953.
Olson, Mancur, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Salisbury, Robert H. An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups. Midwest
Journal of Political Science 13 (February 1969): 132.
Truman, David B. The Governmental Process: Political Interest and Public
Opinion. New York: Knopf, 1951.
Fascism
As an ideal type, Fascism is an ultranationalist totalitarianism
of the extreme right and an ideology of the twentieth century, the era of mass politics. Fascism has appealed to people
who reject modern bourgeois democracy, with its individualism and materialism, but who also oppose revolutionary
communism.
The earliest Fascist governments were a reaction to the
social upheaval, economic decline, and psychological impact
of World War I (19141918) and its aftermath in postwar
Europe.The despair of Europeans, their suffering and deprivations during this interwar period (19181939), together with
the fear of communism, fed into a willingness by many people
to blame other groups (usually racial) and nations for various
economic and social problems, and to follow politicians who
voiced their grievances. The rise of Fascism demonstrates how
democratic liberties can be abolished and totalitarian ideas and
regimes gain acceptance.
REGIMES
The first Fascist government came to power in Italy in 1922,
led by Benito Mussolini (18831945). Mussolini skillfully
combined syndicalism with nationalism. He called for direct
action and advocated a national mission to revolutionize
society from above, using government, and from below, using
a mass movement to create an organized and robust community. To Mussolini, all liberty belongs to the state, and the
only individual rights are those that stem from the needs of
the state. Under the guidance of its natural leader, or Duce, the
nation finds liberation from bourgeois and Marxist values in a
culture dominated by elite warriors, heroic men ready to sacrifice their lives and their treasure for the good of the nation.
Adolf Hitler (18891945) came to power in Germany in
1933, demanding revision of the entire domestic and international order and promising new, permanent solutions. The
Benito Mussolini, left, and Adolf Hitler led the first fascist
governments, capitalizing on nationalism, racism, and imperialist
expansion to maintain their regimes.
source: Michael Nicholson/Corbis
Fascism 563
conservative notions in an often-shifting muddle of ideas. Hitler views Mussolini as an early model but soon surpasses him,
emphasizing a more virulent form of racism that is irrational, anti-intellectual, and antimodern on its face and includes
large doses of pseudoscientific social Darwinism: all life is an
instinctive struggle by the pure race for victory over all other
races, and for a loving unity among racial brothers. This is the
historical destiny of the superior Aryan race.
Hitler posits that world history is made by culture founders,
the pure race, which is strong, loyal, and willing to realize its
historic mission and obey the leader. This race is the source of
all natural leaders and is destined to rule the world. All loyal
members must be willing to sacrifice themselves to this end,
to be ready to hate and kill their racial enemies to the point
of total extermination, and to dedicate themselves to absolute
obedience to the leader and his chosen deputies.
Hitlers regime institutionalized the leadership principle.
He was the absolute leader, answerable to nobody else, the
only one who truly knew the will of the people and could
lead them to their promised destiny as rulers of the world. He
instituted a virtual police state under the direction of Heinrich
Himmler (19001945), which empowered the new, paramilitary army of elite men whose only thoughts were to obey and
fight for their leader to establish a legal reign of terror, including establishing death camps and concentration camps, and
to arrest, imprison, and murder enemies of the regime. Every
institution was designed to express the spirit of the Volk and to
advance the victory of the Aryan race. To gain control, Hitlers
followers first used street violence. Once in power, state violence was employed.
Together with his minister of propaganda, Joseph Goebbels
(18971945), Hitler refined the big lie as a means to keep the
masses in line. They used emotional appeals to a romanticized
nationalism, including myths of a wonderful past that would
be resurrected once all their enemies were defeated. A cult of
personality was created around the supreme leader.
Mussolinis Fascist Italy and Hitlers Nazi Germany provide
two concrete examples of Fascism in practice. They illustrate
both the interaction of ideas and their application in a tangible
setting, which at times led to the diluting or jettisoning of what
had earlier seemed to their followers essential objectives. Many
ideas were declared but never implemented, such as nationalization of trusts, profit sharing by large enterprises, communalization of wholesale distribution, and division of landed
property. Indeed, some of these ideas were directly undercut
by Hitlers support of conservative elites willing to be coopted by him, such as the Prussian landed aristocracy, the military, the bureaucracy, and major capitalists. But he voiced a few
constant themes: racial purity, the leadership principle, and the
importance of Lebensraum, or imperialist expansion of national
borders to provide living space and abundant resources in the
east for favored ethnic groups.
564 Fascism
power. These new beliefs promote a messianic civil religion
that promises national resurrection. Fascism posits that this
will be accomplished by a communal body of believers who
owe their highest loyalty not to themselves, their families and
friends, or any traditional religious authorities who do not
share the vision of the leader but to their nation.
As an alternative to coercion, Fascists seek the cooperation of established conservative elements of the old regime,
including army, church, and industry. Each group is promised
rewards: the protection of private ownership and virulent
anti-Bolshevism for the owners of production, full employment for the workers, national regeneration for traditional
conservatives, imperialist ventures for the military, state support for compliant religious authorities, recognition of special
status for farmers and peasants, and encouragement to engage
in xenophobic nativism for the masses seeking scapegoats for
their grievances, real or imagined. As William Brustein (1996)
argues in his book The Logic of Evil: The Social Origins of the
Nazi Party, the motives of these groups may provide evidence
for the thesis that many Germans joined the Nazi Party to
promote their economic interests.
Change comes from the top, engineered by a government
using the power of the total state dominated by a single political party and headed by a self-anointed supreme leader who
embodies the national will and is aided by a paramilitary vanguard.Together they pledge to transform the chaos and degeneracy of the past into a resurgent community. The state is the
creator of all values, secular and spiritual. It embodies national
unity and is the guarantor of this oneness. Its strength is in
the spiritual union of the masses. The nation is the source of
all that is goodculture, civilization, true freedomand the
duty of all people is to patriotically serve their nation.
In the new community, equality of all is impossible because
the masses are not fit to govern.The only attainable equality of
the atomized masses is that of conformity as obedient contributors to the goals proclaimed by the leadership.When directed
to it, even mob action is an appropriate means of public policy,
particularly when carrying out racist policies. Regime supporters are whipped into a hysterical state in mass meetings by
carefully crafted calls to defeat perceived enemies, all of whom
can justifiably be subjugated, even eliminated.
Following a military model, at the head of this movement
is the charismatic leader, the undisputed possessor of all the
virtues of the new man, who instinctively knows what the
incoherent masses really want because he embodies the spirit
of the people. He is above criticism, as he is never wrong. All
power flows from his desires, his will, his commands. He is
the embodiment of the national purpose, the head of nation,
state, party, and all their organs. He chooses the few qualified
to serve as his subordinate leaders, who are often allowed to
operate, unchecked, in their own assigned spheres of influence.
The leadership is almost exclusively male.Those few women
who have a government function are placed in positions subordinate to men because of their assumed inferiority, and they are
given work that is stereotypically the province of females, such
as directing a womens organization or working as a secretary.
INFLUENCES
Fascism draws on certain ideas of political philosophy and
incorporates ideas from other ideologies, particularly nationalism and anarcho-syndicalism, as well as from the organicist
strain of socialism. From the ancients, such as Plato and Aristotle, Fascist thinker Giovanni Gentile (18751944) took the idea
that humans are by nature social and political animals who are
Fascism 565
free only as members of a community, in opposition to those
liberal democrats who think humans are atomistic individuals.
Assimilating ideas from Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Hegel,
Maurice Barrs (18621923), French politician and theorist, favored extreme nationalism. The central goal of politics
is organizing and maintaining the power of the nation that
expresses the organic needs of the vital collective. A strong
hierarchical regime organizes the masses for united action.
Incorporating biological determinism, romanticism, social
Darwinism, and anti-Semitism, Barrs saw an unconscious,
irrational vitalism at the root of the national soul. All values,
such as justice and liberty, even honesty, must be measured
in relation to the indispensable needs of the nation and the
essential requirement that it conquer its enemies, especially the
twin evils of Marxism and liberal democracy.
Georges Eugene Sorel (18471922) was an anarchist of the
syndicalist school who supported socialism through collective
action of the workers but preferred strikes and direct action
to politics. In Reflections on Violence (1908) he advocates a general strike by the working class that would swiftly lead to a
violent revolution that would wipe out decadent bourgeois
society. Parliamentary government would be replaced by workers organized into industrial syndicates. These small economic
communities would serve as the center of economic, social, and
indeed all productive life, and all daily decisions would be made
by people at their workplaces. Mussolini used some of Sorels
ideas, skillfully combining syndicalism with nationalism.
CONTEMPORARY FASCISM
Today Fascism is widely reviled. Still, most Western industrial
nations have small, transitory groups that could be considered
neo-Fascist and that often model themselves on Fascist movements of the past, agitate for their version of chauvinism and
racial purity, and threaten a revival of some kind of Fascist
government. These include political parties and organizations
such as the National Socialist Movement and the Ku Klux
Klan in the United States, Pamyat in Russia, the National
Alliance in Italy, the National Front in France, and the Freedom Party in Austria.
In addition, some scholars have regarded movements and
regimes in Latin America (Perons in Argentina, Stroessners
in Paraguay, Pinochets in Chile), Africa (Qaddafi in Libya, the
National Party in South Africa), and Asia (Hindu extremists in
India and governments in China, North Korea, and Myanmar)
as Fascist. Other writers consider a number of these as more
authoritarian than Fascist, and the difference between the two
remains open to debate. Today the Internet serves as a means
to propagate race hatred, anti-Semitism, and Holocaust denial,
frequent themes of contemporary Fascists.
What has been termed Islamo-Fascism is an extreme fundamentalist version of Islam. It is a response to the failure of
Western and Marxist ideologies to meet the perceived needs
of the masses in Middle Eastern nations. It preaches such messages as the need for revolutionary struggle against enemies
and the use of the power of the state in a totalitarian manner
to achieve utopian goals, including a regenerated worldwide
Fascist Parties
Fascist parties evolved in most European societies after World
War I (19141918), and the war was the most important reason for their emergence. Fascist parties were often founded
after 1918 by semidemobilized units from regular armies, and
they reflected both the incubated nationalism generated by
the war and the extremely high levels of militarization that
marked many European societies after armistice. The most
notable parties broadly characterized as Fascist are the Partito
Nazionale Fascista (PNF) in Italy, the Nationalsozialistische
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) in Germany, and the
group of parties known as the Falange in Spain. Less significant examples of Fascist parties are the British Union of
Fascists, the Arrow Cross Party (Hungary), and the Iron Guard
(Rumania). Fascist parties were normally organized around
one powerful leader: for example, Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in
Germany, and Franco in Spain.
Federalism 567
government by compensatory organs of coercion, which
assumed control of the means of public violence in societies
in which the traditional organs of statehood were too weak
to withstand intense economic pressures, and which farmed
out state power to a diffuse array of quasi-privatistic societal
actors and organizations. A strongly integrated state, possessing
a broad-based democratic apparatus, was the main bulwark
against the success of Fascist parties.
Federalism
Federalism is a political movement that advances the governing concept of shared rule and self-rule through the development and operation of governmental arrangements called
federations. It represents an ideology of a particular form of
568 Federalism
Canadian provinces, for example, represent different linguisticethnic, geographic, and economic interests. Australias federation
is based largely on both geographic and economic differences;
its states were preindependence colonies. Belgium is federated
by linguistic-ethnic differences between the Flemish and Walloons. Indias states are a mixture of historic principalities, distinct ethnic-language groups, British colonial demarcation, and
religious preferences. In each case, federal arrangements have
developed to allow for representation and promotion of these
differences within the framework of a single country.
For some time, divided rule was considered to be a product
of some bargain among sovereign entities that agree to yield
sovereignty to increase their public security, sometimes economic interests, or both. William Riker (1964) notes that the
product of the bargain is a division of final decisions between
two levels. Alfred Stepan (1999) argues that the problem with
this definition of origin is that many democratic federations
follow a different political and historical logic, one of holding
together through Federalism. He cites as examples India in
the late 1940s, Spain in the late 1970s, and Belgium from the
1970s to the 1990s, where strong unitary features were set aside
in favor of constitutionally devolved power and their polities
were transformed into federal countries.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
As numerous theologians and political philosophers have
noted, the federal idea has biblical roots. Theologically speaking, the partnership between people and God as described
in the Bible was covenantal in idea, which in turn was transformed to the covenantal (or federal) relationship between
individuals and families leading to the formation of political
bodies as compound polities. The term federal is derived from
the Latin foedus, which like the Hebrew term brit means covenant. The political application of this theological use gave
rise to federal as explicitly governmental. The ancient Greeks
used federal arrangements after the Peloponnesian War (431
404 BCE) for military purposes, as small city-states combined
in limited union or confederation to ward off larger powers.
The constituent cities delegated to federal rulers only military authority, retaining diplomatic, treaty, and related powers.
Similarly, in northern Italy and southern Germany, medieval
cities formed military confederations to resist the power of
larger nation-states. Both of these federative movements suffered from increasing restrictions on the authority of military
leaders by their constituent governments, which led to ineffective defensive performance and eventual dissolution. Moreover,
in general, confederations were unable to mobilize sufficient
political support or government power to maintain themselves
in an age of exclusive nationalism. They proved unable to raise
revenues, promote their economies, or even defend themselves.
That indeed is a primary force behind the American transformation from a confederation into the first modern federation. The Articles of Confederation were written in 1777 but
were not adopted until March 1781 as the War of Independence from Britain (17761783) was ending. The roots of the
struggle between the forces of strong national government and
independent states go deep into colonial history and experience, as do quasi-independence and partial self-governance
under the British Crown. In the end the articles left ultimate
power in the hands of states, whereas the general government
was given, according to Merrill Jensen (1950), specific and
circumscribed powers.
The story of the first federation that followed the U.S.
Constitutional Convention of 1787 is well known. The new
federal system, which developed largely along nationalist lines
and very much according to James Madisons image, would
occupy some middle ground between a confederation of
sovereign states and a consolidated (or unitary) nation. After
much debate and compromise, a single countrywide union
was formed that would act directly on the population, through
representative assemblies rather than through the states. The
national government was to be insulated from the direct
political control of the states, but its own influences would be
checked by division of institutional powers between the legislative bodies, the executive, and a judiciary. The new national
government was to be a limited government of enumerated
powers but with all of the necessary means to secure the safety,
liberty, and prosperity of the larger community.
The nineteenth century saw the establishment of a number of federations or at least constitutionally federal regimes,
influenced to some degree by the United States. The first was
Switzerland in 1848, followed by Canada in 1867, the German Empire (and Reich) from 1871 to 1918, and Australia in
the early twentieth century. Four Latin American countries
Venezuela (1811), Mexico (1824), Argentina (1853), and Brazil
(1891)followed suit with federal constitutions, although they
all have faced varying degrees of instability and/or military governments that, in effect, have attenuated their federal arrangements and have experienced periods of strong centralization.
FEDERALISM IN THOUGHT
Neither the ancient Greek philosophers (e.g., Plato and
Aristotle) nor their successors developed a theory of Federalism. The earliest writings surrounded the Swiss and Dutch
confederations, which led to the first full-blown conceptual
framework. Johannes Althusius (15621638) made the connection of union or consociatio, the first federal theory of popular
sovereignty. Althusius stated in his Politica that human society
develops from private to public association by the definite
steps and progressions of small societies, the public association
exists when many private associations are linked together for
the purpose of establishing an inclusive political order (politeuma) (Carney 1964, 84).
The work of James Madison at the American Constitutional
Convention and in the Federalist Papers, which supported ratification of the proposed Constitution, did the most to forge
modern federal theory. Madison argued for a large republic
in which both local and collective interests were to be represented, where power given by the people would be divided
between two governments (Federalist No. 51). It is described
as a compound republic, partaking of both a national and
federal character (Federalist No. 62), a confederated republic
Federalism 569
(Federalist No. 63), forming a combination of the great and
aggregated interests, the local, and particularly state representations (Federalist No. 10). At the time Madison made no distinction between federal, confederate, and confederacy, but
Gottfried Dietze (1999) maintains that he clearly meant to distinguish between a compact forming a league among distinct
societies and a compact by the people, not of individuals composing one entire nation but of the people of the states. The
federal state is one state composed of several states, invoking
both the national and federal character (Federalist No. 62).
Alexander Hamilton, like Madison, thought the supremacy
clause granting the general government ultimate power when
there were disputes among the levels is where the emphasis of
Federalism lies. He writes in the Federalist Papers, The vigor of
government is essential to the security of liberty (Federalist
No. 1) and to be effective must possess energy in pursuing the
public good (Federalist No. 30). He clearly considers territorial power (and institutional power division) less important than
does Madison. The advantage of a modern federation is that it
can act directly on individuals, and through its greater powers
the federal government prevents states from falling into a state
of anarchy, civil war, or dissolution. A strong federal government
is more likely to slay the political monster of imperium im imperio (Federalist No. 15). Hamilton makes it clear that there is only
one national government, one federal republic, one federal state.
Federal theory in the United States and elsewhere has naturally been expanded through the number of applications to
different countries and, of course, as these countries evolve
and deal with new situations. Robert Agranoff and Michael
McGuire (2003) note that the application of U.S. Federalism
has changed and theoretically has been characterized as dual,
cooperative, coercive, and more recently open to a number of
models of overlapping and opportunistic behavior. American
theory in general has been centralizing or national in focus.
In a similar vein, federal experiences on a cross-national basis
have been ideologically identified as leaning toward pluralist
in a multiple institutional sense, centralist in formation of a
union, decentralist in the sense of reinforcing multiple power
centers, and balanced between integration and diversification.
Federal theory has also been closely attached to particular
value or normative positions. Alain Gagnon and Charles Gibbs
(1999) indicate the three most central as (1) communitarian,
both social and political; (2) functional, in the sense of operating manageable political systems; and (3) democratic, enhancing the liberty of persons plus participation of citizens and
the promotion of equality. Promotion of these principles has
evolved as being part of the federal ideology. For example, as
democratic ideals and universal suffrage systems emerged, federal systems evolved along with the rise of democracy through
political parties and other forms of mass political participation.
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND LAW
Ronald Watts (1999) writes that federal systems normally
require a written supreme constitution not unilaterally
amendable and requiring the consent of all or a majority of the
570 Federalism
chamber, similar to that of nonfederal parliaments. The parties
in federal systems, however, are almost always organized on a
federal basis. Spains two major statewide parties, for example,
maintain their basic units at the regional or autonomous community level so that, in effect, there are at least thirty-four
party organizations (more, when nonstate parties are considered) that convene centrally only around general elections.
The same pattern holds for Canada, Australia, the United
States, and many other countries.
All federal countries distribute revenue powers among
the levels of government, although the general governments
tend to raise the largest sums of money. Vertical and horizontal (among subnational units) imbalances are then adjusted
through such mechanisms as tax sharing and subventions.
Older federations, for example, the United States, Canada, and
Australia, use the federal general spending power for broad
purposes, even those that effect exclusive powers of other levels. These actions have generally been upheld by their courts.
The divided power nature of federal systems means that
some form of court must adjudicate jurisdictional disputes
and resolve conflicts. Some differences are, of course, worked
out politically and/or administratively, and some systems rely
on referenda to settle some issues. All federations nevertheless provide for judicial remedies for disputes relating to federal questions, that is, matters of power and responsibility by
level. Some countries use their general federal court systems
to adjudicate such constitutional issues as well as other matters
relating to general government. This is the case for Austria,
Australia, Canada, the United States, Malaysia, and India. Other
countriesGermany, Spain, and Belgiumemploy dedicated
constitutional courts, which specialize in matters of rights and
constitutional interpretation, particularly matters relating to
issues and conflicts between the tiers of government.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Fiscal and program interdependencies among governments
mean that officials within federal countries must interact
regularly. These actions are called intergovernmental relations
(IGR). Dale Krane and Deil Wright (1998) define IGR as
the various combinations and interdependencies and influences among public officialselected and administrativein
all types and levels of governmental units, with particular
emphasis on financial, policy, and political issues (p. 1168).
The concept (not the practice) originated in the United States
during the Great Depression of 1929, when new activities
and programs drastically altered the concept of separation of
functions by level of government. It has come to characterize
the patterns of interaction among levels in many countries,
particularly in federal systems.
Deil Wright (1988) sets out five distinct features that define
and guide IGR studies: (1) number and types of governmental
units, their legal status, and changes over time; (2) number and
types of public officials by jurisdiction and unit; their background, attitudes, and perceptions of their roles and responsibilities; and their actions; (3) patterns of interaction among
and between officials representing various jurisdictions and
CONCLUSION
The Federalism idea involves both structure and processes of
governance that seek to establish unity on the basis of consent
while preserving diversity by constitutionally uniting separate
political communities into an encompassing polity. Powers are
divided and shared between constituent governments and a
federal government, where the constituent governments have
broad responsibilities and the autonomy to carry out responsibilities and the federal government undertakes broader
countrywide responsibilities. A democratic federation is, in
effect, a republic of republics, which emphasizes partnership
and cooperation for the common good while also allowing
diversity and competition.
In an era of increasing globalization and international
interdependence, along with increased contemporary withincountry emphasis on ethnic identity and decentralization,
there are those who maintain that a postmodern era of Federalism is emerging that promotes a variety of new federal
arrangements. To Daniel Elazar (1996), the nation-state system
is taking on a new dimension or overlay on government, a
network of agreements that are not only militarily and economically binding for de facto reasons but are becoming constitutionally binding, de jure (p. 419). These agreements are
federal in nature, not in the sense of federation but in other
ideational manifestations of Federalism, including the revival
of such confederal arrangements as the EU, various union
arrangements (United Kingdom), devolved regional autonomy (Italy), consociational arrangements (Belgium), federacies (Puerto Rico and customs unions), and leagues (North
American Free Trade Agreement, free trade areas). The state
is not going away, but new forms of shared rule or multilevel
governance are emerging. Wherever both unity and diversity
must be simultaneously preserved, Federalism is an ideology
that can offer solutions.
See also Constitutional Courts; Democracy; Democratic Theory;
Federalism, Comparative; Intergovernmental Relations; Nationalism;
Nation-building.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ROBERT AGRANOFF
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Agranoff, Robert. Intergovernmental Policy Management: Cooperative
Practices in Federal Systems. In The Dynamics of Federal Systems, edited
by Michael Pagano and Robert Leonetti. London: Palgrave, 2007.
Agranoff, Robert, and Michael McGuire. Collaborative Public Management:
New Strategies for Local Governments. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 2003.
Federalism, Comparative
Federalism is a principle of government that seeks to reconcile unity and diversity through the exercise of political power
along multiple autonomous levels. The crux of this principle
is the idea of combining self-rule and shared rule. Through
Federalism, different political units can live together yet apart
since they share a government while at the same time having
their own.
Federalism as a principle has three main political uses: fragmenting political power to protect against absolutism (the
case of the United States), decentralizing policy making to
stimulate economic development and render government
more efficient and closer to the people, and managing ethnic
diversity by devolving power over fields that traditionally create tensions between the various communities (Canada and
Switzerland).
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
AND FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS
The study of comparative Federalism often involves a focus
on intergovernmental relations and fiscal arrangements. The
division of power in federations almost never translates into a
situation where the two levels of government can act without
having to interact with one another. This need for interaction explains why federations have developed mechanisms
of consultation and coordination such as meetings between
heads of government from constituent units and/or cabinet
ministers and specific forums such as the Council of Australian Governments.
Federalism tends to give policy areas such as health care and
education, which are expensive to fund, to constituents that
have less revenue than the federal government. For this reason,
federations have developed mechanisms for financial transfers
CENTRALIZATION/DECENTRALIZATION,
SYMMETRY/ASYMMETRY
Comparative Federalism studies also involve researching the
different outlooks that federations can take. Two pairs of concepts are frequently used to characterize federations. The first
is centralization/decentralization, which refers to the relative
power of the federal government and the constituent units. A
centralized federation is a federation in which the powers of
the federal government are relatively greater than those of the
constituent units. A decentralized federation is a federation
in which the powers of the constituent units are relatively
greater than those of the federal government.
This being said, characterizing the degree of centralization/
decentralization of federations is tricky because it is unclear
which criterion should be used. At least three criteria can be
considered.
The first is the written constitution.Which level of government is given more powers? Who has power over the most
important fields? Who is given residual powers, that is, power
over all fields that are not specified in the constitution? This is
seemingly a straightforward approach for assessing the degree
of centralization/decentralization of a federation. However,
it is often misleading because federations change, sometimes
becoming quite different from their original forms as specified in the constitution. A second criterion that can be used
to compare the relative importance of public spending by the
different levels of government is government expenditures.
The argument is that federations with the highest percentage
of public spending for constituent units are more decentralized
since their units are the most able to use their powers to effectively provide public services. From this perspective, federations
such as Malaysia and Austria are centralized, while Switzerland
and Canada are decentralized. A third criterion involves looking at federal institutions. This angle involves focusing on the
representation of the constituent units in these institutions and
on their capacity to shape federal policy making.
Federalist Papers
Written to persuade New York voters of the merits of ratifying the U.S. Constitution, The Federalist Papers are a collection
of eighty-five articles that seek to explain and justify key features of the Constitution and to respond to the objections of
its critics. The Federalist Papers are typically regarded as one of
the most important works of American political thought and
are a critical record of both the principles and the debates that
informed the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.
The Federalist Papers were written principally by Alexander
Hamilton and James Madison (due to illness and other obligations, John Jay wrote only five articles). Published under the
pseudonym Publius, The Federalist Papers appeared three to
four times a week in New York newspapers between October 27, 1787, and April 2, 1788. Advocating a more powerful,
central government, The Federalist Papers reflect the Framers
REPUBLICANISM AND
REPRESENTATION
Publius described the form of government created by the
Constitution as republican, although Madisons use of this
term departed from its traditional association with civic
virtue and small, culturally homogeneous nations. Madison described a republic as a government deriving power
directly or indirectly from the great body of people, administered by people holding office for specific term or good
behavior. By emphasizing representative government and
the indirect power of citizens, Publius insisted that applying the republican principle to the more expansive territory of the United States would render the principle more
effective and the government more stable. A large republic
would enable a scheme of representation that could insulate
officeholders from the transient passions of the public while
retaining a sense of the peoples will. Because representatives
would be elected from relatively large districts and senators chosen by state legislatures, they would more likely be
selected on the basis of their reputation and public standing;
less animated by merely local attachments, they would filter
rather than simply mirror their constituents interests. Moreover, as Madison argued in Federalist No. 10, a large republic
could more effectively address the problem of faction, which
he defined as any number of citizens, whether a majority or
a minority, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse or passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests
of the community. The republican principle itself could
solve the problem of minority factionminorities would be
diluted through the process of representationbut a large
republic would guard against majority faction by taking in
such a large number of interests that no single one would be
able to form a majority.
and The Federalist Papers discussion of some of the Constitutions features presents necessities as virtues. Finally, Hamilton
and Madison were only two of the individuals involved in
drafting the Constitution, and in subsequent years even they
would construe the document differently; for Hamilton the
national government it created might have its own will and
ends, while for Madison it was charged with protecting private
rights and serving as a neutral arbiter of conflicting interests.
The single voice of Publius therefore masked significant differences of opinion among participants in the constitutional
convention, who ultimately agreed on the text but not necessarily the meaning of the Constitution.
FEDERALISM
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carey, George W. The Federalist: Design for a Constitutional Republic. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1989.
Cooke, Jacob E., ed. The Federalist. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University
Press, 1961.
Dietze, Gottfried. The Federalist: A Classic on Federalism and Free Government.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960.
Epstein, David F. The Political Theory of the Federalist. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984.
Furtwangler, Albert. The Authority of Publius: A Reading of the Federalist Papers.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984.
Mason, Alpheus Thomas. The FederalistA Split Personality. American
Historical Review 57, no. 3 (April 1952): 625643.
Storing, Herbert J. What the Anti-Federalists Were For:The Political Thought of the
Opponents of the Constitution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
White, Morton. Philosophy, the Federalist, and the Constitution. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1987.
Wills, Gary. Explaining America:The Federalist. New York: Penguin, 2001.
See also Checks and Balances; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Federalism; Representation and Representative; Republicanism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MATTHEW VOORHEES
Federal Mandates
A federal mandate, or direct order, in the United States is
a federal regulation that must be complied with by a subnational government under the threat of a criminal or civil
sanction. There are myriad arrays of federal mandates involving a broad range of state and local functions and programs.
An excellent and prominent example of a federal mandate in
the United States is the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, forbidding employee job discrimination by state and local governments on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Additional prominent federal mandates involve the
environment (air and water quality), homeland security, fair
housing, fair labor standards, occupational safety, drug and
alcohol testing, and endangered species.
Prior to the 1960s, there were relatively few federal mandates imposed on state and local governments. The proliferation of federal mandates began in the mid-1960s and continued
with even greater force in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, substantially due to the belief of the U.S. Congress that the imposition
of federal mandates on state and local governments was an
efficient and economical mechanism for promoting uniform
national minimum policy standards. In an aggregate sense, this
CONFEDERATIONS AND
FEDERATIONS IN MODERN
WORLD POLITICS
Although better known as an international organization,
the United Nations (UN) is in effect a global confederation,
which tries to reconcile state sovereignty with a weak common government concerned with global problems, notably
peace, human rights, international development, and environmental protection. The UN also illustrates the chief defects of
confederation: the absence of a coercive authority to enforce
member state compliance except ultimately via recourse to
armed force, the subsequent reliance on states respect for
their UN-imposed obligations, and the stymieing effect of
unanimous decision making, at least among the permanent
members of the Security Council.These structural weaknesses
help explain why self-defense confederations such as the
United Provinces of the Netherlands (15791795), the Swiss
Confederation (12911848), the German Bund (18151866),
and the United States under the Articles of Confederation
(17811789) failed to survive into the modern era.
Indeed, it was the desire to remedy the faults of confederation that prompted the members of the Philadelphia Convention (17871788) to design the first modern federation, the
United States of America. U.S. Federalism was intended as a
preferable alternative to a unitary, centralized republic because
individual liberty was thought to require an effective central
government kept in check by unit self-government. Hence,
Federalism is considered a way of institutionalizing democracy,
which is why nondemocratic federations, such as the former
Soviet Union (19221991) or even the contemporary Russian
Federation (1991), are sometimes seen as spurious instances
of federation. Nonetheless, the spread of Federalism has been
such that by 2000, two billion people lived in federations.
By cleaving political authority between two levels of government, the U.S. federal Constitution left unresolved many
problems regarding how this separation would function in
practice. The study of these issues is known as intergovernmental relations. Major research questions in this field include
AN IN-BETWEEN CATEGORY:
THE EUROPEAN UNION
The novelty of the European Union (EU) is its combination
of confederal and federal principles. What began as a regional
economic confederation is now neither a pure federation nor
a pure confederation. Instead, the hybrid EU polity is characterized by the creation of an autonomous, constitutionalized
legal order consisting of individual rights alongside a political order where major decisions are taken unanimously by
member states. Thus, aspects of confederation, notably the
treaty system of common government, the right of exit, and
a chamber representing state governments, coexist alongside a
federal legal order. There is also a directly elected lower chamberthe European Parliamentwhose federal-like legislative
powers have continued to expand.
The EU, therefore, is almost a political laboratory, as the
merits and flaws of confederation and federation are constantly
debatedoften drawing on the U.S. experienceespecially
from the perspective of the respective democratic legitimacy
they confer. In addition, the EU model is seen as a blueprint
for overcoming long-standing antagonisms between nationstates. However, it remains to be seen whether the EU is an
exceptional case or whether other regional organizations of
states, such as the African Union, Mercosur (South American),
or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, will mimic its
hybrid development.
See also Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization;
European Union (EU); Federalism, Comparative; Sovereignty.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANDREW GLENCROSS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Burgess, Michael. Comparative Federalism:Theory and Practice. London:
Routledge, 2006.
Dahl, Robert A. How Democratic Is the American Constitution? New Haven,
Conn.:Yale University Press, 2001.
Fabbrini, Sergio, ed. Democracy and Federalism in the European Union and the
United States: Exploring Post-national Governance. London: Routledge, 2006.
Forsyth, Murray. Unions of States:The Theory and Practice of Confederation.
Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1981.
Kymlicka, Will. Minority Nationalism and Multination Federalism. Chap.
5 in Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.
578 Feminism
McKay, David H. Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal
Experience. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Riker, William H. Federalism: Origins, Operation and Significance. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1964.
Stepan, Alfred. Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model. Journal
of Democracy 10 (1999): 1934.
Feminism
The term feminism, deriving from its mid-nineteenth century French origins in feministe, refers most basically to an
ideological commitment to the social, economic, and political
equality of men and women within nations and across the
globe. Feminism entails a way of critically engaging with the
world from a perspective grounded in sex, gender, and sexuality to advance freedom, equality, and inclusion for women
as full citizens with the right to determine their life paths.
Two identifiable periods of feminism, often referred to as the
first and second waves, track democracys political trajectory
beginning with womens ongoing struggle for equal rights in
the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century suffrage movements and moving into claims related to sexual liberation,
employment, education, and the family from the early 1960s
until today. This highly contested term encompasses diverse
schools of thought emanating from multiple identities and
standpoints that reflect how feminism transforms the political arena by interjecting an understanding of its subjects as
gendered, sexed, and sexual human beings. Feminism, in all its
rich complexity, then conveys a theoretical vision requiring
direct action to address the oppression of women that has
changed the meaning of politics by identifying and challenging the boundaries of public and private life in two key ways.
Feminism, Postcolonial
Theterm postcolonial feminism references a field of study and
activism by and for women that challenges dominant patriarchal ideologies and practices of postcolonial societies. The
term is rooted in oppositional consciousness to the dominant
social order as a form of transformative politics. Tied closely
to nationhood, its strategies are marked by political activism of
women concerned with gaining rights. It challenges gendered
state biases that disable empowerment and equal rights and
views womens political struggle as essential to deconstructing patriarchal power. Postcolonial feminists have therefore
challenged state power structures for access to political equality and participation, opposed discriminatory legislation that
oppresses women, and championed womens empowerment.
The beginnings of postcolonial feminism tend to be associated largely with colonies and former colonies of Western
powers in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. As a
field of activism, it can be dated to the decolonization period
(from the 1950s and 1960s) in former colonial countries, and
as a field of study, it is often associated with the rise of postcolonial and feminist writings of the mid-1970s.
HISTORY
Postcolonial feminism is a subset of both postcolonial and
feminist studies. A history of the term suggests it is has been
framed by active legacies of colonialism and postcolonial
movements. Feminists were concerned that the transfer of
VARIATIONS
Postcolonial feminism draws attention to varying conditions
of women that are contextual, geographical, and temporal.
Hence, there is no single form of postcolonial feminism. Geographical examples include dowry deaths in India; state-legislated discriminatory laws that demean and punish women in
Pakistan; access to clean water and housing in Africa, Central
America, and Southeast Asia; and challenging practices of
dislocating women as subjects of history in the Caribbean.
Representations in the media that objectify and circulate stereotypes about postcolonial women is another major concern
of the field. Postcolonial feminists have drawn attention to
the need to replace disparaging images of these women with
images defined by the women themselves.
Feminism, Radical
The term radical feminism references a school of feminist
thought and approach to mobilization that envisions womens liberation as completely transforming existing political,
Feminism, Socialist
Socialist feminism is a system of analysis of gender oppression
as well as a strategy for political change. While it has been
defined and practiced in many ways, there are central tenants
that link the socialist feminism movement together. Socialist feminism focuses on the intersection between capitalism
and patriarchy. It examines the ideological construction of
femininity within patriarchal capitalism. Socialist feminism
draws attention to issues such as sexuality, reproduction,
domestic and paid labor, gender socialization, class conflict,
sexism, and classism. Socialist feminism recognizes oppression
based on gender and social class. Its focus most often does not
LIBERAL/SAMENESS APPROACH
Different approaches to feminist legal theory may be most
easily understood through the evolution of the question of
sex differences under the law. The first phase of feminist legal
theory, which arose in the early 1970s, is often called the
sameness or equality phase and was most influenced by
core concepts of liberalism such as autonomy, choice, individualism, and the moral equality of all people. In this phase,
feminist legal theorists aimed to assimilate women into the
existing legal structure rather than change the structure of
the law. This is also known as the formal equality approach
because it argues that the law should not distinguish between
the sexes; if the form of the law treats men and women the
same by ridding itself of explicit distinctions between the
sexes, then equality has been achieved.
Associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Ruth Bader
Ginsberg is closely associated with this phase of feminist legal
theory because she applied the formal equality doctrine to
her work with the American Civil Liberties Unions Womens Rights Project and took on many cases wherein the law
explicitly differentiated between men and women, whether
this distinction worked to the benefit of men or women. In
fact, many of Ginsbergs clients were men challenging laws
that excluded them from a special privilege granted to women.
The formal equality approach has been successful in
changing the way the Supreme Court applies the Fourteenth
Amendments equal protection clause to sexual discrimination cases. Gender is now considered suspect under this clause,
so any law that treats people differently based on their sex is
DIVERSITY APPROACH
Beginning in the 1990s, feminist legal theory developed an
interconnected set of approaches loosely labeled the diversity view. Whereas the difference approach studied womens
differences from men, the diversity views examined womens
differences from each other, arguing that not all women have
had the same life experiences. The diversity approach is antiessentialist and more contextual than earlier modes of feminist legal theory, and it is informed by pragmatic feminism,
critical race theory, lesbian feminism, postmodern theory, and
work on intersectionality. Diversity theory states that there
are distinct harms that women experience when they inhabit
multiple, overlapping subordinated identity categories. Thus, it
contests gender essentialist theories that make women choose
whether they want to press claims as women or as Hispanics,
for example, rather than as both, as Latinas. Like difference
theorists, diversity theorists argue that access to institutions
is not sufficient to achieve equality, not only because once
women have access to formerly all-male places of employment they might be subject to sexual harassment, for example,
but because the kinds of harassment they face will be different
depending on their race and sexuality. The diversity approach
examines particular problems as they arise and how gender
expectations affect specific groups of women differently.
CONCLUSION
The varying approaches to feminist legal theory are still
employed by legal scholars and lawyers addressing questions
of patriarchy in the law, although the sameness approach has
had the most influence on legal decision making. The other
perspectives, such as the difference or diversity approaches,
have had more acceptance in law schools and journals but have
been less successfully adapted to the actual practice of the law.
See also Feminism; Feminism, Postcolonial; Feminism, Radical;
Feminist Political Theory; Gender and Politics; Women Legislators; Womens Movement, Comparative; Womens Representation;
Womens Rights.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CARISA R. SHOWDEN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cain, Patricia. Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories. Berkeley
Womens Law Journal 4 (1989): 191214.
Case, Mary Anne. Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence. Yale Law
Journal 105 (1995): 1100.
Chamallas, Martha. Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory. 2d ed. New York:
Aspen, 2003.
Crenshaw, Kimberle. Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence against Women of Color. Stanford Law Review 43
(1993): 12411299.
Dowd, Nancy E., and Michelle S. Jacobs, eds. Feminist Legal Theory: An Antiessentialist Reader. New York: New York University Press, 2003.
Franke, Katherine. The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender. University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 144 (1995): 199.
Harris, Angela P. Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory. Stanford
Law Review 42 (1990): 581616.
MacKinnon, Catharine. Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex
Discrimination. New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 1979.
. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1989.
Matsuda, Mari. Where Is Your Body? And Other Essays on Race, Gender and Law.
Boston: Beacon, 1996.
Menkel-Meadow, Carrie. Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Womens Lawyering Process. Berkeley Womens Law Journal 1 (1985):
3963.
Feminist Movement
There have been a number of discrete but related movements
for womens equality and for the social transformation of
gender relations. Early texts such as Christine de Pizans The
Book of the City of Ladies (1405) and Mary Wollstonecrafts A
Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) contributed to as well
as reflected womens challenges to male authority and their
vision of a more just, egalitarian, and beautiful society.
While women have been political actors in a wide variety
of economic, social, and religious contexts, organized political
action by groups of women with sufficient numbers and presence to rise to visibility as a political movement began in the
mid-nineteenth century. Each of these movements involves a
set of organizations, ideologies, and cultural practices that are
extensive, often contradictory, and dynamic, leading feminist
scholars to stress the importance of movement both as the
actions of a body of persons and as the process of motion itself.
Feminism is often described as occurring in three waves.
Each emergence has been closely linked to political activism
around racial and class injustices. In the United States, the first
wave, from about the mid-1800s to the 1920s, emerged largely
out of the abolition movement and is symbolically represented
by the Declaration of Rights and Sentiments issued by the
Seneca Falls Womens Rights Convention of 1848. The first
wave eventually narrowed around demands for womens suffrage, finally achieved in 1920, but the movement actually had
a much broader theoretical and practical reach, including radical critiques of capitalism, religion, sexuality, and war. Across
Europe, Japan, and Australia, the first wave combined middle-class womens agitation for property rights, legal equality, and marriage reform with working-class womens trade
union activism. In Africa, South America, the Middle East, and
Asia, first-wave feminism generally emerged in the context
of anticolonial movements for national liberation. Success in
achieving suffrage, along with the devastating consequences of
economic collapse, Fascism, and war, led to a decline of feminist movements after 1920.
Second wave refers to the womens liberation movement of
the 1960s through 1980s. Simone de Beauvoirs The Second Sex
(1949) was perhaps the foundational text, along with Betty
Freidans The Feminine Mystique (1963). In the United States
and Europe, feminism emerged in connection with the civil
rights movement as well as antiwar activism, environmentalism, and cultural revolution. In the third world, national liberation movements again provided the context for feminist
organizing. Women of color in both the developed and the
developing worlds confronted the white, middle-class orientation of mainstream groups such as the National Organization
for Women, while lesbians problematized homophobia in the
movement as well as the larger society. This Bridge Called My
Back:Writings of Radical Women of Color (1981), edited by Gloria
Anzalda and Cherri Moraga, was a pivotal text. The academic field of womens studies was initially the creation of the
second wave, as were a host of reforms involving legal equality,
health care, domestic violence, and reproduction.
While many aspects of the second wave continue to thrive,
particularly the insistence on bringing race and class into conversation with sex and gender, a third wave of feminist organizing emerged in the 1990s. Third-wave feminism often attracts
younger women, who may distinguish themselves from their
aging second-wave counterparts, as reflected in Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards book Manifesta:Young Women, Feminism and the Future (2000). Third-wave feminism reflects the
rise of postmodernism in the sense that it deconstructs the categories of women and men as well as gay and straight that had
often been taken for granted as necessary for political organizing, as shown by one of the most influential texts of the third
wave, Judith Butlers Gender Trouble (1990). Third-wave feminism is more self-consciously global than its predecessors, energized by the series of United Nations conferences on women,
and has campaigned worldwide for womens rights as human
rights. Critical analyses of neoliberal models of globalization,
environmental destruction, and rape in war are prominent contributions of an increasingly global feminism.
See also Beauvoir, Simone de; Feminism; Feminism, Postcolonial;
Feminism, Radical; Feminism, Socialist; Feminist Legal Theory; Feminist Political Theory; Feminization of Poverty; Friedan, Betty; Gender and Politics; Gender Gap; Glass Ceiling; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
and Transgender Movements, Comparative; U.S. Politics and Society:
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Identity; U.S.
Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Wollstonecraft,
Mary;Womens Movement, Comparative;Womens Suffrage.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KATHY E. FERGUSON
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aikau, Hokulani K., Karla A. Erickson, and Jennifer L. Pierce, eds. Feminist
Waves, Feminist Generations. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2007.
Evans, Richard. The Feminists:Womens Emancipation Movements in Europe,
America and Australasia, 18401920. London: C. Helm, 1977.
Evans, Sara. Personal Politics:The Roots of Womens Liberation in the Civil
Rights Movement and the New Left. New York:Vintage, 1980.
Freedman, Estelle. No Turning Back:The History of Feminism and the Future of
Women. New York: Random House, 2002.
hooks, bell. Feminism Is for Everybody. Boston: South End, 2000.
Feminist Parties
Although feminism as a social movement dates back to the
nineteenth century, feminist political partiesare relatively
recent phenomena in most countries. Feminist parties, like
environmentalist parties, are oriented around specific political
issues and concentrate on addressing the needs of women in
The politicization of womens issues has proven that parties can accommodate feminist demands in two ways: through
rhetoric, as in most countries, and through affirmative action
and positive discrimination (by filling certain quotas), such as
in the Labour Party in Norway and Social Democratic Parties in Denmark and Sweden. However, most political parties
in Europe encouraged the integration of women into politics
by creating separate womens groups within their own parties
instead of having women create their own separate parties.
CONCLUSION
The desire to eliminate discrimination and gender-based
inequalities and promote womens issues in politics has
resulted in a number of feminist parties currently found
worldwide, including the Shamiram Womens Party in Armenia, the Australian Womens Party in Australia, the Cambodian
Womens Party, the FemINist INitiative of BC in Canada,
the Feminist Party of Germany, the Gabriela Womens Party
in the Philippines, the Women of Russia Party in Russia,
the Feminist Initiative in Sweden, and the parties of the AllUkrainian Party of Womens Initiative in the Ukraine.
However, these political parties do not overcome the low
representation of women in politics, as, for example, the world
average of women in Parliament was only 18.8 percent as of
January 30, 2010. Feminist parties, while not a recent phenomenon, still have a long way to go to succeed in achieving equal
representation and parity for women in the societies.
See also Feminism; Feminist Legal Theory;Womens Representation.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SEZGIN S. CEBI
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Benhabib, Seyla. From Identity Politics to Social Feminism: A Plea for the
Nineties. Philosophy of Education 1, no. 2 (1995): 14.
Harding, Sandra. The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political
Controversies. New York: Routledge, 2004.
Kenney, Sally J., and Helen Kinsella, eds. Politics and Feminist Standpoint
Theories. New York: Haworth, 1997.
Lockwood, Bert B. Womens Rights: A Human Rights Quarterly Reader.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.
News, Feminist Party, gofeminist.com/news/Feminist-Party.html (accessed
January 20, 2010).
Political Platform for a Feminist Initiative. Feminist Initiative. http://www.
feministisktinitiativ.se/engelska.php?text=plattform.
Women in National Parliaments, www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm (accessed
January 31, 2010).
Feminization of Poverty
The term feminization of poverty is used to explain the fact
that women and their dependent children make up the bulk
of the worlds poor. The term was coined in 1976 by sociologist Diana Pearce. In developing nations, poverty may be the
result of a heavy dependence on the agricultural sector and
the lack of government resources. In some countries, women
and children eke out a scant existence by working the land
while older males labor in more affluent neighboring nations
to ensure the familys survival. In developed countries, women
become poor through divorce, insufficient employment
opportunities, low levels of education, or exclusion from
decision-making processes. Those who reject the concept of
the feminization of poverty generally do so because they view
women as extensions of men or because they view the problem of poverty as nongender related.
In all societies, womens work is devalued in relation to
mens with the result that women are paid less for doing the
same work even in countries where laws promise equal pay
for equal work. The inequities arise in part because women
tend to cluster in lower-status female-dominated occupations.
Globally, women earn one-half to three-fourths of the salaries paid to men. In some developing countries, women need
their husbands permission to work, obtain passports, buy or
sell property, secure bank loans, and open bank accounts.These
are some of the same political issues that propelled the first
wave of feminism in the United States and Europe during the
mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The problem of female poverty is so extensive that the
United Nations has declared poverty a violation of [womens] human rights to health and well-being, food, adequate
housing, a safe and healthy living environment, social security,
employment and development. The United Nations General Assembly designated 1996 the International Year for the
Eradication of Poverty and subsequently established guidelines
aimed at alleviating the feminization of poverty.
EUROPE
Poor women in Europe face many of the same problems
as do those in the United States. Part-time work is a major
factor in the feminization of poverty, and large numbers of
European women, particularly single mothers and those in
Northern Europe, work part-time. In the Netherlands, 88
percent of women are so employed. The wage gap is also large
among European women and has changed little during the
past several decades except in Britain (68 percent), Portugal
(72 percent), Denmark (85 percent), and France (81 percent).
Unlike women in the United States, poor European women
have access to strong safety nets that assist those in need.
Among all countries of the world, Finland and Sweden
serve as role models for preventing the feminization of poverty.
Parents share responsibility for children, and extensive social
welfare systems keep single-parent families from falling into
poverty, in part because of government-supported daycare
centers and liberal paid parental leave policies.
Feudalism 589
Feudalism
Feudalism is an indefinite term referring to either a form of
political organization or a type of economic system. Politically, feudalism is an aristocratic hierarchy in which political authority is dispersed among lords and their vassals. Such
feudal relations center on the homage pledged to lords by
vassals, who were granted a benefice or fief (usually land) in
return for service (primarily military). While feudal relations
arose in many countries, such as Japan from the ninth to nineteenth centuries, they dominated in northern Europe during
the Middle Ages, especially in Germany, France, and England.
Feudalism was not a term used during this time to describe a
specific system of government but is an abstraction used by
Enlightenment scholars, some of whom gave it a primarily
economic meaning and condemned it as a form of oppression.
Vassalage was a bond of honor between lord and vassal,
who might be someone already recognized among the aristocracy or a free commoner. In a solemn ceremony the vassal
gave an oath of personal loyalty and service for which the vassal received support and protection by the lord. A vassal would
Peasants pay taxes to their lord in both money and livestock. Feudal lords controlled agricultural resources, which peasants paid to use.
source: The Granger Collection, New York
Fidelism (Castroism)
Fidelism (also known as Castroism) is a political ideology
derived from and inspired by Fidel Castro (1926). As an
ideology, Fidelism represents a particular case of cross-fertilization of revolutionary pan-Americanism in the tradition
of Simn Bolivar and the European Communist movement.
Although Fidelism today represents a tendency within the
broader communist tradition, it is the only tendency to have
developed from outside the communist movement. In that
sense, Fidelism represents the a posteriori application of a
Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the political praxis of a particular Latin American revolutionary movement. Fidelism can
further be distinguished from other tendencies within the
communist movement by its source of authority, its tactics, its
unique geographical influence, and its revolutionary strategy.
The source of authority in Fidelism is Fidel Castro. The
seeds of Fidelism were planted when Castro led his audacious
yet unsuccessful attack against Cuban President Fulgencio
Batista at the Moncado barracks on July 26, 1953. This act
enabled Castro to emerge as an independent political figure
with his own personal following. Castros history will absolve
me speech, delivered during his trial in October 1953, became
the centerpiece for the new Castroites and represented a program of radical social reform for Cuba with Fidel Castro at
its helm. The program itself fit well within the confines of
traditional left-wing Latin American politics in Cuba, which
is situated well outside the communist movement. Castro and
his movement drew inspiration from the likes of Mximo
Gmez, Simn Bolivar, Jos Mart, and other Latin American
revolutionaries. As such, Fidelism was uniquely Cuban from its
inception. Following the July 26 attacks, the charismatic and
audacious Fidel Castro was able to build a personal following
in Cuba and elsewhere, which gave him an increasing maneuverability to define and redefine his movement and ideology.
Fidelism stresses tactics over ideology. Even before coming to
power, Fidel Castro continually demonstrated a willingness to
negotiate and employ selective ideologies as a means for securing
power and consolidating his vision of a more equitable and just
society in Cuba. In fact, Castro has never firmly cast his movement in any theoretical mold. Rather, he has shown a willingness
to enter into broad alliances with any group that will enable him
to build political capital and consolidate his vision. During his
struggle in the Sierra Maestra in Cubas Southeast, he entered
into broad alliances with Autnicos and the Communist party.
Upon seizing power in 1959, he emphatically told the United
States, We are not communist. The doors are open to private
investments that contribute to the development of industry in
Cuba. It was only after relations with the United States deteriorated that Castro turned toward Marxist-Leninism and the
Soviet model to consolidate his power in Cuba and defend his
nationalist project against U.S. aggression. Following the demise
of the Soviet Union in 1991, Castro once again demonstrated
this ideological flexibility by initiating limited, market-oriented
reforms. In this sense, Fidelism is not so much an ism as it is a
leader who is willing to borrow ideology to support his actions.
Field Experiment
Field experiments, as distinct from laboratory experiments, are
randomized interventions that take place in naturalistic settings. Field experiments are principally designed to establish
causal relationships. Well-executed field experiments combine
the strengths of randomized designs with the external validity
of field studies. While a laboratory study, for example, might
examine the effects of political advertising on voter turnout by exposing treatment and control groups to different
advertising stimuli within an artificial setting and gauging
their vote intentions by means of a survey, a field experiment
would randomly manipulate the content and timing of actual
592 Filibuster
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Angrist, Joshua D., Guido W. Imbens, and Donald B. Rubin. Identification
of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables. Journal of the American
Statistical Association 91 (June 1996): 444455.
Druckman, James N., Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur
Lupia. The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in
Political Science. American Political Science Review 100, no. 4 (2006):
627635.
Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. Reclaiming the Experimental
Tradition in Political Science. In Political Science:The State of the
Discipline, 3d ed., edited by Helen V. Milner and Ira Katznelson, 805832.
New York: Norton, 2002.
Morton, Rebecca, and Kenneth Williams. From Nature to the Lab:The
Methodology of Experimental Political Science. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, forthcoming.
Shadish, William R., Thomas D. Cook, and Donald T. Campbell. Experimental
and Quasi-experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference. New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 2002.
Filibuster
The filibuster is a parliamentary tactic used to delay or prevent
a vote on legislation through unlimited speech or debate. The
word filibuster is derived from the Dutch word for pirate
and connotes the attempt to highjack a piece of legislation
that would otherwise pass with a majority vote. The origins
of the filibuster date to the Roman senator Cato the Younger
who, when faced with a measure he opposed, would speak
continuously until the proponents of the action would withdraw it or grant concessions. Many modern parliamentary
systems allow some form of the filibuster. For instance, in
most Westminster systems, parliamentarians may be allowed to
continue debate on a measure and introduce endless amendments as long as they are related to the motion. In the United
States, initially members of both the House of Representatives
and Senate had the right to filibuster. However, the House
imposed restrictions on debate in 1842. Senators continue to
have the privilege of unlimited debate, although the Senate
adopted a rule in 1917 that allows it to invoke cloture with a
three-fifths majority vote (sixty senators). Strom Thurmond
(R-S.C.) holds the record for the longest filibuster at twentyfour hours and eighteen minutes during his 1957 effort to
block the passage of civil rights legislation.
See also Cloture;Westminster Model.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Fiscal Conservatism
Fiscal conservatism is an ideological perspective on what constitutes the appropriate approach to economic matters within
modern capitalist states; it is a term more commonly used in
the United States, Canada, and Australia, but the perspective
can be found throughout Europe as well. The fundamentals of
the approach favored by this perspective include limited government spending, low tax rates, free trade agreements with
other nations, only modest amounts of business regulation,
a strong respect for individual property rights, and balanced
budgets. Sometimes referred to as traditional economic conservatism or classical liberal economics, this perspective
grounds itself in what its advocates see as the laissez-faire tradition of economic thought, beginning with Adam Smith and
David Ricardo, and continuing on through contemporary
economists such as Milton Friedman and George Stigler. As
such, it is a perspective that either completely rejects or greatly
qualifies the economic arguments advanced by contemporary
liberal thinkers such as John Maynard Keynes, agrarian or
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Friedman, Benjamin. The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. New York:
Knopf, 2005.
Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2002.
Fukuyama, Francis. Trust:The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New
York: Free Press, 1996.
Heilbroner, Robert L. The Worldly Philosophers. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1986.
Kristol, Irving. Two Cheers for Capitalism. New York: Signet, 1979.
Schultze, Charles L. The Public Use of Private Interest. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 1977.
Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. New York: Modern Library, 2000.
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy involves decisions about government revenues,
spending, and borrowing. These decisions require politicians
to address the reality of limited means and unlimited desires.
The politics of fiscal policy is often contentious and is affected
by rules that vary across national and subnational governments. Issues may be divided according to the size of government, as measured by spending and taxes (fiscal scale), and the
causes and consequences of deficits (fiscal balance).
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT
Prior to the twentieth century, the fiscal scale of democratic
governments tended to be quite limited except during times
of war. Nondefense government spending and taxes grew
relative to the economy in many countries from about 1910
to 1940, and then again from about 1960 to 1980. Reasons
for this expansion likely included demands created by industrialization and urbanization, widespread acceptance of the
idea that the provision of social services and free education
are basic government functions, and an enhanced ability to
monitor economic activity and collect taxes and fees.
Looking across national and subnational governments, current levels of spending and taxes depend on political and institutional variables as well as demand. Liberal parties tend to tax
and spend more than conservative parties, but the ability of a
party to move fiscal scale to its most preferred level is often
dependent on maintaining control for a number of years. Some
recent research in political economy has focused on the effects
Floating Voter
Floating voters (also known as swing voters) are individuals
who do not maintain their allegiance to a particular party
but instead vote for candidates in other parties or groupings.
Traditionally, most voters maintain their loyalty to a particular
party, and most scholarship suggests that party affiliation is
formed during childhood. However, in the twentieth century,
an increasing percentage of the electorate began to vote for
candidates based on ideas or policy preferences as opposed
to party ideology. The rise of floating voters prompted many
political parties to seek candidates who could appeal to members of other parties. Some political leaders considered floating
voters faithless party members because of their willingness to
cross party lines during elections. Research has also indicated
that some floating voters are less informed and more likely to
cast ballots based on personal preferences rather than political
analysis. Other theorists assert that floating voters reflect democratic ideals since they are not bound by partisanship and
vote based on policy choices. Consequently, they can serve
as a corrective mechanism for political parties that advocate
policies or measures that are out of step with the mainstream.
The number or percentage of floating voters increases during
periods of significant economic, social, or political upheaval.
See also Candidate Recruitment; Candidate Selection; Voting
Behavior.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Born in Quincy, Massachusetts, to a wealthy Quaker family, Follett had an unhappy childhood. In 1884, she attended
Thayer Academy, an academically challenging private school
in Boston, and graduated at age sixteen.When she turned seventeen, she applied to and was accepted to enroll in the Society to Encourage Studies at Home to continue her education.
After three years of study in the society, she enrolled as a special student at Harvard Annex for Women (Radcliffe College),
taking time out to study at Newnham College in Cambridge,
England. She eventually returned to Radcliffe, received an AB
degree, and graduated with highest honors in June 1898.While
a student at Radcliffe, she conducted research on government
and published it as The Speaker of the House of Representatives (1896), a well-documented scholarly account of the U.S.
Speakers political power based on historical and qualitative
research methods.
In the early part of the twentieth century, she was involved
in social work public service in the Boston area. Shortly later,
she was chair of the Womens Municipal Leagues Committee
on Extended Use of School Buildings. In 1911, she continued
to devote her time and energy to help build a sense of community by helping to establish the East Boston High School
Social Center. Her involvement in public service and government affairs continued through her appointment to the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Board and appointment as the vice
president of the National Community Center Association in
1917. In 1918 she published The New State, her second book,
now considered a classic in democratic political theory.
In the early 1920s, Follett began her work on management
and administration in industry and public institutions in earnest. In 1924, she wrote her third book, Creative Experience,
which was based on her community experiences on conflict
resolution and small-group management. Her last two books,
based on her civic and professional work experiences during twenty years in Boston-area neighborhoods, served as the
basis for constructing a new model of democracy whereby she
sought to empower Boston-area immigrants by making them
responsible for their civic duties, thus increasing their level
of participation in government affairs. Follett left the United
States for London in 1928. Unfortunately, prior to this move
abroad, she destroyed most of her personal papers, and she
requested that any other papers be destroyed upon her death.
Despite Folletts major contributions to political science,
she is best known for her work on management and organization, which was summarily dismissed in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s, although it remained highly popular
in Great Britain. Her work on management resurfaced in the
1960s and today is considered classic management theory.
See also Democratic Theory; Organization Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOSEPH C. SANTORA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Follett, Mary Parker. The New State: Group Organization, the Solution for
Popular Government. New York: Longman, Green, 1918.
Tonn, Joan C. Mary Parker Follett: Creating Democracy,Transforming Management.
New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 2003.
Food Policy
A food policy is a decision, program, or project, endorsed by
a government agency, business, or organization, that affects
how food is produced, processed, distributed, purchased,
protected, and disposed of. Food policy can pertain to local,
regional, provincial, national, or within-institution regulations.
Food policy is closely related to agricultural policy, which
is the process of assessing sectoral performance and providing appropriate and participative policy formulation for the
development of the sector. These policies aim to correct market failure, to react to crisis situations, and to promote environmental sustainability. The main objective of the policies is
to increase productivity and income growth, to enhance food
security and equity, and to ultimately reduce the number of
those suffering from hunger.
Forecasting, Political
Political forecasting identifies political phenomena that may
occur at a later point in time, whether specific events or conditions in the broader political milieu. The forecasts that result
may provide (1) estimates of a predicted events magnitude,
through point forecasts, such as the percentage vote that a
candidate is expected to receive in an upcoming election; (2)
estimates of the probability that an event will occur, such as
the likelihood of an international crisis erupting; and (3) scenarios of the future, which specify alternative outcomes that
are conceivable and the intervening circumstances necessary
for each outcome to occur, such as alternative configurations
of power that might exist among nations in twenty years.
Political forecasters also have been active in predicting domestic political conflict, primarily in developing countries, and
conflict among nation-states. Forecasts of domestic conflict
have predicted forms of internal political instability, such as
riots and military coups, as well as larger societal collapses
(state failure), including civil wars and revolutions. Forecasts of
conflict between nation-states have focused mostly on crises
and wars. More recently, predicting attacks by nonstate terrorist groups has gained increased attention. In practice, the lines
between intrastate and interstate forecasting have become
blurred in part because some phenomena have aspects of
both, such as external interference in civil wars.
Conflict forecasting often has a policy motivation. Major
academic projects in this field have been funded by government agencies, and some conflict forecasting is undertaken by
agencies in-house, especially within intelligence and defense
organizations, to support policy requirements. In fact, much
of conflict forecasting is conducted under the banner of early
warning, a term that implies there is a policy response to the
warning.
GOVERNMENT REVENUES
Because every unit of government is dependent on tax revenues and must produce budgets for the future, revenue forecasting is important at all levels of government. The volume
of government revenue forecasts in the United States is large,
owing to the thousands of municipal governments that exist
in the country. In the many smaller municipalities, revenue
forecasts often are limited to the impressionistic judgment of
local officials. By contrast, forecasting revenues for the U.S.
federal government is a complex quantitative process undertaken by the Congressional Budget Office and executive
organizations, notably the Office of Management and Budget
and the Treasury. At the state level, revenue forecasts usually
are produced in the state finance office or similar organization
by economists who use systematic forecasting methods and
who sometimes draw on expertise in state universities.
Revenue forecasts often are significantly inaccurate. Much
of this error is due to the difficulty of the forecasting task,
CONCLUSION
Although underappreciated within political science in the
past, political forecasting is gaining increased recognition for
bringing rigor to hypothesis testing and for contributing to
the policy requirements of government. Growing support for
forecasting is evident in the formation of the Political Forecasting Group and its designation in 2006 as a Related Group
of the American Political Science Association.
See also Budgeting; Counterfactual; Electoral Cycles; Exit Poll;
Political Risk Assessment; Polling, History of; Simulation; State
Failure.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RANDALL J. JONES JR.
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Bates, Robert H., David L. Epstein, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr,
Barbara Harff, Colin H. Kahl, Marc A. Levy, Michael Lustik, Monty
G. Marshall, Thomas M. Parris, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark R. Woodward.
Political Instability Task Force Report: Phase IV Findings. McLean,Va.:
Science Applications International Corporation, 2003. globalpolicy.gmu.
edu/pitf/pitfdata.htm (accessed March 5, 2010).
Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan C. Stam. Predicting the Length of the 2003
U.S.-Iraq War. Foreign Policy Analysis 2, no. 2 (2006): 101116.
Berg, Joyce E., and Thomas A. Rietz. The Iowa Electronic Markets: Stylized
Facts and Open Issues. In Information Markets: A New Way of Making
Decisions, edited by R. W. Hahn and P. C. Tetlock, 142169. Washington,
D.C.: AEI, 2006. www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.
php?pid=1058 (accessed March 5, 2010).
Bretschneider, Stuart, and Wilpen L. Gorr. Practical Methods for Projecting
Revenues. In Handbook of Government Budgeting, edited by R. T. Meyers,
308331. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. Predicting Politics. Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 2002.
Campbell, James E., and James C. Garand, eds. Before the Vote: Forecasting
American National Elections. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2000.
Hughes, Barry B., and Evan E. Hillebrand. Exploring and Shaping International
Futures. Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2006.
James, Patrick, and Michael Lusztig. Beyond the Crystal Ball: Modelling
Predictions about Quebec and Canada. American Review of Canadian
Studies 26, no. 4 (1996): 559575.
Jones, Randall J., Jr. The State of Presidential Election Forecasting: The 2004
Experience. International Journal of Forecasting 24, no. 2 (2008): 310321.
Lichtman, Allan J. The Keys to the White House, 1996: A Surefire Guide to
Predicting the Next President. Lanham, Md.: Madison, 1996.
Martin, Andrew D., Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger, and Pauline T.
Kim. Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision
Making. Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 4 (2004): 761767.
Penner, Rudolph G. Federal Revenue Forecasting. In Government Budget
Forecasting:Theory and Practice, edited by J. Sun and T. D. Lynch, 1125.
Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC/Taylor and Francis, 2008.
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. Patterns of Congressional Voting.
American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 1 (1991): 228278.
Schrodt, Philip A. Twenty Years of the Kansas Event Data System Project.
Political Methodologist 14, no. 1 (2006): 26. polmeth.wustl.edu/
methodologist/tpm_v14_n1.pdf (accessed March 5, 2010).
Simonton, Dean Keith. Predicting Presidential Greatness: Equation
Replication on Recent Survey Results. Journal of Social Psychology 141,
no. 3 (2001): 293307.
U.S. National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World
[unclassified]. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Director of National Intelligence,
2008. www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html (accessed March 5,
2010).
Foreign Aid
Foreign aid (or development assistance) consists of voluntary
transfers of resources from a donor to a (developing) recipient country. More specifically, official development assistance
(ODA) is restricted to transfers of government resources via
bilateral or multilateral channels.
Foreign Policy
Work on foreign policy is ubiquitous because its central
focus is essential to the study of international relations (IR)
more generally: understanding how decision makers perceive
threats, constraints, and opportunities in their external and
internal environments, and how these perceptions guide
actions toward other governments and nongovernmental
actors. The subfield of foreign policy is a prominent research
area in the study of IR. The Foreign Policy organized section
of the American Political Science Association has one of the
largest memberships of the associations thirty-seven sections;
the subfield supports a dedicated journal, Foreign Policy Analysis; and the academic publishing house Palgrave Macmillan
hosts the book series titled Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis.
Foreign policy research can be found across the major paradigms of IR, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Foreign policy scholars have published work covering all
the regions of the globe in studies that are both historically
grounded and focused on the contemporary. Seminal studies
investigate foreign policy making of the great powers, especially U.S. and Soviet decision making during the cold war
era and at the end of the cold war. Other studies compare and
contrast the foreign policies of different states on similar issues
and focus on the foreign policies of middle powers and small
states. Scholars of foreign policy have also addressed the dominant debates in the field of IR, including the extent to which
decision makers are influenced by domestic or international
factors or a combination of the two, the behavior of democracies versus authoritarian states, and whether rational choice
or sociological frameworks are more useful in the study of
political behavior. While the decision-making approach to
foreign policy has dominated the subfield, new developments
in the study of foreign policy include the analysis of how state
decisions are influenced not only by individual policy makers
but also by larger factors, such as cultural trends and religion.
In addition, recent work has moved beyond the dependent
variable of foreign policy to focus on foreign policy change
and on the impact of foreign policy on domestic politics (the
second image reversed).
PARADIGMATIC APPROACHES TO
FOREIGN POLICY
It is typically argued that realist IR theory does not provide a
theory of foreign policy. To be sure, realist theories primarily
focus on broad trends and patterns in interstate interactions
and make predictions regarding aggregate state behavior.
Kenneth N. Waltz, one of the most prominent contemporary
political realists, has famously noted in Theory of International
Politics (1979) that his theory of international politics does
not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday
relations in those states seeking European Union membership, as in the case of Turkey. Recent work in the subfield has
also investigated the impact of regional security conditions on
the propensity for states to democratize. A key finding in this
growing literature is that foreign policies that support peaceful
means of regional conflict resolution can influence not only
the likelihood of war but also domestic institutional development, civil-military relations, and bargaining outcomes among
domestic political actors. Future work in the subfield should
continue to explore how different foreign policy choices, such
as decisions to pursue external balancing (e.g., alliances) versus
internal balancing (e.g., nuclear weapons programs), influence
domestic political outcomes over time.
Future work on foreign policy must continue to advance in
these areas while also encouraging the application of theories
and perspectives to multiple states across regions and historical time. Typically, work on foreign policy focuses on just one
country. The subfield boasts many seminal and new studies of
the foreign policy decision-making process and foreign policy
outcomes in countries as diverse as Israel, China, Japan, Cuba,
and many more. A comparative study, however, permits multiple tests of theoretical propositions and enables findings to
cumulate across states with disparate histories, regime types,
and identities. Several new studies aim to compare and contrast the foreign policies of different states.Yet compared with
single-country analyses, studies of comparative foreign policy
are few and far between. More work remains to be done on
how foreign policy is both similar and different across a diverse
range of international actors.This will be facilitated by regional
and country-specific experts collaborating with foreign policy
and IR theorists, as well as students of comparative politics, to
develop models that apply outside of the U.S. context and that
are meaningful and robust for the changing and volatile nature
of contemporary IR.
See also Constructivism; Democracy and Democratization; International Relations; Liberal Theory; Prospect Theory; Realism and
Neorealism; Religion and Politics; Secularism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . MIRIAM FENDIUS ELMAN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allison, Graham. The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.
Elman, Colin. Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign
Policy? Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 753.
Elman, Miriam Fendius. Does Democracy Tame the Radicals? Lessons from
Israels Jewish Religious Political Parties. Asian Security 4, no. 1 (2008):
7999.
. The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism
in Its Own Backyard. British Journal of Political Science 25 (April 1995):
171217.
Farnham, Barbara. The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat
Perception. International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 3 (September 2003):
395415.
George, Alexander. The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the
Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making. International Studies
Quarterly 13 (1969): 190222.
Hagan, Joe D. Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective.
Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993.
Foreign Relations
See Federalism and Foreign Relations.
GAME THEORY
John Von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern pioneered game
theory in 1944 by building on earlier work by Ernest Zermelo
(1913), Emile Borel (1921), and John Von Neumann (1928).
Game theory studies the interdependence of actions of players or their strategic interaction. This approach is concerned
with how the adoption of particular strategies by players
results in optimal (or nonoptimal) outcomes. Since incentives
are held fixed, the resulting outcome usually is determined by
the payoffs assigned to particular strategies, the information
that players have about the actions of other players or assigned
payoffs, and the institutional rules that have been imposed on
the players environment.
Game theory can be divided into two broad categories:
cooperative (or coalition) games and noncooperative (or strategic) games. (Cooperative game theory is also called social
choice theory and will be discussed later.) In noncooperative
games players cannot enter into binding agreements, whereas
cooperative games players are allowed to enter into binding
agreements. The classic distinction used to revolve around
whether players can communicate with each other, but noncooperative games that allow for communication have been
developed, such as cheap talk games. Within noncooperative
games there is a further distinction between normal form
games (games represented by a payoff matrix) and extensive
form games (games represented by a game tree).The extensive
form is useful to model games where players have more than
one move and also games where players might have imperfect information such as the case wherein a player may not
know what action another player has taken. Normal form
games consider a situation in which the players must make
choices simultaneously so that they make choices without
Fractionalization Index
The concept of fractionalization denotes the fragmentation
and indirectly also the concentration of a set of elements (a
population) into subsets (or components) along certain criteria. In the social sciences, such sets of elements used as the
unit of analysis are commonly social systems, such as a legislative body, a party system, or a society as a whole. An index of
fractionalization measures the degree of such fragmentation
or concentration characterizing a system. Fractionalization
becomes a relevant feature of political life in the context of
social and political cleavages, that is, where circumstances that
have the potential for conflict among members of a population force those members to take sides. Among the criteria,
on which the division of elements or individuals into relevant
subgroups might be based, are attitudes toward political issues,
voting behavior, membership in parties or other politically
relevant organizations, or social characteristics, such as mother
tongue, religion, caste membership, and other self-ascriptive
identity markers.
+ sij 2
i1
However,
in a generalized form it can also be stated as
n
1=1 a
+ sij a
. A population divided into four equally strong
i 1
groups would thus yield an effective number value of 4.This is
more in accordance with intuition than an F-value of 0.75 for
the same constellation. Due to this more intuitive appeal, this
index has become relatively more popular than Raes index
Nj
Francophone Africa
The term Francophone applies to all people whose cultural
background is primarily associated with the French language.
Francophone Africa specifically refers to all the African states
formerly colonized by France and Belgium in the period
between the late nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries.
There are twenty-nine Francophone African countries situated mainly in west, central, and north Africa.
French is the official language in eighteen of these countries.
It is one of two official languages in six of them and is spoken
widely, though not officially apportioned, in the remaining five
countries. It is ironic that during the colonial era French was
spoken by only a few educated elite, but today French is a
major language in independent Africa; the number of French
speakers is second only to the number of English speakers. Each
of the French-speaking countries has adopted the language to
fit in with local pronunciation and existing vocabulary.
E U R O P E
AT LAN T IC
O CE AN
Tunis
Algiers
Rabat
Me
TUNISIA
dite
MOROCCO
rran
A S I A
ean Sea
ALGERIA
LIBYA
SAHARAWI ARAB
DEM. REP.
ea
MAURITANIA
CAPE
VERDE
Praia
dS
Re
ile
EGYPT
MALI
Nouakchott
NIGER
SENEGAL
Bamako
Yamoussoukro
PortoNovo
Lom
Malabo
TOGO
EQUATORIAL
GUINEA
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
NIGERIA
ER
OO
CTE
DIVOIRE
LIBERIA
SUDAN
NDjamena
BURKINA FASO
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
Niamey
BENIN
Conakry
Ouagadougou
GHANA
THE GAMBIA
GUINEA-BISSAU
ERITREA
CHAD
Dakar
CA
Yaound
SOMALIA
Congo
Libreville
GABON
Brazzaville
REP. OF THE
CONGO
Cabinda
(ANGOLA)
ETHIOPIA
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
Bangui REPUBLIC
D E M . R E P.
OF THE
C O N G O Kigali
Bujumbura
Kinshasa
UGANDA
KENYA
RWANDA
Victoria
BURUNDI
SEYCHELLES
TANZANIA
Moroni
ANGOLA
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
Q
BI
ue
C
mb
iq
ZIMBABWE
Mo
za
OC EA N
MOZ
A
UE
ha
nn
el
ZAMBIA
AT L A N T I C
COMOROS
MALAWI
Antananarivo
MAURITIUS
MADAGASCAR
SWAZILAND
SOUTH
AFRICA
Francophone country
LESOTHO
INDIAN
OCEAN
0
0
500 Mi
500 Km
The nations of Francophone Africa are noted by their colonization by France or Belgium, and many hold French as their official language.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chew, Sing C., and Robert A. Denemark. The Underdevelopment of
Development: Essays in Honor of Andre Gunder Frank. Thousand Oaks,
Calif.: Sage, 1996.
Frank, Andre Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America:
Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review, 1969.
. Lumpenbourgeoisie Lumpendevelopment: Dependence, Class and Politics in
Latin America. New York: Monthly Review, 1973.
. Re-orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998.
. World Accumulation: 14921789. New York: Monthly Review, 1980.
Frank, Andre Gunder, and Barry K. Gills, eds. The World System: 500 Years or
5000? New York: Routledge, 1996.
Seers, Dudley. Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment. London: Pinter, 1981.
Frankfurt School
Frankfurt school usually refers to a set of intellectuals of
Marxist origins who worked within the framework of the
Frankfurt Institute for Social Research after Max Horkheimer
became its director in 1930. This article discusses the impact
of and the intellectuals within this school. It first reconstructs
the profile of the first generation of Frankfurt school theorists
and then analyzes the second and third generation as well as
their contemporary legacy.
616 Freedom
. One-dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon, 1964.
Neumann, Franz L., and Otto Kirchheimer. The Rule of Law under Siege:
Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer. Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1995.
Wiggershaus, Rolf. The Frankfurt School. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1994.
Freedom
Freedom is a prime example of what W. B. Gallie refers to as
essentially contested concepts, a term that refers to concepts that participate in a tradition of conflicting interpretations so fundamental that they are permanent and without
resolution. Understanding the concept of freedom means
understanding the fundamentally different ways in which the
concept has been used. A particularly important distinction
is that between freedom from hindrance on one hand and
the freedom to fully realize ones potential on the other. This
difference roughly corresponds to that between the AngloAmerican tradition of freedom from and the continental
European tradition of freedom to, although that puts it a
little too simply.
Drawing fine semantic distinctions, such as that between
freedom and liberty, will not help us understand freedom. In
practice, the terms are synonymous, as the British philosopher
and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin points out in his famous
work Two Concepts of Liberty. We can pursue the meaning
of freedom by deciding which distinctions are useful and which
are not and even whether approaching freedom by making
fine distinctions is fruitful.
Freedom 617
modern West, both an unquestioned good and a questionable
concept.
Instead of asking, What is freedom? it is more useful to
ask, What is freedom good for? Here, the British philosopher
John Stuart Mill is useful. Mills (1975) argument appears to
be a straightforward utilitarian argument: Freedom allows the
maximum of self-expression consistent with the rights of others, and in this way, the marketplace of ideas is enlarged. More
speech puts more ideas in play, and from these ideas, the best
will eventually be chosen and so freedom brings progress.
Such an interpretation is not incorrect. However, a closer
reading of Mill reveals his aristocratic side. Mill was never
primarily interested in the freedom of the average man or
woman. Mill valued freedom as providing an opportunity for
an exceptional few to make of their lives a work of beauty.
From this perspective, freedom is the means, and the cultivation of individuality is the end. Hence he writes,
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is
individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and
interests of others, that human begins become noble and
beautiful objects of contemplation. In proportion to the
development of his individuality, each person becomes
more valuable to himself and is therefore capable of
being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is
more life in the units, there is more in the mass that is
composed of them. I might here close the argument:
for what more or better can be said of any condition of
human affairs than it brings human beings themselves
nearer to the best things they can be? Or what worse
can be said of any obstruction to good than it prevents
this? (On Liberty, 1975, 5960)
FREEDOM AS COMMUNAL
VIRTUOSITY
If Mill were interested in freedom for the sake of the richness
and virtuosity of the individual, then Hannah Arendt may
be seen as taking this argument a step further by claiming in
What Is Freedom? that freedom is virtuosity. Freedom is not
just the cultivation and development of certain excellences.
Freedom resides in the public performance itself in which
we act and speak in public, showing others who we are and
bringing something new into the world. Only through such
acts of political creativity do humans overcome the entropy
that would otherwise overtake human existence.
While critics often focus on Arendts nostalgia for an
ancient Athenian ideal of politics that no longer has a place in
the modern world, the more salient problem with her vision
of freedom is that, in the end, it fails to include the full scope
of human interaction. A critical reading of her work suggests
that it is the role of our fellow citizens to serve as an audience,
so someone may be present to appreciate and remember our
noble words and great deeds. Even a virtuoso needs an audience who can understand and appreciate his or her art.
A vision of freedom that is better suited to the shared character of political life is required. Jazz musicians talk about being
in the groove, a state of improvisation that involves not just
one persons music but also the music of others in the group.
Although individual skills and talent are involved, they do not
create the groove. It is created by the space among the players,
and as such, in the groove is a temporary creation, as transient as the performance. If in the groove is a spontaneous
experience at one level, at another level it reflects spontaneity
built on hundreds of hours of negotiation, learning to barter
the musical assertion of others with ones own musical selfassertion. In the groove is, of course, not just an account of
playing jazz music. It is a way of thinking about the complex
sharing with others that freedom requires. It is about creating
freedom in a complex space that is framed by the activities of
those who make and share the freedom they create.
This communal virtuosity has sometimes been experienced
in times of great political struggle. In Arendts The Revolutionary Tradition and Its Lost Treasure, her reference to the
lost treasure refers to the poet Ren Char who joined the
French Resistance to Nazi occupation during World War II
(19391945) and found himself. Arendt writes, Wherever he
went he appeared as he was to others and to himself. . . . He
could afford to go naked. These reflections . . . testify to the
involuntary self-discourse, to the joys of appearing in word
and deed without equivocation and without self reflection
that are inherent in action (Arendt 2000). Arendt argues that
such an experience could be brought into mundane, everyday
political practice. She takes Thomas Jeffersons ward system as a
model for a participatory democracy that may not be compatible with freedom as lack of constraint, or negative freedom,
but a space in which average citizens flourish through political
participation.
Yet it may be that Arendt continues to ask of politics what
it cannotand perhaps should notdeliver. In particular,
one wonders whether political freedom is really the realm in
which such ambitions should be realized, especially in the dayto-day grind of administration and party life or even for such
a good cause as the French Resistance. Recall Berlins simple
caution that because freedom is good does not mean that it is
every good thing. Contemporary political philosopher Richard Rorty argues in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity that conflating politics and self-developmentthat is, ignoring the
distinction between public and privateis risky business.
See also Academic Freedom; Arendt, Hannah; Freedom of Association; Freedom of Conscience; Freedom of Religion; Kant, Immanuel;
Liberal Theory; Liberalism, Classical.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. FRED ALFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alford, C. Fred. Rethinking Freedom:Why Freedom Has Lost Its Meaning and
What Can Be Done to Save It. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. 2d ed. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1998.
. The Revolutionary Tradition and Its Lost Treasure. In The Portable
Hannah Arendt, edited by Peter Baehr. New York: Penguin Books, 2000.
. What Is Freedom? In The Portable Hannah Arendt, edited by Peter
Baehr. New York: Penguin, 2000.
Berlin, Isaiah. Two Concepts of Liberty. In Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 1969.
Constant, Benjamin, The Liberty of Ancients Compared with That of
Moderns, www.uark.edu/depts/comminfo/cambridge/ancients.html.
First published 1816.
Epictetus. Handbook of Epictetus, translated by Nicholas P White. Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1983.
Gallie, W. B. Essentially Contested Concepts. In The Importance of Language,
edited by Max Black. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962.
Hegel, G. W. F. Philosophy of Mind. Translated by William Wallace. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Translated
by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002.
Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by J.
Ellington. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1981.
. What Is Enlightenment? Translated by Carl Friedrich. In The
Philosophy of Kant. New York: Modern Library, 1994.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. Edited by David Spitz. New York: Norton,
1975.
Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. Translated by Maurice Cranston.
Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1968.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel Barnes. New
York: Washington Square, 1956.
Freedom of Assembly
In the United States, freedom of assembly is one of the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the American people. It is
specifically guaranteed under the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution in the Bill of Rights. As it is located in the
Bill of Rights, it is considered a legal right, enforceable in
the courts under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and enforceable against
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Freedom of
assembly is distinct and different from freedom of association.
Generally, freedom of assembly usually applies to the congregation of groups, and freedom of association applies to the
rights of individuals to associate with other persons or entities.
A POLITICAL RIGHT
However, it is not just a legal right; it is also a political right.
The difference between the two is not just academic. A legal
right is a right that is enforceable by the courts. In contrast, a
purely political right is a right that is recognized in a political
philosophy. There is frequently overlap between political and
legal rights. Some political rights might be enforceable in a
court. Others might not be enforceable.
A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Freedom of assembly, under the First Amendment, is a fundamental right that allows the people to peacefully assemble.The
U.S. Supreme Court has presented three basic definitions of a
fundamental right. The first is whether the right in question
is a natural right under the principles of natural law, such as
the right of self-defense as espoused by, for example, Sir William Blackstone, a famous English legal commentator, in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England. The second is whether
the right in question is fundamental to American justice and
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as recognized in the
case of Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), which was a case in which
an African American was denied the right to a trial by jury.
The third is whether the right is implied in the penumbra of
the Bill of Rights, such as the right of privacy, as recognized
in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) concerning access
to birth control. The second meaning has been the most frequently cited by the American courts. As a practical matter,
what is a fundamental right in America consists of the first ten
amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as presented in the Bill
of Rights, with some exceptions under the doctrine of selective incorporation, which mandates that most of the rights
listed in the Bill of Rights are fundamental and are applicable
against the states as well as the federal government.
In the decision of De Jonge v. Oregon (1937), the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized that the primary purpose of the freedom to
assemble includes the right to consult on public affairs and
to petition for the redress of grievances. Thus, the basis of the
A LIMITED RIGHT
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the decision of Kovacs v. Cooper
(1949), recognized that all rights, even fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, are not absolute. Limitations can be imposed. One example is the requirement of
licensing. It has been universally recognized across the United
States that the governments requiring some form of licensing for public demonstrations is constitutional and does not
violate the right to assemble. However, such licensing cannot
subject the participants to unreasonable limitations on the
time, place, or manner of the public demonstrations.
A primary example of an appropriate limitation on the
right to assemble is the crime of rioting. Although the people
have the fundamental right to gather for political purposes,
such a gathering must be peaceful. If the gathering becomes
violent and disorderly, disturbing the general peace, then the
participants will lose the protection of the right to assemble
and be subject to criminal prosecution. However, even abhorrent ideas are protected by the freedom of assembly, as illustrated by the infamous Nazi parade in Skokie, Illinois, in 1977.
The Skokie case involved a Nazi groups attempting to parade
in a significantly Jewish community. It brought the issue of the
right to assemble to the forefront, even where the content or
purpose of the assembly might be highly offensive to many
people.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Political rights are recognized in international law. In the
United Nations Charter, political rights are not specifically
mentioned. However, in articles 1 and 55 of the charter,
equal rights and the right to self-determination are jointly
recognized; these are political rights, and as a practical matter,
they cannot be implemented without the right to assemble.
Furthermore, in article 21 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the right to peacefully assemble is
recognized. However, it must be realized that even though
these rights are recognized in these international documents,
the United Nations Charter is generally recognized to be
aspirational as opposed to mandatory, and the covenant, even
though it is a treaty, is not enforceable in American courts
because of the numerous reservations made during its ratification. Thus, the issue of legal as opposed to political rights
involving the right to assemble is a significant issue concerning international law.
See also Bill of Rights; Blackstone, William; Freedom of Association; Freedom of Speech.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.
Freedom of Association
Freedom of association is essentially the right to interact with
other people or entities without interference from the government. It is not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights of
the U.S. Constitution. However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
the decisions of NAACP v. Alabama (1958) and Bates v. City
of Little Rock (1960), specifically recognized the freedom to
associate as being related to the right to assemble and freedom
of speech under the due process clause. Both of these cases
involved the governments attempts to obtain the membership
lists of organizations, which the Court found interfered with
the freedom of association. It must be realized that freedom of
association is distinct and different from freedom of assembly.
Generally, freedom of association applies to the rights of individuals to associate with other persons or entities, and freedom
of assembly usually applies to the congregation of groups.
A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Even though freedom of association is not listed in the Bill
of Rights, it is considered a fundamental right. The U.S.
Supreme Court has presented three basic definitions of a
fundamental right. The first is whether the right in question
is a natural right under the principles of natural law. This
includes the right of self-defense as espoused by Sir William
Blackstone, an eighteenth-century English legal commentator, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. The second
is whether the right in question is fundamental to American
justice and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as recognized in the case of Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), in which an
African American youth was sentenced without a jury to a
term of two years in jail for assault. The third is whether the
right is implied in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, such
as the right of privacy, as recognized in the case of Griswold
v. Connecticut (1965) concerning access to birth control. The
second meaning has been the most frequently cited by the
American courts. As a practical matter, what is a fundamental
right in America consists of the first ten amendments to the
U.S. Constitution, as presented in the Bill of Rights, with
some exceptions under the doctrine of selective incorporation, which mandates that most of the rights listed in the Bill
of Rights are fundamental and are applicable against the states
as well as the federal government.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in NAACP v. Alabama (1958),
found that the freedom of association is broad ranging and does
not concern just public political matters. It found that the freedom of association applies, essentially, to any reason, whether
LIMITS
However, like the freedom to assemble, the freedom to associate is not absolute. As with all rights, even fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, the U.S. Supreme Court,
in the decision of Kovacs v. Cooper (1949), recognized that limitations on the right can be imposed. But such limits must be
reasonable, and as it is a fundamental right, any infringement
will be examined by the courts under strict scrutiny.
These circumstances came to the forefront in the infamous
Supreme Court case of Dennis v. United States (1951). Dennis
was an organizer and member of the Communist Party in
America and taught from various Communist books. Dennis
was indicted and convicted because one of the tenants of the
Communist Party was the violent overthrow of the United
States. However, as stated in the vehement dissents, there was
no clear and present danger. Thus, Dennis was convicted, at
least in some part, based on his membership in the Communist Party. This case still raises serious questions about the
freedom of association today and if it is truly a fundamental
right or if it was sacrificed on the altar of political expediency.
However, few would dispute that associating with groups that
present a clear and present danger as to the violent and imminent overthrow of the government would not be protected
under the freedom of association.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the realm of international law, the freedom of association
is not specifically mentioned in the United Nations Charter.
However, it is present by implication. In articles 55 and 62 of
the charter, social equality, social progress, and social problems
are recognized as goals, which implies that freedom to associate is also present. Furthermore, in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, in article 22, the freedom of
association is specifically recognized and includes the right to
unionize.
Indeed, one of the most infamous international examples
of abuse of the freedom of association was in South Africa
during the period of apartheid. Apartheid loosely translates as
apartness. It refers to the principle that the white race is so
superior to the black race that the two must be kept apart. In
support of the enforcement of apartheid, people were banned,
which means that they were not allowed to meet or communicate with more than one person at a time.
The freedom of association is an essential fundamental right
that has effects throughout a persons life and not just in the
Freedom of Conscience
One might understand the concept of conscience as a judicial concept whereby, on reflection, we retrospectively make a
personal judgment about what we did. The judicial conscience
results from personal values or internal judgments, engaging
in a subjective evaluation of our prior actions. An intuitive
notion, the retrospective approach to conscience is strongly
associated with moral and value-oriented evaluations. Such
evaluations might lead one to suffer from a guilty conscience
given prior actions that are, in retrospect, deemed incorrect.
Conscience also acts as a prospective concept, serving a
legislative role in directing a persons actions and providing a
broader framework for consideration and evaluation of future
events. Conscience in the legislative sense results from a metajudgment closely linked to ones essential moral commitments,
creating a disposition to act pursuant to ones fundamental
beliefs and self-identifying moral principles. It is a self-conscious activity to create self-committed decisions about what
is right and wrong.
Thus, a pacifist belief dictates a refusal to use weapons
against another human being, resulting in military conscientious objection and a refusal to engage in any form of military service requiring or supporting the use of arms against
another. There even have been instances of pacifists conscientiously refusing to pay a portion of their income tax, against
the percentage of monetary resources dedicated to the support
of the military.
The legislative role of conscience has been subject to
greater analysis and consideration given its potential to alter
the future behavior of individuals. Thus, respect for the prospective nature of conscience has resulted in the emergence of
a human right to freedom of conscience as a protected belief,
one that is closely associated with, and at times even comparable to, the importance accorded to a religious belief and its
attendant freedom(s).
Freedom of Information
Freedom of information (FOI) signifies ones right of access
to information held by government. Generally, this access
includes access to both government-owned documents and
government meetings. FOI, sometimes referred to as the
right to know, contributes more broadly to transparency,
which is evaluated by how well one is able to see what
government is doing. According to Suzanne Piotrowski
(2007), transparency is achieved through five avenues: FOI
laws, proactive dissemination of information, open meetings,
whistle-blowing, and leaks. FOIand transparency generallyis salient because it helps to ensure and foster democracy, accountability, and citizen trust as well as potentially curb
corruption. Since democracy works best when people are
informed, information flow from the government, then, can
be thought of as a way to ensure better democratic practices
and citizen participation. Furthermore, access to government
documents, information, and meetings paves the way for an
accountability mechanism or check from the public by allowing the public to monitor the decisions and actions taken (or
not taken) by government. While FOI is thought to be an
essential right for all, too much FOI could potentially pose a
threat. Personal privacy and the need for secrecyespecially
in cases of securityhave the potential to be at odds with
FOI rights. As a result, ones right to know as well as ones
right to privacy and security must be balanced in such a way
that neither is breached.
FOI, as discussed above, can help to ensure democratic processes within government. Citizens and residents who utilize
these laws can act as a potential check on government with
close inspection of information and proceedings. However,
FOI can only truly be achieved if a government is transparent
and open about its information. In other words, FOI rights
are upheld when governments produce honest documents
and information in a timely manner that is not burdensome
on requestors.
When dishonest or falsified government information is
released to the public under the guise of true information, FOI
is violated and is only present in theory. In these cases, whistleblowing or leaks are sometimes necessary for FOI rights and
transparency to prevail. A whistle-blower is defined by Sissela Bok (1989) as one who make[s] revelations meant to call
attention to negligence, abuses, or dangers that threaten the
public interest. They sound an alarm based on their expertise
or inside knowledge, often from within the very organization
in which they work. A leak occurs when an informant on
the inside, usually keeping him- or herself anonymous, releases
this information to the press. A famous example of leaking
occurred in the United States during the Watergate scandal
of the 1970s Nixon administration. When whistle-blowing or
Freedom of Movement
Neither the 1787 Constitution of the United States nor any
ratification since mentions anything specific about a right
to move or travel within the country or beyond its borders
(Article I, Clause 6 recognizes the right of national legislators to travel to and from Congress). Nevertheless, the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized this right as a part of U.S. law,
and it is also an important part of international law.
LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT
This right to travel elaborated on in Saenz raises all sorts of
constitutional issues that eventually find their way into the
judiciary and occasionally percolate up to the Supreme Court.
Congress, for example, can restrict travel to other countries
and can impose passport restrictions on certain people. However, these restrictions could raise First Amendment issues
if, for instance, the limitations on foreign travel were aimed
at someones political or religious affiliations. Many of these
once cold war questions were resolved by the Court in favor
of individual freedom, but these matters could recur in the
context of the war on terror. States also have the legitimate
power to restrict the movement of parolees or condition child
custody on parental residence within the state of the child.
Other impediments relate to laws that track sex offenders,
most of which require convicts, even those who have completed their sentences, to register their whereabouts and/or
Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion, libertas religionis, is among the oldest
internationally recognized rights, and most people today in
liberal, secular states around the world consider religious freedom a fundamental human right. Even most states with an
official religion allow the practice of other religions within
their jurisdictions. How much religious freedom, of course,
varies from one state to another.
suddenly reversing course. As long as the contested regulation is nondiscriminatory (that is, not aimed specifically at
religious behavior) and rationally related to a legitimate governmental goal, no one could henceforth claim immunity on
the basis of religious obligation. In reformulating free exercise
law, Justice Antonin Scalias majority opinion attempted judicially to distinguish both Yoder and Sherbert as particular,
special exceptions. However, Justice Sandra Day OConnor,
for herself and three other dissenters, complained that the
Court dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence. Under this policy, the federal, state, or
local government in the United States could ban the hijab in
public schools as long as the prohibition was driven by some
neutral, secular purpose.
Despite a congressional effort to reverse the Courts interpretation of the First Amendment, the Smith doctrine has
prevailed. The free exercise problem generated by religious
pluralism has disappeared. As the Court in Cantwell first ruled,
people can believe whatever they want, but free exercise of
their religions no longer has constitutional shelter unless government has specifically targeted those religious practices.
Other countries where freedom of religion is cherished continue to wrestle with these difficult issues, which increase in
number and intensity in accord with the spread of religious
pluralism and diversity.
See also Bill of Rights; Church and State; Freedom of Conscience; Religion and Politics; Religious Persecution.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JAMES MAGEE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Global Restrictions on Religion. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life.
Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, December 2009. pewforum.
org/docs/?DocID=491.
Knights, Samantha. Freedom of Religion, Minorities, and the Law. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2007.
Neusner, Jacob, ed. World Religions in America. 4th ed. Louisville, Ky.:
Westminster John Knox, 2009.
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of Americas
Tradition of Religious Equality. New York: Basic Books, 2010.
Taylor, Paul M. Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and
Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Zacharias, Gary. Freedom of Religion. Detroit, Mich.: Greenhaven, 2005.
JUDICIAL RETREAT
Other liberal democracies never went as far as the United
States in interpreting their constitutional principles so broadly,
and many nonliberal states impose substantial limitations on
religious practice. France and Italy, where religious freedom
is comparatively very high, nonetheless have not exempted
Muslim girls and young women from public school dress
codes. Wearing the burka or hijab in public schools has created in both countries the inevitable clash between religious
freedom and public order. Having given religious practice
a greater value in the conflict of liberty and order at least
since the Sherbert case in 1963, in Employment Division of
Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith (1990), a narrowly split (54) Court eliminated this problem altogether by
Freedom of Speech
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo in Palko v.
Louisiana (1937) described freedom of speech as the matrix,
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
freedom. Without the capacity to identify and protest injustice, people would neither know what their rights are nor be
able to challenge deprivations of those rights. Near universal agreement on the merits of speech rights in the abstract,
however, has not entailed any general agreement on what
speech constitutions and laws must permit. Legal scholars,
elected officials, and judges dispute the central purposes of
free speech, what constitutes speech, and the values that might
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Freedom of the press is located in the First Amendment of the
Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution. Although freedom of
the press is part of the First Amendment and intricately linked
to freedom of speech, it is a separate and distinct right. In
America, freedom of the press is a fundamental right, which
means that it has the highest level of protection in the American political and legal system. However, this freedom is not
absolute.
In modern times, there are a number of laws prohibiting
certain public statements involving, for example, libel, obscenity, and national security. Libel is the defamation of a person
through the written word. A person who has been defamed in
writing generally has the right to sue for damages and equitable relief prohibiting the defamation in court. However, if a
person is a public figure or a private person who speaks publicly on an issue of public concern, then the protections provided by libel laws are reduced. The publication of criticisms
of public officials and statements on matters of public concern are considered to be essential to a free political system.
Furthermore, the government cannot be libeled. In the realm
of politics and American political theory, this is an essential
protection; otherwise, the ruling party would be able to easily
stifle dissent and opposition.
OBSCENITY
Obscenity is difficult to define. In American society, there
have been numerous cases involving what is obscene and not
protected by the First Amendment. In the famous case of
Miller v. California (1973), which involved a person distributing
obscene material, the U.S. Supreme Court defined something
as obscene if it met the following test: (1) the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct; and (3) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. The difficulty of applying this definition is highlighted
by the statement of Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart
even though he could not define obscenity, he knew it when
he saw it. Obscenity can have an important role in political
debate. For example, in the case of Cohen v. California (1971),
the Supreme Court found that the use of the phrase Fuck
the draft (worn on a T-shirt) was protected by the First
Amendment, as at the time of the Vietnam War, the draft was
a serious political issue. In the opinion, Justice Harlan noted
that one mans vulgarity may be another mans lyric.
CONCLUSION
Whatever the form or purpose, it is widely accepted that
freedom of the press was primarily enacted for the protection of political discourse. At the time of the American
Revolution (17761783), much of the impetus and support
for the revolution was based in the publications of such
A COLLECTIVE OR
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT?
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the first
issue, whether the right to keep and bear arms is a collective
right or an individual right, has been the primary focus of
discussion concerning the Second Amendment. Proponents
of the collective right theory stated that the Second Amendment applies only to militias that are under the control of the
government and not to individuals. The individual right proponents relied on the fact that it was the individual citizens
who bore arms during the American Revolution (17761783)
and not militias controlled by the government. Furthermore,
the many writings of the Founders clearly supported the individual right to keep and bear arms.
In modern jurisprudence, the issue has been raised in the
lower courts in a number of cases, but these decisions almost
uniformly find that the Second Amendment provides only a
collective right. One of the most famous exceptions was the
decision in United States v. Emerson (1999), wherein a federal
district court in Texas found that it was an individual right.The
A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?
The third issue is whether the right to keep and bear arms is
a fundamental right. The U.S. Supreme Court has presented
three basic definitions of a fundamental right. The first is
whether the right in question is a natural right, under the
principles of natural law, such as the right of self-defense, as
espoused by, for example, Sir William Blackstone, a famous
English legal commentator, in his Commentaries on the Laws of
England published in the late eighteenth century. The second
is whether the right in question is fundamental to American
justice and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as recognized in the case of Duncan v. Louisiana (1968). The third
is whether the right is implied in the penumbra of the Bill
of Rights, such as the right of privacy, recognized in the case
AN OUTDATED RIGHT?
The fourth major issue concerning the right to keep and bear
arms is whether society has changed such that the right is
outmoded. There are numerous political groups opposed to
the ownership of guns. They have successfully lobbied for the
enactment of numerous gun control laws across the nation,
which mandate such requirements as licensing, waiting periods before purchases, background checks before purchasing,
and prohibitions.The basic premise of such groups is that guns
are dangerous. Many people are killed with guns, and many
crimes are committed with guns. These groups argue that
regulating, controlling, and even prohibiting the ownership
and use of guns will reduce these dangers to society. There is
significant evidence supporting aspects of these claims.
However, when considering the right to keep and bear
arms, a balancing must be made: do the benefits of individual
gun ownership (the right to revolt against a tyrannical government) outweigh the risks (crimes committed with guns)? This
question is still being debated in the political arena in America.
In the international context, the right to keep and bear arms is
generally not recognized. It is not part of the United Nations
Charter, nor is it part of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
See also Bill of Rights; Blackstone, William; Civil and Political
Rights; International Bill of Rights.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Aukamp, William M. No Individual Gun Right. National Law Journal, June
14, 1999, A22.
Cooke, Jacob E., ed. The Federalist. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University
Press, 1961.
Halbrook, Stephen P. Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberty of
the Subject: Pre-revolutionary Origins of the Second Amendment.
University of Dayton Law Review 15 (1989): 91124.
Henkin, Louis. Revolutions and Constitutions. Louisiana Law Review 49
(1989): 1023, 10241028.
Johnson, David E. Taking a Second Look at the Second Amendment and
Modern Gun Control Laws. Kentucky Law Journal 86 (1998): 197222.
Levinson, Sanford. The Embarrassing Second Amendment. Yale Law Journal
99 (1989): 637659.
Lott, John R., Jr. More Guns, Less Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1998.
Plouffe, William C., Jr. A Federal Court Holds the Second Amendment Is
an Individual Right: Jeffersonian Utopia or Apocalypse Now? University
of Memphis Law Review 30 (Fall 1999): 55, 8789.
Shalhope, Robert E. The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment.
Journal of American History 69 (1982): 599614.
Vandercoy, David E. The History of the Second Amendment. Valparaiso
University Law Review 28 (1994): 10071039.
Free Trade
The concept of free trade is rooted in the eighteenth-century
antimercantilist movement seen in Europe and prerevolutionary America. Mercantilism is an economic theory founded
on a belief that the global volume of international trade is
fixed or unchangeable and that the prosperity of a nation
depends on its supply of capital, particularly gold and silver.
According to mercantilists, governments should maximize
their capital with protectionist policies, encouraging exports
and discouraging imports through tariffs and subsidies, resulting in a positive balance of trade. Conversely, the emerging
free trade concepts in the 1700s among intellectuals in France,
Great Britain, and colonial America were based on a belief
in laissez-faire government and international commerce.
Focusing on agriculture as the only source of true wealth for
nations, a group of French economists known as physiocrats
argued a nations net product could be increased by reducing
barriers to trade and regulations impeding the growth of this
sector.
English economists such as David Hume and Adam Smith,
helped transform anti-mercantilism into the positive cosmopolitical vision of free trade benefiting humanity (Eckes,
Opening Americas Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776,
1995, 4). They argued mercantilists failed to understand the
benefits of free trade between nations and the notion of comparative advantage, which was fully developed later in the
1800s by David Ricardo, an English political economist. The
theory of comparative advantage argues, for example, that
if France were a more efficient producer of both cloth and
wine than Britain, but Britain could produce cloth with fewer
resources than it could produce wine, both countries could
financially benefit by specializing, Britain in cloth and France
in wine, and then trading.Trade, in other words, was no longer
viewed as a zero-sum game but as a means of enhancing the
wealth of all nations involved.
Freezing of Party
Alternatives
The freezing of party alternatives is a concept that asserts that
political party structures in democratic systems tend to block
or freeze the emergence of additional competitive parties,
especially in two-party systems. The idea was first developed
Freire, Paulo
Paulo Freire (19211997) was a leading Brazilian educator and
theorist. His lifes work is an attempt to liberate the marginalized classes, who constitute a culture of silence in many parts
of the developing world. His primary theoretical contribution
is the philosophy of popular education that reflects classic
Platonic tendencies, enriched by a Marxist, anticolonialist
framework. Today, his work serves as the foundation for critical pedagogy and numerous popular and informal education
programs around the world.
Born to middle-class parents in Recife, Brazil, Freire grew
up knowing poverty and hunger during the Great Depression
of 1929. In 1943, he studied law at the University of Recife. After passing the bar, Freire abandoned law and worked
as a schoolteacher. In 1946, he was appointed director of the
Department of Education and Culture of the Social Service in
the State of Pernambuco.Working primarily with the illiterate
poor in this post, Freire began to formulate a means of communicating with the dispossessed that would later develop into
his dialogical method for adult education.
In 1961, he was appointed director of the Department of
Cultural Extension at Recife University, where he was afforded
the first opportunity for significant application of his theory
of education. Freires literacy program was an overwhelming
success, with three hundred illiterate sugarcane workers learning to read and write in just forty-five days. In response, the
government approved the creation of thousands of literacy
programs across the country based on Freires model.
In 1964, following the overthrow of the Goulart regime
in Brazil, Freire was imprisoned for seventy days. After a brief
exile in Bolivia, Freire worked in Chile under the Frei government. In 1967, he published his first book, Education as the
Practice of Freedom, and in 1969, he took a visiting professorship
at Harvard University.
During this period, Freire wrote his most influential text,
Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970), in which he described education as a path to permanent liberation, with two stages. The
first stage, conscientization, is a process in which a learner
moves toward critical consciousness, an awareness of being
an oppressed object in a world where only subjects have
power. This process is the heart of liberatory education and
stands in contrast to what Freire termed banking education,
a dehumanizing method of education where learners are conceptualized as passive recipients of preselected knowledge.The
second stage, praxis, comprises a dialogical cycle of actionreflection-action, in which critically conscious individuals
seek to transform the social order.
After leaving Harvard in the early 1970s, Freire served as
the assistant secretary of education for the World Council of
Churches in Switzerland. In 1979, he was invited by the Brazilian government to return from exile, where he assumed a faculty position at the University of So Paulo. He also joined the
Workers Party in the city of So Paulo and acted as a supervisor for its adult literacy project from 1980 to 1986. When the
Workers Party prevailed in municipal elections in 1988, he was
appointed minister of education for So Paulo.
Throughout his life, Freire joined in writing more than a
dozen books, integrating strands of thinking about educational
practice, critical theory, democracy, and liberation. Specifically,
his emphases on dialogue, conscientization, praxis, the naming of oppression, and the lived experience of participants
are the core tenets of his pedagogy of hope. Such innovations have had a considerable impact on the development of
education practice and theorizing, especially in Latin America,
Africa, and Asia.
See also Civic Education; Critical Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICHAEL MCNAMARA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Darder, Antonia. Teaching as an Act of Love: Reflection on Paulo Freire
and His Contributions to Our Lives and Work. In Critical Pedagogy
Reader, edited by Antonia Darder, Marta Baltodano, and Rodolfo Torres,
497510. New York: Taylor and Francis, 2003.
Gadotti, Moacir. Reading Paulo Freire: His Life and Work. New York: State
University of New York Press, 1994.
Smith, Mark K, Paulo Freire and Information Education, The Encyclopedia
of Informal Education, www.infed.org/thinkers/et-freir.htm. Last updated
June 18, 2009.
Have any recent political thinkers broken with these traditions? The most likely candidates are Michel Foucault and
Jacques Derrida. Foucault, however, preserved something
of the older French intellectual habits. A critic of Enlightenment rationalism and the despotic practices it founded,
he ended up adopting a guise toward democracy that was
severe, skeptical, and watchfulnot unlike Tocquevilles
democratic pessimism. The History of Sexuality shows a
thinker fully absorbed in anthropological comparisons. Like
Montaigne, Foucault discovered in Greek antiquity the solace of a pagan ethics. The Lectures at the College de France of
19751976 (Society Must Be Defended) was a defense of
civil society. In resurrecting the Comte de Boulainvillierss
prerevolutionary fascination with the wars of the Barbarian
conquest, Foucault argues that it was the French aristocracy
(not bourgeoisie or proletariat) who invented a subversive
historical discourse that was a weapon of self-defense for
peoples and societies in an unending war with officials,
whose kindred weapons were the disciplinary human sciences. Foucaults subsequent interest in governmentality,
(a rethinking of the issues of Discipline and Punish) is but
the classical French quest for discerning in remote but connected habits what Montesquieu called the spirit that governs mennow, however, displayed on the micro-level of
bio-politics. With all the severity of the Cartesian rationalist, Foucault cast an unflattering light on how precisely this
Cartesian spirit has invaded and transformed these various
practices of civil society.
Let us turn to Jacques Derridas later and more explicitly
political or ethical writings: Force of Law, Specters of Marx, Politics
of Friendship, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, On Hospitality,
Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, and The Beast and the Sovereign.
In these writings we find an extreme but still-recognizable
version of the Montaignian skeptic. Not unlike the sixteenthcentury author, Derrida rediscovers in various domains, such
as law, justice, and hospitality, a source of unease. They possess an ever-transformative internal dialectic that renders them
both demandingly necessary and always undecidablethat is,
impossible, or at least impossible to fully satisfy. In passing we
mention Derridas own taking up of the classical theme of
national spirit (Of Spirit). Equally interesting is his return
to the old French tension between an insistence on sovereign
closure to malign external influences and cosmopolitan openness to diverse manners and customs. This whole drama of the
postrevolutionary period, enacted as the always unhappy compromises between the Jacobin state and the society it would
superintend, or the world in which it acted, is played out again
in a new deconstructive philosophical key.
Among these master thinkers there is no doubt great novelty, but they are also recognizable iterations of traditional
obsessionssymptoms, so to speak, that suggest continuities
lurking in every effort to digress from the past.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICHAEL MOSHER
See also Beauvoir, Simone de; Comte, Auguste; Condorcet,
Marquis de; Derrida, Jacques; Diderot, Denis; Durkheim, mile;
Freund, Ernst
Ernst Freund (18641932) was one of the leading American
legal thinkers at the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth
century. He was a practicing attorney, law professor, political
scientist, writer, and social reformer. Freund was educated at
the German universities of Berlin and Heidelberg and became
a professor of administrative law and municipal corporations
in 1892 at Columbia University in the United States. He
received a PhD in political science while he was at Columbia,
and in 1894 he accepted a position with the political science
department at the University of Chicago in Illinois. In 1903
he joined the faculty of the new law school on the Chicago
campus and was instrumental in developing and advancing
its curriculum on social and public service, political science,
and the law. Freund also helped establish the first graduate
school of social service in the country. In 1915 he served as
the president of the American Political Science Association.
Freunds most famous work was his highly influential 1904
Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights. This book
constitutes the first methodical analysis and structured elucidation of governmental police power in the American context, and it had a profound impact on the way the countrys
legal and judicial systems considered the topic. At the heart of
Freunds dissection of police power was an engagement of the
question of the extent of the limitations placed on legislative
power by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Freund called for a structure of legal rules and regulations
that would properly balance rights of the individual versus
rights of businesses and property rights. He clarified what
police power entailedthe authority of the government to
advance the general, public welfare by regulating the use of
propertyand when and where such an exercise of authority is legitimate, such as in the securing of public health and
safety, public morals, public order, and security. He saw police
power as not frozen in time with a particular understanding
but instead as a much more elastic and malleable concept susceptible to adaptations over time in accord with varying social,
economic, and political circumstances and conditions. This
book and other writings helped cement Freunds reputation as
one of the foremost analysts and theorists of administrative law.
In 1928 Freund published another seminal work, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property. In this book, he articulates his concern over too great a growth and expansion of
government power and calls for an appropriate reconciling
and balancing of inherent respect for individual rights, social
obligations and societal responsibilities of property, and the
dominating demands of the public interest and common welfare. He importantly delineates here the differences and implications of power, authority, and leverage in society among
governmental actors, individual citizens, and property. At
the forefront of Freunds arguments is an unyielding need to
marry the law, legislative enactments, and legal interpretations
with actual social reality. That is to say, Freund saw a compelling necessity for the law to remain sensitive and responsive to
genuine needs of actual persons, not to be caught in an impersonal vacuum of pure jurisprudential theorizing.
Friedan, Betty
Betty Friedan (19212006) was an American writer and feminist known for being a founder of the National Organization
for Women (NOW) and for her writings, public statements,
and actions that helped change the perception of the role of
women in American society.
Born in Peoria, Illinois, she attended Smith College and
graduated with a major in psychology. At Smith, she became
the editor of the campus newspaper, and under her leadership the paper editorialized in favor of the unionization of the
maids on campus. Friedan then spent a year completing a masters degree in psychology at the University of California at
Berkeley, where she became politically active and was involved
in a number of left-wing causes.
After leaving Berkeley, Friedan moved to New York City
and became a reporter. She wrote for the Federated Press, a
news service that was controlled by the Communist Party. She
then wrote for the UE News, the newspaper of the United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. She was
fired by the paper because she was pregnant with her second
child. In 1963 Friedans The Feminine Mystique was published.
An outgrowth of a survey of Smith College graduates that she
had conducted for the fifteenth reunion of their class in 1957
(later extended to other female college graduates), the book
discusses the role of women in industrial societies. It contends
that the role of the full-time homemaker repressed and stifled
women and that there was an absence of female role models
who both worked and took care of a family. Friedan argues
that women are as capable as men and can follow any career
path. She asserts that restrictive laws and narrow social views
were responsible for the limits on womens lives rather than
any inherent weakness or incapacity and that women could
find personal fulfillment outside of their traditional role as
homemakers. The book became a best seller, is credited with
Fringe Parties
There is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes
a fringe party. Fringe party is mostly used by journalists, politicians, and political scientists as a pejorative term to demarcate
the boundary between reasonable politics and the lunatic
fringe, a label famously applied by Theodore Roosevelt in
his autobiography (1922) to describe the foolish fanatics
always to be found in such a [reform] movement and always
discrediting it. Consequently, some political scientists have
argued that the term should best be replaced by more neutral
expressions, such as marginal parties, nonestablished parties, or
nonmainstream parties.
Fromm, Erich
Erich Fromm (19001980) was a German-Jewish-American
psychoanalytic social critic, humanistic thinker, and social psychologist who first visited the United States in 1933 to lecture
and then immigrated the following year to escape the rise of
the Nazi state.
Closely associated with the Frankfurt school of critical
theory, Fromm combined a deep nonreligious understanding
of biblical texts with close readings of Marx, Freud, and others
to produce an original body of work that highlights the contradictions and development of Western liberal democracy as
it pertains to the mental health and well-being of its citizens.
Fromms basic insight is that the psychological toll of market
economies emphasis on competition and material accumulation has made individuals vulnerable to forms of authoritarian rule that paradoxically mirror their own fear of freedom.
Fromm, however, was no social determinist or pessimist but
argues that human community can be built on a reawakened
sense of reason, solidarity, and love. Although underplaying
the role of institutions and constitutional safeguards such as
separation of powers, checks and balances, and civil liberties
that might be invoked to protect the citizen from the state,
Fromms work nevertheless remains fresh and full of insight
regarding the role of self-understanding and mass psychology
in the contemporary world.
The most enduring of Fromms books for political scientists is his 1941 tour de force Escape from Freedom. In recounting the emergence of the individual from the Middle Ages
through the Protestant Reformation and the subsequent
development of capitalism, Fromm posits a dynamic socialpsychosocial theory that examines the personal and social
structures that contribute to the making of an authoritarian
character. This emergence, recapitulated in an extreme form
in the rise of Nazi Germany, includes personality types driven
by economic social forces and unconscious pathological anxieties who would willingly give up the burden of freedom
and submit to the manipulation of hateful and repressive leaders rather than face the ambiguities and uncertainties of being
human in the modern world. Looked at from a historical and
comparative perspective, what can be thought of as Fromms
political theory of collective action and human behavior in
times of accelerated economic transformation and stress has
important implications for understanding globalization and
the rise of religious fundamentalism and reactions to it in the
twenty-first century.
Having published more then twenty books and three hundred articles, Fromm continually explores the interplay of
ideas and social structures on the formation and malformation
of human personality and by implication politics. In The Sane
Society (1955), Fromm argues that affluent democratic societies
could be sick due to the constant bombardment of advertising and creation of personality types that act more like conforming robots than free and autonomous individuals. In The
Art of Loving (1956), Fromm argues that in an alienated capitalist society, love is more often than not unconsciously confused
with the buying and selling of goods, thereby transforming
the beloved into an object of desire rather than a subject of
mutual trust and respect. Fromm paid his most explicit theoretical debt to Freud and Marx in Beyond the Chains of Illusion
(1962), arguing that human freedom lies in the awareness of
the inner and outer constraints that bind the individual and
society. Only in conscious choices can a more just and peaceful world be achieved.
The political theorist John Scharr, perhaps Fromms sharpest critic, argues that Fromm is a utopian thinker whose
Functionalism 641
emphasis on human freedom avoids the difficult political
choices of authority. Despite the criticism that Fromm offered
no practical way out of the modern dilemma, he was active in
politics in the 1950s and 1960s for a time as a member of the
Socialist Party of America and a supporter of Senator Eugene
McCarthys run for the Democratic Partys presidential nomination. Fromm was also the author of May Man Prevail? An
Inquiry into the Facts and Fictions of American Foreign Policy (1961)
and cofounder of SANE, an activist peace group that called for
a ban on nuclear weapons.
See also Frankfurt School; Human Nature and Politics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KENNETH A. BETSALEL
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Funk, Rainer. Erich Fromm: His Life and Ideas. New York: Continuum, 2000.
Schaar, John H. Escape from Authority:The Perspectives of Eric Fromm. New
York: Basic Books, 1961.
Wilde, Lawrence. Erich Fromm and the Quest for Solidarity. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004.
Functionalism
Functionalism (sometimes referred to as structural-functionalism) is a theoretical perspective and methodological strategy
employed predominantly in sociology and anthropology, but
it can be found in most social sciences. The English social
scientist Herbert Spencer and the French sociologist Emile
Durkheim explicitly laid the theoretical foundations of functionalism and provided the first empirical work applying the
functionalist perspective. While both theorists assumed populations grew larger and denser leading to differentiated structures with distinct functions meant to handle the problems
emerging from larger societal systems, each theorist tended
to emphasize different processes of societal evolution. For
Spencer, the emphasis was on the process of differentiation,
which was a sign of societal adaptation staving off disintegration, conquest, or collapse. Conversely, Durkheim was more
interested in understanding how these differentiated parts
were integrated into the whole such that social organization
and relations remained stable and potential competition or
conflict was prevented. Ultimately, the idea that society was
a whole with distinct parts that were mutually dependent on
each other through a division of labor came to be the guiding
principle of functionalist theory and analysis.
MODERN FUNCTIONALISM
Talcott Parsons is the father of modern American functionalism. His goal was to build a grand synthetic theory that drew
from the insights of the masters. Society was a system; it had
four needs: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent
pattern maintenance. Visually, he represented these four needs
by drawing a fourfold box representing each subsystem that
functioned to meet the societys larger needs. Each square
internally differentiated into four smaller boxes representing
the subsystems creation of structures functioning to meet its
internal needs. His model attempted to account for everything
from the biological level (which was analogized as located in
the economic sector, the primary location for adaptive structures) to the psychological level (where the polity was oriented
toward collective goal setting and attainment) to the social level
(where integration occurred through roles, status positions, and
SETH ABRUTYN
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Alexander, Jeffrey C. Neofunctionalism. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1985.
Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society. Translated by W. D. Halls.
New York: Free Press, 1997.
Luhmann, Niklas. The Differentiation of Society. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1982.
Malinowski, Bronislaw. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. London: Routledge,
1922.
Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. New York: Free Press, 1951.
Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. Structure and Function of Primitive Society. New York:
Free Press, 1965.
Spencer, Herbert. The Principles of Sociology. New York: Appleton, 18741896.
Turner, Jonathan. Human Institutions: A Theory of Societal Evolution. Lanham,
Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003.
Turner, Jonathan, and Alexandra Maryanski. Functionalism. Upper Saddle
River, N.J.: Benjamin Cummings, 1979.
Functional Representation
Functional representation is an alternative form of political
representation in which legislators are chosen not by territorial units but by various other groups such as social class,
occupation, or minority status. It was developed as a means
to provide representation to groups that might otherwise be
marginalized in the political process. In addition, it reflected
concerns that traditional political systems created artificial
divides between politics, economics, and society. Initially,
functional representation was popular among industrial organizations that sought either direct election of representatives
to national legislatures or the creation of consultative bodies that had a role in the policy process. For instance, several
countries in western Europe developed consultative assemblies
whose members were elected by socioeconomic groups. In
contemporary Slovenia, the forty-member National Council
is composed of representatives of employer groups, employee
groups, farmers, trade groups, and so forth. In many modern
systems, functional representation is used to ensure minority
participation in the legislature. For example, in the Croatia
House of Representatives, five of the delegates are elected
to represent the countrys minority groups. Opponents of
functional representation assert that it creates legislators that
serve very narrow special interests instead of broad segments
of society.
See also Minority Representation; Representative Systems.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Fundamentalism
Fundamentalism is notoriously difficult to define, as countless political science commentators have found. Part of the
difficulty lies in the use of the term in a pejorative sense to
describe those whose religious or political opinions lie outside the norm. Few groupings that are labeled as fundamentalist would willingly describe themselves as such. The 1992
Merriam-Webster Dictionary describes fundamentalism as either
an extreme Protestant position characterized by the belief
that the Bible is a verbally accurate recording of the word of
God or adherence to traditional beliefs of any kind. This
definition incorporates many who could not be considered
fundamentalist; however, in these two concepts lie both narrow and broad definitions of the term. The narrow definition
traces fundamentalism to its Christian origins in the early
twentieth century and has been described by George Marsden (1980) as militantly anti-modernist Protestant evangelicalism (p. 4). The broad definition seeks to expand the term
to include other faith and nonfaith groupings that possess
similar characteristics and ways of operating. Jeffrey Hadden
and Anson Shupe (1989) provide a useful definition for this
broader definition, describing fundamentalism as a proclamation of reclaimed authority over a sacred tradition which is to
be reinstated as an antidote for a society that has strayed from
its cultural moorings (p. 111).
Fundamentalism 643
CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISM
In its narrow definition, fundamentalism refers to the movement in the United States and Britain that developed out of
the teachings of Princeton Theological Seminary and a series
of pamphlets published between 1910 and 1915 called The
Fundamentals, which called Christians to return and adhere to
a strict and literalist interpretation of an inerrant Bible, which
emphasized belief in the deity of Christ and the virgin birth.
The movement grew in opposition to prevailing trends in the
church, inspired by German higher criticism and scientific
discovery of modernism and liberalism. Those who clung to
the fundamentals of a literal interpretation of the Bible saw
themselves as the guardians of true Christianity against nominal Christianity and nonbelievers. They considered themselves
a faithful remnant in a fallen world that had begun to infect
the church. They spent the following six decades avoiding
political involvement and cooperation with mainstream
churches while building their own churches, schools, colleges,
theological and evangelistic training centers, and publishing
houses. In the 1970s the Row v. Wade decision on abortion
and attempts to bring about the Equal Rights Amendment
spurred fundamentalists to act politically in defense of what
they perceived to be an attack on traditional values. They
reemerged as a potent political and religious force in the 1980s
with tens of millions of adherents. During the following three
decades, the movement was to emerge as a dominant force in
both American Christianity and the Republican Party.
CHARACTERISTICS OF
FUNDAMENTALISM
The defining characteristics of Christian fundamentalism can also be used to understand fundamentalisms more
broadly. Marty and Applebys comprehensive Fundamentalism Project in the 1990s identified nine ideological and
organizational characteristics of fundamentalism. Among five
ideological characteristics, they note, first, fundamentalists
tendency to react against secular modernization and the perceived marginalization of religion. Second, attention is drawn
to the selectivity of those aspects of tradition and modernity fundamentalists choose to reshape, reject, or embrace.
Although modernism might be rejected, modernity with its
technological progress is embraced to spread their message.
Third, fundamentalists tend to have a Manichean worldview,
a dualism that sees the world in absolutist terms of good and
evil. Fourth, there is a belief in the inerrancy and absolutism
of sacred texts. Finally, fundamentalists believe in the idea of
millennialism and messianism, that there was and/or will be a
golden age when they will be rewarded and nonbelievers will
be punished. The four organizational characteristics include,
first, the idea of an elect or chosen membership. Second, this
membership needs to be separate and distinct from other
members of society. Third, fundamentalist groups are typically male dominated and led by a charismatic or authoritarian figure; dissent is not tolerated and leads to schism rather
than compromise. Womens roles tend to be subordinate and
conform to traditional roles in a patriarchal society. Finally,
FUNDAMENTALISM TODAY
Marty and Applebys work is helpful in identifying the commonalities shared by different fundamentalist movements.
Although the term remains contested, it is in common usage
and as such is useful in designating groups that share such
features. These ideological and organizational characteristics
are shared by Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, and other
fundamentalists. They possess different sacred texts and leaders but adopt similar approaches in claiming inerrancy for
their interpretation of such scriptures and reacting against the
marginalization of religion in a globalized era. They are comfortable using modern technology to disseminate their worldview while simultaneously attacking selective Enlightenment
values. Convinced of their own right standing with their God,
they adopt a dualistic view of the world and eagerly await
the time when they will be rewarded for their obedience and
faithfulness. Members of fundamentalist movements are set
apart from others, made to believe they are special and different from the majority of the society in which they live.
Accordingly, they may act and dress differently to identify
themselves with other group members and to differentiate
themselves from fellow citizens. The strong charismatic leadership of such movements retains control over members and
shapes the ideological agenda, mobilizing support on behalf of
the specific issues on which they decide to concentrate.
Fundamentalism has developed to become a feature of the
modern political arena in ostensibly secular states such as the
United States, India, and Turkey as well as more overtly religious countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, where no clear
separation of religion and state exists. Fundamentalists have
formed political parties that have gone on to govern, such
as the Bharatiya Junata Party in India or Adalet ve Kalkinma
Partisi in Turkey; others have infiltrated existing parties including the Republican Party in the United States.Yet other fundamentalists, such as al-Qaida, have eschewed the democratic
process and pursued violent means to achieve their political
and religious objectives. Others including Hamas and Hezbollah pursue violent, political, and social welfare means to
advance their religious/political objectives. The wars and acts
of terrorism of the early twenty-first century have thrust fundamentalism to the fore of political science discourse, a long
way from its rather quieter beginnings a century ago.
See also Al-Qaida; Religious Parties; Religious Right.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LEE MARSDEN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Almond, Gabriel, Emmanuel Sivan, and R. Scott Appleby. Fundamentalism:
Genus and Species. In Fundamentalisms Comprehended, edited by Martin
Marty and R. Scott Appleby, 399424. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1995.
Barr, James. Fundamentalism. London: SCM, 1977.
Hadden, Jeffrey, and Anson Shupe. Is There Such a Thing as Global
Fundamentalism? In Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered,
G
G7/G8 and G20
The acronyms G7/G8 (Group of Seven/Eight) and G20
(Group of Twenty) denote two informal interstate coalitions that coordinate the policies of nation-states in regularly
held summits at the ministerial or heads-of-state level. This
informal mode of governance contrasts the highly organized,
formal decision-making mechanisms typically analyzed in
international relations studies, such as in the United Nations,
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade
Organization. Scholars observe increasing trends of informality in international relations since the cold war due to a shift
in political decision making from formal forms of governance
to informal bodies. This is the result of resistance to reform
in formal institutions, a growth of informal groups within
formal institutions, and the informal addressing of policies
that were traditionally handled through formal agreements.
Against these overall trends in international relations, the G7/
G8 and G20 have become decisive institutions in certain key
policy fields, although the two coalitions differ in regard to
their history, composition, and policy contents.
The G7/G8 was created in 1975 following the 1973 oil
crisis and subsequent global recession. Originally referred to
as the G6, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan,
and the United States gathered annually to coordinate financial and economic policies for industrialized countries. In 1976
Canada joined the group, and since 1977 the European Union
has participated in all of the groups summits without being a
recognized member. The addition of Russia, which was officially invited in 1998 as the groups latest member, created the
Group of Eight. However, Russia is not a full participant in all
activities, because it is excluded from the G7 finance grouping.
Since the 1970s, the small gatherings of G7/G8 heads of
states have evolved into annual summits that attract huge
media attention, mass mobilization, and public consultation
with key civil society stakeholders. The G7/G8 has broadened
its agenda from pure financial and economic issues to wideranging policies, including foreign affairs, science and technology, financial markets, energy, environment and climate,
and employment/labor. The original informal mode of governance has been steadily formalized through regular policy
meetings and routinization of cooperation on the ministerial
level. The annual summits of the heads of state remain the
645
Game Theory
Game theory analyzes social situations in which parties
choose actions in pursuit of their individual goals, each person
knowing that his or her success depends on all the choices
made. A player, X, tries to predict others moves and considers
their views of the situation. However, X realizes that they are
likewise trying to predict Xs move, so a circularity appears.
The most important concept in the theory, the equilibrium of
John Nash, is an attempt to escape the circle.
The analysis is conducted mathematically, so the details
must be specified precisely. In the simplest case, parties know
their goals and the consequences of their moves, and they
know that the others are similarly informed. In more sophisticated games, the players may be uncertain about goals, moves,
or outcomes, and their uncertainty is expressed as probability
distributions.The use of mathematics ensures that all assertions
have a clear meaning within the formal system and that the
conclusions follow undeniably from the premises.
Game theory applications have yielded results that seemed
odd at first but made sense when the logic was examined, and
without the discipline of mathematics the analyst might have
slipped back into the conventional thinking. The theorys precision does not mean that it can predict real parties actions in
specific contexts, since it is impossible to model all variables in
play or measure all the parameters. The theorys contribution
has been to clarify the structure of different kinds of conflict
or coordination.
Game theory proper is distinguished in its applications. It
is a mathematical enterprise guided by interest in abstract systems, following criteria that are basically aesthetic.The greatest
number of applications are in economics, followed by political science, biology, computer science, law, linguistics, and the
philosophy of ethics.
measuring ones goals even when they are not money or any
other quantitative commodity.
A strategy is a complete plan of action for the game, instructing a player what to do for any information that might arise.
A Nash equilibrium is an assignment of strategies to the players,
such that each player would be ready to use his or her strategy
even if, hypothetically, the player learned the others strategies. Whether this property should persuade sensible players
depends on the situation. In the most favorable case, players
culture and history might give them shared expectations about
each others moves, and it follows that they would use a Nash
equilibrium.
For a wide class of games, at least one equilibrium exists,
but often a game possesses several.The theorys own logic thus
shows it is not deterministic and leaves a role for outside factors like precedent or culture. To increase the theorys predictive strength and to eliminate certain nonsensible equilibria,
writers have constructed requirements to reduce the set of
Nash equilibria, for example, subgame perfection, intuitive criterion, and forward induction. They show the importance of beliefs
about events that never happen, that is, of players expectations about behavior on nonoptimal paths of play. Other work
has contended that Nashs concept is too narrow and tried
to generalize it, prominent concepts being rationalizability and
correlated equilibria.
Behavioral game theory, a development of the past two
decades, tests simple models in the laboratory. Other research
has focused on certain elements from the beliefs-goals-strategies triad: Interactive epistemology, for example, studies knowledge about other parties knowledge, and the theory of games in
coalitional form considers only the values of the coalitions players can join and not the moves they might make to get into
them. Evolutionary game theory drops the element of strategic
thinking in favor of imitation or heredity, so that a certain rule
that does well in one generation of players will be used more
often next time.
A prominent application in political science studies the
growth of trust and reputation in social institutions. Repeated
games, where the same elementary game is played over and
over, have a major role. Also fundamental are signaling games, in
which an informed player makes a move from which another
player draws information as a basis for action.
Gandhism 647
spark building by the adversary. Other research has studied the
advantage of democracies in crisis bargaining, the regularity
that democracies seldom get into war with each other, the
greater difficulty of negotiating an end to a civil war compared
with an international one, reciprocity in trade agreements, the
effectiveness of economic sanctions, the design of international
treaties, the role of honor and face in international affairs, and
strategic aspects of terrorist recruiting.
In the analysis of governance systems, strategic questions
arise from four viewpoints: that of founders who set up a constitution to achieve stability and fairness; that of candidates
trying to get elected; that of voters who vote strategically
rather than simply choosing their favorite; and that of legislators who assemble allies and construct clever motions. An
early paper from a founders perspective was Lloyd Shapley
and Martin Shubiks 1954 proposal on measuring the power of
a committee member based solely on the voting rules. Later
examples have asked whether any voting methods exist that
motivate voters to act sincerely rather than strategically, that is,
to choose their most preferred candidate rather than consider,
for example, electability. (The answer is that the only such
methods are bizarre and undesirable.) A literature has developed on how the median voter theorem holds up with strategic voters under various voting systems.
See also Formal Political Theory; Rational Choice Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BARRY ONEILL
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Aumann, Robert, and Sergiu Hart, eds. Handbook of Game Theory with
Economic Applications, vols. 13. Amsterdam: North Holland, 19922002.
Banks, Jeffrey. Signaling Games in Political Science. New York: Taylor and
Francis, 2002.
Osborne, Martin J. An Introduction to Game Theory. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003.
Shapley, L. S., and Martin Shubik. A Method for Evaluating the
Distribution of Power in a Committee System. American Political Science
Review 48 (1954): 787792.
Gandhism
Gandhism may be defined as the ideology of Mohandas K.
Gandhi (18691948). Mahatma, or Great Soul, was an
honorific title bestowed on him by Rabindranath Tagore
(18611941). It is significant that Tagore, a renowned Nobel
Prizewinning poet of India, could hold Gandhi in such high
esteem while also serving as Gandhis most eloquent critic.
Their extensive dialogue, public and private, signifies a stellar
ability for expressing profound differences with utmost civility.
The voluminous writings by leading advocates of Indian
independence reveal this civility. It consistently marked the
divergent ideologies of the nationalist movement from 1885,
when the Indian National Congress was founded, until liberation from British imperial rule came in 1947. An initial feature
of Gandhism that deserves emphasis is how its spirit of tolerance nurtured such civility in the midst of vigorous debate
about fundamental moral and political issues. This flowed
steadily from 1919, when Gandhi assumed leadership of the
Indian Congress, until January 30, 1948, when he was assassinated by a Hindu fanatic, Nathuram Godse, who contended
that Gandhi had betrayed Hinduism through his tolerance of
Muslims and Islam.
GANDHIS LEGACY
Gandhi and his legacy have gathered admirers worldwide.
Writing on Gandhis philosophy, American psychologist
Howard Gardner commends his creativity among geniuses of
the twentieth century, calling Gandhi a thinker of the highest
order. Soon after Gandhis death, American physicist Albert
Einstein urged international emulation of his thought and
practice. Pacifists like American civil rights activist Martin
Luther King Jr., the Dalai Lama of Tibet, and Myanmar leader
Aung San Suu Kyi expressed similar thoughts as they strove to
pursue his model.
Gandhis life and ideas resound in many arenas and in varied formats, from opera to environmentalism. When American composer Philip Glass discussed the thought behind his
unique opera, Satyagraha, he commended Gandhis relevance
to the cause of saving the earths resources. In a 2008 interview
with the New York Times, Glass asserted that the environment
and nonviolence made a perfect match, stating that if humans
followed Gandhis principles, the earth would not be plagued
with so many problems.
See also Colonialism; Nonviolence; Pacifism and Conscientious
Objection.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DENNIS DALTON
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bondurant, Joan. Conquest of Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1988.
Brown, Judith. Gandhi: A Prisoner of Hope. New Haven:Yale University Press,
1989.
Dalton, Dennis. Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2000.
Erikson, Erik. Gandhis Truth. New York: Norton, 1969.
Iyer, Raghavan. The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Rudolph, Susanne, and Lloyd Rudolph. Gandhi. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1983.
Garvey, Marcus M.
Marcus Garveys (18871940) goal of black unity, pride, and
self-determination made him a preeminent black nationalist
leader in the early twentieth century. His philosophy echoed
in the pan-African movements and anticolonial struggles of
the mid-twentieth century and in the black power movement
of the 1960s. His call for self-respect and pride can be heard
in the lyrics of James Brown (Say it loud, Im black and Im
proud!) and reggae artists such as Bob Marley and Steel
Pulse. His emphasis on a glorious African history that black
people must reclaim lives on in the reparations movement, the
Afrocentrism movement, and other cultural movements.
Garvey was born in the British colony of Jamaica in 1887.
He left school at age fourteen, apprenticed as a printer, and
edited several newspapers in various Central American countries before traveling to London, where he sharpened his oratorical skills and his interest in African history. He returned to
Jamaica in 1914 and founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) under the banner of One God,
One Aim, One Destiny! but garnered little support. In 1916,
he moved to the United States and established the UNIA
headquarters in Harlem.
Garvey claimed the UNIA had six million members at its
peak, and critics concede that it had at least 500,000 members
spread across more than 700 branches in thirty-eight states. His
newspaper, Negro World, reached a circulation of about 50,000
in the mid-1920s. In contrast to the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Garvey and
the UNIA had greater appeal to the black masses, earning
Garvey the label Black Moses.
Garvey was critical of the NAACP for its middle-class and
interracial leadership as well as its tactics of lobbying and litigation that did not adequately address the economic and cultural
degradation of the majority of black people in the United
States. While W. E. B. DuBois and other NAACP leaders
viewed Garvey as an unrealistic and dangerous self-promoter,
Garvey rejected their goal of equality and racial integration in
the United States as a naive illusion.
Garveys nationalism had economic and cultural dimensions. Economically, he was influenced by Booker T. Washingtons strategy of self-help and racial uplift through education,
skills, and businesses. Culturally, Garvey counteracted the
mindset of subservience and self-degradation by drawing on a
glorious African history to inspire self-respect, pride, and black
unity with slogans such as Africa for Africans and Up! You
mighty race, you can accomplish what you will.
Garveys grandest goal was the emigration of black people
back to Africa, where he sought to create independent states
that would ensure self-determination for African descendants
throughout the diaspora and provide a basis from which black
people could act as equals on the world stage. To carry this
650 Gatekeeping
out, he established the Black Star Line Steamship Company,
which purchased ships by selling stock to UNIA members.
This venture was a financial disaster, and in 1922 the U.S. government charged Garvey with mail fraud. Though guilty only
of mismanagement, he was tried, convicted, and jailed in 1925.
President Coolidge commuted Garveys sentence in 1927, and
he was deported to Jamaica. He died in relative poverty and
obscurity in London in 1940, having never set foot in Africa.
See also African Political Thought; Pan-Africanism; Reparations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GREGORY W. STREICH
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Cronon, E. David. Black Moses:The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal
Negro Improvement Association. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1955.
Essein-Udom, E. U. Black Nationalism: A Search for an Identity in America.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.
Garvey, Marcus. Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey. New York:
Atheneum, 1969.
Gatekeeping
Gatekeeping is a practice used by legislative bodies to allow
only selected measures to be debated or voted upon. Gatekeeping is alternatively known as exclusive proposal power
and jurisdictional dominance. It may take several procedural
forms, including action by legislative committees to obstruct
or delay measures, or actions by legislative leaders to prevent
votes on bills. Gatekeeping can serve to force consensus on
issues, but it can also serve to obstruct popular legislation.
Systems in which gatekeeping occurs have strong institutional
power vested in legislative leaders such as the speaker or committee chairs.
Gatekeeping is typically undertaken to prevent debate or
votes on a measure that is opposed by committee chairs or
members, who believe that the measure would otherwise be
enacted by the full legislature.The practice may also be utilized
to avoid debate on a contentious matter that could embarrass
or undermine the majority party or grouping. Consequently,
scholars have asserted that the most significant power of a legislative committee is the ability to say no or prevent action
on a measure.
Gatekeeping can also occur at the supranational level. For
instance, the European Commission has a gatekeeping function within the European Union and can prevent certain legislative acts.
See also Consensus; Group Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Gellner, Ernest
Ernest A. Gellner (19251995) was an influential philosopher,
historian, and social anthropologist who made major contributions to the study of Islam, nationalism, and modernity.
He was a stalwart champion of critical rationalism and open
systems of thought, defending them from, among others,
Marxists, relativists, psychoanalysts, and dogmatic advocates of
the free market.
Gellner was born in Paris but grew up in Prague. His Jewish family decided to move to Great Britain in 1939. At the
end of World War II (19391945) he enlisted in the Czech
Army, but after the war, foreseeing the communist takeover
in Czechoslovakia, he returned to Britain to finish his studies, first at Oxford and then at London School of Economics
(LSE), from which he received a PhD in 1961. A year later,
thanks in large measure to the critical acclaim of his first book,
Words and Things (1959), which attacked linguistic idealism and
contained a foreword by Bertrand Russell, he became professor of philosophy, logic, and scientific method at LSE.
Gellner would maintain his post at LSE until 1984, when
he left to become professor of social anthropology at Cambridge. In 1993, he returned to Prague as the research director
for the Center for the Study of Nationalism at Central European University, where he would work until his death.
Throughout his career, Gellner published path-breaking
books, earning a reputation as one of the most original and
versatile scholars in the world and having command of numerous languages. Thought and Change (1964) was a penetrating
analysis of modernity and theories of social change. Saints of
the Atlas (1969) was an ethnographic study of Moroccan tribal
people. Muslim Society (1981) was an influential tract in Islamic
studies. Nations and Nationalism (1983) became a classic work
in the burgeoning field of nationalism and ethnic studies and
Gender
See Race and Gender.
political and economic status. By the mid-1900s, developments such as quantitative databases based on large, nationally
representative samples, the apparent ease of identifying the sex
of survey respondents, and computer-facilitated quantitative
analysis allowed for the generation of research on sex-related
differences in mass political behavior and preferences. By the
1970s this research, increasingly informed by developments in
feminist political thought and by feminist movement mobilization in North America and Western Europe, provided the
foundation for moving from research on women and politics
to a gendered analysis of politics. Although gender and sex are
related concepts in political science research, their relationship
continues to be debated among political theorists and empirical scholars in the discipline.
DEFINING SEX
It is worth noting that, for many decades, political science
engaged primarily in single-sex research, in which sex was
not a variable but a constant. Male political elites, male elected
officials, and men as citizens and voters were the central focus
of political science research and theory and, in some cases,
the exclusive concern of the discipline. The development of
a disciplinary subfield of women and politics research shifted
the treatment of sex as a constant to sex as a variable; feminist
theorizing made women visible in political theory.
In political science, as early as 1974, with Wilma Rule
Krausss article Political Implications of Gender Roles, gender emerged as a variable distinct from sex, with sex treated
as a biological fact and gender expressed through gender
identity. The variable sex was based on state-assigned sex
classification, generally at birth, as male or female.The variable
of gender roles, related to but distinct from sex, was understood as sets of traits and behaviors considered to be feminine
or masculine. Sex as a dichotomous variable, operationalized
as male and female, was found to have limited analytical
utility, however. Sex-based political research on women has
served more to correct and to modify previous research concerning sex-related differences than it has to develop complex
models of the political meanings of sex; nonetheless, it has
provided the foundation upon which a gendered analysis of
politics is being constructed. The distinction of sex and gender, as separate variables, has clarified, empirically, the socially
constructed features of masculinity, femininity, sexualities,
and structural meanings of gender, distinct from biological
assumptions about sex and sex difference. As political scientists
asked questions that could not be answered by employing sex
as a political variablefor example, do party nomination rules
structure internal party competition to advantage male rather
than female candidates? Why do numbers of elected women
increase in the aftermath of war?they began to turn to gender as a concept for purposes of political analysis; they also
turned to, and relied heavily on, gendered research in anthropology, history, labor studies, psychology, sociology, womens
studies, and sexuality studies as well as on theoretically related
work being developed in regard to race and research on the
intersections of race, class, and gender.
A poster for womens suffrage calls for political equality for women, pointing to other areas in society in which women already participate.
The role of gender in politics came to the fore in the mid-twentieth century.
source: Corbis
DEFINING GENDER
Gender as a concept in political research is conventionally
understood as sets of socially constructed meanings of masculinities and femininities derived from context-specific identifications of sex, that is, male and female, men and women.
These meanings emerge from stereotypes about male and
female behavior, from characteristics people tend to associate with women and men, femaleness and maleness (as
Beth Reingold writes in her 2000 book Representing Women,
p. 47), from normative assumptions about appropriate behaviors of men and women, and from social structures of power.
As Nancy Burns noted in Gender: Public Opinion and
Political Action (2002, p. 463464), Gender is a repertoire
of mechanisms that provide social interpretations of sex, that
enable sex to structure peoples lives. Gender is a set of ways
in which people and institutions make sex matter. Gender
is a principle of social organization. Gender is a hierarchy.
Gender represents both the outcomes and processes of human
actors and institutions in developing meanings about a range
of femininities and masculinities that are not natural but are
identifiable social and political constructions. As Iris Marion
Young concluded in her essay Modernity, Emancipatory
Values, and Power, Gender is . . . a set of ideational and social
structural relationships that people move through, rather than
attributes they have attached to their persons (p. 493).
Gender and the political are mutually constitutive, and
hence a central question for scholars of women, gender, and
politics is how gender and politics interact to construct hierarchies of political power. Gender produces and transforms
political inequalities, privileging most men in relationship
to most women but also privileging some women in regard
to other women and to some men. At the same time, political institutions, laws, and political practices construct gender,
identifying appropriate political actors as primarily (or exclusively) male, establishing masculine behaviors as normative
and fitting political institutions to a model of the male actor.
As Lisa Baldez writes in her 2007 work Intersectionality,
because gender never . . . operates independently of other
aspects of political life, . . . it is misleading to think of gender as
an autonomous category of analysis (p. 229).
Gender has multiple meanings that rely on context and that
change across time. No universal content emerges from sex
that gives single and universal meaning to gender; the identification of a person as male or female does not automatically
indicate that persons political behavior, political preferences,
or location in political hierarchies of power. As Laurel Weldon notes in her 2006 article on The Structure of Intersectionality, Gender norms and practices vary across groups of
women and men as well as across nations, regions, generations,
and cultural groups (p. 238), and across age, race, and time.
These norms and practices also have multiple logics; that
is, their development, workings, and functions differ according to context. The political implications of gender, as a result,
were different for white working-class women in the United
masculine and/or feminine, with the recognition that masculinity and femininity correspond only fleetingly and roughly
to male and female, as Karen Beckwith writes in her 2005
article A Common Language of Gender? (p. 131). Gender as
a category variable has utility in its classification of feminine
and masculine behaviors, actions, attitudes and preferences and
its impact on particular outcomes, such as military intervention, social movement success, and electoral choice, among
others (p. 131). Recent research on gendered campaign strategies of women and men running for office, on gendered media
behaviors of male and female candidates, and on gendered
interactions among women and men in national parliaments
are examples of the utility of gender as a category variable. For
example, Dianne Bystrom and her coauthors, in Gender and
Candidate Communication (2004), found that women running
for elective office in the United States developed specifically
gendered campaign styles designed to transcendor to take
advantage ofstereotypes about female candidates and women
in politics. Kathleen Dolan, in her 2004 Voting for Women, found
that voters held gendered assumptions about policy issues,
about womens and mens likelihood of promoting some issues
rather than others, and about ideology; in her 2008 review of
the scholarship on female candidates in the United States, she
found that women candidates of both parties [are] seen as
more liberal than their male counterparts but also they are perceived as more liberal than they actually are (p. 116).
Mary Hawkesworth, in her 2003 article Congressional
Enactments of Race-Gender, for the U.S. Congress, and Joni
Lovenduski, in her 2005 book Feminizing Politics, for the British House of Commons, found structures and practices in
each institution that shaped differences in access to power and
influence between men and women in these national legislatures. Examples include differences in treatment by colleagues,
where, as Hawkesworth found (pp. 538539), female legislators were explicitly excluded from Congressional committee
press conferences and remained unrecognized for speaking by
their male colleagues, and where female members of Congress employed techniques akin to groveling to influence
their male peers, [indicating] a power dynamic that Congresswomen of color must take into account in devising their
legislative strategies (p. 538).These indicate the ways in which
gender can be identified and employed as a category variable
for political analysis.
In contrast, gender as a process concept functions to identify the differential effects of apparently gender-neutral structures and policies upon women and men, and upon masculine
and/or feminine actors, as Beckwith observes (2005, 132), as
well as the behaviors of individual women and men to shape
structures and policies to a specifically gendered outcome.
Examples of such research include studies of the gendered
impact of electoral rules, nomination procedures, and policymaking and other decision-making processes, where structures,
procedures, and practices produce outcomes that advantage
some men and disadvantage some men. Lovenduski describes
a deeply embedded culture of masculinity that pervades political institutions in Britain . . . manifested in the agenda-setting,
Shifting States, activist women helped to forge. Dobrowolsky found that activist women were particularly successful
in developing new, women-friendly political institutions in
Scotland with the opportunities afforded by the prospect of
a Scottish Parliament (pp. 133139).
Work of this type, analyzing the gendered nature of institutions, according to Acker, demonstrates the states susceptibility to influence. Not only do states and other institutions
express, practice, and shape gender; they are also responsive
to the attempts by political actors to regender them; that is, to
recast the terms and contexts of state and institutional arrangements, practices, and discourses in order to leverage political
advantage and to increase strategic political opportunities and
outcomes along gender lines.
Focusing on gender as a concept that functions independently and dependently, conceptualized as category and/or
process, allows scholars, as Corrine McConnaughy writes in
her 2007 article Seeing Gender over the Short and Long
Haul, to [account for] the interaction of gendered identities
and attitudes, social location, and political context (p. 380).
This permits us to treat gender as a meta-concept, to construct meaningfully distinguished concepts within it, and then
to model explicitly those concepts and their interactions (p. 380;
emphasis in original).
What gender as a concept does for political science is to
provide an analytical strategy for the political and politicized
relations of power between and among women and men that
cannot be fully or clearly identified or analyzed by a reliance on
sex as a variable. Research using gender and sex as variables still
includes the counting of self-identified women and men, interpretation of regression analyses that include a sex variable (see
Nancy Burnss 2005 article Finding Gender), and analyses of
the presence of men and women in political institutions. Gender, however, has moved political research further toward the
heart of disciplinary research, with foci on the social, activist,
and legal constructions of empowered and/or disempowered
women and men across intersectionalities of, for example, race,
class, caste, sexuality, and nationality; on the imbrications of gender and power in institutions; and on the strategic employment
of masculinities and femininities in constructing and gaining
political power. Gender also makes clear the imposed, involuntary political differences and inequalities imposed upon (and
often resisted by) women, revealing the gendered and racialized
dichotomies of, for example, enfranchisement, access to office,
legal status, and provision of government benefits.
Gender Gap
The gender gap refers to a pattern of systematic differences
in political attitudes, political behavior, and party affiliation
between men and women. Theories of the origins of the gender gap have emphasized variation in the political socialization experiences of men and women that shape the political
resources and perspectives of these groups.
From World War II (19391945) through the 1970s, a traditional gender gapone in which women held more conservative political attitudes and were more likely to support
center- or right-wing partiesappeared in most countries of
the world. Societal differences between men and women, such
as their longevity, labor force participation, and levels of religiosity, generally yielded these patterns.
However, beginning in the late 1970s, a new pattern emerged
in the United States, in which women tended to hold more
liberal positions on a variety of issues, such as the appropriate
role of government, gender equality, and other issues that are
particularly salient to womens experiences.The gender gap in
votingthe difference in the proportion of women and men
voting for any given candidatehas also been evident in the
United States since 1980, with women being more likely to
vote for and identify with the Democratic Party in comparison with their male counterparts.This modern gender gap has
been the result, not of movement by women to more liberal
attitudes and behavior, but of the increasingly conservative
attitudesand consequent voting behaviorof men.
Although it was first thought to be a reflection of American
exceptionalism, the modern gender gap is now experienced
in most advanced industrial societies, while preindustrial
countries continue to demonstrate a traditional gender gap.
Some scholars have suggested that the political socialization
experiences of men and women in countries that have undergone the modernization process emphasize postmaterialist
values, such as gender equality, feminist identity, and group
Gender Issues
Gender as a term has gained increasing usage in mainstream
as well as academic discourse, often confused with sex and
regularly thought to be a proxy for a focus on women. Sex,
however, refers to biology and anatomy. Gender, by contrast,
is a term explicitly meant to focus on both sexes and how
they interact. Maleness and femaleness, in the sexual sense, are
determined by biological and anatomical traits, including the
presence of external and internal sex organs and secondary
sexual development at puberty. Gender, on the other hand,
refers to a set of qualities and behaviors expected from a female
or male by society. Gender roles are nurtured or learned formally and informally, varying widely within and among cultures.The roles and expectations due to gender emerge in such
areas as the economic, political, and sociocultural arenas. Lack
of a gendered perspective on these issues thus misses truth.
Gender Mainstreaming
Gender mainstreaming has become the most common label
used by academics and practitioners to describe any institutional strategy employed to incorporate gender issues into
institutional practices, culture, and outcomes. As a result of its
varying and widespread usage, however, there is no consensus or clarity about what gender mainstreaming is, what its
potential is, or indeed whether efforts to implement gender
mainstreaming have been a success or failure to date. There
is more agreement as to a definition of gender mainstreaming. Emile Hafner-Burton and Mark Pollack (2002) cite the
definition of gender mainstreaming used by the Council of
Europe as the (re)organization, improvement, development
and evaluation of policy processes so a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and all stages
by key actors normally involved in policy-making (p. 342).
Although gender mainstreaming first came to prominence
at the Beijing Womens Conference in 1995 when governments and other actors were exhorted to promote an active
and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in
all policies and programmes, its origins lie in the shift from
the liberal women in development policies to gender and
Gender Quotas
Gender quotas are a corrective measure used by political
actors (e.g., political parties) to enhance representation of
women in political and public institutions such as parliaments,
councils, and parties. They require women or female candidates constitute a targeted minimum of the members of a
publicly elected or appointed political body. Gender-neutral
quotas establish a maximum percentage held by either gender.
Two kinds of quotas exist: legally binding quotas and voluntary party quotas. Legally binding quotas force all parties to
nominate a specific percentage of women on their candidate
lists as established by a constitution or legislated by electoral
laws. There are two subcategories of legally binding quotas:
reserved seats and legislative quotas. Reserved seats allocate
to women a set percentage of seats in an assembly or council.
Legislative quotas oblige parties to nominate a certain number of women on their slates for electoral office. The latter
category, voluntary party quotas, is a quota provision that is
regulated and enacted at the discretion of the parties. Parties
set targets for the nomination of women on candidate slates
and/or for offices within each party.
When supported by a variety of international and transnational actors such as the European Union and the African
Union, quotas can be an effective way to address the underrepresentation of women. Quota provisions have helped to
increase the number of female legislators in the past fifteen
years from 11.5 percent of the national legislators in the mid1990s to 16.9 percent in 2007. Out of the twenty countries
with the most female deputies, 90 percent have some kind of
quota clauses.
General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
emerged as a temporary intergovernmental organization in
1947. It served as a negotiating forum promoting multilateral
trade liberalization. Despite its small secretariat and uncertain status, it promoted significant reductions in tariffs, but it
was supplanted in 1995 by the World Trade Organization in
response to persistent shortcomings.
Following World War II (19391945), the Bretton Woods
framers of postwar economic arrangements hoped to create
a formal international trade organization (ITO) that would
liberalize trade, regulate investment flows and international
commodity agreements, and promote development. When
negotiation to form an ITO broke down, smaller talks among
fifteen leading western trading nations (led by the United
States) became the de facto forum for discussion of multilateral trade liberalization. The GATT sprung from these talks.
While only twenty-three countries, or contracting parties,
signed the first round of GATT tariff reductions in 1948,
through successive rounds, the treaty expanded to include over
110 countries in the 1990s.
While the GATT was based in Geneva, its principle preoccupation was negotiating tariff reductions through a series of
multilateral trade rounds. Often these rounds were hosted
elsewhere, giving the name to each negotiating round (e.g.,
the last two rounds were the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds).
Each round was guided by a set of GATT principles intended
to ensure liberalization; these included the principle of reciprocity, the most favored nation provision (which required
that members give the same market access to all members that
they give to their most favored trading partner), and national
treatment (which required that states not discriminate
against foreign goods). Within these principles, each round
focused on binding states to further reductions in existing
trade barriers.
Early GATT rounds were undoubtedly successful at achieving tariff reductions. Over the forty-seven year period in which
GATT was the key multilateral trade IGO, trade consistently
grew at a faster rate than did the size of domestic economies,
suggesting that GATT promoted deeper economic integration, which many associate with economic growth. Indeed,
most states flocked to join GATT, given its successes.
Prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, however,
the GATT appeared increasingly incapable of dealing with
the competing agendas of developing and developed countries on politically sensitive issues such as agricultural trade
and the expansion of GATT coverage. As tariffs were successfully reduced, negotiators from developed states turned to
the removal of more complex forms of trade protectionism.
These nontariff barriers proved harder to eliminate, because
they required deeper coordination of domestic public policies in areas that were politically more sensitive. Demands that
the GATT should also include trade in services, investment,
and intellectual property only further overstressed its informal structures. Both the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds focused
on these types of post-border paradigm concerns, and both
took much longer to complete than earlier rounds, drawing
attention to the shortcomings of the GATT system. Perhaps
most problematically, the GATT lacked an effective dispute
settlement system, meaning GATT rules were often violated.
Given these problems, the most important outcome of the
Uruguay Round was the agreement to supplant the GATT
with the more-formally organized World Trade Organization
(WTO). The GATT remains the key treaty within the WTO
structure, but it has now been joined by treaties covering services, investment, and intellectual propertyall under the
supervision of the WTO, with its larger permanent secretariat
and more effective dispute settlement system.
See also Free Trade; Globalization; Intellectual Property Rights;
Nontariff Barriers to Trade; North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA); Trade Blocs; Trade Diplomacy; World Trade Organization (WTO).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . RUSSELL ALAN WILLIAMS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bhagwati, J. The World Trading System at Risk. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1991.
Finlayson, Jock A., and Mark W. Zacher. The GATT and the Regulation
of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions. International
Organization 35, No. 4 (Autumn 1981): 561602.
Hoekman, Bernard M., and Michel M. Kostecki. The Political Economy of the
World Trading System. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Jackson, John Howard. The World Trading System: Law and Policy of
International Economic Relations. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997.
Winham, Gill R. GATT and the International Trade Regime. International
Journal 15 (1990): 786822.
General Will
Although he was neither the first nor the last to use it, the
concept of the general will is inextricably linked to the
political thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (17121778). In
a number of works, but especially his Social Contract (1762),
Rousseau argues that a just political society is one in which
the citizens promote and obey the general will. In developing
this argument, Rousseau insists that the general will is not
to be confused with the will of all, that it is always right,
that it is to be found on the side of the majority when votes
are counted, and that those who refuse to follow it must be
forced to be free.
Such enigmatic and apparently outrageous claims have led
to much controversy about the meaning and coherence of this
concept in Rousseaus thought. Unsympathetic critics have
long dismissed what he says about the general will as either
vacuous or incoherent nonsense; some have deemed it downright dangerous. In The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, for
instance, Jacob Talmon (1960) charges Rousseau with dangerous ambiguity (p. 40), because the general will points toward
both democracy, in its attention to the will of the people, and
totalitarianism. The danger, Talmon says, is that Rousseaus
general will gives those who claim to know and to represent
the real and ultimate will of the nation . . . a blank cheque to
act on behalf of the people, without reference to the peoples
actual will (p. 48; see also Lester Crockers 1968 Rousseaus
Social Contract: An Interpretive Essay).
Sympathetic interpretations of Rousseaus thought tend to
begin with a fundamental distinction he draws between man
and citizen. That is, Rousseau holds that we may think of every
member of the body politic in two ways: first, as a unique individual with a particular set of interestsa human, and second,
as a public person who shares a common interest in the welfare of the body politica citizen. As a human, everyone has
a private will that aims at his or her particular good or personal
interests, but as a citizen, everyone has a general will that aims at
the common good or public interest. The general will is different from the will of all, then, because the latter is the sum
of private wills. If every voter decides whether to vote for or
against a tax increase simply on the basis of personal costs and
benefits, for example, the result of the vote will be the will of
all. But if they all vote as citizens, in an effort to promote the
common good, the result should be the general will.
Understood in this way, Rousseaus other statements about
the general will seem less enigmatic and outrageous, if not
always clear and compelling. Thus it happens that the general
will is always right, for the will of the citizen by definition aims
to promote the common good.The general will is to be found
in the vote of the majority, moreover, because the majority is
more likely than those in the minority to be right about which
policies really will serve the common good (on this point, see
Brian Barrys The Public Interest, 1964). Finally, individuals
who break the law must be forced to be free, because their
disobedience is the act of humans who act contrary to their
will as citizens. People who know, as citizens, that paying taxes
Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Conventions are a series of treaties concerning
the treatment of prisoners and civilians in times of war. The
Geneva Conventions have a long history and were developed
over many years and through a number of wars.
member of the armed forces; a member of a militia or volunteer corps; a member of a resistance group that has distinctive
emblems capable of being seen at a distance, openly carries
arms, and acts in accordance with the laws of war; civilians or
laborers attached to military forces; and civilians who spontaneously take up arms to resist an approaching enemy and
who respect the laws of war. Prisoners of war were required
to provide certain identifying information, which the captors
were required to report to the prisoners home nations. Prisoners had to be given reasonable food, water, shelter, clothing,
and medical care; were allowed to be used for certain labor,
but had to be removed from the war zone; and were allowed
to make complaints but were subject to judicial or disciplinary
proceedings for misconduct.
Geneva Convention IV, the Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, addressed how
to treat civilians in a war zone, which had not been addressed
by the previous Geneva Conventions. Under Geneva Convention IV, a civilian not taking active part in the hostilities was
to be treated without violence, with honor, with respect for
family rights, with respect for religious practices, and with no
insults or humiliation. They were to be protected from coercion designed to obtain information about third parties and
were to suffer no discrimination based on race, religion, age,
sex, or political opinions. They could be compelled to work in
occupations relative to necessary food, shelter, clothing, transport, or medical services, all of which had to be nonmilitary,
and they had to be paid wages. Civilians could be interned, but
only if absolutely necessary, and internees had to be allowed
access to the courts. Internees were generally afforded the same
protections presented in Geneva Convention Ithey had to
be allowed reasonable food, water, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and religious activities and access to a canteen to purchase
goods at market value. All internees had to be reported to the
protecting power and were to be allowed communication and
receive relief consignments. If they were charged with misconduct, they were to be given a fair trial and the right to appeal.
The occupying power could requisition food, medical supplies,
or other goods from them only when fair market value was
paid and civilian needs were taken into account.
As with all political solutions to political problems, the
Geneva Conventions have not fully solved the problems
concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians.
Enforcement is difficult. However, they are an attempt to bring
some humanity to the otherwise inhumane activity of war.
See also Human Rights; International Law; International Norms;
Prisoners of War (POW).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carter, Barry, and Phillip Trimble. International Law. Boston: Little, Brown, 1991.
Friedman, Leon, ed. The Law of War: A Documentary History. New York:
Random House, 1972.
International Committee of the Red Cross and Diplomatic Conference for
the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of
Victims of War. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. Geneva: The
Committee, 1981.
Genocide 665
Jennings, R., and A. Watts, eds. Oppenheims International Law. 9th ed. London:
Longman, 1996.
Miller, Richard, ed. The Law of War. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975.
Roberts, Adam, and Richard Guelff, eds. Documents on the Laws of War.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.
Sieghart, Paul. The International Law of Human Rights. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1983.
United Nations. United Nations Charter. New York: Fiftieth Anniversary
Secretariat, 1995.
Genocide
A concept created by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, the term
genocide was originally used for Nazi patterns of state violence
against the European Jewish populations during World War II
(19391945). The word combines the Greek prefix for race or
tribe (geno-) with the Latin suffix for killing/murder (-cide).
The most frequently cited examples of genocide include the
Holocaust during World War II, the killing fields of Cambodia in the 1970s, the 100 days in Rwanda in 1994, and the
Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1995.
In 1948, Lemkins concept of genocide was codified and
established as an international crime through the United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide. The convention defined the term as
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. It is
important to note that the conventions definition does not
include the targeting of political, ideological, economic, professional, or other groups. Genocide refers solely to groups
one is born into, what Rudolph Rummel (1994) refers to as
indelible groups.
As defined by the convention, overt acts of genocide
include (1) killing members of the group, (2) causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group, (3) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,
(4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group, and (5) forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
In addition to defining the crime of genocide, Article 1
of the UN (United Nations) Genocide Convention calls on
signatories to prevent and to punish genocide whether it is
committed in times of war or peace. The responsibility for the
prosecution of genocide currently rests with the International
Criminal Court (ICC). Created by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court in 1998, the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
The enforcement of the UN Genocide Convention and
the prosecution of genocide are problematized by its definition.The concept, the behavior, and the designation of relevant
actors, as such, are highly contested on numerous grounds.
First, identifying and proving the intent of the perpetrator is
extremely difficult. Because of the legal obligation to prove
that the specific and targeted destruction of a group was the
intended act of the perpetrator, governments and prosecutors have favored the more broadly defined charge of crimes
against humanity. Violent acts against a group without the
Genocide, Armenian
See Armenian Genocide.
Gentile, Giovanni
Giovanni Gentile (18751944) was an Italian philosopher,
educator, and politician. As a neo-Hegelianist, he developed
an extremely rigid form of idealism referred to as actual idealism or actualism. He eventually considered himself the
philosopher of Fascism, even though he showed an interest
for this movement only after the success of the 1922 March
on Rome, which brought fascist Italian dictator Benito Mussolini to power. In fact, some of Gentiles most important
philosophical works, such as The Theory of Mind as Pure Act
(1916) and Logic as Theory of Knowledge (1917) were written
before the rise of fascism in Italy.
Born in Castelvetrano, Sicily, Gentile soon discovered his
vocation for philosophy, joining the faculty of the University
of Palermo in 1906 and subsequently moving to Pisa (1914)
and Rome (1917). Between 1922 and 1924, he held the post of
minister of education and implemented a complete reform of
the Italian educational system. While minister he also took on
the challenge of developing an ideological and cultural agenda
for the Fascist Party that would rely greatly on his own philosophical views. Following publication of his 1925 Manifesto
of Fascist Intellectuals, he became involved with a number of
cultural and scholarly initiatives, including the National Fascist
Institute of Culture, the National Institute for Germanic Studies, the Italian Institute for the Far and Middle East, and the
National Centre for Manzonian Studies. He also edited the
Italian Encyclopedia (1932).
Despite these associations, Gentiles relations with the fascist regime were uneasy at times. Gentile vehemently opposed
the signing of the 1929 Lateran Pacts with the Holy See, and
many of his works were eventually banned by the Catholic
Church. He also opposed the 1940 alliance with Germany and
Japan (the Tripartite Pact). However, he supported Mussolini
and the Sal Republic until his assassination by communist
partisans in April 1944, eleven months before Mussolinis own
assassination.
Gentiles philosophical views supported the idea that only
concrete acts can define reality, which on its own is simply
an abstract set of unrelated phenomena. Reality is therefore an
extension of the individual who sets its terms; it is not something exterior to the individual. Thought in action (pure
acts) implies the merging of subjects and objects, theory and
practice, past and present. Countering materialism, realism,
and positivism, Gentile rejected externalized historical dialectics and emphasized the confrontation between subjectivity (thesis), objectivity (antithesis), and philosophy (synthesis).
Philosophy cannot be disassociated from life, or vice versa, as
its purpose is to guide it through thought in action.
In Genesi e Struttura della Societ (1943), Gentile argues that
the autonomous individual is nothing but a formal abstraction, because in reality, state and individual cannot be separated. His legal-naturalist views characterized the state as an
Geopolitics
The concept of geopolitics is widely used in the public
domain by politicians, journalists, policy analysts, and academics. As a result of its broad usage, providing a precise, succinct
definition of the term is nearly impossible. In the academic
world, the concept of geopolitics is used in many disciplines
of the social sciences. Political scientists, economists, geographers, and historians all use the concept widely as well, but
with differing meanings.
In most general terms, the term geopolitics refers to simple
visualizations of relationships or concepts in world politics. At
the end of the cold war, for example, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill predicted that an iron curtain would
come down over Europe virtually separating the East from
the West. A more recent example is the axis of evil, a term
used by U.S. President George W. Bush in 2002 to describe the
connections of Saddam Husseins regime in Iraq to a group
of rogue states. In short, geopolitical descriptions in this sense
provide a geographical simplification of international relations.
Geopolitical activities, however, are not solely conducted
by states and their governments. International organizations
such as the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), nongovernmental organizations such
as Amnesty International, private multinational businesses, and
supranational institutions such as the European Union (EU)
are also geopolitical actors. They not only influence international decision-making processes but also have a stake in world
politics in terms of strategic, military, political, economic,
social, and environmental issues.
Swedish political science professor Rudolf Kjellen first used
geopolitics as a scholarly term in 1899. His approach to geopolitics
can be termed the realist approachhe emphasized the role
George, Alexander L.
Alexander George (19202006) was an American political
scientist and scholar of international relations. He saw the
role of the political scientist in a democratic polity as that
of scholar-advisor to the policy maker. He was particularly
concerned about the origin of foreign policy crisis and the
management of crisis abroad by democracies. At the heart of
this management advice was international relations theory,
which he differentiated in terms of substance and process.
Substantive theory encompassed mediation and dispute
resolution, deterrence, dtente, and crisis management. It was
always tied to specific historical events such as the Korean War
(19501953) or the termination of World War I (19141918).
Motivation for the development of such theory stemmed from
the practical desire to understand why wars started, how they
ended, or whether important diplomatic signals were missed.
George, Henry
Henry George (18391897) was an American political
economist whose works have influenced social and political
theorists of the left and the right and whose books sold in
the millions. An opponent of private monopolies in business
and state interference in economic matters, Georges primary
influence has been on libertarian social theory. He is perhaps
best known for his support of a single tax on land or land
value tax.
George was particularly concerned about privately controlled resource enterprises, especially mining interests, and
land speculators. His analysis suggested that private control
over land explained why wealth and poverty under capitalism
advanced simultaneously. As population in an area grows, the
land also grows in value, thus requiring that those who work
it pay more to do so. An opponent of natural monopolies,
George called for taxation, regulation, and limited state ownership. He argued for state-operated telegraph services, control
of railroad tracks, and municipal control of water supplies.
Georges most influential contribution to economic theory
is perhaps his advocacy of a single tax on land. For George,
the economic rent gained from land should be shared socially
rather than be controlled by private interests. In his bestknown work, Progress and Poverty (1879), George argues that
a large proportion of the wealth created through social and
technological development in a market economy becomes
concentrated in the hands of monopolists by way of economic
rents, and this is the primary cause of poverty in capitalist
economies. Collecting private profit by restricting access to
natural resources upon which all depend for survival amounts
to a system of theft and slavery. This is made even worse given
that productive activity such as industrial works were burdened by taxes while land values were not.
George regarded natural resources as the product of nature
rather than human labor or initiative and believed that as
such, they should not provide the basis by which individuals acquire revenues. Nature as the common heritage of all
humanity must be made a common property of society as a
whole. George advocated taxation of unimproved land value
as a way to share land wealth socially without employing a
policy of land dispossession and nationalization. This single
land tax would allow the state to remove taxes on all other,
more productive, economic undertakings and transactions.
Georges ideas have recently been taken up by environmentalists who view the earth as the common property of all species.
Such environmental economists are also seeking to reduce the
economic practice of treating ecological damage as an externality in which private interests hold monopoly control over
profits while shifting the social and economic burden of ecological harm onto society.
NATURAL LAW
The German natural law tradition gained weight and
widespread dissemination through Samuel von Pufendorf
(16321694), who produced the most influential natural law
philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Writing against the background of the Thirty Years War
(16181648) and in critical appropriation of the ideas of Grotius and Hobbes, Pufendorf elaborated a system of rights and
obligations pertaining to individuals and political associations
under a secular natural law, emphasizing sociality as its basis:
In order to be safe, humans must be sociable. In Germany,
his work gave rise to an important natural law school that
included Christian Thomasius and Christian Wolff. Abroad,
Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Madison were among
the authors who picked up some of his ideas.
NIETZSCHE
GERMAN ROMANTICISM
Max Weber (18641920) is often named as one of the founders of sociology, along with Marx, Comte, and Durkheim.
Actually, his methodological and substantive contributions
have enriched the entire field of the social sciences and
humanities. One key to Webers methodological legacy is
the term Verstehen (understanding). For Weber, sociology is a
science which wants to understand social action interpretatively and thereby to explain it causally in its course and
consequences (Economy and Society, 1922, 1). It can achieve
this by identifying the rationale of actions as instrumental
nihilistic conclusion of enlightenment, Webers gloomy analysis of the iron cage of modernity, and Sigmund Freuds
insights into the repressive nature of civilization, Horkheimer and Adorno expounded critical theory by exposing
the self-destructive tendency of enlightenment. In Dialectics of Enlightenment (1944), they aim to show how enlightenments aspiration to create a rational system of value-free,
objective, and noncontingent knowledge leads to totalitarian
claims in both science (where positivism reduces the world
to the blindness and muteness of data, p. 174) and society
(where capitalism administers persons as things). The purpose
of critical theory, instead, is to liberate human beings from the
circumstances that enslave them. Sometimes, it seems to be
this emancipatory attitude rather than any specific theoretical
insight that has secured the Frankfurt school a place in the
genealogical lineage of present-day academic movements like
feminist theory, multicultural theory, theories of deliberative
democracy, and the antiglobalization movement.
Entangled in the tragedy of Germany in the twentieth century are the life and work of Hannah Arendt (19061975).
Raised in a liberal German-Jewish environment in Kants
hometown of Knigsberg, Arendt was influenced as a student by the brand of German existentialism developed by her
teachers Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. She was forced
to flee the Nazis and deprived of her German citizenship in
1937, yet the Nazi ideology and crimes provided her with
the material for two of her best-known books: The Origins of
Totalitarianism (1951), which traces the intellectual and social
origins of Hitlers and Stalins regimes, and Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), which was based on
her trial reports for the New Yorker. She became an American
citizen in 1951 but cherished the intellectual heritage of her
native Germany. She translated some of her own works from
English into German, including her philosophical magnum
opus The Human Condition (1958), a neo-Aristotelian attempt
to identify the practical human activity action as the basis of
a true understanding of political life.
Arendts fate of being forced to flee her homeland was
shared by a group of German-Jewish social philosophers
whose careers were conjoined by the Institute for Social
Research, which was established at the University of Frankfurt
in 1923, transferred to New York in the 1930s, and reestablished
in Frankfurt in 1950: Max Horkheimer (18951973), Herbert
Marcuse (18981979), Erich Fromm (19001980), and Theodor W. Adorno (19031969), today collectively known as the
Frankfurt school. While Fromm advanced the psychological
analysis of society, and Marcuse became an icon of the student
revolutions of the 1960s, the lasting impact of the Frankfurt
school must be attributed to the critical theory developed
chiefly by Horkheimer (who coined the term in a 1937 essay
on Traditional and Critical Theory) and Adorno.
Well versed in the German idealism of Hegel and Kant,
inspired above all by Marx, and spurred on by Nietzsches
672 Gerrymandering
elaboration of an all-encompassing systems theory of social
life in which the primary units of analysis are not people or
groups but the structures and operations (especially communications) of the diverse systems that constitute the overall system of society.
Among the younger generations of political thinkers in
Germany, no one has so far matched the breadth and depth,
let alone the international impact, of Habermas. This does not
belittle the quality and originality of their writings. It simply
means that the next chapter in the history of German political
thought has yet to be written.
See also Adorno, Theodor W.; Arendt, Hannah; Critical Theory;
Engels, Friedrich; Frankfurt School; Fromm, Erich; Hegel, Georg
W. F.; Horkheimer, Max; Kant, Immanuel; Luther, Martin;
Marcuse, Herbert; Marx, Karl; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Pufendorf,
Samuel;Weber, Max.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARC SCHATTENMANN
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Schocken Books,
2004.
Beiser, Frederick C. The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics
(Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. Foundations of Natural Right: According to the Principles
of the Wissenschaftslehre (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy).
Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
Habermas, Jrgen. Faktizitt und Geltung: Beitrge zur Diskurstheorie des
Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats. 4th edition. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1994. Translated by William Rehq as Between Facts and
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Studies
in Contemporary German Social Thought). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1996).
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Philosophy of Right
(Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought). Edited by Allen
W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialektik der Aufklrung:
Philosophische Fragmente. Frankfurt: Fischer, 2006. Translated by Edmund
Jephcott as Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2002.
Kant, Immanuel. Political Writings. 2nd ed., enlarged ed., reprint (Cambridge
Texts in the History of Political Thought). Edited by Hans Reiss.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Lessnoff, Michael. Social Contract: Issues in Political Theory. Basingstoke,
Hampshire, U.K.: Macmillan, 1986.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality (Cambridge Texts in
the History of Political Thought). Edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None (Cambridge Texts
in the History of Philosophy). Edited by Adrian DelCaro and Robert
Pippin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Pufendorf, Samuel von. The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf. Edited by
Craig L. Carr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Expanded ed. Chicago: University.
of Chicago Press, 2007.
Tucker, Robert C. The Marx-Engels Reader. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 1978.
Weber, Max. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundri der verstehenden Soziologie.
5th ed., rev. Edited by Johannes Winckelmann. Tbingen, Germamy:
Mohr, 1990. Originally published 1921. Edited and translated by
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich as Economy and Society: An Outline of
Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
Weber, Max. Wissenschaft als Beruf. Politik als Beruf (Max Weber
Studienausgabe 17) [Politics as a Vocation. Science as a Vocation (Max
Weber Study Issue)]. Edited by Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfgang
Schluchter. Tbingen, Germany: Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1994. Originally
published 1919. Edited and translated by Hans Heinrich Gerth and C.
Wright Mills in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1958.
Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering, a pejorative term, earned its name from
the fifth U.S. vice president, Elbridge Gerry (17441814).
While Elbridge Gerry was serving as governor of Massachusetts from 1810 to 1812, the Massachusetts legislature, which
was controlled by the Democratic-Republicans, changed the
district boundaries in Essex County in order to weaken the
political fortunes of the countys Federalists. After redistricting, a local newspaper said the new district had the shape of
a salamander, so the newspaper creatively merged Elbridge
Gerrys last name with the shape of the district and referred to
it as a gerrymander.
Political scientist Leroy Hardy defines gerrymander as a technique used for partisan purpose in the creation of constituencies . . . [that entails] the consolidation of opposition strength
[in an] arbitrary [or] unnatural manner. The political party in
control develops safe seats that cannot be challenged by their
opponents, thereby limiting strength of the opposition.
Since its first use in 1812, the term has become commonplace in politics. The U.S. Constitution provides the states
with the authority to redraw district lines in order to ensure
equality of representation. Political parties and state legislators
eagerly wait to redraw congressional and state districts in order
to protect their partisan turf, weaken their opposition, stake
out new territory for their respective parties, and disadvantage
certain groups within the electorate.
If a district is redrawn for partiality on the basis of partisanship, race, religion, or economics, it has been gerrymandered,
and the constitutionality of the new district is called into question. The U.S. Supreme Court determines whether claims of
gerrymandering in redrawn voting districts are legitimate.This
determination can be a difficult task, with the ultimate criterion being to ensure fairness. Technological innovations, such
as geographic innovation systems (GIS), have made it easier for
the politically savvy to devise various redistricting plans that
undercut the strictest rules for impartial redistricting, allowing
the system to continue to be manipulated to produce gerrymandered districts.
The U.S. Supreme Court has grappled with the issues of
defining fairness and what constitutes a gerrymander, and no
definitive definition has been provided for the latter. At one
time the Supreme Court refused to hear cases that claimed
political gerrymandering, because the justices believed that it
was not the Courts responsibility to make decisions regarding
political matters. However, since gerrymandering can encompass redistricting based on economics, race, and religion, the
Supreme Court has begun to consider the constitutionality of
redistricting efforts. In Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986),
RICHARD M. YON
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Curry, M. R. On the Possibility of Democracy in a Geocoded World: GIS
and Redistricting. Social Science Computer Review 17, no. 1 (1999): 1015.
Galderisi, Peter F. Redistricting in the New Millennium. Lanham, Md.: Rowman
and Littlefield, 2005.
Grofman, Bernard, and Arend Lijphart. Political Gerrymandering and the Courts.
New York: Agathon Press, 1990.
Hardy, Leroy, Alan Heslop, and Stuart Anderson, eds. Reapportionment Politics:
The History of Redistricting in the 50 States. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage
Publications, 1981.
Rush, Mark E. Does Redistricting Make a Difference?: Partisan Representation
and Electoral Behavior. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1993.
674 Glasnost
Glasnost
The campaign for glasnost (meaning openness) was the first
sign that Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was serious about reform.
Gorbachev used the word in his first speech after he came to
power in March 1985. The next year, finding his economic
reforms blocked by party conservatives, Gorbachev encouraged the media, still subject to close state censorship, to more
openly discuss social problems. He hoped this would pressure
bureaucrats to embrace reform. However, intellectuals seized
the opportunity to raise issues way beyond Gorbachevs economic agenda, from the crimes of Joseph Stalin to the rights
of national minorities.
Free speech initially took root in some intellectual journals,
theatrical performances, and movies, and then spread to news
magazines and eventually television. Pioneering editors, such
as those at the weeklies Moscow News and Arguments and Facts,
brought hitherto taboo topics into the public arena. By 1987
the elaborate system of state prepublication censorship had
effectively collapsed.
August 1987 saw a wave of nationalist protests in Armenia
and the Baltic republics, but Gorbachev refused to give in to
conservative critics who were calling for a reversal of glasnost.
On the contrary, he accelerated the pace of reform, introducing limited competitive elections in March 1989. A new June
1990 law on press freedom formally abolished censorship.
See also Censorship; Perestroika; Soviet Union, Former.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PETER RUTLAND
Glass Ceiling
The glass ceiling is a metaphor for the range of unofficial and
artificial barriers that stop otherwise qualified individuals from
obtaining promotions or top positions within an organization.
These obstacles are usually not apparent or formal, hence the
reference to a glass barrier. The concept was popularized
in the 1980s and applied to the business sector, and wages in
particular, following successive studies that revealed that men
continued to dominate senior positions and earn, on average,
higher salaries than women for comparable work. Since the
term gained popularity over two decades ago, responses to
economic glass ceilings have included attempts to diminish
the wage gap through affirmative action legislation and both
formal and informal quota systems, but inequity in both wage
and opportunity is still among the most pervasive of contemporary social and political issues.
Within political systems, glass ceilings have prevented
women and minority groups from obtaining elected office
or governmental posts, even though legislation may exist that
formally bans overt discrimination. In practice, a glass ceiling may exist within political parties and manifest itself in the
selection of candidates to run for political office. It may also
impact the selection of party or legislative leaders.
There have been a variety of responses to the phenomenon. Some systems require that political parties have
Gleichshaltung
The German word gleichshaltung (meaning synchronization
or coordination) originally referred to the campaign by the
National Socialists (Nazis) during the 1930s to have the Nazi
party take complete control of the German state through the
creation of a cult of personality around the party leader, Adolf
Hitler. The ultimate goal was the establishment of a single, unified political state under the control of the dominant party. The
Nazis undermined, outlawed, or replaced potential rival groups,
including other political parties, trade unions, civic organizations, and the media. They also created parallel party structures
that eventually superseded existing political bodies or agencies.
Central to Gleichshaltung was the notion that the leader
represented the will of the people. All political, economic,
and social power flowed through that leader into the institutions and structures established or captured by the party.
Consequently, existent systems of checks and balances were
eliminated or circumvented. Opponents of the process were
identified as enemies of the state and subject to persecution
and punishment. Within two years of their assumption of
power, the Nazis had gained control over all major German
institutions, with the exception of the Catholic Church. Gleichshaltung subsequently came to mean any effort by a political
grouping to displace the state and install a monolithic, totalitarian single-party system.
See also Cult of Personality; Fascism; Fascist Parties; National
Socialism; One-party Systems;Totalitarianism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Globalism 675
The central concern is that because of supranational rules
and decisions, citizens of a democratic country are occasionally subject to domestic policies that they have not, or would
not, put in place through their own domestic democratic processes. On such occasions, citizens may feel that they have been
overruled by a supranational organization to which they have
no direct recourse. There are at least three broad responses to
this problem. Proponents of cosmopolitan democracy seek to
extend the principles of democracy to the global level by shifting the foundation of global governance from sovereign territorial states and their executives to the political autonomy of
individuals and global society. Some skeptics of cosmopolitan
democracy agree with the basic concern about a global democratic deficit but propose a different set of institutional reforms.
Supranational delegated democracy does have its defenders.
The European Union, although not a perfectly democratic
institution, provides an example of a supranational organization with a directly elected parliament. Some cosmopolitan
democrats propose the establishment of a global parliament
or peoples assembly. The concept is not new, and in fact a
similar idea was proposed and rejected when the League of
Nations was formed. Still, the United Nations (UN) remains
governed by diplomats who are appointed by state executives,
and there are no direct institutional links between the people
of the world and the UN, which is the largest global governance institution. A movement to increase citizen electoral
participation within and outside the UN has grown, and there
have been numerous proposals for doing so.
In addition to the creation of an institutional assembly for
the people, global conferences that include the participation
of citizens, global civil society, and nongovernmental organizations may provide another avenue for strengthening global
democracy. Citizen participation in global governance through
conferences and other means of global or new diplomacy
have been credited with significantly influencing the creation
of the International Criminal Court and the establishment of
an international convention prohibiting the use of landmines.
In addition to calls for increasing direct citizen participation in global institutions, pressures for improving nonelectoral
accountability, such as transparency, and linkages to nonstate
actors, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
global civil society organizations, have intensified. Increasing
avenues of participation for NGOs and civil society organizations as representatives of the people has the potential to
increase accountability of global institutions but would not create global democracy in the way that cosmopolitans seek. Still,
institutional reforms improving transparency and creating closer
working conditions between global nonstate actors and international organizations have been the most common and visible
effects of the global movement to reduce the democratic deficit.
Most scholars agree that the perceived legitimacy of international decision making is important to its public acceptance and the continuation of multilateralism. However, the
goal of democratizing global governance is not universally
championed. All democratic systems of government involve
some delegation, particularly when it would not be practical
Globalism
Globalism is a ubiquitous term often used in a sloppy manner to describe general globalizing trends as well as particular
systems of ideas and values connected to various globalization processes. For purposes of analytical clarity, however, it
is useful to distinguish between globalism, a political ideology
that endows globalization with certain norms, values, and
meaningsand globalization, a multidimensional set of social
processes that extend and intensify social interdependencies
across the globe. This distinction is not meant to suggest that
globalism (the ideational package) exists in isolation from
globalization (the material process). The complexity of actual
social life admits to no such thing as political ideas and values
isolated from their socioeconomic context and their institutional manifestations. But it is crucial not to lose sight of
the considerable role played by ideas, beliefs, language, and
symbols in shaping the conditions of the social world. A focus
on the ideological dimensions of globalization allows a more
extensive analysis of the production and worldwide circulation of ideas and norms.
Globalism, then, refers to powerful ideologies ranging
across the left-right political spectrum both in support of and
in opposition to the project of extending a free-market model
of capitalism to all regions of the world. The dominant variant of globalism focuses on the concept of the market. To
be sure, the wide-ranging preeminence of market harkens
676 Globalization
back to the heyday of liberalism in mid-Victorian England.
And yet, the fundamental difference is that the idea of the
market has moved beyond the political framework of national
economies to an expanded vision of an integrated global economic exchange. In other words, while the grand ideologies
of modernityliberalism, conservatism, socialismexpressed
a largely prereflexive national imaginary in compressed form
as explicit political doctrine, the focus of the political belief
systems in the early twenty-first century is the political articulation of a global imaginary. Naturally, the principal types of
globalism contain some ideational components of the grand
ideologies. However, most of these old concepts have been
rearranged and hybridized with new concepts into novel ideational structures.
The public interpretation of the origin, direction, and
meaning of the profound social changes that go by the name
of globalization has fallen disproportionately to global social
elites composed of executives of large transnational firms, corporate lobbyists, journalists, public relations specialists, intellectuals writing to a large public audience, state bureaucrats,
politicians, and cultural celebrities. The public advocacy of
market globalism involves five ideological claims that recur
with great regularity.
Claim #1: Globalization is about the liberalization and global
integration of markets. This claim is anchored in the liberal ideal
of the self-regulating market as the normative basis for a future
global order. The liberalization and integration of global markets are presented as both desirable and natural phenomena
that promote individual liberty and material progress in the
world.
Claim #2: Globalization is inevitable and irreversible. According to this assertion, globalization involves a spread of irreversible market forces driven by technological innovations that
make the worldwide integration of national economies inevitable. The portrayal of globalization as some sort of natural
force suggests that people must adapt to the discipline of the
market if they are to survive and prosper.
Claim #3: Nobody is in charge of globalization. The claim of
inevitability contains yet another implication. If the natural
laws of the market have indeed preordained the course of history, then globalization does not reflect the arbitrary agenda
of a particular social class or group. In that case, certain social
elites are not in charge of globalization, but markets and technology are.
Claim #4: Globalization benefits everyone. This claim lies at
the very core of market globalism, because it provides an affirmative answer to the crucial normative question of whether
globalization should be considered a good or a bad thing. Market globalists assert that free trade and open markets provide
the best prospect for creating jobs, spurring economic growth,
and raising living standards around the world. While market
globalists typically acknowledge the existence of unequal
global distribution patterns, they insist that the market itself
will eventually correct some of these irregularities.
Globalization
Since its earliest appearance in the 1960s, the term globalization has been used to describe a process, a condition, a system,
a force, and an age. To avoid both the indiscriminate usage
of these concepts and the sloppy conflation of process and
condition that encourages circular definitions, it is necessary
to draw meaningful analytical distinctions between causes
and effects. For example, the term globality refers to global
phenomena as a social condition, whereas globalization signifies a set of social processes that are thought to transform our
Globalization 677
present social condition into one of globality. Indeed, like
modernization and other verbal nouns that end in the suffix
-ization, globalization captures the dynamic of development
or unfolding along discernable patterns. At its core, then, globalization is about both new and intensifying forms of human
interactions and interconnectedness that stretch across the
planet.
At the same time, however, scholars have increasingly
realized the dangers of conceptualizing globalization processes according to rigidly nested geographical scales separating the global from the national or the local. This crucial
task of rethinking historically contingent categories of spatiality yields important insights into the nature of the mutual
embeddedness of the global in the local, and vice versa. Hence,
the fledgling academic field of global(ization) studies requires
methodologies and theoretical models that engage not only
global scalings but also attend to both national and subnational
levels.
Since the first scholarly debates on globalization in the
1980s, globalization has remained a slippery and hotly contested concept. In spite of the remarkable proliferation of
research programs, students of globalization have remained
divided on the utility of various methodological approaches;
the value of available empirical evidence for gauging the
extent, impact, and direction of globalization; and, of course,
its normative implications. The failure to arrive at a broad
scholarly consensus attests not only to the contentious nature
of academic inquiry in general but also reflects the uneven
and contradictory nature of the phenomenon itself. Hence,
there seems to be very little utility in forcing such a complex
set of social processes as globalization into a single analytic
framework.
The persistence of academic divisions on the subject
notwithstanding, it is also important to acknowledge some
emerging points of agreement. During the 2000s, in particular,
there has been a noticeable convergence of scholarly views
on the following three positions: (1) Globalization is actually
occurring and can be defined according to certain characteristics. (2) Globalization is a long-term historical process that,
over many centuries, has crossed a number of qualitatively distinct thresholds. (3) Globalization is a multidimensional set of
social processes that cannot be reduced to its economic and
technological aspects; it also contains crucial political, cultural,
and ideological dimensions. The bulk of this essay will explore
these three positions in some detail.
678 Globalization
transportation technologies. Proceeding at an ever-accelerating pace, these innovations are reshaping the social landscape
of human life.
Fourth, the creation, expansion, and intensification of social
relations do not occur merely on an objective, material level.
Thus, globalization also involves the subjective plane of human
consciousness. People become increasingly conscious of growing manifestations of social interdependence and the enormous acceleration of social interactions.Their awareness of the
receding importance of geographical boundaries and distances
fosters a keen sense of becoming part of a global whole. Reinforced on a daily basis, these persistent experiences of global
interdependence gradually change peoples individual and collective identities and thus dramatically impact the way they act
in the world.
Thus, a comprehensive definition of globalization that
reflects this general consensus on these four constitutive characteristics might look like this: Globalization refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch,
and intensify worldwide social relations while at the same time
fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant.
GLOBALIZATION AS A PROCESS
The answer to the question of whether globalization really
constitutes a new phenomenon depends upon how far back
in time one is willing to extend the chain of causation. Some
researchers consciously limit the historical scope of globalization to the last four decades of postindustrialism in order
to capture its contemporary features. Others are willing to
extend this timeframe to include the path-breaking socioeconomic and political developments of the nineteenth century.
Still others argue that globalization really represents the continuation and extension of complex processes that began with
the emergence of modernity and the capitalist world system
some five centuries ago. And a few remaining scholars refuse
to confine globalization to time periods measured in mere
decades or centuries. Rather, they suggest that these processes
have been unfolding for millennia, since about 10,000 BCE,
when humans first settled on all five continents.
No doubt, each of these contending perspectives contains
important insights. The advocates of the first approach have
marshaled impressive evidence for their view that the dramatic
expansion and acceleration of global exchanges since the early
1970s represents a quantum leap in the history of globalization. The proponents of the second view correctly emphasize the tight connection between contemporary forms of
globalization and the technological innovations of the Industrial Revolution. The representatives of the third perspective
rightly point to the significance of the time-space compression that occurred in the sixteenth century with the capture
of the Americas by European powers. Finally, the advocates of
the fourth approach advance a rather sensible argument when
they insist that any truly comprehensive account of globalization falls woefully short without taking into consideration
ancient developments.
GLOBALIZATION AS A
MULTIDIMENSIONAL PROCESS
A multidimensional set of social processes, globalization cannot be reduced to its economic and technological aspects. It
must be complemented by sustained explorations of its political, cultural, and ideological dimensions. This final point of
agreement affirms the importance of presenting globalization
as a multidimensional process. From its beginnings in the late
1990s, the academic field of global studies has been dominated
by accounts focusing on economic and technological aspects
of the phenomenon. To be sure, a proper recognition of the
crucial role of these factors should be part of any comprehensive interpretation of globalization. But it is equally important
to avoid the trap of technological and economic determinism.
The burgeoning literature on various nonstructural aspects of
globalization attests to the growing recognition of the centrality of ideas, subjectivity, and symbolic exchanges in the current
acceleration of globalization processes. In general, researchers
have identified three major dimensions of globalization: the
economic, the political, and the cultural-ideological.
Economic globalization refers to the intensification and
stretching of economic interrelations across the globe. Gigantic flows of capital and technology have stimulated trade in
goods and services. Markets have extended their reach around
the world, in the process creating new linkages among national
economies. Huge transnational corporations, powerful international economic institutions like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund, and large regional
trading systems like the European Union and Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation have emerged as the major building blocs of the twenty-first centurys global economic order.
Moreover, the liberalization of financial transactions has led to
the deregulation of interest rates, the removal of credit controls, and the privatization of government-owned banks and
financial institutions. Globalization of financial trading allows
for increased mobility among different segments of the financial industry, with fewer restrictions and greater investment
opportunities.
Most people associate economic globalization with the
controversial issue of free trade. After all, the total value of
Globalization 679
world trade exploded from $57 billion in 1947 to an astonishing $6 trillion in the late 1990s. During the 2000s, the
public debate over the alleged benefits and drawbacks of free
trade reached a fever pitch, as wealthy Northern countries
have increased their efforts to establish a single global market
through regional and international trade-liberalization agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Free trade proponents assure the public that the elimination or reduction of
existing trade barriers among nations will enhance consumer
choice, increase global wealth, secure peaceful international
relations, and spread new technologies around the world.
While there seems to be some evidence for the increase of
productivity as a result of free trade, it is less clear whether the
resulting profits have been distributed equitably within and
among countries. Many studies show that the gap between
rich and poor countries is widening at a fast pace. Hence, free
trade proponents have encountered severe criticism from labor
unions and environmental groups, who claim that the elimination of social control mechanisms has resulted in a lowering of
global labor standards, severe forms of ecological degradation,
and the growing indebtedness of the global South. The emergence of large-scale social protests around the world attests to
the pervasiveness of these dissenting views.
Political globalization refers to the intensification and
expansion of political interrelations across the globe.These processes raise an important set of political issues pertaining to the
principle of state sovereignty, the growing impact of intergovernmental organizations, and the future prospects for regional
and global governance. Obviously, these themes respond to the
evolution of political arrangements beyond the framework of
the nation-state, thus breaking new conceptual ground. Contemporary manifestations of political globalization are apparent in the partial permeation of old territorial borders, in the
process also softening hard conceptual boundaries and cultural
lines of demarcation. Emphasizing these tendencies, hyperglobalizers have suggested that the period since the late 1970s has
been marked by a radical deterritorialization of politics, rule,
and governance. Considering such pronouncements premature at best and erroneous at worst, globalization skeptics have
not only affirmed the continued relevance of the nation-state
as the political container of modern social life but have also
pointed to the emergence of regional economic and political
alliances as evidence for new forms of territorialization. As
each group presents different assessments of the fate of the
modern nation-state, they also quarrel over the relative importance of political and economic factors.
A third group has tried to offer a synthesis that captures
important insights from both hyperglobalizers and skeptics.
Conceding that globalization has exerted a considerable influence on most national economies to follow the Anglo-American model, they nonetheless insist that there remain important
differences among national economies. In short, capitalism
does not develop toward a one-size-fits-all model but comes
in several varieties. Members of this third group, who focus on
Europe, have furnished empirical studies suggesting that the
rise of the new global economy in the late 1980s neither led
to the destruction of some of the central features of the traditional European welfare state nor eliminated the fiscal powers
of nation-states. Thus, these scholars conclude that globalization appears to have had a differential impact on social and
industrial policy in Europe.
Out of these disagreements, however, there have emerged
three fundamental issues and themes that probe the extent of
political globalization: (1) the curtailment of the power of the
nation-state by massive flows of capital, people, and technology across territorial boundaries; (2) the search for the primary causes of these flows; and (3) the possible emergence of
forms of global governance and extensive network of nongovernmental groups often described as global civil society. Indeed, political globalization is perhaps most visible in
the rise of supraterritorial institutions and associations held
together by common norms and interests. In this early phase
of global governance, these structures resemble an eclectic web
of interrelated power centers such as municipal and provincial authorities, regional blocs, international organizations, and
national and international private-sector associations.
Cultural globalization refers to the intensification and
expansion of cultural flows across the globe. The exploding
network of cultural interconnections and interdependencies
in the last decades has led some commentators to suggest that
cultural practices, not the economy, lie at the very heart of
contemporary globalization. Facilitated by the Internet and
other new technologies, the dominant symbolic systems of
meaning of the global ageindividualism, consumerism, and
various religious discoursescirculate more freely and widely
than ever before. Since images and ideas can be more easily and rapidly transmitted from one place to another, they
profoundly impact the way people experience their everyday
lives. In the early twenty-first century, cultural practices frequently escape fixed localities such as town and nation, eventually acquiring new meanings in interaction with dominant
global themes. The thematic landscape traversed by scholars of
cultural globalization is vast, and the questions they raise are
too numerous to be fleshed out in this short essay. Some of the
most important issues include the tension between homogenization, difference, and hybridization within and among
various cultures; the crucial role of transnational media corporations in disseminating popular culture to all parts of the
planet; the globalization of languages; and the impact of materialist and consumerist values on Earths ecological systems.
Finally, cultural globalization contains important ideological
aspects involving various norms, claims, beliefs, and narratives
about the phenomenon itself. The heated public debate over
whether globalization represents a good or a bad thing highlights the importance of ideology. As a result, various ideologies of globalism compete with each other in the struggle to
shape public opinion around the world.
No doubt, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
and the ensuing political fallout have given an unexpected
jolt to the contemporary struggle over the meaning and the
direction of globalization. In general terms, one can discern
Globalization and
Development
Globalization is an increasingly important phenomenon
affecting the world in political, economic, social, and cultural arenas. In her 1999 article Gender and Globalization,
Valentine Moghadam describes globalization as a complex
economic, political, cultural and geographic process in which
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43194330.
Rahnema, Majid, ed. The Post-Development Reader. London: Zed Books, 1997.
Sachs, Wolfgang, ed. The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as
Power. London: Zed Books, 1992.
Shurman, Frans J. Globalization and Development Studies: Challenges for the
21st Century. Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage Publications, 2001.
Snarr, Michael T., and D. Neil Snarr. Introducing Global Issues. 3rd ed. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 2005.
Godwin, William
Political philosopher William Godwin (17561836) was born
in Cambridgeshire, England, to middle-class parents. His
father was a Nonconformist minister, a profession for which
Godwin was initially educated. His life was at times turbulent; he was declared bankrupt in 1825 and was scorned
and satirized by former friends and in the conservative
press for both his political views and his personal life. In his
later years, his troubled reputation led him to publish under
pseudonyms.
Godwin married protofeminist and social critic Mary Wollstonecraft in 1797, an act that surprised many, given his controversial claim, as stated in his 1832 Fleetwood: The New Man
of Feeling, that marriage, as now understood, is a monopoly,
and the worst of monopolies. Wollstonecraft died that same
year, shortly after the birth of their daughter Mary, who would
become the author Mary Shelley. Godwins candid biography
of Wollstonecraft, Memoirs of the Author of a Vindication of the
Rights of Woman (1798), added to the notoriety of both. Godwin remarried in 1801 and raised five children, three of them
stepchildren.
Goldman, Emma
Emma Goldman (18691940) was an anarchist, socialist
activist, speaker, and writer born in Lithuania (then part of
the Russian empire) and active in the United States, Soviet
Union, and several Western European countries.
Goldman worked in the garment industry in St. Petersburg and, after emigrating in 1885, in Rochester, New York,
where she married Jacob Kershner and became a U.S. citizen.
Inspired by the story of the 1886 Haymarket tragedy, in which
labor strikers and police clashed and several people were killed,
she became an anarchist through self-study. After leaving her
husband, Goldman moved to New York City in 1889, where
she first worked with Johan Most and then, after her views
diverged from Mosts, she studied the works of Pyotr Kropotkin. During these years, Goldman entered into a political and romantic relationship with fellow anarchist Alexander
Berkman, whom she defended after he was imprisoned for
the attempted assassination of industrialist Henry Clay Frick
in 1892.
Goldman lectured widely, at political demonstrations as
well as in lecture halls, advocating socialism, anarchism, absolute freedom of the individual, modern drama, and free love.
She played a major role in making the freedom and gender
equality of women part of generally accepted anarchist principles. She applied these standards to her own life, having longterm liaisons with Ben Reitman and possibly Hippolyte Havel
as well as with Berkman.
After Berkmans release from prison, he and Goldman published a monthly journal, Mother Earth, from 1906 to 1917,
when its offices were raided by government agents and its subscription lists seized under the provisions of the Espionage Act.
During this period Goldmans major essays were collected in
Anarchism and Other Essays (1911).
Goldman was imprisoned from 1893 to 1895 for inciting to
riot after she led a march of 1,000 people to Union Square in
support of free bread for hungry workers. She was imprisoned
twice more, in 1916 for distributing birth control literature
and in 1917 for obstructing the draft. Her U.S. citizenship was
revoked in 1908, and she and Berkman were deported to the
Soviet Union in 1919 during the Palmer Raids.
Goldman had hoped to find a land ruled by workers in the
Soviet Union, but she became a strong critic of the lack of
personal freedom under Communist rule. She left the Soviet
Union after two years and published her opinions in two volumes, My Disillusionment in Russia (1923) and My Further Disillusionment in Russia (1924). Her two-volume autobiography,
Living My Life (1931, 1934), is an important statement of her
views as well as a memoir of her activities through 1927. Her
other major book, The Social Significance of the Modern Drama
(1914), is a collection of essays on thirty-two plays by nineteen
European playwrights, including Anton Chekov, John Galsworthy, Gerhart Hauptmann, Henrik Ibsen, Maurice Maeterlinck, George Bernard Shaw, August Strindberg, Leo Tolstoy,
and William Butler Yeats; this volume helped to popularize
modern drama in the United States.
Good Governance
The concept of governance is as old as human civilization. In
their 2002 article, Comparing Governance across Countries
and Over Time, Goran Hoyden and Julius Court note that
there are those who view governance, on the one hand, as
concerned with the rules of conducting public affairs, and on
the other, those who see it as steering or controlling public
affairs (p. 12). In essence, governance means the process of decision making and the procedure by which decisions are carried
out, or not carried out, by those who govern. It is distinguished
from government, which refers to an institution consisting of
a set of instruments through which people of a state govern
themselves by means of laws, rules, and regulations enforced by
the state apparatus. Good governance is a subset of governance,
and its essential ingredients depend on such fundamental
values as accountability, transparency, justice, fairness, equity,
and ethics as practiced in a liberal democratic polity. Good
governance is also part of a governments goal of sustaining a
good quality of life for its public. Ultimately, governance links
an administrative system to a collaborative arrangement with
interest groups, citizens, industry, legislators, and a judiciary,
creating legitimacy of the public domain while letting each
group share its perspective on governance with the rest.
GOOD GOVERNANCE
Emma Goldman advocated anarchism, socialism, and individual
freedom. She spoke out in favor of gender equality and was
imprisoned in 1916 for distributing pamphlets on birth control.
source: The Library of Congress
IMPEDIMENTS TO GOOD
GOVERNANCE
Among major impediments to good governance, corruption
and corrupt behavior among public officials constitute a most
insidious challenge; however, institutional or bureaucratic
hurdles and inadequate compliance mechanisms are equally
responsible for bad governance.
The biggest challenge to good governance faced by many
countries is inefficiency in the implementation of various policy programs and effective delivery of service.While a country
may have adequate legal mandates to solve problems, the gaps
in policy implementation mechanisms indicate that enforcement of policies is rather weak and at times nonexistent. In
addition, there always exists jurisdictional fighting across levels of government and among various ministries desperate to
safeguard their jurisdictions, so policies and programs enthusiastically initiated by one ministry or department may be considered unnecessary or problematic by others and, thus, are
slow to be embraced.
Many poor nations have crafted various laws concerning
social welfare, environmental protection, and economic development, but they are rarely enforced because of insufficient
financial, technical, and administrative resources. Powerful
interest groups are often able to influence the regulatory system or bypass compliance measures that are in place. Finally,
for government regulators, the cost of enforcement in time
and resources is higher than the cost of nonenforcement. Government officials thus suffer from a negative public image and
lack of public credibility, both of which contribute to a level
of inertia that can inhibit good governance.
Despite the fact that in some developing nations, as in industrialized nations, resources may be diverted from the purpose
originally intended for them, developing nations often suffer disproportionately from direct political interference in the
administrative and enforcement process; policy goals deflected
and responsibilities for achieving policy mandates evaded; and
rampant reliance on tokenism by a government administration
to fill ministry positions rather than talent. Nevertheless, the
tenacity of some administrators and political leaders is such
that they are able to keep a system of good governance functioning. And so, it would be erroneous to conclude that the
various impediments facing these nations are such that they
preclude the establishment of good governance.
See also Consensus; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies;
Corruption, Political; Governance; Legitimacy; Pluralism; Rule of
Law;Transparency.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O. P. DWIVEDI
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Caiden, G. E. Corruption and Governance. In Where Corruption Lives,
edited by G. E. Caiden, O. P. Dwivedi, and J. Jabbra, 1537. West
Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 2001.
Dwivedi, O. P. On Common Good and Good Governance: An Alternative
Approach. In Better Governance and Public Policy, edited by D. Olowu and
S. Sako, 3551. Bloomfield, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 2002.
. Good Governance in a Multi-cultural World: Oceans Apart yet World
Together. In Administrative Culture in a Global Context, edited by Joseph G.
Jabbra and O. P. Dwivedi, 271290.Toronto, ON: de Sitters, 2005.
Dwivedi, O. P., and D. S. Mishra. Good Governance: A Model for India. In
Handbook of Globalization, Governance, and Public Administration, edited
by Ali Farazmand and Jack Pinkowski, 701741. Boca Raton, Fla.: Taylor
and Francis.
Frederickson, H. G. The Spirit of Public Administration. San Francisco: JosseyBass, 1997.
Hoyden, G., and J. Court. Comparing Governance Across Countries and
Over Time: Conceptual Challenges. In Better Governance and Public
Policy, edited by D. Olowu and S. Sako, 1333. Bloomfield, Conn.:
Kumarian Press, 2002.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Wellbeing of Nations:The Role of Human and Social Capital. Paris: OECD
Development Committee, 2001.
Simon,Y. R. Philosophy of Democratic Government. Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993.
Transparency International. Report. www.transparency.org/cpi/index.html,
the Website of Transparency International, 2003.
. Corruption Perceptions Index 2009. www.transparency.org/policy_
research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.
United Nations Development Programme. Good Governance and Sustainable
Human Development. New York: UNDP, 1998.
Weiss, Thomas. Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance:
Conceptual and Actual Challenges. Third World Quarterly 21 (2000):
795814.
World Bank. The World Development Report: Development and the Environment.
Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1992.
World Bank. World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor
People. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004.
was particularly concerned with building the reputation of scientific objectivity and the nonpartisan image of the association.
See also Administrative Law; Politics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BENOIT F. MONANGE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fairlie, John A.. Frank Johnson Goodnow. The American Political Science
Review 34 (1940): 114117.
Goodnow, Frank Johnson. The Work of the American Political Science
Association. Proceedings of the American Political Science Association 1
(1904): 3546.
Haines, Charles Grove, and Marshall Edward Dimock, eds. Essays on the
Law and Practice of Governmental Administration: A Volume in Honor
of Frank Johnson Goodnow. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1935.
Patterson, Samuel C. Remembering Frank J. Goodnow. PS: Political Science
and Politics 34, no. 4 (December 2001): 875881.
686 Governability
the book combine[d] new methodology and familiar concern
in a fashion which startles the profession. In Getting out the
Vote, Gosnell provided the first use of experimental methods
to study voter turnout, finding that mailing reminders regarding upcoming elections to potential voters increased turnout.
Another of Gosnells works, Machine Politics: Chicago Model
(1937), was the first book to use correlation, regression, and
factor analysis in political science.
Gosnell is also remembered for his forward-thinking substantive research. Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in
Chicago (1935) was the first book on the subject of African
American politics, and his Why Europe Votes (1930) provides an
early account of cross-national voting.
After Robert M. Hutchins, a critic of behaviorialism,
became president of the University of Chicago, Gosnell left the
school for a position at the Office of Price Administration in
Washington, D.C. He also served at the Bureau of the Budget
and Department of State. Gosnell later served as an adjunct professor at American University, visiting professor at the University of Washington, and professor of political science at Howard
University. He published four more books during this time,
Grass Roots Politics (1942), Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom
(1948), Champion Campaigner: Franklin D. Roosevelt (1952), and
Trumans Crises: A Political Biography of Harry S.Truman (1980).
In 1995 the Harold F. Gosnell Prize of Excellence was
established to honor his influence and legacy in the field of
political methodology.
See also Political Participation; Quantitative Analysis; Statistical Analysis; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political
Participation;Voting Behavior.
J ANET BOX-STEFFENSMEIER AND
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LYNDSEY STANFILL
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Brooks, Robert C. Review: Boss Platt and His New York Machine by
Harold F. Gosnell. American Political Science Review 18, no. 3 (1924):
627629.
Hansen, John Mark. In Memoriam: Harold F. Gosnell. PS: Political Science &
Politics 30, no. 3 (1997): 582587.
Karl, Barry D. Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1974.
Governability
Governability can be defined as the capacity of governors
to steer the ship of state toward its policy objectives. Policies
depend for their success not only on what governments do
but also on the responses of others that government can influence but not completely determine. First of all, policies must
be framed within the limits of resources. Second, policies must
be acceptable to those whose endorsement is required to turn
intentions into law. Third, policies must secure cooperation
from all involved in implementing them. If all of these conditions are met, then the actions of governors are effective, and
the political system appears governable. If these conditions
are met to some extent, then governability is difficult but
achievable.
A MATTER OF DEGREE
The capacity of a government to achieve its policy objectives depends on its choice of goals, its political institutions,
and the behavior of its citizens. Obstacles to governability
are usually matters of degree. Each condition varies from one
area of public policy to another as well as from country to
country. Hence, societies and political problems are more or
less governable.
The realistic choice of policy goals is a necessary condition of governability. What is realistic is affected by resources.
The inability of low-income countries to finance major social
benefits on the scale of Scandinavia is an obvious illustration.
Low-income countries often lack the personnel to provide
high-standard services to all their citizens. Some governments
lack the transparency and integrity to administer foreign aid
without favoritism and corruption.
Within a developed country, the annual budget cycle
matches policy intentions with the money at hand. If there
is a gap, governors have the choice of raising taxes to make
more money available, scaling down their policy intentions, or
inviting inflation by increasing the money supply. Population
size affects personnel. A rich but small country such as Luxembourg lacks the people to carry out major large-scale scientific projects, while the European Union offers small countries
the opportunity to pool resources to conduct big projects.
Countries with hundreds of millions of people can mobilize resources selectively to achieve major goals. While the
income of individual Chinese is low, the aggregate resources
at the command of the one-party government of the Peoples
Republic of China are very large.
The endorsement of policy intentions is more readily secured
in a dictatorship than in a democracy. An arbitrary despot can
threaten those who disagree with the loss of office, wealth, or
liberty. Democracies vary in the extent to which institutions
act as checks on the initiatives of the leaders of government.
Federalism often requires approval at two levels of government.
The separation of powers between the American president and
Congress requires two federal institutions to agree. In the British parliamentary system, control of the executive and legislature
is in the hands of a prime minister holding that office because
he or she has the confidence and disciplined support of the
majority in parliament. In parliamentary systems elected by
proportional representation, government is usually a coalition,
Governance 687
thus requiring the endorsement of two or more parties before
a policy proposed by the prime minister can become law. This
makes governing more difficult as well as more consensual.
INTERDEPENDENCE
National government is part of an interdependent system that
determines policy outcomes. It can influence but not control
entirely what others do. For example, the governability of the
education system depends not only on what policy makers
decide and the resources it allocates but also on what teachers
do in their classrooms and how their students respond. The
success of a crime policy depends not only on what the police
and courts do but also on the behavior of criminals.
Government policies for managing the economy have
always depended on the response of a multiplicity of actors
in the marketplace. These include business firms, trade unions,
financial institutions, and individuals in their roles as workers
and as consumers. Government can design policies to promote
economic growth and full employment, but success depends
on what economic actors do as well. The increasing internationalization of economic activity has made managing the
national economy into an intermestic problem, because the
economy is much affected by what happens outside national
boundaries as well as domestically. Public institutions such as
the European Union and the International Monetary Fund
operate across national boundaries. Major banks now have
offices in New York, London, and Tokyo, and automobile manufacturers have plants on three continents. Each institution has
the capacity to influence one part of the global economy; collectively, they create obstacles to any government being able
to command and control what happens in the international
economic system.
Interdependence is even more important in determining
the consequences of a national governments foreign policy;
a foreign policy without foreigners is an empty domestic
political gesture. In international relations, governments are
very unequal in resources. Nonetheless, governability often
depends on how others, state and nonstate actors such as alQaida, respond to the initiatives of the strongest powers.
To describe governability as a political problem is misleading if this is taken to mean that there is a solution. Instead,
governability is better understood as a condition of contemporary governance. Challenges to governability have increased
because the intentions of governors and popular expectations
have expanded as well as resources.
See also Interdependence; Policy Evaluation; Policy Theory; Power.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RICHARD ROSE
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Dahrendorf, Ralf. Effectiveness and Legitimacy: On the Governability of
Democracies. Political Quarterly 51 (1980): 393402.
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence. 2nd ed.
Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman Little Brown, 1989.
Kooiman, Jan. Exploring the Concept of Governability. Journal of
Comparative Policy Analysis 10, no. 2 (2008): 171190.
Mayntz, Renate. Governing Failures and the Problem of Governability. In
Modern Governance, edited by J. Kooiman, 920. London: Sage.
Wildavsky, Aaron. Speaking Truth to Power. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.
Governance
Good governance requires representation and effectiveness.
A representative government, if it is not effective at decision
making, may generate frustration and conflict among different
groups. In turn, administrative effectiveness, if it is not based
on fair representation of the society, can be counterproductive,
since it may produce arbitrary governmental decisions against
the citizens majority preferences. However, the neologism
governance emerged in political science and public administration studies in reference to a set of institutional rules, coordination, and decision-making processes aimed at attaining
effectiveness in defining collective goals, making priorities,
and producing outcomes as, in a similar way, one can talk of
private corporate governance, rather than of representative
government.
Concern with governance has grown with changes in the
environment of existing governments and the subsequent
worsening of their performance. Recent processes of increasing internationalization, usually labeled globalization, and
intensification of societal complexity have indeed undermined
the basis of traditional territorial jurisdictions and hierarchical,
top-down coordination mechanisms. They have caused different forms of state decline, state restructuring, or state failure.
In the new environment, good governance requires larger and
more diversified territorial scopes of public policies and a new
functional specialization and fragmentation of policy-making
and political institutions.
CAUSES OF UNGOVERNABILITY
Put in more theoretical terms, recent concerns with governance reflect a decreasing fit between institutional structures and recurrent patterns of behavior in the environment
of these structuresa situation that may emerge in human
history in different places and times. The current perception
of a decreasing performance of state-centered governance
can be attributed to three different processes: (1) increasing
internationalization of human exchanges and relationships; (2)
state failures, provoked by excessive demands on governments,
excessive state intervention, and the fiscal crisis of the state;
and (3) the failure of certain states.
INTERNATIONALIZATION
688 Governance
international trade agreement, especially under the sponsorship of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Widespread
currencies, such as the dollar and the euro, and international
monetary policies make traditional states obsolete in their task
of shaping and protecting markets and inefficient in governing the economy.
Dramatic reductions in the costs of transport, especially by
air, and of communications, especially by telephone and the
Internet, have greatly favored these new developments. Just
as other technological changes in the past (like gunpowder
or railways) induced the formation of relatively large states
and made them viable, others are now creating larger areas
of human relations that make traditional states too small for
efficient performance.
At the same time, transnational processes create new
opportunities for local political units of small size to develop
their self-government. Specifically, the larger the markets,
the more regionalized the economic activity tends to be. In
general, economic differences across the territory increase
with internal integration, which tends to foster territorially
differentiated political demands. Also, linguae francae, such as
English and others, permit human beings to develop broad
communications while maintaining their own local languages
and cultures and avoiding the costs of forced homogenization
typically imposed by large nation-states. Indeed the number
of independent countries has increased dramatically since the
early twentieth century, leading to an overall decrease in the
size of countries, a process that has developed in parallel to the
diffusion of democracy across the world. Decentralization of
large states, diverse forms of asymmetric federalism, and the
independence of small political units, while they undermine
traditional nation-states, also favor the introduction of new
forms of democratic governance.
STATE FAILURES
Governance 689
in Europe, three in North America, two in Asia, and two in
Oceania. Elsewhere, the attempts to build sovereign and effective states have been much less successful. Good governance in
a state requires indeed an extremely costly initial accumulation
of resources into the hands of the public authority, a condition
detrimental to the opportunities for private initiatives, at least at
some foundational stage. Building a new public administration
able to impose order, guard the borders, and collect taxes over
a large territory requires heavy, labor-intensive investments,
which may imply net losses for the economic activity of the
subjects. Only when the size of the bureaucracy is sufficiently
large can it be more technology intensive and produce outputs with net social benefits. Many countries have not reached
such an advanced stage of statehood development. In particular,
a number of former colonies and other deprived territories
without administrative resources have been unable to achieve
minimum levels of state effectiveness and governance.
In several dozen countries at the bottom of the scale of
statehood, the government has actually ceased to function, if
ever it did. This implies that the central rulers have no control
over most of the states territory; they are ineffective in collecting taxes; they do not provide even the most basic goods
and services (not even money coinage, for instance); there are
epidemic diseases, widespread crime, disorder, rebellions, ethnic civil wars, and frequent interstate border conflicts; natural
disasters become highly destructive; and masses of people emigrate, up to the point that emigrants remittances become the
first source of income for natives.There are several accounts of
failed states in the current world, including the World Banks
list of between thirty and forty fragile, collapsed, or failing
states, its list of states in internal conflict called LICUS (low
income countries under stress), and Britains Department for
International Developments list of forty-six fragile states
of concern. Most of these states are located in Central and
West Africa, the Middle East, Asian territories of the former
Soviet Union, Central America, the Caribbean Sea, and the
Andean region.
NEW GOVERNANCE
The decline or failure of governance in the framework of
traditional states implies economic inefficiencies, bad governmental performances in providing public services, and
democratic deficits in the form of low levels of rulers control
and accountability. Subsequent responses have attempted to
address these concerns.
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Increasing relations beyond the traditional limits of nationstates require certain worldwide institutional arrangements,
including international organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO, interstate agreements,
and common practices such as arbitration. But as transnational exchanges and relationships develop within large world
regions, such as North America, Europe, or Asia, rather than as
true globalization, it also makes other complex institutional
arrangements highly relevant. At continental scale, multilevel
governance implies a set of overlapping jurisdictions in which
690 Governance
should be required to produce returns as if they were private
firms operating in competitive markets, especially through
contracting out, quasi-markets, and consumer choice.
With this, both politicians and citizens (or consumers) were
bound to ask why, if state-owned enterprises were to work
like private enterprises, should they be state owned at all. A
new proposal was, thus, privatization (in fact, in many cases, reprivatization), a word that had been coined with this purpose
in 1968. State governments have been indeed downloaded and
downsized. During the 1980s and 1990s, there were more than
4,000 privatizing transactions, valued at more $1 trillion, in
more than 100 countries. By 2000, the share of state-owned
enterprises in the gross domestic product had been reduced to
less than half its previous value in high-income countries (from
10 to 4 percent), less than one-third in low-income countries
(from 16 to less than 5 percent), and less than one-sixth in former communist European countries (from more than 90 to less
than 15 percent). Divested firms almost always became more
efficient and more profitable, increased their capital investment
spending, and became financially healthier than state-owned
enterprises (with the major exception of Russia), according to
a review of twenty-two empirical studies on privatization.
In a parallel campaign, international organizations, private
think tanks, and certain political leaders argued that the civil
service should reduce staffing, introduce budgetary discipline,
decentralize administration, and make greater use of nongovernmental organizations. In a number of countries, public officers and bureaucrats were submitted to performance measures
such as managing by results, value for money, and closeness to
the consumers.
The creation of networks has been highlighted as a particularly innovative way to improve service delivery systems. Networks in this sense are combinations of government with the
private and voluntary sectors, including local authority, central
government, unions, and business.They can be conceived of as
a form of social coordination and allocation of resources based
on trust and cooperation among varied actors, and they differ
from traditional models of policy making based on either hierarchy or markets. Networks are self-organizing and develop
diplomacy, reciprocity, and interdependence. However, they
have also been blamed for being unrepresentative, closed to
outsiders, unaccountable for their actions, and prone to serve
private rather than public interests.
Finally, the fiscal crisis of the state was responded to with
claims for fiscal responsibility. The policy of balanced budgetsthat is, to equate the public revenues with public expenditures over the business cyclewas adopted as mandatory
by most states of the United States during the 1980s and the
1990s. The EU requires member states using the euro to have
an annual deficit of no more than 3 percent of gross domestic
product. The IMF has made balanced or near-balanced budgets a condition of aid to some low-income countries.
SUCCESSFUL STATES?
sovereign statehood does not appear to be a necessary condition for good democratic governance. Indeed, democracyin
the sense of free elections and control of rulers by broad layers of citizenshad already existed in numerous local communities in the ancient and medieval world, long before the
notion of state was invented, and democracy is now practiced
in many private organizations, in several hundred democratic
but nonsovereign local and regional governments, and in
transnational institutions such as the European Parliament.
Historically, most of North America, Russia, and Asia kept
very large compound republics or empires for long periods
and were unacquainted with the Westphalian model of sovereign nation-state. It was in Western Europe that a few large,
robust states were built by affirming their own sovereignty vis-vis other states. But, after long periods of continuous interstate and civil wars and conflicts, only in the second half of the
twentieth century did Europe achieve an institutional equilibrium able to provide democratic governance, peace, and
prosperity by building a very large union based on military,
commercial, monetary, and political cooperation among states.
In large parts of Latin America, Africa, and the Arab region,
former European colonies tried to replicate the Western European model of sovereign nation-states, but the failure of a high
number of states in those regions seems unquestionable. Bad
governance in these countries implies not excessive intervention, as is claimed for high-income countries, but lack of rule
of law and insufficient provision of public goods. So far, institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS),
the African Union, and the League of Arab States have been
revelations of intention and hope more than effective organizations. But, in the absence of operational states, building
and putting into effect large institutional networks of this sort
might be, as it was in Europe, the best way to attain stable good
democratic governance in those parts of the world.
See also European Union (EU); International Monetary Fund
(IMF); North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD);World Trade Organization
(WTO).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JOSEP M. COLOMER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ansell, Christopher K., and Giuseppe di Palma, eds. Restructuring Territoriality.
Europe and the United States Compared. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
Badie, Bertrand. The Imported State:The Westernization of Political Order.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
Buchanan, James M., and Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in Deficit. New York:
Academic Press, 1977.
Colomer, Josep M. Large Empires, Small Nations. London: Routledge, 2007.
Cooper, Robert. The Breaking of Nations. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press,
2003.
Crozier, Michel J., Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. The Crisis of
Democracy. New York: New York University Press, 1975.
Floyd, Gray, and R. P. Short, eds. Public Enterprises in Mixed Economies.
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1984.
Frankel, Jeffrey A. Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System.
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997.
Governments, Regional
See Regions and Regional Governments.
Governor
In the United States, each of the fifty states has a governor
who serves as the leader of the executive branch. The power
and influence of the governor varies from state to state. In
general, the governor has the authority to veto legislation,
activate the states National Guard, and grant pardons.
One area of great variance among the states is the ability
of the governor to appoint members of the executive branch
of state government. The governor in 48 states may appoint
members of the executive branch with state senate approval;
in Massachusetts, such appointments may be made with
the approval of the states Governors Council or no other
approval, and in New Hampshire, such appointments may be
made with the approval of the states Executive Council. Some
states allow the governor and lieutenant governor to run on
the same ticket, while other states have separate elections for
the two offices. Other important state offices such as those of
attorney general, state auditor, and secretary of state are often
elected positions. The powers of governors and other elected
officials in each states executive branch are typically defined
by the states constitution and vary among the states.
Over the past fifty years, the nature of governorships has
changed due to a push during the progressive era to increase
the state executives power. Examples include a lengthening
Gramsci, Antonio
Antonio Gramsci (18911937) was an Italian journalist, activist, and theorist who developed an alternative Marxist political analysis. Although the concepts Gramsci contributed were
somewhat obscure during his life, they were later viewed by
many as the most important developments in Marxist thinking of the twentieth century.
As a young journalist, Gramsci wrote and edited a number
of Italian socialist papers focusing on political developments
such as the rise of fascism. Later, after being arrested in 1926
and imprisoned by fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, Gramsci
wrote his famous Prison Notebooks (19291935), which are more
philosophical than his earlier works and are the basis for the
contemporary assessment of his ideas. As these works demonstrate, his major theoretical break with early forms of Marxism
was that he rejected economic determinism, or the notion that
economic factors drive social and political changes. Instead, he
placed more emphasis on the roles of culture, ideology, and
human agency in explaining historical development.
Gramsci explored the social basis of ruling class domination in society, suggesting (in perhaps his key insight) that it
was grounded in hegemony. For Gramsci, hegemony combined traditional forms of economic and coercive (or violent)
forms of domination with intellectual and moral leadership
that made domination seem natural to the dominated. He
also believed hegemony had to be constructed and struggled
over, as it was possible for other classes in society to pursue
their own hegemonic ambitions. Indeed, Gramsci felt that
for the working class to challenge the hegemony of capitalists, they would need to organize ideological alliances with
other societal groups supportive of the interests of the working
classa counter hegemony. Espousing a theory perhaps more
appropriate to modern democratic societies then other Marxist political strategies, Gramsci argued that through a war of
position, the working class, engaged in a long ideological and
organizational struggle, could undermine the cultural domination of the ruling class.
This focus on ideas and culture as key sites of social struggle
also led Gramsci to place considerable emphasis on the role of
intellectuals (allied to different classes) in helping to construct
or undermine a particular hegemony and also to develop the
distinction between civil society (the nonstate sphere of the
social world) and the state in capitalist hegemonychallenging capitalism required ideological organization in civil society.
The twenty-first century popularity of Gramsci in political
science and international relations is due to the fact that his
Great Power
For centuries, scholars have noted the international importance of powerful states. Today scholars differentiate international systems according to the number of great powers. Most
scholars agree about how great power should be measured
and which states are likely to be great powers in the coming
decades. Debate centers on why individual great powers rise
and fall and on how the rise of new great powers will affect
international conflict and cooperation.
THE IMPORTANCE OF
GREAT POWERS
According to structural realists, great powers matter for
three reasons. First, as Kenneth N. Waltz explains in Theory of
International Politics (1979), in the absence of an international
sovereign, powerful states set the scene of action for others as
well as for themselves (p. 72). In other words, as Thucydides
noted in his account of the Athenian conquest of Melos in
415 BCE, The strong do what they can and the weak suffer
what they must (History of the Peloponnesian War, bk. 5). The
suffering caused by powerful states can be deliberate or inadvertent. Great powers frequently conquer and coerce weak
Booth, Ken, and Nicholas J. Wheeler. Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and
Trust in World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Chua, Amy. Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominanceand
Why They Fall. New York: Random House, 2009.
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983.
Ikenberry, G. John. The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Foreign
Affairs 87, no. 1 (January/February 2008): 2337.
Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change
and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House,
1987.
Kindleberger, Charles. The World in Depression 19291939. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1986.
Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W.
Norton, 2001.
Modelski, George, and William R. Thompson. Leading Sectors and World
Powers:The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics. Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1996.
Posen, Barry R. Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of
U.S. Hegemony. International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 546.
Waltz, Kenneth N. The Emerging Structure of International Politics.
International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 4479.
Wohlforth, William C. The Stability of a Unipolar World. International
Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 541.
Great Society
The Great Society was the general term for U.S. President
Lyndon B. Johnsons package of domestic reforms, which were
enacted by a Democratically controlled Congress in the mid1960s. The Great Society programs were initially proposed in
1964 as part of the presidents efforts to improve racial equality
and eradicate poverty in the United States. Many of the economic and social programs enacted became part of Johnsons
War on Poverty. The Great Society programs were designed
to complement and expand on the New Deal of Franklin D.
Roosevelt as well as to finalize a number of policy initiatives
begun under President John F. Kennedy.
A series of measures were enacted to improve racial and
gender equality, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
Over a three-year period between 1964 and 1967, more than
$3 billionan enormous sum at the timewas spent on
poverty reduction programs, including education and worker
training initiatives as well as the creation of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Office
of Economic Opportunity. The Great Society also included
the creation of public health care insurance programs for the
elderly (Medicare) and the poor (Medicaid).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
See also Entitlements; New Deal; Social Engineering; Social
Welfare;Welfare Rights;Welfare State.
ANTIDEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS
Because the major Greek political philosophersThucydides,
Plato, and Aristotlewere from elite backgrounds and held
CONCLUSION
This barrage of criticism, at least in regard to Athens, must be
recognized as unfairalthough the extent to which similar
factors held in other cities is subject to debate. Like other
democracies, the Athenian system gave the average citizen
unparalleled rights of political participation. A large percentage of the citizens were active in political affairs, in accordance with the Greek ideal that ruling and being ruled in
turn is one of the highest forms of life. On the whole, the
Athenians exercised their power well. In spite of the overall
turmoil of the Greek political world, Athenian democracy was
generally stable for some two centuries. The main outbreaks
of instability were oligarchic seizures of power in the closing
years of the Peloponnesian War, in 411 and 404 BCE. When
the oligarchs had been defeated, in 403 BCE, the Athenians
enacted a generous amnesty, which quickly restored a measure
of social harmony.
Direct participatory democracy in Athens and other cities
was made possible by their small size. Population estimates are
necessarily rough. A reasonable estimate for Athens at its peak
would be 30,000 to 40,000 male citizens. Including women
and children, this figure would be 110,000 to 150,000. The
entire population, including metics (foreign residents) and
Plato, left, and Aristotle walk the halls of the School of Athens and
discuss philosophy. The two mens political teachings emphasized
ethics in politics.
source: The Granger Collection, New York
BEGINNINGS
The tradition of Western political theory began in ancient
Greece. An impulse similar to that which led early philosophers such as Thales and Anaximander to inquire into the
nature of the universe led other thinkers to raise questions
about the nature of political association and the laws and customs of societies. One factor prompting questions about the
nature and status of nomoi was contact with other societies,
which led to the discovery that many Greek norms differed
from those of other peoples. A common effect of such contact was moral relativism, a belief that nomoi rested solely
on convention. Traditional Greek norms of justice required
not oppressing the downtrodden, as commanded by the gods.
But these claims were called into question by relativism. A
sophisticated relativistic position was advanced by Protagoras
of Abdera, perhaps the greatest of the Sophists, itinerant Greek
teachers of rhetoric and other arts, who played an important
role in the development of democracy. Protagoras declared
that man is the measure of all things and doubted our ability to know about the gods because of the difficulty of the
subject combined with the shortness of human life. In regard
to standards of proper conduct, Protagoras argued that there is
no truth beyond social conventions, and so one should adapt
to those of ones society.
But other thinkers searched for moral norms rooted in
something more substantial than convention and so opposed
nature (physis) to nomos. The Sophist Antiphon argued that
the only sanction of human norms was fear of punishment,
while by nature, every creature seeks its own advantage.Therefore we should adhere to social norms only for fear of being
caught; if we can break the rules undetected, we should do so.
An alternative to the traditional view of justice was visible in
the animal kingdom, and so thinkers argued for the naturalness of the law of the jungle. A full-fledged immoralist
doctrine is expressed by Callicles, a probably fictional character
in Platos Gorgias. What we regard as rules of justice were devised
by the weak to prevent the strong from oppressing them.
Genuine moral standards require that the strong allow their
natural tendencies to be unleashed. They should subordinate the weak and have morehave large appetites and the
ability to satisfy them. The first occurrence of the phrase law
of nature (nomon . . . ton ts physes) in Greek prose occurs in
a one of Callicles speeches in the Gorgias.
ARISTOTLE
Although Aristotle was Platos student for twenty years, he
broke from the high idealism of the Republicalthough less so
from the Laws, which Plato was probably writing during the
time Aristotle was at the academy. Aristotles ethical teaching is
clearly indebted to Plato, as is evident in his interest in psychic
balance and harmony, achieved through lengthy habituation
and conditioning. Aristotle viewed ethics and politics as
a single subject, and in his corpus, the Nicomachean Ethics and
HELLENISTIC PERIOD
With the Macedonian conquests, the formerly autonomous
polis became an administrative unit in a much larger political
form. Political activity retreated from the center of human
life, and the Greek conception of a citizen became more passive. The free citizen was no longer self-governing but was
relatively free of direct domination by others. Important
commentators argue that the gap between Hellenic and Hellenistic views is one of the largest in the history of Western
political thought.
With political affairs in the ordinary sense largely removed
from most peoples lives, Hellenistic political theory has little direct political content. In regard to moral philosophy,
the Hellenistic schools provided philosophies of life, helping
individuals to bear up during this troubled period. The Stoics
preached the imperturbability of the wise person; the Epicureans preached peace of mind, and similar attitudes were upheld
by other schools.
The Stoics were the most influential Hellenistic philosophical school. Believing in moral norms rooted in nature
and accessible through reason, they developed the conception of natural law that was central to subsequent political
Green Parties
Green political parties are formally organized around the principles of Green politics. They were born out of the 1960s protest movements and the 1970s peace movements in response
to what some perceived as politics without real participation,
a disrespect for other nations sovereignty, a single-minded
and one-dimensional pursuit of money, and more. At first
composed primarily of well-educated young people in their
twenties and thirties living in the United States and Europe,
green movements, or green environmental movements, have
worked to dispel the widespread misconception that to be
green did not mean to support only nature at the expense
of everything else. On the contrary, to be green meant to very
well include everything else but to see it through a green lens.
Hence, on the agenda of green movements across Europe
were new issues related to the environment and sustainable
growth as well as more traditional issues such as social security
Grotius, Hugo
Hugo Grotius (15831645) was a Dutch jurist. He is most
famous for having written De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Laws of
War and Peace, 1625), a text commonly acknowledged to have
ushered in the modern natural rights tradition and the study
of international relations. Grotius held legal and administrative posts in the government of Holland until 1618, when he
became embroiled in a religious conflict within the United
Provinces. He was charged with treason and sentenced to life
imprisonment at Loevestein Castle. Grotius famously escaped
from Loevestein in 1621 in a chest of books and fled to France,
where he was granted a royal pension by Louis XIII. Grotius
left France in 1631, and, after failing to secure repatriation to
the United Provinces, became the Swedish ambassador to
France. He lived in Paris in this capacity until 1645, when he
died in a shipwreck.
The religious and political conflict in his native Holland,
the Eighty Years War (15681648), and the Thirty Years War
(16181648) all shaped Grotiuss approach to jurisprudence
and international relations. He sought not to eliminate religious differences and armed conflicts, but rather to construct
a theory of natural law that could speak to different Christian
denominations and to develop a theory of international relations that both justified and regulated the practice of war.
De Jure Belli ac Pacis, which Grotius began writing in prison,
represents a break with the Scholastic tradition of natural law
and ushered in a new natural jurisprudence consistent with
humanism and Protestantism. Grotiuss approach to natural
law is essentially rationalist, that is, he attempts to derive natural law from human reason and human experience rather than
from the will of God. Grotiuss depiction of human beings as
rational creatures moved by instinctive drives for self-preservation and for sociability consequently forms the foundation
of his political and jurisprudential thinking. The natural law
theory of De Jure Belli marks the first significant conception
of natural law as a series of rights belonging to individuals and
to states; Grotius shifts the meaning of ius from a law to which
self-categorization (in 1985). Both theories differentiated interpersonal and group processes from one another. Social identity
theorists use self-inclusive social categories such as nationalities
to show how those categories constitute part of the self-image
while impacting the perceptions and behavior of members.The
own group, and thus the self, is enhanced. Self-categorization
theory emphasizes perceptions of difference from other groups
and reduction of differences within the group. Social attraction
was determined by the social relationships of an individual, by
how much others were seen to be similar, and by whether or
not the boundaries or differentiations among various groups
were seen as permeable and legitimate.
Research initially focused on the cognitive processes of
group members regarding their particular group, but it was
expanded to include any collectivity an individual person
thought of belonging to. In the early 1990s, new insights
included groups being also seen in structural terms (from
network theory) and a greater focus on the role of emotions. Research suggested that emotional attachment to the
group increases as the individuals sense of control increases, a
dynamic especially present in smaller groups. The concept of
relational cohesion as an enforcer of group cohesion entered
the analysis. Relational cohesion focuses on exchange patterns within a group that lead to positive emotions, uncertainty reduction, and the creation of behavioral commitment
of members. Equal power relations and high group density
increase cohesion, solidarity, and the perception of a shared
experience within a group. Recent research has focused on
the connections of group members and their impact on social
consensus in groups.
Work on group cohesion mainly comes from sociology and
psychology. Sociologists have focused mostly on the individuals connection to a group and on emotional reactions, and
psychologists have focused on larger social categories and the
aspect of cognitive self-categorization. The ecological theory
argues that a group is maintained when member characteristics in the group spread by keeping members or recruiting
new ones who fit those characteristics. Different groups may
also compete for members and affect each others development. Research has often neglected the influence of the external environment on group cohesion. Critics also charge that
the focus of group cohesiveness has been reduced to interpersonal processes or attraction within a group, which does not
achieve theoretical expectations.
Early research in the 1940s and 1950s led to the first theory of
group cohesion to explain dynamics in small groups. This theory posited that group cohesion is determined by the level of
attraction among group members and the extent to which the
group mediates among members and fulfills their needs and
goals. When these levels were high, membership continuity
and adherence to group norms resulted. Later research tended
to focus strongly on intragroup forces and the aspect of mutual
attraction of group members, while ignoring external forces.
The understanding of group cohesion was further developed by incorporating theories of social identity (in 1979) and
Group Cohesion
Group of 7; Group of 8;
Group of 20
See G7/G8 and G20.
Group Relations
Group relations describe the inner dynamics and interactions
of people within a group. They are formed and maintained
because group membership satisfies a number of human needs.
Groups vary in size and character and exist for a common
purpose. A group consists of two or more persons who can
interact and impact each others needs and aims. Humans enter
into relations to satisfy a basic need of belonging, stemming
from evolution, where group membership assured important advantages and ones own survival. Humans have a need
to control that part of the social environment that concerns
themselves.
Groups reduce the complexities of life via providing information, helping to shape individual identity, and developing social norms regulating behavior. They exhibit a certain
degree of inner homogeneity. Aside from norms, there are also
social roles describing how people in a certain position within
the group should behave. Social roles can also have negative
effects, for example, when people act beyond the expectations
of the role, giving up their own identity, or when people do
not act according to the role.
In their groups, humans tend to categorize, identify,
and compare as well as differentiate their own group from
othersthese processes were explored by Henri Tajfel, among
others, in social identity theory. Also, various processes of control, persuasion, social facilitation, or social loafing take place.
Conformity in groups largely depends on the level of importance of group membership to members, the level of group
influence that a member is subject to, and the group size. The
greater the first two factors, the greater the conformity. Size
will impact conformity more in smaller groups, but less so or
not at all in larger groups. Pressure to conform increases for
members holding minority opinions. The more collective the
group, also within the frame of the national culture, the greater
is the inherent conformity.
Group cohesion is another important aspect of group relations, providing for connections among members and the promotion of mutual affection. Cohesion is important for group
maintenance and can also improve the group performance.
Group membership can also lead to de-individuation,
however, such as in cases where an individual member starts
to act in a way that is against social norms and that he or she
would never do alone (e.g., mobs among soccer fans or lynching incidents). This dynamic can develop because persons
within a group feel less responsible for their own behavior
and potentially act more aggressively. When de-individuation
takes place, individual actions are more oriented along the
norms of the group.
Group dynamics may further lead to information and
process losses, which weaken good decision making. In such
cases, important information and minority opinions are often
ignored. Groupthink can develop when group cohesion and
solidarity are seen as important.The level of risk taking within
a group also increases the more risk is seen as cultural value in
a given society. A further aspect is group polarization, describing group members making more extreme decisions when in
their group than when alone.
Group relations vary across cultures due to different norms
and expectations. The different dynamics can be experienced
to a certain degree when entering or interacting with someone from another culture. Differences in group relations also
affect modes of cooperation and conflict within as well as
among groups.
See also Group Cohesion; Groupthink.
. . . . . . . . . . . . SYBILLE REINKE DE BUITRAGO
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aronson, Elliott, Timothy D. Wilson, and Robin M. Akert. Sozialpsychologie.
4th ed. Munich: Pearson Studium, 2004.
Fisher, Glen. Mindsets:The Role of Culture and Perception in
International Relations. 2nd ed.Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural
Press, 1997.
Shaw, Marvin E. Group Dynamics:The Psychology of Small Group Behavior.
2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.
Tajfel, Henri. The Achievement of Group Differentiation. In: Differentiation
between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup
Relations, edited by Henri Tajfel, 7798. London: Academic Press, 1978.
. Interindividual Behaviour and Intergroup Behaviour. In
Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of
Intergroup Relations, edited by Henri Tajfel, 2760. London: Academic
Press, 1978.
Group Theory
Group theory constitutes the intellectual precursor to pluralism and was originated by Arthur F. Bentley in his The
Process of Government (1908). The theory was built upon and
refined further by David Truman in his The Governmental Process (1951). Thus, group theory and its offspring of pluralism
and other competitor group-based theories (such as elitism
and neocorporatism) are closely entwined, and discussion of
one necessitates discussion of the others. Both Bentley and
Truman recognized the prominent political role of interest
groups in American liberal democracy and realized that giving that type of societal institution a more salient position
in social scientific theorizing would result in improved and
more accurate analyses of the democratic political process
in America. Trumans fundamental declaration that politics
is best understood by examining the interaction of groups
resides as the cornerstone of this analytical orientation. Thus,
at the heart of group theory is the recognition that politics
is understood best as the action of groups. The pressures
exercised by organized interest groups greatly influence the
activities and actions of governmentas groups pursue their
varied interests, they become the basis of public policy and
the essence of politics. These manifested pressures and influence are considered not to be democratically problematic;
instead they are important elements that make up the actual
strength and vigor of American democracy.
PLURALISM
Pluralism sprung from this group theory orientation, and
pluralists conclude that the wide variety and diversity of
interest groups and the decentralized quality of so much
of governmental decision making allows a great number of
groups to have impact and relevance in the public policymaking process. So in group theory and pluralism, the primary political actors are groups, not individual citizens, and
this is interpreted to be a strong positive, not a negative, in
the American system of governance. This pluralism of groups
serves as a useful and effective check on potential governmental tyranny. In other words, American democracy works
quite well precisely because of the benevolent effects of the
enormous and active universe of both actual and potential
groups in the country. Thus, pluralism derives from group
theory and is one of the leading schools of thought in this
type of political analysis.
Robert Dahls seminal 1961 study of local politics in New
Haven, Connecticut, entitled Who Governs?, constituted the
high point of pluralistic theorizing. As his analysis adduces, government plays the role of a competitive arena where interest
groups battle with each other for influence over political officials and the direction of public policy in a particular issue area.
The state does not systematically privilege one set of interests
over another or favor one group above others either. For pluralists, there is no inherent bias inside of governmentinstead,
politics is a wide-open, free-ranging marketplace where leaders or representatives of various groups bargain, negotiate, and
CRITICISMS OF PLURALISM
As time has passed, a variety of criticisms from other group
theory competitors have arisen to contest the accuracy and
validity of pluralisms insights. The first major criticism came
from the sociologist C. Wright Mills, who produced power
elite theory in 1956. In the American context, Mills contended
that the leaders of business, academia, military, and government compose a small cadre of power elites who dominate
policy making. They do not compete for influence or power
with each other, as the pluralists argue across issue areas, but
instead are all generally on the same page ideologically and
politically. The shared commonality of the interests of this
power elite results in public policy debates occurring only at
the margins and a slight tweaking of policy minutiae, with the
probability of transformative policy change being quite slim.
For Mills (and other critics as well), policy disagreements,
political disputes, and partisan battles amongst political actors
are mere faadespluralism (and the ostensible fragmentation and decentralization of governmental decision making)
is little more than a masquerade obscuring how decisions are
truly made in the halls of power.
Another leading critique of pluralism in group theory is
best captured by E. E. Schattschneiders famous statement that
the flaw in the pluralist paradise is that the heavenly choir
sings with an upper-class accent. Schattschneiders point is
that there is an inherent bias in the American interest group
universe that strongly favors business, industry, and the generally better organizednot every group or every set of interests has the same chance to influence policy that the more
moneyed ones have. Some are clearly and consistently more
favored by government officials than others, and this structural
skewing undermines the pluralist contention of a level playing
field for all interests and groups.
Groupthink 703
Similarly, the neocorporatist view of interest group activity posits that the idea that the government is simply and
solely an arena where interests come to do battle does not
adequately capture the true role of the state in these interactions. Government officials will and do choose groups and
interests to favor in their decisions, and these choices end up
impacting the shape and hierarchy of the interest group community and the relative strengths of specific groups in that
community. Neocorporatism essentially sees a cooperative
relationship between government and certain interest groups
(typically peak associations and broad organizations representing business and labor) so as to more effectively and efficiently
stabilize the formulation and implementation of public policy
(primarily in the economic realm). So, government should not
be interpreted to be the neutral, low-impact variable in the
policy process that pluralism posits. The state is a relevant and
important factor that does necessarily affect policy outcomes;
it is not just a neutral arena. This debate between pluralism
and neocorporatism continues to be one of the most salient in
group theory and has been so for several decades.
CONCLUSION
Group theory remains a vitally important aspect of analysis of
politics in the American context as well as elsewhere. Pluralism continues to be the major focus of such theorizing, with
important competitors arising over time in the form of the
elitist and neocorporatist analytic schools.
See also Bentley, Arthur Fisher; Interest Groups and Lobbies;
Pluralism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . STEPHEN R. ROUTH
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Bentley, Arthur F. The Process of Government. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. 1908.
Berry, Jeffrey M. The Interest Group Society. 2nd ed. Glenview, Ill.: Scott,
Foresman, 1989.
Cigler, Allan J., and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. Interest Group Politics. 7th ed.
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006.
Dahl, Robert A. Who Governs? New Haven:Yale University Press, 1961.
Garson, G. David. Group Theories of Politics. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage, 1978.
Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop, eds. Political Science: A Comparative
Introduction. 5th ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Truman, David B. The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf, 1951.
Groupthink
Groupthink, a termed coined by Yale psychologist Irving Janis,
refers to a dysfunctional mode of decision making in which
members of exceptionally cohesive groups strive for unanimity in opinion to the extent that they prematurely agree on a
particular course of action and fail to consider more suitable
alternatives. Although teams generally make better decisions
than individuals, in-group pressures for solidarity, loyalty, and
uniformity in beliefs and behavior can interfere with beneficial group dynamics. For these reasons, teams interacting
over long periods of time can become too cohesive and too
focused on agreeing with each other.
Guest Workers
Guest workers are people who sell their labor in a country
other than their country of citizenship. As the term implies,
guest workers are different from immigrants in that guest
workers are in a host country strictly to work and are
expected to eventually return to their home country. The
term also implies that the temporary migration is voluntary.
Guild socialism is a political movement advocating for workers to control industry through a system of national guilds
that operate in an implied contractual relationship with
society and consumers. A. R. Orage, Arthur J. Penty, Samuel
Hobson, and ultimately G. D. H. Cole are all associated with
guild socialism.
Guild socialism originated from seventeenth-century British philosophers John Ruskin and William Morris and their
monastic-order vision of labor and the productive process, in
which the role of the wage earner is transformed into one of
producer and integral member of a community. Ruskin and
Morris argued that economic theory and capitalism per se
had no moral implications for the essential dignity of labor
as self-creation. In the weekly British literary magazine New
Age (19071920), British editor A. R. Orage wrote about an
emergent guild socialist sensibility, a leftNietzschianism that
charted a separate course from both syndicalism, with its
tendency to pit the potentially tyrannical self-interest of producers against the general needs of the community, and state
socialism, with its technocratic planning where the workforce
is deprived of its right to organize work creatively on a dayto-day basis.
Guild socialist writings continued to draw upon similar
theories, including Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkins writings on mutual aid (1902); the theories of Fernand Pelloutier, leader of the 1800s French trade union Bourses des Travail;
Guild Socialism
functionalism involving workers control within a strengthened trade unionism rather than a centralized collectivism.
See also Cole, George Douglas Howard; Communism; Marxism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RICHARD R. WEINER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carpenter, Niles. Guild Socialism: An Historical and Critical Analysis. New
York: Appleton, 1922.
Cole, G. D. H. Guild Socialism Restated. London: Parsons, 1920.
Eisfeld, Rainer. The Emergence and Meaning of Socialist Pluralism.
International Political Science Review 17 (1996): 267299.
Hobson, Samuel. National Guilds and the State. London: G. Bell and Sons,
1920.
Hutchinson, Frances, and Brian Burkitt. The Political Economy of Social Credit
and Guild Socialism. London: Routledge, 1997.
Penty, Arthur J. Guilds and the Social Crisis. London: Allen and Unwin, 1919.
Stears, Marc. Guild Socialism and Ideological Diversity on the British Left,
19141926. Journal of Political Ideology 3 (1998): 289306.
Guillotine
See Cloture.
Gulf States
The gulf states are the countries in the Middle East that border
the Persian or Arabian Gulf: Iran, Oman (the small exclave of
Musandam), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq (the Tigris-Euphrates river
delta: the Shatt-el-Arab). The name of the gulf is disputed
because of its geopolitical connotation. The United Nations
(UN) officially recognizes the Persian Gulf as the standard
geographical designation, and history names the gulf the Pars
Sea or Persian Gulf because of the influence of the Persian Empire. Since the 1960s and the rise of nationalist panArabist movements in the region, however, Arab states have
adopted the term Arabian Gulf. This name is controversial
because of its political implications and also because the term
Arabian Gulf is an ancient name for the Red Sea.
CLEAVAGES
The gulf naming dispute is the tip of an iceberg of linguistic,
religious, historical, political, tribal, and economic cleavages
between and across the gulf states. Irans official language is
Farsi, and the majority of the population is Shiite Muslim,
while the official language of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait is Arabic, and the majority of their population is Sunni Muslim. Arabic-speaking Iraq
has a Shiite majority but with a big minority of Sunni Muslims, while Bahrain has an important Shiite minority.
Various tribal loyalties throughout the region are frequently
divisive and are exacerbated by religious differences.Tribal lineage, family, and clan connections affect the political system
of the gulf states to different degrees: Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain are monarchies based on
tribal leadership with no significant level of democratic participation, while Iran and Iraq are republics. Historically, the
development of the states as independent entities and their
JORDAN
West
Bank
d
Re
a
Se
Riyadh
YEMEN
BAHRAIN
lf
Yazd
IRAN
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
Doha
Manama
KUWAIT
Shiraz
Esfahan
Sari
OMAN
OMAN
Bandar
Abbas
Kerman
Muscat
Zahedan
Mashhad
T U R K M E N I S TA N
300 Km
Sea
300 Mi
Arabian
PAKISTAN
AF GHANISTAN
The Gulf states border the Persian, or Arabian, Gulf in the Middle East. The term for the gulfPersian in reference to its history or Arabian in acknowledgment of pan-Arabismis often
in dispute.
ER IT RE A
Mecca
A R A B I A
Al Basrah
Jeddah
Medina
An-Nasiriyah
Ahvaz
Khorramabad
Tehran
Caspian
Sea
Arak
Hamadan
Zanjan
Rasht
Kuwait
Kermanshah
Al 'Amarah
Kirkuk
S A U D I
An Najaf
Baghdad
IRAQ
Euphra
t
Arbil
Tabriz
si
S U D A N
EGYPT
Gaza
Strip
ISRAEL
LEBANON
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Mosul
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Me dit erran e an
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CYPRUS
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Tigr
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REGIONAL COOPERATION
Despite the troubles in the region, some cooperation does
exist between gulf states. The Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) was created in 1981, and its members include Bahrain,
Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE. With the
aim of establishing a common currency by 2010, the GCC
has successfully instituted a common market and harmonized
regulations in various fields such as economy, finance, trade,
customs, tourism, legislation, and administration. The attraction of national sovereignty to young independent states
(most of the states gained their independence in the 1960s
and 1970s) as well as the cleavages and the divergent interests
the City of New York (1953); and The Metropolitan Problem and
American Ideas (1962).
Gulick had a culturally diverse upbringing. He spent the
first twelve years of his life in Japan; then his familys missionary work took them to California, Germany, and eventually
back to the United States.
As a young man, Gulick gained early admission into Oberlin College, where he graduated in 1914 with high honors in
political science. At commencement he met keynote speaker
Charles Austin Beard, a foremost authority in American history and political science. Gulicks passion for the study of
public administration was inspired by Beards commencement address, and Gulick continued his studies at Columbia
Universitys graduate program in political science, which was
headed by Beard.
Concurrently, Gulick enrolled in the Training School
of Public Service of the New York Bureau of Municipal
Research (BMR). There he was eventually employed by
the BMR after serving as an intern. After a short time with
the federal government during World War I (19141918), he
returned to the BMR as director of the Training School.
These organizations were later absorbed into the National
Institute of Public Administration, with Gulick becoming its
director. He served this organization in various capacities for
over sixty years.
Gulick provided assistance and direction on projects outside
the scope of municipal research. He conducted work on pensions and social security in the state of New York for Governor
Franklin D. Roosevelt.This relationship continued throughout
Roosevelts presidency and led to Roosevelts 1936 appointment of Gulick to the Presidents Committee on Administrative Management, also known as the Brownlow Commission.
Gulicks work on this committee led to his seminal piece,
Notes on the Theory of Organization (1937), in which he outlined
the functions of the chief executive.These functions are represented by the acronym POSDCORBplanning, organizing,
staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting.
Although Gulicks professional life focused primarily on
the study of government organizations rather than practice, he
did serve as the first city administrator for New York City from
1954 to 1956. Frustrated by the political realities that slowed
implementation of administrative reforms, he resigned after
only two years. Gulick served for many years thereafter as a
consultant on federal, state, and local projects. He remained a
devoted public servant and an active participant in the study of
public administration until his death in 1993.
See also Beard, Charles.
. . . VICTORIA GORDON AND JEFFERY L. OSGOOD JR.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Blumberg, Stephen K. Seven Decades of Public Administration: A Tribute
to Luther Gulick. Public Administration Review 41, no. 2 (March/April
1981): 245248.
Fitch, Lyle C. Luther Gulick. Public Administration Review 50, no. 6
November/December 1990): 604608.
Gunboat Diplomacy
Gunboat diplomacy refers to the practice of making threats
against another state by the visible demonstration of warships.
The term is associated with the early twentieth century use of
small coastal or river warships to enforce the interests of the
great powers in places such as Latin America and China, usually involving issues of trade and the treatment of nationals.
More broadly in international relations, gunboat diplomacy is
the use of conspicuous displays of military strength, or limited
use of military force, other than as part of an act of war, to
coerce a target state to submit to a particular foreign policy
objective. Gunboat diplomacy is therefore an alternative to
war, and it can be described as having failed if war erupts as a
result of the demonstration.
H
Habeas Corpus
Originating in England at least eight hundred years ago, habeas
corpus is an ancient common-law concept strongly connected
to the Magna Carta. The name denotes a court order that
commands those holding another in custody to produce that
individual before the court, so that the court can assess the
legality of the detention. A judge or court frequently petition
for a writ on behalf of someone in police custody to either
force the authorities to charge the detained person with a
crime, or to release the person from custody. Habeas corpus is
considered a fundamental safeguard of liberty and by using
this writ, an independent judiciary works to reinforce due
process of individuals legal protection, and intervene when
states improperly detain individuals. Typically referred to as
the great writ, this remedy exists predominately in countries
springing from the Anglo-American legal tradition, but other
countries with alternative legal systems have also implemented parallel protections recognizing this foundational
limit on governmental power. In political systems in which
personal liberty is highly valued, habeas corpus, or something
similar to it, exists.
By the time of the American Revolutionary War (1776
1783), the right to habeas corpus had become a fundamental
protection of individual liberty in the British colonies of
North America. Upon independence, the new nation included
it in the U.S. Constitution. Article I, Section 9, declares that
the Privilege of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it. In this American context, the writ of habeas corpus
demonstrates two distinct historical trajectories: the first deals
with testing military authority over civilians during times of
war; the second involves using the writ as a source for indefinite review of both state and federal criminal convictions.
With the first trajectory, suspending the right to habeas
corpus essentially permits the military or other government
agents to incarcerate, without judicial intervention, any person considered to be a threat. The inevitable questions arise
here: Who possesses the constitutional authority to suspend
this writ? Is it the president or Congress or some combination
thereof? This issue came into sharp focus during the American
Civil War when President Abraham Lincoln issued an 1861
executive order granting Union military commanders the
711
Hamilton, Alexander
Alexander Hamilton (17551804), born on the island of Nevis
in the British West Indies in 1755, was the son of a Scottish
merchant. His father, James Hamilton and his mother, Rachel
Lavien, were not legally married, and his illegitimate birth
was commonly used by his enemies to tarnish his reputation.
Hamiltons father abandoned him at the age of eleven, and
three years later his mother died, leaving him an orphan. The
local community, at the urging of a Presbyterian clergyman,
soon recognized young Hamiltons talents and provided for
his passage to New York to be formally educated. He arrived
in New York in 1773 and began his studies at Kings College
(Columbia University). Two years into his studies, Hamilton
found himself immersed in the hostilities then developing
between Britain and the colonies. By 1776, Hamilton was
a captain of a New York artillery company. His talents were
again readily recognized and at the age of twenty-two, he
elevated to lieutenant colonel and joined General George
Washingtons staff. In 1780, Hamilton married into a wealthy
and prominent family with his nuptials to Elizabeth Schulyer.
After a disagreement with Washington, Hamilton resigned
his post in 1781. Washington reluctantly accepted the resignation and gave Hamilton command of a light infantry battalion.
By 1781, Hamilton left the military to study and, later, practice
law in Albany. However, he became restless and found public
service more compelling. After being elected to the Continental Congress in 1782, New York sent him as a delegate to
the Annapolis Convention in 1786, where he was one of the
most vocal supporters of the Constitutional Convention, and
one year later, chosen as a delegate for the event. Hamilton,
frequently absent from the deliberations, was not instrumental in the drafting of the Constitution. However, he proved
determined to seek its ratification and collaborated with James
Madison and John Jay in writing pro-Constitution essays published collectively in 1788 as The Federalist.
George Washingtons administration offered Hamilton the
position of treasury secretary, and he proved quite skilled at
placing the fledgling country on a sound financial foundation by proposing a national bank, assuming war debts of the
states, fostering manufacturing, and managing the nations
debt. Despite thriving in this position, family and financial
reasons forced Hamilton to hand in his resignation. Although
no longer serving in public office, Hamilton still exerted a
great degree of power in national politics. When Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr locked in a tie in the 1800 presidential
election, Hamilton used his influence to Jeffersons advantage
with his public support. In 1804, Hamilton also proved instrumental in defeating Aaron Burrs attempt to become governor
of New York. Offended by Hamiltons actions and insulting
remarks, Burr challenged Hamilton to a duel in Weehawken,
New Jersey on July 11, 1804. Hamilton was mortally wounded
and died the next day.
See also Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Hamiltonianism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RICHARD M. YON
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ambrose, Douglas, and Robert Martin. The Many Faces of Alexander Hamilton:
The Life and Legacy of Americas Most Elusive Founding Father. New York:
New York University Press, 2007.
Brookhiser, Richard. Alexander Hamilton, American. New York: Touchstone,
1999.
Chernow, Ron. Alexander Hamilton. New York: Penguin Books, 2004.
Ellis, Joseph J. Founding Brothers:The Revolutionary Generation. New York:
Vintage Books, 2000.
Wood, Gordon S. Revolutionary Characters:What Made the Founders Different.
New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
Hamiltonianism
Hamiltonianism describes the public philosophy associated
with Alexander Hamilton (17551804), the first secretary of
the U.S. Treasury. As President George Washington began
to distance himself from other key advisers, such as James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton came to play the
role of prime minister to Washington. Hamilton recommended sweeping economic reforms designed to address the
governments immediate financial crisis and to establish a
foundation for future prosperity. Hamilton hoped the success
of these policies would build confidence in the new government and establish its authority. Hamiltons brilliant economic
reports recommended that the national government assume
the war debts of the states; engage in a complex refinancing
Harrington, James
James Harrington (16111677) was an English political writer
most famous for The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), considered one of the most systematic treatises to emerge from the
English republican movement.
There is little reliable biographical information about Harringtons early life; he provided loans to Parliament in the early
1640s and was politically aligned with them, but he apparently
was also a companion of Charles I prior to Charles Is execution. Unlike many of the other English Republicans, Harrington was not particularly active in terms of political service;
instead, he worked on Oceana. Subsequently, Oliver Cromwell
suppressed the work and imprisoned Harrington, who was not
able to secure his release and the right to print Oceana until
1656. This was the first of two tenures in prison; Harrington
was imprisoned again for a period after the Restoration.
In Oceana, Harrington initially establishes some basic principles of politics grounded in what he terms ancient prudence. He praises the ancients for employing an empire of
laws, not men, and accuses philosopher Thomas Hobbes of
advocating for the modern mode of an empire of men, not
laws. After describing modern prudence with a mix of history and mythmaking, Harrington sets forth the model for
Oceana. Assuming an agrarian or natural economy and a tribally divided society, Harrington describes a number of offices
and their method of election. Over three days, the citizenry
elects the magistrates to govern them. Harrington also provides methods for senatorian elections and the election of
certain posts via scrutiny. Ultimately, Harrington breaks the
population down into thirty orders, creating many opportunities for citizen service and activity in the commonwealth.
Because of the completeness of Oceana and its provision
of new institutions for voting and distributing duties among
magistrates, it has attracted a considerable amount of attention
in modern scholarship. J. G. A. Pocock is considered the leading contemporary authority on Harringtons work, and his
introduction to The Political Works of James Harrington (1977)
is often cited as the leading summary and treatment of Harringtons thought. However, the work of scholars such as Jonathan Scott, who highlights the role of motion in Harringtons
work and thus focuses on similarities between Harrington and
Hobbes, offers a well-developed alternative to Pococks study.
Pococks examination of Harrington in The Political Works
of James Harrington places Harrington firmly in the civic republican tradition and discusses the links between Harringtonian
republicanism and the classical tradition of Aristotle and (especially) Niccol Machiavelli. Pocock pays particular attention
to the importance that Harrington places on arms, and argues
that adopting Machiavellis conception of the citizen-solider
allows Harrington to level his greatest critique against the feudal monarchy of England. As quoted in Pococks work, the
feudal system clearly displays the subjection . . . of individuals whose capacity to be masters, citizens, and equals can be
simultaneously displayed with equal clarity. For Harrington,
the citizen-soldier cannot be justly subjugated, and must be
Hartz, Louis
Louis Hartz (19191986), an American political scientist, had
a major influence on how scholars of the 1950s and 1960s
viewed American political culture. Born in Youngstown, Ohio,
on April 7, 1919, Hartz was the third son of Russian Jewish immigrants. He grew up in Omaha, Nebraska, where his
father was a grocer. Hartz was accepted to Harvard in 1936 on
a scholarship from a local newspaper. He completed his SB in
1940 and after a year of traveling returned to the university on
a teaching fellowship for graduate study in government. Prior
to completing his PhD in 1946, he married Stella Freinberg
and they had one son. He then joined the Harvard faculty and
quickly became a popular teacher and respected scholar.
Hartzs first book, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought:
Pennsylvania, 17761860 (1948), challenged critics who claimed
that government intervention in the economy violated Americas long tradition of free enterprise. Hartz presented evidence
that early postcolonial Pennsylvania adopted considerable government legislation in response to the demands of vying business and labor groups. In fact, both businesses and workers
benefited from government assistance in the areas of education
and transportation. Contrary to the opinions of free market
proponents, Hartzs findings suggested that the New Deal was
hardly a radical departure from the past.
A few years later, Hartz completed his most famous and
widely discussed book. In The Liberal Tradition in America
(1955), he argued that Americans never had to rid themselves
of the feudal traditions and class hierarchies associated with the
Old World of Europe, so never experienced a confining social
order. Hartz found a liberal outlookan outlook that was distrustful of any government not sanctioned by the people, that
valued individual rights over duty, and that upheld the sanctity
of private propertypermeated American political thought
and practice. Both major U.S. political parties, it follows, are
liberal at their most basic level. This consensus thesis also
explained why neither aristocratic conservatism nor a socialist movement had many followers in America. Hartzs book
was awarded the Woodrow Wilson Prize from the American
Political Science Association in 1956.
Hartz would later extend and revise his argument to include
an analysis of other new nations. In The Founding of New Societies (1964), Hartz maintained that former European colonies
had adopted fragments from the whole of Europes political culture. American and English Canada, for instance, had
adopted the liberal fragments, while French Canada embraced
the feudal fragments. His fragment theory became influential
in comparative studies of developing countries.
By the mid-1960s, Hartz began work on his most ambitious book, titled A Synthesis of World History (1983), which
applied his colonial fragments theory to five great cultural
areas: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism, and African totemism. During the early 1970s, Hartzs writing and personal life were disrupted by ill health. He became estranged
from his family and friends and resigned from Harvard in 1974.
Nevertheless, he continued his scholarly work, traveling frequently until settling in Turkey where he died from an epileptic seizure in 1986.
See also Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; Economic Systems,
Comparative; Political Culture; Political Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RAMONA JUNE GREY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barber, Benjamin R. Louis Hartz. Political Theory 14, no. 3 (August 1986):
355358.
Diggins, John Patrick. Knowledge and Sorrow: Louis Hartzs Quarrel with
American History. Political Theory 16, no. 3 (August 1988): 355376.
Hartz, Louis. The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United
States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964.
. The Liberal Tradition: An Interpretation of American Political Thought
Since the Revolution. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955.
Hate Speech
Though hate speech comes in many forms, liberal democracies in the earlier twentieth century concerned themselves
primarily with speech that vilified or criticized individuals
and groups based on the categories of race, nationality, and
religion. In the 1920s, the term race hate was the preferred
label for such expression, while group libel emerged as the predominant designation in the 1940s and 1950s. By the 1980s
and 1990s, gender and sexual orientation were among items
added to the list of categories considered hate speech. Human
Rights Watch provides a typical contemporary definition of
hate speech as any form of expression regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic and religious groups and other discrete
minorities, and to women.
Hate speech and its regulation pose a dilemma for liberal
democracies. On the one hand, hate speech threatens social
order and the security (or sense of security) of targeted individuals and groups. On the other hand, prohibiting hate speech
can threaten freedom of speech, especially if such expression
Heckscher, Gunnar
Gunnar Heckscher (19091987) was a major right-wing
political scientist in Sweden during the period between World
War I (19141918) and World War II (19391945). The son of
economic historian Eli Heckscher, he was born in Danderyd
in Stockholm County. He studied at Uppsala University and
received his PhD in 1934 with his thesis, Konung and Minister of State in the Constitutional Act of 1809. Later, as an
associate professor of political science, he wrote a thesis on
the development of Swedish conservatism and the representative systems reform. During the 1940s and 1950s, Heckscher
authored many groundbreaking works, including State and
Organizations (1947), Swedish Government at Work (1952), and
Study of Comparative Government (1957).
Heckscher became an associate professor at Stockholm
University in 1941 and a full professor in 1948. He also served
on the boards of several government commissions and, from
1945 to 1954, was a rector at the Social Institute. He was considered a moderate conservative and was chair of the rightwing youth organization of the Moderate Party. He was elected
to the second chamber of the Swedish Riksdag in 1957 and
became vice chair of the National Federation of the Right.
In 1961, Heckscher took over the presidency of the Moderate Party after Jarl Halmarssons resignation. Heckscher
encountered much opposition within his own party because
of his moderate position on social issues. His main achievements were the admission of Ireland to the European Union
and rallying the Conservatives after their defeat in the 1964
elections. He resigned as party leader in 1965. The Social
Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theorem is the cumulative work
of two Swedish economists, Eli F. Heckscher and his student
Bertil Ohlin, first published in the early twentieth century.
The theorem revolutionized economic explanations of international trade, replacing classical accounts found in the work
of Robert Torrens and David Ricardo. The theory purports
to explain the conditions under which international trade
takes place and what patterns of international trade to expect.
Though it has been subject to some degree of criticism, the
HO theorem, along with revisions from other economists,
Hegedus, Andras
Andras Hegedus (19221999) was a Hungarian politician who
served as his countrys youngest prime minister from 1955 to
1956. He signed the treaty establishing the Warsaw Pact as well
as the document requesting the help of Soviet troops to crush
the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. He later criticized and
opposed Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and
Hegel, Georg W. F.
Philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (17701831)
was born in Stuttgart, Germany, in 1770. He was educated
at the Tbinger Stift, where he became close friends with
Friedrich Schelling and Friedrich Hlderlin. During their
time in Tbingen, they were inspired by the outbreak of the
720 Hegemony
French Revolution (17891799) but horrified by the Reign of
Terror that took place during it, in which ideological struggles
between rival political factions led to mass executions. After
serving as a private tutor in Switzerland, Hegel went first to
Frankfurt where Hlderlin lived, and then in 1801 assumed
a lectureship in Jena where Schelling was teaching. Together
Hegel and Schelling edited the Critical Journal of Philosophy,
an organ for their new speculative philosophy. While in Jena,
Hegel also wrote his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). With the
closure of the university following the battle of Jena on October 14, 1806, Hegel became a newspaper editor in Bamberg
and then the head of a college preparatory school in Nuremberg. After publishing Science of Logic in 1816, he obtained a
professorial position at the University of Heidelberg and published his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1818). During
the same year, Hegel was called to Berlin where he taught
until his death in 1831. While in Berlin, he published the Philosophy of Right (1822) and delivered lectures on the philosophy
of history, religion, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy
all published after his death. At the time of his death, he was
considered one of the most influential philosophers in Europe
and exercised a profound influence on many of the greatest
thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Hegel is best known for the development of a dialectical
philosophy that combines a Kantian notion of consciousness
with a notion of historical development derived from French
political thinker Charles-Louis Montesquieu, Irish philosopher Edmund Burke, and others. In the Phenomenology, Hegel
traces the development of consciousness as a historical phenomenon, demonstrating that the human intellectual project came to its end in his own time with the realization and
reconciliation of everything that had previously been considered dichotomoussubject and object, individual and society,
human and nature, and human and divine. This was achieved
through what Hegel called absolute knowledge or science. He
spelled out the conceptual foundations for this science in his
Logic, which constituted the basis for his practical philosophy.
Hegels political philosophy is laid out in his Philosophy of
Right, which combines a theory of natural or abstract (property) rights, a modified Kantian moral theory, a communitarian notion of the family, a Smithian notion of economic life or
civil society, and a bureaucratic model of a rational state that
resembles the constitutional monarchy of England. In his Philosophy of History (1837), Hegel attempts to show that history
is a dialectic of freedom beginning with the master and slave
relationship and ending with universal citizenship; it passes
from oriental despotism to Greek democracy, and Roman
aristocracy to the monarchical world of modern Europe. A
humans historical task, in Hegels view, comes to its practical
end in the realization of such rational states, and to its spiritual
end in the completion and perfection of knowledge as the
systematic science of all that is.
See also Burke, Edmund; German Political Thought; Kant,
Immanuel; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis; Political Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICHAEL ALLEN GILLESPIE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kojeve, Alexandre. Introduction la lecture de Hegel. Paris: Gallimard, 1980.
Moldenhauer, Eva, ed. Werke in 20 Bnden und Register. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1970.
Pinkard, Terry. Hegels Phenomenology:The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Pippin, Robert. Hegels Idealism:The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Taylor, Charles. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Hegemony
The term hegemony means domination with consent. From
the Greek hegemonia, it denotes leadership of an alliance by a
single leader, or hegemon. Although ancient hegemons tended
to possess great power, their allies conceded them leading
roles due to other qualities, such as skill and virtue, as well as
the policies they embraced. The tendency toward domination
without consent, however, has led many international relations scholars to equate hegemony with domination that does
not respect the independent existence and autonomy of allies,
thus providing a different definition of the term.
In the twentieth century, political theorist Antonio Gramsci
renewed interest in the concept of hegemony when he used
the term in the context of domestic politics rather than international relations. Gramsci sought to understand the formation of alliances among groups to achieve domination, and
he stressed the important role of ideology in convincing followers to support a leadership. Gramsci assigned a distinctive
role to intellectuals as formulators of ideas that link leaders to
followers. At the same time, he stressed that political struggle
continued as subordinate groups sought to achieve a position
of domination through a counterhegemony. This implies that
some groups, instead of being enlisted in a hegemonic enterprise, are suppressed, sometimes with force. Thus, hegemony
in this interpretation is a system of domination with minimal
violence.
Heidegger, Martin
Martin Heidegger (18891976) was a highly influential German philosopher and thinker. With all that has been written by and about Heidegger, there is much that remains an
enigma about both the man and his philosophy. Educated
as a Catholic with the hope of going into the priesthood,
he instead became a professional philosopher whose work
would give little comfort to those who find faith in religious
dogmas or the ideology of what Heidegger considered instrumental reason. The biggest puzzle regarding Heidegger is his
relationship to politics and power and why a philosopher of
nearly undisputed genius would lend his office as rector of the
University of Freiburg in 1933 to support the rise of national
socialism and the early triumphant stages of Adolf Hitlers
dictatorial leadership. There is also the question of legacy and
whether or not Heideggers difficult style of writing and philosophizing clarifies more than it conceals about the human
condition and the essentially political nature of human relations. It is, in part, because there are so many dimensions to
Heideggers life and ideas that his thinking (if not his choices)
remain as provocative as they are controversial.
Heideggers most well-known contribution to philosophy (and one with important implications for postmodern
political theory) is his first book, Being and Time (1927). From
the books opening questionwhether the true meaning of
being is understoodto its closing querywhether being
exists outside timeBeing and Time offers a revolutionary way
of thinking about what it means to be a person, or what Heidegger calls Dasein. Heideggers central thesis is that people are
beings who can never fully be explained rationally or scientifically, but are instead historical agents whose awareness, guilt,
and anxiety over the absolute nature of death leads to a choice:
lead an authentic existence in the resolve to careoften in the
face of great dangeror live inauthentically by substituting
nonthinking everydayness for commitment.
For Heidegger, therefore, Dasein is never a static being, but
is always in the process of becoming through the questions
asked and the choices and commitments made. Though he
resisted the label of existentialist, Heideggers Being and Time is
considered foundational to modern existentialism, influencing
such thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus.
The problem with Heideggers phenomenological method
of analysis, a method that suggests truth is best revealed as a
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dreyfus, Hurbert L. Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art,
Technology, and Politics. In The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, edited
by Charles B. Guigonon. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Gelven, Michael. A Commentary on Heideggers Being and Time. New York:
Harper and Row, 1970.
Gillespie, Michael Allen. Martin Heideggers National Socialism. Political
Theory 28, no. 2 (April 2000): 140166.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and
Edward Bobinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962
. Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowinig). Translated by Parvis
Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.
. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New
Haven:Yale University Press, 1959
. Poetry, Language,Thought. Translated by Albert Hfstadter. New York:
Harper and Row, 1971
. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Translated by
William Lovitt. New York: Harper and Row, 1977
Ott, Hugo. Martin Heidegger: A Political Life. New York: Basic Books, 1993.
Sharr, Adam. Heideggers Hut: Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006.
Wollin, Richard. The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1993.
Herzen, Alexander I.
Alexander I. Herzen (18121870) was a Russian writer, philosopher, and political activist. Considered by some to be the
father of Russian socialism, Herzen spent much of his life
in exile, agitating for political change in tsarist and autocratic
Russia. Born in Moscow as the illegitimate son of a rich
Russian landowner and a German woman, he completed his
studies at Moscow University. In 1834, he was arrested for
attending an event upholding views against the tsar. He was
found guilty and exiled to a small town outside of Russia.
Herzen returned to Moscow in 1840 and was drawn
into socialist literary circles. He worked as a state official in
Herzen, Alexander. From the Other Shore and the Russian People and Socialism.
Translated by Moura Budberg and Richard Wollheim. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979.
. My Past and Thoughts:The Memoirs of Alexander Herzen. Translated by
Constance Garnett. London: Chatto and Windus, 1979.
Malia, Martin. Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 18171855.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.
Heuristics
Heuristics (or heuristic algorithms) are problem-solving procedures that, while may yield acceptable results in practice,
provide no guarantees of yielding good solutions in general.
Specifically, an algorithm is called heuristic if it cannot be
shown to yield a result to be correct, correct within a known
error of approximation, or correct with known probability.
Generally, heuristics are used for problems that are too difficult to be solved correctly, or where a provably correct procedure is too expensive, time-consuming, or cognitively complex.
In political science, heuristics are used for both solving statistical models and developing political-behavior models.
Political methodologists often use complex statistical models to analyze political phenomena. While simple linear models and simple, globally concave nonlinear models are usually
straightforward to solve exactly, statistical functions with many
discontinuities or local optima may require heuristics for practical solution.
Cognitive heuristics, pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tverskys Nobel Prize-winning work on prospect theory, are often incorporated into models of political and social
behavior. These heuristics represent alternatives to standard
models of rational choice for individual behavior, in which
individuals are assumed to possess unbounded rationality, attention, and problem-solving ability. However, while it is plausible
that people often behave heuristically, there are a large variety
of theoretically plausible cognitive heuristics, especially where
the decision-making environment is complex; thus social scientists face a significant challenge in discovering which heuristics adequately capture or predict real behavior.
See also Quantitative Analysis; Statistical Analysis.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICAH ALTMAN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gilovich, Thomas, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, eds. Heuristics and
Biases:The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
Michalewicz, Zbigniew, and David B. Fogel. How to Solve It: Modern
Heuristics. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2004.
Hierarchical Modeling
Hierarchical models, also commonly called multilevel models,
hierarchical linear modeling, nested models, and multilevel
analyses, are structures that consist of multiple units of analysis, one nested within the other. This type of model is useful
in political science because often the effect of an independent
variable on the dependent variable, observed at one level, is
influenced by variables observed at another level. For example,
Here the -coefficients are fixed parameters, zj is a second-level predictor (the degree to which politicians practice
clientelism in the example above), and the s are the disturbances. The coefficient g 00 is referred to as the grand mean and
represents the level-2 intercept. This specification allows the
researcher to explore the phenomenon in question along with
differences in the intercept or slope coefficients, by nation.
The model expands to include more independent variables or,
if necessary, to account for variables measured at higher levels
of aggregation.
Hierarchical models provide several advantages to resear
chers, but there are weaknesses worth noting. First, the stability of any given hierarchical model decreases as more
predictors are added. Second, multicollinearity is a more
acute concern in a hierarchical model relative to an OLS
model. Last, hierarchical models are typically estimated using
Hilferding, Rudolf
Rudolf Hilferding (18771941) was a leading Austro-Marxist
theorist and political figure in the German Social Democratic
Party (SPD). Author of Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest
Phase of Capitalist Development (1910), classical Marxisms most
important political economy work after Marxs Capital (1867),
Hilferding introduced the term organized capitalism. He served
twice as finance minister in SPD-led coalition governments
in the Weimar Republic and was the leading theorist and key
advocate of the Republic in the SPD.
Hilferding was born in Vienna, Austria-Hungary, on August
10, 1877, into a liberal-Jewish bourgeois family. He studied
medicine at the University of Vienna, leaving with a doctorate
in 1901 to become a general practitioner. By the early 1890s,
he had become radicalized and joined with like-minded
others into a reading and study group that later became the
nucleus of the school of Austro-Marxism. The iconoclasm of
Austro-Marxismblending historical analysis, neo-Kantian
philosophy, the Marxian critique of political economy, and
contemporary developments in sociology and economics
influenced his thinking for the rest of his life.
After receiving an invitation from August Bebel, founding
leader of the SPD, and Karl Kautsky, the partys leading theorist,
Hilferding moved to Berlin in 1906. He was initially a leading
voice against Eduard Bernsteins revisionism and he defended
revolutionary politics in the debate on the mass strike.
Hilferdings Finance Capital begins by examining the financial market and its institutions, money, and banks, and makes
the case for a new phase and type of capitalism. This new
capitalism becomes organized into cartels dependent on and
led by finance capital (the banking sector) and is ultimately
incapable of a final economic breakdown. However, the new
capitalism is also intrinsically linked to a political compromise between old (aristocratic) and new (bourgeois) order
and includes imperialism as the necessary outcome. The work
thereby stands both analytically and politically in stark contrast
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS OF
HINDUISM IN POLITICS
In the modern era, liberal and socialist ideas have dominated
Indias political field, resulting in the almost general acceptance of a secular state, separating religion and politics, and
thereby reducing the scope for religious political thought.
This secular solution was accepted by the Indian National
Congress, the dominant freedom movement of British India,
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ghoshal, Upendra Nath. A History of Hindu Political Theories from the Earliest
Times to the End of the First Quarter of Seventeenth Century AD. London:
Oxford University Press, 1923.
Hellman, Eva. Political Hinduism:The Challenge of the Vishva Hindu Parishad.
Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 1993.
Jaffrelot, Christophe. The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925
to the 1990s. London: Hurst, 1996.
Kaut ilya, and R. P. Kangle (coauthor). The Kautiliya Arthasastra. Part 1: A
Historical Interpretation
Historical interpretation is a scholarly approach to issues that
emphasizes the study of the past to develop solutions to contemporary problems. It is based on the efforts to explain past
events and analyze them in order to provide an understanding
of cause and effect or cost-benefit analysis. Historical interpretation dominated the early study of politics, but with the rise
of other approaches to political science, the field expanded
with methodologies centered on quantitative and statistical
analyses. Nonetheless, it continues to be an important component of political science research. In particular, comparisons
to current circumstances with case studies of past political
events, trends, or situations allow examination of a policys full
course of cause and effect. Historical interpretation also continues to be a significant factor in comparative politics, where
it is used to explain the evolution of individual states and the
idiosyncratic factors in political or social development.
Political movements use historical interpretation to motivate their members pursuit of the movements goals and
objectives. For instance, leaders during the civil rights movement used interpretations of past experiences to provide
critical discourse on the race struggle in the United States.
Likewise, Karl Marx used the approach to delineate shared
interpretations and observed cultural meanings to develop
his theory of class struggle. Historical interpretation has been
criticized as an approach by numerous scholars, such as Jrgen
Habermas, who argue that interpretations are often portrayed
through privileged or biased self-interpretation excluding
representation of critical perspectives, demonstrated by the
past dominance of Eurocentric models.
See also Historical Method, Comparative; Historicism; Political
Science, History of.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
Historical Method,
Comparative
The comparative historical method approaches social science research involving the over-time exploration of long
processes within as well as between a small number of cases.
The goal is to arrive at generalizable theories concerning the
Historicism 727
origins of macrophenomena, such as revolutions, the welfare state, and political regimes. This method contains two
essential elements. First, because comparative historical studies
focus on slow-moving structural changes, they are, according to Edwin Amentas 2003 article What We Know about
the Development of Social Policy, necessarily situate[ed]
within the relevant historical contexts. This means that the
practitioner takes a sophisticated approach to historiography,
thinks seriously about issues of process, timing, and historical
trajectories, and gains a deep understanding of the cases (94).
Second, because the aim is theory building, the researcher also
engages in explicit comparisons across cases to transcend the
idiosyncrasies of any single case. Cross-case comparisons are
vital for theory building, since, as Dietrich Rueschemeyer
notes in the 2003 article, Can One or a Few Cases Yield
Theoretical Gains?, Going beyond the boundaries of a
single case can put into question seemingly well-established
causal accounts (332). This allows the researcher to evaluate
hypothesized cause-and-effect relationships identified in the
first case by assessing how these variables play out across a
small number of similarly contextualized cases.
The comparative historical method has a long pedigree,
going back at least as far as sociologist Max Weber and historian
Otto Hintze, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, in their writings on the origins of the modern state.
In a generation of scholars from the mid- to late twentieth century, political sociologist Barrington Moore Jr. wrote that the
democratic-, fascist-, and communist-regime types were determined by interactions between the states premodern regime
and its process of industrialization. Later, sociologist and political scientist Theda Skocpol used the cases of France, Russia,
and China to demonstrate that social revolutions were driven
by a complex interplay of elite splits, economic dependency,
and international threats. In the 1990s, sociologist Rogers Brubaker explained the differences between modern French and
German citizenship policies as the outcome of different legacies of nation-building. Similarly, political scientist Kathleen
Thelen has examined vocational training regimes in contemporary Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan, showing
the marked differences among them result from nineteenthcentury employer-union-artisan political settlements. A casual
review of this scholarship suggests that comparative historical
analysis is particularly well-suited for testing hypotheses that
emphasize the importance of founding moments, path dependence, critical junctures, and causal complexity in explaining
macrophenomena.
There are at least three major criticisms of the comparative
historical method.The first, made against all small-n studies (or
studies with a small studied population), is that there are simply
too few cases (or data points) to arrive at generalizable inferences.The second problem relates to the comparability of cases,
in that it is extremely difficult to identify those cases with a
comparison that can adequately control for confounding variables, particularly when it comes to large-scale processes or
superstructures. Finally, given the massive scope of their subject
material, practitioners of the comparative historical method
Historicism
Historicism maintains that all human thought rests on
indemonstrable presuppositions that are unknown to the
thinkerpresuppositions that vary from one historical epoch
to another. It is a powerful paradigm that underlies much of
social and political inquiry since the beginning of the twentieth century. In political theory, historicism is evident in the
rejection of natural right or rational norms in favor of a relativist theory of values. In the history of political philosophy,
it is via the belief that all previous universal statements about
the nature of politics and of the good society should be traced
Hobbes, Thomas
Born in Malmesbury, England, Thomas Hobbes (15881679)
was a philosopher and political theorist widely renowned for
his 1651 book Leviathan, arguably the single-greatest work of
political philosophy in the Anglo-American tradition. Leviathan brings together parts of Hobbess previously published
writings, including the 1642 Latin work De Cive and the 1640
Elements of Law, Natural and Political. Hobbes was also author
of A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England (1666); Behemoth: Or the Long Parliament
(1668); and various essays on free will, optics, geometry, and
moral philosophy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gauthier, David. The Logic of Leviathan:The Moral and Political Theory of
Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
Hobbes, Thomas. Behemoth: Or the Long Parliament. Edited by Stephen
Holmes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
. A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of
England. Edited Joseph Cropsey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1971.
. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
Oakeshott, Michael. Hobbes on Civil Association. Oxford: Blackwell, 1975.
Sommerville, Johann P. Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context.
New York: St. Martins Press, 1992.
Hobhouse, Leonard
Trelawney
Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse (18641929) was an English
political theorist, sociologist, and activist. In addition to being
the leading thinker of new liberalism, he was one of his eras
most engaged public intellectuals and was instrumental in
the establishment of sociology as an autonomous academic
discipline.
Born on September 8, 1864, in St. Ive, Cornwall, Hobhouse was educated at Marlborough College and Corpus
Christi College, Oxford. Although already engaged in progressive politics, he initially pursued an academic career,
becoming a fellow of Corpus in 1894. Shortly after publishing Theory of Knowledge (1896), a realist critique of contemporary British epistemology, Hobhouse left Oxford in
1897 to join the editorial staff of the Manchester Guardian. In
this capacity, as well as in his journalistic career after moving to London in 1902, he wrote hundreds of articles urging domestic reform and denouncing imperialism. At the
same time, Hobhouse involved himself deeply in the nascent
field of sociology. His Mind in Evolution (1901) and Morals
in Evolution (1906) proposed an interpretation of evolution
notable for its rejection of Spencerian instinctualism in favor
of viewing social change as driven by the progressive growth
of general intelligence coordinating public action. These
works led to his appointment in 1907 as professor of sociology at the London School of Economics, the first chair of its
kind in the English-speaking world and a post he occupied
until his death. As before, Hobhouse split his efforts between
academic social theory and public commentary. Having
revived his association with the Manchester Guardian, he
became director of its company in 1911. His later years were
marked by continued contributions to Britains progressive
journals as well as the completion of his mature sociological
system in a series of works collectively entitled The Principles
of Sociology (19181924).
Liberalism (1911) is considered Hobhouses most lasting
intellectual achievement, where he argues that classical liberalisms laissez-faire doctrines rested on a falsely atomistic
conception of the individual. To Hobhouse, classical liberals denied the fundamental interrelatedness of human life,
resulting in a negative characterization of freedom as the
absence of state intervention in the society and economy.
Holocaust 731
See also British Political Thought; Hobhouse, Lawrence Trelawney;
Imperialism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Liberalism, Classical; Mill, John
Stuart.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NEIL HIBBERT
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Allet, John. New Liberalism:The Political Economy of J. A. Hobson. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1981.
Freeden, Michael, ed. Reappraising J. A. Hobson: Humanism and Welfare.
London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.
Hobson, J. A. The Crisis of Liberalism. London: P. S. King and Son, 1909.
. Economics and Ethics. Boston: Heath and Company, 1929.
. Imperialism: A Study. New York: J. Pott and Company, 1902.
Holcombe, Arthur N.
American Arthur N. Holcombe (18841977) was one of
the twentieth centurys most prolific and respected political
scientists. He received his doctorate in 1909 from Harvard
University and taught there until his retirement in 1955. He
also served at national universities in China, the College of
Europe, Claremont College, the University of Michigan, and
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He contributed to
a number of government agencies, including the U.S. Bureau
of Efficiency (19171919), the Presidents Committee on
Administrative Management (1936), and the War Production
Board (19421945).
Early in his career, Holcombe focused on state government
and party politics, publishing Foundations of the Modern Commonwealth (1923) and Political Parties of Today (1924). A visiting
professorship in China led to a book on Chinese politics in
1930. Later his interests turned to international peacekeeping
and the United Nations (UN). His enduring interest, however, was the U.S. political system. Throughout his career he
promoted the concept of public interest, which he saw as the
mediating element in conflict resolution and the animating
element of a democratic society promoting civility and moderationtwo cardinal civic virtues. He believed that political
parties should be organizationally strong but not doctrinaire
and partisan. Holcombe viewed the middle class as the repository of middle-of-the-road and moderate value systems and
thus the key to the functioning of a successful democracy.
Holcombe applied the same concepts to a study of the
United Nations. In his work, A Strategy of Peace in a Changing
World (1967), Holcombe advocated the development of a twoparty system within the organization as part of which members would sacrifice some of the elements and prerogatives of
sovereignty. By curtailing national sovereignty, he felt the UN
could become an effective world government. Holcombe was
the chair of the Commission to Study the Organization of
Peace and authored the commissions report, Strengthening the
United Nations (1957), which contained numerous recommendations for the institutional reform of the UN.
Holcombes lasting legacy is in the field of political behavior and political institutions, especially in the United States.
His early work, State Government in the United States (1928),
compares varieties of state government practices and programs.
He found that two-party systems are more desirable in promoting public interest because they enable large segments of
the population to come together to serve common purposes.
See also Political Theory; Public Good and Public Interest Groups;
United Nations (UN).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Holcombe, Arthur N. Dependent Areas in the Post-war World. Boston: World
Peace Foundation, 1941.
. The Middle Classes in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1940.
. Our More Perfect Union: From 18th Century Principles to 20th Century
Practice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.
. Securing the Blessings of Liberty:The Constitutional System. Chicago:
Scott, Foresman, 1964.
. The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1931.
. State Government in the United States. New York: Macmillan, 1928.
. A Strategy of Peace in a Changing World. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1967.
. Strengthening the United Nations. New York: Harper, 1957.
Holocaust
The capitalized term Holocaust emerged in the 1950s and,
over the next two decades, gradually replaced the German
term Endlsung (final solution) for the macrokilling project
of European Jews by Nazi Germany. Holocaust originally
possessed a sacrificial meaning as a burnt offering and, because
of its misleading sacred connotation, became frequently substituted by the Jewish concept of Shoah, referring to the Nazi
extermination of Jews. Some authors have used the expression
holocaust in reference to other mass-killing events, such as
genocidal policies against Native Americans in the United
States (nineteenth century), Tutsis in Rwanda (1994), and
Muslims in Bosnia (19921995).
The genocidal project of the extermination of European Jews received scarce attention by political scientists in
the United States and other Western countries after World
War II (1939-1945). With the exceptions of Hannah Arendt,
Raul Hilberg, and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, the overwhelming American and international scholarship on the Holocaust
was and still is conducted by historians. This scholarly deficit
of the political science profession regarding one of the major
planned-killing events in human history can extend to the
coverage of the other killing regimes in the twentieth century.
The historical understanding of the Nazi killing project
underwent substantial changes with the shift from the perpetrators language of Endlsung to the victim- and survivorcentered symbolic concepts of Holocaust and Shoah. Both
terms refer to experiences of calamity and catastrophe and have
a long conceptual prehistory. The current alternating and capitalized use of these symbolic expressions indicate the primacy
of the Jews as a target population for destruction, though other
victim populations were included in the genocidal policies of
Nazi Germany, such as Sinti and Roma (the so-called Gypsies),
mentally and physically disabled people, homosexuals, Russian
CONTROVERSIES
In 1984, scholars debated the question as to whether the
Holocaust was an intentional mass killing project designed
and ordered by Adolf Hitler himself, or the result of contingent circumstances and opportunities offering themselves
during the course of World War II. The division lay between
the intentionalists, on one hand, who believed in an original
design and, occasionally, also a written Fhrerbefehl (order) from
Hitler himself, and the functionalists, on the other hand, who
considered it more probable that the extermination policies
became enacted as functions of the development of the war.
The opposing lines have since become blurred by authors
who combine intentional and functional arguments in their
research. Agreement, however, has been reached that the search
for an original Fhrerbefehl is an ideological red herring.
The claim of the uniqueness of the Holocaust as a killing event has not only been challenged by the killing record
of regimes such as Pol Pots Khmer Rouge in Cambodia
(19751979; 1.7 million deaths) and the Rwandan massacre
of Tutsis (1994; 800,000 deaths), but also by the massive death
tolls resulting from Russian leader Joseph Stalins Gulag camps
(19241953; 30 million or more deaths); mass executions in
Ukraine (19321933; 7 million deaths); and Chinese premier
Mao Zedongs revolutionary campaigns (19661976; 30 million or more deaths). Comparative studies of mass killings in
the twentieth century and history in general have tremendously expanded knowledge about ideologically motivated
and politically legitimated killing regimes.
See also Anti-Semitism; Armenian Genocide; Ethnic Cleansing;
Genocide; State Repression.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MANFRED HENNINGSEN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bauer,Yehuda. Rethinking the Holocaust. New Haven:Yale University Press,
2001.
Browning, Christopher. The Origins of the Final Solution:The Evolution of Nazi
Jewish Policy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004.
Friedlnder, Saul. Nazi Germany and the Jews. 2 vols. New York:
HarperCollins, 19972006.
Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the European Jews. 3 vols. New York: Holmes
and Meier, 1985.
Kiernan, Ben. Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination
from Sparta to Darfur. New Haven:Yale University Press, 2007.
Valentino, Benjamin A. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the
Twentieth Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.
Homeland Security
The issue of homeland security took on new meaning in
countries around the world after the attacks on the United
States on September 11, 2001 (9/11). The surprise attacks
proved that at-will countries could be successfully attacked
if they were not prepared to defend themselves. The attacks
occurred when al-Qaida forces hijacked four commercial airliners for use as instruments of mass destruction. Two attacks
on the World Trade Center in New York City and a third
attack on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., were successful.
However, passengers averted a fourth attack by driving United
Flight 93 into the ground in rural Pennsylvania. Before the
day was over, nearly three thousand people, including nine
from the al-Qaida network, had lost their lives, and the safety
of the civilized world had been challenged.
Concerns over militant attacks throughout the twentieth century were primarily restricted to national or regional
threats, such as those from the Irish Republican Army in
Northern Ireland, the Red Brigades in Italy, and Hamas in the
Middle East. Prior to 9/11, groups halfway around the world
had not successfully carried out an attack on a distant target.
AFTER 9/11
Within days of the September 11 attacks, the U.S. Congress
passed the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), giving the national government
unprecedented powers to fight terrorism. The following year,
Congress expanded government counterterrorism powers
with the passage of the Homeland Security Act. In the most
far-reaching government reorganization since World War II,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was charged
with coordinating the activities of twenty-two government
agencies, including Customs and Border Protection, the
Secret Service, Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard. DHS was also given
the responsibility for overseeing the gathering and sharing of
intelligence among government agencies and for coordinating
responses to national emergencies among private industries
and state, local, and regional governments.
DHS was specifically created to identify potential terrorist threats and avert future attacks. In practice, however, the
Homelessness 733
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) have retained control of antiterrorist activities. Critics of DHS contend that the agency has not been
successful in responding to natural disasters such as Hurricane
Katrina, which devastated the Gulf Coast in August 2005.
DHS is perceived as more successful in working with states
to enhance defensive capabilities and in establishing national
warning systems.
While the United States responded to 9/11 with heightened government powers and an aggressive new military
policy (preemption), European nations, in addition to pledging support for the United States, strengthened their existing security measures and passed new antiterrorism legislation
that, in large part, focused more on prosecution than militarily driven action. The issue was particularly relevant in
Europe, where groups such as the Basque Separatist Movement in Spain and the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany
had long made terrorism a concern. The European Union
(EU) responded to 9/11 by creating a joint policing authority
and taking measures to coordinate counterterrorism activities
among member nations. These measures included the sharing
of intelligence and police information, issuing warrants across
national boundaries, strengthening border controls, and cooperating with the United States.
Despite its heightened security efforts, Europe has proved
to be vulnerable to attacks since 9/11. On March 11, 2004,
forces likely linked to al-Qaida exploded ten bombs on the
commuter train system in Madrid, Spain. At least 192 people
were killed, and 1,500 others were wounded. A few weeks
later, after an unsuccessful bombing attempt on April 2, police
trapped suspected individuals inside a home where they committed suicide. One police officer was also killed.
To battle the problem, rather than reorganize its homeland
security systems as the United States had done, the Spanish
government chose to draw on laws designed to fight domestic terrorism. Authority over homeland security activities
remained in the hands of the secretary of the interior. The
new strategies Spain announced were an expansion of antiterrorism resources, improved coordination within and among
security and intelligence agencies, and heightened security at
vulnerable points.
Another major attack took place on the London commuter
system during the morning rush hour on July 7, 2005, when
three bombs exploded. A fourth bomb was detonated on a bus
one hour later. Overall, 52 people were killed and 700 were
wounded. Four suicide bombers also perished in the attacks.
Two days later, on July 9, a second set of explosives was set off,
but no casualties were reported. These perpetrators, who were
suspected of having links to al-Qaida, were later arrested.
A year before the 9/11 attacks, the British parliament had
enacted a new antiterrorism package that expanded the governments authority for dealing with suspected terrorists both
legally and financially. This strategy stressed enhanced information sharing, immigration monitoring, and tightened security at laboratories and aviation, civilian, and nuclear sites. After
9/11, the government chose to leave the responsibility for
Homelessness
The term homelessness implies the lack of a fixed, regular,
stable, and adequate nighttime abode. The homeless, as defined
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
include persons whose primary nighttime residences are in
transitional housing. In most societies, cultural perceptions
determine the terms used to label the homeless. Labels such as
hobo, tramp, transient, bagman or bagwoman (United States),
sturdy beggar (Nigeria), vagabond, and bum have been used to
categorize a person with no permanent residence, often with
negative societal connotations. By the late twentieth century,
the terms houseless and no fixed abode (NFA) emerged to refer
to homelessness and the homeless in a way that avoided the
undesirable stereotypes of other terms. Similarly, the use of
houseless deemphasizes the negative connotations generally
associated with the homelessunemployment, mental unbalance, drug addictionand instead stresses the concrete problem of not having a house or apartment in which to reside.
Advocates and persons who have experienced homelessness
tend to use these terms as well, while NFA is used for legal
purposes. Furthermore, terms such as family homelessness,
youth homelessness, veteran homelessness, domestic violence
homelessness, and reentry homelessness have evolved to classify different categories of the homeless.
Considered an urban phenomenon, homelessness, a global
problem, has existed since at least the sixteenth century, when
England first tried to address the problem of vagrants on its
streets. The industrial revolution in the eighteenth century,
which greatly influenced the socioeconomic conditions
of society, also intensified the occurrence of homelessness.
Homelessness affects all genders, regardless of socioeconomic
734 Homophobia
status, race, age, or geographical location. In 1995, the United
Nations classified six hundred million people as homeless or
residing in low-quality housing, most of them women and
dependent children. However, a census of the homeless is
problematic. Double counts, hidden homelessness, mobility of
homeless persons, and service-system paradox (where service
providers tend to report higher counts) all affect homeless
estimates.
Mitigating or eliminating homelessness requires understanding and identifying its causes. Researchers have largely
identified three principal questions in the effort to resolve
homelessness: What causes homelessness? Why does homelessness exist? And, who is at risk of becoming homeless?
In some cases, homelessness can be voluntary. Religion,
culture, and an established way of life constitute the decisional
basis to live without a permanent residence or place of abode.
For example, the spiritual convictions of yogis in Asia, social
customs of nomads in Africa, and lifestyle preferences in the
developed world signify a conscious resolution to be homeless. In the United States, however, greater poverty and the
lack of affordable housing since the 1980s are the principal
reasons contributing to the increase in the number of homeless individuals in the early 2000s. On a global level, political
conflicts and natural disasters, continued urbanization, economic programs resulting in an uneven distribution of wealth,
and the collapse of traditional family support systems are all
causes for homelessness. Other causes can include domestic
violence, unemployment, low-paying jobs, lack of affordable
housing, substance abuse, mental illness, changes and cuts in
public assistance, and the difficulty of reentering society after
incarceration.
The interaction between these complex sets of circumstances forces many people into poverty and drives them to
prioritize and make difficult choices between provisions, shelter, and other essential human needs. As housing costs increase,
more and more people cannot afford to pay for a permanent
abode nor for other important provisions, such as child and
health care. Policies and programs that concentrate on reducing poverty not only help the homeless find a stable residence;
they also help increase access to other necessities.
Resolving homelessness relies on effectively addressing the
responsible factors. The costly endeavor of homelessness management once was the exclusive domain of the public sector.
However, by the end of the twentieth century, the public, private, and nonprofit sectors had formed broad partnerships to
address issues of homelessness. Subsequently, there have been
shifts in strategies to resolve homelessness, primarily to focus
on its prevention. Economically, it is more efficient to prevent homelessness than to resolve it later. As a result, strategies
to ensure livable incomes, improved availability of affordable
housing, rapid rehousing, and systems that facilitate the provision of required services for low-income people are now
prevalent.
See also Human Development Index; Poverty; Urban Housing.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ISMAILA ODOGBA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arnold, Kathleen R. Homelessness, Citizenship, and Identity:The Uncanniness of
Late Modernity. Albany: SUNY Press, 2004.
Kyle, Ken. Contextualizing Homelessness: Critical Theory, Homelessness, and
Federal Policy Addressing the Homeless (New Approaches in Sociology: Studies
in Social Inequality, Social Change, and Social Justice). New York: Routledge,
2005.
National Coalition for the Homeless. Homelessness in America. Washington,
D.C.: Oryx Press, 1996.
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements. Strategies to Combat
Homelessness. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Centre for Human
Settlements (Habitat), 2000.
Homophobia
Homophobia refers to aversion, bias, or discriminatory actions,
attitudes, or beliefs directed toward individuals who either
have or are perceived as having nonheterosexual identities
such as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer people
(GLBTQ). The term came into its contemporary usage in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, when it was used to describe what
Kenneth Smith called a fear of homosexuals and the anxiety
that one may be perceived by others as homosexual. Homophobic fear and anxiety are seen to be negative attributes, and
in this regard, the term links to other social prejudices such
as sexism, racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and classism. In
this regard, GLBTQ groups have used the term to organize
against discriminatory public policies and cultural attitudes.
The term internalized homophobia relates to anxiety about
or aversion to ones own homosexuality or nonnormative
sexuality. Internalized homophobia has been linked to low
self-esteem and suicide in GLBTQ individuals.
Examples of homophobia include name-calling, harassment, social exclusion, job and housing discrimination, criminalization of homosexual sexual practices, and violence. The
criminalization of homosexual sexual practices can be seen
as state-sponsored homophobia. According to the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), those arrested for
offenses related to same-sex sexual practice are subject to the
death penalty in 5 countries and to imprisonment in 72 countries. The 1998 torture and murder of Matthew Shepard in
the United States brought national and international attention to the problem of homophobic violence. A bill known as
the Matthew Shepard Act passed the U.S. Senate in July 2009,
and is expected to pass into law. This act expands the 1969
U.S. hate-crime law to include crimes motivated by a victims
actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity,
or disability. According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations 2007 Hate Crime Statistics, 16.6 percent of the hate
crimes documented in 2007 were motivated by bias against a
victims perceived or actual sexual orientation.
Closely related terms to homophobia are heteronormativity
and heterosexism. Heteronormativity refers to the assumption
that heterosexuality is and should be the norm. Heterosexism (also sometimes called compulsory heterosexuality) refers
to the array of attitudes, actions, and institutions that structure heterosexuality as the norm. The issue of same-sex marriage illustrates some of the differences between the terms.
Hook, Sidney
Sidney Hook (19021989) was an American philosopher,
Marxist, and exponent of pragmatism. Born in Brooklyn,
New York, he graduated from City College in 1923 and
received his PhD from Columbia University in 1927. While at
Columbia, he absorbed the tradition of American pragmatism
from one of his professors, John Dewey. Hook then joined
the philosophy department at New York University, where he
remained until 1972. After World War II (19391945), Hook
became involved with the Congress for Cultural Freedom,
an organization designed to influence intellectual opinion
away from communism and which later was revealed to have
received CIA funds. As the 1960s unfolded, Hook became
horrified by the assault of student radicals for academic freedom on campus. In response, he helped establish the University Center for Rational Alternatives and its journal Measure.
In his 1987 book, Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the 20th Century, Hook described the purpose of the organization and
journal as to defend the relative autonomy of the university
and to resist attacks against the freedom to teach and freedom
to learn from without and from within.
Despite his long career of anticommunism and his abhorrence of campus radicalism, Hook remained on the left in
domestic matters. He never accepted free market economics
and the notion that capitalism for all its flaws is the most rational system. In 1985, Hook was given the Medal of Freedom
by President Reagan. His final institutional affiliation was with
the Hoover Institution in Stanford.
Hook was a pragmatist and a naturalist who belonged in
the tradition of Dewey, Charles Sanders Pierce, and William
James. Hook also attributed significant influences in his development to American philosopher Morris Cohen and British
philosopher Bertrand Russell. One simple principle stands at
the core of Hooks thought from which radiates all his secondary views: his rejection of metaphysics and his insistence
that all true knowledge is practical and contingent rather than
purely theoretical and unchanging. For Hook, there could be
no eternal verities apprehended by the exercise of the purest
rationality, and he absorbed the insight of Scottish philosopher
David Hume, who Hook believed had shown that pure reason
did not exist. A clear statement of Hooks position is given in
his 1989 American Scholar review of American author and philosopher Allan Blooms best-selling The Closing of the American
Mind (1987). The difficulty with Blooms position, Hook
says, is that, like Leo Strauss, he has not emancipated himself
from the Greek notion that the cosmos is an ethos, and that
Hooker, Richard
Richard Hooker (15541600) was one of the preeminent
Anglican theologians of the sixteenth century and is still considered one of the most influential expositors of the Anglican
ecclesiastical, social, and political vision.
Born in 1554 in Exeter, England, Hooker attended Exeter
Grammar School and entered Corpus Christi College, Oxford,
in 1569, under the patronage of John Jewel, bishop of Salisbury.
Hooker completed his BA degree in 1574 and his MA in 1577.
In 1579, he took holy orders as a deacon in the Church of
England and was appointed deputy professor of Hebrew at
Oxford. Hooker left Oxford to become rector of St. Marys
church, Drayton Beauchamp, in 1584, and master of Temple
Church, London, the following year. Temple Church was an
influential London parish attended by many of the nations
political elite, and it was at Temple that Hooker engaged in
his noted controversy with his Puritan assistant (and cousin),
Walter Travers. The Temple years were unique ones, with
Hooker delivering morning sermons defending the Anglican via media (middle way) between Puritanism and Roman
Catholicism, and Travers taking the afternoon lecture and
Horkheimer, Max
Max Horkheimer (18951973) was a German philosopher
and sociologist. His name is primarily linked to the Frankfurt
school, of which he is considered to be one of the founding fathers. Born in Stuttgart to a Jewish family, Horkheimer
studied philosophy and psychology in Munich. He then
Horn of Africa
The Horn of Africa (alternatively northeast Africa, and
sometimes Somali peninsula) is a peninsula of East Africa
that extends for hundreds of miles into the Arabian Sea and
lies along the southern side of the geostrategically important
waterway of the Gulf of Aden. It is the easternmost projection
of the African continent. The term also refers to the greater
region containing the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
and Somalia. As such, it covers approximately 1,242,742 square
miles (2,000,000 square kilometers) and is inhabited by about
86.5 million people. In the 2000s, the term Horn of Africa
has often been extended to cover the member countries of
the regions Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD), namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia,
Sudan, and Uganda (this more expansive definition is disputed
by some scholars). Regularly hit by both natural disasters
(floods in Somalia, droughts in Ethiopia and Eritrea) and violent conflicts, the Horn remains among the worlds poorest
regions.
PREVALENCE OF CONFLICTS
IN THE REGION
Despite certain positive developments such as the peace
accord between North and South Sudan, the situation in
the region has further deteriorated in the first decade of the
twenty-first century. Somalia, for example, entered a new
conflict phase in June 2006 when fighters of the Islamic
Courts Union (ICU) seized power in Mogadishu, causing
Ethiopia to intervene in December 2006. Since March 2007,
an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force (AMISOM) has
been deployed to Somalia but, as of mid-2009, has failed to
create stability in Mogadishu.
Concurrently, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea
over the border enclave of Badme remains unresolved. The
ruling of an international arbitrary commission, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC), has not been
implemented. In July 2008, the mandate of the UN observer
mission (UNMEE), in place since 2000 to keep the fragile
peace between the two countries, was terminated.
The Sudan continues to be the theatre of several conflicts,
of which at least one, in the western province of Darfur, is
intensifying. Despite the presence of a twenty-seven thousandstrong joint United NationsAfrican Union peacekeeping
mission (UNAMID) and substantial international attention,
the fighting between local movements and government-supported Arab militias known as Janjaweed has already cost up to
five hundred thousand lives.
INTRAREGIONAL DYNAMICS
These conflicts all led to seriously strained interstate relations
in the region. In order to improve these relations and provide an anchor of stability, in 1996, the countries of the Horn
decided to transform the regions Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) into a broader
cooperative venture addressing issues of peace, security, and
development. Renamed Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), the organization has since made great
strides in bringing the regions states together in common
INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS
IN THE REGION
Given the prevalence of conflict in the region as well as its
geostrategic location, it is not surprising that the Horn of
Africa continues to be the subject of considerable external
interests (both African and non-African). Fearing the Talibanization of Somalia (as a safe haven and training ground),
the United States, for example, has substantially increased its
engagement in the region. The United States maintains particularly close relations with Ethiopia, which may eventually
even serve as the location of the U.S. strategic Africa command (AFRICOM) currently being established in Stuttgart,
Germany. Several other countries, such as China, India, and
Malaysia, have increased their presence in the region to satisfy
their growing needs for natural resources. In order to curb
the increasing piracy in the region and safeguard the Babel Mandab, an important chokepoint for international trade
located between Yemen and Somalia, the international community has launched two maritime missions (NATOs Operation Enduring Freedom and the EUs Operation Atalanta) to
monitor the waterways.
Horvat, Branko
Branko Horvat (19282003) was a Croatian economist and
one of the most active public intellectuals of former socialist
Yugoslavia. He is best known for his work on Marxist economic theory in general and the theory of the labor-managed
firm in particular. His approach is sometimes referred to as
Marxism-Horvatism. Horvat was director of the Institute of
Economic Sciences in Belgrade, Serbia; a long-time editor
of the well-respected journal Economic Analysis and Workers
Self-Management; and an adviser to the Yugoslav government
and several other countries in the world.
Horvat is recognized for his criticism of existing political
and economic systems, both in the West and in the East. He
promoted a third system that would avoid both the pitfalls of
capitalism in Europe and Northern America and etatism, as
he called the state socialist systems of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. Horvat believed both were inefficient in their
developmental results as well as unjust in their distribution of
property and power. He hoped that a third model, that of socialism, could be developed to overcome these shortcomings.Yugoslavia had the opportunity to produce this vision of a better
socioeconomic system, but Horvat was nevertheless critical of
what he saw as various problems of Yugoslav reality. He advocated a mixture of self-management, the market, and planning
to overcome the economic crisis which gripped the country in
the 1970s and 1980s. Horvat placed great hope in economics as
a scientific enterprise comparable to the hard sciences, and he
was very confident about the type of knowledge economists
could produce. His confidence in economic analysis garnered
him a high standing in global leftist circles. He was even in the
running for a Nobel Prize in Economics after the publication
of his Political Economy of Socialism in 1982. In his own country,
however, he was often out of sync with current politics.
Horvat was one of several intellectuals who founded the
Yugoslav Democratic Initiative at the end of the 1980s.The initiative attempted to establish its base in all the republics and to
simultaneously avoid ethnic conflict while promoting democracy. After the initiative failed and Yugoslavia broke apart, Horvats political outlook only grew dimmer as he clashed with
the economic policy of the newly independent Croatian government. He organized a small Social Democratic Party, which
never recorded significant electoral results. Despite his scientific credentials, Horvat was forced to retire from his position
at the University of Zagreb. He remains notable for his advocacy of market socialism, self-management, and participation
as a way of more efficiently and democratically organizing the
economy and society as well as his constant efforts in developing a rigorous scientific analysis to support these arguments.
See also Economic Theories of the State; Marxism; Socialism.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARKO GRDESIC
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Franicevic,Vojmir, and Milica Uvalic, eds. Equality, Participation,Transition:
Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat. London: Macmillan, 2000.
Horvat, Branko. The Political Economy of Socialism: A Marxist Social Theory.
Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1982.
. The Theory of the Worker-Managed Firm Revisited. Journal of
Comparative Economics 10 (1996): 925.
Ward, Benjamin. Marxism-Horvatism: A Yugoslav Theory of Socialism;
A Review Article. The American Economic Review 57 (1967): 509523.
Housing
See Urban Housing.
Humanitarian Intervention
By the end of the twentieth century, humanitarian intervention had become one of the most controversial issues in the
debate on international relations and foreign policy. It entails
forced intervention in the territory of another state in the
name of humanitarian aid or humanity. In the first decade of
the twenty-first century, a shift in paradigm occurred from the
right to intervene to the duty to protect. The U.S. intervention in
Iraq in 2002 illustrates this shift to duty to protect as part of
U.S. efforts in the global war on terrorism to prevent further
threats and attacks such as those against the United States
on September 11, 2001, which killed nearly three thousand
people.
One example that exemplifies both the right to intervene
and the duty to protect is Kosovo. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) mounted a military intervention against
Yugoslavia in 1999 in response to the Yugoslav governments
violent actions against ethnic Albanian citizens in Kosovo, a
region where many residents desired independence from the
central government. Thousands fled as a result of the central
governments crackdown. NATO justified its involvement on
behalf of Kosovars on humanitarian grounds, and in 2001 a
United Nationssupervised Supreme Court in Kosovos capital of Pristina confirmed that war crimes and crimes against
humanity had occurred, including systematic campaigns of
murder and rape. NATOs military action was the first of its
kind against a sovereign state, and still remains controversial.
Some countries, such as Russia, India, and China, claim that
NATOs involvement violated both Yugoslavias sovereignty
and the United Nations Charter, while others have noted that
such interventions are based more on national interests than
actual humanitarian grounds.
Questions concerning humanitarian intervention include:
How can a democratic country legally attack another country or invade a sovereign state? Is humanitarian intervention a
right or a duty? What is the credibility of the United Nations
(UN) if a group of countries are able to usurp the power to
intervene in the name of humanitarianism? How humanitarian is humanitarian intervention? What are the politics, economics, and ethics behind humanitarianism?
In postcold war politics, Western Europe and the United
States have engaged in humanitarian interventions in Somalia (19921995), Haiti (1994), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995),
and Iraq (2002- ). Such interventions have been multilateral
and based on cooperation among various governments on
the basis of short- and long-term goals. Humanitarian interventions, however, have never been purely humanitarian and
can be explained both in terms of idealism and realism. In the
debate over humanitarian intervention, moral questions cannot
be divorced from political, strategic, and prudential questions.
The normative perspective usually found in contemporary
literature on humanitarian intervention is based on international law and rights, but many political and ethical issues are
automatically involved in any discussions on humanitarian
interventions or human rights. For instance, the UN policies
traditional approach to humanitarian intervention. Proponents of this second model insist on adopting the tradition
of internationalism to regulate interstate relations and allow
humanitarian intervention in rare cases. For instance, the
1951 UN Genocide Convention establishes a right to forcible humanitarian intervention with the UNs authorization
on the grounds that repression and cruelty on a large scale can
pose threats to international peace and security.
Under the third model, sovereignty of the state is seen in
cosmopolitan tradition. It amounts to sovereignty of the people
rather than the sovereignty of the sovereign. According to this
model, the sovereignty of the state can be violated not only
by outside forces but also by the indigenous use of force. For
instance, Chinese sovereignty of the people was violated by
the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, in which the central
government engaged in a violent crackdown against peaceful
student protestors. In such cases, sovereignty can be restored
both by international and national powers. Such a viewpoint
provides justification for humanitarian action against pariah
states such as apartheid South Africa, targeted by many nations
for social and economic boycotts.
Although the international and cosmopolitan traditions provide legitimacy to humanitarian intervention, they
are unable to authorize agents for such an intervention. The
agents could be the United Nations, the European Union
(EU), NATO, or any state in its single capacity. Nevertheless,
larger states cannot be allowed to resort to humanitarian intervention to serve their own self-interests. Their moral anger
also cannot provide just cause for military intervention. For
intervention to be just, the intention must also be just.
The notion of just cause excludes, among other things,
motives based on self-interestprofit, power, or glory. For
instance, the French intervention in Rwanda in 1994 met with
widespread dissatisfaction, primarily because it was perceived
as motivated more by the continued desire to play the greatpower game in central Africa than by humanitarian concerns.
It can be quite difficult, if not impossible, to draw a neat line
between humanitarian and political concerns or between
rhetoric and actions. As such, humanitarianism cannot and
should not be allowed to be used to justify unacceptable or
self-interest based interventions.
Inconsistent and arbitrary judgments about humanitarian
interventions further complicate the matter. Inconsistency
and selectivity with regard to the practice of humanitarian intervention makes motives highly questionable. Since
the UN, EU, or NATO cannot intervene in every case, it
becomes important to establish criteria for when to intervene and when not to intervene. This poses a significant challenge. If humanitarian concerns are to be measured in terms
of number of deaths and genocidal campaigns, then Sudan,
Liberia, and East Timor have a better claim for humanitarian
intervention than Bosnia.
In fact, it is very difficult to arrive at some consensus on
acceptable motives focused on preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement as far as humanitarian intervention is concerned. While many scholars have criticized
MILITARY INTERVENTION OR
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
U.S. president George W. Bushs intervention in Iraq, allegedly to prevent the nation from using weapons of mass
destruction and to liberate its citizens from a dictatorthus
bringing about democracydiscredited humanitarian intervention around the globe. The humanitarian arguments for
invading Iraq met with severe criticism when the weapons
of mass destruction the United States insisted were presentand had built a coalition of allies to assist in containing
the threatwere never found. In many cases, humanitarian
interventions have not resulted in humanitarian outcomes.
British philosopher John Stuart Mill ably summarized in On
Liberty (1859):
The disputed question is that of interfering in the
regulation of another countrys concerns; the question
whether a nation is justified in taking part, on either
side, in the civil wars or party contests of another: and
chiefly, whether it may justifiably aid the people of
another country in struggling for liberty; or may impose
on a country any particular government or institutions,
either as being best for the country itself, or as necessary
for the security of its neighbours.
Mill did not support intervention by those governments
that tried to oppress an uprising of their own citizens. To Mill,
A government which needs foreign support to enforce obedience from its own citizens is one which ought not to exist.
He further added that intervention could be recommended
provided it gave people freedom, but he also asserted that freedom bestowed on people from others cannot be real and permanent. People have to be their own vanguard.
In contemporary times, the question arises: is humanitarian intervention morally imperative? This debate took a sharp
turn when a cyclone hit Myanmar in May 2008, killing tens of
thousands of people. The junta in Myanmar could not provide
immediate relief to its own people, yet refused international aid
as a threat to its sovereignty. Whereas France was of the opinion that the United Nations should invoke the Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) doctrine in the case of Myanmars natural
disaster, allowing for intervention, Russia, China, and South
Africa disagreed. The latter opined that it was the responsibility of the states concerned to protect their populations in the
event of a natural disaster.
While the 2001 R2P report included overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned
is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and
significant loss of life is occurring or threatened, there are
many scholars who believe that natural disasters should not be
politicized and that they should be excluded from R2P. Allowing intervention in such circumstances would arouse the suspicion of weaker states about the true motives of powerful states
and their tactics. Weaker nations are usually afraid that dominant states might intend to bring about regime change without
taking responsibility toward their nations reconstruction.
Despite sovereignty concerns, many countries in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America are opening up to the idea of
humanitarian intervention. For instance, in 2004, Indonesias
Aceh province was worst hit by a tsunami and the Indonesian
government allowed international aid in the province, placed
under martial law. Aceh was previously not accessible to most
human rights groups, international reporters, or aid givers.
Similarly, in 2005, the Pakistan government allowed access to
international relief agencies in an earthquake-rocked area of
the disputed region Kashmir, which divides India and Pakistan.
China too accepted international aid from the United States
after an earthquake in Sichuan province in May 2008, despite
a history of reluctance to accept such aid. Not all nations
welcome humanitarian aid, such as India, which refused aid
from other states after a 2004 tsunami and 2005 earthquake
in Kashmir. While Chinas earlier refusals of foreign aid were
motivated by its desire to retain complete control over its population, Indias refusal was intended to illustrate its strength as
an emerging economy and a world power that could effectively manage its own affairs.
In practice, humanitarian intervention, carried out by a
coalition of nations, can prove too divisive. Despite the generous notions underlying humanitarian interventionspromotion of democracy; protection of human rights; provision of
aid in the case of natural disasters; and the maintenance of
peace, law, and orderaccepting such aid may be seen as jeopardizing national sovereignty. Article 2.7 of the UN Charter
forbids interference in matters, which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Despite these concerns,
humanitarian interventions continue over the years, such as
in Congo (1964), the Dominican Republic (1965), East Pakistan (1971), Cambodia (1978), Tanzania (1979), Iraq (1991 and
2002), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), and Kosovo (1999).
It is impossible to separate humanitarian motives from the
political ones or for those who provide aid to claim a neutral
stance. Humanitarian intervention is often directed by some
omnipotent states in the north toward weaker states in the
south. It is difficult to think of a weaker state in a similar role.
For instance, the United Kingdom associated itself with the
global war on terrorism in Iraq in support of the United States
and their mutual interests as hegemonic countries. However,
the United Kingdom perhaps would not have taken such
a similar step in the case of India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh.
Humanitarian intervention in the developed world may be
perceived as mere propaganda on the part of the interveners.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bajoria, Jayshree. The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention. Council on
Foreign Relations, June 12, 2008.
Blake, Michael. Humanitarian Intervention and Reconstruction: Collateral
Benefit. A presentation at the Peace and Conflict Series, Concordia
University, Montreal, January 24, 2005.
Crawford, Timothy W., and Alan J. Kuperman, eds. Gambling on Humanitarian
Intervention. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Hilpold, Peter. Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal
Reappraisal? European Journal of International Law 12 (2002): 437467.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859.
What constitutes a realistic portrait of human nature? Perhaps the first thing to examine is what human nature is not.
Human nature is not most of the things that have been attributed to it: it is not distinct from nurture; it is not universal; it
is not static; and, importantly, it is not restricted to negative
emotions such as fear, greed, and anger.
Nature and nurture do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they
continually cocreate one another, such that environmental
contingencies constantly interact with genotype to write and
rewrite expression that produces a unique phenotype over time.
Even twins with the same genotype do not necessarily evince
identical disease traits, even for illnesses with established genetic
components. In schizophrenia, for example, identical twins
share a probability of being stricken at about a 50 percent likelihood, which while much higher than the odds in the general
population, do not come close to certainty, at least partly due
to different environmental experiences and precipitants. Social
experiences and relationships can also influence biological
changes, even in other animal species, just as any honeybee can
become queen after the reigning bee passes away. Some animals
even change sex under the right environmental circumstances.
Importantly, human nature is not universal, and therefore
can prove quite useful in explaining unique outcomes. While
some aspects of human physiology have proven so effective as
to drive out much variation, such as color vision, these universal features do not constitute the main focus of interest and
attention in political science. Rather, aspects of human nature
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF
HUMAN NATURE
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Traditional images of human nature present a static and fixed
set of responses. The problem with such models is that they
introduce an unrealistically constrained view of endogenous
human processes. Human genetic and biological mechanisms
interact with their environments in complex and sophisticated
ways to produce political and social behaviors of interest.
More accurate and comprehensive models of human nature
would explicitly embody the myriad ways in which human
brains interact with the environment to prompt change in
both. Such attempts should rest on an integration of behavior
genetics and evolutionary theory, which recognizes genotypic
variance across individuals and populations, and also seeks to
understand and appreciate the functional purpose and potential adaptive advantage of any given behavior. In such a way,
it becomes possible to develop a more accurate and coherent
understanding of the interplay between genes, brains, environment, and behavior.
See also Emotions in Politics; Group Relations; Morgenthau,
Hans Joachim; Political Psychology; Social and Political Cognition;
Socialization, Political.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ROSE MCDERMOTT
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Brewer, Paul, and Steenbergen, Marco. All against All: How Beliefs About
Human Nature Shape Foreign Policy Opinions. Political Psychology 23,
no. 1 (2002): 3958.
Crawford, Neta. Man in the Mirror. Unpublished Manuscript. 2008.
Dawes, Robyn. The Nature of Human Nature: An Empirical Case for
Withholding Judgment; Perhaps Indefinitely. Political Psychology 16, no.
1 (1995): 8197.
Frost, Samantha. Hobbes and the Matter of Self-Consciousness. Political
Theory 33 (2005): 495517.
Hatemi, Peter K., John Alford, John Hibbing, Nicholas Martin, and Lindon
Eaves. Is There a Party in Your Genes? Political Research Quarterly 62,
no. 3 (2009).
Jervis, Robert. The Implications of Prospect Theory for Human Nature and
Values. Political Psychology 25, no. 2 (2004): 163176.
Morganthau, Hans. Politics among Nations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948.
Plomin, Robert, and Kathryn Asbury. Nature and Nurture: Genetic and
Environmental Influences on Behavior. Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 600, no. 1 (2005): 8698.
Sullivan, John, John Aldrich, Eugene Borgida, and Wendy Rahn. Candidate
Appraisal and Human Nature: Man and Superman in the 1984 Election.
Political Psychology 11, no. 3 (1990): 459484.
Walsh, Katherine Cramer, Kent Jennings, and Laura Stoker. The Effects
of Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards
Government. British Journal of Political Science 34, no. 3 (2004): 469495.
Human Rights
Human rights are often defined as those rights that belong to
persons simply by virtue of their being human.This definition
neatly captures the ethical intuition of human moral equality
that is at the core of human rights. The idea of human rights
has been a central theme of modern liberal and democratic
thought. It has also proven politically explosive, igniting the
democratic revolutions that swept the Atlantic region at
the end of the eighteenth century, and fanning the flames
of democratization in the twentieth century. It is the commitment to human moral equality that gives human rights
doctrine its revolutionary spark.
Demonstrators hold signs in 2009 protest against price increases on basic commodities in India. Whether human rights are universal is
controversial, but supporters claim they prescribe the equal treatment of human beings under social, political, and economic conditions,
including basic subsistence.
source: Getty
KEY CONTROVERSIES
Although human rights have become the predominant normative discourse in global politics, there is little agreement
on their philosophical foundation or justification. Numerous
justifications for human rights have been advanced over the
years, from the natural rights arguments of the seventeenth
century to more contemporary arguments based in autonomy,
human capabilities, and human interests, among others. Some
critics cite the uncertainty reflected in this plurality of justifications as a problem for their legitimacy, arguing that without
a single, clear, and uncontroversial justification, human rights
lose credibility. Yet it is not obvious why everyone has to
agree on what reasons justify human rights in order to find
Human Security
The human security discourse dates back to the Human
Development Report 1994, published by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), subtitled New Dimensions
of Human Security. The catchphrase definition has become
freedom from fear and freedom from want. In 2003, the
Commission on Human Security (initiated by the Japanese
government, and working closely with the UN) formulated
the following main characteristics, published in 2003 by
Hume, David
David Hume (17111776) was born on April 26, 1711, in
Edinburgh, Scotland. After studying at the University of Edinburgh and briefly considering a career in law, he embarked on
a lifelong career as a moral philosopher, historian, and essayist. He is widely considered the leading intellectual figure in
the Scottish Enlightenment, and his writings had a profound
influence on moral philosophy and the social sciences.
Hume is usually associated with the philosophical doctrine
of empiricism, or the idea that all moral ideas can be traced
back to sense impressions.This idea influenced Humes account
of the origins of morality and justice. He is often described as
a common sense philosopher because he believed that moral
principles were best sought in everyday moral and political
practices that had evolved over timerather than in appeals
to abstract principles, natural laws, or transcendent reason.
Another of Humes most enduring philosophical claims is his
criticism of the naturalistic fallacy, or the idea that evaluative
claims about what ought to be can be deduced from purely
factual observations of what is.
In addition to his major philosophical writings, which
include A Treatise of Human Nature (17391740), An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding (1748), and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), Hume is renowned for his
Essays: Moral, Political and Literary (17411742). Preferring the
affluence and stability of modern commercial societies over
the ignorance, poverty, and discord of the classical republics of
antiquity, Hume argued for the civilizing role of commerce
and criticized mercantilist prejudices holding that the wealth
of some nations must come at the expense of others. Humes
economic writings influenced his colleague Adam Smith
and are widely credited for contributing to the development
of the modern science of economics. Additionally, Humes
essays included classic contributions like Of Superstition and
Enthusiasm, in which he condemned Christianitys sectarian
tendency to mix into political affairs. His essays on political
parties are credited with influencing the thought of James
Madison, particularly Federalist No. 10 detailing the problems
of factions. More generally, Humes essays idealized a commercial society and the progress in arts, sciences, manners,
sociability, and conversation which he believed accompanied
economic prosperity.
Hume was also renowned as the author of the magisterial
History of England (17451762), published in six volumes and
widely considered the definitive history of England from the
time of Julius Caesar to the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
Humor, Political
Political humor is the term used to describe the use of
humor in the domain of politics. Though occasionally used
to describe the use of humor by political figures themselves,
the term is most often reserved for humorous images, texts,
and expressions that mock public officials, people in positions
of authority, as well as government, institutions, policies, or
practices. According to the taxonomy introduced by David
L. Paletz in his 1990 article Political Humor and Authority: From Support to Subversion, political humor can vary
in terms of target (at whom or what is the humor aimed?),
focus (what element or characteristic of the target is under
scrutiny?), acceptability (how socially or culturally accepted is
the joke in question?), and presentation (how, with what style
or medium, is the humor communicated to the receiver?).
These four criteria then determine where a given piece of
political humor falls on a spectrum ranging from supportive to subversive. Paletz defines supportive political humor as
political humor that is loyal to the dominant political order,
and supportive of the individuals and institutions in power,
such as the innocuous and friendly barbs in the jokes of Bob
Hope. At the other end of the spectrum is subversive political
humor, which seeks to aggressivelyand perhaps unacceptablycriticize not just public officials, but the norms and
practices of those highest in authority as well as the very
institutions that hold power.
Huntington, Samuel P.
Samuel P. Huntington (19272008) was an American political scientist best known for his thesis that, in the postcold
war world, conflicts would stem from the competing cultural
identities of civilizations rather than the ideological (and
state-based) conflicts of the cold war period.
Huntington earned a bachelors degree from Yale University before serving in the U.S. Army at the end of World
War II (19391945). He went on to obtain his masters degree
from the University of Chicago in 1948 and then completed
his doctorate at Harvard University in 1951. Huntington joined
Hyneman, Charles S.
American political theorist Charles S. Hyneman (19001985)
was born on a farm in Gibson County, Indiana, in 1900. He
received his undergraduate degree from Indiana University in
1923 and his masters degree in 1925. After spending a short
time doing graduate work at the University of Pennsylvania,
he transferred to the University of Illinois where he received
his PhD in 1929. Hyneman held appointments early in his
career at Syracuse University and at the University of Illinois
before he became the chair of the Department of Government at Louisiana State University in 1937. While at LSU he
was instrumental in organizing the Louisiana Municipal Association and initiating a merit system for the state civil service.
While Hyneman was a student of pragmatic politics, this in
no way limited his accomplishments as a theorist. Much of his
later work focused on the philosophical underpinnings of the
I
Ibn Taymiyya
Taqi al-Din Ahmed Ibn Taymiyya (12631328) was a prominent Muslim scholar and jurist of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. He is noted for his contribution to debates
about the combination of secular logic and Islamic faith, his
attachment to a conservative and totalizing notion of Islam,
and his defense of jihad as a primary responsibility of Muslims. Ibn Taymiyya resisted contemporary forms of innovation
in religion and castigated Muslim rulers such as the Mongols
who did not abide by the customs of Islamic unity, all the
while defending Islamic practice as a pillar of state policy. He
is therefore often credited as a forerunner of modern Salafist or Islamist movements that condemn both non-Muslim
governments and their secular Muslim counterparts. His
approach to jihad is widely viewed as a significant development in the tradition of Islamic militancy.
Ibn Taymiyya was born in 1263 in Harran, now located in
southeastern Turkey. His birth came at a time of widespread
political instability and ferment. The invasion and sack of
Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 brought an end to the Ayyubid Empire and left all of Southwest Asia in danger of raids and
violence. When he was about seven years old, Ibn Taymiyyas
family left Harran for the more stable confines of Damascus, at
that time ruled by the Egyptian Mamluks. Both his father and
grandfather were noted Sunni scholars of the Hanbali tradition. His father became a teacher in Damascus, and upon his
death in 1284, Ibn Taymiyya took his place.
Ibn Taymiyya taught at a time when Arab Muslim societies
were being forced to respond to the political challenges of the
Mongols and the Crusaders. In 1291 the last Crusader kingdom of Acre was defeated by the Mamluks, and Ibn Taymiyya
joined in the defense of Damascus against invading Mongol
armies in 1300. The need to maintain a unified defense against
external opponents shaped his attitude to politics and to jihad.
An extensive collection of Ibn Taymiyyas teaching has
come down in the form of religious rulings (fatawa) and
monographs. He worked to renew and reinvigorate traditional
scholarship, particularly in opposition to the Ashari school,
which was premised on the unity of creation that fused Greek
philosophic thought with the Islamic tradition. His opposition
to the Sufi theologies of hulul (Gods indwelling of man) and
wahdat al wujud (unity of creation) set him against standard Sufi
Idealism
Idealism usually refers to views holding that reality is constituted by mind, spirit, or some other nonmaterial entities.
It is opposed to materialism, holding that reality, including
consciousness, is reducible to matter. Political idealism covers
political views based on a nonmaterialist ontology, but the
term is also used more loosely to describe any conception
committed to shape the world through demanding moral
ideals and a strict sense of duty. When used in the latter sense
it is contrasted with realism, or Realpolitik.
Platos political theory is idealist in both senses. It holds that
moral guidance for political organization and decision making must be sought at a distance from the imperfect world of
appearances known to our senses. For Plato, the visible world,
with its finite, constantly changing, and imperfect objects, is
like shadows of the true, higher, and eternal nature of things.
755
See also Hegel, Georg W. F.; More, Sir Thomas; Plato; Utopias
and Politics.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SIMON BIRNBAUM
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Augustine. The City of God against the Pagans. Translated by R. W. Dyson.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Boucher, David, and Andrew Vincent. British Idealism and Political Theory.
Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2000.
Hegel, G. W. F. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 1967. First published 1921.
More, Thomas. Utopia. Translated by Paul Turner. London: Penguin, 2003.
First published 1516.
Plato. The Republic. Translated by Robin Waterfield. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1998. First published 360 BCE.
Identity, Politics of
Identity for most people derives from personal history, family relationships and friendships, neighborhood, region, and
country. Generally, the sense of self is validated by membership in a group or affiliation with something intangible such
as a culture or religion. In this sense, politics of identity refers to
political attitudes or positions that focus on the concerns of
social groups identified mainly on the basis of gender, race,
ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation.
The scope of political movements that may be described as
politics of identity ranges from the struggles within Western
capitalist democracies to indigenous rights movements worldwide to nationalist projects and demands for self-determination.
In general, the politics of identity has developed around the
idea of empowering the oppressed to articulate their oppression in terms of their own experience.
In the twentieth century, organizing around a shared
identity challenged the conventional organization of politics
around beliefs or programs. Politics since then has become as
much about identity as about self-interest or policy. Particularly during the second half of the twentieth century, largescale political movements based on claims about the injustices
done to particular social groups, such as feminism, minority
civil rights, and gay and lesbian liberation, emerged. In this
sense, identity has driven politics, if not always explicitly.
In a 2007 publication C. Heyes contends that feminist identity politics has underlined the task of articulating womens
understanding of themselves and of men without reducing
femininity to biology. According to feminists the experiences
women share do not necessarily result from sexual differences
but rather from social injustice. In this sense feminist politics
of identity as a social and political movement has been based
on the argument that although sex may be biological, gender
is socially constructed. On the other hand, liberal-reformist gay
and lesbian activists have struggled for the full acceptance of gays
and lesbians in the institutions and culture of mainstream society.
S. Aronowitz notes that the politics of identity has been
criticized by orthodox and revisionist Marxists and socialists.
They have argued that groups based on shared identity, other
than class, have diverted attention from more fundamental
issues, such as class conflict in capitalist societies. However,
gender-based, ethnic, regional, and other modes of identification that compete with national identity.
These developments bring forth a heightened concern
with identity and the recognition of uniqueness, equality, and
equitable valuation. People from different ethnic and religious backgrounds seek recognition of both their unique and
national identities. In the early twenty-first century, many of
the concerns that excite public discourse are driven by questions of national identity and politics of identity.
In essence multiculturalism stands in contrast to assimilation, which imposes a single culture on minority groups. Some
multicultural states such as Britain and Canada have praised
the variety of cultural identities of their residents and wish
them to be preserved rather than assimilated, despite the concern that the values of such states may be at odds with the
values of those they claim to protect. In these cases, the strong
emphasis on national identity has proved difficult to reconcile
with the notion of multiculturalism, which claims equality for
different cultures and identities.
Conflicts due to different ethnic and cultural identities lead
to a sort of politics of identity, in which a marginalized community or its members are involved in the reaffirmation of
identity. It is the struggle over definitions of, or claims to, politically and culturally sensitive categories of ethnic and religious
identities. In the early twenty-first century, the concept of
ethnic minorities is identified exclusively with nonwhite ethnic groups, who are mainly the product of immigration into
Western societies during the past half century because of persecution or poverty and poor economic opportunities in their
countries of origin. The reason ethnic minorities are significant for the politics of identity is not that they are different but
the way they are treated by other ethnic groups, particularly
by the white majority. Issues of identity and allegiance can
be complicated for ethnic minorities, and many immigrants
have continuing positive sentiments toward their countries of
origin.The United States, which has had a relatively successful
program of education to integrate immigrants into the American way of life, nonetheless contains Irish American, Spanish
American, Polish American, and Jewish American communities. Similarly, there exist thriving Polish, Italian, and Ukrainian
communities in Britain. Werbner points out that these dual
identities show that allegiances are not mutually exclusive and
that it is possible to be black or Asian and British or American.
Since the 1990s, religion as a marker of identity has been
gaining prominence. Religion has played one of the central
roles in the politics of identity. Particularly among Muslims,
membership in the ummah (Muslim community) brings about
the Islamic identity. Recent developments show how Islam or
its militant adherents have waged jihad, or holy war, against
those seen as enemies. Cases such as the attacks on the United
States on September 11, 2001, and suicide attacks elsewhere,
including Britain and India, have highlighted the role of religion in instances when believers see the issue of identity as a
matter of life and death.
In the case of Muslim identity vis--vis the West, religion
rather than ethnicity comes to the fore because the Muslim
Ideologies, Political
Ideologies are systems of ideas that shape peoples thoughts and
actions with regard to many things, including nationality, race,
the role and function of government, property and class divisions, the relations between men and women, human responsibility for the natural environment, and more. These systems
of ideas have proven to be potent, and often lethal, political
forces. As the historian Isaiah Berlin observed in his 1992 book
The Crooked Timber of Humanity, the great ideological storms
of the twentieth century have altered the lives of virtually all
mankind, producing not only revolutions but totalitarian tyrannies of both right and left and . . . explosions of nationalism,
racism, and, in places, of religious bigotry. . . .These great movements began with ideas in peoples heads: ideas about what
relations between men have been, are, might be, and should be;
and . . . [these ideas were] transformed in the name of a vision
of some supreme goal in the minds of the leaders, above all of
the prophets with armies at their backs (p. 1).
Not all ideologies have spawned totalitarian tyrannies
not conservatism, for example, nor the liberalism that Berlin
A PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF
IDEOLOGY
These points of agreement suggest a definition of ideology
that provides a useful basis for identifying, comparing, and
contrasting various ideologies. According to this definition, an
Illich, Ivan
Ivan Illich (19262002) was a one-time Catholic priest, Austrian philosopher, and anarchist social critic of various forms
of professional authority. His foremost critique of modern
culture was that bureaucratic institutions tend to act counter to their original, rational purpose, thereby undermining
peoples confidence in themselves and their ability to solve
their own problems.
Born in Vienna, Austria, on September 4, 1926, Illich
attended religious school from 1931 to 1941. His father was a
Illich, Ivan. DeSchooling Society. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
. Medical Nemesis:The Expropriation of Health. London: Marian Boyars,
1975.
. Tools for Conviviality. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.
Immigration, Effects on
Intergroup Relations
Immigration affects not only the ethnic, racial, religious, and
linguistic makeup of immigrant-receiving countries but also
conceptions of national identity and relations between the
multitudes of groups that constitute pluralistic societies. In
particular, it affects relations between ethnic groups, or as Max
Weber (1996) describes, those human groups that entertain
a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of
memories of colonization and migration (p. 35). Under the
best circumstances, immigration adds to and enriches the fabric of society and leads to harmonious relationships between
ethnic groups. Under the worst, it causes profound socioeconomic and political change that leads to violent conflict.
For many Europeans, immigrating to the New World
meant an escape from poverty, increased economic prospects
and political freedoms, and the beginning of a new life infused
with great opportunity. Conversely, from the vantage point of
the native inhabitants, European immigration was commonly
associated with conquest, domination, displacement, disease,
genocide, and the destruction of traditional ways of life. For
the estimated ten million Africans brought to the Americas
between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, their forced
migration experience was characterized by enslavement and
extreme racial prejudice. These patterns of migration and
settlement resulted in a hierarchical power structure based
on race, with whites holding dominant social, economic, and
political positions.
Immigration, Politics of
The politics of immigration (entry) are distinct from, but
closely related to, the politics of emigration (departure),
remigration (return), and migration (movement) and can
be defined broadly as the struggle for power related to the
entry and permanent settlement of people in a nation-state.
As such, a complex amalgamation of frequently divisive and
LOW POLITICS
The politics of immigration exist, in one form or another, in
many countries but are particularly prominent in so-called
classic countries of immigration, such as Australia, Canada,
and the United States, where immigration has played a central role in the nation-building process. Immigration in these
countries is normally considered low politics, and with the
exception of the humanitarian admittance of refugees and
asylum seekers, policy is made mostly in terms of what is in
the states best interest. The general consensus among economists is that a solvent welfare state cannot have completely
open borders, for it must be able to regulate who has access
to its finite resources. Conversely, most countries also cannot
live with completely closed borders, for capitalist societies
invariably need both cheap and skilled labor. Policy makers
thus focus on effectively regulating legal entry so as to meet
the demand for workers and mitigate illegal immigration.
Once migrants enter, whether legally or illegally, it is difficult for governments to force them to leave. Large-scale forced
deportation is neither practically feasible nor ethically in accordance with twenty-first-century human rights norms. Moreover, remigration may not ultimately be desired as national
economies quickly become dependent on low-skilled foreign
workers to do the dirty, dangerous, and difficult jobs natives
are unable or unwilling to do and on high-skilled workers
to fill important niches in the labor market. In industrialized
countries such as Japan and Italy, where fertility rates are below
replacement levels and populations are rapidly shrinking and
aging, there is also a dire need for immigrants to offset growing demographic deficits, pay taxes, and finance the social
security of retirees.
Immigration Policy
Immigration policy refers to the laws adopted and implemented
by nation-states to regulate the entry and permanent settlement of foreigners. Immigration policies encompass ways to
control borders, integrate immigrants into society, and meet
the labor needs of national economies. There is, however, significant variation in the theoretical and practical application
of immigration policies around the world.
The immigration policies of individual countries are shaped
by such things as political history, geographic location, party
politics, and governmental institutions as well as by powerful, ever-changing, global economic push-and-pull forces that
are beyond their control. Few countries have completely open
or closed immigration policies, but some are more restrictive
than others. In Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United
States, for example, immigration played an important role in
the nation-building process, and immigration policies in those
countries reflect this history. By contrast, France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom have only more recently, and reluctantly,
received large-scale immigration. Migration scholars make a
further distinction between economically developed countries, which regularly attract large numbers of immigrants,
and less economically developed countries, which commonly
experience more emigration than immigration.
More than half of the worlds estimated two hundred million immigrantsthat is, people residing permanently outside
their countries of originlive in Europe and North America.
In countries such as the United States (a traditional country
of immigration) and Germany (a reluctant country of immigration), where the foreign born constitute more than 12
percent of the total population, immigration is a particularly
salient political issue. The fundamental areas of policy concern
include immigrant integration, border control, refugees, family
unification, and migrant labor.
Immobolisme 767
Commissioner for Refugees, relatively few of the millions of
people fleeing wars, persecution, and famine will ever gain
refugee status in Europe or North America. In 2007, for
instance, the United States admitted 1,608 Iraqi refugees out
of an estimated two million living outside Iraq. In global comparative perspective, humanitarian concern for refugees falls
largely outside the perceived national interest of the worlds
most powerful countries.
Caldera, Selena, and Paige Piper-Bach. Immigration Policy in the United States.
Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget
Office, 2006.
Cornelius, Wayne A. Controlling Immigration. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2004.
Legomsky, Stephen H. Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy. New York:
Foundation, 2005.
LeMay, Michael C. Anatomy of a Public Policy:The Reform of Contemporary
American Immigration Law. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994.
Massey, Douglas S. Worlds in Motion. Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 2005.
Schain, Martin. The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain, and the United
States: A Comparative Study. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
UNHCR. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva,
Switzerland: United Nations High Commission for Refugees Media
Relations and Public Information Service, 2007.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of
Immigration Statistics, 2008.
Zolberg, Aristide R. A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of
America. New York: Russell Sage, 2006.
Immobolisme
Immobolisme (immobilism) refers to a period of political
instability and inaction in France from the late 1800s through
the mid-1950s. During the Third and Fourth Republics the
French government was characterized by a weak executive
and a strong legislature. Within the National Assembly, the
number of political parties precluded majoritarian governments, and instead, the country was governed by a series of
fragile coalition governments. These cabinets frequently disintegrated over policy or personality issues and often lasted
less than a year. Between 1947 and 1958, the office of prime
minister changed twenty-one times. This instability prevented
the formulation and implementation of long-term planning
and policy implementation, leading governments to be characterized as immobile or static. Immobolisme was especially
damaging to France because of the dramatic socioeconomic
changes that occurred and the high level of external security
threats faced by the country, including the initial period of
decolonization. There was a rise in the power of the bureaucracy, which itself began to develop and adopt policies in the
absence of formal direction from the executive or the legislature. Although particularly associated with France, the tenets
of immobolisme may also be applied to other countries with
a history of short-lived governments, including Italy.
See also Bureaucracy; European Politics and Society; French Political Thought.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Furniss, Edgar. France,Troubled Ally: De Gaulles Heritage and Prospects. New
York: Harper, 1960.
Rioux, Jean-Pierre. The Fourth Republic, 19441958. Translated by Godfrey
Rogers. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Immunity
See Executive Immunity; Parliamentary Immunity.
768 Impeachment
Impeachment
Impeachment, often confused with actual removal from office,
is the required first step in removing an elected official from
office. Impeachment is not the same as removal. Presidents
Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton were both impeached by
the House of Representatives, but the trial conducted in the
Senate failed to garner enough votes, in either case, to warrant
their removal.
The Founders, fearing a tyrannical leader, seriously deliberated how to remove judges or presidents who abused their
powers.The Constitution states, The president, vice president
and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The infrequency with which impeachment has occurred attests to its
significance; clearly, only the most extreme situations warrant impeachment. Throughout the nations history, only two
presidents have been impeached, and only one other had
impeachment hearings begin. However, the judiciary has been
exposed to quite a few more impeachments, and since 1936
the U.S. House of Representatives witnessed six impeachment
investigations, while trials have occurred only twice in the U.S.
Senate in the nations history. The infrequency of its occurrence can also be attributed to the ambiguity that surrounds
the process.
The Constitution fails to clarify what constitutes an
impeachable offense. It makes clear that treason and bribery
are impeachable offenses, but what about other high crimes
and misdemeanors? What constitutes these offenses? This is
a question that still plagues constitutional scholars. Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution provides the House of Representatives with the sole authority over impeachment. It also
provides the House with the ability to determine the rules of
the proceedings. The official process begins once a complaint
of official misconduct is given to the House. Any representative, the president, a grand jury, or a state legislature can make a
request for impeachment. Once a complaint is received, there
are two alternate routes by which proceedings may be initiated in the House. First, the Judicial Conference can forward
the request for impeachment to the House and by doing so
recommend impeachment. Second, the passage of the Independent Counsel Act provides the special prosecutor with the
discretion to forward a request of consideration for impeachment to the House. Once received by the House, all impeachment requests are forwarded to the Judiciary Committee. Any
resolutions seeking an impeachment investigation are then
referred to the Rules Committee. After the investigation into
the impeachment terminates, a vote is set for the articles of
impeachment.
If the impeachment passes, the House determines which
representatives will serve as House managers in presenting
the articles of impeachment to the Senate. They are usually
chosen in an election by a majority of the House, by resolution, or by resolution in which the Speaker of the House
nominates the representatives. However, the House Judiciary
Imperialism
In a strict sense, imperialism is the process of creating an
empire. An empire is a complex political unit comprising
diverse social units, each with distinct cultural identities,
hierarchically organized under the domination of one of its
parts. An empire is thus distinct from a national state, which
is relatively homogeneous in its sociocultural features, and a
multinational state based on a free federation of its component parts.
Historically, empires generally developed from the expansion of a relatively compact and homogeneous core state
extending the territorial range of its domination. Imperial
expansion in its early forms was thus largely geographically
contiguous, involving a process of progressive movement outward from an original core territory. Various forms of imperial political administration were established, but all involved a
substantial devolution of political authority to local officials or
agents, creating a recurring problem of fragmentation as local
actors chose to prioritize their own interests over those of
the imperial center. This produced a typical cycle of imperial
Imperialism 769
In 1858, the East India Company transferred its rule of India to the
British Crown, adding to Britains imperial holdings. The British
attempted to administer India through indirect rule via local
intermediaries.
source: The Granger Collection, New York
expansion followed by a phase of decay induced by overexpansion and the emergence of dissident forces in the periphery that threatened imperial power.
Nevertheless, imperial development often took place on
top of a parallel process of cultural enlargement of the center that contributed to historical nation-building. Thus, the
Roman city-state left a legacy that contributed to the formation of the Italian nation long after its imperial dominion
had disintegrated, and the Chinese and Russian empires both
contributed to the formation of modern national identities
and nation-states.
770 Imperialism
democratic public opinion at home, was less harsh and more
developmental. Colonialism provided a framework for transfers that could benefit the recipient societies: modern technologies, capital, education, public health, and Western-originated
values of nationhood and democracy. But colonial administrations also imposed fiscal burdens on local populations and
retarded local economic development when it threatened to
conflict with the needs of the metropolis.The balance sheet of
colonialism is complex, but at the end of the day it must incorporate the fact that colonial development was undertaken in
a way that served the interests of the colonial masters and not
local societies. Moreover, the liberal Western cultural values
that were transferred with colonization contained within
them a powerful critique of the ethos of colonial dependency.
These processes fused with the impact of two global wars,
in which colonial resources were mobilized to strengthen
the military needs of the European colonial powers. In the
aftermath of World War I (19141918), indigenous resistance
to colonialism began to assume a new form, centered on a
nascent anticolonial nationalism. World War II (19391945)
intensified this process still further, and in its wake modern
forms of anticolonial nationalism erupted throughout the
colonial world.
This ushered in a long, and often highly conflictual, process
of decolonization, especially bitter where nationalist forces had
to deal not only with colonial administrations but also with
privileged white settler groups, as in Algeria, Kenya, and Rhodesia.The independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 marked
the commencement of this process, which unfolded throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Imperialism 771
second place to the export of capital. It produced intensified
competition between national blocs of capital that moved
from the economic to the international political plane. One
manifestation of this was the scramble for colonial possessions;
anothercrucial for Lenins political argumentwas the outbreak of World War I, which he viewed as a conflict driven by
rival imperialist ambitions.
Particular elements of Lenins analysis have been subject
to telling criticism, in particular the implication that nineteenth-century colonial expansion was driven by the export
of capital, when in fact more capital flowed into countries not
subject to colonial rule (either developed countries or those in
Latin America) and finance capital was least developed in the
most important colonial power, Britain. However, the general
sweep of his argumentthe identification of a distinct, highly
internationalized phase of capitalism based on the export of
capitalappears quite prescient. His unidimensional reduction of international relations to interimperialist competition
looks oversimplified, failing to give sufficient weight to an
autonomous dynamic of state power seeking, but he appears
to be right in calling attention to the importance of economic objectives in foreign policy and to the close connection between state power and control of economic resources.
Later Marxist writers have largely followed Lenins model
of imperialism and his linkage between economic objectives
and interstate conflict. However, with the establishment of
new noncapitalist societies, first in the Soviet Union and then
in eastern Europe and China, it was argued that interimperialist rivalry was overshadowed by the conflict between the
two opposed social systems and that the imperialist countries
became united under the leadership of their most powerful
memberthe United Statesin efforts to prevent the socialist
model from spreading to other countries. Later Marxist writings therefore shifted their attention to the structure of the
postwar international system and to the relationship between
the leading capitalist countries and that section of the world
that was seen as being subject to the most intense exploitation:
the third world.
Impossibility Theorem
Society has a constant need to aggregate preferences. On
a personal level, when making decisions, an individual has
to make a rational choice based on several criteria. Taking
a presidential election as an example, when deciding which
candidate to vote for, the constituent has to take into consideration the candidates previous history, political party,
and program, among other factors. On a group level, voting
systems are built with the purpose of extracting the decision
from different voters preferences. In this case, legislatures are
the most common example. Legislatures have their own voting rules that are used to translate individual preferences into
a group preference.
B1
B2
B3
774 Impoundment
Poundstone, William. Gaming the Vote:Why Elections Arent Fair (and What We
Can Do About It). New York: Hill and Wang, 2008.
Schofield, Norman James. The Spatial Model of Politics. London: Routledge,
2008.
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek. Analyzing Politics: Rationality,
Behavior, and Institutions. New York: Norton, 1997.
Tideman, Nicolaus. Collective Decisions and Voting:The Potential for Public
Choice. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006.
Impoundment
Impoundment was a historic power used by presidents of the
United States to not spend funds appropriated by Congress.
Successive chief executives used the authority to avoid expenditures that they disagreed with or believed were unnecessary.
In 1801 Thomas Jefferson initiated impoundment when he
delayed spending $50,000 that Congress had voted to fund
the construction of fifteen naval gunboats to patrol the Mississippi River. Jefferson believed there was no immediate security
threat on the river and that efforts to control the national debt
precluded increased defense expenditures. He deferred funding
the gunboats for a year. Franklin Roosevelt was also notable
for his use of impoundment. Presidents argued that impoundment was one of the inherent powers of the office. In 1974,
in response to the repeated use of impoundment by Richard
M. Nixon in an effort to reduce public spending, Congress
enacted the Budget and Impoundment Control Act, which
ended the practice. Henceforth, presidents were allowed only
to recommend the recession of a specific expenditure, which
then had to be approved by both the House and the Senate.
The loss of impoundment was one of the motivators behind
efforts to enact a line-item veto power for the president.
See also Budgeting; Checks and Balances; Separation of Powers.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOM LANSFORD
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Neustadt, Richard. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents:The Politics of
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. Rev. ed. New York: Free Press, 1991.
Whittington, Keith E. Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and
Constitutional Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Incrementalism
Incrementalism is a theory of decision based on the premise
that actors face broad organizational and cognitive limitations in real-life situations and must deal with a complex,
uncertain world, the interpretation of which is often a matter
of disagreement among them. While democratic interaction is, according to Charles Lindblom and Edward Woodhouse (1993), the most efficient way to decide, an intelligent
approach to analysis that aims at simplifying rather than overcoming these limitations is invaluable. Incrementalism offers a
multifaceted, flexible approach to this analysis.
Although Robert Dahl and Charles Lindbloms book Politics, Economics and Welfare (1953) introduced incrementalism
as an analytical aid to decision making and it was expanded
on in Lindblom (1959), its final version was tabled only in
Lindbloms (1979) article, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through.
Here Lindblom clarifies the multifaceted reality of incremental analysis by distinguishing among simple incremental analysis (limited to policies incrementally different from the status
quo), disjointed incrementalism (a complex simplifying strategy limiting the analysis to familiar options, for which only
limited consequences are explored; intertwining values and
empirical elements, involving a remedial approach based on
a trial-and-error strategy; and fragmenting the analytical work
among many participants), and strategic analysis (encompassing the strategically thought and chosen stratagems that allow
simplification of complex problems). The concept underwent a progressive refinement and was finally synthesized by
Andrew Weiss and Edward Woodhouse (1992) as processes that
(1) aid decision making by limiting analysis to familiar policies
and to only some of the possible consequences they may carry,
(2) employ trial-and-error methods, and (3) are more interested in remedying problems than in seeking positive goals.
Incrementalism also tends to conflate values and policy goals
with the empirical side of the problem (rather than order them
sequentially) and to fragment the analysis among various partisan actors, each working on part of the issue.
There have been five main critiques against incrementalism. The first critique is that it is insufficiently goal oriented,
but even a cursory glance to the literature will reveal that this
is a baseless argument. Second is the charge that it carries an
inherent conservative, proelite bias. One can refute this, however, by noting that bias depends on power distribution rather
than on the model: the elites follow a pattern of decisions that
favors them; incrementalism does not create this pattern.Third,
incrementalism is said to be narrowly applicable, fitting only
stable, noncrisis situations. Here it is worthwhile asking why
nonincremental models would be better in unstable situations;
crisis decision making is inherently difficult, regardless of the
model chosen. Fourth, incrementalism is also charged with
being vulnerable to threshold effects. Small marginal changes,
which the model assumes can be easily reversed, cannot be
altered if the threshold is surpassed, but this problem is common to all models of decision making. The final critique is
that it is difficult to pinpoint the meaning of incrementalism,
which has been applied to fields as diverse as budgeting, foreign
policy, and city planning. This is a real problem; the wide array
of meanings attributed to incrementalism depended both on
Lindbloms delay in specifying the concept and on the liberality
with which other scholars applied it. In the 1990s, neoincrementalism attempted successfully to tackle these criticisms by
distilling broadly accepted definitions, bringing more precision
to the discussion, and distinguishing among incrementalism as
an analytical tool, as disjointed incremental strategy, and as a
small-step process that involves small sequential moves.
See also Decision Theory, Foundations of; Policy Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANDREA MIGONE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dahl, Robert A., and Charles E. Lindblom. Politics, Economics and Welfare.
New York: Harpers, 1953.
Hayes, Michael T. Incrementalism and Public Policy. New York: Longman, 1992.
Incumbency
Incumbent refers to the current holder of a political office. The
term is used mostly in reference to elections as candidates are
often defined by their status as an incumbent or a nonincumbent because incumbency instills benefits that are elusive for
nonincumbents. One of the most difficult aspects of campaigning for elected office is generating name recognition
among voters, which requires money and visibility. Incumbency affords this type of advantage. To be politically viable,
one needs to raise moneyand in many cases, do so better
than ones competition. Incumbency supplies candidates with
the ability not only to call on past supporters but also to seek
out new donors more easily. Contributors are more willing to
donate to an incumbent because that person has already been
elected once and thus has a better chance of being elected
again. Last, incumbents can utilize the benefits of being in
office to their advantage. They can capitalize on the esteem of
their office, advertise their accomplishments and experience,
and benefit from a cadre of willing supporters and staffers to
assist in their election. In many respects, incumbency allows
them to rely on an existing campaign structure.
See also Campaigns.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RICHARD M. YON
Independence
See Wars of Independence.
HISTORY
The region has the oldest heritage of international exchange
in the world. The earliest urban civilizationsin the Middle
East, the Persian Gulf littoral, and South Asiawere linked
by seaborne commerce. In fact, early civilizations in Mesopotamia (Sumer), ancient Egypt, and the Indus Valley have
developed around the Indian Ocean. For some four thousand years, the IOR was the scene of a thriving network of
trade and people-to-people links. However, with the arrival
of the European powers in the late fifteenth centuryfirst
IOR-ARC
IOR-ARC was launched in Mauritius in 1997. The association comprises eighteen member states: Australia, Bangladesh,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Egypt,
Japan, China, France, and the United Kingdom are dialogue
partners. Seychelles withdrew its IOR-ARC membership
on July 1, 2003. The association aims to broaden cooperation among member countries in investment, tourism, construction, trade, training, environment protection, renewable
energy, and agriculture. In 2009, member countries decided to
establish the International Renewable Energy Agency in the
United Arab Emirates. The association also includes bodies
known as the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum and the
Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group. Although the charter of
the organization does not provide it with an explicit mandate
to engage with security issues, over the years member states
NAMIBIA
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NEW
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SOUTH
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Great
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South
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BRUNEI
VIETNAM
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MYANMAR
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BIMSTEC
The idea of the BIMSTEC regional cooperation project was
first brought up by Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand
at a meeting in Bangkok in June 1997.The aims of BIMSTEC
are to create an enabling environment for rapid economic
development, accelerate social progress in the subregion, and
promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest. In January 2004, member countries
agreed on a framework to implement a free trade agreement
in trade in goods. Currently, the members of the organization
are Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan,
and Nepal. The regional group attempts to serve as a bridge
between the five South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation countries (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and
Nepal) and two Association of Southeast Asian Nations states
(Myanmar and Thailand), bringing institutional cohesion to
one of the most diverse regions of the world.
The IOR is a region of vast political, cultural, and economic diversity, which has historically been united by processes of cultural interchange. It is the only major portion of
the globe where all of the worlds great religions are represented. But in modern times the region has been marked by
great disparities in economic development and is the location
of some of the worlds most intractable conflicts and political
disputes. However, the growth of regional cooperation and
integration, embodied in IOR-ARC and BIMSTEC, might
serve as an alternative mode of governance to ensure regional
peace and economic development.
See also International Organization;Trade Coalitions.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RODRIGO TAVARES
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Batesman, Sam. Indian Ocean Region: Prospects for a New Regional
Community. Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter 21 (SeptemberOctober 1995):
1213.
Chaudhuri, K. N. Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic
History from the Rise of Islam to 1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985.
Copley, Gregory. New Strategic Equation in the Indian Ocean. Defense and
Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 25 (April 1997): 2021.
Indirect Elections
In an indirect election, the voters do not choose a candidate directly for office but instead choose electors who then
decide whom to elect for the constituency. Indirect elections
are relatively common, with perhaps the most well-known
example of an indirect election involving the U.S. electoral
college, which selects the president and the vice president.
Other countries that elect officials via indirect elections
include Germany, Italy, Greece, France, Hungary, Estonia,
Latvia, Ireland, and the Czech Republic. Some Eastern societies such as India and Pakistan select legislative officials or
presidents through an indirect procedure as well. Indirect
elections may have implications for democratic representation
that are magnified depending on the post that is being elected.
In Europe, presidents, who typically function as heads of
state, are often indirectly elected. For example, the president
of the Italian Republic (Presidente della Repubblica Italiana) is
elected by the joint vote of its lower and upper legislative bodies: the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati) and the
senate of the republic (Senato della Repubblica). The members
of the German parliament (Bundestag) and an equal number of
representatives from the federal states form the Federal Convention (Bundesversammlung) to elect the German president
(Bundesprsident). Greece, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and the
Czech Republic also elect their heads of state indirectly but
use only the elected parliamentary body to do so. In France,
one chamber of Parliament (Snat) is elected by an electoral
college for a five-year term. The majority of the senators are
selected by state- (Dpartement-) elected representatives, and a
small proportion by the elected assembly of the French living
abroad who form the Assemble des Franais de ltranger. Finally,
the Republic of Irelands senate (ireann Seanad) is indirectly
selected by various electoral bodies.
One of the most notable examples of an indirect election occurs in the United States, where the electoral college
is used to elect the president. The Framers of the American
Constitution wanted to ensure that the federal states would
have an equal influence over the election result and simultaneously guarantee that the elected president would be chosen by
sophisticated delegates and not the uninformed masses. With
the electoral college, each state selects delegates equal to the
number of members serving in the House of Representatives
and the Senate for that particular state. The party affiliation of
these delegates is determined by the winner of the popular
vote in every state separately. Although, in theory, these delegates can cast their votes for the presidential candidate of their
choosing, the precedent is that they vote for the candidate
they have pledged to their constituents to vote for. The electoral college has been the focus of several criticisms, the first
being that the presidential campaigns tend to focus on people
voting in battleground or swing states. Another is that not all
votes cast have an equal influence over the result. A final criticism is that the president can be elected without winning the
popular vote, as evident in the 2000 election between George
W. Bush and Al Gore (similar to the results in 1824, 1876, and
1888). Debate about the potential reform of the U.S. electoral
college has been evident in the past, yet all reform proposals
have been denied by the U.S. Congress.
Obviously, not all indirect elections are designed to serve
the same cause. The majority of indirectly elected officials do
not exercise substantive powers.With the noticeable exception
of the American president, the post of head of state has typical
and often ceremonial jurisdictions. The same holds for indirectly elected parliamentary chambers such as those in France
or Ireland, as their roles are supposedly advisory and lack
SOCIAL CONTRACTS
The interdependence of the individual and society was highlighted in particular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through discussions of the social contract by Thomas
Hobbes (15881679), John Locke (16321704), David Hume
(17111776), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (17121778). It is to
Rousseau that we owe the origin of the term social contract,
or du contrat social. These authors were writing at a time of
great industrial, economic, political, and social change and
faced the challenge of justifying obedience of individuals to
societal authorities. According to the logical social contract,
it was assumed that sometime in the historical past, an actual
contract had been agreed on between individual members of
society and their rulers. This must have been the case because
humans are fairly equal in their physical and mental abilities,
and only through consent could leaders have obtained the
CORRUPT SOCIETY
Rousseau set a very different tradition to explaining the
relationship between the individual and society. People are
born free, yet everywhere they are in chains; individuals are
born good, yet there is corruption and greed everywhere.
The reason, Rousseau argues, is because of the corrupt state
of societies. It is corrupt institutions and cultures that create corrupt individuals. Later, Karl Marx (18181883) would
argue this corrupt state of affairs is upheld by an ideology
and false consciousness, the inability of individuals to correctly perceive their own class membership and interests, and
that the role of the central authority is to protect the interests
of the ruling class.
This emphasis on the power of the environment to shape
human behavior is endorsed by the Lockian tradition of viewing the newborn mind as a blank slate, a tabula rasa. In the
twentieth century, B. F. Skinner (19041990) and other behaviorists attempted to establish a science based on the laws of
learning and to demonstrate empirically how the blank slate
takes shape through environmental stimuli.
Individualism 779
prewiring in the brain, which enables human language acquisition, moral thinking, and the like. This line of research is
particularly influenced by the ideas of Noam Chomsky and by
the availability of new brain-imaging technologies. Research
on stem cells, robotics, and biotechnology raises the possibility
that in the future, researchers will be able to make more direct
and effective interventions in cases of brain abnormalities.
Although individuals do arrive in the world with their
brains in some ways prewired, research also highlights brain
plasticity and the foundational role of society in shaping individual behavior. In addition to the focus on biological characteristics of individuals, then, there is also research on the
second question stated above, namely, those aspects of the
environment that enable society to enter into the individual
and to regulate behavior. Two examples are the discussions by
Richard Dawkins of meme machines, a cultural unit that can
be transmitted from one individual to another, and research by
Fathali Moghaddam on the means by which values and other
aspects of culture are spread. The rise of religious fundamentalism and terrorism has focused particular attention on sacred
carriers, such as the Islamic veil and the Christian cross, that
individuals believe serve to connect them with holy powers.
See also Aristotle; Civic Engagement; Civil Society; Hobbes,
Thomas; Hume, David; Locke, John; Plato; Public Good; Rousseau,
Jean-Jacques; Social Order.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . FATHALI M. MOGHADDAM
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Blackmore, Susan, and Richard Dawkins. The Meme Machine. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000.
Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford University Press,
1989.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Austin, Tex.: Touchstone, 2008.
Moghaddam, Fathali M. The Individual and Society: A Cultural Integration.
New York: Worth, 2002.
Plato. The Republic. Translated by G. M. A. Grube and C. D. C. Reeve.
Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1992.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. Miami, Fla.: BN, 2007.
Individualism
Individualism is largely understood today as a normative
doctrine holding the autonomy of individuals to be the final
object of moral and political life. The term was originally
descriptive, however, invented in the early nineteenth century
to describe the atomization of European society that attended
democracys emergence after the collapse of the ancien rgime.
Scholars attribute the first public use of the word to the
French conservative Joseph de Maistre, and the philosophical
disciples of Henri di Saint Simon popularized it in the late
1820s and 1830s as a mournful term for the disintegration of
the social whole.
The most enduring analysis of individualism as a social
pathology is Alexis de Tocquevilles. In Democracy in America
(1835, 1840), he characterized individualism as a sentiment
that disposes each citizen to cut himself off from the mass of
his fellow men and withdraw into the circle of family and
friends, so that, having created a little society for his own use,
he gladly leaves the larger society to take care of itself (Tocqueville 2004, 585). Tocquevilles critique of individualism as
a phenomenon that dampens public involvement, depletes
political virtue, and produces alienation survives into the presentinspiring Robert Bellah and his colleagues Habits of the
Heart (1985), one of the most popular contemporary communitarian critiques of individualism.
Individualisms vigor as an affirmative moral, political, and
economic doctrine matches the vehemence of its critics. The
enduring power of both the Christian ideal of individual dignity and the Enlightenment ideal of personal autonomy partly
accounts for this. In the mid-nineteenth century, American
philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson and British philosopher
John Stuart Mill made these ideals the centerpiece of their
positive normative accounts of individualism. They fortified these ideals, moreover, by positing that the individuals
freedom to enact his or her inborn genius produces greater
social, intellectual, and artistic goods than could ever be realized through centralized social coordination. Emersonian and
Millian individualism yields a democratic political morality:
the foremost obligation of individuals is to respect their own
and each others autonomy, and the objective of government
is to create the social conditions necessary for citizens to realize their autonomy. The pragmatist John Dewey elaborated
Emerson and Mills conception of democratic individuality in
the early twentieth century, and the political theorist George
Kateb is its most eloquent spokesperson today.
Neoclassical economists and political libertarians are
also counted among the twentieth centurys most energetic
defenders of individualism. F. A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, and
Robert Nozick held that society could best honor individuals by minimizing the states functions to just protecting private property and maintaining a competitive market economy.
Reducing the role of the state to the optimization of free market competition, they argued, produces the widest range of
life options and greatest life chances for individuals as well as
lessens the dangers of government paternalism and tyranny.
The egalitarian liberal John Rawls responded, however,
that a morally individualist theory of justice demands that
government intervene in the economy to minimize material
inequality. Such inequality among citizens, he claimed, is justifiable only when it is necessary to improve the position of
the least well-off member of society. Because the wellspring
of Rawlss egalitarianism is his basic commitment to the equal
dignity of individuals, Kateb crowns Rawlss moral theory
the twentieth centurys greatest statement of individualism
(Kateb 1989, 184).
The final form of individualism central to political science is methodological individualism. Methodological individualism is a doctrine of social explanation that holds that
all social phenomena are descriptively reducible to interactions between persons; it denies that there are social forces,
structural features of society, [and] institutional factors greater
than the sum of the decisions and actions of societys members (Lukes 1973, 122). Articulated originally by Max Weber
Industrial Democracy
In its most general form industrial democracy refers to employees right to be involved in the decision-making process at the
workplace. In some countries such as Germany and Sweden,
so-called codetermination between employers and employees
is a matter of law (since 1976 in Germany with the Mitbestimungesesetz and since 1978 in Sweden with the Medbestmmandelagen), while in other countries similar arrangements
are regulated in collective agreements between employers and
workers. Since 1994 a European Union directive has existed
that requires larger firms with operations in several European countries to create so-called European Works Councils,
mainly to create a platform for consultation.
In its weakest form industrial democracy consists of mere
information and consultation practices at the firm level. In its
strongest form it means workers absolute workplace control,
Information, Freedom of
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Crouch, C., and F. Heller, eds. International Yearbook of Organizational
Democracy. Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1983.
Davis, E., and R. Lansbury, eds. Democracy and Control in the Workplace.
Melbourne, Australia: Longman Cheshire, 1986.
Deery, S., D. Plowman, and J. Walsh. Industrial Relations: A Contemporary
Analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997.
Haug, R. History of Industrial Democracy in Sweden: Industrial
Revolution to 1980. Industrial Journal of Management 21 (March 2004):
715.
Lichtenstein, N., and J. H. Howell. Industrial Democracy in America:The
Ambiguous Promise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Mueller-Jentsch, W. Industrial Democracy: Historical Development and
Current Challenges. Management Revue:The International Review of
Management Studies 19 (2008): 260273.
Webb, Sidney, and Beatrice Webb. Industrial Democracy. New York: AMS, 1994.
Inequality
See Equality and Inequality; Urban Inequality and Poverty.
Inference
Inferential techniques allow researchers to learn something
about unknown phenomena from known evidence or data.
There are chiefly two types of inference: descriptive inference involves extracting useful explanations from masses of
evidence; causal inference pinpoints the explanatory factors,
frequently suggested by theory, underlying the available data
or evidence. Scientific inference, and prediction thereof, usually deploys causal hypothesis testing in which a set of factors
accounts for possible outcomes under particular conditions.
The fundamental problem of causal inference describes the
uncertainty regarding the underlying explanatory factors
being the real causes of the outcomes described. Both supporters and critics of inferential techniques note the influence
of omitted factors or variables, difficulty of measuring what
is being measured (problems of validity), and impossibility of ever knowing that the same causal factors caused the
outcome over and over given that exact experiments cannot be repeated under real-world conditions (problems of
Information Society
Australian economist Colin Clark stressed the dominance of
different sectors of an economy at different stages of its development and modernization, thus leading to the recognition
of the three basic sectors: agriculture, industry, and service.
The dominance of each sector was brought about by revolutions, especially in the agricultural and industrial sectors, thus
emphasizing the significance of the agricultural revolution
and the industrial revolution.
skilled, more capital intensive, and more dependent on technology. Among the most educated people in society today are those
who work in, operate, and control the information economy.
The size of the information sector has grown rapidly. The
concomitant information society would be shaped by the use
and deployment of ICTs including computers and other electronic and audiovisual media such as the television, the phone,
and the cell phone, which clearly have transformed the way
we live and work. At the heart of the information society as
mediated by communication is the decentering of communications so that individuals can remake society by remaking
their communications network, thus leading to the empowerment of the individual and his or her communicative potential. Lewis Mumford uses the term democratic technics to
describe the ability of technology to allow for democratic
self-government with free communication between equals
and unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge.
These are emerging because of ICTs ability to make such
flows a reality. The information society conceived as democratic technics allows individuals to express themselves outside
mass parties and overcome class identities. Gone is the control
of information by the expert.
With the ease and universality of access lies the key to
the information technology revolution and the society that
is developing around it. In the age of computers with evergrowing storage capacity, interactivity, and processing power,
we have a potentially dangerous tool because the revolution is
irreversiblelike nuclear energy, its power needs to be controlled if it is to work for our benefit. The computer is an
empowering tool because of access to information and communication, but it can also be an implement of control, giving
unlimited power to those who control the information that it
stores. The dilemma is how to resolve that issue.
Toffler talked about a future shock from the inability to
keep up with the accelerating changes of the information age.
It is not unusual to talk about the following types of information: misinformation, disinformation, overinformation, or
information overload, which contributes to noise and boredom. Thus, in our information-dependent society those who
possess information can derive real power from it, and the loss
of empowerment can be caused by its absence. It could therefore be the goal of ICT in politics to enhance the efficiency of
delivery methods in terms of voting, political participation, and
so forth so that democracy can be maintained and enhanced.
See also Blogs and Bloggers; E-governance, E-voting, E-democracy,
E-politics; Information Technology and Politics; Network Society.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CECILIA G. MANRIQUE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Castells, Manuel. The Information Age. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996, 1997,
1998.
Dearnley, James, and John Feather. The Wired World. London: Library
Association, 2001.
Feather, John. The Information Society. London: Facet, 2004.
Hornby, Susan, and Zoe Clarke. Challenge and Change in the Information
Society. London: Facet, 2003.
of data about their citizens and perhaps to mine the data for
interesting and otherwise nonobvious relationships.
The resurgence of the state, together with the more ready
availability of empirical data, has transformed debates about
the impact of new information technologies on politics.
Rather than making broad arguments about whether new
technologies are likely to result in secular changes to the
political system, scholars are beginning to try to identify more
specific mechanisms through which these new technologies
may have particular consequences for specific areas of politics.
Some of these mechanisms are beginning to become apparent
but have as yet received little academic attention. For example,
the vast increase in the availability of technical information
about government and politics is surely affecting the balance of political power, yet we know very little about who
is accessing this information and how they are using it. The
political consequences will be quite different depending on
whether the information is used by ordinary citizens, by specialized actors, or by partisan operatives. Other mechanisms
have attracted more attention. Much work has been done on
how the Internet affects politicians electoral strategies, and
work is beginning to emerge on its consequences for citizens political attitudes. Scholars are also beginning to examine
broader forms of politics, asking whether the Internet affects
nondemocratic countries prospects for democratization and
about the degree of political interdependence between states
in a globalized world.The rest of this article will briefly survey
how information technology is affecting political polarization
and electoral politics in the United States and how it is affecting international interdependence and the politics of democratization. This provides at least the beginnings of an overview
of how political scientists are beginning to take account of
the impact of information technology on American politics,
international relations, and comparative politics.
POLITICAL POLARIZATION
There is consensus among scholars of American politics
that the past few decades have seen more polarized politics,
although scholars disagree about whether this polarization
results from the interactions of parties and politicians or from
deeper divisions in the electorate. A significant body of recent
work has explored the extent to which greater media choice
helps spur polarization.
The basic logic of this argument is laid out in Markus Priors 2007 book Post-broadcast Democracy. Prior uses data from
cable television to argue that increased media choice allows
individuals with little direct interest in politics, who tend to be
moderate in their views, to avoid exposure to political information more easily. This makes them less likely to become
mobilized around political issues. In contrast, people with a
strong interest in politics, who tend to be more partisan than
the average, can consume political information more easily,
making them more likely to become mobilized along partisan
lines. Thus, politically apathetic moderates are able to escape
politics more easily, whereas politically interested partisans
have more opportunity to consume political information and
hence to engage in political activity.
ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS
Information technology plays a key role in electoral campaigning, especially in the United States. Data mining,
microtargeting on the basis of extensive electronic data, and
Internet communication are important components of the
political consultants toolkit. Yet the role of these technologies has changed dramatically over time and can be expected
to change further. Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis (2003)
studied the role of new technologies in the 2000 election
by examining largely static candidates Web sites. By 2004,
Democrats had begun to explore the Internets potential for
electronic fund-raising, while Republicans sought to combine
traditional social networks with microtargeting techniques
borrowed from advertising. In 2008, both major party presidential candidates tried to build participatory Web sites that
would spur activist involvement and to create online systems
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE
One of the most important themes of international relations
scholarship over the past thirty years has been the increase
in interdependence between different countries. States
DEMOCRATIZATION AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
There has been much discussion among media and policy elites
about the possibility that the Internet, cell phones, and text
messaging will further the spread of democracy. Most famously,
former U.S. president Bill Clinton claimed that liberty would
spread in this century by cell phone and cable modem and
that trying to control the Internet was like trying to nail Jello
to the wall. However, although there is some evidence that
information technology has been used by democracy activists,
there is remarkably scant evidence that this technology has
played a decisive role. While journalists describe, for example,
the 2009 political unrest in Iran as the Twitter revolution,
the preliminary evidence suggests that Twitter (an online
communication tool) did little to help organize protests on
the ground. Cell-phone text messaging did play a significant
role in coordinating action in prodemocratic revolutions in
the Philippines, the Ukraine, and elsewhere, but there is no
way of showing that these revolutions would not have taken
place, or would not have been successful, in the absence of
these technologies. In a detailed examination of eight cases of
authoritarian regimes, Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas (2003)
find that the Internet and related technologies are not necessarily a threat to authoritarian regimes. More recent work
by Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, Jonathan
Zittrain, and their colleagues (2008) finds that the Internet
has become increasingly balkanized, as governments in both
authoritarian and nonauthoritarian regimes have succeeded in
filtering Internet access for their citizens. Thus, early optimistic
suggestions that the Internet was sliced freedom have turned
out to be badly wrong.
Indeed, the aggregate evidence suggests strongly that the
causal arrow runs in the opposite direction. Helen Milner
(2006) finds strong evidence that differences in regime type
explain many of the lags in Internet diffusion. Authoritarian
governments are less likely to allow the Internet to be easily diffused within their borders both because authoritarian
leaders fear the consequences of open communication and
because powerful domestic actors (such as telecommunications monopolies) are in a better position to impede developments that might hurt their profits.
However, there is some reason to believe that the Internet,
along with other communications technologies, may foster
CONCLUSION
Measuring the impact of new information technologies such
as the Internet on politics is still a work in progress. However,
over the past ten years, there have been significant advances in
our understanding of the consequences of these technologies.
A set of initial debates that concerned very broad questions of
the state and politics has largely been replaced by a set of more
specific debates surrounding more particular consequences of
the Internet for specific aspects of politics.
This is genuine progress. While early arguments helped set
the tone for later discussions, they were for the most part conducted without the benefit of good data and information. By
focusing on narrower mechanisms of changeand bringing
good empirical information to bear on these mechanisms
we are finally making some genuine advances in our understanding of how information technology affects politics.This is
not to say that scholars should refrain from tackling the large,
secular questions of how these technologies are coming to
reshape politics, but they will be doing so on much firmer
ground if they build up from micro- and meso-level mechanisms and data. That the study of the Internet and politics is
becoming more prosaic is by no means necessarily a bad thing.
See also Blogs and Bloggers; Cryptography; Cybersecurity; Internet
and Politics; Network Society;Telecommunications Policy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HENRY FARRELL
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Adamic, Lada A., and Natalie Glance. The Political Blogosphere and
the 2004 US Election: Divided They Blog. In Proceedings of the Third
International Workshop on Link Discovery, 3643. New York: ACM, 2005.
Barlow, John Perry. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. The
Humanist 56 (1996): 1819.
Benkler,Yochai. The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom. New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 2006.
Berger, Suzanne. Globalization and Politics. Annual Review of Political
Science 3 (2000): 4362.
Bimber, Bruce, and Richard Davis. Campaigning Online:The Internet in U.S.
Elections. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Deibert, Ronald, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain.
Access Denied:The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008.
Farrell, Henry, Eric Lawrence, and John Sides. Self-Segregation or
Deliberation? Blog Readership, Participation and Polarization in
American Politics. Perspectives on Politics, 8 (2010): 141157.
Goldsmith, Jack L. Against Cyberanarchy. University of Chicago Law Review
65 (1998): 1199.
Goldsmith, Jack L., and Timothy Wu. Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a
Borderless World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Hargittai, Eszter, Jason Gallo, and Matthew Y. Kane. Cross-Ideological
Discussions among Conservative and Liberal Bloggers. Public Choice 134
(2008): 6786.
Hillygus, D. Sunshine, and Todd G. Shields. The Persuadable Voter:Wedge Issues
in Presidential Campaigns. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2008.
Jackson, David S., and Wendy King. First Nation in Cyberspace. Time,
December 6, 1993. www.chemie.fu-berlin.de/outerspace/internetarticle.html.
Johnson, David R., and David Post. Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace. Stanford Law Review 48 (1995): 1367.
Kalathil, Shanthi, and Taylor C. Boas. Open Networks, Closed Regimes:The
Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2003.
Lessig, Lawrence. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books,
1999.
Lynch, Marc. Blogging the New Arab Public. Arab Media and Society 1
(2007). www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=10 (accessed September 7,
2009).
MacKinnon, Rebecca. Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censorship
and Civic Discourse in China. Public Choice 134, no. 1 (2008): 3146.
Middleton, Joel A., and Donald P. Green. Do Community-based Voter
Mobilization Campaigns Work Even in Battleground States? Evaluating
the Effectiveness of MoveOns 2004 Outreach Campaign. Quarterly
Journal of Political Science 3, no. 1 (2008): 6382.
Milner, Helen V. The Digital Divide: The Role of Political Institutions in
Technology Diffusion. Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 2 (2006): 176.
Nickerson, David W. Does Email Boost Turnout? Quarterly Journal of
Political Science 2, no. 4 (2007): 369379.
Prior, Markus. Post-broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality
in Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
Sunstein, Cass R. Republic.com. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2001.
Wojcieszak, Magdalena, and Diana Mutz. Online Groups and Political
Discourse: Do Online Discussion Spaces Facilitate Exposure to Political
Disagreement? Journal of Communication, forthcoming.
Injustice
See Justice and Injustice.
Inner Cities
Inner city refers to the decaying central area of a major city,
urban metropolis, or conurbation, comprising the most
deprived neighborhoods around the central business district. It
is different from the rest of the city in a number of its characteristics: it is an area affected by long-term urban infrastructure
decay, poor housing conditions, and lack of basic modern
social amenities; it is inhabited by a low-income population,
regeneration of inner cities was seen as requiring policy instruments different from those used before to create dynamic economies in and around the inner-city area, based on economic
sectors in which the inner city had real competitive advantage.
It included initiatives such as enterprise zones and empowerment zones, among other similar instruments. There are many
examples of this approach all over the world, involving in some
cases the creation of private or public-private entities to run the
development process (e.g., London Docklands and its Urban
Development Corporation, Hong Kong and its Land Development Corporation and Urban Renewal Authority). For the
proponents of this new vision, the competitive advantage of
inner cities resulted from factors such as their locations, especially their access and proximity to transportation and to the
central business district, the size and characteristics of their own
consumer markets, and the availability and diversification of
their workforces, among other factors. On the other hand, the
new approach argued that the regeneration process, contrary
to what happened before, should be conducted by private corporations and through special programs for the promotion of
homeownership seen as the best answer to gentrification.
Since the 1990s, a third generation of inner-city policies is
replacing the previous one as part of a more general shift in the
mainstream discourse on urbanism. Cultural urbanism is now
seen as the key driver for urban regeneration in the inner city
and in other parts of the city as well (e.g., in Barcelona, Buenos
Aires, Canberra, and Shanghai, to mention just a few cases).
This includes the promotion of iconic architecture, the hosting of large-scale events as place promotion, and the creation
of a new image for the inner city, its brand image, as part of a
larger project for the cultural city.
See also Local Politics; Mayor; Urban Housing; Urban Inequality
and Poverty.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CARLOS NUNES SILVA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cullingworth, J. Barry. The Political Culture of Planning: American Land Use
Planning in Comparative Perspective. New York: Routledge, 1993.
Cullingworth, J. Barry, and Vincent Nadin. Town and Country Planning in
Britain. London: Routledge, 1994.
Deakin, Nicholas, and John Edwards. The Enterprise Culture and the Inner-city.
London: Routledge, 1995.
Donnison, David, and Alan Middleton, eds. Regenerating the Inner City:
Glasgows Experience. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987.
Grant, Jill. Planning the Good Community: New Urbanism in Theory and Practice.
London: Routledge, 2006.
Irazbal, Clara, ed. Ordinary Places, Extraordinary Events: Citizenship, Democracy,
and Public Space in Latin America. London: Routledge, 2008.
Lewis, Norman. Inner City Regeneration:The Demise of Regional and Local
Government. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1992.
Miles, Malcolm. Cities and Cultures. London: Routledge, 2007.
Moncls, Javier, and Manuel Gurdia, eds. Culture, Urbanism and Planning.
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006.
Porter, Michael. The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City. Harvard
Business Review 73, no. 3 (MayJune 1995): 5571.
Rogers, Alisdair. The Politics of the British Inner City. Geoforum 21, no. 4
(1990): 455463.
Silva, Carlos Nunes. O Programa Polis: Um Instrumento de Regenerao
Urbana [The Polis Program: An Instrument for Urban Regeneration].
Cadernos Municipais: Revista de Aco Regional e Local 14, no. 73 (2000): 3846.
Inspector General
Inspectors general are found throughout bureaucratic and
military apparatuses around the world. The main purpose
of an inspector general is to ensure efficiency and compliance with standards of mission statements for bureaucracies
or standards of military service. Inspectors general are often
recognized for their expertise within their field and in many
countries are high-ranking, well-educated bureaucrats. As the
head of inspections and audits for the bureaucratic departments, inspectors general investigate fraud and misappropriations of funds, time, and equipment.They also work to protect
whistle-blowers, government workers who bring attention to
a serious problem within their agencies. In addition, offices
of inspectors general evaluate and audit programs provided
by the bureaucratic departments and provide recommendations to heads of state and other interested parties, such as
legislatures.
Much of an inspector generals work is in the capacity of
finding wrongdoing rather than identifying good practices and
making positive recommendations. Inspectors general perform
many types of audits, including internal, external, financial, and
performance audits. Internal audits focus on a bureaucracy or
military agency, where inspectors examine the agency from
within, while external audits are performed on contractors the
agency has hired to perform a specific task. Financial audits
focus on where the money has gone and whether the money
allocated to certain projects has been properly spent, and performance audits look at the mission statement of an agency
and evaluate whether the agency and its employees are performing up to standards. Although they work within agencies,
inspectors attempt to remain impartial; however, objectivity
sometimes comes into question when the motives of investigations and audits seem political. Opposing factions within
government may request agency audits to search for wrongdoing that will allow them to reduce allocations to that agency.
Older conceptualizations of the inspector general were
deeply rooted in the need for organization, efficiency, and
compliance in police and military affairs. From these themes
modern bureaucracies have taken these initiatives to create
better government. More recently, a growing number of private agencies have begun offering inspection services to government and industry to ensure compliance with national and
international laws.
See also Attorney General; Bureaucracy; Civil Service.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BOBBI GENTRY
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Anechiarico, Frank, and Ronald Goldstock. Monitoring Integrity and
Performance: An Assessment of the Independent Private Sector
Inspector General. Public Integrity 9, no. 2 (2007): 117132.
Institutionalism
See Institutionalism, Comparative; New Institutionalism.
Institutionalism, Comparative
In comparative politics, like in other subfields of political science, the starting point of the contemporary institutionalist
scholarship is the idea of bringing the state back in, which
became a rallying cry in the 1980s. Reacting to intellectual
trends such as Marxism and system theory, this type of scholarship emphasized state autonomy and the structuring role of
state institutions (i.e., formal and informal norms and rules)
in political life. This push for a more systematic analysis of the
state was grounded in the assumption that state actors and
institutions do more than simply reflect material interests. In
fact, a major institutionalist belief is that institutions mediate
the concrete political impact of such interests. That is not to
say that institutions are the only influential factor in politics
but rather that institutions should become a focal point of
comparative political analysis. Interestingly, even when institutionalist scholars work on only one country, they typically
need to refer to other polities to identify and stress what is specific about that countrys institutions. Therefore, institutionalist
theory naturally leads to comparative perspectives on politics.
VARIANTS: SOCIOLOGICAL
AND RATIONAL CHOICE
INSTITUTIONALISM
Institutionalism research in comparative politics takes different
forms that largely point to the broader distinction between
sociological institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism,
and historical institutionalism. Because sociological institutionalism is not primarily centered on political institutions, it
is not discussed here. As for research in comparative rational
choice institutionalism, it has engaged a number of prominent political scientists such as Robert Bates, Barbara Geddes,
Margaret Levi, Elinor Ostrom, George Tsebelis, and Barry
Weingast. A recent example of comparative rational choice
institutionalism in political science is Daniel N. Posners
(2005) Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, which shows
how political institutions help to determine which ethnic
cleavage becomes politically salient in multiethnic polities
(p. 3). Drawing on the idea put forward by Robert Bates that
ethnic groups are rent-seeking coalitions involved in rational
calculations, Posner explores the question of why individuals
choose to emphasize the particular ethnic identities they do
(p. 3). From this perspective, the study of ethnic groups is
highly relevant for rational choice institutionalists because it
allows them to stress the rational aspects of seemingly irrational processes such as nationalism and ethnic conflicts.
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
A key assumption of historical institutionalist perspectives in
comparative politics is that institutionally embedded rules of
the game strongly affect political behavior as well as policy
development. From this perspective, political institutions create
obstacles and opportunities for actors, and it has been argued
that the number of institutional veto players/points present in
a polity will structure the political. In her comparative book
on health politics, for instance, Ellen Immergut has shown
how national political institutions shape the mobilization of
interest groups such as doctors. From this angle, political
institutions shape (but do not determine) political conflict by
providing interest groups with varying opportunities to veto
policy (Kay 1999, 406). In consequence, although we cannot
assume that institutions alone explain political outcomes, from
a comparative and institutionalist standpoint, it is crucial to
pay close attention to the structuring role of institutions in
explaining political and policy differences between countries.
This remark points to the fact that as far as the idea of rules of
the game is concerned, historical institutionalism and the work
of rational choice scholars such as Tsebelis intersect.
In addition to studying political institutions and the rules of
the game they create, many comparative institutionalist scholars
have taken a historical perspective on the development of institutional and policy legacies and their effects over time. Here,
the objective is to explore how temporal institutional processes
create constraints and opportunities that can either facilitate or
RECENT TRENDS
In recent years, reacting to the above scholarship on path
dependence, historical institutionalist scholars have stressed
the need for more comparative research on the sources of
path-departing institutional change. Beyond outside shocks
and rare critical junctures, scholars such as Kathleen Thelen
argue that over time, incremental processes and political strategies can lead to path-departing changes. In her work, Thelen
explores the role of forms of incremental yet path-departing
change such as conversion (i.e., the transformation of existing institutions without any radical change in their formal
boundaries) and layering (i.e., the creation of new institutional layers alongside existing institutions).
A growing number of institutionalist scholars such as John
L. Campbell have also argued that to fully explain institutional
change, scholars needed to turn to the role of ideas in institutional development. Because ideas help actors assess existing
institutional legacies and forge new institutions when existing
ones are seen as flawed, it has been argued that they are a key
component of institutional politics. Although Craig Parsons
reminds us that ideational analysis belongs to a different type
of explanation than institutional analysis, he also shows that
it is possible to effectively combine these two types of causal
argument. It is hard to predict in which direction contemporary institutional analysis is heading as far as comparative
politics is concerned but it is likely that the analysis of change
will remain on the scholarly agenda for years to come.
See also Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Critical Juncture;
Judicial Systems, Comparative; New Institutionalism; Path Dependencies; Rational Choice Theory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DANIEL BLAND
Insurgency 791
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Campbell, John L. Institutional Change and Globalization. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2004.
Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the
State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. Political Science and the Three
Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44 (1996): 936957.
Immergut, Ellen L. Health Politics: Interest and Institutions in Western Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Kay, Stephen J. Unexpected Privatizations: Politics and Social Security
Reform in the Southern Cone. Comparative Politics, 31, no. 4 (1999):
403422.
Levi, Margaret. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1988.
Parsons, Craig. How to Map Arguments in Political Science. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2007.
Pierson, Paul. Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan,Thatcher, and the Politics of
Retrenchment. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
. Politics in Time. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Posner, Daniel N. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Thelen, Kathleen. How Institutions Evolve:The Political Economy of Skills in
Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2002.
Insurgency
Insurgency is a form of intrasocietal conflict within a state,
in which a nonruling group attempts to destroy, reform, or
degrade the legitimacy and popular support of the states
ruling group to effect political change. Insurgencies are primarily political movements rather than conventional military
conflicts, as insurgent groups attempt to defeat a stronger
military power with political activism, subversion, propaganda,
and intimidation through terror and assassination tactics.
An underlying feature linking many insurgencieshistoric
and currentis the gross disproportion between the grand
political aims of an insurgency and the insurgencys meager
military capability to achieve such political aims.
Insurgencies often attempt to redress their military weaknesses by exploiting their personal knowledge and understanding of their local environments. Past insurgencies have
originated in trackless deserts, dense jungles, or urban settings,
typically less familiar to opposing state or international forces
and providing a strategic advantage to local insurgent elements. Third, and most important, insurgencies rely on their
popular support to leverage the local population for the additional recruits, funding, shelter, sustenance, and intelligence
needed to prevail. In his classic work On War, military philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz described peoples war as a kind
of nebulous vapory essence, nowhere condense into a solid
body. This, combined with support of the people for a passionate cause, is the most basic precept of insurgency.
HISTORY OF INSURGENCY
Most insurgencies are labeled failed revolutions, rebellions,
or crimes by history, in large part due to their inability
to effectively combat a state or international superior military force or sustain resources to participate in prolonged
792 Insurgency
immense source of potential energy and resources to sustain
his insurgent efforts.
Essentially, Maoist insurgency emphasized the critical relationship between the guerilla forces and the people to achieve
a political goal. Since according to studies, there are three strategic phasesthe defensive, stalemate, and offensivebetween
the insurgent and government, who will ultimately meet in
conventional battle, the insurgent leaders must be guaranteed of
the support of the population prior to engaging in conventional
operations, to secure their victory. In an insurgency, the consent
of the population as to how they seek to be governed is the
underlying debate. The insurgent aims to detach the populations loyalty from the state and to demonstrate a greater capacity for governance.This is accomplished by the establishment of
parallel governance structures and intimidation.
CLASSICAL INSURGENCIES VERSUS EMERGING
GLOBAL INSURGENCIES
planned, and executed by individuals and small groups without major central direction. National, classic insurgent organizations are vertical and structured, whereas in a global form,
they exist as unstructured networks, often taking direction
from regional leaders rather than a single entity.
Notably, many modern insurgencies taking place in countries such as Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan fall under the classic category of a Maoist national insurgency movement, with
indigenous rebel groups seeking to overthrow the current
government and expelling any intervening international force.
However, what makes these insurgencies unique and reflects
a common emerging twenty-first-century trend is that global
insurgencies, such as the transnational terrorist organization
al-Qaida, manipulate these national insurgencies as venues
to proliferate their own ideologies and elicit recruits. Many
of these countries become safe operating havens for transnational terrorist networks. Al-Qaida operatives reach out to
insurgents, playing on their mutual anti-Western objectives
and objective to expel international forces. Although al-Qaida
networks may not seek the same nationalist goals as the indigenous insurgents, they provide the insurgents with another
source of funding, arms, and training needed to combat the
state and international intervention and therefore build partnerships of convenience.
Insurgencies have become one of the most hotly debated
and intensely studied aspects of contemporary war studies.
With the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have
drawn in international forces to quell the national insurgencies
in both countries, major world powers have grown increasingly interested in learning to adapt their military structures
and doctrines to meet the challenge. More generally, however, the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency has been
thrust into the limelight because the once norm of regular
conflict now looks decidedly irregular, a trend likely to continue as human society adapts to a radically more interconnected future and war along with it.
See also Colonial Wars; Insurrection and Insurgency; Maoism;
Protests and Demonstrations; Radicalism; State Repression; Terrorism, Financing of;Terrorism, Political;War Crimes.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DAVID J. BETZ
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Asprey, R. War in the Shadows:The Guerrilla in History. 2 vols. Lincoln, Neb.:
iUniverse, 2002.
Callwell, C. E. Small Wars:Their Principles and Practice. London: HMSO, 1906.
von Clausewitz, K. On War, translated by O. J. Matthijs Jolles. New York:
Random House, 1943.
Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare:Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger,
1964.
Holsti, K. J. The State,War and the State of War. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
Katzenbach, E., and G. Hanrahan. The Revolutionary Strategy of
Mao Tse-tung. Political Science Quarterly 70 (1955): 321340.
Kilcullen, D. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a
Big One. London: Hurst, 2009.
Lawrence, T. E. The Science of Guerrilla Warfare. In Encyclopedia Britannica.
14th ed. New York: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1929.
. The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. London: Wordsworth, 1926.
Reprint, 1997.
INSURRECTIONARY ANARCHISM
Insurrectionary anarchism consists of informally organized
groups conducting direct and spontaneous violence against
political authorities on behalf of oppressed segments of the
population. This anarchical approach to revolutionary war
eschews the political organization typical of mainstream revolutionary movements. Although it has never succeeded politically, it was noted for many assassinations against the Tsarists
in Russia, the brief seizure of government in Berlin in 1919
under Rosa Luxemburg and the Sparticists, and the first car
bombdetonated by Mario Buda against Wall Street in New
York in 1920.
MAOISM
Leftist insurgency has its origins in nineteenth-century
Marxist predictions of class revolution in industrializing
states. An early variant, Leninism, emphasized the use of a
vanguard party to guide the masses, which it did with success
in Russia in 1917 but failed to do in Hungary in 1919. During the cold war, applications of communist revolutionary
FOCOISM
An alternative approach to revolutionary warfare, espoused by
Fidel Castro and Che Guevera, is known as focoism. In this
approach, demonstrative acts of violence, rather than political
indoctrination, are used as catalysts to mobilize the population into an uprising. Revolutionary success without political
mobilization was achieved in Cuba in 1959 due mainly to the
widespread alienation caused by the inequitable policies of
the Batista regime. Subsequent failures of focoism in, among
other countries, Colombia in 1961, Guatemala and Ecuador
in 1962, Peru in 1963, and Bolivia in 1967 were the result of
a failure of political preparation. Focoism is usually associated
with urban insurgencies. Focoist insurgency, although not
termed as such, was also commonly used by noncommunist
states. The United States sponsored the Khampa rebellion in
Tibet (19591960) and the contras against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua (19791988). The Republic of South
Africa sponsored Unio Nacional para a Independncia Total
de Angola in Angola (19751989) and Renamo in Mozambique (19751992).
ISLAMIST INSURGENCY
Islamist insurgency is inspired by the Islamic revivalist movement, which draws its legitimacy from the goal of arresting
the relative decline of Islam vis--vis Europe (since the fall of
Andalusia in 1492) and the erosion of Mughal power in India.
Islamist thinkers, such as Jamal ad-din al-Afghani (18371997),
Mohammad Abduh of al Azhar University (18491905), and
Sayyid Qutb (19061966), are generally in agreement that
Islam has been distorted, and thereby weakened, by successive
Intelligence Failure
Intelligence failure is a term used to describe situations when
intelligence organizations, military commands, foreign ministries, or even law enforcement agencies fall short in providing
accurate and timely warning to officials of nascent dangers or
opportunities. The term is used to describe failures to predict
specific events rather than failures to produce accurate risk
SOURCES OF FAILURE
Sources of failure have been linked to several levels of analysis: factors that are inherent in the production of finished
intelligence and warning, human cognition, organizational
behavior, and relations between the intelligence community
and officials. The cry wolf syndrome is an example of a problem inherent in analysis and warning. It occurs when analysts
repeatedly sound false alarms that cause recipients to dismiss
what eventually turns out to be a legitimate alert. Scholars
also have identified several common cognitive biases that can
impede both the analysis of information and the response
to warning. For instance, mirror imagingthe tendency to
interpret another actors behavior using ones beliefs, experiences, values, or standard operating procedurescan cause
fatal errors in analysis and response.
Intelligence Services
Intelligence services undertake counterintelligence operations, monitor internal security, make and break codes, or
conduct covert operations. Some specialize in gathering
information from open sources, espionage, or domestic
surveillance activities to produce secret intelligence reports
for government officials, members of the armed forces, or
the intelligence service itself. During the past half century,
technical collection systems involving imagery captured by
satellites in low-earth orbit and reconnaissance aircraft, signals
intelligence (intercepted communications), and measurement
and signatures intelligence, which characterizes and identifies various electronic and industrial systems, have come to
play a dominant role in the creation of intelligence estimates
and reporting. The rise of transnational criminal-terrorist
networks, however, has placed a premium on human intelligence, especially information gathered by metropolitan
police forces.
Intelligence services have existed in one form or another
throughout history. Today, the best-known intelligence services are maintained by national governments, although state,
local, and even corporate intelligence agencies are becoming
increasingly prevalent and important. The information revolution has created opportunities for subnational and private
organizations to produce tailored intelligence reporting and
improved situational awareness by fusing and then analyzing data from a variety of sources. The New York City Police
Department, for instance, maintains liaison officers with foreign municipalities and publishes the NYPD Shield, an intelligence bulletin for the law enforcement community. Corporate
Interdependence 797
intelligence organizations provide risk assessments related to
a firms assets or interests while identifying immediate threats
to ongoing operations or corporate personnel. Commercial
enterprises also offer risk analysis and clipping services to help
their clients identify business opportunities and gauge investment risks.
The U.S. intelligence services are nominally under the control of the director of national intelligence (DNI). Created in
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, the DNIs primary purpose
is to coordinate the activities of the organizations that constitute the U.S. intelligence community. The National Intelligence Council and the National Counterterrorism Center
are part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
The Central Intelligence Agency continues as an independent
organization, although the community-wide role once played
by the director of central intelligence has now been taken over
by the DNI. The Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Departments
of Justice, State, Energy, and Homeland Security all maintain
specialized intelligence services. Most of this intelligence community, however, is actually lodged within the Department
of Defense. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency,
the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corp intelligence agencies are all
part of the Department of Defense.
Oversight of intelligence services and the concentration of
police and political power in intelligence agencies vary widely.
The division of labor between organizations that gather foreign intelligence and domestic police authorities often was
used as a metric of democratic freedoms enjoyed within
states. Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes often use their
intelligence and law enforcement agencies as an instrument
of state terror, helping to keep a ruling party, clique, or dictator in power. No distinction is made between foreign and
domestic threats; both are often subject to scrutiny by the
same organization. Under these circumstances, intelligence
services and government oversight become indistinct, creating a counterintelligence state. The United States, by contrast,
has utilized both congressional and judicial oversight of the
intelligence community, an arm of the executive branch of
the federal government. Domestic intelligence activities also
are regulated by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
which requires a showing of cause either ex ante or ex post for
surveillance actions undertaken against individuals and careful record keeping to facilitate oversight and accountability. In
addition, the United States traditionally maintains boundaries between the activities of foreign intelligence organizations
(e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency) and domestic counterintelligence and law enforcement agencies (e.g., the Federal
Bureau of Investigation). These boundaries between foreigndomestic and intelligencelaw enforcement activities were
actually exploited by al-Qaida in the months leading up to the
September 11 attacks. The U.S. government agencies found
it difficult to coordinate the flow of information and analysis
Interdependence
Interdependence refers to independent social actors who are
structurally affected by one anothers behavior. The actors
are involved in each others affairs (functional or integrative
systemic interdependence
A
BIBLIOGRAPHY
De Wilde, Jaap H. Saved from Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half
of the 20th Century. Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth, 1991. See esp. pp. 1727.
C
functional interdependence
integrative interdependence
constructional
interdependence
A:B=1:1
(mutual need)
(symmetry)
structural independence
LOBBYING
As demonstrated by their engagement in political campaigns, most interest groups focus their energies in ways that
maximize their chances of influencing policy in their states.
Accordingly, when institutions gain power, they attract greater
attention from interest groups. As such, the decision making
of the European Unions taking precedence over domestic
member state policies has led to a dramatic growth in the
amount of interest groups lobbying the European Union.
In states ruled by parliamentary systemsincluding Australia, Canada, India, Israel, Japan, South Africa, Turkey, and the
United Kingdomthe overriding dominance of the executive body inevitably makes the executive the primary focus
of interest groups, according to pioneering political scientists
Samuel Beer and S. E. Finer. In contrast, the UK government
under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (19791990) explicitly committed itself to reducing the role of interest groups in
policy making, trying to limit the administrations contact frequency and closeness with the Trade Union Congress and the
employers organization Confederation of British Industry.The
Labour government led by Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997
2007) took care not to reverse this change so as to continue
trying to limit union influence in the government. Similarly in
Japan, the relationship between the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry and the general employers organization,
known as the Keidanren, and trade associations was extremely
close during the period of state economic growth from the
1950s to 1990. Thereafter, as this model of economic development faltered, the relationship faltered, and the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry was reorganized.
The focus of U.S. interest groups on the U.S. Congress is so
well known that some are still surprised that interest groups seek
to influence other institutions as well. Since congressional committees generally comprise legislators whose constituencies are
affected by the policies the committee adopts, then these legislators are often the targets of interest groups seeking to impose
changes within constituencies. The combination of the power
of congressional committees over agencies and the influence
of interest groups on the legislators on the committees is often
described as creating subgovernments or iron triangles, threesided relationships between legislators, agencies, and interest
groups that lead public policy to be directed toward satisfying
the interest group, not the public interest. In recent decades,
the iron-triangle approach has diminished as interest groups use
broader policy networks to veil their strategies and activities.
Separately, U.S. interest groups are not limited to lobbying only congressional committees and legislators, but as Joel
DETERMINANTS OF GROUP
STRATEGIES
With few exceptions, political scientists have been slow to
analyze the determinants of interest group strategies. Kenneth
Goldstein (1999) proposed analyzing the relevant differences
between some interest groups in the United States that give
large amounts to political campaigns and others that concentrate on grassroots efforts. Similarly, Wyn Grant (2000)
pointed out that theorists should explain the different strategies employed by interest groups in the United Kingdom;
some choose an insider strategy, developing strong relationships with government departments, while others prefer an
outsider approach more likely to include protests. One explanation for these differences is that institutions shape specific
interest groupsas well as being influenced by them. Interest
groups in many countriesincluding democratic governmentshave been sponsored and promoted by the government. Political funding/backing of an interest group will most
likely determine the methods and degree of accessibility an
interest group possesses and most likely predict the groups
popular support as interest groups are inevitably shaped by the
character of the political institutions supporting them.
Intergovernmental Relations
Intergovernmental relations describes how different levels of
government interact with one another within the same political system. The official organizational structure of governmental units determines the basic parameters of this process.
However, funding mechanisms and specific policy issues also
have significant impacts on how various levels of government
interact with one another.
FINANCIAL INFLUENCES
Many intergovernmental relationships involve an exchange
of financial resources targeted to deliver public goods.Various
methods are used to determine the amount of intergovernmental transfers, including equal sharing arrangements among
municipalities, block grants for individual programs, and formulas that include economic and demographic variables. The
disbursal of funds from one unit to another typically involves
stipulations for administrative oversight and performance
standards. In some instances, lawmakers at the national level
enact mandates requiring services be provided by regional,
state, or local governments but do not provide sufficient
resources to implement them. This behavior is common to
education and entitlement programs, wherein performance
standards are often dictated by a central government but
lower units are responsible for financing the cost of meeting
those benchmarks.
In many federal political systems, resources flow from central to regional governments and then to localities, but the
amount of money distributed and the level of autonomy that
each level of government possesses vary across different federal systems. The central government in Spain, for example,
distributes conditional and unconditional grants and a share
of income tax revenue to municipalities and provinces, which
raise additional income through local taxes, which deliver
public services. Likewise, states/provinces and localities in the
United States and Canada receive a share of federal tax revenue through various meansdirect revenue sharing, grants,
and program subsidiesbut raise additional resources through
income, use, and property taxes.These funds are used to finance
programs mandated at both the federal and the state level.
In other cases financial arrangements are more decentralized. Swiss municipalities enjoy a fair amount of financial sovereignty from their central government. While some federal
resources do trickle down to municipalities through cantons,
a large majority of municipal revenue is derived from locally
levied personal and corporate income taxes. Australian localities enjoy a similar level of independence from their federal
government, raising a majority of their budgets through property taxes, with most federal and state grants earmarked to
provide public goods including housing and infrastructure.
The transfer of funds from central to regional and/or from
regional to local governments for the purpose of providing
social services can lead to conflict with municipal leaders, who
often find that actual program costs exceed what they have
been delegated. Such intergovernmental tension is quite common. School districts in the United States, together with many
state departments of education, have made light of the issue
that federal funding is insufficient to comply with and meet
federal education standards. Similarly, costs associated with the
transfer of French high schools to regional governments have
far outstripped the size of federal grants.
Global economic and demographic changes have had an
impact on local, regional, and federal budgets. Technology has
played a role, as goods formerly subject to taxes are increasingly delivered through hard-to-tax digital channels, creating
downward pressure on state and local budgets that depend on
such revenues and, with rare exception, must be balanced each
year. At the same time, federal budgets worldwide have been
strained by increased expenditures on health care and programs for the elderly, a by-product of a gradually aging population. In the United States, the federal government has shifted
an increasing amount of responsibility for infrastructure construction and maintenance to states and municipalities.This, in
turn, has created additional pressures on state governments to
meet their own obligations.
POLICY INFLUENCES
Constitutional frameworks, political structures, and the needs
of native populations contribute to differences in how policy
relationships play out between levels of government. Areas
that do not require significant dependence on subnational
units for implementation, such as defense, foreign affairs, and
macroeconomic policy, are directed by central governments. If
Given the social and economic benefits attached to a welleducated population, it is not surprising that all levels of government place education at the top of their policy agendas.
Elementary, secondary, and postsecondary schools are often
locally operated, with regulatory and financial support coming
from a combination of local, regional, and national sources.
The structure of intergovernmental associations as they relate
to education differs among developed nations. Many countries operate national ministries of education, although the
actual responsibility for operating the schools often lies at the
local or regional level.
In some contexts, such as the United States, Canada, South
Africa, and Australia, states and provinces assume a great deal of
responsibility for instruction. Funding procedures differ, but in
general, primary and secondary education is financed through
local taxes with some schools overseen by locally elected officials. Curricula are implemented in accordance with standards developed at the local and/or state level. While states
and provinces also contribute funding to community colleges
and public universities, the amount is not equalized, leaving
some institutions to rely more on tuition, research grants, and
private support.
Many national governments do not provide sufficient financial support for schools, but this does not preclude their influence on education policy, especially in terms of establishing
standards and being responsible for program accountability. An
expanded federal role in the United States can be traced to the
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the creation
of the Department of Education in 1980, and the passage of
the No Child Left Behind Act in 2002.These policies had several goals, although most centered on increasing accountability
and standards in public schools and ensuring equal opportunity and access to traditionally underserved populations. State
and local officials often complain that the funding provided
by the federal government is insufficient to implement such
policies and that federal mandates have not improved the quality of public schools. A comparable dynamic can be seen in
Great Britain between local authorities and the central government. Conflict persists because educational services are
delivered at the local level but funded through national taxation and regulated by a national agency, the Department for
Children, Schools and Families, although some mandates have
been relaxed.
Governments have confronted increasing demands for infrastructure development with a mix of public and private
financing for road, rail, and air transportation. In most countries construction and maintenance are funded through the
imposition of gasoline taxes and/or passenger fees. Project
management is usually handled by central governments in
Europe and South America, while the United States takes
a more decentralized approach. States raise their own revenue through taxes but also receive revenue sharing from the
federal government. This arrangement is the subject of some
contention among state policy makers. Because federal transportation funds are not redistributed proportionally to states,
some donor states receive a smaller share of federal gas tax
revenue than they originally remitted.
CHALLENGES OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Perhaps the most persistent challenge of intergovernmental
relations involves how to manage the ever-changing interactions and operations of various governmental jurisdictions.
No matter the organizational structure, different levels of
government develop their own perspectives about which
policies should be pursued and how these policies should
be implemented. In some cases, these perspectives may not
match those of others. This can produce intense political
debates about which level of government should take the lead
in establishing policy directions. It can also lead to confusion
and breakdowns in the delivery of critical public services.
All political systems have encountered these problems of
intergovernmental relations. As the intergovernmental system
continues to evolve, the management of these complicated,
ever-changing systems will become even more pressing.
See also Center-periphery Relations (Federalism); Education
Policy; Education Policy, Higher; Environmental Policy; Federalism;
Homeland Security; Municipal Government; Social Welfare; States
Rights; Unitary Government.
. . . . MICHAEL THOM AND SAUNDRA K. SCHNEIDER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bachtiger, Andre, and Anina Hitz. The Matrix Extended: Federal-municipal
Relations in Switzerland. In Spheres of Governance: Comparative Studies
of Cities in Multilevel Governance Systems, edited by Harvey Lazar and
Christian Leuprecht, 7196. Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queens
University Press, 2007.
Brunet-Jailly, Emmanuel. Municipal-central Relations in France: Between
Decentralization and Multilevel Governance. In Spheres of Governance:
Comparative Studies of Cities in Multilevel Governance Systems, edited by
Harvey Lazar and Christian Leuprecht, 125162. Montreal, Canada:
McGill-Queens University Press, 2007.
Chandler, Jim. Comparative Inter-governmental Relations: Models That
Need to Travel. Local Government Studies 31, no. 3 (2005): 269284.
Leuprecht, Christian, and Harvey Lazar. From Multilevel to Multi-order
Governance? In Spheres of Governance: Comparative Studies of Cities in
Multilevel Governance Systems, edited by Harvey Lazar and Christian
Leuprecht, 122. Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queens University Press,
2007.
Nathan, Richard P. Updating Theories of American Federalism. In
Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century, edited by Timothy
J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner, 1325. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 2008.
Internal Colonialism
Internal colonialism is a relationship between urban/majority populations and rural/minority populations. This asymmetric system of power parallels the dependency theory of
international relations but directs this relationship to describe
domestic development. Like other formulations of the coreperiphery relationship in dependency theory, strong actors
in the capital-rich center have power over the impoverished
majority whom it oppresses at the political, economic, and
often geographic fringes of the state. These urban/metropolitan centers develop industry, become centers of capital, and
dominate peasant farmers and miners through the economy.
Urban elites control farmers and other preindustrial workers
through the capitalistfree market system. Rural populations
within the state provide raw materials and foodstuffs to support these cities and are economically repressed by the urban
center.
Like other types of colonialism, internal colonialism benefits some population at the expense of another. Because capitalist centers produce and sell secondary- and tertiary-sector
goods, and because there are many more impoverished farmers and miners than wealthy industrialists, the rural populations remain permanently poor. Capitalist accumulation at
the metropole increases at the expense of economies at the
periphery. Peripheral populations receive low capital investments and continue agricultural economies and other primary-sector enterprises to feed the industrial center. Such a
drain from these local communities has lasting economic and
environmental effects. The colonial economy destroys existing trade relationships and depletes local capital but also may
destroy local natural resources.
While the idea of internal colonialism is used to describe
capitalist accumulation in international relations theory, other
disciplines discuss race relations using the internal colonialism
model. Famous examples of city centers expanding and prospering from the work of the periphery are the British at the
expense of the Scots and the white urban elite of many former
colonies at the expense of indigenous populations in North
America, South America, and Africa. Sociologists also point to
the U.S. whiteAfrican American relationship as an example
of internal colonialism. In this sociological literature, elites
exploit workers either by maintaining an established system
of exploitation or by structuring social arrangements to strategically impoverish or exclude groups of people. Excluded
groups may be defined by religion, ethnicity, or language.
International Administration
International administration refers to the exercise of executive
and administrative powers in a given territory by an external
actor, endorsed by or part of an international organization or
multilateral agreement. International administration is associated with conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction
but is a separate category of policy. Compared with peacekeeping operations and other such kinds of intervention, the
external actors are dominant in the political and decisionmaking process and commit to rebuilding and running the
administrative infrastructure of the territory. Even though
this involves a lack of nominal and/or effective sovereignty,
international administration is different from trusteeship and
protectorate given the level of multilateral engagement and
the significant extent of involvement it entails.
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION
International administration was pioneered at the beginning of the twentieth century when the League of Nations
allowed certain territories to be partially governed by its own
appointed administration or by countries acting on its behalf.
The League of Nations administered directly the Free City
of Danzig (19191939) and the Saar Basin (19221935). These
experiments were seen as overall successes and provided a
specific inspiration for international administration practices
in the past two decades. Under the mandate system, the
league also granted to the victors of wars the responsibility
to assist certain territories in achieving progressively their
independence.
While it resembled a colonial arrangement, international
administration also enshrined the idea of accountability for
action in the mandated territories. Both policies continued
in parallel with the creation of the United Nations. The mandate system transformed into the trusteeship system, a more
elaborate and clear policy toward independence of territories,
while a limited direct administration (supervision) was used
in West New GuineaWest Irian (19621963) and Cambodia (19921993). While the trusteeship system ended with the
independence of Palau (1994), the direct international administration in its different forms gained momentum after the end
of the cold war and was used in Eastern Slavonia (19961998),
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Kosovo (1999), and East
Timor (19992002).
CASES OF INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION
International administration is a policy designed as a response
to diverse challenges and used in different contexts, both of
which ultimately determine its nature, the strategies behind
it, and to some extent, its success. In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the international administration had to create a viable state
entity from three territorial formations (Bosnian, Croat, and
Serb) whose inhabitants were engaged in a violent ethnic
war. The main challenge was to organize and facilitate an
integrated political process for the multilevel federal entity
International Cooperation
International cooperation refers to the collaborative interactions
among different actors across international borders to address
common issues or problems. Such cooperation involves both
governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and may take an array of forms. Among governments, international cooperation may be bilateral, such as
between the United States and Canada, or multilateral, such as
among Japan, China, and Russia. Countries may also pursue
collaborative actions within intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs; e.g., within a global IGO such as the United Nations
or within a regional IGO such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization [NATO]), or nations may take shared actions
within a particular supranational organization such as within
the European Union. At the nongovernmental level, individuals and groups across nations may engage in international
cooperation. NGOs are numerous and deal with social, economic, and political cooperation among individuals. Many are
humanitarian or social groups, such as the International Red
Cross or Amnesty International; others are economic units,
GOALS
Just as there are numerous forms of international collaboration among governments, groups, and individuals, these different actors pursue a variety of goals through cooperative
activities. One important aim focuses on pursuing greater
security or resolving conflicts among states or groups. Some
nations enhance their security by forming alliances. In the
postWorld War II years, the United States joined a number
of multilateral regional organizations, such as NATO in Western Europe, the Rio Pact in Latin America, and the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization in Southeast Asia, and formed bilateral alliances with Japan, the Republic of China, and South
Korea to protect the members from the threat of international
communism.
Other times, alliances are expanded to enhance the degree
of security. NATO has been enlarged from its original membership of sixteen nations in the early 1990s to twenty-eight
today as a way to provide greater security in central Europe for
the nations that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union
and its empire. In Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in 2001 among China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to enhance security,
trade, and cooperation among these member states. Other
nations form temporary cooperative arrangements, something
less than a formal alliance, to address a particular security issue,
to mediate an issue, or to address an emerging problem. During the past decade, the six-party talks among China, Russia,
Japan, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea represent a cooperative effort among these parties to persuade
North Korea to abandon its development of nuclear weapons.
Similarly, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union
joined together to try to dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear
weapons. IGOs may elicit cooperative actions among states to
promote international security. The members of the United
Nations may impose international sanctions or invoke collective actions against aggressor states, such as Saddam Husseins
Iraq, or against regions or countries in turmoil, such as the
Darfur region in Sudan. Nongovernmental actors may also be
asked to assist in seeking to facilitate cooperation among states
in disputes. For example, the Vatican served as an intermediary
between Argentina and Chile to resolve a boundary dispute.
RESEARCH
Important remaining questions are why international cooperation occurs among these state and nonstate actors and
how these international institutions facilitate or support such
cooperation. Scholars such as Robert Axelrod, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, and Arthur Stein began to unravel
these two puzzles in the 1980s, and their insights remain useful to this day. Moral and ethical imperatives and common
interests may motivate some participants to cooperate and use
these international organizations. Such arguments, however,
appear less persuasive in explaining cooperation among states.
After all, states have long been characterized as rational actors
operating in an anarchic international system in which they
are primarily driven by power and interest considerations.
Yet as some of these scholars note, states still may cooperate
with one another if their rational, self-interested choices yield
less than Pareto-optimal outcomes. Consider the security
dilemma faced by states, often represented by the Prisoners
Dilemma game, as illustrative of when mutual cooperation
would aid states. In a stylized game of an arms race between
two nations, the rational and dominant strategy for the two
participants is for each to continue to increase its armaments
rather than to show any constraint and trust the other state to
restrain its arms spending.Yet such a strategy is both economically costly for a state and potentially dangerous for peace
and security in the international system. In a situation of a
dilemma of common interests, as Arthur Stein (1982) calls
it, there is an imperative for states to abandon independent
decision making and collaborate with one another to achieve
a better outcome for both parties. The resulting regime may
consist of an arms control agreement between the two that
specifies the rules, norms, and procedures that each must follow regarding this issue. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
between the United States and the Soviet Union is one tangible illustration of this kind of international cooperation.The
dilemma of common interests, of course, applies to a variety
of security, economic, and social issues for states in international relations and thus, in part, accounts for the emergence
of numerous international organizations such as the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty and the World Trade Organization.
Moreover, the existence of these international institutions has
the effect of perpetuating and perhaps even expanding the
degree of international cooperation.
See also Climate Change Conferences, United Nations; International Organization; Isolationism; Multilateralism; Nongovernment
Organizations (NGOs); Prisoners Dilemma; Summit Diplomacy;
Trade Blocs;World Trade Organization (WTO).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . JAMES M. MCCORMICK
BIBLIOGRAPHY
About G-20, www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (accessed March 22,
2010).
Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. Rev. ed. New York: Basic
Books, 2006.
Europa: Gateway to the European Union, http://europa.eu/index_en.htm
(accessed January 24, 2010).
International Court of
Justice (ICJ)
Established in 1921, the Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) was sponsored by the League of Nations and
housed in the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands.
The PCIJ was the first court available to all states on a constant
basis for interstate dispute resolution. Although connected to
the League of Nations, the PCIJ was not officially part of the
organization, and both league members and nonmembers,
once ratifying its statute, could use the court. Like the League
of Nations, the PCIJ did not survive the conflict of World
War II (19391945) and officially dissolved in 1940. During its
tenure it heard twenty-nine cases and rendered twenty-seven
advisory opinions requested by the league.
Following the war, the victorious global leaders sought to
build a new international organization and world court for
the development of stable and judicial resolutions to interstate
conflict. Somewhat more skeptical about the utopian promise
of international organizations and international law, the Allies
sought to remedy some of the weakness of the league and
the PCIJ. To gain distance from the criticism of the PCIJ, the
second world court would be an entirely new body, directly
integrated into the United Nations (UN) as its official judicial arm. Accordingly, the statute of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) was annexed to that of the UN, and all members
of the UN are automatically party to the ICJ, although a UN
member state can refuse ICJ jurisdiction. The ICJ, however,
took residency at the Peace Palace in The Hague, as had its
ENFORCEMENT
If parties do not comply with decisions made by the court,
enforcement may be taken up by the Security Council.
However, when a party to the case, or an ally to such a party,
holds veto power on the Security Council, this is not a practical enforcement mechanism. When the Security Council
is unwilling to enforce an ICJ decision, there is no formal
recourse for the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court has been
broadly successful, and in most cases the courts decisions have
been implemented. This has been particularly true of border
disputes, such as the two-centuries-long conflict between El
International Criminal
Court (ICC)
During a five-week period in the summer of 1998, the worlds
nation-states, along with a large contingent of nongovernmental organizations, came together in Rome to deliberate
over the establishment of a permanent International Criminal
Court (ICC). At the final plenary session of the conference,
the state delegates voted on the proposed Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court. After the United States
called for one final unrecorded vote on the proposed Rome
Statute, as a means to measure which nation-states would
support it in its opposition to the statute, the official vote
occurred. The final vote was 120 in favor, 7 against (including
the United States), and 21 abstentions. The Rome Conference
had achieved its ultimate goal, and on the following morning,
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was
open for signatures.
On April 11, 2002, the statute received its 60th ratification, thus allowing the ICC to enter into force on July 1,
2002. Currently the Rome Statute has 139 signatories and
110 ratifications. One of the major exceptions to the list
of ratifying countries is the United States, which initially
signed the statute under President Clinton but then withdrew from any obligation to the court after the election of
President Bush. The Obama administration does not appear
to be moving in a radically different direction. Although the
Obama administration seems more accepting of the ICC and
its mandate, it still appears doubtful that this cordial relationship will ever result in ratification of the Rome Statute. The
United Statess primary objection concerns the sanctity of
the state sovereignty rule and the ICCs ability to prosecute
individuals from nonmember states. Despite this opposition,
the ICC continues to receive widespread support and is currently investigating four cases: the Central African Republic, the Darfur region of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Uganda.
JURISDICTION
Part 2 of the Rome Statute discusses the jurisdiction of the
ICC. As stated in article 5, the ICC has jurisdiction over the
following four crimes: the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The court
has jurisdiction over these crimes from the time the statute
enters into force; therefore, the ICC is temporally bound to
the point of its ratification. No crimes committed before that
date are within the courts jurisdiction.
Scholars often refer to the crimes themselves as the core
crimes of international humanitarian law. Definitions of the
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
are all predicated on established international law.The foundations for defining these crimes include the Genocide Convention, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, the
postWorld War II military tribunals, and the ad hoc tribunals
of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
The crime of aggression is included in the list of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the court, but its definition has yet
to be determined. Even after this crime is defined, the definition must then pass through the procedures of an amendment
to the statute, as laid down in articles 121 and 123. In September 2002, the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC established
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression. This
group is currently working on a draft text concerning the
definition of crimes of aggression. Upon completion, the text
will be forwarded to the assembly for review, and in a subsequent review conference the parties to the ICC will decide
whether to adopt this text.
TRIGGER MECHANISMS
The court may initiate an investigation if a state party, the
United Nations Security Council, or the prosecutor refers a
situation to the court. If any of these actors determines that
any of the crimes defined in article 5 have been committed,
they may refer the case to the prosecutor for further investigation. The case is then in the hands of the prosecutor, who
must decide whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed.
Although this appears to be an approval of universal jurisdiction, it is not. Certain preconditions must exist before the
court can exercise its jurisdiction. These preconditions establish the territorial jurisdiction of the court and limit the application of its power. In other words, article 13 does not give
the court universal jurisdiction; it provides certain spatial considerations that determine where and when the court may
exercise its power.
According to article 12, the court has jurisdiction within
the territory of a state that is party to the statute. Therefore, if
one or more of the crimes defined in article 5 were committed
on a states territory that is party to the statute, then the ICC
has jurisdiction.The ICC also has jurisdiction if the crime was
committed on board a vessel or aircraft that is registered by
a state that is party to the statute. The ICCs jurisdiction also
extends to a situation in which the perpetrator of the crime is
a national of a state that is party to the statute. Finally, the ICC
has jurisdiction over a nonparty state if that state voluntarily
accepts the courts jurisdiction.
The only exceptions to these trigger mechanisms are if a
nonparty state consents to the investigation and subsequent
prosecution and if the Security Council referred the case to
the court. If the latter, then and only then does the court have
universal jurisdiction.
ERIC K. LEONARD
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ed. The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Documentary History. Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational, 1998.
Broomhall, Bruce. International Justice and the International Criminal Court:
Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2003.
Cassese, Antonio. Is the ICC Still Having Teeth Problems? Journal of
International Criminal Justice 4, no. 3 (July 2006): 434441.
Cassese, Antonio, Albin Eser, Giorgio Gaja, et al., eds. The Rome Statute for
an International Criminal Court: A Commentary. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, http://iccnow.org (accessed
September 1, 2009).
International Criminal Court, www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC?lan=en-GB
(accessed September 1, 2009).
Leonard, Eric K. The Onset of Global Governance: International Relations Theory
and the International Criminal Court. Burlington,Vt.: Ashgate, 2005.
Ralph, Jason. Defending the Society of States:Why America Opposes the
International Criminal Court and Its Vision of World Society. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2007.
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, www.icc-cpi.int/
Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rome+Statute
.htm (accessed September 1, 2009).
International Criminal
Tribunals
International criminal tribunals are criminal courts designed
to investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpetrators of gross
human abuses. Unlike the International Criminal Court,
which is a permanent standing court, and the military tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo (1946), which the Allied powers
created to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed during World War II (19391945), international
criminal tribunals are mandated or temporary courts established under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In
1993, for instance, in creating the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the United Nations
Security Council declared that the unlawful detentions and
mass killings in Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted a breach in
international peace and security (the same rationale would
later be invoked, under different circumstances, to create the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). As such, the
ICTY represented a novel mechanism for promoting peace
and security. Although some would argue that it provided an
excuse or a weak alternative to the more stringent demand
for military intervention to stop the war, it eventually received
strong financial backing and international support. More
important, the ICTY seemed to overcome the problem of
victors justice, in which criminal justice served the political
interests of only a few of the most powerful states (the Allied
Powers). It did so by providing a prosecutorial mechanism
that operated independent of the UN Security Council and
establishing the basis of concurrent jurisdiction whereby the
prosecutor and national judiciary would work together to
investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of gross human
rights abuses.
Accordingly, the ICTY statute empowers the prosecutor to investigate the core crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes and targets the guilt of individual
perpetrators. It is believed that by individualizing guilt and
establishing a historical record, international criminal tribunals will help to promote national reconciliation. What is
more, international criminal tribunals provide an arguably
independent venue for investigating and prosecuting the
above crimes. Aside from this intangible benefit, two problems should be noted. First, international criminal tribunals
require substantial economic resources to investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpetrators of the above crimes. This is
one main reason why they need to operate efficiently within
International Labor
Organization (ILO)
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has been a
specialized agency of the United Nations since 1946. It was
originally created in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles
negotiations in the aftermath of World War I (19141918).
Since its inception one of the key activities of the ILO has
been the formulation of international labor standards. It is
unique among other institutions of global governance in that
it has a tripartite system that includes representatives from
employers, labor, and government. Under Director-General
Juan Somava, who was elected to his first term in 1998, the
ILO began to engage with other international institutions in
attempting to develop a social side to globalization. The ILO
conducts research and produces publications on an increasingly diverse series of issues that relate to the changing nature
of work and employment.
International Labor
Standards
International labor standards have risen in prominence
alongside the dramatic increase in trade in the postWorld
War II era. While there is no universally agreed-on definition of international labor standards, most widely cited are
the core labor standards defined by the International Labor
Organization (ILO) in its 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. These standards are (1)
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining, (2) elimination of all forms of
forced or compulsory labor, (3) effective abolition of child
labor, and (4) elimination of discrimination with respect to
employment and occupation. These standards emanate from
a number of ILO conventions. While these core labor standards have evolved over time, they are essentially a floor of
labor rights that states and firms are encouraged to rise above
but should not go below.
The ILO is the intergovernmental organization charged
with promoting international labor standards and promoting the well-being of workers. The ILO works in a tripartite
fashion by convening meetings with representatives of governments, firms, and workers. The ILO develops conventions
and recommendations that, once ratified by member states, are
considered to be binding for signatories. However, the ILO
does not have the power to enforce agreements or sanction
states that violate agreements.
The increased prominence of international labor standards is directly connected to debates about globalization and
trade. As trade agreements and the general liberalization of
trade under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, later the World Trade Organization (WTO), have
reduced trade friction, it has become much easier for firms
to locate production in low-wage and lowlabor standard
countries. While this may be efficient for firms in reducing
unit costs, it also could discourage a country from enforcing
international labor standards as doing so may lead to a loss of
advantage in the highly competitive market for production,
particularly for low-wage production.
Arguments in support of international labor standards cluster around two distinct logics: a normative argument based on
moral claims and an economic argument based on charges of
unfair competition. The normative argument for international
labor standards claims that the rights of workers to collectively bargain, to be free from discrimination in the workplace,
and so on are akin to human rights. Thus, international labor
International Law
The term international law has replaced the older terminology
law of nations in English and Romance languages, reflecting
the diversification of the law and its subjects. Nevertheless, the
general public international law covered by the old denomination still constitutes the core of the international normative order, serving as the rules of the game for international
politics. These rules are based on international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; international conventions and treaties, binding the consenting parties; and a set
of general principles of law.The system emerged in the period
from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) until the end of World
War I (19141918) and has since been adapted and enhanced
by modern international law, such as the prohibition of the
threat of or use of force and the growing body of human
rights law. Originally a European legal order, international
law became globalized through the process of decolonization.
The acceptance of its rules is today a constitutive element of
statehood. Compared to national legal orders, international
law lacks a system of obligatory jurisdiction and a sovereign
power to enforce its nevertheless binding provisions. Even if
international law is at times violated, most states are careful
to observe most obligations of international law most of the
time (Malanczuk 1999, 6).
See also Decolonization.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THORSTEN LUHDE
BIBLIOGRAP HY
Malanczuk, Peter. Akehursts Modern Introduction to International Law. 7th rev.
ed. London: Routledge, 1999.
International Norms
International norms provide a measure of continuity and
stability to relations between states and transnational actors
as they constitute authoritatively endorsed, articulated ideas
and beliefs concerning some aspect of political life beyond
that of domestic systems of governance. But since the boundaries between national and international phenomena have
been significantly relaxed in recent years, norms that evolve
and are disseminated across countries at the same time seem
increasingly important to the inner life of most contemporary
societies. Regardless of the level of governance, norms can be
described as the microfoundations of political institutions.
This article examines international norms in five areas.After
a brief introduction to the legacy of the term, three phases of
the life cycle of an international norm are discussed, namely,
its origins, its modes of operation, and its repercussions. The
article ends by evaluating the added value of this term and its
related field of research to political science overall.
LEGACY
In legal science, norm is used to denote a written or unwritten
rule that forms part of a system of law in that it has normative
power or authority. The term was later borrowed by sociologists, among them mile Durkheim, to describe intersubjectively shared understandings and expectations of behavior
within a particular community of individuals. Both the legal
and the sociological concepts of norm, but especially the latter, had profound effects on political research in the twentieth
century.
In the 1980s and 1990s, a theoretical current in the social
sciences, constructivism, emerged to confront the perceived
hegemony of rationalistic theories of politics and political processes. In a series of theoretical debates raging in the study of
political organization, public policy formation, and international relations, a rationalist logic of consequences associated
with preference-ordering actors was juxtaposed to a constructivist logic of appropriateness, in turn associated with an idea
of social acceptance. Much empirical research was conducted
ORIGINS
Studies on the creation and early diffusion of international
norms have gained momentum in recent years, as scholars
have begun to question the outcomes of predominantly rationalistic approaches oriented toward interest-based conflict
analysis or bargaining processes. In 1996, Martha Finnemore
made an especially significant contribution in this respect in
that she theorized the relationship between norms and institutional development but also provided three short historical
case studies devoted to the rise of the United Nations Education and Science Committee, the evolution of the International Red Cross, and the transfer of the war on poverty
from U.S. President Johnsons administration to the World
Bank by former Secretary of States (and incumbent World
Bank President) McNamara. Scholars subsequently explored
other examples of governments being prepared, under certain (historical) circumstances, to commit to some universal,
normative purpose and at the same time accept the costs in
terms of expenses and partial loss of sovereignty. Illustrating
this phenomenon, empirical studies have described instances
of norms cascades, during which some set of ideas about a
particularly prominent problem or solution (or both) is almost
universally accepted as urgently requiring a response by the
international community of states.
MODES OF OPERATION
Norms cascades remain relatively unusual and restricted to
problems that are considered particularly pressing (e.g., antiterrorism measures following the 9/11 attacks in the United
States) or proposed solutions that are universally embraced.
International norms are otherwise disseminated by more
complex mechanisms, which subsequently affect their respective modes of operation. In fact, the incorporation of international norms at the domestic level may be swift or slow,
haphazard or consistent, and met with strong resistance or
with overwhelming enthusiasm.
Important factors identified by scholars for explaining such
different responses are whether the relevant political decision
makers find the norm in question conducive to their own
agendas, whether a large enough coalition supports it in society
at large, whether it can be conveniently plugged into existing
REPERCUSSIONS
The literature on norm repercussions examines the vexed
question of direct and indirect consequences and of compliance and the eventual effectiveness of international norms.
Whereas this type of research has a long lineage going back
to work on the League of Nations, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, and the early United Nations system,
recent contributions are typically