EN BANC

RAMON C. GONZALES,
Complainant,
- versus COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO,
Respondent.
A.M. No. CA-10-49-J
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-142-CA-J]
Present:
January 28, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The facts that spawned the filing of the present administrative case are as follows:
Ramon C. Gonzales (complainant), then a member of Alabang Country Club, Incorporated (ACCI)
who was vying for a seat in its Board of Directors (the Board), was charged by the Board with
having falsified proxy forms for the 2004 election of Board members. That drew him to file a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 04122, Ramon C. Gonzalez v. Alabang Country Club, Inc., for damages (the civil case).
Complainant was later disqualified as a candidate and ousted as a member of the ACCI. He thus
amended his complaint in the civil case by impleading the members of the Board at the time
material to his expulsion, the newly elected members, and the members of the Nomination and
Election Committee. And he added, as cause of action, the nullification of his disqualification and
expulsion in the reliefs prayed for.
Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC decided the civil case in complainants favor, and issued a writ
of execution allowing him to resume his rights as a member of ACCI.
The defendants in the civil case assailed the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals via
petition for review with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 89358.[1] This case was consolidated with
related cases in which herein complainant was the respondent.
It is gathered that the appellate court issued on April 29, 2005 a temporary restraining order
(TRO) against the execution of the decision in the civil case, drawing complainant to move for its
lifting, alleging that ACCI had already voluntarily executed the decision in the civil case. His
motion was, however, denied.
When the TRO expired, the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals composed of Associate Justices
Roberto A. Barrios, Vicente S.E. Veloso, and Justice Amelita Tolentino as ponente directed the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as in fact one was issued on July 11, 2005.[2]
Complainant challenged the appellate courts issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction via
petition for certiorari filed before this Court on September 8, 2005.[3]
In the meantime, complainant, through counsel, filed on September 29, 2005 before the
appellate court a Motion for Inhibition of respondent because, by his claim, the issuance of the
writ was against the law.
By Resolution of April 11, 2007, the Court dismissed complainants petition for certiorari[4] for
failure to sufficiently show that the questioned [appellate courts] Resolution is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
More than a year later or on August 20, 2008, complainant filed a letter-complaint before this
Court, alleging as follows:
On September 29, 2005, or almost three (3) years ago to date, I asked my lawyer to file a Motion
for Inhibition against the ponente, Justice Amelita G. Tolentino because the issuance of the

injunction was obviously against the law. Up to the present, the [motion for] inhibition has not
been acted upon.
I also understand that cases involving intra-corporate controversy must be resolved as soon as
possible because of [their] nature. The affairs of corporations cannot be suspended or left
undecided longer than is necessary. In my case, I ran x x x for the term June 2004-June 2006 and
a decision was rendered on April 4, 2005. The decision was raised to the Court of Appeals in May
2005. At that time, if the Decision was not restrained, or the case acted upon quickly as should
have been the case, there was still an opportunity for me to have been duly elected and to have
served as director. Because of the inaction of Justice Tolentino which is against the rule governing
intra-corporate dispute, this opportunity was forever lost to me.
As can be seen in the Resolutions issued in the cases, they were also furnished to a certain Atty.
Felisberto Verano [Atty. Verano] who is not even a counsel of record in the case nor has he
entered formally his appearance. Atty. Verano is the brother of then Congresswoman Lorna
Verano-Yap of Paraaque and she was instrumental in having Justice Tolentino appointed to her
present post. In fact, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was even addressed to Atty. Verano and
not to any of the two (2) counsels of record for the Club. This is highly suspicious and anomalous.
xxx
x x x I am bringing this matter to your attention because I have reason to believe that Justice
Tolentino is not innocent when she granted the Writ of Injunction and totally failed to act on the
petitions. This is a favor to Atty. Verano to whose sister Justice Tolentino owes a debt of gratitude
for her position.
In view of the scandal now besetting the Court of Appeals, and recalling the removal of another
associate justice last year, the taint of dishonesty and corruption may not be isolated, and in this
case, the questionable inclusion of Atty. Verano should be immediately investigated, especially
when there exists a link between Justice Tolentino and the Veranos. The inclusion of his name
may be there to remind Justice Tolentino about his interest in the case.[5] (underscoring
supplied)
In a parallel move, complainant filed on August 21, 2008 before the appellate court an Urgent
Verified Motion Reiterating Motion for Inhibition (of Ponenteherein respondent Justice Amelita G.
Tolentino).[6]
This Court referred the letter-complaint to Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado V. Vasquez
for appropriate action.[7]
By Order of October 8, 2008, respondent inhibited herself from CA-G.R. SP No. 89788.[8] On
October 14, 2008, she filed her Comment[9] on the letter-complaint. She claimed that there was
nothing anomalous in furnishing Atty. Verano with a copy of the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, since he signed as collaborating counsel in the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 89788. She
added that she did not know Atty. Verano and former Paraaque Congresswoman Lorna Verano
Yap (Lorna) who she claimed was never a congresswoman of Paraaque.
Respecting the delay in resolving the Motion for Inhibition, respondent claimed that in view of
complainants filing (on September 8, 2005) of the petition for certiorari before this Court, she
deemed it appropriate to defer any action on the motion (which was filed on September 29,
2005) in deference to the authority of this Court to resolve the issues raised before it.[10]
In his letter-reply,[11] complainant stated that Atty. Verano signed no pleading other than the
petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 89358.
In sum, the present administrative case complains against 1) the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, 2) the delay in the resolution by respondent of the Motion for Inhibition, 3)
the furnishing of copies of Resolutions of the appellate court to Atty. Verano, and 4) the delay in
the resolution by respondent of the cases on the merits.
Since the Court has, as reflected above, found in herein complainants petition for certiorari that
the issuance by the appellate court of a writ of preliminary injunction was not attended with
grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall dwell on the other specified complaints against
respondent.
The records show that indeed Atty. Verano signed the Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 89358
as collaborating counsel.[12] He was, therefore, entitled to receive a copy of the appellate courts
resolutions including that which directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In any

event, the order to issue the writ of preliminary injunction was the collective act of the members
of the Ninth Division of the Court. Bautista v. Abdulwahid enlightens:[13]
x x x The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their conclusions in
consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we
have held that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground
that a collective decision is unjust cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges against a
single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate.[14]
Respecting the complaint about the delay in resolving complainants Motion for Inhibition, the
Court notes that the motion was filed on September 29, 2005 after complainant filed before this
Court on September 8, 2005 a petition for certiorari to assail the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. As earlier stated, the Court resolved the petition for certiorari on April 11,
2007. It was only on October 8, 2008, however, or only after complainant filed on August 20,
2008 the letter-complaint which this Court referred to the Court of Appeals, and after
complainant also filed on Augsut 21, 2008 a reiterative motion for inhibition, that respondent
resolved the motion by granting it.
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the Constitution directs:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within twenty-four months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts. (underscoring supplied)
Respondents justification for the delay in resolving the motion for inhibition in deference to the
authority of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the petition for certiorari does not
impress. Section 7 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding
with the case. This rule must be strictly adhered to by appellate and lower courts
notwithstanding the possibility that the proceedings undertaken by them tend to or would render
nugatory the pending petition before this Court.[15]
But even gratuitously crediting respondents justification for the delay, since the Court resolved
complainants petition for certiorari on April 11, 2007, still, given the nature and history of the
cases, respondent unduly delayed the resolution of a mere motion for inhibition only on
October 8, 2008, after the Court referred the present complaint to the appellate court and after
complainant filed a reiterative motion.
Under Section 9 (1) of Rule 140[16] of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or
order is a less serious charge. Under Section 11 (B) of the same rule, the following sanctions may
be imposed on judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan who commit less serious offenses:
1.
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or
2.
A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Under the circumstances, this Court deems it appropriate to impose a fine of P15,000 on
respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent is found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering an order, and is FINED
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000), with WARNING that commission of the same or similar
infraction shall be faulted strictly.
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91486. September 10, 2003]
ALBERTO G. PINLAC, ATTY. ERIBERTO H. DECENA, RODOLFO F. REYES, FELIPE BRIONES, JUANITO
METILLA, JR., FELIPE A. FLORES, HERMINIO ELEVADO, NARCISO S. SIMEROS, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. CORAZON A. MERRERA, ATTY. JEAN MAKASIAR-PUNO, SERGIO ACABAN,
represented by Atty. Ramon Gerona, ATTY. ROGELIO VELASCO, MARTINA S. NONA, OVIDEO
MEJICA, ALFREDO ITALIA, MARIANO GUEVARRA, JESUS YUJUICO, DOMINADOR RIVERA, SATURNINA
SALES, represented by Atty. Consolacion Sales-Demontano, FRED CHUA, SONIA SY CHUA,

LAWRENCE CHUA, CAROLINA C. RUBIO, represented by Tessie Sebastian, GEORGE G. GUERRERO,

BEATRIZ TANTOCO, represented by Filomena Cervantes, ATTY. MARCELA CELESTINO-GARCIA,
FEDERICO GARCIA, ILDEFONSO MORALES, LEONCIA VELASCO, OCRAVIO F. LINA, ANA MARIA
JARAMILLO, ESTRELLA BASA, JOSE ESTEVA, JR., CIRILO GONZALES, VILLY TOBIAS, MIGUEL DELA
PAZ, RUBEN GUILLERMO, FAUSTO YADAO, represented by Jeremias Panlilio, RICARDO YAP,
ROSAURO/PATRICK MARQUEZ, represented by Emmanuel Marquez, MODESTA FABRIG and
MAXIMINO SALCEDA, MELIA LATOMBO, TERESITA PANGILINAN-RIVERO, ARCH. DANILO C. DE
CASTRO, JOSE S. LEDESMA, JAIME P. ANG, VEICENTE P. ANG, MAURO U. GABRIEL, ATTY. VIRGINIA
GOMEZ, GIL S. BONILLA, LOURDES BLANCO, represented by Catalina Blanco, JOSEFA SANCHEZ
and ROSALINA VILLEGAS, represented by Heidi Bobis, SHIRLEY BUCAG, QUIRINA O. TUVERA,
represented by Wilfredo Orejuros, GREGORIO AVENTINO, represented by Enrico Aventino,
LEONARDO L. NICOLAS, NICOMEDES PENARANDA, FRANCISCA MEDRANO, OFELIA IGNACIO,
ROSENDO ABUBO, represented by Santos Chavez, SOLEDAD BAUTISTA DE COLUMNA,
represented by Zenaida Valle, MARQUITA/ SEBASTIAN LOPEZ, represented by Emmanuel
Marquez, DELIA DORION, GERARDO L. SANTIAGO, FIDEL PANGANIBAN, represented by Manuel
dela Roca, MATEO and OFELIA INOVEJAS, REMEDIOS C. DOVAS, represented by Josefa Capistrano,
DOMINGO ALTAMIRANO and SPOUSES ROLANDO ALTAMIRANO and MINERVA FETALVERO, BEATRIZ
RINGPIS, ROSARIO DE MATA, RUFINA CRUZ, represented by JOSEFA MANABAT, SPOUSES ANITA
SALONGA-CAPAGCUAN and MAYNARD CAPAGCUAN, DISCORA YATCO, represented by VICTORINA
Y. FIRME, and CONSUELO YATCO, GENEROSA MEDINA VDA. DE NOGUERA, represented by ATTY.
RAYMUNDO M. NOGUERA, BEATRIZ SALANDANAN and LOURDES ALONTE-VASQUEZ, PEDRO COSIO
and VICTORINA CARINO, RUTH C. ZARATE, PRECIOSISIMA V. YAPCHULAY, BASILISA B. YAPCHULAY,
OFELIA B. YAPCHULAY, FELISA B. YAPCHULAY, FE B. YAPCHULAY, WILMA B. YAPCHULAY, FELIX B.
YAPCHULAY, MARIANO B. YAPCHULAY, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and other registered OWNERS OF
VILAR-MALOLES (VILMA) SUBDIVISION, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the Petition-In-Intervention[1] filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Land Registration Authority and the Motion for Clarification[2] filed by respondents.
The facts may be briefly restated as follows: The controversy stemmed from a Petition for
Quieting of Title filed by petitioners over 3 vast parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 1, 2 & 3. Lot
No. 1 is covered by TCT No. 5690, while Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were originally covered by OCT No. 614
and OCT No. 333, respectively. On March 21, 1988, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision[3]
in favor of petitioners and against the defendants who were declared in default, including
respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles (Vilma) Subdivision whose properties were within Lot No. 2.
The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and
against the defaulted respondents:
1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners hereof, to wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty.
Eriberto H. Decena, Rodolfo T. Reyes, Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as absolute owners in
fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2 & 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription, with
the exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer certificate of title belonging to the
non-defaulted respondents;
2) Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT No. 3548 of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City, and the subsequent TCTs issued therefrom, with the exception of those
titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, as null and void ab initio;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel OCT No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT
No. 3548 as well as the subsequent TCTs issued and emanating therefrom, with the exception of
those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, from its record;
4) Declaring the area of TCT No. 333 in excess of its true and actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as
well as the TCTs subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, covering the area
in excess of said actual area, with the exception of those belonging to non-defaulted
respondents, as null and void ab initio;
5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel all TCTs subsequently issued based on
OCT No. 333 in excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the exception of those titles
belonging to the non-defaulted respondents;

6) Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction dated August 7, 1985, in so far as those areas
covered by the cancelled OCTs and TCTs hereof are concerned, as permanent;
7) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue herein petitioners the corresponding
individual transfer certificate of titles upon proper application made thereof.
SO ORDERED.
On May 17, 1989, the defaulted title owners of Vilma filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to
Annul the Partial Decision of the trial court, which was granted in a decision[4] dated November
15, 1989. The appellate court ruled that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of respondents because of defective service of summons by publication. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied; hence, they filed this petition for
certiorari.
On January 19, 2001, we rendered a Decision denying the petition and affirming the Judgment of
the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
17596 is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[6] contending, inter alia, that the disposition of the
trial court with respect to Lot No. 3, should not have been annulled by the Court of Appeals
because the petition for annulment of judgment filed by the respondents concerned only Lot No.
2. They prayed that the January 19, 2001 decision of the Court which affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals be reconsidered insofar as Lot No. 3 is concerned.
On November 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution partially granting petitioners motion for
reconsideration by reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dipositive portion of the trial courts
Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3, thus
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED and our Decision
promulgated on January 19, 2001 is MODIFIED as follows:
(1) reinstating paragraph (4) and (5) of the Partial Decision of the court a quo; and
(2) affirming the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 17596 in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a PetitionIn-Intervention praying that judgment be rendered declaring:
1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in line with the decisions this Honorable Court
had already rendered;
2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its original area of 52,949,737 square meters;
3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest land and is covered by OCT No. 333;
4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35673 with respect to OCT No. 333 are
null and void; and
5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35672 is null and void, no notice of the
hearings/proceedings having been sent to the Republic and other interested parties.
The Republic likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable under the
circumstances.[8]
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the
Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.[9]
Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of

judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the petition for
review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.[10]
In Mago v. Court of Appeals,[11] intervention was granted even after the decision became final
and executory, thus
The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to
the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same. But needless to
say, this discretion should be exercised judiciously and only after consideration of all the
circumstances obtaining in the case.
But it is apparent that the courts a quo only considered the technicalities of the rules on
intervention and of the petition for relief from judgment. The denial of their motion to intervene
arising from the strict application of the rule was an injustice to petitioners whose substantial
interest in the subject property cannot be disputed. It must be stressed that the trial court
granted private respondent's petition for prohibition with injunction without petitioners being
impleaded, in total disregard of their right to be heard, when on the face of the resolution of the
Community Relations and Information Office (CRIO) sought to be enjoined, petitioners were the
ones directly to be affected. We need not belabor the point that petitioners are indeed
indispensable parties with such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made in their absence without affecting, nay injuring, such interest.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals where the motions for intervention were filed when the
case had already reached this Court, it was declared:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of
the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is
already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond
the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 19, Section 2
of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure].
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of
procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and
completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim
is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created
not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as
the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
In Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this Court allowed intervention almost at the
end of the proceedings. Accordingly, there should be no quibbling, much less hesitation or
circumvention, on the part of subordinate and inferior courts to abide and conform to the rule
enunciated by the Supreme Court.[12]
The Solicitor General summarized the interest of the Republic in Lot No. 3 (originally covered by
OCT No. 333), as follows:
On March 5, 1979, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826 reserving for national
government center site a parcel of land situated in the Constitution Hill, Quezon City, Metro
Manila, containing an area of four million for hundred forty thousand FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX
SQUARE METERS. In a certification [Annex F, Rollo, p. 1415] issued by the Land Registration
Authority, it attested to the fact that the National Government Center described in Proclamation
No. 1826 is within the area covered by GLRO Record No. 1037 (OCT-333) and GLRO Record No.
5975 as plotted in our Municipal Index Sheet (MIS) Nos. 2574-C, 5707-B, 5708-A, 5708-B and
3339-D.
In a letter [Annex B-2, Rollo, p. 1330], the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
certified that within the Project site/jurisdiction of the National Government Center Housing
Project (NGCHP) and the NGC-EASTSIDE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, the following government
buildings, offices and complexes are situated:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

House of Representatives;
Civil Service Commission (CSC);
Department of Social Works and Development (DSWD);
Sandiganbayan;
Commission on Audit (COA);

6)
7)
8)
9)

Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Depot;

Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) Commonwealth Campus;
TESDA Skills Training Center;
Several Public Elementary and High Schools, Health Centers and Barangay Halls.

It also certified that the NGCHP under its Peoples Housing Alternative for Social Empowerment
land Acquisition Development Program (PHASE-LADP), has already awarded 3,975 TCTs to its
beneficiaries. This program comprises the biggest chunk of the NGCHP with about 117 hectares
intended for disposition to qualified beneficiaries. Further, in line with the National Governments
thrust of fast-tracking the implementation of the NGCHP, the remaining 20,696 TCTs are about to
be awarded to qualified beneficiaries.[13]
Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as
government properties located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law can
certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an indispensable party to the case at bar. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended as a protection of
individuals against arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect
its properties.[14]
After a thorough re-examination of the case, we find that our November 20, 2001 Resolution
reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial courts Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3,
overlooked certain aspects which, if not corrected, will cause extreme and irreparable confusion
and prejudice. The reinstated portions of the decision states:
4) Declaring the area of [OCT] No. 333 in excess of its true and actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters,
as well as the TCTs subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, covering the
area in excess of said actual area, with the exception of those belonging to non-defaulted
respondents, as null and void ab initio;
5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel all TCTs subsequently issued based on
OCT No. 333 in excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the exception of those titles
belonging to the non-defaulted respondents;[15]
We note that paragraph 4 does not at all specify which portions are in excess of the 4,574 square
meter area of OCT No. 333 and which areas belong to the defaulted and non-defaulted
respondents. Neither did the body of the trial courts decision state the metes and bounds that
would serve as basis in implementing the dispositive portion thereof. Verily, this flaw goes into
the very identity of the disputed land. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are therefore null and void for having
been rendered in violation of the constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.[16] Hence, the November 20, 2001 Resolution reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial
courts Partial Decision should be modified.
The OSGs prayer that OCT No. 333 be held as a valid and existing title is likewise meritorious. In
Republic v. Tofemi Realty Corporation (Tofemi),[17] an action for Cancellation of Titles &
Reversion of TCT No. 55747 and TCT No. 55748, the validity of OCT No. 333 from which said
transfer certificates of title originated, has already been settled. In dismissing the petition of the
Republic, it was held therein that OCT No. 333 is a valid title duly issued by the Land Registration
Court. The Republic did not appeal therefrom and the decision became final and executory.
Pertinent portion of which states
Regarding the issue of nullity of OCT No. 333,
We find that the then Land Registration Court had the power, authority and jurisdiction to issue
it. It was issued after trial, or presumptively in a fair and square trial with all the requisites of the
law (The Phil. British Co., Inc. vs. de los Angeles, 63 SCRA 52).
The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known in local history as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in its
sections 13 to 18, mentions three (3) classes of land, to wit, public land or public domain, mineral
lands, and timber land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175). Early decisions as regards
classification of public lands, such as Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil 175, Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, supra, and Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10, which
were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by
the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, or prior to the passage of Act No. 2874, had
impliedly ruled that there was no legal provision vesting in the chief Executive or President of the
Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural;

so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or
were invested with implicit power in so doing, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence. In Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, Feb. 10, 1908, the Court of Land Registration
granted the application for registration after finding that it was neither timber nor mineral and
came within the definition of Agricultural land under Act 926. The Attorney General appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment. In G.L.R.O. No. 1037, the application for
registration was granted and consequently the issuance of a title was decreed in favor of the
applicant because the Land Registration Court found that the land applied for is agricultural
susceptible of private appropriation (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, supra; Ankron vs. Government
of the Philippine Islands, supra). We repeat by way of emphasis, the record does not reveal that
the Government has always considered the lot in question as forest reserve prior to the issuance
of OCT 333. To declare the land now as forest land on the authority of LC Map 639 of Rizal
approved on March 11, 1937 only, would deprive defendants of their registered property without
due process of law. It was pronounced in Ramos vs. Director of lands, supra:
x x x Upon the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary evidence, that land is
agricultural in nature. One very good reason is that it is good for the Philippine Islands to have a
large public domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the sagacious
citizen.
OCT No. 333 being legal and valid; ergo, TCTs Nos. 55747 and 55748, being derived from the said
mother title, are also legal and valid. These TCTs were in turn derived from TCTs Nos. 45832 and
45833, covering Lots Nos. 65, 76 and 81 which originally formed parts of Parcel C of Plan Psu32606 approved by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on October 21, 1924. (Emphasis supplied)
[18]
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. It is a
salutary and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law
applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to such principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts sued upon are substantially the same.[19] It is beyond cavil, therefore,
that since the court had already ruled on the validity OCT No. 333, said issue must be laid to rest
and must no longer be relitigated in the present case.
With respect, however, to the area covered by OCT No. 333, the principle of stare decisis is not
applicable because the decision of the Court of Appeals did not indicate the boundaries of the lot
covered by OCT No. 333. While it was held therein that the area of OCT No. 333 is 52,949,735
square meters, the metes and bounds of the land covered by OCT No. 333 was not specified. We
cannot adopt the findings as to the area of OCT No. 333 for it might cause deprivation of
property of adjacent land owners without due process of law.
So, also, the Court cannot nullify the entire Partial Decision of the court a quo. The defaulted
defendants whose properties are located in Lot No. 1 did not question the decision of the trial
court. Neither was it shown in the Petition-In-Intervention that the OSG is an indispensable party
to Lot No. 1.
In their Motion for Clarification and Manifestation, respondents seek the clarification of paragraph
1 of the trial courts Partial Decision declaring petitioners as owners of, among others, Lot No. 2
where respondents properties are located. Paragraph 1, provides:
1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners hereof, to wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty.
Eriberto H. Decena, Rodolfo F. Reyes, Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as absolute owners in
fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2 & 3 hereof by virtue of extraordinary prescription, with
the exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer certificate of title belonging to nondefaulted respondents.[20]
In view of the annulment of the trial courts Partial Decision with respect to Lot No. 2 originally
covered by OCT No. 614, all portions of the decision pertaining to Lot No. 2, including that in
paragraph 1 declaring petitioners as absolute owners in fee simple of Lot No. 2, is declared void.
Likewise, the declaration of nullity of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dispositive portion of the decision
a quo concerning Lot No. 3, renders the disposition in paragraph 1 insofar as it affects Lot No. 3,
also void. Under the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 47, Section 7 thereof, a
judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and
render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being re-filed in the proper
court.
In the meantime, the World War II Veterans Legionaries of the Philippines (WW II) filed a Petitionin-Intervention with prior leave of court. It alleges that the Court of Appeals decision dated

November 15, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596, which is the subject of the instant petition for
review, ran counter to the June 22, 1989 decision of the same court in CA-G.R. SP No. 17221,
which merely amended the first paragraph of the Partial Decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. Q-35672. The latter decision of the appellate court was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
90245 on April 8, 1990.
We find no conflict between the two decisions of the Court of Appeals. It is true that both
decisions affected the portion of the Partial Decision of the trial court which declared petitioners,
who are individual members of the WW II, as absolute owners of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3. However,
the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 17221 merely granted WW IIs prayer that it be substituted for its
individual members, who were declared the owners of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the Partial Decision.
Aside from this, the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 17221 had nothing to do with the merits of the
case. As such, it did not contradict the Court of Appeals decision of November 15, 1989 in CAG.R. SP No. 17596 which set aside the Partial Decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Petition-In-Intervention of the Republic of the
Philippines is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution promulgated on November 20, 2001 is
MODIFIED as follows: The Decision dated March 21, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 83, in Civil Case No. Q-35762, is annulled insofar as it concerns Lot No. 2, originally
covered by OCT No. 614 and Lot No. 3 originally covered by OCT No. 333. The November 15,
1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 17596 is affirmed in all other respects.
As clarified above, paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the decision of the court a quo is void
insofar as it declares petitioners as absolute owners in fee simple of Lot Nos. 2 and 3.
The Petition-in-Intervention filed by the World War Veterans Legionaries of the Philippines is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.