Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EN BANC
BIDIN, J.:
2
Act, the following members of the INP shall be
considered compulsorily retired:
a) Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60)
on the first year of the effectivity of this Act.
b) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine
(59) on the second year of the effectivity of this
Act.
c) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight
(58) on the third year of the effectivity of this
Act.
d) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven
(57) on the fourth year of the effectivity of this
Act.
It is the submission of respondents that the term "INP"
includes both the former members of the Philippine
Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier
constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue of
PD 765 in 1975.
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year
transition period provided in Section 89 applies only to the
local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age
sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or
higher (Sec. 33, PD 1184); while the retirement age for the PC
had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
On December 23, 1991, respondent judge issued a restraining
order followed by a writ of injunction on January 8, 1992 upon
posting of a P100,000.00 bond by private respondents.
3
the statute books except that which was created
and established under
PD 765 pursuant to the mandate of Article XV of
the 1973 Constitution providing that the "State
shall establish and maintain an integrated
national police force whose organization,
administration and operation shall be provided
by law." Heretofore, INP was unknown. And the
said law categorically declared the PC "as the
principal component of the Integrated National
Police" (Sec. 5, PD 765).
The court was supplied by respondents
(petitioners herein) with excerpts taken from the
discussion amongst the members of Congress
concerning the particular provision of Section
89. The court is not persuaded by said
discussion; it was a simple matter for the
members of the legislature to state precisely in
clear and unequivocal terms their meaning,
such as "integrated police" as used in PD 765.
Instead, they employed "INP", a generic term
that includes the PC as the principal component
of the INP, supra. In failing to categorically
restrict the application of Section 89 as the
members of legislature are said to have
intended, it gave rise to the presumption that it
has not limited nor intended to limit the
meaning of the word when the bill was finally
passed into law. It is not difficult for the court to
also presume that in drafting the wording of the
PNP Law, the legislators were aware of the
historical legislative origin of the "INP".
xxx xxx xxx
4
On the other hand, private respondents assert that being the
nucleus of the Integrated National Police (INP) under PD 765,
former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) should
not be discriminated against from the coverage of the term
"INP" in Sec. 89, RA 6975. Clearly, it is argued, the term "INP"
found in Section 89 of RA 6975 refers to the INP in PD 765.
Thus, where the law does not distinguish, the courts should
not distinguish.
Does the law, RA 6975, distinguish INP from the PC?
Petitioners submit that it does and cite Sections 23 and 85 to
stress the point, viz.:
Sec. 23. Composition. Subject to the limitations
provided for in this Act, the Philippine National Police,
hereinafter referred to as the PNP, is hereby
established, initially consisting of the members of the
police forces who were integrated into the Integrated
National Police (INP) pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 765, and the officers and enlisted personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC). . .
5
Sec. 86. Assumption by the PNP of Police Functions.
The PNP shall absorb the functions of the PC, the
INP and the Narcotics Command upon the effectivity of
this Act.
From a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears
therefore that the use of the term INP is not synonymous with
the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just
made a uniform reference to the members of the whole
Philippine National Police (PNP) for retirement purposes and
not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC
and it cannot be construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89
includes the members of the PC.
And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that
the law failed to define who constitutes the INP, Sec. 90 of RA
6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,
Sec. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present National
Police Commission and the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police shall cease to exist. The
Philippine Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
shall cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. The Integrated National Police,
which is the civilian component of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to
be the national police force and lieu thereof, a new
police force shall be established and constituted
pursuant to this Act. (emphasis supplied)
It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the
legislature failed to define who the members of the INP are. In
this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to
categorically restrict the application of the transition period in
6
certain amount of undesirables, then we can allow a
longer retirement age. That was the rationale, that was
the tie-up. Since we are relaxing the entry, we should
speed up . . .
7
Conference Committee that preceded the enactment of RA
6975.
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that
Section 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police
force is clear. The question now is whether the classification is
valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must
conform to the following requirements: (1) It must be based
upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; (4) It must apply equally to all members of the
same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939]).
The classification is based upon substantial distinctions. The
PC, before the effectivity of the law (RA 6975), were already
retirable at age 56 while the local police force were retirable at
60, and governed by different laws
(P.D. 1184, Sec. 33 and Sec. 50). The distinction is relevant for
the purpose of the statute, which is to enable the local police
force to plan for their retirement which would be earlier than
usual because of the new law. Section 89 is merely transitory,
remedial in nature, and loses its force and effect once the fouryear transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it applies not only to
some but to all local police officers.
It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurd
that a law will grant an extension to PC officers' retirable age
from 56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back to 56 without
any cogent reason at all. Why should the retirement age of PC
officers be increased during the transitory period to the
exclusion of other PC officers who would retire at age 56 after
such period? Such absurdity was never contemplated by the
law and would defeat its purpose of providing a uniform
retirement age for PNP members.
SECOND DIVISION
REGALADO, J.:
It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were
moved by their desire to devote their remaining years to the
service of their Creator by forming their own civic organization
for that purpose, should find themselves enmeshed in a
criminal case for making a solicitation from a community
member allegedly without the required permit from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last
quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as
9
Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10. However, accused Yco
subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the case proceeded
only with respect to petitioner Centeno. On May 21, 1993,
respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of
the lower court but modified the penalty, allegedly because of
the perversity of the act committed which caused damage and
prejudice to the complainant, by sentencing petitioner Centeno
to suffer an increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months
and a fine of P1,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. 5 The motion for reconsideration of the
decision was denied by the court. 6
Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the
lowest court in the judicial hierarchy eventually reached this
highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of whether
solicitations for religious purposes are within the ambit of
Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the financial
sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a question of principle,
it is not a trifling matter. This Court is gratified that it can now
grant this case the benefit of a final adjudication.
Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree
No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for religious
purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious
purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of the
statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes;
(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) to subject to State
regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would
constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of religion
guaranteed under the Constitution.
Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075,
otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law), provides as
follows:
10
provides that "charitable institutions, churches and personages
. . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." There
are certain provisions in statutes wherein these two terms are
likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for
instance, Sections 26 (e) (corporations exempt from income
tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the
National Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for the
organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation
Code; and
Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the
Local Government Code.
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out
"charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas
Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or
public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of
the law in question never intended to include solicitations for
religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no
reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
All contributions designed to promote the work of the church
are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities depend for
their support on voluntary contributions. 8 However, "religious
purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable
purpose." While it is true that there is no religious purpose
which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not
equally true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which is
not "religious" in the legal sense of the term.9 Although the
term "charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it
is a broader term and includes matters which are not
"religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between
"charitable purpose" and "religious purpose," except where the
two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the
distinction has been done away with by statute. 10 The word
11
considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to
spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply
felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the
tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it
with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused.
If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a
party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. The
principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful
cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and
unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them
such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal
statute should be regarded as without its intendment. 13
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 14 The word
"charitable" is a matter of description rather than of precise
definition, and each case involving a determination of that
which is charitable must be decided on its own particular facts
and circumstances. 15 The law does not operate in vacuo nor
should its applicability be determined by circumstances in the
abstract.
Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the
statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein given
which include the words "charitable" and "religious" make use
of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as used in
a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It
often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a
choice of either. When "or" is used, the various members of
the enumeration are to be taken separately.16 Accordingly,
"charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an
enumeration using the disjunctive "or" should be given
different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no
compelling consideration why the same treatment or usage of
12
permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected
freedom. 17
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at
some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may protect
its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its
citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in
the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds
for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to
act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is
likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation
generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or
convenience. 18
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties
of the free exercise of religion that everything which may be so
called can be tolerated. 19 It has been said that a law
advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily
invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of religion
merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on
the adherents of one or more religion. 20 Thus, the general
regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not
involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct
or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any
constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a
religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a
prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or
interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. 21
Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is
surprising how many operations are carried on by persons and
associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of
benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and defrauding a
generous public. It is in fact amazing how profitable the
fraudulent schemes and practices are to people who
manipulate them. The State has authority under the exercise
13
There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge
which would indicate, impliedly or otherwise, that petitioner
and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. This could
be reflective upon her objectivity, considering that the
complainant in this case is herself a judge of the Regional Trial
Court at Kalookan City. It bears stressing at this point that a
judge is required to so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, 25 should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert its
independence, and must resist any pressure from whatever
source. 26
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner Martin Centeno is
ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Puno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J.:
I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation
of donations for the repair of a chapel is not covered by P.D.
No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of
contributions for "charitable or public welfare purposes." My
reasons are three-fold.
First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a
church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare
purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is
not necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose. A fund
campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not like
fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the
14
fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be
avoided.
The Case
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. WALPAN
LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL
WARPAN, appellant.
alias
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession
of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed no
other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder
or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating
circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an
accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at
several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant,
he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be
considered to have aggravated the direct assault.
ThatonoraboutSeptember24,1997,intheCityofZamboanga,
Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,the
abovenamedaccused,WalpanLadjaalambeingthentheownerofa
residentialhouselocatedatRioHondo,[4]this City, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his
co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y
Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was]
used in any form.[5]
The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. We quote it below:
ThatonoraboutSeptember24,1997,intheCityofZamboanga,
Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,the
abovenamedaccused,conspiringandconfederatingtogether,
mutuallyaidingandassistingwithoneanother,withoutany
justifiablereasonorpurposeotherthantouseitinthecommissionof
crime,didthenandthere,wilfully,unlawfully,andfeloniouslyhave
intheirpossessionandundertheircustodyandcontrol,thefollowing
weapons,towit:one(1)M14riflewithSN1555225withmagazines
andseven(7)roundsofliveammunition;two(2)magazineswith
15
twenty(20)andtwenty[one](21)roundsoflive[ammunition];one
(1)homemadecaliber.38revolverwithfive(5)liveammunition;
one(1)M79(single)riflewithpouchandwithfive(5)empty
shell[s];one(1)homemadecaliber.38withSN311092withfive
liveammunitionandoneemptyshellof[a]cal.38xxxSmithand
Wesson;two(2).38CaliberpaltikrevolverwithSerialNumber
311092andonedefacedM79grenadelauncherpaltik,withoutfirst
havingobtainedthenecessarylicenseandorpermitthereforfrom
authoritiesconcerned,inflagrantviolationoftheaforementioned
law.[7]
[8]
PoliceOfficers,itwasnotbyreasonoftheirownvoluntary
desistancebutratherbecauseofthefactthatalltheabovenamed
policeofficerswereabletoseekcoverduringthefiringandwerenot
hitbythebulletsandexplosivesfiredbytheaccusedandalsobythe
factsaidpoliceofficerswereabletowrestlewithtwo(2)ofthe
accusednamely:WalpanLadjaalamyMihajila.k.a.Warpanand
AhmadSailabbiyHajairani,whoweresubduedandsubsequently
placedunderarrest;whereasaccusedPO2NurhakimT.Hadjulawas
abletomakegoodhisescapeandhasremainedatlarge. [9]
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with
illegal possession of drugs.[10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in
Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed
upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had
conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the
lower court. The accused were consequently released from
jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took
place on January 6, 1998, during which he entered a plea of
not guilty.[11] After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered,
the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE,theCourtfindsaccusedWALPAN
LADJAALAMyMIHAJILa.k.a.WARPAN
1.inCriminalCaseNo.14636,GUILTYBEYOND
REASONABLEDOUBTofViolationofSection15A,ArticleIII,
ofRepublicActNo.6425,otherwiseknownastheDangerousDrugs
Actof1972,asamended,andSENTENCESsaidaccusedtothe
penaltyofRECLUSIONPERPETUAandtopayafineofFIVE
HUNDREDTHOUSAND(P500,000.00)andtopaythecosts;
16
2.InCriminalCaseNo.14637,NOTGUILTYofViolationof
Section16,ArticleIII,inrelationtoSection21,ArticleIV,of
RepublicActNo.6425,otherwiseknownastheDangerousDrugs
Actof1972,asamended,andACQUITShimofsaidcrimewith
costsdeoficio;
3.inCriminalCaseNo.14638,GUILTYBEYOND
REASONABLEDOUBTofthecrimeofIllegalPossessionof
FirearmandAmmunitionpenalizedunderPresidentialDecreeNo.
1866,asamendedbyRepublicAct.No.8294,
andSENTENCESsaidaccusedtosufferanindeterminatepenalty
ofSIX(6)YEARSofprisioncorreccionalasminimumtoEIGHT
(8)YEARSofprisionmayorasmaximumandtopayafine
[of]THIRTYTHOUSAND(P30,000.00)andpaythecosts;
4.inCriminalCaseNo.14639,GUILTYBEYOND
REASONABLEDOUBTofthecrimeofDirectAssaultwith
MultipleAttemptedHomicideandSENTENCESsaidaccusedtoan
indeterminatepenaltyofTWO(2)YEARSandFOUR(4)
MONTHSofprisioncorreccionalasminimumtoSIX(6)
YEARSofprisioncorreccionalasmaximumandtopayafine
ofONETHOUSAND(P1,000.00)andtopaythecosts.(emphasis
intheoriginal)
Hence, this appeal.[12]
The Facts
Prosecutions Version
In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents
the facts in this wise:
At1:45p.m.ofSeptember24,1997,PO3AllanMarcosObutfiled
anapplicationfortheissuanceofasearchwarrantagainstappellant,
hiswifeandsomeJohnDoes(Exh.C).Afterthesearchwarrantwas
issuedabout2:30p.m.ofthesameday,abriefingwasconducted
insidetheofficeoftheAntiVice/NarcoticsUnitoftheZamboanga
CityPoliceOfficeinconnectionwiththeserviceofthesearch
warrant.ThebriefingwasconductedbySPO2FelipeGaganting,
ChiefoftheAntiVice/NarcoticsUnit.Duringthebriefing,PO3
RenatoDelaPeawasassignedaspresentorofthewarrant.SPO1
RicardoLacastesantosandPO3EnriqueRiveraweredesignatedto
conductthesearch.Otherpolicemenwereassignedasperimeter
guards(TSN,March3,1998,pp.3336).
Afterthebriefing,morethanthirty(30)policemenheadedbyPolice
SuperintendentEdwinSoledadproceededtothehouseofappellant
andhiswifeatRioHondoonboardseveralpolicevehicles(TSN,
March4,1998,p.32;April22,1998,p.54).Beforetheycouldreach
appellantshouse,three(3)personssittingatanearbystoreran
towardsthehouseshouting,[P]olice,raid,raid(Ibid.,March3,1998,
pp.41,4344;April23,1998,p.4).Whenthepolicemenwereabout
ten(10)metersfromthemaingateofthehouse,theyweremetbya
rapidburstofgunfirecomingfromthesecondfloorofthe
house.Therewasalsogunfireatthebackofthehouse(Ibid.,March
5,1998,pp.1416).
SPO1Mirasol,SPO2Lacastesantos,PO3Rivera,andPO3DelaPea
whowerewiththefirstgroupofpolicemensawappellantfirean
M14rifletowardsthem.Theyallknewappellant.Whentheywere
firedupon,thegroup,togetherwithSPO2Gaganting,PO3Obutand
SuperintendentSoledad,soughtcoverattheconcretefenceto
observethemovementsatthesecondfloorofthehousewhileother
policemensurroundedthehouse(Ibid.,March4,1998,pp.5051).
Infrontofthehousewasanextensionbuildingconnectedtothe
concretefence(Ibid.,pp.4546,5759,7376).Gaganting,Mirasol,
17
Lacastesantos,Gregorio,andObutenteredthedooroftheextension
building.Gagantingopenedthemain(steel)gateofthehouse.The
othermembersoftheteamthenentered.LacastesantosandMirasol
enteredthehousethroughthemaindoorandwentinsidethesalaof
thegroundfloorwhileotherpolicemensurroundedthehouse.Two
(2)oldwomenwereinthesalatogetherwithayounggirlandthree
(3)children.Oneoftheoldwomentookthechildrentothesecond
floorwhiletheyounggirlremainedseatedatthecorner(Ibid.,pp.
1921).
AfterLacastesantosandMirasolenteredappellantshouse,Rivera,
DelaPea,GregorioandObutfollowedandenteredthehouse.After
identifyingthemselvesasmembersofthePNPAntiVice/Narcotics
Unit,Obutpresentedtotheoldwomenacopyofthesearch
warrant.DelaPeaandRiverathensearchedappellantsroomonthe
groundfloorinthepresenceofPunongBarangayElhano(TSN,
March3,1998,pp.4143).Ontopofatablewasapencilcase(Exh.
J)withfifty(50)foldedaluminumfoilsinside(Exhs.J1toJ50),
eachcontainingmethamphetaminehydrochlorideorshabu.
LacastesantosandMirasolproceededtothesecondfloorwherethey
earliersawappellantfiringanM14rifleatthemthroughthe
window.Whiletheyweregoingupstairs,appellantnoticedtheir
presence.Hewentinsidethebedroomand,afterbreakingand
removingthejalousies,jumpedfromthewindowtotheroofofa
neighboringhouse.Seeingthis,Mirasolrusheddownstairsandasked
helpfromtheothermembersoftheraidingteamtoarrest
appellant.Lacastesantoswenttothesecondfloorandshoutedtothe
policemenoutsidenottofireinthedirectionofthesecondfloor
becausetherewerechildren.MirasolandSPO1CesarRabuya
arrestedappellantatthebackofhishouseafterabriefchase(Ibid.,
pp.2123).
Otheritemswerefoundduringthesearch,namely,assortedcoinsin
differentdenominations(Exh.W;TSN,April28,1998,pp.2325),
one(1)homemade.38caliberrevolver(Exh.B2)withfive(5)live
[ammunition],one(1)M79singleriflewith[a]pouchcontaining
five(5)emptyshellsofanM79rifle(Exh.B4),andone(1)empty
shellofanM14rifle(TSN,April23,1998,pp.3032).
Atthesecondfloor,LacastesantossawanM14rifle(Exh.B3)with
magazineontopofthesofaatthesalaonthesecondfloor(Ibid.,P.
27).TherifleboreSerialNo.1555225.Heremovedthemagazine
fromtherifleandthebulletinsidethechamberoftherifle.He
countedseventeen(17)liveammunitioninsidethemagazine.Hesaw
two(2)moreM14riflemagazinesonthesofa,onewithtwenty(20)
liveammunition(Exh.G3)andanotherwithtwentyone(21)live
ammunition(Exh.G4).Helikewisesawthree(3)M16rifle
magazines(Exh.G2)inacorneratthesecondfloor(TSN,March5,
1998,pp.2332,5357).
RinoBartolomeLocsonwasaninformeroftheAntiVice/Narcotics
UnitoftheZamboangaPolice.[O]nthemorningofSeptember24,
1997,hewasinstructedbySPO2Gagantingtogotoappellants
housetobuyshabu.Locsonknewappellantasasellerofshabu
(TSN,April22,1998,p.5)andhadbeentoappellantshouseabout
fifteen(15)timesbefore.HewenttoRioHondoandarrivedat
appellantshouseat3:20p.m.HeboughtP300.00worthofshabu
fromappellant.Thelattergotthree(3)decksofshabufromhiswaist
bag.AppellantinstructedLocsontogobehindthecurtainwhere
therewasatable.Thereweresix(6)personsalreadysmoking.There
wasalightedkerosenelampmadeofamedicinebottleplacedonthe
table.TheyaskedLocsontosmokeshabuandLocsonobliged.He
placedthethree(3)decksofshabuheboughtonthetable(Ibid.,pp.
815).
Whiletheyweresmokingshabu,Locsonheardgunfirecomingfrom
appellantshouse.Theyallstoodandenteredappellantscompound
butwereinstructedtopass[through]theotherside.Theymet
18
appellantatthebackofhishouse.Appellanttoldthemtoescape
becausethepolicearealreadyhere.Theyscamperedandranaway
becausetherewerealreadyshots.Locsonjumpedoverthefenceand
rantowardstheseashore.UponreachingaplaceneartheFisheries
School,hetookatricycleandwenthome(Ibid.,pp.1719).
Thefollowingday,September25,1997,hewenttothepolicestation
andexecutedanaffidavit(Exh.M)narratingwhattranspiredat
appellantshouse[o]ntheafternoonofSeptember24,1997.
Afterthesearchandbeforereturningtothepolicestation,P03Dela
PeapreparedaReceiptforPropertySeized(Exh.P&3)listingthe
propertiesseizedduringthesearch.ThereceiptwassignedbyDela
Peaastheseizureofficer,andbyPunongBarangayHadjiHussin
ElhanoandradioreporterJunCayonaaswitnesses.Acopyofthe
receiptwasgiventoappellantbutherefusedtoacknowledgethe
propertiesseized(TSN,April23,1998,pp.1112).
AnexaminationconductedbyPoliceInspectorMercedesD.Diestro,
ForensicChemistofthePNPCrimeLaboratoryServiceOffice9,on
theparaffincaststakenfrombothhandsofappellantyieldedpositive
forgunpowdernitrates(Exh.A3),givingrisetothepossibilitythat
appellanthadfiredagunbeforetheexamination(TSN,March3,
1998,p.11).Gunpowderresidueexaminationsconductedon
September26,1997showedthatthefollowingfirearmswerefired
(Exh.B5):a.38caliberrevolver(homemade)withSerialNo.
311092(Exh.B1),another.38caliberrevolver(homemade)without
aserialnumber(Exh.B2),aCal.7.62mmM14U.S.riflewith
SerialNo.1555225(Exh.B3),andanM79riflewithoutaserial
number(Exh.B4).Theywerefiredwithinfive(5)dayspriortothe
examination(TSN,March3,1998,pp.1621).
Withrespecttothecrystallinesubstances,anexaminationconducted
byPoliceInspectorSusanM.Cayabyab,likewiseaForensicChemist
ofthePNPCrimeLaboratoryServiceOffice9,onthefifty(50)
piecesoffoldedaluminumfoilseachcontainingwhitecrystalline
granuleswithatotalweightof1.7426grams(Exh.J1toJ50)
yieldedpositiveresultsforthepresenceofmethamphetamine
hydrochloride(shabu)(Exh.L).However,theexaminationofone(1)
crystallinestoneweighing83.2674grams(Exh.K)yieldednegative
resultsforthepresenceofmethamphetaminehydrochloride(Exh.L).
TherecordsoftheRegionalOperationandPlansDivisionofthe
PNPFirearmandExplosiveSectionshowthatappellanthadnot
applied/filedanyapplicationforlicensetopossessfirearmand
ammunitionorxxxbeengivenauthoritytocarry[a]firearmoutside
ofhisresidence(Exh.X)[14]
Defenses Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts
given by the lower court. [15] Hence, we quote the pertinent
parts of the assailed Decision:
AccusedWalpanLadjaalamyMihajila.k.a.Warpan,30yearsold,
married,gavehisoccupationassmuggling(tsn,p.2,May4,
1998).HeusedtogotoLabuaninMalaysiaandbringcigarettesto
thePhilippineswithoutpayingtaxes(tsn,pp.4041,id).Hesaidthat
histruename[was]AbdulNasserAbdurakmanandthatWarpanor
WalpanLadjaalam[was]onlyhisalias.However,headmittedthat
morepeoplekn[e]whimasWalpanLadjaalamratherthanAbdul
NasserAbdurakman(tsn.pp.3940;4647,id).Hetestifiedthat[o]n
theafternoonofSeptember24,1997,whenhewasarrestedbythe
police,hewassleepinginthehouseofDandao,arelativeofhis
wife.Hewasalone.HesleptinDandaoshouseandnotinhishouse
becausetheyha[d]asortofaconferenceasDandaosdaughterwas
leavingforSaudiArabia.Henoticedthepresenceofpolicemenin
hisneighborhoodatAplaya,RioHondowhenheheardshots.He
wokeupandwentoutofthehouseandthatwasthetimethathewas
arrested.Hesaidhewasarrestedxxx[at]theothersideofmyhouse;
19
attheothersideofthefencewhereIwassleeping.xxx.Attheback
ofmyhouse(tsn,p.7,id.).Hedoesnotknowwhoarrested
himconsideringthattheonewhoarrestedmedoesnothave
nameplate.Hewasarrestedbyfour(4)persons.Notoneofthose
whoarrestedhimtestifiedinCourt.Hewashandcuffedandplaced
insideajeepparkedatRioHondoElementarySchool.Accordingto
him,hedidnotfireagunatthepolicemenfrom[t]hesecondfloorof
hishouse.Hesaidthepolicemen[were]theone[s]whofire[d]at
us(tsn,p.5,id.).Ifhefiredagunatthepolicemenforsurethey
[would]die[b]ecausethedoorisverynearxxxthevicinityofmy
house.HedoesnotowntheM14rifle(Exh.B3)whichaccordingto
policemen,heusedinfiringatthem.Thegundoesnotbelongto
him.Hedoesnothaveagunlikethat(tsn,p.15,id.).Apoliceman
alsoownsanM14riflebuthedoesnotknowthepoliceman(tsn,pp.
1617,id).HesaidthattheM79rifle(Exh.B4),thethree(3)empty
M16riflemagazines(Exh.G;G1toG2),thetwo(2)M14
magazineswithliveammunition(Exh.G3;G4);thetwo(2)caliber
.38revolvers(Exhs.B1;B2),thefifty(50)aluminumfoilseach
containingshabu(Exhs.J1toJ50)placedinsideapencilcase(Exh.
J,theassortedcoinsplacedinsideabluebag(Exh.W)andthewhite
crystallinestone(Exh.K)alldonotbelongtohim.Hesaidthatthe
policemenjustproducedthosethingsastheirevidence.Thefirearms
donotbelongtohim.Theywerebroughtbythepolicemen(tsn,p.
43,May4,1998).Regardingthebluebagcontainingassortedcoins,
hesaid:thatisnotours,Ithinkthis(is)theirs,xxxtheyjustbrought
thatastheirevidence(tsn,pp.1524,id.)
WalpanLadjaalamdeclaredtherewereoccupantswhowererenting
hisextensionhouse.Heaffirmedthatheownsthathouse.Four(4)
personswerestayingintheextensionhouse.Hecouldonly
recognizethehusbandwhosenameisMomoy.Theyarefrom
Jolo.Theylefttheplacealreadybecausetheywereafraidwhenthe
policeraidedtheplace.(tsn,pp.810,May4,1998).Hedoesnot
knowprosecutionwitnessRinoLocsonyBartolome.Although
Locsonrecognizedhim,inhiscasehedoesnotknowLocsonandhe
doesnotrecognizehim(tsn,p.11,id).Hedidnotsellanythingto
Locsonanddidnotentertainhim.Heisnotsellingshabubuthe
knowsforafactthatthereareplentyofpersonwhoareengagedin
sellingshabuinthatplace,inthatareaknownasAplaya,Rio
Hondo.OneofthemisHadjiAgbi(tsn,pp.1114,id).
AfterhisarrestWalpanLadjaalamwasbroughttothepolicestation
wherehestayedforonedayandonenightbeforehewastransferred
totheCityjail.Whileatthepolicestation,hewasnotabletotakea
bath.Hesmokestwopacksofcigaretteaday.Whilehewasatthe
policestation,hesmoked[a]cigarettegiventohimbyhisyounger
sister.Helightedthecigaretteswith[a]match.Fromthepolice
station,hewasbroughttothePNPRegionalOfficeatR.T.Lim
Boulevardwherehewassubjecttoparaffinexamination(tsn,pp.24
26,May4,1998).
Duringtheraidconductedonhishouse,hiscousinBoyLadjaalam,
AtingSapadi,andJecar(Sikkal)Usman,theyoungerbrotherofhis
wifewerekilled.WalpanLadjaalamsaidthathesawthatitwasthe
policemanwhoshotthem[,]onlyIdonotknowhisname.Theywere
killedatthebackofhishouse.Hesaidthatnochargeswerefiled
againsttheoneresponsiblefortheirdeath(tsn,pp.3033May4,
1998).
AnilhawaAhamad,moreorless80yearsold,awidowwasinthe
houseofWalpanLadjaalamwhomhecallsHadjiIdatthetimethe
policeraidedthehouse.SheisthemotherofAhmaSailabbi.Shewas
togetherwithBaboDandan,twosmallchildrenandahelper
whensoldiersenteredthehouse.(W)hentheyarrived,theykepton
firing(theirguns)eveninsidethehouse(tsn,p.5,May5,
1998).Theywerearmedwithshortandlongfirearms.Theysearched
thehouseandscatteredthingsandgotwhattheywanted.They
enteredtheroomofWalpanLadjaalam.Theytriedtoopenabag
containingjewelry.WhenAnilhawatriedtobringthebagoutsidethe
room,theygrabbedthebagfromherandpokedagunather.Atthat
20
timeWalpanLadjaalamwasnotinthehouse.AhamadSailabbiwas
alsonotinthehouse.ASearchWarrantwasshowntoAnilhawa
afterthesearchwasconductedandjustbeforethepolicemenleftthe
place.AnilhawaAhamadsaidthatitwasalreadylateinthe
afternoon[;]beforetheyleftthatwasthetimetheSearchWarrant
(was)giventousbyxxxBarangayCaptainHussinElhano(tsn,pp.6
8,May5,1998).BarangayChairmanElhanoarrivedalreadylatein
theafternoon,almostsundown(tsn,p.9,id).Anilhawdeclaredthat
asidefromabagcontainingjewelryandabagfullofmoney,shehad
notseenanythingelsethatwastakenfromWalpanLadjaalamshouse
(tsn,pp.912,id).
Akmad(Ahmad)Sailabbi,37yearsold,marriedtestifiedthatabout
4:00oclock[o]ntheafternoonofSeptember24,1997,hawas
standinginfrontofhishousewhenpolicemenarrivedand
immediatelyarrestedhim.HewasabouttogototheCityProperto
buyarticleshewasintendingtobringtoSabah.Hehadaround
P50,000.00placedinsideawaistbagtiedaroundhiswaist.The
policementoldhimtoliedowninpronepositionandapoliceman
searchedhisback.TheypulledhiswaistbagandtookhisDiaStar
wristwatch.Hewasshotthreetimesandwashitontheforehead
leavingascar.Hisinjurywasnottreated.Hewastakentothepolice
stationwherehewasdetainedforonedayandonenight.Hewas
detainedattheCityJailforthreemonthsandfivedaysafterwhich
hewasreleased(tsn,pp.2529,May5,1998).
MelbaUsma,20yearsold,awidow,testifiedthat[o]ntheafternoon
ofSeptember24,1997,shewasinthehouseofherparentslying
togetherwithherhusbandSikkalUsma.Thereisonlyonehouse
betweenherparentshouseandthehouseofWalpanLadjaalam.Her
husbandSikkalUsmanisthebrotherofNurinLadjaalam,Walpans
wife.WhenMelbaheardshots,shewentdownstairs.Apoliceman
waslookingforherhusband.Thepolicemancalledher
husband.Whenherhusbandwentdown,hewasinstructedbythe
policemantoliedowninproneposition.Thenthepolicemanshother
husband.Thepolicemanhadtwoothercompanionswhoalsoshot
herhusbandwhilehewaslyingdowninproneposition(tsn,pp.27,
May5,1998).
MurkisaUsman,30yearsold,married,declaredthat[o]nthe
afternoonofSeptember24,1997,shewassittingatthedoorofher
housewatchingherchildrenplayingwhenamotorcyle,drivenbya
person,stoppednearherhouse.ThedriverwasGagantingwhomshe
calledasoldier.Hewentdownfromhismotorcycle,pulledagun
andpokeditatMurkisa.Murkisastoodupandraisedherhands.She
gotherchildrenandwhenshewasabouttoentertheroomofher
house,Gagantingagainpokedagunatherandtherewasashot.Asa
resultoffiring,threepersonsdied,namely,SikkalUsman,Boy
LadjaalamandAtipSapaliSali(tsn,pp.810,May5,1998).
BarangayCaptainHadjiHussinElhano,51yearsold,testifiedthat
about4:00oclock[o]ntheafternoonofSeptember24,1997,hewas
fetchedbytwopolicemenatCatabanganwherehewasattendinga
seminar.Becauseoftrafficalongtheway,theyarrivedattheRio
Hondoalreadylateintheafternoon.Hesawpolicemenwerealready
insidethehouse.Uponenteringthegate,hesawWalpanatthegate
alreadyhandcuffed.Walpancalledhimbutthepoliceadvisedhim
nottoapproachWalpan.Thesearchwasalreadyoverandthings
werealreadytakeninsidethehouse.Whenhewentinsidethehouse,
hesawthethingsthatthey(policemen)searched,thefirearmsand
theshabu(tsn,p.17.May8,1998).HedidnotseetheSearch
Warrant.Whatwasshowntohimwerethethingsrecoveredduring
thesearchwhichwerebeinglisted.Theywerebeingcountedand
placedonatable.Uponseeingthethingsthatwererecoveredduring
thesearch,Ijustsignedthereceipt(Exh.P;P1)ofthethingsxxx
takenduringthesearch(tsn,pp.1718.May8,1998).Hesawthree
deadbodiesatthesideofthefencewhenhewenttotheothersideof
thehouse.ThethreepersonswerekilledoutsidethefenceofWalpan
Ladjaalam(tsn,p.18,id).[16]
21
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was
raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of Search Warrant No.
20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified
the said Warrant because it had been issued for more than
one specific offense,[17] in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.[18] The court a quo ruled:
ItshouldbestatedattheoutsetthatSearchWarrantNo.20is
totallynullandvoidbecauseitwasissuedformorethanonespecific
offensexxxcontrarytoSection3,Rule1[2]6oftheRulesofCourt
whichprovidesthatAsearchwarrantshallnotissuebutupon
probablecauseinconnectionwithonespecificoffensexxx.In
Tambasanvs.People,246SCRA184(1995),theSupremeCourt
ruledthatasearchwarrantformorethanoneoffenseascattershot
warrantviolatesSection3,Rule126ofthe[R]evisedRulesof
Courtandistotallynullandvoid.[19](emphasisintheoriginal)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as
valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the officers who were
trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was
established by the testimonies of several police officers,[20] who
were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the laboratory
report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and
appellant.[21] Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant
Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his Counter Affidavit,
impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there
had been no exchange of gunfire during the raid. [22] The trial
court concluded that the testimonies of these officers must
prevail over appellants narration that he was not in his house
when the raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the
arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
Underthecircumstances,thepolicemenhadauthoritytopursueand
arrestWalpanLadjaalamandconfiscatethefirearmheusedin
shootingatthepolicemenandtoenterhishousetoeffectsaidarrest
andconfiscationofthefirearm.UnderRule113,Section5(a),ofthe
RulesofCourt,Apeaceofficeroraprivatepersonmay,withouta
warrant,arrestapersonxxx(w)heninhispresence,thepersontobe
arrestedhascommitted,isactuallycommitting,orisattemptingto
commitanoffense.Anoffenseiscommittedinthepresenceorwithin
theviewofanofficer,withinthemeaningoftheruleauthorizingan
arrestwithoutawarrant,whentheofficerseestheoffense,although
atadistance,orhearsthedisturbancescreatedtherebyandproceeds
atoncetothescenethereof.Atthetimethepolicemenenteredthe
houseofaccusedWalpanLadjaalamafterhehadfiredshotsatthe
policemenwhointendedtoservetheSearchWarranttohim,the
accusedwasengagedinthecommissionofacrime,andwaspursued
andarrestedafterhecommittedthecrimeofshootingatthe
policemenwhowereabouttoservetheSearchWarrant. [23]
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the
following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a
magazine containing seventeen live ammunition)[24] used by
appellant against the police elements, two M14 magazines,
and three other M16 rifle magazines. [25] The trial court
observed that these items were in plain view of the pursuing
police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were
evidence [of] the commission of a crime and/or contraband
and therefore, subject to seizure[26] since appellant had not
applied for a license to possess firearm and had not been
given authority to carry firearm outside his residence.[27]
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence,
appellants claim that the items that were seized by the police
officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court.It
ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant evidence to
incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous
raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was
22
unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when
they were accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio
reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed
these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an
inherently weak defense.[28]
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of
maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows:
ThetestimonyofRinoBartolomeLocson,corroboratedbySPO1
RicardoLacastesantosandSPO1AmadoMirasol,Jr.clearly
establishedthatWalpanLadjaalamoperatedandmaintainedadrug
deninhisextensionhousewhereshabuormethamphetamine
hydrochloride,aregulateddrug,wassold,andwherepersonsor
customersboughtandusedshabuormethamphetamine
hydrochloridebyburningthesaidregulateddrugandsniffingits
smokewiththeuseofanaluminumfoiltooter.Adrugdenisalairor
hideawaywhereprohibitedorregulateddrugsareusedinanyform
orarefound.Itsexistence[maybe]provednotonlybydirect
evidencebutmayalsobeestablishedbyproofoffactsand
circumstances,includingevidenceofthegeneralreputationofthe
house,oritsgeneralreputationamongpoliceofficers.The
uncorroboratedtestimonyofaccusedWalpanLadjaalam
a.k.a.Warpanthathedidnotmaintainanextensionhouseoraroom
wheredruguserswhoallegedlybuyshabufromhiminhalesor
smokesshabucannotprevailoverthetestimoniesofLocson,SPO1
Lacastesantos,andSPO1Mirasol.Headmittedthatheistheowner
oftheextensionhousebutheallegedthattherewerefour(4)
occupantswhorentedthatextensionhouse.Heknewthenameof
onlyoneofthefouroccupantswhoareallegedlyfromJolo,acertain
Momoy,thehusband.Asidefrombeinguncorroborated,Walpans
testimonywasnotelaboratedbyevidenceastowhenorforhowlong
wastheextensionhouserented,theamountofrentalpaid,orbyany
otherdocumentshowingthattheextensionhousewasinfact
rented.ThedefenseofdenialputupbyaccusedWalpanLadjaalam
a.k.a.'Warpanisaweakdefense.Denialistheweakestdefenseand
cannotprevailoverthepositiveandcategoricaltestimoniesofthe
prosecutionwitnesses.Denials,ifunsubstantiatedbyclearand
convincingevidence,arenegativeandselfservingevidencewhich
deservenoweightinlawandcannotbegivenevidentiaryweight
overthetestimonyofcrediblewitnesseswhotestifyonaffirmative
matters.Asbetweenthepositivedeclarationoftheprosecution
witnessesandthenegativestatementsoftheaccused,theformer
deservemorecredence.[29]
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability
in this manner:
xxx.TheactoftheaccusedinfiringanM14rifletothepolicemen
whowereabouttoenterhishousetoserveasearchwarrant
constitutesthecrimeofdirectassaultwithmultipleattempted
homicide[,]notmultipleattemptedmurderwithdirectassault[,]
consideringthatnopolicemanwashitandinjuredbytheaccusedand
nocircumstancewasprovedtoqualifytheattemptedkillingto
attemptedmurder.
TheaccusedWalpanLadjaalama.k.a.Warpancannotbeheldliable
[for]thecrimeofViolationofSection16,ArticleIII,inrelationto
Section21,ArticleIV,ofRepublicAct6425otherwiseknownasthe
DangerousDrugsActof1992,asamended,becausethefifty(50)
piecesoffoldedaluminumfoilshavingatotalweightof1.7426
gramsallcontainingmethamphetaminehydrochlorideorshabu
allegedlyfoundinhishouseareinadmissibleasevidenceagainsthim
consideringthattheywereseizedafter[a]searchconductedbyvirtue
ofSearchWarrantNo.20whichistotallynullandvoidasitwas
issuedformorethanoneoffense,andwerenotfoundinplainviewof
thepoliceofficerswhoseizedthem.Neithercouldtheaccusedbe
heldliableforillegalpossessionoffirearmsandammunitionexcept
forthe(1)M14riflewithSerialNumber1555225andwithmagazine
containingfifteen(15)liveammunitionandtwomoreM14rifle
magazineswithtwenty(20)andtwentyone(21)liveammunition
23
respectivelyconsideringthatthepolicemenwhorecoveredorseized
theotherfirearmsandammunitiondidnottestifyincourt.Theblue
bagcontainingassortedcoinscannotbereturnedtotheaccused
WalpanLadjaalama.k.a.Warpanbecauseaccordingtotheaccused
thebluebagandassortedcoinsdonotbelongtohim[;]insteadthe
saidassortedcoinsshouldbeturnedovertotheNationalTreasury. [30]
The Issues
24
we cannot exempt this case from the general rule. [40] Quite the
contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed
that appellant had fired upon the approaching police elements,
and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1
Amado Mirasol Jr.[41] testified thus:
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the
accused?
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went
inside the house, right?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered
the main door of the house of Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam
at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the
ground floor of his house[;] I saw two old woman.
A: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?
COURT:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you
were met by a volley of fire? ... You said you were fired
upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.
xxxxxxxxx
A: I did not mind those two old women because those two
women were sitting on the ground floor. I was
concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam
was firing towards our group so, I, together with
Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second
floor of the house.
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
A: Yes.
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the
gate was opened by your colleague Felipe
Gaganting ... I will reform that question.
25
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the
roofing of the neighbors house?
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you
recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where
is the Serial No. of this?
A: Yes.
FISCAL NUVAL:
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14
rifle and I shouted from the outside, do not fire at the
second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find
this?
A: Yes.
26
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle
magazines and three M14.
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?
A: Empty.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
A: In the corner.
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you identify them?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.
Q: RJL?
A: RJL.[44]
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests
conducted on appellant and on the weapons seized during the
raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the
M-14 which he had used, were positive for gunpowder
nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro explained in
open court:
Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination,
Madam Witness?
27
A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing
of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.
COURT:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired,
during the incident?
A: Yes.
28
inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed
persons.. and I was apprehended by the persons who
attacked x x x our house; [the] house you are referring
to [in] this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring
to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your house or
the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you
heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated
and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon of September 24,
1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo,
Bo. Campo Muslim, my companions in my house
[were] the two old women and my children, is this
correct?
29
PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6
years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on
the ground that the trial court should not have applied the new
law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable
law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its
amendment by RA 8294.
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify
the legal communitys difficulty in grappling with the changes
brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are
opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law,
which provides as follows:
SECTION1.Section1ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1866,asamended,
isherebyfurtheramendedtoreadasfollows:
Section1.UnlawfulManufacture,Sale,Acquisition,Dispositionor
PossessionofFirearmsorAmmunitionInstrumentsUsedor
IntendedtobeUsedintheManufactureofFirearmsor
Ammunition.Thepenaltyofprisioncorreccionalinitsmaximum
periodandafineofnotlessthanFifteenthousandpesos(P15,000)
shallbeimposeduponanypersonwhoshallunlawfullymanufacture,
dealin,acquire,dispose,orpossessanylowpoweredfirearm,such
asrimfirehandgun,.380or.32andotherfirearmofsimilar
firepower,partoffirearm,ammunition,ormachinery,toolor
instrumentusedorintendedtobeusedinthemanufactureofany
firearmorammunition:Provided,Thatnoothercrimewas
committed.
Thepenaltyofprisionmayorinitsminimumperiodandafineof
Thirtythousandpesos(P30,000)shallbeimposedifthefirearmis
classifiedashighpoweredfirearmwhichincludesthosewithbores
biggerindiameterthan.30caliberand9millimetersuchascaliber.
40,.41,.44,.45andalsolessercaliberedfirearmsbutconsidered
powerfulsuchascaliber.357andcaliber.22centerfiremagnumand
otherfirearmswithfiringcapabilityoffullautomaticandbyburstof
twoorthree:Provided,however,Thatnoothercrimewascommitted
bythepersonarrested.
Ifhomicideormurderiscommittedwiththeuseofanunlicensed
firearm,suchuseofanunlicensedfirearmshallbeconsideredasan
aggravatingcircumstance.
IftheviolationofthisSectionisinfurtheranceoforincidentto,orin
connectionwiththecrimeofrebellionorinsurrection,sedition,or
attemptedcoupdetat,suchviolationshallbeabsorbedasanelement
ofthecrimeofrebellionorinsurrection,sedition,orattemptedcoup
detat.
Thesamepenaltyshallbeimposedupontheowner,president,
manager,directororotherresponsibleofficerofanypublicorprivate
firm,company,corporationorentity,whoshallwillfullyor
knowinglyallowanyofthefirearmsownedbysuchfirm,company,
corporationorentitytobeusedbyanypersonorpersonsfound
guiltyofviolatingtheprovisionsoftheprecedingparagraphsor
willfullyorknowinglyallowanyofthemtouseunlicensedfirearms
orfirearmswithoutanylegalauthoritytobecarriedoutsideoftheir
residenceinthecourseoftheiremployment.
Thepenaltyofarrestomayorshallbeimposeduponanypersonwho
shallcarryanylicensedfirearmoutsidehisresidencewithoutlegal
authoritytherefor.
Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the
foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts of this
case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple
unlawful homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be
convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the
second paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore,
30
since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession
cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the
third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the
OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD
1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple
illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is
committed at the same time.[60]
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that
appellant should be convicted of illegal possession of firearms,
in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It
did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not
have been ignorant of the proviso[61] in the second paragraph,
it seemed to have construed no other crime as referring only to
homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of
firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a
crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person
may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this
case, the other crime committed was direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found
appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because
they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple reading
thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of
simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime
is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes
merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate
offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide
was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held
liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused.[62] In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple
language is most favorable to herein appellant.Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.
[63]
31
which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct
assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the
second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may
evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using
such weapons in committing an even lighter offense,[66] like
alarm and scandal[67] or slight physical injuries,[68] both of which
are punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence,
however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294,
whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any
perception that the result reached here appears unwise should
be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no
discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the
manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task
is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts, and we have done so in
this case.
WHEREFORE,
the
appealed
Decision
is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is
found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple
attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is
sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision
correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for which he was
correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion
perpetua. Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of
the Philippines for a possible review, at its sound discretion, of
RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[5]
Rollo, p. 10.
[6]
Rollo, p. 12.
[8]
[10]
[12]
32
[15]
[17]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
Ibid.
[18]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
It provides:
[20]
Decision, pp. 42-43; rollo, pp. 70-71. Both appellant and the
firearms seized tested positive for gunpowder nitrates.
[22]
[33]
[35]
[36]
[38]
33
[50]
[40]
[51]
[41]
[43]
[45]
[46]
[48]
[53]
[54]
Ibid.
[55]
34
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense. An authority on
criminal law writes that when the accused is guilty of a
complex crime, the penalty immediately lower is the next
below the penalty provided for the gravest crime. (Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code, Book One,1981 ed., p. 769.) Since direct
assault is punishable with prision correccional in its medium
and maximum period, the penalty next lower in degree
is arresto mayor (maximum) to prision
correccional (minimum).Accordingly, the indeterminate penalty
for direct assault with multiple attempted homicide is 2 years
and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional.
[59]
[60]
[62]
[65]
[66]
[67]
35
FIRST DIVISION
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission which denied
petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended.
I
Norma Peralta Corporal was employed as a public school
teacher with assignment in Juban, Sorsogon. On November
28 to November 30, 1977, she was confined at the Esteves
Memorial Hospital for acute coronary insufficiency and
premature ventricular contractions.
On June 30, 1983, she was assigned to the Banadero
Elementary School in Daraga, Albay. Norma had to walk three
kilometers to and from said school as no transportation was
available to ferry her and other teachers from the national
36
highway to the school. During her fourth pregnancy, Norma
suffered a complete abortion and was hospitalized for two
days at the Albay Provincial Hospital. After her maternity leave,
Norma reported back to work.
37
prolonged than in angina pectoris, but abnormal ECG
and other laboratory findings associated with
myocardial infarction are absent. The syndrome is
covered by a temporary inability of one's coronary
arteries to supply sufficient oxygenated blood to the
heart muscle. (Merck, Manual of Diagnosis & Therapy,
pp. 100-101).
II
Petitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not one
of occupational diseases listed by the ECC, his claim should
proper under the increased risk theory. He anchors such claim
on the fact that as early as January 1984 or before Norma's
fifth pregnancy, he had noticed a spherical tissue which
appeared like a tomato protruding out of Norma's vagina and
rectum. He avers that such condition was attributable to
38
The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday and
thereafter, a shorter distance of more than one kilometer just
to reach her place of work, was not sufficient to establish that
such condition caused her to develop prolapse of the uterus.
Petitioner did not even present medical findings on the veracity
of his claim that Norma had a tomato-like spherical tissue
protruding from her vagina and rectum.
Norma developed prolapse of the uterus because she was
multiparas, or one who had more than one child, and quite
beyond the safe child-bearing age when she gave birth to her
fifth child she was already forty years old.Novak's Textbook
on Gynecology describes prolapse of the uterus (descensus
uteri) as follows:
An extremely common condition, being far more
frequent in elderly than in young patients. This is
explained by the increasing laxity and atony of the
muscular and fascial structures in later life. The effects
of childbirth injuries may thus make themselves
evident, in the form of uterine prolapse, many years
after the last pregnancy. Pregnancies in a prolapsed
uterus may lead to numerous complications, as noted
by Piver and Spezia.
The important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse
is undoubtedly injury or overstretching of the pelvic
floor, and especially of the cardinal ligaments
(Mackenrodt) in the bases of the broad
ligaments.Combined with this there is usually extensive
injury to the perineal structures, producing marked
vaginal relaxation and also frequent injury to the fascia
or the anterior or posterior vaginal walls, with the
production of cystocele or rectocele. Usually, various
combinations of these conditions are seen, although at
times little or no cystocele or rectocele is associated
39
the services rendered by public elementary school teachers
inspite of their meager salaries which are not proportionate to
their immense responsibility in molding the values and
character of the youth in this country (De Vera v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685 [1984]).
But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest,
not mandate, that respondents grant ex gratia some form of
relief to their members similarly situated as petitioner's wife.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69344
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The legal issue presented in this petition for review is whether
or not the tax amnesty payments made by the private
respondents on October 23, 1973 bar an action for recovery of
deficiency income taxes under P.D.'s Nos. 23, 213 and 370.
On April 15, 1980, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced an action in the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila,
Branch XVI, to collect from the spouses Antonio Pastor and
Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income taxes for the years
1955 to 1959 in the amount of P17,117.08 with a 5%
surcharge and 1% monthly interest, and costs.
The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the
motion was denied.1wphi1 On August 2, 1975, they filed an
answer admitting there was an assessment against them of
P17,117.08 for income tax deficiency but denying liability
therefor. They contended that they had availed of the tax
amnesty under P.D.'s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and had paid the
corresponding amnesty taxes amounting to P10,400 or 10% of
their reported untaxed income under P.D. 23, P2,951.20 or
40
20% of the reported untaxed income under P.D. 213, and a
final payment on October 26, 1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced
by the Government's Official Receipt No. 1052388.
Consequently, the Government is in estoppel to demand and
compel further payment of income taxes by them.
The parties agreed that there were no issues of fact to be
litigated, hence, the case was submitted for decision upon the
pleadings and memoranda on the lone legal question of:
whether or not the payment of deficiency income tax under the
tax amnesty, P.D. 23, and its acceptance by the Government
operated to divest the Government of the right to further
recover from the taxpayer, even if there was an existing
assessment against the latter at the time he paid the amnesty
tax.
It is not disputed that as a result of an investigation made by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1963, it was found that the
private respondents owed the Government P1,283,621.63 as
income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959, inclusive of the 50%
surcharge and 1% monthly interest. The defendants protested
against the assessment. A reinvestigation was conducted
resulting in the drastic reduction of the assessment to only
P17,117.08.
It appears that on April 27, 1978, the private respondents
offered to pay the Bureau of Internal Revenue the sum of
P5,000 by way of compromise settlement of their income tax
deficiency for the questioned years, but Assistant
Commissioner Bernardo Carpio, in a letter addressed to the
Pastor spouses, rejected the offer stating that there was no
legal or factual justification for accepting it. The Government
filed the action against the spouses in 1980, ten (10) years
after the assessment of the income tax deficiency was made.
41
respondents were not qualified to avail of the tax amnesty
under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that decree are available
only to persons who had no pending assessment for unpaid
taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 8-72 and 773. Since the Pastors did in fact have a pending assessment
against them, they were precluded from availing of the
amnesty granted in P.D.'s Nos. 23 and 213. The Government
further argued that "tax exemptions should be
interpreted strictissimi juris against the taxpayer."
The respondent spouses, on the other hand, alleged that P.D.
213 contains no exemptions from its coverage and that, under
Letter of Instruction LOI 129 dated September 18, 1973, the
immunities granted by P.D. 213 include:
II-Immunities Granted.
Upon payment of the amounts specified in the Decree,
the following shall be observed:
1. . . . .
2. The taxpayer shall not be subject to any
investigation, whether civil, criminal or administrative,
insofar as his declarations in the income tax returns
are concerned nor shall the same be used as evidence
against, or to the prejudice of the declarant in any
proceeding before any court of law or body, whether
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative, in which he is a
defendant or respondent, and he shall be exempt from
any liability arising from or incident to his failure to file
his income tax return and to pay the tax due thereon,
as well as to any liability for any other tax that may be
due as a result of business transactions from which
such income, now voluntarily declared may have been
derived. (Emphasis supplied; p. 040, Rollo.)
42
collecting the difference between the deficiency tax
assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty
tax.
A tax amnesty, being a general pardon or intentional
overlooking by the State of its authority to impose
penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or
violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an
absolute forgiveness or waiver by the Government of
its right to collect what otherwise would be due it, and
in this sense, prejudicial thereto, particularly to give tax
evaders, who wish to relent and are willing to reform a
chance to do so and thereby become a part of the new
society with a clean slate (Commission of Internal
Revenue vs. Botelho Corp. and Shipping Co., Inc., 20
SCRA 487).
The finding of the appellate court that the deficiency income
taxes were paid by the Pastors, and accepted by the
Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons
who are required by law to file income tax returns but who
failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and may not
be disturbed except under exceptional circumstances which
have already become familiar (Rule 45, Sec. 4, Rules of Court;
e.g., where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (6) the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence in which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the finding of
43
SECOND DIVISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47-91 and enjoin the
collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value Added Tax
(VAT) on the sale of copra by members of petitioner
organization. 1
Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a
domestic corporation whose members, individually or collectively,
are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis
Oriental. The petitioner alleges that prior to the issuance of
Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which
implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as
agricultural food product under $ 103(b) of the National Internal
Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of
production or distribution.
44
Respondents represent departments of the executive branch of
government charged with the generation of funds and the
assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other imposts.
The pertinent provision of the NIRC states:
Sec. 103. Exempt Transactions. The following
shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
(a) Sale of nonfood agricultural, marine and forest
products in their original state by the primary
producer or the owner of the land where the same
are produced;
(b) Sale or importation in their original state of
agricultural and marine food products, livestock
and poultry of a kind generally used as, or yielding
or producing foods for human consumption, and
breeding stock and genetic material therefor;
Under 103(a), as above quoted, the sale of agricultural non-food
products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale
is made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which
the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or
entity, like a trader or dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the
other hand, under 103(b) the sale of agricultural food products in
their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production
or distribution regardless of who the seller is.
The question is whether copra is an agricultural food or non-food
product for purposes of this provision of the NIRC. On June 11,
1991, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the
circular in question, classifying copra as an agricultural non-food
product and declaring it "exempt from VAT only if the sale is made
by the primary producer pursuant to Section 103(a) of the Tax
Code, as amended." 2
10 April 1991
Mr. VICTOR A. DEOFERIO, JR.
Chairman VAT Review Committee
Bureau of Internal Revenue
Diliman, Quezon City
45
Dear Mr. Deoferio:
This is to clarify a previous communication made by this Office
about copra in a letter dated 05 December 1990 stating that
copra is not classified as food. The statement was made in the
context of BFAD's regulatory responsibilities which focus mainly
on foods that are processed and packaged, and thereby copra is
not covered.
However, in the broader definition of food which include
agricultural commodities and other components used in the
manufacture/ processing of food, it is our opinion that copra
should be classified as an agricultural food product since copra is
produced from coconut meat which is food and based on
available information, more than 80% of products derived from
copra are edible products.
Very truly yours,
QUINTIN L. KINTANAR, M.D., Ph.D.
Director
Assistant Secretary of Health for Standards and Regulations
Moreover, as the government agency charged with the
enforcement of the law, the opinion of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly
wrong, is entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise of his
power under 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in
connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal
revenue laws, including rulings on the classification of articles for
sales tax and similar purposes."
Second. Petitioner complains that it was denied due process
because it was not heard before the ruling was made. There is a
distinction in administrative law between legislative rules and
interpretative rules. 3 There would be force in petitioner's argument if
46
questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial
judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not
into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As
a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative
rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the
opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some
intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative
rule. 6
In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent
Commissioner erred in not considering copra as an "agricultural
food product" within the meaning of 103(b) of the NIRC. As the
Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is
not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats
copra for food." That previous Commissioners considered it so, is
not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling
of his predecessors. 7 To the contrary, the overruling of decisions is
inherent in the interpretation of laws.
Third. Petitioner likewise claims that RMC No. 47-91 is
discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers
are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra
in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax
credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers.
The argument has no merit. There is a material or substantial
difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the
one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the other. The
former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The
Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons
so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them
differently. 8
It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to
102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of
services. Under 104 of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit
the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and dealers, but
there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra
producer as the sale is VAT exempt. In the same manner, copra
traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale
of copra by other traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if
the sale is made by the producer.
Fourth. It is finally argued that RMC No. 47-91 is
counterproductive because traders and dealers would be forced
to buy copra from coconut farmers who are exempt from the VAT
and that to the extent that prices are reduced the government
would lose revenues as the 10% tax base is correspondingly
diminished.
This is not so. The sale of agricultural non-food products is
exempt from VAT only when made by the primary producer or
owner of the land from which the same is produced, but in the
case of agricultural food products their sale in their original state
is exempt at all stages of production or distribution. At any rate,
the argument that the classification of copra as agricultural nonfood product is counterproductive is a question of wisdom or
policy which should be addressed to respondent officials and to
Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 The value-added tax is a percentage tax on the sale,
barter, exchange or importation of goods or services.
(NIRC, 99) Insofar as the sale, barter or exchange of
47
goods is concerned, the tax is equivalent to 10% of the
gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods
sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the
seller or transferor. ( 100(a)) The tax is determined as
follows:
(d) Determination of the tax. (1) Tax billed as separate
item in the invoice. If the tax is billed as a separate item in
the invoice, the tax shall be based on the gross selling
price, excluding the tax. "Gross selling price" means the
total amount of money or its equivalent which the
purchaser pays or is obligated to pay to the seller in the
consideration of the sale, barter or exchange of the
goods, excluding the value-added tax. The excise tax, if
any, on such goods shall form part of the gross selling
price.
(2) Tax not billed separately or is billed erroneously in the
invoice. In case the tax is not billed separately or is
billed erroneously in the invoice, the tax shall be
determined by multiplying the gross selling price,
including the amount intended by the seller to cover the
tax or the tax billed erroneously, by the factor 1/11 or such
factor as may be prescribed by regulations in case of
persons partially exempt under special laws.
(3) Sales returns, allowances and sales discounts. The
value of goods sold and subsequently returned or for
which allowances were granted by a VAT-registered
person may be deducted from the gross sales or receipts
for the quarter in which a refund is made or a credit
memorandum or refund is issued. Sales discounts
granted and indicated in the invoice at the time of sale
may be excluded from the gross sales within the same
quarter. (100(d))
2 This circular is based on VAT Ruling No. 190-90 dated
August 17, 1990 which revoked VAT Ruling No. 009-88
48
G.R. No. L-44899 April 22, 1981
MARIA E. MANAHAN, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GSIS
(LAS PIAS MUNICIPAL HIGH SCHOOL),respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0070 (Nazario
Manahan, Jr., deceased), entitled "Maria Manahan, Appellant,
versus Government Service Insurance System, (Las Pias
Municipal High School), Respondent" affirming the decision of
the Government Service Insurance System which denied the
claim for death benefit. 1
The claimant, petitioner herein, Maria E. Manahan, is the
widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of "Enteric Fever"
while employed as classroom teacher in Las Pias Municipal
High School, Las Pias Rizal, on May 8, 1975.
The petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service
Insurance for death benefit under Presidential Decree 626. In
a letter dated June 19, 1975, the Government Service
Insurance denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of
Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not an occupational
disease.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the deceased, Nazario Manahan, Jr., was in perfect health
when admitted to the service and that the ailment of said
deceased was attributable to his employment.
49
The Government Service Insurance System affirmed the
denial of the claim on the ground that enteric fever or
paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid fever, in the sense
that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.
The petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation
Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government
Service Insurance System on a finding that the ailment of the
deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by or aggravated by
the nature of the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. 2
To support her theory that the disease of Nazario Manahan,
Jr., enteric fever, resulted from his employment as classroom
teacher of the Las Pias Municipal High School, the petitioner
cites the following authority:
EPIDEMOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY
OF ENTERIC FEVER
THE SOURCE OF INFECTION is feces or urine from
patients and carriers. Family contacts may be transient
carriers and 2 to 5% of patients become chronic
carriers. In poorly sanitized communities, water is the
most frequent vehicle of transmission; food, especially
milk, is the next most important. In modern urban
areas, food, contaminated by healthy carriers who are
food handlers, is the principal vehicle. Flies may spread
the organism from feces to food. Direct contact
infection is infrequent.
The organism enters the body through the
gastrointestinal tract, invading the blood stream by way
of the lymphatic channels. There is hyperplasia and
often ulceration of Pyeris patches, especially in the
ileum and cecum. When the ulcers heals, no scar
50
Because of these circumstances, the illness that claimed the
life of the deceased could have had its onset months before
December 10, 1974. Such being the case, his cause of action
accrued before December 10, 1974.
In the case of Corales vs. ECI (L-44063, Feb. 27, 1979), We
ruled that:
... Article 294, Title III (Transitory and Final Provisions)
of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and
claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
be determined in accordance with the laws in force at
the time of their accrual and under the third paragraph
of Article 292, Title 11 Prescription of Offenses and
Claims, workmen's compensation claims accruing prior
to the effectivity of this Code and during the period from
November 1, 1974 up to December 31, 1974 shall be
processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws
and rules at the time their causes of action accrued.
Hence, this Court applied the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, on
passing upon petitioner's claim.
Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act in this case, the
presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the
claimant.
In any case, We have always maintained that in case of doubt,
the same should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that
social legislations like the Workmen's Compensation Act and
the Labor Code should be liberally construed to attain their
laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his
dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain
an injury.
51
3. To reimburse the petitioner expenses incurred for medical
services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased
Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts; and
4. To pay administrative fees.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero and De Castro,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REGALADO, J.:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I concur. Although enteric fever is not an occupational disease,
considering the cause of said illness, the risk of contracting it
could have been increased by the working conditions of the
deceased, a teacher, who used to eat his meals at the school
canteen and used the comfort room and other facilities of the
school.
EN BANC
52
In a letter 4 dated May 28, 1992, the OIC-Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch 28,
informed Pahilan that the correct fees that where supposed to
be paid amounted to P620.00, and that, accordingly, the
petition would not be entered in the court docket and
summons would not be issued pending payment of the
balance of P420.00.
On June 16, 1992, upon receipt of the latter, Pahilan paid the
required balance in the total amount P470.00. 5
Subsequently, on June 22, 1992, Tabalba filed his answer with
Counterclaim, 6 alleging as one of his affirmative defenses lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court to entertain the
election protest for having been filed beyond the ten-day
period provided by law.
On August 17, 1992, Pahilan filed a Motion for Inhibition, dated
August 14, 1992, because of alleged serious and grave doubts
that the presiding judge could impartially hear and decide his
election protest with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge,
as the latter allegedly belongs to and had supported a political
group adverse to the candidacy of petitioner.
On August 18, 1992, the trial court proceeded with the pre-trial
conference, heard the defense on the allegation of lack of
jurisdiction for non-payment of docket fees, and thereafter
ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Tabalba filed his Memorandum in Support of Affirmative
Defense of Lack of Jurisdiction, 7 dated September 4, 1992.
Under date of September 22, 1992, Pahilan filed a
Memorandum 8 as well as a Motion to Resolve Motion for
Inhibition Prior to Resolution of Affirmative Defenses. 9
53
contains all the elements of a "notice of appeal" and
more expressive of the intent to elevate the case for
review by said appellate body, and furnishing copies
thereof to the respondent trial judge and counsel for
the adverse party, aside from the incomplete payment
of the appeal fee; and
2. Whether or not the respondent trial judge validly
dismissed the petition of protest of petitioner for nonpayment on time of the required fee.
We find cogency and merit in the petition.
The bone of contention in this petition is the alleged erroneous
dismissal of petitioner's appeal by respondent Commission
because of the failure of petitioner to file a notice of appeal
before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin which,
in turn, dismissed the election protest of petitioner for nonpayment of docket fees.
The COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE provide for the
manner in which appeals from decisions of courts in election
contests shall be made, to wit:
RULE 22 Appeals from Decisions of Courts
in Election Protest Cases
Sec. 1. Caption and title of appealed cases. In all
election contests involving the elections, returns, and
qualifications of municipal or barangay officials, the
party interposing the appeal shall be called the
"Appellant" and the adverse party the "Appellee", but
the title of the case shall remain as it was in the court of
origin.
xxx xxx xxx
54
(b) Failure of the appellant to file copies of his brief
within the time provided by these rules;
(c) Want of specific assignment of errors in the
appellant's brief; and
(d) Failure to file notice of appeal within the prescribed
period.
In the case at bar, petitioner received a copy of the trial court's
order dismissing his election protest on October 12, 1992. As
earlier stated, herein petitioner, instead of filing a notice of
appeal as required by the rules, filed with respondent
Commission a verified appeal brief within the five-day
reglementary period by registered mail under Registry Receipt
No. 43093, dated October 17, 1992. It will be noted, however,
that on even date, petitioner likewise sent by registered mail
copies of his appeal brief to the Regional Trial Court of
Mambajao, Camiguin, under Registry Receipt No. 43091, and
to the counsel of herein private respondent, under Registry
Receipt No. 43092. 15
The question now posed by the foregoing factual situation is
whether the notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an
appeal brief. We firmly believe and so hold, under the
considerations hereinunder discussed, that the same may be
allowed.
First, in cases where a record on appeal is required under the
Rules of Court, it has been consistently held that the filing or
presentation and approval of the record on appeal on time
necessarily implies or involves the filing of the notice of
appeal, 16 because the act of taking or perfecting an appeal is
more expressive of the intention to appeal than the filing of a
mere notice to do so. 17
55
required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right of
appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case. 20Nevertheless, in some
instances, this Court has disregarded such unintended lapses
so as to give due course to appeals on the basis of strong and
compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and
preventing a grave miscarriage thereof in the exercise of our
equity
jurisdiction. 21
Second, it has been shown and it is not even denied that the
Regional Trial Court of Camiguin, as well as the counsel for
private respondent, was furnished copies of the appeal brief
which were sent by registered mail on October 17, 1992,
within the reglementary period to appeal. This fact was never
refuted by the Solicitor General in his Comment.
Concomitantly, although the Clerk of Court claimed that he had
not received any notice of appeal from herein petitioner, it
would be safe to assume, under the circumstances, that the
appeal brief duly directed mailed was received in the regular
course of the
mail 22 and was, therefore, deemed filed with the trial court as
of the date of mailing.
56
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 27 (an action for a sum
of money and damages), Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) et
al. vs.Asuncion. 28 (a suit for a sum of money and damages),
and Tacay, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del
Norte, etc., et al. 29 (an action for damages). It bears emphasis
that the foregoing cases, except for Malimit vs. Degamo, are
ordinary civil actions. This fact alone would have sufficed for a
declaration that there was no basis for the dismissal of
petitioner's protest for the simple reason that an election
contest is not an ordinary civil action. Consequently the rules
governing ordinary civil actions are not necessarily binding on
special actions like an election contest wherein public interest
will be adversely affected.
The case of Malimit vs. Degamo, on its part, is not on all fours
with the present case. In that case, the petition forquo
warranto was mailed to the clerk of Court on December 14,
1959 and was received by the latter on December 17, 1959.
The docket fee was deemed paid only on January 5, 1960,
because the petitioner therein failed to prove his allegation that
a postal money order for the docket fee was attached to his
petition. Hence, the petition for quo warranto was correctly
dismissed.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the sum of
P200.00 was attached to the petition mailed to the Regional
Trial Court of Camiguin and this fact was even acknowledged
by the Clerk of Court thereof when he requested herein
petitioner to pay the balance of the correct docket fee.
In Malimit, there was no docket fee paid at all at the time of
mailing; in the present case, the docket fee was paid except
that the amount given was not correct. Considering the fact
that there was an honest effort on the part of herein petitioner
to pay the full amount of docket fees, we are not inclined to
insist on a stringent application of the rules.
57
practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer of their
complaints any specification of the amount of damages, the
omission being clearly intended for no other purpose than to
evade the payment of the correct filing fees by deluding the
docket clerk in his assessment of the same. In all these cases,
the rule was applied for failure of the plaintiff to include in the
prayer of the complaint the total amount of damages sought
against the defendant. The reason for this, according to
the Tacay case, is because the amount of damages will help
determine two things: first, the jurisdiction of the court; and,
second, the amount of docket fees to be paid.
reason why only two hundred pesos was remitted at the same
time with the petition." 30
#Footnotes
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.
58
7 Annex H, id.; ibid., 53.
8 Annex I, id.; ibid., 57.
9 Annex G. id.; ibid., 61.
10 Annex K, id.; ibid., 63.
11 Annex L, id.; ibid., 77.
12 Annex M, id.; ibid., 123.
13 Annex N, id.; ibid., 124.
14 Annex P, id.; ibid., 127.
15 Rollo, 88.
16 Lopez vs. Lopez, et al., 77 Phil. 133 (1946).
17 Peralta vs. Solon, 77 Phil. 610 (1946).
18 Unda vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.
94090, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 827.
19 Vda. de De Mesa, et al. vs. Mencias, et al., G.R. No.
L-24583, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 533.
20 Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
99357, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 537.
21 Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 101527,
January 19, 1993, 217 SCRA 237.
22 Section 3(v), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
23 This is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 43
of the comelec Rules of Procedure.
24 G.R. No. L-17850, Nov. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 450.
25 G.R. No. L-34840, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 193.
26 G.R. No. L-15027, January 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 65.
27 G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562.
28 G.R Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA
274.
29 G.R. Nos. 88075-77, December 20, 1989, 180
SCRA 433.
30 Rollo, 58.
THIRD DIVISION
59
intention to personally cultivate the landholding, but despite
the lapse of one (1) agricultural year from receipt of the notice
thereof, petitioner refused to vacate the land.
In his amended answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied
having received any notice from the private respondent and by
way of special and affirmative defenses, he alleged that: (a)
the jurisdictional requirements of the law have not been
complied with by private respondent; (b) the latter has another
palay landholding situated at Santiago, Sta. Ana, Pampanga
with an area of
2 1/2 hectares which is being worked by a hired helper; (c)
private respondent is physically unfit to perform the different
phases of farm work; and (d) that private respondent filed the
case merely to harass petitioner because of the latter's
adoption of the agricultural leasehold system and refusal to
shift back to the 50-50 sharing arrangement with the former. In
his counterclaim, petitioner sought to exercise his right of
redemption over the subject landholding pursuant to the
provisions of R.A. No. 3844 in view of the failure of the former
owner, Daniel Garcia, to notify him beforehand of the intended
sale of the landholding. Private respondent filed his Answer to
the Counterclaim.
At the pre-trial conference of the case, the parties could only
stipulate on their being of legal age, their residences and on
the fact that private respondent is the owner of the landholding
in question, which is cultivated by petitioner under the
leasehold system.
After trial on the merits, the agrarian court rendered a decision
against petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered granting authority to plaintiff Domingo
Pasion to eject defendant Pio Balatbat from the
60
advanced technology, most of the back-breaking processes of
farming have been lightened by machinery. As regards the
asserted right of redemption pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. No.
3844, the Court held that the petitioner "failed to comply with
the requirements" and took note of petitioner's petition before
the lower court to litigate as pauper as "a circumstance that is
highly indicative of lack of funds on his part." 4 His motion to
reconsider 5 the decision having been denied in the resolution
of 25 January 1973, 6 petitioner took the instant recourse to
present the following legal issues for this Court's resolution:
1. What is the effect of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389,
abolishing personal cultivation by landowners as a
ground for dispossession of tenants from their
landholdings, on pending appealed cases?
2. Should pending appealed cases on personal
cultivation be decided in the light of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 6389?
Expectedly, petitioner maintains that this case should have
been decided in the light of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 since,
in view of the appeal, the private respondent did not yet
acquire a vested right to personally cultivate the landholding.
In short, the application of the repealing law warrants the
dismissal of the action for ejectment.
Republic Act No. 6389 took effect on 10 September 1971,
during the pendency of this case before the Court of Appeals.
After private respondent filed his comment 7 in compliance with
the resolution of 13 March 1973, this Court resolved to give
due course to the petition 8 and thereafter required the
petitioner to file his Brief, 9 which he complied with on 22 June
1973; 10 he makes the following assignment of errors:
I
The Court a quo gravely erred in ordering the
ejectment of herein petitioner on the ground of
personal cultivation.
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing
private respondent's complaint for cultivation in view of
the repeal of Section 36(1) Rep. Act 3844 by Section 7
of Rep. Act 6389.
Private respondent filed his Brief on 25 September 1973.
In support of the first assigned error, petitioner asserts that
during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals,
Congress passed Republic Act No. 6389, Section 7 of which
amended Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844. As amended,
personal cultivation is no longer a ground to dispossess an
agricultural lessee of his landholding. Section 36(1) of R.A. No.
3844 originally read as follows:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessorowner or a member
of his immediate family will personally cultivate
the landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory,
hospital or school site or other useful non-
61
agricultural purposes: Provided, That the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five
years rental on his landholding in addition to his
rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four,
except when the land owned and leased by the
agricultural lessor, is not more than five
hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an
advance notice of at least one agricultural year
before ejectment proceedings are filed against
him: Provided, further, That should the
landholder not cultivate the land himself for
three years or fail to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be
presumed that he acted in bad faith and the
tenant shall have the right to demand
possession of the land and recover damages
for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossession.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Section 36(1) of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
(1) The landholding is declared by the
department head upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other
urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the
62
xxx xxx xxx
Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New
Civil Code) provides that: "Laws shall not have a
retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided."
According to this provision of law, in order that a law
may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an
express provision to this effect be made in the law,
otherwise nothing should be understood which is not
embodied in the law. Furthermore, it must be borne in
mind that a law is a rule established to guide our
actions with no binding effect until it is enacted,
wherefore, it has no application to past times but only
to future time, and that is why it is said that the law
looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect
unless the legislator may have formally given that effect
to some legal provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow, 40
Phil. 997).
As early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland
as ponente announced:
The Act contains, as is seen, no express words
giving it a retrospective or retroactive effect, nor
is there anything found therein which indicates
an intention to give it such an effect. Its effect is,
rather, by clear intendment, prospective.
It is a rule of statutory construction that all
statutes are to construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the purpose and
intention of the Legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. In
every case of doubt, the doubt must be solved
against the retrospective effect. The cases
63
a social function. This means that the owner has the
obligation to use his property not only to benefit himself
but society as well. Hence, the Constitution provides
under Section 6 of Article II that in the promotion of
social justice, the State "shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private
property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits." The Constitution also ensures that the worker
shall have a just and living wage which should assure
for himself and his family an existence worthy of human
dignity and give him opportunities for a better life
(Sections 7 and 9, Article II) (Alfanta vs. Noe, 53 SCRA
76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194).
In line with the above mandates, this Court upheld the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, which
decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage
of the soil and transferred to them the ownership of the
land they till, in Gonzales v. Estrella (91 SCRA 294).
We noted the imperative need for such a decree
in Chavez v. Zobel (55 SCRA 26). We held in the latter
case that "on this vital policy question, one of the
utmost concern, the need for what for some is a radical
solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root,
was apparent. Presidential Decree No. 27 was thus
conceived. . . . There is no doubt then, as set forth
expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What
is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of
the land according to the present Constitution.
Significantly, P.D. No. 27, which decrees the
emancipation of the tenant from the bondage of the
soil, transfers to him the ownership of the land he tills,
and provides instruments and mechanisms therefor,
has (sic) recognized personal cultivation as a ground
for retention and, therefore, exemption from the land
64
adequate income to support themselves and
their families. (Letter of Instruction No. 472
dated October 21, 1976).
The subsequent cases of Diga vs. Adriano, et
al. 13 and Gallardo vs. Borromeo 14 reiterated the rule We laid
in the Niloand Castro cases.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104215. May 8, 1996]
65
not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any
defect in the law. It created the POEA to assume the
functions of the Overseas Employment Development
Board, the National Seamen Board and the overseas
employment functions of the Bureau of Employment
Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money
claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out
of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment, including seamen."
The rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to
E.O. No. 797. It should not affect jurisdiction over cases
filed prior to its effectivity.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CURATIVE
STATUTE; DEFINED. - A curative statute is enacted to
cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings,
instruments or acts of public authorities which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain
existing legal requirements.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Ardala, Pecson, Bengzon,
and Jimenez for petitioner.
Fabian Gappi for private respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Erectors, Inc. challenges the jurisdiction of
respondent Labor Arbiter Julio F. Andres, Jr. to hear and
decide the complaint[1] for underpayment of wages and nonpayment of overtime pay filed by private respondent Florencio
Burgos, an overseas contract worker.
The facts are undisputed:
66
On March 31, 1982, private respondent filed with the
Labor Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and
contractual bonus.
On May 1, 1982, while the case was still in the conciliation
stage, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 797 creating the Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration
(POEA)
took
effect. Section 4(a) of E.O. No. 797 vested the POEA with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including
money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment.[2]
Despite E.O. No. 797, respondent Labor Arbiter
proceeded to try the case on the merits. On September 23,
1983, he rendered a Decision[3] in favor of private respondent,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedorderingthe
respondenttopaythecomplainantasfollows:
1.ThesumofUS$2,496.00initspesoequivalentonAugust25,
1981asdifferencebetweenhisallowanceasServiceDriveras
againsthispositionasHelper/Laborer;
2.ThesumofUS$1,000.00initspesoequivalentasofthesame
date,ashiscontractualbonus.
Thecomplaintsfornonpayment/underpaymentofovertimepayand
unpaidwagesorcommissionareDISMISSEDforlackofmerit. [4]
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). It questioned the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter over the case in view of the enactment of
E.O. No. 797.
civil
action
"TheNLRCcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretiontantamounttolack
ofjurisdictioninaffirmingtheLaborArbiter'svoidjudgmentinthe
caseaquo."[7]
It asserts that E.O. No. 797 divested the Labor Arbiter of
his authority to try and resolve cases arising from overseas
employment contract. Invoking this Court's ruling in Briad Agro
Developinent Corp. vs. Dela Cerna,[8] petitioner argues that
E.O. No. 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases,
including the complaint filed by private respondent.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.[9] On March 31, 1982, at the time
private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner,
the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 [10] and
67
Presidential Decree No. 1391[11] which vested the Regional
Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving
employer-employee relations including money claims arising
out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment."[12] At the time of the filing of the
complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the
same.
E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to
hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to
its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless
the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
[13]
We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an
intention to give it retroactive effect.
The case of Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela
Cerna[14] cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the case at
bar. In Briad, the Court applied the exception rather than the
general rule. In this case, Briad Agro Development Corp. and
L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. challenged the jurisdiction of
the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
Employment over cases involving workers' money claims,
since Article 217 of the Labor Code, the law in force at the time
of the filing of the complaint, vested in the Labor Arbiters
exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. The Court dismissed
the petition in its Decision dated June 29, 1989.[15] It ruled that
the enactment of E.O. No. 111, amending Article 217 of the
Labor Code, cured the Regional Director's lack of jurisdiction
by giving the Labor Arbiter and the Regional Director
concurrent jurisdiction over all cases involving money
claims. However, on November 9,1989, the Court, in a
Resolution,[16] reconsidered and set aside its June 29 Decision
and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper
proceedings, in view of the promulgation of Republic Act (R.A.)
6715 which divested the Regional Directors of the power to
68
prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It
should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed prior to its
effectivity.
Our ruling in Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. vs.
NLRC[18] is more apt to the case at bar. In this case, PSPC
hired Jardin to work in Saudi Arabia. Jardin filed a complaint
against PSPC for illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages
on January 31, 1979 with the Labor Arbiter. PSPC questioned
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because at that time, the
power to hear and decide cases involving overseas workers
was vested in the Bureau of Employment Services. We held:
"WhenJardinfiledthecomplaintforillegaldismissalonJanuary31,
1979,Art.217(5)oftheLaborCodeprovidedthatLaborArbiters
andtheNLRCshallhaveexclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecideall
casesarisingfromemployeremployeerelationsunlessexpressly
excludedbythisCode.AtthattimeArt.15ofthesameCodehad
beenamendedbyP.D.No.1412whichtookeffectonJune9,
1978.Thepertinentprovisionofthesaidpresidentialdecreestates:
Article15.BureauofEmploymentServices.
(a)xxxxxxxxx
(b)TheBureaushallhavetheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionover
allmattersorcasesinvolvingemployeremployeerelationsincluding
moneyclaims,arisingoutoforbyvirtueofanylaworcontracts
involvingFilipinoworkersforoverseasemployment,except
seamen.ThedecisionsoftheBureaushallbefinalandexecutory
subjecttoappealtotheSecretaryofLaborwhosedecisionshallbe
finalandinappealable.
ConsideringthatprivaterespondentJardin'sclaimsundeniablyarose
outofanemployeremployeerelationshipwithpetitionerPSPCand
thatprivaterespondentworkedoverseasorinSaudiArabia,the
BureauofEmploymentServicesandnottheLaborArbiterhad
jurisdictionoverthecase.xxx
Art.15wasfurtheramendedbyP.D.No.1691whichtookeffecton
May1,1990.Suchamendmentqualifiesthejurisdictionofthe
BureauofEmploymentServicesasfollows:
(b)TheregionalofficesoftheMinistryofLaborshallhavethe
originalandexclusivejurisdictionoverallmattersorcasesinvolving
employeremployeerelationsincludingmoneyclaims,arisingoutof
orbyvirtueofanylaworcontractsinvolvingFilipinoworkersfor
overseasemploymentexceptseamen:ProvidedthattheBureauof
EmploymentServicesmay,inthecaseoftheNationalCapital
Region,exercisesuchpower,whenevertheMinisterofLabordeems
itappropriate.ThedecisionsoftheregionalofficesortheBureauof
EmploymentServicesifsoauthorizedbytheMinisterofLaboras
providedinthisArticle,shallbeappealabletotheNationalLabor
RelationsCommissionuponthesamegroundsprovidedinArticle
223hereof.ThedecisionsoftheNationalLaborRelations
Commissionshallbefinalandinappealable.
Hence,asfurtheramended,Art.15providedforconcurrent
jurisdictionbetweentheregionalofficesofthethenMinistryof
LaborandBureauofEmploymentServicesintheNationalCapital
Region.ItisnoteworthythatP.D.No.1691,whilelikewise
amendingArt.217oftheLaborCode,didnotaltertheprovisionthat
LaborArbitersshallhavejurisdictionoverallclaimsarisingfrom
employeremployeerelationsunlessexpresslyexcludedbythis
Code.
The functions of the Bureau of Employment Services
were subsequently assumed by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) on May 1, 1982 by
virtue of Executive Order No. 797 by granting the POEA
69
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employer-employee
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment,
including seamen. (Sec. 4 (a); Eastern Shipping Lines v.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration [POEA], 200
SCRA 663 [1991]). This development showed the legislative
authority's continuing intent toexclude from the Labor Arbiter's
jurisdiction claims arising from overseas employment.
These amendments notwithstanding, when the
complaint for illegal dismissal was filed on January 31,
1979, under Art. 15, as amended by P.D. No. 1412, it was
the Bureau of Employment Services which had
jurisdiction over the case and not the Labor Arbiters. It is
a settled rule that jurisdiction is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the
action (Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, 201 SCRA 632, 637
[1991]). P.D. 1691 which gave the regional offices of the
Ministry of Labor concurrent jurisdiction with the Bureau of
Employment Services, was promulgated more than a year
after the complaint was filed. (Italics supplied)
In sum, we hold that respondent NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the jurisdiction of
respondent Labor Arbiter over the complaint filed by private
respondent against the petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Docketed as NLRC-NCR-3-3142-82.
[2]
Official Gazette, Vol. 78, No. 21, May 24, 1982, pp. 2368-7 2638-13.
[3]
[4]
Rollo, p. 23.
[5]
[6]
Rollo, p. 28.
[7]
Rollo, p. 7.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
70
EN BANC
NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a
sunken vessel and in payment of his share of the expenses
of the salvage operations therein stipulated petitioner Albino
Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a
check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated
November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check
was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two
days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being:
"CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in
Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced
to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to
indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
71
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought
exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the
Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of
conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by
this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 i.e.,
that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was
because at the time of the issuance of the check
on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the
promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September
21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as
guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable
offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15,
1981, pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is
neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an
arrangement to guarantee or secure the
payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing
or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for
either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res.
No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino
Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989;
Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23,
1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs.
Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981;
Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs.
Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by
another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12)
almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the
"bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983.
Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No.
4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a
misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, .
. . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the
intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure
or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows: 4
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an
administrative agency having interpreting
authority may reverse its administration
interpretation of a statute, but that its review
interpretation applies only prospectively
(Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128
Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases
involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 where the check in question is issued after
this date, the claim that the check is issued as a
guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure
an obligation collection will no longer be
considered a valid defense.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101
Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did
not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a
construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22,
enacted on April 3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co
appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court
dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under
date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon
by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and,
in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued
against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was
72
substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To
this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992.
After deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions,
the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate
Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines," according to
Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code,
a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal . . . 5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or
amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include:
Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that
Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National
Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of
loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before
effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA
522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA
3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over
guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in
the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64
SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive
Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no
retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640,
holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular
No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred
before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette;
Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive
73
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55
SCRA 607, 611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed
Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962,
and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in
1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid
down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959)
and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our decision in People
v. Mapa, 7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only
in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should
appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the complete reverse of the
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not
laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the
New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a
law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law
as of the date that law was originally passed, since this
Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of
the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim
obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. The
doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was
part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land,
at the time appellant was found in possession of the
firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the
trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in
74
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs.
Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings
giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we
emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
[1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively
and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of
judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case ofChicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374
[1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity
to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its
nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.
Thus, in this Court's decision in Taada
v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 which declared
"that presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published, shall have no force and effect," and as
regards which declaration some members of the Court
appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on
the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." the Court
said:
75
suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other
monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had
been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 .
. . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should
not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." the Court made
substantially the same observations, to wit:11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox
view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise
suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of
any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official
act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental
law once judicially declared results in its being to all
intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution
being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or
executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the
merit of simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently
realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be
compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in
an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled
to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted
under it and may have changed their positions, what
could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation
regard be had to what has been done while such
legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted
as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is
merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final
76
only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet
final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there
should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments,
whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military
courts against civilians before the promulgation of the
Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be
disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where
the convicted person or the State shows that there was
serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused,
should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a
retrial be ordered based on the violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused and not on the
Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the
accused should be released since judgment against
him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes
before the military tribunals and commissions during
the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which
were created under general orders issued by President
Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an
operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated
declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and
invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality
of their consequences which occurred long before our
decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now
prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic.
Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang
v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as
to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by
executive order wiped out all the acts of the local
government abolished. 13
77
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant
to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of
the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no
compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should
override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications
as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal
liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals
and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside,
and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is
DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the
agreement was between Co, representing
Mayflower Shipping Corporation, and Geronimo
B. Bella, representing Tans-Pacific Towage, Inc.
The expenses for refloating were apportioned
chiefly between FGU Insurance and
Development Bank of the Philippines, which
respectively contributed P2,329,022.00 and
P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 20-21.
2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks
Law".
3 The ruling is contained in an extended
resolution on a motion for reconsideration,
78
officer' . . . who under section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code is exempted from
the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearm.
79
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 79060 December 8, 1989
ANICETO C. OCAMPO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (University of the Philippines),respondents.
Pedro F. Martinez for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to reverse or set aside
the judgment of public respondent Court of Appeals dated May
8, 1987 which affirmed the trial court's decision finding
petitioner guilty of violation of Presidential Decree No. 772
(Anti-Squatting Law) and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment for one (1) year, with the accessories provided
by law and to remove the house constructed on the land in
question within thirty (30) days from the finality of judgment,
otherwise, private respondent University of the Philippines was
authorized to demolish or dismantle the house at the expense
of the petitioner.
The facts are not disputed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 15,
1984, the desk officer of the U.P. Police Force received
a telephone call; the caller reported that somebody was
constructing a house at the U.P. Arboretum.
80
Villanueva, Ladip and Ernesto were directed to
investigate (pp. 4-5, TSN, June 21, 1985; p. 4, TSN,
July 22, 1985).
81
the considered view of this Court, did not cripple the
fact that the accused, Aniceto Ocampo, is not the
owner of said property. And since there is no showing
that the accused occupied the lot in question and
constructed his residential house thereat with the
knowledge and/or consent of the owner thereof, the
accused is a squatter within the contemplation of
Presidential Decree No. 772. "Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 772 reads:
Any person, who with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance
of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing
the property of the latter against his will for residential,
commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished
by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one
year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more
than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(p. 5, Comment; p. 25, Rollo)
On October 7, 1985, the trial court found Aniceto Ocampo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Accused then appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that
the trial court erred in: (a) applying Section 15, Rule 119 of the
1985 Rule of Criminal Procedure; (b) convicting appellant on
the basis of evidence which does not measure to the degree of
proof as required by law; and (c) not applying the principle of
presumption of innocence in favor of appellant.
Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court, finding said appealed decision to be in
accordance with law and supported by evidence as well.
82
The evidence presented by the prosecution manifested that
Aniceto Ocampo was not the owner of the land on which he
constructed his house and that he did so against the owner's
will or without its consent. Prosecution witnesses testified that
as early as May, 1983, petitioner was told that the area is U.P.
property; that he began constructing his house without a
permit from the owner; that petitioner had no building permit
and that he had been informed that he was violating the AntiSquatting Law. Besides, it was also confirmed that petitioner
had never shown title to the land he claims to have purchased
from one Roberto Pael. Yet, he failed to present any deed of
sale or any title in his name. This alleged sale is a defense
which the petitioner could have successfully utilized to his
advantage but failed to substantiate it with evidence at the
trial. When petitioner moved for dismissal of the case, he
forfeited his chance to prove his claim. It must be noted also
that this Roberto Pael was shown by testimonial evidence to
be not the owner of the land and that said land is the subject of
a criminal case against Pael for squatting.
Neither did the petitioner exhibit any building or sanitary permit
to the U.P. Security Force or in court, such being attached only
to his motion for reconsideration. Worthy of note is the fact that
such permits are both dated June 26, 1985, which is more
than ten (10) months after the illegal construction took place
and three (3) months after the case had been filed against
petitioner. (p. 29, Rello)
We concur with the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial
court's decision which maintained that the failure of the
prosecution to present title to prove ownership by the
University of the Philippines of the land in question is not
material in proving the guilt of the petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt. The ownership of U.P. is not in issue in this
case. Withal, the property has been widely and publicly known
to be part of the U.P. grounds. The crucial issue is the act of
83
leave of court, the retroactive effect of the amendment
aforestated would therefore work against herein petitioner.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82805 June 29, 1989
84
Lar, Comia, Manala & Associates for respondents in G.R. No.
82805.
Jesus Balicanta for respondents in G.R. No. 83225.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Submitted for decision are these two consolidated cases, both
in the nature of challenges to the jurisdiction of the various
Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and
Employment to act on money claims. 1
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
I. G.R. No. 82805.
This case originated from a complaint filed on February 21,
1987 to recover unpaid wages and wage supplements filed
with Regional Director Filomeno Balbin of the Labor
Department's Regional Office No. I sitting in San Fernando, La
Union. The facts appear in his order:
This case arose out of a complaint filed by TRADE
UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED
SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU Local Chapter No. ROI005, against respondent agricultural firm, for alleged
underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage,
ECOLA, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, night shift
differential pay, 13th month pay and service incentive
leave pay.
Acting on this complaint and pursuant to a
corresponding authority issued, a routine inspection
was conducted on subject establishment by Labor
85
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, and
considering further that said deficiencies form part of
the legal remuneration of herein employees,
respondent is hereby ordered to satisfy the a and pay
the total amount of FIVE MILLION THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE
PESOS and 30/100 (P5,369,909.30) in the manner
above-stated, within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof, and to submit proof of payment within the same
period. Otherwise, a Writ of Execution win be issued to
the proper sheriffs to enforce this Order. The claims for
non-payment of overtime pay and night shift differential
pay, are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Let the parties be notified accordingly.
SO ORDERED. 3
In its appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission,
Briad Agro Development contended that the Regional Director
has no authority to entertain pecuniary claims of workers,
following this Court's ruling in Zambales Base Metals, Inc. v.
Minister of Labor, 4 in which we held that money claims are the
exclusive domain of the labor arbiters. The National Labor
Relations Commission dismissed the appeal on the strength of
Executive Order No. 111, 5 amending Article 128(b) of the
Labor Code, in which jurisdiction to so act on monetary claims
was supposedly granted to regional directors. In its petition to
this Court, Briad Agro Development reiterates its jurisdictional
challenge.
II. G.R. No. 83225.
The money award in this case, as and for unpaid emergency
cost of living allowances, and thirteenth-month and holiday
pays, was granted originally in favor of seventy-four
86
to file his motion to set aside and/or reconsider Order
dated 25 October 1982.
On November 24, 1982, respondent filed a Motion to
Set Aside and/or Reconsider the Order dated 25
October 1982 on the following grounds namely:
1. That the Order dated 25 October 1982 was issued
without notice and hearing.
2. That the questioned Order is not supported by the
facts and the law of the case.
Respondent argues that the awards are void because
the composition of each award was not indicated; that
complainants were either its employees or that of its
subcontractor Carlos Balinagay; that of the 74
complainants only three, namely: Julian Gajana, Jose
Casimora and Jose Roxas failed to execute quitclaims;
and that for these reasons the disputed Order may be
validly set aside and/or reconsidered.
Complainants, thru counsel, filed their opposition to the
aforesaid Motion to Set. Aside Order dated 25 October
1982. They maintain that the Order in question was
issued in the valid exercise of the visitorial and
enforcement power of the Minister (now Secretary) of
Labor and Employment, thru the Regional Director as
his duly authorized representative; that before the said
Order was issued, respondent or its representative was
directed time and again by the Regional Director to
submit the pertinent employment records of
complainants but respondent chose to ignore the said
directives; that during the hearing of respondent's
motion on November 25, 1982 each complainant
testified that no quitclaim was ever executed by them,
87
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission, by force
of Article 217 of the Labor Code:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
within thirty (30) working days after submission of the
case by the parties for decision, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours
of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based
on non- payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits
provided by law or appropriate agreement, except
claims for employees' compensation, social security,
medicare and maternity benefits.
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this
Code, including questions involving the legality of
strikes and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. 7
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, relies on the
provisions of Executive Order No. 111, amending, among other
things, Article 128, paragraph (b), of the Labor Code:
88
(or the various Regional Directors) and the Labor Arbiters
share jurisdiction.
Curative statutes have long been considered valid in this
jurisdiction. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that
would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws
have been complied with. They are, however, subject to
exceptions. For one, they must not be against the Constitution
and for another, they cannot impair vested rights or the
obligation of contracts. 10 It has not been shown in this case
that these exceptions apply.
That Executive Order No. 111 intended to. make the
jurisdiction to pass upon money claims, among the other
cases mentioned by Article 217 of the Labor Code, concurrent
between the Secretary of Labor (or Regional Directors) and
the Labor Arbiters is clear from its perambulatory clauses, to
wit:
WHEREAS, the welfare of the workers is a primary
concern of the government.
WHEREAS, it is necessary to amend or repeal
provisions of laws that repress the rights of workers
and of their trade unions. 11
Executive Order No. 111, it is obvious, was enacted to widen
workers' access to the Government for redress of grievances.
The language of the provision is indeed broad enough to
encompass cases over which Labor Arbiters had hitherto
exercised exclusive jurisdiction. We quote, in part:
... the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to
order and administer, after due notice and hearing,
89
Executive Order No. 111. (In G.R. No. 82805, the complaint
was filed on February 21, 1987; in G.R. No. 83225, the
material dates do not appear in the records but the order
decreeing the money award was issued on October 25, 1982
and a subpoena duces tecum appears to have been issued, in
connection with the inspections that prefaced the complaint,
on August 20, 1982. 18 ) With respect to G.R. No. 82805,
therefore, the Executive Order squarely applies, while insofar
as G.R. No. 83225 is concerned, we give it a retroactive
operation.
With respect moreover, to Camus Engineering's petition (G.R.
No. 83225), it is the Court's considered opinion that the
petitioner is estopped from assailing Director Kong's
jurisdiction. The rule is that a party may not attack a tribunal's
jurisdiction and at the same time ask for affirmative
relief 19 The records disclose that the petitioner had entered
into an amicable settlement with a total of forty-seven
employees and had it approved by Director Kong. The
petitioner must, therefore, be said to have accepted Director
Kong's jurisdiction. It cannot now assail it.
Accordingly, we sustain the jurisdiction of the respondents
Regional Directors.
WHEREFORE, these petitions are DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Cruz, Gutierrez, Jr. JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., Concurring Opinion:
While, for the reasons hereinafter stated, I concur in the result
reached in the main opinion, I cannot quite bring myself to
agree with its express or clearly implied postulate that
Executive Order No. 111 worked any substantive change in the
law previous thereto as far as concerns the extent and
character of the authority vested in the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or his representatives in labor standards
disputes. A survey of the state of the law prior to and after the
issuance of said Executive Order will, I hope, make the point
clearer.
1. The Law Prior to EO 111. 1
a. Exclusive 0riginal Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. Prior to
the effectivity of EO 111, the Labor Arbiters had "original and
exclusive jurisdiction (inter alia) to hear and decide" (1)
"cases ... that workers may file involving wages, hours of work
and other terms and conditions of employment ...," and (2) "all
money claims of workers involving non-payment or
underpayment of wages, overtime or premium compensation,
maternity or service incentive leave, separation pay and other
money claims arising from employer-employee relations,
except claims for employee's compensation, social security
and medicare benefits and as otherwise provided in Article 127
of (the Labor) Code ..." 2
b. Power Granted to Secretary of Labor or Representative.
Notwithstanding that the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters
above mentioned was pronounced to be original and
exclusive, some power over the same subject matter (over
wages [e.g., non-payment or under-payment], hours of work
[e.g., overtime or premium compensation], and other terms
90
and conditions of employment [e.g., separation pay, maternity
and other leave benefits]) was in measure also vested in the
Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative, i.e.,
the Regional Director.
(1) Article 128 of the Labor Code. Article 128 of the Labor
Code, 3 as amended by P.D. No. 850, 4 conferred on the
"Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives ...
the power to order and administer, after due notice and
hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of ...
(the) Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or
industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection,
and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for
the enforcement of their order."
91
(3) The Labor Arbiters. Declared as "CERTIFIABLE" to the
Labor Arbiters were cases which were "not settled by the
Conciliation Section of the Regional Office" "where employeremployee relations no longer exist" or those concerning (a)
"questions of law," or (b) "claims involving an amount
exceeding P100,000 or 40% of the paid-up capital of the
employer, whichever is lower, or (c) evidentiary matters not
disclosed or verified in the normal course of inspection." 10
d. Additional Prescriptions. Further refinement of the power
of the Regional Directors over Labor Standards Cases was
effected by Policy Instructions No. 7. Policy Instructions No. 7
declared that a Regional Director could exercise jurisdiction
over labor standards controversies except in those cases
(1) where questions of law are involved as determined by the
Regional Director; 11
(2) where the amount involved exceeds P100,000 or over 40%
of the equity of the employer, whichever is lower;
(3) where evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the
normal course of inspection are required; or
(4) where there is no more employer-employee relationship
p. 12
e. Later Rules.
(1) PD 1367. Presidential Decree No. 1367 confirmed the
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over "cases arising from
employer-employee relations duly indorsed (or "certified") by
the Regional Directors." 13
(2) Policy Instructions No. 37. Policy Instructions No. 37,
issued on October 7, 1978 in connection with PD 1391,
92
thearbitration system and placed under the enforcement
system to the end that "the worker need not litigate to get what
legally belongs to him," the fact of the matter is that the power
of Regional Directors over labor standards cases prior to EO
111 consisted merely of the enforcement of UNCONTESTED
MONEY CLAIMS OF PERSONS STILL EMPLOYED, i.e.,
money claims of persons arising from violations of labor
standards provisions of the Labor Code (or other statute)
discovered by labor regulations officers in the course of
normal inspection, where the employment relationship still
existed, or the employer did not contest or otherwise raise any
issue respecting the findings of said labor regulations officers.
(1) No adjudicatory power. Indeed, no adjudicative power
as that possessed by Labor Arbiters was ever reposed in the
Regional Director, in the sense of trying and deciding (or
hearing and determining) legal controversies or justiciable
causes involving labor standards laws. The Regional Director
actually did not have the power or faculty known as
"jurisdiction," vested in a judge, for instance, or a labor arbiter,
i.e., to receive evidence adduced by parties involved in a labor
standards controversy, determine on the basis thereof the
factual issues, and apply the law to the facts thus deemed
established, in order that the controversy or litigation might be
authoritatively resolved. He did not have the power to resolve
controversies (understood in the popular sense, as clashes of
opposing views). He merely had functions that can only be
described as ministerial. He had visitorial power, as
representative of the Minister or Secretary of Labor, to cause
inspection of establishments to ascertain observance of labor
standards provisions, and in the event of discovered violations
thereof, to require compliance therewith if the employer
admitted the infractions; but if it should appear, at the hearing
required to be held after discovery of the infractions, that a
controversy existed, i.e., the employer was not accepting but
was on the contrary contesting said officers' findings, or that
93
March 3, 1987. The amendment consisted merely in the
intercalation of two (2) clauses, to wit: (a) "The provisions of
article 217 of this code to the contrary notwithstanding and in
cases where the relationship of employer-employee still
exists," and (b) "and other labor legislation." As thus
amended, 20 paragraph (b) Article 128 now reads:
(b) The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the
contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists, the
Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to
order and administer, after due notice and hearing,
compliance with the labor standards provisions of this
Code and other labor Legislation based on the findings
of labor regulations officers or industry safety engineers
made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of
execution to the appropriate authority for the
enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the
employer contests the findings of the labor regulations
officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved
without considering evidentiary matters that are not
verifiable in the normal course of inspection.
5. Actual Effect of EO 111. According to the Solicitor
General, Executive Order No. 111 was promulgated precisely
to revise the law as pronounced and applied in the Zambales
Base Metals decision. 21 If this be so the formulation of the
executive order falls short of the purpose, and is, in light of the
prior state of the law, inefficacious to bring about the intended
revision.
The insertion of the clause, "where the relationship of
employer-employee still exists," to qualify the power of the
Minister (now Secretary) of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives-the necessary implication being
94
officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved
without considering evidentiary matters that are not
verifiable in the normal course of inspection.
In other words, even without the qualifying phrase, "the
provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding," the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives already "shared" in some measure the
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters to order observance of labor laws
denominated exclusive and original in said Article 217 in
that in UNCONTESTED MONEY CLAIMS OF PERSONS
STILL EMPLOYED, Regional Directors had power to "order
and administer ... compliance with the labor standards
provisions ... and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate
authority for the enforcement of their order." The principle has
not been changed. Even under EO 111 no other aspect of the
Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction may be deemed to be shared by the
Secretary or his representatives, in view of the retention of the
provisos requiring (1) the existence of the employment
relationship and (2) the absence of a contest or issue raised
by the employer anent the findings of the labor regulations
officers. Whether under EO 111 or the prior law, therefore, the
Secretary of Labor or his representatives could,
notwithstanding the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred on
Labor Arbiters, order compliance with the legal provisions
governing wages, hours of employment and other terms of
employment, found to have been violated in the normal course
of inspection, provided that (1) the employment relationship
still existed and (2) the case was uncontested, i.e., the
employer did not contest or raise any issue relative to the
findings of the labor standards officers.
To recapitulate, under EO 111, the Regional Directors, in
representation of the Secretary of Labor and
notwithstanding the grant of exclusive original jurisdiction to
Labor Arbiters by Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended
95
Section 2. Labor Standards and Welfare Officers
(LSWOSs) as witnessesIn cases that have been
endorsed to the NLRC, the (LSWOSs) who participated
in the investigation shall make themselves available as
witnesses in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
concerned.
It may finally be observed that the hearing to be conducted by
the Regional Director is limited to a determination of whether
or not (1) the employment relationship still exists, and/or (2)
the employer accepts the findings of the (LSWOSs) and raises
no issues which cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course
of inspection. In the affirmative case, the Regional Director
may properly order compliance with the legal provisions
violated and issue writs of execution to the appropriate
authority for the enforcement of this order; otherwise, the
Regional Director ceases to have competence to take
cognizance of and decide the case but must refer or certify it
to the Labor Arbiter for hearing and judgment.
6. Application of the Law to Cases at Bar. In G.R. No.
82805 (Briad Agro Development Corporation v. de la Serna),
the employer refused to present its records for inspection by
the Regional Office. This may be deemed a waiver of the right
to contest the conclusions of the Labor Inspectors drawn from
the evidence and records at hand. Under Executive Order 111,
which is applicable since the violations of labor standards took
place after its effectivity, it was within the authority of the
Regional Director to order compliance with the labor standards
statutes, and to issue a writ of execution to the appropriate
authority to enforce his order.
In G.R. No. 83255 (L.M. Camus Engineering Corporation v.
Secretary of Labor), the employer similarly refused to produce
its relevant records, despite several requests therefor by the
96
ART. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims
and other benefits.Upon complaint of any interested
party, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor
and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing
officers of the Department is empowered, through
summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and
decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and
other monetary claims and benefits, including legal
interest, owing to an employee or person employed in
domestic or household service or househelper under
this code, arising from employer-employee
relations;Provided, That such complaint does not
include a claim for reinstatement: Provided, further,
That the aggregate money claims of each employee or
househelper do not exceed five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer
shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30)
calendar days from the date of the filing of the same. ...
Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or
hearing officer pursuant to this provision may be
appealed on the same grounds provided in Article 223
of this Code, within five (5) calendar days from receipt
of a copy of said decision or resolution, to the National
Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the
appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the
submission of the last pleading required or allowed
under its rules.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Amendment of Article 217. Amended by RA 6715, too,
was Article 217 of the same Code, to read as follows:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission.-Except as otherwise provided under this
97
c. Requisites for Exercise of Jurisdiction by Regional Director,
etc.Quite clearly, under the provisions of said Act, Regional
Directors and other hearing officers of the Department of Labor
(aside from the Labor Arbiters) have real jurisdiction-i.e., they
may try and decide, or hear and determine-any claim brought
before them for recovery of wages and other monetary claims
and benefits, including legal interest, if the following requisites
concur, to wit:
1) the claim is presented by an employee or person employed
in domestic or household service, or househelper under the
Code;
2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek
reinstatement; and
3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper
does not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
d. When Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. Where
these three (3) requisites do not co-exist, the Labor Arbiters
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all claims arising from
employer-employee relations, other than those for employees'
compensation, social security, medicare and maternity
benefits.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82805 June 29, 1989
BRIAD AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE DIONISIO DELA SERNA, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, TRADE UNIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS)-WFTU
LOCAL CHAPTER NO. R01-005, ALFRED DELA CRUZ, ET
AL., * respondents.
G.R. No. 83225 June 29, 1989
L.M. CAMUS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE HON.
UNDERSECRETARY DIONISIO C. DELA SERNA,
VICTORIANO ATIENZA, JR., JOSNERI DIOCARES,
REYNALDO PAREO, WINNIE ORTOSIT, NELEN
SEVERINO, MARLON RESONABLE, ROLANDO
ALDANESE, ALICIO SEBIAO, CARLINTO PAQUERO,
JULIAN GOSONA, ROLANDO CASIMERO, ALFREDO DE
LEON, VICTORIANO MACHANG, ARMANDO SALAZAR,
ANITO DE JESUS, FRANCISCO DELGADO, PAQUITO
PITULAN, DANILO CENTINO, ROMEO DELOS SANTOS,
RUBEN LARA, ROGELIO MAGHUYOR, BEN ABDANI,
RUDY PALASUGLO, WILLIAM BALDADO, ROMEO
LABIGAN, TANNY JANOLO and EDGAR A.
OREZ, respondents.
Corazon R. Paulino for petitioner in G.R. No. 82805.
Raoul B. Agrava & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 83225.
98
Lar, Comia, Manala & Associates for respondents in G.R. No.
82805.
Jesus Balicanta for respondents in G.R. No. 83225.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Submitted for decision are these two consolidated cases, both
in the nature of challenges to the jurisdiction of the various
Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and
Employment to act on money claims. 1
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
I. G.R. No. 82805.
This case originated from a complaint filed on February 21,
1987 to recover unpaid wages and wage supplements filed
with Regional Director Filomeno Balbin of the Labor
Department's Regional Office No. I sitting in San Fernando, La
Union. The facts appear in his order:
This case arose out of a complaint filed by TRADE
UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED
SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU Local Chapter No. ROI005, against respondent agricultural firm, for alleged
underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage,
ECOLA, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, night shift
differential pay, 13th month pay and service incentive
leave pay.
Acting on this complaint and pursuant to a
corresponding authority issued, a routine inspection
was conducted on subject establishment by Labor
99
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, and
considering further that said deficiencies form part of
the legal remuneration of herein employees,
respondent is hereby ordered to satisfy the a and pay
the total amount of FIVE MILLION THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE
PESOS and 30/100 (P5,369,909.30) in the manner
above-stated, within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof, and to submit proof of payment within the same
period. Otherwise, a Writ of Execution win be issued to
the proper sheriffs to enforce this Order. The claims for
non-payment of overtime pay and night shift differential
pay, are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Let the parties be notified accordingly.
SO ORDERED. 3
In its appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission,
Briad Agro Development contended that the Regional Director
has no authority to entertain pecuniary claims of workers,
following this Court's ruling in Zambales Base Metals, Inc. v.
Minister of Labor, 4 in which we held that money claims are the
exclusive domain of the labor arbiters. The National Labor
Relations Commission dismissed the appeal on the strength of
Executive Order No. 111, 5 amending Article 128(b) of the
Labor Code, in which jurisdiction to so act on monetary claims
was supposedly granted to regional directors. In its petition to
this Court, Briad Agro Development reiterates its jurisdictional
challenge.
II. G.R. No. 83225.
The money award in this case, as and for unpaid emergency
cost of living allowances, and thirteenth-month and holiday
pays, was granted originally in favor of seventy-four
100
to file his motion to set aside and/or reconsider Order
dated 25 October 1982.
On November 24, 1982, respondent filed a Motion to
Set Aside and/or Reconsider the Order dated 25
October 1982 on the following grounds namely:
1. That the Order dated 25 October 1982 was issued
without notice and hearing.
2. That the questioned Order is not supported by the
facts and the law of the case.
Respondent argues that the awards are void because
the composition of each award was not indicated; that
complainants were either its employees or that of its
subcontractor Carlos Balinagay; that of the 74
complainants only three, namely: Julian Gajana, Jose
Casimora and Jose Roxas failed to execute quitclaims;
and that for these reasons the disputed Order may be
validly set aside and/or reconsidered.
Complainants, thru counsel, filed their opposition to the
aforesaid Motion to Set. Aside Order dated 25 October
1982. They maintain that the Order in question was
issued in the valid exercise of the visitorial and
enforcement power of the Minister (now Secretary) of
Labor and Employment, thru the Regional Director as
his duly authorized representative; that before the said
Order was issued, respondent or its representative was
directed time and again by the Regional Director to
submit the pertinent employment records of
complainants but respondent chose to ignore the said
directives; that during the hearing of respondent's
motion on November 25, 1982 each complainant
testified that no quitclaim was ever executed by them,
101
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission, by force
of Article 217 of the Labor Code:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
within thirty (30) working days after submission of the
case by the parties for decision, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours
of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based
on non- payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits
provided by law or appropriate agreement, except
claims for employees' compensation, social security,
medicare and maternity benefits.
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this
Code, including questions involving the legality of
strikes and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. 7
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, relies on the
provisions of Executive Order No. 111, amending, among other
things, Article 128, paragraph (b), of the Labor Code:
102
(or the various Regional Directors) and the Labor Arbiters
share jurisdiction.
Curative statutes have long been considered valid in this
jurisdiction. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that
would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws
have been complied with. They are, however, subject to
exceptions. For one, they must not be against the Constitution
and for another, they cannot impair vested rights or the
obligation of contracts. 10 It has not been shown in this case
that these exceptions apply.
That Executive Order No. 111 intended to. make the
jurisdiction to pass upon money claims, among the other
cases mentioned by Article 217 of the Labor Code, concurrent
between the Secretary of Labor (or Regional Directors) and
the Labor Arbiters is clear from its perambulatory clauses, to
wit:
WHEREAS, the welfare of the workers is a primary
concern of the government.
WHEREAS, it is necessary to amend or repeal
provisions of laws that repress the rights of workers
and of their trade unions. 11
Executive Order No. 111, it is obvious, was enacted to widen
workers' access to the Government for redress of grievances.
The language of the provision is indeed broad enough to
encompass cases over which Labor Arbiters had hitherto
exercised exclusive jurisdiction. We quote, in part:
... the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to
order and administer, after due notice and hearing,
103
Executive Order No. 111. (In G.R. No. 82805, the complaint
was filed on February 21, 1987; in G.R. No. 83225, the
material dates do not appear in the records but the order
decreeing the money award was issued on October 25, 1982
and a subpoena duces tecum appears to have been issued, in
connection with the inspections that prefaced the complaint,
on August 20, 1982. 18 ) With respect to G.R. No. 82805,
therefore, the Executive Order squarely applies, while insofar
as G.R. No. 83225 is concerned, we give it a retroactive
operation.
With respect moreover, to Camus Engineering's petition (G.R.
No. 83225), it is the Court's considered opinion that the
petitioner is estopped from assailing Director Kong's
jurisdiction. The rule is that a party may not attack a tribunal's
jurisdiction and at the same time ask for affirmative
relief 19 The records disclose that the petitioner had entered
into an amicable settlement with a total of forty-seven
employees and had it approved by Director Kong. The
petitioner must, therefore, be said to have accepted Director
Kong's jurisdiction. It cannot now assail it.
Accordingly, we sustain the jurisdiction of the respondents
Regional Directors.
WHEREFORE, these petitions are DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Cruz, Gutierrez, Jr. JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., Concurring Opinion:
While, for the reasons hereinafter stated, I concur in the result
reached in the main opinion, I cannot quite bring myself to
agree with its express or clearly implied postulate that
Executive Order No. 111 worked any substantive change in the
law previous thereto as far as concerns the extent and
character of the authority vested in the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or his representatives in labor standards
disputes. A survey of the state of the law prior to and after the
issuance of said Executive Order will, I hope, make the point
clearer.
1. The Law Prior to EO 111. 1
a. Exclusive 0riginal Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. Prior to
the effectivity of EO 111, the Labor Arbiters had "original and
exclusive jurisdiction (inter alia) to hear and decide" (1)
"cases ... that workers may file involving wages, hours of work
and other terms and conditions of employment ...," and (2) "all
money claims of workers involving non-payment or
underpayment of wages, overtime or premium compensation,
maternity or service incentive leave, separation pay and other
money claims arising from employer-employee relations,
except claims for employee's compensation, social security
and medicare benefits and as otherwise provided in Article 127
of (the Labor) Code ..." 2
b. Power Granted to Secretary of Labor or Representative.
Notwithstanding that the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters
above mentioned was pronounced to be original and
exclusive, some power over the same subject matter (over
wages [e.g., non-payment or under-payment], hours of work
[e.g., overtime or premium compensation], and other terms
104
and conditions of employment [e.g., separation pay, maternity
and other leave benefits]) was in measure also vested in the
Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative, i.e.,
the Regional Director.
(1) Article 128 of the Labor Code. Article 128 of the Labor
Code, 3 as amended by P.D. No. 850, 4 conferred on the
"Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives ...
the power to order and administer, after due notice and
hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of ...
(the) Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or
industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection,
and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for
the enforcement of their order."
105
(3) The Labor Arbiters. Declared as "CERTIFIABLE" to the
Labor Arbiters were cases which were "not settled by the
Conciliation Section of the Regional Office" "where employeremployee relations no longer exist" or those concerning (a)
"questions of law," or (b) "claims involving an amount
exceeding P100,000 or 40% of the paid-up capital of the
employer, whichever is lower, or (c) evidentiary matters not
disclosed or verified in the normal course of inspection." 10
d. Additional Prescriptions. Further refinement of the power
of the Regional Directors over Labor Standards Cases was
effected by Policy Instructions No. 7. Policy Instructions No. 7
declared that a Regional Director could exercise jurisdiction
over labor standards controversies except in those cases
(1) where questions of law are involved as determined by the
Regional Director; 11
(2) where the amount involved exceeds P100,000 or over 40%
of the equity of the employer, whichever is lower;
(3) where evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the
normal course of inspection are required; or
(4) where there is no more employer-employee relationship
p. 12
e. Later Rules.
(1) PD 1367. Presidential Decree No. 1367 confirmed the
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over "cases arising from
employer-employee relations duly indorsed (or "certified") by
the Regional Directors." 13
(2) Policy Instructions No. 37. Policy Instructions No. 37,
issued on October 7, 1978 in connection with PD 1391,
106
thearbitration system and placed under the enforcement
system to the end that "the worker need not litigate to get what
legally belongs to him," the fact of the matter is that the power
of Regional Directors over labor standards cases prior to EO
111 consisted merely of the enforcement of UNCONTESTED
MONEY CLAIMS OF PERSONS STILL EMPLOYED, i.e.,
money claims of persons arising from violations of labor
standards provisions of the Labor Code (or other statute)
discovered by labor regulations officers in the course of
normal inspection, where the employment relationship still
existed, or the employer did not contest or otherwise raise any
issue respecting the findings of said labor regulations officers.
(1) No adjudicatory power. Indeed, no adjudicative power
as that possessed by Labor Arbiters was ever reposed in the
Regional Director, in the sense of trying and deciding (or
hearing and determining) legal controversies or justiciable
causes involving labor standards laws. The Regional Director
actually did not have the power or faculty known as
"jurisdiction," vested in a judge, for instance, or a labor arbiter,
i.e., to receive evidence adduced by parties involved in a labor
standards controversy, determine on the basis thereof the
factual issues, and apply the law to the facts thus deemed
established, in order that the controversy or litigation might be
authoritatively resolved. He did not have the power to resolve
controversies (understood in the popular sense, as clashes of
opposing views). He merely had functions that can only be
described as ministerial. He had visitorial power, as
representative of the Minister or Secretary of Labor, to cause
inspection of establishments to ascertain observance of labor
standards provisions, and in the event of discovered violations
thereof, to require compliance therewith if the employer
admitted the infractions; but if it should appear, at the hearing
required to be held after discovery of the infractions, that a
controversy existed, i.e., the employer was not accepting but
was on the contrary contesting said officers' findings, or that
107
March 3, 1987. The amendment consisted merely in the
intercalation of two (2) clauses, to wit: (a) "The provisions of
article 217 of this code to the contrary notwithstanding and in
cases where the relationship of employer-employee still
exists," and (b) "and other labor legislation." As thus
amended, 20 paragraph (b) Article 128 now reads:
(b) The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to
the contrary notwithstanding and in cases
where the relationship of employer-employee
still exists, the Minister of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to order
and administer, after due notice and hearing,
compliance with the labor standards provisions
of this Code and other labor Legislation based
on the findings of labor regulations officers or
industry safety engineers made in the course of
inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the
appropriate authority for the enforcement of
their orders, except in cases where the
employer contests the findings of the labor
regulations officer and raises issues which
cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the
normal course of inspection.
5. Actual Effect of EO 111. According to the Solicitor
General, Executive Order No. 111 was promulgated precisely
to revise the law as pronounced and applied in the Zambales
Base Metals decision. 21 If this be so the formulation of the
executive order falls short of the purpose, and is, in light of the
prior state of the law, inefficacious to bring about the intended
revision.
108
engineers made in the course of inspection, and
to issue writs of execution to the appropriate
authority for the enforcement of their order,
except in cases where the employer contests
the findings of the labor regulation officer and
raises issues which cannot be resolved without
considering evidentiary matters that are not
verifiable in the normal course of inspection.
109
The issue of whether or not the case shall be
endorsed to the NLRC shall be resolved by the
Regional Director in the final disposition of the
case.
Section 2. Labor Standards and Welfare
Officers (LSWOSs) as witnessesIn cases that
have been endorsed to the NLRC, the
(LSWOSs) who participated in the investigation
shall make themselves available as witnesses
in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
concerned.
It may finally be observed that the hearing to be conducted by
the Regional Director is limited to a determination of whether
or not (1) the employment relationship still exists, and/or (2)
the employer accepts the findings of the (LSWOSs) and raises
no issues which cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course
of inspection. In the affirmative case, the Regional Director
may properly order compliance with the legal provisions
violated and issue writs of execution to the appropriate
authority for the enforcement of this order; otherwise, the
Regional Director ceases to have competence to take
cognizance of and decide the case but must refer or certify it
to the Labor Arbiter for hearing and judgment.
6. Application of the Law to Cases at Bar. In G.R. No.
82805 (Briad Agro Development Corporation v. de la Serna),
the employer refused to present its records for inspection by
the Regional Office. This may be deemed a waiver of the right
to contest the conclusions of the Labor Inspectors drawn from
the evidence and records at hand. Under Executive Order 111,
which is applicable since the violations of labor standards took
place after its effectivity, it was within the authority of the
Regional Director to order compliance with the labor standards
110
Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation, whichever comes earlier."
111
(6) Except claims for employees compensation,
social security, medicare and maternity benefits,
all other claims arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic
or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00),
whether or not accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
xxx xxx xxx
c. Requisites for Exercise of Jurisdiction by Regional Director,
etc.Quite clearly, under the provisions of said Act, Regional
Directors and other hearing officers of the Department of Labor
(aside from the Labor Arbiters) have real jurisdiction-i.e., they
may try and decide, or hear and determine-any claim brought
before them for recovery of wages and other monetary claims
and benefits, including legal interest, if the following requisites
concur, to wit:
1) the claim is presented by an employee or person employed
in domestic or household service, or househelper under the
Code;
2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek
reinstatement; and
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 80593 December 18, 1989
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA CRUZ, JOSE AGRIPINO, BERNARDO BAUZON,
LUCRECIA BILBAO, MA. LUISA CABRERA, FRANCIS
BAACLO GUADALUPE CAMACHO, LUZ DE LEON, MIKE
VILLAVERDE, NEPOMUCENO MEDINA, EDGARDO
MENDOZA, JENNIFER VELEZ, AMELIA MEDINA,
EDUARDO ESPEJO and RICARDO BATTO, respondents.
The Chief Legal Officer for petitioner.
Romualdo C. Delos Santos for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The focus of the instant petition for certiorari is the application
of Article 110 of the Labor Code. The said article provides that
workers shall enjoy first preference with regard to wages due
them in cases of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's
business.
Sometime in 1980 Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) laidoff about seventy percent (70%) of its employees because it
was experiencing business reverses. The retained employees
constituting thirty percent (30%) of the work force however,
were not paid their wages. This non-payment of salaries went
on until July 1982 when AMEX completely ceased operations
and instead entered into an operating agreement with T.M.
112
San Andres Development Corporation whereby the latter
would be leasing the equipment and machineries of AMEX.
The unpaid employees sought redress from the Labor
Arbiter 1 who, on August 27,1986 rendered a decision finding
their claim valid and meritorious. The dispositive part of the
said decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the claims of
complainants for payment of unpaid wages and
separation pay to be valid and meritorious,
respondents Aggregate Mining Exponent and its
president Luis Tirso Revilla should, as they are
hereby ordered to pay the same to said
complainants in the following amounts:
Rate
Separation Pay
Backwages
P1,300.00
P5,200.00
P6,174.96
1,900.00
8,550.00
11,712.85
2,300.00
8,050.00
19,247.00
113
2,700.00
16,200.00
23,485.70
740.00
740.00
4,287.66
1,800.00
2,700.00
5,004.35
740.00
740.00
6,822.81
3,500.00
12,550.00
32,986.90
970.00
1,940.00
234.10
1,300.00
3,900.00
3,227.15
3,000.00
10,500.00
9,874.70
1,300.00
3,250.00
3,110.85
83,360.00
136,092.03
1,500.00
4,500.00
4,793.80
1,200.00
3,000.00
4,287.10
920.00
1,840.00
832.10
114
To obviate any further differences between
complainants and their counsel to the latter's attorney's
fees which seems to be the cause of their earlier
misunderstanding, as can be gleaned from the
Charging Lien filed by said counsel, respondents are,
moreover, ordered to segregate and pay the same
directly to said counsel, the amount of which is to be
computed pursuant to their agreement on July 14,
1983 (Annex A of Position to Enter Attorney's Charging
Lien in the Record of the Case). 2
AMEX and its President, Tirso Revilla did not appeal from this
decision. But PNB, in its capacity as mortgagee-creditor of
AMEX interposed an appeal with the respondent Commission,
not being satisfied with the outcome of the case. The appeal
was primarily based on the allegation that the workers' lien
covers unpaid wages only and not the termination or
severance pay which the workers likewise claimed they were
entitled to. In a resolution 3 dated October 27, 1987, the
National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the decision
appealed from. Hence the instant petition filed by the petitioner
bank based on the following grounds:
I. ARTICLE 110 OF THE LABOR CODE MUST BE
READ IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 2241, 2242, 2243,
2244 AND 2245 OF THE CIVIL CODE CONCERNING
THE CLASSIFICATION, CONCURRENCE AND
PREFERENCE OF CREDITS.
II. ARTICLE 110 OF THE LABOR CODE DOES NOT
PURPORT TO CREATE A LIEN IN FAVOR OF
WORKERS OR EMPLOYEES FOR UNPAID WAGES
EITHER UPON ALL OF THE PROPERTIES OR UPON
ANY PARTICULAR PROPERTY OWNED BY THEIR
EMPLOYER. 4
115
This Court must uphold the preference accorded to the private
respondents in view of the provisions of Article 110 of the
Labor Code which are clear and which admit of no other
interpretation. The phrase "any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding" indicates that such preference shall prevail
despite the order set forth in Articles 2241 to 2245 of the Civil
Code. 6-a No exceptions were provided under the said article,
henceforth, none shall be considered. Furthermore, the Labor
Code was signed into Law decades after the Civil Code took
effect.
In Herman vs. Radio Corporation of the Philippines, 7 this
Court declared that whenever two statutes of different dates
and of contrary tenor are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the statute of later date must prevail being a
later expression of legislative will. Applying the aforecited case
in the instant petition, the Civil Code provisions cited by the
petitioner must yield to Article 110 of the Labor Code.
Moreover, Our pronouncement in A. C. Ransom Labor UnionCCLU vs. NLRC, 8 reinforces the above-mentioned
interpretation where this Court, speaking through Associate
Justice Melencio-Herrera, explicitly stated that "(t)he worker
preference applies even if the employer's properties are
encumbered by means of a mortgage contract ... So that,
when (the) machinery and equipment of RANSOM were sold
to Revelations Manufacturing Corporation for P2M in 1975, the
right of the 22 laborers to be paid from the proceeds should
have been recognized ... " 9
Reliance by the petitioners on Republic vs. Peralta is without
basis. The said case involved a question of workers'
preference as against the tax claims of the State. In the said
case the Court held that the State must prevail in that instance
since "it has been frequently said that taxes are the very
lifeblood of government. The effective collection of taxes is a
116
Based on that premise, petitioner contends that the claim for
termination pay should not be enforced against AMEX
properties mortgaged to petitioner PNB because Article 110 of
the Labor Code refers only to "wages due them for services
rendered during the period prior to bankruptcy or
liquidation." 14 Citing serious financial losses as the basis for
the termination of the private respondents, petitioner alleges
that the employees are not entitled to the termination pay
which they claim.
This contention is, again, bereft of merit.
The respondent Commission noted that "AMEX failed to
adduce convincing evidence to prove that the financial
reverses were indeed serious." 15 After a careful study of the
records of the case, this Court finds no reason to alter the
findings of the respondent Commission.
In Garcia vs. National Labor Relations Commission , 16 it was
held that "it is essentially required that the alleged losses in
business operations must be proved. " 17 This policy was
adopted to obviate the possibility of an employer fabricating
business reverses in order to ease out employees for no
apparent reason. Hence, no departure shall be made by this
Court from the ruling in Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank vs. National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWUMIF) 18where it was categorically stated that the term "wages"
includes not only remunerations or earnings payable by an
employer for services rendered or to be rendered, but also
covers all benefits of the employees under a Collective
Bargaining Agreement like severance pay, educational
allowance, accrued vacation leave earned but not enjoyed, as
well as workmen's compensation awards and unpaid salaries
for services rendered. All of these benefits fall under the term
"wages" which enjoy first preference over all other claims
against the employer. 19
117
of properties and the interests of the employer who can afford
and survive the hardships of life better than their workers.
Universal sense of human justice, not to speak of our specific
social justice and protection to labor constitutional injunctions
dictate the preferential lien that the above provision accord to
labor. 21 In line with this policy, measures must be undertaken
to ensure that such constitutional mandate on protection to
labor is not rendered meaningless by an erroneous
interpretation of the applicable laws.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ, concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J.,concurring:
I can perhaps be allowed a little immodesty in taking this
occasion to point out that in Republic of the Philippines v.
Peralta, cited in the ponencia, I was the only one who held the
view that the claims of the laborers should take precedence
over those of even the Government under Article 110 of the
Labor Code.
Interpreting the said provision, I submitted that it should be
read according to its literal import and obvious philosophy, to
favor and protect the laborer pursuant to the social justice
policy. None of my thirteen colleagues then agreed with me.
With the amendment of the article, evidently to correct the
meaning given to it in Peralta, all doubt has been removed as
to its original intention (which I feel was quite clear even
SARMIENTO, J.:
The only question in this petition, denominated as a "direct
appeal under Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (e), of the Constitution
and Section 9(3), of Batas Blg. 129," is whether the City
Council of Manila still has the power to appoint Council officers
and employees under Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known
as the Charter of the City of Manila, or whether the power is
now vested with the City Mayor pursuant to Republic Act No.
5185, the Decentralization Law, and Batas Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code. The facts are as follows:
On September 13, 1988, the Vice-Mayor of Manila and
Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, the Hon. Danilo
118
R. Lacuna, submitted to the Civil Service Commission, through
the Regional Director of the National Capital Region, the
appointments of nineteen officers and employees in the
Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer, City
Council of Manila, pursuant to the provisions of Section 15, of
said Republic Act No. 409, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 15. . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
119
As the petitioner contends, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 409
as amended has supposedly been repealed by Republic Act
No. 5185, specifically, Section 4 thereof, which we quote, in
part:
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
120
Legislature, by adopting a general law containing
provisions repugnant to the provisions of the charter,
and without making any mention of its intention to
amend or modify the charter, intended to amend,
repeal, or modify the special act. (Lewis vs. Cook
County, 74 I11. App., 151; Philippine Railway Co. vs.
Nolting 34 Phil., 401.)12
In one case, we held that Republic Act No. 5185 did not divest
the Mayor of Manila of his power under the Charter of the City
of Manila to approve the city budget.13
We also agree with the Civil Service Commission that the
provisions of Republic Act No. 5185, giving mayors the power
to appoint all officials "entirely paid out by city funds14 and
those of Batas Blg. 337, empowering local executives with the
authority to appoint "all officers and employees of the
city,"15 were meant not to vest the city mayors per se with
comprehensive powers but rather, to underscore the transfer
of the power of appointment over local officials and employees
from the President to the local governments and to highlight
the autonomy of local governments. They were not meant,
however, to deprive the City Council of Manila for instance, its
appointing power granted by existing statute, and after all, that
arrangement is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both
the Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that
is, to provide teeth to local autonomy.
In the light of an the foregoing, we do not find any grave abuse
of discretion committed by the respondent Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before the Court is the conflict between the Food
and Drug Administration and the mayor of Olongapo City over
the power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of
drug stores in the said city. While conceding that the FDA
possesses such power, the mayor claims he may
nevertheless, in the exercise of his own power, prevent the
operation of drug stores previously permitted by the former.
There are two drug stores involved in this dispute, to wit, the
San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store,
both owned by private respondent Rosalinda Yambao. 1 They
are located a few meters from each other in the same building
on Hospital Road, Olongapo City. 2 They were covered by
Mayor's Permits Nos. 1954 and 1955, respectively, issued for
the year 1980, 3 and licenses to operate issued by the FDA for
the same year. 4
121
This case arose when on March 21, 1980, at about 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon, a joint team composed of agents from
the FDA and narcotics agents from the Philippine
Constabulary conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian Drug
Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium 10 mg. worth
P410.00 without a doctor's prescription.. 5
A report on the operation was submitted to the petitioner, as
mayor of Olongapo City, on April 9, 1980. 6 On April 17, 1980,
he issued a letter summarily revoking Mayor's Permit No.
1954, effective April 18, 1980, "for rampant violation of R.A.
5921, otherwise known as the Pharmacy Law and R.A. 6425
or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." 7 Later, when the
petitioner went to Singapore, Vice-Mayor Alfredo T. de Perio,
Jr. caused the posting of a signboard at the San Sebastian
Drug Store announcing its permanent closure. 8
Acting on the same investigation report of the "test-buy," and
after hearing, FDA Administrator Arsenio Regala, on April 25,
1980, directed the closure of the drug store for three days and
its payment of a P100.00 fine for violation of R.A. No. 3720.
He also issued a stern warning to Yambao against a repetition
of the infraction. 9 On April 29, 1980, the FDA lifted its closure
order after noting that the penalties imposed had already been
discharged and allowed the drug store to resume
operations. 10
On April 30, 1980, Yambao, through her counsel, wrote a letter
to the petitioner seeking reconsideration of the revocation of
Mayor's Permit No. 1954. 11 On May 7, 1980, having received
no reply, she and her husband filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City a complaint for mandamus and
damages, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,
against the petitioner and Vice-Mayor de Perio. 12
122
Accordingly, a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
is heretofore issued enjoining defendants from doing
acts directed towards the closure of the San Sebastian
Drug Store and the suspension of the Olongapo City
Drug Store both situated at Hospital Road, Olongapo
City. Further, the signboard posted at San Sebastian
Drug Store by the defendants is ordered removed in
order that the said drug store will resume its normal
business operation.
The hearing of the main petition for damages is set on
August 14, 1980, at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above stated
order was denied in an order dated September 4,
1980. 21 The petitioner thereupon came to this Court in this
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary,
injunction, to challenge the aforesaid orders.
We issued a temporary restraining order against the
respondent judge on October 2 7, 1980, 22 but lifted it on
December 10, 1980, for failure of the petitioner to file his
comment on the private respondents' motion to lift the said
order and/or for issuance of a counter restraining order. 23
First, let us compare the bases of the powers and functions
respectively claimed by the FDA and the petitioner as mayor of
Olongapo City.
The task of drug inspection was originally lodged with the
Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners pursuant to Act 2762, as
amended by Act 4162. By virtue of Executive Order No. 392
dated January 1, 1951 (mandating reorganization of various
departments and agencies), this was assumed by the
Department of Health and exercised through an office in the
Bureau of Health known as the Drug Inspection Section. This
123
When the drug addiction problem continued to aggravate, P.D.
No. 280 was promulgated on August 27, 1973, to give more
teeth to the powers of the FDA, thus:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Food and Drug Administrator is
hereby authorized to order the closure, or suspend or
revoke the license of any drug establishment which
after administrative investigation is found guilty of
selling or dispensing drugs medicines and other similar
substances in violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, and Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, or other laws
regulating the sale or dispensation of drugs, or rules
and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
Sec. 2. The administrative investigation shall be
summary in character. The owner of the drug store
shall be given an opportunity to be heard. (P.D. 280,
emphasis supplied.)
For his part, the petitioner, traces his authority to the charter of
Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645, which inter alia empowers the
city mayor under Section 10 thereof:
k. to grant or refuse municipal licenses to operate or
permits of all classes and to revoke the same for
violation of the conditions upon which they were
granted, or if acts prohibited by law or city ordinances
are being committed under protection of such licenses
or in the premises in which the business for which the
same have been granted is carried on, or for any other
good reason of general interest.
The charter also provides, in connection with the powers of the
city health officer, that:
124
issued by the mayor to a drug store not previously cleared with
and licensed by the said agency will be a nullity.
This is not to say, however, that the issuance of the mayor's
permit is mandatory once it is shown that the FDA has
licensed the operation of the applicant drug store. This is not a
necessary consequence. For while it may appear that the
applicant has complied with the pertinent national laws and
policies, this fact alone will not signify compliance with the
particular conditions laid down by the local authorities like
zoning, building, health, sanitation, and safety regulations, and
other municipal ordinances enacted under the general welfare
clause. This compliance still has to be ascertained by the
mayor if the permit is to be issued by his office. Should he find
that the local requirements have not been observed, the mayor
must then, in the exercise of his own authority under the
charter, refuse to grant the permit sought.
The power to approve a license includes by implication,. even
if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By extension,
the power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant the
license, from which it is derived in the first place. Thus, if the
FDA grants a license upon its finding that the applicant drug
store has complied with the requirements of the general laws
and the implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is
only for their violation that the FDA may revoke the said
license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon
his ascertainment that the conditions thereof as applied
particularly to Olongapo City have been complied with, it is
only for the violation of such conditions that the mayor may
revoke the said permit.
Conversely, the mayor may not revoke his own permit on the
ground that the compliance with the conditions laid down and
found satisfactory by the FDA when it issued its license is in
his own view not acceptable. This very same principle also
operates on the FDA. The FDA may not revoke its license on
the ground that the conditions laid down in the mayor's permit
have been violated notwithstanding that no such finding has
been made by the mayor.
In the present case, the closure of the San Sebastian Drug
Store was ordered by the FDA for violation of its own
conditions, which it certainly had the primary power to enforce.
By revoking the mayor's permit on the same ground for which
the San Sebastian Drug Store had already been penalized by
the FDA, the mayor was in effect reversing the derision of the
latter on a matter that came under its jurisdiction. As the
infraction involved the pharmacy and drug laws which the FDA
had the direct responsibility to execute, the mayor had no
authority to interpose his own findings on the matter and
substitute them for the decision already made by the FDA.
It would have been different if the offense condoned by the
FDA was a violation of, say, a city ordinance requiring
buildings to be provided with safety devices or equipment, like
fire extinguishers. The city executive may ignore such
condonation and revoke the mayor's permit just the same. In
this situation, he would be acting properly because the
enforcement of the city ordinance is his own prerogative. In the
present case, however, the condition allegedly violated related
to a national law, not to a matter of merely local concern, and
so came under the 'jurisdiction of the FDA.
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of administrative
authorities are accorded great respect because of their
acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which
they are assigned. 25 Even the courts of justice, including this
Court, are concluded by such findings in the absence of a
clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which is not
present in the case at bar. For all his experience in the
enforcement of city ordinances, the petitioner cannot claim the
125
superior aptitudes of the FDA in the enforcement of the
pharmacy and drug addiction laws. He should therefore also
be prepared, like the courts of justice themselves, to accept its
decisions on this matter.
It is also worth noting that the San Sebastian Drug Store was
penalized by the FDA only after a hearing held on April 25,
1980, at which private respondent Yambao, assisted by her
lawyer-husband, appeared and testified. 28 By contrast, the
revocation of the mayor's permit was communicated to her in a
letter 29 reading simply as follows:
April 17, 1980
Rosalinda Yambao
c/o San Sebastian Drug Store
Hospital Road, Olongapo City
Madame:
Based on a report submitted by PC Major Virtus V. Gil, Chief 3
RFO, Dis. B, Task Force "Bagong Buhay," "you are rampantly
violating the provisions of Republic Act 5921 otherwise known
as the 'Pharmacy Law."
Aside from this, there is evidence that you are dispensing
regulated drugs contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6425
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
126
The reason given by the petitioner in disapproving the transfer
was violation of Mayor's Permit No. 1955, which by its terms
was valid only at the place stated therein. In the letter of May
13, 1980 30 the private respondent was clearly informed that
for violation of the condition of Mayor's Permit No. 1955
granting her the of operating the Olongapo City Drug Store at
No. 1-B Fil-Am Bldg., Hospital Road, the said permit was
"hereby suspended." We find that that reason was valid
enough. The permit clearly allowed the drug store to operate in
the address given and not elsewhere. No hearing was
necessary because the transfer without the mayor's
permission is not disputed and was in fact impliedly admitted
by the private respondent.
If the private respondent wanted to transfer her drug store,
what she should have done was to secure the approval not
only of the FDA but also, and especially, of the mayor. Merely
notifying the petitioner of the change in the location of her drug
stores as allowed by the FDA was not enough. The FDA had
no authority to revoke that particular condition of the mayor's
permits indicating the sites of the two drug stores as approved
by the mayor in the light of the needs of the city. Only the
mayor could.
We assume that Mayor's Permit No. 1954 could also have
been validly suspended for the same reason (as the sites of
the two drug stores were exchanged without amendment of
their respective permits) were it not for the fact that such
permit was revoked by the petitioner on the more serious
ground of violation of the Pharmacy Law and the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
It is understood, however, that the suspension should be
deemed valid only as the two drug stores have not returned to
their original sites as specified in their respective permits.
Indefinite suspension will amount to a permanent revocation,
127
WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders of July 6, 1980 and
September 4, 1980, are MODIFIED in the sense that the
suspension of Mayor's Permit No. 1955 shall be considered
valid but only until the San Sebastian Drug Store and the
Olongapo City Drug Store return to their original sites as
specified in the FDA licenses and the mayor's permits or until
the request for transfer, if made by the private respondents, is
approved by the petitioner. The rest of the said Orders are
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
14 Id
15 pp. 36-37.
10 Id., p. 26.
11 Id., pp. 27-28.
12 Id., pp. 14-21.
13 Id., p. 34.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 47.
2 Ibid.
3 Id.
4 Id., P. 96.
5 Id., pp. 48,15.
6 Id.
7 Id., p. 23.
8 Id., p. 48.
128
al., 152 SCRA 584; Liangga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc. v. Hon. Enage, et al., 152 SCRA 80;
Packaging Products Corp. v. NLRC, 152 SCRA
21 0, and the cases cited therein; Ateneo de
Manila University v. CA, 145 SCRA 100.
26 Rollo, p. 25.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23052
29 Id., p. 23.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
30 Id., P. 36.
129
treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor
P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed,
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint which
was, subsequently, amended for damages against the City
of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the
trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing
public accountant, a businessman and a professor at
the University of the East. He held responsible
positions in various business firms like the Philippine
Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the
Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere
Packing Corporation. He was also associated with
several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack
Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the
Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of
Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented
from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty
days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00
during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident,
he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his
business associates and friends. During the period of
his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and
anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he
was their only support. Due to the filing of this case,
plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the
sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence,
oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain
Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received
a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at
130
aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City
of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case
is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of
the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of
the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city
officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any
other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said
Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of defective conditions of road,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over
the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended
exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a
general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and,
we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law
and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the
subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of
Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the
liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons
or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce
the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces,
cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death
of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically
"of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other-public works under their control or
supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object
thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective
streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon
the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is
decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to
Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him
took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of
Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an
allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover,
Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended
complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition
of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the
City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn,
alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been
constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and
the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been
ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by
law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos
Avenue was and isunder its control and supervision.
131
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a
national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such
assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not
been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for
the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the
decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if
P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or
supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In
fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board
shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx
xxx
xxx
132
national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by
the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers
under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways
and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be
authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or
special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos
Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila
and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection
with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the
Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the
findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so
ordered.1wph1.t
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978
ISIDRO G. ARENAS, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL OF
SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN
POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO BULATAO,
CATALINA B. CAGAMPAN, EUGENIO RAMOS,
FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN, MARCELO
LAPEA, LEOPOLDO C. TULAGAN and TORIBIO
PAULINO, in their official capacities as City Mayor, City
Vice Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer,
respectively, and Honorable Presiding Judge, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS CITY (PANGASINAN),
BRANCH X, respondents.
Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner.
Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents.
Footnotes
1
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at San Carlos City,
Branch X, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil Case
No. SCC-182. 1
In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San Carlos
City (Pangasinan), instituted against the City of San Carlos
(Pangasinan), City Council of San Carlos City and the Mayor,
Vice-Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer of San Carlos
133
City, a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is the
incumbent City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan, that the
respondent City of San Carlos, from the time of its creation in
1966 up to the present, has been classified as a third class
city; that Republic Act No. 5967 which became effective on
June 21, 1969 provides that the basic salaries of city judges of
second and third class cities shall be P18,000.00 per annum;
that the petitioner was then actually receiving a monthly salary
of P1,000.00 of which P350.00 was the share of the national
government and P650.00 is the share of the city government,
which salary was P500.00 below the basic monthly salary of a
City Judge of a third class city; that under Republic Act No.
5967, the difference between the salary actually being
received by a City Judge and the basic salary established in
said act shall be paid by the city government; that from June
21, 1969 up to the filing of the petition on January 21, 1971,
the petitioner was entitled to a salary differential of P9,500.00
with the respondent City of San Carlos (Pangasinan); that the
petitioner had repeatedly requested the respondents to enact
the necessary budget and to pay him the said differential but
the respondents, without any justification, whatsoever, refused
and still refuse to do the same; that it is the clear duty of the
respondent to enact the necessary budget providing for the
payment of the salary of the petitioner as provided for in
Republic Act No. 5967; that petitioner has no other plain,
adequate and speedy remedy except the present action for
mandamus; and that because of the refusal of the respondent
to comply with their obligation as provided in Republic Act No.
5967, the petitioner was forced to engage the services of a
lawyer to file this action for which he was to pay the sum of
P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees. 2
134
xxx xxx xxx
For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first
class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand
pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for
second and third class cities, the city judge shall
receive one thousand five hundred pesos less than that
fixed for the district judge, and for other cities, the city
judge shall receive two thousand pesos less than that
fixed for the district judge: Provided, however, That the
salary of a city judge shall be at least one hundred
pesos per month less than that of the city mayor.
The petitioner contends that "... if the last proviso of said
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967 would be interpreted as the
controlling measure for fixing the salary of the city judges, then
the principal provision of Section 7 fixing the salaries of City
Judges at rate very much higher than that of a City Mayor
(particularly in the case of second and third class cities) would
be rendered totally useless." The petitioner submitted "that
since the principal intention of the legislature in enacting
Section 7 of Republic Act 5967 is to increase the salary of the
city judges, then the last proviso of said Section 7 should give
way to the provisions of said section preceding said proviso."
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took effect
on June 21, 1969, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was a third
class city; that the petitioner as city judge received an annual
salary of P12,000.00; and that the city mayor of San Carlos
City received an annual salary of P13,200.00 which was
exactly P100.00 a month more than the salary of the city
judge.
During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No. 17046,
which became Republic Act No. 5967, the following discussion
took place:
135
SENATOR ANTONINO I would like to call his
attention to lines 13 to 20. We presented this
amendment because it says here: "For the cities of
Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class cities, the
city judge shall receive one thousand pesos less than
that fixed for the district judge". So it will happen, and
my attention was called by the gentlemen from Iloilo
that the city judge win be receiving more salary than
the city mayor. Hence the amendment, Mr. President.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1 Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-24.
2 Annex "B" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 25-30.
3 Annex "C" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 31-32.
4 Answer, Rollo, pp. 41-42.
136
FIRST DIVISION
137
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S.
PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING
& TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR
CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or
MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING
CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.;
MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO
M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC.,
represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT;
MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO
M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S.
LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA;
SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON
FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.;
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO
B. PACIS,respondents.
138
industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed
areas around the lake; the increasing urbanization which
induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality
studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if
steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in
Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will
influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any
scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the
lake and its river systems, likewise gave impetus to the
creation of the Authority.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be
the national policy to promote, and accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns
hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context
of the national and regional plans and policies for social
and economic development and to carry out the
development of the Laguna Lake region with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention
of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution. 1
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this
case, include:
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further
amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to
be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and
(p) which shall read as follows:
139
development or activities which it may place
under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources taking into account the
overall development plans and programs for
Laguna de Bay and related bodies of
water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall
subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines promulgate such rules and
regulations which shall govern fisheries
development activities in Laguna de Bay which
shall take into consideration among others the
following: socio-economic amelioration of
bonafide resident fishermen whether
individually or collectively in the form of
cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a
master plan for fishpen construction and
operation, communal fishing ground for lake
shore town residents, and preference to lake
shore town residents in hiring laborer for fishery
projects;
(l) To require the cities and municipalities
embraced within the region to pass appropriate
zoning ordinances and other regulatory
measures necessary to carry out the objectives
of the Authority and enforce the same with the
assistance of the Authority;
(m) The provisions of existing laws to the
contrary notwithstanding, to exercise water
rights over public waters within the Laguna de
Bay region whenever necessary to carry out the
Authority's projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing
governmental agencies in establishing water
140
including navigation, construction, and operation of
fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term
"Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the Provinces of
Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay,
Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of
Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas
Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite
Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon Province; and
the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and
Pateros in Metro Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby
empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water
and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including
but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal,
industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste
disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to
be collected, and the sharing with other government
agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall
be subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's
Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the
following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the
lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the
Project Development Fund which shall be administered
by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall
constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the
implementation within the three-year period of the
Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan,
the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of
the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent goes to the Project
Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall
be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the
141
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster,
mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas,
within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as
determined by it; . . . .
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry,
prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and
fish from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other
fishing gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental
fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
....
xxx xxx xxx
(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code,
grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish corrals or
fishpens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn
fry orkawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within
the municipal waters.
xxx xxx xxx
142
Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are
hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to
demolition which shall be undertaken by the
Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aquaculture structures declared as illegal shall, without
prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally
charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic
Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the
same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of
imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not
exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the
discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aquaculture structures declared as illegal in accordance with
the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or
before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the
LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures should not be
demolished/dismantled.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the
concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to
dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from
receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction
cases against the Authority before various regional trial courts,
to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and
143
(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs
of preliminary injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos.
64125, 759 and 566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases involving
the Authority which is a co-equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local
Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter or
modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended,
empowering the Authority to issue permits for fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna
de Bay and that, the Authority the government agency
vested with exclusive authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's
consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of
Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasijudicial agencies of government whose decision or order are
appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter
does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as
fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter
insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned
had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991;
(D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits
devolved to and is now vested with their respective local
government units concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority
has returned to this Court charging the following errors:
144
corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160,
the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges
in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant
fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other
aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the
municipal waters.
145
of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of
its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The
authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when
they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to
govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake
resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented
concepts of management policies where lakeshore local
government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific
portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage
discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or
construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not
only that specific portion but the entire 900 km of lake water.
The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water
resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to
conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." 5
The power of the local government units to issue fishing
privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is
evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local
Government Code empowering local governments to issue
fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic
Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The
Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local
Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits
for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for
the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in
the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No.
927) and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does
partake of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all
State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the
charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of
146
Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned
declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others,
to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans,
programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations,
and private persons or enterprises where such plans,
programs and/or projects are related to those of the
LLDA for the development of the region.
xxx xxx xxx
147
the Laguna Lake Region, their previous issuances being
declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by
Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D.
Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega,
Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null
and void and ordered cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put
up by operators by virtue of permits issued by Municipal
Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits
issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila
Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr.
Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures Industrial
Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development
Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM
Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and
Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and
ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc.,
represented by its President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading
Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR
Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures
subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development
Authority.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143596. December 11, 2003]
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in
relation to Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision[1] dated September 14,
1999 of the Commission on Audit (COA), affirming the
resolution of COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong dated
March 29, 1994 which in turn affirmed the opinion dated
October 19, 1993 of the Provincial Auditor of
Oriental Mindoro, Salvacion M. Dalisay. All three denied the
148
grant of P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner Judge Tomas
C. Leynes by the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes who, at present, is the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 was formerly assigned to
the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole
presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court thereof. As such,
his salary and representation and transportation allowance
(RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. In
addition, petitioner received a monthly allowance of P944 from
the local funds[2] of the Municipality of Naujanstarting 1984.[3]
On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan,
through Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the
Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding
any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance
by the municipality to petitioner judge. On May 7, 1993,
the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved Resolution
No. 101 increasing petitioner judges monthly allowance
from P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656) starting May 1993.
[4]
By virtue of said resolution, the municipal government (the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan) approved a
supplemental budget which was likewise approved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial
Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro. In 1994, the
Municipal Government of Naujan again provided for petitioner
judges P1,600 monthly allowance in its annual budget which
was again approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and
the Office of Provincial Budget and Management of
Oriental Mindoro.[5]
On February
17,
1994,
Provincial
Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal
Section36,RANo.7645,GeneralAppropriationsActof1993
RepresentationandTransportationAllowances.Thefollowing
officialsandthoseofequivalentrankasmaybedeterminedbythe
DepartmentofBudgetandManagement(DBM)whileintheactual
performanceoftheirrespectivefunctionsareherebygranted
monthlycommutablerepresentationandtransportationallowances
payablefromtheprogrammedappropriationsprovidedfortheir
respectiveoffices,notexceedingtheratesindicatedbelow...
NationalCompensationCircularNo.67datedJanuary1,1992,ofthe
DepartmentofBudgetandManagement
Subject:RepresentationandTransportationAllowancesofNational
GovernmentOfficialsandEmployees
xxxxxxxxx
4.FundingSource:Inallcases,commutableandreimbursable
RATAshallbepaidfromtheamountappropriatedforthepurpose
andotherpersonalservicessavingsoftheagencyorprojectfrom
wheretheofficialsandemployeescoveredunderthisCirculardraw
149
theirsalaries.NooneshallbeallowedtocollectRATAfrommore
thanonesource.[6](emphasissupplied)
d.ThattheLGUhasalreadycreatedmandatorypositions
prescribedinRA7160;and
Petitioner
judge
appealed
to
COA
Regional
Director Gregoria S. Ong who, however, upheld the opinion of
Provincial Auditor Dalisay and who added that Resolution No.
101,
Series
of
1993
of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with
Section 3 of Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated September 1,
1993 outlining the conditions for the grant of allowances to
judges and other national officials or employees by the local
government units (LGUs). Section 3 of the said budget circular
provides that:
e.Thatsimilarallowances/additionalcompensationarenot
grantedbythenationalgovernmenttothe
officials/employeesassignedtotheLGU.[7]
Sec.3Allowances.LGUsmaygrantallowances/additional
compensationtothenationalgovernmentofficials/employees
assignedtotheirlocalityatratesauthorizedbylaw,rulesand
regulationsandsubjecttothefollowingpreconditions:
a.Thattheannualincomeorfinancesofthemunicipality,
cityorprovinceascertifiedbytheAccountant
concernedwillallowthegrantofthe
allowances/additionalcompensationwithout
exceedingthegenerallimitationsforpersonal
servicesunderSection325ofRA7160;
b.ThatthebudgetaryrequirementsunderSection324of
RA7160includingthefullrequirementofRA6758
havebeensatisfiedandprovidedfullyinthebudget
ascertifiedbytheBudgetOfficerandCOA
representativeintheLGUconcerned;
c.ThattheLGUhasfullyimplementedthedevolutionof
personnel/functionsinaccordancewiththe
provisionsofRA7160;
150
3.Officials/employeesondetailwithotherofficesor
assignedtoserveotherofficesoragenciesshallbe
paidfromtheirparentagencies;
4.NooneshallbeallowedtocollectRATAfrommore
thanonesource.
Ontheotherhand,themunicipalgovernmentmayprovideadditional
allowancesandotherbenefitstojudgesandothernational
governmentofficialsoremployeesassignedorstationedinthe
municipality,provided,thatthefinancesofthemunicipalityallow
thegrantthereofpursuanttoSection447,Par.1(xi),R.A.7160,and
providedfurther,thatsimilarallowance/additionalcompensationare
notgrantedbythenationalgovernmenttotheofficial/employee
assignedtothelocalgovernmentunitasprovidedunderSection3(e)
ofLocalBudgetCircularNo.53,dated01September1993.
TheconflictingprovisionsofSection447,Par.(1)(xi)oftheLocal
GovernmentCodeof1991andSection36oftheGeneral
AppropriationsActof1993[RA7645]havebeenharmonizedbythe
LocalBudgetCircularNo.53dated01September1993,issuedby
theDepartmentofBudgetandManagementpursuanttoitspowers
underSection25andSection327oftheLocalGovernment
Code.Thesaidcircularmustbeadheredtobythelocalgovernment
unitsparticularlySection3thereofwhichprovidestheimplementing
guidelinesofSection447,Par.(1)(xi)oftheLocalGovernment
Codeof1991inthegrantofallowancestonationalgovernment
officials/employeesassignedorstationedintheirrespectivelocal
governmentunits.
Consequently,thesubjectSBResolutionNo.101dated11May
1993oftheSangguniangBayanofNaujan,OrientalMindoro,having
failedtocomplywiththeinherentpreconditionasdefinedinSection
3(e)...isnullandvoid.Furthermore,theHonorableJudgeTomas
C.Leynes,beinganationalgovernmentofficialisprohibitedto
receiveadditionalRATAfromthelocalgovernmentfundpursuantto
Section36oftheGeneralAppropriationsAct(R.A.7645for1993)
andNationalCompensationCircularNo.67dated1January1992.
[8]
(emphasisours)
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Petitioner judge filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above decision but it was denied by the Commission in a
resolution dated May 30, 2000. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the
instant petition, raising the following assignments of error for
our consideration:
I
WHETHERORNOTRESOLUTIONNO.1O1,SERIESOF1993
OFNAUJAN,ORIENTALMINDORO,WHICHGRANTED
ADDITIONALALLOWANCETOTHEMUNICIPALTRIAL
JUDGEOFNAUJAN,ORIENTALMINDOROAND
INCREASINGHISCURRENTREPRESENTATIONAND
TRAVELLINGALLOWANCE(RATA)TOANAMOUNT
EQUIVALENTTOTHATRECEIVEDMONTHLYBY
SANGGUNIANGMEMBERSINPESOS:ONETHOUSANDSIX
HUNDRED(P1,600.00)EFFECTIVE1993,ISVALID.
II
WHETHERORNOTTHEPOWEROFMUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENTSTOGRANTADDITIONALALLOWANCES
ANDOTHERBENEFITSTONATIONALGOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEESSTATIONEDINTHEIRMUNICIPALITYISVERY
EXPLICITANDUNEQUIVOCALUNDERTHELOCAL
GOVERNMENTCODEOF1991PARTICULARLYSECTION447
INRELATIONTOSECTIONS17AND22THEREOF.
151
III
WHETHERORNOTTHEDEPARTMENTOFBUDGETAND
MANAGEMENT(DBM)CAN,BYTHEISSUANCEOFBUDGET
CIRCULARS,RESTRICTAMUNICIPALGOVERNMENT
FROMEXERCISINGITSGIVENLEGISLATIVEPOWERSOF
PROVIDINGADDITIONALALLOWANCESANDOTHER
BENEFITSTONATIONALEMPLOYEESSTATIONEDOR
ASSIGNEDTOTHEIRMUNICIPALITYFORASLONGAS
THEIRFINANCESSOALLOW.
IV
WHETHERORNOTTHELOCALGOVERNMENTCODEOF
1991PARTICULARLYSECTION447(a)(1)(xi)WAS
EXPRESSLYORIMPLIEDLYREPEALEDORMODIFIEDBY
REPUBLICACT7645ANDTHEGENERALAPPROPRIATIONS
ACTOF1993.
V
WHETHERORNOTPETITIONERWASENTITLEDTO
RECEIVETHEADDITIONALALLOWANCESGRANTEDTO
HIMBYTHEMUNICIPALITYOFNAUJAN,ORIENTAL
MINDOROBYVIRTUEOFITSRESOLUTIONNO.101,SERIES
OF1993.
POSITION OF COA
Respondent Commission on Audit opposes the grant by
the Municipality of Naujan of the P1,600 monthly allowance to
petitioner Judge Leynes for the reason that the municipality
could not grant RATA to judges in addition to the RATA already
received from the Supreme Court.[9] Respondent bases its
contention on the following:
152
substantive law like the Local Government Code of 1991
through mere budget circulars. Petitioner emphasizes that
budget circulars must conform to, not modify or amend, the
provisions of the law it seeks to implement.[11]
HISTORY OF GRANT OF
ALLOWANCES TO JUDGES
The power of local government units (LGUs) to grant
allowances to judges stationed in their respective territories
was originally provided by Letter of Instruction No. 1418 dated
July 18, 1984 (hereafter LOI No. 1418):
WHEREAS,theStateiscognizantoftheneedtomaintainthe
independenceoftheJudiciary;
WHEREAS,thebudgetaryallotmentoftheJudiciaryconstitutes
onlyasmallpercentageofthenationalbudget;
WHEREAS,presenteconomicconditionsadverselyaffectedthe
livelihoodofthemembersoftheJudiciary;
WHEREAS,somelocalgovernmentunitsareready,willingandable
topayadditionalallowancestoJudgesofvariouscourts withintheir
respectiveterritorialjurisdiction;
NOW,THEREFORE,I,FERDINANDE.MARCOS,Presidentof
theRepublicofthePhilippines,doherebydirect:
1.Section3ofLetterofImplementationNo.96is
herebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
3.Theallowancesprovidedinthislettershallbe
borneexclusivelybytheNational
Government.However,provincial,cityand
municipalgovernmentsmaypayadditional
allowancestothemembersandpersonnel
oftheJudiciaryassignedintheirrespective
areasoutofavailablelocalfunds butnotto
exceedP1,500.00;Provided,thatin
MetropolitanManila,thecityand
municipalgovernmentsthereinmaypay
additionalallowancesnot
exceedingP3,000.00.(emphasisours)[12]
On June 25, 1991, the DBM issued Circular No. 91-7
outlining the guidelines for the continued receipt of allowances
by judges from LGUs:
Consistentwiththeconstitutionalprovisiononthefiscalautonomy
ofthejudiciaryandthepolicyoftheNationalGovernmentof
allowinggreaterautonomytolocalgovernmentunits,judgesofthe
Judiciaryareherebyallowedtocontinuetoreceiveallowancesat
thesamerateswhichtheyhavebeenreceivingfromtheLocal
GovernmentUnitsasofJune30,1989,subjecttothefollowing
guidelines:
1.Thatthecontinuanceofpaymentofsubjectallowanceto
therecipientjudgeshallbeentirelyvoluntaryand
noncompulsoryonthepartoftheLocal
GovernmentUnits;
2.Thatpaymentoftheaboveshallalwaysbesubjecttothe
availabilityoflocalfunds;
3.Thatitshallbemadeonlyincompliancewiththepolicy
ofnondiminutionofcompensationreceivedbythe
recipientjudgebeforetheimplementationofthe
salarystandardization;
153
4.Thatthesubjectallowanceshallbegivenonlytojudges
whowerereceivingthesameasofJune30,
1989andshallbecoterminouswiththeincumbent
judges;and
5.Thatthesubjectallowanceshallautomaticallyterminate
upontransferofajudgefromonelocalgovernment
unittoanotherlocalgovernmentunit.(emphasis
ours)
On October 10, 1991, Congress enacted RA 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
[13]
The power of the LGUs to grant allowances and other
benefits to judges and other national officials stationed in their
respective territories was expressly provided in Sections
447(a)(1)(xi), 458(a)(1)(xi) and 468(a)(1)(xi) of the Code.
On March 15, 1994, the DBM issued Local Budget
Circular No. 55 (hereafter LBC No. 55) setting out the
maximum amount of allowances that LGUs may grant to
judges. For provinces and cities, the amount should not
exceed P1,000 and for municipalities, P700.
On December 3, 2002, we struck down the above circular
in Dadole, et al. vs. COA.[14] We ruled there that the Local
Government Code of 1991 clearly provided that LGUscould
grant allowances to judges, subject only to the condition that
the finances of the LGUs allowed it. We held that setting a
uniform amount for the grant of allowances (was) an
inappropriate way of enforcing said criterion. Accordingly, we
declared that the DBM exceeded its power of supervision
over LGUs by imposing a prohibition that did not jibe with the
Local Government Code of 1991.[15]
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
has
LOI
and
and
154
Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991, provides:
(a)Thesangguniangbayan,asthelegislativebodyofthe
municipality,shallenactordinances,approveresolutionsand
appropriatefundsforthegeneralwelfareofthemunicipalityandits
inhabitants...,andshall:
(1)Approveordinancesandpassresolutionsnecessaryforan
efficientandeffectivemunicipalgovernment,andinthisconnection
shall:
xxxxxxxxx
(xi)Whenthefinancesofthemunicipalgovernmentallow,provide
foradditionalallowancesandotherbenefitstojudges,prosecutors,
publicelementaryandhighschoolteachers,andothernational
governmentofficialsstationedinorassignedtothemunicipality;
(emphasisours)
Respondent COA, however, contends that the above
section has been repealed, modified or amended by NCC No.
67 dated January 1, 1992, RA 7645 (the General
Appropriations Act of 1993) and LBC No. 53 dated September
1, 1993.[16]
It is elementary in statutory construction that an
administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify or
nullify a statute. A statute is superior to an administrative
circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or amend it. [17] In the
present case, NCC No. 67, being a mere administrative
circular, cannot repeal a substantive law like RA 7160.
It is also an elementary principle in statutory construction
that repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, unless it is
155
7645 (the GAA of 1993), on the other hand, was a general
law[22] which outlined the share in the national fund of all
branches of the national government. RA 7645 therefore,
being a general law, could not have, by mere implication,
repealed RA 7160. Rather, RA 7160 should be taken as the
exception to RA 7645 in the absence of circumstances
warranting a contrary conclusion.[23]
The controversy actually centers on the seemingly
sweeping provision in NCC No. 67 which states that no one
shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.
Does this mean that judges cannot receive allowances
from LGUs in addition to the RATA from the Supreme Court?
For reasons that will hereinafter be discussed, we answer in
the negative.
The pertinent provisions of NCC No. 67 read:
3.RulesandRegulations:
3.1.1PaymentofRATA,whethercommutableor
reimbursable,shallbeinaccordancewith
theratesprescribedforeachofthefollowing
officialsandemployeesandthoseof
equivalentranks,andtheconditions
enumeratedunderthepertinentsectionsof
theGeneralProvisionsoftheannualGeneral
AppropriationsAct(GAA):
xxxxxxxxx
4.FundingSource:
Inallcases,commutableandreimbursableRATAshallbepaidfrom
theamountappropriatedforthepurposeandotherpersonalservices
savingsoftheagencyorprojectfromwheretheofficialsand
employeescoveredunderthisCirculardrawtheirsalaries.Noone
shallbeallowedtocollectRATAfrommorethanone
source.(emphasisours)
In construing NCC No. 67, we apply the principle in
statutory construction that force and effect should not be
narrowly given to isolated and disjoined clauses of the law but
to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together in one
rational view.[24] Because a statute is enacted as a whole and
not in parts or sections, that is, one part is as important as the
others, the statute should be construed and given effect as a
whole. A provision or section which is unclear by itself may be
clarified by reading and construing it in relation to the whole
statute.[25]
Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole then, what it seeks to
prevent is the dual collection of RATA by a national official from
the budgets of more than one national agency. We emphasize
that the other source referred to in the prohibition is another
national agency. This can be gleaned from the fact that the
sentence no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more
than one source (the controversial prohibition) immediately
follows the sentence that RATA shall be paid from the budget
of the national agency where the concerned national officials
and employees draw their salaries. The fact that the other
source is another national agency is supported by RA 7645
(the GAA of 1993) invoked by respondent COA itself and, in
fact, by all subsequent GAAs for that matter, because
the GAAs all essentially provide that (1) the RATA of national
officials shall be payable from the budgets of their respective
national agencies and (2) those officials on detail with other
national agencies shall be paid their RATA only from the
budget of their parent national agency:
Section36,RA7645,GeneralAppropriationsActof1993:
156
RepresentationandTransportationAllowances.Thefollowing
officialsandthoseofequivalentrankasmaybedeterminedbythe
DepartmentofBudgetandManagement(DBM)whileintheactual
performanceoftheirrespectivefunctionsareherebygranted
monthlycommutablerepresentationandtransportationallowances
payablefromtheprogrammedappropriationsprovidedfortheir
respectiveoffices,notexceedingtheratesindicatedbelow,which
shallapplytoeachtypeofallowance:
xxxxxxxxx
Officialsondetailwithotheroffices,includingofficialsofthe
CommissionofAuditassignedtoserveotherofficesoragencies,
shallbepaidtheallowancehereinauthorizedfromthe
appropriationsoftheirparentagencies.(emphasisours)
Clearly therefore, the prohibition in NCC No. 67 is only
against the dual or multiple collection of RATA by a national
official from the budgets of two or more national
agencies.Stated otherwise, when a national official is on detail
with another national agency, he should get his RATA only
from his parent national agency and not from the other
national agency he is detailed to.
157
by the Constitution.[27] The Local Government Code of 1991
was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the
autonomy of local governments as mandated by the
Constitution. By upholding, in the present case, the power
of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their
discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant,
depending on the availability of local funds, we ensure the
genuine and meaningful local autonomy of LGUs.
We now discuss the next contention of respondent COA:
that the
resolution
of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting
the P1,600
monthly allowance to petitioner judge was null and void
because it failed to comply with LBC No. 53 dated September
1, 1993:
Sec.3Allowances.LGUsmaygrantallowances/additional
compensationtothenationalgovernmentofficials/employees
assignedtotheirlocalityatratesauthorizedbylaw,rulesand
regulationsandsubjecttothefollowingpreconditions:
a.Thattheannualincomeorfinancesofthe
municipality,cityorprovinceascertifiedby
theAccountantconcernedwillallowthe
grantoftheallowances/additional
compensationwithoutexceedingthegeneral
limitationsforpersonalservicesunder
Section325ofRA7160;
b.ThatthebudgetaryrequirementsunderSection324
ofRA7160includingthefullrequirementof
RA6758havebeensatisfiedandprovided
fullyinthebudgetascertifiedbytheBudget
OfficerandCOArepresentativeintheLGU
concerned;
c.ThattheLGUhasfullyimplementedthedevolution
ofpersonnel/functionsinaccordancewith
theprovisionsofRA7160;
d.ThattheLGUhasalreadycreatedmandatory
positionsprescribedinRA7160.
e.Thatsimilarallowances/additionalcompensation
arenotgrantedbythenationalgovernment
totheofficials/employeesassignedtothe
LGU.
Though LBC No. 53 of the DBM may be considered within
the ambit of the President's power of general supervision
over LGUs,[28] we rule that Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof is
invalid. RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, clearly
provides that provincial, city and municipal governments may
grant allowances to judges as long as their finances
allow. Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53,
by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances to
judges whenever such allowances are (1) also granted by the
national government or (2) similar to the allowances granted
by the national government, violates Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of
the Local Government Code of 1991.[29] As already stated, a
circular must conform to the law it seeks to implement and
should not modify or amend it.[30]
Moreover,
by
prohibiting LGUs from
granting
allowances similar to the allowances granted by the national
government, Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53 practically
prohibits LGUsfrom granting allowances to judges and, in
effect, totally nullifies their statutory power to do so. Being
unduly restrictive therefore of the statutory power of LGUs to
grant allowances to judges and being violative of their
autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution, Section 3,
paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby declared null and void.
158
Paragraphs (a) to (d) of said circular, however, are valid
as they are in accordance with Sections 324[31] and 325[32] of
the Local Government Code of 1991; these respectively
provide for the budgetary requirements and general limitations
on the use of provincial, city and municipal funds. Paragraphs
(a) to (d) are proper guidelines for the condition provided in
Sections 447, 458 and 468 of the Local Government Code of
1991 that LGUs may grant allowances to judges if their funds
allow.[33]
Respondent COA also argues that Resolution No. 101 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with
paragraphs (a) to (d) of LBC No. 53, thus it was null and void.
The argument is misplaced.
Guidelines
(a)
to
(d)
were
met
when
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro approved
Resolution
No.
101
of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting theP1,600 monthly
allowance to petitioner judge as well as the corresponding
budgets of the municipality providing for the said monthly
allowance to petitioner judge. Under Section 327 of the Local
Government
Code
of
1991,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was specifically tasked to
review the appropriation ordinances of its component
municipalities to ensure compliance with Sections 324 and 325
of
the
Code.
Considering
said
duty
of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, we will assume, in the
absence
of
proof
to
the
contrary,
that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro performed
what the law required it to do, that is, review the resolution and
the corresponding budgets of the Municipality ofNaujan to
make sure that they complied with Sections 324 and 325 of
the
Code.[34] We
presume
the
regularity
of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigans official act.
159
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
[1]
[11]
[2]
[12]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
Rollo, p. 38.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Respondent
COA erroneously considered
the P944
monthly allowance being received by petitioner judge
from the local funds of the municipality since 1984 as
RATA from the Supreme Court. Thus, in 1993 when the
municipality increased said allowance to P1,600 (an
160
(2) the COA had no more than auditorial visitation
powers over the LGUs pursuant to Section 348 of RA
7160 which provides for the power to inspect at any
time the financial accounts of LGUs. Moreover, the
Solicitor General opined that the DBM and the
respondent are only authorized under RA 7160 to
promulgate a Budget Operations Manual for LGUs, to
improve and systematize methods, techniques and
procedures
employed
in
budget
preparation,
authorization, execution and accountability pursuant to
Section 354 of RA 7160. The Solicitor General pointed
out that LBC 55 was not exercised under any of the
aforementioned provisions.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
584
[1948];
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
161
[29]
[30]
[31]
162
appointments shall
appropriations;
be
covered
by
adequate
[33]
[35]
Ibid.