constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and
consent, by respondent. It turned out that respondent had purchased a different lot but that after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer, he pointed to the respondent the lot of the petitioners as the one respondent purchased. Respondent claimed that they acted in good faith in constructing the house on petitioners lot as they have relied on the technical description of the lot sold to them, verified by the geodetic engineer. Is respondent a builder in good faith? A: YES, respondent is considered a builder in good faith. A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. Under Art. 448 of the Civil Code, the landowner can choose between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. (Rosales v. Castelltort, G.R. No. 157044, October 5, 2005) NOTE: Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith
ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects in
the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.
Q: In a previous case for declaration of nullity of marriage,
the RTC held that respondent (petitioners wife) was suffering from psychological incapacity. On appeal, the CA (and the SC) ruled that petitioner failed to prove that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity. It was held that the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses, presented by petitioner, who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Should the findings of the RTC based on the testimonies of the expert witnesses be given conclusive weight? A: YES, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual premises. It is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. (Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015) NOTE: The lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.